17 JUIN 2004

ORDONNANCE

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES
ENGAGÉES EN FRANCE

(RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO c. FRANCE)

CASE CONCERNING CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE

(REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO y». FRANCE)

17 JUNE 2004

ORDER
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2004
2004
17 juin
Rôle général
n° 129
17 juin 2004

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES
ENGAGÉES EN FRANCE

(RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO c. FRANCE)

ORDONNANCE

Présents : M. SHI, président, M. RANJEVA, vice-président, MM. GUILLAUME, KOROMA,
VERESHCHETIN, Mme HIGGINS, MM. PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOLUMANS, REZEK,
AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL, ELARABY, OWADA, SIMMA, TOMKA, juges;
M. COUVREUR, greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,
Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44 et 45, paragraphe 2, de son
Règlement,

Vu la requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 9 décembre 2002, par laquelle la République
du Congo, se référant à l’article 38, paragraphe 5, du Règlement de la Cour, a entendu introduire
une instance contre la République française au sujet d’un différend relatif à certaines procédures
pénales engagées en France,

Vu la lettre du ministre français des affaires étrangères, datée du 8 avril 2003, par laquelle la
France a accepté expressément la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de la requête,
À

Vu l’ordonnance du 17 juin 2003 par laquelle la Cour s’est prononcée sur la demande en
indication de mesure conservatoire présentée par la République du Congo le 9 décembre 2002,

Vu l'ordonnance du 11 juillet 2003 par laquelle le président de la Cour a fixé aux
11 décembre 2003 et 11 mai 2004 les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt, respectivement, du
mémoire de la République du Congo et du contre-mémoire de la République française,

Vu le mémoire et le contre-mémoire dûment déposés par les Parties dans ces délais;

Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion que le président de la Cour a tenue avec les agents
des Parties le 11 juin 2004, l’agent du Congo a demandé à la Cour d’autoriser la présentation d’une
réplique par son gouvernement pour la fin de l’année 2004, et que l’agent de la France a indiqué
que son gouvernement n’avait pas d’objection à ce qu’il soit accédé à cette demande, étant entendu
que la France disposerait d’un délai égal pour le dépôt d’une duplique;

Compte tenu de l’accord des Parties et des circonstances propres à l’affaire,

Autorise la présentation d’une réplique du Congo et d’une duplique de la France;

Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt de ces pièces de procédure :

Pour la réplique de la République du Congo, le 10 décembre 2004;

Pour la duplique de la République française, le 10 juin 2005;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le
dix-sept juin deux mille quatre, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour
et les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République du Congo et au
Gouvernement de la République française.

Le président,
(Signé) SHI Jiuyong.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.


DISSENTING OPINION BY SIR ARNOLD McNAIR,
PRESIDENT, AND JUDGES BASDEVANT, KLAESTAD
AND READ

To our great regret we are unable to concur in the Judgment
of the Court. We must therefore indicate the way in which we
understand the task of the Court in the present case, the meaning
of the question submitted to it, the answer which should be given,
and the grounds on which we base our opinion.

*
* *

By the Judgment of July rst, 1952, in which the Court defined
the limits of its jurisdiction in the Ambatielos case, it is now called
upon to ‘‘decide’’, in accordance with the terms of that Judgment,
“‘whether the United Kingdom is under an obligation to submit to
arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration of 1926, the differ-
ence as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim, in so far as this
claim is based on the Treaty of 1886’’. The Court must say whether
or not there is an obligation, as so defined, binding upon the United
Kingdom. In their final Submissions the Parties clearly recognized
that this was the object of the Judgment now to be given by the
Court. The Court, having found that it has jurisdiction for this
purpose, is called upon to adjudicate upon the merits of the differ-
ence between the Parties as to the existence or non-existence of
this obligation. As to the difference between the same Parties
with regard to the validity of the Ambatielos claim, the Court has
declared, in the Judgment mentioned above, that it has no juris-
diction to decide upon the merits of that difference.

x
+ +

Having been required by the Application of the Hellenic Govern-
ment to decide whether the United Kingdom is under an obligation
to submit to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration of
1926, the difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim, the
Court, ‘‘whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it” (Article 38, para-
graph 1, of the Statute), must for this purpose examine and take
into account all legal factors which it deems relevant. There is no
tule of law which limits this examination. The Court indeed lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the Ambatielos
claim ; provided, however, that it confines itself to stating whether
or not there exists an obligation to submit the difference as to the
validity of that claim to arbitration, it will not trench upon the

19
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 26

question of validity itself. If it be found that there is any point of
law which is relevant to the solution of both these differences—
which were clearly distinguished by the Judgment of July rst,
1952—this cannot constitute a valid ground for the Court’s refrain-
ing from examining that point and forming an opinion as to its
importance for the purpose of determining whether an obligation
to have recourse to arbitration exists in this case.

The Court is called upon to say whether or not there exists an
obligation to set up a Commission of Arbitration whose task it
would then be to decide as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim.
An affirmative reply to this question can be given only if the
existence of this obligation can be established on a basis of law.
Unless this can be established, it does not appear to us to be possible
to give an affirmative answer to the question which the Court is
required to decide. It is therefore necessary to examine all the
factors susceptible of affecting the answer to be given to this ques-
tion. It is only after such an examination, and in the light of what
may emerge from it, that it will be possible to decide whether a
Commission of Arbitration should be set up. It was in this way
that the Court considered that the respective functions should be
divided in a case—the Interpretation of Peace Tvreaties—which,
apart from the fact that the Court had there before it a request for
an advisory opinion, had much in common with the present case.
The Court there pointed out that it had to give an opinion on the
applicability to certain disputes of the procedure for settlement by
means of Commissions instituted by the Peace Treaties, and not
on the merits of these disputes. The same is true in the present case.
The Court in that case itself considered the question whether the
disputes which it found to exist ‘“‘were among those for which”
the Peace Treaties had provided a procedure for settlement. The
Court found that the disputes in question related to the performance
or non-performance of obligations arising from certain articles of the
Peace Treaties. The Court made this finding without being ham-
pered in any way by the jurisdiction of the Commissions charged with
the duty of deciding as to the validity of the allegations forming the’
subject-matter of the disputes. Having made this finding, it deduced
therefrom an obligation on the States concerned to co-operate
in the procedure for settlement prescribed by the Treaties. In
our opinion, the Court in the present case must make a similar
investigation in order to ascertain whether the conditions necessary
for establishing an obligation to arbitrate are present.

Similarly, in the Advisory Opinion relating to the Interpretation
of the Greco-Turk Agreement of December rst, 1926, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, having been asked who was entitled
to seise the President of the Greco-Turk Arbitral Tribunal of certain
proceedings, gave its opinion on this question on the basis of the
relevant provisions and did not leave it to the President of this
Tribunal to deal with the point by deciding, in due course, whether

20
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 27

he had been properly seised. Yet what was involved in that case
was a question of the capacity necessary for the seising of an autho-
rity which already existed. When, as in the present case, it isa
question of adjudicating upon the obligation to co-operate in
setting up a body which would be called upon to make a decision
at a later stage, the arguments in favour of a decision in advance
on the question whether ail the necessary conditions are satisfied
appear to be still more convincing.

There is no rule of law nor anything contained in Article 29
of the Treaty of 1926 which restricts the Court in the exercise of
its jurisdiction to decide upon the existence of the obligation to
arbitrate. It follows from this Article, in accordance with the
interpretation given in the Judgment of July Ist, 1952, that the
Court has jurisdiction to deal with any dispute as to the interpre-
tation or application of the Declaration of 1926 : this is the question
which arises in ascertaining whether the arbitration clause con-
tained in that Declaration is to be applied in the present case.
Nothing contained in this Article or in the Declaration imposes
any limitation on the power of the Court to consider any factor
susceptible of affecting its judgment and, in particular, nothing
therein contained directs it to surrender this examination to any
other body. Provided the Court confines itself, in the operative part
of its Judgment, to adjudicating upon the existence of the obligation
to arbitrate, its power to consider the reasons determining its
decision does not appear to us to be limited by the fact that a
Commission of Arbitration may be constituted for the purpose of
deciding as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim.

*
* *

By the Declaration of 1926, the United Kingdom consented to
the submission to arbitration of any difference with the Hellenic
Government “‘as to the validity” of “claims on behalf of private
persons based on the provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial
Treaty of 1886’’. On the question whether this provision is applicable
to the ‘difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim”,
the operative part of the Judgment of July 1st, 1952, added the
following words: ‘in so far as this claim is based on the Treaty
of 1886”. This being the case, it is necessary to consider the meaning,
which is in issue between the Parties, of the expression ‘‘claims ....
based on the provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of
1886”, an expression which is contained in the Declaration and
repeated in the Judgment.

It is not enough for the Hellenic Government to invoke a provi-
sion of the Treaty of 1886 for the Ambatielos claim to be con-
sidered as “‘based on the provisions of the .... Treaty of 1886” within
the meaning of the Declaration of 1926. There is nothing in the

21
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 28

Declaration which authorizes either Party to the Treaty and Decla-
ration of 1926 to impose its own subjective interpretation of this
expression. The Declaration states it objectively, and the Court,
which is empowered by Article 29 of the Treaty to interpret the
expression, must determine in an objective way whether the claim
presented under the Declaration is or is not based on the provisions
of the Treaty of 1886.

The arbitration clause, in the form in which it appeared in the
Protocol of 1886, was open to the risk of becoming ineffectual
in cases where it was invoked by one State and the respondent
State alleged that the difference existing between them lay outside
the scope of the provisions of the clause. The negative view of the
respondent State was then sufficient to prevent the practical
application of the clause. By the combined effect of the Declaration
of 1926 and Article 29 of the Treaty of the same date, a remedy was
provided for this defect in the arbitration clause: by this remedy
the Court is empowered to decide this preliminary difference. The
effect of this is that the opinion which will prevail will be that
formed by the Court itself as to the character of the difference and,
in the present case, on the question whether the claim which has
been presented is or is not a claim based on the provisions of the
Treaty of 1886.

When the Permanent Court and the present Court have had to
ascertain whether a dispute fell within the scope of an arbitration
clause or a compulsory jurisdiction clause, these Courts have always
considered that it was their duty first to determine the categories
of disputes to which the clause in question was applicable and then
to enquire whether the dispute in question fell within one of these
categories.

This is the consequence of a principle of international law which
forms the basis of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. In the
Eastern Carelia Opinion, the Permanent Court invoked this prin-
ciple, and declared that “It is well established in international
law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit
its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration,
or to any other kind of pacific settlement’. This principle was
thereafter applied on a number of occasions by the Permanent
Court, in particular in the cases concerning the Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions, German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
the Factory at Chorzôw, and the Rights of Minorities in Upper
Stlesia. That Court applied the principle with particular care when
it had. to decide the scope of an exception ratione temporis con-
tained in a compulsory jurisdiction clause invoked before it in the
Phosphates in Morocco case. The principle was also applied by the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case, the
Interpretation of Peace Treaties case and the Anglo-Irantan O1l
Company case.

22
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 29

In applying this principle for the purpose of deciding whether
a given jurisdictional clause covered a given dispute which it was
alleged could be submitted to it by virtue of the clause in question,
the Permanent Court was not satisfied by a mere doubt resulting
from weighty arguments presented before it, nor by prima facie
considerations or considerations of a provisional character. In
the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, it invoked “‘the fact
that its jurisdiction .... is variably based on the consent of the
respondent”, and it expressly stated that it “cannot content
itself with the provisional conclusion that the dispute falls or
not within the terms of the Mandate’’. In the case concerning the
Factory at Chorzôw, after repeating that its jurisdiction ‘is always
a limited one, existing only in so far as States have accepted it”,
the Court added :

“When considering whether it has jurisdiction or not, the Court’s
airn is always to ascertain whether an intention on the part of the
Parties exists to confer jurisdiction upon it. The question as to the
existence of a doubt nullifying its jurisdiction need not be considered
when, as in the present case, this intention can be demonstrated
in a manner convincing to the Court.”

Before declaring a State to be bound to submit a dispute to the
decision of an international tribunal, the Permanent Court and
the present Court have always considered it necessary to establish
positively, and not merely on prima facie or provisional grounds,
that the State in question had in some form given its consent to
this procedure. No distinction in this connection has been drawn
between cases where the jurisdiction of the Court was involved
and cases where that of some other tribunal or authority was in
question.

Since there is nothing in the Declaration of 1926 to indicate an
intention that prima facie considerations should be regarded as
sufficient, it is our opinion, based on the principle referred to above
and the way in which this principle has been invariably applied,
that the United Kingdom can only be held to be under an obli-
gation to accept the arbitral procedure by application of the
Declaration of 1926 if it can be established to the satisfaction of
the Court that the difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos
claim falls within the category of differences in respect of which
the United Kingdom consented to arbitration in the Declaration
of 1926.

*
* *

It is necessary therefore to examine the matter and, without
prejudging the validity of the Ambatielos claim, to ascertain
what claims the Declaration of 1926 was intended to refer to and
whether the Ambatielos claim falls within the category of claims so
determined.

23
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 30

The claims referred to by the Declaration of 1926 are claims
““based on the provisions of the Treaty” of 1886. These words should
be construed in their natural and ordinary meaning, as has been
said over and over again and, in particular, in the Advisory Opinion
of the Court on the Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the United Nations. In our opinion, the
natural and ordinary meaning of these words is limited to claims
whose legal support is found in the provisions of the Treaty ; that
is, claims whose validity should be appraised in the light of these
provisions ; the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, in our
opinion, excludes claims whose support must be sought elsewhere.
In accordance with the method of interpretation adopted by. the
Court in the above-mentioned Opinion, we would add that nothing
in the Declaration suggests that the Parties intended to confer any
other meaning on these words.

A reading of the Declaration as a whole confirms the view that
the natural meaning of the words used corresponds to the purpose
which the Parties had in mind. The Declaration begins with a clause
whose purpose is to keep alive, in spite of the lapse of the Treaty
of 1886, claims on behalf of private persons based on the provisions
of that Treaty. This clause can only have a meaning, and can only
have effect, in respect of claims legally based on the Treaty of 1886.
It cannot be extended to cover claims in respect of which those
provisions might be invoked without being really applicable. It was
in the nature of things that this saving clause could only safeguard
claims that had a legal basis in the Treaty of 1886. The arbitration
clause in the Declaration of 1926 mentions expressly the claims
referred to in the saving clause. It cannot extend to other claims.

Thus, and by virtue of the express reference made by the Decla-
ration to the Treaty of 1886, a difference concerning a claim on
behalf of a private person comes within the scope of the arbitration
clause of the Declaration of 1926 only if the examination of the
claim demonstrates that it falls within the framework of the Treaty.

*
* *

In order to determine whether the arbitration clause in the Decla-
ration of 1926 should be applied in the present case, we must
ascertain whether the difference under consideration falls within
the category of differences which the Parties have agreed to submit
to arbitration.

The sphere of application of the arbitration clause in the Decla-
ration of 1926 has been defined by reference to the relevant law,
namely, the provisions of the Treaty of 1886. This method has been
frequently adopted in the drafting of arbitral or jurisdictional
clauses.

24
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 31

The method to be followed must therefore be to enquire whether
the dispute as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim falls to be
decided by the application of the provisions of the Treaty of 1886.
This method was described by the Permanent Court in the Mavrom-
matis Palestine Concesstons case as follows:

“For this reason the Court, bearing in mind the fact that its
jurisdiction is limited, that it is invariably based on the consent
of the respondent and only exists in so far as this consent has been
given, cannot content itself with the prosivional conclusion that
the dispute falls or not within the terms of the Mandate. The Court,
before giving judgment on the merits of the case, will satisfy itself
that the suit before it, in the form in which it has been submitted
and on the basis of the facts hitherto established, falls to be decided
by application of the clauses of the Mandate. For the Mandatory
has only accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for such disputes.”

The same method was adopted by the Permanent Court in the
Phosphates in Morocco case and by the present Court in its Advisory
Opinion concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties. Having
to decide whether the disputes under consideration were among
those which were subject to the provisions of the Peace Treaties
for the settlement of disputes by means of Commissions, the Court
examined the subject-matter of the differences. It found that the
disputes related “‘to the question of the performance or non-
performance of the obligations provided in’’ certain articles of the
Treaty, and it deduced from this finding that these disputes “are
clearly disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of
the Peace Treaties’, and that furthermore the Governments con-
cerned were bound to carry out the provisions of those articles
in the treaties relating to the settlement of disputes by means of
Commissions.

We therefore have to consider whether the Ambatielos claim
falls within the framework of the Treaty of 1886. In order to do
this, it is necessary to examine the claim as it has been put forward,
without enquiring whether the facts alleged are true or not, and
to consider the provisions of the Treaty of 1886 which the Hellenic
Government has invoked.

The origin of the claim is to be found in a contract between
Mr. Ambatielos and the British Ministry of Shipping for the sale
of nine ships then under construction. Mr. Ambatielos has con-
tended that this contract was not properly carried out by the
seller, but this question of the breach of the contract is not one
which has to be decided by international arbitration. It was sub-

25
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION} 32

mitted to English Courts by common accord of the Parties, as is
stated in the British Note of 2gth Mav 1933, and not disputed in
the Hellenic answer of 3rd August 1933. The Admiralty Court
gave judgment against Mr. Ambatielos, who appealed against
this decision to the Court of Appeal but subsequently abandoned
his appeal.

The present claim, as formulated by the Hellenic Government,
relates to the way in which justice was administered in the pro-
ceedings in the English Courts between Mr. Ambatielos and the
Board of Trade as the successor to the Ministry of Shipping. It
has been alleged, on behalf of the Hellenic Government, that
officials of the Board of Trade wrongly failed to produce in the
Admiralty Court all the evidence available and that this resulted
in damage to Mr. Ambatielos. The Hellenic Government also
complains of the refusal by the Court of Appeal of leave to
Mr. Ambatielos to adduce new evidence. The difference existing be-
tween the Hellenic Government and the United Kingdom Govern-
ment is therefore concerned with a claim based on alleged improper
administration of justice, in particular with regard to the produc-
tion of evidence in proceedings in the English Courts. The question
for this Court is to decide whether the matter of complaint thus
relied upon falls within the provisions of the Treaty of 1886.
Without passing upon the truth of the facts relied on, and assuming
them to be established, without moreover passing on the legal or
illegal character of these facts, it is possible to determine whether
this legal or illegal character is or is not dependent on the appli-
cation of the provisions of the Treaty of 1886, and to decide, as
a result of the view, formed on this point, whether the claim
based on these facts is or is not one which should be referred
to arbitration in application of the Declaration of 1926. Such a
decision, relating solely to the obligation to resort to-arbitration,
will not prejudge any decision to be given as to the validity of the
Ambatielos claim, which is not within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Is the claim of the Hellenic Government against the United
Kingdom, the object of which has been thus defined, within the
framework of the Treaty of 1886 ? The reply to this question must
be in the affirmative before there can arise an obligation, in accord-
ance with the Declaration of 1926, to submit the claim to arbi-
tration. The ‘provisions of the Treaty of 1886 invoked by the
Hellenic Government must now be considered. _

The Hellenic Government invokes Article XV, paragraph 3, of
the Treaty of 1886. This Article provides :

“The subjects of each of the two Contracting Parties in the
dominions and possessions of the other shall have free access to
the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their rights,
without other conditions, restrictions, or taxes beyond those imposed
on native subjects, and shall, like them, be at liberty to employ, in
all causes, their advocates, attorneys or agents, from among the

26
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 33

persons admitted to the exercise of those professions according to
the laws of the country.”

This Article promises free access to the Courts ; it says nothing
with regard to the production of evidence. Questions as to the pro-
duction of evidence are by their nature within the province of the
law of the Court dealing with the case (lex fori). The Treaty could
have laid down certain requirements in this connection, but it did
not do so. The free access clause frequently found in treaties, more
commonly in the past than at the present, has as its purpose the
removal, for its beneficiaries, of the obstructions, which existed in
certain countries as the result of old traditions, to the right of
foreigners to have recourse to the Courts. Its object is, as it states,
to ensure free access to the Courts, not to regulate the different
question of the production of evidence. An extensive interpretation
of the free access clause which would have the effect of including
in it the requirements of the proper administration of justice, in
particular with regard to the production of evidence, would go
beyond the words and the purpose of Article XV, paragraph 3.
Free access to the Courts is one thing ; the proper administration
of justice is another. A distinction is traditionally drawn between
the two as is shown, in particular, by the preparatory work of the
1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law (see in
particular the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law,
League of Nations, C. 196. M. 70. 1927. V, pages 96-100 and 104 ;
Observations of the Hellenic Government on this Report, pages
167-168, and Bases of Discussion Nos. 5 and 6 by the Preparatory
Committee, League of Nations, C. 75. M. 69. 1929. V, Vol. ITI,
pages 48 and 51).

Finally, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that in this
case the Court has to decide, on the basis of the meaning to be
attributed to the free access clause, what is the extent of the obli-
gation to arbitrate arising from the Declaration of 1926. With two
interpretations of Article XV, paragraph 3, before us, we cannot
subscribe to the one which would extend it to the production of
evidence and thereby enlarge the obligation to submit to arbitra-
tion. It is particularly difficult to accept an interpretative extension
of an obligation of a State to have recourse to arbitration. The
Permanent Court in the Phosphates in Morocco case stated that a
jurisdictional clause must on no account be interpreted in such a
way as to exceed the intention of the States that subscribed to it.
It went on to say with regard to the scope to be attributed to an
exception rafione temporis contained in the compulsory jurisdiction
clause invoked before it :

‘it is necessary always to bear in mind the will of the State which
only accepted the compulsory jurisdiction within specified mits,
and consequently only intended to submit to that jurisdiction

27
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 34

disputes having actually arisen from situations or facts subsequent
to its acceptance’.

The free access clause does not do more than provide for free
access and for national treatment as regards conditions, restric-
tions, taxes and the employment of counsel. The complaint, as put
before the Court in this case, does not allege that Mr. Ambatielos
was refused access to the English Courts, or that he was denied
national treatment as regards conditions, restrictions, taxes or the
employment of counsel. The Hellenic Government merely alleges
that the production of evidence was effected in a manner which in
its opinion was defective and detrimental to its national. Art-
icle XV, paragraph 3, is unconnected with this complaint. If any
legal rule has been broken, it is not a rule contained in this Article.

In fact, when the Hellenic Government complains that the
executive or judicial authorities of the United Kingdom have not
acted according to the requirements of the proper administration
of justice, it is alleging a violation of general international law.
Can such a claim be considered to be based on a provision of the
Treaty of 1886? At this stage we meet Article X of the Treaty of
1886 which has been invoked by the Hellenic Government. This
Article contains a most-favoured-nation clause which, in its opinion,
embodies certain references to the requirements of the proper
administration of justice. But, having regard to its terms, Article X
promises most-favoured-nation treatment only in matters of com-
merce and navigation; it makes no provision concerning the admi-
nistration of justice; in the whole of the Treaty this matter is the
subject of only one provision, of limited scope, namely, Article XV,
paragraph 3, concerning free access to the Courts, and that Article
contains no reference to most-favoured-nation treatment. The most-
favoured-nation clause in Article X cannot be extended to matters
other than those in respect of which it has been stipulated. We
do not consider it possible to base the obligation on which the
Court has beén asked to adjudicate, on an extensive interpretation
of this clause.

The Hellenic Government has also invoked Articles I and XII
of the Treaty of 1886 as a basis for its claim, but these Articles,
like Article X, are unconnected with the administration of justice.
They throw. no light on the question whether the evidence was
properly or improperly produced in the English Courts. Nor do
they permit an opinion to be formed as regards the complaint of
improper performance of the contract or of unjust enrichment,
even assuming that these complaints fall to be considered by an
international tribunal.

28
AMBATIELOS CASE (DISSENTING OPINION) 35

The difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos ciañn, in
respect of which the Court has been asked to say whether it should
be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Declaration of
1926, does not, therefore, appear to us to fall within the provisions
of the Treaty of 1886 which have been invoked. A comparison
between the object of the claim and the provisions of the Treaty
thus leads us to the conclusion that the claim—whether it be justi-
fied or not—falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause in the
Declaration of 1926.

*
* *

For these reasons, we consider that the Ambatielos claim does
not fall within the category of claims in respect of which the United
Kingdom has agreed to arbitration by the Declaration of 1926.
Consequently the United Kingdom, in our opinion, is not under
an obligatior to submit this claim to the arbitral procedure provided
for in that Declaration.

(Signed) Arnold D. McNair.
(Signed) BASDEVANT.
(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD.
(Signed) J. E. READ.

29


IOI

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. URRUTIA

La requête du Gouvernement belge contre l’État bulgare con-
cernant la Compagnie d’Electricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie
exprime que ledit Gouvernement s’est prévalu pour l’introduire
devant la Cour:

1° des déclarations d’adhésion de la Belgique et de la Bul-
garie à la disposition facultative portant acceptation comme
obligatoire de la juridiction de la Cour, déclarations ratifiées.
respectivement le ro mars 1926 et le 12 août 1921;

2° du Traité de conciliation, d'arbitrage et de règlement judi-
ciaire intervenu entre les deux pays sous la date du 23 juin 1931.

Dans l’Exposé du droit du Mémoire belge (p. 18), on a
déduit la compétence de la Cour en premier lieu de l'arti-
cle 4 du nommé Traité de conciliation, d'arbitrage et de règle-
ment judiciaire, mais on a ajouté: « Surabondamment le |
Gouvernement belge établit la compétence de la Cour permanente
de Justice internationale par les déclarations d'adhésion de la
Belgique et de la Bulgarie à la disposition facultative du Sta-
tut de la Cour », etc.

Dans VExposé des faits dudit Mémoire (p. 17), référence est
faite à la note adressée par le ministre de Belgique à Sofia
au ministre des Affaires étrangères de Bulgarie, le 24 juin 1937
(annexe 56 du Mémoire belge), note dans laquelle le ministre
de Belgique faisait connaître l'intention de son Gouvernement
de soumettre le différend à la Cour, « le litige actuel », disait
. la note, « rentrant dans la catégorie de ceux que les arti-
cles 4 et 6 du Traité de conciliation intervenu entre la Bul-
garie et la Belgique, le 23 juin 1931, permettent de différer
unilatéralement à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale »,
etc.; on ajoute entre parenthèses: « (à la clause de compé-
tence obligatoire de laquelle la Bulgarie a, d’autre part, adhéré
le 27 août 19217) ».

Dans le Mémoire additionnel du Gouvernement belge, on
exprime que le Traité de conciliation, d'arbitrage et de règle-
‘ment judiciaire a été indiqué ex deuxième lieu comme base de
compétence de la Cour. D’après l'exposé de droit du Mémoire
du Gouvernement bulgare introduisant son exception prélimi-
naire, on peut déduire que le Gouvernement bulgare a com-
pris aussi dans ce sens la requête belge.

Il semble que la question qui, en premier lieu, s’est posée
devant la Cour pour établir sa compétence est celle de savoir
si l’exception du Gouvernement bulgare doit être tranchée sur

41
102 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

la base du traité plusieurs fois nommé, ou sur celle de la dis-
position iacultative, ou sur les deux textes conjointement.

L’avocat-conseil du Gouvernement belge, Me Rolin, dans son
exposé du ret mars 1939 (matin) devant la Cour, a exprimé
ses points de vue sur cette question et est arrivé à la conclu-
sion suivante :

« Jusqu'au 3 février 1933, nos relations ont été régies par la
clause facultative avec les modalités résultant de nos deux déclara-
tions d’acceptation.

Du 3 février 1933 — date de la mise en vigueur du Traité de
1931 — au 3 février 1938, nos relations ont été régies par le traité.

Du 3 février 1938 à nos jours, nos relations sont de nouveau
régies par la clause facultative. »

« Il est assez singulier que, d’après la procédure et d’après l'exposé
qui vous a été fait, on vous invite à apprécier votre compétence
pour un litige unique entre deux États, d’après deux séries de
documents que l’on examine successivement, comme s'il y avait
entre la Belgique et la Bulgarie deux dispositions en vigueur pen-
dant la même période, et devant être appliquées d’une façon sépa-
rée, deux documents sans relation l’un avec l’autre, deux systèmes
de règles auxquels on vous invite à vous référer successivement...
Zl est absurde d'imaginer qu’il ait été dans l'intention de la Bel-
gique et de la Bulgarie de créer additionnellement un autre système
qui, pendant la même période, serait en vigueur cumulativement
avec la clause facultative qui déjà nous liait. »

Me Rolin, dans l’audience de l’après-midi du même jour, a
rectifié son opinion antérieure et en a exprimé une autre dans
le sens que « dans cette deuxième période intermédiaire, qui
se place au moment où la Belgique dépose la requête, la Cour
puisse prendre en considération la clause facultative avec les
amendements qu’éventuellement y a apportés le traité entre la
Belgique et la Bulgarie » (Exposés oraux, Distr. 4225).

M. Altinoff, agent du Gouvernement bulgare, a opposé quel-
ques arguments à la thèse développée par Me Rolin au cours
du premier exposé de celui-ci. D’après M. Altinoff, le traité
d'arbitrage, de conciliation, etc., entre la Belgique et la Bul-
garie n'innove rien en ce qui concerne le règlement judiciaire, et
laisse purement et simplement intact ce qui existait antérieurement.

La Cour n'est pas obligée de se placer pour décider cette
question sur le terrain juridique de l’une ou de l’autre Partie,
elle a toute liberté pour arriver. à une décision d’après son
propre jugement, et même si.les deux Parties étaient d’accord
pour défendre la même thèse juridique, si celle-ci manque de
fondements solides dans l'opinion de la Cour.

La Cour n’a pas seulement la faculté mais aussi le devoir
de s'assurer, même d'office, de sa compétence, c’est-à-dire du

42
3 . A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

pouvoir qu’elle a de connaître d’une affaire d’après les textes
qui régissent ladite compétence (art. 53 du Statut).

*
* *

La déclaration d’acceptation de Ja Bulgarie de la juridiction
de la Cour d’après l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour a été
signée le 29 juillet 1921 ; elle a été ratifiée le 12 août Ig2r et
‘ne comporte aucune réserve. Il n’y a que la condition générale
de la réciprocité.

La déclaration de la Belgique est limitée à quinze ans sur
tous les différends qui s’éléveraient après la ratification au sujet
des situations ou des faits postérieurs à la ratification, sauf
les cas où les Parties auraient convenu ou conviendraient d’avoir
recours à un autre mode de règlement pacifique.

La déclaration belge a été ratifiée le 10 mars 1926, date qui
fixe l'entrée en vigueur pour la Belgique et la Bulgarie des
déclarations précitées, en vertu de la réciprocité.

Le Traité de conciliation, d'arbitrage et de règlement judi-
claire signé entre la Bulgarie et la Belgique le 23 juin 1931 a
été ratifié le 4 février 1933. Il a été dénoncé le 3 août 1937,
et il est venu à expiration le 4 février 1938, d'accord avec
l'article 37.

L’adhésion des deux Parties à l’article 36 du Statut de la
Cour a la signification juridique d’un accord international entre
elles dans le cadre fixé par les réserves de la déclaration belge.
Cet engagement a pu être modifié, soit par une amplification
des obligations, soit par une restriction de celles-ci, soit par des
dispositions complémentaires, en vertu d’un autre accord ultérieur.

Le traité nommé entre la Belgique et la Bulgarie a précisé
et amplifié les obligations réciproques dérivées de son accepta-
tion de l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour par l'introduction de
nouvelles dispositions sur le règlement judiciaire, par la création
d'un système juridique complémentaire en relation avec ledit
règlement.

La réserve. consignée dans la déclaration belge ratione tem-
poris ne peut être invoquée dans la période pendant laquelle
le Traité de 1931 reste en vigueur. On ne conçoit pas qu’on
puisse appliquer en même temps, dans le même litige et par
le même tribunal, une stipulation conventionnelle qui exclue du
règlement judiciaire certains différends et une autre qui les
comprend. C’est l’une ou c’est l’autre stipulation qui doit pré-
valoir. Dans le présent cas, c’est le traité qui est une loi uliérieure
entre les Parties, qui est une loi spéciale et dont le texte est
d'une clarté si parfaite qu’il ne donne lieu à aucune interpré-
tation, moins encore à aucune confusion.

Par l’article 3 du traité nommé, les Hautes Parties se sont
mises d'accord pour établir certaines conditions spéciales pour

43
104 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

qu'une requête puisse être introduite devant la Cour. Cet
article, qui est l’article 31 de l’Acte général de conciliation, de
règlement judiciaire et de règlement arbitral adopté par l’Assem-
blée de la Société des Nations le 26 septembre 1928, a mis une
condition expresse pour que l’on puisse appeler à la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour acceptée dans les déclarations relatives à .
ladite juridiction, d’après l’article 36 du Statut. Cette condition,
qui figure, dans l’une ou l’autre forme, dans les nombreux
traités qui ont suivi l’Acte général d'arbitrage, signifie l’accep-
tation par un acte solennel et positif des Hautes Parties contrac-
tantes de ce principe de droit international sur l'épuisement
des recours internes, principe déjà généralement reconnu comme
l'un de ceux auxquels se réfère l'alinéa 3 de l’article 38 du
Statut de la Cour, et que celle-ci vient de consacrer heureuse-
ment dans son récent arrêt sur l'affaire du chemin de fer
Panevezys-Saldutiskis entre l’Estonie et la Lithuanie.

L'application de la règle commune du droit international sur
l'épuisement des recours internes, qui, d’après mon opinion,
est obligatoire en relation avec l'introduction de n'importe
quelle requête à la Cour sur le régime juridique de la disposi-
tion facultative, dans la présente affaire devient inévitable
comme effet positif de la stipulation d’un traité. L'article 38
du Statut. de la Cour, parmi les sources de droit à appliquer,
signale comme la première les conventions internationales éta-
blissant des règles expressément reconnues par les États en litige.

Ainsi, pendant que le Traité de 1931 a été en vigueur,
Particle 3 est celui qui est appelé à régir la compétence de la
Cour au cas d'une requête introduite par une des Hautes Parties
contractantes. Si on pouvait arriver à la conclusion que les
Parties peuvent, par la seule invocation de l'acceptation de la
juridiction de la Cour consignée dans leurs déclarations d’adhé-
sion, laisser de côté cette stipulation aussi capitale du traité, il
faudrait conclure que celui-ci n’a qu'une valeur académique et
_ sans aucune efficacité pratique.

L'article 7 du Traité de 1931 a introduit aussi une disposi-
tion nouvelle et complémentaire en relation avec le règlement
judiciaire dans le cas d’un différend entre les Hautes Parties
contractantes. On a établi qu’en cas d'échec de la procédure
de conciliation, un délai doit précéder la présentation d’une
requête devant la Cour.

Dans les articles 33 et 34 du traité se trouvent aussi des
dispositions sur le règlement judiciaire.

Tout un système juridique a été établi dans le traité qui
vient compléter et encadrer l'exercice de la juridiction obli-
gatoire de la Cour acceptée par les Parties. Celles-ci n’ont pas
perdu de vue leurs déclarations d’acceptation, et l’article 4
du traité prévoit expressément que les différends visés par lui

44
105  A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l’article 36 du
Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Dans
l'article 31 du traité, référence est faite aussi aux règles de
fond énumérées dans l’article 38 du Statut. Donc, on peut
conclure que l'intention des Parties était d’incorporer le système
juridique général dérivé de l'acceptation de la juridiction obliga-
toire de la Cour dans un autre système, plus précis, plus
compréhensif, et que, sans doute, les Parties considéraient
comme le plus convenable pour leurs intérêts réciproques.

On ne peut pas dire que le traité a annulé, ni abrogé, ni
suspendu les effets juridiques des déclarations, mais il les a
soumis à des conditions telles que, pendant que le traité est en
vigueur, la juridiction de la Cour et, partant, sa compétence,
ne peut être exercée que d'accord avec elles.

Si on pouvait arriver à la conclusion que deux dispositions,
régissant la compétence de la Cour d'une façon différente et
même contraire, sont en même temps applicables, on pourrait
aussi arriver à cette autre conclusion que la Cour peut être
compétente pour connaître d’une affaire, en conformité avec
une de ces dispositions, et incompétente d’après une autre. Or,
cette situation me paraît difficile à concevoir et à admiettre
d’un point de vue juridique, et il me semble qu’elle ne se
conformerait pas non plus avec la volonté des Hautes Parties,
telle qu’elle apparaît dans le texte des actes qui les obligent.

Si, dans le droit interne, il n’est pas admissible que la compé-
tence d’un tribunal soit régie par une loi qui est la source de
sa compétence et par une autre qui serait la cause juridique
de son incompétence, dans le domaine du droit international
on ne peut pas non plus admettre une situation analogue.

*
* *

L’adhésion à l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour, prévue dans
le même article, par plusieurs Etats, a été un grand pas dans
la voie de ce qu’on appelle l'arbitrage obligatoire. Cette dis-
position est venue réaliser, dans une certaine mesure, les aspi-
rations de plusieurs Etats qui désiraient voir consacrer la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour dans le Statut méme. Mais ce
système d’ordre général devait être perfectionné et complété
par des accords multilatéraux ou bilatéraux appelés a bien
préciser les obligations des parties. C’est de ce propos que se
sont inspirées les recommandations de l’Assemblée de la Société
des Nations du 2 octobre 1924, du 25 septembre 1926, et
finalement les projets d’Acte général d'arbitrage, de concilia-
tion et de procédure judiciaire et des conventions modèles y
annexées, votées par l’Assemblée de 1928.

La question que la présente affaire a posée devant la Cour
implique un problème juridique d’une grande importance pour

45
106 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

la meilleure appréciation des rapports entre la Disposition
facultative et les conventions nommées, et il est sûr que la
présente décision de la Cour fera l’objet d’une étude très atten-
tive. de la part de tous les États signataires. ~

*
* 7%

A la date du 25 janvier 1938, jour où la requête belge a
été introduite devant la Cour, le Traité de r931 était encore
en vigueur, et ce sont les dispositions de ce traité sur la pro-
cédure judiciaire qui doivent déterminer la compétence de la
Cour pour cette affaire.

La Belgique, d’aprés mon opinion, ne pouvait introduire sa
requéte pendant que ledit traité était en vigueur sans tenir
compte des dispositions de celui-ci.

La Bulgarie aussi, dans son exception préliminaire, devait
discuter la compétence de la Cour à la lumière des dispositions
du traité.

Le Gouvernement bulgare appuie son exception d’incompé-
tence de la Cour sur l’article 3 du traité nommé. Le Gouver-
nement belge, tant dans les écritures que dans les plaidoiries,
a été d'accord pour apprécier l'exception du Gouvernement bul-
gare comme exception d’incompétence de la Cour, comme elle
est en réalité, puisque ladite compétence est une émanation du
texte du traité.

L'article 3 précité pose les conditions suivantes pour qu’une des
Parties puisse s’opposer à l’introduction d’une requête devant
la Cour:

1° S'il s’agit d’un différend dont l'objet, d’après la légis-
lation intérieure d’une des Hautes Parties contractantes, relève
des autorités judiciaires ou administratives de la Partie qui
fait l'opposition. —

2° Si, pour ce différend, une décision définitive n’a pas été
rendue dans des délais raisonnables par l'autorité compétente.

3° Si la Partie requérante n'a pas notifié à l’autre Partie son
intention dans le délai d’un an à partir de la décision susvisée.

Il me semble que le présent différend relève des autorités judi-
ciaires de la Bulgarie pour les raisons suivantes.

Le Gouvernement belge a reconnu la compétence des tribu-
naux bulgares dans la lettre du ministre de Belgique au pré-
sident du Conseil des Ministres de Bulgarie, du 22 avril 1937
(Mémoire bulgare, n° 37).

La Compagnie d’Electricité de Sofia a reconnu aussi ladite
compétence, d’après ce qu’a exprimé le ministre de Belgique

46
107 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

dans la note précitée. Aussi par le fait même d’avoir introduit
des recours devant les tribunaux.

L'agent du Gouvernement belge a reconnu telle compétence,
dans les écritures, et dans les plaidoiries. Dans le Mémoire
additionnel du Gouvernement belge se trouve cette importante
déclaration : « D'autre part, il est si peu exact que le Gouver-
nement belge ait prétendu soustraire aux tribunaux bulgares
l'examen du litige qui leur revenait de droit qu’au moment du
dépôt de sa requête, deux degrés de juridiction bulgare s'étaient
définitivement prononcés. »

Selon les principes de droit international universellement accep-
tés, «les droits de propriété et les droits contractuels relèvent
du droit interne, et, de ce chef, c’est avant tout aux tribu-
naux internes qu’il appartient d’en connaître ». J’emprunte cette
déclaration au texte du dernier arrêt de la Cour (chemin de
fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis).

La Cour a établi aussi, dans l’arrêt nommé, que le point de
savoir si les tribunaux d’un État sont ou non compétents pour
connaître d’une instance déterminée dépend de la loi de cet
État, et que seuls lesdits tribunaux peuvent, en cette matière,
rendre une décision définitive.

Il n'est pas nécessaire de pénétrer dans le fond même de ce
différend pour apprécier ce qui est évident déjà, à savoir qu’il
s’agit des droits contractuels entre Ja Municipalité de Sofia et
une compagnie belge d'électricité.

Il me semble aussi que la Belgique a introduit sa requête
avant qu'une décision définitive des tribunaux bulgares ait été
rendue, pour les raisons suivantes.

L'arrêt de la Cour de cassation pouvait casser l’arrêt de la
Cour d’appel et renvoyer l'affaire pour un nouvel examen devant
deux nouvelles instances.

La Compagnie d’Electricité de Sofia a fait un pourvoi en
cassation justement pour obtenir que le litige soit de nouveau
examiné par les tribunaux bulgares.

Le Mémoire du Gouvernement belge lui-même reconnaît
implicitement que le dernier recours était celui-ci, intenté devant
la Cour de cassation (pp. 20 et 36 du Mémoire belge). Le
Mémoire belge conclut ainsi:

« Plaise à la Cour, sous réserve de toutes conclusions plus
amples à prendre en cours d'instance,

A. Déclarer que l’État bulgare a manqué à ses obligations
internationales,

T° ee :

2° par les jugement et arrét susvisés du Tribunal régional et
de la Cour d’appel de Sofia, ainsi que par l’arrêt de la Cour
de cassation du 16 mars 1938.... »

47
108  A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. URRUTIA

La thèse en vertu de laquelle un recours en cassation n’em-
pêche pas l'application de la règle de l'épuisement des recours
internes conduirait à ce résultat que le même litige pourrait
être suivi simultanément devant un tribunal interne et devant
une Cour.internationale.

En ce qui concerne les délais raisonnables pour l'expédition
de la décision définitive des tribunaux nationaux, le Gouverne-
ment belge n’a présenté aucune observation, ni ne pouvait la
présenter dans la requête, puisque, au moment de son intro-
duction, on ne connaissait pas encore la date de l'expédition
de l'arrêt de la Cour de cassation. D'ailleurs, cet arrêt a été
rendu dans un délai de moins de neuf mois. -

La deuxième partie de l’articlé 3 du traité prévoit l’obliga-
tion d’une notification par l’État qui se propose d'introduire
la requête dans le délai d’un an à partir de la décision sus-
visée. Comme il n’y a pas eu de décision définitive, une telle
notification ne pouvait avoir lieu. La notification que contient
la note de la légation de Belgique à Sofia, note adressée au
président du Conseil et ministre des Affaires étrangères de
Bulgarie, le 24 juin 1937, se réfère a l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel
de Sofia du 27 mars 1937.

En ce qui se réfère à Valinéa 4 de l’article 37. du traité, il
me semble que les mots « procédures engagées au moment de
l'expiration du terme du traité continueront jusqu'à leur achève-
ment normal » sont relatifs à une procédure valablement engagée.
C'est-à-dire que l'alinéa 4 de l’article 37 se réfère aux procé-
dures engagées en conformité avec l’article 3.

Les considérations que je viens d’exposer m'ont amené à la
conclusion que l'exception préliminaire d’incompétence de la
Cour, présentée par le Gouvernement bulgare et qui se base
sur le Traité d’arbitrage, de conciliation et de règlement judi-
ciaire entre la Belgique et la Bulgarie du 23 juin 1031, est
fondée. .

(Signé) URRUTIA.

48


                                     SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TOMKA

        Jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá  Interpretation of
Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá  The meaning and purpose of the phrase “so long as the present
Treaty is in force”  No temporal limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article XXXI 
Requirement that the Pact of Bogotá be in force when the Application instituting proceedings is
filed  No new claim formulated by Nicaragua after the filing of the Application and the lapse of
the title of jurisdiction.

      Nicaragua’s straight baselines  Finding of the Court that they are not in conformity with
international law  No legal consequences drawn by the Court from this finding  Obligation of
Nicaragua to bring its straight baselines in the Caribbean Sea into conformity with UNCLOS.

       Although I have voted in favour of all the conclusions reached by the Court, there are two
issues on which I wish to offer some observations.

                                                    I. JURISDICTION

      1. The first issue concerns the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. In its Judgment rendered
on 17 March 2016, the Court found

       “that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to adjudicate
       upon the dispute between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia
       referred to in subparagraph 1 (b) above [i.e. the ‘dispute regarding the alleged violations
       by Colombia of Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones which, according to
       Nicaragua, the Court declared in its 2012 Judgment appertain to Nicaragua’]” 1.

       2. In the resumed proceedings on the merits, Colombia subsequently argued that “the Court
lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider any claims that are based on events that are alleged to
have transpired after Colombia ceased to be bound by the provisions of the Pact” 2, that is, after
26 November 2013. According to the Respondent, Article XXXI, read together with Article LVI of
the Pact, provides for “a clear temporal limitation to Colombia’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction
over a dispute concerning the existence of any fact which, if established, could constitute the breach
of an international obligation” 3. Therefore, in Colombia’s view, “no jurisdictional basis exists for the
Court to rule on any of the facts alleged to have occurred after the Pact ceased to be in effect for
Colombia” 4.

     3. It has, however, to be emphasized that Colombia did not include this argument in its final
submissions  not in its Counter-Memorial or Rejoinder, nor at the end of the oral proceedings. The

       1 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), pp. 42-43, para. 111.
        2 Counter-Memorial of the Republic of Colombia, para. 1.15. The argument has been further elaborated in

paras. 4.19-4.21 of the Counter-Memorial, in paras. 3.6-3.36 of the Rejoinder of the Republic of Colombia and during the
hearings (see CR 2021/15, pp. 14-18, paras. 31-46 (Bundy) and CR 2021/18, pp. 32-35, paras. 18-33 (Bundy)).
       3 CR 2021/15, p. 15, para. 37 (Bundy).

       4 Ibid., p. 15, para. 34 (emphasis in the original).

                                                           -2-

Court nevertheless considered it necessary to rule on this argument in the operative clause of the
present Judgment (paragraph 261 (1)).

       4. Article XXXI of the Pact has to be interpreted according to the customary rules on treaty
interpretation which, as the Court has repeatedly stated, are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 5.

        5. Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá provides:

              “In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International
        Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize in relation to
        any other American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without
        the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all
        disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them concerning:

        (a) The interpretation of a treaty;

        (b) Any question of international law;

        (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an
            international obligation;

        (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
            obligation.”

        6. Denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá is governed by Article LVI, which reads:

               “The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced
        upon one year’s notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with
        respect to the State denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining
        signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which
        shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties.

               The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated
        prior to the transmission of the particular notification.”

      7. Before interpreting Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, it may be useful, as a preliminary
matter, to make two observations. First, it is noteworthy that Article XXXI of the Pact is modelled
on the text of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute. One key difference between the two
provisions is that instead of providing an acceptance of jurisdiction by each State party to the Statute
individually by way of a declaration, Article XXXI creates jurisdiction between the American States
which are parties to the Pact. As the Court has previously observed, Article XXXI of the Pact is an
“autonomous” basis of jurisdiction, distinct from Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute 6. It
is a treaty provision conferring jurisdiction upon the Court in accordance with Article 36,
paragraph 1, of the Statute.

       5 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 19, para. 35, referring to various past judgments of the Court.
        6 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 85, para. 36.

                                                            -3-

        8. Second, an important conceptual distinction has to be made between the validity in time of
a title of jurisdiction on the one hand, and on the other hand, the temporal scope of jurisdiction
conferred by the title of jurisdiction, that is, a temporal limitation attached to the title excluding, for
example, disputes arising prior to a certain date 7. At risk of stating the obvious, there must exist a
valid title of jurisdiction between the parties at the date of the institution of proceedings for the Court
to have jurisdiction over a dispute in the first place 8. The title invoked must be in force; this goes to
the validity in time of a title of jurisdiction. The Court must then ascertain whether the title of
jurisdiction provides for any temporal conditions, and if so whether the dispute comes within the
temporal scope of the title. In this sense, temporal conditions are an element of the definition of the
class of disputes to which consent extends 9. They go to the Court’s jurisdiction itself; they do not go
to the validity in time of the title of jurisdiction, which is a distinct, separate issue.

       9. Once this distinction between validity in time of a title of jurisdiction and temporal
conditions in the title of jurisdiction is appreciated, it becomes clear that Colombia’s interpretation
cannot be accepted. Interpreting Article XXXI as a whole, in its context and in light of the object and
purpose of the Pact, it must be concluded that Article XXXI does not contain any temporal condition
or limitation.

       10. The phrase “so long as the present Treaty is in force” does not, in its plain meaning, suggest
any temporal condition as to the disputes over which the Court has jurisdiction. This is not the
purpose of this phrase. The phrase simply concerns the validity in time of the title of jurisdiction. It
specifies that a State party to the Pact recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court without the necessity
of any special agreement so long as it remains a party to it. The consent of a State to the Court’s
jurisdiction remains valid from the moment it becomes a party to the Pact of Bogotá until the moment
it ceases to be a party thereto. Thus, a Contracting Party to the Pact may institute proceedings against
any other Contracting Party “so long as the . . . Treaty is in force” between them. I do not share the
Court’s view that the phrase “so long as the present Treaty is in force” in Article XXXI of the Pact
of Bogotá “limits the period within which such a dispute must have arisen” (Judgment,
paragraph 40). Certainly, a dispute must, according to the Court’s well-established jurisprudence,
exist at the moment of filing the application instituting the proceedings and the applicant may validly
institute proceedings only when the title of jurisdiction invoked is in force. But the phrase in question
does not limit the period within which the dispute must have arisen, as the Court opines. In fact, a
dispute may have arisen even before the Pact of Bogotá has entered into force in relations between
the parties to a dispute. Such dispute may be brought before the Court if, subsequent to the dispute’s
emergence, the Pact of Bogotá has entered into force as between the disputing parties 10.

        7 Malcolm N. Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice of the International Court: 1920-2015, Vol. II, 5th ed., 2016,

p. 934, para. 236. Many States in their declarations accepting the Court’s jurisdiction specify that they do so only in respect
of disputes arising after the declaration is made or disputes arising out of facts and situations subsequent to the date of the
declaration. However, if no such statement is contained in the declaration, the State recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court
by such declaration with regard to disputes irrespective of when they have arisen or when the facts or situations which have
given rise to a dispute occurred.
        8 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 445, para. 95; see also Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights
and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 18, para. 33.
         9 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence,

Vol. I, 2013, p. 797.
        10 The best example is a dispute brought before the Court by Bolivia on 24 April 2013 against Chile. Chile ratified

the Pact of Bogotá on 15 April 1974 while Bolivia did so only on 9 June 2011. The dispute between them had arisen several
decades earlier. See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 601, para. 21, as well as the Judgment on the merits in the same case, I.C.J.
Reports 2018 (II), pp. 518-538, paras. 19-83.

                                                        -4-

       11. The phrases “[a]ny question of international law” and “[t]he existence of any fact which,
if established, would constitute the breach of an international obligation” found in Article XXXI,
subparagraphs (b) and (c), of the Pact do not point to a different conclusion. These phrases in their
ordinary meaning do not intimate any temporal condition as to the disputes over which the Court has
jurisdiction. I agree with the Court’s Judgment that the categories listed in Article XXXI concern the
subject-matter of the disputes (Judgment, paragraph 40). This observation is consistent with the
Court’s interpretation of Article XXXI of the Pact 11. It merits repeating that the enumeration of
subject-matters of disputes in Article XXXI of the Pact was taken from Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court, which itself tracked Article 36 of the Permanent Court of International
Justice’s Statute, which in turn followed almost exactly the wording of Article 13, paragraph 2, of
the Covenant of the League of Nations. This enumeration has a long legal pedigree. Yet never in
more than one hundred years has the suggestion been made that the subjects listed therein constitute
a temporal limitation, as Colombia now contends with respect to Article XXXI of the Pact.
Colombia’s interpretation of Article XXXI runs counter to the terms of that Article.

       12. Article LVI likewise says nothing about the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over a dispute
brought to it on the basis of Article XXXI. That provision governs denunciation 12. The Pact of
Bogotá, once ratified or acceded to by an American State, continues in force indefinitely in relation
to that State, and may be denounced only by giving one year’s notice, remaining in force during all
that period.

        13. Colombia’s interpretation, moreover, runs counter to the context of Article XXXI. Several
provisions of the Pact are aimed at restricting the scope of the parties’ commitment, notably
Article V, Article VI and Article VII. In addition, Article LV of the Pact of Bogotá allows the parties
to make reservations to that instrument which “shall, with respect to the State that makes them, apply
to all signatory States on the basis of reciprocity”. These provisions, taken together, tend to indicate
that temporal limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction under the Pact can only be introduced by means
of reservations to it.

       14. As to the Pact’s object and purpose, the Court has stated that it is “quite clear from the Pact
that the purpose of the American States in drafting it was to reinforce their mutual commitments with
regard to judicial settlement” 13. On Colombia’s interpretation, however, a respondent State would be
able, by denouncing the Pact of Bogotá after the filing of an application against it, to prevent the
Court from considering facts directly related to the dispute brought before it and occurring
subsequent to the termination date, i.e. one year following the denunciation of the Pact. Such a
solution is out of harmony with the Pact’s object and purpose.

        15. The question to be addressed next is whether the Court may consider the incidents that
occurred after the filing of the Application. In dealing with Colombia’s arguments, the Court refers
to its jurisprudence on two distinct issues, namely on new facts and new claims. In my view, the
Court’s jurisprudence on new claims is not pertinent to the present case, for the simple reason that
Nicaragua has not formulated any new claim; it has merely referred to additional facts in support of
its original claim. In other words, it has provided detailed particulars of further incidents

        11 See Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 84, para. 34.
       12 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 23, para. 44.
        13 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 89, para. 46.

                                                       -5-

substantiating its original claim. It suffices to look at Nicaragua’s submissions. Thus, in its
Application, Nicaragua requested the Court to adjudge and declare that Colombia is in breach of

       “its obligation not to violate Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited in paragraph 251
       of the ICJ Judgment of 19 November 2012 as well as Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and
       jurisdiction in these zones” (Application, p. 24, para. 22).

       16. In its Memorial, it requested the Court to adjudge and declare that,

       “[by its conduct, the Republic of Colombia has breached] its obligation not to violate
       Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited in paragraph 251 of the Court Judgment of
       19 November 2012 as well as Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in these
       zones” (Memorial of Nicaragua, p. 107, para. 1 (a)).

       17. And in its Reply, it asked the Court to adjudge and declare that,

       “[b]y its conduct, the Republic of Colombia has breached its international obligation to
       respect Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited in paragraph 251 of the Court
       Judgment of 19 November 2012 as well as Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction
       in these zones” (Reply of Nicaragua, p. 191, para. 1 (a)).

       18. Finally, in its final submissions, Nicaragua requested the Court to adjudge and declare that

       “[b]y its conduct, the Republic of Colombia has breached its international obligation to
       respect Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited in paragraph 251 of the Court
       Judgment of 19 November 2012, as well as Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and
       jurisdiction in these zones” (CR 2021/17, p. 50, para. 1 (a) (Argüello Gómez)).

       19. Nicaragua has not modified its original claim, which has remained virtually the same
throughout the proceedings. Thus, the Court’s jurisprudence on new claims (whether based on facts
subsequent to the application or not) is not pertinent in the present case. Rather, it must be asked
whether reliance on detailed particulars of further incidents substantiating Nicaragua’s original claim
“transform[s] the nature of the dispute”. In its Application, Nicaragua referred to some 13 incidents.
By subsequently referring to 38 post-Application incidents, it has not, in my view, transformed the
dispute or its character.

       20. An applicant may provide additional particulars of incidents to further substantiate an
original claim made in its application. This principle is in accordance with the Court’s Statute and
the Rules of Court and is well illustrated by the Court’s Judgment in the Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case 14. In that case, the Court was called on to examine
whether the applicant, Cameroon, could present additional facts and legal considerations in its
Memorial in connection with a claim made in its application. In its application, Cameroon
complained generally of “military activities” carried out by Nigeria’s troops across the frontier in
violation of international law (without referring to particular incidents) and asked the Court to
adjudge and declare that Nigeria had breached its obligations under international law 15. In its

      14 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275.
       15 Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 March 1994 on behalf of the

Government of the Republic of Cameroon, paras. 19 and 20.

                                                        -6-

Memorial, Cameroon made the same claim 16, but this time substantiated it by reference to specific
incidents said to have occurred before and after the filing of the application 17. Nigeria challenged
Cameroon’s freedom to present further particulars to its original claim.

      21. The Court rejected Nigeria’s preliminary objection. It found that Cameroon had the
freedom to present additional facts and considerations on new incidents to substantiate the original
claim formulated in its application and that it had not, in doing so, transformed the dispute brought
before it into another dispute. The Court stated the following:

               “Article 38, paragraph 2, [does not] provide that the latitude of an applicant
       State, in developing what it has said in its application is strictly limited, as suggested by
       Nigeria. That conclusion cannot be inferred from the term ‘succinct’; nor can it be drawn
       from the Court’s pronouncements on the importance of the point of time of the
       submission of the application as the critical date for the determination of its
       admissibility; these pronouncements do not refer to the content of applications
       (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
       from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
       Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 44; and Questions
       of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
       Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America),
       Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 130, para. 43). Nor would so
       narrow an interpretation correspond to the finding of the Court that,

               ‘whilst under Article 40 of its Statute the subject of a dispute brought
               before the Court shall be indicated, Article 32 (2) of the Rules of Court
               [today Article 38, paragraph 2] requires the Applicant “as far as possible”
               to do certain things. These words apply not only to specifying the provision
               on which the Applicant founds the jurisdiction of the Court, but also to
               stating the precise nature of the claim and giving a succinct statement of
               the facts and grounds on which the claim is based.’ (Northern Cameroons
               (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
               I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 28.)” 18

       22. And the Court recalled that

       “it has become an established practice for States submitting an application to the Court
       to reserve the right to present additional facts and legal considerations. The limit of the
       freedom to present such facts and considerations is ‘that the result is not to transform
       the dispute brought before the Court by the application into another dispute which is
       different in character’ (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
       (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
       I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 427, para. 80).” 19

       16 Memorial of the Republic of Cameroon, 16 March 1995, para. 9.1 (e).

        17 Cameroon referred to incidents which occurred after the filing of Cameroon’s Application. See e.g., Memorial

of Cameroon, p. 595, para. 6.108. The application instituting proceedings was filed on 29 March 1994. An additional
application was filed on 6 June 1994.
       18 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 318, para. 99.
       19 Ibid., pp. 318-319, para. 99.

                                                        -7-

      23. The Court’s pronouncement is clear. An applicant may present additional facts and legal
considerations in support of its original claim, provided that the dispute brought before the Court by
the application is not transformed into another dispute which is different in character.

       24. A similar issue arose in the Oil Platforms case, this time in respect of a counter-claim. The
United States provided, subsequent to the presenting of its counter-claim with the Counter-Memorial,
detailed particulars of further incidents substantiating, in its contention, its original claims. Iran
objected, contending that the United States had broadened the subject-matter of its claim beyond the
submissions set out in its counter-claim by, among other things, belatedly adding new examples of
breaches of the freedom of maritime commerce in its Rejoinder 20. The Court considered that the
question raised by Iran was whether the United States was presenting “a new claim” or merely
providing “additional evidence relating to the original claim” 21. The Court went on to recall that the
parties to a case cannot in the course of proceedings “transform the dispute brought before the Court
into a dispute that would be of a different nature” 22. The Court was of the view that

       “the United States ha[d] not, by [providing detailed particulars of further incidents
       substantiating its original claim], transformed the subject of the dispute originally
       submitted to the Court, nor ha[d] it modified the substance of its counter-claim, which
       remain[ed] the same, i.e., alleged attacks by Iran on shipping, laying of mines and other
       military actions said to be ‘dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce’, thus
       breaching Iran’s obligations to the United States under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
       1955 Treaty” 23.

       25. The basic principle identified here is the same as the one identified above in Land and
Maritime Boundary. The respondent, just like the applicant with respect to its original claims
formulated in its application, is at liberty to provide further particulars of incidents in support of its
original counter-claim presented in its Counter-Memorial, provided that the result does not transform
the dispute brought before the Court into a dispute of a different character.

      26. In other words, disputes are not frozen in time at the moment the application is filed by the
applicant, nor at the moment a counter-claim is formulated by the respondent.

       27. There is, however, still one question to be answered, namely, whether the conclusion just
reached is altered in any way by the fact that the incidents occurred after the date on which the Pact
of Bogotá ceased to be in force for Colombia. Nicaragua has relied in support of its original claim as
formulated in its Application on incidents that occurred not only after the filing of the Application
but also the date on which the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force for Colombia. In this sense, the
present case is unique and has no exact precedent in the past practice of the Court 24.

       20 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 213,

para. 116.
       21 Ibid., para. 117.

       22 Ibid.

       23 Ibid., p. 214, para. 118.

       24 Although it has to be mentioned that, in the present case, Colombia itself made its counter-claims in its

Counter-Memorial filed on 17 November 2016, almost three years after the Pact of Bogotá had ceased to be in force for
Colombia. See Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 290, para. 6.

                                                       -8-

       28. It is a well-established principle that once the Court has established jurisdiction to entertain
a case, the subsequent lapse of the title cannot deprive the Court of its jurisdiction. As the Court
stated in the Nottebohm case, in the context of the lapse, after the filing of the application, of the
respondent’s declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, “[a]n extrinsic
fact such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration, by reason of the expiry of the period or by
denunciation, cannot deprive the Court of the jurisdiction already established” 25.

        29. This principle applies equally here. As observed above, a dispute is not frozen in time and
the parties may rely in support of their original claims on facts that occurred during the course of the
proceedings, i.e. those facts which occurred after the filing of the application and even those which
occurred after the lapse of the title of jurisdiction, provided that they do not transform the dispute
into another dispute which is different in character. The applicant’s freedom to present additional
facts in support of its original claim is not dependent on the continued validity of the title of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the fact that Colombia denounced the Pact of Bogotá, under Article LVI
of the Pact, with the effect that it ceased to be in force between the Parties as of the termination date
(i.e. after 26 November 2013), does not — and cannot — deprive the Court of its jurisdiction in the
present case.

                                II. NICARAGUA’S STRAIGHT BASELINES

       30. The second issue concerns the Court’s finding on Nicaragua’s straight baselines and the
legal consequences of this finding. The Court concluded that Nicaragua’s straight baselines
established by Decree No. 33-2013, as amended by Decree No. 17-2018, are not in conformity with
customary international law (Judgment, paragraph 261 (7)). The Court has not, however, articulated
any legal consequence to be drawn from this finding. By contrast, in relation to Colombia’s
Presidential Decree 1946, as amended by Decree No. 1119, by which Colombia’s “integral
contiguous zone” was established, the Court, having found that such zone is not in conformity with
customary international law (Judgment, paragraph 261 (5)), has gone on to draw a legal consequence
from this finding. It decided that

      “the Republic of Colombia must, by means of its own choosing, bring into conformity
      with customary international law the provisions of Presidential Decree 1946 . . . as
      amended by Decree No. 1119 . . . in so far as they relate to maritime areas declared by
      the Court in its 2012 Judgment to appertain to the Republic of Nicaragua” (Judgment,
      paragraph 261 (6)).

       31. This striking difference in the Court’s approach to drawing legal consequences from
similar legal findings can only be explained by the fact that Colombia, in contrast with Nicaragua,
has not formally requested the Court in its final submissions to draw any legal consequence from the
Court’s finding on Nicaragua’s straight baselines. One is, however, puzzled as to why the Court
considered it necessary to rule in the operative clause of its Judgment on Colombia’s argument, which
was not presented as a formal final submission, that Nicaragua cannot rely on facts which occurred
after the date when Colombia ceased to be bound by the Pact of Bogotá. There seems to be an
apparent inconsistency in the Court’s approach.

       32. In any case, there should be no doubt that Nicaragua must bring its straight baselines in
the Caribbean Sea into conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea since Nicaragua is a party to that Convention and the lawfulness of Nicaragua’s straight

      25 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 123.

                                                   -9-

baselines is not just a bilateral issue between the two Parties before the Court. Its baselines also affect
the interests and rights of other States.

                                                           (Signed)           Peter TOMKA.

                                              ___________