                     373

                           OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE ABRAHAM

                        Accord avec le dispositif de l’arrêt — Désaccord avec le raisonnement suivi par
                     la Cour pour conclure que le différend n’entre pas dans le champ ratione materiae
                     de l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme — Accord avec la conclusion selon
                     laquelle les règles du droit international coutumier relatives aux immunités de
                     l’Etat et de leurs agents ne sont pas incorporées dans l’article 4 de la convention —
                     Distinction injustifiée opérée par la Cour entre les règles relatives aux immunités
                     et les autres règles du droit international coutumier qui découlent des principes de
                     l’égalité souveraine, de la non-intervention et de l’intégrité territoriale énoncés à
                     l’article 4 — Absence d’incorporation, par renvoi à ces principes, de quelque règle
                     ou principe de droit international coutumier dans la convention — Article 4 ayant
                     pour fonction de préserver l’application des obligations existant en vertu du droit
                     international coutumier.

                        1. J’approuve, dans ses grandes lignes, le présent arrêt, et j’ai voté en
                     faveur de tous les points du dispositif. J’estime en effet que le différend
                     soumis à la Cour par la Guinée équatoriale n’entre pas dans les prévisions
                     de l’article 35 de la convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité
                     transnationale organisée (la « convention de Palerme »), parce qu’il ne
                     concerne pas « l’interprétation ou l’application de [ladite] Convention », et
                     que, par suite, cette clause ne saurait fonder la compétence de la Cour en
                     la présente instance ; mais que, en revanche, le protocole de signature
                     facultative à la convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques four-
                     nit une base de compétence permettant à la Cour de connaître de la requête
                     en ce qu’elle a trait au statut de l’immeuble du 42 avenue Foch, dont il est
                     prétendu par la Guinée équatoriale qu’il fait partie des « locaux de [sa]
                     mission » diplomatique à Paris et qu’il bénéficie à ce titre des protections
                     accordées à de tels locaux par l’article 22 de la convention en cause.
                        2. Il est cependant une partie du raisonnement suivi par l’arrêt que je
                     considère comme inutilement compliquée, non dénuée parfois d’obscurité
                     et même, à certains égards, juridiquement erronée. Il s’agit des raisons sur
                     la base desquelles l’arrêt conclut que le différend à elle soumis n’entre pas
                     dans le champ ratione materiae de l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme
                     et, par suite, n’entre pas dans les prévisions de la clause compromissoire
                     de l’article 35 de la même convention.
                        Je pense que la Cour aurait pu et dû suivre un raisonnement plus simple
                     qui l’aurait conduite à la même conclusion par une voie différente : je vais
                     expliquer à présent laquelle.
                        3. Pour convaincre la Cour qu’elle était compétente sur la base de l’ar-
                     ticle 35 de la convention de Palerme pour connaître de la partie de sa
                     requête relative à la prétendue violation par la France des immunités et
                     protections dont bénéficieraient, selon elle, tant son vice-président de la

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                     République que l’immeuble du 42 avenue Foch, la Guinée équatoriale n’a
                     pas prétendu que la France aurait méconnu l’une quelconque des obliga-
                     tions spécifiques mises à la charge des Etats parties par la convention
                     de Palerme, c’est-à-dire par les articles 5 à 31 de cet instrument, et qui
                     visent dans leur ensemble, comme le dit l’article premier, à « promouvoir
                     la coopération afin de prévenir et de combattre plus efficacement la crimi-
                     nalité transnationale organisée ».
                        4. Elle a prétendu que la France a méconnu l’article 4 de la conven-
                     tion, qui est une disposition générale figurant sous l’intitulé « Protection
                     de la souveraineté », et dont le paragraphe 1, celui qui a été invoqué par
                     la demanderesse, dispose que « [l]es Etats Parties exécutent leurs obliga-
                     tions au titre de la présente Convention d’une manière compatible avec
                     les principes de l’égalité souveraine et de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats et
                     avec celui de la non-    intervention dans les affaires intérieures d’autres
                     Etats ». Selon la Guinée équatoriale, en engageant des poursuites pénales
                     à l’encontre de son vice-président et en procédant à divers actes de perqui-
                     sition et de saisie à l’égard de l’immeuble du 42 avenue Foch et de certains
                     objets qui s’y trouvaient, la France a méconnu le principe de « l’égalité
                     souveraine … des Etats », lequel englobe les règles du droit international
                     coutumier relatives aux immunités des Etats, de leurs biens et de leurs
                     agents. En conséquence, il existerait un différend relatif au respect par la
                     défenderesse de l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme, donc entrant dans
                     les prévisions de la clause compromissoire de l’article 35. La Guinée équa-
                     toriale admet, certes, que l’article 4 ne s’applique pas isolément, mais qu’il
                     doit être combiné à une autre disposition (ou à d’autres dispositions) de
                     la convention, puisqu’il vise le cas où un Etat « exécut[e] … [ses] obliga-
                     tions au titre de la présente Convention ». Mais selon la demanderesse, en
                     engageant une procédure pénale à l’encontre de son vice-président et en
                     procédant à la saisie d’une partie de ses biens, la France agissait pour la
                     mise en œuvre de ses obligations résultant de la convention, et elle était
                     dès lors tenue de respecter les principes mentionnés à l’article 4, ce qu’elle
                     n’a pas fait. Bien entendu, la demanderesse admet que la question de
                     savoir si la France a ou non méconnu à son détriment le principe de
                     « l’égalité souveraine » relève de l’examen du fond, mais elle soutient que
                     l’existence à cet égard de prétentions opposées de la part des Parties suffit
                     à caractériser un différend « concernant l’interprétation ou l’application »
                     de la convention de Palerme, donc ressortissant à la compétence de la
                     Cour en vertu de l’article 35 de ladite convention.
                        5. A mon avis, ce raisonnement est erroné. Mais il ne l’est ni pour la
                     raison invoquée par la France au soutien de son exception préliminaire
                     d’incompétence, ni pour celles retenues par la Cour dans son arrêt.
                        6. La défenderesse a soutenu que l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme
                     était une « clause générale » comparable à celle qui était en cause dans
                     l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, dans laquelle la Cour avait estimé
                     que l’article premier du traité d’amitié entre les Etats-Unis et l’Iran devait
                     être regardé comme « fixant un objectif à la lumière duquel les autres dis-
                     positions du traité d[evai]ent être interprétées et appliquées » (République

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                     islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique, exception préliminaire, arrêt,
                     C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 814, par. 28), mais qui était dépourvu par
                     lui‑même de portée normative.
                        Mais — et sur ce point j’approuve l’arrêt, paragraphe 92 — il n’y a pas
                     grand-chose de commun entre une disposition telle que celle en cause
                     dans l’affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, par laquelle il était proclamé,
                     en matière d’introduction au traité, qu’« [i]l y aura paix stable et durable
                     et amitié sincère entre les Etats-Unis … et l’Iran », et une clause telle que
                     l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme. Dans ce dernier cas, il ne s’agit
                     pas d’affirmer un but (pour ne pas dire un idéal) à la lumière duquel
                     toutes les dispositions qui suivent doivent se comprendre parce qu’il en
                     indique en quelque sorte la direction générale ; il s’agit plutôt de fixer cer-
                     taines limites aux obligations qui résultent de la convention, et qui figurent
                     aux articles suivants, limites qui tiennent à cette idée simple que la conven-
                     tion n’autorise pas les Etats parties à s’affranchir des règles que leur
                     impose le droit international coutumier en matière d’égalité souveraine
                     des Etats, de respect de l’intégrité territoriale et de non-intervention dans
                     les affaires intérieures d’autres Etats. En ce sens l’article 4 de la conven-
                     tion de Palerme me paraît avoir une portée normative et opérationnelle
                     (ou, pourrait‑on dire, un « effet utile ») très supérieure à l’article premier
                     du traité d’amitié en cause dans l’affaire précédente.

                        7. Pour autant je ne suis pas convaincu, je l’ai dit, par le raisonnement
                     de la Guinée équatoriale. J’aurais toutefois préféré que la Cour, pour le
                     réfuter, ne se fondât pas sur les arguments qui figurent aux paragraphes 92
                     à 102 de l’arrêt et qui me semblent faiblement convaincants. Ma conclu-
                     sion est aussi que « les règles du droit international coutumier relatives
                     aux immunités des Etats et de leurs agents ne sont pas incorporées dans
                     l’article 4 » (par. 102), mais pour des raisons différentes de celles que
                     donne l’arrêt.
                        8. La question clef est celle de savoir si et dans quelle mesure l’article 4,
                     en mentionnant « les principes de l’égalité souveraine et de l’intégrité ter-
                     ritoriale des Etats et … celui de la non‑intervention dans les affaires
                     intérieures d’autres Etats », a pour effet d’incorporer ces principes

                     (ainsi, nécessairement, que les règles du droit international coutumier
                     qui en découlent et en sont inséparables) dans la convention elle-même ;
                     c’est-à-dire, en d’autres termes, de transformer des obligations coutu-
                     mières en obligations conventionnelles, par le renvoi qu’opère le traité vers
                     la coutume.
                        9. L’arrêt paraît répondre à cette question, en règle générale, par l’af-
                     firmative, bien qu’il ne soit pas dépourvu sur ce point d’une certaine dose
                     d’ambiguïté.
                        C’est en tout cas dans le sens d’une telle réponse affirmative qu’on
                     pourrait comprendre le paragraphe 92, qui affirme que l’article 4 « impose
                     une obligation aux Etats parties », en ce que « [s]on but est de garantir que
                     les Etats … s’acquittent de leurs obligations conformément aux prin-
                     cipes » mentionnés (les italiques sont de moi).

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                        10. Ensuite, le raisonnement de la Cour paraît amorcer un changement
                     d’orientation, lorsqu’elle relève que l’article 4 « se contente de renvoyer à
                     des principes généraux » plutôt qu’à des règles spécifiques de droit inter-
                     national coutumier, pour en déduire que, « [l]u dans son sens ordinaire, le
                     paragraphe 1 de l’article 4 n’impose pas aux Etats parties, par sa réfé-
                     rence à l’égalité souveraine, l’obligation de se comporter d’une manière
                     compatible avec les nombreuses règles de droit international qui pro-
                     tègent la souveraineté en général » (par. 93).
                        11. Dès lors, le raisonnement se concentre sur les règles du droit inter-
                     national coutumier relatives aux immunités des Etats et de leurs agents.
                        Tout en admettant que « les règles relatives à l’immunité de l’Etat pro-
                     cèdent du principe de l’égalité souveraine des Etats », comme la Cour l’a
                     déjà dit dans une affaire antérieure, l’arrêt conduit un raisonnement au
                     terme duquel il est conclu que les règles en matière d’immunités ne sont
                     pas couvertes par la disposition de l’article 4, paragraphe 1.
                        Deux raisons sont données au soutien d’une telle conclusion : principa-
                     lement, une interprétation de l’article 4 qui incorporerait les immunités en
                     tant qu’obligations conventionnelles ne cadrerait pas avec l’objet et le but
                     de la convention dans son ensemble, qui est de promouvoir la coopération
                     afin de prévenir et de combattre plus efficacement la criminalité transna-
                     tionale organisée ; subsidiairement, l’examen des travaux préparatoires de
                     la convention de Palerme fait apparaître que l’intention des rédacteurs de
                     l’article 4 n’a pas été de protéger les immunités des Etats ni d’incorporer
                     par référence les règles relatives à de telles immunités à cette convention.
                        D’où la conclusion énoncée au paragraphe 102 : « les règles du droit
                     international coutumier relatives aux immunités des Etats et de leurs
                     agents ne sont pas incorporées dans l’article 4 ».
                        12. L’impression que l’on peut retirer de la lecture des paragraphes 92
                     à 102 de l’arrêt est que, de l’avis de la Cour, il se pourrait bien que cer-
                     taines règles de droit international coutumier soient « incorporées par
                     référence » à la convention, par l’effet de la mention, figurant à l’article 4,
                     paragraphe 1, des principes de l’égalité souveraine, de la non-intervention
                     et de l’intégrité territoriale (sans qu’on sache très bien lesquelles), mais
                     qu’en tout état de cause ce n’est pas le cas des règles relatives aux immu-
                     nités des Etats. En conséquence, un différend relatif au respect par un
                     Etat partie des immunités dues (prétendument) à un autre Etat partie en
                     vertu du droit international coutumier échappe ratione materiae au champ
                     de l’article 35 et la Cour n’est pas compétente pour en connaître (lors
                     même que l’Etat défendeur aurait agi dans le cadre de l’exécution de ses
                     obligations résultant des articles 5 et suivants).
                        13. Je suis d’avis que la Cour aurait pu et dû parvenir à la même
                     conclusion en l’espèce sans faire aucune distinction entre les règles rela-
                     tives aux immunités et les autres règles du droit international coutumier
                     qui découlent des trois principes mentionnés à l’article 4, paragraphe 1.
                        14. En effet, l’article 4 est, dans son ensemble, une clause de sauve-
                     garde. Il ne vise pas à créer des obligations (de nature conventionnelle) à
                     la charge des Etats parties, ni à incorporer par référence des règles pré-

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                     existantes de droit coutumier à la convention. Il vise à rendre claire, en la
                     formulant expressément, une idée qui, autrement, pourrait être sujette à
                     contestation, à savoir qu’aucune disposition de la convention ne peut être
                     interprétée comme autorisant (et a fortiori comme obligeant) un Etat par-
                     tie, lorsqu’il applique ladite convention, à s’affranchir des règles que le
                     droit international coutumier impose à l’ensemble des Etats (qu’ils soient
                     ou non parties à cette convention) en matière d’égalité souveraine, de res-
                     pect de l’intégrité territoriale et de non‑ingérence dans les affaires inté-
                     rieures des autres Etats.
                        15. Ainsi entendu, l’article 4 a un effet utile indiscutable; mais ce n’est
                     pas celui que lui prête la Guinée équatoriale. L’article 4, à mes yeux, n’in-
                     corpore à la convention aucune règle ni aucun principe de droit interna-
                     tional coutumier, pas plus les règles relatives aux immunités que les
                     autres. Il indique seulement — mais cela peut être d’une grande impor-
                     tance dans certaines situations — que rien dans la convention ne déroge
                     aux règles du droit international coutumier qui se rapportent à certains
                     principes fondamentaux qu’il énonce, ou encore, en d’autres termes, que
                     la convention n’affecte pas l’application de ces règles, n’y porte pas
                     atteinte (même dans les relations juridiques entre Etats parties).
                        16. Il en résulte que, si un Etat, en mettant en œuvre telle ou telle obli-
                     gation résultant de la convention, méconnaissait, par exemple, une règle
                     de droit coutumier découlant du principe de la non-intervention dans les
                     affaires intérieures d’autres Etats, il ne pourrait pas justifier légalement
                     cette méconnaissance en arguant du fait qu’il exécute une obligation que
                     lui impose la convention : l’article 4, paragraphe 1, ferait obstacle à une
                     telle justification. Dans l’hypothèse imaginée, l’Etat serait en infraction
                     avec ses obligations juridiques internationales. Mais ce serait parce qu’il
                     aurait violé le droit international général, non parce qu’il aurait violé la
                     convention — c’est‑à‑dire son article 4. L’article 4 par lui-même n’est pas
                     la source d’une obligation; il vise à préserver des obligations qui existent
                     par ailleurs, et qui ne sont pas de nature conventionnelle.
                        17. Ce qui conduit vers une telle interprétation, c’est d’abord l’argu-
                     ment que l’arrêt lui-même donne au paragraphe 95, mais dont il limite
                     curieusement la portée aux seules règles relatives aux immunités des Etats
                     et de leurs agents. L’interprétation de l’article 4 défendue par la Gui-
                     née équatoriale, selon laquelle les règles coutumières découlant des prin-
                     cipes mentionnés au paragraphe 1 de cet article sont incorporées dans cet
                     instrument en tant qu’obligations conventionnelles, « est sans rapport avec
                     l’objet et le but déclarés de l’instrument en question ». Ce qui est vrai,
                     selon l’arrêt, des règles relatives aux immunités, est vrai aussi de toutes les
                     règles coutumières qui visent à protéger l’égalité souveraine, l’intégrité
                     territoriale ou la non‑intervention : ni plus, ni moins. L’objet et le but de
                     la convention sont clairement énoncés à l’article premier. Il s’agit, en
                     substance, de mieux combattre certaines formes de criminalité transnatio-
                     nale particulièrement préoccupantes en rendant plus étroite la coopéra-
                     tion entre Etats. On comprend que, en négociant cet instrument, les Etats
                     aient tenu à préciser, par précaution, que les obligations renforcées qu’ils

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                     instituaient n’allaient pas jusqu’à permettre d’écarter certains principes
                     fondamentaux que consacre le droit international général ; on compren-
                     drait moins qu’ils aient entendu incorporer ces principes en en faisant des
                     obligations conventionnelles dans le cadre d’un instrument dont ce n’est
                     aucunement la raison d’être.
                        18. La lecture de l’article 4 dans sa totalité va, à mon avis, dans le
                     même sens. Alors que le paragraphe 1 est rédigé avec une tournure posi-
                     tive (« [l]es Etats Parties exécutent leurs obligations … d’une manière
                     compatible avec les principes »), le paragraphe 2 est très nettement rédigé
                     sous la forme classique d’une clause de sauvegarde, c’est-à-dire avec une
                     tournure négative : « [a]ucune disposition de la … Convention n’habilite
                     un Etat Partie à exercer sur le territoire d’un autre Etat une compétence
                     et des fonctions qui sont exclusivement réservées aux autorités de cet
                     autre Etat par son droit interne ».
                        19. Il est clair que le paragraphe 2, tel qu’il est rédigé, n’incorpore pas
                     à la convention la règle prohibitive qu’il énonce. On pourrait soutenir
                     que, par contraste, le paragraphe 1 a une portée différente, en ce sens qu’il
                     produit un effet d’« incorporation », puisqu’il est formulé positivement.
                     Mais en réalité c’est, à mon avis, l’inverse qui est vrai, à savoir que le
                     paragraphe 1 doit être lu non par contraste avec le paragraphe 2, mais à
                     la lumière de celui‑ci. L’idée énoncée au paragraphe 2 n’est en effet rien
                     d’autre qu’un aspect particulier, dont l’importance a justifié qu’il soit sou-
                     ligné, de l’idée plus générale énoncée au paragraphe 1. Le fait pour un
                     Etat d’exercer sur le territoire d’un autre Etat une compétence ou des
                     fonctions réservées à ce dernier par son droit interne serait contraire aux
                     principes de l’égalité souveraine et de la non-intervention dans les affaires
                     intérieures d’un autre Etat. En conséquence, il serait incohérent d’attri-
                     buer au paragraphe 1 un effet quelconque d’incorporation, tandis que le
                     paragraphe 2 serait appliqué — comme il doit certainement l’être — en
                     tant que clause de sauvegarde. La totalité de l’article 4 répond à une seule
                     et même inspiration.
                        20. S’il en était besoin, l’examen des travaux préparatoires confirme-
                     rait cette interprétation. Non pas directement les travaux préparatoires de
                     la convention de Palerme, mais, puisque l’article 4 de cette convention est
                     une transposition de l’article 2, paragraphes 2 et 3, de la convention des
                     Nations Unies de 1988 contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants, les travaux
                     préparatoires de cette dernière convention.
                        21. La proposition initiale, émanant notamment du Canada et du
                     Mexique, de ce qui devait devenir l’article 2 de la convention, comportait
                     un paragraphe 2 aux termes duquel « rien dans la présente Convention ne
                     porte atteinte aux principes de l’égalité souveraine et de l’intégrité territo-
                     riale des Etats ou de la non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures des
                     Etats » (« Nothing in this Convention derogates from the principles of the
                     sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States or that of non-
                     intervention in the domestic affairs of States »).
                        22. C’est le délégué des Etats-Unis à la conférence diplomatique qui a
                     proposé, lors de la séance du 13 décembre 1988, de modifier ce texte, regret-

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                     tant sa tonalité trop négative selon lui, et suggérant en conséquence de le
                     réécrire en employant une tournure plus positive (« [the US delegation] had
                     accordingly redrafted the text with the aim of giving it a more positive
                     mode of expression »). C’est ainsi qu’a été présenté le paragraphe 2 dans sa
                     formulation finalement adoptée, qui est identique à l’article 4, paragraphe 1,
                     de la convention de Palerme. Les délégations du Canada et du Mexique,
                     ainsi que d’un groupe de pays qui avaient été ensemble à l’origine du texte
                     initial, ont accepté la proposition américaine lors de la séance de l’après-
                     midi du même jour, au motif essentiel qu’ils ne voyaient pas de différence
                     substantielle entre leur texte et la proposition des Etats-Unis, et qu’il était
                     préférable d’éviter une longue discussion inutile qui aurait pu mettre en
                     péril l’issue de la conférence (United Nations Conference for the Adoption
                     of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
                     Substances, Vienna, 25 November-20 December 1988, Official Records
                     Vol. I, p. 97‑98, par. 2-3 ; Vol. II, p. 171, par. 5 ; p. 176, par. 4).
                        23. En somme, ni la délégation américaine qui l’a proposée, ni les
                     autres délégations qui l’ont acceptée, n’ont vu dans la tournure « plus
                     positive » du texte qui est devenu l’article 2, paragraphe 2, de la conven-
                     tion contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants, et ensuite l’article 4, para-
                     graphe 1, de la convention de Palerme, quoi que ce soit de substantiellement
                     différent d’une clause de sauvegarde classique, dont l’objet est d’indiquer
                     que la convention ne déroge pas aux (ou qu’elle est sans préjudice des)
                     règles de droit international coutumier.
                        24. Si la Cour avait adopté cette interprétation de l’article 4, elle n’au-
                     rait pas eu besoin de consacrer de longs développements (par. 104 à 117)
                     à un autre chef de demande de la Guinée équatoriale, selon lequel la
                     France aurait également violé cet article, parce qu’elle aurait méconnu
                     tant le principe de l’égalité souveraine des Etats que celui de la non-
                     intervention en attribuant à ses juridictions pénales une compétence
                     excessive, par la manière dont elle a incriminé dans son droit interne l’in-
                     fraction de blanchiment, comme l’y obligeait l’article 6, et dont elle a
                     défini la compétence de ses juridictions pour connaître d’une telle infrac-
                     tion, en exécution de l’article 15.
                        25. Plutôt que de répondre que l’article 4 n’incorpore dans la conven-
                     tion aucun des principes auxquels il se réfère, comme je crois qu’elle
                     aurait dû le faire, et ne pouvant pas se fonder sur le raisonnement qu’elle
                     avait très spécifiquement consacré aux règles coutumières relatives aux
                     immunités — pour les exclure du champ de l’article 4 —, la Cour s’engage
                     ici dans une direction différente. Elle justifie son refus d’admettre sa com-
                     pétence pour connaître de ce volet de l’affaire par le motif tiré de ce que,
                     en incriminant le blanchiment et en délimitant la compétence de ses juri-
                     dictions pour en connaître (d’une manière trop large selon la Guinée équa-
                     toriale), la France n’a pas agi pour l’exécution de ses obligations résultant
                     de la convention de Palerme. A cet égard, je me bornerai à dire respec-
                     tueusement que la démonstration est laborieuse.
                        26. Les réserves qui précèdent ne m’empêchent évidemment pas,
                     comme je l’ai dit en commençant, d’adhérer pleinement à toutes les

                     91

5 CIJ1142.indb 178                                                                                21/02/19 15:44

                     380 	    immunités et procédures pénales (op. ind. abraham)

                     conclusions auxquelles parvient l’arrêt, tant sur l’exception d’incompé-
                     tence relative à la convention de Palerme, que la Cour retient, que sur
                     celle relative au protocole à la convention de Vienne, qu’elle rejette à bon
                     droit selon moi.

                     (Signé) Ronny Abraham.

                     92

5 CIJ1142.indb 180                                                                                21/02/19 15:44


              JOINT DECLARATION OF JUDGES TOMKA, GREENWOOD, SEBUTINDE
                              AND JUDGE AD HOC DUGARD

       Costs – Article 64 of the Statute of the Court  Provisional measures  Obligation of a
State to comply with Order indicating provisional measures  Obligations imposed by 2011 Order
violated by Nicaragua  Conduct of Nicaragua  Costs incurred by Costa Rica in seeking
further Order in 2013  Whether Court should have exercised discretion to order Nicaragua to
pay Costa Rica’s costs of the 2013 Request for provisional measures.

       1. We regret that we are unable to agree with the decision of the majority of the Court to
reject Costa Rica’s request that it be awarded the costs of having had to come to the Court in
October 2013 for a second Order on Provisional Measures of Protection. We have therefore voted
against operative paragraph 5 (c) of the Judgment.

       2. Article 64 of the Statute of the Court provides that “[u]nless otherwise decided by the
Court, each party shall bear its own costs”. This provision is supplemented by Article 97 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that “[i]f the Court, under Article 64 of the Statute, decides that all
or part of a party’s costs shall be paid by the other party, it may make an order for the purpose of
giving effect to that decision”.

      We accept that, in the words of a leading work on the Court, Article 64 of the Statute “may
be interpreted as implying the general rule that each party bears its own costs, and that only in
exceptional circumstances will the Court decide otherwise” (see Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and
Practice of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. III, 4th ed., 2006, p. 1281). In no case so far
has the Court considered that such exceptional circumstances existed. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Statute gives the Court discretion in this matter and we consider it important that the Court
exercises that discretion, when it is called upon to do so, after careful consideration of the particular
circumstances of the case.

       3. What, then, are the circumstances of the present case? In its Order on Provisional
Measures of 8 March 2011, the first measure, indicated unanimously by the Court, was that “[e]ach
Party shall refrain from sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory, including the caño, any
personnel, whether civilian, police or security” (Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I),
p. 27, para. 86 (1)). The “disputed territory” was defined in paragraph 55 of that Order as “the area
of wetland of some 3 square kilometres between the right bank of the disputed caño, the right bank
of the San Juan River up to its mouth at the Caribbean Sea and the Harbor Head Lagoon” (ibid.,
p. 19, para. 55). The first provisional measure, therefore, could not have been clearer. Nicaragua
was prohibited from “sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory” any personnel, military
or civilian, let alone from carrying out any works therein. The Court’s orders on provisional
measures being binding (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 506, para. 109), Nicaragua had a legal obligation to comply with this
measure. The Court also enjoined both Parties to “refrain from any action which might aggravate
or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve” (Order of
8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 27, para. 86 (3)).

      4. On 13 September 2013, Costa Rica received evidence, in the form of satellite images, that
two new caños had been dug in the disputed territory, that a dredger was operating in one of them
and that a Nicaraguan military encampment had been established on the beach nearby. On
16 September, Costa Rica wrote to Nicaragua complaining of a violation of the provisional
measures. According to counsel for Nicaragua, this letter prompted the President of Nicaragua to
order an investigation into the state of affairs in the disputed territory. Nevertheless, on

                                                 -2-

18 September, the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry replied to Costa Rica, stating that Nicaragua had
authorized no works in the disputed territory (Costa Rica, Request for the Indication of New
Provisional Measures, 24 September 2013, Attachment PM-5). As counsel for Nicaragua
subsequently remarked, “[i]n retrospect, it would have been better if the Foreign Ministry had
waited until the investigation ordered by President Ortega was completed, or at least until the
following day” (CR 2013/25, p. 21). Costa Rica reacted to the Foreign Ministry’s letter by filing,
on 24 September 2013, a new Request for provisional measures. In the meantime, however, the
investigation ordered by President Ortega had disclosed that two new caños had indeed been dug
on the orders of Mr. Eden Pastora, who was described in a Nicaraguan document as the
“Government Delegate for the Dredging Works” (see letter from Nicaragua to the Court,
11 October 2013, Ref. HOL-EMB-197, Ann. 8). On 21 September 2013, President Ortega gave
instructions that Mr. Pastora was to cease all operations on the two new caños and to withdraw the
dredger. These instructions were complied with. Nicaragua did not, however, inform either
Costa Rica or the Court of this development, or take any steps to rectify the impression created by
its letter of 18 September, until Thursday 10 October 2013. In the meantime, the Court had
informed both Parties that it would hold hearings on the new Costa Rican Request for provisional
measures beginning on Monday 14 October 2013. So far as the military encampment was
concerned, Nicaragua maintained that it was located on Nicaraguan territory outside the disputed
territory, specifically, on a beach just to the north of the disputed territory, and that Nicaragua was
therefore under no obligation to withdraw (CR 2013/25, p. 29).

       5. The Court has unanimously found (see paragraphs 121-129 and paragraph 229 (3)) that
this conduct amounted to a violation of the provisional measures ordered by the Court in
March 2011. While Mr. Pastora may have exceeded his instructions, he was a senior official of the
Republic of Nicaragua and his actions purported to be an exercise of his official authority. That
they would have seemed as such to any observer was accepted by Nicaragua, which stated that
those who saw him may have assumed he was authorized to be in the area; in the words of
Nicaragua’s counsel, “Mr. Pastora is a well-known figure in Nicaragua” and “[i]t would have been
quite strange that a young lieutenant in charge of the nearby areas would question what Mr. Pastora
was doing” (CR 2013/25, p. 16). It is beyond question that Mr. Pastora’s actions were attributable
to Nicaragua and engaged its responsibility for a breach of the obligations under the March 2011
Provisional Measures Order. Nicaragua quite rightly accepted that responsibility. Nevertheless,
while Nicaragua’s counsel described the breach as “unintentional” (CR 2015/7, p. 61), the senior
position held by Mr. Pastora means that the breach cannot be so lightly put aside. There was
nothing “unintentional” about the breach of the Court’s Order; it was a deliberate action
undertaken on the instructions of the senior government official entrusted by Nicaragua with
responsibility for the dredging programme in the area immediately adjacent to the disputed
territory.

       6. As for the establishment of a military encampment, the Court found, in its 2013 Order,
that  contrary to what Nicaragua said  that encampment was not on the sand bank but on land
that formed part of the disputed territory (Order of 22 November 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 365,
para. 46). Nicaragua has never suggested that the presence of this encampment was unauthorized.

      7. The Court is thus faced with two serious violations of the obligations imposed upon
Nicaragua by the 2011 Order on Provisional Measures. The Court has made plain that Nicaragua
must compensate Costa Rica for any damage caused by its violation of those obligations.
Costa Rica will therefore be able to recover, for example, the costs of any remediation work which
was necessary in order to deal with the two additional caños. The Court has, however, denied
Costa Rica the chance of recovering from Nicaragua what may well be the largest expense it was
obliged to incur, namely the costs of nearly a week of hearings before the Court. Those costs were
a direct consequence of Nicaragua’s breach of the obligations imposed by the 2011 Order.

                                                 -3-

Moreover, even after it had ordered Mr. Pastora’s withdrawal, Nicaragua could have taken steps
which would have made the hearings in October 2013 unnecessary but it did not do so. Instead of
notifying the Court and Costa Rica of its order to Mr. Pastora on 21 September 2013, it said
nothing until the eve of the hearings, leaving Costa Rica  and the Court  under the impression
that it denied that there had been any activity in the disputed territory. When it did inform the
Court and Costa Rica of its actions, Costa Rica suggested that the Parties agree an Order which the
Court would issue and thus save the cost of the hearing itself. Nicaragua refused. It is illogical for
the Court to adopt a posture in which a party which has been the victim of a breach of provisional
measures indicated by the Court is treated less favourably if it incurs expense in coming back to the
Court to seek redress than if it takes unilateral action to remedy the damage caused by that breach.

       8. We consider that these are exceptional circumstances which warrant an exercise by the
Court of the power given to it by Article 64 of the Statute. It is true that the Court has never
previously exercised that power but it has seldom been asked to do so and none of the cases in
which costs have been requested by a party has been remotely comparable to the present one. The
power to indicate provisional measures is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of the
integrity of proceedings before the Court. The measures thus indicated are legally binding and
their breach is an autonomous violation of legal obligations, entirely distinct from the merits of the
case. The Court, and those States appearing before it, are entitled to assume that a State litigating
in good faith will be scrupulous in complying with those measures. If its failure to do so
necessitates a further hearing, it is only right that that State should bear the costs incurred.

       9. It is therefore a matter for regret that the Court has dismissed Costa Rica’s request for the
costs incurred in obtaining the Order of 22 November 2013 and that it has done so without any
discussion of the circumstances considered in this Declaration. This was surely a case in which
something more was called for than a Delphic pronouncement that “taking into account the overall
circumstances of the case, an award of costs to Costa Rica . . . would not be appropriate”
(Judgment, paragraph 144).

                                                             (Signed)   Peter TOMKA.

                                                       (Signed)   Christopher GREENWOOD.

                                                           (Signed) Julia SEBUTINDE.

                                                             (Signed) John DUGARD.

                                            ___________


232 SOVEREIGNTY OVER FRONTIER LAND (JUDGMENT 20 VI 59)

trative acts should have been performed there in the ordinary
course of affairs. However, the fact that local conditions have
necessitated the normal and unchallenged exercise of Netherlands
administrative activity provides an additional reason why, in the
absence of clear provisions of a treaty, there is no necessity to
disturb the existing state of affairs and to perpetuate a geographical
anomaly.

Judge SprropouLos makes the following Declaration:

The international legal status of the disputed plots seems to me
to be extremely doubtful.

The facts and circumstances (decisions of the Mixed Boundary
Commission, letters, etc.) at the basis of the Belgian hypothesis
that the copy, which has not been produced before the Court, of
the Communal Minute of 1841 attributed the disputed plots to
Belgium or that the Boundary Commissioners had corrected it to
that effect—which facts go back more than a century—do not, in
my opinion, make it possible to conclude with sufficient certainty
that the Belgian hypothesis corresponds with the facts.

On the other hand, the thesis of the Netherlands to the effect
that an error crept into the Minute attached to Article 90 of the
Descriptive Minute of 1843 is also merely based on a hypothesis,
i.e. on the mere fact that the text of the Communal Minute of
1841 departs from the text of the Minute attached to Article 90 of
the Descriptive Minute of 1843.

Faced as I am with a choice between two hypotheses which lead
to opposite results with regard to the question to whom sovereignty
over the disputed plots belongs, I consider that preference ought
to be given to the hypothesis which seems to me to be the less
speculative and that, in my view, is the hypothesis of the Nether-
lands. For this reason I have hesitated to concur in the Judgment
of the Court.

Judges ARMAND-Ucon and MORENO QUINTANA, availing them-
selves of the right conferred upon them by Article 57 of the Statute,
append to the Judgment of the Court statements of their Dissenting
Opinions.

(Initialled) H. K.
(Initialled) G.-C.

27


232

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SKUBISZEWSKI

1. While agreeing with the Court in all its other holdings, I am unable
to concur in the broad finding that Czechoslovakia was not entitled to
put Variant C into operation from October 1992 (Judgment, para. 155,
point 1C). The finding is too general. In my view the Court should have
distinguished between, on the one hand, Czechoslovakia’s right to take
steps to execute and operate certain works on its territory and, on the
other, its responsibility towards Hungary resulting from the diversion of
most of the waters of the Danube into Czechoslovak territory, especially
in the period preceding the conclusion of the 1995 Agreement (Judgment,
para. 25).

I

2. In proposing to Czechoslovakia the revision of the Treaty, Hun-
gary, for some time, did not exclude the possibility of an arrangement
that would maintain, in one form or another, the System of Locks
(Article | of the Treaty). But the subsequent abandonment of the works
was a clear indication of where Hungary was heading. Even when it first
proposed a postponement of the works it was aiming at abolishing the
Project. That was the heart of the matter. On 22 May 1990, the Prime
Minister of the newly democratic Hungary put it in a nutshell by describ-
ing the whole Project as “a mistake” (Memorial of Hungary, Vol. 1,
p. 64, para. 3.110). Hungary wanted to extricate itself from that “mis-
take”. This is the basic fact of the case. The mass of scientific and tech-
nological information that has been submitted to the Court and the maze
of legal argumentation should not cause that basic fact to be lost: it was
Hungary, and Hungary alone, which, from a certain moment on, fol-
lowed a policy of freeing itself from the bonds of the Treaty. Czechoslo-
vakia, on its part, insisted on the implementation of the Treaty, though it
was ready to adopt a flexible attitude with regard to some aspects of the
operation of the System of Locks, for example with regard to the limita-
tion or exclusion of the peak power operation mode or the objectively
verified environmental needs.

3. This difference in the stance and the actions of the two Parties with
regard to the Treaty should not be blurred. To simply say that, in fact,
the two contracting States (and not only one of them, i.e., Hungary) con-
formed to rules other than those laid down by the Treaty does not cor-

229
233 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SKUBISZEWSKI)

respond to legal reality. In particular, chronology cannot be dismissed as
irrelevant. Hungarian doubts and reservations about and, finally, Hun-
gary’s withdrawal from the Project have not only preceded Variant C,
but constituted its cause. Without an earlier suspension and abandon-
ment of the works by Hungary there would have been no Variant C. Nor
can it be said that Variant C excluded Hungary from the Project. The
fact is that Hungary excluded itself, having lost all interest in the main-
tenance of the Project. Also, Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia
were prepared to co-operate with Hungary in respect of Variant C which
they regarded as a provisional solution.

4. The documentation submitted in these proceedings does not sup-
port the view that the two States actually displayed the same intention of
withdrawing from the Treaty. Prior to and also after the Hungarian dec-
laration of termination, Czechoslovakia did not express any such inten-
tion. Variant C maintained some important aims of the joint investment:
production of energy, flood prevention, and improvement of navigation.
Where it deviated from the Project, it did not put any definitive bar to a
return to the original concept of the Treaty. There was no tacit consent to
the extinction of the Treaty on the part of Czechoslovakia. That country
no longer exists, but Slovakia (as its successor) still postulates the imple-
mentation of the Treaty (Judgment, para. 14).

5. When Czechoslovakia and Hungary were negotiating and conclud-
ing their Treaty, they knew very well what they were doing. They made a
conscious choice. A joint investment of such proportions inevitably entails
some changes in the territories of the countries involved, including an
impact on the environment. In particular, the two States were facing the
dichotomy of socio-economic development and preservation of nature.
Articles 15, 19 and 20 show that the two States paid attention to environ-
mental risks and were willing to meet them. In the 1970s, when the
Treaty was being negotiated, the state of knowledge was sufficient to per-
mit the two partners to assess the impact their Project would have on the
various areas of life, one of them being the environment. The number of
studies was impressive indeed. The progress of science and knowledge is
constant; thus, with regard to such a project, that progress becomes a
reason for adaptation and, consequently, for entering into negotiations,
no matter how long and difficult.

6. By its unilateral rejection of the Project, Hungary has precluded
itself from asserting that the utilization of the hydraulic force of the Dan-
ube was dependent on the condition of a prior agreement between it and
Czechoslovakia (and subsequently Slovakia). For this is what the Treaty
was and is about: mutual regulation of the national competence of each
riparian State, in particular, to use the hydraulic force of the river.
Mutual rights and obligations have been created under the Treaty, but

230
234 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SKUBISZEWSKI)

during the period 1989 to 1992 Hungary progressively repudiated them.
It thus created an estoppel situation for itself.

II

7. The withdrawal of Hungary from the Project left Czechoslovakia
with the possibility of doing on its territory what it was allowed to do by
general law. In the circumstances of the dispute submitted to the Court
action based on general law does not derogate from the binding force of
the Treaty. The shift onto the plane of general law results from the Hun-
garian rejection of the Project. There was, actually, no “single and indi-
visible operational system of works” (Art. 1, para. 1, of the 1977 Treaty)
in which first Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia could partici-
pate. The conduct of Hungary led to a factual situation which, as long as
it lasted, prevented the implementation of binding agreements. A full
application of the Treaty required bilateral action. Thus, for the time
being, the treaty relationship of the two States found itself in a state of
abeyance or inactivity. As the objectives of the Treaty did not disappear,
a temporary solution would be based on general law and equity, until
there was a return to the bilateral enforcement of the Treaty. That is the
essence of the concept of the Czechoslovak “provisional solution”, main-
tained by Slovakia.

8. In the present case one should draw a distinction between, on the
one hand, the “provisional solution” which, as a whole, is lawful, espe-
cially under the existing circumstances (i.e., the advanced stage of com-
pletion of the works on Czechoslovak territory at the beginning of the
1990s), and, on the other, one element of the implementation of that
solution that calls for redress and remedy; that element is the sharing of
the waters of the Danube. It is not enough to dismiss the Slovak argu-
ments (that is, the principle of approximate application; the duty to miti-
gate damages; and, as a possibility, the plea of countermeasures, Judg-
ment, paras. 75-87). The situation is more complex. A legal evaluation of
Variant C cannot be limited to the Treaty alone. As a result of Hungar-
ian action, the implementation of the Treaty became paralysed. Czecho-
slovakia responded by putting into effect its “provisional solution”. In
the proceedings before the Court Slovakia’s emphasis was on what
I would term as the Treaty approach. But Slovakia has also referred,
though in a somewhat subsidiary manner, to general law. Under that
law, as applied by the Court, Slovakia bears responsibility for withhold-
ing from Hungary that part of the Danube’s waters to which the latter
was entitled. By saying that Hungary did not forfeit “its basic right to an
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse” the Court applies general law (Judgment, para. 78). The
Court likewise applies general law (cf. para. 85) when, in particular, it
refers to the concept of the “community of interest in a navigable river”,
as explained by the Permanent Court in the case relating to the Territo-

231
235 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SK UBISZEWSK1)

rial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder,
(Judgment No. 16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, p. 27). The canon of
an equitable and reasonable utilization figures prominently in the recent
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, especially in its general principles (Arts. 5-10).

9. The Award in the case of Lake Lanoux between Spain and France
states the law which is relevant to the evaluation of Variant C, though for
various reasons that case must be distinguished from the case before the
Court. In the Lake Lanoux case, the Arbitral Tribunal considered the
question whether the French development scheme for Lake Lanoux
(involving the diversion of waters) required, for its execution, a prior
agreement between the two Governments, in the absence of which the
country proposing the scheme would not have freedom of action to
undertake the works (Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),
Vol. XII, p. 306, para. 10; International Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 24,
1957, p. 127, para. 10).

10. The Tribunal said:

“In effect, in order to appreciate in its essence the necessity for
prior agreement, one must envisage the hypothesis in which the
interested States cannot reach agreement. In such case, it must be
admitted that the State which is normally competent has lost its
tight to act alone as a result of the unconditional and arbitrary
opposition of another State. This amounts to admitting a ‘right of
assent’, a ‘right of veto’, which at the discretion of one State para-
lyses the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of another.

That is why international practice prefers to resort to less extreme
solutions by confining itself to obliging the States to seek, by prelimi-
nary negotiations, terms for an agreement, without subordinating the
exercise of their competences to the conclusion of such an agreement.
Thus, one speaks, although often inaccurately, of the ‘obligation of
negotiating an agreement’. In reality, the engagements thus under-
taken by States take very diverse forms and have a scope which var-
ies according to the manner in whichythey are defined and according
to the procedures intended for their execution; but the reality of the
obligations thus undertaken is incontestable and sanctions can be
applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified breaking off of the
discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of the agreed procedures,
systematic refusals to take into consideration adverse proposals or
interests, and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of
good faith (Tacna-Arica Arbitration: Reports of International Arbi-
tral Awards, Vol. II, pp. 921 et seg.; Case of Railway Traffic between
Lithuania and Poland: Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.L.J., Series A/B,
No. 42, pp. 108 et seq.).” (RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 306, para. 11; ZLR,
Vol. 24, 1957, p. 128, para. 11; footnotes omitted.)

232
236 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SKUBISZEWSKI)

Czechoslovakia has fulfilled its obligation to negotiate a revision of the
Treaty. But a revision is something different from the refusal to imple-
ment that Treaty. Faced with such a refusal on the part of Hungary
Czechoslovakia could act alone, without any prior consent by Hungary,
while respecting the latter’s right to an equitable and reasonable share of
the Danube’s waters. But in evaluating whether Czechoslovakia has
respected that right one must not forget that the said share has increased
in 1995, and that the water appropriated by Czechoslovakia and subse-
quently used by Slovakia does not serve Slovakia’s interests alone, but
also Hungary’s. The operation of Variant C improved navigation on the
Danube and enhanced flood protection.

11. In the Lake Lanoux case the Tribunal expressed its position on the
right of each riparian State to act unilaterally in the following terms:

“In fact, States are today perfectly conscious of the importance of
the conflicting interests brought into play by the industrial use of
international rivers, and of the necessity to reconcile them by mutual
concessions. The only way to arrive at such compromises of interests
is to conclude agreements on an increasingly comprehensive basis.
International practice reflects the conviction that States ought to
strive to conclude such agreements: there would thus appear to be
an obligation to accept in good faith all communications and con-
tracts which could, by a broad comparison of interests and by recip-
rocal good will, provide States with the best conditions for conclud-
ing agreements. .. .

But international practice does not so far permit more than the
following conclusion: the rule that States may utilize the hydraulic
power of international watercourses only on condition of a prior
agreement between the interested States cannot be established as a
custom, even less as a general principle of law. The history of the
formulation of the multilateral Convention signed at Geneva
on December 9, 1923, relative to the Development of Hydraulic
Power Affecting More than One State, is very characteristic in this
connection. The initial project was based on the obligatory and
paramount character of agreements whose purpose was to harness
the hydraulic forces of international watercourses. But this formula-
tion was rejected, and the Convention, in its final form, provides
(Article I) that ‘[it] in no way alters the freedom of each State, within
the framework of international law, to carry out on its territory all
operations for the development of hydraulic power which it desires’ ;
there is provided only an obligation upon the interested signatory
States to join in a common study of a development programme; the
execution of this programme is obligatory only for those States
which have formaily subscribed to it.” (RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 308,
para. 13; ZLR, Vol. 24, 1957, p. 129, para. 13: footnote omitted.)

233
237 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SKUBISZEWSKI)

I think that the Court would agree that this is an exact statement of
general law. That law is applicable in the present case. Czechoslovakia
had the right to put the Gabéikovo complex into operation. It also had
the duty to respect Hungary’s right to an equitable and reasonable share
of the waters of the Danube.

12. In rejecting, in the Lake Lanoux case, the necessity of a prior
agreement between the interested States on the utilization of the hydrau-
lic power of international watercourses the Tribunal referred to the
“most general principles of international law” according to which:

“It is for each State to evaluate in a reasonable manner and in
good faith the situations and the rules which will involve it in con-
troversies; its evaluation may be in contradiction with that of another
State; in that case, should a dispute arise the Parties normally seek
to resolve it by negotiation or, alternatively, by submitting to the
authority of a third party; but one of them is never obliged to sus-
pend the exercise of its jurisdiction because of the dispute except
when it assumes an obligation to do so; by exercising its jurisdiction
it takes the risk of seeing its international responsibility called into
question, if it is established that it did not act within the limits of its
rights.” (RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 310, para. 16; ZLR, Vol. 24, 1957,
p. 132, para. 16.)

13. This seemed to be, mutatis mutandis, the position of Czechoslo-
vakia. It could act, but it had to respect certain rights of Hungary. In
the Lake Lanoux case, the Tribunal said that, carrying matters to
extremes, the requirement of prior agreement

“would imply either the general paralysis of the exercise of State
jurisdiction whenever there is a dispute, or the submission of all dis-
putes, of whatever nature, to the authority of a third party; interna-
tional practice does not support either the one or the other of these
consequences” (loc. cit.}.

14. Concerning the said possibility of a unilateral suspension of works
the Tribunal added:

“Further, in order for negotiations to proceed in a favourable
climate, the Parties must consent to suspend the full exercise of
their rights during the negotiations. It is normal that they should
enter into engagements to this effect. If these engagements were to
bind them unconditionally until the conclusion of an agreement, they
would, by signing them, lose the very right to negotiate; this cannot
be presumed.

It is important to keep these considerations in mind when drawing
legal conclusions from diplomatic correspondence.” (R/AA,
Vol. XIE, p. 311, para. 18; ZLR, Vol. 24, 1957, p. 134, para. 18.)

234
238 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (DISS. OP. SKUBISZEWSKI)

15. Finally, it is worthwhile to note the following statement of the
Tribunal:

“France is entitled to exercise her rights; she cannot ignore
Spanish interests.

Spain is entitled to demand that her rights be respected and that
her interests be taken into consideration.

As a matter of form, the upstream State has, procedurally, a right
of initiative; it is not obliged to associate the downstream State in the
elaboration of its schemes. If, in the course of discussions, the down-
stream State submits schemes to it, the upstream State must examine
them, but it has the right to give preference to the solution contained
in its own scheme provided that it takes into consideration in a rea-
sonable manner the interests of the downstream State.” (RIAA,
Vol. XII, p. 316, para. 23; ILR, Vol. 24, 1957, p. 140, para. 23.)

I

16. In paragraph 72 of its Judgment the Court makes clear that it ts
aware of the serious problems with which Czechoslovakia was con-
fronted as a result of Hungary’s action. That is another reason for dis-
tinguishing between various elements of Variant C. Having said what it
did the Court should have made a step further and applied equity as part
of international law. It would then have arrived at a holding that would
have given more nuance to its decision.

17. In the case relating to the Diversion of Water from the Meuse
Judge Hudson observed:

“It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where
two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one
party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that
obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar
non-performance of that obligation by the other party.

The general principle is one of which an international tribunal
should make a very sparing application. It is certainly not to be
thought that a complete fulfilment of all its obligations under a
treaty must be proved as a condition precedent to a State’s appear-
ing before an international tribunal to seek an interpretation of that
treaty. Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the limi-
tations which are necessary, a tribunal bound by international law
ought not to shrink from applying a principle of such obvious fair-
ness.” (P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 70, Judgment, 1937, p. 77.)

18. The foregoing quotation does not mean that one may close one’s
eyes to the differences between the Diversion of Water from the Meuse
case and the present case. According to Judge Hudson the two locks (1.e.,
the one operated by the Netherlands and the one operated by Belgium)

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were in law and in fact in the same position. “This seems to call for an
application of the principle of equity stated above” (P.C.LJ., Series A/B,
No. 70, Judgment, 1937, p. 78). But the more complex facts in the present
case do not by themselves eliminate the relevance of the learned judge’s
opinion.

19. The impossible situation in which Hungarian action put Czecho-
slovakia speaks strongly in favour of the application of equitable prin-
ciples by the Court in evaluating Variant C. For “fe]quity as a legal con-
cept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. . . . [T]he legal concept of
equity is a general principle directly applicable as law” (Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1CJ. Reports 1982,
p. 60, para. 71). The Court’s “decisions must by definition be just, and
therefore in that sense equitable” (North Sea Continental Shelf, Judg-
ment, 1 C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 48-49, para. 88). “[A]n equitable solution
derive[s] from the applicable law” (Fisheries Jurisdiction, Merits, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 33, para. 78; p. 202, para. 69). Both “the
result to be achieved and the means to be applied to reach the result”
must be equitable. “It is, however, the result which is predominant; the
principles are subordinate to the goal” (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya}, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 59,
para. 70).

20. In its resolution of 1961 on the utilization of non-maritime inter-
national waters the Institute of International Law has stated (Art. 3):

“If the States are in disagreement over the scope of their rights of
utilization [of the said waters], settlement will take place on the basis
of equity, taking particular account of their respective needs, as well
as of other pertinent circumstances.” (Annuaire de l'Institut de droit
international, 1961, Vol. II, p. 382.)

21. The degree to which Czechoslovakia has implemented the Treaty
has reached such proportions that it would be both unreasonable and
harmful to stop the completion of certain works and to postpone indefi-
nitely the operation of the bypass canal, the Gabéikovo hydroelectric
power plant, navigation locks and appurtenances thereto, in so far as
that operation was possible without Hungarian co-operation or partici-
pation. To find, as the Court does, that such operation is unlawful over-
looks the considerations of equity. At the same time Hungary’s right
under general international law to an equitable and reasonable sharing
of the waters of the Danube had to be preserved notwithstanding its
repudiation of the Project and the Treaty.

IV

22. À State that concluded a treaty with another State providing for
the execution of a project like Gabtikovo-Nagymaros cannot, when that
project is near completion, simply say that all should be cancelled and the

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only remaining problem is compensation. This is a situation where, espe-
cially under equitable principles, the solution must go beyond mere pecu-
niary compensation. The Court has found that the refusal by Hungary to
implement the Treaty was unlawful. By breaching the Treaty, Hungary
could not deprive Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia of all the
benefits of the Treaty and reduce their rights to that of compensation.
The advanced stage of the work on the Project made some performance
imperative in order to avoid harm: Czechoslovakia and Slovakia had the
right to expect that certain parts of the Project would become operational.

23. Thus, pecuniary compensation could not, in the present case, wipe out
even some, not to speak of all, of the consequences of the abandonment
of the Project by Hungary. How could an indemnity compensate for the
absence of flood protection, improvement of navigation and production
of electricity? The attainment of these objectives of the 1977 Treaty was
legitimate not only under the Treaty but also under general law and
equity. The benefits could in no way be replaced and compensated by the
payment of a sum of money. Certain works had to be established and it
was vital that they be made operational. For the question here is not one
of damages for loss sustained, but the creation of a new system of use and
utilization of the water.

24. Once a court, whether international or municipal, has found that a
duty established by a rule of international law has been breached, the
subject to which the act is imputable must make adequate reparation.
The finding in point 2 D of the operative paragraph is the consequence of
the holdings in point 1. Absence of congruence between the vote on one
or more of the findings in point | and the vote on point 2 D should be
explained in order that any implication of an uncertainty regarding the
foregoing principle on reparation may be eliminated.

25. The formulation of the finding in point 1 € of the operative para-
graph does not correspond to the possibility of different evaluations con-
cerning the various elements of the “provisional solution”. There is
equally no reflection of that possibility in the formulation of the finding
in point 2 D. Indeed, the terms of that point made the position of those
judges who voted against point 1 C quite difficult. The same applies to
point 2 D when a judge does not agree with a// the findings in point lt,
though I think that there is a way out of this difficulty.

26. It is on the basis of the position taken in this dissenting opinion
that I have voted in favour of the finding in point 2 D. However, there is
a further reason which made it possible for me to accept that finding.
That reason is linked to the task of the Court under Article 2, para-
graph 2, of the Special Agreement and the ensuing negotiations of the

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Parties on the modalities of the execution of the Judgment (Art. 5,
para. 2). My understanding of point 2 D of the operative paragraph is
that the enforcement of responsibility and the obligation to compensate,
though elaborated upon by the Court in the part of the Judgment
devoted to Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement (paras. 148-
151) need not be a primary factor in the negotiations on the future of the
Gabéikovo-Nagymaros Project. It should be noted that the said finding
refers to the issue of compensation in rather general terms. At the same
time the Court gives its support to what I would describe as the “zero
option” (para. 153 of the Judgment). In my view the underlying message
of point 2 D to the negotiating Governments is that, notwithstanding
their legal claims and counterclaims for compensation, they should seek
— and find — a common solution.

(Signed) Krzysztof SKUBISZEWSKI.

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