                                                                                112

                                DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE GAJA

                 [Traduction]

                      1. La présente déclaration porte sur la question tranchée par la Cour
                 au premier point du dispositif de l’arrêt.
                      En ce qui concerne la délimitation entre les zones maritimes afférentes
                 aux îles et celles qui sont générées par les côtes continentales, la déclara-
                 tion de Santiago fait référence au parallèle passant par le point où la fron-
                 tière terrestre aboutit en mer (punto en que llega al mar la frontera
                 terrestre). Pour les raisons exposées dans l’opinion dissidente commune,
                 ce même parallèle est également à retenir, suivant la déclaration de San-
                 tiago, lorsque la délimitation concerne les zones maritimes engendrées par
                 les côtes continentales d’Etats adjacents. Il est donc nécessaire de définir
                 le point exact où la frontière terrestre entre le Chili et le Pérou aboutit en
                 mer.
                      2. Le Chili soutient que la Cour n’a pas compétence au titre du pacte
                 de Bogotá pour trancher un différend sur l’interprétation ou l’application
                 du traité de Lima de 1929, qui a établi la frontière terrestre entre les
                 Parties. Elle ne pourrait donc rendre aucune décision qui tendrait à

                 déterminer le tracé de la frontière terrestre. Pourtant, rien n’empêche
                  la Cour de se référer à ce traité pour définir le point de départ de la
                  frontière maritime.
                      3. Selon l’article 2 du traité de Lima de 1929, « la frontière entre les
                   territoires du Chili et du Pérou partira d’un point de la côte qui sera
                   appelé « Concordia », à une distance de dix kilomètres au nord du pont de
                   la Lluta » (un punto de la costa que se denominará « Concordia », distante
                   diez kilómetros al Norte del puente del Rio Lluta). En 1930, les membres
                   de la commission mixte bilatérale chargée de la démarcation de la fron-
                   tière reçurent des instructions identiques de la part de leurs gouverne-
                   ments respectifs, avec pour mission de tracer « jusqu’à la côte un arc d’un
                   rayon de dix kilomètres …, dont le centre sera[it] le pont susmentionné »
                   (punto de intersección del arco trazado, con la orilla del mar). Une borne
                   devait être placée « aussi près que possible de la mer mais à l’abri de l’ac-
                   tion destructrice des flots » (lo más próximo al mar posible, donde quede a
                   cubierto de ser destruido por las aguas del océano).

                    Il semble clair, à la lecture de ces textes, que c’était l’intersection de
                 l’arc avec le littoral, et non la borne, qui était considérée comme le point
                 de départ de la frontière terrestre.
                    4. La question qui se pose en l’espèce est celle de savoir si le point de
                 départ de la frontière maritime est constitué par l’intersection de l’arc
                 avec le littoral ou par le point où le parallèle passant par la borne la plus
                 proche de la mer (la « borne no 1 ») croise la laisse de basse mer. Les Par-

                                                                                113

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                                       différend maritime (décl. gaja)                         113

                 ties ont des opinions opposées sur la question, le Chili soutenant la
                 seconde solution et le Pérou, la première, et leurs conclusions reflètent
                 cette divergence de vues.
                    Comme nous l’avons déjà vu, le point où la frontière terrestre aboutit en
                 mer et auquel la déclaration de Santiago fait référence pour désigner le
                 parallèle à retenir est le point de départ de la frontière terrestre, soit l’inter-
                 section de l’arc avec le littoral. La position chilienne ne saurait prévaloir
                 que s’il pouvait être démontré que, pour définir la frontière maritime, les
                 Parties avaient convenu d’utiliser le parallèle passant par la borne no 1.
                 Certains éléments de preuve indiquent effectivement que cette borne a
                 servi pour définir la frontière maritime, en particulier dans le contexte de
                 la construction de deux phares dans les années qui ont suivi 1968, lorsque
                 les Parties ont décidé, sur proposition d’une commission bilatérale, de
                 « matérialiser » le parallèle passant par la borne no 1. Cependant, ce choix
                 peut s’expliquer par des raisons d’ordre pratique, compte tenu également
                 de la très faible distance qui sépare ces points. Et rien ne démontre que les
                 Parties se sont entendues pour adopter, en vue de la délimitation de leurs
                 espaces maritimes respectifs, un point de départ différent de celui dont
                 elles avaient convenu dans la déclaration de Santiago, à savoir le point de
                 départ de la frontière terrestre prévu par le traité de Lima.
                    En outre, la coïncidence des points de départ respectifs des frontières
                 terrestre et maritime permet d’empêcher que, ne serait‑ce que pour un
                 segment limité du littoral, un Etat autre que l’Etat côtier ait souveraineté
                 sur la mer territoriale adjacente. Même si une telle situation n’est pas
                 inconcevable, les Etats préfèrent généralement l’éviter dans la pratique.

                                                                       (Signé) Giorgio Gaja.

                                                                                114

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PUBLICATIONS DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE
INTERNATIONALE |

SERIE A — N° 22

RECUEIL DES ARRETS

AFFAIRE DES ZONES FRANCHES DE LA
HAUTE-SAVOIE ET DU PAYS DE GEX

ORDONNANCE DU 19 AOÛT 1929

PUBLICATIONS OF THE PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

SERIES A — No. 22

COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS.

CASE OF THE FREE ZONES
OF UPPER SAVOY
AND THE DISTRICT OF GEX

ORDER OF AUGUST roth, 1929

LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF’S
PUBLISHING COMPANY
1929

LEYDE
SOCIÉTÉ D’EDITIONS
A. W. SIJTHOFF
1929

ORDER
MADE ON AUGUST roth, 1929.

SEVENTEENTH (ORDINARY) SESSION. nue oth

ugust th.

| File Ec. Vi,

Before: . Docket XVIL 1

MM. ANZILOTTI, President,
LODER,
NYHOLM,

DE BUSTAMANTE,
ALTAMIRA,

ODA,

HUBER,

PESSGOA,
HUGHES,

MM. NEGULESCO,
WANG,

M. DREYFUS, Judge ad hoc.

Judges,

Deputy-Judges,

CASE OF THE FREE ZONES OF UPPER SAVOY
AND THE DISTRICT OF GEX.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 48, 54,and 58 to 60 of the Court’s
Statute, |

Whereas, by a Special Agreement dated October 30th, 1924,
ratified on March aist, 1928, and duly notified to the Registrar
of the Court on March 2gth, 1928, the President of the French
Republic and the Swiss Federal Council, in view of the fact
that France and Switzerland, having been “unable to agree in
regard to the interpretation to be placed on Article 435,
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 6

paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes,
and as it has proved to be impossible to effect the agreement
provided for therein by direct negotiations,

“Have decided to resort to arbitration in order to obtain
this interpretation and for the settlement of all the questions
involved in the execution of paragraph 2 of Article 435 of the
Treaty of Versailles’’,

Whereas the two’ Parties have respectively appointed as
their Agents, ,

the French Government, M. Jules Basdevant, Professor in
the Faculty of Law of Paris and Assistant Legal Adviser
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;

the Swiss Government, H.E. M. A. de Pury, Swiss Minister
to the Netherlands, and M. Paul Logoz, member of the Swiss
National Council and Professor at the University of Geneva ;

and as Counsel,

the French Government, M° Paul-Boncour, Deputy, former
Minister and Counsel before the Court of Appeal of Paris;

the Swiss Government, M. Walter Burckhardt, Professor at
the University of Berne, and M. Paul-Edmond Martin, Professor
at the University of Geneva and Director of the Geneva
State Archives ;

Having regard to the Cases, Counter-Cases and Replies
duly submitted by the Parties on September 5th, 1928,
January 23rd, and June 12th, 1929, and the documents annexed
thereto ; |

Having duly heard the oral pleadings presented by M° Paul-
Boncour and M. Logoz and the replies made by M° Paul-
Boncour, M. Basdevant and M. Logoz on July oth, roth,
xith, rath, 13th, 15th, 16th, 18th, roth, 22nd and 23rd, 1929;

Whereas, according to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the said
Special Agreement, “‘it shall rest with the Permanent Court of
International Justice to decide whether, as between Switzer-
land and France, Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of
Versailles, with its annexes, has abrogated or has for its
object the abrogation of the provisions of the Protocol of the
Conference of Paris of November 3rd, 1815, of the Treaty of
Paris of November 2oth, 1815, of the Treaty of Turin of
March 16th, 1816, and of the Manifesto of the Sardinian Court
of Accounts of September gth, 1829, regarding the customs
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 7

and economic régime of the free zones of Upper Savoy and
the Pays de Gex, having regard to all facts anterior to the
Treaty of Versailles, such as the establishment of the Federal
customs in 1849, which are considered relevant by the Court” ;

Whereas, under paragraph 2 of the same article of the
Special Agreement, ‘the High Contracting Parties agree that
the Court, as soon as it has concluded its deliberation on this
question, and before rendering any judgment, shall accord to
the two Parties a reasonable time to settle between them-
selves the new régime to be applied in those districts, under
such conditions as they may consider expedient, as provided
in Article 435, paragraph 2, of the said Treaty. This time
may. be extended at the request of the two Parties”;

Whereas under Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Special
Agreement: “failing the conclusion and ratification of a
convention between the two Parties within the time specified,
the Court shall, by means of a single judgment rendered in
accordance with Article 58 of the Court’s Statute, pronounce
its decision in regard to the question formulated in Article 1
and settle for a period to be fixed by it and having regard
to present conditions, all the questions involved in the
execution of paragraph 2 of Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles” ;

Whereas, according to the notes exchanged on October 30th, |
1924, between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and
the Swiss Minister at Paris, it is understood between the
Parties, amongst other things, ‘‘that no objection shall be raised
on either side to the communication by the Court to the
Agents of the two Parties, unofficially and in each other’s
presence, of any indications which may appear desirable as
‘to the result of the deliberation upon the question formulated
in Article x, paragraph 1, of the Arbitration Convention” ;

Whereas, under Article 3, paragraph 3, of the Special Agree-
ment of October 30th, 1924, the written Reply to be filed
by each Party shall formulate “its final conclusions” ;

Whereas the Reply filed on behalf of the French Government
submits that the Court should:
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 8

[Translation.]

“In accordance with the letters attached to the Special
Agreement, communicate to the Agents of the two Parties,
unofficially and in each other’s presence, any indications
which may appear desirable as to the result of its delibera-
tion upon the question formulated in Article 1, paragraph 2,
of the Special Agreement ;

Determine the import of its deliberation and, in the circum-
stances contemplated by Article 2 of the Special Agreement,
so formulate the operative part of its judgment that its effect
shall be to decide that, as between France and Switzerland,
Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with its
annexes, has abrogated the provisions of the Protocol of the
Conferences of Paris of November 3rd, 1815, of the Treaty of
Paris. of November 2oth, 1815, of the Treaty of Turin of
March x6th, 1816, and of the Manifesto of the Sardinian
Court of Accounts of September gth, 1829, regarding the
customs and economic régime of the free zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex;

As soon as it has concluded its deliberation on this question
and: before pronouncing any decision, accord to the two
Parties a reasonable time to settle between themselves the
new régime to be applied in those districts under such condi-
tions as they may consider expedient, as provided by Article 435,
paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, this time _ Pains
capable of extension at the request of the two Parties”

Whereas the Reply filed on behalf of the Swiss Government
submits that:
[Translation.|

“t, As between France and Switzerland, Article 435, para-
graph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes, has not
abrogated the provisions of the Protocol of the Conferences of
Paris of November 3rd, 1815, of the Treaty of Paris of Novem-
ber 20th, 1815, of the Treaty of Turin of March 16th, 1816,
or of the Manifesto of the Sardinian Court of Accounts of
September gth, 1829, regarding the customs and economic
régime of the zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex.

2. As between Switzerland and France, Article 435, para-
graph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes, has
not for its object the abrogation of the provisions of the Proto-
col of the Conferences of Paris of November 3rd, 1815, of the
Treaty of Paris of November 2oth, 1815, of the Treaty of
Turin of March 16th, 1816, or of the Manifesto of the Sar-
dinian Court of Accounts of September 9th, 1829, regarding the
customs and economic régime of the free zones of Upper Savoy
and the District of Gex, that is to say, that as between Switzerland
and France, Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles,
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST roth, 1929) 9

with its annexes, is not intended necessarily to lead to the abro-.
gation of the aforesaid provisions, but simply means that Switzer-
land and France may abrogate them by mutual. consent” ;

| Whereas, in the same document, with reference to the
fixing of the time provided for in Article I, paragraph 2, of
the Special Agreement, it is said that

“The Federal Government reserves the right to make
such submissions as may be indicated in regard to this |
point when the Court has given the Parties the neces-
sary indications as to the result of its deliberation upon
the question of interpretation (Article I, paragraph 1, of
the Special Agreement) on the solution of which are
dependent the direct negotiations here referred to” ;

Whereas Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties, while they recognize
the guarantees stipulated by the treaties of 1815, and
especially by the Act of November 2oth, 1815, in favour
of Switzerland, the said guarantees constituting inter-
national obligations for the maintenance of peace, declare
nevertheless that the provisions of these treaties, conven-
tions, declarations and other supplementary acts concerning
the neutralized zone of Savoy, as laid down in paragraph 1
of Article 92 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna
and in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris of
November 20th, 1815, are no longer consistent with present
conditions. For this reason the High Contracting Parties
take note of the agreement reached between the French
Government and the Swiss Government for the abrogation
of the stipulations relating to this zone which are and
remain abrogated. ;

The High Contracting Parties also agree that the
stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other
supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Upper
Savoy and the Gex District are no longer consistent
with present conditions, and that it is for France and
Switzerland to come to an agreement together with a
view to settling between themselves the status of these
territories under such conditions as shall be considered
suitable by both countries” ;

Whereas the relevant passages in the annexes to this article
are as follows: |
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Ioth, 1920) Io

“J,

The Swiss Federal Council has informed the French
Government on May 5th, 1910, that after examining
the provisions of Article 435 in a like spirit of sincere
friendship, it has happily reached the conclusion that
it was possible to acquiesce in it under the following
conditions and reservations : ;

1. The neutralized zone of Haute-Savoie:

2. Free zone of Haute-Savoie and the District of Gex.

(a) The Federal Council makes the most express reser-
vations to the interpretation to be given to the statement
mentioned in the last paragraph of the above article for
insertion in the Treaty of Peace, which provides that
‘the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and other
supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Haute-
Savoie and the Gex District are no longer consistent with
present conditions’. The Federal Council would not wish that
its acceptance of the above wording should lead to the con-
clusion that it would agree to the suppression of a system
intended to give neighbouring territory the benefit of a
special régime which is appropriate to the geographical
and economical situation and which has been well tested.

In the opinion of the Federal Council, the question
is not the modification of the customs system of the zones
as set up by the treaties mentioned above, but only the
regulation in a manner more appropriate to the economic
conditions of the present day of the terms of the exchange
of goods between the regions in question. The Federal
Council has been led to make the preceding observations
by the perusal of the draft convention concerning the
future constitution of the zones which was annexed to the
note of April 26th from the French Government. While
making the above reservations, the Federal Council declares
its readiness to examine in the most friendly spirit any
proposals which the French Government may deem it
convenient to make on the subject.

(0) It is conceded that the stipulations of the treaties
of 1815 and other supplementary acts relative to the
free zones will remain in force until a new arrangement
is come to between France and Switzerland to regulate mat-
ters in this territory.

IL.

The French Government have addressed to the Swiss
Government, on May 18th, 1919, the following note in
reply to the communication set out in the preceding
paragraph : :
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, 1929) II

In a note dated May 5th, the Swiss Legation in Paris
was good enough to inform the Government of the French .
Republic that the Federal Government adhered’ to the
proposed article to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace
between the Allied and Associated Governments and Ger-
many.

The French Government have taken note with much
pleasure of the agreement thus reached, and, at their
request, the proposed article, which had been accepted by
the Allied and Associated Governments, has been inserted
under No. 435 in the Peace conditions presented to the
German, plenipotentiaries.

The Swiss Government, in their note of May 5th on
this subject, have expressed various views and reservations.

Concerning the observations relating to the free zones
of Haute-Savoie and the Gex District; the French Govern-
ment have the honour to observe that the provisions of
the last paragraph of Article 435 are so clear that their
purport cannot be misapprehended, especially where it
implies that no other Power but France and Switzer-
land will in future be interested in that question.

The French Government, on their part, are anxious to
protect the interests of the French territories concerned,
and, with that object, having their special situation in
view, they bear in mind the desirability of assuring them
a suitable customs régime, and determining, in a manner
better suited to present conditions, the methods of
exchanges between these territories and the adjacent Swiss
territories, while taking into account the reciprocal
interests of both regions.

It is understood that this must in no way prejudice
the right of France to adjust her customs line in this
region in conformity with her political frontier, as is
done on the other portions of her territorial boundaries,
and as was done by Switzerland long ago on her own
boundaries in this region.

The French Government are pleased to note on this
subject in what a friendly disposition the Swiss Govern-
ment take this opportunity of declaring their willing-
ness to consider any French proposal dealing with the
system to be substituted for the present régime of the said
free zones, which the French Government intend to formu-
late in the same friendly spirit.

Moreover, the French Government have no doubt that
the provisional maintenance of the régime of I815 as
to the free zones referred to in the above-mentioned

2
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, 1929) 12

paragraph of the note from the Swiss Legation of
May 5th, whose object is to provide for the passage from
the present régime to the conventional régime, will cause
no delay whatsoever in the establishment of the new
situation which has been found necessary by the two
Governments. This remark applies also to the ratification
by the Federal Chambers, dealt with in paragraph I (a)
of the Swiss note of May 5th, under the heading

LEE

‘Neutralized zone of Haute-Savoie’ ” ;

Whereas, at the present stage of the proceedings, the Court ,
is simply asked to accord to the two Parties a reasonabletime —
to settle between themselves a “new régime” for the free |
zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex; as this time
is to be accorded “‘as soon as” the Court’s “deliberation” on
the question set out in Article I, paragraph 1, of the Special
Agreement is concluded, and before “rendering any judgment”’ ;
as it will rest with the Court only in certain circumstances
and at a later stage to “pronounce its decision” upon the
said question by means of a “judgment rendered in accordance
with Article 58 of the Statute’; but seeing that ‘‘no objection
shall be raised’? by the Parties to the “communication by the
Court unofficially” to their Agents ‘of any indications which
may appear desirable as to the result of the deliberation”’
upon the said question ;

Whereas the spirit and letter of : its Statute, in particular
Articles 54, paragraph 3, and 58, do not allow the Court
“anofficially’’ to communicate to the representatives of two
Parties to a case “‘the result of the deliberation’? upon a ques-
tion submitted to it for decision; as, in contradistinction to
that which is permitted by the Rules (Article 32), the Court
cannot, on the proposal of the Parties, depart from the terms
of the Statute;

Whereas, on the other hand, according to the preamble of
the Special Agreement of October 30th, 1924, there is reason
to believe that the agreement between the Parties contem-
plated by Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles,
has hitherto proved to be impossible because they have ‘“‘been
unable to agree in regard to the interpretation to be placed
upon” the said article and its annexes; as consequently it
would be useless to grant the Parties time within which to
conclude this agreement, without informing them at the same
FREE ZONES.— ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 1I9th, I929) 13:

time or previously, what, in the Court’s opinion is the correct
interpretation of the said texts as between France and
Switzerland ;

Whereas the judicial settlement of international disputes,
with a view to which the Court has been established, is simply
an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement of such
disputes between the Parties; as consequently it is for the
Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible with its Statute,
such direct and friendly settlement ;

Whereas the Court must, in any event, fix by order, in
accordance with Article 48 of the Statute, the time contem-
plated by Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement ;
and whereas, in contradistinction to judgments contemplated by
Article 58 of the Statute, to which reference is made in Article 2,
paragraph 1, of the Special Agreement, orders made by the Court,
although as a general rule read in open Court, due notice having
been given to the Agents, have no ‘‘binding’’ force (Article 59 of
the Statute) or “‘final’’ effect (Article 60 of the Statute) in decid-
ing the dispute brought by the Parties before the Court;

Whereas, in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement
by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does
not involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a
manner enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate
effects ;

Whereas it is possible, without infringing the provisions
of the Statute, to give effect in all essential respects to the
common will of the Parties as expressed in the Special Agree-
ment, by indicating, in the grounds of the order according
to the Parties the time referred to in Article I, paragraph 2,
of the Special Agreement, the result of the Court’s delibera-
tions upon the question formulated in Article 7, paragraph 1,
of that instrument ;

As, nevertheless, it is important to set forth clearly that
special agreements whereby international disputes are submitted
to the Court should henceforth be formulated with due regard
to the forms in which the Court is to express its opinion
according to the precise terms of the constitutional provisions
governing its activity, in order that the Court may be able to
deal with such disputes in the ordinary course and without
resorting, as in the present case, to a construction which |
must be regarded as strictly exceptional,
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 14
Makes the following Order:

As to the evidence: |

Whereas, in the course of his argument on July 13th, the
Agent for the Swiss Government filed a volume entitled:
Publications des Comités suisses en faveur du maintien des
zones franches de 1815 et I8I6, and as, in his reply of July
roth, the Agent for the French Government submitted, as
a preliminary objection, that this publication should not be
received in evidence ;

As, in his reply on July 22nd, the Agent for the Swiss
Government stated that he left the decision on this point to
the Court ;

Whereas, according to Article 52 of its Statute, “‘after
the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the
time specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any
further oral or written evidence that one Party may desire
to present unless the other side consents” ;

Whereas the extracts from the said volume read by the
Agent for the Swiss Government during the hearing are not
necessary at the present stage of the proceedings to enable
the Court to form its opinion upon the question submitted
to it by Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Special Agreement ;

As ‘to the Courts function:

Whereas, according to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Special
Agreement, it rests with the Court to decide whether, as
between France and Switzerland, Article 435, paragraph 2,
of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes, has abrogated
or has for its object the abrogation of the provisions of the
Protocol of the Conferences of Paris of November 3rd, 1815,
of the Treaty of Paris of November 2oth, 1815, of the Treaty
of Turin of March 16th, 1816, and of the Manifesto of the
Sardinian Court of Accounts of September gth, 1829, regarding
the customs and economic régime of the free zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex, having regard to all facts
anterior to the Treaty of Versailles ;

Whereas the expression ‘‘as between France and Switzer-
land” has the effect of limiting the function of the Court
solely to that of determining the reciprocal rights and
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 15

obligations arising in connection with the régime of the free
zones for the two countries, under Article 435, paragraph 2,
of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes, apart from the
legal relations as between signatories of the said Treaty result-
ing from this article ; .

Whereas, having regard more particularly to the aim of the
Special Agreement, as this aim appears from its preamble
when it states that the Parties have been unable to agree
in regard to the interpretation to be placed upon Article 435,
paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with its annexes;
having regard to the fact that the real divergence which was
the cause of the failure of the Parties to reach an agreement,
related to the question whether the régime of the zones could
be abolished without Switzerland’s consent; and having regard
to the fact that the Court cannot as a general rule be com-
pelled to choose between constructions determined beforehand
none of which may correspond to the opinion at which it may
arrive, the Court is entirely free to interpret. Article 435,
paragraph 2, with its annexes, of the Treaty of Versailles
upon both points without restriction, that is, whether it has
abrogated the former provisions in question, and whether
it has for its object their abrogation ; as, therefore, if it arrives
at the conclusion that the article, with its annexes, has not
abrogated the former provisions relating to the free zones, it
is not obliged to say that it has for its object their abroga-
tion, but, on the contrary, may equally say that this is not
the intention of the article, with its annexes;

Whereas, in view of the indications afforded by the pre-
amble of the Special Agreement and by the history of the nego-
tiations which have taken place between the Parties with a
view to reaching the agreement contemplated by Article 435,
paragraph 2, and which have been cited before the Court,
the task of the latter, in replying to the question whether
the said article, with its annexes, has for its object the abro-
gation of the former provisions relating to the free zones,
is to decide whether or not Switzerland is obliged to accept,
as a basis for the future negotiations contemplated by Article 1,
paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement, the abolition of the
régime of the free zones, that is to say, in particular the trans-
fer of the French customs barrier in these territories to the
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, 1929) 16

political frontier; and whereas it Is, in fact, evident that if
France and Switzerland succeed in reaching the agreement
provided for in the said article and in Article 2, paragraph 1,
of the Special Agreement, that agreement, whatever its con-
tents may be, will have the formal effect of abrogating the
former provisions ; and therefore if, in replying to the question
put, the Court were not to regard the expression “has for
its object the abrogation of” as meaning “‘is intended neces-
sarily to lead to the abrogation of”, its reply would not
eliminate the fundamental difficulties which have hitherto
impeded the negotiations between -France and Switzerland
and which have induced them to have recourse to the Court ;

As to the questions submitted :

Whereas the Court, in performing its function in the light
of the foregoing considerations, must have regard to all facts
antecedent to the Treaty of Versailles, and particularly the
establishment of the Federal customs in 1849, which are con-
sidered relevant by it;

Whereas these facts, taken together, are clearly relevant
to the question submitted to the Court in that they explain
the conclusion drawn by the High Contracting Parties to the
Versailles Treaty in their declaration to the effect that ‘the
stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other supple-
mentary acts concerning the free zones of Upper Savoy and
the Gex District are no longer consistent with present condi-
tions’, namely “‘that it is for France and Switzerland to
come to an agreement together with a view to settling between
themselves the status of these territories under such conditions
as shall be considered suitable by both countries”; and as
the subsequent examination of the question by the Court
has been entirely conducted in the light of this consideration ;

Whereas the text itself of Article 435, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty of Versailles draws from the statement that the former
stipulations are not consistent with present conditions, no other
conclusion but that France and Switzerland are to settle
between themselves the status of the free zones, a conclusion
which is tantamount to a declaration of disinterestedness as
regards that status, on the part of the High Contracting
Parties other than France; as, in particular, this text does
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST roth, 1929) 17

not set forth the conclusion that as a necessary consequence
of this inconsistency the former stipulations relating to the
free zones are abrogated ;

Whereas, furthermore, in Article 435, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Versailles, the High Contracting Parties, after stating
that the ‘provisions of these treaties [of 1815], conventions,
declarations and other supplementary acts concerning the
neutralized zone of Savoy... are no longer consistent with
present conditions’, take ‘‘note of the agreement reached
between the French Government and the Swiss Government
for the abrogation of the stipulations relating to this zone”,
adding that these stipulations “are and remain abrogated”’ ;

Whereas the expression “are no longer consistent with
present conditions’, when used in the first. paragraph of the
article, constitutes the ground on which the High Contracting
Parties acquiesce in an agreement already concluded between
France and Switzerland abolishing the neutral zone; as, when
it is used in the second paragraph of the same article, it also
constitutes the ground on which the High Contracting Parties
declare that they acquiesce in an agreement—in this case a
future agreement—between France and Switzerland ;

As, consequently—no matter what its significance might
be in other contexts—, there is no reason for regarding the
expression “are no longer consistent with present conditions”
as ipso facto involving, in the second paragraph of the article,
the abolition of the free zones, since in the first paragraph
its meaning is not such as automatically to involve. the aboli- ©
tion of the neutral zone;

Whereas, in any event, Article 435 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles is not binding on Switzerland, which is not a Party
to this Treaty, except to the extent to which that country
has itself accepted it; as this extent is determined by the
note of the Swiss Federal Council of May 5th, 1910, an extract
from which constitutes Annex I to this article; as it is by
this action and by this action alone that the Swiss Govern-
ment has “acquiesced” in the ‘‘provisions of Article 433”,
namely “under the conditions and reservations” which are set
out in the said note;
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, 1929) 18

Whereas, amongst the aforesaid conditions and reservations,
it is stated inter aha that ‘‘the Federal Council would not
wish that its acceptance of the above wording [i.e. Article 435,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Versailles] should lead to the conclu-
sion that it would agree to the suppression of a system .... which
has been well tested”, namely the régime of the free zones;

As, accordingly, the said article, assuming that it were pos-
sible to interpret it as involving the abolition of the said
régime, could not be operative as between France and Switzer-
land, unless Switzerland’s consent were not necessary for
such abolition ;

Whereas the Court is unable to regard as decisive the argu-
ments to the contrary which it has been sought to deduce
from other passages of the said note of the Federal Council
and from the whole of the French note of May 18th, I010,
which forms Annex II to Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles ;

As, with regard to this latter note, the Court—which,
though its task is to interpret the said article with its annexes,
nevertheless remains free to estimate the weight to be attached
from this point of view to each of the annexes—is unable
to regard it as possessing any weight for the purposes. of inter-
pretation, having regard especially to the fact that it cannot
in any circumstances affect the conditions of the Federal
Council’s acquiescence in the article in question, that acquies- :
cence being a unilateral act on the part of Switzerland ;

Whereas, in regard to the possibility of abolishing the
régime of the free zones without Switzerland’s consent, the
actual terms of Article 435, paragraph 2, generally speaking,
would seem to presuppose the existence of a right on the
part of Switzerland derived from the former stipulations; as,
in the same connection, Switzerland’s consent has in fact been
sought ; and lastly, as the High Contracting Parties have
inserted, after Article 435, the Swiss note of May 5th, 1910,
which, in the Court’s opinion, is entirely based on the exist-
ence of such a right on the part of Switzerland;

Whereas, with particular regard to the Sardinian zone,
Switzerland, in her capacity as Party to the Treaty of Turin
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, Ig29) 19

of March 16th, 1816, has acquired a contractual right to the
withdrawal of the customs barrier in that district ;

Whereas, with particular regard to the zone of Saint-
Gingolph, the Court, being of opinion that the Treaty of Turin
of March 16th, 1816, has not been abrogated, the same is true
as regards the Manifesto of the Royal Chamber of Accounts
of Sardinia dated September goth, 1820, the question of the
legal nature of that instrument remaining however reserved ;

Whereas, with particular regard to the zone of Gex, both
Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles and the
Special Agreement treat this zone in exactly the same way as
the zone of Upper Savoy; and as this zone forms part of a
territorial arrangement in favour of Switzerland, an arrange-
ment which, being contemplated in the ‘Declaration of the
Powers assembled at the Congress of Vienna in regard to
Switzerland” of March 2oth, 1815, to which Switzerland acceded
by act of the Diet of the Helvetian Confederation dated
May 27th. 1815, was restated in the Protocol signed on
November 3rd, 1815, at Paris (this Protocol being referred to
in the Special Agreement and expressly mentioning the with-
drawal. of the French customs barriers ‘‘from the Swiss
frontiers facing the Jura”), and received final form in Article x
of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on November 2oth,
1815, the preamble and third paragraph of this article being
as follows:

[Tvanslation. |
“The frontiers of France shall be as they were in 1790,

save for the modifications in one direction or the other
which are indicated in this article.

3. In order to establish direct communication between
the Canton of Geneva and Switzerland, that part of
the District of Gex bordered on the east by the Lake
of Geneva, on the south by the territory of the Canton
of Geneva, on the north by that of the Canton of Vaud,
‘on the west by the course of the river Versoix and by
a line including the communes of Collex-Bussy and Meyrin,
leaving the commune of Fernex to France, shall be ceded
to the Helvetian Confederation to be -united to the
Canton of Geneva. The line of the French customs shall
be placed to the west of the Jura, so that the whole
District of Gex shall be outside this line”

3
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST 19th, I9g29) 20

Whereas the aforesaid Protocol of November 3rd, 1815, was
formally transmitted to Switzerland by the Powers signatory
to the Declaration of Vienna of March 2oth, 1815, together
with a Declaration of November 2oth, £815, following upon
the act of accession of May 27th, 1815, of the Helvetian Diet
to the said Declaration of March zoth, 1815 ;

Whereas all these instruments, taken together, as also the
circumstances in which they were executed, establish, in the
Court’s opinion, that the intention of the Powers was, besides
“rounding out” the territory of Geneva and assuring direct
communication between the Canton of Geneva and the rest
of Switzerland, to create in favour of Switzerland a right, on
which she could rely, to the withdrawal of the French customs
‘barrier from the political frontier of the District of Gex, that
is to say, a right to the free zone of Gex;

Whereas the Court, having reached this conclusion simply
on the basis of an examination of the situation of fact in
regard to this case, need not decide as to the extent to which
international law takes cognizance of the principle of “‘stipula-
tions in favour of third Parties” ;

Whereas, if Article 435, paragraph 2, with its annexes, of
the Treaty of Versailles has not, as between France and
Switzerland, abrogated the former provisions relating to the
free zones, neither has it for its object the abrogation thereof;
as, in fact, since the High Contracting Parties in Article 435,
paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, have not drawn
from their statement as to the inconsistency of the former
stipulations concerning the free zones with present conditions
any consequence other than that it is for France and Switzer-
land to come to an agreement together with a view to
settling between themselves the status of these territories
under such conditions as shall be considered suitable by both
countries, without in any way prejudging the question of
the contents of this agreement which, therefore, may or may
not, according to the common will of the Parties, lead to
the abrogation of the régime of the free zones; and since
Switzerland, in her note of May 5th, 1919, annexed to the
said article, made an express reservation regarding abolition
in the future (“would agree”) of the régime of the free zones
resulting from the former stipulations concerning them, it
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, 1929) 21

is impossible to conclude that as between France and Swit-
zerland, the aforesaid article and its annexes is intended
necessarily to lead to the abrogation of the said provisions,
thus compelling Switzerland to accept the abrogation of the
régime of the free zones as the only possible basis of the
future agreement between herself and France;

Whereas this view is in no way weakened by the facts
antecedent to the Treaty of Versailles; as, on the contrary,
-it is corroborated by the facts relating to the drafting of
Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles which have been cited
before the Court;

As to the time to be granted :

Whereas, having regard to the circumstances of the present
case, a period of approximately nine months seems to be
sufficient to allow the Parties to establish the basis of an
agreement which they have themselves, on. many occasions,
recognized as highly desirable ;

THE Court

(x) excludes as evidence at the present stage of the case the
Publications des Comités suisses en faveur du maintien des
zones franches de 1815 et 1816 filed at the hearing of July x3th,
1929, by the Agent for the Swiss Government ;

(2) accords to the Government of the French Republic and
to the Government of the Swiss Confederation: a period
expiring on May ist, 1930, to settle between themselves, under
such conditions as they may consider expedient, the ‘new
régime” to be applied in the districts contemplated by Art-
icle 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles.

Done in French and English, the French text being author-
itative, at the Peace. Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth
day of August, nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, in three
copies, one of which shall be placed in -the archives of the
FREE ZONES.—ORDER OF COURT (AUGUST Igth, 1929) 22

Court and the others delivered to the Agents of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic and of the Swiss Federal
Government respectively.

(Signed) D. ANZILOTTI,
President. ,

(Signed) À. HAMMARSKJÜLD,
Registrar.

MM. Nyholm, Judge, Negulesco, Deputy-Judge, and Dreyfus,
Judge ad hoc, whilst concurring in the operative portion of
the present order, declare that they are unable to agree with
the reasons to the extent which they have themselves indic-
ated in the separate opinions set forth hereafter.

M. Pessôa, Judge, while agreeing with the present order,
desires to add thereto the observations which follow hereafter.

(Initialled) D. A.

(Initialled) A. H.


SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOSLER

I concur in the opinion that the request to indicate interim measures
must be dismissed. Since this is the effect of the operative part of the
Order, I voted for it, although I do not share the reasons given by the
majority of my colleagues but base the same conclusion on different
grounds.

An Order made on the request of an applicant State to indicate interim
measures of protection pending judgment is given in incidental pro-
ceedings, normally at a very preliminary stage of the pendency of the
case before the Court. Furthermore, the definitive decision on jurisdic-
tion and admissibility is reserved to later proceedings, if the parties, as
in the present case, disagree on this point. Matters belonging to the
substance of the case must not be touched at all. It follows from the
provisional character of these proceedings as well as from the need to
reach a decision urgently that the reasoning motivating the operative part
of the Order is kept brief. Accordingly an opinion differing from the
reasons given in the Order is bound to confine itself to similar restrictions.

Subject to this understanding, my reasons are as follows:

1. In my view, the first question arising is that of the jurisdiction of the
Court to indicate interim measures in the case submitted by the Greek
Application of 10 August 1976 instituting proceedings before the Court.
Article 41 of the Statute confers this power on the Court without being,
in my interpretation, an independent source of jurisdiction on the same
footing and of the same legal quality as Article 36. The various ways there
indicated of founding the obligation to take part in proceedings before
the Court as a respondent party all depend on the voluntary submission
of the State concerned. Article 41 is, however, in so far an autonomous
grant of jurisdiction that it permits that the grounds conferring jurisdic-
tion in conformity with the basic Article are to be examined only to the
extent that this can be done without endangering the urgency with which
a request for interim measures must be considered.

In view of the provisional character of the requested Order and bearing
in mind that it in no way prejudges the decisions to be taken in the
forthcoming proceedings, it is in my view sufficient that the Court, when
it actually indicates interim measures, should have reached the provisional
conviction, based on a summary examination of the material before it
(including written observations of a party not represented) and subject
to any objections which may be raised in subsequent proceedings, that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case. This amounts to an attempted

25
25 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. MOSLER)

definition of the criteria of a positive prima facie test. I would add that
provisional affirmation of jurisdiction is in my view not a “circumstance”
contributing to the necessity of provisional measures in the sense of
Article 41, but a precondition of the examination whether such circum-
stances exist.

If the Court however, as in the present Order, rejects the request
because the circumstances are not considered to require interim measures,
it examines the legal situation existing between the parties to the dispute
and thus, to that extent, also assumes jurisdiction. But in this hypothesis
the Court has only to satisfy itself that it does not manifestly lack
jurisdiction, since the Order does nothing to interfere with the rights of the
respondent party.

2. In the present case the jurisdiction is open to doubt and certainly
not manifest. I must therefore examine whether it is, according to the
above-mentioned criteria, sufficiently established to justify the indication
of interim measures, supposing that circumstances exist which require
such measures to be taken in order to preserve the respective rights of
either party. Greece asserts that the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to the
merits of the dispute is founded on two separate grounds, each of them
furnishing a sufficient basis: the General Act of Geneva of 26 September
1928 and the Brussels communiqué of 31 May 1975.

(a) There may be reasonable grounds for maintaining that the General
Act of Geneva is still in force between those parties who have not
denounced it, but objections to that view are possible and may be
raised in the forthcoming proceedings on jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Greece’s reservation made in 1931 in accordance with Article 39,
paragraph 2 (c), of the General Act (Annex IX to the Application),
excluding from her undertakings under the Act, inter alia, “disputes
relating to the territorial status of Greece”, gives rise to doubts
whether this status comprises the areas of the continental shelf
appertaining to the coastal State.

But neither of these problems can be solved, even in a summary
manner, in the present incidental proceedings, to the extent neces-
sary to meet the test indicated above and furnish the basis of the
Court’s jurisdiction at the present stage of the proceedings.

(b) The same applies to the Brussels communiqué of 31 May 1975. I am
not sufficiently convinced, after a summary examination, that it
constitutes an agreement to seise the Court “as regards the continen-
tal shelf of the Aegean Sea”, conferring on either party the right to
institute proceedings before the Court.

3. The request must therefore be rejected for the sole reason that the
jurisdiction of the Court is not sufficiently established. It must be
determined in subsequent proceedings on the basis of Article 36, para-
graph 6, of the Statute.

Te Court bases its negative decision on the circumstances existing in
the present situation, which in its view do not require the indication of

26
26 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. MOSLER)

interim measures in order to preserve the rights of either party. It draws
this conclusion from an examination first of the consequences of the
exploration by Sismik I of part of the seabed the appurtenance of which
to either Greece or Turkey is at issue between the parties and, secondly,
of the danger of an armed conflict involved in military measures taken by
Turkey to protect her research vessel and by Greece to monitor the move-
ment of it.

I share the Court’s reasoning that the continued exploration of disputed
areas of the continental shelf by Sismik I does not cause, of itself and
seen in isolation, irreparable prejudice to Greece justifying the exercise
of the exceptional power granted to the Court under Article 41, even
though, in the event of a judgment favourable to Greece, it would consti-
tute an infringement of an exclusive right of the coastal State. But I
must express doubts regarding the Court’s separation of the infringement
of alleged Greek rights to exploration from the military measures, taken
by both sides for purposes of the protection or supervision of the vessel,
which involve a risk of armed conflict. I consider the military aspect not
as a distinct element but simply as an aggravating circumstance additional
to the basic element of continued exploration. In my view the Court
should have considered that it was part of its overall responsibility to
consider the situation as a whole, quite apart from its assessment of the
Security Council’s resolution and the reactions thereto of Greece and
Turkey.

However, having taken the position I have indicated in section 2 of this
opinion, I find that the question whether one of these two circumstances,
or both in combination, require the indication of interim measures to
preserve the rights of either party, loses relevance. I must therefore
abstain from making further comments on these points.

(Signed) Hermann MOSLER.

27


37 | AVIS CONSULTATIF N° I7
ANNEXE 1

CONVENTION
ENTRE LA GRÈCE ET LA BULGARIE
RELATIVE A L'ÉMIGRATION RÉCIPROQUE :

SIGNÉE À NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE LE 27 NOVEMBRE 19010.

[Texte officiel français communiqué par le ministre de Grèce
à Londrés, aux effets de l'enregistrement, le 25 août 1920.
L'enregistrement de cette Convention a eu lieu le 25 août 1920.]

Ainsi qu’il est prévu à l'article 56, alinéa 2, du Traité de
paix avec la Bulgarie conclu le 27 novembre 1919, et confor-
mément à la décision des Principales Puissances alliées et
associées en date du 27 novembre 1919 et ainsi conçue:

« Vu l’article 56, alinéa 2, du Traité de paix avec la
Bulgarie, les Principales Puissances alliées et associées
jugent opportun que l’émigration réciproque et volontaire
des minorités ethniques, de religion ou de langue en
Grèce et en Bulgarie, soient réglées par une convention
conclue entre ces deux Puissances dans les termes arrêtés
à la date de ce jour », ;

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés de la Grèce, d’une part,

Et de la Bulgarie, d’autre part,

Aprés échange de leurs pleins pouvoirs respectivement recon-
nus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions
suivantes :

Article’ premier.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent à leurs
ressortissants appartenant à des minorités ethniques, de
religion ou de langue, le droit d’émigrer librement dans leurs
territoires respectifs.

Article 2.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à faciliter, par
tous les moyens dont elles disposent, l'exercice du droit prévu
à l’article premier, et à n’apporter directement ou indirectement
aucune entrave à la liberté d’émigration, nonobstant les lois
ou règlements contraires, qui, à cet égard, seront réputés sans
effet. :

1 L’échange des ratifications a eu lieu le 9 août 1920 à Paris.
38 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 17

En particulier, l’exercice du droit d’émigration ne portera
pas atteinte aux droits pécuniaires des émigrants, tels que ces
droits se trouvent constitués au moment de l’émigration.

Article 3.
CA

Il ne pourra être apporté aucun obstacle au départ d’un
émigrant volontaire pour quelque cause que ce soit, sauf
en cas de condamnation définitive à une peine afflictive pour
infraction de droit commun. En cas de condamnation non
encore définitive ou de poursuite pénale de droit commun
contre un émigrant, ce dernier sera livré aux autorités du
pays où il se rend, par les autorités du pays poursuivant,
afin qu'il soit jugé. :

Article 4.

Le droit d’émigration volontaire appartient à toute personne
âgée de plus de 18 ans. Il pourra être exercé dans un délai
de deux ans à partir de la constitution de la Commission
mixte prévue à l’article 8, au moyen d’une déclaration devant
ladite Commission ou devant ses représentants. La déclaration
d’émigration du mari impliquera celle de la femme; la décla-
ration d’émigration des parents ou des tuteurs impliquera
celle de leurs enfants ou pupilles âgés de moins de 18 ans.

Article 5.

Les émigrants perdront la nationalité du pays qu'ils aban-
donnent, dès l’instant où ils l’auront quitté, et ils acquerront
celle du pays de destination, dès leur arrivée sur le territoire
de ce pays.

Article 6.

Les personnes qui, en exécution des dispositions précédentes,
exerceront le droit d’émigration, seront libres d’emporter avec
elles ou de faire transporter leurs biens meubles de toute
nature, sans qu'il leur soit imposé de ce chef aucun droit,
soit de sortie, soit d’entrée.

De même, au cas où le droit d’émigration serait exercé
par des membres de communautés (y compris les églises,
couvents, écoles, hôpitaux ou fondations de quelque nature
que ce soit) qui, de ce chef, devront être dissoutes, la Com-
mission mixte prévue. à l’article 8 déterminera si, et dans
quelles conditions, ces membres auront la faculté d’emporter
librement ou de faire transporter les biens meubles qui appar-
tiennent à ces communautés.
39 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 17
Article 7.

Les biens immobiliers, ruraux ou urbains, appartenant aux
émigrants volontaires ou aux communautés visées à l’article 6,
seront liquidés conformément aux dispositions ci-après, par la
Commission mixte prévue à l’article 9.

- Article 8.

Dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur
de la présente Convention, il sera créé une Commission mixte,
composée d’un membre nommé par chacun des États contrac-
tants intéressés et d’un nombre égal de membres d’une autre
nationalité, parmi lesquels le président sera ‘choisi, et qui
seront nommés par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Article 9.

La Commission mixte aura pour attributions de-surveiller et
faciliter l’émigration volontaire prévue par la présente Conven-
tion et de liquider les immeubles des -émigrants.

Elle fixera les modalités de l’émigration et de la liquidation
des biens immobiliers.

D'une façon générale, la Commission mixte aura tout
pouvoir de prendre les mesures que nécessitera l'exécution de
la présente Convention et de décider toutes les questions aux-
quelles cette Convention pourrait donner lieu. .

Les décisions de la Commission mixte seront prises à la
majorité des voix, la voix du président étant prépondérante en
cas de partage.

Article T0.

La Commission mixte aura tout pouvoir pour faire procéder .
à l'estimation des biens immobiliers, les intéressés étant enten-
dus ou ayant été dûment convoqués pour être entendus.

Le gouvernement du pays où la. liquidation aura eu lieu
devra verser à la Commission mixte, dans les conditions à
fixer par celle-ci et pour être remis aux ayants droit, le
montant de la valeur des biens immobiliers liquidés, qui reste-
ront la propriété dudit gouvernement.

A rticle 11.

Des fonds seront avancés à la Commission mixte par les
États intéressés, en vue de faciliter l’émigration et dans les
conditions fixées par ladite Commission. Celle-ci avancera aux
émigrants, dans la mesure des fonds disponibles, la valeur de
leurs biens immobiliers.
40 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 17
Article 12.

Les personnes qui, avant la mise en vigueur de la présente
Convention, auraient quitté le territoire d’un des États con-
tractants et se seraient déjà établies sur le territoire de l’État
dont elles relèvent, .au point de vue ethnique, de la religion
ou de la langue, auront droit à la valeur des biens laissés
par elles dans le pays qu'elles ont quitté, telle que cette
valeur résultera de la liquidation qui en sera faite par la
Commission mixte.

Article T3.

Les frais d'entretien et de fonctionnement de la Commission
mixte et de ses organes seront supportés par les gouvernements
intéressés dans des proportions à déterminer par la Commission.

Article 14.

La présente Convention ne porte pas atteinte aux droits qui
seraient reconnus aux intéressés par les dispositions des traités
ou conventions conclus ou à conclure pour le réglement des
affaires actuelles. .

Article 15.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’engagent à apporter à
leur législation respective les modifications qui seraient néces-
saires pour assurer l'exécution de la présente Convention.

Article 16.

Dans le délai d'un an à dater de sa mise en vigueur, la
présente Convention sera ouverte à l'adhésion des Etats ayant
une frontière commune avec l’un des États signataires.

Cette adhésion sera signifiée, par. la voie diplomatique, au
Gouvernement de la République française, et par celui-ci aux
États signataires ou adhérents ainsi qu’à la Commission mixte.
Elle portera effet quinze jours après la signification au Gou-
vernement français.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications
seront respectivement déposées à Paris par les Puissances
signataires en même temps que leurs ratifications du Traité de
paix signé à Neuilly-sur-Seine le 27 novembre 1919. Elle
entrera en vigueur en même temps que ledit Traité de paix
entrera en vigueur entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie.
4I AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 17

Fait à Neuilly-sur-Seine, le vingt-sept novembre mil neuf
cent dix-neuf, en un seul exemplaire qui restera déposé dans
les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et
dont les expéditions authentiques seront remises à chacune
des Puissances signataires.

(L. S.) (Signé) ELEFTHERIOS VENISELOS.
(L. S.) (Signé) N. PoLrris.
(L. S.) (Signé) AL. STAMBOLIISKI.

Pour copie conforme.
Londres, le 25 août 1920.
Le Ministre de Gréce:
(Signé) D. CACLAMANOs.