359

           DE
            u CLARATION DE M. LE JUGE BENNOUNA

   Maintien de la RFY au sein des Nations Unies — Effets de l’admission de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro aux Nations Unies le 1er novembre 2000 — Complicité
de la Serbie dans le génocide — Mens rea du complice par opposition à celui de
l’auteur principal — Liens entre responsabilité pénale individuelle et responsa-
bilité étatique — Définition de la complicité — « Scorpions », force paramili-
taire sous contrôle serbe.

   Je voudrais, au travers de cette déclaration, compléter et éclairer cer-
tains des développements que la Cour consacre à la réaffirmation de sa
compétence pour donner son jugement dans cette affaire. J’expliciterai
ensuite les raisons qui m’ont amené à être en désaccord avec la Cour
lorsqu’elle a conclu à la non-complicité de la Serbie dans le génocide
commis à Srebrenica.
   Concernant la compétence, je suis pleinement d’accord avec les déve-
loppements de la Cour sur le caractère res judicata de l’arrêt de 1996, en
ce qu’il postule que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (RFY) avait
la qualité de Membre des Nations Unies et de partie au Statut de la Cour.
Si, en effet, à la date critique de l’introduction de l’instance, cette qualité
n’était pas contestée par les Parties elles-mêmes, comme l’a rappelé la
Cour, il se trouve que l’organisation universelle a été confrontée à une
situation sans précédent qui, ainsi que l’avait relevé son conseiller juri-
dique le 29 septembre 1992,
      « n’est pas prévue par la Charte des Nations Unies, à savoir les
      conséquences sur le plan de l’appartenance à l’Organisation de la
      désintégration d’un Etat Membre s’il n’y a pas d’accord à ce sujet
      entre les successeurs immédiats de cet Etat ou entre les autres Etats
      Membres de l’Organisation » (Nations Unies, doc. A/47/485).

Le Conseil de sécurité avait noté ce désaccord et en avait déduit l’absence
d’une succession automatique de la RFY à la République fédérative
socialiste de Yougoslavie (résolution 777 (1992)). L’Assemblée générale,
en conséquence, dans sa résolution 47/1 du 22 septembre 1992, avait sus-
pendu la participation de la RFY à ses travaux et lui avait demandé de
présenter une demande d’adhésion à l’Organisation, mais ce pays n’en a
pas moins continué à participer aux débats du Conseil de sécurité et à
faire publier ses documents en tant que documents officiels des Nations
Unies.
   A mon avis, la situation sui generis de la RFY, évoquée par la Cour
dans son arrêt du 3 février 2003 sur la demande en revision, se réfère à la
volonté qui s’est exprimée au sein des Nations Unies de maintenir cet

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360      APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

Etat au sein de l’Organisation avec des droits réduits, en attendant de lui
faire subir le test de l’article 4 de la Charte afin qu’il démontre qu’il est
bien un Etat pacifique qui accepte les obligations de la Charte, est
capable de les remplir et est disposé à le faire.
   Il a fallu attendre le 1er novembre 2000 pour que la Serbie-et-Monté-
négro soit admise aux Nations Unies, après que le régime Milošević ait
été écarté et que son chef ait été transféré au Tribunal pénal international
pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) à La Haye. On ne peut pas pour autant en
déduire qu’il y a eu un vide juridique entre la dissolution de l’ex-Yougo-
slavie et cette admission, c’est-à-dire, pendant près de huit années. La
continuité de la présence de la RFY au sein de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies a permis à celle-ci de maintenir ses moyens de pression sur
ce pays, notamment au travers des sanctions au titre du chapitre VII de la
Charte, jusqu’à ce qu’il rejoigne la légalité internationale. La Cour était
pleinement consciente de cette situation en 1996 lorsqu’elle s’est déclarée
compétente pour se prononcer sur le différend dont elle a été saisie par la
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il nous paraît évident, en présence de la situation
sans précédent à laquelle la communauté internationale a été confrontée,
que le changement d’attitude de la Serbie-et-Monténégro et son admis-
sion aux Nations Unies le 1er novembre 2000 ne pouvaient avoir d’effet
que pour l’avenir.
   Dans son arrêt sur la demande en revision, la Cour a considéré ainsi que

      « [l]a résolution 47/1 ne portait notamment pas atteinte au droit de la
      RFY d’ester devant la Cour ou d’être partie à un différend devant
      celle-ci dans les conditions fixées par le Statut » (Demande en revision
      de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la
      convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
      (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires (You-
      goslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 31,
      par. 70).
Et, en effet, lorsqu’elle s’est prononcée sur sa compétence en 1996, la
Cour était parfaitement au fait de la situation de la RFY à l’égard de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies. C’est pour cela qu’elle a tenu à souli-
gner lorsqu’elle a été saisie d’une demande en revision que
      « la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale en date du 1er no-
      vembre 2000 [relative à l’admission de la RFY] ne peut avoir rétro-
      activement modifié la situation sui generis dans laquelle se trou-
      vait la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
      pendant la période 1992-2000, ni sa situation à l’égard du Statut
      de la Cour et de la convention sur le génocide » (ibid., par. 71).
   En ce qui concerne le fond de cette affaire, je considère que tous les
éléments étaient réunis pour que la Cour puisse conclure à la responsa-
bilité de la RFY pour complicité avec la Republika Srpska et son armée
dans le génocide commis à Srebrenica. C’est pour cette raison que j’ai

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361      APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

voté contre le point 4 du dispositif de l’arrêt. L’examen de la question de
la complicité de génocide de la RFY, au sens du litt. e) de l’article III de
la convention de 1948, a permis de constater à quel point la Cour était
tributaire, lorsqu’il s’agit d’apprécier la responsabilité de l’Etat, des
conclusions du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie rela-
tives à la culpabilité des acteurs individuels principaux de ce drame, qu’il
s’agisse de M. Milošević ou de M. Mladić. D’ailleurs, la Cour s’est
appuyée exclusivement sur l’arrêt du TPIY dans l’affaire Krstić lorsqu’il
s’est agi de qualifier le crime de Srebrenica de crime de génocide.
   Dans la mesure où le procès de Milošević n’est pas parvenu à son
terme et que M. Mladić n’a pas été arrêté et déféré au TPIY, la Cour n’a
pu disposer de tous les éléments de preuve indispensables pour apprécier
la complicité de la Serbie dans le génocide de Srebrenica. Par conséquent,
la Cour a fait bénéficier la RFY du doute qui persiste, selon elle, sur le
comportement de la haute hiérarchie de cet Etat en juillet 1995, lors de la
préparation du crime de Srebrenica, notamment sur le point de savoir si
la RFY savait ou avait une raison de savoir que l’armée de la Republika
Srpska se préparait à commettre un génocide. A mon avis, le mens rea
exigé du complice n’est pas le même que celui qui incombe à l’auteur
principal, soit l’intention spécifique (dolus specialis) de commettre le
génocide, et il ne peut pas en être autrement, car exiger cette intention
reviendrait à assimiler le complice au coauteur.
   Il est possible, à ce propos, de se référer, par analogie, à l’article 16 des
articles de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilité de
l’Etat, intitulé « Aide ou assistance dans la commission du fait inter-
national illicite », selon lequel :
         « L’Etat qui aide ou assiste un autre Etat dans la commission du
      fait international illicite par ce dernier est internationalement res-
      ponsable pour avoir agi de la sorte dans le cas où
      a) ledit Etat agit ainsi en connaissance des circonstances du fait
           internationalement illicite ; et
      b) le fait serait internationalement illicite s’il était commis par cet
           Etat. »
Il ressort de cet article, qui peut être considéré comme se rapportant à « la
complicité » dans les relations interétatiques, que les deux éléments exigés
sont l’assistance et la connaissance des circonstances du fait internatio-
nalement illicite et non la participation à la commission de celui-ci.
   En l’occurrence, le mens rea consiste en la volonté du complice d’assis-
ter l’auteur principal, en sachant bien ou en étant censé savoir la nature
du crime que celui-ci se prépare à commettre. C’est ainsi que la Commis-
sion du droit international a interprété le litt. e) de l’article III de la
convention sur le génocide de 1948 relatif à la complicité (rapport de la
Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa cinquante-
troisième session, 2001, p. 155).
   Il est de fait que de nombreuses données, dont la Cour était saisie,
convergeaient pour démontrer que la RFY aurait dû savoir qu’un géno-

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362     APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

cide se tramait et qu’elle n’en a pas moins continué à assister la Repu-
blika Srpska et son armée dans les opérations qu’elle menait, y compris à
Srebrenica.
   Il est difficile de comprendre que la Cour ait évité de se prononcer sur
la définition de la complicité, laissant ainsi en suspens la question de
savoir si le complice doit partager lui-même l’intention spécifique (dolus
specialis) avec l’auteur principal du génocide (arrêt, par. 421). Pourtant,
la Cour se devait d’écarter une telle condition, avancée par le défendeur,
parce qu’elle va à l’encontre de la définition généralement admise de la
complicité et, d’un point de vue logique, parce qu’elle conduirait au résul-
tat absurde consistant à assimiler complice et auteur principal. Pour ne
pas avoir à trancher cet aspect, ce qui est regrettable pour la clarification
du droit international en la matière, la Cour a estimé que, au minimum,
la connaissance par le complice de l’intention spécifique de l’auteur prin-
cipal était nécessaire ; ce qui lui permettra ensuite, en se livrant à une
interprétation, à notre avis non fondée, des faits de la cause de conclure
à l’absence de complicité de la Serbie.
   Il est vrai que les conclusions du TPIY dans le jugement des principaux
responsables, que ce soit à la tête de la RFY ou de la Republika Srpska,
auraient pu fournir des éléments décisifs, susceptibles de balayer tous les
doutes éventuels quant à la connaissance que les dirigeants de la Serbie-
et-Monténégro avaient de ce qui se tramait à Srebrenica. Cela nous
amène naturellement à considérer que l’appréciation complète de la res-
ponsabilité de l’Etat demeure, en réalité, suspendue à l’arrestation des
principaux responsables du drame de Srebrenica, à leur jugement et aux
révélations qui pourraient s’ensuivre quant au rôle de la RFY.
   Ainsi, à la lumière des débats approfondis qui se sont tenus devant la
Cour, j’ai été convaincu des liens étroits entre la responsabilité pénale
individuelle et la responsabilité étatique dans ce type de procès. Il est rare
en effet qu’un Etat annonce sans détour son intention de détruire partiel-
lement ou totalement un groupe ethnique, culturel ou religieux, ou qu’il
fasse état de sa connaissance qu’un tel crime allait advenir ou encore qu’il
admette l’avoir commis. C’est donc au travers du comportement de ceux
qui engagent l’Etat et de leur mise en jugement qu’on peut remonter à la
responsabilité de l’Etat lui-même ; à moins, bien entendu, que l’on se
trouve dans l’hypothèse d’un pays vaincu, livré à ses occupants, dont les
structures, anéanties, dévoilent ainsi tous les secrets de leurs archives à la
justice internationale. Mais tel n’était pas le cas pour la RFY (Serbie-et-
Monténégro) qui est allée jusqu’à refuser à la Cour l’accès aux comptes
rendus non expurgés de son « Conseil suprême de défense » (lettre de
l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro en date du 16 janvier 2006).
   Cela étant, je suis d’avis que la Cour disposait des éléments pour éta-
blir d’ores et déjà la complicité de la RFY pour le génocide.
   L’élément matériel de ce crime, à savoir l’aide et l’assistance multi-
formes de Belgrade à la Republika Srpska et à son armée, la VRS, a été
largement étayé par la Cour, lorsqu’elle a examiné la responsabilité de la
RFY pour manquement à l’obligation de prévenir le génocide. Ce soutien

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363      APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

continu de nature politique, militaire et financière avait existé, en effet,
avant, pendant et après le massacre de Srebrenica.
   Il reste à se demander si l’élément intentionnel existe, soit la poursuite
de cette aide et de cette assistance, alors que la RFY savait ou était censée
savoir que les destinataires se préparaient à commettre un acte de géno-
cide et qu’elle les soutenait de la sorte pour parvenir à leurs fins. C’est
lorsque l’aide et l’assistance sont fournies en connaissance de cause de
l’intention génocidaire de son destinataire qu’elles sont constitutives de
complicité, se distinguant ainsi de la violation de l’obligation de préven-
tion où seule la perception du risque de génocide est exigée.

   J’admets que la difficulté, dans cette affaire, pour prouver la connais-
sance par Belgrade de l’intention génocidaire de l’armée des Serbes de
Bosnie, provient du fait que cette intention ne s’est constituée, selon le
TPIY, qu’à peine deux jours avant l’exécution matérielle du génocide
intervenu entre le 13 et le 17 juillet 1995. Mais de cette difficulté réelle, on
ne peut déduire automatiquement que Belgrade ne savait pas et ne pou-
vait pas savoir que le génocide se décidait.
   Tout d’abord, l’armée yougoslave de Belgrade (la VJ) avait maintenu
la présence d’un certain nombre de ses officiers au quartier général de
l’armée des Serbes de Bosnie (la VRS), à Han Pijesak, et il est inconce-
vable que ceux-ci n’aient pas informé leur hiérarchie (voir le rapport du
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, « Srebrenica — a « safe »
area », du 10 avril 2002).
   D’autre part, lors du procès Milošević, le général Wesley Clark
(conseiller militaire américain) a fait le témoignage suivant :
         « Général Clark : Moi, j’avais toujours envie de mieux comprendre
      pourquoi Milošević pensait pouvoir conserver son autorité et
      son pouvoir en présentant le plan de paix aux Serbes de Bosnie.
      Donc, je lui ai simplement posé la question. Je lui ai dit : « Monsieur
      le président, vous dites que vous avez une grande influence sur les
      Serbes de Bosnie, mais comment se fait-il que votre influence aille si
      loin qu’elle permette au général Mladić de tuer toutes ces personnes
      qui ont été tuées à Srebrenica ? » Et Milošević m’a regardé. Il s’est
      interrompu un instant et il a déclaré : « Eh bien, général Clark, j’ai
      averti moi-même Mladić qu’il ne fallait pas qu’il fasse cela, mais il ne
      m’a pas obéi. »
         Question : Vous comprenez à quoi il est fait référence ici. Vous
      comprenez bien, sans doute, que les choses vont au-delà des
      mots.
         Général Clark : Certainement.
         Question : Est-ce que cela vous explique le contexte dans lequel
      l’accord a finalement été obtenu ?
         Général Clark : Et bien, il était tout à fait clair que je l’interrogeais
      au sujet du massacre de Srebrenica. Lorsque j’ai parlé de « tuer

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364      APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

      toutes ces personnes », il ne s’agissait pas d’opération militaire, mais
      d’un massacre. Et c’était une réalité qui était diffusée un peu partout
      par les médias. » (Milošević, IT-02-54, compte rendu d’audiences,
      15 décembre 2003.)

En effet, plusieurs sources attestent que le général Mladić était resté en
contact permanent avec Milošević avant le début des massacres et notam-
ment entre les 7 et 14 juillet 1995 (voir le rapport présenté par le
Secrétaire général en application de la résolution 53/35 de l’Assemblée
générale intitulé « La chute de Srebrenica », Nations Unies, doc. A/54/549,
p. 83).
   Il est dès lors établi, à notre avis, que les autorités de Belgrade étaient
pleinement informées de l’attaque de Srebrenica et qu’elles auraient dû
savoir également qu’un massacre de la population musulmane de cette
ville se préparait.
   Il suffit pour s’en convaincre de rappeler la présence des « Scorpions »,
forces paramilitaires sous le contrôle du ministre de l’intérieur de la Ser-
bie-et-Monténégro, sur le terrain même où s’est déroulé le massacre.
   La Cour admet d’ailleurs que des documents lui ont été présentés rat-
tachant les « Scorpions » au « MUP de Serbie [ministère serbe de l’inté-
rieur] » ou les qualifiant « d’unité … du ministère serbe de l’intérieur »
(arrêt, par. 389), mais elle n’en tire aucune conséquence au niveau de la
complicité, se demandant seulement, pour les besoins de l’appréciation de
la responsabilité directe, si ces forces paramilitaires étaient des organes de
jure du défendeur ou si elles étaient sous sa complète dépendance. Or, à
supposer même que ce ne soit pas le cas, les liens de ces forces avec le
ministère de l’intérieur serbe et leur participation avérée
au massacre de Srebrenica pouvaient, pour le moins, conduire la Cour
à se demander si la Serbie n’était pas, de ce fait, tenue informée de la pré-
paration et de l’exécution du génocide perpétré à Srebrenica.
   La Serbie, qui portait à bout de bras la Republika Srpska et son armée,
la VRS, où exerçaient de nombreux officiers dont la carrière était dépen-
dante de Belgrade, avait tissé de multiples liens avec les structures poli-
tiques et militaires qui avaient décidé du génocide et l’avaient mis en exé-
cution ; elle en était, dès lors, parfaitement informée, ce qui en fait le
complice de ce crime et engage sa responsabilité internationale.

  A mon avis, la Cour, sans même attendre d’autres jugements du TPIY,
pouvait conclure, avec les éléments à sa disposition, à la complicité de la
Serbie dans le génocide perpétré à Srebrenica ; elle aurait fait justice de la
sorte à la mémoire des milliers de victimes de ce massacre, tout en répon-
dant à l’attente de leurs familles.

  Elle n’aurait pas, pour autant, accablé la Serbie, ni entravé en quoi que
ce soit l’indispensable réconciliation et la coopération nécessaire entre les
Etats de la région des Balkans ; la Cour s’adresse certes aux agissements
d’un pays, mais celui-ci avait à sa tête un régime qui a été qualifié par le

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365      APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (DÉCL. BENNOUNA)

Conseil des ministres de Serbie-et-Monténégro, dans un communiqué du
15 juin 2005, de la façon suivante :
        « Ceux qui ont accompli les tueries à Srebrenica et ceux qui ont
      ordonné et organisé le massacre ne représentaient ni la Serbie ni le
      Monténégro, mais un régime antidémocratique de terreur et de
      mort, contre lequel la grande majorité des citoyens de Serbie-et-
      Monténégro a opposé la plus forte résistance. »
Il est certain que la continuité de l’Etat a pour conséquence la perma-
nence de la responsabilité de celui-ci pour tout acte illicite qui aurait été
commis en son nom. Est-ce une raison pour s’installer dans un quel-
conque négationnisme ? Certainement pas. L’un des enseignements les
plus précieux des drames qui ont endeuillé le siècle précédent, et qui
heurtent la conscience de l’humanité tout entière, consiste en l’accep-
tation du passé dans toute sa vérité et en la demande, en conséquence,
du pardon pour les souffrances infligées. C’est le seul moyen, sans doute,
d’annoncer la reconstruction d’un avenir commun. Un tel processus va
au-delà de la justice à proprement parler ; mais celle-ci peut y contribuer
fortement.

                                         (Signé) Mohamed BENNOUNA.

326


703

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. PARRA-ARANGUREN
[Traduction]

1. Je souscris au dispositif de ’ordonnance mais j’estime indispensable
de formuler les observations ci-après.

2. L'article IX de la convention sur le génocide est en vigueur entre les
parties. Cette disposition prescrit ce qui suit:

«Les différends entre les Parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpré-
tation, Papplication ou l’exécution de la présente convention, y com-
pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide
ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article II, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’une partie
au différend.»

3. La Yougoslavie soutient que le défendeur a violé:

«l'obligation énoncée dans la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide de ne pas soumettre intentionnelle-
ment un groupe national à des conditions d’existence devant entrai-
ner sa destruction physique...» (requête de la Yougoslavie, p. 13).

En outre, lors des audiences publiques, la Yougoslavie a déclaré que «le
bombardement intensif de zones habitées yougoslaves constitue en
l’occurrence une violation de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide »
(CR 99/25, p. 12, Brownlie).

4. Le défendeur considère qu’il n’a pas violé la convention sur le géno-
cide parce qu'il n’a pas été commis de crimes de génocide pendant l’inter-
vention militaire des pays de l'OTAN en Yougoslavie, ni à la suite de
cette intervention.

5. Dans son arrêt du 1! juillet 1996, la Cour a admis qu'il existait
prima facie un différend d’ordre juridique entre les Parties parce qu’il
existait:

«une situation dans laquelle les points de vue des deux parties,
quant à l'exécution où à la non-exécution de certaines obligations
découlant d’[un traité], sont nettement opposés» (/nterpréta-
tion des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la
Roumanie, première phase, avis consultatif, C.1J. Recueil 1950,
p. 74);

et que, du fait du rejet, par la Yougoslavie, des griefs formulés à son
encontre par la Bosnie-Herzégovine, «il existe un différend d’ordre
juridique» entre elles (Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie), C.J.
Recueil 1995, p. 100, par. 22)» (Application de la convention pour la

51
LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. PARRA-ARANGUREN) 704

prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, exceptions prélimi-
naires, C.LJ. Recueil 1996 (IT), p. 614-615, par. 29).

6. Par conséquent, compte tenu des allégations formulées par les Parties
lors de la procédure incidente dont il s’agit, il semble exister prima facie
un «différend d’ordre juridique» entre elles au sujet de l’interprétation
et de l'application de la convention sur le génocide. C’est pourquoi l’ar-
ticle IX de la convention sur le génocide est applicable et, à mon avis, la
Cour est compétente prima facie pour connaitre de la demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires présentée par la Yougoslavie.

7. Cet article IX de la convention sur le génocide est le seul fondement
de compétence prima facie de la Cour en l'espèce. Les seules mesures
conservatoires que la Cour puisse indiquer sont par conséquent celles qui
visent à préserver les droits du demandeur au titre de la convention sur le
génocide.

8. La Yougoslavie demande à la Cour d’indiquer que le défendeur
«doilt] cesser immédiatement de recourir à l'emploi de la force et doit]
s'abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de recours ou un recours à
l'emploi de la force contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie»
(CR 99/14, p. 63, (Etinski)). Or, la menace de recours à l'emploi de la
force ou l’emploi de la force contre un Etat ne constitue pas en soi un
acte de génocide au sens de la convention sur le génocide. Les mesures
conservatoires demandées par la Yougoslavie ne visent par conséquent
pas à garantir ses droits en vertu de la convention sur le génocide, c’est-
à-dire le droit de ne pas subir des actes qui risquent d’être qualifiés de
crimes de génocide selon la convention. C’est pourquoi, à mon avis, il ne
faut pas indiquer les mesures conservatoires demandées par la Yougo-
slavie.

(Signé) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

52


                                                                                607

                           DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC DAUDET

                 [Translation]

                    Existence of an obligation to negotiate — “Acta Protocolizada” of 1920 —
                 1950 exchange of Notes — Charaña process — No contextualization by the Court
                 of the obligation to negotiate — Effect of the accumulation of elements — Legal
                 rule and moral rules — Excessive formalism — Obligation of means and obligation
                 of result — Need for continuation of the dialogue between the Parties.

                     1. I deeply regret that I was unable to vote in favour of the operative
                 clause of the Court’s Judgment; however, before I set out what I disagree
                 with and why, I would like to state in paragraphs 5 to 7 below that I
                 endorse several aspects of the decision not to find in favour of Bolivia’s
                 claim that Chile has an obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the
                 Pacific Ocean.
                     2. The question of such access, of which Bolivia was deprived follow-
                 ing the War of the Pacific, is a very old one: it is included in the 1895 trea-
                 ties (which did not enter into force), thus even before the Treaty of
                 20 October 1904 fixed boundaries transforming Bolivia, which had previ-
                 ously had a coastline of over 400 km, into a landlocked nation, to the
                 benefit of one State, Chile, which has a coastline of over 4,000 km. It is
                 easy to understand why Bolivia feels that this situation is profoundly
                 unjust. However, such was the law at a time when Abraham König,
                 Chile’s Minister Plenipotentiary in Bolivia, was able to declare on
                 13 August 1900, without fear of rebuff or criticism: “Our rights are the
                 outcome of victory [in the War of the Pacific], the supreme law of
                 nations.” 1 The principles of intertemporal law apply to those rights. Such
                  circumstances therefore preclude the Court from drawing any legal con-
                 clusions. The feeling of injustice is nonetheless not to be overlooked, since
                 it explains the steadfastness of Bolivia’s claim to recover its lost access
                 and the multiplicity of its arguments, not all of which are necessarily
                 legally founded.
                     3. The Court’s Judgment sets out the various facts, which extend over
                 more than a century. Although only a minor point, I would note here
                 in passing that, to my mind, it would have been more appropriate
                 to combine the factual elements in the first part of the Judgment
                 (“Historical and factual background”) with the arguments in the third
                 part (“The alleged legal bases of an obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s
                 sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”) which they serve to support, so as
                  to avoid the — sometimes correct — impression that the facts are being
                  repeated.

                     1   Memorial of Bolivia, Ann. 39.

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                            obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)             608

                    4. Over such a long period, those facts are, by force of circumstance,
                 numerous and varied, and include bilateral and unilateral acts with differ-
                 ent legal effects, and political statements and representations mixed up
                 with legal acts; in short, a complex whole whose knotted threads had to
                 be disentangled. This difficult exercise required separating what could be
                 a matter of law from what were mere political or diplomatic representa-
                 tions, or references to moral principles unsanctified by law.

                    5. For example, it is clear that Bolivia’s reliance on estoppel could not
                 be upheld by the Court here. Although from a moral point of view I read-
                 ily acknowledge that Chile has “blow[n] hot and cold” on a number of
                 occasions, I share the views of the Court, which could not decide in
                 favour of Bolivia, owing to that State’s failure to fulfil the conditions set
                 out in the jurisprudence recalled in paragraphs 158 and 159 of the Judg-
                 ment. Bolivia did not change its position to its detriment, or to Chile’s
                 advantage, by relying on Chile’s representations. Nor does it claim to
                 have suffered “some prejudice” (Land and Maritime Boundary between
                 Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
                 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 303, para. 57), which might have been
                 caused by, for example, economic, commercial or other measures taken
                 by it on the basis of Chile’s position and which would have been deprived
                 of effect or thwarted following a change in the Applicant’s conduct.

                   6. Similarly, with regard to legitimate expectations, Bolivia invokes a
                 principle that is sometimes applied in investment law, but which has not
                 entered general international law and which here is ultimately confined to
                 the moral disorder created by the non-satisfaction of expectations that
                 Bolivia had forged for itself outside any established legal framework.

                    7. Bolivia principally relied on material of a unilateral and collabora-
                 tive nature. I share the position of the Court, which dismissed a number
                 of those elements deemed to be lacking in legal relevance and therefore
                 unable to create legal obligations incumbent on Chile.

                    8. On the other hand, I disagree with the decision of the majority not
                 to uphold several other elements which, alone (and each on their own),
                 would have been sufficient grounds for the Court to reverse its decision. I
                 will first examine the elements in question before expressing my reserva-
                 tions about the spirit in which the Court conceived of the law it had to
                 apply here.

                     I. Existence of an Obligation to Negotiate Incumbent on Chile

                   9. In my opinion, there are three elements that create an obligation to
                 negotiate incumbent on Chile in respect of which I disagree with the find-
                 ing of the Court. They are the 1920 “Acta Protocolizada”, the 1950

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                              obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)             609

                 exchange of Notes, and the Charaña process of 1975 to 1978. I will exam-
                 ine them in turn.

                                        (a) The 1920 “Acta Protocolizada”
                    10. The 1920 Act has its immediate origins in a Chilean Memorandum
                 of 9 September 1919, in which Chile’s Ambassador in La Paz writes:
                 “Independently of what was established in the Peace Treaty of 1904,
                 Chile accepts to initiate new negotiations aimed at satisfying the aspira-
                 tions of the friendly country, subject to Chile’s triumph in the plebiscite” 2.
                 The Act — or Minutes — that followed on 10 January 1920 gives an
                 account of a series of meetings held in La Paz between the Minister for
                 Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and the Minister Plenipotentiary and Special
                 Envoy of Chile. The Chilean representative, “duly authorised by his Gov-
                 ernment[,] pu[t] forward suggestions, or key points . . . and propose[d]
                 that they be the terms for an agreement between both parties” 3. That Act
                 was followed by other episodes, some of which were mere political state-
                 ments, while others were political statements which included some legal
                 content.
                    11. The Act itself contains specific facts, notably in point IV, where it
                 is stated that Chile “is willing to seek that Bolivia acquire its own access
                 to the sea, ceding to it an important part of that zone in the north of
                 Arica and of the railway line which is within the territories subject to the
                 plebiscite stipulated in the Treaty of Ancón” 4, thus using terms which, if
                 given credence, suggest a negotiating position. These territorial questions
                 were again addressed by Chile a short while later in a Note of 6 February
                 1923 from the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs, which mentions the
                 conclusion, by means of “a direct negotiation”, of “a new Pact . . . with-
                 out modifying the Treaty of Peace and without interrupting the territorial
                 continuity of the Chilean territory” 5. That Note is supplemented by a
                 second dated 22 February of the same year, which clearly sets out what is
                 and what is not possible in the eyes of Chile. The author states that he is
                 acting in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Repub-
                 lic. It is expressly stated in that Note that Chile will never agree to a solu-
                 tion that would interrupt the continuity of its territory. This implies,
                 a contrario, that other solutions might be found, confirming a willingness
                 to negotiate.
                    12. Thus, the language used by official authorities with the power to
                 speak on behalf of the State they represent reflects a commitment by
                 Chile to enter into negotiations with a view to granting Bolivia sovereign
                 access to the sea, Chile going so far as to identify areas which might be

                     2 Counter‑Memorial of Chile, Ann. 117.
                     3 Memorial of Bolivia, Ann. 101.
                     4 Counter-Memorial of Chile, Ann. 118.
                     5 Memorial of Bolivia, Ann. 48.

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                           obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)             610

                 ceded to Bolivia. These are not merely statements of political intent, but
                 the expression of an obligation that Chile imposed on itself.

                    13. Chile objects to this today on the grounds that, in any event and
                 even supposing that there were parts of the 1920 Act capable of creating
                 obligations incumbent on it, those obligations would be annulled simply
                 by virtue of the fact that Bolivia’s representative himself stated in that
                 Act that the declarations made in it did not contain provisions creating
                 rights or obligations for the States. Chile concludes from this that the
                 1920 Minutes cannot, as Bolivia claims, be the source of a legal obliga-
                 tion that the Parties did not intend to undertake, because that instrument
                 is not legally binding. The Court endorses this position.

                    14. However, in this regard, unlike the Court, I believe that the Boliv-
                 ian minister’s declaration does not raise questions about the negotiation
                 procedure itself, only its possible substance. As ever in this case, a clear
                 distinction must be made between what would be a substantive commit-
                 ment on the content of the negotiations on Bolivia’s sovereign access to
                 the sea (the area to be transferred, on what conditions, by what arrange-
                 ments and other substantive aspects which, moreover, the Court need not
                 entertain) and the negotiation procedure (which the Court must address),
                 by means of which those substantive questions could be resolved. The
                 substantive questions concerning the territorial sovereignty of the State
                 are, of course, far too important and too delicate an issue for the States’
                 representatives — at the time of the 1920 Act, which records the content
                 of discussions of a preliminary nature — to have wished to commit them-
                 selves on those matters, without first having carefully secured the views of
                 the highest executive and legislative authorities of their respective coun-
                 tries and the state of public opinion.

                    15. This explains the clarification given by Bolivia’s Minister for For-
                 eign Affairs, which I understand as referring only to the substantive
                 aspects and not to anything else. Indeed, one might well ask why he
                 would have made that clarification about the non-binding nature of the
                 exchanges conducted, had he also intended to refer to the procedure, i.e.
                 the very fact of having recourse to negotiation. This would have been
                 unfathomable, since it would have been completely contrary to the inter-
                 ests of Bolivia.
                    16. In my view, therefore, there would appear to be grounds for find-
                 ing in favour of Bolivia that the 1920 Act, in itself and without prejudice
                 to its place in a series of other acts, is of a binding character.

                             (b) The Exchange of Notes of 1 and 20 June 1950
                   17. I also disagree with the decision of the Court with regard to this
                 exchange of Notes between the Ambassador of Bolivia and the Minister
                 for Foreign Affairs of Chile.

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                    18. Bolivia sees this exchange as “a treaty under international law, the
                 terms of which are clear and unequivocal” 6, which commits Chile to
                 enabling Bolivia to have sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. This view
                 is contested by Chile and the Court concurs with the Respondent. Chile
                 is of the opinion that these Notes express only political or diplomatic
                 representations and are not legal undertakings that are binding on it; that
                 since the Parties do not state the same thing, there is no identity of
                 subject-matter required for an agreement to be constituted; and, finally,
                 that ultimately Bolivia did not follow the matter up since it did not
                 respond to Chile’s last Note.
                    19. However, to my mind, the 1950 Notes and ensuing documents
                 appear on the contrary to have the characteristics of a legal act rather
                 than a merely political or diplomatic one, in that they form a substan-
                 tively well-developed whole and show a common intent expressed by indi-
                 viduals authorized to do so regarding a common object and purpose.

                    20. The Note of 1 June 1950 7 sent to the Chilean Minister for Foreign
                 Affairs by the Ambassador of Bolivia to Chile recalls the successive epi-
                 sodes of the 1895 Treaty and the 1920 Act, Chile’s statement before the
                 League of Nations on 1 November 1920, the message from the President
                 of Chile to the Chilean Congress in 1922, the Note of 6 February 1923,
                 the Kellogg Proposal and the 1926 Matte Memorandum, as well as vari-
                 ous other exchanges. The continuous character of Bolivia’s claim and the
                 link between the various acts expressing that claim are thus plain to see.
                    21. The Note goes on to set out a proposal of Bolivia, cited in para-
                 graph 51 of the Judgment, to which I refer the reader.
                    22. The Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs responded to the various
                 points raised by Bolivia in a Note of 20 June 1950, as cited in para-
                 graph 52 of the Judgment, to which I also refer the reader.
                    23. Chile’s Note is perfectly clear in my view: Chile replies that it “is
                 open formally to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
                 formula” (according to the English translation produced by Chile; “is
                 willing to formally enter into direct negotiations aimed at finding a for-
                 mula”, according to the English translation produced by Bolivia; empha-
                 sis added) 8 that will make it possible to give Bolivia sovereign access to
                 the Pacific Ocean. The “formula” was to include compensation for Chile.

                    24. The two Notes are from authorities competent to speak on behalf
                 of the State, one being the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile and the
                 other the Ambassador of Bolivia accredited to Chile. The Court states in
                 paragraph 117 that, contrary to usual diplomatic practice, the two Notes

                     6 Reply of Bolivia, para. 228.
                     7 Memorial of Bolivia, Ann. 109A.
                     8 Ibid., Ann. 109B; Counter-Memorial of Chile, Ann. 144.

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                                obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)            612

                         “do not contain the same wording nor do they reflect an identical
                         position, in particular with regard to the crucial issue of negotiations
                         concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The
                         exchange of Notes cannot therefore be considered an international
                         agreement.”
                    I do not share this conclusion. While it is true that the texts are not
                 exactly the same word for word, to use that as grounds for rejecting the
                 Bolivian position is overly formalistic, in so far as the texts both mention
                 an agreement to enter into direct negotiations and refer to the same object
                 of the negotiation as sovereign access for Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean.
                 Chile’s position of “obtain[ing] compensation of a non-territorial charac-
                 ter which effectively takes into account its interests” (see paragraph 52 of
                 the Judgment) can be understood by reference to the concern expressed in
                 Bolivia’s Note that a solution be found “on terms that take into account
                 the mutual benefit and genuine interests of both nations” (see para-
                 graph 51 of the Judgment).

                    25. In my view it is therefore established that while these concordant
                 acts may “not contain the same wording”, they do create a legal obliga-
                 tion for Chile to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for
                 Bolivia. Subsequent practice (in particular the 1961 Trucco Memoran-
                 dum) was to confirm this.
                    26. It is to be noted, however, that the process did not ultimately suc-
                 ceed. Chile holds Bolivia responsible, claiming that it failed to respond to
                 one of Chile’s Notes, and Bolivia cites difficulties with public opinion in
                 both countries that made it necessary to defer implementation of an
                 agreement and the opening of negotiations — negotiations which it none-
                 theless does not seem to have given up on.

                                       (c) The Charaña Process of 1975 to 1978
                   27. The Joint Declaration of Charaña of 8 February 1975, signed by
                 Presidents Banzer of Bolivia and Pinochet of Chile, was followed by a
                 series of exchanges constituting the “Charaña process”, which lasted
                 until 1978. My reading of this episode is different from that of the Court.

                    28. Bolivia states that the declaration itself is an act which confirms the
                 undertaking to negotiate, while Chile claims that it entails no legal obliga-
                 tion, noting that “an agreement or statement may impose a legal obliga-
                 tion only if the parties intend to create rights and obligations governed by
                 international law”, whereas, in this instance, a “record of a decision to
                 continue discussions shows no intention to create a legal obligation
                 to negotiate” 9.

                     9   Counter-Memorial of Chile, para. 7.11 (a).

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                   29. It was further decided in the Charaña Declaration to restore diplo-
                 matic relations between the two countries. Bolivia made restoration of
                 those relations conditional on Chile’s compliance with an obligation to
                 negotiate its access to the sea. Since diplomatic relations were resumed,
                 the condition must have been met, and I therefore conclude that Chile
                 accepted the obligation to negotiate.

                    30. The Charaña Declaration combines political, diplomatic and legal
                 elements, which is perfectly natural, moreover, since it is a document
                 signed by the two Presidents of the Republics which must also express
                 general political views of mutual solidarity and understanding. At the
                 same time, it is stated in paragraph 4 of the Declaration, as recalled in
                 paragraph 62 of the Judgment of the Court, that “[b]oth Heads of
                 State . . . have decided [according to the English translation produced by
                 Bolivia; “have resolved” according to the English translation produced by
                 Chile] to continue the dialogue” in order to “solve the vital issues that
                 both countries face, such as the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia”
                 (emphasis added). The issue of the landlocked situation is a reference to
                 sovereign access to the sea which had been discussed at length in earlier
                 stages.

                   31. The Charaña Declaration thus expresses a common will to negoti-
                 ate on a clearly identified subject, which was to be confirmed in the
                 months that followed. Indeed, Charaña is a process which must be read
                 through the successive statements and representations made from 1975 to
                 1978, when diplomatic relations were once again broken off. Taken
                 together, these exchanges and statements form a body of undertakings,
                 even if, taken individually, they do not all have equal legal significance.

                   32. Of particular note are the guidelines for negotiations that Bolivia
                 proposed to Chile on 26 August 1975, which included a proposal for the
                 cession of territory to Bolivia; these are dealt with by the Court in para-
                 graph 64 of the Judgment, where it recalls the extremely detailed counter-
                 proposals of Chile, to which Bolivia agreed. These practical and specific
                 proposals and counter-proposals should accordingly be understood as
                 demonstrating a common will to negotiate, and not merely as general
                 declarations of a political nature which were made with no intention of
                 follow-up in a negotiation and which therefore had no legal significance.
                 Further Notes were produced, details of which the Court provides in the
                 subsequent paragraphs of its Judgment.

                    33. Under the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of
                 3 June 1929, however, Chile was obliged to seek Peru’s consent to c reate a
                 corridor for Bolivia in the province of Arica. Peru agreed
                 on condition that the area thus created be placed under the joint
                 sovereignty of the three States. Chile rejected this condition and the

                 negotiations between Peru and Chile then stalled. Bolivia protested

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                                obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)         614

                 that Chile had made no effort to obtain Peru’s consent to a workable
                 formula.

                    34. The Charaña process was thus complex. Taken as a whole, as it
                 should be — and despite the fact that the successive episodes over those
                 months produced a mix of specific legal formulations, on the one hand,
                 and statements that were purely political, diplomatic and friendly, on the
                 other — the process has obvious legal significance in that it unambigu-
                 ously refers to Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea and a willingness to
                 find the most appropriate means of making such access possible, by iden-
                 tifying territories for Bolivia as well as compensatory exchanges for Chile.
                 There is thus an expression of willingness to negotiate which is binding on
                 Chile. Overall, it was a time of intense negotiations, as Chile itself recog-
                 nizes when it states that there were “sustained negotiations on the possi-
                 ble transfer from Chile to Bolivia of sovereignty over territory to grant
                 Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific” 10; and in paragraph 127 of the
                 Judgment, it is stated that the Parties “engaged in meaningful negotia-
                 tions”.
                    35. Consequently, even assuming that the Charaña Declaration did
                 not by itself establish any binding legal commitment, in my view the sub-
                 sequent practice consisting of negotiations — which Chile acknowledges
                 to have taken place and whose significance is noted by the Court (though
                 it draws no conclusions in this regard) — on the contrary justifies recog-
                 nition of an obligation to negotiate incumbent on Chile.
                    36. The process failed of course, as did implementation of the
                 1895 Treaty, the exchanges in the 1920s and the 1950 Notes, but these
                 failures do not extinguish Chile’s legal obligation to negotiate with
                 Bolivia, which remains in place. Subsequent events confirm that there
                 were continuing exchanges up until 2011, when Chile adopted a radical
                 stance and the President of the Republic declared before the
                 United Nations General Assembly that “there [were] no territorial issues
                 pending” between the two States, the situation having been settled once
                 and for all by the 1904 Treaty 11. Thereafter Bolivia seised the Court
                 through its Application of 24 April 2013.
                    37. I am therefore of the view that the Court should have recognized
                 that Chile has a legal obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to
                 the Pacific Ocean, an obligation created by the three instruments and the
                 negotiating process described above.
                    38. Aside from these factors which to my mind permit a finding that
                 Chile has an obligation to negotiate, I have reservations about the spirit
                 in which the Court conceived of the applicable law in the case in question.
                 I see several dilemmas which I, for my part, would have addressed differ-
                 ently by endeavouring to contextualize the obligation to negotiate.

                     10   Counter-Memorial of Chile, para 1.3.
                     11   Memorial of Bolivia, Ann. 164.

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                            II. Contextualization of the Obligation to Negotiate

                    39. The main point of law in the Court’s decision is preserving the
                 integrity of the legal nature of negotiation, which, as the Court states in
                 paragraph 91 of its Judgment, “is part of the usual practice of States in
                 their bilateral and multilateral relations”, and thus an essential, everyday
                 tool, one of whose purposes is, in particular, the peaceful settlement of
                 disputes. This concern underlies the Court’s strict position that a State
                 cannot be compelled to enter into international negotiations which do not
                 stem from a legally binding commitment to do so, whether it arises out of
                 an agreement, a unilateral act or a principle of international law. A com-
                 mitment with such a legal basis ensures that a State does not find itself
                 obligated to negotiate “by surprise”, for example because of a statement
                 made in circumstances or in a manner such that, from the State’s stand-
                 point, it was not expressing an objective intention to be bound but merely
                 a political option.
                    40. It must be borne in mind that the Court is constrained by the
                 future and by precedent. The Court is of course not bound by the stare
                 decisis principle, but it is not easy for it to depart from past rulings. The
                 Court must therefore be mindful of the fact that today’s ruling may be
                 echoed by counsel and advocates in a similar case tomorrow. These con-
                 siderations lead the Court to exercise caution, and discourage it from
                 straying from the beaten track, at the risk of opening up uncertain ave-
                 nues in future cases. No one can deny the merits of this approach.

                    41. However, I believe such caution was unwarranted in this instance,
                 since, as I stated earlier, the episodes of 1920, 1950 and 1975 demon-
                 strated the existence of a legal commitment by Chile which was sufficient
                 to establish its obligation to negotiate. In deciding otherwise, the Court
                 based its reasoning on a particularly strict form of positivism that fails
                 to take into account the cumulative effect of the successive elements
                 relied on by Bolivia, and makes an overly rigid distinction between legal
                 obligations and moral or political and diplomatic ones in a context where
                 the nature of the obligation to negotiate invoked by Bolivia remained
                 unclear.

                                  (a) A Sequence or an Accumulation of Elements?
                    42. During the hearings, Bolivia argued that “even if there is not a
                 single decisive event — a magic moment when the obligation is created —
                 cumulative historical practice may have a ‘decisive effect’” 12. As the
                 Court observes in paragraph 174 of its Judgment, this argument “is pred-
                 icated on the assumption that an obligation may arise through the cumu-
                 lative effect of a series of acts even if it does not rest on a specific legal
                 basis”. I regret that, in this same paragraph, the Court rejected Bolivia’s

                     12   CR 2018/10, p. 15, para. 3 (Akhavan).

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                 argument on the grounds that since no obligation has arisen from any of
                 the invoked legal bases taken individually, “a cumulative consideration of
                 the various bases cannot add to the overall result”, thereby subscribing to
                 Chile’s position which one of its counsel imaginatively summed up as
                 “0 + 0 + 0 = 0”. Although the result of this sum is correct mathemati-
                 cally, it is not necessarily so in international law, which is not arithmetic.
                 And it is precisely because international law is not an exact science but a
                 social science that its rules are not applied mechanically. However, in its
                 zeal to safeguard the integrity of the principles governing negotiations
                 and the pure nature of obligations, so as to preclude any unintentional
                 commitment, in this paragraph of its decision the Court chose to apply
                 the rule of law in a way that is largely indifferent to the historical and
                 political realities at issue and the moral imperatives that should have
                 helped place the rule in context.
                    43. There is indeed no reason to sequence the acts in order to consider
                 each one in isolation from the others, since they all concern the same
                 subject and are all part of the same overall claim. There were of course
                 breaks in that claim, but it will be readily conceded that, for Bolivia,
                 which had become landlocked, a question as crucial as access to the sea
                 was a recurrent one; given this context of accumulation and repetition,
                 the Court’s approach is not, in my view, self-evident. Bolivia has repeated
                 the same claim for over a century. In the hope of achieving a favourable
                 outcome, it has formulated its claim in different ways, in various circum-
                 stances and through a wide range of acts and conduct. These have, in
                 turn, led to responses from Chile which have also varied in content and
                 intensity and which have always originated from senior foreign policy
                 officials. These representations must be considered as a whole and cannot
                 be subject to the same régime as a single, isolated act that can be exam-
                 ined alone, out of context. The Parties were, moreover, well aware of this:
                 Chile emphasizing the sequential nature of the various elements of this
                 long process, while Bolivia sees them as a continuum. Yet international
                 law does not disregard the effect of repetition, which is sometimes even a
                 requisite element for an act to have legal effect (protests, for example).

                                      (b) Legal Rules and Moral Rules
                    44. In certain situations, legal rules and moral rules coincide, as is only
                 natural in a system of law including principles which themselves derive
                 from moral rules. Good faith is one such principle. Not that either Party
                 has breached it. Besides, as the Court has stated on numerous occasions,
                 quoting the arbitral award in the Lac Lanoux case ((Spain, France),
                 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XII, p. 305),
                 “there is a general . . . principle of law according to which bad faith is not
                 presumed” (see Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights
                 (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 267,

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                            obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)              617

                 para. 150; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
                 (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
                 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101; see also the dissenting
                 opinion of Judge Yusuf in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic
                 (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment,
                 I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 402, para. 54).
                    45. Bolivia frequently invoked good faith but — as we saw with estop-
                 pel and legitimate expectations — without any legal underpinning, it was
                 by itself ineffective.
                    46. The question of good faith is different as regards the statements
                 and representations which Chile now describes, in its written pleadings
                 and oral arguments before the Court, as mere political and diplomatic
                 discourse intended to maintain good relations between the two States. I
                 am not certain that Chile could seriously have thought it was improving
                 relations and being a good neighbour by deliberately raising hopes which,
                 since not part of a binding obligation, would only be dashed — as indeed
                 they were. I believe that, on the contrary, a State that was acting in good
                 faith, as Chile undoubtedly was when it made those statements, expected
                 that sooner or later they would lead it to the negotiating table, and that it
                 was only much later, before the Court and ex post, that they would be
                 regarded as mere diplomatic courtesies.

                    47. It is regrettable that the Court did not address these moral aspects.
                 Perhaps, as I believe, Chile was sincere in expressing its willingness to find
                 a solution to the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked situation, although such
                 a sensitive issue involving questions of territorial sovereignty could clearly
                 not be resolved quickly. Thus, any delays or difficulties were probably
                 material in nature, and did not call into question any willingness to nego-
                 tiate. Or perhaps — a second possibility which I readily exclude — Chile
                 has, for over a century, carefully walked the fine line between political
                 and diplomatic promises and legal promises, taking care never to slip into
                 the legal side. Accepting this possibility would raise the question whether
                 safeguarding the legal integrity of the negotiation process, a prime tool in
                 international relations, is sufficient justification for those same interna-
                 tional relations to be safely founded on morally questionable behaviour,
                 and thus unreliable bases, at a time when good conduct and relationships
                 of trust are being promoted in international relations.

                    48. Although, as has been pointed out, an intention to negotiate is not
                 an obligation to do so, I regret that the Court did not consider whether,
                 when an intention is repeated over the years, and frequently by a State’s
                 senior officials, the line between intention and obligation becomes blurred.
                 The nature of that obligation, as invoked by Bolivia, must of course be
                 clear.

                                                                                114

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                              obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)                     618

                                (c) Obligation of Means or Obligation of Result?
                    49. Did the ambiguity of Bolivia’s position on this point possibly com-
                 plicate the handling of the present case by introducing some uncertainty
                 about the nature of the alleged obligation? The initial claim, as set out in
                 Bolivia’s Application and Memorial, asserts that “Chile has the obliga-
                 tion to negotiate with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting
                 Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” 13. According to
                 Bolivia, the legal nature of the obligation, as described in greater detail in
                 its Memorial, is that of an “affirmative obligation to negotiate in good
                 faith in order to achieve a particular result” 14, and thus “[t]he require-
                 ment that the Parties in this case negotiate to secure a specified result
                 gives a special feature to this obligation: it survives until the reaching of
                 that result” 15, and “it is an obligation to negotiate in order to achieve a
                 specific result” 16. Clearly, the obligation referred to here is an obligation
                 of result.

                    50. In its Reply, Bolivia tempers its position and, dismissing the binary
                 distinction between an obligation of means and an obligation of result,
                 refers to the notion of an obligation that is “conditional” or “qualified”
                 in that “the obligation to negotiate is entered into within a predetermined
                 framework imposed upon the Parties for the duration of the negotiations.
                 The precise result of the negotiations, however, is not predetermined,
                 because a wide margin of discretion is left to the Parties.” 17 In short, “[i]t
                 differs from an obligation of result, but it is an obligation to negotiate
                 with a view to reaching an agreement regarding the objective that has
                 been agreed upon by the Parties (a Bolivian sovereign access to the
                 sea)” 18. The idea of a middle ground in between an obligation of means
                 and an obligation of result is an interesting one, especially from a doctri-
                 nal point of view, but it fails to shed any light on the present instance.
                 Indeed, during the oral proceedings, Bolivia subsequently — and wisely —
                 took the line of least resistance when its counsel stated on the first day of
                 oral argument: “Bolivia’s case is remarkable in its modesty. All that it
                 asks is for Chile to return to the negotiating table.” 19 In concluding
                 Bolivia’s oral arguments, another counsel nonetheless developed the
                 above-mentioned argument from the Reply, and the final submissions
                 presented by Bolivia’s Agent “remained unchanged since the Applica-
                 tion”, as the Court notes in paragraph 85 of the Judgment 20.

                     13 Application of Bolivia, para. 32 (a); Memorial of Bolivia, para. 500 (a).
                     14 Memorial of Bolivia, para. 221.
                     15 Ibid., para. 289.
                     16 Ibid., para. 290.
                     17 Reply of Bolivia, para. 118.
                     18 Ibid., para. 119.
                     19 CR 2018/6, p. 30, para. 30 (Akhavan).
                     20 CR 2018/10, pp. 59‑60, paras. 7-8 (Chemillier-Gendreau).

                                                                                115

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                              obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)                          619

                    51. Yet it is abundantly clear that the more the claim tends towards an
                 obligation of result, the lower the chances are it will be satisfied, because
                 it must be ascertained beyond doubt that such a binding obligation was
                 indeed undertaken.
                    52. In its 2015 Judgment on the preliminary objection, the Court stated
                 that if, arguendo, it were to find that an obligation to negotiate existed, “it
                 would not be for the Court to predetermine the outcome of any negotia-
                 tion that would take place in consequence of that obligation” (Obligation
                 to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary
                 Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 605, para. 33). However,
                 if an obligation is definitely not an obligation of result, is it simply an
                 obligation of means?
                    53. Like Bolivia, I am not convinced that matters must be seen from
                 this alternative angle. The obligation borne by Chile is more than a sim-
                 ple obligation of means, in view of the clearly defined purpose of provid-
                 ing Bolivia with sovereign access to the sea, which has always been at the
                 heart of the discussions between the two States.
                    54. Paul Reuter’s doctrinal notion of a “fixed obligation” 21 falls in
                 between an obligation of means and an obligation of result, in line with
                 what he calls the obligation’s “context”. In the present case, disparate ele-
                 ments of differing legal value occurring over a long period of time have
                 created a context that could have allowed for the recognition of a “fixed
                 obligation”, which would have enabled the Court to consider that there
                 was an obligation whose object was to hold negotiations with the clearly
                 defined objective of (or negotiations aimed at): sovereign access to the
                 Pacific Ocean for Bolivia, and fair compensation for Chile. The negotia-
                 tions aimed at achieving this objective would have to be conducted in
                 good faith, such that they “are meaningful” (North Sea Continental Shelf
                 (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/
                 Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 85) and are pur-
                 sued “as far as possible” (Application of the Interim Accord of 13 Septem‑
                 ber 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece),
                 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), p. 685, para. 132; Application of the
                 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis‑
                 crimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections,
                 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 131, para. 150, quoting the Advi-
                 sory Opinion on Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (Advisory
                 Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 42, p. 116)). Yet as the Perma-
                 nent Court of International Justice found in its above-mentioned Advi-
                 sory Opinion, and as this Court found in 2010 in the case concerning Pulp
                 Mills on the River Uruguay ((Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment,
                 I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 68, para. 150), “an obligation to negotiate
                 does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement”.
                    55. Besides, can we even speak of “negotiations” when it comes to an

                    21 Paul Reuter, “De l’obligation de négocier”, Il processo internazionale : studi in onore

                 di Gaetano Morelli, Milan, Giuffré, 1975, pp. 711 et seq.

                                                                                116

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                            obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)             620

                 obligation of result? The Court does find in paragraph 86 of its Judgment
                 that States “may agree to be bound by an obligation to negotiate”, but
                 when that obligation incorporates a predetermined result, does the notion
                 of negotiation still carry any meaning? Can this situation be considered to
                 be consistent with the characteristic of negotiations whereby parties are
                 free to suspend them or break them off at any time, or to ultimately “not
                 reach an agreement”? Aside from the requirement that good faith be
                 respected and applied during negotiations, it is freedom which prevails.
                 But freedom is curbed if it is limited to discussions on the means of
                 obtaining a result fixed in advance. All things considered, apart from
                 exceptional circumstances such as negotiations on nuclear disarma-
                 ment — the Court having noted in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality
                 of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that Article VI of the Treaty on
                 the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons set out an “obligation to
                 achieve a precise result” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 264, para. 99) — is
                 an obligation of result compatible with negotiation? I regret that the
                 Court did not avail itself of this opportunity to give these delicate and
                 unclear questions greater consideration than it has done, as its view on
                 them was highly anticipated.

                                                Conclusion

                    56. I deeply regret the overwhelming rejection of the positions of
                 Bolivia which, alongside its sense of injustice, has now seen its hopes
                 dashed that a decision of the Court would compel Chile to come to the
                 negotiating table with a view to providing it with a portion of coast that
                 would be the lifeline of any landlocked State. These effects are obviously
                 not lost on the Court, but need I recall that Article 38 of the Court’s Stat-
                 ute requires it to decide in accordance with the law? Conceptions of the
                 law and of its requirements may of course not be uniform, leading to dif-
                 ferent options and sometimes dissenting opinions, but the law must be
                 applied in all its rigour in every instance.
                    57. With this in mind, paragraph 176 of the Judgment merits close
                 attention. It shows that the question of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
                 sea has not been closed by this ruling, which is anything but a shut door.
                 While Bolivia’s arguments failed to convince the majority, with this para-
                 graph the Court clearly wanted to do more than simply offer Bolivia a
                 “consolation prize”: it in fact reflects the limits of the courses of action
                 open to the Court, which decides disputes on the basis of international
                 law alone, unless the parties ask it to decide ex aequo et bono (which
                 might have been a wise choice for States with a genuine desire to put a
                 definitive end to the difficult legacy of the historic conflict known as the
                 War of the Pacific). With the limits thus defined, the Court’s concern is
                 that the dispute should not persist and that its decision should not be
                 understood as being the end of the matter, allowing things to remain as
                 they are.

                                                                                117

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                           obligation to negotiate access (diss. op. daudet)             621

                    58. In this regard, while hard for Bolivia, the Judgment could, if the
                 Parties so wish, prompt a return to negotiations, which would not be
                 imposed but desired by both sides with a renewed spirit. Indeed, it is
                 questionable whether negotiations entered into on the basis of coercion
                 would succeed. However, once the initial disappointment and frustration
                 have passed on one side, and the joy of winning has faded on the other, I
                 hope that calmer minds will be able to appreciate fully what is at stake.
                 This is not the place to discuss that. It is for the States themselves to do
                 so, by making the more measured claims required on the one hand, and
                 by putting forward means of satisfying them on the other, through a bal-
                 ance of mutual concessions and with an awareness that good neighbourly
                 relations between States is one of the keys to ensuring happy populations
                 thanks to the progress fostered by economic, commercial and cultural
                 co‑operation between players able to draw on common action to drive
                 their development. That is how I understand paragraph 176 of the Court’s
                 Judgment, and, in particular, the last sentence of that paragraph. I attach
                 the utmost importance to this text, and hope my viewpoint will be shared
                 by Bolivia and Chile, who will then, quite rightly, be able to satisfy the
                 former’s claim for sovereign access to the sea while granting the latter the
                 legitimate compensation it is entitled to receive.

                 (Signed) Yves Daudet.

                                                                                118

5 CIJ1150.indb 233                                                                              22/05/19 10:55


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM

(LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)

ORDONNANCE DU 8 MAI 1954

1954

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

NOTTEBOHM CASE

(LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA)
ORDER OF MAY 8th, 1954
La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:

« Affaire Nottebohm,
Ordonnance du 8 mat 1954: C.I. J. Recueil 1954, p. 16.»

This Order should be cited as follows:

“Notiebohm case,
Order of May 8th, 1954: I.C.J. Reports 7954, p. 16.”

N° de vente: 118
Sales number

16

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1954
. May 8th

YEAR 1954 General List :

No. 18

May &th, 1954

NOTTEBOHM CASE

(LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA)

ORDER

The International Court of Justice,
having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
having regard to Article 37 of the Rules of Court ;

Makes the following Order :

Having regard to the Judgment of November 18th, 1953, by which
the Court, having rejected the Preliminary Objection presented by
the Government of the Republic of Guatemala, fixed time-limits for
the filing of the Counter-Memorial, the Reply and the Rejoinder,

Having regard to the Order of January 15th, 1954, by which,
at the request of the Agent for the Government of Guatemala, the
time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial was extended
to April 2oth, 1954, and by which the rest of the procedure was
reserved for further decision,

Whereas the Counter-Memorial was filed within the time-limit
thus extended ;

THE CourT,

After ascertaining the views of the Parties,

Fixes July 17th, 1954, as the time-limit for the filing of the
Reply of the Government of Liechtenstein and October 2nd, 1954,

4
NOTTEBOHM CASE (ORDER OF 8 V 54) 17

as the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the Government
of Guatemala.

Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of May, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-four, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others will be
transmitted to the Governments of the Principality of Liechtenstein
and of the Republic of Guatemala, respectively.

(Signed) ARNOLD D. McNair,
President.

(Signed) J. LOPEZ OLIVAN,
Registrar.


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A L’APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PREVENTION
ET LA REPRESSION DU CRIME DE GENOCIDE

(BOSNIE-HERZEGOVINE — |
c. YOUGOSLAVIE (SERBIE ET MONTENEGRO))

ORDONNANCE DU 14 JUILLET 1995

1995

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPENTONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
5. YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

ORDER OF 14 JULY 1995
Mode officiel de citation:
Application de la convention pour la prévention ef lu répression
du crime de génocide, ordonnance du 14 juiller 1465,
CLS Recueil 1965, p. 279

Official citation:
Application af the Convention on the Prevention aud Punisiinent
of the Crime of Genocide, Order of 14 duly 1995,
LC Reports 1095, p. 279

: N° de vente: :
ISSN 0074-4441 Saies number 663 |

ISBN 92-1-070726-5
279

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1995 ANNEE 1995
14 sublet
Rôle péneral
n°91 14 juillet 1995

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À L’APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PRÉVENTION
ET LA RÉPRESSION DU CRIME DE GÉNOCIDE

(BOSNIE-HERZEGOVINE | ;
©. YOUGOSLAVIE (SERBIE ET MONTENEGRO}}

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de ta Cour internationale de Justice,

Vu larticle 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31 ct 79 de son Réègle-
ment,

Vu l'ordonnance du {6 avril 1993, par laquelle le Président de la Cour
a fixé au 15 octobre 1993 fa date d'expiration du délai pour ic dépôt du
mémoire de fa Bosnie-Herzégovine et au 15 avril 1994 la date d'expira-
tion du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire de la Yougoslavie {Serbie
el Monténégro),

Vu l'ordonnance du 7 octobre 1993, par laquelle le Vice-Président de la
Cour a reporté au 15 avril 1994 la date d'expiration du détail pour le
dépôt du mémoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine ct au 15 avrit 1995 ta date
d'expiration du délar pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire de la Yougoslavie
(Serbie et Monténégro),

Vu l'ordonnance du 21 mars 1995, par laquelle le Président de la Cour
a reporté au 3G juin 1995 la date d'expiration du délai pour fe dépôt du
contre-mémoire de la Yougoslavie {Serbie et Monténégroi:

Considérant que. le 26 juin 1995, la Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro)
a déposé certaincs exceptions préliminaires afférentes. en premicr lieu, à
la récevabtlité de la requête et, en second lieu. à la compétence de la Cour
pour connaître de l'affaire:

4
286 APPLICATION DLE CONVENTION GENOCIDE forD. 14 VI] 95)

Considérant qu'en conséquence, en vertu de l'arucle 79, paragraphe 3,
du Réglement de ia Cour, la procédure sur le fond est suspendue et qu'il
échet d'organiser la procedure pour l'examen desdites exceptions prelimi-
naires conformément aux dispositions de cet article;

Compte tenu des vues exprimées par jes agents des Parties lors d'une
réunion que le Président de la Cour a tenue avec eux le 11 juillet 1995,

Fixe au 14 novembre 1995 fa date d'expiration du délat dans lequel la
Republique de Bosnic-Herzégovine pourra présenter un exposé écrit
contenant ses observations et conclusions sur Jes exceptions préliminaires
soulevées par la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monté-
négro);

Réserve la suite de la procédure,

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français Faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le quatorze juillet mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quinze,
en trois exemplaires, dont Fun restera déposé aux archives de fa Cour et
les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique de Bosnie-Herzégovine et au Gouvernement de la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie ct Monténégro),

Le Président,
{Signe} Mohammed BEDHOUI.
o

Le Greffier,
{Signé; Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPIXA.