96

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. NI
[Traduction]

Je suis d’accord avec la décision de la Cour selon laquelle la requête de
la Guinée-Bissau doit être rejetée. De manière générale, je suis également
d’accord avec l’argumentation figurant dans l’arrêt. Cependant, il est à
mon sens certains éléments qui mériteraient un examen plus poussé.

Dans la présente affaire, deux questions de fond, que je traiterai séparé-
ment, sont posées: 1) la sentence du 31 juillet 1989 devrait-elle être frap-
pée d’inexistence à cause de la déclaration du président du Tribunal
arbitral, M. Barberis; et 2) subsidiairement, la sentence prononcée est-elle
entachée de nullité du fait que le Tribunal a négligé de répondre a la
seconde question figurant à l’article 2 du compromis d’arbitrage et de
joindre à sa sentence le tracé de la ligne frontière sur une carte, tel que
prévu à l’article 9 du compromis, sans donner de raisons.

1. ALLEGATION D'INEXISTENCE DE LA SENTENCE

Il convient de noter que, des trois membres du Tribunal arbitral,
M. Barberis et M. Gros ont voté pour, alors que M. Bedjaoui a voté contre.
Si la déclaration de M. Barberis doit être perçue, comme le prétend la
Guinée-Bissau, comme une opinion contraire a la sentence, alors la
sentence doit, de l’avis de la Partie requérante, être considérée comme
inexistante puisque, selon la Guinée-Bissau, elle ne serait plus fondée sur
une majorité. La déclaration de M. Barberis a été citée in extenso au para-
graphe 19 de l’arrêt et ne sera donc pas reprise ici.

Une lecture de la déclaration de M. Barberis révéle qu’elle comporte un
certain nombre d’expressions, rédigées au conditionnel, et notamment
«aurait», «aurait pu», «aurait pu ou non», etc. Elle est rédigée dans une
large mesure sous la forme d’énoncés de doute, de réserves, de supposi-
tions ou de variantes proposées sans soulever aucune opposition claire et
décisive ou contradiction à l’égard d’aucune partie du dispositif de la
sentence susceptible de faire apparaître la déclaration comme une expres-
sion de dissentiment.

La déclaration affirme toutefois en substance, comme le fait la
sentence, que l’accord conclu par échange de lettres en 1960 fait droit dans
les relations entre la République de Guinée-Bissau et la République du
Sénégal. On y établit aussi, de même que dans la sentence, que l’accord
fait droit entre les Parties à l'égard de la mer territoriale, de la zone conti-
gué et du plateau continental. Comme la sentence, la déclaration indique
encore que l’accord ne fait pas droit pour ce qui est des eaux de la zone
économique exclusive ou la zone de pêche.

47
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 97

La déclaration diffère du dispositif de la sentence en ceci que le membre
de phrase «en ce qui concerne les seules zones mentionnées dans cet
accord, à savoir la mer territoriale, la zone contigué et le plateau continen-
tal» (les italiques sont de moi), au paragraphe 88 de la sentence, implique
que la zone économique exclusive est exclue. Selon la déclaration de
M. Barberis, celui-ci souhaiterait ajouter au dispositif ceci: « mais ne fait
pas droit pour les eaux de la zone économique exclusive ou la zone de
péche». Selon M. Barberis, cette «réponse partiellement affirmative et
partiellement négative » aurait habilité le Tribunal à trancher la seconde
question et à régler ainsi le différend «d’une manière complète », pour ce
qui est des frontières maritimes entre les deux Etats.

Mais ici apparaît la question de savoir si la réponse donnée au para-
graphe | de l’article 2 du compromis, que ce soit explicitement ou implici-
tement, peut être caractérisée comme étant « partiellement affirmative et
partiellement négative ». La question posée au paragraphe | de l’article 2
du compromis porte sur la validité de l’accord de 1960, qui ne pouvait
faire référence qu’à la mer territoriale, à la zone contiguë et au plateau
continental, seuls espaces maritimes existant à l’époque de la conclusion
de l’accord. Il ne pouvait donc être question de zone économique exclu-
sive ou de zone de pêche. Lorsque le Tribunal a répondu à la question
posée au paragraphe | de l’article 2 du compromis, il ne pouvait se
prononcer qu’au sujet de la mer territoriale, de la zone contigué et du
plateau continental, à l'exclusion de tout autre espace. En répondant à
cette question de manière affirmative, le Tribunal a accompli sa tâche
entièrement. La réponse ne saurait être qualifiée de «réponse partielle-
ment affirmative et partiellement négative».

L'expression «les seules », employée au paragraphe 88 de la sentence,
est explicative plutôt qu’exclusive. L'expression ne signifie pas que lors-
que le point de savoir si l'accord de 1960 faisait droit a été soumis au
Tribunal, pour décision, le Tribunal ait admis que l’accord avait force de
loi pour la mer territoriale, la zone contigué et le plateau continental, niant
qu’il faisait droit pour ce qui est de la zone économique exclusive ou de la
zone de pêche. Elle ne signifie pas davantage que le Tribunal ait donné
une réponse affirmative pour ce qui est des trois premières zones mais
donné une réponse négative pour ce qui est de la quatrième, c’est-à-dire la
zone économique exclusive ou la zone de pêche. F n’était absolument pas
question que, prononçant la sentence, le Tribunal tienne compte de la
quatrième; en effet, le concept de zone économique exclusive n'existait
pas encore lors de la conclusion de l’accord de 1960. La validité ou la non-
validité pour ce qui est de la zone économique exclusive ou la zone de
pêche n’entrait aucunement dans le cadre de l’arbitrage. Le Tribunal
n’était pas saisi de la question de la zone économique exclusive ou la zone
de péche et cette question ne saurait donc naturellement pas avoir fait
l’objet d’une décision du Tribunal.

Dans ces conditions, la réponse du Tribunal à la première question du
paragraphe | de l’article 2 du compromis est une réponse complète et non

48
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 98

une réponse partielle. Comme il s’agissait d’une réponse affirmative à la
première question, le Tribunal n’était pas appelé à répondre à la seconde
question posée au paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 du compromis, qui était
tributaire d’une condition expresse: « En cas de réponse négative à la
première question.» M. Barberis ne pouvait en fait se mettre en quête dela
solution d’un problème qui n’existait pas, puisque le Tribunal n’était pas
confronté à la question de savoir si l’accord de 1960 faisait droit pour ce
qui est de la zone économique exclusive ou la zone de pêche.

M. Barberis a donné à penser que le Tribunal aurait eu compétence
pour délimiter les eaux de la zone économique exclusive ou la zone de
pêche de manière à régler l’ensemble du différend. Mais le Tribunal ne
pouvait pas aller au-delà de son mandat, qui ne concernait que la mer
territoriale, la zone contigué et le plateau continental. En fait M. Barberis
en est resté là. Il a simplement suggéré une solution plus complète, comme
en témoigne son choix de mots: «aurait pu être ». Sa suggestion s’arrête
cependant en ce point précis. On ne saurait donc considérer sa déclaration
comme un énoncé destiné à consigner sa divergence de vues, jusqu’à
annuler ou invalider son vote. En fait, le vote est l'indicateur le plus fiable
pour déterminer si M. Barberis s’associe ou non à la sentence.

La déclaration ne fait pas partie de la sentence. La pratique observée
par les juges de joindre une opinion individuelle, une opinion dissidente
ou une déclaration n'est pas nouvelle; elle date de l’époque de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale. Cette pratique est désormais inté-
grée à l’article 95, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la Cour, qui prévoit que:

«Tout juge peut, s’il le désire, joindre à l’arrêt l’exposé de son
opinion individuelle ou dissidente ; un juge qui désire faire constater
son accord ou son dissentiment sans en donner les motifs peut le faire
sous la forme d’une déclaration.»

Ce libellé montre clairement, puisqu'il y est dit qu’une opinion indivi-
duelle ou une déclaration est jointe à l’arrêt, qu’elle ne saurait en faire
partie intégrante. Etant donné que l’on se trouve en présence d’opinions
individuelles, qu'il s'agisse d'accords ou de dissentiments à l’égard de
l’arrêt (ou, en l’occurrence, de la sentence), on ne saurait les considérer
comme représentant l'opinion du collège (qu’il s’agisse d’une cour ou
d’un tribunal) pris dans son ensemble. Elles ne peuvent que représenter
les vues des rédacteurs pris individuellement. Et elles ne sont donc que
jointes à l’arrêt ou à la sentence, sans en faire partie intégrante. Elles
peuvent expliciter, interpréter, constituer des variantes, critiquer, voire
constituer un dissentiment à certains égards, à l’encontre du jugement ou
de la sentence. Mais critiquer ou proposer des variantes ne signifie pas
nécessairement qu’il y a dissentiment. C’est le dispositif et, plus particu-
liérement, le vote qui compte. A moins que le dispositif ne soit subdivisé et
ne fasse l’objet de votes distincts, c’est sur l’ensemble du dispositif que
l’on vote.

En fait, ceci constitue la seule façon rationnelle de concevoir un arrêt ou
une sentence rendu non pas par un seul juge ou arbitre mais par un

49
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 99

collège. Si les parties avaient toute latitude pour considérer une opinion
individuelle ou une déclaration en fonction de leur propre perspective et
pour faire ainsi abstraction du vote, quelle confusion de l’ordre juridique
cela créerait-il! On ne peut pas davantage concéder que la Cour, compé-
tente pour la sentence (comme c’est le cas en la présente affaire), puisse
être considérée comme libre de faire abstraction du vote en interprétant à
son gré ce que représente la déclaration de l’un des juges ou arbitres, à
moins qu’il n'existe une preuve manifeste et incontestable de ce que les
faits sont tels que la déclaration constitue l'expression d’un dissentiment
et que le vote a été vicié par une erreur ou des contraintes. Mais ce n’est pas
le cas en l’espèce.

La Guinée-Bissau a reproché au Sénégal de «s'être retranché derrière
le formalisme juridique». Mais les juges ou les arbitres ne votent pas
seulement pour accomplir une formalité. C’est leur façon d'exprimer avec
précision leur position. Ils ont pleinement conscience des incidences
matérielles de leur vote, lequel n’est pas un simple geste formel. Le vote est
l'indice de leur décision définitive. Si la déclaration, comme en la présente
affaire, donne lieu à une incertitude sur le point de savoir si un juge ou un
arbitre approuve un arrêt ou une sentence ou s’il en diverge, c’est le vote
qui montre quelle est sa véritable attitude.

Pour ces raisons, on ne saurait admettre l’affirmation de la Guinée-
Bissau selon laquelle il n’y a pas eu de majorité à l’appui de la sentence
arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 et la Cour devrait dire et juger que la sentence
est frappée d’inexistence.

2. PRETENDUE NULLITÉ DE LA SENTENCE

La Guinée-Bissau prie la Cour de dire et juger, subsidiairement, que
cette prétendue décision est absolument frappée de nullité et sans effet, le
Tribunal n’ayant pas répondu a la seconde question posée dans le
compromis, puisqu’il n’a pas décidé de la délimitation de l’ensemble des
zones maritimes par une ligne unique, qu’il n’a pas indiqué la délimitation
au moyen d’une ligne portée sur une carte et qu’il n’a pas donné les motifs
sur lesquels se fondait sa sentence.

L’arbitrage a prouvé son utilité pour le règlement pacifique des diffé-
rends entre Etats. Mais on a vu aussi des abus, pouvant entraîner la nullité.
Ce qui importe de manière déterminante est d’avoir une liste de ces causes
de nullité, et aussi de prévoir quel organe international sera appelé à se
prononcer sur les causes prétendues de nullité.

C’est en 1929 que le Gouvernement finlandais a proposé que cette ques-
tion fasse l’objet d’un examen et recommandé de conférer le pouvoir de se
prononcer sur les recours en nullité à la Cour permanente de Justice inter-
nationale. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a nommé une commission
de spécialistes pour étudier cette proposition. La même année, l’Institut
de droit international a décidé d'inscrire à son ordre du jour la question de
la création d’un organe pouvant connaître des appels en cassation des

50
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 100

décisions des tribunaux d’arbitrage internationaux. Et c’est la Commis-
sion du droit international des Nations Unies qui a rédigé et présenté en
1958 le «Modèle de règles sur la procédure arbitrale», sur lequel a été
appelée l’attention des Etats.

Parmi ces « règles », nous intéressent ici les deux dispositions suivantes :

« Article 35

La validité d’une sentence peut être contestée par toute partie pour
l’une ou plusieurs des raisons suivantes:

a) excès de pouvoir du tribunal;

b) corruption d’un membre du tribunal;

c) absence de motivation de la sentence ou dérogation grave à une
règle fondamentale de procédure;

d) nullité de l'engagement d’ arbitrage ou du compromis.

Article 36

1. Si dans les trois mois de la date où la validité a été contestée, les
parties ne se sont pas mises d’accord sur une autre juridiction, la
Cour internationale de Justice est compétente pour prononcer, sur la
demande de l’une des parties, la nullité totale ou partielle de la
sentence.»

En fait, la notion de nullité a été considérée comme assez large pour
embrasser tous les cas d’irrégularité grave dans l’arbitrage. Cela dit, la
plupart des publicistes conviennent que la sentence arbitrale ne peut être
considérée comme nulle et de nul effet que dans les cas où le tribunal a
«manifestement et substantiellement outrepassé les termes du compro-
mis» (K.S. Carlston, The Process of International Arbitration, p. 81, et les
auteurs qu'il cite, p. 81-84). Après avoir cité un certain nombre d’éminents
auteurs, tels que Vattel, Bluntschli, Bonfils, Fauchille, Calvo, Oppenheim,
Hall, Hyde, Castberg, Schatzel, Stoykovitch, Weiss, etc., Carlston conclut
que:

« La nullité ne doit pas étre invoquée dans un esprit de chicane. Les
auteurs qui se sont particuliérement penchés sur le probléme de la
nullité s’accordent à penser que la violation des termes d’un compro-
mis doit être si manifeste qu’elle s’établit de soi-même. Pour que la
décision d’un tribunal ou la conclusion d’une juridiction soient
considérées comme nulles, elles doivent d’une manière générale être
arbitraires et pas simplement douteuses ou contestables.» (Ibid.
p. 86.)

Dans la présente espèce, la Guinée-Bissau soutient que la sentence
arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 est frappée de nullité parce qu’elle ne répond
pas à la seconde question du paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 du compromis. La
Guinée-Bissau avance un certain nombre d’arguments pour prouver qu’il
y a là un cas d’excès de pouvoir et que la sentence est par conséquent frap-
pée de nullité. IN y a lieu, avant d'examiner au fond cette allégation, de
mentionner certains points.

51
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 191

En premier lieu, le terme «excès de pouvoir » signifie que le Tribunal a
excédé ou outrepassé les pouvoirs que lui avaient conférés les Parties. Or,
ce dont la Guinée-Bissau se plaint ici, c’est que le Tribunal n’a pas exercé
le pouvoir qui lui était attribué, non qu'il a outrepassé ce pouvoir (voir, par
comparaison, le libellé de l’article 11, paragraphe 2, du statut du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies). L'expression «excès de pouvoir par
omission» est une contradiction dans les termes. On peut d’autre part
douter que lorsque le Tribunal manque 4 exercer la totalité ou une partie
des pouvoirs qui lui sont attribués, la voie de recours adéquate soit l’annu-
lation de la sentence.

En deuxième lieu, la Guinée-Bissau se plaint que le Tribunal n’ait pas
répondu à la seconde question du paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 du com-
promis. Mais elle ne fait pas mention de la réponse que la sentence ap-
porte à la première question, celle du paragraphe 1 de ce même article.
Aucune raison satisfaisante n’est donnée pour expliquer pourquoi c’est
l'ensemble de la sentence qui doit être annulé.

Quoi qu’il en soit, le fond de la thèse de la Guinée-Bissau est ceci : quelle
qu’eût été sa réponse sur la valeur de l’échange de lettres entre la France et
le Portugal, le Tribunal était appelé à procéder à une délimitation
complète des territoires maritimes. Cette interprétation contredit cepen-
dant à l'évidence le sens ordinaire qu’il faut prêter aux termes du compro-
mis. En la présente affaire, une réponse à la seconde question du para-
graphe 2 de l'article 2 du compromis ne s’imposerait qu’en cas «de
réponse négative » à la première question. L'obligation de répondre à la
seconde question est alternative, elle n’est pas simultanée. Comme il a été
répondu par l’affirmative à la première question, le Tribunal n’était pas
tenu de répondre à la seconde. Tel est le sens ordinaire, le sens naturel des
mots pertinents. Cette interprétation est tout à fait conforme aux disposi-
tions de l’article 31, paragraphe 1, de la convention de Vienne sur le droit
des traités.

La Guinée-Bissau n’en soutient pas moins que la réponse du Tribunal à
la première question est en partie affirmative et en partie négative; qu’une
réponse en partie négative reste une réponse négative; que le Tribunal
était donc tenu de donner une réponse à la seconde question. On a déjà
signalé qu'il ne peut y avoir en l’espèce de «réponse en partie affirmative
et en partie négative», puisque la question posée dans le compromis
concernait la frontière maritime telle qu’elle existait au moment de la
conclusion de Paccord de 1960, et non postérieurement à celui-ci. Et, de
fait, la sentence précise, au paragraphe 85, que l’accord doit être interprété
à la lumière du droit en vigueur à la date de sa conclusion. Il s’ensuit que la
réponse donnée par le Tribunal à la première question en ce qui concerne
la mer territoriale, la zone contigué et le plateau continental satisfait
complètement à la question posée. L'expression «en ce qui concerne les
seules zones» ne fait que préciser la portée de la décision. Elle ne peut
donc être considérée comme un rejet d’une partie de la demande, ni servir,
en tant que telle, à qualifier la réponse à la première question de réponse
en partie négative, voire de réponse entièrement négative.

52
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 102

Par ailleurs la Guinée-Bissau allégue que, puisque le litige porte en tota-
lité sur la frontière maritime et que le titre de l'accord de 1960 et le préam-
bule du compromis se réfèrent l’un et l’autre à la détermination de la
frontière maritime, le Tribunal était tenu de répondre à la seconde ques-
tion quelle que fût sa réponse à la première.

Il faut rappeler que lorsqu'on interprète un traité, comme ici le compro-
mis, dont le texte est clair et sans ambiguïté, on ne doit pas chercher à
modifier le sens ordinaire, le sens naturel des termes employés en recou-
rant à des éléments auxiliaires, qu’on interpréterait comme exigeant en
toutes circonstances la détermination de l’ensemble de la frontière mari-
time entre les deux Etats. C’est principalement dans le corps de l’article 2
du compromis que s’exprime le but poursuivi par les Parties. Elles y
conviennent que la réponse à la seconde question est subordonnée à une
réponse négative à la première. Il est inconcevable que le simple fait de
mentionner la détermination de la frontière maritime dans le titre et dans
le préambule du compromis ait eu pour effet de modifier le sens des
dispositions d’un texte clair et sans ambiguïté, celui de l’article 2 du
compromis.

La Guinée-Bissau n’a laissé de soutenir que l'intention des Parties était
que, quelle que soit sa réponse à la première question (posée à l’article 2
du compromis d'arbitrage), le Tribunal devait délimiter dans sa totalité la
frontière en mer entre les deux Etats. Mais on ne trouve rien pour étayer
cette affirmation dans le libellé très clair du compromis.

Bien au contraire, il est un passage du mémoire présenté par la Guinée-
Bissau au Tribunal qui se lit comme suit:

«Les représentants du Sénégal finirent par partager ce point de vue
[les italiques sont de moi] et c’est donc une double démarche qui est
demandée au Tribunal: se prononcer d’abord sur la validité de
l'échange de notes franco-portugais du 26 avril 1960 pour décider de
la frontière en mer entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal. Et si cette
validité n'est pas reconnue [les italiques sont du Sénégal] dire alors
quel est le tracé de la ligne délimitant les territoires maritimes entre
les deux Etats en se fondant sur les normes pertinentes du droit inter-
national positif.» (Mémoire présenté par la Guinée-Bissau au cours
de la procédure arbitrale, p. 35; cité par le Sénégal dans son contre-
mémoire dans le cadre de la procédure arbitrale, p. 34.)

Ce passage montre clairement que c’est la Guinée-Bissau qui a proposé
de demander au Tribunal de se prononcer sur la validité de l’échange de
lettres de 1960 et, au cas où cette validité ne serait pas reconnue, de tracer la
ligne délimitant la frontière maritime entre les deux Etats. Et le Sénégal
s'est rangé à cette manière de voir. Telle fut donc la conclusion des négocia-
tions entre les deux Etats, qui avaient pleinement conscience de ce dont ils
convenaient.

Certes, ce passage était suivi de la phrase suivante: « En tout état de
cause, à l’issue de l’arbitrage, la délimitation maritime entre la Guinée-
Bissau et le Sénégal sera acquise. » Mais, par délimitation maritime, on ne

53
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 103

pouvait entendre que les espaces maritimes qui existaient à l’époque de
la conclusion de l’accord de 1960, puisque c'était précisément cet
accord de 1960 qui était controversé. Si les Parties étaient convenues
qu’il fallait procéder à une délimitation ex novo de toute la frontière en
mer quel que fût le résultat de l’examen de la validité de l’échange de
lettres de 1960 entre la France et le Portugal, elles l’auraient dit dans le
compromis. Et comme il s’agit la d’un point non seulement pertinent mais
d’une importance majeure, elles n’auraient pas négligé de le faire. Les
négociations se sont étendues sur huit années. Comment imaginer qu’un
point aussi fondamental et aussi important aurait pu être négligé ? Il n’y
a aucune preuve que pendant leurs négociations il se soit élevé quelque
différend entre les deux Parties sur ce point. Au contraire, les neuf mots
introductifs du paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 ont été proposés par la Guinée-
Bissau elle-même (contre-mémoire du Sénégal déposé dans la présente
instance, p. 29, 33, 38 et 44; voir aussi audience publique du 5 avril 1991,
CR 91/4, p. 45).

La Guinée-Bissau affirme aussi que les diverses composantes des zones
maritimes sont indivisibles. Mais cet appel à la notion d’indivisibilité, si
tant est qu’il fût dans l’intention des Parties, n’écarte pas la condition que
celles-ci ont expressément posée à l’article 2, paragraphe 2, du compro-
mis. Que la ligne soit ou non divisible est fonction de la manière dont elle
est tracée, question ne se posant que si la réponse à la première question
était affirmative. Cela ne change rien à la relation fondamentale entre les
deux questions posées à l’article 2, à savoir que la réponse à la seconde
question est subordonnée à une réponse négative à la première.

Tl convient de noter que les deux Parties ont souligné qu’elles voulaient
une ligne de délimitation unique, mais leur point de vue n’était pas le
même. La Guinée-Bissau pour sa part souhaitait une ligne de démarca-
tion intégrée du plateau continental et de la zone économique exclusive,
ligne redéfinie selon des principes équitables. Le Sénégal de son côté
souhaitait que la ligne d’azimut 240° existante soit élevée de manière à
diviser la zone économique exclusive. L’argument de l’indivisibilité, par
lequel on cherche à identifier les divers éléments de la frontière maritime
et à les faire coïncider, ne peut donc servir à corroborer la thèse de la
Guinée-Bissau selon laquelle, quelle qu’eût été sa réponse à la première
question, le Tribunal aurait dû procéder à la délimitation ex novo confor-
mément à la seconde.

On ne peut non plus prétendre que la tdéche du Tribunal ait été indi-
visible. Il était appelé, si sa réponse à la première question était né-
gative, à déterminer le tracé de la ligne de délimitation des territoires
maritimes. La réponse à la première question a été affirmative, et la mis-
sion du Tribunal n'allait pas plus loin. La Guinée-Bissau n’est pas
fondée à prétendre maintenant que quelque chose a été laissé en
suspens. Cette «chose» ne pouvait et ne peut toujours pas constituer
l’objet de l'arbitrage, car elle n’existait pas au moment de la conclusion
de l’accord de 1960.

Il est vrai que dans le chapeau de l’article 2 du compromis, puis encore

54
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. Ni) 104

au paragraphe 1 de l’article 9, le mot «question » est employé au pluriel.
Un point technique de rédaction ne peut cependant être ainsi opposé au
sens de l’ensemble de l’instrument considéré puisque au moment de la
rédaction de celui-ci il n’était pas certain que les deux questions dussent
recevoir une réponse.

La Guinée-Bissau allègue en outre que le Tribunal n’a pas exercé le
pouvoir qui lui était conféré de décider du tracé d’une ligne unique pour
délimiter les territoires maritimes, et de porter cette ligne sur une carte.
Puisque, comme on l’a dit plus haut, le Tribunal n’était pas appelé à
répondre à la seconde question, il n’y avait pas lieu de tracer la ligne fron-
tière ni, à fortiori, de joindre une carte à la sentence.

Quant à savoir si les motifs sont suffisants, il ne faut pas borner l’exa-
men au seul paragraphe 87 de la sentence. Celui-ci ne fait en effet que
conclure sur la base de ce qui a été précédemment analysé. Les motifs sur
lesquels s'appuie la conclusion à laquelle on est arrivé dans ce para-
graphe ont été exposés auparavant dans la sentence. Le point principal en
est l’affirmation de la validité de l’accord de 1960, dont il découle que la
seconde question n’appelle pas de réponse. Et puisqu'il ne doit y avoir
aucune délimitation ex novo de la frontière en mer, il n’y avait pas lieu de
Joindre une carte. Toutes ces choses-là sont indissociables. La raison en va
de soi. Il est vain de vouloir considérer la question de la carte comme un
sujet indépendant et de prétendre qu’aucun motif suffisant n’est donné à
ce propos.

On peut suivre le fil de la pensée qui aboutit à la conclusion du para-
graphe 87. Après avoir analysé la question de la validité de l’accord de
1960, le Tribunal, au paragraphe 80 de la sentence, fait observer que
«l'accord de 1960 est valable et opposable au Sénégal et à la Guinée-
Bissau ». Au paragraphe 85, il dit que l’accord doit être interprété à la lu-
mière du droit en vigueur à la date de sa signature. Et de conclure, dans
le même paragraphe, que l’accord ne délimite pas les espaces maritimes
qui n’existaient pas à cette date, qu’on les appelle «zone économique
exclusive », «zone de pêche » ou autrement.

Il convient également de noter que les paragraphes 87 et 88 sont intime-
ment liés. Au paragraphe 88, le Tribunal estime que l’accord de 1960 fait
droit dans les relations entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal en ce qui con-
cerne les zones mentionnées dans cet accord. Par conséquent, en vertu des
termes de l’article 2 du compromis d’arbitrage, le Tribunal n’avait pas à
répondre à la seconde question. Telle est la conclusion figurant au para-
graphe 87 de la sentence. Lorsque le Tribunal a adopté le paragraphe 88
par deux voix contre une, il approuvait par la force des choses le raisonne-
ment sur lequel se fonde le paragraphe 87.

Sur la base de ces analyses et de ces déductions, le Tribunal a alors
conclu qu'il n’avait pas à répondre à la seconde question. La réponse à la
question de la carte découle de la décision prise à propos de la délimita-
tion de la frontière en mer. Puisqu’il a été répondu par l’affirmative à la

55
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. NI) 105

première question de l’article 2, il n’y a pas eu de délimitation ex novo. Par
conséquent, la carte ne s’imposait pas. Le raisonnement est succinct mais
suffisamment limpide pour les besoins de la sentence.

Pour toutes ces raisons, la conclusion subsidiaire de la Guinée-Bissau
selon laquelle la sentence du 31 juillet 1989 devrait étre frappée de nullité
ne saurait se defendre.

(Signé) Ni Zhengyu.

56


183

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AJIBOLA

After due and careful reflection, I have decided to write a dissenting
opinion on the issue of Libya’s request for the Court to indicate provi-
sional measures under Article 41 of the Statute. I think it is necessary for
me to write this dissenting opinion on some of the issues that are of pri-
mordial significance in the request before us, reflecting some of the rea-
sons upon which my decision is based. The subject-matter of this case is
not only unique in nature but is also of fundamental importance in the
field of international law.

Needless for me to state the facts of the case herein, other than to say
that the catastrophic aerial incident at Lockerbie of 21 December 1988
which resulted in the death of 270 people is the subject-matter of this
action brought by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (otherwise Libya) against
the United States based on the interpretation and application of the 1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation. An aspect of its uniqueness is the fact that the
subject-matter of the case is contemporaneously before the Security
Council.

One may go further to state that that alone does not make it unique
ipso facto because in recent times the issues presented by at least three
cases before the Court have at the same time been deliberated upon by the
Security Council (cf. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey),
I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 3; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States of Americav. Iran), I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.3; Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 169). In these three cases the
Court and Security Council exercised mutual or in fact “symbiotic”
powers and functions. In effect these two main organs of the United
Nations as established under Article 7 of the Charter even though exer-
cising their respective powers and functions independently and pari
passu did so in parallelism. In all three cases, the Court, while supportive
of the Security Council, unambiguously confirmed its authority to adju-
dicate issues within its jurisdiction even where the Security Council is
seised of the same matter. For example, while indicating provisional
measures in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
case, the Court “endorsed” resolution 457 of 1979, which called for the
immediate release of the hostages and further observed:

73
184 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

“Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General
Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or
situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in
respect of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on
the functioning of the Court by any provision of either the Charter or
the Statute of the Court. The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal

‘questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the
resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important,
and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement
of the dispute.” (C.J. Reports 1980, p. 22, para. 40.)

Similarly in the Nicaragua case, the Court made the following signifi-
cant pronouncement on its jurisdiction:

“The United States is thus arguing that the matter was essentially
one for the Security Council since it concerned a complaint by Nicar-
agua involving the use of force. However, having regard to the United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, the Court is of
the view that the fact that a matter is before the Security Council
should not prevent it being dealt with by the Court and that both pro-
ceedings could be pursued pari passu.” (1.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 433,
para 93.)

Admittedly, the Security Council is a political organ, while Article 92 of
the United Nations Charter describes the Court as “the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations”. However, in this case, one is inclined to
admit an overlap of function, even though a cursory evaluation may sug-
gest a contrary view. For example, the Montreal Convention on which
Libya’s Application is based squarely presents the Court with issues of
“rights” and “disputes” under international law, involving, in particular,
extradition, while the Security Council is dealing with the issue of the
“surrender” of two suspects and the problem of international terrorism as
it affects international peace and the security of nations — i.e., matters of a
political nature.

There is also the issue of different connotations of the word “co-opera-
tion”. While the Security Council wants Libya to co-operate with the
United States by surrendering to her the two suspects in Libya, the Appli-
cation of Libya seeks the co-operation of the United States in prosecuting
the two suspects in Libya under the Libyan Criminal Code and in accord-
ance with Article 11 (1) of the 1971 Montreal Convention.

Assuming for the moment that there were no resolutions or any action
whatsoever on this matter in the Security Council, the question is, what
would have been the attitude and approach of the Court to the interim
measures sought by Libya? In my view, to indicate interim measures in
this case, the Court must answer the following preliminary questions in
the affirmative:

74
185 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

1. Does the Court have prima facie jurisdiction to entertain this Applica-
tion?

2. Are there legal disputes between the Applicant and the Respondents in
accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention? If
so, what are these disputes ?

3. Arethe “rights” being claimed by the Applicant legal rights sustainable
under international law? If so, what are these legal rights ?

4. Is this matter urgent to warrant immediate attention of the Court and
upon which provisional measures should be pronounced?

5. Has the Court jurisdiction to entertain this matter presently, or was it
prematurely brought before the Court having regard to the provisions
of Article 14 (1) of the 1971 Montreal Convention upon which the
Application is based ?

6. Would failure to indicate interim measures result in irreparable harm
to the Applicant?

1. On the first question, I have no doubt that the Court has a prima
facie jurisdiction to entertain Libya’s request for interim measures. It is
well-settled jurisprudence of the Court to concede the establishment of
prima facie jurisdiction once the Applicant can show that she has an argu-
able case. This view was confirmed in the Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France) case when the Court observed:

“Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need
not, before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdic-
tion on the merits of the case, and yet ought not to indicate such mea-
sures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima
facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded” (.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 101, para. 13).

The Parties do not deny that the 1971 Montreal Convention is a Con-
vention in force which they have entered into and ratified. The issue is one
of pacta sunt servanda as provided for in Article 26 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties which came into force in 1980.

2. The second question deals with the issue of legal disputes. From the
totality of the oral arguments presented by the Parties, lam convinced that
there is a legal dispute concerning the interpretation and application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention.

To my mind the legal disputes may be summarized as three:

(a) The United States is demanding the surrender of the two suspects
involved in the Lockerbie incident and Libya refuses to comply with
this demand. The Applicant argues that under Articles 5 (2), 5 (3), 7
and 8 of the 1971 Montreal Convention she has the option either to
extradite or prosecute: aut dedere aut judicare (or aut prosequi) — and

75
186 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

in the circumstances she has decided to prosecute the suspects on her
own soil because her internal criminal law does not permit the “extra-
dition” of Libyan citizens.

(b) The second legal dispute is whether Article 11 (1) of the 1971 Montreal
Convention requires the United States to co-operate with Libya’s
domestic prosecution of the two suspects. Article 11 (1) of the 1971
Montreal Convention provides :

“Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in
respect of the offences. The law of the State requested shall apply in
all cases.” (Emphasis added.)

(c) The third dispute may be found in paragraph 5 of Libya’s request for
the indication of provisional measures, which urges the Court to order
the Respondent to “refrain from taking any step that might aggravate
or extend the dispute as would surely happen if sanctions are imposed
against Libya or force employed”. During the oral proceedings, coun-
sel for the Applicant referred to identical statements of Government
authorities of both the Respondent and the United Kingdom to the
effect that “we have neither ruled any option in or any option out” and
which to some extent have been disputed or explained away by the
counsel forthe Respondent.

3. Next is the question of whether the Applicant has the rights under
international law claimed in the Application. To answer this question, the
Applicant referred to many of the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention, especially Articles 5 (2), 5 (3), 7, 8 and 11 (1). Many of these
Articles deal with the issue of aut dedere aut judicare. In effect, the Con-
vention recognizes the fact that the internal law of some States prohibits
the extradition of its citizens. The hydra-headed problem or conflict of
jurisdiction to prosecute which must clearly be borne in mind in this case,
is that the two Parties have the right/obligation to prosecute offences
listed in the Convention in their respective States. Article 5 (1) enumer-
ates such options thus:

“Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences in the following
cases:

(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State;
(b) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft
registered in that State;

76
187 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

(c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands
in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;

(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft
leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of
business or, ifthe lessee has no such place of business, his perma-
nent residence, in that State.”

General international law recognizes the same options. Hence, the
United States of America could establish jurisdiction as the State where
the aircraft was registered. However, Libya has the suspects within her
jurisdiction and is equally entitled to prosecute the suspects. I am of the
view that based on the 1971 Montreal Convention, Libya has a legal right
to protect. Itis a right recognized in international law and even considered
by some jurists as jus cogens. I share the view of some of my colleagues,
especially Judge Weeramantry, that Libya is entitled to prosecute the two
accused Libyans if she wants. Even if other rights under Articles 5 (2),
5 (3), 7 and 8 are debatable and arguable as to whether they are rights or
obligations, the legal right under Article 11 (1) is an indisputable right
under the 1971 Montreal Convention.

4, Next is the issue of urgency. Equally I have no doubt about the
urgency of this matter. If I had any doubt in my mind before, the devel-
opments in the recent days are all clear indications that there is a need for
the Court to take immediate action and to give Libya’s request the
priority that it deserves as indicated in Article 74 (1) of the Rules of Court.

5. The next question, the timeliness of the Application, is admittedly
not as easy as the others that I have dealt with above. Opinions are
strongly divided on the issue of the interpretation of Article 14 (1) of the
1971 Montreal Convention. The Court listened to cogent arguments for
and against the applicability or non-applicability of this Article, for the
time being, from the Applicant and the Respondent. Before I go further,
let me quote this provision:

“Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organiza-
tion of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute
to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with
the Statute of the Court.”

The Respondent forcefully argues that the Applicant failed to exhaust
all the stages of negotiation and arbitration before making her Applica-

77
188 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

tion to the Court. It was pointed out, and is clearly indicated in the Article,
that the requirements of negotiation and arbitration are mandatory condi-
tion precedents that must be complied with before recourse to the Court is
available. The Respondent further argued that the Applicant’s letter of
18 January 1992 on the issue of negotiation and arbitration was merely six
weeks old when the Application was made to the Court on 3 March 1992,
and therefore the Application is premature.

The Applicant answers that waiting for the six months prescribed in
Article 14 (1) to run its course would be pointless because the Respondent
unequivocally refused Libya’s 18 January 1992 request for negotiation
and arbitration. Reference was made to the statement of the United States
of America Representative during the debate on the matter at the Security
Council when he said “the issue at hand is not some difference of opinion
or approach that can be mediated or negotiated”.

From this pronouncement by the Respondent it seems to me, and quite
reasonably too, that even if the Applicant had waited until after six
months from 18 January, or even longer, her request would have been met
by the same refusal. This, to my mind, is a case of anticipatory breach of
the provisions of Article 14 (1) on the part of the Respondent and Libya
was not obliged to delay her Application until the expiry of six months
after 18 January 1992. This view is reflected in some of the past decisions
of the Court. A good example is the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v.
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), where the Court observed:

“It is immaterial and unnecessary to enquire what the different
and opposing views were which brought about the deadlock in the
past negotiations in the United Nations, since the present phase calls
for determination of only the question of jurisdiction. The fact that a
deadlock was reached in the collective negotiations in the past and
the further fact that both the written pleadings and oral arguments of
the Parties in the present proceedings have clearly confirmed the
continuance of this deadlock, compel a conclusion that no reason-
able probability exists that further negotiations would lead to a
settlement.” (1.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 345.)

The Court refused to adopt a purely technical attitude to this matter in
the same cases when it noted that:

“it is not so much the form of negotiation that matters as the attitude
and views of the Parties on the substantive issues of the question
involved. So long as both sides remain adamant . . .” (Ibid., p. 346.)

There is also the issue of whether the word “within” as used in
Article 14 (1) means after or inside of six months. The word “dans” in the

78
189 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

corresponding French text suggests that demand and refusal within six
months triggers the right of recourse to the Court. Moreover, “within” in
the Concise Oxford Dictionary means “not beyond”, or “inside” or “before
expiration of” or “in a time no longer than” or “during”. Ifthe Convention
meant to stipulate afer it would have explicitly said so.

Given all the points I have dilated upon above, it is my humble opinion
that the Application was not prematurely presented to the Court, and the
Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same.

6. There remains the issue of irreparable harm. Here again arguments
have been advanced on both sides. The point of the United States was that
a party should not take action pendente lite that would frustrate the
Court’s later judgment on the merits. Provisional measures are therefore
unnecessary, the argument runs, because the Parties are already under an
obligation to avoid irreparable prejudice to the potential judgment of the
Court, irreparable harms to rights claimed, and irreparable harms to per-
sons and property. To buttress this point torrents of authority were cited
from the past Judgments of the Court.

Again, one must pause to note that the test here is not one of “irrepar-
able prejudice” or “irreparable harm” but the possibility or the risk of such
irreparable harm or prejudice. This point has been made in several cases
before the Court. The Court in indicating provisional measures in the
Nuclear Tests case observed thus:

“29, Whereas for the purpose of the present proceedings it suf-
fices to observe that the information submitted to the Court, includ-
ing Reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation between 1958 and 1972, does not
exclude the possibility that damage to Australia might be shown to be
caused by the deposit on Australian territory of radio-active fall-out
resulting from such tests and to be irreparable;

30. Whereas in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court
is satisfied that it should indicate interim measures of protection in
order to preserve the right claimed by Australia in the present litiga-
tion in respect of the deposit of radio-active fall-out on her territory”
(C.J. Reports 1973, p. 105; emphasis added).

Similar pronouncements can be found in the Tehran Hostages case and
Passage through the Great Belt case.

Two questions are pertinent to the issue under discussion. First, is there
a likelihood, or to use the appropriate words “possibility” or “risk” of
harm to the Applicant if she is not allowed to prosecute the two suspects

79
190 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

on her own soil ? Second, is there a likelihood that the Respondent will use
force or coercion if provisional measures are not indicated ? From the evi-
dence adduced at the hearings, I am very much inclined to answer these
questions in the affirmative, especially when one considers the fact that
what is in issue is the possibility or risk of such irreparable harm or preju-
dice.

Now, having resolved all of these questions in favour of the Applicant,
in relation to the relevant provisions for indication of provisional mea-
sures (i.e., Art. 41 of the Statute of the Court) I should proceed to state
that the Court should indicate provisional measures in favour of the
Applicant only when it “considers that the circumstances” of this case
“so require”. Similar reference can also be made to relevant parts of
Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.

In my view the request for interim measures must be seen against the
background of concurrent actions of the Security Council, and in particu-
lar its adoption of resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992). There is therefore
need to examine the effect, if any, of resolution 731 (1992) on this case and
most importantly to indicate the effect of the recent resolution 748 (1992),
passed during the currency of our deliberation on this case.

Before embarking on the bumpy journey of examining the effects of
these resolutions in international law, let me pause to examine one aspect
of this case that troubles my own sense of justice. Perhaps it is better to
deal with this matter fully when the case will be considered on its merits.
However, it concerns the two resolutions of the Security Council and their
effect on the provisional measures now under consideration.

A point which is uncontested and accepted by both Parties is the desira-.
bility, and in fact the need, that the two suspects allegedly involved in this
matter be thoroughly investigated and tried. The Applicant believed so,
and said so. The Respondent is also eager to try them. The disagreement is
only on where they should be tried. To my mind the investigation cannot
be completed without the co-operation of both Parties. On completion of
investigation, and if a prima facie case is established against the suspects,
they will be tried as accused persons before a criminal court or tribunal.
Judgment comes after trial and then sentence, if found guilty.

Ihave stated all these elementary and trite principles of criminal justice
to stress the point, that all along, the issue of investigation by the Respon-
dent was being apparently treated in some of the arguments like final judg-
ment. It is obvious that the allegation of terrorism, a very serious and
heinous offence, against the two Libyans cannot be sustained unless and
until they are tried and found guilty. A fortiori the allegation that the State

80
191 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

of Libya is involved in terrorism cannot hold legally until such a time as
judgment is given against the two Libyans and it is proved that they were
acting for and on behalf of the State of Libya.

A statement dated 27 November 1991, S/23308, was issued by the
United States of America, which demanded thus:

“After the indictments were handed down on 14 November we
conveyed them to the Libyan regime. We have also consulted closely
with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom and in
concert with those two Governments we have the following two dec-
larations to present publicly today.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM

The British and American Governments today declare that the
Government of Libya must:

— surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials;

— disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those
responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and
other material evidence, including all the remaining timers;

— pay appropriate compensation.

We expect Libya to comply promptly and in full.” (Emphasis
added.)

It will be noted that payment of compensation was demanded in the
above statement, i.e., “pay appropriate compensation”. What worries me
is how the State of Libya could be urged to pay compensation when the
“suspects” or even to put it higher than that the “accused persons” have
not been found guilty by any competent court or tribunal and have not
been proved to have acted in complicity with Libya. The presumption of
innocence until guilt is established is still an integral part of the due
administration of criminal justice the world over.

The significance of this point is that the requests of the United States,
referred to above, formed the basis of the requests contained in resolu-
tion 731 (1992), especially the preambular paragraph which states:

“ Deeply concerned over the results of investigations, which impli-
cate officials of the Libyan Government and which are contained in
Security Council documents that include the requests addressed to
the Libyan authorities by France, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in
connection with the legal procedures related to the attacks carried

81
192 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

out against Pan American flight 103 and Union de transports
aériens flight 772”

as well as paragraph 3 of the resolution which

“Urges the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full and
effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the elimina-
tion of international terrorism”.

What then is the effect of resolution 731 on the Court’s authority to
indicate interim measures? It has been argued that resolution 731 is
merely recommendatory and as such it is not a decision of the Security
Council. I think I share the view on a careful study of the content of the
resolution that the request to surrender the two Libyans cannot be said to
be mandatory. Again, the action of the Security Council with regard to this
resolution could be placed under Article 36 (1) of the Charter which states
that:

“The Security Council may at any stage of a dispute of the nature
referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.” (Emphasis
added.)

Undoubtedly all these provisions are within Chapter VI of the Charter
which deals with pacific settlement of disputes. Since the issue involves
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial
settlement as enumerated in Article 33, it was possible for the Security
Council to avail itself of the ultimate invocation and application of Ar-
ticle 36 (3) by referring this matter to the Court. However, the Security
Council did not exercise that option. After careful consideration of the
content and possible effect of resolution 731, it is my humble opinion and
conclusion that it in no way impedes the Court’s authority to indicate the
interim measures requested by Libya.

Resolution 748 which was adopted while the Court was considering
Libya’s request for interim measures, is undoubtedly within the power
and function of the Security Council since it falls under Chapter VII of the
Charter, particularly Article 41.

What then is the legal effect of resolution 748 on the Court’s authority
to indicate interim measures? There is no doubt that there is an overlap
between the powers and functions of the Court and Security Council,
which I mentioned earlier in the opinion. The resolution is a decision of
the Security Council and therefore its effect and validity is even stronger
than that of resolution 731 in light of the provisions of Article 25 and Ar-
ticle 103 of the Charter. Article 25 enjoins Members to “respect and carry

82
193 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

out the decisions of the Security Council” and Article 103 provides that in
any case of conflict of obligations between the Charter and other interna-
tional agreement, the obligation under the Charter is supreme and shall
prevail. Arguably, certain intrinsic defects may invalidate the two resolu-
tions mentioned herein. For example, there is the issue of nemo iudex in
sua causa, as well as the possible effect of Article 27 (3) of the Charter on
the resolutions. Nevertheless, I do not pronounce on their validity here,
nor need I do so in order to reach my decision.

However, in view of the provisions of resolution 748 (1992), it is my
opinion that the Court should decline to indicate the provisional mea-
sures requested by Libya. However, it is also my belief that the Court
should indicate provisional measures proprio motu under Article 75 of the
Rules of Court against both Parties to ensure non-use of force or aggra-
vation or extension of the dispute pending the Court’s judgment on the
merits.

The Court has the legal and inherent power to order provisional mea-
sures proprio motu against both Parties independent of any request made
by either Party. Such an independent indication of provisional measures
is not alien to the jurisprudence of this Court and its predecessor. In the
case concerning the Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Green-
land the Permanent Court of International Justice pronounced :

“Whereas, on the other hand, the Court must consider whether or
not there is ground for proceeding, proprio motu, to indicate interim
measures of protection in connection with the two applications of
July 18th, 1932, independently of the Norwegian request to that
effect...” (P.CIJ.,, Series A/B, No. 48, pp. 287-288; emphasis
added).

Again in the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria
(Interim Measures of Protection) the Permanent Court of International
Justice ordered interim measures thus:

“Whereas according to Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute,

‘The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought
to be taken to reserve the respective rights of either party’ ;

And whereas, according to Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules,

‘The Court may indicate interim measures of protection other than
those proposed in the request.’

83
194

1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

Whereas the above quoted provision of the Statute applies the
principle universally accepted by international tribunals and like-
wise laid down in many conventions to which Bulgaria has been a
party — to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any
measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the
execution of the decision to be given and, in general, not allow any
step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dis-
pute” (P.C_LJ.,, Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199; emphasis added).

The Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case reached a similar conclu-
sion on the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures proprio
motu when it declared:

“Whereas the object of interim measures of protection provided
for in the Statute is to preserve the respective rights of the Parties
pending the decision of the Court, and whereas from the general
terms of Article 41 of the Statute and from the power recognized by
Article 61, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Court, to indicate interim
measures of protection proprio motu, it follows that the Court must be
concerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may be sub-
sequently adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to
the Respondent.” (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 93; emphasis added.)

Even quite recently and with absolute clarity the Court boldly empha-
sized its power to indicate provisional measures in the case of Frontier Dis-
pute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) when it stated:

“Considering that, independently of the requests submitted by the
Parties for the indication of provisional measures, the Court or, accord-
ingly, the chamber possesses by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute the
power to indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the
aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that
circumstances so require” (1.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 18; empha-
sis added).

The learned author Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had this to say on the issue
of interim measures on page 542 in The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Vol. II, 1986,

84

“c, As has been shown above, the power of the Court to indicate
interim measures falls into the same category as its compétence de la
compétence. Both are an exercise of incidental jurisdiction, necessary
in the case of the compétence de la compétence to enable the Court to
function at all, and, in the case of the power to indicate interim mea-
sures, to prevent its decisions from being stultified. Now in the case
of the Court, its power to determine its own jurisdiction is specifi-
195 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

cally provided for by Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute. Yet it is
established law that this power is part of the inherent powers of all
international tribunals, irrespective of whether it has been expressly
conferred on them or not — a view specifically endorsed by the
Court when it said in the Nottebohm case (Jurisdiction) . . .”

Such indication of provisional measures will not run against the deci-
sion of the Security Council as contained in resolution 748 (1992) since the
resolution does not condone the use of any force. Resolution 748 (1992) is
quite elaborate and states in clear and unambiguous terms the decision of
the Security Council which should be carefully examined here in order to
explain my conviction that the Court’s indication of interim measures
proprio motu to enjoin the use of force pending judgment on the merits
would not interfere with the functioning of the Security Council.

The first point is that resolution 748 (1992) reaffirms all that is con-
tained in resolution 731 (1992) and as already explained, resolution 731
(1992) falls under Chapter VI of the Charter and in particular
Article 36 (1). In effect, all resolution 731 (1992) requested from Libya is
that she must comply with the demands of the United States and the
United Kingdom as contained in their respective and joint statements on
this issue. There is nothing in resolution 731 (1992) to indicate approval,
explicit or implicit, by the Security Council of the use of force to ensure
Libya’s compliance. The preambular paragraphs, while noting the reports
of the Secretary-General, restated the Security Council’s position on
terrorism and how and why the same must be effectively dealt with and
reaffirmed the need for all States to refrain from organizing, assert-
ing or participating in acts of terrorism. Again, it should be noted here
too that there is nothing suggestive of support for the use of force by the
Security Council.

As regards the operative part of the resolution, the Security Council
made it abundantly clear that it was acting under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter. This is an important point to note, because this Chapter deals with
“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and
acts of aggression”. Here again, one must ask which Article the Security
Council invoked when it adopted resolution 748 (1992) having regard to
the content of the decisions contained therein. A thorough perusal of the
resolution clearly indicates that the Council was acting, as I have said
earlier, under Article 41 of the Charter which deals with the issue of
economic sanctions.

Article 41 of the Charter directs that:

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,

85
196 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions.” (Emphasis added.)

The emphasized words, when read in conjunction with para-
graphs 4 (a), (b), 5 (a), (b), (c), 6 (a), (b), (c)and 7 of resolution 748 (1992), all
give the unequivocal indication that the resolution is aimed at imposing
economic and commercial sanctions, along with diplomatic restrictions
against Libya and explicitly prohibits sanctions “involving the use of
armed force”. I have elaborated on the content of Article 41 in order to
show that although resolution 748 (1992) was adopted by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, Article 41 of this Chapter clearly prohibits the
use of force.

Libya also confirmed this in her latest observation dated 7 April 1992,
on the effect of resolution 748 (1992), when she noted that:

“the sanctions that the Security Council has adopted against Libya,
should it fail to comply with resolution 748 (1992), directly impair
Libya’s economic, commercial and diplomatic rights”.

The conclusion that I have therefore arrived at is that the Court would
not impair or impede the full force and effect of resolution 748 (1992) if it
were to indicate measures proprio motu or even suo motu to enjoin both
Parties to this dispute from taking any action that may involve the use of
force or taking any step which might aggravate or extend the dispute
pending the Court’s judgment on the merits.

The next point which is equally germane to the issue of resolution 748
(1992) is the question of its validity. At the moment this assertion is neither
here nor there and consequently one relies on the decision of the Security
Council with regard to resolution 748 (1992) based on its prima facie vali-
dity. This issue will be resolved one way or the other when the matter
comes up for argument on its merits. I have personally echoed my doubts
earlier on this point but one should at the moment let sleeping dogs lie.

Assuming, arguendo, that resolution 748 (1992) is valid on its face, the
United States in her observation of 7 April 1992 submits:

“Irrespective of the existence of the novel right Libya claims under
the Montreal Convention — a right contrary to the text, structure,
purpose and history of the Convention — Libya now has a Charter-
based duty to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security

86
197 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

Council in resolution 748 (1992) and other States have a Charter-
based duty to seek Libya’s compliance. The predicate for Libya’s
request for provisional measures, therefore, is entirely lacking.”

As already indicated, the United States is entitled to this view having
regard to other provisions of the Charter, so long as she does not resort to
the use of force to ensure compliance with the resolution.

The Parties have based much of their arguments on the issue of legal
rights. Without doubt, I think that the issue of legal rights is relevant and
important to the Application of Libya and that the Applicant must clearly
establish these rights to succeed on the merits. That is why Article 41 talks
of the preservation of the respective rights of either party. However, Ar-
ticle 75 of the Rules of Court does not refer to the issue of rights but merely
grants the Court the power to indicate provisional measures proprio motu
against any or all parties if after due examination the circumstances of the
case so require. In my view the Court should exercise the power conferred
by Article 75 in this case.

Each case must be decided on its own merits. Situations are always
changing. The world is in a state of flux economically and politically.
International law has been enriched by its dynamic development from
this Court. Even if in the past the measures suggested by me for indication
have always been incidental, there is every reason why they should be
indicated in this case given the urgent, serious and unique circumstances
that it presents. The world is constantly faced with new situations from
day to day, and it is imperative that the Court must always rise to the occa-
sion and meet the new demands and challenges of our time as they sur-
face. However, care must be taken that pronouncements, indications,
orders and judgments of the Court be given in accordance with interna-
tional law and one need not emphasize this. (Art. 38 (1) of the Statute of
the Court.) In this case, the Court has the power to pronounce on the pro-
visional measures I have suggested, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 75 of the Rules of Court. In addition, it is invariably the inherent
power of the Court to grant such provisional measures under customary
international law.

In conclusion, I believe that the Court should deny Libya’s request
for interim measures, but should independently apply the provisions of
Article 75 of the Rules of Court to prevent further escalation, aggrava-
tion or extension of the dispute pending judgment on the merits.

Again, I ask myself what is justice in a case of this nature, with regard to

87
198 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (DISS. OP. AJIBOLA)

the request for indication of provisional measures, which is before the
Court. To me, the fundamental focus and obligation as judges of the
Court must be to do justice in accordance with the spirit of Article 1 of the
Charter: to maintain international peace and security; to take effective
measures to prevent and remove all threats to peace; to suppress all
threats of aggression or any form of breaches of peace in any part of the
world within the spirit of the Charter and in accordance with international
law.

To me, justice requires prompt action to prevent deterioration of peace-
ful co-existence among nations of the world. No one goes to sleep when
the house is burning.

' Finally, justice of this case requires that we should act in consonance
and within the spirit and content of Article 2 (3) of the Charter, which
states:

“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.”

I would therefore indicate provisional measures in this case based on
Article 75 of the Rules of Court against both Parties pendente lite to
prevent the escalation, aggravation or extension of the dispute and in par-
ticular the use of force by either or both Parties.

(Signed) Bola ANBOLA.

88


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUGDMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT
AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED
(BELGIUM v. SPAIN)

ORDER OF 5 DECEMBER 1959

1959

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE
À LA BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT
AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED

(BELGIQUE c. ESPAGNE)
ORDONNANCE DU 5 DÉCEMBRE 1959
This Order should be cited as follows:
“Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Belgium v. Spain),
Order of 5 December 1959: I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 289.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:
« Affaire relative à la Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Belgique c. Espagne),
Ordonnance du 5 décembre 1959: C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 289.»

Sales number 2929
N° de vente:

289

COUR INTERNATIONALE. DE JUSTICE

ANNEE 7959 Le 5 décembre
5 décembre 1959 Role genera

AFFAIRE RELATIVE
A LA BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT
AND POWER COMPANY, LIMITED
(BELGIQUE c. ESPAGNE)

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et l'article 37 du Règlement
de la Cour,

vu l’ordonnance du 18 octobre 1958 fixant au 18 juin 1959 la date
d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire du Gouvernement
belge et au 18 février 1960 la date d’expiration du délai pour le
dépôt du contre-mémoire du Gouvernement espagnol et réservant
la suite de la procédure,

Considérant que, par lettre du 24 novembre 1959, l’agent du
Gouvernement espagnol a demandé le report au 18 août 1960 de la
date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire, cette
demande étant motivée par le nombre et la longueur des documents
annexés au mémoire, documents qu’il convient de vérifier et qui
se trouvent disséminés en différents pays, et par l’obligation pour
y répondre de réunir d’autres documents et preuves également
disséminés en différents pays et rédigés en différentes langues;

Considérant que copie de la lettre précitée a été communiquée
le même jour à l’agent du Gouvernement belge, lequel a été invité

4
BARCELONA TRACTION (ORDONN. DU 5 XII 59) 290

à faire connaître les vues de son Gouvernement sur la demande
ainsi présentée ;

Considérant que, par lettre du 2 décembre 1959, l'agent du
Gouvernement belge a fait savoir que cette demande suscite de
sérieuses réserves;

Décide de reporter au 21 mai 1960 la date d’expiration du délai
pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire du Gouvernement espagnol, la
suite de la procédure restant réservée.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le cinq décembre mil neuf cent
cinquante-neuf, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment au Gouvernement belge et au Gouvernement espagnol.

Le Président,
(Signé) Helge KLAESTAD.

Le Greffier adjoint,
(Signé) GARNIER-COIGNET.


67

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE ALVAREZ

[Translation]
I

The question referred to the International Court of Justice
by the General Assembly of the United Nations for an Advisory
Opinion in the matter of the Effect of Awards of Compensation
made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in favour
of certain staff members is drafted in very precise terms which
considerably limit its scope.

In Question (1) of the Request for an Advisory Opinion, the
General Assembly asks whether, having regard to the Statute
of the Administrative Tribunal and any other relevant legal instru-
ment or to the relevant records, it has the rigkf on any grounds
to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made by the
Tribunal in favour of a staff member of the United Nations ; and
in Question (2) it asks, if the answer given by the Court to Question
(I) is in the affirmative, what are the principal grounds upon which
the General Assembly could lawfully exercise its right.

The question however is more general in character by reason
of the third recital in the Request for an Opinion, which reads as
follows : ‘Considering, nevertheless, that important legal questions
have been raised in the course of debate in the Fifth Committee
with respect to that appropriation (for the purpose of covering the
awards made by the Administrative Tribunal)....”

What the General Assembly is really asking is whether, apart
from the specific texts indicated in Question (1), there are other
considerations or grounds upon which the General Assembly could
exercise a right to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation
made by the Administrative Tribunal.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to indicate these considerations
or grounds ; they may be not only legal but also political, for the
question presents this two-fold character.

Some of the Governments to which the Registrar of the Court,
in accordance with Article 66 of the Statute of the Court, had
communicated the present Request for an Opinion, relied in their
Written Statements, or in oral statements made before the Court,
not only on the documents referred to in Question (1) but also on
legal considerations or considerations of a more general character.

The opinions thus expressed show that there are two conflicting
views :

A.—The Administrative Tribunal, established by the Assembly
of the United Nations, is a subsidiary organ of the Assembly and
accordingly the Assembly is not bound by the decisions of the
Tribunal.

24
U.N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 68

B.—The Administrative Tribunal is a real tribunal whose awards
are binding and therefore the Assembly must always respect them.

I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority of the Court
because they have relied almost exclusively on the documents
indicated in Question (1) of the Request for an Opinion. I, for my
part, consider that apart from these elements there are other very
important elements of a general character which must also be
taken into account.

It is for this reason that I have appended my dissenting opinion
to the opinion of the Court.

II

My basic assumption is that the question referred to the Court
relates to the international organization established by the Charter
of the United Nations ; it is therefore a problem of politics and of
the new international law, which must be resolved in accordance
with those elements and having regard to a new criterion.

Before we show in what respect the problem belongs to the domain
of the new international law and before we deal with the solution
which should be given to it in accordance with that law, let us
consider how it would be resolved by classical international law.

Before 1914 there were no arbitral tribunals operating on a
permanent basis; there were merely occasional arbitrators who
adjudicated upon disputes regarding specific matters. A distinction
had to be made between appeals against such awards and their
performance.

As regards appeal, this was provided for in the arbitration
agreement, which usually stipulated that revision might be under-
taken by the arbitrator in certain cases.

And as regards the performance of the award, the practice was
that it was carried out in good faith; but if it contained grave
defects and in particular if the arbitrator had acted wltra vires, the
party concerned could refuse to give effect to the award. Such a
refusal, moreover, might give rise to a new dispute between the
parties.

These precedents of arbitral tribunals finally gave rise to a
principle of classical international law to the effect that a party
might refuse to give effect to an arbitral award if the award
contained grave defects.

If classical international law is applied to the case now before
the Court, there can be no doubt as to the solution : the General
Assembly of the United Nations must not give effect to awards
of the Administrative Tribunal if it considers that they are vitiated
by some important defect.

25
U.N. ADM, TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 69

But now that, in addition to arbitral tribunals, the International
Court of Justice, which is permanent in character, has come into
existence, the question of the review and performance of arbitral
awards must be resolved, having regard to the new conditions of
arbitration as well as to the new conditions of international life
in general.

In this connection, it is necessary to proceed on the basic assump-
tion that, following the last two social cataclysms in particular,
rapid and profound transformations have eccurred in the life of
peoples and in the traditional or classical international law, which
have not been sufficiently appreciated. By reason of the extent of
these changes, a new epoch, a new era has opened in the life of
peoples and in the traditional or classical international law.

A rapid review of thesé transformations will serve to show how
important they are.

Until the two last world wars, all the States formed a mere
community and there existed between them no links other than
those which had been freely accepted. Since then, and as a result
of a number of circumstances, particularly the ever-increasing
relations between States, the complexity and variety of those
relations, the great number of international services created by the
States, as well as the increasing dynamism of the life of peoples,
this community has been transformed into a real international society
which includes all the States of the world. This transformation
has taken place without any convention or solemn act being required.
for that purpose.

There are great differences between the old community and the
new international society.

Without expatiating on this point, I shall merely indicate that
in the new international society the psychology of peoples has
been deeply modified from a two-fold point of view. Certain peoples
who for centuries had followed a traditional course, adopted new
ways of life and embraced, almost abruptly, a political, social and
economic régime which was entirely different from the one that
had hitherto prevailed. This is particularly true of Russia, where
the Soviet regime was born. Since that time there has also been
an awakening among many peoples of Asia, Oceania and North
Africa who are desirous of casting off what they call the European
yoke. In this way more than half of the world to-day has, particu-
larly from the international point of view, a psychology which is
very different from what it formerly was.

Furthermore, all the peoples now understand that they are no
longer isolated or bound only by the instruments which they have
freely accepted, but that they are a part of a real society which is
broader than the civil community to which they belong and which
limits their absolute sovereignty.

As a result, the classical international law which governed the
old community has been modified from several points of view.

26
U.N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 70

First, it has established, in many respects, a new legal order by
creating certain rights and duties which States did not formerly
have ; secondly, international law must henceforth have primacy
over national law, a fact which was formerly challenged ; and finally,
international law has undergone considerable change in so far as
the concept of that law and its essential facts are concerned; it
is no longer exclusively juridical and individualistic, as was classical
international law ; it now assumes a political and social character
as well.

The profound modifications in international life and in inter-
national law which I have just outlined are not the mere expression
of doctrine or legal speculation, as might be thought at first sight ;
what are involved are facts, declarations, and bases recognized by
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in its Preamble
and in Chapter I.

The political character of international law has been recognized,
at least by implication, by the Third Assembly of the United
Nations, when it debated the Advisory Opinion of the Court in the
matter of the Admission of New Members to the United Nations.

The social character of the international law of to-day is a result
of the new régime of inter-dependence which has emerged and which
tends to replace the traditional individualistic régime. Having
regard to this social character, what may be called the new inter-
national law is particularly concerned with the maintenance of
peace and the development of confidence and co-operation between
States ; it assigns an important place to the general interest and
condemns abus du droit ; it also has a new aim: the well-being of
the individual and of society.

The Charter applies this social law in a number of its provisions,
particularly in Chapters IX to XIV. It was also applied in some
of the decisions of the International Court of Justice and in the
work of the Codification Commission in the preparation of regu-
lations governing certain matters.

Finally, a further characteristic of the international society is
that it has been organized by the Charter of the United Nations.
The Charter has established six principal organs, including,
with particular reference to the matter we are considering, the
General Assembly and the Secretariat (Art. 7). And Article 22
provides that “The General Assembly may establish such sub-
sidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions”.

The principal organs play the most important part in the new
international society ; almost all the activity of that society is
concentrated in those organs. The only purpose of the subsidiary
organs is to assist the principal organs to discharge their duties.

One fact must be particularly stressed and that is that the
organs and agencies established by the Charter —as, indeed, all
social institutions—evolve more or less rapidly in accordance

27
U.N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 7I

with the new conditions of the life of peoples ; this evolution
to-day constitutes a real sociological or social law.

As regards the subject we are here considering, I shall confine
myself to the evolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations. This evolution is characterized by a number of factors
which transform the Assembly into an all-powerful legislative
organ.

First, the Assembly tends to be in almost permanent session.

Secondly, the Assembly is becoming a real international legis-
lative power for, apart from recommendations made to States, it
adopts resolutions whose provisions are binding on them all. This
fact is of great importance for the future of international law.

A number of publicists and statesmen have expressed the desire
for the establishment of an international legislative power: in
fact such a power already exists.

A third tendency of the Assembly of the United Nations is to
intervene more and more in the solution of the great international
problems which arise. To-day, whenever a difficult situation presents
itself in international life, its reference to the General Assembly
for consideration is always envisaged.

A fourth tendency relates to the formation, within that Assembly,
of a special psychology in international matters. Indeed, when
the States meet in the Assembly—except in cases involving their
vital interests—the juridical conscience of peoples is developed
there, along with the new conception of law and of justice.

This conscience gives rise either to legal principles—in other
words, principles whose observation can be required, and they are
then principles of social law or more properly, of the international
law of social inter-debendence—or merely to moral principles, and
these constitute international social justice. The latter may become
principles of law by means of resolutions of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, or by decisions of certain international
organs, such as the International Court of Justice, which, in respect
of a given matter, may declare that a certain principle of inter-
national social justice should be established in positive terms and
applied as the law in force.

And, finally, the General Assembly of the United Nations tends
to be guided by the notion of social law and international social
justice in its work and resolutions, as has already been pointed
out above.

This character, this omnipotence which has been acquired by
the General Assembly of the United Nations is to be explained by
the fact that it is made up almost permanently of representatives
of most of the countries of the world, whereas this was not formerly
the case.

28
U. N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 72

The Assembly constitutes the supreme power ; it is bound only
by the Charter which established it, or by its own resolutions. There
is nothing above the Assembly except moral forces, particularly
public opinion, which may censure the acts of the Assembly if it
considers them open to criticism:

A logical and practical consequence of the foregoing is that any
attempt to limit the power of the General Assembly of the United
Nations would run counter to the realities of international life.

A further very important consequence is that in the solution of
international problems that may arise in the future, regard may no
longer be had—as was hitherto the case and as was done by a
number of governments in their opinions, to which reference has
already been made—for diplomatic precedence, international
awards, preparatory work or the views expressed by delegates
during the debates relating thereto. In international life there can
no longer be any looking backwards, although this was admissible
when international life scarcely moved forward; the dynamism
of that life makes it necessary to look ahead.

Ill

The great transformations in international life and in internation-
al law which I have just indicated in summary form are so impor-
tant that they deserve special consideration with regard to the
solution of the question put to the Court.

First, the Administrative Tribunal was established by reason of
the fact that the Secretariat of the United Nations consists of some
thousands of staff members who were engaged under contracts
which may give rise to disputes between the Secretariat and the
staff members. These disputes are not decided by the General
Assembly of the United Nations—this would burden it unduly ;
nor by the International Court of Justice—this would increase its
task considerably ; nor by any other tribunal. Accordingly, the
General Assembly considered it necessary to establish a subsidiary
organ in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter.

Certain governments, in their opinions, and the Court itself, have
sought at considerable length to prove that the General Assembly
had the capacity to establish that organ ; in my opinion, the Assem-
bly clearly had that capacity by virtue of Article 22 quoted above
and by virtue of the omnipotence of the Assembly.

The name of this organ is especially significant : “The United
Nations Administrative Tribunal”.

What is involved is, indeed, a tribunal and not—as alleged by
certain governments—a mere advisory body of the Assembly
because, under the terms of its Statute, the Tribunal delivers
binding judgments ; it is not, however, a judicial tribunal : it is an
administrative tribunal because it deals only with specific questions

29
U. N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 73

in that field, which, in the first instance, fall within the purview
of the General Assembly which established the Tribunal to assist
it in the discharge of its duties.

The members of the Tribunal are appointed by the General
Assembly and the Statute of the Tribunal was drawn up by the
Assembly.

It is self-evident that the Tribunal has no competence other than
that conferred upon it expressly by the Assembly ; the Tribunal’s
competence is indicated in Article 2 of its Statute: its particular
task is to settle disputes arising out of contracts of employment
entered into between the Secretariat and the staff members of the
United Nations.

Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Statute provides that ‘the
judgments shall be final and without appeal” ; and Article 9 provides
that “in any case involving compensation, the amount awarded
shall be fixed by the Tribunal and paid by the United Nations....”’.

It is to be noted that the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal
does not provide for any means of appeal against the awards ; nor
does it indicate how effect is to be given to the awards.

There is therefore a difference between the Tribunal and the
International Court of Justice in this respect.

The judgments of the International Court of Justice, which is
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Art. 92 of the
Charter), are “final and without appeal’ (Art. 60 of the Statute
of the Court), but provision is made for revision or interpretation
by the Court in certain cases (Arts. 60-61 of the Statute).

As regards compliance with the decisions of the Court, the
interested party may, in accordance with Article 94 of the Charter,
have recourse to the Security Council “which may, if at deems
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment”’.

The carrying out of the judgments of the Court is thus dependent
upon the Security Council, which may make a decision in this
respect, as has just been pointed out.

Since the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal contains no
provision for the review of its awards and no provision relating
to their performance, do those awards automatically bind the
Assembly so that the Assembly must always give effect to them
even when they are vitiated by a patent defect, such as excess
of powers or manifest injustice ? Obviously not.

It is inadmissible that a principal organ of the United Nations,
such as the General Assembly, which has very broad powers,
should be bound passively to. give effect to all the awards of a
tribunal which it has established. The Assembly is bound to do
so only in cases in which the Tribunal has acted within the limits
of its competence. But if the Assembly considers that the Tribunal
has acted ultra vires—for example, if it grants an amount of
compensation which is higher than the amount claimed, or if

30
U.N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 74.

the compensation has been awarded without valid grounds, or
if the Tribunal has committed an abus du droit—then there can
be no doubt that the Assembly can refuse to give effect to the
award by not providing for the amount of compensation in the
budget of the Organization ; but in such a case the Assembly
is bound to indicate expressly the grounds for its refusal, failing
which its attitude would be open to criticism.

As I have already pointed out above, it is a principle of classical
international law—and also of modern international law—that
the awards of tribunals are not binding when they are vitiated
by some defect, as, for example, when the tribunal has acted
ultva vives, and that accordingly the parties may refuse to give
effect to them. In order to make the awards binding in such
cases, an express provision would be required in the instrument
providing for the constitution of the tribunal. But no such provision
exists in the case of the Administrative Tribunal.

What the Court said in its Advisory Opinion in the matter
of Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United
Nations is perfectly applicable here ; the relevant passage which
is quoted in the present Advisory Opinion by the Court in support
of other assertions is as follows: “Under international law, the
Organization (the Assembly in the present case) must be deemed
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in
the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as
being essential to the performance of its duties’ (I.C.J. Reports
1949, p. 182).

The General Assembly of the United Nations which, as has
been pointed out above, must constantly be guided by the notion
of international social justice, cannot passively agree to give
effect to the awards of a subsidiary organ which it has established
if those awards are vitiated by a patent defect.

Furthermore, the nature of the Tribunal is such that its decisions
do not have the same scope in respect of the applicant as they
do in respect of the respondent, or the General Assembly of the
United Nations. They are binding on the applicant since he
resorted to this Tribunal, which was especially created to deal
with his complaints and which, moreover, is the only tribunal
in existence for this purpose ; but the decisions of the Tribunal
are not binding upon the General Assembly, which may refuse
to give effect to them if it considers that there are valid reasons
for such a refusal. By acting in this way, the Assembly is not
setting itself up as a court of appeal; nor does it proceed to
review the awards: it is merely exercising a right which it has
to supervise the performance of the judgments of the Adminis-
trative Tribunal which it has established. To deny this right
to the Assembly would be tantamount to placing the Tribunal
above the Assembly, which is inadmissible.

31
U.N. ADM. TRIB. (DISS. OP. BY JUDGE ALVAREZ) 75

A concrete case may arise which would fully justify the fore-
going assertion : it is the opposite case to the one usually considered.
Let us suppose that the Assembly should consider that an application
is well-founded which the Administrative Tribunal has found to be
inadmissible. Could it then be argued that the General Assembly
is not entitled to sustain this application ? This is a question which
answers itself.

Furthermore, a considerable change may occur in the economic
or social conditions between the date of the giving of the award
and that of its performance, which might entirely alter the scope
of the award, for example, if there should be an abrupt fluctuation
in the value of the dollar, the currency in which the amount of
compensation is fixed, resulting in a considerable modification in
the real value of the compensation. Should the Assembly remain
passive ? Should it not have the power to refer the matter back
to the Tribunal for necessary adiustment, or should the Assembly
itself not have the power to make such an adjustment ?

Finally, it may happen that an award of compensation has been
validly made, but that the Assembly has no funds available for
that purpose ; the Assembly must then decide how the payment
shall subsequently be made.

The Assembly must make provision in the budget of the United
Nations for the following expenditure : first, all expenditure relating
to bodies established by the Charter, for the Assembly is bound to
respect the provisions of the Charter; secondly, all other expend-
iture deemed necessary by the Assembly, as well as that arising
from the performance of the obligations contracted by the Organi-
zation ; and finally, the compensation to be paid in pursuance of
those awards of the Administrative Tribunal which the Assembly
regards as justified.

In short, the Assembly is sovereign in the matter of the drawing
up and adoption of the budget of the Organization ; there is no
appeal against the decisions of the Assembly and the only sanction
in respect of its actions is the criticism of public opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, I give the following answer to the
questions referred to the Court :

In reply to Question (1), I am of opinion that the General Assembly
has the right to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation
made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal if it considers
that there are serious grounds justifying such a refusal.

In reply to Question (2), I am of the opinion that the grounds on
which the General Assembly is entitled to refuse to give effect to
such an award are, in particular, if the Tribunal has acted ultra
vires or if there has been manifest injustice especially if in conflict
with the concept of international social justice, or a violation of
the great principles of international law.

(Signed) A. ALVAREZ.
32