476

JOINT DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT RANJEVA,
JUDGES GUILLAUME, HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS,
AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL AND ELARABY

[English Original Text]

Various objections to the jurisdiction of the Court — Freedom of choice of
the Court — Guiding criteria: consistency; certitude; implications for the other
pending cases — Judgment of the Court inappropriately based on its lack of
jurisdiction ratione personae — Judgment incompatible with previous decisions
of the Court.

1. We have voted in favour of the dispositif of the Judgment because,
at the end of the day, we each agree that this case cannot, as a matter of
law, proceed to the merits. Nevertheless, we profoundly disagree with the
reasoning upon which the Judgment rests, in particular the ground upon
which the Court has found it has no jurisdiction.

2. It is not unusual that, in a case, the Court has the possibility of
determining its jurisdiction on more than one ground (Right of Passage
over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J Reports
1957, pp. 129-134; Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp. 132-134; Land and Maritime Bound-
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I. C.J Reports 1998, pp. 284-289; Aerial Incident
of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I CJ.
Reports 2000, pp. 19-24). Submissions may have been made to the Court
that it lacks jurisdiction by reference to more than one of the common
bases of jurisdiction (that is to say, ratione personae, ratione materiae,
ratione temporis). If the Court finds that, on two or more grounds, its
jurisdiction is not well founded, it may choose the most appropriate
ground on which to base its decision of lack of competence. The Court
does not necessarily first have to dispose of the conditions laid down in
Article 35 of the Statute, dealing only later with the conditions laid down
in Articles 36 and 37.

3. The choice of the Court has to be exercised in a manner that reflects
its judicial function. That being so, there are three criteria that must
guide the Court in selecting between possible options. First, in exercising
its choice, it must ensure consistency with its own past case law in order
to provide predictability. Consistency is the essence of judicial reasoning.
This is especially true in different phases of the same case or with regard
to closely related cases. Second, the principle of certitude will lead the
Court to choose the ground which is most secure in law and to avoid a
ground which is less safe and, indeed, perhaps doubtful. Third, as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court will, in making

51
477 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

its selection among possible grounds, be mindful of the possible implica-
tions and consequences for the other pending cases.

4. In the earlier phase of the present case — as in other cases relating
to events after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia — the Court had chosen to base itself on jurisdictional considera-
tions ratione temporis and ratione materiae.

5. In this respect it should first be recalled that when the Court gave an
Order of 2 June 1999, in response to a request by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia for the indication of provisional measures, in which it found
that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction to rule on Yugoslavia’s Applica-
tion, it did so on quite different grounds from the one on which the Court
has based itself in the present decision.

6. In the Orders concerning Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal
and the United Kingdom, the Court observed that Yugoslavia’s declara-
tion accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, had been filed with the United Nations
Secretary-General on 26 April 1999 (three days before the institution of
proceedings). In that declaration, Yugoslavia recognized, on condition
of reciprocity, “the jurisdiction of the said Court in all disputes arising
or which may arise after the signature of the present Declaration,
with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature”.

The Court found that the Application was directed, in essence, against
the bombing of Yugoslav territory by several members of NATO. It
observed that the bombings began on 24 March 1999. Accordingly, it
considered that the disputes before it had arisen some time prior to
25 April 1999. The Court further recalled its established jurisprudence
whereby any limitation ratione temporis attached by one of the parties to
its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction “holds good as
between the Parties” and concluded from this that the declaration of
Yugoslavia, taken in conjunction with those made by the Parties which
had also accepted the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute, did not constitute a basis on which its jurisdiction could
prima facie be founded (see, for example, case concerning Legality of Use
of Force ( Yugoslavia v. Canada}, Order of 2 June 1999, L. C.J. Reports
1999 (I), p. 269, para. 29). The Court, thus lacking prima facie jurisdic-
tion ratione temporis, concluded that it did not need to examine whether
Yugoslavia was or was not a Member of the United Nations and a party
to the Statute in 1999, or whether on such basis it had jurisdiction ratione
personae.

7. In all the Orders, the Court next noted that Yugoslavia and certain
of the respondent States were parties to the United Nations Genocide
Convention without reservation. It recalled the definition of genocide as
stated in the Convention and observed that, according to that definition,

52
478 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

“[the] essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of
‘a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’” (Z C.J. Reports 1999 (I),
p. 272, para. 39). In the Court’s view, it did not appear “at the present
stage of the proceedings that the bombings which form the subject of the
Yugoslav Application ‘indeed entail the element of intent, towards a
group as such, required by the provision quoted above’” (ibid, p. 273,
para. 39).

8. Based on different reasoning, the Court has now confirmed that
it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claims presented by Serbia and
Montenegro. It began by finding that Serbia and Montenegro, on
29 April 1999, was not a Member of the United Nations and not a party
to the Statute. It concluded therefrom that the Court was not open to
Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

Moreover, the Court considered that Article 35, paragraph 2, of the
Statute enabled States not parties to the Statute to appear before the
Court only by virtue of treaties concluded prior to the entry into force of
the Statute. It observed that the Genocide Convention entered into force
at a later date, on 12 January 1951. It thus concluded that Article 35,
paragraph 2, did not grant Serbia and Montenegro access to the Court
under Article IX of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court was not
called upon to decide “whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a
party to the Genocide Convention” when the Applications were filed. In
any event, the Court was, once again, not open to Serbia and Monte-
negro.

In sum, and contrary to its position in 1999, the Court has thus pre-
ferred to rule on its jurisdiction ratione personae, without even examining
the questions of jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione materiae on
which it had previously pronounced prima facie.

9. This change of position is all the more surprising as the reasoning
now adopted by the Court is at odds with judgments or orders previously
rendered by the Court.

10. We would first observe that the question whether Yugoslavia was
a Member of the United Nations and as such a party to the Statute
between 1992 and 2000, remained a subject of debate during that period.
The Court declined to settle the issue, both in 1993 (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ), Pro-
visional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 18) and in 1999 when
issuing its Order on provisional measures (Legality of Use of Force
( Yugoslavia v. Canada), Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (1),
p. 270, para. 32). It then confined itself to stating that the solution
adopted in this respect by Security Council resolution 757 (1992) and
General Assembly resolution 47/1 was “not free from legal difficulties”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and

53
479 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14,
para. 18).

Subsequent to the admission of Serbia and Montenegro to the United
Nations on 1 November 2000, the Court had to consider the question
whether that admission clarified the previous position. The Court then
found, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003, that

“resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’s right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a
dispute before the Court under the conditions laid down by the Stat-
ute” (Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections ( Yugoslavia v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina), I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 70).

The Court added that

“General Assembly resolution 55/12 of 1 November 2000 cannot
have changed retroactively the sui generis position which the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia found itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations
over the period 1992 to 2000, or its position in relation to the Statute
of the Court” (ibid., para. 71).

The Court thus previously found in 2003 that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia could appear before the Court between 1992 and 2000 and that this
position was not changed by its admission to the United Nations in 2002.

11. Further, the interpretation given in the present Judgment of
Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute also appears to us to be at odds
with the position previously adopted by the Court in its Order of 8 April
1993, where it considered that

“proceedings may validly be instituted by a State against a State
which is a party to such a special provision in a treaty in force, but
is not party to the Statute, and independently of the conditions laid
down by the Security Council in its resolution 9 of 1946” (Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993,
C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19).

It is moreover astonishing that the Court found it necessary to rule on
the scope of Article 35, paragraph 2, whereas the Applicant did not
invoke this text.

12. Turning to the second criterion that the Court should apply in
selecting between alternative grounds for its decision — that of certi-
tude — we also find this not to be reflected in the ground chosen by the
Court today. Nothing has occurred, in the series of cases concerning
Kosovo, since the Court’s last judgment in 2003, to suggest that the

54
480 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

grounds previously chosen have now lost legal credibility. Further, the
grounds today selected by the Court are less certain than others open to
it. The Court has determined that the admission of the Applicant to the
United Nations in November 2000 “did not have, and could not have
had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared” (para. 77). The Court
has also stated that “the significance of this new development in 2000 is
that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation concerning the
status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-a-vis the United Nations”
(para. 78). Without specifying whether this “clarification” refers to the
period 1992-2000, the Court asserts that it has now become “clear that
the sui generis position of the Applicant could not have amounted to its
membership in the Organization”. We find this proposition far from self-
evident and we cannot trace the steps of the reasoning. Such grounds
seem to us to be less legally compelling and therefore less certain, and
more open to different points of view, than the grounds relied upon by
the Court thus far and which are now set aside by the Court.

13. We have referred also to the care that the Court must have, in
selecting one among several possible grounds for a decision on jurisdic-
tion, for the implications and possible consequences for other cases. In
that sense, we believe that paragraph 39 of the Judgment does not
adequately reflect the proper role of the Court as a judicial institution.
The Judgment thus goes back on decisions previously adopted by the
Court, whereas it was free to choose the ground upon which to base them
and was under no obligation to rule in the present case on its jurisdiction
ratione personae. Moreover, this approach appears to leave some doubt
as to whether Yugoslavia was a party, between 1992 and 2000, to the
United Nations Genocide Convention. Such an approach could call into
question the solutions adopted by the Court with respect to its jurisdic-
tion in the case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and
Montenegro for the application of the Genocide Convention. We regret
that the Court has decided to take such a direction.

(Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signed) Rosalyn HIGGINS.
(Signed) Pieter KOOTIMANS.
(Signed) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
(Signed) Thomas BUERGENTHAL.
(Signed) Nabil ELARABY.

55


49

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. KOROMA
[Traduction]

Demande jugée irrecevable pour des raisons semblant relever de la casuistique
— Interpréter l'arrêt sans Vinterpréter — Conclusions du Nigéria — Conclu-
sions du Cameroun — Existence du différend — Reconnaissance de la compé-
tence de la Cour — Dispositions pertinentes du Statut et du Règlement de la
Cour — Nécessité d'honorer ses obligations et de respecter le Règlement de
la Cour lorsque l'on soumet une affaire à celle-ci — L'absence de clarification
risque de prolonger et de perturber l'instance — Non-contestation de l'autorité
de la chose jugée — « Interprétation» qui ne clarifie pas ni ne précise la portée
et le sens de l'arrêt — Demande d'interprétation satisfaisant aux critères appli-
cables — La Cour aurait dû faire droit à la demande.

1. J’estime que les motifs, tels qu’énoncés dans l’arrêt, pour lesquels la
demande a été jugée irrecevable relèvent dans une certaine mesure de la
casuistique et je regrette de ne pouvoir souscrire à l'arrêt.

2. On peut considérer qu’en déclarant la demande irrecevable après
avoir dit au paragraphe 15 de son arrêt qu’elle n’avait pas distingué, dans
son arrêt du 11 juin 1998, entre «incidents» et «faits», la Cour a donné
une «interprétation» indirecte mais à mon avis insatisfaisante, qui
n’éclaircit pas le sens et la portée de l’arrêt. Il est regrettable qu’en adop-
tant cette position la Cour semble essayer de faire droit à la demande
tout en la rejetant.

3. En présentant sa demande en interprétation de l’arrêt de la Cour du
11 juin 1998, le Nigéria attendait de la Cour qu’elle précise si le Came-
roun était en droit, après le dépôt de sa requête additionnelle, de faire
état à plusieurs reprises devant la Cour de nouveaux «incidents», après
avoir prétendu que la responsabilité internationale du Nigéria était
engagée «en raison de certains incidents qui se seraient produits en divers
lieux de Bakassi et du lac Tchad et le long de la frontière entre ces deux
régions». Le Nigéria soutenait également que le Cameroun avait fait des
allégations concernant plusieurs «incidents» de ce genre dans sa requête
du 29 mars 1994, dans sa requête additionnelle du 6 juin 1994, dans ses
observations du 28 avril 1996, et au cours des audiences tenues du 2 au
11 mars 1998. Il faisait aussi valoir que le Cameroun avait dit qu’il serait
en mesure de fournir des renseignements relatifs à d’autres «incidents»
sans préciser à quel moment. Le Nigéria a enfin avancé que la Cour
n'avait pas précisé «quels [étaient] ceux de ces incidents allégués qui
[devaient] encore être pris en considération lors de l’examen de l'affaire
au fond». C’est pourquoi le Nigéria considérait que l'arrêt n’était «pas
clair sur le point de savoir si le Cameroun était en droit, à diverses dates
après le dépôt de sa requête modifiée, de soumettre à la Cour de nou-
veaux incidents».

22
DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION (OP. DISS. KOROMA) 50

4. Le Nigéria a fait valoir que l'on ne saurait considérer comme
entrant dans le différend porté devant la Cour par les requêtes de mars et
de juin 1994 des incidents qui se seraient produits après juin 1994 et que
le Cameroun était seulement en droit, en l’espèce, de communiquer des
«faits supplémentaires pour décrire plus en détail des incidents déjà men-
tionnés de façon succincte» et non de présenter «un exposé concernant
des incidents entièrement nouveaux et distincts qui donnent lieu à de
nouvelles demandes portant sur des questions de responsabilité». Le
Nigéria a également soutenu que l'arrêt du 11 juin 1998 devait par consé-
quent être interprété comme signifiant

«en ce qui concerne la responsabilité internationale du Nigéria ...
[que] le différend soumis à la Cour n’inclut pas d’autres incidents
allégués que ceux {tout au plus) qui sont indiqués dans la requête …
et dans la requête additionnelle ... présentées par le Cameroun».

5. Dans ses observations écrites, le Cameroun a notamment avancé
qu’il était en droit d’invoquer tous les faits, quelle que soit leur date, qui
contribuent à établir la violation continue de ses obligations internatio-
nales par le Nigéria, et il a prié la Cour de déclarer irrecevable la
demande en interprétation. Il existe donc bien un différend sur la portée
et le sens de l’arrêt et il revenait à la Cour de déclarer que le Cameroun
n’était autorisé à invoquer que des incidents antérieurs à 1994 à l’appui
de sa requête de 1994 sauf, bien entendu, si la Cour estimait que la portée
et le sens de son arrêt n'étaient pas ainsi limités.

6. Dans son arrêt, la Cour s’est reconnue compétente, conformément à
Particle 60 de son Statut complété par le paragraphe 1 de l’article 98 de
son Règlement, pour connaître de la demande en interprétation de l’arrêt.
Elle s’est ensuite demandée si la demande était recevable, soulignant
qu’en la matière l’une des conditions de la recevabilité était que le but
véritable de la demande soit d'obtenir une interprétation — un éclaircis-
sement sur le sens et la portée de l'arrêt. Après avoir examiné les conclu-
sions des parties, la Cour a conclu qu’elle n’avait pas distingué entre
«incidents» et «faits», que les «incidents supplémentaires» ! constituaient
des ««faits supplémentaires»! , et que leur introduction dans une instance
devant elle était régie par les mêmes dispositions.

7. Amon avis, des «incidents» à venir ne sauraient fonder une requête
dont la Cour est déjà saisie, puisque cela signifierait qu’il n’y avait pas de
différend lorsque la requête a été déposée, ce qui serait en soi incompa-
tible avec les obligations statutaires et les dispositions du Règlement de la
Cour relatives à une procédure régulière ; la Cour aurait dû le dire. Autre-
ment dit, une requête introductive d'instance devant la Cour ne saurait se
fonder sur des «incidents» postérieurs à son dépôt, car cela risquerait de
créer une confusion et d’obscurcir le point de savoir quel «incident» est,
ou quels «incidents» sont, à l’origine de cette procédure.

! Les italiques sont de moi.

23
DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION (OP. DISS. KOROMA) 51

8. Ainsi, dans la mesure où l’arrêt de la Cour du 11 juin 1998 était
susceptible d’une interprétation erronée ou pouvait préter 4 confusion en
ce qui concerne sa portée et son sens, il était a la fois nécessaire et oppor-
tun que la Cour le clarifie ou l’interprète de manière à éliminer toute pos-
sibilité d'interprétation erronée ou de confusion. A cet égard, lorsqu'une
partie prie la Cour d’expliciter son arrêt en précisant quel incident — ou
quels incidents — forment d’après elle la base d’une requête et d’indiquer
la date butoir, une telle demande me semble remplir les critères appli-
cables pour obtenir une interprétation au sens de l’article 60 du Statut et
du paragraphe | de l’article 98 du Règlement de la Cour. En conséquence,
si, en disant dans son arrêt qu’elle n’avait pas distingué entre «incidents»
et «faits», la Cour semble dans une certaine mesure donner une inter-
prétation, elle n’en laisse pas moins subsister la possibilité d’une interpré-
tation erronée ou d’une confusion, ce qui, à défaut d’éclaircissements,
pourrait même être contraire aux dispositions pertinentes du Statut et du
Règlement de la Cour.

9. L'article 40 du Statut et l’article 38 du Règlement de la Cour sont
applicables en la matière. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 40 du Statut est
ainsi libellé:

«Les affaires sont portées devant la Cour, selon le cas, soit par
notification du compromis, soit par une requête, adressées au Gref-
fier; dans les deux cas, l’objet du différend et les parties doivent être
indiqués. »

L'article 38 du Règlement dispose quant à lui:

«1. Lorsqu'une instance est introduite devant la Cour par une
requête adressée conformément à l’article 40, paragraphe 1, du Sta-
tut, la requête indique la partie requérante, l'Etat contre lequel la
demande est formée et l’objet du différend.

2. La requête indique autant que possible les moyens de droit
sur lesquels le demandeur prétend fonder la compétence de la Cour;
elle indique en outre la nature précise de la demande et contient un
exposé succinct des faits et moyens sur lesquels cette demande
repose. »

10. En conséquence, conformément à ces dispositions, pour qu’une
partie puisse saisir la Cour d’une requête concernant un différend, ce
différend, de même que les faits et les motifs qui en constituent la base,
doivent déjà exister et être indiqués.

11. Au paragraphe 16 de son arrêt, la Cour a également déclaré que:

«Les deux autres conclusions, à savoir que:

«b) la latitude dont dispose le Cameroun pour présenter des élé-
ments de fait et de droit supplémentaires ne concerne (tout
au plus) que les éléments indiqués dans la requête du 29 mars
1994 et dans la requête additionnelle du 6 juin 1994 présen-
teés par le Cameroun»,

24
DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION (OP. DISS. KOROMA) 52

et que:

«c) la question de savoir si les faits allégués par le Cameroun
sont établis ou non ne concerne (tout au plus) que ceux qui
sont indiqués dans la requête du 29 mars 1994 et dans la requête
additionnelle du 6 juin 1994 présenteés par le Cameroun»,

tendent à soustraire à l’examen de la Cour des éléments de fait et de
droit dont la présentation a déjà été autorisée par l’arrêt du 11 juin
1998.»

et qu’elle n’était donc pas en mesure de faire droit à ces conclusions. Avec
tout le respect dû, cette affirmation est sujette à caution, en particulier en
tant que motif de rejet de la demande. Signifie-t-elle que, étant donné que
la Cour a «autorisé» le Cameroun à présenter des éléments de fait et de
droit, une telle «autorisation» ne saurait être contestée et, dans le cas où
elle le serait, la Cour serait tenue de ne pas donner suite à cette contesta-
tion parce qu'elle a autorisé la présentation de ces éléments? En outre,
présenter des éléments de fait et de droit à l’appui d’une thèse n'est-elle
pas une prérogative des parties plutôt qu’une démarche soumise à auto-
risation de la Cour? A la lumière de ces considérations, l'affirmation, telle
qu'elle est formulée, semble pouvoir être contestée tant d’un point de vue
procédural que sur le plan juridique.

12. La raison d’être de l’article 60 du Statut est de préserver l’intégrité
et le caractère définitif des arrêts de la Cour, c’est-à-dire l’autorité de la
chose jugée, une autorité que la demande en interprétation ne remet pas
en cause. Mais cette disposition, complétée par le paragraphe | de l’ar-
ticle 98 du Règlement de la Cour, envisage et permet également que la
Cour interprète ou clarifie ses arrêts pour en préciser la portée et le sens?.
Lorsque la précision ou la clarté font défaut, les parties sont en droit de
demander à la Cour d’y remédier.

13. En l’espèce, l'absence de clarification quant au sens et à la portée
de l'arrêt pourrait prolonger et perturber inutilement la procédure, ce qui
aurait pu être évité si la Cour avait interprété son arrêt.

14. À mes yeux, les motifs à la base de la demande, et donc les raisons
de demander des éclaircissements, sont à la fois solides et légitimes et
satisfont aux critères énoncés dans les dispositions pertinentes du Statut
et du Règlement de la Cour. La demande ne crée pas un nouveau diffé-
rend et elle découle de la procédure antérieure. Le demandeur a établi
que ses intérêts, tant sur le plan du droit que des faits, méritaient d’être
juridiquement protégés en ce sens qu’en tant que partie au différend il a
un intérêt de nature juridique à veiller à ce que la partie adverse s’acquitte
des obligations qui sont les siennes aux termes du Statut du Règlement de
la Cour, et à faire en sorte d’être en mesure de répondre au mémoire en

2 Interprétation des arrêts n°" 7 et 8 (usine de Chorzéw), arrêt n° 11, 1927, CPJ.L
série À n° 13, p. 10.

25
DEMANDE EN INTERPRÉTATION (OP. DISS. KOROMA) 53

tant que de besoin. L'intérêt du défendeur dans le différend porté devant
la Cour serait notamment de connaître les «incidents» spécifiques en ce
qu'ils se distinguent des «faits» invoqués à l’appui de la requête, inci-
dents sur lesquels il devra répondre dans son contre-mémoire.

15. Après réflexion, je considère que l’«interprétation » de l’arrêt qui a
été donnée n’a pas apporté les éclaircissements et les précisions sollicités
dans la demande. La Cour aurait dû faire droit à celle-ci et la déclarer
recevable, puisqu'elle remplit tous les critères énoncés dans les disposi-
tions pertinentes du Statut et du Règlement, de même que dans sa juris-
prudence.

{ Signé) Abdul G. Koroma.

26


373

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE RUDA

I have voted in favour of paragraphs 2 A and 2 B of the operative
clause of the Advisory Opinion, which contains the decisions of the Court
on the merits ; but, since I voted against paragraph 1, on the preliminary
point as to whether or not the Court should comply with the request, I feel
myself obliged to explain, in an individual opinion, the reasons for my
vote.

‘In its 1973 Advisory Opinion on the Application for Review of Judgement
No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (I.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 166), the Court, for the first time, dealt with a request from the Com-
mittee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judge-
ments, the origin of which was an objection raised by a person in respect of
whom a judgement had been rendered by such Tribunal. I was among the
judges who voted in favour of the decision to render the Opinion in that
case. In the present proceedings, the circumstances differ from those of
1973 on a fundamental legal aspect, because now the application to the
Committee was submitted by a member State, which was not a party to the
litigation before the Administrative Tribunal. This new situation gives rise
to some legal problems different from those that confronted the Court
before.

The Court already took note, in 1973, of some important observations
that were raised in the General Assembly, in 1955, during the discussions
on the review procedure, on the possibility of a member State to initiate
such proceedings. The Court said :

“31. The Court does not overlook that Article 1] provides for the
right of individual member States to object to a judgement of the
Administrative Tribunal and to apply to the Committee to initiate
advisory proceedings on the matter ; and that during the debates in
1955 the propriety of this provision was questioned by a number of
delegations. The member State, it was said, would not have been a
party to the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal, and to
allow it to initiate proceedings for the review of the judgement would,
therefore, be contrary to the general principles governing judicial
review. To confer such a right on a member State, it was further said,
would impinge upon the rights of the Secretary-General as chief
administrative officer and conflict with Article 100 of the Charter. It
was also suggested that, in the case of an application by a member
State, the staff member would be in a position of inequality before the
Committee. These arguments introduce additional considerations
which would call for close examination by the Court if it should

52
374 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (SEP. OP. RUDA)

receive a request for an opinion resulting from an application to the
Committee by a member State. The Court is not therefore to be
understood as here expressing any opinion in regard to any future
proceedings instituted under Article 11 by a member State. But these
additional considerations are without relevance in the present pro-
ceedings in which the request for an opinion results from an appli-
cation to the Committee by a staff member. The mere fact that Arti-
cle 11 provides for the possibility of a member State applying for the
review of a judgement does not alter the position in regard to the
initiation of review proceedings as between a staff member and the
Secretary-General. Article 11, the Court emphasizes, gives the same
rights to staff members as it does to the Secretary-General to apply to
the Committee for the initiation of review proceedings.” (CJ.
Reports 1973, p. 178.)

The three objections mentioned by the Court in this paragraph were,
therefore, the following :

(a) to allow a member State, which had not been a party to the proceedings
before the Administrative Tribunal, to initiate proceedings for review,
would be contrary to the general principles governing judicial
review ; ;

(b) such right would impinge upon the authority of the Secretary-General
as chief administrative officer ; and

(c) the staff member would be in a position of inequality before the
Committee.

As to the first objection, it is true that the member State which has
initiated the review proceedings was not a party to the proceedings before
the Administrative Tribunal, the parties thereto having been the staff
member and the Secretary-General ; but the right to initiate the review
proceedings does not mean that the State becomes a party to the litigation.
Article 11 of the Statute of the Tribunal does not give the member State the
right to request an advisory opinion, but only the right to invite the
Committee to make the request, which is, therefore, submitted by an organ
duly authorized by the General Assembly. The fact that a member State
has the power to initiate the review procedure does not transform the State
into a party to the dispute. But the Secretary-General is an organ of the
United Nations and the Committee is also an organ of the United Na-
tions ; therefore, the system provides for the contradictory situation that
one organ of the Organization gives his acquiescence to the judgement
of the Administrative Tribunal and another organ of the same Organization,
on the initiative of a third entity not party in the litigation, decides to put
into operation a review proceeding of an already accepted judgement. To
my mind, the system of Article 11 of the Statute of the Tribunal goes
against the elementary requirements of a judicial process, because a party
to the dispute, in this case the United Nations, cannot accept a judgement

53
375 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (SEP. OP. RUDA)

and, at the same time, open a procedure for its review. This inherent
contradiction in the system is, for me, a very “compelling” reason to refuse
to render the Advisory Opinion.

As to the second objection, concerning the impact upon the authority of
the Secretary-General, my conclusions are based on the juridical situation
just described. The Secretary-General, “the chief administrative officer of
the Organization”, according to Article 97 of the Charter, acquiesces in a
judgement of the Administrative Tribunal, in a case where “the parties to
the dispute before the Tribunal are the staff member concerned and the
United Nations represented by the Secretary-General” (Effect of Awards of
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advi-
sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p.53). Later, another organ of the
United Nations, subsidiary to the General Assembly, the Committee on
Applications, submits a request to the Court for an advisory opinion, in a
review proceeding, at the initiative of a third entity, a member State, which
was not a party before the Administrative Tribunal. The decision of the
Committee has its juridical effect on ajudgement already acquiesced in by
the Secretary-General. This attitude seems to me very clearly to impinge on
the authority of the Secretary-General, precisely in the administrative field
where he is the chief authority. The relationship between the Secretary-
General and the staff member is undoubtedly administrative in character,
including the decision whether or not to open a review procedure. I see this
impact upon the administrative authority of the Secretary-General as
another “compelling” reason to refuse to give the advisory opinion.

We come now to the third objection ; i.e., that the review procedure
places the staff member in a position of inequality before the Committee,
when the application is submitted by a member State. The Court rightly
points out, in paragraph 30 of the Advisory Opinion, that the requirements
of equality before the Court are fully satisfied in the present instance, as
they were in 1973, when the review procedure originated in an application
submitted by a staff member. The problem, therefore, is not the inequality
before the Court, but before the Committee.

I find this inequality evident, when the member State submitting the
application is a member of the Committee, as is the case here, for the
simple reason that such State is allowed to vote on its own proposal ; the
inequality arising from this fact does not need any further elaboration.
Moreover, it has been the practice of the Committee that the staff member
or his representative is not permitted to participate in the debates, but the
delegate of the State, as a member of the Committee, is present and of
course submits arguments in favour of its application. This additional fact
makes the inequality before the Committee even more evident.

I agree, therefore, with the Court when it states in paragraph 32 of the
Advisory Opinion, that “it can conclude at once that on the theoretical
level inequality exists”. I go a step further and I find this theoretical
inequality as another “compelling” reason to refuse to render the Opinion.

54
376 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (SEP. OP. RUDA)

To sum up, I conclude that when the application is submitted to the
Committee by a State, and more particularly, when such State is a member
of the Committee, the objections mentioned in paragraph 31 of the 1973
Advisory Opinion are valid and consequently in abstracto the necessary
compatibility of the review procedure with the requirements of a judicial
process is not fulfilled.

Moreover, in the Advisory Opinion, the Court indicates in concreto, in
the particular circumstances of the case, a series of irregularities related to
the composition of the Committee, to the formal defects of the application
submitted by the United States Government, and to the inequality before
the Committee emerging from the fact that such organ refused to allow Mr.
Mortished’s counsel to participate in the deliberations. The analysis of the
Court of these irregularities is detailed and convincing ; I would only put
perhaps more emphasis on some points.

I would like, on the composition of the Committee, to highlight the
conclusion of the Court in paragraph 38 that it was “unquestionably
irregular” for the Sierra Leone Chairman of the Sixth Committee to
nominate the Vice-Chairman, a Canadian representative, to sit in the
Committee on Applications, instead of a member of his own delegation. I
fully share this conclusion and J find it sufficiently important to be by itself
a “compelling” reason to decline to give the Opinion ; the Court cannot act
on the basis of a request from a Committee that has not been properly
constituted.

It seems to me equally important that the United States application did
not clearly set forth in detail the grounds upon which it was based, as is
provided for in Article I], paragraph 3 fc), of the Provisional Rules of
Procedure of the Committee ; moreover, this lack of a clear statement on
the ground of objections has particular importance in regard to the second
objection invoked by the Committee, i.e., excess by the Tribunal of its
jurisdiction or competence.

When Mr. Mortished submitted his comments on the United States
application, although he did not fail to point out that the United States
statement did not fall within the terms of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the
Statute of the Tribunal, he developed his arguments, however, on the
assumption that the objection appeared to be based on the existence of an
error on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter. But no
comments were submitted by Mr. Mortished on the ground that there has
been an excess of jurisdiction or competence; his position was fully
justified because Mr. Mortished simply did not know, and had no way of
knowing, that the United States application was supposedly based on the
allegation of an excess of jurisdiction or competence. It should be remem-
bered, furthermore, that the United States delegate, during the debates in
the Committee, developed the idea that the objection based on an excess of
jurisdiction or competence was “subsumed” (see A/AC.86/PV.2, p. 46) by
the concept of “error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter”, but
Mr. Mortished or his counsel did not participate in the proceedings of the

55
377 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (SEP. OP, RUDA)

Committee and, consequently, had no opportunity to present his views on
the subject. Hence, as far as the ground based on an excess of jurisdiction
or compeience is concerned, there has been an evident inequality in the
procedure within the Committee in contradiction also with the most ele-
mentary requirements of a judicial process.

Apart from the considerations just mentioned, I must deal in more
general terms with the refusal by the Committee to let Mr. Mortished’s
counsel be present and participate in the deliberations. The theoretical
inequalities referred to above find a good example in the practical in-
equalities in the present case. This inequality simply results from the
participation of the applicant State in the debate, without Mr. Mortished
being given the opportunity to let his views be heard on the position that
such State developed during the deliberation, which was not exactly the
same as the one it took in the application, but also on the views of other
representatives on the Committee who commented on the United States
application. Furthermore, the applicant State is permitted to vote, and
voted, on its own application. I agree with the Court that, taking into
account the quasi-judicial functions of the Committee on Applications, the
non-participation of Mr. Mortished in the deliberations accentuated the
irregularity of the proceedings (para. 44).

It is clear that up to this point of my reasoning I am in full agreement
with the Advisory Opinion of the Court, with some shades of difference as
to the emphasis to be put on some issues. But the final conclusion that the
Court reaches, despite all these important legal objections, is different
from my own. I find these objections, both on the theoretical and on the
practical level, “compelling reasons” to justify not giving the Advisory
Opinion ; the Court, on the contrary, decides to render the Opinion.

The Court bases its main reason for delivering the opinion on the need
“to assist a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly in
putting its operation upon a firm and secure foundation” (para. 45). I have
no doubt that this is a very important value that the Court ought to
preserve. The main purpose of the advisory competence of the Court is
precisely to assist, on legal questions, organs of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies in the fulfilment of their functions ; such assistance
partakes of the very nature of the advisory competence. But, as the Court
has always remembered, and as it does also in the present instance, such
competence is discretionary, according to the clear terms of Article 65 of
the Statute. The discretionary power to give or not to give an advisory
opinion could have only one purpose, to leave to the Court the power to fix
by itself the limits of the assistance to be given. Discretionary power means
also, by its very nature, that there are limits beyond which the assistance
should not be given. It is for the Court to fix those limits. These limits arise
from the fact that the Court, even when exercising its advisory competence,
remains ‘a tribunal and, as such, is primarily bound to safeguard the
requirements of a judicial process, in every stage of this review process.
This is, for me, the paramount consideration to be taken into account, the
very nature of the functions of the Court cannot be sacrificed because of

56
378 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW (SEP. OP. RUDA)

the need of assistance to a United Nations organ. Since the delivery of the
opinion is within its discretionary power, the Court has to choose, in the
present case, which value is more important, the assistance to another
organ of the United Nations or the safeguarding of the requirements of the
judicial character of the review procedure. I believe that such requirements
are so affected in the present case, as much in abstracto as in concreto in the
stage of the review before the Committee on Applications, that the Court
should refuse to give this Advisory Opinion.

Moreover, if the Court wants to assist the General Assembly, as is said in
paragraph 79 of the Opinion, “to reconsider its present procedure related
to review of the Administrative Tribunal’s Judgements”, it is sufficient to
call attention to the failures of the system ; perhaps precisely the best
method to call such attention is to refuse to give the Advisory Opinion, on
the basis that the established system, when the application to the Com-
mittee is submitted by a member State, is contrary to the requirements of a
judicial process.

According to the final part of paragraph 45, the Advisory Opinion has
two other objectives in view, first, not to “leave in suspense a very serious
allegation against the Administrative Tribunal, that it had in effect chal-
lenged the authority of the General Assembly” and, second, to dispose of
the “important legal principles involved”. As to the first objective, I do not
regard the allegation made against the Administrative Tribunal as a reason
to give the Advisory Opinion ; I cannot see the role of the Court as being to
clear the Administrative Tribunal from this kind of allegation, especially,
when the review procedure followed goes against the requirements of a
judicial process. The same rationale could be applied to the second objec-
tive ; whatever the importance of the legal principles involved, the main
consideration that the Court should always have in mind is to safeguard its
functions as a tribunal.

I will end this separate opinion by adding that I share the arguments put
forward by the Court at paragraph 26 of the Advisory Opinion, when it
rejects the conclusions of the United States statement that

“if the Court declined to give an opinion, that would ‘put in question
the status of Judgement No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal’, with
manifest implications for the Court’s discretion to give or to refuse the
opinion requested”.

It is juridically impossible for the General Assembly to establish a review
procedure of judgements of the Administrative Tribunal, which would
compel the Court to give an advisory opinion against the clear permissive
character of its advisory functions, in accordance with Article 65 of the
Statute. The General Assembly cannot oblige the Court to find “compel-
ling reasons”, in order to give an advisory opinion. That cannot be the
intention of the General Assembly.

(Signed) J. M. Rupa.

57


181

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. ANZILOTTI

N

Tout en arrivant a la conclusion a laquelle est arrivée la
Cour, il m’est impossible de souscrire aux motifs sur lesquels
cette ordonnance est fondée.

Je tiens avant tout à constater que, à un point de vue
général, s’il y a un cas dans lequel l'application de l'arti-
cle 41 du Statut serait tout à fait à sa place, ce cas est
assurément le nôtre. Le Gouvernement allemand prétend que
certaines expropriations déjà accomplies ou en cours impliquent
un traitement différentiel. des ressortissants polonais de race
allemande, par rapport aux ressortissants polonais de race
polonaise, et sont, de ce chef, contraires au Traité du
28 juin 1919: sur cette base, il demande, à titre de mesure
conservatoire, qu'il soit sursis aux expropriations en cours
jusqu’au moment où il sera définitivement statué par la Cour
sur la légalité ou l'illégalité desdites expropriations. Si la
summaria cognitio, qui est le propre de ce genre de procé-
dure, permettait de retenir la possibilité du droit revendiqué
_par le Gouvernement allemand et la possibilité du danger
auquel ce droit serait exposé, il me serait difficile d’imaginer
une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires plus
juste, plus opportune, plus appropriée que celle dont il s’agit.

x

Réserve faite pour tout ce qui a trait à l'interprétation de
l’article 12 du Traité du 28 juin 1919 sur la protection des
minorités, la seule raison qui, selon moi, empéchait la Cour, dans
Vétat actuel de la procédure, de faire droit à la demande du Gou-
vernement allemand était Vincertitude que la requête intro-
ductive de V’instance principale laisse planer sur ce que ledit
Gouvernement veut obtenir de la Cour et partant sur létendue
des droits éventuels que les mesures conservatoires devraient
sauvegarder.

Selon la Cour, l'instance instaurée par le Gouvernement
allemand aurait pour objet la constatation et la réparation
de prétendues infractions commises dans certains cas indi-
viduels d’applications de la réforme agraire. Telle est, en
effet, l'impression qui se dégage, tout au moins à première
vue, de la formule employée dans la requête pour indiquer
l'objet de la demande: « constater les infractions au Traité
du 28 juin 1919, commises au préjudice des ressortissants
polonais de race allemande et en ordonner la réparation ».
Si tel était vraiment le cas, il est évident que les mesures
conservatoires demandées dépasseraient de beaucoup le droit

Io
182 . OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. ANZILOTTI

contesté. Des mesures conservatoires auraient été certainement
possibles et opportunes ; mais elles auraient dû se limiter aux
cas individuels envisagés par le Gouvernement allemand. Et
puisque ni la requête ni la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires ne permettaient d'établir quels sont ces cas, la
Cour se trouvait dans l'impossibilité pratique de procéder à
Vindication demandée.

Mais est-ce vraiment là le sens de la requête allemande?
Son objet n'est-il pas plutôt d'obtenir de la Cour un arrêt
déclaratoire constatant que l'attitude du Gouvernement polo-
nais dans l'application de la réforme agraire n’a pas été
conforme aux obligations résultant du Traité du 28 juin 1919 ?
En d’autres mots, il ne s’agirait pas, ou, en tout cas, il ne
s'agirait pas seulement de telle ou telle infraction commise
au préjudice de tel ou tel ressortissant polonais de race
‘allemande ; il s'agirait de l’ensemble des actes par lesquels
les autorités polonaises ont appliqué la réforme agraire, et ce
serait l’incompatibilité de l'attitude résultant de cet ensemble
avec le Traité du 28 juin 1919 que la Cour aurait à
constater. Si tel était l’objet de la demande contenue dans
la requête du Gouvernement allemand, on s’expliquerait fort
bien que l’on demandât, à titre de mesure conservatoire, la
suspension de l'application de la réforme agraire aux ressor-
tissants polonais de race allemande, en général.

Je suis disposé à croire que tel est vraiment le sens de la
requête; et cela surtout parce qu’on ne peut pas comprendre
que l'on demande de constater des infractions sans dire quelles
sont les infractions qu’il y a lieu de constater : une requête ainsi
conçue serait d’ailleurs nulle pour cause d'incertitude absolue
sur l’objet de la demande.

Mais je dois reconnaître que la requête du Gouvernement
allemand prête à interprétation; et cela, sur un point qui
doit être absolument clair. Comme il n’est que juste que ce
Gouvernement supporte les conséquences de la rédaction peu
claire d’un document qui émane de lui, je pouvais parfaite-
ment comprendre que la Cour, pour ce motif, se refusât à
donner suite à la demande en indication de mesures conser-
vatoires. Cela, cependant, ne devait aucunement préjuger du
droit, pour le Gouvernement allemand, de présenter une
nouvelle requête indiquant, avec la clarté et la précision
nécessaires, l’objet de la demande en justice, et ensuite une
nouvelle demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
appropriées aux droits revendiqués.

(Signé) D. ANZILOTTI.

TI


132

DECLARATION OF JUDGE NI

The Court is confronted with an extraordinary situation which, how-
ever, is not entirely unprecedented. It occurs from the fact that a case is
before both the Security Council and the Court.

On 21 January 1992, the United Nations Security Council had adopted
a resolution, urging the Libyan Government to provide full account and
effective response to the requests of the Council in connection with the
destruction of Pan Am flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December
1988 and requesting the Secretary-General to seek co-operation of the
Libyan Government to provide full and effective response to the requests.

On 3 March 1992, Libya filed two separate Applications against the
United Kingdom and the United States of America, requesting this Court
to adjudge and declare, inter alia, that both the above-mentioned States
had breached their legal obligations to Libya under the Articles of the
Montreal Convention. On the same day, Libya made two separate
requests to indicate provisional measures to enjoin the United Kingdom
and the United States of America from taking certain actions.

On 31 March, the Security Council adopted resolution 748 (1992),
imposing sanctions, if Libya does not comply before 15 April.

Question arises whether the Security Council and the Court can now
exercise their respective functions at the same time in respect of the dis-
pute between Libya on the one side and the United Kingdom and the
United States on the other. It can be urged on behalf of the Security Coun-
cil that under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, Members of the
United Nations confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, in order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United Nations. But on the other hand,
it can also be argued that it is provided in Article 92 of the United Nations
Charter that the International Court of Justice shall be the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations which is given the power, under
Article 36 of the Court’s Statute, to settle “all legal disputes concern-
ing: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international
law;...”.

In this respect, we are not without guidance from the jurisprudence of
the Court. As recently as the 1980s, we have the case of the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran and the case of Military and Para-
military Activities in and against Nicaragua. In the former case which was

22
133 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DECL. NI)

decided in 1980, resolutions were previously passed by the Security Coun-
cil and even a fact-finding commission was established by the Secretary-
General with the agreement of the two parties. These did not prevent the
Court from exercising its judicial functions. The Judgment indicated that
in adopting resolution 461 (1979),

“it does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that
there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise
of their respective functions by the Court and the Security Council.
Nor is there in this any cause for surprise.” (I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 21,
para. 40).

In comparing the relations between the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly, and the relations between the Security Council and the
Court, the Court had this to say in that Judgment:

“Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General
Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or
situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in
respect of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on
the functioning of the Court by any provision of either the Charter or
the Statute of the Court. The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal
questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the
resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important,
and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement
of the dispute. This is indeed recognized by Article 36 of the Charter,
paragraph 3 of which specifically provides that:

‘In making recommendations under this Article the Security
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court.” (Ibid. p. 22, para. 40.)

The Court’s decision in the Nicaragua case is consistent with the rea-
soning in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case.
The Judgment says:

“Until the Security Council makes a determination under Article
39, a dispute remains to be dealt with by the methods of peaceful
settlement provided under Article 33, including judicial settlement;
and even aftera determination under Article 39, there is no necessary
inconsistency between Security Council action and adjudication by
the Court.” (.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 432, para. 90; emphasis added.)

23
134 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DECL. NI)

In the same vein, the Court indicated that “the fact that a matter is
before the Security Council should not prevent it being dealt with by the
Court and that both proceedings could be ‘pursued pari passu” (1.CJ.
Reports 1984, p. 433, para. 93). The Court went on to say that:

“It is necessary to emphasize that Article 24 of the Charter of the
United Nations provides that

‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security...”

The Charter accordingly does not confer exclusive responsibility
upon the Security Council for the purpose. . . The Council has func-
tions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises
purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same
events.” (Ibid., pp. 434-435, para. 95.)

Here the mention of complementary functions should not be over-
looked. Although both organs deal with the same matter, there are differ-
ing points of emphasis. In the instant case, the Security Council, as a
political organ, is more concerned with the elimination of international
terrorism and the maintenance of international peace and security, while
the International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, is more concerned with legal procedures such as ques-
tions of extradition and proceedings in connection with prosecution of
offenders and assessment of compensation, etc. But these functions may
be correlated with each other. What would be required between the two is
co-ordination and co-operation, not competition or mutual exclusion.

Having said this, I am now to state my views with respect to the Appli-
cant’s request for provisional measures. I consider that, above all, there is
the question of whether Libya can seek legal remedy now under the 1971
Montreal Convention on which Libya primarily relies for its institution of
legal proceedings in this Court. The 1971 Montreal Convention provides
in its Article 14 (1) that:

“Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organiza-
tion of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute
to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with
the Statute of the Court.”

24
135 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DECL. NI)

In determining whether the Court should or should not grant relief now
to the Applicant, the Court should first decide on this temporal question
of the six-month period for organizing arbitration. The period thus pro-
vided cannot be ignored at the pleasure of either Party. There has been no
refusal to arbitrate on the part of the Respondents. No negotiation has yet
been conducted for this purpose between the Parties. It is clear that, since
the Applicant’s letter of 18 January 1992 requesting agreement to arbi-
trate, the six-month period has not yet run out. It is premature for
the Applicant to seek a legal remedy now from this Court. This is the
threshold question which must first be solved before any other question
can be decided upon.

I agree with the majority that the request for provisional measures
should be denied. But I consider that it should be denied on the sole
ground of non-fulfilment of the temporal requirement provided in Ar-
ticle 14 (1) of the 1971 Montreal Convention without having to decide at
the same time on the other issues, such as the existence of rights claimed
by the Applicant, irreparable damage, urgency, etc. Consequently, in my
view the Applicant will not be prevented from seeking a remedy of this
Court in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion, if the dispute months later still subsists and if the Applicant so
desires.

(Signed) Ni Zhengyu.

25


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA DÉLIMITATION
DE LA FRONTIÈRE MARITIME
DANS LA RÉGION DU GOLFE DU MAINE

(CANADA/ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 30 MARS 1984
NOMINATION D’EXPERT

1984

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING DELIMITATION
OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
IN THE GULF OF MAINE AREA

(CANADA/UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER OF 30 MARCH 1984

APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT
Mode officiel de citation :

Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine,
nomination d'expert, ordonnance du 30 mars 1984, C.I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 165.

Official citation :
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
Appointment of Expert, Order of 30 March 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 165.

N° de vente : 498
Sales number

165

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1984 ANNÉE 1984
30 mars
Rôle général
n° 67 30 mars 1984

AFFAIRE DE LA DÉLIMITATION
DE LA FRONTIÈRE MARITIME
DANS LA RÉGION DU GOLFE DU MAINE

(CANADA/ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE

NOMINATION D’EXPERT

Présents : M. AGo, président de la chambre; MM. Gros, MOSLER,
SCHWEBEL, juges ; M. COHEN, juge ad hoc; M. TORRES BERNARDEZ,
Greffier.

La chambre de la Cour internationale de Justice constituée pour
connaître de l’affaire concernant la délimitation de la frontière maritime
dans la région du golfe du Maine,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré,

Vu les articles 48 et 50 du Statut de la Cour,

Vu l’article II du compromis entre le Gouvernement du Canada et le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, signé le 29 mars 1979 et notifié à la Cour le
25 novembre 1981. en vue de soumettre à une chambre de la Cour la

question de la délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe
du Maine, stipulant ce qui suit :

« 1. La chambre est priée de statuer, conformément aux règles et
principes du droit international applicables en la matière entre les
Parties, sur la question suivante :
166 GOLFE DU MAINE (ORDONNANCE 30 III 84)

Quel est le tracé de la frontière maritime unique divisant le
plateau continental et les zones de péche du Canada et des Etats-
Unis d’Amérique à partir d’un point situé par 44° 11’ 12” de lati-
tude nord et 67° 16’ 46” de longitude ouest jusqu’a un point devant
être fixé par la chambre à l’intérieur d’une zone délimitée par des
lignes droites reliant les coordonnées géographiques suivantes : 40°
de latitude nord et 67° de longitude ouest ; 40° de latitude nord et
65° de longitude ouest ; 42° de latitude nord et 65° de longitude
ouest ?

2. La chambre est priée de décrire le tracé de la frontière maritime
en termes de lignes géodésiques reliant les coordonnées géogra-
phiques des points. La chambre est également priée, à seules fins
d'illustration, d'indiquer le tracé de la frontière sur la carte n° 4003 du
Service hydrographique du Canada et sur la carte n° 13006 de la
United States National Ocean Survey, conformément aux dispositions
de Particle IV.

3. Les Parties prient la chambre de nommer un expert technique,
désigné conjointement par les Parties, pour l’aider dans la considé-
ration des questions techniques et notamment dans la préparation de
la description de la frontière maritime et des cartes mentionnées au
paragraphe 2. Le Greffier est prié de fournir à l’expert technique des
exemplaires des pièces de procédure de chaque Partie lorsque lesdites
pièces sont communiquées à l’autre Partie. L’expert assiste à la pro-
cédure orale et se tient à la disposition de la chambre pour toute
consultation que cette dernière estime nécessaire aux fins du présent
article.

4, Les Parties acceptent comme définitive et obligatoire pour
elles-mêmes la décision de la chambre rendue en application du
présent article » ;

Considérant que, par lettre conjointe du 12 octobre 1983, les agents des
Parties, faisant référence à l’article IJ, paragraphe 3, du compromis, ont
demandé que le capitaine de frégate Peter B. Beazley, de la marine bri-
tannique (à la retraite), soit nommé expert technique comme prévu audit
article II,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante :

1. Le capitaine de frégate Peter B. Beazley est nommé expert technique
au service de la chambre pour les questions techniques, et en particulier
pour la description de la frontière maritime et les cartes visées à l’article II,
paragraphe 2, du compromis.

2. Avant de prendre ses fonctions, l’expert technique fera la déclaration
solennelle suivante devant la chambre :

« Je déclare solennellement, en tout honneur et en toute conscience,
que je m’acquitterai de mes fonctions d’expert en tout honneur et
dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et en toute conscience,
167 GOLFE DU MAINE (ORDONNANCE 30 III 84)

et que je m’abstiendrai de divulguer ou d’utiliser en dehors de la
chambre de la Cour les documents ou renseignements de caractère
confidentiel dont je pourrais prendre connaissance dans l’accomplis-
sement de ma mission. »

3. Le Greffier mettra les pièces de procédure et les documents annexés à
la disposition de l’expert technique, qui les considérera comme confiden-
tiels tant qu’ils n’auront pas été rendus accessibles au public conformé-
ment à l’article 53, paragraphe 2, du Règlement.

4. L'expert technique assistera à la procédure orale. En outre il se
tiendra à la disposition de la chambre, pour être consulté, autant qu’elle
l’estimera nécessaire.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le trente mars mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-quatre, en trois
exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Canada et au
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le président de la chambre,
{Signé) Roberto AGo.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Santiago TORRES BERNARDEZ.


173

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BONI
[Translation]

I have voted without reservation in favour of the Advisory Opinion
delivered by the Internationa! Court of Justice.

The Court has decided that Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El
Hamra) was not a terra nullius. Its population, although consisting mainly of
nomads, was organized in independent tribes under the authority of
democratically elected sheikhs.

The Court has found that legal ties of allegiance existed between the Sultan
of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara.

It has also found that there existed many ties of a racial, linguistic,
religious, cultural and economic nature between the tribes who dwelt in the
Sahara region which today is comprised within the Sahara under Spanish
domination and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

On the other hand it has categorically affirmed that these ties were not ties
of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara on the one
hand and Morocco and the Mauritanian entity on the other hand.

In adopting this latter solution, the Court has not taken sufficient account
of the tocal context. As regards Morocco, insufficient emphasis has been
placed on the religious ties linking the Sultan and certain tribes of the Sakiet
El Hamra. For these tribes, the Sultan was Commander of the Faithful, that is
to say, the Steward of God on earth for all matters, whether religious or not.
He was thus regarded not only as religious leader but as director of their
temporal affairs. The legal ties between them were thus not only
religious — which no one denies — but also political, and had the character of
territorial sovereignty.

In strict logic, I should have voted “no” to the second question of the
Advisory Opinion. I did not do so for the following reasons:

The Court has denied that the ties between Western Sahara and Morocco
were in any way ties of territorial sovereignty. It has urged the General
Assembly to consult the population of those regions on their future in
conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Can one
reasonably reproach the Court for having adopted such an attitude, which is
consistent with its role in the present case, viz. to enlighten the General
Assembly?

The solution which I advocate, and which confers a character of territorial
sovereignty on the ties that existed between Morocco and Western Sahara,
leads to the same conclusion: obligatory consultation of the inhabitants of

165
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. BONI) 174

Western Sahara on their future, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV).

The General Assembly has, it is true, decided on occasion that there was no
need to consult the populations of territories that were to be decolonized. But
it has stated its reasons, namely: |

The populations in question were not peoples and did not therefore qualify
for self-determination.

Consultations were unnecessary because of special circumstances, of which
the General Assembly is the sole judge.

Such reasons could not be held to apply in the present case. If the General
Assembly had had before it an advisory opinion of the Court declaring that
there were ties of sovereignty between Morocco and certain areas of Western
Sahara, it would have been obliged to consult the inhabitants of the region on
the different options provided for in resolution 1514 (XV).

(Signed) A. Boni.

166