1178

         SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KATEKA

   1. I voted in favour of the dispositif although I ﬁnd the provisional
measure indicated to be inadequate. Crucially, I do not agree with the
Court’s conclusion in paragraph 50, namely, that, prima facie, a dispute
capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and therefore concern-
ing the interpretation or the application of Article 4 of that Convention
does not exist between the Parties. I shall explain my disagreement with
the reasoning and conclusion of the Court on prima facie jurisdiction
regarding the Palermo Convention. I shall then brieﬂy consider the other
requirements for the indication of provisional measures before conclud-
ing with a few remarks on the provisional measure that the Court has
indicated.
   2. The Court rightly states that it may indicate provisional measures
only if the provisions relied on by the Applicant appear, prima facie to
aﬀord a basis on which its jurisdiction could be founded, but need not
satisfy itself in a deﬁnitive manner that it has jurisdiction as regards the
merits of the case (Order, para. 31, citing Questions relating to the Seizure
and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor Leste v. Australia),
Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 151,
para. 18). This is the ﬁrst condition for granting provisional measures.
The second condition is that the rights asserted by a party should be at
least plausible 1, and a link must exist between the rights which form the
subject of the proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case and
the provisional measures being sought 2. The third condition is that of
urgency, in the sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irrepara-
ble prejudice may be caused to the rights in dispute before the Court has
given its ﬁnal decision 3.
   1 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning

the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 545, para. 33; Certain
Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 18, para. 53; Ques-
tions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional
Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 151, paras. 56-57.
   2 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nica-

ragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 18,
para. 54; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 151, para. 56.
   3 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nica-

ragua), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 21,

34

1179     immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

                              Prima Facie Jurisdiction

   3. Prima facie jurisdiction is one of the well-established conditions for
the Court to grant provisional measures. It is one of the requirements for
the preservation of the respective rights of the parties, pursuant to Arti-
cle 41 of the Court’s Statute. While the Court has discretion whether or
not to grant provisional measures, it normally grants such measures,
unless the absence of jurisdiction is manifest. Owing to the short time
frame for the consideration of provisional measures, there is no detailed
argument of fact and law at this stage of the case.

   4. I shall not discuss in detail the question of the relationship between
prima facie jurisdiction and substantive jurisdiction (on the merits). There
is controversy on how far the Court can trespass on the merits in its con-
sideration of prima facie jurisdiction. In the process of indicating mea-
sures of protection, the Court may encroach on the rights of the other
party and interfere with the latter’s sovereign rights and hence prejudge
the merits. Thus some judges have argued that when the Court indicates
provisional measures, it should have reached the provisional conviction
based on a summary examination of the material before it, that it has
jurisdiction on the merits Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur-
key), Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, I.C.J. Reports 1976,
pp. 24-25, separate opinion of Judge Mosler). In the case concerning Pas-
sage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), the Court refers to
Denmark’s contention that for provisional measures to be granted it is
essential that Finland be able to substantiate the right it claims to a point
where a reasonable prospect of success in the main case exists (Provisional
Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17). Judge Sha-
habuddeen in his separate opinion in the Passage through the Great Belt
argues that in his view, Finland was obliged to show a prima facie case in
the sense of demonstrating a possibility of existence of the speciﬁc right of
passage claimed (ibid., p. 31).
   5. Some commentators have argued in favour of the independence of
the provisional measures proceedings from the mainline case proceedings.
In this regard, Rosenne observes that the Court can indicate provisional
measures without the presence of judges ad hoc even if they have been
appointed (Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court 1920-2005, Vol. III, p. 1443). The same author has argued that the
Court cannot speculate as to the merits of the case at the stage of provi-
sional measures (ibid., p. 1425). Thus the Court should avoid the draw-
back of raising the bar for the existence of prima facie jurisdiction. I am
of the opinion that the threshold for prima facie jurisdiction is low.

para. 64; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 152-153, para. 62.

35

1180   immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

   6. In my view, the Court’s summary consideration of the applicability
of Article 4 of the Palermo Convention has fallen short of the requisite
examination of the question. The Order refers to 13 articles of the Pal-
ermo Convention and notes that the obligations under the Convention
consist mainly in requiring the States parties to introduce in their domes-
tic legislation provisions criminalizing certain transnational oﬀences
(Order, para. 48). The Court states that the purpose of Article 4 of the
Convention is to ensure that the States parties to the Convention perform
their obligations in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in the domestic aﬀairs
of other States (ibid., para. 49). The Court adds that the provision does
not appear to create new rules of customary international law concerning
the immunities of holders of high-ranking oﬃce in the State or incorpo-
rate rules of customary international law concerning those immunities.
   7. It is observed that the Court reaches the above position after mak-
ing a brief summary of the views of the Parties in paragraphs 41 to 46 of
the Order. The Court states that the Parties have expressed diﬀering views
on Article 4 of the Palermo Convention. But it does not analyse the rele-
vant views of the Applicant in the oral observations before agreeing with
the Respondent that any dispute which might arise with regard to “the
interpretation or application” of Article 4 of the Convention could relate
only to the manner in which the States parties perform their obligations
under the Convention.
   8. In view of the importance and relevance of paragraph 49 to the
Court’s reasoning it is worth citing the rest of its text. In this paragraph,
the Court continues that
     “[i]t appears to the Court, however, that the alleged dispute does not
     relate to the manner in which France performed its obligations under
     Articles 6, 12, 14 and 18 of the Convention, invoked by Equatorial
     Guinea. The alleged dispute, rather, appears to concern a distinct
     issue, namely whether the Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea enjoys
     immunity ratione personae under customary international law and, if
     so, whether France has violated that immunity by instituting proceed-
     ings against him.» (Ibid.)
Then the Court states, as I already indicated in paragraph 1 above that,
prima facie, a dispute capable of falling within the provisions of the Pal-
ermo Convention and therefore concerning the interpretation or the
application of Article 4 of that Convention does not exist between the
Parties. The Court then concludes that it does not have prima facie juris-
diction under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Palermo Convention to
entertain Equatorial Guinea’s request relating to the immunity of
Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, the Vice-President of Equatorial
Guinea.
  9. I do not share the Court’s view that Article 4 of the Palermo Con-
vention relates only to the manner in which States parties perform their
obligations under that Convention. Nor do I agree with the Court’s view

36

1181   immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

that Article 4 does not incorporate rules of customary international law
concerning the immunities of holders of high-ranking oﬃce in the State. I
have referred to the ﬁrst condition of prima facie jurisdiction which I
shall elaborate on by analysing the Palermo Convention.
   10. In its consideration of the requirement of prima facie jurisdiction,
the Court has interpreted Article 4 to relate only to the manner in which
States parties perform their obligations under the Convention. In my
view, the Court has not explored Article 4 in its proper context. The
Court has not considered the article itself or any of the other articles of
the Palermo Convention to any considerable extent. The Court merely
cites 13 provisions of the Palermo Convention and then observes that
these articles concern the obligations of States parties to criminalize cer-
tain transnational crimes (Order, para. 49). As also indicated above, the
Court did not deal at length with the views of the Parties made during the
oral observations.
   11. At the outset it is noted that the legislative history of Article 4 of
the Palermo Convention shows that its paragraph 1 is based on Article 2,
paragraph 2, of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traﬃc in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (Vienna Conven-
tion). Article 4 of the Palermo Convention has the title of “Protection of
sovereignty” while Article 2 of the Vienna Convention has the title of
“Scope of the Convention”. This provision as proposed by Canada and
Mexico in document E/CONF/82.C.1/L.1 read: “Nothing in this Conven-
tion derogates from the principles of the sovereign equality and territorial
integrity of States or that of non-intervention in the domestic aﬀairs of
States” (Oﬃcial Records of the UN Conference for the Adoption of a
Convention against Illicit Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna,
25 November-20 December 1988, UN doc. E/CONF.82/16, Vol. 1). This
two-power draft was under the title of scope. In the case of the Palermo
Convention, the scope of application is to be found in Article 3 titled
“Scope of application”. Subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the Vienna Con-
vention is on the purpose of the Convention. In the case of the Palermo
Convention the purpose of the Convention is in Article 1.

   12. I am citing these articles in order to show that caution should be
taken when comparing the two Conventions even where there is similarity
of language in the Conventions’ provisions. Thus, even though the lan-
guage of Article 4, subparagraph 1, of the Palermo Convention is similar
to that of Article 2, subparagraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, the two
should be looked at by taking into account the relevant circumstances.
The drafters of the Palermo Convention were aware that Article 2 (2) of
the Vienna Convention has the title of “scope”. The fact that they did not
adopt the Vienna approach shows that they intended to put a diﬀerent
interpretation to Article 4. In my view, that article is self-standing and
can be the basis of obligations for States parties.
   13. In the case of Article 4 of the Palermo Convention, the “Legislative
Guides for the Implementation of the UN Convention against Transna-

37

1182   immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

tional Organized Crime and the Protocol Thereto” states that “Article 4
is the primary vehicle for protection of national sovereignty in carrying
out the terms of the Convention. Its provisions are self-explanatory.”
(United Nations, 2005, E.05.V.2, p. 16, para. 33.) On the other hand, the
“Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traﬃc
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988”, particularly to
Article 2, subparagraph 2, referring to the principles of sovereign equality
and territorial integrity states that

        “It would be futile to attempt to draw up a comprehensive cata-
     logue of possible violations of those principles that might result from
     any arbitrary, indiscriminate application of speciﬁc provisions of the
     Convention. Occurrences that are open to dispute will have to be
     approached and resolved on a case-by-case basis in the light of the
     development of international law, taking into account the particular
     circumstances of each incident.” (United Nations, 1998, E/CN.7/590,
     p. 46, para. 2.18.)
Hence the context is very important when interpreting the two similar
provisions to be found in the two Conventions. It bears stressing that
Article 4 of the Palermo Convention appears under the title of “Protec-
tion of sovereignty” and not under “Scope of the Convention” as in the
Vienna Convention. This diﬀerence is not accidental but is a deliberate
change in the Palermo Convention which was adopted in the year 2000,
twelve years after the Vienna Convention.
   14. Article 4 provides as follows :
       “Protection of sovereignty
     1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Conven-
        tion in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equal-
        ity and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention
        in the domestic aﬀairs of other States.
     2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in
        the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and per-
        formance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the author-
        ities of that other State by its domestic law.”
   15. In the present case, the relevant provision is Article 4, subpara-
graph 1. In this regard, the Parties have shown diﬀerences in their inter-
pretation of that provision.
   16. Equatorial Guinea argues that its claims for respect for the princi-
ples of sovereign equality and of non-intervention, and the rules of State
immunity that derive from these principles, in particular the immunity
from foreign criminal jurisdiction of certain holders of high-ranking oﬃce
in the State are based on the terms of Article 4 of the Palermo Convention.
Equatorial Guinea adds that this article has the eﬀect of incorporating
these fundamental principles of the international legal order into the Con-
vention. In Equatorial Guinea’s view Article 4 establishes a treaty obliga-

38

1183     immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

tion to respect these principles when implementing the Convention 4.
Equatorial Guinea stresses that in entertaining criminal proceedings
against the Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea, France is prosecuting an
alleged crime the criminalization of which is explicitly required by Arti-
cle 4 of the Palermo Convention. It adds that France is also seeking to
implement other provisions of the Convention, for example, Article 12
(Conﬁscation and seizure), Article 14 (Disposal of conﬁscated proceeds of
crime or property) and Article 18 (Mutual legal assistance) 5.
   17. For its part, France argues that Article 4 is a general guideline
which clariﬁes the manner in which the other provisions of the treaty
should be implemented. It adds that the object and purpose of the Pal-
ermo Convention is not to protect the sovereignty of the States parties in
a general sense ; nor is it to codify the prohibition of intervention in the
internal aﬀairs of other States 6. France stresses that the reference to these
principles in Article 6 indicates the manner in which the other provisions
must be applied ; it can be used to interpret them, but in no way can it
serve as an autonomous basis of the Court’s jurisdiction. While contend-
ing that the proceedings against the Vice-President were not initiated on
the basis of the Palermo Convention 7, France concedes that its request
for mutual legal assistance (Article 18 of the Convention) to Equato-
rial Guinea was done on the basis of the Convention 8.
   18. The Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea is charged, inter alia, with
money laundering, complicity in money laundering, handling of misap-
propriated public funds, complicity in the misappropriation of public
funds, misuse of corporate assets and complicity in misuse of corporate
assets and concealment of each of these oﬀences. Thus, France, in some
of these charges, is prosecuting an alleged crime, the criminalization of
which is required by Article 6 of the Palermo Convention — criminaliza-
tion of the laundering of proceeds of crime. This title to Article 6, accord-
ing to the interpretative notes, set out in the “Travaux Préparatoires of
the negotiations for the elaboration of the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto”, is
understood to be equivalent to “money laundering” (United Nations,
2006, 06.V.5, p. 62). This crime falls within the scope of application of the
Palermo Convention under Article 3 (1), because it is not only an oﬀence
established in accordance with one of the oﬀences listed, namely that of
“laundering the proceeds of crime” under Article 6 of the Convention,
but is also a “serious crime” 9, among oﬀences established in accordance
with Articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of the Convention.
     4CR 2016/16, p. 11, paras. 11-13.
     5Ibid., p. 13, para 18.
   6 CR 2016/15, pp. 21-22, paras. 11-12.
   7 Ibid., p. 22, para 13.
   8 Request for the indication of provisional measures by the Republic of Equatorial

Guinea, Annex 1, Referral Order of 5 September 2016, p. 29.
   9 Which means conduct constituting an oﬀence punishable by a maximum deprivation

of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty, Article 2 (b) of the Palermo
Convention.

39

1184     immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

   19. In my view this crime of money laundering falls into the category
of crimes that are transnational in nature — Article 3 (1) (b) — because
of the involvement of several companies from diﬀerent countries, such as
Equatorial Guinea (for example, Somagui Forrestal), ﬁve companies
from Switzerland 10, and several companies based in France (such as Sarl
Foch Services). Regarding the requirement of an “organized criminal
group”, which is deﬁned as a structured group of three or more per-
sons — Article 2 (a) — it is noted that some of the oﬀences brought
against the Vice-President include “complicity” in money laundering.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “complicity” means the fact
or condition of being involved with others in an unlawful activity. Thus
the criterion for an “organized criminal group” is met because it takes
more than one person for there to be complicity. In case of any doubt, the
situation is clariﬁed by the interpretative notes of Article 2 (a), concern-
ing organized criminal group, which are set out in the “Travaux Prépara-
toires of the negotiations for the elaboration of the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols
thereto (United Nations, 2006, 06.V.5, p. 62). The notes state that the
inclusion of a speciﬁc number of persons in the deﬁnition of organized
criminal group would not prejudice the rights of States parties pursuant
to Article 34 (3) of the Palermo Convention. That article states that
“[e]ach State party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those
provided for by the Convention for preventing and combating transna-
tional organized crime”. One can infer from this analysis of the Palermo
Convention that fewer persons than those mentioned in Article 2 (a)
would not aﬀect the application of the Convention. Hence, Article 4
whether on its own or in combination with other articles of the Conven-
tion, such as Article 6, provides the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.

   20. As for the procedural conditions set out in Article 35 (2) of the
Palermo Convention (Order, para. 38), I am of the view that these condi-
tions are met because France categorically refused to negotiate with
Equatorial Guinea for the settlement of the dispute in spite of the numer-
ous oﬀers by the Applicant to settle the dispute. Paragraph 56 of the
Order refers to Equatorial Guinea’s Application 11 concerning the diplo-
matic exchanges aimed at settling the dispute. It is stated clearly that on
17 March 2016, the French Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs responded that it
was “unable to accept the oﬀer of settlement by the means proposed by
the Republic of Equatorial Guinea” on the grounds that “the facts men-
tioned . . . have been the subject of court decisions in France and remain
the subject of ongoing legal proceedings” 12.

    10 It is alleged by the indictment that these companies belong to the Vice-President as

sole shareholder.
    11 Application instituting proceedings ﬁled on 13 June 2016 by the Republic of Equato-

rial Guinea, against the French Republic.
    12 Ibid., Ann. 13.

40

1185     immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

   21. In light of the above, I am of the opinion that, prima facie, a dis-
pute capable of falling within the provisions of the Palermo Convention
and thus concerning the interpretation or application of Article 4 of the
Convention, exists between the Parties. Pursuant to Article 35 (2) the
Court should have entertained the request by Equatorial Guinea relating
to the immunity ratione personae of the Vice-President.
   22. As the Court examined only the question of prima facie jurisdic-
tion, I shall brieﬂy look at the other requirements for the indication of
provisional measures in order to complete the picture.

                Plausible Character of the Alleged Rights
                  and Their Link to the Measures Sought

   23. The second condition that has to be met for the granting of provi-
sional measures is that the rights asserted by a party should be at least
plausible 13. Equatorial Guinea argues that the Vice-President enjoys
immunity ratione personae in his capacity of being in charge of National
Defence and State Security and as such the criminal proceedings against
him constitute a violation of international law. This request reﬂects the
claim that the proceedings in France violate Equatorial Guinea’s right to
respect for the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention from
which the right to respect for the immunity its Vice-President derives 14. It
is observed that the status of the immunity of the Vice-President is a mat-
ter for the merits. It suﬃces for the purposes of the provisional measures
stage, to assess whether this right exists plausibly.
   24. The immunity of the Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea ﬂows
from the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention as estab-
lished in Article 4 of the Palermo Convention. In the Arrest Warrant of
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) case, it was
held that :
     “in international law it is ﬁrmly established that, as also diplomatic
     and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking oﬃce in a State,
     such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for
     Foreign Aﬀairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States,
     both civil and criminal” (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
     Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
     pp. 20-21, para. 51 (emphasis added)).

    13 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning

the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand) Provisional
Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 545, para. 33; Certain Activi-
ties Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 18, para. 53; Questions
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional
Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 151, paras. 56-57.
    14 CR 2016/14, p. 25, para. 18.

41

1186    immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

This dictum was reaﬃrmed in the Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France) case, which reiterated that “cer-
tain holders of high-ranking oﬃce in a State . . . enjoy immunities from
jurisdiction in other States” (Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008,
pp. 236-237, para. 170).
   25. The Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea is number two in the
Government. He is above the Prime Minister. He is thus entitled to
immunity ratione personae. I am of the view that the provisional measures
requested by Equatorial Guinea are linked to the rights which are the
object of the case. The request to suspend the criminal proceedings reﬂects
the claim that these proceedings violate the right to respect the principles
reﬂected in Article 4 of the Palermo Convention. Therefore there is a
plausible right to immunity for the Vice-President under the Palermo
Convention.

               Risk of Irreparable Prejudice and Urgency

   26. The ﬁnal criterion that has to be met in order for the Court to
indicate provisional measures is that of urgency, in the sense that there is
a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the
right in dispute before the Court has given its ﬁnal decision 15. Given that
the Court has prima facie jurisdiction on this issue and that the Vice-
President indeed enjoys immunity ratione personae from criminal jurisdic-
tion as a “holder of high-ranking oﬃce in a State”, it will now be shown
that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be
caused to this immunity.
   27. It is clear that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable
prejudice will be caused to the rights in dispute. Following the Order of
5 September 2016 by the investigating judges, the Paris Tribunal correc-
tionnel has ﬁxed dates in January 2017 for the criminal trial against the
Vice-President. Counsel for France during the oral observations gave an
explanation of the French criminal proceedings. He contended that the
trial in France would take years. The appeal process was long in France.
He speculated that the Vice-President may not be summoned to appear in
person ; that he may not be given a custodial sentence. Such arguments do
not take away the fact that the Vice-President will be tried in contraven-
tion of his immunity ratione personae. Irreparable prejudice will be done
to the rights of Equatorial Guinea.

   15 Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and

Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014,
I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 154, para. 32; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009,
I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 152-153, para. 62.

42

1187   immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. kateka)

  28. In its oral observations, France attempted to downplay the
position of the Vice-President and his functions. Counsel ranked the
Vice-President along with other Ministers. He argued that the Vice-
President’s functions are not the same as those of the Minister for
Foreign Aﬀairs. But as already explained above the Vice-President is
number two in the Government. Being in charge of defence and State
security indicates that these portfolios are aspects of foreign policy.
His functions require him to travel often. His functions would thus be
compromised by the ongoing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the
decision of 24 October 2016 that the criminal proceedings will continue
early next year. There is urgency and the rights of Equatorial Guinea
will suﬀer irreparable prejudice if the measure requested is not ordered.

          The Provisional Measure Indicated by the Court

   29. The Court has indicated a provisional measure concerning the
premises of the diplomatic mission of Equatorial Guinea. The measure
states that
       “France shall, pending a ﬁnal decision in the case, take all measures
     at its disposal to ensure that the premises presented as housing the
     diplomatic mission of Equatorial Guinea at 42 Avenue Foch in Paris
     enjoy treatment equivalent to that required by Article 22 of the Vienna
     Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in order to ensure their invio-
     lability” (Order, para. 99 ; emphasis added).

   30. I ﬁnd the way the measure is framed to be inadequate. I do not
understand the meaning of the term “equivalent”. Does it imply treat-
ment less than is required by the 1961 Vienna Convention ? Article 22 of
the Vienna Convention is very clear. The premises of the mission shall be
inviolable. The provision adds that the receiving State is under a special
duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the mission against any intru-
sion. In paragraph 89 of the Order, the Court notes that the premises of
the Embassy have been searched a number of times in the context of the
proceedings brought against the Vice-President and that “it is not incon-
ceivable that the building on Avenue Foch will be searched again”. Given
this possibility the Court should have issued a measure that is unequivo-
cal as requested by Equatorial Guinea (ibid., para. 17), namely, that
“France ensure that the building located at 42 Avenue Foch in Paris is
treated as premises of Equatorial Guinea’s diplomatic mission in France
and, in particular, assure its inviolability . . .”.

                                            (Signed) James L. Kateka.

43


Permanent Court of International Justice — Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Court's Statute — Optional clause — Commonwealth nations reservation —
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes — Assembly
resolution of 2 October 1924 — 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes — Assembly resolution of 26 September 1928 —
Article 17 of the 1928 General Act — Accession to the 1928 General Act.

1. | fully support the Court’s finding that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the Application filed by Pakistan on 21 September 1999 (insti-
tuting proceedings against India in respect of a dispute relating to the
destruction, on 10 August 1999, of a Pakistani aircraft) on any of
the bases asserted by Pakistan as grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction:
(i) Article 17 of the General Act of 1928; (ii) the declarations made
by both Parties pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's
Statute; and (iii) paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute.

2. 1 would, however, like to shed light on the General Act of 1928, on
which Pakistan relies as one of the grounds for the Court's jurisdiction
and which the Court rejects as such.

Pakistan claims that British India (India) acceded to that Act on
21 May 1931 and that Pakistan itself acceded to that Act by automatic
succession pursuant to international customary law. The Court, without
finding it necessary to decide the issue of whether the General Act of
1928 itself is still in force, states that “India cannot be regarded as a party
to the [General Act of 1928] at the date when the Application in the
present case was filed by Pakistan” and concludes that “the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the Application on the basis of the provisions of
Article 17 of the General Act of 1928” (see Judgment, paras. 13-28).

I do not disagree with the Court’s reasoning rejecting Article 17 of the
General Act of 1928 as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. I, however, see
the General Act, which in Pakistan’s view is a basis for the Court’s juris-
diction, from a different angle.

3. I believe, for my part, that from the outset, the General Act of 1928
could not itself be considered a document which would confer compul-
sory jurisdiction upon the Court independently from or in addition to the
“optional clause” under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. This is the point on which

28
37 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

I take issue with the reasoning adopted by the Court in ruling that
Article 17 of the General Act of 1928 cannot constitute a basis of
the Court’s jurisdiction.

It is pertinent in this respect to take a brief look at how and in what
circumstances the General Act, which Pakistan cites as grounds for the
Court’s jurisdiction, was drafted in 1928 and the related issue of the man-
ner in which the concept of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court has developed.

x * x

4. The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (as
approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 13 December
1920) entered into force on 2 September 1921 after the “Protocol of Sig-
nature of the Statute for the Court” had been ratified by a majority
(namely, 27 States) of the Members of the League of Nations (note: the
First Annual Report of the Permanent Court shows, on page 124, that
48 Members of the League of Nations had signed the Protocol by | June
1925).

Article 36 of the Statute, dealing with the Court’s jurisdiction, provides
in its paragraph 2 that:

“The Members of the League of Nations and the States men-
tioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or
ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at
a later moment, declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or
State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in
all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

(a) The interpretation of a Treaty;

(b) Any question of International Law;

(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation;

(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.”

The States parties to the Court’s Statute could make declarations under
Article 36, paragraph 2, the model of which was worded in the Protocol
of Signature of the Court as follows:

“Optional Clause

The undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, further declare,
on behalf of their Government that, from this date, they accept as
compulsory ipso facto and without special Convention, the jurisdic-
tion of the Court in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court, under the following conditions . . .”

5. Not many States, in fact, made this declaration in the first few years

29
38 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

after the Permanent Court was set up. Information maintained by the
League of Nations in its early days varied according to the documents
consulted. However, the first four volumes of the Annual Report of the
P.C.LJ., taken as a whole, would seem to indicate that the following
States successively made declarations and became bound by the “optional
clause” within a few years of adoption of the Court’s Statute: Austria
1921; Denmark 1921; Switzerland 1921; Netherlands 1921: Bulgaria
1921; Sweden 1921; Uruguay 1921; Norway 1921; Portugal 1921; Haiti
1921; Finland 1922; Lithuania 1922; and Estonia 1923 (see the Fourth
Annual Report, pp. 120, 416).

This list may not be entirely accurate or complete due to unclear
source information, which is conflicting even in the Permanent Court’s
documents. Yet it was evident that the number of such States making the
declaration was not large when compared with the total number of some
50 States that were parties to the Statute of the Permanent Court.

x oe

6. In these circumstances the Assembly of the League of Nations, in its
fifth session in 1924, in order to facilitate acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court by as many countries as possible, replied to the
question of the legality of making a reservation to the “optional clause”.
On 2 October 1924 the Assembly passed a resolution in which it consid-
ered that “the study of the . . . terms [of Article 36, paragraph 2] shows
them to be sufficiently wide to permit States to adhere to the special Pro-
tocol, opened for signature in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, with the
reservations which they regard as indispensable” and recommended States
to accede at the earliest possible date to the optional clause (League of
Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 23, p. 225; see p. 497:
(Annex 30), Annex I (2) to A.135.1924).

7. In parallel with this resolution of 2 October 1924, the Assembly
recommended on the same day that all Members of the League of
Nations accept the “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes” which the Assembly had drafted out of the desire to “facili-
tat{e] the complete application of the system provided in the Covenant
of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between
States”. Article 3 of the “1924 Protocol” reads:

“The Signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, ipso
facto and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by para-
graph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but without preju-
dice to the right of any State, when acceding to the [optional clause]
to make reservations compatible with the said clause.” (/bid., p. 225:
see p. 498 (Annex 30a), Annex II to A.135.1924.)

30
39 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

On reading this text it is clear, however, that the 1924 Protocol was not
drafted in order to have the States parties directly bound by the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court but rather to encourage more States to
accept the “optional clause” of the Court’s Statute without prejudice to
the rights of States to make reservations they regarded as indispensable.
The drafters of the Protocol apparently did not consider that those States
unwilling to adhere to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by
accepting the “optional clause” of the Statute would in any case assume
anew the same obligation simply by acceding to the 1924 Protocol.

Both the resolution mentioned in paragraph 6 above and another reso-
lution to which the “1924 Protocol” was annexed dealing with what the
Assembly contemplated under a single subject-heading, namely, “Arbi-
tration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Protocol for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes”, were intended to facilitate adher-
ence to the “optional clause” of the Court’s Statute by allowing States to
make whatever reservations they regarded as indispensable. They were
voted on together by roll-call and were passed by the unanimous vote of
the 48 delegates present.

8. In fact, in the first few years after 1924, only a few States (namely,
Belgium 1926; Ethiopia 1926; and Germany 1928) were to make decla-
rations under the “optional clause” in response to the appeal in the reso-
lution that “States accede at the earliest possible date” to that clause; the
“1924 Protocol” was not ratified by even one State and thus did not come
into force.

x OF

9. The Assembly in its ninth session in 1928 reiterated its appeal to
States to make declarations to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court. In a Resolution adopted on 26 September 1928 regarding the
optional clause of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute, the Assembly referred
to the 1924 Resolution, which, in its view, “ha[d] not so far produced all
the effect that [was] to be desired”. The Assembly was of the opinion that
“in order to facilitate effectively the acceptance of the clause in question,
it is expedient to diminish the obstacles which prevent States from com-
mitting themselves” and was further convinced that

“attention should once more be drawn to the possibility offered by
the terms of that clause to States which do not see their way to
accede to it without qualification, to do so subject to appropriate
reservations limiting the extent of their commitments, both as regards
duration and as regards scope”.

The Assembly recommended that “States which have not yet acceded to
the optional clause of Article 36 of the Statute . . . should, failing acces-

31
40 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

sion pure and simple, consider, with due regard to their interests, whether
they can accede on the conditions above indicated” (League of Nations
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 64, p. 182; see p. 491).

10. Thus, within less than ten years of the founding of the Permanent
Court, reservations to the jurisdiction of the Court had become per-
missible in order to encourage States to accept the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction.

A fairly large number of States acceded to the “optional clause” with
various types of reservation appended. By 1939, the total number of
States which had ratified the “optional clause”, and were thus bound by
it, was 29. These declarations, each accompanied by various types of
reservation, are found in the Annual Reports of the Permanent Court.

India, as one of these States, made a declaration on 19 September 1929
reading:

“On behalf of the Government of India and subject to ratification,
I accept as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention on
condition of reciprocity the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity
with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, for a
period of ten years and thereafter until such time as notice may be
given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the
ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or
facts subsequent to the said ratification:

other than . .. disputes with the government of any other Member of
the League which is a member of the British Commonwealth of
Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the
Parties have agreed or shall agree . . .”. (Sixth Annual Report of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (June 15th, 1929-June
15th, 1930), p. 482.)

India’s accession to the “optional clause” with the Commonwealth reser-
vation was identical to those of Great Britain (19 September 1929) and
other Commonwealth nations such New Zealand (19 September 1929),
the Union of South Africa (19 September 1929), Australia (20 September
1929), and Canada (20 September 1929).

%

11. In parallel with the above-mentioned resolution, the Assembly also
at its ninth session in 1928 prepared a draft of a General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in an attempt to unify the
numerous existing bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties by way
of a comprehensive multilateral instrument. The draft suggested new con-
cepts for the “permanent or special conciliation commission” (Chapter |:
Conciliation) and the “arbitral tribunal” (Chapter I]: Arbitration), both
of which could be constituted according to the Act.

The draft of the General Act also provided for the judicial settlement
of international legal disputes (Chapter II: Judicial Settlement), namely

32
4l AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

resort to the Permanent Court. A State might accede to the 1928 General
Act by choosing one of three formulae: Formula A (all provisions relat-
ing to conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration); Formula B (con-
ciliation and judicial setttement); Formula C (conciliation only) (General
Act of 1928, Art. 38). Judicial settlement was in all cases accompanied by
resort to conciliation or arbitration.

Article 17, namely the first Article in Chapter If (Judicial Settlement),
of the General Act read:

“All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be
made under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent
Court ... unless the parties agree, in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal.

It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in par-
ticular those mentioned in Article 36 of the [Court’s] Statute.”

Article 39 (referred to in the above text) applied not only to the chapter
on judicial settlement but also to those on conciliation and arbitration,
and read “a Party, in acceding to the present General Act, may make his
acceptance conditional upon the reservations exhaustively enumerated in
the following paragraph”; those reservations were restricted to three
possibilities and did not include anything related to the Commonwealth
reservation.

12. It is important to note, however, that in the draft of the General
Act judicial settlement (Chapter II) was treated differently from the cases
of conciliation and arbitration, in that resort to the existing institution of
the Permanent Court itself was not new. This indicates that, as far as
resort to the Permanent Court is concerned, the text of the General Act
added nothing new to the existing “optional clause” under the Court’s
Statute. Accession to the General Act under Formula A or B (covering
judicial settlement) was not intended to replace acceptance of the
“optional clause” or to create any obligation with respect to the Court’s
jurisdiction. The States parties to the Court’s Statute remained free at all
times to accept the “optional clause” under the Statute. As far as the
compulsory reference of disputes to the Permanent Court is concerned,
the General Act did not have any real effect and cannot be considered to
impose a new obligation upon those States which acceded to it or to
modify the Court’s jurisdiction which the States had previously accepted.
In other words, the General Act, in its part dealing with judicial settle-
ment (Chapter Il), was not intended to replace or be a substitute for
Article 36, paragraphs | and 2, as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.

The Assembly, in parallel with the Resolution mentioned in para-
graph 9 above, adopted on the same day a resolution urging the
Assembly to adopt the General Act.

13. In addition, these provisions regarding judicial settlement show

33
42 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

that the General Act should have been considered in combination with
the Assembly’s Resolution, mentioned in paragraph 10 above, which was
designed as an appeal to States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Permanent Court, even with such reservations attached as the States
might deem indispensable. The General Act cannot be considered as
inconsistent with the intended effect of the Resolution — adopted in
parallel and on the same date as the Act. I would like to repeat what
I said in paragraph 7 above in connection with the 1924 Protocol, which
is equally relevant to the General Act, and I quote:

“(T]he drafters of the [1924 Protocol] apparently did not consider
that those States unwilling to adhere to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court by accepting the ‘Optional Clause’ of the Statute would
in any case assume anew the same obligation simply by acceding to
the [1924 Protocol].”

14. The General Act of 1928 entered into force on 16 August 1929
after the required number of States (namely, two: Sweden (13 May 1929)
and Belgium (18 May 1929)) had acceded to it in 1929, Other States
followed suit: 23 States altogether have acceded to the General Act
and Latvia’s accession on 17 September 1935 was the last of those. (See
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at
31 December 1999, New York, United Nations, 2000.)

In fact, all 23 States which, in the period of several years after 1928,
acceded to the General Act of 1928 had, prior to that accession, made
declarations under the “optional! clause”. This is shown in the table on
page 43, which is based on the best available information. It is also note-
worthy that the reservations these States attached to their accession to
the General Act were in substance the same as those attached to their
respective declarations accepting the Court’s jurisdiction under the
“optional clause”.

15. India, which, as I have explained, had already adopted the
“optional clause” on 19 September 1929, acceded to the General Act on
21 May 1931, in parallel with Great Britain and other Commonwealth
countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (note: Canada’s
accession occurred on | July 1931):

“Subject to the following conditions:

1. That the following disputes are excluded from the procedure
described in the General Act

(iii) Disputes between the Government of [India] and the Govern-
ment of any other Member of the League which is a Member of the

British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be
settled in such a manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree.”

(Note: this reservation was common to all the Commonwealth nations
mentioned above.)

34
43

State Date of Accession to the Date of Declaration of the
General Act of 1928 Optional Clause
Sweden 13 May 1929 18 March 1926
Belgium 18 May 1929 25 September 1925
Denmark 14 April 1930 28 January 1921
Norway 11 June 1930 6 September 1921/
22 September 1926
Netherlands 8 August 1930 6 August 1921/
22 September 1926
Finland 6 September 1930 3 March 1927
Luxembourg 15 September 1930 1921
Spain 16 September 1930 21 September 1928
Australia 21 May 1931 20 September 1929/
14 March 1922
France 21 May 1931 19 September 1929
Great Britain 21 May 1931 19 September 1929
India 21 May 1931 19 September 1929
New Zealand 21 May 1931 19 September 1929
Canada 1 July 1931 20 September 1929/
28 July 1930
Estonia 3 September 1931 25 June 1928
Italy 7 September 1931 9 September 1929
Greece 14 September 1931 12 September 1929
Ireland 26 September 1931 14 September 1929
Peru 21 November 1931 19 September 1929
Turkey 26 June 1934 26 June 1934
Switzerland 7 December 1934 7 December 1934
Ethiopia 15 March 1935 12 July 1926
Latvia 17 September 1935 10 September 1929

AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

(Note: The dates shown in the above table have been taken from the Annual
Reports of the Permanent Court of International Justice.)

On the eve of the outbreak of war in Europe, India (along with the
United Kingdom and some other Commonwealth nations), by means of
a communication received at the Secretariat on 15 February 1939, made
a declaration stating that:

“India will continue, after the [6th August 1939, to participate in
the [General Act] subject to the reservation that, as from that date,
the participation of India will not . . . cover disputes arising out of
events during the war. The participation of India in the General Act,
after the 16th August 1939, will continue, as heretofore, to be subject
to the reservations set forth in the instrument of accession in respect
of India.”

35
44 AERIAL INCIDENT (SEP. OP. ODA)

16. The General Act was revised in 1949 to take account of the new
United Nations system. Since that time not one single State has acceded
to the General Act in its 1949 revised form. On the contrary, some States
have denounced the General Act to which they had previously acceded.

After the Second World War, Pakistan declared, in its notification of
succession dated 30 May 1974 (see United Nations Treaty Collection
Database, update 13 June 2000) to the Secretary-General, that it “con-
tinues to be bound by the accession of British India of the General Act of
1928” and that it “does not, however, affirm the reservations made by
British India”. This is the only positive action taken in the post-war
period by any State in connection with the General Act of 1928.

ok
*

17. I now conclude this extensive discussion of the 1928 General Act
by repeating, as I stated in paragraph 2 above, that 1 agree that the Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application of Pakistan on the basis
of the provisions of Article 17 of the General Act but I come to this con-
clusion for different reasons: namely, not because, as the Court main-
tains, India is presently not a party to the General Act of 1928 as revised
in 1949, but because the Act itself cannot be considered a document that
would confer compulsory jurisdiction upon the Court independently
from or in addition to the “optional clause” under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of either the Permanent Court or of the present
Court. The Court’s jurisdiction is conferred only pursuant to Article 36,
paragraphs 1 or 2, of its Statute.

(Signed) Shigeru Opa.

36


108

DECLARATION BY JUDGE LACHS

The Court’s Judgment has necessarily to dwell on and resolve only
issues of procedure (jurisdiction and admissibility); judgments of this
type may be exposed to criticism as being apparently legalistic.

Yet solutions of matters of procedure are essential in the activities of
any court, as they determine its role in the fate of a dispute brought before
it. Such decisions may constitute the Court’s last word in such a dispute, or
they may open the door to substantive consideration. In taking these deci-
sions, this Court has to exercise the utmost care to discourage attempts to
resort to it in any case lacking a proper jurisdictional foundation, but at
the same time not to deny States their right to benefit from its decisions
where such a foundation does exist. Sometimes the mere opening of the
door may bring about a solution to a dispute.

In the present case the Court has had to take decisions which — as will
be clear from a mere reading of the Judgment — have not been free from
complexities, placing on judges serious responsibilities, both as regards
analysis of the underlying circumstances of the case, and of a juridical
nature.

The Court has not prejudged the future. Thus the Parties retain their
freedom of action, and full possibilities of finding solutions.

All these considerations have prompted me to give my support to this
decision, voting in favour of the Judgment, as I have in 18 of the 19 Judg-
ments in the elaboration of which I have participated.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS.

43


621

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE DE M. LE JUGE RANJEVA,
VICE-PRÉSIDENT, ET DE M. LE JUGE GUILLAUME,
DE M°° LE JUGE HIGGINS ET DE MM. LES JUGES KOOIJMANS,
AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL ET ELARABY

[Texte original français ]

Objections diverses à la compétence de la Cour — Liberté de choix de cette
dernière — Critères à retenir: cohérence; certitude; implications dans les
autres affaires pendantes — Arrêt de la Cour fondé à tort sur son incompétence
ratione personae — Arrêt incompatible avec des décisions antérieures de la
Cour.

1. Nous avons voté en faveur du dispositif de l’arrêt parce qu’en fin de
compte chacun d’entre nous estime qu’en droit la Cour ne saurait passer
à l’examen au fond de cette affaire. Nous sommes cependant en désac-
cord profond avec la motivation retenue dans l’arrêt, en particulier
s'agissant de la base sur laquelle la Cour s’est déclarée incompétente.

2. Il n’est pas rare que, dans une instance devant la Cour, celle-ci ait la
possibilité de se prononcer sur sa compétence sur plus d’un terrain (Droit
de passage sur territoire indien, exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.L.J. Recueil 1957, p. 129-134; Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955 (Israël
c. Bulgarie), arrêt, C.J. Recueil 1959, p. 132-134; Frontière terrestre et
maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), excep-
tions préliminaires, CI.J. Recueil 1998, p. 284-289; Incident aérien
du 10 août 1999 (Pakistan c. Inde), compétence de la Cour,
C.LJ. Recueil 2000, p. 19-24). Des conclusions peuvent avoir été présen-
tées par les Parties déniant la compétence de la Cour sur plusieurs des
bases habituelles de compétence (à savoir les compétences ratione perso-
nae, ratione materiae ou ratione temporis). Si la Cour estime que, sur
deux terrains ou plus, sa compétence n’est pas établie, elle est libre de
choisir le terrain le plus approprié pour fonder sa décision d’incompé-
tence. La Cour n’a pas nécessairement à trancher d’abord des conditions
posées par l’article 35 du Statut et à ne traiter qu’ultérieurement des
conditions fixées aux articles 36 et 37.

3. Le choix de la Cour doit être opéré d’une manière conforme à sa
fonction judiciaire. Trois critères doivent guider la Cour dans son choix.
En premier lieu, elle doit s’assurer de la cohérence de la solution retenue
avec sa propre jurisprudence afin de garantir la sécurité juridique. La
cohérence est l’essence même des motivations judiciaires et cela est spé-
cialement vrai dans les différentes phases de la procédure d’une même
affaire ou s’agissant d’affaires connexes. En deuxième lieu, la recherche
d’une solution fermement assurée doit conduire la Cour à choisir le ter-
rain qui est le mieux fondé en droit et à éviter des terrains moins sûrs,
voire des terrains douteux. Enfin, en tant qu’organe judiciaire principal

50
622 LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (DÉCL. COMMUNE)

de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, la Cour doit, en choisissant entre les
différents terrains possibles, être attentive aux implications et aux consé-
quences éventuelles de ce choix dans les autres affaires pendantes.

4, Dans une phase antérieure de la procédure en la présente espèce —
comme dans d’autres affaires relatives à des événements ayant fait suite à
l'éclatement de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie —, la
Cour avait choisi de se fonder sur des considérations de compétence
ratione temporis et ratione materiae.

5. A cet égard, il convient de rappeler dès l’abord que, si, lors de l’exa-
men des demandes en indication de mesures conservatoires présentées
par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, la Cour avait par ordon-
nances du 2 juin 1999 estimé qu’elle n’avait pas compétence prima facie
pour se prononcer sur les requêtes de la Yougoslavie, elle l’avait fait
sur de tout autres terrains que celui retenu par elle aujourd’hui.

6. Dans les ordonnances concernant la Belgique, le Canada, les Pays-
Bas, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni, la Cour avait rappelé en premier lieu
que la déclaration par laquelle la Yougoslavie avait reconnu la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut
avait été déposée auprès du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies le
26 avril 1999 (soit trois jours avant l’introduction de l’instance). Dans
cette déclaration, la Yougoslavie reconnaissait sous condition de récipro-
cité «la juridiction de la Cour pour tous les différends qui pourraient sur-
gir après la signature de la présente déclaration, concernant des situations
ou des faits postérieurs à ladite signature».

La Cour avait constaté que les requêtes étaient dirigées, dans leur
essence, contre les bombardements du territoire yougoslave par plusieurs
pays membres de l'OTAN. Elle avait observé que ces bombardements
avaient commencé le 24 mars 1999 et estimé, par suite, que les différends
qui lui étaient soumis avaient surgi bien avant le 25 avril 1999. Elle avait
en outre rappelé sa jurisprudence constante selon laquelle toute limita-
tion ratione temporis apportée par l’une des Parties à sa déclaration
d'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour «fait droit entre les parties» et
en avait conclu que la déclaration de la Yougoslavie, combinée avec celle
des Etats défendeurs ayant également accepté la juridiction de la Cour en
vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut, ne pouvait constituer une
base sur laquelle la compétence de cette dernière pouvait prima facie être
fondée (voir, par exemple, affaire de la Licéité de l’emploi de la force
{Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
2 juin 1999, C.LJ. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 135, par. 30). La Cour étant à
priori incompétente ratione temporis en avait déduit qu’elle n’avait pas
à rechercher si la Yougoslavie était ou non Membre des Nations Unies
et partie au Statut en 1999 et si, par suite, elle était compétente ratione
personae.

7. Dans toutes les ordonnances, la Cour avait en second lieu relevé que
tant la Yougoslavie que certains des Etats défendeurs étaient parties sans
réserves à la convention des Nations Unies sur le génocide. Elle avait rap-
pelé la définition du génocide donnée dans cette convention et observé

51
623 LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (DÉCL. COMMUNE)

que, d’après cette définition, «la caractéristique essentielle du géno-
cide est la destruction intentionnelle d’un «groupe national, ethnique,
racial ou religieux»» (C.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 138, par. 40). Elle avait
estimé qu’il n’apparaissait pas «au présent stade de la procédure que
les bombardements qui constituent l’objet de la requête yougoslave
«comportent effectivement l’élément d’intentionnalité, dirigé contre un
groupe comme tel, que requiert la disposition sus-citée»» (ibid, p. 138,
par. 40).

8. Par une motivation différente, la Cour a confirmé aujourd’hui qu’elle
n’a pas compétence pour connaître des demandes présentées par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro. Elle a tout d’abord estimé que la Serbie-et-Mon-
ténégro n’était pas au 29 avril 1999 membre de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies et, en cette qualité, partie au Statut de la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice. Elle en a déduit que la Cour n’était pas ouverte à la Ser-
bie-et-Monténégro au titre du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut.

Par ailleurs, la Cour a estimé que le paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 du
Statut ne permettait à des Etats non parties au Statut d’ester devant la
Cour que sur la base de traités conclus antérieurement à l’entrée en
vigueur du Statut. Elle a constaté que la convention sur le génocide était
entrée en vigueur à une date postérieure, soit le 12 janvier 1951. Elle en a
déduit que le paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 ne donnait pas à la Serbie-et-
Monténégro accès à la Cour en vertu de l’article IX de la convention. Dès
lors, la Cour n’avait pas à décider «si la Serbie-et-Monténégro était ou
non partie à la convention sur le génocide» à la date d’introduction des
requêtes. En tout état de cause, la Cour n’était, là encore, pas ouverte à la
Serbie-et-Monténégro.

Au total, et contrairement à ce qu’elle avait fait en 1999, la Cour a
ainsi préféré se prononcer sur sa compétence ratione personae, sans
même examiner sa compétence ratione temporis et ratione materiae sur
laquelle elle s’était prononcée auparavant prima facie.

9. Ce changement d’attitude est d’autant plus surprenant que le rai-
sonnement tenu aujourd’hui par la Cour est incompatible avec des arrêts
ou ordonnances déja rendus par elle.

10. Nous reléverons en premier lieu que la question de savoir si la You-
goslavie était Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et, à ce titre,
partie au Statut de la Cour, entre 1992 et 2000, était demeurée contro-
versée à cette époque. La Cour s’était refusée à la trancher tant en 1993
(Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténé-
gro)), mesures conservatoires, C.LJ. Recueil 1993, p. 14, par. 18) qu’en
1999 (Licéité de l'emploi de la force ( Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.J. Recueil 1999 (I),
p. 136, par. 33). Elle s'était bornée alors à préciser que la solution adop-
tée à cet égard par résolution 757 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité et par
résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale «ne laisse pas de susciter des dif-
ficultés juridiques» (Application de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie

52
624 LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (DÉCL. COMMUNE)

(Serbie et Monténégro)), mesures conservatoires, C.I.J. Recueil 1993,
p. 14, par. 18).

Postérieurement à l’admission le 1° novembre 2002 de la Serbie-et-
Monténégro au sein de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, la question
s’est posée devant la Cour de savoir si cette admission avait permis de
clarifier la situation antérieure. La Cour avait alors précisé, par arrêt du
3 février 2003, que

«[l]la résolution 47/1 ne portait notamment pas atteinte au droit de la
RFY d’ester devant la Cour ou d’être partie à un différend devant
celle-ci dans les conditions fixées par le Statut» (Demande en revision
de l'arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l'affaire relative à l’Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires
{Yougoslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine), C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 31,
par. 70).

Elle avait ajouté que

«la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale en date du 1° no-
vembre 2000 ne peut avoir rétroactivement modifié la situation sui
generis dans laquelle se trouvait la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies pendant la période 1992-2000, ni sa situation
à l’égard du Statut de la Cour» (ibid., par. 71).

Ainsi la Cour a déja jugé que la RFY pouvait ester devant la Cour entre
1992 et 2000 et que son admission aux Nations Unies en 2002 n’a rien
changé 4 cette situation.

11. Par ailleurs, l’interprétation donnée dans le présent arrêt du para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut nous paraît, elle aussi, incompatible
avec la position antérieurement prise par la Cour dans son ordonnance
du 8 avril 1993, dans laquelle elle a estimé

«qu’une instance peut étre valablement introduite par un Etat contre
un autre Etat qui, sans étre partie au Statut, est partie 4 une telle
disposition particuliére d’un traité en vigueur, et ce indépendamment
des conditions réglées par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 9
(1946)» (Application de la convention pour la prévention et la ré-
pression du crime de génocide ( Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie
(Serbie et Monténégro)), mesures conservatoires, C.IJ. Recueil
1993, p. 14, par. 19).

On peut s’étonner d’ailleurs que la Cour ait cru nécessaire de se pronon-
cer sur la portée du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 alors que l’Etat deman-
deur ne se prévalait pas de ce texte.

12. S’agissant du deuxiéme critére qui doit étre appliqué par la Cour
en opérant son choix entre différents motifs susceptibles de fonder sa
décision — le critère de certitude —, nous estimons qu’il n’est pas davan-
tage reflété dans le terrain qu’elle a choisi aujourd’hui. Depuis le dernier
arrét de la Cour en 2003, aucun fait n’est survenu dans la série d’ins-

53
625 LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (DÉCL. COMMUNE)

tances concernant le Kosovo qui laisserait à supposer que le terrain pré-
cédemment retenu par la Cour a perdu de sa crédibilité juridique. En outre,
le terrain choisi aujourd’hui par la Cour offre moins de certitude que
d’autres options possibles. La Cour a décidé que l’admission du deman-
deur en novembre 2000 comme Membre de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies «n’a pas remonté et n’a pu remonter à l’époque de l’écla-
tement et de la disparition de la République fédérative socialiste de You-
goslavie» (par. 77). La Cour a aussi déclaré que «l’importance de cette
évolution survenue en 2000 tient au fait qu’elle a clarifié la situation juri-
dique, jusque-là indéterminée, quant au statut de la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie vis-à-vis de l'Organisation des Nations Unies» (par. 78).
Sans préciser si cette «clarification» concerne la période 1992-2000, la
Cour affirme qu’il est maintenant devenu clair que «la situation sui gene-
ris du demandeur ne pouvait être regardée comme équivalant à la qualité
de Membre de l'Organisation». Nous trouvons que cette proposition est
loin d’être évidente et nous n’avons pu identifier les étapes de raisonne-
ment adopté. Une telle motivation paraît moins convaincante en droit et
dès lors moins sûre, et ouvre davantage la porte à des divergences de
points de vue que les solutions adoptées jusqu’à présent par la Cour.

13. Nous avons par ailleurs évoqué le fait que la Cour, en choisissant
parmi les terrains possibles d’une décision sur sa compétence, doit tenir
compte des implications et des conséquences éventuelles de sa motivation
dans d’autres affaires. A cet égard, nous estimons que le paragraphe 39
de l’arrêt ne reflète pas de manière satisfaisante le rôle que doit jouer la
Cour en tant qu’institution judiciaire. En effet, l’arrêt revient sur les déci-
sions antérieurement prises par la Cour alors que cette dernière avait le
choix du terrain sur lequel elle pouvait se placer et qu’elle n’était nulle-
ment tenue de se prononcer dans la présente affaire sur sa compétence
ratione personae. Bien plus, cette démarche semble laisser planer le doute
sur la question de savoir si la Yougoslavie était partie entre 1992 et 2000
à la convention des Nations Unies sur le génocide. Cette même démarche
pourrait conduire à remettre en cause les solutions adoptées par la Cour
en ce qui concerne sa compétence dans l’affaire opposant la Bosnie-
Herzégovine à la Serbie-et-Monténégro pour l’application de la conven-
tion sur le génocide. Nous regrettons que la Cour se soit engagée dans
une telle direction.

(Signé) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signé) Rosalyn Hiccins.
(Signé) Peter KOOIMANS.
(Signé) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
(Signé) Thomas BUERGENTHAL.
(Signé) Nabil ELARABY.

54


                      COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                          RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                   AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                    Délimitation maritime
                     dans l’Océan INDIEN
                           (SOMALIE c. KENYA)

                    ORDONNANCE DU 16 OCTOBRE 2014

                             2014
                      INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                        Reports of judgments,
                     ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                    Maritime delimitation
                     in THE INDIAN OCEAN
                           (SOMALIA v. KENYA)

                        ORDER OF 16 OCTOBER 2014

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                                           Mode officiel de citation :
                                  Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien
                              (Somalie c. Kenya), ordonnance du 16 octobre 2014,
                                          C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 482

                                               Official citation :
                                  Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
                                (Somalia v. Kenya), Order of 16 October 2014,
                                         I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 482

                                                                               1071
                                                                No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                               Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-071185-2

4 CIJ1071.indb 2                                                                      20/04/15 09:28

                                           16 OCTOBRE 2014

                                            ORDONNANCE

                   Délimitation maritime
                    dans l’Océan INDIEN
                     (SOMALIE c. KENYA)

                   Maritime delimitation
                    in the INDIAN ocean
                     (SOMALIA v. KENYA)

                                           16 OCTOBER 2014

                                               ORDER

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                                                                                482

                               INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                               YEAR 2014                                          2014
                                                                                16 October
                                                                                General List
                                             16 October 2014                                    No. 161

                               MARITIME DELIMITATION
                                IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
                                         (SOMALIA v. KENYA)

                                                 ORDER

                    The President of the International Court of Justice,
                    Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
                 cles 44, paragraphs 1 and 4, 45, 48 and 49 of the Rules of Court,
                    Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
                 28 August 2014, whereby the Federal Republic of Somalia instituted pro-
                 ceedings against the Republic of Kenya with regard to a dispute concerning
                     “the establishment of the single maritime boundary between Somalia
                     and Kenya in the Indian Ocean delimiting the territorial sea, exclusive
                     economic zone . . . and continental shelf, including the continental
                     shelf beyond 200 nautical miles” ;
                   Whereas a certified copy of the Application was communicated to
                 Kenya on the day it was filed ;
                   Whereas Somalia notified the Court, in its Application, of the appoint-
                 ment of H.E. Mr. Abdirahman Dualeh Beileh as Agent and of
                 H.E. Mr. Elmi Ahmed Duale as Deputy‑Agent, and, by a letter dated
                 16 September 2014, of the appointment of H.E. Mr. Ali Said Fiqi as
                 Co‑Agent ; whereas, by a letter dated 30 September 2014, Kenya notified
                 the Court of the appointment of H.E. Ms Makena Muchiri as Agent and
                 of the Honourable Githu Muigai as Co‑Agent ;

                  Whereas, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the
                 Agents of the Parties on 15 October 2014, pursuant to Article 31 of the

                                                                                4

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                                   maritime delimitation (order 16 X 14)                    483

                 Rules of Court, those Agents expressed the views of their respective Gov-
                 ernments regarding the time‑limits required in order to prepare the first
                 round of written pleadings ; whereas Somalia requested a time‑limit of
                 nine months from the date of the filing of the Application for the prepa-
                 ration of the Memorial ; whereas Kenya indicated that a period of twelve
                 months would be appropriate for the preparation of its Counter‑
                 Memorial ; whereas Somalia, in an attempt at compromise, proposed that
                 a time‑limit of ten and a half months could be fixed for the filing of each
                 of those pleadings ; and whereas Kenya stated that it could leave the deci-
                 sion thereon to the Court ;
                    Having regard to the views of the Parties,
                     Fixes the following time‑limits for the filing of the written pleadings :

                     13 July 2015 for the Memorial of the Federal Republic of Somalia ;

                     27 May 2016 for the Counter‑Memorial of the Republic of Kenya ; and
                     Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                   Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
                 the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of October, two thousand
                 and fourteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
                 of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal
                 Republic of Somalia and the Government of the Republic of Kenya,
                 respectively.

                   (Signed) Peter Tomka,
                 	President.
                                                              (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                                            Registrar.

                                                                                5

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