                    54

                                 SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ROBINSON

                       Whether a question of an alleged violation of sovereign immunity of a State
                    enterprise such as Bank Markazi concerns the interpretation or application of the
                    Treaty of Amity — Article XI, paragraph 4, of the Treaty of Amity — A contrario
                    interpretation — Object and purpose of the Treaty.

                      1. In this opinion, I explain my disagreement with the finding in
                    point (2) of the dispositif, which upholds the second preliminary objection
                    to jurisdiction made by the United States of America (hereinafter the
                    “United States”).
                      2. In its second preliminary objection to jurisdiction, the United States
                    asked the Court to dismiss
                         “as outside the Court’s jurisdiction all claims, brought under any pro-
                         vision of the Treaty of Amity, that are predicated on the United States’
                         purported failure to accord sovereign immunity from jurisdiction
                         and/or enforcement to the Government of Iran, Bank Markazi, or
                         Iranian State-owned entities”.
                    In order to uphold this objection, the Court must be satisfied that “the
                    violations of the Treaty pleaded by Iran [do not] fall within the provisions
                    of the Treaty” 1. Whether the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
                    Consular Rights (hereinafter the “Treaty”) has actually been violated is
                    not, of course, a matter for determination at this stage.
                      3. In my view, the question of a violation of an obligation to accord
                    sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and/or enforcement to State entities
                    engaged in acts jure imperii arises under Article XI, paragraph 4, of the
                    Treaty, which provides :
                            “No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corpo-
                         rations, associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities,
                         which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in com
                         mercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the
                         territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy,
                         either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation,
                         suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately
                         owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.”

                      1 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary

                    Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 810, para. 16.

                    51

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                     55 	             certain iranian assets (sep. op. robinson)

                     In precluding only a State enterprise engaging in commercial activities
                     from enjoying immunities from suit or other liability to which private
                     companies would be subject, this paragraph does not, in its terms, say or
                     imply that State enterprises carrying out acts jure imperii would also be
                     deprived of the immunity they would otherwise enjoy under customary
                     international law ; it does, however, compellingly imply that State enter-
                     prises carrying out acts jure imperii enjoy sovereign immunity by virtue of
                     the Treaty.
                        4. The question is whether an interpretation of the Treaty, in accor-
                     dance with Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law
                     of Treaties, yields the conclusion that an allegation of a breach of immu-
                     nity for State enterprises carrying out acts jure imperii falls within the
                     provisions of the Treaty. In effect the question is whether there is a “rea-
                     sonable connection” 2 between the Treaty and the claim of sovereign
                     immunity.
                        5. To begin with, it must be said at once that the fact that the Treaty
                     does not expressly refer to sovereign immunity for acts jure imperii is not
                     decisive in determining whether the Treaty covers such immunity. For the
                     interpretative function is perfectly capable of resolving the question
                     whether an element not expressly mentioned in the Treaty is nonetheless
                     covered by it.
                        6. The background to the Treaty is well known. In 1812, the
                     United States Supreme Court enunciated the principle of absolute immu-
                     nity in the case of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. In 1952 the State
                     Department of the United States issued the Tate Letter implementing the
                     restrictive approach to sovereign immunity. That Letter indicated that a
                     government or governmental entity engaging in commercial activities was
                     not entitled to immunity in the United States. It is clear that the Tate
                     Letter left untouched and applicable the customary immunity of State
                      entities for sovereign, governmental activities.

                        7. The provision in Article XI, paragraph 4, that a State entity engag-
                     ing in commercial activities will not have immunity from suit or other
                     liability to which a private entity is subject, immediately and inevitably
                     requires a determination as to whether particular acts are commercial, in
                     which case they do not attract immunity, or sovereign and governmental,
                     in which case a question arises as to whether their customary right to
                     immunity becomes applicable by virtue of the Treaty. The Treaty antici-
                     pates that determination and therefore makes provision for the resolution
                     of the issue through the application of the customary rules of State immu-
                     nity. In ascertaining whether acts are commercial under Article XI, para-
                     graph 4, the Treaty calls for a determination that excludes those acts from
                     characterization as sovereign and governmental. This call is implied and

                        2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.

                     United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
                     p. 427, para. 81.

                     52

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                     56 	            certain iranian assets (sep. op. robinson)

                     requires recourse to customary international law to ascertain whether
                     such acts are entitled to immunity. It is the Treaty itself that directs the
                     Parties to customary international law to ascertain the treatment to be
                     accorded to such acts. The Treaty gives this directive because the enjoy-
                     ment of immunity by a State entity for sovereign, governmental acts is
                     vital to the achievement of its object and purpose, which — as gathered
                     from the preamble and the Treaty as a whole — is to maximize trade,
                     investment and economic relations between the two countries. The Court
                     should not take a narrow view as to what constitutes the object and pur-
                     pose of the Treaty, the interpretative significance of which is stressed in
                     Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
                     ties. Immunities for sovereign, governmental acts carried out by a State
                     enterprise contribute significantly to the achievement of the Treaty’s
                     object and purpose and are therefore part of its object and purpose.

                        8. The innate and organic connectedness between acts jure imperii and
                     jure gestionis is endemic to the Treaty, foreseen and embraced by it, and
                     therefore governed by it in all its aspects, including recourse to the cus-
                     tomary rules of immunity. It is this interrelatedness that brings into the
                     conventional régime of the Treaty, the customary rules on immunity for
                     a State entity carrying out acts jure imperii, and dictates recourse to infer-
                     ential reasoning. It matters not whether the reasoning in this interpreta-
                     tive process is described as “a contrario”, or “by necessary implication”
                     or, more simply, “implied”. What is important is that the inference is
                     reasonable, and recourse to the customary rules on immunity required by
                     the Treaty is, as demonstrated below, supported by an interpretation of
                     the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article XI, paragraph 4, in their
                     context, and in light of the Treaty’s object and purpose of maximizing
                     trade, investment and economic relations between the two countries.

                        9. In paragraph 63 of the Judgment, the Court describes the reasoning
                     adopted by Iran as an a contrario reading of Article XI, paragraph 4, and
                     in that regard cited a passage from its previous decision in Alleged Viola-
                     tions of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nica-
                     ragua v. Colombia). However, it omitted a part of the passage in which
                     the Court described an a contrario reading as follows: “by which the fact
                     that the provision expressly provides for one category of situations is said
                     to justify the inference that other comparable categories are excluded” 3.
                     This is not a full description of a contrario reasoning, which, more simply,

                        3 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea

                     (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I),
                     p. 19, para. 37.

                     53

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                     57 	                  certain iranian assets (sep. op. robinson)

                     calls for an inference that a matter is either included in or excluded from
                     a treaty. Whether the inference is that comparable categories are excluded
                     depends on the specific provision in the treaty to which those categories
                     would be contrary. An a contrario interpretation does not always lead to
                     an inference that other comparable categories are excluded. This means
                     of interpretation can, as in this case, lead to an inference that a compa-
                     rable category is included. In this case, the inference to be drawn from
                     Article XI, paragraph 4, is that, by only denying immunity in respect of
                     the commercial activities of a State enterprise, the Treaty is to be read as
                     preserving immunity in respect of State entities carrying out acts jure impe-
                     rii. That inference is supported by the fact that such immunities are, as is
                     demonstrated below, a part of the object and purpose of the Treaty. It is
                     an inference that points to a reasonable connection between the alleged
                     violation and the Treaty, sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction. This
                     interpretation, relying on an a contrario interpretation, is consistent with
                     the Court’s finding in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime
                     Spaces in the Caribbean Sea that “[s]uch an interpretation is only war-
                     ranted, however, when it is appropriate in light of the text [of the Treaty]
                     of all the provisions concerned, their context and the object and purpose
                     of the treaty” 4.

                        10. There was no need for paragraph 4 in Article XI of the Treaty to
                     provide expressly that sovereign, governmental acts of State entities
                     attract immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement. In the context in
                     which the debate over sovereign immunity had taken place since 1812 and
                     in which the Tate Letter was written only three years earlier, it would
                     have been understood by both the United States and Iran that, under the
                     Treaty, a State entity engaging in sovereign, governmental acts would
                     continue to enjoy under the Treaty the immunity it had.

                        11. This conclusion is wholly consistent with the object and purpose of
                     the Treaty to maximize trade, investment and economic relations between
                     the peoples of the two countries. The immunity of State-owned compa-
                     nies engaged in sovereign, governmental acts is as important to and nec-
                     essary for the achievement of this object and purpose as is the denial of
                     immunity for State companies engaged in commercial activities. A State
                     entity such as the Central Bank of one Party will have to carry out in the
                     territory of the other Party several sovereign, governmental activities in
                     the lawful discharge of its functions. These activities are as vital to the
                     achievement of the above‑mentioned object and purpose of the Treaty as
                     are the activities of a private company.

                       12. In the oral proceedings Iran pointed to the important role played
                     by the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Markazi, in providing international
                          4   I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 19, para. 37.

                     54

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                     58 	            certain iranian assets (sep. op. robinson)

                     currency exchange services in relation to imports from or exports to the
                     United States. The measures adopted by the United States in relation to
                     Bank Markazi, including stripping it of its immunity, had, as also stated
                     by Iran, an adverse effect on the discharge by the Bank of its functions
                     and are precisely the kind of measures that the Treaty was intended to
                     prevent and regulate. Consequently, there is a sufficient relationship
                     between the alleged violations of sovereign immunity and the Treaty to
                     give the Court jurisdiction. This point is not answered with the acknowl-
                     edgment that there is a question of sovereign immunity, but it is governed
                     by customary international law. This is so because the sovereign immuni-
                     ties of the Central Bank, being vital for the achievement of the Treaty’s
                     object and purpose, are a part of that object and purpose and thus a part
                     of the Treaty. Therefore, the source of the obligation to recognize the
                     Bank’s sovereign immunities in respect of its sovereign, governmental
                     functions is the Treaty itself, and not customary international law.

                        13. There can be no doubt that the activities of a central bank are gov-
                     erned by the Treaty. The Court has held that in case of doubt, one should
                     adopt an interpretation of the Treaty that is “more in consonance with its
                     overall objective of achieving friendly relations over the entire range of
                     activities covered by the Treaty” 5. The Central Bank’s role in regulating
                     the transfer of payments for goods and services traded between the coun-
                     tries undoubtedly falls within “the entire range of activities covered by the
                     Treaty” 6.
                        14. Significantly, the Treaty has an article that highlights an aspect of
                     the trade and economic relationship between the Parties in which a cen-
                     tral bank has an important role. Article VII is designed to ensure that,
                     subject to certain exceptions, restrictions are not placed on transfers of
                     funds to or from the territory of the other Party. This article is central to
                     the achievement of the Treaty’s object and purpose of maximizing trade,
                     investment and economic relations between the two countries. For if
                     investors are not able to transfer funds to and from the host State, the
                     achievement of the Treaty’s object and purpose will be seriously impaired.
                     Article VII is the lifeblood of the Treaty. Bank Markazi as a Central
                     Bank is principally responsible for the activities that would be undertaken
                     in the implementation of this Article. It is wholly natural that, in those
                     circumstances, the Treaty would preserve the Central Bank’s sovereign
                     immunities and, therefore, a question must arise as to whether the mea-
                     sures adopted by the United States have breached its sovereign immunity,
                     thereby giving the Court jurisdiction.

                       5 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary

                     Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 820, para. 52.
                       6 Ibid.

                     55

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                     59 	          certain iranian assets (sep. op. robinson)

                        15. The third preliminary objection must be rejected because the ques-
                     tion of sovereign immunities and their alleged breach can, on a fair read-
                     ing of the Treaty, be said to be covered by it, and those immunities can,
                     on a fair reading of the Treaty, be said to be part of the Treaty’s object
                     and purpose. There is a reasonable relationship between the question of
                     sovereign immunities for State entities and the Treaty ; the two are suffi-
                     ciently connected through the Treaty’s object and purpose to give the
                     Court jurisdiction. An allegation of failure to accord Bank Markazi sov-
                     ereign immunity from jurisdiction or enforcement falls within the scope
                     of Article XI, paragraph 4. Therefore, the Court should have found that
                     there is a dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or applica-
                     tion of the Treaty, thereby conferring on the Court jurisdiction under
                     Article XXI, paragraph 2.

                     (Signed) Patrick L. Robinson.

                     56

3 CIJ1158.indb 108                                                                                21/10/19 10:25


107

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE SIR CECIL HURST
[Traduction]

Je ne puis me rallier à l'arrêt rendu par la Cour dans la
présente instance.

La question que la Cour est appelée à trancher est énoncée
dans le compromis. Il s'agit de savoir si le contrat de 1913 —
prolongeant Jusqu'en 1949 la concession des phares — est dûment
intervenu et partant est opérant, vis-à-vis du Gouvernement
hellénique, en ce qui concerne les phares de Crète et de Samos.
En répondant à cette question, la Cour est priée de tenir compte
de l’époque à laquelle la Crète et Samos furent détachées de
l'Empire ottoman, mais il n’en reste pas moins que le point
sur lequel Ia Cour est appelée à se prononcer est de savoir si
le contrat de 1913 est ou non dûment intervenu, de telle
manière qu'il lie la Grèce en ce qui est des phares de Crète
et de Samos.

Les Parties, en présentant leur cause, se sont placées au
point de vue que la seule question que dût trancher la Cour
était celle de la date à laquelle la Crète et Samos furent déta-
chées de l’Empire ottoman. A cet égard, l'arrêt de la Cour a
suivi la voie tracée par les Parties. La Cour considère que, la
présente instance étant accessoire à celle qui avait été intro-
duite devant elle par les mêmes Parties en 1034, et l'arrêt
rendu alors ayant reconnu le contrat de 1913 comme dûment
intervenu, cette question est réglée une fois pour toutes et ne
peut être rouverte. Je ne puis me rallier à cette manière de voir.

J'accepte la conclusion énoncée dans l'arrêt de la Cour, à
savoir que la Crète et Samos furent détachées de l’Empire otto-
man à la suite des guerres balkaniques. C’est en partant du
fait que ces deux îles furent ainsi détachées qu’à mon avis la
Cour devrait examiner le point de savoir si le contrat dont il
s'agit est dûment intervenu et, partant, est opérant vis-à-vis
du Gouvernement hellénique en ce qui concerne les phares de
Crète et de Samos.

Il est admis de part et d'autre que, si la Crète et Samos
furent détachées de l’Empire ottoman à la suite des guerres
balkaniques, le caractère, opérant ou non vis-à-vis de la Grèce,
du contrat de 1913, en ce qui concerne la Crète et Samos,
dépend du point de savoir si ledit contrat tombe ou non dans
le champ d'application de l’article 9 du Protocole XII, de même
date que le Traité de Lausanne.

Cet article dispose que, dans les territoires détachés de la
Turquie, l'État successeur est subrogé dans les droits et charges
de la Turquie découlant de contrats de concession. La Cour,

T7
108 A/B 71 (PHARES EN CRÈTE, ETC.). — OP. HURST

dans son arrêt de 1934, a examiné l'effet des divers articles
pertinents du Protocole XII. I y est dit (p. 25) que l’article 9
du Protocole XII présuppose naturellement la validité des
contrats de concession dont il s’agit (c’est-à-dire des contrats
qui tombent sous l’application dudit article). Ce dernier n’admet
contre la subrogation que des objections fondées sur la date
ou la validité du contrat de concession.

Il ressort du passage qui vient d’être mentionné qu’en vertu
de l’article 9 la subrogation ne peut intervenir en matière de
contrats de concession à moins et jusqu’à ce que la validité du
contrat soit démontrée : c’est-à-dire qu'avant de pouvoir dire
que la Grèce, en vertu du contrat de 1913, est subrogée dans
les droits et obligations de la Turquie, il faut établir que ce
contrat est dûment intervenu.

La Cour, dans son arrêt de 1934, a considéré que le contrat
de 1913 était dûment intervenu, mais l'examen du texte de
l'arrêt fait ressortir qu’en constatant le caractère « dûment
intervenu » du contrat, ce que l’on a établi c’est que ce contrat
était dûment intervenu au regard du droit ottoman.

Les questions que traite successivement l’arrét de 1934 à cet
égard visent le pouvoir conféré au ministre des Finances de
Turquie de signer le contrat au nom du Gouvernement otto-
man, l'interprétation de la loi turque de 1910 en matière de
concessions d'utilité publique, la validité et l'effet du décret-loi
turc du 1er/14 avril 1913, autorisant la conclusion du contrat,
et la soumission ultérieure du décret-loi au Parlement turc.

Si la subrogation, en vertu de l’article 9 du Protocole XII,
d'un Etat successeur (la Grèce) dans les droits et obligations
découlant pour la Turquie du contrat de 1913 dépend de la vali-
dité du contrat, c’est-à-dire du fait que le contrat soit dûment
_Intervenu, le point de savoir si la subrogation s’étend aux
phares de Crète et de Samos doit être subordonné à la vali-
dité du contrat en Crète et à Samos, ce qui revient à recher-
cher si l’effet du contrat s’étendait ou non à ces territoires.

La subrogation implique la substitution d’une partie à une
autre dans les droits et obligations qui échéaient précédemment
à celle-ci. Elle n'implique pas — et ne peut impliquer dans la
présente instance — que la Grèce, en Crète et à Samos, dût
bénéficier de droits et assumer des obligations qui, précédem-
ment, n’appartenaient ou n’incombaient pas à la Turquie. Si
l’article 9, du fait de la subrogation, confère à la Grèce, pour
la Crète et Samos, des droits et obligations en vertu du contrat
de 1913, cette conséquence doit être limitée aux droits et obli-
gations qui étaient antérieurement ceux de la Turquie. La
subrogation — l’article ne prévoit rien d’autre — ne peut avoir
pour effet de rendre le contrat opérant vis-à-vis de la Grèce,
en Crète et à Samos, dans une plus grande mesure que ce

18
109 A/B 71 (PHARES EN CRETE, ETC.). — OP. HURST

contrat n'était précédemment opérant, dans les mêmes îles,
vis-à-vis de la Turquie.

Pour justifier la décision que l'effet de l’article 9 du Proto-
cole XII serait de rendre le contrat de 1913 opérant vis-à-vis
du Gouvernement hellénique en ce qui concerne les phares de
Crète et de Samos, il faudrait entrer dans l’examen de la vali-
dité du contrat à l’égard de la Crète et de Samos. Pour pouvoir
présumer, comme une conséquence de la constatation faite par la
Cour dans son arrêt de 1034, que ledit contrat était dûment
intervenu parce qu'il possédait ce caractère au point de vue du
droit ottoman en vigueur à l’époque, on doit démontrer que le
droit ottoman dont il s’agit était également en vigueur à cette
époque en Crète et à Samos. C’est là une question entièrement
indépendante de celle de savoir à quelle date la Crète et Samos
furent détachées de l’Empire ottoman. Cet examen s'impose
quand il s’agit de démontrer que les conditions énoncées dans
l’article 9 sont remplies — l’une de ces conditions étant le
caractère « dûment intervenu » du contrat.

En cette matière, malheureusement, les Parties n’ont prêté
à la Cour aucune assistance. La France, en sa qualité d'Etat
prenant en mains les intérêts de l'Administration des Phares,
‘se place au point de vue que la question de la validité du
contrat de 1913, en ce qui concerne la Crète et Samos, n'était
pas de celles sur lesquelles la Cour eût à se prononcer (Distr.
3895, pp. 45, 46). La position prise par la Grèce a consisté à
alléguer que l'autonomie de la Crète et de Samos — élément
juridique dont dépend la validité du contrat pour ces terri-
toires — était seulement une question apparentée à celle de
la date à laquelle la Crète et Samos furent respectivement
détachées de l’Empire ottoman.

Ce point n'ayant été traité ni dans les écritures ni dans les
exposés oraux faits devant la Cour, je me demande s’il est
de mon devoir, comme membre de la Cour, de me prononcer
à son égard ; mais la documentation fournie par les Parties en
cause et jointe aux mémoires et contre-mémoires jette sur le
problème assez de lumière pour rendre opportune une expres-
sion de l'opinion à laquelle je suis arrivé.

Considérons d’abord le cas de la Crète. Il est admis de part
et d'autre qu’à l'époque du contrat de 1913 la Crète jouissait
d’une pleine autonomie. Les textes des Constitutions de 1899
et de 1907 sont joints au Mémoire hellénique. I] a déjà été
fait mention plus haut, dans la présente opinion, des diverses
questions qui firent en 1934 l'objet d’un examen de la part
de la Cour et auxquelles elle répondit alors dans son arrêt —
questions formant la base dont est partie la Cour pour consta-
ter que le contrat de 1913 était dûment intervenu au point de
vue du droit ottoman; il s'agissait par exemple du pouvoir

19
110 A/B 71 (PHARES EN CRÈTE, ETC.). — OP. HURST

conféré au ministre des Finances de Turquie de signer le contrat
au nom du Gouvernement ottoman, de l'interprétation de la loi
turque de 1910, de l'effet du décret-loi turc du 1er/14 avril 1973,
et de la soumission ultérieure de ce décret-loi au Parlement
turc. L'examen le plus hatif des Constitutions crétoises suffit
à démontrer qu'aucune de ces questions n’exercait une portée
quelconque sur celle de savoir si ledit contrat était dûment
intervenu au point de vue du droit en vigueur en Crète. Le
Sultan ne pouvait conférer au ministre des Finances de Turquie
aucun pouvoir de signer au nom du Gouvernement turc un
contrat qui fit opérant en Crète; la loi turque de 1910 né
s’appliquait pas dans cette île, non plus que le décret-loi turc
du zer/14 avril 1913; enfin, la juridiction du Parlement
turc ne s’étendait pas à la Crète. Ceci suffit à établir que l’arrêt
rendu par la Cour en 1934 n'autorise pas à considérer le contrat
de 1913 comme étant dûment intervenu en ce qui concerne la
Crète. Comme la validité du contrat est l’une des conditions
à remplir, avant que puisse intervenir la subrogation prévue à
l’article 9 du Protocole XII, et que, d’autre part, aucun motif
ne me permet de supposer que ledit contrat soit dûment inter-
venu en ce qui concerne la Crète, la Cour aurait dû, selon
moi, considérer dans son arrêt qu'en ce qui est des phares
de Crète, le contrat n’est pas opérant vis-à-vis du Gouvernement
hellénique.

L'agent du Gouvernement français a soutenu dans ses expo-
sés oraux (Distr. 3895, p. 46) que le Sultan avait le droit de
conclure, avec force et effet en Crète, le contrat de 1933,
parce que les phares dans l’Empire turc constituaient un
service impérial qui ressortissait à la juridiction des autorités
centrales. En conséquence, il a été allégué que l'autonomie
conférée à la Crète n’enfreignait pas les droits du Sultan à cet
égard. Il est difficile de saisir nettement dans quelle mesure on
entendait utiliser cet argument, parce qu'il a été reconnu que
les autorités crétoises étaient également intéressées. Les autorités
turques, avaient, cela est admis, perdu le droit d’exproprier
les terrains ; or, cette expropriation, aux termes de la conces-
sion, pouvait devenir indispensable aux fins de la construction
de nouveaux phares. Il a été admis également que tous les
détails de l'administration locale étaient aux mains des autorités
crétoises, qui avaient donc.leur mot à dire en cette matière.
Selon cet argument, le droit du Sultan de prolonger la conces-
sion des phares n’aurait pas, de lui-même, entraîné le pouvoir
du Sultan d'exécuter le contrat. A cette fin, la coopération des
autorités crétoises se serait imposée. Ceci étant, les autorités
crétoises auraient dû également être associées au renouvelle-
ment de la concession de telle manière que le contrat ptt, à
leur égard, être rendu exécutoire. Rien, en tout cas, dans les

20
III A/B 7I (PHARES EN CRETE, ETC.). —- OP. HURST

termes de la Constitution crétoise, n’autorise à prétendre qu’une
restriction analogue à celle qui a été suggérée ait été imposée
à l’autonomie crétoise.

Pour ce qui est de Samos, les Hatts de 1832 et de 1852
semblent avoir conféré à cette île une autonomie moins éten-
due que dans le cas de la Crète. Le Hatt de 1832 ne confère
au Conseil” samien que « l’autorité intérieure de l’île ». Posté-
rieurement au Hatt additionnel de 1852, le degré d'autonomie
dont jouissait l’île jusqu’à l’époque du contrat de 1913 ne paraît
aucunement avoir été modifié. Ni l’acte de 1832 ni celui de
1852 n'indique clairement dans quelle mesure la Porte conservait,
sur le territoire de l'île, des droits de contrôle et d’admi-
nistration. Cependant, ces deux actes portaient une date anté-
rieure à celle de la première concession turque des phares, et
les faits exposés devant la Cour par l'agent du Gouvernement
français — et qui n’ont pas été contestés par l’agent du Gou-
vernement hellénique — montrent que, dans la pratique, la
concession des phares (y compris les renouvellements pério-
diques de cette concession) a été considérée comme opérante à
Samos, tout au moins jusqu’à l’époque des guerres balkaniques.
Dans ces conditions, je n’entrevois point de motif suffisant
pour me dissocier de la conclusion à laquelle est arrivée la
Cour, à savoir qu’en ce qui concerne les phares de Samos, le
contrat de 1913 est opérant vis-à-vis du Gouvernement hellénique,
encore que j'arrive à cette conclusion par une voie différente.

(Signé) CEciz J. B. Hurst.

21


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
NOTWITHSTANDING SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

ORDER No. 2 OF 26 JANUARY 1971

1971

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE
LA PRESENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE

(REQUETE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE No 2 DU 26 JANVIER 1971
Official citation:

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa

in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-

lution 276 (1970), Order No. 2 of 26 January 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p. 6.

Mode officiel de citation:

Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de I Afrique

du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276

(1970) du Conseil de sécurité, ordonnance n° 2 du 26 janvier 1971, C.I.J.
Recueil 1971, p. 6.

No de vente: 349

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1971

26 janvier 1971

CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE
LA PRESENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE

(REQUETE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE
(n° 2 du 26 janvier 1971)

Présents: Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président; M. AMMOUN,
Vice-Président; sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, MM. Forster, GROS,
BENGZON, PETREN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD, IGNACIO-
PINTO, DE CASTRO, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, juges; M. AQUA-
RONE, Greffier.

.LA COUR,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu Particle 48 du Statut de la Cour,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante:

Vu lexposé écrit présenté par le Gouvernement de la République
sud-africaine le 19 novembre 1970, où des objections sont faites à la
participation de certains membres de la Cour à la présente procédure,

1971
26 janvier
Rôle général
n° 53
NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) (ORDONNANCE 26 I 71) 7

La Cour

Décide à l’unanimité,

En ce qui concerne M. Padilla Nervo, juge, de ne pas faire droit
à l’objection soulevée.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-six janvier mil neuf cent soixante et onze
en quatorze exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la
Cour, un autre sera transmis au Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies et les autres seront transmis aux gouvernements des Etats
suivants: Afrique du Sud, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande, France,
Hongrie, Inde, Nigéria, Pakistan, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie,
Yougoslavie.

Le Président,
(Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.


522

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KRECA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. CoMPoOSITION OF THE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE
II. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE
II]. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RATIONE MATERIAE
IV. OTHER RELEVANT Issues

45

Paragraphs
1-4

5-7

8-10
11-14
523 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS, OP. KRECA)
I. COMPOSITION OF THE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE

1. In the context of the conceptual difference between the interna-
tional magistrature and the internal judicial system within a State, the
institution of judge ad hoc has two basic functions:

“{a) to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a
Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties;
and (b) to create a nominal equality between two litigating States
when there is no Member of the Court having the nationality of
either party” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court, 1920-1996, Vol. II], pp. 1124-1125).

In this particular case room is open for posing the question as to
whether either of these two basic functions of the institution of judge ad
hoc has been fulfilled at all.

It is possible to draw the line between two things.

The first is associated with equalization of the Parties in the part con-
cerning the relations between the Applicant and the respondent States
which have a national judge on the Bench. Jn concreto, of special interest
is the specific position of the respondent States. They appear in a dual
capacity in these proceedings:

primo, they appear individually in the proceedings considering that
each one of them is in dispute with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
and,

secondo, they are at the same time member States of NATO under
whose institutional umbrella they have undertaken the armed attack on
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Within the framework of NATO,
these respondent States are acting in corpore, as integral parts of an
organizational whole. The corpus of wills of NATO member States, when
the undertaking of military operations is in question, is constituted into a
collective will which is, formally, the will of NATO.

2. The question may be raised whether the respondent States can
qualify as parties in the same interest.

In its Order of 20 July 1931 in the case concerning the Customs Régime
between Germany and Austria, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice established that:

“all governments which, in the proceedings before the Court, come
to the same conclusion, must be held to be in the same interest for
the purposes of the present case” (P.C1J., Series A/B, No. 41,
p. 88).

The question of qualification of the “same interest”, in the practice of
the Court, has almost uniformly been based on a formal criterion, the
criterion of “the same conclusion” to which the parties have come in the
proceedings before the Court.

46
524 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

In the present case, the question of “the same conclusion” as the rele-
vant criterion for the existence of “the same interest” of the respondent
States is, in my opinion, unquestionable. The same conclusion was, in a
way, inevitable in the present case in view of the identical Application
which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has submitted against ten
NATO member States, and was formally consecrated by the outcome of
the proceedings before the Court held on 10, 11 and 12 May 1999, in
which all the respondent States came to the identical conclusion resting
on the foundation of practically identical argumentation which differed
only in the fashion and style of presentation.

Hence, the inevitable conclusion follows, it appears to me, that all the
respondent States are in concreto parties in the same interest.

3. What are the implications of this fact for the composition of the
Court in the present case? Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute says:
“If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of
the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge.”

The Statute, accordingly, refers to the right of “any other party”,
namely, a party other than the party which has a judge of its nationality,
in the singular. But, it would be erroneous to draw the conclusion from
the above that “any other party”, other than the party which has a judge
of its nationality, cannot, under certain circumstances, choose several
judges ad hoc. Such an interpretation would clearly be in sharp contra-
diction with ratio legis of the institution of judge ad hoc, which, in this
particular case, consists of the function “to equalize the situation when
the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality
of one of the parties” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Interna-
tional Court, 1920-1996, Vol. UI, pp. 1124-1125). The singular used in
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute with reference to the institution of
judges ad hoc is, consequently, but individualization of the general, inher-
ent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench in the relations
between litigating parties, one of which has a judge of its nationality on
the Bench, while the other has not. The practical meaning of this principle
applied in casum would imply the right of the Applicant to choose as
many judges ad hoc to sit on the Bench as is necessary to equalize the
position of the Applicant and that of those respondent States which have
judges of their nationality on the Bench and which share the same interest.
In concreto, the inherent right to equalization in the composition of the
Bench, as an expression of fundamental rule of equality of parties, means
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should have the right to choose
five judges ad hoc, since even five out of ten respondent States (the United
States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Neth-
erlands) have their national judges sitting on the Bench.

Regarding the notion of equalization which concerns the relation
between the party entitled to choose its judge ad hoc and the parties
which have their national judges on the Bench, the fact is that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, as can be seen from the Order, did not raise any
objections to the circumstance that as many as five respondent States

47
525 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

have judges of their nationality on the Bench. However, this circum-
stance surely cannot be looked upon as something making the question
irrelevant, or, even as the tacit consent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia to such an outright departure from the letter and spirit of
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court has, namely, the obligation to take account ex officio of the
question of such a fundamental importance, which directly derives from,
and vice versa, may directly and substantially affect, the equality of the
parties. The Court is the guardian of legality for the parties to the case,
for which presumptio juris et de jure alone is valid — to know the law
(jura novit curia). As pointed out by Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume and
Ranjeva in their joint declaration in the Lockerbie case: “that is for the
Court — not the parties — to take the necessary decision” (Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
Kingdom), 1 C.J. Reports 1998, p. 36, para. 11).

A contrario, the Court would risk, in a matter which is ratio legis
proper of the Court’s existence, bringing itself into the position of a pas-
sive observer, who only takes cognizance of the arguments of the parties
and, then, proceeds to the passing of a decision.

4. The other function is associated with equalization in the part which
is concerned with the relations between the Applicant and those respon-
dent States which have no national judges on the Bench.

The respondent States having no judge of their nationality on the
Bench have chosen, in the usual procedure, their judges ad hoc (Belgium,
Canada, Italy and Spain). Only Portugal has not designated its judge ad
hoc. The Applicant successively raised objections to the appointment of
the respondent States’ judges ad hoc invoking Article 31, paragraph 5, of
the Statute of the Court. The responses of the Court with respect to this
question invariably contained the standard phrase “that the Court...
found that the choice of a judge ad hoc by the Respondent is justified in
the present phase of the case”.

Needless to say, the above formulation is laconic and does not offer
sufficient ground for the analysis of the Court’s legal reasoning. The only
element which is subject to the possibility of teleological interpretation
is the qualification that the choice of a judge ad hoc is “justified in the
present phase of the case”. A contrario, it is, consequently, possible that
such an appointment of a judge ad hoc would “not be justified” in some
other phases of the case. The qualification referred to above could be
interpreted as the Court’s reserve with respect to the choice of judges ud
hoc by the respondent States, a reserve which could be justifiable on
account of the impossibility for the Court to perceive the nature of their
interest — whether it is the “same” or “separate” — before the parties set
out their positions on the case.

The meanings of equalization as a ratio legis institution of judges ad
hoc, in the case concerning the Applicant and respondent States which

48
526 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

are parties in the same interest, and which do not have a judge ad hoc of
their nationality on the Bench, have been dealt with in the practice of the
Court, in a clear and unambiguous manner.

In the South West Africa case (1961) it was established that, if neither
of the parties in the same interest has a judge of its nationality among the
Members of the Court, those parties, acting in concert, will be entitled to
appoint a single judge ad hoc (South West Africa, LC.J. Reports 1961,
p. 3).

If, on the other hand, among the Members of the Court there is a judge
having the nationality of even one of those parties, then no judge ad hoc
will be appointed (Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commis-
sion of the River Oder, P.C.I.J., Series C, No. 17-If, p. 8; Customs
Régime between Germany and Austria, 1931, P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 41,
p. 88).

This perfectly coherent jurisprudence of the Court applied to this par-
ticular case means that none of the respondent States were entitled to
appoint a judge ad hoc.

Consequently, it may be said that in the present case neither of the two
basic functions of the institution of judge ad hoc has been applied in the
composition of the Court in a satisfactory way. In my opinion, it is a
question of the utmost specific weight in view of the fact that, obviously,
its meaning is not restricted to the procedure, but that it may have a far-
reaching concrete meaning.

Il. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE

5. Humanitarian concern, as a basis for the indication of provisional
measures, has assumed primary importance in the more recent practice of
the Court.

Humanitarian concern has been applied on two parallel tracks in the
Court’s practice:

(a) In respect of the individual

In this regard the cases concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United
States of America) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
( Paraguay v. United States of America) are characteristic.

In both cases the Court evinced the highest degree of sensibility for the
humanitarian aspect of the matter, which probably found its full expres-
sion in the part of the Application submitted by Germany on 2 March
1999:

“The importance and sanctity of an individual human life are well
established in international law. As recognized by Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, every human
being has the inherent right to life and this right shall be protected

49
527 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

by law.” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, 1.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 12,
para. 8).

The following day, the Court already unanimously indicated provisional
measures because it found that in question was “a matter of the greatest
urgency” (ibid., p. 15, para. 26), which makes it incumbent upon the Court
to activate the mechanism of provisional measures in accordance with Ar-
ticle 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court in order: “to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings” (ibid., p. 16, para. 29).

Almost identical provisional measures were indicated by the Court in
the dispute between Paraguay and the United States of America which
had arisen on the basis of the Application submitted by Paraguay on
3 April 1998. On the same day, Paraguay also submitted an “urgent
request for the indication of provisional measures in order to protect its
rights” (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America), Order of 9 April 1998, LC.J. Reports 1998, p. 251,
para. 6). As early as 9 April 1998 the Court unanimously indicated pro-
visional measures so as to: “ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings” (ibid., p. 258,
para. 41).

It is evident that humanitarian concern represented an aspect which
brought about unanimity in the Court’s deliberations. This is clearly
shown not only by the letter and spirit of both Orders in the above-
mentioned cases, but also by the respective declarations and the separate
opinion appended to those Orders. In the process, humanitarian consid-
erations seem to have been sufficiently forceful to put aside obstacles
standing in the way of the indication of provisional measures. In this
respect, the reasoning of the Court’s senior judge, Judge Oda, and that of
its President, Judge Schwebel, are indicative.

In paragraph 7 of his declaration appended to the Order of 3 March
1999 in the case concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
America), Judge Oda convincingly put forward a series of reasons of a
conceptual nature which explained why he “formed the view that, given
the fundamental nature of provisional measures, those measures should
not have been indicated upon Germany’s request”. But, Judge Oda goes
on to “reiterate and emphasize” that he “voted in favour of the Order
solely for humanitarian reasons” (C.J. Reports 1999, p. 20).

President Schwebel, in his separate opinion, has not explicitly stated
humanitarian considerations as the reason that guided him in voting for
the Order; however, it is reasonable to assume that those were the only
considerations which prevailed in this particular case in view of his “pro-
found reservations about the procedures followed both by the Applicant
and the Court” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Pro-
visional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, LC.J. Reports 1999, p. 22).

50
528 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

As far as the Applicant is concerned:

“Germany could have brought its Application years ago, months
ago, weeks ago or days ago. Had it done so, the Court could have
proceeded as it has proceeded since 1922 and held hearings on the
request for provisional measures. But Germany waited until the eve
of execution and then brought its Application and request for pro-
visional measures, at the same time arguing that no time remained to
hear the United States and that the Court should act proprio motu.”
(1. C.J. Reports 1999, p. 22.)

The Court, for its part, indicated provisional measures, as President
Schwebel put it, “on the basis only of Germany’s Application”.

(b) In respect of a group of individuals or the population as a consti-
tutive element of the State

The protection of the citizens emerged as an issue in the case concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua ( Nica-
ragua v. United States of America):

“In its submission, Nicaragua emphasized the death and harm
that the alleged acts had caused to Nicaraguans and asked the Court
to support, by provisional measures, ‘the rights of Nicaraguan citi-
zens to life, liberty and security’.” (R. Higgins, “Interim Measures
for the Protection of Human Rights”, in Politics, Values and Func-
tions, International Law in the 21st Century, 1997, Charney, Anton,

O’Connell, eds., p. 96.)

In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) case, the
Court found the source for provisional measures in:

“incidents . . . which not merely are likely to extend or aggravate
the dispute but comprise a resort to force which is irreconcilable
with the principle of the peaceful settlement of international dis-
putes” (Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January
1986, 1. C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 19).

Humanitarian concern in this particular case was motivated by the risk
of irreparable damage:

“the facts that have given rise to the requests of both Parties for the
indication of provisional measures expose the persons and property
in the disputed area, as well as the interests of both States within
that area, to serious risk of irreparable damage” (ibid, p. 10,
para. 21).

It can be said that in the cases referred to above, in particular those in

5]
529 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

which individuals were directly affected, the Court formed a high stand-
ard of humanitarian concern in the proceedings for the indication of
interim measures, a standard which commanded sufficient inherent
strength to brush aside also some relevant, both procedural and material,
rules governing the institution of provisional measures. Thus, humanitar-
ian considerations, independently from the norms of international law
regulating human rights and liberties, have, in a way, gained autonomous
legal significance; they have transcended the moral and philanthropic
sphere, and entered the sphere of law.

6. In the case at hand, it seems that “humanitarian concern” has lost
the acquired autonomous legal position. This fact needs to be stressed in
view of the special circumstances of this case.

Unlike the cases referred to previously, “humanitarian concern” has as
its object the fate of an entire nation, in the literal sense. Such a conclu-
sion may be inferred from at least two elements:

— primo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its national and eth-
nic groups have been subjected for more than two months now to con-
tinued attacks of a very strong, highly organized air armada of the most
powerful States of the world. The aim of the attack is horrifying, judging
by the words of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wesley Clark, and he
ought to be believed:

“We're going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt,
degrade, devastate, and ultimately, unless President Milosevic com-
plies with the demands of the international community, we're going
to completely destroy his forces and their facilities and support.”
(BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/english/static. NA TOgallery/air
default.stm/14 May 1999.)

“Support” is interpreted, in broad terms, extensively; to the point
which raises the question of the true object of the air attacks. In an
article entitled “Belgrade People Must Suffer” Michael Gordon quotes
the words of General Short that he “hopes the distress of the public will,
must undermine support for the authorities in Belgrade” (/nternational
Herald Tribune, 16 May 1999, p. 6) and he continued:

“I think no power to your refrigerator, no gas to your stove, you
can’t get to work because bridge is down — the bridge on which you
held your rock concerts and you all stood with targets on your
heads. That needs to disappear at three o’clock in the morning.”
(Ibid. )

That these are not empty words Is testified to by destroyed bridges, power
plants without which there is no electricity, water supply and production

52
530 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

of foodstuffs essential for life; destroyed roads and residential blocks and
family homes; hospitals without electricity and water and, above all,
human beings who are exposed to bombing raids and who, as is rightly
stressed in the Application in the LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
America) case, have the “inherent right to life” (International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6), whose importance and sanctity are
well established in international law. In the inferno of violence, they are
but “collateral damage”.

— secundo, the arsenal used in the attacks on Yugoslavia contains also
weapons whose effects have no limitations either in space or in time. In
the oral proceedings before the Court, the Agent of the United States
explicitly stressed that depleted uranium is in standard use of the United
States Army (CR 99/24, p. 21).

The assessment of the effects of depleted uranium should be left to
science. The report by Marvin Resnikoff of Radioactive Management
Associates on NMI elaborated upon these effects:

“Once inhaled, fine uranium particles can lodge in the lung alveo-
lar and reside there for the remainder of one’s life. The dose due to
uranium inhalation is cumulative. A percentage of inhaled particu-
lates may be coughed up, then swallowed and ingested. Smoking is
an additional factor that needs to be taken into account. Since
smoking destroys the cilia, particles caught in a smoker’s bronchial
passages cannot be expelled. Gofman estimates that smoking
increases the radiation risk by a factor of 10. Uranium emits an
alpha particle, similar to a helium nucleus, with two electrons
removed. Though this type of radiation is not very penetrating, it
causes tremendous tissue damage when internalized. When inhaled,
uranium increases the probability of lung cancer. When ingested,
uranium concentrates in the bone. Within the bone, it increases the
probability of bone cancer, or, in the bone marrow, leukemia. Ura-
nium also resides in soft tissue, including the gonads, increasing the
probability of genetic health effects, including birth defects and
spontaneous abortions. The relationship between uranium ingested
and the resultant radiation doses to the bone marrow and specific
organs .. . are listed in numerous references.

The health effects are also age-specific. For the same dose, chil-
dren have a greater likelihood than adults of developing cancer.”
(Uranium Battlefields Home & Abroad: Depleted Uranium Use by
the U.S. Department of Defense, Rural Alliance for Military
Accountability et al, March 1993, pp. 47-48.)

A scientific analysis of the concrete effects of armed operations against

33
531 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

Yugoslavia has been presented by Umweltbundesamt (UBA). The essen-
tials of the expertise are as follows!:

[Translation by the Registry]

“The longer the war in Yugoslavia lasts, the greater the risk of
long-term damage to the environment. Such damage threatens to
extend beyond national frontiers, and it may no longer be possible
fully to make it good. The Federal Environmental Agency [Umwelt-
bundesamt (UBA)] comes to this conclusion in an internal paper
examining the ecological consequences of the war in Yugoslavia,
prepared for the meeting of European Environment Ministers at the
beginning of May in Weimar. Catastrophes ‘like Seveso and Sandoz’
are, in the opinion of the Agency, ‘a perfectly probable damage sce-
nario’.

' “Je langer der Krieg in Jugoslawien dauert, desto grésser wird die Gefahr von lang-
fristigen Schädigungen der Umwelt. Diese drohen sich über die Landesgrenzen
hinaus auszubreiten und kénnen môglicherweise nicht mehr vollstandig beseitigt wer-
den. Zu dieser Einschätzung kommt das Umweltbundesamt (UBA) in einem internen
Papier, das sich mit den dkologischen Auswirkungen des Krieges in Jugoslawien
befasst und für die Vorbereitung des Treffens europäischer Umweltminister Anfang
Mai in Weimar erstellt wurde. Katastrophen ‘wie Seveso und Sandoz’ sind nach
Ansicht des Amtes ‘ein durchaus wahrscheinliches Schadensszenario’.

Umweltgifte, die nach Zerstôrungen von Industrieanlagen austreten, kônnten sich
weiter ausbreiten. ‘Bei Sicherstellung sofortigen Handelns, das unter Kriegsbedingun-
gen aber unméglich ist, bleibt die Wirkung dieser Umweltschadigungen lokal begrenzt.
Langere Verzôgerungen führen zu einem übertritt der Schadstoffe in die Schutzgiiter
Boden, Grund- und Oberflächenwasser, erhôhen das Gefahrdungspotential für den
Menschen und den Sanierungsaufwand betrachtlich.”

Diese Folgen müssen nicht auf Jugoslawien beschrankt sein. Schadstoffe aus
Grossbranden kénnten grenziiberschreitend verteilt werden. Weiter heisst es in dem
Papier: ‘Die Einleitung der Gefahrstoffe in Oberflachenwasser kann zur weiträumi-
gen Schädigung der Okosysteme führen. Die Deposition von Gefahrstoffen in Boden
kann je nach Eigenschaft der Stoffe und Béden zu langanhaltenden Versuchungen
mit weitgehenden Nutzungseinschrankungen fihren.”

Die Gefahr einer ‘tiefgreifenden Zerst6rung wesentlicher Bestandteile von Trink-
wasserversorgungssystemen’ sei fiir mittlere und grosse Städte sowie Ballungsgebiete
am grôssten. Schon geringe Mengen von Substanzen der petrochemischen Industrie
kônnten ‘grosse Grundwasservorrate unbrauchbar machen’.

Wie gefährlich die freigesetzten Stoffe insgesamt sind, lässt sich nach Ansicht der
UBA-Experten nur schwer abschatzen, ‘weil durch die Zerst6rung ganzer Industrie-
komplexe Mischkontaminationen verschiedenster Schadstoffe gebildet werden’, die
noch wenig erforscht seien. Noch komplizierter sei die Beurteilung von Umwelt-
schaden durch Brande und Explosionen. ‘Hier treten bezogen auf Schadstoffinventar
und Ausbreitung weit weniger kalkulierbare, zum Teil grossflächige Umweltschadi-
gungen ein.’

Die Verbrennungsprodukte seien ‘zum Teil hoch toxisch und kanzerogen’. Je nach
klimatischen Bedingungen kénne es ‘zu einer grossflachigen Verteilung dieser Stoffe’
kommen, ‘die eine vollstandige Beseitigung nahezu unméglich macht’...

Die Wechselwirkungen der Produkte mit den eingesetzten Waffen dürften ‘vôllig
unbekannt’ sein.” (TAZ, Die Tageszeitung. Berlin, 20 May 1999.)

54
532 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

Environmental toxins released by the destruction of industrial
plant could spread further. ‘If immediate action is taken, which is,
however, impossible under war conditions, the effect of this environ-
mental damage will remain restricted to local level. Longer delays
will result in toxic substances passing into the soil, groundwater and
surface water, and substantially increase the potential danger to
man, and the cost of cleansing operations.’

These consequences are not necessarily limited to Yugoslavia.
Harmful substances deriving from major conflagrations can be dif-
fused beyond frontiers. The paper continues: ‘Passage of harmful
substances into surface water can lead to extensive damage to eco-
systems. The deposition of hazardous substances in the soil can,
depending on the nature of those substances and of the soil, result in
long-term contamination, imposing far-reaching limitations upon
utilization.’

The danger of ‘extensive destruction of essential components of
drinking-water supply networks’ is biggest with regard to middle-
sized and large cities and conurbations. Even small amounts of sub-
stances from the petrochemical industry can render ‘extensive
groundwater reserves unusable’.

According to the Federal Environmental Agency experts, the over-
all risk posed by the substances released is difficult to assess, ‘because
the destruction of entire industrial complexes results in mixed con-
tamination by a wide variety of harmful substances’ — an area in
which there has as yet been little research. Even more problematic,
in the experts’ view, is the assessment of environmental damage
caused by fires and explosions. ‘Here, in terms of identification of
the harmful substances involved and the possibility of their diffu-
sion, environmental damage is far harder to predict, but will on
occasion be extensive.’

The substances produced by the fires are described as ‘in part
highly toxic and carcinogenic’. Depending on climatic conditions,
‘widespread diffusion of these substances’ could occur, ‘which would
render full cleansing almost impossible’.

The effects of the interaction of those substances with the
weapons employed were said to be ‘completely unknown’.” (TAZ,
Die Tageszeitung, Berlin, 20 May 1999.)

Therefore, it is my profound conviction, that the Court is, in concreto,
confronted with an uncontestable case of “extreme urgency” and “irrepa-
rable harm”, which perfectly coincides, and significantly transcends the

55
533 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

substance of humanitarian standards which the Court has accepted in
previous cases.

7. I must admit that I find entirely inexplicable the Court’s reluctance
to enter into serious consideration of indicating provisional measures in a
situation such as this crying out with the need to make an attempt,
regardless of possible practical effects, to at least alleviate, if not elimi-
nate, an undeniable humanitarian catastrophe. I do not have in mind
provisional measures in concrete terms as proposed by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, but provisional measures in general: be they
provisional measures proprio motu, different from those proposed by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, simply, an appeal by the President
of the Court, as was issued on so many occasions in the past, in less
difficult situations, on the basis of the spirit of Article 74, paragraph 4,
of the Rules of Court.

One, unwillingly, acquires the impression that for the Court in this par-
ticular case the indication of any provisional measures whatever has been
terra prohibita. Exempli causa, the Court, in paragraph 18 of the Order,
says that it:

“deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties appearing before it
must act in conformity with their obligations under the United
Nations Charter and other rules of international law including
humanitarian law”,

or, in paragraph 37 of the Order, that the Parties: “should take care not
to aggravate or extend the dispute”, and it is obvious that both the above
pronouncements of the Court have been designed within the model of
general, independent provisional measures.

III. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RATIONE MATERIAE

8. I am of the opinion that in the matter in hand the Court’s position
is strongly open to criticism.
The Court finds:

“whereas the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself
constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the
Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the
bombings which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application
‘indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required
by the provision quoted above’ (Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, L C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240,
para. 26)” (Order, para. 27).

The intent is, without doubt, the subjective element of the being of the

56
534 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

crime of genocide as, indeed, of any other crime. But, this question is not
and cannot, by its nature, be the object of decision-making in the inci-
dental proceedings of the indication of provisional measures.

In this respect, a reliable proof should be sought in the dispute which,
by its salient features, is essentially identical to the dispute under consid-
eration — the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

In its Order on the indication of provisional measures of 8 April 1993,
in support of the assertion of the Respondent that, inter alia, “it does not
support or abet in any way the commission of crimes cited in the Appli-
cation . .. and that the claims presented in the Application are without
foundation” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April
1993, LCS. Reports 1993, p. 21, para. 42), the Court stated:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on
a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41
of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as
requiring the indication of provisional measures, but cannot make
definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each
Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribu-
tion to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments
in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s deci-
sion” (ibid., p. 22, para. 44)

and

“Whereas the Court is not called upon, for the purpose of its
decision on the present request for the indication of provisional
measures, now to establish the existence of breaches of the Geno-
cide Convention” (ibid., para. 46).

The rationale of provisional measures is, consequently, limited to the
preservation of the respective rights of the parties pendente lite which are
the object of the dispute, rights which may subsequently be adjudged by
the Court. As the Court stated in the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria case:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the proceedings concerning
the indication of provisional measures, cannot make definitive find-
ings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each Party to dispute
the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribution to it of
responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments, if appropri-
ate, in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s
decision” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, ICJ.
Reports 1996 (1), p. 23, para. 43).

57
535 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

9. Fundamental questions arise regarding the position of the Court on
this particular matter.

The relationship between the use of armed force and genocide can be
looked upon in two ways:

(a) is the use of force per se an act of genocide or not? and,
(b) is the use of force conducive to genocide and, if the answer is in the
affirmative, what is it then, in the legal sense?

It is incontrovertible that the use of force per se et definitione does not
constitute an act of genocide. It is a matter that needs no particular prov-
ing. However, it could not be inferred from this that the use of force is un-
related and cannot have any relationship with the commission of the crime
of genocide. Such a conclusion would be contrary to elementary logic.

Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide defines the acts of genocide as

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

fe) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Any of these acts can be committed also by the use of force. The use of
force is, consequently, one of the possible means of committing acts of
genocide. And, it should be pointed out, one of the most efficient means,
due to the immanent characteristics of armed force.

Extensive use of armed force, in particular if it is used against objects
and means constituting conditions of normal life, can be conducive to
“inflicting on the group conditions of life” bringing about “its physical
destruction”.

Of course, it can be argued that such acts are in the function of degrad-
ing the military capacity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But such
an explanation can hardly be regarded as a serious argument. For, the
spiral of such a line of thinking may easily come to a point when, having
in mind that military power is after all comprised of people, even mass
killing of civilians can be claimed to constitute some sort of a precaution-
ary measure that should prevent the maintenance or, in case of mobiliza-
tion, the increase of military power of the State.

Of course, to be able to speak about genocide it is necessary that there
is an intent, namely, of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life” bringing about “its physical destruction in whole or in part”.

58
536 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

In the incidental proceedings the Court cannot and should not concern
itself with the definitive qualification of the intent to impose upon the
group conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened. Having
in mind the purpose of provisional measures, it can be said that at this
stage of the proceedings it is sufficient to establish that, in the conditions
of intensive bombing, there is an objective risk of bringing about condi-
tions in which the survival of the group is threatened.

The Court took just such a position in the Order of 8 April 1993 on the
indication of provisional measures in the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case.

Paragraph 44 of that Order stated:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on
a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41
of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as
requiring the indication of provisional measures, but cannot make
definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each
Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribu-
tion to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments
in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s deci-
sion” (LC. J. Reports 1993, p. 22).

The question of “intent” is a highly complicated one. Although the
intent is a subjective matter, a psychological category, in contemporary
criminal legislation it is established also on the basis of objective circum-
stances. Inferences of intent to commit an act are widely incorporated in
legal systems. Exempli causa, permissive inferences as opposed to a man-
datory presumption in the jurisprudence of the United States of America
may be drawn even in a criminal case.

In any event, there appears to be a clear dispute between the Parties
regarding “intent” as the constitutive element of the crime of genocide.

The Applicant asserts that “intent” can be presumed and, on the other
hand, the Respondent maintains that “intent”, as an element of the crime
of genocide, should be clearly established as dolus specialis. Such a con-
frontation of views of the Parties concerned leads to a dispute related to
“the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention”, includ-
ing disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention.

10. At the same time, one should have in mind that whether “in cer-
tain cases, particularly that by the infliction of inhuman conditions of
life, the crime may be perpetrated by omission” (Stanislas Plawski, Etude
des principes fondamentaux du droit international pénal, 1972, p. 115.
Cited in United Nations doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/415 of 4 July 1978).

59
537 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

Since,

“Experience provides that a state of war or a military operations
régime gives authorities a convenient pretext not to provide a popu-
lation or a group with what they need to subsist — food, medicines,
clothing, housing . . . It will be argued that this is inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part.” (J. Y. Dautricourt, “La prévention du
génocide et ses fondements juridiques”, Etudes internationales de
psychosociologie criminelle, Nos. 14-15, 1969, pp. 22-23. Cited in
United Nations doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/415 of 4 July 1978, p. 27.)

Of the utmost importance is the fact that, in the incidental proceedings,
the Court cannot and should not concern itself with the definitive quali-
fication of the intent to impose upon the group conditions in which the
survival of the group is threatened. Having in mind the purpose of pro-
visional measures, it can be said that at this stage of the proceedings it is
sufficient to establish that, in the conditions of intensive bombing, there
is an objective risk of bring about conditions in which the survival of the
group is threatened.

IV. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

11. In paragraph 15 of the Order the Court states:

“Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form
the background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss
of life and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia.”

The phrasing of the statement seems to me unacceptable for a number
of reasons. First, the formulation introduces dual humanitarian concern.
The Court is, it is stated, “deeply concerned”, while at the same time the
Court states “the loss of life”. So, it turns out that in the case of “all parts
of Yugoslavia” the Court technically states “the loss of life” as a fact
which does not cause “deep concern”. Furthermore, the wording of the
formulation may also be construed as meaning that Kosovo is not a part
of Yugoslavia. Namely, after emphasizing the situation in Kosovo and
Metohija, the Court uses the phrase “in all parts of Yugoslavia”. Having
in mind the factual and legal state of affairs, the appropriate wording
would be “in all other parts of Yugoslavia”. Also, particular reference to
“Kosovo” and “all parts of Yugoslavia”, in the present circumstances,
has not only no legal, but has no factual basis either. Yugoslavia, as a
whole, is the object of attack. Human suffering and loss of life are, un-
fortunately, a fact, generally applicable to the country as a whole; so, the
Court, even if it had at its disposal the accurate data on the number of

60
538 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

victims and the scale of suffering of the people of Yugoslavia, it would
still have no moral right to discriminate between them. Further, the
qualification that “human tragedy and the enormous suffering in Kosovo
... form the background of the present dispute” not only is political, by
its nature, but has, or may have, an overtone of justification of the armed
attack on Yugoslavia. Suffice it to recall the fact that the respondent
State refers to its armed action as humanitarian intervention.

It is up to the Court to establish, at a later stage of the proceedings, the
real legal state of affairs, namely, the relevant facts. At the present stage,
the question of the underlying reasons for the armed attack on the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia is the object of political allegations. While
the Respondent argues that what is involved is a humanitarian interven-
tion provoked by the “human tragedy and the enormous suffering”, the
Applicant finds that sedes materiae the underlying reasons are to be
sought elsewhere — in the support to the terrorist organization in
Kosovo and in the political aim of secession of Kosovo and Metohija
from Yugoslavia.

Consequently, we are dealing here with opposed political qualifications
in which the Court should not, and, in my view, must not, enter except in
the regular court proceedings.

12. The formulation of paragraph 38 of the Order leaves the impres-
sion that the Court is elegantly attempting to drop the ball in the Security
Council’s court. Essentially, it is superfluous because, as it stands now, it
only paraphrases a basic fact that “the Security Council has special
responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter”. It can be interpreted,
it is true, also as an appeal to the United Nations organ, specifically
entrusted with the duty and designed to take measures in case of threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; but, in that case the
Court would need to stress also another basic fact — that a legal dispute
should be referred to the International Court of Justice on the basis of
Article 36, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter.

13. The Court, by using the term “Kosovo” instead of the official
name of “Kosovo and Metohija”, continued to follow the practice of the
political organs of the United Nations, which, by the way, was also
strictly followed by the respondent States.

It is hard to find a justifiable reason for such a practice. Except of
course if we assume political opportuneness and involved practical, politi-
cal interests to be a justified reason for this practice. This is eloquently
shown also by the practice of the designation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. After the succession of the former Yugoslav federal units,
the organs of the United Nations, and the respondent States themselves,

61
539 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

have used the term Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, since
22 November 1995, the Security Council uses in its resolutions 1021 and
1022 the term “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” instead of the former
“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)” without any
express decision and in a legally unchanged situation in relation to the
one in which it, like other organs of the United Nations, employed the
term “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. The
fact that this change in the practice of the Security Council appeared on
the day following the initialling of the Peace Agreement in Dayton gives
a strong basis for the conclusion that the concrete practice is not based
on objective, legal criteria but rather on political criteria.

By using the word “Kosovo” instead of the name “Kosovo and Meto-
hija”, the Court, in fact, is doing two things:

(a) it gives in to the colloquial use of the names of territorial units of an
independent State; and

(b) it ignores the official name of Serbia’s southern province, a name
embodied both in the constitutional and legal acts of Serbia and
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it runs
contrary to the established practice in appropriate international orga-
nizations. Exempli causa, the official designation of the southern
Serbian province “Kosovo and Metohija” has been used in the
Agreement concluded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe ({nter-
national Legal Materials, 1999, Vol. 38, p. 24).

Even if such a practice — which, in my opinion, is completely inappro-
priate not only in terms of the law but also in terms of proper usage —
could be understood when resorted to by entities placing interest and
expediency above the law, it is inexplicable in the case of a judicial organ.

14. A certain confusion is also created by the term “humanitarian law”
referred to in paragraphs 18 and 36 of the Order. The reasons for the
confusion are dual: on the one hand, the Court has not shown great con-
sistency in using this term. In the Genocide case the Court qualified the
Genocide Convention as a part of humanitarian law, although it is obvi-
ous that, by its nature, the Genocide Convention falls within the field of
international criminal law (see dissenting opinion of Judge Kreéa, in the
case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, EC.J.
Reports 1996 (IT), pp. 774-775, para. 108).

On the other hand, it seems that in this Order the term “humanitarian
law” has been used with a different meaning, more appropriate to the
generally accepted terminology. The relevant passage in the Order should
be mentioned precisely because of the wording of its paragraphs 18 and
36. The singling out of humanitarian law from the rules of international

62
540 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

law which the Parties are bound to respect may imply low-key and timid
overtones of vindication or at least of diminishment of the legal implica-
tions of the armed attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Humanitarian law, in its legal, original meaning implies the rules of jus
in bello. If, by stressing the need to respect the rules of humanitarian law,
which I do not doubt, the Court was guided by humanitarian considera-
tions, then it should have stressed expressis verbis also the fundamental
importance of the rule contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Char-
ter, which constitutes a dividing line between non-legal, primitive inter-
national society and an organized, de jure, international community.

(Signed) Milenko KRECA.

63


357

APPENDIX.
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT.
A.—BY THE AGENTS OF THE APPLICANT POWERS!
I—On June. gth, 1932.

1.—Extract from the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the
observations of the German delegation, June 16th, 1919.

2.—Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic, August ist, 1922.
3.—Letter from the Conference of Ambassadors, dated December 2oth, 1922.

4.—Statute of the Territory of Memel (League of Nations Doc. C. 159.
M. 39. 1924. VII) (March 22nd, 1924):

(a) Letter from the Conference of Ambassadors to the Secretariat-General, -
September 28th, 1923.

(b) Letter from the Conference of Ambassadors to the Secretariat-General,
October 18th, 1923. ;
(c) Letter from the President of the Lithuanian Cabinet to the Secretary-

General, November 22nd, 1923.

(d) Letter from the President of the Lithuanian Cabinet to the Secretary-
General, November 24th, 1923.

(e) Extracts from the minutes of the 27th Session of the Council, Paris:

Minutes of 8th meeting, December 15th, 1923; brief analysis of the
Memel question prepared by the Secretariat.
Minutes of the goth meeting, December 17th, 1923.
» » 5 Toth 4 , » nos on
Report by M. Guani, adopted by the Council on December 17th, 1923.

(f) Letter from M. Skirmunt to the President of the Council, with annexes,
communicated to Members of the Council, December 11th, 1923.

(g) Letter from M. Galvanauskas to the Secretary-General, communicated to
Members of the Council, December 11th, 1923. :

(4) Note by the Secretary-General, informing Members of the Council of
the composition of the Memel Commission, February 9th, 1924.

(i) Letter from the Conference of Ambassadors to the Secretary-General,
dated February 4th, 1924, and a Memorial containing the observations
of the Conference of Ambassadors on M. Galvanauskas’ letter of Decem-
ber rith, 1923.

(7) Letter from M. Galvanauskas to the Secretary-General: comments on
the letter from the Conference of Ambassadors of February 4th, 1924.

(k) Letter from M. Skirmunt to the President of the Council, communi-
cated to the Council on March roth, 1924.

{) Extract from the minutes of the 4th meeting of the 28th Session of
the Council. Geneva, March i2th, 1924.

(m) Report of the Commission (annex to minutes of 28th Session of the
Council).

. (n) Extract from the minutes of the 8th meeting of the 28th Session of
the Council. Geneva, March 14th, 1924.

(0) Draft convention and annexes (annex to minutes of 28th Session
of the Council).

(p) Transitory provision (formerly Art. 18 of the draft convention) (annex
to minutes of 28th Session of the Council).

5.—Letter from M. Bôttcher (translation), January 16th, 1932.

6.—Sitting of the Diet of Memel (extract from the verbatim record—
translation}, January 25th, 1932.

9 67
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE OF MEMEL TERRITORY 358

7,—Notification by the Governor, M. Merkys, February 6th, 1932.

- 8.— Documents relating to the procedure before the Council of the League
of Nations, February 5th—zoth, 1932 (14 documents) :

Opening of credits (expenses in connection with the experts). Report
submitted by the representative of Guatemala. Geneva, February 5th,
1932 (Doc. C. 175. 1932. X).

Minutes of the 9th meeting of the 66th Session of the Council (Feb. 6th,
1932).

Communication from the German Government concerning Memel. Note by
the Secretary-General. Geneva, February 8th, 1932 (Doc. C. 189. 1932. VII).

Communication from the German Government. Note by the Secretary-
General. Geneva, February oth, 1932 (Doc. C. 194. 1932. VIT).

Communication from the Lithuanian Government. Note by the Secretary-
General. Geneva, February roth, 1932 (Doc. C. 203. 1932. VII).

Communication from the Lithuanian Government. Note by the Secretary-
General. Geneva, February roth, 1932 (Doc. C. 211. 1932. VII).

Communication from the German representative on the Council. Note
by the Secretary-General. Geneva, February 11th, 1932 (Doc. C. 212.
1932: VII).

Communication from the German Government. Note by the Secretary-
General. Geneva, February 11th, 1932 (Doc. C. 213. 1932. VII).

Exchange of telegrams between the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Secretary-General (Feb. 1rith, 1932; Doc. C. 215. 1932. VIT).

Statements concerning infractions of the Convention of Memel: Letter
from the Chancellor of the German Reich. Communication from the
Lithuanian Government. Note by the Secretary-General. Geneva, Febru-
ary 13th, 1932 (Doc. C. 224. 1932. VII).

Minutes of the rith meeting of the 66th Session of the Council. Geneva,
February 13th, 1932.

Statements concerning infractions of the Convention of Memel: Letter from
the Chancellor of the German Reich. Note by the Secretary-Genefal.
Geneva, February 15th, 1932 (Doc. C. 231. 1932. VII).

Report by the Norwegian representative. Geneva, February 18th, 1932
(Doc. C. 249. 1932. VIN.

Minutes of the 13th meeting of the 66th Session of the Council. Geneva,
February 20th, 1932. :

9.—-Letter from M. Bôttcher, February 23rd, 1932.

10.—Protocol of signature of the Convention of May 8th, 1924, and four
letters from M. Galvanauskas dated May 17th, 1924, in regard to this signature.

II.—On June 14th, 1932.

11.—Verbal note presented on March 1gth, 1932, by His Britannic Majesty’s
Chargé d’affaires at Kovno to the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Identical notes were presented to the Lithuanian Government by the French
and Italian Ministers.

12.—Aide-mémoive presented on March 19th, 1932, by the Lithuanian
Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’affaires
at Kovno.

TIl—On July. 11th, 1932.

13 —Telegram from the French Minister at Kovno to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Paris, February 26th, 1932.

14.—Translation of an ‘Official Opinion by the Governor of the Memel
Territory”, February 27th, 1932.

15.—Translation of a letter from MM. Gubba and Kraus to M. Simaitis,
March ist, 1932. ;

68
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE OF MEMEL TERRITORY 359

16.—Transiation of a letter from MM. Gubba and Kraus to. the President
of the Directorate, March 2nd, 1932.

17.—Translation of a letter from M. Simaitis to M. Gubba, leader of the
Farmers’ Party group, March 11th, 1932.

18.—Translation of a letter from M. Gubba to M. Simaitis, March 11th, 1932.
19.—-Translation of a letter from M. Kraus to M. Simaitis, March 11th, 1932.

20.—Translation of a letter from MM. Kraus and Gubba to the Governor of
Memel, March t2th, 1932.

21.—Translation of the verbatim report of the meeting of the Diet of
March 22nd, 1932.

22.—Figures showing the results of the elections which took place at
Memel on May 4th, 1932.

B.—By THE AGENT OF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT :
I—As annexes to the first Counter-Memorial (May 30th, 1932).

1.—Convention signed at Paris on May 8th, 1924, between France, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan and Lithuania, concerning the Memel Territory.

2.—The Constitution of the Lithuanian State (Constitution of 1928).

3.—Minutes of the 11th meeting (public) of the Council of the League of
Nations, held on Saturday, February 13th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

4.—Extracts from the Treasury Accounts of the Territory}.

5.—Copy of a certificate given by M. Toepke, the German Consul-General
at Memel, to M. Baltromejus.

6.—Copy of the usual travelling permit issued by German diplomatic
representatives and consuls.

7.—Letter from the Governor of Memel, M. Merkys, to the President of
the Chamber of Representatives, dated January 25th, 1932.

8.—Statement made by M. Bôttcher at the meeting of the Chamber of
Representatives on January 25th, 1932.

9.—Statement made by M. Podszus at the meeting of the Chamber of
Representatives on January 25th, 1932.

Il—On June 15th, 1932.

10.— Official Journal of the League of Nations, VIIth year, No. 10, Octo-
ber 1926, containing the minutes of the meeting of the Council of the
League of Nations held at Geneva on September 3rd, 1926, and the Report
of the Committee of Jurists to the Council of the League of Nations of
September 16th, 1926.

11.—A certified true copy of identical notes forwarded to the Lithuanian
Minister for Foreign Affairs by the representatives of the Powers which,
together with Lithuania, signed the Convention of Paris of March igth, 1932
(see above, A, No. 11).

IIT.—On July 8th, 1932.

12.—-Translation of the letter written by M. Béttcher to his son on
February 6th, 1932, after his dismissal.

1 Translation filed on July 11th, 1932 (see below, No. 24).
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INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE OF MEMEL TERRITORY 360

13.—Letter, dated February roth, 1932, from the majority parties to the
Governor of the Territory.

14.—Minutes of the meeting of the German Reichstag. 59th Meeting.
—Thursday, February 25th, 1932.—-Extract.

15,—Letter, dated March ist, 1932, from the majority parties to the Presi-
dent of the Directorate.

16.—Pro-memoria addressed on March 7th, 1932, by the Lithuanian
Government to the Powers, signatories together with Lithuania of the Con-
vention of Paris of May 8th, 1924. ;

17.—Letter, dated March rz2th, 1932, from the majority parties to the
Governor of the Territory.

18.—Letter, dated March 17th, 1932, from the President of the Memel
Directorate to the Governor of the Memel Territory.

19.—Extract from the statement by M. Simaitis, President of the Direc-
torate, which was read to the Chamber of Representatives of the Memel
Territory on March 22nd, 1932.

IV.— On July 1th, 1932.

20.—Letter, dated February 6th, 1932, from the Governor of the Memel
Territory to M. Zygaudas, a member of the Directorate.

21.—M. Zygaudas’ reply to the above letter.
22.—Letter, dated March 11th, 1932, from the Directorate of the Memel
Territory to M. J. Gubba, the President of the Farmers’ Party.

23.—Letter, dated February 23rd, 1932, to the Governor of the Memel
Territory from the Presidents of the People’s and the Farmers’ Parties,

24.—Translation of extracts from the Treasury Accounts of the Memel
Territory (see above, B, I, No. 4).

C.—THE COURT ALSO HAD BEFORE IT:

1.—Diplomatic documents of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Lithua-
nian Republic. Memel Question. 2 volumes. Kovno, 1923 and 1924.

2.—Resolutions of the Council, dated:
October 22nd, 1920.
» 25th, 4, .
June 27th, 1921.
September 5th, 1923.
» 2oth, 1926.
3.—Resolutions of the Assembly, dated:
‘September 21st, 1922.
5 26th, 1923.
4.—Lithuanian declaration concerning Minorities, dated May 12th, 1922.

70