INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

ORDER OF 19 JUNE 1992

1992

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU TIMOR ORIENTAL

(PORTUGAL c. AUSTRALIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 19 JUIN 1992
Official citation :

East Timor (Portugal v. Australia),
Order of 19 June 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 228

Mode officiel de citation :

Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie),
ordonnance du 19 juin 1992, C.I.T. Recueil 1992, p. 228

Sales number 6 1 2
N° de vente :

ISBN 92-1-070670-6

228

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1992 YEAR 1992
19 June
General List
No. 84 19 June 1992

CASE CONCERNING EAST TIMOR

(PORTUGAL v. AUSTRALIA)

ORDER

Present: President Sir Robert JENNINGS; Vice-President ODA; Judges
LACHS, AGO, SCHWEBEL, BEDJAOUI, NI, EVENSEN, TARASSOV,
GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN, AGUILAR MAWDSLEY, RANJEVA,
AJIBOLA; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 31, 44 and 45 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Order made by the President of the Court on
3 May 1991 fixing 18 November 1991 and 1 June 1992 as time-limits for
the Memorial of the Portuguese Republic and the Counter-Memorial of
the Commonwealth of Australia, respectively,

Having regard to the Memorial and the Counter-Memorial duly filed
by the Parties within those time-limits ;

Whereas at a meeting between the President of the Court and the
representatives of the Parties, held on 1 June 1992, the Parties agreed to
request the Court that a Reply by the Applicant and a Rejoinder by the
Respondent be authorized and that a time-limit of six months be fixed for
each of these pleadings;

4
229 EAST TIMOR (ORDER 19 VI 92)

Taking into account the views of the Parties,

Authorizes the filing of a Reply and a Rejoinder in the present case;
Fixes the following time-limits for the filing of those pleadings:

1 December 1992 for the Reply of the Portuguese Republic;
1 June 1993 for the Rejoinder of the Commonwealth of Australia; and
Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of June, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-two, in three copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the Commonwealth
of Australia, respectively.

(Signed) R. Y. JENNINGS,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.


1057

            SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BHANDARI

   Concur with the conclusions of the majority — Existence of a dispute is central
to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction — On the basis of documents and
pleadings of the Parties, no dispute existed — ICJ lacks jurisdiction — Greater
emphasis ought to have been given that no dispute existed and lesser on the
Respondent’s awareness — Other preliminary objections should have been
adjudicated in the facts of this case — Monetary Gold principle — Judgment falls
outside the judicial functions of the Court.

  1. I concur with the conclusions of the majority Judgment upholding
the objection to jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom based on the
absence of a dispute. However, I wish to append a separate opinion to
expand the basis of the reasoning of the Judgment. I also propose to deal
with another aspect of this case, that in the facts of this case, the Court
ought to have dealt with the other preliminary objections raised by the
United Kingdom because the issues raised in the case aﬀect not only the
Parties, but also the entire humanity. Additionally, adjudicating these
objections would have further crystallized the controversy involved in the
case, particularly when all documents, pleadings and submissions were
placed on record in extenso.

   2. The question, which needs to be decided, is whether from the docu-
ments, pleadings and the conduct of the Parties it can be established that
a dispute existed between them at the time of ﬁling the Application in the
terms prescribed by the applicable legal instruments and the Court’s juris-
prudence.
   3. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, and Article 38, paragraph 1, of the
Statute of the Court, it can only exercise its jurisdiction in case of a dis-
pute between the parties. The concept of “dispute”, and more speciﬁcally
“legal dispute”, is thus central to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.
The majority Judgment acknowledges this and reﬂects on certain key
aspects from the Court’s jurisprudence on this concept.
   4. Any analysis of the existence of a dispute should start with a deﬁni-
tion of the term “dispute”. Black’s Law Dictionary oﬀers the following
deﬁnitions, which may help in guiding the analysis:
         “Dispute: A conﬂict or controversy; a conﬂict of claims or rights;
      an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary
      claims or allegations on the other.”
         “Legal dispute: Contest/conﬂict/disagreement concerning lawful
      existence of (1) a duty or right, or (2) compensation by extent

228

1058      nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bhandari)

      or type, claimed by the injured party for a breach of such duty or
      right.”
   5. In Georgia v. Russian Federation, in determining whether a legal dis-
pute existed between the Parties at the time of the ﬁling of the Applica-
tion, the Court undertook a detailed review of the relevant diplomatic
exchanges, documents and statements. The Court carried out an extensive
analysis of the evidence, covering numerous instances of oﬃcial Georgian
and Russian practice from 1992 to 2008. The Court found that most of
the documents and statements before it failed to evidence the existence of
a dispute, because they did not contain any “direct criticism” against the
Respondent, did not amount to an “allegation” against the Respondent
or were not otherwise of a character that was suﬃcient to found a justi-
ciable dispute between the Parties, and in this case the Court also held
that it is a matter of substance and not a question of form or procedure
(Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp. 84-91,
paras. 30-46).

   6. In Belgium v. Senegal, the Court similarly carried out a systematic
review of the diplomatic exchanges that had preceded the ﬁling of the
Application in order to ascertain if the dispute had been properly notiﬁed
to Senegal. The Court, in that case, concluded that at the time of the ﬁl-
ing of the Application, the dispute between the parties did not relate to
breaches of obligation under customary international law and that it had
thus no jurisdiction to decide Belgium’s claims (Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 433-435, paras. 24-26).
   7. In another important case, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the
Court considered that a dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or
fact, a conﬂict of legal views or of interests” between parties (Mavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 2, p. 11). In the South West Africa cases, the Court laid down the
criterion for the existence of a dispute, which is that the claim of one
party be positively opposed by the other (South West Africa (Ethiopia v.
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328).

   8. On application of the Court’s Statute and its jurisprudence to the
documents and pleadings placed before the Court, the irresistible conclu-
sion is the absence of any dispute between the Parties, and consequently,
on the facts of this case, the Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with this case.
   9. The majority Judgment, instead of looking into these aspects closely,
chose to focus mainly on the lack of awareness of the Respondent of the
impending dispute. The Judgment considers that “a dispute exists when it
is demonstrated, on the basis of the evidence, that the respondent was

229

1059      nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bhandari)

aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were ‘positively
opposed’ by the applicant” (Judgment, para. 41).

   10. The Court has the freedom to choose any preliminary objection
when examining its own jurisdiction. In doing so, it usually chooses the
most “direct and conclusive one”. Christian Tomuschat summarized the
situation in clear terms in his contribution on Article 36 to the handbook
The Statute of the International Court of Justice — A Commentary (Sec-
ond Edition). He stated:
         “The Court is free to choose the grounds on which to dismiss a case
      either for lack of jurisdiction or as being inadmissible. It does not
      have to follow a speciﬁc order, nor is there any rule making it com-
      pulsory to adjudge ﬁrst issues of jurisdiction before relying on lack of
      admissibility. The Court generally bases its decisions on the ground
      which in its view is ‘more direct and conclusive’. In pure legal logic,
      it would seem inescapable that the Court would have to rule by order
      of priority on objections related to jurisdiction. However, such a strict
      procedural regime would be all the more infelicitous since the border-
      line between the two classes of preliminary objections is to some
      extent dependent on subjective appreciation. The Court therefore
      chooses the ground which is best suited to dispose of the case (‘direct
      and conclusive’).” 1
   11. This freedom of the Court was ﬁrst stated in the Certain Norwe-
gian Loans (France v. Norway) case, where the Court considered that its
jurisdiction was being challenged on two grounds, and that the Court is
free to base its decision on the ground which in its judgment is more
direct and conclusive (Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 25).
   12. This position has consistently been taken by the Court in the years
since the Certain Norwegian Loans matter (see, for example, Aerial Inci-
dent of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959,
p. 146; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1978, pp. 16-17; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Paki-
stan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 24, para. 26;
and Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 298, para. 46).
   13. In the instant case, by choosing the lack of awareness on the part
of the Respondent as the main ground for the dismissal of the claim, it
appears, with respect, that the Court has chosen not to give emphasis to
the most “direct and conclusive” element of that ground for the dismissal
of the claim. The consequence is serious: lack of awareness on the part of
the Respondent can be easily cured by the Applicant by giving proper
notice of the dispute to the Respondent. In that case, the Marshall Islands

   1 Christian Tomuschat, The Statute of the International Court of Justice — A Commen-

tary (Second Edition), p. 707, para. 138, footnotes omitted.

230

1060     nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bhandari)

could simply bring the case again before the Court. In my view, that
would be an undesirable result and should be discouraged. The real
ground for the dismissal of the case ought to have been the absence of a
dispute between the Parties. The majority Judgment has only dealt with
preliminary objection number one, and even while dealing with that
objection greater emphasis was not placed on the analysis of the docu-
ments and pleadings of the Parties, which reveals that there is no dispute
between them.
   14. The Parties have already submitted documents, pleadings and sub-
missions in extenso. In the facts of this case, this Court ought to have
examined the other preliminary objections. Otherwise, a re-submission of
the case again would entail a waste of the eﬀorts, time and resources
already spent by the Parties and the Court in adjudicating this matter.

   15. On careful consideration of all documents, pleadings and submis-
sions the irresistible conclusion is that no dispute exists between the Par-
ties. The majority Judgment ought to have rejected the Marshall Islands’
Application mainly on this ground.

                     Other Preliminary Objections

  16. In the facts of this case the Court should have examined the other
preliminary objections taken by the Respondent. All ﬁve preliminary
objections advanced by the United Kingdom are reproduced below:
 (i) The Court lacks jurisdiction because “there is no justiciable ‘dispute’
     between the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom . . . within the
     meaning of this term in Articles 36 (2), 38 (1) and 40 (1) of the Court’s
     Statute, Article 38 (1) of the Rules, and relevant applicable custom-
     ary international law and jurisprudence” (Preliminary Objections of
     the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of
     15 June 2015, hereinafter “POUK”, para. 6).

 (ii) The Court lacks jurisdiction “pursuant to the Optional Clause
      Declarations of the United Kingdom and the Marshall Islands, these
      Declarations being the sole basis relied upon by the Marshall
      Islands to found the jurisdiction of the Court” (POUK, para. 7).
(iii) Additionally or alternatively, “the Marshall Islands, by its Optional
      Clause Declaration of 24 April 2013, accepted the compulsory juris-
      diction of the Court only ‘for the purpose of the dispute’ that it now
      alleges with the United Kingdom. As such disputes are excluded from
      the jurisdiction of the Court by operation of paragraph 1 (iii) of the
      United Kingdom’s Optional Clause Declaration, the Court has no
      jurisdiction to decide on the claims in question” (ibid., para. 8).

231

1061     nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bhandari)

(iv) The Application is inadmissible and/or that the Court lacks jurisdiction
     to address the claim on the ground of the absence from the proceedings
     of States whose essential interests are engaged by it (POUK, para. 9).
 (v) Any judgment of the Court would have no practical consequences,
     the Application falls outside the judicial function of the Court and
     the Court should therefore decline to exercise jurisdiction in any
     event (POUK, para. 10).
  17. Out of these ﬁve preliminary objections, in my considered view, some
preliminary objections are direct and conclusive, which in the facts and cir-
cumstances should have been adjudicated by the Court so that the Appli-
cant may not be able to re-open the same proceedings later on. These are:
(a) Monetary Gold principle, i.e., the absence of essential parties not party
    to the instant proceedings;
(b) the Marshall Islands claim is excluded in consequence of the Optional
    Clause Declaration of the Parties; and
(c) the Marshall Islands’ claim falls outside the judicial function of the
    Court and the Court should therefore decline to exercise jurisdiction
    over the Claim.

                         Monetary Gold Principle
  18. As to Monetary Gold, the Applicant in its Application submitted a
chart, which indicates that India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom,
Respondents in these three proceedings put together, possess less than
3 per cent of the total nuclear weapons in the world (Application of the
Marshall Islands, p. 9). The other countries, who possess the other more
than 97 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world, are not before the
Court and consequently the Court is precluded from exercising its juris-
diction in this matter with respect to those States (the States possessing
97 per cent of the nuclear weapons). Therefore, it is indispensable to have
the participation of the other countries who possess such a large quantity
of the world’s nuclear weapons.
  19. The Court considered in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on nuclear
weapons that any realistic search for general and complete disarmament
would require the co-operation of all States (Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 264,
para. 100).
  20. This preliminary objection is substantial in character and it ought
to have been adjudicated by the Court.

                The Parties’ Optional Clause Declarations
  21. In its submission on preliminary objections, the United Kingdom
argued that, if the Court were to ﬁnd that there was a justiciable dispute
between the Parties (which it denies), in that case it would not be a dis-

232

1062      nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bhandari)

pute “that is properly amenable to adjudication by the Court simply by
reference to situations or facts subsequent to 17 September 1991”, as
required by the Marshall Islands’ Optional Clause Declaration. This is so
because any dispute that could be found to exist would necessarily turn
on the alleged continuous conduct of the United Kingdom stretching
from the entry into force of the NPT on 5 March 1970 until the present.
The Respondent argues that given that “a material component of the dis-
pute falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Marshall
Islands’ claim against the United Kingdom falls outside the jurisdiction
of the Court in toto” (POUK, para. 64).

  22. This is a substantial objection in character, and it should have been
considered by the Court.

                   The Claim Falls Outside the Jurisdiction
                               of the Court
   23. The United Kingdom argues that the claim falls outside the judi-
cial function of the Court and the Court should therefore decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the claim (POUK, paras. 104-112). In its
Counter-Memorial, the Respondent submitted that “even if the Court
ﬁnds that it has jurisdiction in a particular case, it may decline to exercise
that jurisdiction if it considers that to do so would be incompatible
with its function” (ibid., para. 104). Reliance was placed on this Court’s
decision in the Northern Cameroons case, where the Court considered
that
      “[t]here are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function
      which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore . . . The Court
      itself, and not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court’s judicial
      integrity.” (Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Pre-
      liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 29.)

In application of this concept of judicial integrity, the Respondent argued
that the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in circumstances
where it would not be in a position to “render a judgment capable of
eﬀective application” (ibid., p. 33).
  24. This preliminary objection also deserved adjudication.

  25. The majority Judgment ought to have held clearly that, on the
basis of documents and pleadings of the Parties, no dispute existed
between the Parties at the time of ﬁling the Application while upholding
the United Kingdom’s ﬁrst preliminary objection.

                                             (Signed) Dalveer Bhandari.

233


REQUÊTE DU GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS AUX
FINS D’INTERVENTION.

La Haye, le 22 mai 1923.

\

A la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

Vu l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 58-59
du Réglement de la Cour ;

Considérant que les Gouvernements de Sa Majesté britan-
nique, de la République française, de Sa Majesté le Roi
d'Italie et de Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon ont introduit
devant la Cour une instance, par lettre de la Légation de
France à La Haye, datée le 16 janvier 1923, concernant le
fait par les autorités allemandes d’avoir refusé, le 21 mars
1921, au vapeur britannique Wimbledon, affrété par la Société
française d'armement «Les affréteurs réunis », le libre accès
au canal de Kiel ;

Considérant que ledit vapeur Wimbledon était en route
sur Dantzig avec un chargement de 4000 tonnes de marchan-
dises (matériel militaire) à destination du Gouvernement
polonais ; que le Gouvernement allemand a prétendu justifier
le refus opposé au passage du Wimbledon, en alléguant
que, le traité de Paix entre la Pologne et la Russie
n'étant pas encore ratifié, l’état de guerre existait entre
la Pologne et la Russie et que les règlements allemands
sur la neutralité interdisaient le transit sur le territoire
allemand du matériel de guerre à destination de ces deux
pays ; |

Considérant que la Pologne a participé au Traité de
Versailles et que le refus en question a violé les droits et
les intérêts matériels garantis à la Pologne aux termes de
l’article 380 du Traité de Versailles.

Le soussigné dûment autorisé par le Gouvernement de la
République polonaise présente à la Cour, d'accord ave
les Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, de France, d'Italie
10
et du Japon, la demande de l'Etat polonais d'intervenir,
aux côtés de ces autres Etats, dans l'affaire du Wimbledon
susindiquée. &
. ee
Le Ministre,

(Signé) JOSEPH DE WiERUSz-KOwWALSKI.


                     585

                                                DECLARATION
                                         OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

                        1. I have voted in favour of the adoption — by unanimity — of the
                     present Order, whereby the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has found
                     that the proper course to take, in the present case of Armed Activities on
                     the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
                     is to resume the proceedings on reparations. Yet I think the ICJ, in sup-
                     port of its own Order just adopted today, 1 July 2015, should have given
                     a more thorough account of the facts brought to its attention by the two
                     contending Parties. In effect, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
                     (DRC) and Uganda have, for a couple of years, been forwarding corre-
                     spondence to the Court concerning the ongoing negotiations between
                     them for reparations for damages 1, in pursuance of resolutory
                     point No. 14 of the dispositif of the Court’s Judgment of 19 December
                     2005 in the present case.
                        2. Thus, two years after the Court’s Judgment of 2005, the two con-
                     tending Parties, the DRC and Uganda, in their meeting in Ngurdoto
                     (Tanzania), agreed (on 8 September 2007) to constitute an ad hoc com-
                     mittee, inter alia to consider the implementation of the ICJ Judgment
                     of 2005 as to reparations (Article 8 of the Agreement). After the bilateral
                     agreement of Ngurdoto, the DRC and Uganda held four inter‑ministerial
                     meetings in South Africa. The persistent difficulties in negotiations were
                     reported to the Court 2, as well as their endeavours in their production of
                     evidence, e.g., in the meeting of Kinshasa (of 10‑14 December 2012) of
                     the aforementioned ad hoc committee, held in a spirit of “fraternity and
                     friendship” (fraternité et amitié) 3. In the most recent inter‑ministerial
                     meeting, which took place in Pretoria, on 17‑19 March 2015, they con-
                     cluded that, despite their endeavours, in a “spirit of brotherhood and
                     good neighbourliness”, they had not succeeded to reach a consensus in

                        1 Namely, the correspondence with the Court from DRC (of 10 March and 7 May 2015)

                     as well as from Uganda (of 25 March and 10 October 2015). I can add to this correspon-
                     dence that of previous years namely : of 4 September and 19 February 2014 (from Uganda),
                     of 25 March 2014 (from DRC) ; of 16 October 2013 (from Uganda), of 6 February 2013
                     (from DRC) ; of 7 November and 19 April 2012 (from Uganda), and of 23 September,
                     5 July and 13 June 2011 (from DRC) ; of 25 August 2010 (from DRC), and of 6 September
                     2010 (from Uganda).
                        2 As in, e.g., the agreed minutes of the ministerial meeting in Johannesburg,

                     on 13‑14 September 2012.
                        3 As reported in the procès‑verbal of the Kinshasa meeting of 14 December 2012.

                     9

4 CIJ1082.indb 590                                                                                28/04/16 15:39

                     586 	           armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                     their negotiations, which had thus come to an end “at technical and min-
                     isterial level” 4.
                        3. Looking back in time, the Court, almost a decade ago, in its afore-
                     mentioned Judgment of 19 December 2005, set forth the duty of the con-
                     tending Parties to make reparation (Uganda, resolutory point No. 5 ; and
                     DRC, resolutory point No. 13 in the dispositif of its Judgment on the
                     merits in the cas d’espèce. The absence in resolutory points Nos. 5 and 13
                     of time‑limits to that effect, in my view did not imply that negotiations (to
                     reach an agreement on reparations) could continue indefinitely, as they
                     have done. On the contrary, having extended for almost a decade, they
                     have already far exceeded a reasonable time, bearing in mind the situa-
                     tion of the victims, still waiting for justice. The acknowledgment of the
                     great suffering of the local population in the conflicts in the Great Lakes
                     region 5 should have been accompanied by the determination of a reason-
                     able time for the provision of reparations for damages inflicted upon the
                     victims.
                        4. The lesson to be drawn from this decade of waiting for reparations
                     is clear to me : in a case like the present one, involving grave violations (as
                     established by the Court 6) of the international law of human rights and
                     of international humanitarian law, the Court should not have left the
                     question of reparations, as it did in its Judgment of 19 December 2005,
                     open to negotiations between the parties without a time‑limit, without a
                     reasonable time. I hope the Court has learned this lesson and no longer
                     does what it did in its 2005 Judgment as to the timing of reparations for
                     damages, in cases of this kind. After all, in the present case, the members
                     of the affected segments of the population keep on waiting, for almost a
                     decade, for the reparations due to them for the damages they suffered.

                        5. In this connection, three years ago, in the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
                     (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment on
                     reparations, of 19 June 2012), I observed, in my separate opinion, that
                     this “victim‑centred outlook has entailed implications for the reparations
                     due, has clarified their forms, has fostered the progressive development of
                     international law in the present domain” (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 382,
                     para. 94). I further pondered that :

                            “Within this humanized outlook, the reparatio (from the Latin rep‑
                          arare, ‘to dispose again’) ceases all the effects of the breaches of inter-
                          national law (the violations of human rights) at issue, and provides

                        4 Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the agreed minutes of the Pretoria meeting on the implementa-

                     tion of the 2005 Judgment of the ICJ, of 17‑19 March 2015.
                        5 As acknowledged by the ICJ in its Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras. 26 and 221.
                        6 Ibid., paras. 207, 209‑211 and 219‑221, and resolutory point No. 3 of the

                     dispositif.

                     10

4 CIJ1082.indb 592                                                                                28/04/16 15:39

                     587 	         armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                          satisfaction (as a form of reparation) to the victims ; by means of the
                          reparations, the law re-establishes the legal order broken by those
                          violations — a legal order erected on the basis of the full respect for
                          the rights inherent to the human person. The full reparatio does not
                          ‘erase’ the human rights violations perpetrated, but rather ceases all
                          its effects, thus at least avoiding the aggravation of the harm already
                          done, besides restoring the integrity of the legal order, as well as that
                          of the victims.
                             One has to be aware that it has become commonplace in legal cir-
                          cles (. . .) to repeat that the duty of reparation, conforming a ‘second-
                          ary obligation’, comes after the breach of international law. This is
                          not my conception (. . .). In my own conception, breach and repara-
                          tion go together, conforming an indissoluble whole : the latter is the
                          indispensable consequence or complement of the former. The duty of
                          reparation is a fundamental obligation, and this becomes clearer if we
                          look into it from the perspective of the centrality of the victims, which
                          is my own.” (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 362, paras. 39‑40.)

                       6. In the present case, the Court, as the master of its procedure, was, in
                     my understanding, fully entitled, in the proper exercise of its judicial
                     function and in the interest of the sound administration of justice (la
                     bonne administration de la justice), by means of the present Order, to
                     resume the proceedings on reparations in the cas d’espèce, so as to avoid
                     further delays, and to give effect to resolutory point No. 14 of its Judg-
                     ment on the merits of 19 December 2005. The Court now knows that it is
                     necessary to bridge the regrettable gap between the time of human justice
                     and the time of human beings.
                       7. Reparations, in cases involving grave breaches of the international
                     law of human rights and of international humanitarian law, cannot sim-
                     ply be left over for “negotiations” without time‑limits between the States
                     concerned, as contending parties. Reparations in such cases are to be
                     resolved by the Court itself, within a reasonable time, bearing in mind not
                     State susceptibilities, but rather the suffering of human beings, — the sur-
                     viving victims, and their close relatives, — prolonged in time, and the
                     need to alleviate it. The aforementioned breaches and prompt compliance
                     with the duty of reparation for damages, are not be separated in time :
                     they form an indissoluble whole.

                                             (Signed) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.

                     11

4 CIJ1082.indb 594                                                                                28/04/16 15:39


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AUX DROITS
DES RESSORTISSANTS
DES ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE

AU MAROC
(FRANCE / ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 22 NOVEMBRE 1950

1950

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING RIGHTS OF
NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA IN MOROCCO
(FRANCE / UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER OF NOVEMBER 22nd, 1950
La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :
« Affaire relative aux droits des ressortissants

des États-Unis d'Amérique au Maroc, Ordonnance du

22 novembre 1950: C. I. J. Recueil 1950, p. 391.»

This Order should be cited as follows :
“Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States
of America in Morocco, Order of November 22nd, 1950 :
I.C. J. Reports 1950, p. 301.”

N° de vente: 5]
Sales number ¢

391

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1950
Le 22 novembre

Rôle général ANNÉE 1950

n° ir

Ordonnance rendue le 22 novembre 1950

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AUX DROITS
DES RESSORTISSANTS
DES ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE
AU MAROC
(FRANCE / ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

La Cour internationale de Justice,
vu l'article 48 du Statut de la Cour,

vu l’article 37 du Règlement de la Cour,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante :

Considérant que, par une lettre datée du 28-octobre 1950 et enre-
gistrée au Greffe de la Cour le même jour, le chargé d’affaires de
France à La Haye a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête, datée
du 27 octobre 1950, par laquelle la Cour est invitée à dire et juger

« Que les privilèges des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
au Maroc sont uniquement ceux qui résultent du texte des arti-
cles 20 et 21 du traité du 16 septembre 1836 et que, la clause de
la nation la plus favorisée contenue dans l’article 24 dudit traité ne
pouvant plus être invoquée par les États-Unis dans l’état actuel
des engagements internationaux de l’Empire chérifien, rien ne
justifie pour les ressortissants des États-Unis un régime préférentiel
qui serait contraire aux dispositions des traités ;
392 ORDON. DU 22 XI 50 (RESSORTISSANTS DES E. U. AU MAROC)

Que le Gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique n’est pas en
droit de prétendre que l’application à ses ressortissants au Maroc
de toutes législations et réglementations dépend de son consente-
ment exprès ; .

Que les ressortissants des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc sont
soumis aux dispositions législatives et réglementaires mises en
vigueur dans l’Empire chérifien, notamment en ce qui concerne la
réglementation du 30 décembre 1948 sur les importations sans
devises, sans que l'accord préalable du Gouvernement des Etats-
Unis soit nécessaire ;

Que le dahir du 30 décembre 1948 portant réglementation des
importations sans devises est conforme au régime économique
applicable au Maroc selon les conventions qui lient la France et
les Etats-Unis » ;

Considérant que la requéte, qui porte la signature de M. André
Gros, jurisconsulte du ministére des Affaires étrangéres, agent du
Gouvernement de la République frangaise, invoque les déclarations
déposées tant par le Gouvernement de la République frangaise que
par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, en vertu de
l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut,. l’article 40, paragraphe
premier, du Statut, et l’article 32 du Règlement de la Cour ;

Considérant, par conséquent, que la requête énonce les disposi-
tions par lesquelles le requérant prétend établir la compétence de
la Cour ;

Considérant, en outre, que la requête contient Vindication de
l’objet de la demande et un exposé succinct des faits et motifs par
lesquels la demande est prétendue justifiée ;

Considérant que, dans ces conditions, la requête satisfait aux
conditions de forme posées par le Règlement ;

Considérant qu'à la date du 28 octobre 1950, le Gouvernement
des États-Unis d'Amérique a été avisé télégraphiquement du dépôt
de ladite requête, dont copie certifiée conforme lui a été expédiée
le 31 octobre 1950 ;

Considérant que, dans une lettre du 16 novembre 1950, signée
par son ambassadeur à La Haye, le Gouvernement des États-Unis
d'Amérique informe la Cour qu'il a désigné comme agent M. Adrian
S. Fisher, jurisconsulte du département d’État :

La Cour, après s’étre renseignée auprès des Parties sur les ques-
tions de procédure, fixe comme suit les délais pour la présentation,
par les Parties, des pièces de la procédure écrite :

pour le Mémoire du Gouvernement de la République française,
au Ie mars 1951;

pour le Contre-Mémoire du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d’Amé-
rique, au re juillet 1951;

5
393 ORDON. DU 22 XI 50: (RESSORTISSANTS DES E. U. AU MAROC)

pour la Réplique du Gouvernement de la République française,
au 1e septembre 1951;

pour la Duplique du Gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique,
au 1 novembre I951.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-deux novembre mil neuf cent
cinquante, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement
au Gouvernement de la République française et au Gouvernement
des États-Unis d'Amérique.

Le Président en exercice,
(Signé) J. G. GUERRERO.

Le Greffier de la Cour,
(Signé) E. HAaMBRo.


86

DECLARATION OF JUDGE AGUILAR MAWDSLEY

I have voted for the Judgment because I concur with its reasoning.
However, | am not persuaded that the delimitation line as drawn by the
Court provides for an equitable result. In my opinion, the difference in the
lengths of the coasts of Greenland and Jan Mayen is such that Greenland
(Denmark) should have received a larger proportion of the disputed area.
Given the importance attached to this factor in the Judgment, it would
have been logical at least to make an equal distribution of zones 1, 2 and 3.

(Signed) Andrés AGUILAR MAWDSLEY.

52


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA ». SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

ORDER OF 29 NOVEMBER 1965

1965

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRES DU SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN

(ÉTHIOPIE c. AFRIQUE DU SUD;
LIBÉRIA c. AFRIQUE DU SUD)

ORDONNANCE DU 29 NOVEMBRE 1965
Official citation:

South West Africa, Order of 29 November 1965,
I.C.J. Reports 1965, p. 9.

Mode officiel de citation:

Sud-Ouest africain, ordonnance du 29 novembre 1965,
C.T.]. Recueil 1965, D. 9.

Sales number 997
N° de vente:

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1965

1965 29 November 1965
29 November

General List:
Nos. 46 & 47

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA v. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

ORDER

Present: President Sir Percy SPENDER; Vice-President WELLINGTON
Koo; Judges WINIARSKI, SPIROPOULOS, Sir Gerald
FITZMAURICE, KORETSKY, TANAKA, JESSUP, MORELLI,
PapitLa NERVO, FORSTER, Gros; Judges ad hoc Sir Louis
MBANEFO, VAN WyK; Deputy-Registvar AQUARONE.

THE CouRT,

composed as above,
after deliberation,
having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,

In the proceedings instituted before the Court by the Applications
filed in the Registry of the Court on 4 November 1960 by the
Government of Ethiopia and the Government of Liberia against
the Government of South Africa,

makes the following Order :

Having regard to the request made by the Respondent during
the course of the oral proceedings on 30 March 1965 whereby it
was proposed that the Court should make an inspection i loco of

4
10 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (ORDER OF 29 XI 65)

the Territory of South West Africa and also, but subject to con-
ditions then indicated by it, that the Court should visit the Republic
of South Africa, and the further proposal then made that the Court
should also visit the Applicant States and as well one or two
sub-Saharan African countries of the Court’s own choosing;

Whereas all the said proposals were opposed by the Applicants;

Having heard the contentions of the Parties,

THE COURT,

as to so much of the proposals as relates to the Territory of
South West Africa,

by eight votes to six,

as to so much of the proposals as relates to the Republic of
South Africa,

by eight votes to six,

as to so much of the proposals as relates to the Applicant States,

by nine votes to five,

as to so much of the proposals as relates to the sub-Saharan
African countries,

by nine votes to five,

decides not to accede to the request of the Respondent.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authorita-
tive, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-ninth day of
November, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five, in four
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court
and the others transmitted to the Government of Ethiopia, the
Government of Liberia and the Government of South Africa,
respectively.

(Signed) Percy C. SPENDER,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Deputy-Registrar.