34

DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER.

[ Translation. |

Turkey, having arrested, tried and convicted a foreigner for an
offence which he is alleged to have committed outside her territory,
claims to have been authorized to do so by reason of the absence
of a prohibitive rule of international law.

Her defence is based on the contention that under international
law everything which is not prohibited is permitted.

In other words, on the contention that, under international law,
every door is open unless it is closed by treaty or by established
custom.

The Court in its judgment holds that this view is correct, well
founded, and in accordance with actual facts.

I regret that I am unable to’concur with the opinion of the
Court. |

It seems to me that the contention is at variance with the spirit

of international law. This law is for the most part unwritten and
lacks sanctions ; it rests on a general consensus of opinion ; on the
acceptance by civilized States, members of the great community
of nations, of rules, customs and existing conditions which they
are bound to respect in their mutual relations, although neither
committed to writing nor confirmed by conventions. This body
of rules is called international law.
* These rules may be gradually modified, altered or extended, in
accordance with the views of a considerable majority of these States,
as this consensus of opinion develops, but is seems to me incor-
rect to say that the municipal law of a minority of States suffices
to abrogate or change them.

It also appears to me incorrect to claim that the absence of inter-
national disputes or diplomatic difficulties in regard to certain pro-
visions of the laws of some States, which are at variance with
generally accepted ideas, can serve to show the development or
modification of such ideas.

International disputes only arise when a particular application
of the laws in question shows them to be at variance with inter-
national law. _ |

The family of nations consists of a collection of different sovereign
and independent States.
JUDGMENT No. 9.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER 35

The fundamental consequence of their independence and sov-
ereignty is that no municipal law, in the particular case under con-
sideration no criminal law, can apply or have binding effect outside
the national territory.

This fundamental truth, which is not a custom but the direct
and inevitable consequence of its premiss, is a logical principle of
law, and is a postulate upon which the mutual independence of
States rests.

The criminal law of a State applies in the first place to all persons
within its territory, whether nationals or foreigners, because the
right of jurisdiction over its own territory is an attribute of its
sovereignty.

The criminal law of a State may extend to crimes and offences
committed abroad by its nationals, since such nationals are subject
to the law of their own country ; but it cannot extend to offences
committed by a foreigner in foreign territory, without infringing
the sovereign rights of the foreign State concerned, since in that
State the State enacting the law has no jurisdiction.

Nor can such a law extend in the territory of the State enacting
it to an offence committed by a foreigner abroad should the foreigner
happen to be in this territory after the commission of the offence,
because the guilty act has not been committed within the area sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of that State and the subsequent presence
of the guilty person cannot have the effect of extending the juris-
diction of the State.

It seems to me clear that such is the logical consequence of the
fundamental principle above enunciated.

It however is also clear that this consequence can be overridden
by some convention to the contrary effect or by some exception
generally and even tacitly recognized by international law.

Like all exceptions, however, such an exception must be strictly
construed and cannot be substituted for the well-established rule,
to which it is an exception. |

Now, the rule has gradually undergone an important modifica-
tion in the legislation of a somewhat large majority of civilized
States, a modification which does not seem to have encountered
objections and which may be regarded as having been accepted.
This modification tends to except from the strict rule governing
the jurisdiction over offences committed by foreigners abroad such
offences, in so far as they are directed against the State itself or

5
JUDGMENT No. 9.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER 36

against its security or credit. The injured State may try the guilty
persons according to its own law if they happen to be in its territory
or, if necessary, it may ask for their extradition.

Apart from this exception, the rule holds good.

The so-called system of ‘protection’ which Turkey claims to be
entitled to apply and which is tantamount to the abrogation of the
rule itself, is very far from being accepted by the great majority
of States and is not in my opinion in harmony with positive inter-
national law.

The alleged offence with which M. Demons is charged by Turkey,
namely, involuntary manslaughter, does not fall within the scope
of the exception which I have mentioned. Turkey admits that she
is applying the so-called system of “protection” in pursuance of
her municipal law and she holds that she is authorized to do so
because she has found nowhere a positive and accepted rule pro-
hibiting her from so doing.

It will appear from the foregoing that I am of opinion that for
this reason alone, Turkey must be held to have acted in contraven-
tion of the principles of international law.

* *

The Court has been made cognizant of a definite occurrence ; it
has to give judgment upon a particular case. This case is the colli-
sion between the French ship Lotus and the Turkish ship Boz-Kourt.

Turkey claims that both vessels, owing to faulty navigation, were
jointly to blame for this collision.

The result of the collision was that the Boz-Kourt sank, and that
some members of the crew and passengers were drowned.

Turkey argues from these facts that M. Demons, officer of the
watch on board the Lotus, is guilty of manslaughter and that he
is responsible for the death of the persons above mentioned.

She argues that this offence took place on board the Boz-Kourt
because it was there that the effects of the alleged negligence were
felt.

She therefore contends that the wrongful act having taken place
on board the Turkish ship, its author is amenable to the jurisdiction
of the Turkish Courts.

If this argument be sound, in point of fact the deduction made
from it is correct and the accusation of having acted contrary to
JUDGMENT No. 9.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER 37

the principles of international law at once falls to the ground,
because every State is entitled to prosecute and sentence any for-
eigner who commits an offence within its territory. And the
vessel Boz-Kourt must be regarded as Turkish territory.

The question of the localization of the offence is therefore of
capital importance for the purposes of the decision of the dispute
before the Court. |

It is clear that the place where an offence has been committed
is necessarily that where the guilty person is when he commits the
act. The assumption that the place where the effect is produced
is the place where the act was committed is in every case a legal
fiction. It is, however, justified where the act and its effect are
indistinguishable, when there is a direct relation between them ;
for instance, a shot fired at a person on the other side of a frontier ;
a parcel containing an infernal machine intended to explode on
being opened by the person to whom it is sent. The author of the
crime intends in such cases to inflict injury at a place other than
that where he himself is.

But the case which the Court has to consider bears no resemblance
“to these instances. The officer of the Lotus, who had never set
foot on board the Boz-Kouri, had no intention of injuring anyone,
and no such intention is imputed to him. The movements executed
in the navigation of a vessel are only designed to avoid an accident.

Only an investigation by naval experts into the circumstances
can show whether the manner in which the ship was navigated is to
be regarded as contrary to the regulations or negligent in some
respect, or whether some unforeseen movement by the other vessel
contributed to the accident—and this investigation is a matter
solely for the naval authorities of the country of the person respon-
sible for navigating the ship.

In these circumstances, it seems to me that the legal fiction where-
- by the act is held to have been committed at the place where the
effect is produced must be discarded.

Turkey seeks to base her jurisdiction upon an alleged “connexity”
between the movements of the two vessels.
JUDGMENT No. 9.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER 38.

She, in fact, claims that the offence of involuntary manslaughter,
imputed to M. Demons, is “connected” (connexe) with the identical
charge against the captain of the Boz-Kourt and that the Turkish
court has jurisdiction on this ground.

This argument is also unsound.

Simultaneousness is not the same as “connexity’’.

The movements of the two vessels were independent of each
other : the movement of each ship was even unknown to the officer
commanding the other.

= The result of both movements may have been the collision, but
there is no kind of ‘‘connexity’’ between them.

À municipal statute, or a code of procedure, may, in order to
simplify the conduct of two or more cases and to facilitate their
examination, provide for the possibility of their joinder by reason
of their being connected. Proceedings must then have been insti-
tuted in both cases before they can be joined on the ground of
connection between them (connexité). And joinder will only be

possible if the judge before whom the joined causes are brought
has jurisdiction in respect of each of them separately.

Joinder on the ground of ‘‘connexity”’ is a proceeding under muni-
cipal law ; “‘connexity” does not create jurisdiction.

FA
* *

The general rule that the criminal law of a State loses its compel-
ling force and its applicability in relation to offences committed by
a foreigner in foreign territory, a rule derived from the basic prin-
ciple of the sovereignty and independence of States, has indeed
undergone modifications and has been made subject to exceptions
restricting its scope by the mutual consent of the different Powers
in so far as territory properly so called is concerned.

But according to a generally accepted view, this is not the case
as regards the high seas. There the law of the flag and national
jurisdiction have retained their indisputable authority to the exclu-
sion of all foreign law or jurisdiction. I lay special stress on the
word “foreign”. A guilty person on board a ship flying the flag
of a State other than the one to which he owes allegiance, may of
course be indicted and sentenced by the State of which he is a
national. In that case, but only then, there will be concurrent
jurisdiction.
JUDGMENT No. 9.—-DISSENTING OPINION BY M. LODER 39

But that is not M. Demons’ case.

A merchant ship being a complete entity, organized and subject
to discipline in conformity with the laws and subject to the control
of the State whose flag it flies, and having regard to the absence of
all territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, it is only natural
that as far as concerns criminal law this entity should come under
the jurisdiction of that State. This applies with especial force
to the case now before the Court. The accusation against Lieute-
nant Demons is that whilst navigating his ship he gave an order
for a wrong manœuvre.

The rules for navigation which he was obliged to follow were
those contained in his national regulations. He was responsible
to his national authorities for the observance of these rules. It was
solely for these authorities to consider whether the officer had
observed these rules, whether he had done his duty, and, if not,
whether he had neglected their observance to such a degree as to
have incurred criminal responsibility.

It consequently seems to me that Turkey, in arrogating to herself
jurisdiction over the acts of a foreign officer doing duty on the
high seas on a ship carrying a foreign flag, has acted in contraven-
tion of the principle of international law set out above.

On these grounds I regret that I am unable to concur with the
Court in its present judgment.


                                                                                228

               DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE TOMKA

[Texte original en français]

   Recherche d’une solution équitable dans la délimitation de la zone économique
exclusive et du plateau continental — Nécessité d’éviter que la frontière maritime
ne produise un effet d’amputation marqué — Ajustement de la ligne
d’équidistance provisoire — Recherche d’un juste équilibre entre les droits respectifs
des Parties.

  1. Bien que j’aie souscrit à toutes les conclusions de la Cour, je ne suis
pas pleinement satisfait de la manière dont celle-ci a établi la frontière
maritime entre les Parties dans la mer des Caraïbes. A mon sens, le pre-
mier segment de la ligne ainsi tracée a pour eﬀet d’amputer les projections
d’une partie non négligeable — voire substantielle — de la côte concave
du Nicaragua dans la Bahía de San Juan del Norte.

   2. Le droit applicable à la délimitation de la zone économique exclu-
sive et du plateau continental entre le Costa Rica et le Nicaragua, tous
deux Etats parties à la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la
mer de 1982, se trouve aux articles 74 et 83, respectivement, de cet instru-
ment. Ces deux articles quasiment identiques (la seule diﬀérence étant que
le premier fait référence à la zone économique exclusive et le second au
plateau continental) disposent ce qui suit :
        « 1. La délimitation [de la zone économique exclusive/du plateau
     continental] entre Etats dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face
     est eﬀectuée par voie d’accord conformément au droit international
     tel qu’il est visé à l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour internationale de
     Justice, aﬁn d’aboutir à une solution équitable.
        2. S’ils ne parviennent pas à un accord dans un délai raisonnable,
     les Etats concernés ont recours aux procédures prévues à la par-
     tie XV… ».
  3. De par leur caractère très général, ces dispositions ne disent pas clai-
rement comment procéder. Les Etats sont censés négocier en vue de s’en-
tendre sur une délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau
continental qui leur permette d’aboutir à « une solution équitable ». C’est
à eux qu’il revient d’apprécier ce qui est « équitable ». Mais dès lors qu’ils
parviennent à un accord, ils sont réputés avoir trouvé « une solution équi-
table ». Si toutefois ils ne parviennent pas à s’entendre, ils auront recours
à des procédures de règlement des diﬀérends pour résoudre la question
pendante de leur frontière maritime. Lorsque la Cour est choisie comme
juridiction pour régler ce diﬀérend, sa mission se substitue en fait à celle
qui incombait initialement aux Etats concernés, à savoir la recherche

                                                                                93

    délimitation maritime et frontière terrestre (décl. tomka) 229

d’« une solution équitable ». En pratique, il en résultera une ligne de déli-
mitation qui permette d’emporter l’adhésion de la majorité des juges sié-
geant en l’aﬀaire.
   4. Cet exercice peut conduire à un résultat qui, bien que contraignant
pour les parties, sera plus ou moins convaincant. La Cour a précisé sa
jurisprudence aﬁn de fournir des orientations sur la manière d’eﬀectuer
une délimitation maritime en gardant toujours à l’esprit que l’objectif est
d’aboutir à « une solution équitable ». Selon cette jurisprudence, une ligne
frontière ne doit pas amputer les projections côtières de l’une ou l’autre
des parties (voir Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colom-
bie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II), p. 703-704, par. 215-216). Dans l’af-
faire relative à la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), la Cour a expliqué que la ligne tracée par elle devait per-
mettre « aux côtes adjacentes des Parties de produire leurs eﬀets, en
matière de droits maritimes, d’une manière raisonnable et équilibrée pour
chacune d’entre elles » (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 127, par. 201). Par
ailleurs, la Cour a estimé qu’une ligne d’équidistance provisoire produi-
sant un eﬀet d’amputation devait être ajustée si cela était nécessaire pour
aboutir à « une solution équitable » (Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II), p. 703-704,
par. 215). De même, le Tribunal international du droit de la mer, obser-
vant que, en raison de la côte « manifestement concave » de l’une des par-
ties, la ligne d’équidistance provisoire produisait « sur la projection
maritime de la côte nord [de celle-ci] un eﬀet d’amputation marqué », a
conclu que cette situation constituait « une circonstance pertinente qui
nécessit[ait] un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire » (Délimi-
tation de la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/
Myanmar), arrêt, TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 87, par. 323-324).
   5. A mon sens, la Cour, en la présente espèce, n’a pas complètement
réussi à éviter l’eﬀet d’amputation produit par le premier segment de la
ligne de délimitation dans la mer des Caraïbes. Le tracé de cette ligne est
illustré ci-dessous (p. 230) sur le croquis A, qui est un agrandissement tiré
du croquis no 11 ﬁgurant dans l’arrêt de la Cour.
   6. Ce croquis montre que le segment initial de la ligne de délimitation
a pour eﬀet d’amputer les projections maritimes (non seulement radiales
mais également frontales) générées par près de la moitié de la longue côte
concave du Nicaragua dans la Bahía de San Juan del Norte. J’estime que
le résultat obtenu n’est pas totalement équitable. La Cour aurait dû ajus-
ter quelque peu la ligne dans la zone économique exclusive et sur le pla-
teau continental, aﬁn d’atténuer l’amputation produite. A mon avis, elle
aurait dû, pour ce faire, relier par une ligne droite le point Lx (point ter-
minal de la frontière maritime dans la mer territoriale) et le point P
(signalé sur le croquis A).

  7. Cet ajustement aurait permis à la Cour d’assurer un équilibre plus
juste entre les droits respectifs des Parties et d’aboutir à une solution glo-
bale plus équitable, d’autant qu’elle a décidé qu’« il ne sera[it] pas tenu

                                                                           94

    délimitation maritime et frontière terrestre (décl. tomka) 230

compte … d’un quelconque droit qui découlerait » du cordon littoral
séparant la lagune de Harbor Head de la mer des Caraïbes (arrêt,
par. 105). La souveraineté sur le cordon littoral et la lagune appartient au
Nicaragua (ibid., par. 205, point 2)). La Cour ne tranche pas la question
de savoir si le cordon littoral génère un quelconque droit maritime au
bénéﬁce du Nicaragua, se bornant à relever que « [s]i l’enclave devait se
voir attribuer des eaux territoriales, celles-ci seraient peu utiles au Nicara-
gua, tout en brisant la continuité de la mer territoriale du Costa Rica »
(ibid., par. 105). Bien que l’on puisse comprendre qu’elle ait choisi cette
approche pragmatique, l’on pouvait cependant s’attendre aussi à ce que
la Cour apporte une solution plus équilibrée aux eﬀets que produit la
concavité marquée de la côte nicaraguayenne dans la Bahía de San Juan
del Norte, combinée à la convexité du court segment de côte costa-
ricienne qui lui est immédiatement adjacent.

                                                    (Signé) Peter Tomka.

                                                                            95


334

              SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SIMMA

   The Court should have called the Ugandan invasion of a large part of the
DRC’s territory an act of aggression — The Court should not have avoided
dealing with the issue of self-defence against large-scale cross-boundary armed
attacks by non-State actors but rather it should have taken the opportunity to
clarify a matter to the confused state of which it has itself contributed —
Against the background of current attempts to deprive certain persons of the
protection due to them under international humanitarian and human rights law,
the Court should have found that the private persons maltreated at Kinshasa
Airport in August 1998 did enjoy such protection, and that Uganda would have
had standing to raise a claim in their regard irrespective of their nationality.

   1. Let me emphasize at the outset that I agree with everything the
Court is saying in its Judgment. Rather, what I am concerned about are
certain issues on which the Court decided to say nothing. The first two
matters in this regard fall within the ambit of the use of force in the con-
text of the claims of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ; the third
issue concerns the applicability of international humanitarian and human
rights law to a certain part of Uganda’s second counter-claim.

      1. THE USE OF FORCE BY UGANDA AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION
   2. One deliberate omission characterizing the Judgment will strike any
politically alert reader : it is the way in which the Court has avoided deal-
ing with the explicit request of the DRC to find that Uganda, by its mas-
sive use of force against the Applicant has committed an act of aggres-
sion. In this regard I associate myself with the criticism expressed in the
separate opinion of Judge Elaraby. After all, Uganda invaded a part of
the territory of the DRC of the size of Germany and kept it under its own
control, or that of the various Congolese warlords it befriended, for sev-
eral years, helping itself to the immense natural riches of these tormented
regions. In its Judgment the Court cannot but acknowledge of course
that by engaging in these “military activities” Uganda “violated the prin-
ciple of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of
non-intervention” (Judgment, para. 345 (1)). The Judgment gets toughest
in paragraph 165 of its reasoning where it states that “[t]he unlawful mili-
tary intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that
the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition of the use
of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter”. So, why not

170

335                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. SIMMA)

call a spade a spade ? If there ever was a military activity before the Court
that deserves to be qualified as an act of aggression, it is the Ugandan
invasion of the DRC. Compared to its scale and impact, the military
adventures the Court had to deal with in earlier cases, as in Corfu Chan-
nel, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua or Oil
Platforms, border on the insignificant.

   3. It is true that the United Nations Security Council, despite adopting
a whole series of resolutions on the situation in the Great Lakes region
(cf. paragraph 150 of the Judgment) has never gone as far as expressly
qualifying the Ugandan invasion as an act of aggression, even though it
must appear as a textbook example of the first one of the definitions of
“this most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” laid
down in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). The Council will
have had its own — political — reasons for refraining from such a deter-
mination. But the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, does not have to follow that course. Its very raison d’être is to
arrive at decisions based on law and nothing but the law, keeping the
political context of the cases before it in mind, of course, but not desist-
ing from stating what is manifest out of regard for such non-legal con-
siderations. This is the division of labour between the Court and the
political organs of the United Nations envisaged by the Charter !

2. SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST LARGE-SCALE ARMED ATTACKS BY NON-STATE
                            ACTORS

   4. I am in agreement with the Court’s finding in paragraph 146 of the
Judgment that the “armed attacks” to which Uganda referred when
claiming to have acted in self-defence against the DRC were perpetrated
not by the Congolese armed forces but rather by the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), that is, from a rebel group operating against Uganda
from Congolese territory. The Court stated that Uganda could provide
no satisfactory proof that would have sustained its allegation that these
attacks emanated from armed bands or regulars sent by or on behalf of
the DRC. Thus these attacks are not attributable to the DRC.

  5. The Court, however, then finds, that for these reasons the legal and
factual circumstances for the exercise of a right to self-defence by Uganda
against the DRC were not present (Judgment, para. 147). Accordingly,
the Court continues, it has no need to respond to the contentions of the
Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary interna-

171

336                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. SIMMA)

tional law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks
by irregular forces (Judgment, para. 147).

  6. Thus, the reasoning on which the Judgment relies in its findings on
the first submission by the DRC appears to be as follows :
— since the submission of the DRC requests the Court (only) to find
  that it was Uganda’s use of force against the DRC which constituted
  an act of aggression, and
— since the Court does not consider that the military activities carried
  out from Congolese territory onto the territory of the Respondent by
  anti-Ugandan rebel forces are attributable to the DRC,
— and since therefore Uganda’s claim that its use of force against the
  DRC was justified as an exercise of self-defence, cannot be upheld,

it suffices for the Court to find Uganda in breach of the prohibition of the
use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in general inter-
national law. The Applicant, the Court appears to say, has not asked for
anything beyond that. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Court to deal
with the legal qualification of either the cross-boundary military activities
of the anti-Ugandan groups as such, or of the Ugandan countermeasures
against these hostile acts.
   7. What thus remains unanswered by the Court is the question whether,
even if not attributable to the DRC, such activities could have been
repelled by Uganda through engaging these groups also on Congolese
territory, if necessary, provided that the rebel attacks were of a scale suf-
ficient to reach the threshold of an “armed attack” within the meaning of
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
   8. Like Judge Kooijmans in paragraphs 25 ff. of his separate opinion,
I submit that the Court should have taken the opportunity presented by
the present case to clarify the state of the law on a highly controversial
matter which is marked by great controversy and confusion — not the
least because it was the Court itself that has substantially contributed to
this confusion by its Nicaragua Judgment of two decades ago. With
Judge Kooijmans, I regret that the Court “thus has missed a chance to
fine-tune the position it took 20 years ago in spite of the explicit invita-
tion by one of the Parties to do so” (separate opinion of Judge Kooij-
mans, para. 25).
   9. From the Nicaragua case onwards the Court has made several pro-
nouncements on questions of use of force and self-defence which are
problematic less for the things they say than for the questions they leave
open, prominently among them the issue of self-defence against armed
attacks by non-State actors.

   10. The most recent — and most pertinent — statement in this context
is to be found in the (extremely succinct) discussion by the Court in its
Wall Opinion of the Israeli argument that the separation barrier under

172

337                    ARMED ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. SIMMA)

construction was a measure wholly consistent with the right of States to
self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter (Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advi-
sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 194, para. 138). To this argument
the Court replied that Article 51 recognizes the existence of an inherent
right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack by one State against
another. Since Israel did not claim that the attacks against it were
imputable to a foreign State, however, Article 51 of the Charter had
no relevance in the case of the wall (ibid., para. 139).

   11. Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected
the state, or rather the prevailing interpretation, of the international law
on self-defence for a long time. However, in the light of more recent
developments not only in State practice but also with regard to accom-
panying opinio juris, it ought urgently to be reconsidered, also by the
Court. As is well known, these developments were triggered by the terror-
ist attacks of September 11, in the wake of which claims that Article 51
also covers defensive measures against terrorist groups have been received
far more favourably by the international community than other extensive
re-readings of the relevant Charter provisions, particularly the “Bush
doctrine” justifying the pre-emptive use of force 1. Security Council reso-
lutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as affirmations of
the view that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can qualify as
“armed attacks” within the meaning of Article 51.

   12. In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans points to the fact that
the almost complete absence of governmental authority in the whole
or part of the territory of certain States has unfortunately become a
phenomenon as familiar as international terrorism (separate opinion of
Judge Kooijmans, para. 30). I fully agree with his conclusions that, if
armed attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory
against a neighbouring State, these activities are still armed attacks even
if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State, and, further, that it
“would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-
defence merely because there is no attacker State and the Charter does
not so require” (ibid.) 2.
   13. I also subscribe to Judge Kooijmans’s opinion that the lawfulness

  1 Th. Bruha and Ch. Tams, “Self-Defence against Terrorist Attacks. Considerations in

the Light of the ICJ’s ‘Israeli Wall’ Opinion”, in K. Dicke et al (eds.), Weltinnenrecht.
Liber Amicorum Jost Delbrück, 2005, pp. 84-112, at p. 97.
  2 Referring to Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., 2001, p. 216.

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of the conduct of the attacked State in the face of such an armed attack
by a non-State group must be put to the same test as that applied in the
case of a claim of self-defence against a State, namely, does the scale of
the armed action by the irregulars amount to an armed attack and, if so,
is the defensive action by the attacked State in conformity with the
requirements of necessity and proportionality ? (Separate opinion of Judge
Kooijmans, para. 31.)
   14. In applying this test to the military activities of Uganda on Con-
golese territory from August 1998 onwards, Judge Kooijmans concludes
— and I agree — that, while the activities that Uganda conducted in
August in an area contiguous to the border may still be regarded as keep-
ing within these limits, the stepping up of Ugandan military operations
starting with the occupation of the Kisangani airport and continuing
thereafter, leading the Ugandan forces far into the interior of the DRC,
assumed a magnitude and duration that could not possibly be justified
any longer by reliance on any right of self-defence. Thus, at this point,
our view meets with, and shares, the Court’s final conclusion that
Uganda’s military intervention constitutes “a grave violation of the
prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of
the Charter” (Judgment, para. 165).
   15. What I wanted to demonstrate with the preceding reasoning is that
the Court could well have afforded to approach the question of the use of
armed force on a large scale by non-State actors in a realistic vein,
instead of avoiding it altogether by a sleight of hand, and still arrive at
the same convincing result. By the unnecessarily cautious way in which it
handles this matter, as well as by dodging the issue of “aggression”, the
Court creates the impression that it somehow feels uncomfortable being
confronted with certain questions of utmost importance in contemporary
international relations.

3. THE MALTREATMENT OF PERSONS AT NDJILI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
     AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

   16. My third observation relates to the maltreatment inflicted on
certain persons by Congolese soldiers at Ndjili International Airport in
Kinshasa in August 1998.
   In its second counter-claim, Uganda alleged, inter alia, that by mal-
treating certain individuals other than Ugandan diplomats when they
attempted to leave the country following the outbreak of the armed con-
flict, the DRC violated its obligations under the “international minimal
standard relating to the treatment of foreign nationals lawfully on State
territory”, as well as “universally recognized standards of human rights
concerning the security of the human person” (Counter-Memorial of
Uganda (CMU), paras. 405-407). The Court concluded in paragraph 333
of its Judgment that in presenting this part of the counter-claim Uganda

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was attempting to exercise its right to diplomatic protection with regard
to its nationals. It followed that Uganda would need to meet the condi-
tions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection as recognized in
general international law, that is, the requirement of Ugandan national-
ity of the individuals concerned and the prior exhaustion of local
remedies. The Court observed that no specific documentation could be
found in the case file identifying the persons as Ugandan nationals. The
Court thus decided that, this condition not being met, the part of
Uganda’s counter-claim under consideration here was inadmissible.
It thus upheld the objection of the DRC to this effect (Judgment,
para. 345 (11)).

  17. My vote in favour of this part of the Judgment only extends to the
inadmissibility of Uganda’s claim to diplomatic protection, since I agree
with the Court’s finding that the preconditions for a claim of diplomatic
protection by Uganda were not met. I am of the view, however, that the
Court’s reasoning should not have finished at this point. Rather, the
Court should have recognized that the victims of the attacks at the Ndjili
International Airport remained legally protected against such maltreat-
ment irrespective of their nationality, by other branches of international
law, namely international human rights and, particularly, international
humanitarian law. In its Judgment the Court has made a laudable effort
to apply the rules developed in these fields to the situation of persons of
varying nationality and status finding themselves in the war zones, in as
comprehensive a manner as possible. The only group of people that
remains unprotected by the legal shield thus devised by the Court are
the 17 unfortunate individuals encountering the fury of the Congolese
soldiers at the airport in Kinshasa.

   18. I have to admit that the way in which Uganda presented and
argued the part of its second counter-claim devoted to this group struck
me as somewhat careless, both with regard to the evidence that Uganda
mustered and to the quality of its legal reasoning. Such superficiality
might stem from the attempts of more or less desperate counsel to find
issues out of which they think they could construe what to them might
look like a professionally acceptable counter-claim 3, instead of genuine
concern for the fate of the persons concerned.

  3 This is not the first case giving me this impression ; cf. my separate opinion in the

case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 342-343, para. 36.

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   19. Be this as it may, I will take the opportunity of Uganda’s claim
concerning the events at the airport further to develop the thesis pre-
sented at the outset, namely that it would have been possible for the
Court in its Judgment to embrace the situation in which these individuals
found themselves, on the basis of international humanitarian and human
rights law, and that no legal void existed in their regard. The reader
might ask himself why I should give so much attention to an incident
which happened more than seven years ago, whose gravity must certainly
pale beside the unspeakable atrocities committed in the war in the Congo.
I will be very clear : I consider that legal arguments clarifying that in situ-
ations like the one before us no gaps exist in the law that would deprive
the affected persons of any legal protection, have, unfortunately, never
been as important as at present, in the face of certain recent deplorable
developments.

  20. Let me, first, turn to the relevance of international humanitarian
law to the incident at Ndjili International Airport.

   To begin with, the fact that the airport was not a site of major hostili-
ties in the armed conflict between the DRC and Uganda does not present
a barrier to the application of international humanitarian law to the
events which happened there. There are two reasons for this.
   21. First, the key issue in finding whether international humanitarian
law should apply also in peaceful areas of the territory of a belligerent
State is whether those areas are somehow connected to the conflict. This
was indeed the case with Ndjili International Airport because the indi-
viduals maltreated there found themselves in a situation of evacuation
from armed conflict. The Note of Protest sent by the Embassy of Uganda
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRC on 21 August 1998 —
which the Court considers reliable evidence in paragraph 339 of its Judg-
ment — states that individuals and Ugandan diplomats were at Ndjili
International Airport in the context of an evacuation (CMU, Ann. 23).
This evacuation was necessary due to the armed conflict taking place in
the DRC. Therefore, the events at the airport were factually connected to
the armed conflict. The airport was not a random peaceful location com-
pletely unconnected to that conflict. Quite the contrary, it was the point
of departure for an evacuation rendered necessary precisely by the armed
conflict. During that evacuation, the airport became the scene of violence
by Congolese forces against the evacuees.

  22. Article 80 (1) of the Rules of Court states that : “A counter-claim
may be presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-
matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the juris-
diction of the Court.” (Emphasis added.) In its Order of 29 November
2001, the Court found the second counter-claim admissible under the

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Article 80 “direct connection” test, stating that “each Party holds the
other responsible for various acts of oppression allegedly accompanying
an illegal use of force ; . . . these are facts of the same nature, and . . . the
Parties’ claims form part of the same factual complex” (para. 40 ; empha-
sis added). Therefore the Court had already determined, in its Order
under Article 80, that the events at the airport formed part of the “same
factual complex” as the armed conflict which constitutes the basis of the
main claim. Hence, international humanitarian law should apply to the
counter-claim as it does to the main claim.

  23. Second, the application of international humanitarian law to the
events at the airport would be consistent with the understanding of the
scope of international humanitarian law developed by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber. In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals Chamber stated :

         “Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
      between States or protracted armed violence between . . . such
      groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from
      the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessa-
      tion of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached ; or,
      in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is
      achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law con-
      tinues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the
      case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a
      party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.” (No. IT-94-1,
      Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the defence motion for inter-
      locutory appeal on jurisdiction, para. 70 (2 October 1995) ; emphasis
      added.)
The Appeals Chamber also noted that “the temporal and geographical
scope of both internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond
the exact time and place of hostilities” (ibid., para. 67). Later in the same
case, a Trial Chamber analysed the phrase “when committed in armed
conflict”, which qualifies the unlawful acts set out in Article 5 of the
Statute of the ICTY, and concluded that “it is not necessary that the acts
occur in the heat of battle” (Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, No. IT-94-1-T,
Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment, para. 632 (7 May 1997)). Simi-
larly, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY has stated that “there does not have
to be actual combat activities in a particular location for the norms of
international humanitarian law to be applicable” (Prosecutor v. Delalić,
Mucić, Delić, & Landzo, No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
para. 185 (16 November 1998)).

  24. I turn, next, to the substantive rules of international humanitarian

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law applicable to the persons in question. The provision which first
comes to mind is Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
According to Article 4, persons who “at a given moment and in any man-
ner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals” are considered “protected persons” under the Convention.
If the individuals maltreated by the DRC at Ndjili International Airport
were considered protected persons under Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, the behaviour of the Congolese soldiers would have violated
several provisions of that Convention, including Article 27 (requiring
that protected persons “shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall
be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and
against insults and public curiosity”), Article 32 (prohibiting the infliction
of physical suffering on protected persons), Article 33 (prohibiting
reprisals against protected persons and their property), and Article 36
(requiring that evacuations of protected persons be carried out safely).

   25. However, the qualification of the 17 individuals at the airport as
“protected persons” within the meaning of Article 4 meets with great
difficulties. As I stated above, Uganda was not able to prove that these
persons were its own nationals ; in fact we have no information what-
soever as to their nationality. In this regard, Article 4 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention states that :
        “Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory
      of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall
      not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they
      are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in
      whose hands they are.”

The individuals under consideration might have been nationals of
a neutral State or those of a co-belligerent (like Rwanda), and we do
not know whether their home State maintained normal diplomatic rela-
tions with the DRC at the time of the incident. Against this factual
background — or rather, the lack thereof — it would not have been
possible for the Court to regard them as “protected persons”.
   26. But this is not the end of the matter. The gap thus left by Geneva
Convention Article 4 has in the meantime been — deliberately — closed
by Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949. This provision enshrines the fundamental guarantees of interna-
tional humanitarian law and reads in pertinent part as follows :

        “1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in
      Article 1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party

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      to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treat-
      ment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated
      humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a minimum, the
      protection provided by this Article . . .
        2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
      and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by
      military agents :
      (a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of
           persons, in particular :
           . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
           (iii) corporal punishment ;
           . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
      (b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
           degrading treatment, . . .”
The Commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross to
Article 75 specifically notes that this provision was meant to provide pro-
tection to individuals who, by virtue of the exceptions listed in Article 4
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, did not qualify as “protected per-
sons”. Thus, the Commentary makes clear that Article 75 provides pro-
tection to both nationals of States not parties to the conflict and natio-
nals of allied States, even if their home State happened to have normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they find them-
selves 4. The Commentary emphasizes that “[i]f . . . there were . . . cases
in which the status of . . . protected person were denied to certain indi-
viduals, the protection of Article 75 must be applied to them as a mini-
mum” 5.
   27. The conclusion just arrived at has been confirmed recently in an
Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) established by the Council of Europe 6. This
Opinion was prepared to answer the question whether the new challenges
posed by international terrorism, and the claims made by the United
States in the wake of September 11 to the effect that the United States
could deny certain persons the protection of the Geneva Conventions
because they were “enemy unlawful combatants”, rendered necessary a
further development of international humanitarian law. According to the
Venice Commission, Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, as well as common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
(on which infra)
      “are based on the assumption that nationals of States which are not

  4 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of

12 August 1949, Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), 1987, p. 869.
  5 Ibid., p. 867.
  6 Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 57th Plenary Session, Venice, 12-13 Decem-

ber 2003, Opinion No. 245/2003, doc. No. CDL-AD (2003) 018, paras. 34 ff.

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      Parties to the conflict or nationals of co-belligerent States do not
      need the full protection of GC IV since they are normally even better
      protected by the rules on diplomatic protection. Should, however,
      diplomatic protection not be (properly) exercised on behalf of such
      third party nationals, International Humanitarian Law provides for
      protection under Article 75 P I and common Article 3 so that such
      persons do not remain without certain minimum rights.” 7

Thus, also according to the Venice Commission, there is “in respect of
these matters . . . no legal void in international law” 8.
   28. Further, it can safely be concluded that the fundamental guaran-
tees enshrined in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I are also embodied in
customary international law 9.
   29. Attention must also be drawn to Article 3 common to all four
Geneva Conventions, which defines certain rules to be applied in armed
conflicts of a non-international character. As the Court stated in the
Nicaragua case :

        “There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed con-
     flicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to
     the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international
     conflicts ; and they are rules which, in the Court’s opinion, reflect
     what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of human-
     ity’ (Corfu Channel, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22 . . .).” (Mili-
     tary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara-
     gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
     1986, p. 114, para. 218.)
As such, the Court in Nicaragua found these rules applicable to the inter-
national dispute before it. The same is valid in the present case. In this
regard, the decision of the Tadić Appeals Chamber discussed above is
also of note. In relation to common Article 3, it stated that “the rules
contained in Article 3 also apply outside the narrow geographical context
of the actual theatre of combat operations” (Prosecutor v. Tadić, Deci-
sion of the Appeals Chamber on the defence motion for interlocutory
appeal on jurisdiction, para. 69 ; see supra, para. 23).

  30. In addition to constituting breaches of international humanitarian

  7 Op. cit. footnote 6, para. 38.
  8 Ibid., para. 85.
  9 For a highly relevant reference in this regard (cf. supra, para. 19), United States

Army, Operational Law Handbook (2002), International and Operational Law Depart-
ment, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, issued 15 June 2001, Chap. 2, p. 5. See also, more generally, A. Roberts, “The Laws
of War in the War on Terror”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 32 (2002), pp. 192-
245.

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law, the maltreatment of the persons in question at Ndjili International
Airport was also in violation of international human rights law. In para-
graph 216 of its Judgment, the Court recalls its finding in the Advisory
Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, according to which “the
protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case
of armed conflict . . .” (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 178, para. 106). In its
Advisory Opinion, the Court continued :

        “As regards the relationship between international humanitarian
      law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations :
      some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitar-
      ian law ; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law ; yet
      others may be matters of both these branches of international law.”
      (Ibid.)
In my view, the maltreatment of the individuals at the airport falls under
the third category of the situations mentioned : it is a matter of both
international humanitarian and international human rights law.
   31. Applying international human rights law to the individuals mal-
treated by the DRC at Ndjili International Airport, the conduct of the
DRC would violate provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of
10 December 1984, to all of which both the DRC and Uganda are
parties. Specifically, under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, the conduct of the DRC would violate Article 7 (“No one
shall be subjected to . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment”), Article 9, paragraph 1 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or deten-
tion. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law”), Article 10,
paragraph 1 (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son”), and Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 (“1. Everyone lawfully within
the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement . . . 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own”).

   Under the African Charter, the conduct of the DRC would violate
Article 4 (“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be
entitled to respect for . . . the integrity of his person. No one may be arbi-
trarily deprived of this right”), Article 5 (“Every individual shall have the
right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the
recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation
of man particularly . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and

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treatment shall be prohibited”), Article 6 (“Every individual shall have
the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid
down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or
detained”), as well as Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 (“1. Every individual
shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 2. Every individual shall
have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to
his country . . .”). Finally, although the conduct of the DRC at Ndjili
International Airport did not rise to the level of torture, it was never-
theless in violation of Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Convention against
Torture which reads as follows :
         “Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory
      under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
      treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined
      in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation
      of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
      person acting in an official capacity.”

   32. The jurisdiction of the Court being firmly established, there remains
the issue of standing to raise violations of international humanitarian and
human rights law in the case of persons who may not have the nationality
of the claimant State. In the present case, regarding Uganda’s counter-
claim, the issue does not present itself in a technical sense because
Uganda has not actually pleaded a violation of either of these branches
of international law in relation to the persons in question. But if
Uganda had chosen to raise these violations before the Court, it would
undoubtedly have had standing to bring such claims.

   33. As to international humanitarian law, Uganda would have had
standing because, as the Court emphasized in its Advisory Opinion on
the Wall :
        “Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a provision common
      to the four Geneva Conventions, provides that ‘The High Contract-
      ing Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
      Convention in all circumstances.’ It follows from that provision that
      every State party to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to
      a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the require-
      ments of the instruments in question are complied with.” (I.C.J.
      Reports 2004, pp. 199-200, para. 158.)
The Court concluded that given the character and the importance of the
rights and obligations involved, there is an obligation on all States parties
to the Convention to respect and ensure respect for violations of the
international humanitarian law codified in the Convention (ibid., p. 200,
paras. 158-159). The same reasoning is applicable in the instant case.

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There cannot be any doubt that the obligation (not only to respect but
also) to ensure respect for international humanitarian law applies to the
obligations enshrined both in common Article 3 and in Protocol I Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions.
   34. The ICRC Commentary to common Article 1 of the Conventions
arrives at the same result in its analysis of the obligation to respect and to
ensure respect, where it is stated that :
      “in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations [under the
      Convention], the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy)
      may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect
      for the Convention. The proper working of the system of protection
      provided by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting
      Parties should not be content merely to apply its provisions them-
      selves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the
      humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied
      universally.” 10
Thus, regardless of whether the maltreated individuals were Ugandans or
not, Uganda had the right — indeed the duty — to raise the violations of
international humanitarian law committed against the private persons at
the airport. The implementation of a State party’s international legal
duty to ensure respect by another State party for the obligations arising
under humanitarian treaties by way of raising it before the International
Court of Justice is certainly one of the most constructive avenues in this
regard.
   35. As to the question of standing of a claimant State for violations of
human rights committed against persons which might or might not
possess the nationality of that State, the jurisdiction of the Court not
being at issue, the contemporary law of State responsibility provides a
positive answer as well. The International Law Commission’s 2001 draft
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides
not only for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State (which
quality Uganda would possess if it had been able to establish the
Ugandan nationality of the individuals at the airport) but also for the
possibility that such responsibility can be invoked by a State other
than an injured State. In this regard, Article 48 of the draft reads as
follows :

                                       “Article 48
        Invocation of Responsibility by a State Other than an Injured State
        1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the
      responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if :

  10 Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, J. S. Pictet (ed.), 1958, p. 16.

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348                   ARMED ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. SIMMA)

      (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including
            that State, and is established for the protection of a collective
            interest of the group ; or
      (b) The obligation breached is owed to the international commu-
            nity as a whole.
         2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1
      may claim from the responsible State :
      (a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances
            and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30 ;
            and
      (b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with
            the preceding articles, in the interest of the injured State or of
            the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
         3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an
      injured State under articles 43, 44 and 45 apply to an invocation of
      responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1.” 11

The obligations deriving from the human rights treaties cited above and
breached by the DRC are instances par excellence of obligations that
are owed to a group of States including Uganda, and are established
for the protection of a collective interest of the States parties to the
Covenant.
   36. With regard to the customary requirement of the exhaustion of
local remedies, this condition only applies if effective remedies are avail-
able in the first place (cf. ILC Article 44 (b) and the commentary
thereto). In view of the circumstances of the airport incident and, more
generally, of the political situation prevailing in the DRC at the time of
the Ugandan invasion, I tend to agree with the Ugandan argument that
attempts by the victims of that incident to seek justice in the Congolese
courts would have remained futile (cf. paragraph 317 of the Judgment).
Hence, no obstacle would have stood in the way for Uganda to raise the
violation of human rights of the persons maltreated at Ndjili Inter-
national Airport, even if these individuals did not possess its nationality.

   37. In summary of this issue, Uganda would have had standing to
bring, and the Court would have had jurisdiction to decide upon a claim
both under international humanitarian law and international human
rights law for the maltreatment of the individuals at the airport, irrespec-
tive of the nationality of these individuals. The specific construction of
the rights and obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well

  11 Report of the ILC on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, Official Records of the

General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10), p. 56.

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as the relevant provisions of Protocol I Additional to this Convention
not only entitles every State party to raise these violations but even cre-
ates an obligation to ensure respect for the humanitarian law in question.
The rules of the international law of State responsibility lead to an analo-
gous result as concerns the violations of human rights of the persons con-
cerned by the Congolese soldiers. Uganda chose the avenue of diplomatic
protection and failed. A reminder by the Court of the applicability
of international humanitarian and human rights law standards and of
Uganda’s standing to raise violations of the obligations deriving from
these standards by the DRC would, in my view, not have gone ultra
petita partium.

   38. Let me conclude with a more general observation on the commu-
nity interest underlying international humanitarian and human rights
law. I feel compelled to do so because of the notable hesitation and weak-
ness with which such community interest is currently manifesting itself
vis-à-vis the ongoing attempts to dismantle important elements of these
branches of international law in the proclaimed “war” on international
terrorism.
   39. As against such undue restraint it is to be remembered that at least
the core of the obligations deriving from the rules of international humani-
tarian and human rights law are valid erga omnes. According to the
Commentary of the ICRC to Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, “[t]he spirit which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes
it desirable that they should be applicable ‘erga omnes’, since they may
be regarded as the codification of accepted principles” 12. In its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the
Court stated that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person
and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ . . .”, that they are “to be
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions
that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 257, para. 79).
Similarly, in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court affirmed that the
rules of international humanitarian law “incorporate obligations which
are essentially of an erga omnes character” ( Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 199, para. 157).
   40. As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, obligations
erga omnes are by their very nature “the concern of all States” and, “[i]n
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection” (Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 32, para. 33). In the same vein, the International Law Commission has

 12   Op. cit. footnote 10, p. 48.

185

350                      ARMED ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. SIMMA)

stated in the Commentaries to its Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts that there are certain rights in the
protection of which, by reason of their importance, “all States have a
legal interest . . .” (A/56/10 at p. 278) 13.

   41. If the international community allowed such interest to erode in
the face not only of violations of obligations erga omnes but of outright
attempts to do away with these fundamental duties, and in their place to
open black holes in the law in which human beings may be “disappeared”
and deprived of any legal protection whatsoever for indefinite periods of
time, then international law, for me, would become much less worthwhile.

                                                            (Signed) Bruno SIMMA.

  13 Concerning the specific question of standing in case of breaches of obligations erga

omnes the Institute of International Law, in a resolution on the topic of obligations of this
nature adopted at its Krakow Session of 2005, accepted the following provisions :

                                             “Article 3
         In the event of there being a jurisdictional link between a State alleged to have
      committed a breach of an obligation erga omnes and a State to which the obligation
      is owed, the latter State has standing to bring a claim to the International Court of
      Justice or other international judicial institution in relation to a dispute concerning
      compliance with that obligation.
                                             Article 4
         The International Court of Justice or other international judicial institution should
      give a State to which an obligation erga omnes is owed the possibility to participate
      in proceedings pending before the Court or that institution and relating to that obli-
      gation. Specific rules should govern this participation.”

186


1933.

Le 26 janvier.

Rôle général
n° 46.

COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE

ORDONNANCE
RENDUE A LA DATE DU 26 JANVIER 10933

VINGT-SIXIÈME SESSION (EXTRAORDINAIRE)

26 janvier 1933.

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA DELIMITATION
DES EAUX TERRITORIALES ENTRE
L'ILE DE CASTELLORIZO ET LES

COTES D’ANATOLIE

Présents : MM. ADATCI, Président ; GUERRERO, Vice-Président ;
le baron ROLIN-JAEQUEMYNS, le comte Rostwo-
ROWSKI, ANZILOTTI, URRUTIA, sir CECIL HURST,
MM. SCHÜCKING, NEGULESCO, Jr. VAN EYSINGA,
WANG, juges.

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale,

ainsi composée,
après délibéré en Chambre du Conseil,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante :

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour;

Vu l'article 61 du Règlement de la Cour;

Considérant que, par un compromis signé à Ankara le 30 mai
1929, le Gouvernement de la République turque et le Gou-
vernement royal italien sont convenus de prier la Cour per-
manente de Justice internationale de La Haye de donner sa
décision sur certaines questions surgies à la suite de la déli-
mitation des eaux territoriales entre l’île de Castellorizo et
les côtes d’Anatolie ;

4
5 ILE DE CASTELLORIZO ET COTES D’ANATOLIE

Considérant qu’aux termes du compromis, la Cour serait
saisie desdites questions, dès l’entrée en vigueur du compromis,
par voie de signification de celui-ci au Greffe de la Cour par
l’une ou l’autre des Parties ;

Considérant que le compromis est entré en vigueur le 3 août
1931, à la suite de l’échange des instruments de ratification ;

Considérant que le compromis a été notifié au Greffe de
la Cour, en conformité des dispositions de l’article 40 du Sta-
tut de la Cour, par lettre en date du 18 novembre 1931 du
chargé d’affaires de Turquie à La Haye;

Considérant que la Turquie, qui n’est pas mentionnée à
l'annexe au Pacte de la Société des Nations, n'était pas, à
cette époque, Membre de la Société; qu’elle a fait parvenir
au Greffe, en même temps que le texte du compromis, une
déclaration faite conformément à l’article 35, alinéa 2, du
Règlement de la Cour;

Vu les ordonnances du 30 novembre 1931, du 8 mars 1932
et du 23 juin 1932, par lesquelles la Cour a fixé, puis, à la
demande des Parties, prolongé les délais pour la présentation,
par celles-ci, de leurs Mémoires, Contre-Mémoires et Répliques
dans l'affaire ;

Considérant que le délai fixé en dernier lieu pour le dépôt
des Mémoires vint à expiration le 3 janvier 1933;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du 3 janvier 10933, le
chargé d’affaires de Turquie à La Haye, d'ordre de son
Gouvernement et en se basant sur les dispositions de l’arti-
cle 61 du Règlement de la Cour, a fait savoir au Greffier que
son Gouvernement, d'accord en cela avec le Gouvernement royal
d'Italie, se désistait de son action introduite le 18. novembre
1937: et priait le Greffier de prendre acte de cette communication
afin que ladite action soit rayée du rôle de la Cour ;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du même jour, le ministre
d'Italie à La Haye, d’ordre de son Gouvernement, a informé
le Greffier, en se basant sur les dispositions de l’article 61 du
Réglement de la Cour, que le Gouvernement italien renongait
à poursuivre la procédure prévue dans le compromis d’arbi-
trage du 30 mai 1929 et initiée par la lettre en date du
18 novembre 1931 du chargé d’affaires de Turquie à La Haye,
et priait le Greffier de bien vouloir prendre acte de cette
renonciation afin que ladite procédure prenne fin;

Considérant que, les deux Parties au compromis du 30 mai
1929 étant ainsi d'accord pour renoncer à poursuivre la procé-
dure, rien n'empêche la Cour de prendre acte de cette renon-
ciation, qui met fin à la procédure ;
6 ILE DE CASTELLORIZO ET COTES D’ANATOLIE

Considérant que, dans ces conditions, il y a lieu de donner
suite 4 la demande des deux Gouvernements parties en cause
tendant à obtenir la radiation de Vaffaire du rôle de la Cour;

La Cour

Prend acte du fait que, d’un commun accord, le Gouver-
nement royal d’Italie et le Gouvernement de la République
turque renoncent à poursuivre la procédure prévue dans le
compromis intervenu à Ankara le 30 mai 1920 entre l'Italie
et la Turquie ;

Constate que la procédure ouverte au sujet de l'affaire
relative à la délimitation des eaux territoriales entre Vile de

Castellorizo et les côtes d’Anatolie a ainsi pris fin ;

Décide que ladite affaire sera rayée du rôle de la Cour.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte français faisant foi,
au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-six janvier mil
neuf cent trente-trois, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera
déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement royal d'Italie et au
Gouvernement de la République turque.

Le Président de la Cour:
(Signé) M. ADATCI.

Le Greffier de la Cour:
(Signé) À. HAMMARSKJÜLD.


535

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1974 1974
20 décembre
20 décembre 1974 Réle général
no 59

AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES
(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

REQUÊTE DE FIDJI À FIN D’INTERVENTION

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. LACHS, Président; MM. FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETRÉN,
ONYEAMA, DILLARD, IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, MOROZOV,
JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, sir Humphrey WALDOcCK, MM. Na-
GENDRA SINGH, RUDA, juges; sit Garfield BARWICK, juge ad hoc;
M. AQUARONE, Greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,
Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu les articles 48 et 62 du Statut de la Cour,

Vu la requête en date du 18 mai 1973 par laquelle le Gouvernement
fidjien a demandé à être autorisé à intervenir dans l’instance,

Vu l'ordonnance rendue par la Cour en l’espèce le 12 juillet 1973,
Rend Pordonnance suivante:

1. Considérant que, par un arrêt du 20 décembre 1974 en l’espèce, la
Cour dit que la demande de la Nouvelle-Zélande est désormais sans objet
et qu’il n’y a dès lors pas lieu à statuer,

2. Considérant qu’en conséquence il n’existe désormais plus d’instance
sur laquelle la requête à fin d’intervention puisse se greffer,
ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (ORDONNANCE 20 XII 74) 536

La Cour,
A l’unanimité,
Dit que la requéte par laquelle le Gouvernement fidjien demande a

intervenir dans l’instance introduite par la Nouvelle-Zélande contre
la France tombe et que la Cour n’a plus aucune suite à lui donner.

Fait en anglais et en frangais, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt décembre mil neuf cent soixante-quatorze,
en quatre exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour
et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement
fidjien, au Gouvernement néo-zélandais et au Gouvernement de la
République frangaise.

Le Président,
(Signé) Manfred LAcus.

Le Greffier.
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

M. Gros, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
[Translation]

I voted in favour of the present decision for reasons other than those
stated in the Order. The document filed by the Government of Fiji on
18 May 1973 could not in any way be regarded as a request to be per-
mitted to intervene within the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute, and
the request should have been dismissed in limine.

M. ONYEAMA, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
[Traduction ]

J’ai voté pour l’ordonnance, bien que, selon moi, le motif sur lequel
elle repose, à savoir que la demande de [Etat requérant est désormais
sans objet et qu’en conséquence il n’existe désormais plus d’instance sur
laquelle l’intervention puisse se greffer, implique une prémisse que je ne
suis pas en mesure d’accepter. Cette prémisse est que, si la demande avait
eu un objet et si la Cour avait été appelée à se prononcer à son égard, il
aurait existé une possibilité d'intervention en l’espèce.

A aucun moment qui intéresse la présente instance, Fidji n’a été.partie à
PActe général de 1928 et n’a accepté la clause facultative du Statut de la
Cour, qui ont été invoqués par l'Etat demandeur pour établir la-compé-

5
ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (ORDONNANCE 20 XII 74) 537

tence de la Cour, et il n’a pas non plus invoqué un titre quelconque de
juridiction vis-à-vis de la France dans sa requête à fin d’intervention.

La Cour aurait dû statuer sur cette requête elle-même comme le lui
prescrit l’article 62 de son Statut et aurait dû, à mon avis, la rejeter pour
le motif que la condition de réciprocité qui accompagne l’acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour n’était nullement remplie entre Fidji et
la France.

M. DILLARD et sit Humphrey WALDOCK, juges, font la déclaration
commune suivante:

[Traduction ]

L’ordonnance dit que la Cour, ayant considéré ia demande de la
Nouvelle-Zélande comme désormais sans objet, n’a plus aucune suite à
donner à cette demande et qu’en conséquence il n’existe désormais plus
d’instance sur laquelle une intervention puisse se greffer. De ce fait, d’après
la Cour, la requête du Gouvernement fidjien tombe.

La conclusion découle logiquement de la prémisse. En tant que mem-
bres de la Cour, liés par la décision rendue en l'affaire des Essais nucléaires,
nous sommes donc tenus de voter pour l’ordonnance. II n’est manifeste-
ment pas possible que le Gouvernement fidjien intervienne à l’instance dès
lors que, en vertu de l’arrêt de la Cour, aucune instance n’existe.

Cela dit, nous nous sentons l’obligation de dire que nous n’acceptons
pas la prémisse sur laquelle repose la conclusion de la Cour. Comme
l’indique de façon détaillée l’opinion dissidente que nous présentons avec
nos collègues, nous ne souscrivons pas à la décision de la Cour selon
laquelle il n’y a aucune suite à donner à la demande formulée par la
Nouvelle-Zélande contre la France.

Si les vues de la minorité l’avaient emporté dans l’affaire Nouvelle-
Zélande c. France, il aurait fallu examiner la question de l’intervention de
Fidji afin de déterminer s’il existait un lien juridictionnel suffisant entre
Fidji et la France pour justifier l'intervention de Fidji en vertu de l’ar-
ticle 62 du Statut de la Cour. De plus, on aurait dû selon nous donner à
Fidji la possibilité de se faire entendre sur la question avant de prendre
une décision.

Il résulte de ce qui précède que, tout en nous estimant tenus de voter
pour l'ordonnance que rend la Cour, nous avons pour ce faire des motifs
qui diffèrent à certains égards de ceux que la Cour a avancés.

M. JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

[Traduction]

J'ai voté pour le rejet de la requête par laquelle Fidji demandait à
intervenir en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut, mais pour un autre motif que

6
ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (ORDONNANCE 20 XII 74) 538

celui sur lequel se fonde l’ordonnance, à savoir que Fidji, qui n’est pas
partie à l’Acte de 1928, ni au système de la clause facultative, n’a invoqué,
dans sa requête, aucun lien de juridiction avec la France.

Pour pouvoir intervenir en application de l’article 62 du Statut en vue
de faire valoir un droit contre le défendeur, un Etat doit se trouver dans
une situation qui lui permettrait d’attraire lui-même le défendeur devant
la Cour. |

Les rédacteurs de l’article 62 du Statut sont partis du principe que
PEtat intervenant aurait son propre titre de juridiction vis-à-vis du défen-
deur, car à l’époque le projet de Statut envisageait une juridiction obliga-
toire pour tous. Quand ce système a été remplacé par celui de la clause
facultative, aucun changement n’a été apporté à l’article 62, mais, aux
fins de son interprétation et de son application, celui-ci doit être considéré
comme restant soumis à la même condition. S’il en allait autrement, il en
résulterait des conséquences fâcheuses et incompatibles avec des prin-
cipes fondamentaux tels que ceux de légalité des parties devant la Cour
ou de la réciprocité rigoureuse des droits et des obligations entre les Etats
qui acceptent sa compétence. Un Etat qu’un autre Etat ne peut pas
assigner comme défendeur devant la Cour ne peut pas non plus se pré-
senter comme demandeur ni comme partie intervenante contre ce même
Etat, avec la faculté de soumettre des conclusions indépendantes à
Pappui d’un intérêt propre. À mon avis, la disposition de l’article 69,
paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la Cour qui exige que soient exposées les
«raisons de droit et de fait justifiant l’intervention » doit s’entendre, en
des circonstances comme celles de ia présente espèce, comme imposant
aussi obligation d'établir un lien juridictionnel indépendant entre l’inter-
venant et le défendeur.

Sir Garfield BARWICK, juge ad hoc, fait la déclaration suivante:
[Traduction]

J'ai voté pour l’ordonnance relative à la requête de Fidji à fin d’inter-
vention dans la présente instance non pas en raison des arrêts rendus par
la Cour dans les affaires Australie c. France et Nouvelle-Zélande c. France
mais uniquement pour les motifs exposés par MM. Jiménez de Aréchaga
et Onyeama dans leurs déclarations concernant l’ordonnance relative à
Fidji, que j’approuve entièrement.

(Paraphé) M.L.
(Paraphé) S.A.