219

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KOOIJMANS

Reasons for negative vote on operative subparagraph (3) (D) — Background
and context of request for advisory opinion — Need for balanced treatment —
Jurisdictional issues — Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter and General
Assembly resolution 377 A (V) — Question of judicial propriety — Purpose of
request — Merits — Self-determination — Proportionality — Self-defence —
Legal consequences — Obligations for other States — Article 41 of the Inter-
national Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility — Duty of non-
recognition — Duty of abstention — Duty to ensure respect for humanitarian
law — Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions.

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. I have voted in favour of all paragraphs of the operative part of the
Advisory Opinion with one exception, viz. subparagraph (3) (D) dealing
with the legal consequences for States.

I had a number of reasons for casting that negative vote which I will
only briefly indicate at this stage, since I will come back to them when
commenting on the various parts of the Opinion.

My motives can be summarized as follows.

First, the request as formulated by the General Assembly did not make
it necessary for the Court to determine the obligations for States which
ensue from the Court’s findings. In this respect an analogy with the struc-
ture of the Opinion in the Namibia case is not appropriate. In that case
the question about the legal consequences for States was at the heart of
the request and logically so since it was premised on a decision of the
Security Council. That resolution, and in particular its operative para-
graph 5 which was addressed to “all States”, was considered by the Court
to be “essential for the purposes of the present advisory opinion” (Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1. C.J. Reports 1971, p. 51, para. 108).

A similar situation does not exist in the present case, where the Court’s
view is not asked on the legal consequences of a decision taken by a
political organ of the United Nations but of an act committed by a Mem-
ber State. That does not prevent the Court from considering the issue of
consequences for third States once that act has been found to be illegal
but then the Court’s conclusion is wholly dependent upon its reasoning
and not upon the necessary logic of the request.

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It is, however, this reasoning that in my view is not persuasive (see
paras. 39-49, below) and this was my second motive for casting a nega-
tive vote.

And, third, I find the Court’s conclusions as laid down in sub-
paragraph (3) (D) of the dispositif rather weak; apart from the Court’s
finding that States are under an obligation “not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by [the] construction
fof the wall]” (a finding I subscribe to) I find it difficult to envisage
what States are expected to do or not to do in actual practice. In my
opinion a judicial body’s findings should have a direct bearing on the
addressee’s behaviour; neither the first nor the last part of operative
subparagraph (3) (D) meets this requirement.

2. Although I am in general agreement with the Court’s Opinion, on
some issues I have reservations with regard to its reasoning. I will, in
giving my comments, follow the logical order of the Opinion:

(a) jurisdictional issues;

(b) the question of judicial propriety;
(c) the merits;

(d) the legal consequences.

Before doing so I wish, however, to make some remarks about the
background and context of the request.

II]. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ADVISORY OPINION

3. In paragraph 54 of the Opinion the Court observes (in the context
of judicial propriety) that it is aware that the question of the wall is part
of a greater whole but that that cannot be a reason for it to decline to
reply to the question asked. It adds that this wider context will be care-
fully taken into account. | fully share the Court’s view as laid down in
that paragraph including the Court’s observation that it can nevertheless
only examine other issues to the extent that is necessary for the con-
sideration of the question put to it.

4. In my opinion the Court could and should have given more explicit
attention to the general context of the request in its Opinion. The situa-
tion in and around Palestine has been for a number of decades not only
a virtually continuous threat to international peace and security but also
a human tragedy which in many respects is mind-boggling. How can a
society like the Palestinian one get used to and live with a situation where
the victims of violence are often innocent men, women and children?
How can a society like the Israeli society get used to and live with a situa-
tion where attacks against a political opponent are targeted at innocent
civilians, men, women and children, in an indiscriminate way?

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5. The construction of the wall is explained by Israel as a necessary
protection against the latter category of acts which are generally con-
sidered to be international crimes. Deliberate and indiscriminate attacks
against civilians with the intention to kill are the core element of terror-
ism which has been unconditionally condemned by the international
community regardless of the motives which have inspired them.

Every State, including Israel, has the right and even the duty (as the
Court says in paragraph 141) to respond to such acts in order to protect
the life of its citizens, albeit the choice of means in doing so is limited by
the norms and rules of international law. In the present case, Israel has
not respected those limits, and the Court convincingly demonstrates that
these norms and rules of international law have not been respected by it.
I find no fault with this conclusion nor with the finding that the construc-
tion of the wall along the chosen route has greatly added to the suffering
of the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territory.

6. In paragraph 122 the Court finds that the construction of the wall,
along with measures taken earlier, severely impedes the exercise by the
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and therefore consti-
tutes a breach of Israel’s obligation to respect that right. I have doubts
whether the last part of that finding is correct (see paragraph 32, below),
but it is beyond doubt that the mere existence of a structure that sepa-
rates the Palestinians from each other makes the realization of their right
to self-determination far more difficult, even if it has to be admitted that
the realization of this right is more dependent upon political agreement
than on the situation in loco.

But it is also true that the terrorist acts themselves have caused “great
harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a better
future”, as was stated in the Middle East Quartet Statement of 16 July
2002. And the Statement continues: “Terrorists must not be allowed to
kill the hope of an entire region, and a united international community,
for genuine peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis.”
(Written Statement of Israel, Annex 10.)

7. The fact that the Court has limited itself to report merely on a
number of the historical facts which have led to the present human
tragedy may be correct from the viewpoint of what is really needed to
answer the request of the General Assembly: the result, however, is that
the historical résumé, as presented in paragraphs 70 to 78, is rather two-
dimensional. I will illustrate this by giving one example which is hardly
relevant for the case itself.

8. Before giving its historical résumé, the Court says that it will first
make a brief analysis of the status of the territory and it starts by men-
tioning the establishment of the Mandate after the First World War.
Nothing is said, however, about the status of the West Bank between the
conclusion of the General Armistice Agreement in 1949 and the occupa-
tion by Israel in 1967, in spite of the fact that it is a generally known fact

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that it was placed by Jordan under its sovereignty but that this claim
to sovereignty, which was relinquished only in 1988, was recognized by
three States only.

9. I fail to understand the reason for this omission of an objective
historical fact since in my view the fact that Jordan claimed sovereignty
over the West Bank only strengthens the argument in favour of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention right from the moment
of its occupation by Israel in June 1967.

If it is correct that the Government of Israel claims that the Fourth
Geneva Convention is not applicable de jure in the West Bank since that
territory had not previously to the 1967 war been under Jordanian sov-
ereignty, that argument already fails since a territory, which by one of the
parties to an armed conflict is claimed as its own and is under its control,
is — once occupied by the other party — by definition occupied territory
of a High Contracting Party in the sense of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion (emphasis added). And both Israel and Jordan were parties to the
Convention.

That this at the time also was recognized by the Israeli authorities is
borne out by the Order issued after the occupation and referred to in
paragraph 93 of the Opinion.

10. The strange result of the Court’s reticence about the status of the
West Bank between 1949 and 1967 is that it is only by implication that
the reader is able to understand that it was under Jordanian control
(paragraphs 73 and 129 refer to the demarcation line between Israel and
Jordan (the Green Line)) without ever being explicitly informed that the
West Bank had been placed under Jordanian authority. This is all the
more puzzling as the Court would in no way have been compelled to
comment on the legality or legitimacy of that authority if 1t had made
mention of it.

11. In a letter of 29 January from the Deputy Director General and
Legal Adviser of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Registrar
of the Court it is stated that “Israel trusts and expects that the Court will
look beyond the request to the wider issues relevant to this matter”
(Written Statement of Israel, covering letter). In this respect it was said
that resolution ES-10/14 is “absolutely silent” on the terrorist attacks
against Israeli citizens and thus “reflects the gravest prejudice and imbal-
ance with the requesting organ”. Israel, therefore, requested the Court
not to render the opinion.

12. | am of the view that the Court, in deciding whether it is appro-
priate to respond to a request for an advisory opinion, can involve itself
with the political debate which has preceded the request only to the
extent necessary to understand the question put. It is no exception that
such debate is heated but, as the Court said in the case of the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

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“once the Assembly has asked, by adopting a resolution, for an advi-
sory opinion on a legal question, the Court, in determining whether
there are any compelling reasons for it to refuse to give such an
opinion, will not have regard to the origins or to the political history
of the request, or to the distribution of votes in respect of the
adopted resolution” (C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 237, para. 16).

The Court, however, does not function in a void. It is the principal judi-
cial organ of the United Nations and has to carry out its function and
responsibility within the wider political context. It cannot be expected to
present a legal opinion on the request of a political organ without taking
full account of the context in which the request was made.

13. Although the Court certainly has taken into account the argu-
ments put forward by Israel and has dealt with them in a considerate
manner, I am of the view that the present Opinion could have reflected in
a more satisfactory way the interests at stake for all those living in the
region. The rather oblique references to terrorist acts which can be found
at several places in the Opinion are in my view not sufficient for this pur-
pose. An advisory opinion is brought to the attention of a political organ
of the United Nations and is destined to have an effect on a political
process. It should therefore throughout its reasoning and up till the
operative part reflect the legitimate interests and responsibilities of all
those involved and not merely refer to them in a concluding paragraph
(para. 162).

IH]. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

14. I fully share the view of the Court that the adoption of resolu-
tion ES-10/14 was not ultra vires since it did not contravene the provision
of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter; nor did it fail to fulfil the
essential conditions set by the Uniting for Peace resolution (resolu-
tion 377 A (V)) for the convening of an Emergency Special Session.

15. I doubt, however, whether it is possible to describe the practice of
the political organs of the United Nations with respect to the interpreta-
tion of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter without taking into
account the effect of the Uniting for Peace resolution on this interpreta-
tion. In the Opinion, the Court deals with resolution 377 A (V) as a sepa-
rate item and merely in relation to its procedural requirements. In my
opinion this resolution also had a more substantive effect, namely with
regard to the interpretation of the relationship between the competences
of the Security Council and the General Assembly respectively, in the
field of international peace and security and has certainly expedited

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the development of the interpretation of the condition, contained in
Article 12, paragraph 1, namely that the Assembly shall not make a
recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security
Council is exercising its functions in respect of such dispute or situation
(emphasis added).

16. This effect is also recognized in doctrine. “The adoption of the
‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution . . . could not fail to have an effect on the
weight to be given to the restriction in Article 12, paragraph 1.” (Philippe
Manin, in J.-P. Cot, La Charte des Nations Unies, 2nd ed., 1981, p. 298
[translation by the Registry]; see also E. de Wet, The Chapter VIT
Powers of the United Nations Security Council, 2004, p. 46.) In actual
practice the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution has contributed
to the interpretation that, if a veto cast by a permanent member prevents
the Security Council from taking a decision, the latter is no longer con-
sidered to be exercising its functions within the meaning of Article 12,
paragraph 1. And the fact that a veto had been cast when the Security
Council voted on a resolution dealing with the construction of the wall is
determinative for the conclusion that the Security Council was no longer
exercising its functions under the Charter with respect to the construction
of the wall. In the present case, therefore, the conclusion that resolu-
tion ES-10/14 did not contravene Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter
cannot be dissociated from the effect resolution 377 A (V) has had on the
interpretation of that provision.

17. That such practice is accepted by both Assembly and Security Coun-
cil also with regard to the procedural requirements of resolution 377 A (V)
is borne out by the fact that none of the Council’s members con-
sidered that the reconvening of the Assembly in Emergency Special Ses-
sion on 20 October 2003 was unconstitutional and that the adoption of
the resolution demanding that Israel stop and reverse the construction
of the wall was therefore ultra vires. In this respect it is telling that this
resolution (resolution ES-10/13) was tabled as a compromise by the
Presidency of the European Union, among whose members were two
permanent and two non-permanent members of the Security Council,
less than a week after a draft resolution on the same subject had been
vetoed in the Council.

18. Let me add that I agree with the Court that there has developed a
practice enabling the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal
in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. I doubt, however, whether a resolution of the
character of resolution ES-10/13 (which beyond any doubt is a recom-
mendation in the sense of Article 12, paragraph 1) could have been law-
fully adopted by the Assembly, whether in a regular session or in an
Emergency Special Session, if the Security Council had been considering
the specific issue of the construction of the wall without yet having taken
a decision.

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IV. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL PROPRIETY

19. I must confess that I have felt considerable hesitation as to whether
it would be judicially proper to comply with the request of the Assembly.

20. This hesitation had first of all to do with the question whether the
Court would not be unduly politicized by giving the requested advisory
opinion, thereby undermining its ability to contribute to global security
and to respect for the rule of law. It must be admitted that such an
opinion, whatever its content, will inevitably become part of an already
heated political debate. The question is in particular pertinent as three
members of the Quartet (the United States, the Russian Federation and
the European Union) abstained on resolution ES-10/14 and do not seem
too eager to see the Court complying with the request out of fear that the
opinion may interfere with the political peace process. Such fears cannot
be taken lightly since the situation concerned is a continuous danger for
international peace and security and a source of immense human suffer-
ing.

21. While recognizing that the risk of a possible politicization is real,
I nevertheless concluded that this risk would not be neutralized by a
refusal to give an opinion. The risk should have been a consideration for
the General Assembly when it envisaged making the request. Once the
decision to do so had been taken, the Court was made an actor on the
political stage regardless of whether it would or would not give an
opinion. A refusal would just as much have politicized the Court as the
rendering of an opinion. Only by limiting itself strictly to its judicial func-
tion is the Court able to minimize the risk that its credibility in upholding
the respect for the rule of law is affected.

22. My hesitation was also related to the question of the object of the
Assembly’s request. What was the Assembly’s purpose in making the
request? Resolution ES-10/14 seems to give some further information in
this respect in its last preambular paragraph which reads as follows:

“Bearing in mind that the passage of time further compounds the
difficulties on the ground, as Israel, the occupying Power, continues
to refuse to comply with international law vis-a-vis its construction
of the above-mentioned wall, with all its detrimental implications
and consequences . . .”

Evidentiy the Assembly finds it necessary to take speedy action to bring
to an end these detrimental implications and consequences and for this
purpose it needs the views of the Court.

But the question remains: Views on what? And why the views of a judi-
cial body on an act which has already been determined not to be in con-
formity with international law and the perpetrator of which has already
been called upon to terminate and reverse its wrongful conduct (resolu-
tion ES-10/13)?

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23. The present request recalls the dilemma as seen by Judge Petrén in
the Namibia case. He felt that the purpose of the request for an advisory
opinion was in that case “above all to obtain from the Court a reply such
that States would find themselves under obligation to bring to bear on
South Africa pressure . . .”. He called this a reversal of the natural dis-
tribution of roles as between the principal judicial organ and the political
organ of the United Nations since, instead of asking the Court its opin-
ion on a legal question in order to deduce the political consequences fol-
lowing from it, the opposite was done (Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opin-
ion, L C.J. Reports 1971, p. 128).

24. In the present Opinion the Court responds to the argument that
the Assembly has not made clear what use it would make of an advisory
opinion on the wall, with a reference to the Nuclear Weapons case where
it said that

“it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an
advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its
functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide for itself on
the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.” (Para. 61.)

And the Court continues that it “cannot substitute its assessment of the
usefulness of the opinion requested for that of the organ that seeks such
opinion, namely the General Assembly” (para. 62).

25. I do not consider this answer fully satisfactory. There is quite a dif-
ference between substituting the Court’s assessment of the usefulness of the
opinion for that of the organ requesting it and analysing from a judicial
viewpoint what the purpose of the request is. The latter is a simple neces-
sity in order to find out what the Court as a judicial body is in a position
to say. And from that point of view the request is phrased in a way which
can be called odd, to put it mildly. And in actual fact the Court makes this
analysis when in paragraph 39 of the Opinion it says that the use of the
terms “legal consequences” arising from the construction of the wall
“necessarily encompasses an assessment of whether that construction is or
is not in breach of certain rules and principles of international law”. I agree
with that statement but not because the word “necessarily” is related to the
terms of the request but because it is related to the judicial responsibility of
the Court. To quote the words of Judge Dillard in the Namibia case:

“when these [political] organs do see fit to ask for an advisory opin-
ion, they must expect the Court to act in strict accordance with its
judicial function. This function precludes it from accepting, without
any enquiry whatever, a legal conclusion which itself conditions the
nature and scope of the legal consequences flowing from it. It would
be otherwise if the resolutions requesting an opinion were legally
neutral...” (LC. J. Reports 1971, p. 151; emphasis added.)

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26. In the present case the request is far from being “legally neutral”.
In order not to be precluded, from the viewpoint of judicial propriety,
from rendering the opinion, the Court therefore is duty bound to recon-
sider the content of the request in order to uphold its judicial dignity. The
Court has done so but in my view it should have done so proprio motu
and not by assuming what the Assembly “necessarily” must have assumed,
something it evidently did not.

27. Let me add that in other respects I share the views the Court has
expressed with regard to the issue of judicial propriety. In particular the
Court’s finding that the subject-matter of the General Assembly cannot be
regarded as being “only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine”
(para. 49) is in my view worded in a felicitous way since, in regard
to the issue of the existence of a bilateral dispute, it avoids the dilemma
of “either/or”. A situation which is of legitimate concern to the organized
international community and a bilateral dispute with regard to that same
situation may exist simultaneously. The existence of the latter cannot
deprive the organs of the organized community of the competence which
has been assigned to them by the constitutive instruments. In the present
case the involvement of the United Nations in the question of Palestine is
a long-standing one and, as the Court says, the subject-matter of the
request is of acute concern to the United Nations (para. 50). By giving an
opinion the Court therefore in no way circumvents the principle of con-
sent to the judicial settlement of a bilateral dispute which exists simul-
taneously. The bilateral dispute cannot be dissociated from the subject-
matter of the request, but only in very particular circumstances which
cannot be spelled out in general can its existence be seen as an argument
for the Court to decline to reply to the request. In this respect, I find the
quotation from the Western Sahara Opinion in paragraph 47 of the
Opinion, which contains pure circular reasoning, less than helpful.

28. If the request has been legitimately made in view of the United
Nations long-standing involvement with the question of Palestine,
Israel’s argument that the Court does not have at its disposal the neces-
sary evidentiary material, as this is to an important degree in the hands of
Israel as a party to the dispute, does not hold water. The Court has to
respect Israel’s choice not to address the merits, but it is the Court’s own
responsibility to assess whether the available information is sufficient to
enable it to give the requested opinion. And, although it is a matter for
sincere regret that Israel has decided not to address the merits, the Court
is right when it concludes that the available material allows it to give the
opinion.

V. MERITS

29. I share the Court’s view that the 1907 Hague Regulations, the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the 1966 Covenants on Civil and

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Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child are applicable to the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory and that Israel by constructing the wall and
establishing the associated régime has breached its obligation under cer-
tain provisions of each of these conventions.

I find no fault with the Court’s reasoning in this respect although I
regret that the summary of the Court’s findings in paragraph 137 does
not contain a list of treaty provisions which have been breached.

30. The Court has refrained from taking a position with regard to ter-
ritorial rights and the question of permanent status. It has taken note of
statements, made by Israeli authorities on various occasions, that the
“fence” is a temporary measure, that it is not a border and that it does
not change the legal status of the territory. I welcome these assurances
which may be seen as the recognition of legal commitments on the side of
Israel but share the Court’s concern that the construction of the wall
creates a fait accompli. It is therefore all the more important to expedite
the political process which has to settle all territorial and permanent
status issues.

31. Self-determination — In my view, it would have been better if the
Court had also left issues of self-determination to this political process.
I fully recognize that the right of self-determination is one of the basic
principles of modern international jaw and that the realization of this
right for the people of Palestine is one of the most burning issues for
the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The overriding aim of the
political process, as it is embodied inter alia in the Roadmap, is “the
emergence of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian State
living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neigh-
bours” (dossier of the Secretary-General, No. 70). This goal is subscribed
to by both Israel and Palestine; both are, therefore, in good faith bound
to desist from acts which may jeopardize this common interest.

32. The right of self-determination of the Palestinian people is there-
fore imbedded in a much wider context than the construction of the wall
and has to find its realization in this wider context. 1 readily agree with
the Court that the wall and its associated régime impede the exercise by
the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination be it only for the
reason that the wall establishes a physical separation of the people
entitled to enjoy this right. But not every impediment to the exercise of a
right is by definition a breach of that right or of the obligation to respect
it, as the Court seems to conclude in paragraph 122. As was said by the
Quartet in its statement of 16 July 2002, the terrorist attacks (and the
failure of the Palestinian Authority to prevent them) cause also great
harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and thus

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seriously impede the realization of the right of self-determination. Is
that also a breach of that right? And if so, by whom? In my view the
Court could not have concluded that Israel had committed a breach of
its obligation to respect the Palestinians’ right to self-determination
without further legal analysis.

33. In this respect I do not find the references to earlier statements of
the Court in paragraph 88 of the Opinion very enlightening. In the
Namibia case the Court referred in specific terms to the relations between
the inhabitants of a mandate and the mandatory as reflected in the con-
stitutive instruments of the mandate system. In the East Timor case the
Court called the rights of peoples to self-determination in a colonial situa-
tion a right erga omnes, therefore a right opposable to all. But it said
nothing about the way in which this “right” must be translated into obli-
gations for States which are not the colonial Power. And J repeat the
question: Is every impediment to the exercise of the right to self-determi-
nation a breach of an obligation to respect it? Is it so only when it is
serious? Would the discontinuance of the impeding act restore the right or
merely bring the breach to an end?

34. Proportionality — The Court finds that the conditions set out in
the qualifying clauses in the applicable humanitarian law and human
rights conventions have not been met and that the measures taken by
Israel cannot be justified by military exigencies or by requirements of
national security or public order (paras. 135-137). I agree with that find-
ing but in my opinion the construction of the wall should also have been
put to the proportionality test, in particular since the concepts of military
necessity and proportionality have always been intimately linked in inter-
national humanitarian law. And in my view it is of decisive importance
that, even if the construction of the wall and its associated régime could
be justified as measures necessary to protect the legitimate rights of
Israeli citizens, these measures would not pass the proportionality test.
The route chosen for the construction of the wall and the ensuing dis-
turbing consequences for the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory are manifestly disproportionate to interests which Israel seeks to
protect, as seems to be recognized also in recent decisions of the Israeli
Supreme Court.

35. Self-defence — Israel based the construction of the wall on its
inherent right of self-defence as contained in Article 51 of the Charter. In
this respect it relied on Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001), adopted after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against
targets located in the United States.

The Court starts its response to this argument by stating that

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Article 51 recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in
the case of an armed attack by one State against another State (para. 139).
Although this statement is undoubtedly correct, as a reply to Israel's
argument it is, with all due respect, beside the point. Resolutions 1368
(2001) and 1373 (2001) recognize the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence without making any reference to an armed attack by a
State. The Security Council called acts of international terrorism, without
any further qualification, a threat to international peace and security
which authorizes it to act under Chapter VII of the Charter. And it actu-
ally did so in resolution 1373 (2001) without ascribing these acts of ter-
rorism to a particular State. This is the completely new element in these
resolutions. This new element is not excluded by the terms of Article 51
since this conditions the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence on a
previous armed attack without saying that this armed attack must come
from another State even if this has been the generally accepted interpre-
tation for more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably by-passed this
new element, the legal implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but
which marks undeniably a new approach to the concept of self-defence.

36. The argument which in my view is decisive for the dismissal of
Israel’s claim that it is merely exercising its right of self-defence can be
found in the second part of paragraph 139. The right of self-defence as
contained in the Charter is a rule of international law and thus relates to
international phenomena. Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) refer
to acts of international terrorism as constituting a threat to international
peace and security; they therefore have no immediate bearing on terrorist
acts originating within a territory which is under control of the State
which is also the victim of these acts. And Israel does not claim that these
acts have their origin elsewhere. The Court therefore rightly concludes
that the situation is different from that contemplated by resolutions 1368
(2001) and 1373 (2001) and that consequently Article 51 of the Charter
cannot be invoked by Israel.

VI. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

37. I have voted in favour of subparagraph (3) (B), (C) and (E) of the
operative part. I agree with the Court’s finding with regard to the conse-
quences of the breaches by Israel of its obligations under international
law for Israel itself and for the United Nations (paras. 149-153 and 160).
Since I have voted, however, against operative subparagraph (3) (D), the
remainder of my opinion will explain the reasons for my dissent in a
more detailed way than I did in my introductory remarks.

38. The General Assembly requests the Court to specify what are the

98
231 CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL (SEP. OP. KOOIJMANS)

legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall. If the object
of the request is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General
Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions
(para. 50) it is only logical that a specific paragraph of the dispositif is
addressed to the General Assembly. That the paragraph is also addressed
to the Security Council is logical as well in view of the shared or parallel
responsibilities of the two organs.

Since the Court has found that the construction of the wall and the
associated régime constitute breaches of Israel’s obligations under inter-
national law, it is also logical that the Court spells out what are the legal
consequences for Israel.

39. Although the Court beyond any doubt is entitled to do so, the
request itself does not necessitate (not even by implication) the determi-
nation of the legal consequences for other States, even if a great number
of participants urged the Court to do so (para. 146). In this respect the
situation is completely different from that in the Namibia case where the
question was exclusively focused on the legal consequences for States,
and logically so since the subject-matter of the request was a decision by
the Security Council.

In the present case there must therefore be a special reason for deter-
mining the legal consequences for other States since the clear analogy in
wording with the request in the Namibia case is insufficient.

40. That reason as indicated in paragraphs 155 to 158 of the Opinion
is that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga
omnes. I must admit that I have considerable difficulty in understanding
why a violation of an obligation erga omnes by one State should neces-
sarily lead to an obligation for third States. The nearest I can come to
such an explanation is the text of Article 41 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. That Article reads:

“1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means
any serious breach within the meaning of article 40. [Article 40 deals
with serious breaches of obligations arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law.]

2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a
serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or
assistance in maintaining that situation.”

Paragraph 3 of Article 41 is a saving clause and of no relevance for the
present case.

41. I will not deal with the tricky question whether obligations erga
omnes can be equated with obligations arising under a peremptory norm
of general international law. In this respect I refer to the useful commen-
tary of the ILC under the heading of Chapter ITI of its Articles. For argu-
ment’s sake I start from the assumption that the consequences of the
violation of such obligations are identical.

99
232 CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL (SEP. OP. KOOIJMANS)

42. Paragraph 1 of Article 41 explicitly refers to a duty to co-operate.
As paragraph 3 of the commentary states, “What is called for in the
face of serious breaches is a joint and coordinated effort by all States to
counteract the effects of these breaches.” And paragraph 2 refers to
“[clooperation . . . in the framework of a competent international organi-
zation, in particular the United Nations”. Article 41, paragraph |, there-
fore does not refer to individual obligations of third States as a result of
a serious breach. What is said there is encompassed in the Court’s finding
in operative subparagraph (3) (E) and not in subparagraph (3) (D).

43. Article 41, paragraph 2, however, explicitly mentions the duty not
to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach just as
operative subparagraph (3) (D) does. In its commentary the ILC refers to
unlawful situations which — virtually without exception — take the form
of a legal claim, usually to territory. It gives as examples “an attempted
acquisition of sovereignty over territory through denial of the right of
self-determination”, the annexation of Manchuria by Japan and of
Kuwait by Iraq, South Africa’s claim to Namibia, the Unilateral Decla-
ration of Independence in Rhodesia and the creation of Bantustans in
South Africa. In other words, all examples mentioned refer to situations
arising from formal or quasi-formal promulgations intended to have an
erga omnes effect. I have no problem with accepting a duty of non-
recognition in such cases.

44. I have great difficulty, however, in understanding what the
duty not to recognize an illegal fact involves. What are the individual
addressees of this part of operative subparagraph (3) (D) supposed to do
in order to comply with this obligation? That question is even more
cogent considering that 144 States unequivocally have condemned the
construction of the wall as unlawful (resolution ES-10/13), whereas those
States which abstained or voted against (with the exception of Israel)
did not do so because they considered the construction of the wall
as legal. The duty not to recognize amounts, therefore, in my view to an
obligation without real substance.

45. That argument does not apply to the second obligation mentioned
in Article 41, paragraph 2, namely the obligation not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation created by the serious breach. I
therefore fully support that part of operative subparagraph (3) (D).
Moreover, I would have been in favour of adding in the reasoning or
even in the operative part a sentence reminding States of the importance
of rendering humanitarian assistance to the victims of the construction of
the wall. (The Court included a similar sentence, be it with a different
scope, in its Opinion in the Namibia case, 1 C.J. Reports 1971, p. 56,
para. 125.)

46. Finally, | have difficulty in accepting the Court’s finding that the
States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention are under an obligation

100
233 CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL (SEP. OP. KOOLJMANS)

to ensure compliance by Israel with humanitarian law as embodied in
that Convention (paragraph 159, operative subparagraph (3) (D), last
part).

In this respect the Court bases itself on common Article | of the
Geneva Convention which reads: “The High Contracting Parties under-
take to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.” (Emphasis added.)

47. The Court does not say on what ground it concludes that this
Article imposes obligations on third States not party to a conflict.
The travaux préparatoires do not support that conclusion. According to
Professor Kalshoven, who investigated thoroughly the genesis and further
development of common Article 1, it was mainly intended to ensure
respect of the conventions by the population as a whole and as such was
closely linked to common Article 3 dealing with internal conflicts
(F. Kalshoven, “The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All
Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit”, in Yearbook of
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 3-61). His conclusion
from the travaux préparatoires is:

“I have not found in the records of the Diplomatic Conference
even the slightest awareness on the part of government delegates
that one might ever wish to read into the phrase ‘to ensure respect’
any undertaking by a contracting State other than an obligation to
ensure respect for the Conventions by its people ‘in all circum-
stances’.” (Ibid., p. 28.)

48. Now it is true that already from an early moment the International
Committee of the Red Cross in its (non-authoritative) commentaries on
the 1949 Convention has taken the position that common Article 1 con-
tains an obligation for all States parties to ensure respect by other States
parties. It is equally true that the Diplomatic Conference which adopted
the 1977 Additional Protocols incorporated common Article 1 in the
First Protocol. But at no moment did the Conference deal with its
presumed implications for third States.

49. Hardly less helpful is the Court’s reference to common Article 1 in
the Nicaragua case. The Court, without interpreting its terms, observed
that “such an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions
themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which
the Conventions merely give specific expression”. The Court continued
that “The United States [was] thus under an obligation not to encourage
persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua” to act in viola-
tion of common Article 3 (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, C.J. Reports 1986, p. 114, para. 220).

But this duty of abstention is completely different from a positive duty
to ensure compliance with the law.
50. Although I certainly am not in favour of a restricted interpretation

101
234 CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL (SEP. OP. KOOIJMANS)

of common Article 1, such as may have been envisaged in 1949, I simply
do not know whether the scope given by the Court to this Article in the
present Opinion is correct as a statement of positive law. Since the Court
does not give any argument in its reasoning, I do not feel able to support
its finding. Moreover, I fail to see what kind of positive action, resulting
from this obligation, may be expected from individual States, apart from
diplomatic démarches.

$1. For all these reasons I felt compelled to vote against operative sub-
paragraph (3) (D).

(Signed) Pieter H. KOOUMANS.

102


110 NUCLEAR TESTS (DECL. BARWICK)

consuming and therefore comes into conflict with the urgency of the
matter coupled with the prospect of irreparable damage to the
rights of the parties. It is this situation which furnishes the “raison
d’être” of interim relief.

If, therefore, the Court, in this case, has granted interim measures of
protection it is without prejudice to the substance whether jurisdictional
or otherwise which cannot be prejudged at this stage and will have to be
gone into further in the next phase.

Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICK makes the following declaration:

I have voted for the indication of interim measures and the Order of the
Court as to the further procedure in the case because the very thorough
discussions in which the Court has engaged over the past weeks and my
own researches have convinced me that the General Act of 1928 and the
French Government’s declaration to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court with reservations each provide, prima facie, a basis on which the
Court might have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claims made
by Australia in its Application of 9 May 1973. Further, the exchange of
diplomatic notes between the Governments of Australia and France in
1973 afford, in my opinion, at least prima facie evidence of the existence
of a dispute between those Governments as to matters of international
law affecting their respective rights.

Lastly, the material before the Court, particularly that appearing in the
UNSCEAR reports provides reasonable grounds for concluding that
further deposit in the Australian territorial environment of radio-active
particles of matter is likely to do harm for which no adequate comnen-
satory measures could be provided.

These conclusions are sufficient to warrant the indication of interim
measures,

I agree with the form of the provisional measures indicated, under-
standing that the action prescribed is action on the part of governments
and that the measures are indicated in respect only of the Australian
Government’s claim to the inviolability of its territory.

Judges FORSTER, GROS, PETREN and IGNACIO-PINTO append dissenting
opinions to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) F.A.
(Initialled) S.A.

15


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA BARCELONA
TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER
COMPANY, LIMITED

(NOUVELLE REQUETE: 1962)
(BELGIQUE c. ESPAGNE)

ORDONNANCE DU 24 MAI 1968

1968

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT
AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED

(NEW APPLICATION: 1962)
(BELGIUM y. SPAIN)

ORDER OF 24 MAY 1968
Mode officiel de citation:

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
ordonnance du 24 mai 1968, C.I.J. Recueil 1968, p. 13.

Official citation:

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Order of 24 May 1968, I.C.J. Reports 1968, p. 13.

Sales nmber 32.2

13

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1968
1968
24 May
24 May 1968 General List:
No. 50

CASE CONCERNING
THE BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT
AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED

(NEW APPLICATION: 1962)
(BELGIUM v. SPAIN)

ORDER

Present: President BUSTAMANTE Y RIVERO; Vice-President KORETSKY;
Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, TANAKA, JESSUP, MORELLI,

PADILLA NERVO, Gros, AMMOUN, BENGZON, PETREN, LACHS,
ONYEAMA; Registrar AQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 37
of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Order of 15 September 1967 extending to 31 May

1968 the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the Government of
Spain,
BARCELONA TRACTION (ORDER OF 24 V 68) 14

Makes the following Order:

Whereas, by a letter dated 10 May 1968, the Agent for the Government
of Spain, for the reasons therein set out, requested the Court to extend
by one month the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder;

Whereas, on 10 May 1968, acertified true copy of the afore-mentioned
letter was transmitted to the Agent for the Government of Belgium who
was asked to make known the views of that Government on the request;

Whereas, by a letter dated 17 May 1968, the Agent for the Govern-
ment of Belgium stated that that Government had no objection to the
request for extension;

Although noting with regret that the time-limits originally fixed by the
Court for the filing of the pleadings have not been observed, whereby
the written proceedings have been considerably prolonged,

THE COURT

Nevertheless extends to 1 July 1968 the time-limit for the filing of the
Rejoinder of the Government of Spain.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fourth day of May, one
thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to
the Government of Belgium and to the Government of Spain, respec. -
tively.

(Signed) J. L. BUSTAMANTE R..,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.


I15

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. KLAESTAD
[Traduction]

Je partage l’opinion selon laquelle la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires doit être rejetée, mais ceci pour des raisons
différentes que j’exposerai brièvement, de façon générale, sans
entrer dans les détails.

Au présent stade préliminaire de la procédure, j'ai à examiner
sommairement et de manière provisoire s’il apparaît, prima jacie,
que la Cour n’a pas compétence pour agir en vertu de l’article 41
de son Statut.

Dans sa déclaration d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire
de la Cour, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a formulé
la réserve selon laquelle la déclaration ne s’applique pas «aux
différends relatifs à des questions relevant essentiellement de la
compétence nationale des Etats-Unis d’ Amérique, telle qu’elle est
fixée par les États-Unis d'Amérique ». Cette réserve se rapporte à
l’ensemble de la juridiction de la. Cour aux termes du Statut, y
compris sa compétence pour agir en vertu de l'article 47.

Le Gouvernement des États-Unis a présenté, conformément à
l’article 62 du Règlement de la Cour, une exception préliminaire en
l'instance introduite par la requéte,.« pour autant que cette requête
se rapporte à la vente ou aux autres mesures de disposition des
actions de la General Aniline and Film Corporation actuellement
détenues par le Gouvernement des États-Unis ». Le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis a décidé que la vente ou la disposition des actions
est une question qui reléve essentiellement de sa compétence
nationale. [la invoqué la réserve précitée et a contesté la compétence
de la Cour pour indiquer des mesures conservatoires se rapportant
à la vente ou aux autres mesures de disposition des actions. Cette
invocation de la réserve doit être entendue comme se rapportant
à la première conclusion de la requête, relative à la prétendue obli-
gation de restituer les avoirs de l’Zuferhandel, et non pas à la seconde
conclusion, de caractère subsidiaire, qui a trait à la référence à un
règlement judiciaire, à l’arbitrage ou à la conciliation.

A l'audience, le co-agent du Gouvernement suisse s’est référé à la
question de la validité de la réserve des États-Unis mais il n’a pas
expressément prétendu que cette réserve fat non valide. En ce qui
concerne cette question, il ne paraît pas pour le moment qu'il y ait
une divergence de vues que la Cour aurait à examiner.

Dans l'affaire relative à Certains Emprunts norvégiens, la Cour
s’est trouvée en présence d’une situation semblable. En vertu de la
condition de réciprocité, la Norvège avait invoqué une réserve
contenue dans la déclaration française d’ acceptation de la juridic-
tion obligatoire de la Cour et semblable à la réserve des États-Unis

14
INTERHANDEL (OP. INDIV. DE M. KLAESTAD) 116

mentionnée plus haut. Les deux Parties se sont fondées sur la
déclaration française et ont argumenté en se basant sur la validité
juridique de la réserve. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour ne s’est pas
tenue pour appelée à entrer dans un examen de la validité de la
réserve française et a décidé de l'appliquer.

Je considère qu’il me faudra adopter dans la présente espèce la
même attitude, en appliquant la réserve dans la mesure où elle est
invoquée et sans entrer dans un examen de sa validité. Mais à ce
stade préliminaire de la présente procédure, la conclusion que la
Cour n’est pas compétente en ce qui concerne la question à laquelle
se rapporte l'exception préliminaire, ne doit nécessairement avoir
qu'un caractère provisoire. Une telle conclusion prima facie ne
préjuge en aucune manière la question de la compétence de la Cour
pour connaître de l'affaire au fond.

(Signé) Helge KLAESTAD.

15


39

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ

Je me rallie à l’arrêt rendu par la Cour, mais je considère qu'il
y a lieu de mettre en relief certaines considérations de caractère
juridique à l'appui dudit arrêt.

I.

Le cataclysme que nous venons de traverser ouvre une nouvelle
époque dans l’histoire de la civilisation ; elle est plus importante
que toutes les précédentes: plus importante que celle de la
Renaissance, que celle de la Révolution française de 1789, que
celle qui a suivi la premiére guerre mondiale ; et cela par suite des
profondes modifications qui se sont produites dans tous les ordres
de l’activité, surtout dans la vie internationale et dans le droit des
gens,

Il est donc nécessaire de connaître l’état actuel de ce droit ; il
faut le faire dans les matières se rapportant au litige soumis à la
Cour. Cela ne veut pas dire que ce tribunal devait se prononcer sur
tous les points de droit que ces matières comportent ; mais il m'a
semblé utile que l’un des juges, au moins, les examine. C’est ce que
je me propose de faire dans la présente opinion individuelle.

IT.

Des divers points de droit concernant le différend actuel, je
retiendrai les sept suivants :

A. — Quel droit doit appliquer la Cour ?
B. — Importance de la politique, de la force et de l'opinion
publique sur l'exercice des droits des États.
. — La souveraineté des États. Sa nouvelle conception.

en ce qui concerne le litige actuel.

. — Le passage des navires de commerce et de guerre d’un
État dans les eaux territoriales d'un autre État, ainsi que
dans les détroits. Sa situation actuelle.

F. — L'intervention, les actes de force, les violations de souve-
raineté.
G. — L'abus du droit.

Toutes ces matières sont soit anciennes maïs revêtant des aspects
nouveaux, soit entièrement nouvelles. Toutes font partie de ce
qu’on appelle le droit international nouveau.

39

C
D. — La responsabilité des Etats. Divers aspects qu’elle présente
E
40 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

Je vais examiner, dans leurs grandes lignes, ces différents sujets,
sans indiquer l’application de chacun d'eux au litige actuel, car elle
ressort suffisamment du texte de la sentence.

III.

Dans l’opinion individuelle que j’ai émise au sujet de l’Avis
consultatif rendu par la Cour internationale de Justice le 28 mai 1948,
j'ai indiqué que, par suite des profondes transformations survenues
dans la vie internationale, un nouveau droit des gens s’est fait jour ;
il est fondé sur l'interdépendance sociale. J'y ai exposé les caractéris-
tiques de ce nouveau droit ; il est, en somme, la réalisation de la
justice sociale. Il est tout autre chose que l’ancien droit strictement
juridique ; il se rapproche de la notion d’équité, sans se confondre
avec elle. Ce nouveau droit international n’est pas une lex ferenda,
comme on le croit ordinairement : il existe réellement et il a des
assises essentiellement positives, notamment, dans le nouveau
régime d’interdépendance sociale qui se fait jour, dans la Charte des
Nations Unies, ainsi que d’autres éléments qu’il n’y a pas lieu
d'indiquer ici. Il se heurte souvent avec l’ancien droit des gens.

Quel droit doit appliquer la Cour? Celui qui existait jusqu’au
cataclysme de 1939 ? Ou doit-elle renouveler ce droit, le mettre,
en quelque sorte, à jour, en harmonie avec les nouvelles conditions
de la vie sociale et internationale ? (Droit international nouveau.)

On croit généralement que le rôle de la Cour est seulement
d'appliquer le droit international existant, sans se préoccuper de
savoir s’il correspond ou non à ces nouvelles conditions et que, si
elle le renouvelait, elle se transformerait en véritable législateur.

Or, la Cour actuelle a maintenant une nouvelle mission qui
n’appartenait pas, au moins de façon formelle, à la Cour précédente.
En effet, la Charte des Nations Unies, dans son article 13, a chargé
l’Assemblée générale d’« encourager le développement progressif
du droit international et sa codification ». Et, afin d'obtenir ces
résultats, cette Assemblée, dans sa Résolution 171 de 1947, a
manifesté le désir que la Cour internationale de Justice développe
ce droit, c’est-à-dire le mette à jour.

La Cour a ainsi, actuellement, trois attributions :

a) l’ancienne, qui consiste à dégager le droit existant, à le préciser
et le confirmer ;

b) celle de modifier, conformément aux conditions actuelles de
la vie internationale, les préceptes en vigueur mais devenus désuets ;

zc} celle de créer, formuler des préceptes nouveaux pour les
matières anciennes où il n’en existe pas, ainsi que pour les matières
nouvelles.

40
41 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

Ces deux dernières attributions de la Cour dérivent du fait
que la vie internationale est en évolution constante et que le droit
des gens doit toujours la refléter. Dans leur exercice, la Cour ne
doit pas procéder arbitrairement mais s'inspirer des grands principes
du droit international nouveau.

Deux considérations, entre autres, vont montrer l'exactitude
de ce qui vient d’être dit. Supposons que le Conseil de Sécurité de
l'O. N. U. décide de prendre des mesures de coercition contre un
État et envoie, dans ce but, des navires de guerre appartenant à
différents pays, puisque l'O. N. U. ne dispose pas de force navale
propre. Si cette escadre internationale veut traverser les eaux
territoriales de certains États, ceux-ci ne pourront mettre aucune
entrave à ce passage, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, même si
leurs lois nationales exigent une autorisation préalable ou d’autres
formalités. Il s’agit ici d’un cas nouveau, du passage d’une force
internationale ; or, celle-ci doit avoir le droit de passer librement
partout. Si un litige était soumis à la Cour à ce sujet, il serait
inadmissible qu’elle déclarât que ladite force internationale doit
se soumettre à la législation des États riverains.

La deuxième considération est, elle aussi, décisive. On connaît
la doctrine bien établie dans le droit international de la clause dite
rebus sic stantibus, d'après laquelle un Etat peut se refuser à exécuter
un traité si les conditions dans lesquelles il l’a signé ont substan-
tiellement changé. Cette doctrine est si juste qu’elle commence à
passer dans le droit privé. Or, la faculté qu’a la Cour de renouveler
le droit international n’est que l’application dans tout ce droit de
la doctrine relative à la clause rebus sic stantibus ; le principe qui
l'anime est le même : c’est un principe de justice sociale.

La Cour se trouve donc en présence de ce dilemme: ou bien
appliquer strictement les préceptes du droit existant, même s'ils
sont surannés et peuvent conduire à des injustices ou à des solutions
inacceptables ; ou bien renouveler ces préceptes, comme il vient
d’être dit. A mon sens le choix n’est pas douteux.

IV.

Le droit d’interdépendance sociale n’oppose pas, comme on l’a
fait jusqu'ici, le droit à la politique ; au contraire, il admet qu’il
existe des rapports étroits entre eux. .

_ Les juristes imbus du droit traditionnel ont considéré le droit
international comme ayant un caractère strictement juridique ;
ils n’envisageaient que ce qu’ils appelaient le droit pur, en excluant
entièrement la politique comme étrangère au droit. Or, le droit
pur n'existe pas: le droit est le résultat de la vie sociale et évolue
avec elle, c'est-à-dire est, en grande partie, l'effet de la pratique,
de la politique, surtout collective, des États. Il ne faut donc pas

41
42 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

établir un antagonisme entre le droit et la politique ; ces deux
éléments doivent s’interpénétrer.

La politique et l'opinion publique exercent une grande influence
sur l'exercice des droits des États. Divers cas peuvent se présenter,
quelques-uns desquels apparaissent dans le litige actuel :

A. — Un Etat a un droit indiscutable envers un autre Etat
mais ne veut pas l'exercer pour diverses considérations politiques,
notamment pour maintenir de bonnes relations avec ledit État.

B — Un Etat a un droit envers un autre Etat mais celui-ci le
conteste. Peut-il appuyer son droit par la force? Et l’autre Etat
peut-il, de son côté, résister en employant, aussi, la force ?

C. — Un État a un droit à exercer sur le territoire d’un autre
État, par exemple, le droit de passage. Peut- il appuyer ce droit
par la force s’il est contesté ? Et, à son tour, l’autre État peut-il
résister par la force également ?

D. — Les droits de deux États se heurtent, ce qui est, en grande
partie, le résultat du régime individualiste qui n’admet presque pas
de limitations aux droits qu’il consacre. Comment résoudre ces
conflits ?

E. — Un Etat n’a pas le droit d'accomplir certains actes sur le:
territoire d'un autre Etat, mais ses intérêts vitaux ou l'intérêt
général le poussent à agir ainsi, en violant, par suite, la souveraineté
de l’autre Etat, et le droit international.

F. — Un État craint d'être victime d’une agression de la part
d'un autre État ou a des craintes légitimes que celui-ci veuille
l'empêcher d'exercer un de ses droits. Peut-il employer la menace
de force, ou même la force, comme précaution, pour empêcher ladite
agression ou la violation de son droit ?

G. — Un État se trouve en cas de légitime défense.

Dans toutes ces situations, les considérations politiques joueront
un rôle très important dans l'attitude des États intéressés ; ceux-ci
devront tenir grand compte de l'opinion publique.

La Charte de FO. N. U. (art. 2, n° 4) interdit l'emploi de la force,
sauf en cas de légitime défense art. 51). Par suite, l'État qui se
trouve dans les situations précédentes, à l'exception de celles indi-
quées sous les lettres A et E, doit avoir recours non pas à la force
mais au Conseil de Sécurité ou a la Cour internationale de Justice.

Ici apparaît clairement la différence entre l’ancien et le nouveau
droit international.

ll y a lieu de remarquer, en passant, que malgré la prohibition
par la Charte des Nations Unies de l’emploi de la force, celle-ci
peut encore, dans certains cas, produire des effets juridiques : par
exemple les acquisitions faites par le vainqueur à la suite d’une

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43 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

guerre, l'indépendance de colonies, la sécession d'États, ces der-
nières étant ensuite reconnues par les métropoles ou par l'O. N. U.
Je ne m’attarderai pas sur ce sujet d’un grand caractère psycholo-
gique, car il sort du cadre de ce travail.

V.

Il convient de considérer particulièrement ce qui a trait à la
souveraineté des Etats, car les grandes questions qui dominent Je
litige actuel ont toutes leur origine premiére dans cette notion
ou l’affectent.

Par souveraineté, il faut entendre l’ensemble des droits et des
attributions que l'État a sur son territoire, à l'exclusion de tous
autres États, ainsi que dans ses rapports avec ceux-ci.

La souveraineté confère des droits aux États et leur impose des
obligations.

Ces droits ne sont pas les mêmes et ne s’exercent pas de la même
manière dans tous les domaines du droit international : les quatre
traditionnels — terrestre, maritime, fluvial et lacustre — auxquels
il faut ajouter les trois nouveaux — aérien, polaire et flottant
(îles flottantes) ; d'autre part, la violation de ces droits n’a pas la
même gravité dans tous ces domaines.

Quelques juristes ont proposé d’abolir la notion de souveraineté
des États, la considérant caduque. C’est une erreur : cette notion
a son fondement dans le sentiment national et dans la psychologie
des peuples, c’est-à-dire a des racines profondes. Le Pacte consti-
tutif de l'Organisation internationale a reconnu expressément la
souveraineté des États et s’est efforcé de la mettre en harmonie.
avec les fins de cette Organisation (art. 2, n° I).

Cette notion a évolué, et actuellement il faut en avoir une
conception qui s'accorde avec les nouvelles conditions de la vie sociale.
On ne doit plus considérer la souveraineté comme un droit absolu
et individuel de chaque Etat, ainsi qu’on le faisait dans l’ancien
droit fondé sur le régime individualiste, d’après lequel les Etats
n'étaient liés que par les préceptes qu'ils avaient acceptés. Aujour-
d’hui, en raison de l’interdépendance sociale, ainsi que de la prédo-
minance de l'intérêt général, les Etats sont liés par bien des pré-
ceptes sans que leur volonté intervienne. La souveraineté des
Etats est devenue actuellement une institution, une fonction sociale
internationale de caractère psychologique et devant s'exercer
conformément au droit international nouveau.

VI.

De même que la souveraineté, la responsabilité des États est une
matière ancienne et qui occupe une place très importante dans le

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44 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

x

droit international. Elle est délicate et sujette 4 controverses du
fait qu’il n’y a pas de préceptes bien établis qui la réglementent.
Cela est apparu clairement 4 la Conférence de codification de
La Haye de 1930.

Il est donc nécessaire que cette matière soit précisée dans ses
parties essentielles et même renouvelée.

Pour ce renouvellement dans les matières concernant le litige
actuel, la Cour pourrait s'inspirer des données suivantes basées
sur le droit d’interdépendance sociale :

1° Tout État est tenu d’assurer sur son territoire l’ordre indis-
pensable pour l’accomplissement des obligations internationales :
autrement, il engage sa responsabilité.

2° Tout Etat est tenu d’exercer une surveillance diligente sur son
territoire. Cette surveillance ne s’étend pas aux régions désertes ;
elle n’est pas la même pour la partie terrestre que pour les parties
maritime, aérienne, etc.

Cette obligation de surveillance varie selon les conditions géogra-
phiques et autres du pays : un État surveille certaines régions plus
que d’autres, suivant ses intérêts. D'autre part, cette surveillance
dépend des moyens dont dispose chaque État. En Amérique, cette
question est très importante : les États-Unis et bien des pays latins
ne peuvent pas surveiller efficacement toute l'énorme étendue de
leurs côtes. Comme l’a établi très justement l’article 25 de la Conven-
tion XIII de La Haye de 1907, une Puissance n’est pas tenue
d'exercer d’autres surveillances que celles qui comportent les moyens
dont elle dispose.

L'État qui n’exerce pas cette surveillance ou qui est négligent
dans son exercice engage sa responsabilité dans le cas où des dom-
mages sont causés sur son territoire à d’autres Etats ou à leurs
ressortissants.

3° Comme conséquence de ce qui précède, tout État est considéré
comme ayant connu ou ayant dé avoir connaissance des actes dom-
mageables commis dans les régions de son territoire où il a des auto-
rités locales ; ce n’est pas une présomption, ce n’est pas une hypo-
thèse : c’est la conséquence de sa souveraineté, Si ledit État prétend
qu’il n’a pas eu connaissance de ces actes, notamment par suite de
circonstances que sa vigilance ne pouvait déceler, par exemple
l’action de sous-marins, etc., il doit le prouver : autrement sa respon-
sabilité est engagée.

4° Tout État doit prendre des mesures préventives en vue
d'empêcher l’exécution sur son territoire d’actes délictueux ou
dommageables à l'égard d’autres Etats ou de leurs ressortissants,
et si de tels actes sont commis, il est tenu de les réprimer.

5° Tout Etat est tenu d’éclaircir immédiatement les circonstances
dans lesquelles a été commis sur son territoire un acte délictueux ou
dommageable, notamment de procéder à des enquêtes.

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45 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

6° il est tenu d'informer immédiatement les pays intéressés de
l’existence sur son territoire de dangers dont il a connaissance, qui
pourraient leur causer des dommages et qui sont l’œuvre d’autres
pays ; autrement, il se rend complice.

Il y a actuellement dans le droit international trois notions
de grande importance, bien distinctes, qui ont des points communs
et qu’on tend à confondre, car toutes se réfèrent à des dommages
subis par un État ordinairement sur le territoire d’un autre État,
par la faute de celui-ci, et pour lesquels des indemnités sont récla-
mées. Ces trois notions sont celles du délit international, de l'acte
dommageable et de l'acte illicite.

La caractéristique du délit international est qu'il est un acte
contraire aux sentiments d'humanité. Par suite des exigences de la
conscience juridique des peuples, on tend actuellement à introduire
cette notion de délit comme précepte fondamental du droit
international.

On doit considérer comme délits internationaux :

a) les actes contraires aux sentiments d'humanité commis par
un État sur son territoire, même pour défendre sa sécurité ou ses
intérêts vitaux : par exemple, la pose de mines sous-marines, sans
en aviser les pays intéressés ;

b) les actes contraires aux sentiments d'humanité commis par
un État et ayant causé des dommages sur le territoire d’un autre
État, avec le consentement de celui-ci. Ce dernier est considéré
comme complice ;

c) les actes contraires aux sentiments d'humanité commis sur le
territoire d’un Etat par un autre pays sans le consentement dudit
État mais que celui-ci a connus ou dé connaître, et qui ont causé
des dommages à un tiers. Cette connaissance ne suffit pas pour
constituer un délit : il faut que l’État ait négligé d'informer dudit
acte les pays intéressés,

L'acte dommageable est celui qui cause un préjudice à un Etat ou
à ses ressortissants, mais par suite de faits ne constituant pas un
délit international : par exemple, comme conséquence d’une insur-
rection, d’une guerre civile, etc. Cet acte n'engage la responsabilité
de l’État sur le territoire duquel il a été commis que s’il n’avait pas
pris les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher son exécution ou pour
le réprimer.
_ L'acte illicite est celui qui méconnait ou viole les droits d’un
État ou qui est contraire à la loi internationale, à un traité, etc. :
par exemple, la violation de frontières, la non-exécution d’une
convention, etc. La responsabilité de l’État qui l’a commis varie
selon la nature dudit acte.

Ii convient d’attirer spécialement l'attention sur cinq catégories
d'actes illicites ou contraires au droit international, qui se rapportent

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46 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

au litige actuel: l'intervention, la pression ou menace de force, la
manifestation de force dans un but d’intimidation, la violafion de
souveraineté et l'abus du droit dont je parlerai plus loin.

La responsabilité d’un État peut être limitée. Elle peut être
aussi atténuée par certaines circonstances, par exemple le fait d’avoir
agi au bénéfice de l'intérêt général, le fait d’avoir pris toutes les
mesures nécessaires pour éviter que d’autres Etats ou leurs ressor-
tissants subissent des dommages sur son territoire. Mais en cas de
délit international, il ne peut y avoir de circonstances atténuantes.

Dans les matières précédentes, on voit clairement la différence
qui existe entre l’ancien droit individualiste et le nouveau droit
d’interdépendance sociale.

VII.

Le passage des navires de commerce ou de guerre d’un État dans
les eaux territoriales d’un autre État ou dans les détroits qui s’y
trouvent et font communiquer deux mers libres est une question de
grande importance. Il s’agit du passage en temps de paix, car pour
le passage en temps de guerre, il doit y avoir des règles spéciales
conformes à la nouvelle condition juridique de la guerre.

Dans le litige actuel, les Parties ont admis, conformément à la
doctrine courante, que le passage des navires de commerce d’un
Etat dans les eaux territoriales d’un autre Etat, y compris celles des
détroits qui unissent deux mers ouvertes, était libre ; mais la question
de savoir s’il en était de même pour le passage des navires de guerre
a été très controversée : l’agent du Gouvernement albanais a
soutenu que les États riverains pouvaient réglementer le passage
de ces navires, ce qui a été nié par Vagent du Royaume-Uni.

La Charte de l'Atlantique de 1941 a posé comme principe
fondamental la liberté des mers et des océans. Les nations unies
ont signé, le ret janvier 1942, une déclaration par laquelle elles
acceptaient ce principe. L'article 3 de la Charte des Nations Unies
fait allusion à cette déclaration. L'opinion publique est, elle aussi,
favorable à cette liberté des mers ; on peut donc dire qu'elle fait
partie du nouveau droit international.

On doit, par suite, considérer qu’actuellement le passage dans la
mer territoriale d’un Etat ou dans les détroits qui s’y trouvent,
ainsi que dans ceux de caractère international, n'est pas une simple
tolérance mais un droit pour les navires de commerce des autres
États. Ces navires, en outre, ont une mission pacifique et contribuent

au développement de bonnes relations entre les peuples.

Ii n’en est pas de même pour les navires de guerre. La guerre
étant désormais mise hors la loi, la mission de ces navires doit être
principalement d’assurer la légitime défense des pays auxquels ils

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47 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

appartiennent. De ce fait, s’ils peuvent effectuer un passage innocent
dans les détroits constituant une route internationale de navigation
entre deux mers libres, dans les autres cas, les Etats riverains
peuvent réglementer ce passage, notamment pour défendre leur
sécurité ou leurs intérêts, mais ils ne peuvent pas l’interdire.

Les navires de guerre n’ont un droit de passage sans aucune
restriction que lorsqu'ils effectuent une mission internationale
confiée par l'O. N. U., comme il a été dit précédemment.

VIII.

Au sujet du passage des navires de guerre britanniques dans
les eaux territoriales albanaises le 22 octobre 1946 et les
12-13 novembre suivants, on a beaucoup discuté sur Vinterven-
tion, les manifestations de force dans un but d’intimidation, la
violation de souveraineté, etc., et parfois en confondant ces notions.

L'intervention d’un Etat dans les affaires intérieures ou exté-
rieures d’un autre Etat, c’est-à-dire son action en vue d’obliger
celui-ci à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose, a été condamnée
depuis longtemps ; elle est formellement prohibée par la Charte des
Nations Unies. Il en est de même pour les autres actes de force et
même pour la menace de force.

L'agent du Royaume-Uni a soutenu que l'opération de dragage
dite « Retail » effectuée par les navires britanniques dans le Détroit
de Corfou constituait une intervention ou auto-défense justifiée.
Cela n’est pas exact : cette opération était, en réalité, une violation
de la souveraineté albanaise.

La Cour doit réaffirmer, chaque fois qu’il y a lieu, que l’inter-
vention, ainsi que tout acte de force, ne sont permis sous aucune
forme et sous aucun prétexte dans les rapports internationaux ;
mais elle peut admettre des circonstances atténuantes dans des
cas exceptionnels.

IX.

L'abus du droit n'existait pas autrefois dans le droit. Chacun
pouvait exercer ses droits dans toute leur étendue, même s’il en
résultait un préjudice pour autrui ; il n’y avait, dans ce cas, aucune
obligation d’indemnité.

Actuellement, il n’en est plus ainsi : certaines législations civiles,
surtout les plus récentes, prohibent expressément l'abus du droit
dans les rapports privés. Le Code civil allemand établit dans son

‘article 226: « L'exercice d’un droit n’est pas permis lorsqu'il ne
peut avoir d'autre but que de causer des dommages à autrui. »
Et le Code civil suisse, dans son article 2 du Titre préliminaire,
déclare : « Chacun est tenu d'exercer ses droits et d'exécuter ses

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48 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ALVAREZ

obligations selon les règles de la bonne foi. L’abus manifeste d’un
droit n’est pas protégé par la loi. »

J'estime qu’en vertu du droit d’interdépendance sociale, cette
condamnation de l'abus du droit doit être transportée dans le droit
international. Dans celui-ci, en effet, ]’exercice intégral d'un droit
par un Etat, conséquence de sa souveraineté absolue, peut causer
parfois des troubles et méme des conflits qui menacent la paix.
Les heurts de droits et d'intérêts sont des causes de malaises
sociaux et même de guerres.

Dans cette matière, il y a deux choses à déterminer : a) quand
il y a abus du droit ; b) quelle doit être sa sanction. Pour ce qui
concerne la première, il faut apprécier les faits dans chaque cas
qui se présente et, pour ce qui concerne la sanction, elle pourra
consister, selon le cas, en excuses, admonestation ou même indem-
nité pour le préjudice causé.

L'abus du droit admet — de même que la responsabilité — des
circonstances atténuantes, par exemple si l’abus du droit a eu lieu
au bénéfice de l'intérêt général, etc.

(Signé) ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ.

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