COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU DETROIT
DE CORFOU

ORDONNANCE DU 17 DECEMBRE 1948

1948

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

THE CORFU
CHANNEL CASE

ORDER OF DECEMBER 17th, 1948
La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:

« Affaire du détroit de Corfou, Ordonnance du 17 décembre 1948 :
C. I. J. Recueil 1948, p. 124. »

This Order should be cited as follows:

“Corfu Channel case, Order of December 17th, 1948:
I.C. J. Reports 1948, p. 124.”

N° de vente:
Sales number 13

124

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1948.

Order made on December 17th, 1948.

THE CORFU
CHANNEL CASE

The International Court of Justice,

Having regard to Articles 48 and 50 of the Statute of the Court
and Article 57 of the Rules,

And to the fact that certain points have been contested between
the Parties which make it necessary to obtain an expert opinion,

After deliberation,
Decides that

I.

An expert opinion shall be obtained upon the following
points :

(1) You are requested to examine the situation in the
North Corfu Strait immediately before October 22nd, 1946,
from the point of view of (a) the position of the swept channel ;
(0) the effectiveness of the mine-clearance previously carried
out ; and (c) the risk of encountering floating mines in this
Channel owing to the proximity of the old minefields, and to
study the German documents in order to obtain information
from them concerning the types of mines laid in those mine-
fields.

(2) You are requested to examine the information and
documents available concerning the navigation of the Mauri-
tius, the Saumarez and the Volage, in order to ascertain what
conclusions, if any, may be drawn concerning the identity
of the type of mines which struck the two last-named vessels

4

1948.
December 17th
General List:

No. 1.
THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (DEC. I7th, 1948) 125

with the type of mines discovered on November 13th, 1946,
and to state how far, in your opinion, these conclusions can
be regarded as valid.

(3) Youare requested to examine the information and docu-
ments available relating to the damage suffered by the Sau-
marez and the Volage, and to the fragments of a mine found
in the Volage, with a view to ascertaining what conclusions,
if any, may be drawn regarding the types of mine which
struck these vessels, and how far these conclusions can, in
your opinion, be regarded as valid.

(4) You are requested to examine the questions whether it
is possible to draw (a) from the position of the mines swept
on November 13th, 1946 ; (8) from the fact that a complete
mine-clearance of the Albanian waters in this area had not
yet been carried out at that time ; and (c) from the passage
of the Mauritius on the 22nd October, 1946, without striking
any mine, any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions,
regarding the existence of a methodically laid minefield and
the object for which, in the light of the disposition of the
mines, they appear to have been laid.

(5) From the state of the mines swept on November 13th,
1946, can you draw any conclusions, and, if so, what conclu-
sions, as to the date on which they were moored, and, in
particular, on the question whether they were moored before
or after the 22nd October, 1946?

(6) Having regard to the replies given, by agreement
between the Parties, to the questions concerning the position
of the sun at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946, and on
the basis of the documents in the case, does the examination
of the factual circumstances concerning (a) the date, (6) the
time of day, (c) the lie of the land, (d) the conditions of
visibility, (e) the position of the objects (ships, mines, horns,
rails), (f) their form, colour and dimensions, lead you to the
conclusion that, in the circumstances in which the witness
Kovacic was situated, it was possible for him to see the load-
ing and the presence of GY mines on board two ships of the
M-class in Panikovac Cove and the rails on the ships ?

(7) You are requested to state your opinion as to

{a) the number of GY mines which a minelayer of the
M-class could load ;

(6) the time required by two ships of this class, each pos-
sessing a derrick and a steam winch, and lying approximately
in the positions indicated by the witness Kovacic, to take
their complete load of mines ; and
THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (DEC. 17th, 1948) 126

(c) whether GY mines are normally fitted with horns when
they are loaded on ships, or whether, on the contrary, they
normally have to be fitted with the horns at the time when
they are moored.

(8) On the assumption that the mines discovered on
November 13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the few
preceding months, whoever may have laid them, you are
requested to examine the information available regarding
(a) the number and the nature of the mines, (b) the means
for laying them, and (c) the time required to do so, having
regard to the different states of the sea, the conditions of the
locality, and the different weather conditions, and to ascertain
whether it is possible in that way to draw any conclusions,
and, if so, what conclusions, in regard to (1) the means
employed for laying the minefield discovered on Novem-
ber 13th, 1946, and to (ii) the possibility of mooring those
mines with those means without the Albanian authorities
being aware of it, having regard to the extent of the measures
of vigilance existing in the Saranda region.

II. The duty of giving the expert opinion shall be entrusted
to a Committee of Experts composed of Commodore J. Bull, of
the Royal Norwegian Navy, Commodore S. A. Forshell, of the
Royal Swedish Navy, and Lieutenant-Commander S. J. W. Elffe-
rich, of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

The Experts shall elect a chairman from amongst their number

III. After undertaking to serve, each Expert shall make in
Court the following declaration :

“T solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will
perform my duties in all sincerity and will abstain from divulging
or using, outside the Court, any secrets of a military or technical
nature which may come to my knowledge in the course of the
performance of my task.”

IV. The Registrar shall be responsible for the secretarial arran-
gements of the Committee of Experts. He may appoint a high
official of the Registry to perform these duties.

V. The Registrar shall place the pleadings, the documents filed
and the verbatim record of public sittings at the disposal of the
Experts.

VI. The Experts shall bear in mind that their task is not to
prepare a scientific or technical statement of the problems involved,
but to give to the Court a precise and concrete opinion upon the
points submitted to them.

VII. The Experts shall not limit themselves to stating their
findings ; they will also, as far as possible, give the reasons for these

6
THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (DEC. 17th, 1948) 127

findings in order to make their true significance apparent to the
Court. If need be, they will mention any doubts or differences
of opinion amongst them.

VIII. The Experts shall file their report in the Registry, at the
latest, on the roth of January, 1949. The report shall be com-
municated by the Registry to the Agents of the Parties.

IX. The Court reserves the right to put further questions to
the Experts if it thinks fit.

Done in French and English, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this seventeenth day of December,
nineteen hundred and forty-eight, in three copies, one of which
shall be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others handed
to the Agents of the Government of the People’s Republic of
Albania and of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,
President.

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,
Registrar,


461

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KRECA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. COMPOSITION OF THE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE
II. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE
II]. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RATIONE MATERIAE
IV. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

43

Paragraphs
1-4

5-7

8-10
11-14
462 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)
I. COMPOSITION OF THE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE

1. In the context of the conceptual difference between the interna-
tional magistrature and the internal judicial system within a State, the
institution of judge ad hoc has two basic functions:

“{a) to equalize the situation when the Bench already includes a
Member of the Court having the nationality of one of the parties;
and (4) to create a nominal equality between two litigating States
when there is no Member of the Court having the nationality of
either party” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court, 1920-1996, Vol. I, pp. 1124-1125).

In this particular case room is open for posing the question as to
whether either of these two basic functions of the institution of judge ad
hoc has been fulfilled at all.

It is possible to draw the line between two things.

The first is associated with equalization of the Parties in the part con-
cerning the relations between the Applicant and the respondent States
which have a national judge on the Bench. Jn concreto, of special interest
is the specific position of the respondent States. They appear in a dual
capacity in these proceedings:

primo, they appear individually in the proceedings considering that
each one of them is in dispute with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
and,

secondo, they are at the same time member States of NATO under
whose institutional umbrella they have undertaken the armed attack on
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Within the framework of NATO,
these respondent States are acting in corpore, as integral parts of an
organizational whole. The corpus of wills of NATO member States, when
the undertaking of military operations is in question, is constituted into a
collective will which is, formally, the will of NATO.

2. The question may be raised whether the respondent States can
qualify as parties in the same interest.

In its Order of 20 July 1931 in the case concerning the Customs Régime
between Germany and Austria, the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice established that:

“all governments which, in the proceedings before the Court, come
to the same conclusion, must be held to be in the same interest for
the purposes of the present case” (P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 41,
p. 88).

The question of qualification of the “same interest”, in the practice of
the Court, has almost uniformly been based on a formal criterion, the
criterion of “the same conclusion” to which the parties have come in the
proceedings before the Court.

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463 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

In the present case, the question of “the same conclusion” as the rele-
vant criterion for the existence of “the same interest” of the respondent
States is, in my opinion, unquestionable. The same conclusion was, in a
way, inevitable in the present case in view of the identical Application
which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has submitted against ten
NATO member States, and was formally consecrated by the outcome of
the proceedings before the Court held on 10, 11 and 12 May 1999, in
which all the respondent States came to the identical conclusion resting
on the foundation of practically identical argumentation which differed
only in the fashion and style of presentation.

Hence, the inevitable conclusion follows, it appears to me, that all the
respondent States are in concreto parties in the same interest.

3. What are the implications of this fact for the composition of the
Court in the present case? Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute says:
“Tf the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of
the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge.”

The Statute, accordingly, refers to the right of “any other party”,
namely, a party other than the party which has a judge of its nationality,
in the singular. But, it would be erroneous to draw the conclusion from
the above that “any other party”, other than the party which has a judge
of its nationality, cannot, under certain circumstances, choose several
judges ad hoc. Such an interpretation would clearly be in sharp contra-
diction with ratio legis of the institution of judge ad hoc, which, in this
particular case, consists of the function “to equalize the situation when
the Bench already includes a Member of the Court having the nationality
of one of the parties” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Interna-
tional Court, 1920-1996, Vol. Ill, pp. 1124-1125). The singular used in
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute with reference to the institution of
judges ad hac is, consequently, but individualization of the general, inher-
ent right to equalization in the composition of the Bench in the relations
between litigating parties, one of which has a judge of its nationality on
the Bench, while the other has not. The practical meaning of this principle
applied in casum would imply the right of the Applicant to choose as
many judges ad hoc to sit on the Bench as is necessary to equalize the
position of the Applicant and that of those respondent States which have
judges of their nationality on the Bench and which share the same interest.
In concreto, the inherent right to equalization in the composition of the
Bench, as an expression of fundamental rule of equality of parties, means
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should have the right to choose
five judges ad hoc, since even five out of ten respondent States (the United
States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Neth-
erlands) have their national judges sitting on the Bench.

Regarding the notion of equalization which concerns the relation
between the party entitled to choose its Judge ad hoc and the parties
which have their national judges on the Bench, the fact is that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, as can be seen from the Order, did not raise any
objections to the circumstance that as many as five respondent States

45
464 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

have judges of their nationality on the Bench. However, this circum-
stance surely cannot be looked upon as something making the question
irrelevant, or, even as the tacit consent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia to such an outright departure from the letter and spirit of
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court has, namely, the obligation to take account ex officio of the
question of such a fundamental importance, which directly derives from,
and vice versa, may directly and substantially affect, the equality of the
parties. The Court is the guardian of legality for the parties to the case,
for which presumptio juris et de jure alone is valid — to know the law
(jura novit curia). As pointed out by Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume and
Ranjeva in their joint declaration in the Lockerbie case: “that is for the
Court — not the parties — to take the necessary decision” (Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
Kingdom), I. C.J. Reports 1998, p. 36, para. 11).

A contrario, the Court would risk, in a matter which is ratio legis
proper of the Court’s existence, bringing itself into the position of a pas-
sive observer, who only takes cognizance of the arguments of the parties
and, then, proceeds to the passing of a decision.

4, The other function is associated with equalization in the part which
is concerned with the relations between the Applicant and those respon-
dent States which have no national judges on the Bench.

The respondent States having no judge of their nationality on the
Bench have chosen, in the usual procedure, their judges ad hoc (Belgium,
Canada, Italy and Spain). Only Portugal has not designated its judge ad
hoc. The Applicant successively raised objections to the appointment of
the respondent States’ judges ad hoc invoking Article 31, paragraph 5, of
the Statute of the Court. The responses of the Court with respect to this
question invariably contained the standard phrase “that the Court . ..
found that the choice of a judge ad hoc by the Respondent is justified in
the present phase of the case”.

Needless to say, the above formulation is laconic and does not offer
sufficient ground for the analysis of the Court’s legal reasoning. The only
element which is subject to the possibility of teleological interpretation
is the qualification that the choice of a judge ad hoc is “justified in the
present phase of the case”. A contrario, it is, consequently, possible that
such an appointment of a judge ad hoc would “not be justified” in some
other phases of the case. The qualification referred to above could be
interpreted as the Court’s reserve with respect to the choice of judges ad
hoc by the respondent States, a reserve which could be justifiable on
account of the impossibility for the Court to perceive the nature of their
interest — whether it is the “same” or “separate” — before the parties set
out their positions on the case.

The meanings of equalization as a ratio legis institution of judges ad
hoc, in the case concerning the Applicant and respondent States which

46
465 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

are parties in the same interest, and which do not have a judge ad hoc of
their nationality on the Bench, have been dealt with in the practice of the
Court, in a clear and unambiguous manner.

In the South West Africa case (1961) it was established that, if neither
of the parties in the same interest has a judge of its nationality among the
Members of the Court, those parties, acting in concert, will be entitled to
appoint a single judge ad hoc (South West Africa, LC.J. Reports 1961,
p. 3).

If, on the other hand, among the Members of the Court there is a judge
having the nationality of even one of those parties, then no judge ad hoc
will be appointed (Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commis-
sion of the River Oder, P.C.I1.J., Series C, No. 17-II, p. 8; Customs
Régime between Germany and Austria, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 41,
p. 88).

This perfectly coherent jurisprudence of the Court applied to this par-
ticular case means that none of the respondent States were entitled to
appoint a judge ad hoc.

Consequently, it may be said that in the present case neither of the two
basic functions of the institution of judge ad hoc has been applied in the
composition of the Court in a satisfactory way. In my opinion, it is a
question of the utmost specific weight in view of the fact that, obviously,
its meaning is not restricted to the procedure, but that it may have a far-
reaching concrete meaning.

II. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE

5. Humanitarian concern, as a basis for the indication of provisional
measures, has assumed primary importance in the more recent practice of
the Court.

Humanitarian concern has been applied on two parallel tracks in the
Court’s practice:

(a) In respect of the individual

In this regard the cases concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United
States of America) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States of America) are characteristic.

In both cases the Court evinced the highest degree of sensibility for the
humanitarian aspect of the matter, which probably found its full expres-
sion in the part of the Application submitted by Germany on 2 March
1999:

“The importance and sanctity of an individual human life are well
established in international law. As recognized by Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, every human
being has the inherent right to life and this right shall be protected

47
466 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

by law.” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, L. C.J. Reports 1999, p. 12,
para. 8).

The following day, the Court already unanimously indicated provisional
measures because it found that in question was “a matter of the greatest
urgency” (ibid., p. 15, para. 26), which makes it incumbent upon the Court
to activate the mechanism of provisional measures in accordance with Ar-
ticle 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court in order: “to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings” (ibid., p. 16, para. 29).

Almost identical provisional measures were indicated by the Court in
the dispute between Paraguay and the United States of America which
had arisen on the basis of the Application submitted by Paraguay on
3 April 1998. On the same day, Paraguay also submitted an “urgent
request for the indication of provisional measures in order to protect its
rights” (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America), Order of 9 April 1998, LC.J. Reports 1998, p. 251,
para. 6). As early as 9 April 1998 the Court unanimously indicated pro-
visional measures so as to: “ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings” (ibid., p. 258,
para. 41).

It is evident that humanitarian concern represented an aspect which
brought about unanimity in the Court’s deliberations. This is clearly
shown not only by the letter and spirit of both Orders in the above-
mentioned cases, but also by the respective declarations and the separate
opinion appended to those Orders. In the process, humanitarian consid-
erations seem to have been sufficiently forceful to put aside obstacles
standing in the way of the indication of provisional measures. In this
respect, the reasoning of the Court’s senior judge, Judge Oda, and that of
its President, Judge Schwebel, are indicative.

In paragraph 7 of his declaration appended to the Order of 3 March
1999 in the case concerning LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
America), Judge Oda convincingly put forward a series of reasons of a
conceptual nature which explained why he “formed the view that, given
the fundamental nature of provisional measures, those measures should
not have been indicated upon Germany’s request”. But, Judge Oda goes
on to “reiterate and emphasize” that he “voted in favour of the Order
solely for humanitarian reasons” (4 C.J. Reports 1999, p. 20).

President Schwebel, in his separate opinion, has not explicitly stated
humanitarian considerations as the reason that guided him in voting for
the Order; however, it is reasonable to assume that those were the only
considerations which prevailed in this particular case in view of his “pro-
found reservations about the procedures followed both by the Applicant
and the Court” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America}, Pro-
visional Measures, Order of 3 March 1999, 1 C.J. Reports 1999, p. 22).

48
467 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

As far as the Applicant is concerned:

“Germany could have brought its Application years ago, months
ago, weeks ago or days ago. Had it done so, the Court could have
proceeded as it has proceeded since 1922 and held hearings on the
request for provisional measures. But Germany waited until the eve
of execution and then brought its Application and request for pro-
visional measures, at the same time arguing that no time remained to
hear the United States and that the Court should act proprio motu.”
(1. C.J. Reports 1999, p. 22.)

The Court, for its part, indicated provisional measures, as President
Schwebel put it, “on the basis only of Germany’s Application”.

(b) In respect of a group of individuals or the population as a consti-
tutive element of the State

The protection of the citizens emerged as an issue in the case concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua ( Nica-
ragua v. United States of America):

“In its submission, Nicaragua emphasized the death and harm
that the alleged acts had caused to Nicaraguans and asked the Court
to support, by provisional measures, ‘the rights of Nicaraguan citi-
zens to life, liberty and security.” (R. Higgins, “Interim Measures
for the Protection of Human Rights”, in Politics, Values and Func-
tions, International Law in the 21st Century, 1997, Charney, Anton,

O’Connell, eds., p. 96.)

In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina FasolRepublic of Mali) case, the
Court found the source for provisional measures in:

“incidents . .. which not merely are likely to extend or aggravate the
dispute but comprise a resort to force which is irreconcilable with
the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes”
(Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986,
LC J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 19).

Humanitarian concern in this particular case was motivated by the risk
of irreparable damage:

“the facts that have given rise to the requests of both Parties for the
indication of provisional measures expose the persons and property
in the disputed area, as well as the interests of both States within
that area, to serious risk of irreparable damage” (ibid, p. 10,
para. 21).

It can be said that in the cases referred to above, in particular those in
which individuals were directly affected, the Court formed a high stand-

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468 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

ard of humanitarian concern in the proceedings for the indication of
interim measures, a standard which commanded sufficient inherent
strength to brush aside also some relevant, both procedural and material,
rules governing the institution of provisional measures. Thus, humanitar-
ian considerations, independently from the norms of international law
regulating human rights and liberties, have, in a way, gained autonomous
legal significance; they have transcended the moral and philanthropic
sphere, and entered the sphere of law.

6. In the case at hand, it seems that “humanitarian concern” has lost
the acquired autonomous legal position. This fact needs to be stressed in
view of the special circumstances of this case.

Unlike the cases referred to previously, “humanitarian concern” has as
its object the fate of an entire nation, in the literal sense. Such a conclu-
sion may be inferred from at least two elements:

— primo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its national and eth-
nic groups have been subjected for more than two months now to con-
tinued attacks of a very strong, highly organized air armada of the most
powerful States of the world. The aim of the attack is horrifying, judging
by the words of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wesley Clark, and he
ought to be believed:

“We're going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt,
degrade, devastate, and ultimately, unless President Milosevié com-
plies with the demands of the international community, we're going
to completely destroy his forces and their facilities and support.”
(BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/english/static.NATOgallery/air
default.stm/14 May 1999.)

“Support” is interpreted, in broad terms, extensively; to the point
which raises the question of the true object of the air attacks. In an
article entitled “Belgrade People Must Suffer” Michael Gordon quotes
the words of General Short that he “hopes the distress of the public will,
must undermine support for the authorities in Belgrade” (/nternational
Herald Tribune, 16 May 1999, p. 6) and he continued:

“I think no power to your refrigerator, no gas to your stove, you
can’t get to work because bridge is down — the bridge on which you
held your rock concerts and you all stood with targets on your
heads. That needs to disappear at three o’clock in the morning.”
(Ibid. )

That these are not empty words is testified to by destroyed bridges, power
plants without which there is no electricity, water supply and production

50
469 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

of foodstuffs essential for life; destroyed roads and residential blocks and
family homes; hospitals without electricity and water and, above all,
human beings who are exposed to bombing raids and who, as is rightly
stressed in the Application in the LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
America) case, have the “inherent right to life” (International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6), whose importance and sanctity are
well established in international law. In the inferno of violence, they are
but “collateral damage”.

— secundo, the arsenal used in the attacks on Yugoslavia contains also
weapons whose effects have no limitations either in space or in time. In
the oral proceedings before the Court, the Agent of the United States
explicitly stressed that depleted uranium is in standard use of the United
States Army (CR 99/24, p. 21).

The assessment of the effects of depleted uranium should be left to
science. The report by Marvin Resnikoff of Radioactive Management
Associates on NMI elaborated upon these effects:

“Once inhaled, fine uranium particles can lodge in the lung alveo-
lar and reside there for the remainder of one’s life. The dose due to
uranium inhalation is cumulative. A percentage of inhaled particu-
lates may be coughed up, then swallowed and ingested. Smoking is
an additional factor that needs to be taken into account. Since
smoking destroys the cilia, particles caught in a smoker’s bronchial
passages cannot be expelled. Gofman estimates that smoking
increases the radiation risk by a factor of 10. Uranium emits an
alpha particle, similar to a helium nucleus, with two electrons
removed. Though this type of radiation is not very penetrating, it
causes tremendous tissue damage when internalized. When inhaled,
uranium increases the probability of lung cancer. When ingested,
uranium concentrates in the bone. Within the bone, it increases the
probability of bone cancer, or, in the bone marrow, leukemia. Ura-
nium also resides in soft tissue, including the gonads, increasing the
probability of genetic health effects, including birth defects and
spontaneous abortions. The relationship between uranium ingested
and the resultant radiation doses to the bone marrow and specific
organs .. . are listed in numerous references.

The health effects are also age-specific. For the same dose, chil-
dren have a greater likelihood than adults of developing cancer.”
(Uranium Battlefields Home & Abroad: Depleted Uranium Use by
the U.S. Department of Defense, Rural Alliance for Military
Accountability er al, March 1993, pp. 47-48.)

A scientific analysis of the concrete effects of armed operations against

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470 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

Yugoslavia has been presented by Umweltbundesamt (UBA). The essen-
tials of the expertise are as follows':

[Translation by the Registry]

“The longer the war in Yugoslavia lasts, the greater the risk of
long-term damage to the environment. Such damage threatens to
extend beyond national frontiers, and it may no longer be possible
fully to make it good. The Federal Environmental Agency [Umwelt-
bundesamt (UBA)] comes to this conclusion in an internal paper
examining the ecological consequences of the war in Yugoslavia, pre-
pared for the meeting of European Environment Ministers at the
beginning of May in Weimar. Catastrophes ‘like Seveso and Sandoz’
are, in the opinion of the Agency, ‘a perfectly probable damage sce-
nario’.

' “Je länger der Krieg in Jugoslawien dauert, desto grôsser wird die Gefahr von lang-
fristigen Schädigungen der Umwelt. Diese drohen sich über die Landesgrenzen
hinaus auszubreiten und kônnen môglicherweise nicht mehr vollständig beseitigt wer-
den. Zu dieser Einschätzung kommt das Umweltbundesamt (UBA) in einem internen
Papier, das sich mit den 6ékologischen Auswirkungen des Krieges in Jugoslawien
befasst und für die Vorbereitung des Treffens europäischer Umweltminister Anfang
Mai in Weimar erstellt wurde. Katastrophen ‘wie Seveso und Sandoz’ sind nach
Ansicht des Amtes ‘ein durchaus wahrscheinliches Schadensszenario’.

Umweltgifte, die nach Zerst6rungen von Industrieanlagen austreten, kônnten sich
weiter ausbreiten. ‘Bei Sicherstellung sofortigen Handelns, das unter Kriegsbedingun-
gen aber unméglich ist, bleibt die Wirkung dieser Umweltschädigungen lokal begrenzt.
Längere Verzôgerungen führen zu einem übertritt der Schadstoffe in die Schutzgiiter
Boden, Grund- und Oberflächenwasser, erhôhen das Gefährdungspotential für den
Menschen und den Sanierungsaufwand beträchtlich.”

Diese Folgen miissen nicht auf Jugoslawien beschränkt sein. Schadstoffe aus
Grossbränden kônnten grenziiberschreitend verteilt werden. Weiter heisst es in dem
Papier: ‘Die Einleitung der Gefahrstoffe in Oberflachenwasser kann zur weitraumi-
gen Schädigung der Okosysteme führen. Die Deposition von Gefahrstoffen in Béden
kann je nach Eigenschaft der Stoffe und Béden zu langanhaltenden Versuchungen
mit weitgehenden Nutzungseinschränkungen führen.”

Die Gefahr einer ‘tiefgreifenden Zerstôrung wesentlicher Bestandteile von Trink-
wasserversorgungssystemen’ sei für mittlere und grosse Stadte sowie Ballungsgebiete
am grôssten. Schon geringe Mengen von Substanzen der petrochemischen Industrie
Kônnten ‘grosse Grundwasservorräte unbrauchbar machen’.

Wie gefährlich die freigesetzten Stoffe insgesamt sind, lässt sich nach Ansicht der
UBA-Experten nur schwer abschatzen, ‘weil durch die Zerstôrung ganzer Industrie-
komplexe Mischkontaminationen verschiedenster Schadstoffe gebildet werden’, die
noch wenig erforscht seien. Noch komplizierter sei die Beurteilung von Umwelt-
schäden durch Brande und Explosionen. ‘Hier treten bezogen auf Schadstoffinventar
und Ausbreitung weit weniger kalkulierbare, zum Teil grossflächige Umweltschadi-
gungen ein.’

Die Verbrennungsprodukte seien ‘zum Teil hoch toxisch und kanzerogen’. Je nach
klimatischen Bedingungen kônne es ‘zu einer grossflächigen Verteilung dieser Stoffe’
kommen, ‘die eine volistindige Beseitigung nahezu unmôglich macht’...

Die Wechselwirkungen der Produkte mit den eingesetzten Waffen diirften ‘véllig
unbekannt’ sein.” (TAZ, Die Tageszeitung, Berlin, 20 May 1999.)

52
471

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

Environmental toxins released by the destruction of industrial
plant could spread further. ‘If immediate action is taken, which is,
however, impossible under war conditions, the effect of this environ-
mental damage will remain restricted to local level. Longer delays
will result in toxic substances passing into the soil, groundwater and
surface water, and substantially increase the potential danger to
man, and the cost of cleansing operations.’

These consequences are not necessarily limited to Yugoslavia.
Harmful substances deriving from major conflagrations can be dif-
fused beyond frontiers. The paper continues: ‘Passage of harmful
substances into surface water can lead to extensive damage to eco-
systems. The deposition of hazardous substances in the soil can,
depending on the nature of those substances and of the soil, result in
long-term contamination, imposing far-reaching limitations upon
utilization.’

The danger of ‘extensive destruction of essential components of
drinking-water supply networks’ is biggest with regard to middle-
sized and large cities and conurbations. Even small amounts of sub-
stances from the petrochemical industry can render ‘extensive
groundwater reserves unusable’.

According to the Federal Environmental Agency experts, the over-
all risk posed by the substances released is difficult to assess, ‘because
the destruction of entire industrial complexes results in mixed con-
tamination by a wide variety of harmful substances’ — an area in
which there has as yet been little research. Even more problematic,
in the experts’ view, is the assessment of environmental damage
caused by fires and explosions. ‘Here, in terms of identification of
the harmful substances involved and the possibility of their diffu-
sion, environmental damage is far harder to predict, but will on
occasion be extensive.’

The substances produced by the fires are described as ‘in part
highly toxic and carcinogenic’. Depending on climatic conditions,
‘widespread diffusion of these substances’ could occur, ‘which would
render full cleansing almost impossible’.

The effects of the interaction of those substances with the
weapons employed were said to be ‘completely unknown’.” (TAZ,
Die Tageszeitung, Berlin, 20 May 1999.)

Therefore, it is my profound conviction, that the Court is, in concreto,
confronted with an uncontestable case of “extreme urgency” and “irrepa-
rable harm”, which perfectly coincides, and significantly transcends the

53
472 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

substance of humanitarian standards which the Court has accepted in
previous cases.

7. I must admit that I find entirely inexplicable the Court’s reluctance
to enter into serious consideration of indicating provisional measures in a
situation such as this crying out with the need to make an attempt,
regardless of possible practical effects, to at least alleviate, if not elimi-
nate, an undeniable humanitarian catastrophe. I do not have in mind
provisional measures in concrete terms as proposed by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, but provisional measures in general: be they
provisional measures proprio motu, different from those proposed by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, simply, an appeal by the President
of the Court, as was issued on so many occasions in the past, in less
difficult situations, on the basis of the spirit of Article 74, paragraph 4,
of the Rules of Court.

One, unwillingly, acquires the impression that for the Court in this par-
ticular case the indication of any provisional measures whatever has been
terra prohibita. Exempli causa, the Court, in paragraph 18 of the Order,
says that it:

“deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties appearing before it
must act in conformity with their obligations under the United
Nations Charter and other rules of international law including
humanitarian law”,

or, in paragraph 36 of the Order, that the Parties: “should take care not
to aggravate or extend the dispute”, and it is obvious that both the above
pronouncements of the Court have been designed within the model of
general, independent provisional measures.

IT. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RATIONE MATERIAE

8. Lam of the opinion that in the matter in hand the Court’s position
is strongly open to criticism.
The Court finds:

“whereas the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself
constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the
Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the
bombings which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application
‘indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required
by the provision quoted above’ (Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, LC.J. Reports 1996 (I),
p. 240, para. 26)” (Order, para. 27).

The intent is, without doubt, the subjective element of the being of the

54
473 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

crime of genocide as, indeed, of any other crime. But, this question is not
and cannot, by its nature, be the object of decision-making in the inci-
dental proceedings of the indication of provisional measures.

In this respect, a reliable proof should be sought in the dispute which,
by its salient features, is essentially identical to the dispute under consid-
eration — the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

In its Order on the indication of provisional measures of 8 April 1993,
in support of the assertion of the Respondent that, inter alia, “it does not
support or abet in any way the commission of crimes cited in the Appli-
cation . .. and that the claims presented in the Application are without
foundation” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April
1993, LC.J. Reports 1993, p. 21, para. 42), the Court stated:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on
a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41
of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as
requiring the indication of provisional measures, but cannot make
definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each
Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribu-
tion to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments
in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s deci-
sion” (ibid., p. 22, para. 44)

and

“Whereas the Court is not called upon, for the purpose of its
decision on the present request for the indication of provisional
measures, now to establish the existence of breaches of the Geno-
cide Convention” (ibid., para. 46).

The rationale of provisional measures is, consequently, limited to the
preservation of the respective rights of the parties pendente lite which are
the object of the dispute, rights which may subsequently be adjudged by
the Court. As the Court stated in the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria case:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the proceedings concerning
the indication of provisional measures, cannot make definitive find-
ings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each Party to dispute
the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribution to it of
responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments, if appropri-
ate, in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s
decision” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, LC.
Reports 1996 (1), p. 23, para. 43).

55
474 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

9. Fundamental questions arise regarding the position of the Court on
this particular matter.

The relationship between the use of armed force and genocide can be
looked upon in two ways:

(a) is the use of force per se an act of genocide or not? and,
(b) is the use of force conducive to genocide and, if the answer is in the
affirmative, what is it then, in the legal sense?

It is incontrovertible that the use of force per se et definitione does
not constitute an act of genocide. It is a matter that needs no particular
proving. However, it could not be inferred from this that the use of
force is unrelated and cannot have any relationship with the commission
of the crime of genocide. Such a conclusion would be contrary to elemen-
tary logic.

Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide defines the acts of genocide as

“any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

fe} Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

Any of these acts can be committed also by the use of force. The use of
force is, consequently, one of the possible means of committing acts of
genocide. And, it should be pointed out, one of the most efficient means,
due to the immanent characteristics of armed force.

Extensive use of armed force, in particular if it is used against objects
and means constituting conditions of normal life, can be conducive to
“inflicting on the group conditions of life” bringing about “its physical
destruction”.

Of course, it can be argued that such acts are in the function of degrad-
ing the military capacity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But such
an explanation can hardly be regarded as a serious argument. For, the
spiral of such a line of thinking may easily come to a point when, having
in mind that military power is after all comprised of people, even mass
killing of civilians can be claimed to constitute some sort of a precaution-
ary measure that should prevent the maintenance or, in case of mobiliza-
tion, the increase of military power of the State.

Of course, to be able to speak about genocide it is necessary that
there is an intent, namely, of “deliberately inflicting on the group con-

56
475 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

ditions of life” bringing about “its physical destruction in whole or in
part”.

In the incidental proceedings the Court cannot and should not concern
itself with the definitive qualification of the intent to impose upon the
group conditions in which the survival of the group is threatened. Having
in mind the purpose of provisional measures, it can be said that at this
stage of the proceedings it is sufficient to establish that, in the conditions
of intensive bombing, there is an objective risk of bringing about condi-
tions in which the survival of the group is threatened.

The Court took just such a position in the Order of 8 April 1993 on the
indication of provisional measures in the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case.

Paragraph 44 of that Order stated:

“Whereas the Court, in the context of the present proceedings on
a request for provisional measures, has in accordance with Article 41
of the Statute to consider the circumstances drawn to its attention as
requiring the indication of provisional measures, but cannot make
definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the right of each
Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge the attribu-
tion to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit arguments
in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s deci-
sion” (LC. Reports 1993, p. 22).

The question of “intent” is a highly complicated one. Although the
intent is a subjective matter, a psychological category, in contemporary
criminal legislation it is established also on the basis of objective circum-
stances. Inferences of intent to commit an act are widely incorporated in
legal systems. Exempli causa, permissive inferences as opposed to a man-
datory presumption in the jurisprudence of the United States of America
may be drawn even in a criminal case.

In any event, there appears to be a clear dispute between the Parties
regarding “intent” as the constitutive element of the crime of genocide.

The Applicant asserts that “intent” can be presumed and, on the other
hand, the Respondent maintains that “intent”, as an element of the crime
of genocide, should be clearly established as dolus specialis. Such a con-
frontation of views of the Parties concerned leads to a dispute related to
“the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention”, includ-
ing disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention.

10. At the same time, one should have in mind that whether “in cer-
tain cases, particularly that by the infliction of inhuman conditions of
life, the crime may be perpetrated by omission” (Stanislas Plawski, Etude

57
476 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

des principes fondamentaux du droit international pénal, 1972, p. 115.
Cited in United Nations doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/415 of 4 July 1978.)

Since,

“Experience provides that a state of war or a military operations
régime gives authorities a convenient pretext not to provide a popu-
lation or a group with what they need to subsist — food, medicines,
clothing, housing . . . [t will be argued that this is inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part.” (J. Y. Dautricourt, “La prévention du
génocide et ses fondements juridiques”, Etudes internationales de
psychosociologie criminelle, Nos. 14-15, 1969, pp. 22-23. Cited in
United Nations doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/415 of 4 July 1978, p. 27.)

Of the utmost importance is the fact that, in the incidental proceedings,
the Court cannot and should not concern itself with the definitive quali-
fication of the intent to impose upon the group conditions in which the
survival of the group is threatened. Having in mind the purpose of pro-
visional measures, it can be said that at this stage of the proceedings it is
sufficient to establish that, in the conditions of intensive bombing, there
is an objective risk of bring about conditions in which the survival of the
group is threatened.

IV. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES

11. In paragraph 15 of the Order the Court states:

“Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form
the background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss
of life and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia.”

The phrasing of the statement seems to me unacceptable for a number
of reasons. First, the formulation introduces dual humanitarian concern.
The Court is, it is stated, “deeply concerned”, while at the same time the
Court states “the loss of life”. So, it turns out that in the case of “all parts
of Yugoslavia” the Court technically states “the loss of life” as a fact
which does not cause “deep concern”. Furthermore, the wording of the
formulation may also be construed as meaning that Kosovo is not a part
of Yugoslavia. Namely, after emphasizing the situation in Kosovo and
Metohija, the Court uses the phrase “in all parts of Yugoslavia”. Having
in mind the factual and legal state of affairs, the appropriate wording
would be “in all other parts of Yugoslavia”. Also, particular reference to
“Kosovo” and “all parts of Yugoslavia”, in the present circumstances,
has not only no legal, but has no factual basis either. Yugoslavia, as a

58
477 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

whole, is the object of attack. Human suffering and loss of life are, un-
fortunately, a fact, generally applicable to the country as a whole; so, the
Court, even if it had at its disposal the accurate data on the number of
victims and the scale of suffering of the people of Yugoslavia, it would
still have no moral right to discriminate between them. Further, the
qualification that “human tragedy and the enormous suffering in Kosovo
... form the background of the present dispute” not only is political, by
its nature, but has, or may have, an overtone of justification of the armed
attack on Yugoslavia. Suffice it to recall the fact that the respondent
State refers to its armed action as humanitarian intervention.

It is up to the Court to establish, at a later stage of the proceedings, the
real legal state of affairs, namely, the relevant facts. At the present stage,
the question of the underlying reasons for the armed attack on the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia is the object of political allegations. While
the Respondent argues that what is involved is a humanitarian interven-
tion provoked by the “human tragedy and the enormous suffering”, the
Applicant finds that sedes materiae the underlying reasons are to be
sought elsewhere — in the support to the terrorist organization in
Kosovo and in the political aim of secession of Kosovo and Metohija
from Yugoslavia.

Consequently, we are dealing here with opposed political qualifications
in which the Court should not, and, in my view, must not, enter except in
the regular court proceedings.

12. The formulation of paragraph 37 of the Order leaves the impres-
sion that the Court is elegantly attempting to drop the ball in the Security
Council’s court. Essentially, it is superfluous because, as it stands now, it
only paraphrases a basic fact that “the Security Council has special
responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter”. It can be interpreted,
it is true, also as an appeal to the United Nations organ, specifically
entrusted with the duty and designed to take measures in case of threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; but, in that case the
Court would need to stress also another basic fact — that a legal dispute
should be referred to the International Court of Justice on the basis of
Article 36, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter.

13. The Court, by using the term “Kosovo” instead of the official
name of “Kosovo and Metohija”, continued to follow the practice of the
political organs of the United Nations, which, by the way, was also
strictly followed by the respondent States.

It is hard to find a justifiable reason for such a practice. Except of
course if we assume political opportuneness and involved practical, politi-
cal interests to be a justified reason for this practice. This is eloquently

59
478 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

shown also by the practice of the designation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. After the succession of the former Yugoslav federal units,
the organs of the United Nations, and the respondent States themselves,
have used the term Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, since
22 November 1995, the Security Council uses in its resolutions 1021 and
1022 the term “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” instead of the former
“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)” without any
express decision and in a legally unchanged situation in relation to the
one in which it, like other organs of the United Nations, employed the
term “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. The
fact that this change in the practice of the Security Council appeared on
the day following the initialling of the Peace Agreement in Dayton gives
a strong basis for the conclusion that the concrete practice is not based
on objective, legal criteria but rather on political criteria.

By using the word “Kosovo” instead of the name “Kosovo and Meto-
hija”, the Court, in fact, is doing two things:

(a} it gives in to the colloquial use of the names of territorial units of an
independent State; and

(6) it ignores the official name of Serbia’s southern province, a name
embodied both in the constitutional and legal acts of Serbia and
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it runs
contrary to the established practice in appropriate international orga-
nizations. Exempli causa, the official designation of the southern
Serbian province “Kosovo and Metohija” has been used in the
Agreement concluded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (/nter-
national Legal Materials, 1999, Vol. 38, p. 24).

Even if such a practice — which, in my opinion, is completely inappro-
priate not only in terms of the law but also in terms of proper usage —
could be understood when resorted to by entities placing interest and
expediency above the law, it is inexplicable in the case of a judicial organ.

14. A certain confusion is also created by the term “humanitarian law”
referred to in paragraphs 18 and 35 of the Order. The reasons for the
confusion are dual: on the one hand, the Court has not shown great con-
sistency in using this term. In the Genocide case the Court qualified the
Genocide Convention as a part of humanitarian law, although it is obvi-
ous that, by its nature, the Genocide Convention falls within the field of
international criminal law (see dissenting opinion of Judge Kreéa, in the
case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, 1.C.J.
Reports 1996 (11), pp. 774-775, para. 108).

On the other hand, it seems that in this Order the term “humanitarian
law” has been used with a different meaning, more appropriate to the

60
479 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. KRECA)

generally accepted terminology. The relevant passage in the Order should
be mentioned precisely because of the wording of its paragraphs 18 and
35. The singling out of humanitarian law from the rules of international
law which the Parties are bound to respect may imply low-key and timid
overtones of vindication or at least of diminishment of the legal implica-
tions of the armed attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Humanitarian law, in its legal, original meaning implies the rules of jus
in bello. If, by stressing the need to respect the rules of humanitarian law,
which I do not doubt, the Court was guided by humanitarian considera-
tions, then it should have stressed expressis verbis also the fundamental
importance of the rule contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Char-
ter, which constitutes a dividing line between non-legal, primitive inter-
national society and an organized, de jure, international community.

(Signed) Milenko KRECA.

61


21

SEPARATE OPINION OF PRESIDENT SCHWEBEL

The issuance of today’s Order indicating provisional measures is un-
precedented. It is to be hoped that it will not form a precedent, for it
departs in critical measure from a basic rule of the judicial process. The
Order has been issued on the basis of one party’s views, without hearing
the other. It is unprecedented in a further respect as well, for it is the first
case in which the Court has issued an Order on its own motion, pursuant
to Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court providing that:

“1. The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of pro-
visional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any
or all of the parties.”

Whether the Court has acted in correct application of that Rule is open
to question. The Rule assumes that the Court may act on its own motion
where a party has not made a request for the indication of provisional
measures. But the Court’s consideration of the matter in this case has
only been provoked by Germany’s Application and its request for provi-
sional measures. Article 74 of the Rules provides that, where a party
makes such a request, the Court shall arrange “a hearing which will
afford the parties an opportunity of being represented at it”. No such
hearings have been held, arranged or contemplated in the current case.

Under Article 75, paragraph |, the Court may issue an order of provi-
sional measures without giving the parties the opportunity to be heard.
That is an extraordinary power, to be exercised with the utmost caution.
There may be room to question whether sovereign States should be sub-
jected to the Court’s restraints pendente lite without giving them the
opportunity to be heard. But if in extreme circumstances they are to be so
subject, then the Court should act in meticulous conformity with its
Rules. Its Rules do not contemplate it so acting where a party has — as
Germany here — made a request for the indication of provisional
measures.

Moreover, the Court has done so on the basis only of Germany’s
Application. It has no other pleading, no other basis for the indication of
provisional measures, before it. Is proceeding in this way consistent with
fundamental rules of the procedural equality of the parties?

My doubts are confirmed by a reading of the most authoritative work
in the field, Jerzy Sztucki’s Interim Measures in The Hague Court (1983).

16
22 LAGRAND (SEP. OP. SCHWEBEL)

Professor Sztucki concludes that the Court may indicate provisional
measures proprio motu “without any request for interim measures”. He
adds that only such a case “qualifies as an action proprio motu in the
meaning of Article 75 (1) of the present Rules”, and he reaches that con-
clusion after a careful examination of prior versions of the Rules of
Court and the pertinent travaux préparatoires of all versions (at
page 158.) But in this case, the Court has had such a request, and it is on
the basis of the contents of Germany’s accompanying Application that
the Court has acted — all without affording the United States a hearing
or the opportunity to present written observations.

Germany could have brought its Application years ago, months ago,
weeks ago, or days ago. Had it done so, the Court could have proceeded
as it has proceeded since 1922 and held hearings on the request for pro-
visional measures. But Germany waited until the eve of execution and
then brought its Application and request for provisional measures, at the
same time arguing that no time remained to hear the United States and
that the Court should act proprio motu.

I do not oppose the substance of the Court’s Order, and accordingly
have not voted against it. I have profound reservations about the pro-
cedures followed both by the Applicant and the Court.

(Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL.

17


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)

ORDER OF 7 NOVEMBER 2002

2002

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DES ACTIVITES ARMEES
SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO

(REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

ORDONNANCE DU 7 NOVEMBRE 2002
Official citation:

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Order of 7 November 2002, I. C.J. Reports 2002, p. 604

Mode officiel de citation:

Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo
(République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda),
ordonnance du 7 novembre 2002, C.LJ. Recueil 2002, p. 604

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N° de vente: 853
ISBN 92-1-070959-4

7 NOVEMBER 2002

ORDER

ARMED ACTIVITIES
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ». UGANDA)

ACTIVITES ARMEES
SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO

(REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

7 NOVEMBRE 2002

ORDONNANCE
604

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2002 2002
7 novembre
Rôle général

7 novembre 2002 n° 116

AFFAIRE DES ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES
SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. GUILLAUME, président; M. Sul, vice-président; MM. RAn-
JEVA, HERCZEGH, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
M”™* Hiccins, MM. PARRA-ARANGUREN, K.OOLIMANS, REZEK, AL-
KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL, ELARABY, juges; M. COUVREUR,

greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et le paragraphe 3 de l’article 44 de
son Règlement,

Vu l’ordonnance du 29 novembre 2001, par laquelle la Cour s’est pro-
noncée sur la recevabilité des demandes reconventionnelles présentées par
la République de l’Ouganda dans son contre-mémoire, a prescrit la pré-
sentation d'une réplique de la République démocratique du Congo et
d’une duplique de la République de |’Ouganda portant sur les demandes
des deux Parties dans l’instance en cours, et a fixé, respectivement, au
29 mai 2002 et au 29 novembre 2002 les dates d'expiration des délais pour
le dépôt de ces pièces de procédure,

Vu la réplique de la République démocratique du Congo, déposée dans
le délai ainsi fixé;
ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (ORDONNANCE 7 XI 02) 605

Considérant que, par deux lettres datées du 21 octobre 2002 et reçues
au Greffe le même jour par télécopie, l’agent de la République de
POuganda a prié la Cour de proroger de sept jours le délai pour le dépôt
de la duplique et a indiqué les raisons à l’appui de cette demande; et
considérant que, dès réception de ces lettres, le greffier adjoint, se référant
au paragraphe 3 de l’article 44 du Règlement, en a fait tenir copie à
l'agent de la République démocratique du Congo;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du 29 octobre 2002 et reçue au Greffe
le 30 octobre 2002, l’agent de la République démocratique du Congo a
indiqué que son Gouvernement ne faisait pas objection à la prorogation
de délai demandée par la République de l'Ouganda;

Compte tenu des raisons invoquées par la République de l’Ouganda et
de l’accord des Parties,

Reporte au 6 décembre 2002 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt
de la duplique de la République de ’Ouganda;
Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le sept novembre deux mille deux, en trois exemplaires,
dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République démocra-
tique du Congo et au Gouvernement de la République de ’Ouganda.

Le président,
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.


1933.

II mai.
Rôle général
nos 52 et 53.

157

COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE

ORDONNANCE RENDUE LE ir MAI 1933

VINGT-HUITIÈME SESSION (EXTRAORDINAIRE)

11 mai 1933.

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU STATUT
JURIDIQUE DU TERRITOIRE DU SUD-EST
=. DU GROENLAND

Présents : MM. ADATCI, Président ; GUERRERO, Vice-Président ; le
baron Ro in-JAEQUEMYNS, le comte RosTwoROwSsKI,
MM. FROMAGEOT, ANZILOTTI, URRUTIA, sir CECIL HURST,
MM. SCHÜCKING, NEGULESCO, Jhr. van EYsINGA,
M. WANG, juges.

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale,

ainsi composée,
après délibéré en Chambre du Conseil,

Rend Vordonnance suivante:

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour;

Vu l’article 61 du Règlement de la Cour;

Vu d'une part la requête déposée le 18 juillet 1932 au
Greffe de la Cour, par le chargé d'affaires de Norvège à
La Haye, et introduisant au nom du Gouvernement norvégien
contre le Gouvernement danois une instance relative au statut
juridique de certaines parties du territoire sud-est du Groën-
land ; . ee

Considérant que ladite requête indique comme il suit l’objet
du différend : « Par décret royal du 12 juillet 1932, le Gouver-
nement royal de Norvège a soumis à la souveraineté de la

4 .
158 TERRITOIRE DU SUD-EST DU GROENLAND

Norvège le territoire sud-est du Groënland situé entre 63° 40’
et 60° 30’ de latitude nord »;

Vu, d'autre part, la requête déposée le même jour, 18 juillet
1932, au Greffe de la Cour, par le ministre de Danemark à
La Haye, et introduisant, de son côté, une instance au nom
. du Gouvernement danois contre le Gouvernement norvégien
relativement au statut juridique des mêmes parties du Groën-
land du Sud-Est ;

Considérant que ladite requête indique comme suit l'objet
du différend: « Par une proclamation royale du 12 de ce mois
[juillet 1932], le Gouvernement norvégien a déclaré avoir procédé
-à Poccupation du territoire entre 63° 40’ et 60° 30’ de latitude
nord sur la côte orientale du Groënland, territoire soumis à
la souveraineté de la Couronne danoise » ;

Vu l'ordonnance du 2 août 1932, par laquelle la Cour a
joint les deux instances;

Vu l'ordonnance du 24 mars 1933, par laquelle la Cour
a, conformément à un accord intervenu entre les Parties et
après plusieurs prorogations successives, fixé en dernier lieu
les délais pour la présentation des mémoires et contre-mémoires
dans les deux instances au rer juin et 15 juillet 1933, date
à laquelle lesdites affaires seraient en état;

Considérant que, par lettre du 18 avril 1933, l'agent du
Gouvernement norvégien, chargé d’affaires 4.1. de Norvège à
La Haye, a fait savoir à la Cour que, par décret royal du
7 avril 1933, ledit Gouvernement avait révoqué la proclama-
tion royale du 12 juillet 1932, par laquelle certaines parties
du Groénland du Sud-Est avaient été déclarées soumises à
la souveraineté de la Norvège, et que, dans ces conditions, il
retirait sa requête introductive d'instance du 18 juillet 1932,
relative au statut juridique desdits territoires ;

Considérant que, par lettre du 18 avril 1933, l'agent du
Gouvernement danois, ministre de Danemark à La Haye,
a de son côté fait savoir à la Cour que, le Gouvernement
royal de Norvège ayant, à la date du 12 avril 1033, notifié
au Gouvernement royal de Danemark le retrait de « sa décla-
ration d'occupation de certains territoires du sud-est du Groén-
land promulguée en date du 12 juillet 1932 », le Gouvernement
danois, se référant à l’article 61 du Règlement de la Cour,
retirait sa requête introductive d'instance en date du 18 juillet

1932 ;
PAR CES MOTIFS,

La Cour,

| Prenant acte des déclarations, en date du 18 avril 1933,
du Gouvernement royal de Norvège et du Gouvernement

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159 TERRITOIRE DU SUD-EST DU GROËNLAND

royal de Danemark portant respectivement désistement de
leurs requêtes introductives d’instances du 1x8 juillet 1932,

Déclare close la procédure relative au statut juridique
de la partie du territoire sud-est du Groénland objet des
requêtes norvégienne et danoise du 18 juillet 1932;

Dit que lesdites affaires seront rayées du rôle de la Cour.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi,
au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le onze mai mil neuf cent
trente-trois, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé
aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis
respectivement au Gouvernement royal de Norvège et au
Gouvernement royal de Danemark.

Le Président de la Cour:
(Signé) M. ADATCI.

Le Greffier de la Cour:
(Signé) A. HamMMaRSKJOLD.


OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. PETREN

Ayant voté contre l’adoption de l’ordonnance, je dois y joindre une
opinion dissidente.

Vu l'identité des demandes et conclusions ainsi que la coïncidence
des circonstances de fait et de droit en la présente affaire et en l'affaire des
Essais nucléaires ( Australie c. France), j'ai été d’avis que les deux affaires
auraient dû être jointes dès le stade actuel de la procédure. La Cour ayant
rejeté cette proposition, il ne me reste qu’à exprimer ici la même opinion
qu'en l’autre affaire.

Je ne saurais me rallier à l’opinion de la majorité ni en ce qui concerne
le renvoi des questions de la compétence de la Cour et de la recevabilité de
la requête à un stade ultérieur de la procédure, ni en ce qui concerne
l'indication de mesures conservatoires.

A mon avis, le cadre commun dans lequel s’inscrivent les questions de
la compétence de la Cour et de la recevabilité de la requête, ainsi que la
question de l’indication de mesures conservatoires, se présente comme
suit.

Avant d’entreprendre l’examen du fond d’une affaire, la Cour a, com-
me toute autre juridiction, le devoir de vérifier dans la mesure du possible
sa propre compétence et la recevabilité de la requête. Que l'Etat contre
lequel une requête est dirigée fasse défaut n’y change rien. Au contraire,
l’article 53 du Statut oblige la Cour à s’assurer de sa compétence et de la
recevabilité de la requête sur la base des éléments à sa portée. Parmi ceux-
ci se trouvent en la présente affaire les arguments avancés par la France
dans la lettre remise par son ambassadeur et par la Nouvelle-Zélande dans
sa requête et dans ses plaidoiries des 24-25 mai 1973. La Cour a cependant
le devoir de porter aussi son attention sur tous autres éléments qu’elle
pourrait trouver pertinents. Que la Nouvelle-Zélande ait demandé des
mesures conservatoires ne dispense pas la Cour de l’obligation d'examiner
d’abord les questions de sa compétence et de la recevabilité de la requête
et est même de nature à la rendre plus urgente.

Pour que la Cour puisse se considérer comme compétente quant au
fond de l’affaire, il faudrait, à mes yeux, qu’elle approuve au moins l’une
des trois thèses suivantes susceptibles d’étayer la requête du Gouverne-
ment de la Nouvelle-Zélande:

1) la réserve faite par la France lors du renouvellement en 1966 de son
acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour, réserve qui se réfère aux

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160 ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (OP. DISS. PETRÉN)

activités se rapportant à la défense nationale de la France, n'est pas
valable:

2) les essais nucléaires envisagés dans la requête de la Nouvelle-Zélande
ne se rapportent pas à la défense nationale de la France;

3) l’Acte général de 1928 est resté en vigueur entre les Etats parties à cet
acte en 1944, ce qui a pour conséquence que les réserves faites par de
tels Etats en acceptant après 1945 la juridiction de la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice ne sont d’aucun effet dans leurs relations entre eux.

Les questions qui se posent ainsi à la Cour ne touchent pas au fond de
l'affaire. Elles se situent dans un contexte général de droit international et,
à mes yeux, la Cour n’aurait pas eu besoin de nouvelles explications du
Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande pour les résoudre et elle aurait
pu et dû les trancher sur la base des éléments dont elle dispose.

A ce sujet, il y a lieu de signaler que la question de compétence met en
cause la mesure dans laquelle l’Acte général de 1928 a pu survivre a la
disparition de la Société des Nations et de ses organes ainsi que l'effet
éventuel d’une telle survie sur les réserves faites par les Etats parties
à l’Acte en acceptant la juridiction de la Cour actuelle. Or Particle 63 du
Statut exigeait que ces Etats fussent avertis sans délai que pareilles ques-
tions étaient soumises à la Cour en la présente affaire. S’ils en avaient été
avertis, ils auraient déjà eu l’occasion de manifester leur étonnement,
leur satisfaction ou leur indifférence devant la thèse du Gouvernement de
la Nouvelle-Zélande évoquée sous 3 ci-dessus. Mais le fait que la notifica-
tion requise n’ait pas encore été faite ne justifie pas que la Cour invite
aujourd’hui le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande à présenter, à un
stade ultérieur de la procédure, un nouvel exposé sur la question de com-
pétence.

Je suis donc d’avis que la Cour n’aurait pas dû ouvrir à cette fin une
nouvelle phase de l’affaire mais qu’elle aurait au contraire dû demander
au Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande d’achever son argumentation à
cet égard au stade actuel de l'affaire.

Comme la Cour a maintenant différé sa décision sur la question de
compétence, je ne saurais indiquer déjà ici comment j'apprécie les diffé-
rents éléments se rapportant à son examen.

Néanmoins, la demande du Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande en
indication de mesures conservatoires m’oblige à examiner si les conditions
pour que la Cour puisse indiquer de telles mesures sont remplies.

Parmi ces conditions, il en est qui se rapportent à la question de compé-
tence. À ce sujet, le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande s’est référé,
entre autres éléments, aux ordonnances rendues par la Cour le 17 août
1972 dans les deux affaires relatives à la Compétence en matière de pêche-
ries. Dans chacune de ces ordonnances, la Cour a considéré que, lorsqu’-
elle est saisie d’une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires,
elle n’a pas besoin, avant d'indiquer ces mesures, de s’assurer de manière
concluante de sa compétence quant au fond de l’affaire, mais qu’elle ne

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161 ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES (OP. DISS. PETREN)

doit cependant pas appliquer l’article 41 de son Statut lorsque son incom-
pétence est manifeste.

Le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande a voulu tirer de ce considé-
rant la conclusion que c’est seulement quand l’incompétence de la Cour
est manifeste qu’elle ne doit pas appliquer l’article 41 du Statut. Pareille
interprétation ne saurait être acceptée. Le considérant fait simplement
allusion à deux situations extrêmes: l’une dans laquelle la compétence de
la Cour est établie de manière concluante et l’autre dans laquelle son in-
compétence est manifeste. I] dit que l'existence de la première situation
n’est pas une condition nécessaire pour que la Cour puisse indiquer des
mesures conservatoires et que, dans la seconde situation, elle ne doit pas
en indiquer, constatation qui va de soi et ne prête pas à conclusions plus
vastes. Le considérant ne dit pas selon quels critères il faut, dans la zone
s'étendant entre la compétence établie de manière concluante et l’incom-
pétence manifeste, tracer la limite entre les situations qui permettent l'appli-
cation de l'article 41 et celles qui ne le permettent pas. Ce n’est que dans
un considérant ultérieur, également commun aux deux ordonnances
précitées, que l’on trouve une réponse à cette question. La Cour y indique
qu'elle considère qu’une disposition dans un certain instrument émanant
des Parties se présente comme constituant prima facie une base sur laquel-
le la compétence de la Cour pourrait être fondée.

En la présente affaire, il ressort du paragraphe 14 de l’ordonnance que
la Cour s’est inspirée de ce précédent, car elle y exprime l’opinion qu’elle
ne doit pas indiquer de mesures conservatoires si les dispositions invo-
quées par le demandeur ne se présentent pas comme constituant prima
facie une base sur laquelle la compétence de la Cour pourrait être fondée.
Je peux me rallier à cette formule qui, à mes yeux, signifie qu'il ne suffit
pas, pour l’applicabilité de l’article 41 du Statut, qu’un simple commen-
cement de preuve, envisagé isolément, indique la possibilité de la compé-
tence de la Cour, mais qu’il faut une probabilité résultant d’un examen de
l’ensemble des éléments dont dispose la Cour.

Force m’a donc été de procéder à un tel examen. Le résultat en a été
que je ne trouve pas probable que les trois thèses mentionnées plus haut
ou l’une quelconque d’entre elles puissent fournir une base sur laquelle
fonder la compétence de la Cour. Pour la raison déjà indiquée, je me vois
empêché de développer au présent stade de la procédure les appréciations
m’ayant conduit à cette conclusion, qui m’interdit de voter en faveur de
Vindication de mesures conservatoires.

A côté de la question de la compétence de la Cour se pose celle de la
recevabilité de la requête de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Sous ce terme j'entends
Pexamen de toutes questions qui se posent pour décider si la Cour a été
valablement saisie de l’affaire. Dans cette optique il y a cependant avant
tout lieu de se demander si, d’une manière générale, les essais atmosphéri-
ques d’armes nucléaires sont déjà régis par des normes de droit inter-
national, ou s’ils n’appartiennent pas à un domaine hautement politique
où les normes concernant leur légalité ou illégalité internationale sont
encore en gestation.

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162 ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (OP. DISS. PETRÉN)

Certes l'existence des armes nucléaires et les essais servant à les per-
fectionner et à les multiplier occupent une place de premier plan parmi
les hantises actuelles du genre humain. Conjurer leur spectre relève cepen-
dant en premier lieu des forces politiques. Il faut espérer que celles-ci
réussiront un jour à établir un état de choses à la fois politique et juridi-
que qui mettra l’humanité tout entière à l’abri de l’angoisse créée par les
armements nucléaires. Entre-temps, se pose la question de savoir si le
moment est déjà venu où une juridiction internationale est le destinataire
approprié d’une requête telle que celle qui a été dirigée en la présente
affaire contre l’une seulement des puissances nucléaires actuelles.

L’ordonnance renvoie la question de la recevabilité de la requête,
comme celle de la compétence de la Cour, à un stade ultérieur de la pro-
cédure. Je ne saurais me rallier à cette décision, car je pense que la Cour
aurait pu et dû régler pendant sa présente session l’ensemble des questions
préliminaires et urgentes qui se posent en l'espèce et sur lesquelles il
incombe à la Cour de prendre position proprio motu.

Pour ne pas anticiper sur mon vote éventuel dans la nouvelle phase de
l'affaire, je crois devoir ne rien dire de plus sur la question de la receva-
bilité de la requête. Je ne trouve d’ailleurs pas nécessaire de répondre à
la question de savoir s’il apparaît comme probable que la requête soit
recevable, ce qui représente l’une des conditions pour que la Cour puisse
franchir le seuil de l’article 41 de son Statut et indiquer des mesures con-
servatoires. Ayant déjà trouvé l’article 41 inapplicable dans le cas d’es-
pèce, à cause de l’improbabilité de ce que la France puisse, malgré la
réserve qu’elle a faite à son acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour,
être tenue pour justiciable en cette affaire, je n’ai pas besoin de me pro-
noncer sur d’autres aspects de la question de l’applicabilité de l’article 41.

{ Signé) S. PETRÉN.

31