OT

ANNEXE

DOCUMENTS SOUMIS À LA COUR

I. — PIÈCES DÉPOSÉES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT HONGROIS (DEMANDEUR).

Exception préliminaire.

Io.

II.

12.
13.
F4.

15.

65

A. — Au cours de la procédure écrite :

. Traité de paix conclu avec la Hongrie et signé à Trianon, le 4 juin 1920

(art. 250).

. Arrêt du T.A.M. hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 21 avril 1933 dans l'affaire

n° 733, DT Jules Pajzs et épouse contre Fonds agraire.

. Arrêt du T. A.M. hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 21 avril 1933 dans l'affaire

n° 735, Comtesse Félix Csaky contre Fonds agraire.

. Arrêt du T.A.M. hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 21 avril 1933 dans l'affaire

n° 734, Prince Paul Esterhézy contre Fonds agraire.

. Arrêt du T.A.M.hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 22 juillet 1935 dans l'affaire

n° 749, Jules Pajzs et son épouse, née Anne Bischitz, contre État yougo-
slave.

. Arrêt du T.A.M. hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 22 juillet 1935 dans l'affaire

n° 750, Comtesse Félix Cséky, née Elisabeth Fernbach, contre État yougo-
slave.

. Arrêt du T. À. M. hungaro-yougoslave, rendu le 22 juillet 1935 dans l'affaire

n° 747, Prince Paul Esterhdzy contre État yougoslave.

. Avis dissident, signé, le 22 juillet 1935, par M. l'arbitre neutre J. A. van

Hamel, dans l'affaire n° 749, Dr Jules Pajzs contre État yougoslave.

. Avis dissident, signé, le 22 juillet 1935, par M. l'arbitre neutre J. A. van

Hamel, dans l'affaire n° 750, Comtesse Félix Csdky, née Elisabeth Fern-
bach, contre État yougoslave.

Avis dissident, signé, le 22 juillet 1935, par M. l'arbitre neutre J. A. van
Hamel, dans l'affaire n° 747, Prince Paul Esterhdzy contre Etat yougo-
slave.

Opinion dissidente de M. l'arbitre national hongrois A. Székécs, dans les
affaires n° 747, Prince Paul Esterhazy, n° 749, Jules Pajzs et son épouse,
et n° 750, Comtesse Félix Csaky, née Elisabeth Fernbach, contre Etat
yougoslave.

Opinion dissidente de M. larbitre roumain, donnée à l'occasion des sentences
rendues par le T. A. M. roumano-hongrois et reconnaissant la compétence dans
les affaires à propos de la réforme agraire.

Opinion dissidente de M. l'arbitre tchécoslovaque, donnée a l’occasion
des sentences rendues par le T. A. M. hungaro-tchécoslovaque et recon-
naissant la compétence dans les affaires à propos de la réforme agraire.
Opinion dissidente de M. l'arbitre yougoslave, donnée à l'occasion des
sentences rendues par le T. A.M. hungaro-yougoslave et reconnaissant la
compétence dans les affaires à propos de la réforme agraire.

Protocoles, procès-verbaux et décisions relatifs aux méthodes d’évaluation
concernant la fixation des indemnités à allouer aux requérants hongrois
dans les procès agraires, méthodes adoptées par la Commission de gestion
du Fonds agraire et les T. A. M. roumano-hongrois, hungaro-tchécoslovaque
et hungaro-yougoslave.
9%
16.

17.

A/B 68. —— AFFAIRE PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY
Échange de notes entre les Gouvernements royaux de Hongrie et de
Yougoslavie concernant l’accomplissement de leur mandat reçu de la
Conférence de Paris en l’article XVI de l'Accord IT du 28 avril 1930.

Liste contenant quelques noms de ressortissants hongrois intéressés dans
l'affaire pendante devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

B. — Au cours de la ‘procédure orale:

. Texte complet des Accords de Paris du 28 avril 1930.
. Requêtes présentées au T.A.M. hungaro-yougoslave dans l'affaire Pajzs, en

date des 21 décembre 1931 et 18 octobre 1933 (avec annexes).

. Réglément de procédure du T. A. M. hungaro-yougoslave (3 oct. 1924 et

4 août 1931).

. Règlement de procédure du T. A. M. hungaro-yougoslave concernant les

affaires agraires (4 août 1931).

. Loi yougoslave du 19 juin 1931 sur la liquidation de la réforme agraire

des grandes propriétés (ivaduction en français).
Loi yougoslave sur les douzièmes provisoires (1925); article 38 (éraduciion
en français).

7. Loi yougoslave des finances pour les années 1926-1927; article 150

(traduction en francais).

Suite de la procédure,

Io.
It.

66

A. — Au cours de la procédure écrite:

. Chambre des Députés du Parlement frangais. Session de 1931. Rapport

fait, au nom de la Commission des Affaires étrangères chargée d’examiner
le projet de loi portant approbation des différents Accords intervenus. à
Paris, le 28 avril 1930, en vue du réglement complet et définitif des
obligations résultant du Traité de Trianon, par M. Loucheur, député.

. Vingt-huit requêtes introduites à propos des réformes agraires devant les

T. À. M. roumano-hongrois, hungaro-tchécoslovaque et hungaro-yougosla ve,
et servant de base aux décisions de compétence dans ces affaires.

. Trois sentences des T. A. M. roumano-hongrois, hungaro-tchécoslovaque et

hungaro-yougoslave, reconnaissant leur compétence dans les affaires dites
agraires des ressortissants hongrois.

. Cinquante-sept requêtes déposées par des ressortissants hongrois, à propos

des réformes agraires, au T.A.M. hungaro-yougoslave.

. Cinquante-sept sentences rendues, dans les affaires introduites à propos

des réformes agraires, par le T. A.M. hungaro-yougoslave, concernant la
responsabilité du: Fonds agraire ; sentences admettant les requérants contre
le Fonds agraire; sentences écartant entièrement les requérants du Fonds
agraire. : :

. Affaire non encore décidée (extrait de la reauéte).
. Ordonnances, décrets, décrets-lois et arrétés yougoslaves, concernant la

réforme agraire, promulgués avant le 19 juin 1931 (traduction en français).

. Exemples de quelques décisions ou d’autres dispositions d’autorités yougo-

slaves portant des mesures agraires décisives au point de vue du calcul
des délais pour le dépôt des requêtes, datant de bien avant le 19 juin
1931 (tvaduction en français).

. Réponse de l'agent du Fonds agraire contenant l'exception de forclusion

contre les procès dits de première série.

Recueil intitulé: Accords relatifs aux obligations résultant du Traïüé de
Trianon, signés à Paris, le 28 avril 1930 (Budapest, Imprimerie Athe-
næum).

Documents « concernant les méthodes d'évaluation sommaire non. repro-
duites à l’annexe [X/1-4 au Mémoire » du Gouvernement hongrois :
93

12.

13.

14.

15.

A/B 68. — AFFAIRE PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY

a) Rapport 4 la Commission de gestion du Fonds agraire, fait par son
membre hongrois, au sujet des méthodes d’évaluation des dommages
agraires, à établir en vertu de l’alinéa 2 de l’article VIII de l’Accord II
de Paris.

b) Expertise préliminaire concernant l'évaluation des biens agricoles
appartenant à des ressortissants hongrois et situés sur les territoires
que le Traité de Trianon a transférés de la Hongrie à la Roumanie,
la Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie.

c) Expertise relative à l'évaluation des biens immobiliers.

ad) Rapport de M. Borel, expert neutre, sur l'expertise des experts hon-
grois.

e) Échange de vues concernant un détail des questions (privation de
jouissance) au sujet duquel une jurisprudence a déjà commencé près le
T. A. M. roumano-hongrois.

f) Jurisprudence du T. A. M. roumano-hongrois (espèce T. Beliczay c/
Fonds agraire).

g) Jurisprudence revisée du T. A. M. roumano-hongrois.

h) Aperçu du procédé concernant l'évaluation des forêts.

4) Expertise concernant l'évaluation des forêts.

j) Aide-mémoire sur les procédés d'évaluation des forêts.

À) Procès-verbal du T. A. M. roumano-hongrois concernant l'interprétation
de l'expertise forestière.

Ouvrage en deux tomes, intitulé: Bericht über die Tätigheit der Deutsch-

Osterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye.

Journal officiel francais, numéro du 25 mars 1931. Débats parlementaires,

n° 52, compte rendu de la Chambre des Députés, 1ère et 2me séances

du 24 mars 1931 (discours prononcé par M. Loucheur, député).

Collection de documents du Parlement hongrois ayant trait au « projet

de loi portant insertion entre les lois hongroises des accords relatifs aux

obligations résultant du Traité de Trianon ».

Ouvrage intitulé: Les lois roumaines de réforme agraire devant le T.A. M.

roumano-hongrois. Quelques types d'affaires. Mémoires déposés par les difié-

ventes parties en cause relativement à l'exception d’incompétence soulevée par
l'État roumain. (Imprimé à Paris.)

. Pierre Jousse: Les tendances des réformes agraires dans l'Europe centrale,

l’Europe orientale et l’Europe méridionale (1918-1924) (x vol.).

. Milan Ivëié : Les problèmes agraîres en Yougoslavie (x vol.).
. Tchédomir Srebreno-Dolinski 1: La réforme agraire en Yougoslavie (1 vol.).

B. — Au cours de la procédure orale:

. Acte supplémentaire à la requête déposée le 21 décembre 1931 sous le

n° 733, auprès du T. A.M. hungaro-serbe-croate-slovène contre le Fonds
agraire, par le Dr Jules Pajzs et son épouse (avec annexes).

. Décret du ministère de la Réforme agraire de Yougoslavie sur la vente

facultative des grands domaines, en date du 8 octobre 1925 (traduction
en français).

. Vingt-cinq requêtes ? déposées auprès du T. A. M. hungaro-serbe-croate-

slovène contre l’État serbe-croate-slovène par des ressortissants hongrois.

. Extraits du Budapesti Küzlôny du 11 août 1935 (notes de la Commission

de gestion du Fonds agraire au Gouvernement hongrois, 17 oct. 1934 et
24 juillet 1935).

. Extraits des publications du Fonds agraire, plus récentes encore, à savoir

du 30 avril 1936.

1 Dans cet ouvrage sont reproduits un certain nombre d'actes législatifs
relatifs à la réforme agraire en Yougoslavie.

2 À chaque requête se trouve joint le document indiquant la suite à
laquelle elle a donné lieu: sentence, ordonnance d’homologation ou de désis-
tement.

67
94

IT.

A/B 68. — AFFAIRE PAJZS, CSÂKY, ESTERHAZY

: Décision du ministre de l’Agriculture de Yougoslavie (25 juin 1932).
. Requête Esterhäzy c/ État yougoslave (aff. n° 747; 15 juin 1933) (avec

annexes).

. Requête Csaky c/ État _ yougoslave (aff. n° 750; 19 oct. 1933) (avec

annexes).

. « Annexes du procès Csaky », n° 735 (28 déc. 1931).
. « Annexes du procès Esterhazy », n° 734 (24 juin 1932).

— PIÈCES DÉPOSÉES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT YOUGOSLAVE (DÉFENDEUR).

Exception préliminaire.

A. — Au cours de la procédure écrite :

. Sentence du T. A.M. hungaro-yougoslave dans l’affaire Comte et Comtesse

Sigismund de Batthyäny contre Fonds agraire du 23 janvier 1934, n° 732.

. Extrait des dispositions transitoires ayant force de loi et préparatoires de

_la réforme agraire, du 25 février 1919 (art. 9; traduction en français).

. Extrait du décret du 27 juillet 1919. (ratifié le 20 mai 1922) sur l’inaliéna-

bilité et Vinsaisissabilité des grands | domaines fonciers (art. 1; traduction
en français).

. Extrait du décret du 12 février 1920 (ratifié le 4 juin 1922) sur l’exécu-

tion de l’expropriation des terres des grands domaines, occasionnée par les
intérêts généraux, la colonisation, la construction d'immeubles et' jardins
pour ouvriers ét fonctionnaires (art. 1, 3 et 13; traduction en français).

. Extrait dé la loi sur la liquidation de la réforme agraire sur les’ grandes

propriétés du 19 juin 1931 (par. 61; traduction en français).

. Décision de troisième instance du ministre de l'Agriculture n° 38.820/VIa/32

du 25 juin 1932, concernant l’expropriation de la propriété du ressortis-

_ sant hongrois Dr Jules Pajzs (traduction en français).

B. — Au cours de la procédure orale :

. Décret yougoslave du 3 septembre 1920 devenu loi du 20 mai 1922 sur

* Ia location des grands domaines fonciers en baux quatriennaux (#aduction

en français).

. Demande exceptionnelle qu 2 avril 1934) du Gouvernement yougoslave

à la requête dans l'affaire n° 747, du prince Paul Esterhazy contre VEtat

- yougoslave.

Suite de la procédure.

qe

72.

68

Au cours de la procédure orale :

Loi yougoslave du 27 mai 1930 concernant la ratification des Accords de
Paris (traduction en français).

Extrait du décret du 27 juillet 1919, ratifié le 20 mai 1922, sur l'inalié-
nabilité et l’insaisissabilité des grands domaines fonciers _ (art, 2: traduc-
tion en français). .


                                                                         934

         DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC GAJA

[Traduction]

   Même si je souscris entièrement au dispositif de l’arrêt, je ne partage
pas l’opinion consistant à dire qu’il ne subsiste pas de différend entre les
Parties à propos de la question de la souveraineté sur les îles de San
Andrés, Providencia et Santa Catalina et que la Cour n’a donc pas com-
pétence sur la base des déclarations faites par les Parties conformément
au paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut. Il me semble qu’il est difficile
de nier l’existence d’un différend compte tenu du fait que le Nicaragua
a revendiqué la souveraineté sur les trois îles dans les conclusions qui
figurent dans son mémoire.
   Pour conclure que la Cour n’a pas compétence en ce qui concerne la
question de la souveraineté sur les trois îles, je me fonde sur la réserve
contenue dans la déclaration de la Colombie, suivant laquelle ladite
déclaration « ne s’applique qu’aux différends nés de faits postérieurs au
6 janvier 1932 ». Si l’on examine les « faits générateurs du différend »,
comme l’a indiqué la Cour dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu dans l’affaire du
Droit de passage sur territoire indien (Portugal c. Inde) (fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 35), tous les faits concernant le contenu et la vali-
dité du traité de 1928 sont antérieurs à 1932 puisqu’ils ont trait à la
conclusion de ce traité. Ainsi, la partie du différend concernant les îles
qui furent attribuées à la Colombie par le traité de 1928 ne relève pas non
plus de la compétence de la Cour sur la base des déclarations faites par
les Parties en vertu de la clause facultative.
   L’argument du Nicaragua selon lequel le traité de 1928 a pris fin par
suite d’une violation commise par la Colombie renvoie à des faits qui se
sont produits après 1932. Toutefois, que la Colombie ait adopté une
interprétation large de la portée du traité de 1928, incluant la délimitation
maritime, ne saurait en théorie constituer une violation matérielle, même
si cette interprétation est inexacte.

                                                 (Signé) Giorgio GAJA.

                                                                         106


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING PASSAGE
THROUGH THE GREAT BELT

(FINLAND v. DENMARK)

ORDER OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1992

1992

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE
DU PASSAGE PAR LE GRAND-BELT

(FINLANDE c. DANEMARK)

ORDONNANCE DU 10 SEPTEMBRE 1992
Official citation :

Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark),
Order of 10 September 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 348

Mode officiel de citation :

Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark),
ordonnance du 10 septembre 1992, C.1.J. Recueil 1992, p. 348

Sales number 6 2 5
N° de vente:

ISBN 92-1-070685-4

1992
10 September
General List
No. 86

348

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1992

10 September 1992

CASE CONCERNING PASSAGE
THROUGH THE GREAT BELT

(FINLAND v. DENMARK)

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court, and to Article 89
of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the Republic of Finland filed in the
Registry of the Court on 17 May 1991, instituting proceedings against the
Kingdom of Denmark in respect of a dispute concerning passage through
the Great Belt (Storebzlt),

Having regard to the Order of 29 July 1991 by which the Court adjudi-
cated upon a request for the indication of provisional measures presented
by Finland on 23 May 1991, in which Order the Court declared inter alia
that, “pending a decision of the Court on the merits, any negotiation
between the Parties with a view to achieving a direct and friendly settle-
ment is to be welcomed”,

Having regard to the Order made by the President of the Court on
29 July 1991 fixing time-limits for the written proceedings, and to the
Memorial filed by Finland and the Counter-Memorial filed by Denmark
within those time-limits ;

Whereas by a letter dated 3 September 1992, received in the Registry
of the Court by telefax the same day, the Agent of Finland, referring to
the passage in the Court’s Order of 29 July 1991 quoted above, stated
that a settlement of the dispute between Finland and Denmark had been

4
349 PASSAGE THROUGH THE GREAT BELT (ORDER 10 IX 92)

attained on that date; and whereas by the said letter the Agent of Finland
accordingly notified the Court, pursuant to Article 89 of the Rules of
Court, of the discontinuance of the case by Finland;

Whereas by a letter dated 4 September 1992, received in the Registry by
telefax the same day, the Agent of Denmark, to whom a copy of the letter
from the Agent of Finland had been communicated, stated that Denmark
had no objection to the discontinuance,

Places on record the discontinuance by the Republic of Finland of the
proceedings instituted by the Application filed on 17 May 1991; and
Orders that the case be removed from the list.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this tenth day of September, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-two, in three copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Kingdom of
Denmark, respectively.

(Signed) R. Y. JENNINGS,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.


260

DECLARATION OF JUDGE ELARABY

1. I have voted against the rejection of the request for the indication of
provisional measures submitted by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, mainly because, in accordance with its Statute and its present
jurisprudence, the Court should, in principle grant a request for provi-
sional measures once the requirements of urgency on the one hand and
likelihood of irreparable damage to the rights of one or both parties to a
dispute, on the other, have been established. I am of the opinion that the
Court has, under Article 41 of the Statute, a wide-ranging power of dis-
cretion to indicate provisional measures, The jurisprudence of the Court
has progressively, albeit gradually, advanced from its earlier strict insis-
tence on established jurisdiction to acceptance of prima facie jurisdiction
as the threshold for the exercise of the Court’s powers under Article 41 of
the Statute. This progressive shift has not, in my view, been reflected in
the Order.

2. I see Article 41 of the Statute as the point of departure. Article 41 (1)
provides that: “[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate, if it con-
siders that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”, while
Article 41 (2) stipulates that “notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council” (emphasis
added).

3. My reading of the two subparagraphs together convinces me that
the Court is vested with a wide scope of discretion to decide on the cir-
cumstances warranting the indication of provisional measures. The ref-
erence to the Security Council underlines the prominence of the link
between the Court and the Council in matters related to the maintenance
of international peace and security. The Statute moreover does not attach
additional conditions to the authority of the Court to grant provisional
measures. In point of fact, the jurisdiction of the Court need not be estab-
lished at this early stage of the proceedings.

4. As far back as 1962 Judge G. Fitzmaurice wrote that:

“The distinctive feature of the jurisdiction to indicate interim
measures is not, however, that it involves any prejudgment of, or
may prejudge the eventual decision, of the Court as to its substantive
competence to decide the merits. It is that this exercise of jurisdiction
involves a certain jurisdictional determination of its own, for its own
purposes, before it can be exercised. In short, it involves both a ques-

45
261 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DECL. ELARABY)

tion of merits and a preliminary question of jurisdiction, or rather
perhaps of the propriety of exercising it; and this is not the case with
any of the other possible exercises of preliminary jurisdiction.” (Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, “Hersch Lauterpacht — The Scholar as Judge,
Part Il”, 38 British Year Book of International Law, 1962, p. 71.)

5. Judge Fitzmaurice also observed that:

“The jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of protection is, so
far as the International Court is concerned, part of the incidental
jurisdiction of the Court, the characteristic of which is that it does
not depend on any direct consent given by the parties to its exercise,
but is an inherent part of the standing powers of the Court under its
Statute. Its exercise is therefore governed, not by the consent of the
parties (except in a remote sense) but by the relevant provisions of
the Statute and the Rules of Court.” (The Law and Practice of the
International Court of Justice: 1951-1954, p. 304.)

J subscribe to this interpretation of the powers conferred by the Statute
on the Court.

6. As for the circumstances of the case, the Court acknowledged the
magnitude of the tragic events occurring in the Congo by referring to the
eleven resolutions adopted so far by the Security Council. The Congo has
relied in its request for the indication of provisional measures on a host
of compromissory clauses which, if proven applicable, would have estab-
lished the requisite prima facie jurisdiction. The Court has analysed each
of these clauses and found that it does not have prima facie jurisdiction.

7. The Court however stated in paragraph 87, “both the Congo and
Rwanda are parties to the Montreal Convention and have been since
6 July 1977 in the case of the Congo and 3 November 1987 in the case of
Rwanda”, and in paragraph 88, “the Congo has not however asked the
Court to indicate any provisional measure relating to the preservation of
rights which it believes it holds under the Montreal Convention”. Yet in
paragraph 88 it chose to conclude on this point that “accordingly the
Court is not required, at this stage in the proceedings, to rule, even on a
prima facie basis, on its jurisdiction under that Convention nor on the
conditions precedent to the Court’s jurisdiction contained therein” and
then drew the general conclusion in paragraph 89 that “the Court does
not in the present case have the prima facie jurisdiction necessary to indi-
cate those provisional measures requested by the Congo”.

8. It is factually accurate that the Congo did not specify what meas-
ures the Court has requested to adopt to safeguard its rights under the
Montreal Convention. But the Congo did refer to the 1998 incident in
which a Congo Airlines plane was shot down. In my view, a degree of
inconsistency exists between the possible implication in paragraph 88 that

46
262 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DECL. ELARABY)

prima facie jurisdiction might exist and the conclusion in paragraph 89
that since the Congo did not ask the Court to indicate any provisional
measures relating to the Montreal Convention, the Court is not required
to rule on its jurisdiction. Somehow I find it difficult to reconcile this con-
clusion by the Court with the circumstances of the case particularly in
light of its recent jurisprudence.

9. The Court was more flexible when it considered the case concerning
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda) in July 2000. It then reached out to adopt a less
formalistic interpretation of its mandate. In that case the Court twice
asserted its power,

“independently of requests for the indication of provisional
measures submitted by the parties to preserve specific rights, . . .
by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute . . . to indicate provisional
measures with a view to preventing the aggravation or extension
of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so require”
(LCL. Reports 2000, p. 128, para. 44).

10. I hasten to add that I do realize that in the case concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), the assertion of jurisdiction was probably more
solidly anchored than in the present case. I also recognize that the
Court entertained a degree of doubt as to whether the conditions laid
down in Article 14 of the Montreal Convention have been fully met so
that a referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice could
be made in accordance with the Statute.

11. Notwithstanding such doubts, which I do not hesitate to confess
that I share, the provisions of Article 14 of the Montreal Convention
together with the reference to the shooting down of a Congolese plane in
1998 should have been considered adequate to establish a prima facie
jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures. It is relevant to recall in this
context that Judge H. Lauterpacht

“leaned very definitely in the direction of the view that before the
Court could grant a request for interim measures there must exist
some documentary or instrumental basis for the view that the Court
might be possessed of substantive jurisdiction relative to the even-
tual merits, such as an adjudication clause in a treaty, ‘optional
clause’ declaration, etc.; and also that the particular case must at
least not be clearly excluded in some way from the scope of any such
clause or declaration — e.g. by a reservation.” (Fitzmaurice, op. cit.,
p. 74.)

The Montreal Convention should have therefore been regarded as a
suitable instrumental basis to serve this purpose.

47
263 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DECL. ELARABY)

12. Thus, the criteria suggested by Judge H. Lauterpacht have, in my
opinion, been satisfied with respect to the Montreal Convention. Indeed
it was suggested by Mendelson in this context that

“To lay down in advance a hard-and-fast rule for dealing with one
of these factors — the possibility of Jurisdiction — is to fail suffi-
ciently to take into account the great variability of the others from
case to case. If the other circumstances suggest very strongly that
interim measures should be indicated, the Court may be justified in
indicating them even in the face of substantial — though not over-
whelming — doubts as to its substantive jursidiction.” (M. H. Men-
delson, “Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Juris-
diction”, 46 Brtish Year Book of International Law, 1972-1973,
p. 319.)

13. Another aspect of the Order which I also fail to appreciate is the
absence of any reference to the Court’s powers under Article 75 (2) of the
Rules of Court. It will be recalled that in the case concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda) the Court stated that “pursuant to Article 75, para-
graph |, of its Rules, the Court may in any event decide to examine pro-
prio motu whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of
provisional measures” (Z C.J. Reports 2000, p. 127, para. 38) and reiter-
ated its pronouncement that “Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court empowers the Court to indicate measures that are in whole or in
part other than those requested” (ibid, p. 128, para. 43).

14. In conclusion, it is to be recalled that in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
(United Kingdom v. Iceland) case in 1972 the Court first laid down what
has now become settled jurisprudence. It stated that:

“on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the
merits of the case, yet it ought not to act under Article 41 of the
Statute if the absence of jurisdiction on the merits is manifest”
(LC.J. Reports 1972, p. 15, para. 15).

This positive approach was maintained and reflected in a different
context in paragraph 91 of the Order, where the Court recognized the
absence of a manifest lack of jurisdiction and dismissed Rwanda’s request
that the case be removed from the List. In my view, the cumulative effect
of the absence of a manifest lack of jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the
implied acceptance of prima facie jurisdiction under the Montreal Con-
vention, on the other, should have been considered an adequate basis to
found jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures.

15. [ am therefore of the opinion that the circumstances of the case
reflect an urgent need to protect the rights and interests of the Demo-

48
264 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DECL. ELARABY)

cratic Republic of the Congo. For the aforementioned reasons, I could
not join the majority in voting in favour of rejection of the request for the
indication of provisional measures.

(Signed) Nabil ELARABY.

49


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA COMPAGNIE DU PORT,
DES QUAIS ET DES ENTREPOTS
DE BEYROUTH ET DELA
SOCIETE RADIO-ORIENT
(FRANCE c. LIBAN)

ORDONNANCE DU 6 JANVIER 1960

1960

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE COMPAGNIE
DU PORT, DES QUAIS ET DES ENTREPOTS
DE BEYROUTH AND THE
SOCIETE RADIO-ORIENT
(FRANCE v. LEBANON)

ORDER OF 6 JANUARY 1960
La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:

« Affaire de la Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepéts
de Beyrouth et de la Société Radio-Orient
(France c. Liban),
Ordonnance du 6 janvier 1960 : C. I. J. Recueil 1960, p. 3.»

This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning the Compagnie du Port, des Quaïs et des
Entrepéts de Beyrouth and the Société Radio-Orient
(France v. Lebanon),

Order of 6 January 1960 : 1.C.]. Reports 1960, p. 3.”

N° de vente : 994
Sales number

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

. 1960

YEAR 1960 General Lit:
No. 42

6 January 1960

CASE CONCERNING THE COMPAGNIE
DU PORT, DES QUAIS ET DES ENTREPOTS
DE BEYROUTH AND THE
SOCIÉTÉ RADIO-ORIENT
(FRANCE v. LEBANON)

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Article 62 of the Rules of Court;

Having regard to the Order of 15 October 1959 extending to
29 December 1959 the time-limit fixed for the filing of the Counter-
Memorial of the Government of Lebanon;

Whereas, within the time-limit so fixed, the Government of
Lebanon filed certain Preliminary Objections and asked the Court
to adjudge and declare that the Application of the Government of
France is inadmissible;

Whereas, accordingly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 62,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits
are suspended and a time-limit has to be fixed for the presentation
by the other Party of a written statement of its Observations and
Submissions on the Preliminary Objections;

Fixes 10 February 1960 as the time-limit within which the Govern-
ment of France may present a written statement of its Observations
and Submissions on the Objections raised by the Government of
Lebanon.

4
COMPAGNIE DU PORT DE BEYROUTH (ORDER 6 1 60) 4

Done in French and in English, the French text being authori-
tative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixth day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others trans-
mitted to the Governments of France and Lebanon, respectively.

(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.


                                                                          235

           Déclaration de M. le juge Skotnikov

[Traduction]

    J’ai voté en faveur de la conclusion générale de la Cour selon laquelle
celle-ci n’a pas compétence pour connaître de la requête déposée par la
Géorgie le 12 août 2008. Je souscris pleinement à la décision de la Cour
de retenir la deuxième exception préliminaire soulevée par la Fédération
de Russie. Cependant, pour les raisons énoncées ci‑dessous, je ne peux
être d’accord avec sa décision de rejeter la première exception prélimi-
naire soulevée par cette dernière.
    1. Je fais mienne la conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle « la Géorgie ne
s’est référée à aucun document ou déclaration antérieur à la date à
laquelle elle est devenue partie à la CIEDR (juillet 1999) et attestant,
comme elle l’affirme, que « le différend avec la Russie au sujet du net-
toyage ethnique existe depuis longtemps, qu’il est fondé et qu’il ne s’agit
pas d’une invention récente » » (arrêt, par. 64). De même, je conclus,
 comme la Cour, qu’« il n’existait aucun différend d’ordre juridique entre
 la Géorgie et la Fédération de Russie au sujet du respect par celle‑ci de ses
 obligations en vertu de la CIEDR [pendant la période allant de 1999 à
 juillet 2008] » (ibid., par. 105).
    2. La Cour est parvenue aux conclusions ci‑dessus après un examen
 minutieux des faits pertinents dans le contexte qui était le leur.
    3. Malheureusement, la Cour n’a pas appliqué le critère de l’examen
 contextuel avec la même rigueur avant de parvenir à la conclusion qu’un
 différend touchant l’interprétation et l’application de la CIEDR est
 apparu le 9 août 2008 au cours du conflit armé qui s’est déclenché pen-
dant la nuit du 7 au 8 août 2008 et que, par conséquent, il existait un
différend relatif au respect par la Fédération de Russie de ses obligations
en vertu de la CIEDR le jour où la Géorgie a déposé sa requête, soit le
12 août 2008 (ibid., par. 113).
    4. Comme la Cour l’a indiqué à maintes reprises, « une situation
donnée peut englober des différends ayant trait à plusieurs corpus juri-
 diques et ne relevant pas des mêmes procédures de règlement » (ibid.,
 par. 32). Tout au long de l’arrêt, la Cour relève que, dans la situation
 précédant le déclenchement des hostilités pendant la nuit du 7 au
 8 août 2008, il existait des différends concernant une série de
 questions, mais pas celle de l’interprétation ou de l’application de la
 CIEDR.
    5. La Cour a le devoir d’établir si le différend d’août 2008 portait ou
 non sur le respect de la CIEDR, et non sur celui des dispositions de la
 Charte des Nations Unies relatives au non‑emploi de la force ou des
 règles du droit international humanitaire. Cette tâche n’est certes pas
 facile. En effet, certains actes proscrits par le droit international humani-

                                                                          169

    convention sur la discrimination raciale (décl. skotnikov) 236

taire peuvent aussi être de nature à violer des droits énoncés dans la
CIEDR. Pour établir l’existence d’un différend relevant de la Convention,
la Cour doit néanmoins s’assurer que le différend allégué concerne l’ins-
tauration d’une « distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondée
sur la race, la couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine nationale ou ethnique »
(CIEDR, art. 1).
   6. En raison de cette difficulté, la Cour n’est sans doute pas toujours à
même d’établir, au stade préliminaire de l’instance, l’existence d’un diffé-
rend relevant de la CIEDR dans une situation de conflit armé. Toutefois,
elle a toujours la possibilité de déclarer que l’exception soulevée quant à
l’existence d’un différend n’a pas dans les circonstances de l’espèce un
caractère exclusivement préliminaire (Règlement de la Cour, art. 79,
par. 9). Il aurait été beaucoup plus prudent que la Cour emprunte cette
voie dans la présente affaire.
   7. Il est frappant que la Cour ait décidé de rejeter la première excep-
tion préliminaire pour ce qui concerne la période commençant le
9 août 2008 sur la seule base de diverses déclarations des Parties.
   Une analyse contextuelle aurait montré que ces déclarations ne consti-
tuent pas des preuves suffisantes de l’existence d’un différend touchant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la CIEDR.
   8. La Cour commence l’examen de cette période d’août 2008 en citant
le rapport de la mission d’enquête internationale indépendante sur le
conflit en Géorgie créée par le Conseil de l’Union européenne, selon
lequel, pendant la nuit du 7 au 8 août :
    « la Géorgie lança une attaque à l’artillerie lourde sur la ville de
    Tskhinvali. D’autres mouvements des forces armées géorgiennes
    visant Tskhinvali et les régions environnantes étaient en cours, et des
    unités militaires et éléments armés russes, sud‑ossètes et abkhazes
    prirent rapidement part aux combats. Toutefois, il ne fallut pas long-
    temps pour que l’avancée des troupes géorgiennes en Ossétie du Sud
    soit stoppée. Dans une contre‑offensive, les forces armées russes,
    couvertes par des frappes aériennes et par des éléments de la flotte
    russe basée en mer Noire, pénétrèrent très avant en territoire géor-
    gien, coupant la principale voie qui traverse le pays d’est en ouest,
    atteignant le port de Poti et s’arrêtant à quelques kilomètres de la
    capitale de la Géorgie, Tbilissi. Les affrontements se transformèrent
    en un conflit à la fois externe et interne opposant, d’une part, les
    forces géorgiennes aux forces russes et, d’autre part, les combattants
    sud‑ossètes et abkhazes aux Géorgiens. » (Rapport, vol. I, par. 2 ;
    exceptions préliminaires de la Fédération de Russie, vol. II,
    annexe 75 ; voir arrêt, par. 106.)
  Il aurait été utile à mon sens de tenir compte d’au moins deux autres
observations qui figurent dans le rapport de la mission :
      « La question se pose de savoir si l’emploi de la force par la Géorgie
    en Ossétie du Sud, qui a commencé par le bombardement de Tskhin-

                                                                        170

    convention sur la discrimination raciale (décl. skotnikov) 237

    vali dans la nuit du 7 au 8 août 2008, pouvait trouver une justification
    en droit international. Tel n’était pas le cas. » (Rapport, vol. I, par. 19.)
       « Une autre question d’ordre juridique qui se pose, au moins en ce
    qui concerne la phase initiale du conflit, est de savoir si le recours à
    la force par la Géorgie à l’encontre des forces de maintien de la paix
    russes sur le territoire géorgien, c’est‑à‑dire en Ossétie du Sud, pour-
    rait avoir été justifié. Là encore, la réponse est non… Rien ne per-
    met … d’affirmer que les forces russes de maintien de la paix
    stationnées en Ossétie du Sud manquaient de façon flagrante aux
    obligations qu’elles tenaient des accords internationaux pertinents,
    comme l’accord de Sotchi, et qu’elles étaient donc déchues de leur
    statut juridique international. En conséquence, l’emploi que la Géor-
    gie a fait de la force contre les forces russes de maintien de la paix à
    Tskhinvali dans la nuit du 7 au 8 août 2008 était contraire au droit
    international. » (Ibid., par. 20.)
   9. Le contexte factuel qui ressort de ce rapport est tout à fait clair : il
apparaît pour le moins improbable que la réaction russe à l’attaque de la
Géorgie ait constitué une violation de la CIEDR. La majorité qui a voté
contre la première exception préliminaire a malheureusement perdu de
vue cette évidence.
   10. En examinant les accusations échangées par les Parties, la Cour
aurait dû les évaluer dans le contexte du conflit armé qui était en cours
lorsqu’elles ont été formulées. Lorsqu’elle traite d’une situation de conflit
armée et de la question du respect de la CIEDR, la Cour doit faire la
distinction entre, d’une part, la propagande de guerre et, d’autre part, les
déclarations qui peuvent effectivement révéler l’apparition et la cristallisa-
tion d’un différend relevant de cet instrument. Ce n’est sans doute pas
facile, mais elle est assez perspicace pour y parvenir. Ainsi, il n’était pas
difficile de conclure que l’affirmation de la Géorgie selon laquelle la Rus-
sie avait pour intention d’« éliminer l’Etat géorgien et [d’]exterminer sa
population » (arrêt, par. 109) relève de la rhétorique de guerre et est donc
dénuée de valeur probante quant à l’existence d’un différend relevant de
la CIEDR. De même lorsque la Géorgie prétend que « toute la population
abkhaze de souche géorgienne est victime d’un nettoyage ethnique mené
par les troupes russes » (ibid., par. 111) ou que « les soldats … russes [ont]
expulsé l’ensemble de la population de souche géorgienne de la région
[l’Ossétie du Sud] » (ibid., par. 109). Soit dit en passant, le rapport de la
mission d’enquête montre très clairement que toutes les accusations
ci‑dessus étaient manifestement dénuées de fondement.
   11. La Cour met fortement l’accent sur ce qu’elle appelle « la réponse …
donnée le 12 août par le ministre russe des affaires étrangères » aux « accu-
sations formulées les 9 et 11 août par le président de la Géorgie » (ibid.,
par. 113). Mais les observations du ministre russe des affaires étrangères
citées au paragraphe 112 de l’arrêt ne représentent en rien une réponse
aux accusations portées par M. Saakachvili. Voici ce qu’a dit M. Lavrov
lors d’une conférence de presse :

                                                                             171

    convention sur la discrimination raciale (décl. skotnikov) 238

        « Deux jours après que [la secrétaire d’Etat des Etats‑Unis d’Amé-
     rique] Mme Rice m’a exhorté à ne pas employer de telles expressions,
     M. Saakachvili … a proféré des propos hystériques, accusant la par-
     tie russe de chercher à annexer l’ensemble de la Géorgie, sans hésiter
     à employer le terme de nettoyage ethnique ; mais il est vrai que c’est
     la Russie qu’il accusait de tels actes. » (Arrêt, par. 112.)
Puis il ajoute (cette phrase est omise de la citation ci‑dessus) : « Je suppose
que Mme Rice, après m’avoir parlé, n’a pas eu le temps d’adresser la même
recommandation à M. Saakachvili. » (Observations écrites de la Géorgie
sur les exceptions préliminaires, vol. IV, annexe 187.) M. Lavrov s’adresse
manifestement à Mme Rice, plutôt qu’au président de la Géorgie, estimant
qu’elle aurait peut‑être dû demander aux deux Parties de modérer leurs
propos.
   12. La Géorgie n’a formulé aucune réclamation crédible qui eût été
susceptible de se heurter à l’opposition manifeste de la Fédération de
Russie, au sens de la jurisprudence établie de la Cour (voir très récem-
ment Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne), exceptions préliminaires,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005, p. 19, par. 25). Un échange d’accusations entre
les Parties, eu égard au contexte de conflit armé, n’est tout simplement
pas suffisant pour établir l’existence d’un différend juridique touchant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la CIEDR.

                                              (Signé) Leonid Skotnikov.

                                                                           172


65

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TANAKA

The following observations are limited to the Court’s opinion on the
second principal Preliminary Objection raised by the Respondent
Government.

I can completely agree with the conclusion of the Court in rejecting
this objection. Furthermore, I cannot deny the well-foundedness of
the reasons by which the Court reached this conclusion. Nor do I
hesitate to say that these reasons in general are in themselves suffi-
cient to overrule this Preliminary Objection.

However, to my regret, I cannot agree with the Court’s choice of
reasons. To reach a conclusion there may be found many concurrent
reasons upon which a decision of the Court can be based. Some of
them may be more immediate, essential and straightforward than
others which are of indirect and subsidiary importance and serve
simply to corroborate the principal reasons.

The choice of reasons as grounds for a decision, however, is neces-
sarily subject to a limitation which is required by the nature of judicial
activities. I am well aware that some consideration should be given
to the existence of precedents in regard to a case which the Court is
called upon to decide. Respect for precedents and maintenance of
the continuity of jurisprudence are without the slightest doubt highly
desirable from the viewpoint of the certainty of law which is equally
required in international law and in municipal law. The same kind of
cases must be decided in the same way and possibly by the same reason-
ing. This limitation is inherent in the judicial activities as distinct
from purely academic activities.

On the other hand, the requirement of the consistency of jurispru-
dence is never absolute. It cannot be maintained at the sacrifice of
the requirements of justice and reason. The Court should not hesitate
to overrule the precedents and should not be too preoccupied with the
authority of its past decisions. The formal authority of the Court’s
decision must not be maintained to the detriment of its substantive
authority. Therefore, it is quite inevitable that, from the point of
view of the conclusion or reasoning, the minority in one case should
become the majority in another case of the same kind within a compara-
tively short space of time.

What I want particularly to emphasize is not only the concrete
appropriateness of the conclusion, namely the operative part of each
decision, but the reasoning upon which the conclusion is based. The
more important function of the Court as the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations is to be found not only in the settlement of concrete
disputes, but also in its reasoning, through which it may contribute to
the development of international law. It seems hardly necessary to

63
66 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

say that the real life of a decision should be found in the reasoning
rather than in the conclusion.

Therefore, the above-mentioned choice of reasons by which the
Court disposes of a matter in issue becomes important. It affects the
intrinsic value and weight of a reason on the basis of which a concrete
issue is dealt with.

In the light of these short preliminary remarks I shall consider the
matter at issue as regards the choice of reasons by which the Court has
disposed of the second Preliminary Objection raised by the Respondent
Government.

There is not the slightest doubt that this objection denying the
Court’s jurisdiction in the present case has been motivated and inspired
by the existence of two precedents, namely the Judgments in the
Aerial Incident case of 26 May 1959 (I.C.J. Reporis 1959, p. 127), and
the Temple of Preah Vihear case of 26 May 1961 U.C.J. Reports 1961,

P- 17).

First I shall consider the Court’s Judgment in the Aerial Incident
case, which marked the starting point of the subsequent history of
the jurisdictional matter with which we are concerned.

In this case the Bulgarian Government raised a preliminary objection
denying the validity of the Declaration of 12 August 1921, by which
Bulgaria accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
of International Justice. This Declaration, the Bulgarian Government
insisted, “ceased to be in force on the dissolution of the Permanent
Court” of International Justice on 18 April 1946 and therefore “cannot
accordingly be regarded as constituting an acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, by virtue of Article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Statute of that Court”. The Government oi
Israel, on the other hand, to establish the jurisdiction of the Court in
that case, invoked the Bulgarian Declaration of 1921 and Article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Statute and the fact that Bulgaria became a Member
of the United Nations on 14 December 1955 and ‘accordingly a party
to the Statute.

The Court upheld this objection and ruled that it had-no jurisdiction
in the case.

I quote a passage of the Judginent which seems most clearly to indi-
cate its essential reasons :

“At that date (namely, 14 December 1955], however, the Bul-
garian Declaration of 1921 was no longer in force in consequence
of the dissolution of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in 1940. The acceptance set out in the Declaration of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International

64
67 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

Justice was thereafter devoid of object since that Court was no
longer in existence. The legal basis for that acceptance in Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, ceased to exist with the disappearance of that
Statute. Thus, the Bulgarian Declaration had lapsed and was
no longer in force” U.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 143).

This ruling of the Court was based on two main reasons which were
concerned with the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5. The
one was the recognition of the destructive effect of the dissolution of
the Permanent Court on 18 April 1946 upon the Bulgarian Declaration
of 1921. The other was the distinction made between original and
non-original Members of the United Nations concerning the interpre-
tation of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute.

Although this Judgment was given in consideration of the particular
circumstances of the case and its binding force was limited to the parties
and to this particular case (Article 59 of the Statute), it has exercised.
tremendous influence upon the subsequent course of the Court’s juris-
prudence and the attitude of parties vis-à-vis the jurisdictional issues
relative to this Court.

The first repercussion of the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case
may be seen in the Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case de-
livered on 26 May 1961, precisely two years after the delivery of the
Judgment in the Aerial Incident case.

It is to be noted that the repercussion is found not in the conclusion
of the Judgment itself, but in the argument of the party raising a
preliminary objection to the Court’s jurisdiction, and in the reasoning
of the Court in disposing of this objection.

The question at issue was concerned with the effect of the Thai
Declaration of 20 May 1950 which renewed for a period of ten years
the Declaration of 3 May 1940, constituting the ten-year renewal of a
Declaration dated 20 September 1929, accepting the compulsory juris-
diction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The question
was whether the 1950 Declaration of Thailand was valid by the operation
of Article 36, paragraph 5, notwithstanding the dissolution of the
Permanent Court on 18 April 1946 and the fact that Thailand became
a Member of the United Nations and thus a party to the Statute on
16 December 1946, eight months after the dissolution of the Permanent
Court.

One may recognize that Thailand was legally in an analogous position
with Bulgaria in regard to the application of Article 36, paragraph 5,
except that, while the Bulgarian Declaration was made for an inde-
finite period, the Thai Declaration covered a period of ten years with
the possibility of renewal. Accordingly, it was quite natural that,
when the Thai Government raised a preliminary objection denying
the jurisdiction of the Court by excluding the application of Article 36,

65
68 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

paragraph 5, to that declaration, it did not fail to refer to the Judgment
in the Aerial Incident case.

The Preliminary Objection and Submissions of Thailand on this
point read as follows :

“{) that the Siamese declaration of the zoth September, 1929
lapsed on the dissolution of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice on the 1gth April, 1946, and thereafter could
not be renewed ;

(ii) that the Thai declaration of the 2oth May, 1950 purported
to do no more than renew the said declaration of the 20th Sep-
tember, 1929, and so was ineffective ab initio ;

(iii) that consequently Thailand has never accepted the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute”.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that this objection of Thailand was
encouraged by the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case. However,
differently from that case, the objection was not successful for the
cause of Thailand. The Court, although it recognized its jurisdiction
in the case, reached its conclusion not by way of the application of
Article 36, paragraph 5, but by recognizing the validity of the Thai
Declaration of 1950 as made independently under Article 36, para-
graphs 2 to 4 (1.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 29).

It is to be noted that in the Temple of Preah Vihear case the Court
did not establish its jurisdiction by considering the question whether
or not the dissolution of the Permanent Court resulted in the lapse of
the Thai Declaration of 1940, renewed in 1950. This question was left
untouched and the maiter was decided by stressing the particularity
of the case, which was different from the Aerial Incident case.

Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation that the Thai Declaration
of 1950 should be considered as independent irom that of 1940 does
not seem quite in conformity with the text of the declaration which
renewed the previous declaration, and with the real intention of Thai-
land from which the historical continuity between the two deciarations
is undeniable. From this viewpoint the solution presented by the
Judgment does not seem quite satisfactory.

The question of the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court
in the light of an interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, upon which
the preliminary objection was based, should have been reconsidered
by the Court. :

There remained for the Court the following alternatives: either the
Court would comply with the principle enunciated by the Judgment in
the Aerial Incident case and uphold this objection, or it would overrule
this principle and reject the objection.

66
69 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP, TANAKA)

In the case of the second alternative the Joint Dissenting Opinion of
Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender
appended to the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case (1.C.J. Reports
1959, pp. 156 ef seg.) might naturally have much importance in deciding
this issue.

This Joint Dissenting Opinion, different from the Court’s opinion,
firstly denied the lapsing effect of the dissolution of the Permanent
Court upon the Bulgarian Declaration of 1921 by the interpretation and
application of Article 36, paragraph 5, and secondly, it did not distin-
guish between original and non-original Members of the United Nations
regarding the matter of transfer of compulsory jurisdiction. The
fundamental idea upon which this opinion rested was nothing but the
substantial identity of the old and the new Court and the continuity
of their jurisdiction notwithstanding the dissolution of the old Court.
Whether the conclusion was negative or positive, the Court should
have tackled and solved this essential question without confining itself
to reasons of a subsidiary character.

That the Court’s attitude vis-à-vis the Temple of Preah Vihear case
was influenced by the preoccupation of not impairing the authority of
the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case is very probable. Respect
for precedents and maintenance of jurisprudence are important consi-
derations required in judicial activities. But the choice of reasons for
a decision is no less important, as I said above. From this viewpoint
the Court should have chosen in the Temple case more essential, more
immediate reasons in deciding the matter at issue.

This is one reason why Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and myself
appended a Declaration to the Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear
case (I.C.J. Reports 1961, pp. 36 ef seg.; cf. Declaration of Judge
Wellington Koo, bid., p. 36).

Thus the doctrine of lapse by dissolution which was incorporated in
the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case has remained intact. It has
offered a powerful tool to those States which were not inclined to submit
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by the application either
of Article 36, paragraph 5, or of Article 37 of the Statute. It has
become an indirect obstacle to the Court in choosing reasons.

*
* *

The thesis of lapse by dissolution has appeared for the third time
in the second principal Preliminary Objection put forward by the
Respondent Government in the present case. The Judgment in the
Aerial Incident case has become the core of the argument of the Res-
pondent Government in denying the validity of the jurisdictional
clause contained in the Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and
Arbitration of°19 July 1927 between Belgium and Spain. The position

67
70 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

of the Respondent Government is to deny the jurisdiction of the Court
by referring to the principles enunciated by the Judgment in the
Aerial Incident case regarding the interpretation of Article 36, para-
graph 5, of the Statute. The attitude of the Applicant Government
vis-a-vis the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case, on the other hand,
seems to be that it avoids challenging this Judgment openly and tries
to attain the same purpose, namely justification of the jurisdiction of
the Court, by another means. This means is to emphasize the difference
between the two cases. The difference is found in the fact that, whereas
a declaration referred to in Article 36, paragraph 5, is of a unilateral
character and simply aims at the acceptance of the compulsory juris-
diction, and is furthermore intimately connected with the Statute of
the Permanent Court, the jurisdictional clause with which Article 37
is concerned, is of a bilateral character and is incorporated in a treaty
or convention which has a wider purpose than a declaration under the
optional clause. Therefore, the jurisdictional clause in the Treaty of
1927, unlike the Bulgarian declaration of 1921, would not be subject
to the annihilating effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court.

On the other hand, the validity of the Treaty of 1927 as a whole is
not denied by the Parties.

The result thereof is that the Parties have gone into the question
of the severability of the provisions of a treaty : the Spanish Government
is in favour of severability provided this does not come into conflict
with the validity of the remaining parts of the treaty, namely the
parts relative to conciliation and arbitration ; the Belgian Government
is in favour of inseverability of the treaty in order to save the validity
of the jurisdictional clause as an integral part of the Treaty of 1927.

Thus the discussions deviated in the wrong direction by dealing with
a question which does not seem to be relevant to the interpretation of
Article 37 of the Statute, the main legal issue in the second principal
Preliminary Objection.

The Court’s viewpoint seems to support, in general, the contention
of the Belgian Government resting upon the emphasis of a difference
between Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 of the Statute in so
far as the interpretation of these two provisions is concerned.

I shall now consider the question whether Article 37 can be interpreted
differently from Article 36, paragraph 5, in regard to the effect of the
dissolution of the Permanent Court. The question is concerned with
the identity or divergence of these provisions:

It is quite true that there exist many points of difference bétween
Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 of the Statute, for example,
the wording, the source of compulsory jurisdiction, the unilateral cha-
racter of the declaration and the bilateral character of the jurisdictional
clause incorporated in a treaty, etc. The question, however, is whether
these differences are relevant to a decision of the matter at issue, namely
the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court on the fate of

68
71 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

declarations made under the optional clause and jurisdictional clauses
in treaties.

In a matter of this kind we cannot assert absolutely that one thing
is identical with or different from the other. There may be found
many elements of similarity and difference. What matters is from
what viewpoint they are identical or different. The decision as to
whether one thing is identical or not with the other depends upon the
position from which one regards the matter. Therefore, the decision
is relative to the viewpoint one adopts.

Concerning the matter at issue, namely the question of identity or
diversity between Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 of the Statute,
the criterion should be sought in the viewpoint of the essential purpose
of both provisions, i.e., the continuity of the acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction. If these provisions are identical in this fundamental
purpose, they may be considered as identical notwithstanding the
possible difference in many other respects which are not related to the
purpose itself.

Now, nobody would dare deny the fact that the above-mentioned
purpose is common to Articles 36, paragraph 5, and 37. Consequently,
the Court, called upon to give an interpretation on Article 37 in regard
to the second principal Preliminary Objection, could not have ignored
the existence of the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case, whatever
the conclusion of the Court might be: either to follow or to overrule
this precedent. The Court should have met the question which is
common to Articles 36, paragraph 5, and 37, instead of dealing with
the present case independently of the Aerial Incident case.

The Court should have made its position clear on the jurisdictional
matter, vis-à-vis the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case as involving
an issue which is of the same legal nature as the present case. That is
what is dictated by the value and importance of the matter at issue.

I am not unaware of the fact that, while there now exists no optional
clause declaration which needs to be saved by the operation of Article 36,
paragraph 5, a large number of treaties and conventions containing a
jurisdictional clause are still in existence. In the former case this
issue, namely the question of the interpretation of Article 36, para-
graph 5, may have lost all practical value ; accordingly, the Judgment
in the Aerial Incident case would do no harm to the interpretation of
Article 36, paragraph 5, even if it should be overruled.

However, consideration should be given not only to the practical
significance of the Court’s decisions but also to their theoretical mean-
ing and value. I consider that the Court should have dealt primarily
with the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case as this involved the same
legal question as the present issue rather than evade it because it was
an inconvenient obstacle. General international law might have
benefited by such an attitude of the Court by finding a common solution

69
72 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

to the jurisdictional question which has arisen or might arise concerning
Articles 36, paragraph 5, and 37.

x
* *

So far as my view on the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5,
is concerned, I agree fundamentally with the view put forward in the
above-mentioned Joint Dissenting Opinion appended to the Judgment
in the Aerial Incident case. Not only do I share the view of this Opinion
as an interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, but I agree with the
view of its authors which does not make a distinction between the inter-
pretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 (1.C.]. Reports
1959, pp. 180-182) so far as the effect of compulsory jurisdiction is
concerned.

It is unnecessary to describe the content of this Opinion in detail.
I would rather limit myself to stressing some of its essential points
from my own viewpoint.

What I have to say below is concerned with the interpretation of Art-
icle 36, paragraph 5, which constitutes the subject of that Opinion, but
this can be applied mutatis mutandis to the interpretation of Article 37.

The principal question we are confronted with is the effect of the
dissolution of the Permanent Court of International Justice upon the
compulsory jurisdiction accepted by a unilateral declaration under
Article 36, paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Statute. It has a bearing on the
interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, which stipulates :

“Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in
force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute,
to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run
and in accordance with their terms.”

Nobody can deny that the purpose of this provision is the preservation
of the effect of compulsory jurisdiction accepted in regard to the old
Court under the régime of the new Court. The alleged effect of the
lapse of declarations by the dissolution of the Permanent Court shall be
considered from this point of view, namely the purpose of Article 36,
paragraph 5.

The theory of “lapse” advanced by the Bulgarian Government and
supported by the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case is based on
the great significance attached to the fact of the dissolution of the
Permanent Court. It presupposes the existence of some difference
between the old and new Courts. If some differences between the two
Courts, either fundamental or in detail, exist then declarations made

70
73 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

under the old Court could not be expected to continue the same effect in
regard to the new Court. In this case the dissolution of the Permanent
Court might have a serious effect upon the fate of the said declarations.

Now there is no doubt that not only in their fundamental purpose
but in every detail, namely from: the viewpoint of organization, compo-
sition and procedure, the old and the new Court are identical with
each other ; the latter being the exact counterpart or copy of the former.
They do not differ except in name. The continuance of substantially
the same Court, differing only in name, has never been contested, even
by those who sought to deny the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court.

The continuity between the two Courts under a different name
guaranteed the subsistence of the same jurisdictional rights and obli-
gations of the declarant States. There would seem to be no inconven-
ience or disadvantage to the parties concerned. Presumably if when
the switchover from one Court to the other was carried out no change
of name had been effected, no one, in this case, would contend for the
lapse of an already existing declaration.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the dissolution of the Permanent
Court did not occur suddenly but had been anticipated and that there
was no temporal gap between the dissolution of the old Court and the
creation of the new one.

Consequently, the real circumstances are not so much the transfer
of jurisdiction from the old Court to the new one as the replacement of
the former by the latter. The acceptances by the declarant States of
the compulsory jurisdiction remain unchanged. Accordingly there did
not occur the “transfer of jurisdiction” nor the “automatic succession”
{in the proper sense of the terms). The circumstances concerning the
dissolution of the Permanent Court being such, it does not seem to be
in conformity with the true intention of the parties or with a common-
sense conclusion to attach the lapsing effect to the fact of the dissolution
of the Permanent Court. Nor does there exist here any material
change in the compulsory jurisdiction originally accepted. It matters
only that declarations are “still in force” or “faites ... pour une durée
qui n’est pas encore expirée” (Article 36, paragraph 5).

From what is indicated above, I may conclude that Article 36,
paragraph 5, simply affirms the true and reasonable intention of declar-
ant States and does not impose any new obligations upon them. This
provision is nothing but the expression of what is required by logic and
reason. This provision may be conceived as an authentic interpreta-
tion concerning the law on jurisdictional matters.

If the dissolution of the Permanent Court could have so important
an effect upon declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction, the
legislators of this provision would have expressly mentioned this
matter. However, the term “dissolution” does not appear in Article 36,
paragraph 5. It is certain that they did not approve the destructive
effect of dissolution. What they contemplated must have been, on

71
74 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

the contrary, to save the effect of declarations accepting the compul-
sory jurisdiction by excluding the possible erroneous construction of
the effect of the dissolution. Such construction is radically opposed
to the purpose inherent in Article 36, paragraph 5.

The real and only obstacle to the continuance of the compulsory
jurisdiction existing with regard to some States is the fact that they
did not become Members of the United Nations and accordingly parties
to the Statute of the International Court before the dissolution of the
Permanent Court. In this case one of the most important conditions
required for acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction is lacking. But
this condition can be fulfilled by admission to the United Nations and
ipso facto becoming a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.

Thus, upon the basis of the already existing objective condition,
namely declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court, the compulsory jurisdiction can become effective,
being completed by the fulfilment of a subjective condition, namely
membership of the United Nations and party to the Statute.

So long as this subjective condition is unrealized, the declaration
remains inoperative or “dormant”; it has not become null and void
by the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court. The cause
of the fact that temporarily the declaration remains inoperative, is
found not in the effect of the dissolution, but in the lack of the capacity
of the declarant State.

From what has been stated above, it is clear that the dissolution of
the Permanent Court cannot have such an important effect as to decide
the fate of declarations having accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court by those States which were not original Mem-
bers of the United Nations, or did not become Members before the
dissolution of the Permanent Court. Therefore the doctrine of the
“lapse” first put forward by the Bulgarian Government in the Aerzal
Incident case, and reiterated by the Thai Government in the Temple
of Preah Vihear case regarding Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute
(and finally invoked by the Spanish Government regarding Article 37)
is quite illusory and unsound. This doctrine, I am inclined to consider,
might have been artificially devised by those parties who, in concrete
cases, did not want to submit themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction
which they had accepted and the effective continuance of which they
had never doubted before.

The logical fallacy of this doctrine is clear. As is indicated above,
the replacement of the Permanent Court by the International Court in
itself does not possess any negative effect on the continuance of the
declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction, owing to the exis-
tence of exact identity between these two juridical organs. This is
a sociological fact underlying the legal issue. However, these organs

72
75 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

have a distinct legal existence. Accordingly, to carry out smoothly
the “transfer of jurisdiction” or the “automatic succession” between
the old and the new Court a legislative measure or technique had to be
adopted. This is precisely the purpose which was intended to be
realized by Article 36, paragraph 5, and which is in conformity with
the presumed intention of reasonable declarant States. It is evidently
a contradiction to invoke the lapsing effect of dissolution and to deny
the application of this provision, because its principal aim, undoubtedly,
is nothing but the exclusion of such invocation.

The objective of the preservation of the effect of declarations under
the old Court, as much as possible in regard to the new Court, must
govern the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute.
This objective is related to the institution of compulsory jurisdiction
and, thereby, linked with the ideals of justice and peace which are to
prevail in the international community. Those who advocate the
doctrine of the “lapse” seem to view the concept of “dissolution” as
if it presents an obstacle interrupting the continuity of the natural
process of cause and effect. We should beware of falling into the
excess of the legal formalism of so-called “conceptual jurisprudence”
of which the doctrine of the “lapse” presents a conspicuous example.
Sociological and teleological approaches, I consider, are particularly
needed in the field of international law.

*
* *

What I have stated above is limited to the question of the effect of
the dissolution of the Permanent Court upon the existing declarations
in the light of the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5. With
regard to another question, namely whether or not “the parties to the
present Statute” within the meaning of the said Article is limited to
original members of the United Nations, and therefore the signatories
of the Statute, I need only refer to the above-mentioned Joint Dissenting
Opinion and will not go further into the matter.

These fundamental arguments relative to the interpretation of
Article 36, paragraph 5, can be applied unchanged to that of Article 37,
since, as I mentioned above, so far as the fundamental objective is
concerned, these provisions are exactly identical and there is no room
for different interpretations of these two provisions. Accordingly, the
Joint Dissenting Opinion which originally related to the interpretation
of Article 36, paragraph 5, can be naturally extended to the interpre-
tation of Article 37, in so far as common questions are concerned.

Briefly, I can agree with the opinion of the Court on the second prin-
cipal Preliminary Objection, in its conclusion as well as in its reasoning.
Next, it seems that the Court’s view on Article 37, namely the question
of the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court, is not essentially
very different from that of the Dissenting Opinion on Article 36, para-
graph 5, regarding the same question, except with regard to some points

73
76 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

which are derived from the particularity of a jurisdictional clause incor-
porated in a treaty. So far as the question of the effect of the disso-
lution of the Permanent Court on the compulsory jurisdiction is con-
cerned, there should be no different answer or reasons as regards an
independent unilateral declaration under the optional clause or a juris-
dictional clause in a treaty. What can be said is that the reasons
based on the particularity of the latter could be invoked a fortiori for
the effective subsistence of the clause.

The following reasoning of the Court at the closing part of its consider-
ation of the second principal Preliminary Objection is very convincing :

“It was this fallacy which underlay the contention advanced
during the hearings that the alleged lapse of Article 17 (4) was
due to the disappearance of the ‘object’ of that clause, namely the
Permanent Court. But that Court was never the substantive
‘object’ of the clause. The substantive object was compulsory
adjudication and the Permanent Court was merely a means for
achieving that object.”

This reasoning can be very precisely applied to the interpretation of
Article 36, paragraph 5.

The Aerial Incident case, the Temple of Preah Vihear case, and the
present case, each of them possessing some particular aspect distin-
guishing the one from the others, involve an important legal issue which is
common to them, namely the question of the effect of the dissolution
of the Permanent Court upon the fate of the compulsory jurisdiction
based on the optional clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, or the juris-
dictional clause incorporated in a treaty. This common question was
for the first time raised by the objection advanced by the Bulgarian
Government in the Aerial Incident case. The Judgment in that case
upheld the objection by recognizing the lapsing effect of the dissolution
upon the compulsory declaration accepted by the optional clause.
Although Article 36, paragraph 5, became obsolete, the Court’s reason-
ing in that Judgment remains, unless it should be overruled by a sub-
sequent judgment. Although the decision of the Court has no force
of res judicata except between the parties, and in respect of that parti-
cular case, its reasoning should de facto exercise lasting influence upon
matters involving the same kind of question. Accordingly, the attitude
of the Thai Government and the Spanish Government, each invoking
the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case, respectively in the Temple
of Preah Vihear case and in the present case, is quite natural, so long
as the reasoning of the Judgment in the Aerial Inctdent case has sur-
vived without being overruled by subsequent practice.

74
77 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. TANAKA)

As one who shares the view of the Joint Dissenting Opinion con-
cerning the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, I consider that
the Court should have overruled the Judgment of 1959 in the Aerial Inci-
dent case by the Judgment of 1961 in the Temple of Preah Vihear case.
But as I pointed out above, the Court avoided meeting that Judgment
directly and dealt with the matter in a different way. Now the Court
has faced the same question for the second time. It should have made
its standpoint on the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5, clear.
But the Court has refrained from doing so from the viewpoint of stress-
ing the difference between Article 37 and Article 36, paragraph 5, and
has disposed of the issue quite independently of the interpretation of
the Judgment of 1959. Thus, the Court has again lost the chance of
rectifying the view adopted by that Judgment.

Whereas Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 are as regards their
fundamental objective quite identical and their differences are unessen-
tial, the matter involved in the second principal Preliminary Objection
should have been disposed of in the light of the common principle
underlying these two provisions, namely the preservation under the
new Court of the compulsory jurisdiction accepted during the period
of the old Court.

The Court’s opinion, although it rests on the difference between the
two provisions, is not limited to points peculiar to the interpretation of
Article 37. Its essential reason can be mutatis mutandis applied to
the interpretation of Article 36, paragraph 5. Furthermore, I assume
that the Court’s opinion is, in its fundamental reasoning, not very far
from that of the Joint Dissenting Opinion in the Aerial Incident case.
The above-cited passage from the Court’s reasoning may be regarded
as precisely the antithesis or refutation of what was declared in the
essential part of the reasoning in the Judgment in the Aerial Incident
case.

I consider that the Court’s emphasis upon the difference between
Article 36, paragraph 5, and Article 37 is more apparent than real.
The Court has been careful not to deal directly with the 1959 Judgment,
but the viewpoint adopted by the Court in 1959 is substantially over-
ruled by the present Judgment.

(Signed) Kotaro TANAKA.

75


531 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 20 XII 74)

THE COURT,
Unanimously,

Finds that the Application of the Government of Fiji for permission to
intervene in the proceedings instituted by Australia against France lapses,
and that no further action thereon is called for on the part of the Court.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of December, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-four, in four copies, one of which
will be deposited in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted
to the Government of Fiji, the Government of Australia, and the French
Government, respectively.

(Signed) Manfred LAcus,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Judge Gros makes the following declaration:

Je vote la présente ordonnance pour des motifs différents de ceux
qu’elle indique. Le document présenté par le Gouvernement fidjien le
16 mai 1973 ne pouvait à aucun titre être considéré comme une demande
d’intervention au sens de l’article 62 du Statut et cette demande aurait
dû être rejetée dès l’origine.

Judge ONYEAMA makes the following declaration:

T have voted in favour of the Order, although, in my view, the reason
given for it, namely that the claim of the applicant State no longer has
any object and in consequence there will no longer be any proceedings
before the Court in which intervention would be possible, carries an
implication with which I am unable to agree. The implication is that if
the claim had had an object and the Court had been called upon to give a
decision thereon, there would have been a possibility of intervention in
this case.

Fiji was not, at any time material to these proceedings, a party to the
General Act of 1928 nor to the optional clause of the Statute of the Court
on which the applicant State sought to base the Court’s jurisdiction, nor

5
532 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 20 XII 74)

has she invoked any basis of jurisdiction vis-à-vis France in her request
to intervene.

The Court should have decided upon this request itself as required by
Article 62 of the Statute of the Court and should, in my view, have
rejected it on the ground that the condition of reciprocity of an obligation
to accept the Court’s jurisdiction was wholly absent between Fiji and
France.

Judges DILLARD and Sir Humphrey WALbDocxk make the following joint
declaration:

The Order states that, the Court having found that the claim of Austra-
lia no longer has any object, the Court is not called upon to give a decision
thereon and consequently there will no longer be any proceedings to
which intervention can relate. The Application of the Government of
Fiji has, according to the Order, therefore lapsed.

The conclusion flows logically from the premise. As Members of the
Court, bound by its decision in the Nuclear Tests case, we are therefore
impelled to vote in favour of the Order. It is clearly not possible for the
Government of Fiji to intervene in proceedings, when, by the Judgment
of the Court, no proceedings exist.

Having said this we feel it incumbent on us to state that we do not
agree with the premise which furnishes the ground on which the Court’s
conclusion rests. As indicated in detail in the dissenting opinion of our-
selves and some of our colleagues, we do not agree that the Court should
have decided that no further action is called for on the claim of Australia
against France.

If, in the case of Australia v. France, the views of the minority had
prevailed, the issue of Fiji’s intervention would have required examination
in order to determine whether or not there existed a sufficient jurisdic-
tional link between Fiji and France to justify the former’s intervention
under Article 62 of the Court’s Statute. Furthermore, in our view an
opportunity should have been given to Fiji to be heard on the issue before
this determination was made.

It follows from what we have said above that, while we feel impelled
to vote for the Order of the Court, our reasons for doing so differ in
certain respects from those advanced by the Court.

Judge JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA makes the following declaration:

I have concurred in voting for the dismissal of Fiji’s application to
intervene under Article 62 of the Statute for a reason other than that

6


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM

(LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)
ORDONNANCE DU 7 MARS 1952

1952

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

NOTTEBOHM CASE

(LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA)
ORDER OF MARCH 7th, 1952
La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire Nottebohm,
Ordonnance du 7 mars 1952: C.I. J. Recueil 1952, p. I9.»

This Order should be cited as follows :

“Noitebohm case,
Order of March 7th, 1952: I.C.J. Reporis 1952, p. 19.”

No de vente : 84
Sales number

7 MARS 1952

ORDONNANCE

AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM
(LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)

NOTTEBOHM CASE
(LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA)

MARCH th, 1952

ORDER
19

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1952
Le 7 mars
Rôle général

ms ANNEE 1952

7 mars 1952

AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM

(LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,
vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour,
vu Varticle 37 du Règlement de la Cour,

vu la requête, datée du 10 décembre 1951 et déposée au Greffe de
la Cour le 17 décembre, par laquelle le Gouvernement de la Princi-
pauté du Liechtenstein a introduit contre la République du Guate-
mala une instance relative à l'affaire Nottebohm,

vu l'ordonnance du 26 janvier 1952 fixant les délais pour le dépôt
du mémoire et du contre- mémoire en ladite affaire, et réservant la
suite de la procédure ;

Considérant que, par lettre du 28 février 1952, reçue au Greffe
le 3 mars 1952, l’agent du Gouvernement du Liechtenstein a
demandé une prolongation de deux mois du délai fixé pour le
dépôt du mémoire ;

Considérant que, par télégramme du 4 mars 1952, le ministre
des Affaires étrangères du Guatemala, auquel la demande pré-
citée avait été communiquée, a fait savoir que son gouvernement
n'avait pas d’objection à la prolongation ;

4
20 ORDONNANCE DU 711152 (AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM)

Fixe comme suit la date d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt
des deux premières pièces de la procédure écrite :

pour le mémoire du Gouvernement du Liechtenstein : 3 juin 1952 ;

pour le contre-mémoire du Gouvernement du Guatemala : 15 sep-
tembre 1952 ;

la suite de la procédure restant réservée.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le sept mars mil neuf cent cinquante-
deux, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de
la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouver-
nement de la Principauté du Liechtenstein et au Gouvernement de
la République du Guatemala.

Le Président de la Cour,
(Signé) BASDEVANT.

Le Greffier de la Cour,
(Signé) E. HAMBRO.