150

PERMANENT COURT OF [NTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

Order made on April 4th, 1939.

JUDICIAL YEAR 1930.

THE ELECTRICITY COMPANY
OF SOFIA AND BULGARIA

Present: M. GUERRERO, President; Sir Crcix Hurst, Vice-
President ; Count Rostworowski, MM. FROMAGEOT,
ALTAMIRA, ANZILOTTI, Urrutia, Jhr. vAN EVSINGA,
MM. Nacaoka, CHENG, Hupson, DE VisscHER, ERICH,
judges; M. PAPAZOFF, Judge ad. hoc.

The Permanent Court of International Justice,
composed as above,
after deliberation,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
Having regard to Articles 38 and 62 of the. Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order :

Having regard to the Application filed with the Registry of the
Court on January 26th, 1938, whereby the Belgian Government
instituted proceedings before the Court against the Bulgarian Govern-
ment concerning the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria ;

Having regard to the Order of March 28th, 1938, fixing the time-
limits for the filing by the Parties of the Memorial and Counter-
Memorial in the proceedings thus instituted, but leaving the time-
limits for the filing of the Reply and Rejoinder to be fixed later;

Having regard to the Orders of August 27th and October 22nd,
1938, extending the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial ;

Having regard to the preliminary objection raised on November 25th,
1938, by the Bulgarian Government ;

Whereas, in consequence of the judgment rendered this day upon
the said objection, time-limits must once more be fixed for the

go

1939.
April 4th.
General List :
Nos. 75 and 78.
ORDER OF APRIL 4th, 1939 I5I

future proceedings in accordance with Article 62, paragraph 5, of
the Rules;

The Court

fixes as follows the time-limits for the filing of the further docu-
ments of the written proceedings on the merits: |

for the Counter-Memorial of the Bulgarian Government, Tuesday,

July 4th, 1939;
for the Reply of the Belgian Government, Saturday, August 10th,

1939 ;
"For the Rejoinder of the Bulgarian Government, Wednesday,
October 4th, 1939.

Done at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourth day of April,
one thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine, in three copies, one of
which will be deposited in the archives of the Court and the. others
will be transmitted to the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium
and to the Government of the Kingdom of Bulgaria respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,

President.

(Signed) J. Lopez OLIVAN,

Registrar.

12 91


DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE FORSTER
[Translation]

The Order made today in the case between New Zealand and France
is related to the one made also today in the case of Australia v. France.

The two Orders are as alike as twins. They indicate the same measures
of protection; the only difference lies in the mention of different territories
in the case of each Applicant.

There exists, moreover, such a close connection between the questions
of law raised respectively by the Australian and the New Zealand claims
that a joinder of the two cases would have been perfectly justified from
the very first day of the proceedings.

For the same reasons as are set forth in my preceding dissenting opinion
(Australia v. France), 1 must decline to side with the majority in the
present case (New Zealand v. France).

I remain convinced that in these exceptional cases the International
Court of Justice should have forsaken the beaten paths traditionally
followed in proceedings on interim measures. The Court should above all
have satisfied itself that it really had jurisdiction, and not have contented
itself with a mere probability.

It is not a question of approving or condemning the French nuclear
tests in the Pacific; the real problem is to find out whether we have
jurisdiction to say or do anything whatever in this case.

It was that problem of jurisdiction which it was necessary for us to
solve as a matter of absolute priority, before pronouncing upon the
interim measures.

Since that was not done, I express, here too, my dissenting opinion.

(Signed) 1, FORSTER.

17


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22,
OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

ORDER OF 14 JUNE 1989

1989

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

APPLICABILITE
DE LA SECTION 22 DE L’ARTICLE VI
DE LA CONVENTION SUR LES PRIVILEGES
ET IMMUNITES DES NATIONS UNIES

(REQUETE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE DU 14 JUIN 1989
Official citation :

Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Order of 14 June 1989, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 9.

Mode officiel de citation :

Applicabilité de la section 22 de l'article VI de la convention
sur les priviléges et immunités des Nations Unies,
ordonnance du 14 juin 1989, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 9.

Sales number 5 5 2
N° de vente :

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1989 1989
14 juin
Rôle général
14 juin 1989 n° 81
APPLICABILITE

DE LA SECTION 22 DE L’ARTICLE VI
DE LA CONVENTION SUR LES PRIVILEGES
ET IMMUNITES DES NATIONS UNIES

(REQUETE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

Vu le paragraphe 2 de l’article 66 du Statut de la Cour,

Considérant que, le 24 mai 1989, le Conseil économique et social des
Nations Unies a adopté la résolution 1989/75 ci-après:

« Le Conseil économique et social,

Ayant examiné la résolution 1988/37 de la Sous-Commission de la
lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des mino-
rités, en date du 1° septembre 1988, et la résolution 1989/37 de la
Commission des droits de l’homme, en date du 6 mars 1989,

1. Conclut qu’une divergence de vues s’est élevée entre l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies et le Gouvernement roumain quant à
l’applicabilité de la convention sur les privilèges et immunités des
Nations Unies [résolution 22 A (I) de l’Assemblée générale] au cas
de M. Dumitru Mazilu, en sa qualité de rapporteur spécial de la
Sous-Commission de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et
de la protection des minorités;

2. Demande a titre prioritaire à la Cour internationale de Justice,
en application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 96 de la Charte des

4
PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (ORDONNANCE 14 VI 89) 10

Nations Unies et conformément à la résolution 89 (I) de l’ Assemblée
générale, en date du 11 décembre 1946, un avis consultatif sur la
question juridique de l’applicabilité de la section 22 de l’article VI de
la convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies au
cas de M. Dumitru Mazilu en sa qualité de rapporteur spécial de la
Sous-Commission » ;

Considérant que copie certifiée conforme des versions anglaise et
française de cette résolution a été transmise à la Cour par une lettre du
Secrétaire général de Organisation des Nations Unies du 1° juin 1989,
reçue au Greffe le 13 juin 1989;

Considérant que, pour fixer les délais de procédure, il est nécessaire de
tenir compte du fait que la requête pour avis consultatif a été expressé-
ment présentée «à titre prioritaire»,

Décide que l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats parties à la
convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies sont suscep-
tibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question soumise à la Cour
pour avis consultatif;

Fixe au 31 juiliet 1989 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel des
exposés écrits pourront être présentés à la Cour conformément au
paragraphe 2 de l’article 66 de son Statut;

Fixe au 31 août 1989 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel les Etats
ou organisations qui auront présenté un exposé écrit pourront présenter
des observations écrites sur les autres exposés écrits conformément au
paragraphe 4 de l’article 66 du Statut de la Cour;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le quatorze juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-neuf.

Le Président,
(Signé) José Maria RUDA.
Le Greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.


PUBLICATIONS DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE :
JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE.

SÉRIE B, N°7.

Le 15 septembre 1923

RECUEIL

DES

AVIS CONSULTATIFS

_ ACQUISITION DE LA NATIONALITÉ POLONAISE

PUBLICATIONS OF THE PERMANENT COURT
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

SERIES B, No. 7.

September 15th, 1923 .

COLLECTION

OF

ADVISORY OPINIONS

ACQUISITION OF POLISH NATIONALITY.

LEYDE LEYDEN
SOCIETE D’EDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF’S
A.W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING CO.

1923 1923
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE.
1923.
Sept: 15th
; File F. c. VIII
THIRD SESSION Docket JIT. 4

Present :

MM. LODER, President,
Weiss, Vice-President,
Lord FINLAY,
MM. NYHOLM,
DE BUSTAMANTE,
ALTAMIRA, Judges,
ODA,
ANZILOTTI,
HUBER,

M Wane, Deputy- Judge.

ADVISORY OPINION No. 7.

On July 7th, 1923, the Council of the League of Nations
adopted the following Resolution :

The Council of the League of Nations having received
notice of the following question :

The Polish Government has decided to treat certain
persons, who were formerly German nationals, as not
having acquired Polish nationality and as continuing
to possess German nationality, which exposes them in
Poland to the treatment laid down for persons of non-
Polish nationality, and in particular of German natio-
nality : :

On the one hand, on the ground that these persons
were born in the territory which is now part of Poland,
their parents having been habitually resident there at
the date of this birth, it is maintained that in virtue
of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of June 28th,
1919, between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
and Poland, they are ipso facto Polish nationals, and
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 7

consequently enjoy all the rights and guarantees granted
by the provisions of the said Treaty to Polish nationals
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities :

On the other hand, the Polish Government considers
itself entitled not to recognise these persons as Polish
nationals, if their parents were not habitually resident
in the above-mentioned territory both on the date of
birth of the person concerned and on the date of the
entry into force of the above-mentioned Treaty, namely
January 1oth, 1920. It is consequently maintained that
these persons cannot legally enjoy the guarantees granted
by the Treaty :

Requests the Permanent Court of International Justice
to give its Advisory Opinion, if possible during the present
session, on the following questions :

(rt) Does the question regarding the position of the ©
above-mentioned persons, in so far as they may belong
to racial or linguistic minorities, arising out of the applic-
ation by Poland of Article 4 of the Treaty of June
28th, 1919, between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and Poland, fall within the competence of the
League of Nations under the terms of the said Treaty ?

(2) If so, does Article 4 of the above-mentioned treaty
refer solely to the habitual residence of the parents at
the date of birth of the persons concerned, or does it also
require the parents to have been habitually resident at
the moment when the treaty came into force ?

The Secretary-General is authorised to submit this
request to the Court, together with all documents con-
cerning ‘ the question, to inform the Court of the action
taken by the Council in the matter, to give all necessary
assistance in the examination of the case and, if necess-
ary, to arrange to be represented at the Court.

On the rrth of the same month, the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations submitted to the Permanent Court
of International Justice a request in the following terms:
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 8

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
in pursuance of the Council Resolution of July 7th,
1923, |

and in virtue of the authorization given by the Council,
has the honour te submit to the Permanent Court of
International Justice an application requesting the Court,
in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant, to give
an advisory opinion to the Council on the questions
which have been referred to the Court by the Resolution
of July 7th, 1923. |

The Secretary-General has also the honour to attach
to this communication a note explaining the action taken
by the Council in the matter, together with copies of
such documents, relative to the points under discussion,
as have up to the present been communicated to the
Members of the Council and are not yet in the possession
of the Court.

The Secretary-General will be prepared to furnish
any assistance which the Court may require in the exam-
ination of the question, and will, if necessary, argange
to be represented before the Court.

In conformity with Article 73 of the Rules of Court, notice
of the request for an advisory opinion was given to the Mem-
bers of the League of Nations through the Secretary-General
of the League and to the States mentioned in the Annex to
the Covenant. The Registrar was also instructed to notify
the German Government.

The Secretary-General sent, both with the request and
subsequently, a number of documents relating to the question.
At the same time the Secretary-General referred to certain
other documents, which he had sent to the Court with the
request for an Advisory Opinion regarding the question of the
German settlers in Poland, which question formed the subject
of the Advisory Opinion given by the Court on September roth,
1923 (No. 6). |

Furthermore, the Court, at the request of the Polish and
German Governments respectively, has heard oral statements
made by Count Rostworowski, Professor at the University
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 9

of Cracow, representative of the Polish Government, and
M. Schiffer former Minister of Justice, representative of the
German Government.

The Roumanian Government, to whom notice of the request
for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Council was des-
patched by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
on August 6th, informed the Court only.on August 25th that
it desired to be allowed to furnish information during the
hearings in regard to this Opinion. The Court, using the
discretionary powers which it possesses in the case of Advis-
ory Opinions, at once deferred to the desire thus expressed,
and fixed September 3rd for the hearing of the Roumanian
representative. The period of time thus allowed was cons-

. sidered too short by Roumania, but it was impossible to
extend it beyond the date already fixed, having regard to
the fact that the completion of the Court’s Agenda was
imminent, and to the Council’s desire that the question
should, if possible, be dealt with during the present session.
It appears from the documents (1) placed before the Court

() LIST OF DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED TO THE COURT BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS OR TO WHICH
REFERENCE IS MADE BY HIM.

1. Account of the action taken by the Council of the League of Nations
in the matter, dated July 11th, 1923.

2. Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the Members.
of the Council, dated April 25th, 1923.

Appendix: Letter from the Brazilian representative to the. Secretary-
General of the League of Nations, dated April 21st, 1923.

3. Rep oop sented by the Brazilian representative to the Council on July
th, 1

4. Note by the Secretary-General of the pease of Nations to the Members
of the Council, dated June 27th, 1923
Appendix: Letter from the Polish Delegate to the League of Nations
to the Secretary-General of the League, dated June 26th, 1923.

5. Minutes of the 5th meeting of the 25th session of the’ Council of the.
League of Nations.

6. Minutes of the 12th meeting of the 25th session of the Council of the
League of Nations.

7. Report by the representatives of Belgium, Italy and Japan, approved
by the Council on May 17th, 1922.

8. Petition of the “Deutschtumsbund” of November 12th, 1921.

9. Memorandum of the Polish Delegation to the League of Nations of
January 26th, 1928.

0. Information regarding the questions of fact and of law mentioned in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Resolution of the Council of the League of
Nations of May 17th, 1922, presented to the Council! on July 5th, 1922
by the Polish Delegate to the League of Nations. .

11. Memorandum emanating from the“ Deutschtumsbund”, dated August Ist, 1922.

12. Report by the Brazilian representative and Resolution adopted by the
Council of the League of Nations on September 9th, 1922.

13. Report by the Brazilian representative and Resolution adopted by the
Council of the League of Nations on September 30th, 1922.

14: Note by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland to the President of
the Council of the League of Nations, dated December 7th, 1922.

15. Report by the Brazilian representative and Resolution adopted by the
‘Council of the League of Nations on February 3rd, 1923.
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 ro

that, whereas the question regarding the German settlers in
Poland was brought to the knowledge of the League of Nations
by a telegram from the German League for the Protection of
the Rights of Minorities in Poland, of Bromberg, addressed
to the Secretary-General on November 8th, 1921, the question
relating to the interpretation of Article 4 of ‘the Treaty signed
at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, between the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and Poland, was referred to for the
first time in the above-mentioned League’s petition to the
League of Nations, dated November 12th, 1921. This peti-
tion also dealt with the question of the settlers, and the Coun-
cil of the League subsequently considered both questions
together.

The petition was brought to the knowledge of the Polish
representative near the Secretariat and was communicated
to the Members of the Council, in conformity with a Council
Resolution on the protection of minorities, dated June 27th,
1921. In accordance with the procedure laid down in its
Resolution of October 25th, 1920, the Council appointed a
Committee consisting of three of its Members to investigate
the questions submitted to the League by the German League
in Poland. On the basis of information supplied by the
Polish representative at Geneva and by the League above-
mentioned, the Committee prepared a report which was appro-
ved by the Council on May 17th, 1922. In the Resolution —
approving the report, the Council requested the Polish Govern-
ment to postpone any administrative or judicial measures
likely to affect the normal position of persons of German crigin
engaged in agricultural work, whose status as Polish subjects
was dependent upon the decision taken with regard to the
questions of interpretation raised in the Committee’s report.

Subsequently additional information was submitted to
the Council by the German League in Poland and the Polish
Government, and on September gth, 1922, the Brazilian repres-
entative submitted to the Council, then in session at Geneva,
a report recommending that the question of the interpretation
of Article 4 of the Polish Treaty of Minorities should be sub-
mitted to a Committee of Jurists. The Council approved
ADVISORY :OPINION No. 7 II

this suggestion and appointed the Committee, which was
composed of MM. Botella (Spain), Fromageot (France), Sir
Cecil Hurst (Great Britain), and van Hamel (Secretariat of
the League: of Nations). In a Resolution dated September
30th, the Council decided to request the representative of the
Polish Government to bring the report submitted by this
Committee to the notice of his Government at the earliest
possible moment. The Polish Government informed the
President of the Council of the League of Nations that it could
not accept the interpretation of Article 4 of the Polish Treaty of
Minorities adopted in the report and added that inits opinion
the said Article was not amongst those placed under the
guarantee of the League of Nations.

When, on February 3rd, 1923, the Council decided to
submit to the Court for an advisory opinion the question
regarding the German colonists, it stated at the same time
that since the interpretation of Article 4 of the Polish Treaty
of Minorities was at that moment the subject of negotiations
between, German and Polish Delegations at Dresden, it would
perhaps be better for practical reasons not to submit that
question to the Court for the time being, and to await the
result of the negotiations then proceeding, it being understood,
however, that the League of Nations reserved all the rights
which it possessed under the Treaty of Minorities.

In the absence of information in regard to the progress of
negotiations at Dresden, the Brazilian Representative on
the Council, on April 21st, instructed the Secretary-General
to ask the Polish Government to furnish all information likely
to throw light on the matter, in order that the Council might
once more consider the question. The Secretary-General
having complied with these instructions, the Polish Delegate
to the League of Nations informed him, on June 26th, that
in the course of the negotiations at Dresden the foundations
of an agreement regarding the interpretation of Article 4 had
been laid, and that the agreement in question was under
consideration by the two Governments. The Polish Govern-
ment therefore requested the Council to refrain from including
the question of the interpretation of Article 4 oi the Minorities
Treaty upon its Agenda. |
‘ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 I2

Nevertheless, as the question had been included on the
Agenda for the 25th Session of the Council, and as the German
Consul. at Geneva informed the Secretary-General, on July
6th, that the German Government did not foresee the possi-
bility of a speedy settlement of the question by means of
direct negotiations, the Council decided to submit to the Court
for its advisory opinion the two following questions :

(1) Is the League of Nations competent to deal with
the question of Article 4 of the Treaty of June 28th, 1919,
between the Principial Allied and Associated Powers and
Poland?

(2) Ifthe League of Nations i is competent, what is the
precise interpretation of this Article ? :

At the request of the Council, the President agreed to
draw up the final text of the request to be submitted to the
Court. This text is that which is reproduced at the com-
mencement of the present opinion. The new wording of
the second question concentrates the Court’s attention on
the difficulty arismg out of the words “born in the said
territory of parents habitually resident there” which occur |
in Article 4.

The first question to be decided is whether the matter
dealt with in the request is within the competence of the
League of Nations.

In contesting the competence of the League to deal with
the question regarding the interpretation of Article 4 of the
Polish Treaty of Minorities with respect to certain former
German subjects, and regarding the manner in which this
Article has been applied by Poland to these persons, Poland
contends that the guarantee of the League of Nations esta-
blished by the Treaty does not extend to the provisions of
Articles 3 to 6. -

Poland’s contention in this respect is as follows. Article
12 of the Minorities Treaty begins: os
ADVISORY OPINION No: 7 13

“Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing
Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to: racial,
religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations
of international concern and shall be placed under the
‘guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not
be modified without the assent of a majority.ot the Council
of the League of Nations.”

The guarantee of the League of Nations therefore only
extends to the preceding Articles of the Treaty in so far as
the stipulations of these Articles affect persons belonging to
racial, religious or linguistic minorities, and Poland does not ~
admit that the persons contemplated in Article 4 do in fact
belong to a minority within the meaning of the Treaty.
The first paragraph of Article 4 runs as follows :

“Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals
ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality
persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian
nationality who were born in the said territory, or parents
habitually resident there, even if at the date of the
coming into force of the present treaty they are not
themselves habitually resident there.”

According to Poland’s contentions, a person must be
a Polish national in order to belong to a minority within
the meaning of the Treaty. But the persons referred to in
the paragraph quoted above — in this case persons of Ger-
man origin — cannot be considered as Polish nationals, since
the question to be decided is whether, under the terms of
this Article, they do or do not possess this status. At the
most they can only be considered as candidates for member-
ship of a minority ; it follows therefore that the competence
of the League.of Nations as defined in Article 12 of the Treaty
does not extend to these persons. :

The first question which arises therefore is what must
be understood: by a minority — in the present case a German
minority. — within the meaning of the Polish. Minorities
Treaty: In order to reply to.this question it is necessary to
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 14

bear in-mind the conditions under which the Minorities Treaty
was conclüded and the relations existing between that Treaty
and the Treaty of Peace which was signed on the same day.
. The independence of the new State of Poland was finally
recognized by the Treaty of Peace. At the same time Poland
assumed certain obligations towards the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers who were co-signatories with her of the
Treaties of Peace and Minorities. According to Article 93
of the Treaty of Peace :

“Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty
with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such »
provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Po-
wers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland
who differ from the majority of the population in race,
language or religion.”

Again, in the Preamble of the Minorities Treaty Poland
declares that she desires :

“to conform her institutions to the principles of
liberty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee to the
inhabitants of the territory over which she has assumed
sovereignty.”

It is to be observed that these two clauses which serve
as a basis for the provisions embodied in the Minorities
Treaty do not speak restrictively of Polish nationals, that.
is to say of persons who in their capacity as Polish nationals
constitute minorities within the whole body of nationals of
the country.; these clauses considerably extend the concep-
tions of minority and population, since they allude on the one
hand to the inhabitants of the territory over which Poland
has assumed sovereignty and on the other hand to inhabitants
who differ from. the majority of the population in race,
language or religion. The expression “population” seems thus
to include all inhabitants of Polish origin in the territory
incorporated in Poland. Again, the term “minority” seems
to include inhabitants: who differ from the population in
race, language or religion, that is to say, amongst others,
inhabitants of this territory of non-Polish origin, whether
.* ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 - 15

they are Polish nationals or not. This conclusion is confirmed
by the terms of Article 2 of the Minorities Treaty, according
to which the Polish Government undertakes to assure full
and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants
without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or
religion, and declares that all inhabitants of Poland shall
enjoy certain rights which are therein enumerated.

The terms of Article 12, which fixes the extent of the com-
petence of the League of Nations, are in entire accordance
with the wider conception of a minority derived from the
Articles above-mentioned, since it speaks of “persons belong-
ing to racial, religious or linguistic minorities”, without atta-
- ching any importance to the political allegiance of these
persons.

Moreover, the Minorities Treaties in general, and the Polish
Treaty in particular, have been concluded with new States,
or with States which, as a result of the war, have had their
territories considerably enlarged, and whose population was.not
therefore clearly defined from the standpoint of political alle-
giance. One of the first problems which presented itself in
connection with. the protection of the minorities was that
of preventing these States from refusing their nationality, on
racial, religious or linguistic grounds, to certain categories of
persons, in spite of the link which effectively attached them
to the territory allocated to one or other of these States. It
is clearly not a purely fortuitous circumstance that the Treaties
for the protection of minorities contain provisions relating to
the acquisition of nationality. Again, the fact that in some
cases these provisions merely repeat, either in their entirety
or in part, principles laid down in the Peace Treaties, would
appear to be explained by the intention to extend to these
principles the guarantee of the League of Nations, no matter
what points of difference or resemblance there may between
these treaties. .

Poland therefore, at the moment of her final recognition
as an independent State and of the delimitation of her fron-
tiers; signed provisions which establish a right to Polish
nationality, and these provisions, in so far as they are inserted
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 . 16

in the Minorities Treaty, are recognized by Poland as funda-
mental laws with which no law; regulation or official action
may conflict or interfere (Article 1 of the Treaty of Minorities).
Though, generally speaking, it is true that a sovereign State
has the right to decide what persons shall be regarded as its
nationals, it is no less true that this principle is applicable
only subject to the Treaty obligations referred to above.

The observance by Poland of the provisions regarding the
acquisition of Polish nationality, which she accepted in
signing the Treaty of Peace, is of supreme importance to persons
of non-Polish origin who are entitled to avail themselves of
the provisions in question in order to become Polish nationals.

In view of the importance of this matter, the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers desired to create a sure guaran-
tee in favour of these persons ; with this object in view they
_ inserted stipulations on the subject in the Minorities Treaty,
thus indicating their intention that these persons should
benefit by the protection provided for under Article 12. The
very fact that Articles 3 to 6 are included in the Minorities
Treaty seems thus to show that, in so far as these Articles
establish a right on the part of persons of German origin to
Polish nationality, this right is placed under the guarantee of
the League of Nations, which is specially fitted to undertake
the protection of the persons of German origin referred to in
the Minorities Treaty, to which Germany was not a signatory.

It seems therefore evident that since the Minorities Treaty
in general, and Article 4 in particular, does not exclusively
contemplate minorities composed of Polish nationals or of
inhabitants of Polish territory, Poland, by consenting, in
Article 12 of the Treaty, to the preceding Articles being placed
under the guarantee of the League of Nations in so far as they
concern persons belonging to racial or linguistic minorities,
also consents to the extension of this protection to the appli-
cation of Articles 3 to 6. |

If this were not the case, the value and sphere of applica-
tion of the Treaty would be greatly diminished. But in the
Advisory Opinion given with regard to the questions put
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 17

_ concerning the German colonists in Poland, the Court has
already expressed the view that an interpretation which
would deprive the Minorities Treaty. of a great part of its
value is inadmissible. In the present case it would be still
less admissible, since it would be contrary to the actual terms
of the Treaty, which lays down in Article 12 that the clauses
preceding this Article, including therefore those contained
in Article 4, are placed under the guarantee of the League

of Nations. |

II.

The Council of the League of Nations, in the second place,
has requested the Court to give its opinion regarding the
construction to be placed upon the above-mentioned stipula-
tion of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Minorities Treaty of June
28th, 1919, between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers and Poland, and in particular: upon the words “‘habi-
tually resident there”.

The Polish Government maintains that when the Treaty
places it under an obligation to admit and declare to be
Polish nationals persons of German, Austrian, Hungatian or
Russian nationality, born in the territory which has now be-
come Polish, of parents habitually resident there, the meaning —
is that, of the individuals ot German origin born in this terri-
tory, only those can claim Polish nationality whose parents
were habitually resident there both on the day of the coming
into force of the Treaty (January roth, 1920) and on the day
of the birth of the individual.

Such an assertion is in contradiction with the terms of the
provision which it claims to interpret and is not supported
by the precedents supplied by international practice.

When saying that persons born in the territories ceded to
Poland of. parents habitually resident there are admitted to
Polish nationality, the Treaty clearly takes the date of birth
of those persons as a basis and establishes a close relationship,
an intentional synchronisation between their birth and the
habitual residence of their parents. On the other hand, to
ADVISORY OPINION No 7 ' 18

require furthermore the continuance or the reestablishment
of this habitual residence at the time of the coming into force
of the Treaty would amount to an addition to the text and
would go beyond its terms. Persons whose parents were
then, but then only, habitually resident in the new Poland
would not have been born of persons habitually resident there,
and there was never any intention of making Article 4 appli-
‘cable to them. Why should the fact that the parents had
been habitually resident at a previous period change the na-
tural meaning of the words ? Since the choice lay between
the two systems which in various forms and combinations
have always been adopted when it has been necessary to
‘determine the effect of a territorial adjustment upon the
nationality of the inhabitants of the territories annexed or
‘ceded, the Treaty adopted both the principle of habitual
residence and the principle of origin ; it has combined these
‘two systems.

In Article 3, which supplements Article 97 of the Peace
‘Treaty of Versailles, it declares in the first place to be Polish
nationals, subject to a right of individual option, all German
nationals habitually resident in the territories incorporated
in Poland.

In the second place, under Article 4, it grants the same na-
tionality to persons born in the above-mentioned territories,
that is to say, originating from these territories, provided
‘they are born of parents habitually resident there, and that
they do not renounce, within a period of two years, the
‘nationality which they have acquired. In laying down the
‘condition with regard to the residence of the parents the
authors of the Treaty desired to reduce as far as possible the
element of chance. A birth occurring in a family established
in the territory, on the regular and permanent footing pre-
supposed by habitual residence, would not be an accidental
‘circumstance taking place during a. temporary sojourn or
visit. The establishment of his parents in the territory
‘on this basis creates between the child and his place of birth
-a moral link which justifies the grant to him of the nationality
of this country ; it strengthens and supplements the material |
‘bond already created by the fact of his birth.
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 19

To require in addition that the parents should have renewed
or preserved their habitual residence in the ceded territories at
the time when the Treaty of Minorities came into force would
be to lay down a useless condition not to be foundin any Treaty
of annexation hitherto concluded. The habitual residence
of parents at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty
does not in any way concern or affect the individuals whose
nationality has to be determined. Many of these individuals
have doubtless reached the age of manhood ; some perhaps
have already reached old age ; at all events, most of them
have attained an independent existence and a home of
their own. What in these circumstances would be the use
of ascertaining whether. their parents, whose house they
have left and whose destinies they no longer share, weré
or were not habitually resident in the territories incorporated
in Poland on a day following this incorporation? The inquiry
thus prescribed would be entirely arbitrary; and there
could be no reason for it unless the habitual residence
of the parents in the territories in question implied or
was calculated to create a presumption that the children
themselves were habitually resident there and that in conse-
quence of this residence there was a closer, more enduring
and more powerful link with Poland, which had become their
fatherland. But the first paragraph of Article 4 itself is
careful explicitly to dispel a presumption of this kind, when
it declares that it is not necessary for the persons with whom .
it deals to be themselves habitually resident in the territories
incorporated in Poland at the date of the coming into force
of the-Treaty. The solution thus adopted by the Treaty
appears further to be justified, having regard to the great
number of persons who were forced by the war to abandon
their homes in the present Polish territories.

Furthermore, what is the position of those whose parents
died before January roth, 1920, or transferred their residence
abroad in the interval between that date and the date of birth?
Wouldsuch death or change of residence, for which the children
are in no way responsible, prevent them from availing them-
selves of the provisions of Article 4, should they think fit to do
so? According to the theory that the habitual residence of
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 20

the parents in Poland on the day of the coming into force of ©
‘the Treaty is a necessary and hard and fast condition, this
question can only be answered in the affirmative. This is
sufficient to condemn such a contention. |
Finally, is it necessary to point out that the adoption of
the Polish standpoint would by no means render it impossible
for one and the same person to possess more then one nation-
ality, a consequence which the exponents of that standpoint
have indicated, pointing out the danger involved ? It would
undoubtedly have the result of diminishing this danger, by
reducing the number of persons who become Polish under
Article 4. But the possibility of cases of double nationality
would by no means be eliminated. Only an international
agreement between the interested Powers could produce this
desirable result. ;
The Court’s task is clearly defined. Having before it a
clause which leaves little to be desired in the nature of clear-
ness, it is bound to apply this clause as it stands, without
considering whether other provisions might with advantage
have been added to or substituted for it. The Minorities
Treaty (Article 4, paragraph 1) admits and declares to be
Polish nationals, ipso facto, persons who were born in the territ-
ory of the new State ‘‘of parents habitually resident there”.
These words refer to residence of the parents at the time of
the birth of the child and at this time only. It is necessary,
but on the other hand sufficient, that on the date of birth the
parents should have been habitually resident, that is to say
should have been established in a permanent manner, with
the intention of remaining, in the territory which subsequently
becameincorporatedin Poland. To impose an additional con-
dition for the acquisition of Polish nationality, a condition not
provided for in the Treaty of June 28th, 1919, would be equiva-
lent; not to interpreting the Treaty, but to reconstructing it.
ADVISORY OPINION No. 7 aI

FoR THESE REASONS
THE COURT IS OF OPINION

That the position of the persons contemplated in the Resol-
ution of the Council of the League of Nations of July 7th,
1923, arising out of the application by Poland of Article 4
of the Treaty of June 28th, 1919, between the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and Poland does fall within the comp-
etence of the League of Nations under the terms of the said
Treaty ; |

That Article 4 of the above-mentioned Treaty does refer
only to the habitual residence of the parents at the date of
birth of the persons concerned.

Done in English and in French, the French text being
authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth
day of September, nineteen hundred and twenty-three, in :
two copies, one of which is to be deposited in the archives of
the Court and the other to be forwarded to the Council of
the League of Nations.

(Signed) LODER,
_ President.

(Signed) À. HAMMARSKJÜLD,
Registrar.

Mr. Moore took part in the deliberations of the Court
concerning the present Opinion, but had to leave the Hague
before its terms were finally settled. He declared that he
concurred in the conclusions of this Opinion.

Lord Finlay, while agreeing in the conclusions arrived
at in regard to both questions before the Court, desired. to
add the following observations in regard to the question of
the competence of the League of Nations in the present

matter.
(Initialled) L.

A: H.


1233

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE REZEK
[Translation]

Identification of the main channel of the Chobe in the Kasikili/Sedudu region
— Ambiguous nature of local geography — Criticism of the arguments relating
to navigability, visibility and natural prolongation — Interpretation of the 1890
Anglo-German Treaty in the light of history — Conduct of the Parties — Equi-
table sharing of watercourse resources — Cartography — Effective occupation
of the Island — Preponderance of evidence in favour of the finding that the
boundary lies in the southern channel and that Namibia has sovereignty over
Kasikilil/Sedudu.

1. I. am sorry to find myself in complete disagreement with the major-
ity. A particular source of regret is the gulf between the position taken by
the Judgment and my own views concerning the principle of uti possidetis
in the context of a colonial situation and the accession of peoples to inde-
pendence. Over the course of my years of service on the Supreme Court
of my own country, I learned that the majority is always right, and time
has effaced any vestiges of doubt I entertained early on about the validity
of that maxim. What follows, therefore, is not a plea in support of the
losing side, particularly since both Parties had the benefit of impeccable
representation in these proceedings, and their cases were argued
thoroughly and tenaciously by their respective counsel. I could set
out at length my support for the case put by Namibia, while paying
tribute to the opinion of the majority of the Court’s Members. How-
ever, I shall confine myself to indicating as succinctly as possible the
substance of my dissent.

2. The Court correctly understood, in the light of Article IIT of the
1890 Anglo-German Treaty, that its task was not simply to determine the
thalweg of the Chobe, but rather first of all to identify the point at which
the main channel of the river bifurcates, and then to determine the thal-
weg of this channel —— “im Thalweg des Hauptlaufes” — on the basis of
the German version, which makes it clear, to readers of the English ver-
sion, what is meant by the term “centre”.

3. In identifying the main channel, where the two branches of the
Chobe separate in order to encircle Kasikili/Sedudu Island, the Judgment
appears to seek to attach more importance to geographical considera-
tions, despite the attendant ambiguities. The northern channel has a
greater mean depth and is therefore said to be more easily navigable than
the southern channel, when the Chobe carries sufficient water to permit
navigation at all. However, navigability is referred to in the abstract,
since it is clear that, as far as actual traffic is concerned, the southern
channel has always been more heavily used. It is there, moreover,
that most of the Chobe’s water resources are found, which should be

192
KASIKILI/SEDUDU ISLAND (DISS. OP. REZEK) 1234

accessible to both Parties equally, in accordance with a basic principle of
international law relating to river boundaries.

4. The northern channel is also said to have greater “visibility” in
terms of its contours and banks, and is thus regarded, despite the linger-
ing uncertainty about comparative volumes of water, as the more sub-
stantial of the two branches of the Chobe surrounding Kasikili/Sedudu.
1 ask myself whether this could have had any significance whatsoever to
the colonial powers who negotiated the 1890 Treaty, or to their agents in
the disputed region or to the indigenous communities over subsequent
decades. This “visibility” is evidenced only by aerial photography, and
was therefore non-existent at the time when the bilateral agreement was
concluded and implemented.

5. I am unable to understand why the northern channel is considered
to constitute the “natural prolongation” of the course of the Chobe
when it reaches Kasikili/Sedudu Island. We are dealing here not with a
railway or a road, but with a natural watercourse, which does not neces-
sarily follow the most direct route. However, were I to accept that such
morphological considerations should be taken into account, it would
be difficult for me to say why the upstream prolongation should be
given more importance than the downstream prolongation: indeed, when
the two channels come together again, it is in fact the southern
channel which appears to determine the orientation of the reunited water-
course.

6. The variability of the geographical aspect highlights the importance
of the historical factor, when it comes to interpreting the 1890 Treaty cor-
rectly. It is likely that the parties used the conventional formulas for
determination of the boundary line when it follows a watercourse on
which islands are located, without according any particular attention to
the features specific to the Kasikili/Sedudu area. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that the two powers became aware, with the passage of time, of the
need to arrive at a proper interpretation of the Treaty in regard to the
determination of the boundary at that precise location. Rather than seek
to ascertain what the parties concerned meant by the words “main chan-
nel”, since they probably had nothing special in mind, it fell to the Court
to determine, with specific reference to the disputed area, what they read
into those words during the decades following the conclusion of the 1890
Treaty.

7. All the same, it seems to me proven that access by river to the Zam-
bezi was not the key objective for the parties to the 1890 Treaty, particu-
larly for Germany. J accept that the main aim in the treaty negotiation
was to delimit spheres of influence between the two powers. That aim was
to be attained in the light of certain principles governing river bound-
aries, foremost among which is that of equality of access to the resources
of a watercourse. An examination of the object and purpose of the 1890
Treaty also results in the identification of the southern channel as the
main channel:

193
KASIKILI/SEDUDU ISLAND (DISS. OP. REZEK) 1235

“For, if the boundary were to be redrawn along the northern
channel, Namibia would be entirely shut off from the southern chan-
nel — as it is, indeed, today because of the illegal military occupa-
tion of the Island. It would thereby be denied the use of the Chobe
River where it actually serves the needs and interests of both ripar-
ian States. To continue this state of affairs by redrawing the bound-
ary according to Botswana’s claims would be incompatible with the
object and purpose of the 1890 Treaty. It would also subvert the
general principle of equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources
of a boundary river enunciated by this Court in the case concerning
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.” (CR 99/1, p. 66 (Delbrück, for
Namibia)).

8. Practice subsequent to the conclusion of the 1890 Treaty indicates
as a whole that, as from the first decades after that date, the parties iden-
tified the southern channel as the main channel of the Chobe, where the
latter reaches Kasikili/Sedudu Island. This is, moreover, acknowledged in
the Judgment, which states that prior to 1947 the boundary “had until
then been supposed to be located in the southern channel of the Chobe”
(para. 62).

9. The agreements between the parties concerning the interpretation of
the 1890 Treaty or the application of its rules contain information of
varying import. As far as both Captain Eason’s opinion and the 1948
Trollope-Redman report are concerned, I consider that Namibia is cor-
rect in its assertion that:

“The question whether the deeper channel is ‘the main channel’
within the meaning of the Treaty is an inference of law, as to which
the officials have no particular expertise. If, as Namibia contends,
the criterion of depth is not the correct one for identifying the main
channel, then the reports of the officials are of no assistance in deter-
mining the main channel.” (CR 99/11, p. 56 (Chayes).)

The Trollope-Dickinson agreement of 1951 confirmed the status quo
ante, particularly as regards occupation of the Island by the Masubia, as
well as the designation of the northern channel as “free for all”. The
parties “reserved their rights”. I regarded this “gentlemen’s agreement”
as primarily indicative of the redundancy of declaring open the southern
channel, which was understood to be the international boundary.

10. The map evidence is copious, but admittedly is not totally consist-
ent. However, it is not just a matter of there being a numerical majority
of maps on which the boundary at Kasikili/Sedudu is depicted as the
southern channel; I was struck by the variety of sources and the temporal
continuity displayed by these documents: the 1909 German map; the
1933 British map GSGS 3915; the 1949 South African map TSO 400/
558; the United Nations map No. 3158, published in 1985. The most

194
KASIKILI/SEDUDU ISLAND (DISS. OP. REZEK) 1236

impressive cartographic materials produced over that lengthy period date
from the period of effective occupation of the Island and, in my view,
confirm Namibia’s rights.

11. There is scope, in principle, for the application in this case of the
doctrines of prescription and acquiescence. Such application is fully in
keeping with the provisions of the Special Agreement, as readily acknow-
ledged.

These doctrines give expression to customary rules of international
law, which are moreover of long standing, based on general principles
such as “effectivité” and good faith, as well as on the dictates of reason,
such as consideration of the passage of time and of failure to act. The
Court has jurisdiction, under the terms of the Special Agreement, to give
a ruling “on the basis of the Anglo-German Treaty of | July 1890 and the
rules and principles of international law”.

12. I consider that the occupation of the Island by the Masubia from
the Caprivi side of the Chobe, an indisputable fact, dating back to a
point in time close to the entry into force of the 1890 Treaty, and con-
tinuing at least until — and perhaps even beyond — a date close to that
of Botswana’s independence, can be considered to provide justification
for acquisitive prescription. However, in my view interpretation of the
1890 Treaty in the light of history, and in a manner at least fully com-
patible with the hydromorphology of the disputed area, in itself provides
sufficient grounds for recognition of the rights of the potential beneficiary
of prescription, i.e., Namibia. Even if that were not so — in particular, if
the interpretation of the Treaty effectively resulted in placing the main
channel of the Chobe to the north of Kasikili/Sedudu — I would find
myself able to take the view that the process of acquisitive prescription in
favour of Namibia was completed even before the two former colonies
became independent: a process involving all the attendant elements of
prescription, including acquiescence by the other colonial power.

13. The Judgment does not deny that “links of allegiance may have
existed between the Masubia and the Caprivi authorities” (para. 98). It
does not, however, consider it “proven that the members of this tribe
occupied the Island à titre de souverain”. To my mind, the animus of the
occupation, its nature and its effects must be evaluated in the light of the
surrounding circumstances and the period. What actions or indicia would
have had to mark the presence of the Masubia on Kasikili/Sedudu Island
in order for it to be recognized that they were there à titre de souverain?
In my opinion, to deny that the indigenous occupation of the Island has
any legal legitimacy and to take the view that this people lacked the
necessary rights to live there à titre de souverain is an approach which
would only make sense if we were still living in the first half of the century
and the boundary dispute was not between the successors of Germany
and Great Britain, but between the two powers themselves.

14. The Masubia were “private persons” according to the Judgment.
Their allegiance did not, therefore, constitute sufficient title. It would per-
haps have required the continued presence of agents of the German State

195
KASIKILI/SEDUDU ISLAND (DISS. OP. REZEK) 1237

to justify either acquisitive prescription or the idea of conduct serving to
confirm a particular interpretation of the 1890 Treaty. I nevertheless
incline to the view that private persons provide perfect evidence of a
peaceful occupation which deserves the protection of the law. Private
persons — not agents of the State — wrote the history of uti possidetis in
much of the American continent, where they altered the course of fron-
tiers, frequently in defiance of the claims of the colonial powers.

15. ! would readily admit that occupation by private persons would
have no such legitimacy if the community in question was there under the
authority of the other power or, at the very least, if it lived side by side
with agents of the other power. In this case, even the presence on
Kasikili/Sedudu Island of private persons bearing allegiance to Great
Britain has not been confirmed with a minimum degree of permanency.
Hence the relevance of the lesson drawn by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the case concerning the Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland:

“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to
territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tri-
bunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exer-
cise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries.” (Judgment of 5 April 1933, P.C LJ, Series AIB, No. 53,
p. 46.)

16. With all due respect and not without regret, I dissociate myself
from the majority of the Court. I would have reached the opposite con-
clusion in this case.

(Signed) Francisco REZEK.

196


56 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DECL. BENGZON)

between 1945 and 1958 and that in State practice prior to 1958 it was
wholly lacking in any definition of crucial elements as it was also of the
legal régime applicable to the coastal State with respect to the continental
shelf, then it would seem to follow conclusively that the principle of
equidistance was not inherent in the concept of the continental shelf.

Judge BENGZON makes the following declaration:

I regret my inability to concur with the main conclusions of the
majority of the Court. T agree with my colleagues who maintain the view
that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is the applicable international
law and that as between these Parties equidistance is the rule for delimita-
tion, which rule may even be derived from the general principles of law.

President BUSTAMANTE Y RIVERO, Judges JESSUP, PADILLA NERVO and
AMMOUN append Separate Opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

Vice-President KORETSKY, Judges TANAKA, MORELLI, LACHS and Judge
ad hoc SGRENSEN append Dissenting Opinions to the Judgment of the
Court.

(Initialled) J. L. B.-R.

(Initialled) 8. A.

57


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING DELIMITATION
OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
IN THE GULF OF MAINE AREA

(CANADA/UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER OF 5 NOVEMBER 1982

1982

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA DELIMITATION
DE LA FRONTIERE MARITIME
DANS LA REGION DU GOLFE DU MAINE

(CANADA/ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 5 NOVEMBRE 1982
Official citation :

Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
Order of 5 November 1982, I.C.J. Réports 1982, p. 560.

Mode officiel de citation :

Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine,
ordonnance du 5 novembre 1982, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 560.

Sales number 4 80
N° de vente :

560

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1982 1982
5 novembre
- Rôle général

5 novembre 1982 n° 67

AFFAIRE DE LA DÉLIMITATION
DE LA FRONTIÈRE MARITIME
DANS LA RÉGION DU GOLFE DU MAINE

(CANADA/ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE

Le président de la chambre de la Cour internationale de Justice cons-
tituée pour connaître de l'affaire de la Délimitation de la frontière maritime
dans la région du golfe du Maine entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis d’Amé-
rique,

Vu Particle 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 18, paragraphe 3, 44, 46
et 92 du Règlement de la Cour,

Vu le compromis conclu le 29 mars 1979, et modifié par la suite, entre le
Canada et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique en vue de soumettre à une chambre
de la Cour la question de la délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la
région du golfe du Maine,

Vu l'ordonnance du 28 juillet 1982 prorogeant au 27 septembre 1982 la
date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire de chaque Partie ;

Considérant que les mémoires du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
ont été déposés dans le délai susvisé ;

Considérant que l’article VI, paragraphe 1, du compromis du 29 mars
1979 fait en particulier état d’un accord des Parties selon lequel des
contre-mémoires seront soumis au plus tard six mois après le dépôt des
mémoires ;

Considérant que, par lettre au Greffier de la Cour en date du 27 sep-
GOLFE DU MAINE (ORDONNANCE 5 XI 82) 561

tembre 1982, l’agent du Canada a demandé que ce délai soit porté à dix
mois ;

Considérant que, par lettre du même jour, l'agent des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique a indiqué au Greffier qu’il lui communiquerait ultérieurement
les vues de son gouvernement à cet égard et que, par une lettre remise au
Greffier le 20 octobre 1982, il a fait connaître que ce gouvernement n’au-
rait pas d’objection à un report raisonnable du délai pour le dépôt des
contre-mémoires si cela était nécessaire ;

Considérant que, par lettre du 20 octobre 1982, l’agent du Canada a fait
savoir au Greffier qu’il s’en tenait à sa demande originale ;

Fixe au 28 juin 1983 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt des
contre-mémoires du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le cinq novembre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-deux, en trois
exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Canada et au
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le président de la chambre,
(Signé) Roberto AGo.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Santiago TORRES BERNARDEZ.


11

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

In accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Court
may create a Chamber for consideration of a particular case, and there is
no doubt that this is a discretionary right of the Court. In the course of
discussion of the matter in the Court I supported the view that, taking the
circumstances into account, it was reasonable that the whole matter be
considered by the Court as newly composed in February 1982. I did not
object to the positive decision of the Court in principle to establish the
Chamber, subject to the reservation that the election of the members of the
Chamber should be postponed until 6 February 1982. I maintain that
reservation.

After rejection of my suggestion relating to the postponement of the
election, I did not participate in that election. In the course of the general
discussion I noted that, in substance, the Special Agreement between the
United States of America and Canada clearly took as point of departure
the erroneous presumption that, contrary to Article 26, paragraph 2, of the
Statute, the Parties who present a request to create a Chamber for con-
sideration of a particular case may not merely choose what should be the
number of the members of the Chamber, but also formally decide and
propose the names of the judges who should be elected by secret ballot, and
even present these proposals to the Court in the form of some kind of
“ultimatum”. I was and remain unconvinced by the answers given to the
Court by the Ambassadors of the United States of America and Canada in
their letter to the Acting President of the Court of 6 January 1982, which
moreover only repeats and confirms the above-mentioned incorrect pre-
sumption of the Parties that they may dictate to the Court who should be
elected.

In this situation, the sovereign right of the Court to carry out the election
independently of the wishes of the Parties, by secret ballot in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute and Rules of Court, becomes in sub-
Stance meaningless.

I have therefore voted against the Order as a whole. I continue to think
that the matter could have been successfully settled by the Court in
February 1982 in its new composition, which would not have been in
contradiction with Article II of the Treaty of 29 March 1979 between the
United States of America and Canada, since that Article provides that the
Parties are ready to wait six full calendar months for settlement of the
question (that is to say, until 19 May 1982).

(Signed) P. D. Morozov.
12


45

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE COLLECTIVE DE MM. FORSTER,
BENGZON, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
NAGENDRA SINGH ET RUDA

[Traduction]

1. Si nous avons pu souscrire à la décision de la Cour et a ses motifs
c’est que, tout en affirmant que l’extension par I’Islande de sa juridiction
en matiére de pécheries n’est pas opposable au demandeur en raison
de ses droits historiques, l'arrêt ne déclare pas, comme le souhaitait le
demandeur, que cette extension est sans fondement en droit international
et dépourvue de validité erga omnes. En s’abstenant de se prononcer sur la
première conclusion du demandeur et en parvenant à une décision décla-
rant le règlement islandais inopposable au Royaume-Uni, l'arrêt s’appuie
sur des motifs juridiques qui sont expressément liés aux circonstances et
aux caractéristiques particulières de l'espèce et non sur la thèse juridique
principale du demandeur, à savoir qu’il existerait aujourd’hui une règle
coutumière de droit international qui interdirait d’une façon générale
aux Etats d’étendre leur juridiction en matière de pêcheries au-delà de
12 milles marins à partir de leurs lignes de base.

2. Selon nous, une conclusion qui affirmerait l’existence actuelle d’une
règle générale de droit coutumier fixant pour les Etats riverains, en ma-
tière de pêcheries, une limite obligatoire maximum de 12 milles n’aurait
pas été fondée. Il n’y a pas aujourd’hui d’usage international ayant un tel
effet, qui soit suffisamment général et uniforme pour constituer, au sens
du paragraphe 1 b) de l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour, la «preuve d'une
pratique générale acceptée comme étant le droit ».

3. I] n’est pas niable que, en dépit des efforts déployés lors de con-
férences successives de codification du droit de la mer, les Etats n’ont pas
réussi à s'entendre sur une règle de droit conventionnel fixant la largeur
maximum de la mer territoriale ou la distance maximum vers le large au-
delà de laquelle les Etats ne sont pas autorisés à étendre unilatéralement
leur juridiction en matière de pêcheries. Les débats de la Conférence de
Genève de 1958 sur le droit de la mer ont révélé cet échec, qui a été cons-
taté dans la résolution VIII que cette conférence a adoptée le 27 avril
1958. En conséquence, l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies décida
que ces deux sujets constitueraient l’ordre du jour de la Conférence de
1960 sur le droit de ja mer, dont jes participants ne parvinrent pas non
plus à se mettre d’accord sur un texte. L’élaboration d’une règle sur ces
deux questions demeure donc inscrite à l’ordre du jour de la troisième
Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, réunie en ce moment
même.

4. Le droit relatif à la pêche des poissons nectoniques s’est développé

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COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 46

sans rapport aucun avec la question du plateau continental; ces deux
matières, dissociées à la conférence de 1958, sont demeurées distinctes. I]
s’ensuit que, si les dispositions de la Convention sur le plateau continental
(ou les principes qu’elle a proclamés en tant qu’éléments du droit coutu-
mier) ne peuvent, à elles seules, servir de fondement juridique à la reven-
dication d’un droit en ce qui concerne les poissons nectoniques dans les
eaux recouvrant le plateau continental, elles ne peuvent non plus être
invoquées, par un raisonnement a contrario, pour juger illicite une pré-
tention à un droit exclusif de pêche dans les eaux surjacentes. Pour mon-
trer l'absence de liens entre ces deux questions, il suffit de rappeler que le
demandeur lui-même revendique depuis 1964 des droits exclusifs pour ce
qui est de la pêche des poissons nectoniques dans des eaux adjacentes et
extérieures à sa mer territoriale, c’est-à-dire dans des eaux qui, selon la
définition figurant à l’article premier de la convention, recouvrent une
partie de son plateau continental.

5. On a également soutenu qu’une limite maximum de 12 milles pour la
zone de pêche résulte implicitement du fait que l’article 24 de la Conven-
tion sur la mer territoriale fixe à 12 milles la limite maximum de la zone
contigué. Il convient cependant de noter que la question de la zone conti-
gué est, elle aussi, dépourvue de tout lien avec les questions concernant
les pêcheries: la pêche, en effet, n’est pas au nombre des fins mention-
nées dans ledit article en vue desquelles cette zone est établie. I] ne semble
donc pas possible dé voir dans cette disposition une restriction apportée
aux limites des pêcheries. D’ailleurs, lorsque la notion de zone contiguë
et ses limites ont été adoptées à la conférence de Genève, nul n’a compris
qu’en convenant de cette disposition d'importance relativement secon-
daire la conférence tranchait implicitement les deux questions fondamen-
tales qui avaient été laissées en suspens et qui ont dû en fin de compte
être renvoyées à une deuxième conférence: la largeur maximum de la mer
territoriale et la limite maximum de la compétence de l'Etat riverain en
matière de pêcheries. Dans sa résolution VIII, la conférence a reconnu que
ces deux questions n'avaient pas reçu de solution. Devant une telle con-
clusion, on ne saurait maintenant plausiblement soutenir qu’en adoptant
l'article 24 relatif à la zone contigué la conférence a impliqué, même par
inadvertance, qu'il existait une limite maximum à la compétence en ma-
tière de pêcheries ou à la largeur de la mer territoriale.

6. Aucune règle quant aux limites maximum de pêche, qui vaille en
tant que coutume internationale, ne semble encore s’être dégagée comme
définitivement établie. Le demandeur a toutefois soutenu qu’une telle
règle s’est cristallisée à partir de la proposition qui n’a pas été adoptée,
faute d’une voix, à la Conférence de 1960 sur le droit de la mer. I est
exact qu’une pratique générale s’est établie à partir de cette proposi-
tion et a, en fait, modifié la convention de 1958 praeter legem: une zone
exclusive de pêche au-delà de la mer territoriale est devenue un élément
établi du droit international contemporain. Il est également exact que le
texte conjoint mis aux voix à ladite conférence prévoyait une formule
6 + 6, c’est-à-dire une zone exclusive de pêche d’une largeur de 12 milles.

47
COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 47

Il convient toutefois de distinguer entre les deux sens que peut avoir cette
référence aux 12 milles:

a) l'extension à 12 milles est maintenant reconnue au point que même les
Etats pratiquant la pêche lointaine ne s'opposent plus à ce qu’un Etat
riverain étende à 12 milles sa juridiction exclusive en matière de pêche-
ries; ou bien

b) la règle des 12 milles signifie maintenant que les Etats ne peuvent pas
étendre valablement leur zone exclusive de péche au-dela de cette
limite.

7. A notre avis, la notion de zone de péche et la limite de 12 milles se
sont établies au sens indiqué à l’alinéa 6 a) ci-dessus quand, vers le milieu
des années 60, les Etats se livrant à la pêche lointaine ont cessé de con-
tester la validité des mesures prises par un certain nombre d’Etats rive-
rains pour établir une zone de pêche exclusive de 12 milles. C’est pour
cette raison que l’on peut dire, comme le fait l’arrêt, que la limite de
12 milles «semble désormais généralement acceptée ».

8. Cependant, le fait de reconnaître que, sans risquer de contestation
ou d’opposition, les Etats peuvent prétendre à une zone exclusive de
pêche de 12 milles ne peut logiquement entraîner la conclusion énoncée à
l'alinéa 6 6) et défendue par le demandeur, à savoir qu'en l’état actuel du
droit maritime international ce chiffre constitue une limite maximum
obligatoire et qu’un Etat qui dépasse cette limite commet un acte illicite,
dépourvu de validité erga omnes. Cette thèse du demandeur répond à une
question différente, qui doit être examinée séparément.

9, Cette question est la suivante: existe-t-il une règle de droit coutumier
qui interdise aux Etats d'étendre au-delà de 12 milles leur juridiction en
matière de pêcheries? Pour pouvoir répondre par l’affirmative à cette
question, il faudrait avoir l’assurance qu’une telle règle répond aux condi-
tions requises pour que prenne naissance une coutume internationale.

10. Il est de fait que des Etats de plus en plus nombreux émettent la
prétention d’étendre ou étendent effectivement leur juridiction en matière
de pêcheries au-delà de 12 milles. Si cette tendance s’est d’abord manifes-
tée en Amérique latine, elle a été suivie récemment non seulement dans
cette partie du monde mais aussi dans d’autres régions. Des mesures
analogues ont été prises par un certain nombre de pays d’Afrique et
d'Asie. Le nombre total des Etats riverains qui ont ainsi agi peut être
maintenant évalué à un chiffre se situant entre trente et trente-cinq, selon
la façon dont on interprète certaines lois ou certains décrets internes.

11. Si ces prétentions ont généralement entraîné des protestations ou
des objections de la part d'un certain nombre d'importants Etats mari-
times qui se livrent à la pêche lointaine —- si bien qu'il n’est pas permis de
dire qu'elles sont «généralement acceptées » —, les Etats dans leur majo-
rité n'ont pas formulé de protestations de ce genre et un grand nombre
d'entre eux ont, au contraire, fait des déclarations publiques ou présenté
des propositions formelles qui paraissent incompatibles avec d'éventuelles
protestations de leur part.

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COMPETENCE PECHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 48

12. A cet égard, il convient d’attirer attention sur les déclarations que
de nombreux Etats ont faites ou les propositions qu'ils ont présentées à
propos ou en vue de la troisième Conférence sur le droit de la mer. Il est
vrai que, comme l'indique VParrét de la Cour, les propositions et docu-
ments préparatoires présentés a cette occasion sont de lege ferenda. Toute-
fois, on ne saurait, selon nous, entièrement écarter ces prises de position
des Etats, ni les considérer comme dénuées de toute signification juri-
dique. Si, dans le domaine du droit relatif aux pécheries, il était possible de
se faire une idée claire de ce qu'est exactement la règle de droit interna-
tional existante, on aurait pu ne donner aucune portée juridique à cer-
taines propositions ou déclarations tendant à changer ou à améliorer un
système de droit considéré comme injuste ou inadéquat. Mais telle n’est
pas la situation. Il règne actuellement une grande incertitude au sujet du
droit coutumier existant en raison des pratiques opposées et discordantes
des Etats. Dès lors qu'on reconnaît le caractère incertain de la pratique en
la matière, ces déclarations et propositions officielles rendent forcément
plus difficile encore la cristallisation du droit coutumier, encore fluctuant
sur ce point. Qui plus est, le droit relatif aux limites de pêche a toujours
été et doit, par son essence même, demeurer un compromis entre les reven-
dications et les prétentions contraires des Etats riverains et des Etats
qui se livrent à la pêche lointaine. Dans un domaine où la pratique est
contradictoire et imprécise, est-il possible, est-il raisonnable de considérer
comme dénuées de toute pertinence les indications relatives à ce que les
Etats sont prêts à revendiquer ou disposés à accepter, telles qu'elles
ressortent des positions qu'ils ont adoptées en vue ou en prévision d'une
conférence visant la codification et le développement progressif du droit
en la matière?

13. Le moins que l’on puisse dire est donc que ces déclarations de
même que les propositions écrites déposées par les représentants des
Etats ne sont pas sans importance quand il s’agit de déterminer quel est,
selon ces Etats, le droit en ce qui concerne la compétence en matière de
pêcheries et quelle est leur opinio juris sur un point qui est régi par le droit
coutumier. Certaines positions ainsi adoptées par les Etats dans les cir-
constances décrites plus haut montrent que, si le principe fondamental de
la liberté de la pêche en haute mer n'est pas mis en cause en tant que tel,
un grand nombre d'Etats riverains contestent ou nient que ce principe
s'applique automatiquement et sans exception aux eaux adjacentes
partout dans le monde dès que la limte de 12 milles est atteinte. Cette
attitude ne découle pas seulement de la constatation évidente que deux
conférences n'ont pas pu aboutir à un accord sur une limite maximum;
elle se fonde aussi sur d’autres éléments qui sont apparus dans l'intervalle
entre la deuxième et la troisième Conférence des Nations Unies sur le
droit de la mer. On fait valoir, par exemple, que la limite de pêche de
12 milles confère en réalité un privilège manifeste et un net avantage aux
quelques Etats outillés pour se livrer à la pêche lointaine, ce qui contribue
à agrandir l'écart entre pays développés et pays en voie de développement;
un deuxième élément est que les progrès techniques et l'accroissement de

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COMPETENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 49

la demande en denrées alimentaires qui résulte de l’explosion démogra-
phique comportent un risque grave d’épuisement des ressources biologi-
ques a proximité des côtes de nombreux pays. A ce propos, des études
économiques sur les pêcheries montrent que le principe d’un accès illi-
mité aux eaux côtières provoque inéluctablement un gaspillage physique
et économique, car rien n’incite à ralentir effort de pêche pour préserver
les rendements futurs: ce qu’on laisse dans les eaux adjacentes pour
demain peut être pris aujourd’hui par d’autres. Alors que les Etats mieux
outillés peuvent sans difficulté transférer leurs navires ailleurs dès que les
opérations de pêche cessent d’être rentables, l'Etat riverain, dont les
flottilles sont moins mobiles, reste le plus intéressé à protéger de l'épuise-
ment les ressources voisines de ses côtes.

14. Tout en admettant que les propositions et les documents prépa-
ratoires soient de lege ferenda et procèdent du dessein d’aboutir à des
accords futurs moyennant des concessions et des compromis, ces prises de
position autorisent néanmoins à tirer les conclusions suivantes:

a) Les Etats qui ont présenté des propositions en vue de l'établissement
d’une zone économique de 200 milles, par exemple, comportant le
contrôle et la réglementation des ressources halieutiques dans cette
zone, ne pourraient pas, sans montrer un certain illogisme, s’opposer
aux prétentions d’autres Etats à une extension analogue, ni protester
contre de telles prétentions. Tel serait notamment le cas des Etats qui,
au Conseil des ministres de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine, ont
voté pour la déclaration sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
où l’on peut lire (par. 6 du dispositif) ce qui suit:

«Les Etats africains reconnaissent le droit de tous les Etats rive-
rains d'établir au-delà de leur mer territoriale une zone économique
exclusive qui ne s’étendra pas au-delà de 200 milles marins, mesurés à
partir des lignes de base servant à délimiter leur mer territoriale. »

On pourrait également citer le cas de la République populaire de
Chine. Dans le communiqué commun qu'elle a publié avec le Pérou
le 2 novembre 1971 au sujet de l'établissement de relations diploma-
tiques, la République populaire de Chine reconnaît «la souveraineté
du Pérou sur la zone maritime adjacente à ses côtes, jusqu’à une limite
de 200 milles marins ». Une déclaration de reconnaissance du même
genre figure dans un communiqué semblable publié avec l'Argentine
le 16 février 1972.

b) Il ne paraît guère justifié de compter les Etats qui ont fait ou accepté
de telles déclarations ou propositions au nombre de ceux qui admet-
tent existence d’une prétendue pratique en faveur de la limite maxi-
mum obligatoire de 12 milles.

15. Si, aux trente à trente-cinq Etats qui ont déjà étendu au-delà de
12 milles leur compétence en matière de pêcheries, l’on ajoute les vingt à
vingt-cinq Etats qui ont adopté les positions évoquées au paragraphe
précédent, force est de conclure qu’à l’heure actuelle plus de la moitié des

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COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 50

Etats maritimes ont manifesté par leur action ou leur comportement qu’ils
refusent leur appui à la prétendue règle de la limite maximum obligatoire
de 12 milles. Dans ces conditions, la pratique limitée de vingt-quatre
Etats maritimes seulement, que le demandeur invoque en faveur de l’exis-
tence de cette règle, ne saurait être considérée comme constituant la pra-
tique générale qu’exige l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour.

16. Une autre condition fondamentale qui doit être remplie pour que la
pratique des Etats devienne une règle de droit coutumier est que cette
pratique soit commune, uniforme et concordante. En conséquence, l’exis-
tence d'éléments contradictoires dans la pratique des Etats ou la manifes-
tation d’un comportement incompatible avec cette pratique, surtout si
elles sont imputables aux Etats mêmes qui sont censés suivre la coutume
ou la créer, feraient obstacle à la formation d’une règle de droit coutu-
mier.

17. Certains Etats, dont on invoque le comportement pour prouver
qu'il existe une règle relative a la limite maximum de 12 milles, n’ont pas
hésité à protéger leurs propres intérêts en matière de pêche au-delà de
cette limite, lorsqu'ils ont estimé qu'ils devaient le faire dans l’intérêt de
leurs ressortissants parce que d'importantes pêcheries se trouvaient dans
les eaux adjacentes à leurs côtes. Diverses méthodes ont été employées
pour atteindre ce résultat mais la diversité des moyens ne doit pas dissi-
muler le fait essentiel. On peut noter, par exemple, que les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique et l'URSS ont récemment réussi à assurer une protection de
ce genre au moyen, non pas d’une action unilatérale, mais d’accords bila-
téraux conclus entre eux et avec d’autres Etats 1. Toutefois, ces Puissances
commencèrent par adopter des mesures unilatérales, si bien que les Etats
dont les ressortissants pratiquaient la pêche dans les eaux adjacentes
furent obligés, s’ils voulaient que ceux-ci puissent continuer à pêcher
dans ces eaux, de conclure avec elles des accords de pêche. Ayant rendu
la conclusion de tels accords indispensable, ces Puissances n’eurent aucun
mal, du fait qu’elles étaient en mesure d’offrir divers avantages en com-
pensation, à parvenir à des accords leur garantissant une situation préfé-

1 Convention internationale (avec annexe et protocole) concernant les pêcheries
hauturières de l'océan Pacifique Nord, signée le 9 mai 1952 par les Etats-Unis d’Amé-
rique, le Canada et le Japon (Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, vol. 205, p. 65); con-
vention concernant les pêcheries hauturiércs de l'océan Pacifique du nord-ouest, signée
le 14 mai 1956 par le Japon et l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques (American
Journal of International Law, 1959, p. 763); accord relatif à certaines questions posées
par l’exercice de la pêche dans la partie nord-est du Pacifique au large de la côte des
Etats-Unis d'Amérique, signé le 13 février 1967 par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique et le Gouvernement de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques
(Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, vol. 688, p. 157); accord relatif à certaines questions
posées par l’exercice de la pêche dans la partie centre-ouest de l’océan Atlantique, signé
le 25 novembre 1967 par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Gouver-
nement de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques (Nations Unies, Recueil des
traités, vol. 701, p. 162); accords conclus par des échanges de notes signés le 23 décem-
bre 1968 par les Etats-Unis et le Japon à propos de certaines activités de pêche au large
des côtes des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et de la pêche au saumon (Etats-Unis, TIAS,
n° 6600).

3]
COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 51

rentielle, voire exclusive, sur les lieux de pêche adjacents à leurs côtes,
mais se trouvant bien au-dela de 12 milles, qui présentaient pour elles un
intérét particulier. Cela démontre qu’une zone de 12 milles n’est peut-
être pas suffisante, même pour les Etats qui ne peuvent prétendre qu'ils
sont spécialement tributaires de la pêche pour la subsistance de leur popu-
lation ou pour leur développement économique. En présence d’une pra-
tique si divergente, il ne semblerait ni juste ni équitable d'admettre l’exis-
tence d’une règle de droit qui priverait certains pays du moyen de protéger
des intérêts beaucoup plus vitaux en matière de pêche, du fait qu'ils n’au-
raient pas les mêmes possibilités d’offrir des conditions attrayantes en
contrepartie d’un engagement de ne pas pêcher dans les eaux adjacentes à
leur territoire.

18. La pratique de la France offre un autre exemple intéressant en ce
qui concerne la question de l’uniformité de la coutume. La France a
porté à 80 milles, en 1972, les limites de la zone de pêche de la Guyane
française. La loi n° 72-620 du 5 juillet 1972 établit cette zone de 80 milles
«en vue d’assurer la conservation des ressources biologiques ». Néan-
moins, l’article 2 de cette loi dispose:

« Dans la partie de la zone définie à l’article premier ci-dessus qui
s'étend au-delà des eaux territoriales, des mesures sont prises, en
tant que de besoin, dans des conditions fixées par décret, pour limiter
la pêche des diverses espèces d'animaux marins. L'application de ces
mesures aux navires des Etats étrangers est faite en tenant compte de
la situation géographique de ces Etats et des habitudes de pêche de
leurs ressortissants.

Dans la même partie de la zone, la pêche peut être interdite par
décret aux navires des Etats qui n’autorisent pas l’exercice de la
pêche par les navires français dans des conditions comparables. »

La France se réserve ainsi le droit d'interdire aux navires étrangers de
pratiquer la pêche dans une zone de 12 à 80 milles au large de la Guyane,
si les navires français ne sont pas autorisés à pêcher dans les zones, ad-
jacentes à un autre pays, qui se trouvent au-delà de 12 milles de la côte.
Il ne serait guère possible de ranger la France parmi les Etats dont la
pratique se fonde toujours sur une prétendue limite maximum de 12 milles,
alors qu’elle se réserve le droit, sous certaines conditions, d'interdire
la pêche aux navires étrangers à une distance de plus de 12 milles de
la côte de la Guyane française.

19. De même, les Etats constituant des archipels, qui ont revendiqué
ou établi des limites de pêche en fonction des caractéristiques géogra-
phiques de leur territoire, ne peuvent guère être comptés au nombre
des Etats qui admettent l'existence d’une limite maximum obligatoire de
12 milles. On peut en dire autant des Etats qui ont créé une zone de pêche
exclusive bien au-delà de la limite des 12 milles à partir de leurs côtes
en traçant des «lignes d'interdiction de la pêche » en travers de certaines,
baies.

20. Cela étant, il n’est pas aujourd’hui possible de voir dans la pratique

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COMPETENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. COLL.) 52

des Etats ce que la Cour a qualifié, dans l’affaire du Droit d’asile, de
«coutume constante et uniforme acceptée comme étant le droit » (C.Z.J.
Recueil 1950, p. 277). La prétendue règle obligatoire fixant la limite maxi-
mum à 12 milles ne répond pas à une condition jugée «indispensable » par
la Cour, à savoir que «dans ce laps de temps, aussi bref qu’il ait été, la
pratique des Etats, y compris ceux qui sont particulièrement intéressés, ait
été fréquente et pratiquement uniforme » (affaires du Plateau continental
de la mer du Nord, C.1.J. Recueil 1969, p. 43).

21. On peut donc conclure que, en ce qui concerne l’existence d’une
règle de droit coutumier imposant une limite maximum à la compétence
d’un Etat en matière de pêcheries, la situation est actuellement incertaine.
Il n’est pas possible de dégager de la pratique des Etats une règle ferme
qui soit suffisamment générale et uniforme pour être acceptée comme
règle de droit coutumier fixant l'étendue maximum de la compétence d’un
Etat riverain en matière de pêcheries. Il ne s’ensuit pas qu'il existe en
droit une lacune complète qui justifierait toute réclamation ou rendrait
impossible toute décision sur des différends concrets. En l’espèce, par
exemple, nous avons pu souscrire à un arrêt fondé sur deux notions que
nous approuvons totalement: les droits préférentiels de l'Etat riverain et
les droits d’un Etat dont la population et l’industrie dépendent en partie
depuis longtemps sur le plan économique des mêmes ressources halieu-
tiques.

22. Certes, un tel état du droit n’est pas satisfaisant et peut provoquer
des frictions entre Etats et des différends internationaux. Il faut toutefois
espérer que le droit en la matière pourra être précisé grâce aux efforts
visant à assurer sa codification et son développement progressif qui sont
actuellement déployés à la conférence de Caracas.

(Signé) I. FORSTER.

(Signé) C. BENGZON.

(Signé) E. JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA.
(Signé) NAGENDRA SINGH.
(Signé) J. M. RUDA.

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