85

DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ODA.
[Translation.]

Since the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is not the rule and
since Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate constitutes an exceptional
clause creating such jurisdiction, that article cannot be interpreted
extensively.

According to Article 26, in order that a dispute may be submitted .
to the Court, the following conditions must be fulfilled : (x) it must
be a dispute between a Member of the League of Nations and the
Mandatory ; (2) it must be incapable of settlement by negotiation ;
and (3) it must relate to the interpretation or the application of
the terms of the Mandate.

Of these three conditions, the two first are matters of form and
the last of substance.

On the facts as set out by the Parties, it is very difficult definitely
to state that the formal conditions have been fulfilled. The
dispute, in the first place, was only between the Colonial Office and
a private person, and after the intervention of the Greek Govern-
ment to protect this person, there was only a single exchange of
views between the Foreign Office and the Greek Legation in London.
Even assuming the formal conditions to be fulfilled, the condition
of substance is entirely lacking. The dispute, which relates to the
validity of certain concessions and to the vindication of certain
rights which, in the contention of the concessionnaire, have been
prejudiced, has nothing whatever to do with either the interpre-
tation or the application of the terms of the Mandate.

The history of the preparation of Article rx of the Mandate shows
that for unavoidable reasons the present reservation was substituted
for that contained in the original draft which ran “subject. to
Article 311 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey” ; it is therefore
perfectly reasonable to regard the present version as possessing the
samé scope—neither more not less—as the original one. Assuming
this to be correct, there is no doubt that the international obli-
gations accepted by Great Britain, referred to in the present version,
are those arising out of the special provisions of a convention—
such as the Protocol of Lausanne in the present case—and that
they are entirely unconnected with the legal relationship created
by the Mandate.
JUDGMENT No. 2. — DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ODA 86

The position as Mandatory has no bearing on the conclusions to
be drawn from the Protocol, since the relations created by the
Mandate, which exist as between the League of Nations and Great
Britain only, are not ifso facto applicable as between the Powers
signatory to the Protocol. The word “Mandatory” in the reserva-
tion made in Article rz is merely used for the sake of convenience
in order to keep to the terminology used in other articles of the
Mandate. Thelegal relationship resulting from the Mandate, which
only exists as between Members of the League of Nations, must be
distinguished from the obligations arising out of the principle of State
succession, which may be binding on all States throughout the world,
including Members of the League of Nations, quite apart from the
obligations arising under the Mandate. It must also beremembered
that the Mandatory has to assume certain special and burdensome
obligations over and above those arising out of his position as
successor State, and that consequently these obligations of the
Mandatory do not in any respect extend beyond the limits fixed
by the Mandate.

Considered in this light the Protocol of Lausanne is neither a
special statute nor a set of rules to be regarded as the complement
of the Mandate. Its provisions are entirely distinct and cannot
in any sense form part of the terms of the Mandate. It follows
therefore that the dispute regarding the concessions granted under
the Ottoman Empire has nothing to do either with the interpreta-
tion or the application of the terms of the Mandate and is not
byi ts nature within the Court’s jurisdiction.

Since the Mandate establishes a special legal relationship, it is
natural that the League of Nations, which issued the Mandate,
should have rights of supervision as regards the Mandatory.
Under the Mandate, in addition to the direct supervision of the
Council of the League of Nations (Articles 24 and 25) provision is
made for indirect supervision by the Court ; but the latter may only
be exercised at the request of a Member of the League of Nations
(Article 26). It is therefore to be supposed that an application
by such a Member must be made exclusively with a view to the
protection of general interests and that it is not admissible for a
State simply to substitute itself for a private person in order to
assert his private claims. That this is the case is clearly shown by
a reference to Article 13 of the Mandate for East Africa, in which
Members of the League of Nations are specially authorized to bring
JUDGMENT No. 2. — DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ODA 87

claims on behalf of their nationals. It is impossible to ascertain
why this special provision was only inserted in the East African
Mandate ; but, as it appears that in all the drafts of ‘“B’’ Mandates
the same provision was inserted, but deleted in the final documents,
except in the case of the Mandate for East Africa, it is at all events
‘clear that it was intended to establish a difference between “‘B”
and “A” Mandates to which latter category the Palestine Mandate
belongs. The logical conclusion is that an action in support of
private interests is excluded under Article 26 of the Mandate now
in question, and that, precisely from this standpoint, the Court has
no jurisdiction in the case of the Mavrommatis concessions.

(Signed) Y. ODA.


762

            SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BHANDARI

   Concur with the conclusions of the majority — Existence of a dispute is central
to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction — On the basis of documents and
pleadings of the Parties, no dispute existed — ICJ lacks jurisdiction — Greater
emphasis ought to have been given that no dispute existed and lesser on the
Respondent’s awareness — Other preliminary objections ought to have been
adjudicated in the facts of this case — Monetary Gold principle — The Applicant
lacks standing to bring this case — The Judgment would amount to an advisory
opinion.

   1. I concur with the conclusions of the majority Judgment upholding
the objection to jurisdiction raised by Pakistan based on the absence of a
dispute. However, I wish to append a separate opinion to expand the
basis of the reasoning of the Judgment. I also propose to deal with
another aspect of this case, that in the facts of this case, the Court ought
to have dealt with the other preliminary objections raised by Pakistan
because the issues raised in the case aﬀect not only the Parties, but also
the entire humanity. Additionally, adjudicating these objections would
have further crystallized the controversy involved in the case, particularly
when all documents, pleadings and submissions were placed on record
in extenso.

   2. The question, which needs to be decided, is whether from the docu-
ments, pleadings and the conduct of the Parties it can be established that
a dispute existed between them at the time of ﬁling the Application in the
terms prescribed by the applicable legal instruments and the Court’s juris-
prudence.
   3. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, and Article 38, paragraph 1, of the
Statute of the Court, it can only exercise its jurisdiction in case of a dis-
pute between the parties. The concept of “dispute”, and more speciﬁcally
“legal dispute”, is thus central to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction.
The majority Judgment acknowledges this and reﬂects on certain key
aspects from the Court’s jurisprudence on this concept.

   4. Any analysis of the existence of a dispute should start with a deﬁni-
tion of the term “dispute”. Black’s Law Dictionary oﬀers the following
deﬁnitions, which may help in guiding the analysis:

         “Dispute: A conﬂict or controversy; a conﬂict of claims or rights;
      an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary
      claims or allegations on the other.”

214

763       nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

         “Legal dispute: Contest / conﬂict / disagreement concerning lawful
      existence of (1) a duty or right, or (2) compensation by extent or type,
      claimed by the injured party for a breach of such duty or right.”

   5. In Georgia v. Russian Federation, in determining whether a legal dis-
pute existed between the Parties at the time of the ﬁling of the Applica-
tion, the Court undertook a detailed review of the relevant diplomatic
exchanges, documents and statements. The Court carried out an extensive
analysis of the evidence, covering numerous instances of oﬃcial Georgian
and Russian practice from 1992 to 2008. The Court found that most of
the documents and statements before it failed to evidence the existence of
a dispute, because they did not contain any “direct criticism” against the
Respondent, did not amount to an “allegation” against the Respondent
or were not otherwise of a character that was suﬃcient to found a justi-
ciable dispute between the Parties, and in this case the Court also held
that it is a matter of substance and not a question of form or procedure
(Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), pp. 84-91,
paras. 30-46).

  6. In Belgium v. Senegal, the Court similarly carried out a systematic
review of the diplomatic exchanges that had preceded the ﬁling of the
Application in order to ascertain if the dispute had been properly notiﬁed
to Senegal. The Court, in that case, concluded that at the time of the ﬁl-
ing of the Application, the dispute between the parties did not relate to
breaches of obligation under customary international law and that it had
thus no jurisdiction to decide Belgium’s claims (Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 433-435, paras. 24-26).

   7. In another important case, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the
Court considered that a dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or
fact, a conﬂict of legal views or of interests” between parties (Mavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 2, p. 11). In the South West Africa cases, the Court laid down the
criterion for the existence of a dispute, which is that the claim of one
party be positively opposed by the other (South West Africa (Ethiopia v.
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328).

   8. On application of the Court’s Statute and its jurisprudence to the
documents and pleadings placed before the Court, the irresistible conclu-
sion is the absence of any dispute between the Parties, and consequently,
on the facts of this case, the Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with this case.

215

764       nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

   9. The majority Judgment, instead of looking into these aspects closely,
chose to focus mainly on the lack of awareness of the Respondent of the
impending dispute. The Judgment considers that “a dispute exists when it
is demonstrated, on the basis of the evidence, that the respondent was
aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were ‘positively
opposed’ by the applicant” (Judgment, para. 38).

   10. The Court has the freedom to choose any preliminary objection
when examining its own jurisdiction. In doing so, it usually chooses the
most “direct and conclusive one”. Christian Tomuschat summarized the
situation in clear terms in his contribution on Article 36 to the handbook
The Statute of the International Court of Justice — A Commentary (Sec-
ond Edition). He stated:
         “The Court is free to choose the grounds on which to dismiss a case
      either for lack of jurisdiction or as being inadmissible. It does not have
      to follow a speciﬁc order, nor is there any rule making it compulsory to
      adjudge ﬁrst issues of jurisdiction before relying on lack of admissibility.
      The Court generally bases its decisions on the ground which in its view
      is ‘more direct and conclusive’. In pure legal logic, it would seem ines-
      capable that the Court would have to rule by order of priority on objec-
      tions related to jurisdiction. However, such a strict procedural regime
      would be all the more infelicitous since the borderline between the two
      classes of preliminary objections is to some extent dependent on subjec-
      tive appreciation. The Court therefore chooses the ground which is best
      suited to dispose of the case (‘direct and conclusive’).” 1
   11. This freedom of the Court was ﬁrst stated in the Certain Norwe-
gian Loans (France v. Norway) case, where the Court considered that its
jurisdiction was being challenged on two grounds, and that the Court is
free to base its decision on the ground which in its judgment is more
direct and conclusive (Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 25).
   12. This position has consistently been taken by the Court in the years
since the Certain Norwegian Loans matter (see, for example, Aerial Inci-
dent of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959,
p. 146; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1978, pp. 16-17; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Paki-
stan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 24, para. 26;
and Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 298, para. 46).
   13. In the instant case, by choosing the lack of awareness on the part of
the Respondent as the main ground for the dismissal of the claim, it
appears, with respect, that the Court has chosen not to give emphasis to the
most “direct and conclusive” element of that ground for the dismissal of

   1 Christian Tomuschat, The Statute of the International Court of Justice — A Commen-

tary (Second Edition), p. 707, para. 138, footnotes omitted.

216

765      nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

the claim. The consequence is serious: lack of awareness on the part of the
Respondent can be easily cured by the Applicant by giving proper notice of
the dispute to the Respondent. In that case, the Marshall Islands could
simply bring the case again before the Court. In my view, that would be an
undesirable result and should be discouraged. The real ground for the dis-
missal of the case ought to have been the absence of a dispute between the
Parties. The majority Judgment has only dealt with preliminary objection
number one, and even while dealing with that objection greater emphasis
was not placed on the analysis of the documents and pleadings of the Par-
ties, which reveals that there is no dispute between them.
   14. The Parties have already submitted documents and pleadings
in extenso. In the facts of this case, this Court ought to have examined the
other preliminary objections. Otherwise, a re-submission of the case again
would entail a waste of the eﬀorts, time and resources already spent by
the Parties and the Court in adjudicating this matter.
   15. On careful consideration of all documents and pleadings, the irre-
sistible conclusion is that no dispute exists between the Parties. The
majority Judgment ought to have rejected the Marshall Islands’ Applica-
tion mainly on this ground.

                     Other Preliminary Objections

   16. In the facts of this case the Court should have examined other pre-
liminary objections taken by the Respondent, namely:
— the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ case against Pakistan was
  brought in bad faith;
— the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ claims against Pakistan are
  manifestly without legal merit or substance;
— the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ Memorial does not conform to
  the Rules of the Court and the ICJ Practice Directions;

— the Republic of the Marshall Islands has the burden of proving that
  the Court has jurisdiction and that its Application is admissible, and
  it has failed to discharge its burden of proof in its Application and
  Memorial;
— the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ claims do not come within the
  scope of the Parties’ consent to the Court’s jurisdiction for reason of
  the reservations included with their Article 36 (2) declarations;

— the Application is inadmissible because no dispute existed between the
  Republic of the Marshall Islands and Pakistan at the time the Appli-
  cation was submitted to the Court;
— the Application is likewise inadmissible because the Republic of the
  Marshall Islands does not have jus standi in connection with the
  claims as formulated in the Application;

217

766        nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

— the Application of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is an impermis-
  sible attempt to re-open the question of the legality of nuclear weapons
  and to obtain what would, in eﬀect, amount to an advisory opinion;
— the Application of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is inadmissi-
  ble because it has failed to bring indispensable parties before the
  Court;
— the judicial process is inherently incapable of resolving questions of
  nuclear disarmament involving multiple States; and
— entertaining the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ claims would com-
  promise the sound administration of justice and judicial propriety and
  integrity.
   17. Out of this long list of preliminary objections, in my considered
view, three preliminary objections ought to have been examined by the
Court. These are:
(a) Monetary Gold principle, i.e., the absence of essential parties not party
    to the instant proceedings;
(b) the Applicant lacks standing to bring this case; and

(c) the Judgment would amount to an advisory opinion.
  18. Each of these is analysed in turn in the following paragraphs.

                          Monetary Gold Principle
   19. I deem it proper to very brieﬂy deal with the other preliminary
objections to demonstrate that those objections are also substantial in
character and should have been adjudicated by the Court.
   20. The Respondent argues that the adjudication of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands claims would necessarily implicate the rights
and obligations of other States, i.e., that essential parties are absent
(Counter-Memorial of Pakistan, hereinafter “CMP”, Part 8, Chap-
ter 4, pp. 56-59). Pakistan stated in its Counter-Memorial that
        “The RMI’s Application contravenes the principle of consent
      which bars the adjudication of the legal obligations of States parties
      under the NPT and other States without their agreement. Pakistan
      contends that the Monetary Gold principle is directly applicable to the
      case brought by the RMI, because the Court cannot decide this case
      without deciding whether the NWS [nuclear-weapon states] that are
      party to the NPT are in breach of their obligations under Article VI
      of the NPT, which the RMI seeks to enforce against Pakistan under
      the guise of customary international law obligations.” 2

  2   CMP, para. 8.78.

218

767        nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

   21. The Applicant in its Application submitted a chart, which indicates
that India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, Respondents in these three
proceedings put together, possess less than 3 per cent of the total nuclear
weapons in the world (Application of the Marshall Islands, p. 9). The other
countries, who possess the other more than 97 per cent of the nuclear weap-
ons in the world, are not before the Court and consequently the Court is
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction in this matter with respect to
those States (the States possessing 97 per cent of the nuclear weapons).
Therefore, it is indispensable to have the participation of the other coun-
tries who possess such a large quantity of the world’s nuclear weapons.
   22. The Court considered in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on nuclear
weapons that any realistic search for general and complete disarmament
would require the co-operation of all States (Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 264,
para. 100).
   23. This preliminary objection is substantial in character and it ought
to have been adjudicated by the Court.

                        Lack of Standing of the Applicant
  24. Pakistan bases its arguments on this point on two grounds:
        “First, the RMI has no standing to claim in its own right in this
      case, because it has failed to (i) identify the existence of a legal dispute
      between the RMI and Pakistan at the time of the ﬁling of the Appli-
      cation and (ii) submit even prima facie evidence of any concrete or
      imminent harm fairly traceable to the challenged action or inaction
      of Pakistan that would be redressed by a favourable decision by this
      Court.

        Second, given that the Court has not been presented with even
      prima facie evidence of the existence of an obligation erga omnes to
      conduct negotiations and 1996 Advisory Opinion provides no support
      for the RMI’s ‘essential contention’ that ‘the customary obligation to
      conduct negotiations is an obligation erga omnes’ and that, ‘[a]s such,
      every State [including the RMI] has a legal interest in its timely per-
      formance’, the RMI cannot claim a legal interest in the timely perfor-
      mance of a non-existing obligation and hence has no right to an
      adjudication of its claims as formulated in the Application.” 3

  25. The Application of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is based
on the premise that there is an erga omnes obligation to negotiate nuclear

  3 CMP, p. 52, paras. 8.50-8.51, citing Memorial of the Republic of the Marshall Islands

(MMI), para. 31.

219

768       nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

disarmament, which entitles it to come before the Court invoking the
international responsibility of States that in its view have failed to fulﬁl
this obligation. The determination of the existence of such an obligation,
independent of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is a question
more appropriate for an analysis of the merits of this case. But even
assuming, for the purposes of argument, that such an obligation exists,
the absence of any prima facie evidence of harm, realized or potential,
deprives the applicant of standing to bring this claim.
   26. I would like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that these
considerations do not ignore the serious eﬀects of nuclear testing in the
past in the territory of the Republic of the Marshall Islands when it was
a protectorate of the United States of America. However, such unfortu-
nate circumstances are not and cannot be the basis for their claims as they
would be excluded from the temporal scope of the alleged dispute.

  27. This preliminary objection is also of a substantial character and it
ought to have been adjudicated by the Court.

              Any Judgment Given by the Court Would Amount
                         to an Advisory Opinion
   28. Pakistan submits that “[t]he RMI’s assertion that the ‘Application
is not an attempt to re-open the question of the legality of nuclear weap-
ons’ must be rejected as self-serving” 4. It further contends that the Statute
of the Court does not provide a basis for revisiting or appealing from the
Court’s advisory opinions. Of course, the Respondent is here making ref-
erence to the 1996 Advisory Opinion issued by the Court on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was requested by the
United Nations General Assembly and where 22 countries participated,
including the Republic of the Marshall Islands but not Pakistan.

  29. In Pakistan’s submission,
      “[the] Court has already exhaustively addressed the question of the
      legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of its
      advisory jurisdiction, after hearing a large number of States and inter-
      governmental organizations, including the RMI” 5.

   30. As I have discussed above, the absence of essential parties for
achieving eﬀective global disarmament from these proceedings renders
any potential decision by this Court on the claims submitted devoid of
any practical eﬀect. In such circumstances, it appears that indeed a deci-
sion from this Court in this matter would more closely resemble an advi-

  4 CMP, p. 55, para. 8.64, citing Application of the Republic of the Marshall Islands

(AMI), para. 2.
  5 Ibid., p. 56, para. 8.71.

220

769      nuclear arms and disarmament (sep. op. bandhari)

sory opinion as a general statement from the Court on a particular aspect
of international law without any immediate binding eﬀect on the Parties.
  31. This preliminary objection also deserved to be considered.
  32. The majority Judgment ought to have held clearly that, on the
basis of documents and pleadings of the Parties, no dispute existed
between the Parties at the time of ﬁling the Application while upholding
Pakistan’s ﬁrst preliminary objection.

                                         (Signed) Dalveer Bhandari.

221


152

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE REZEK
[Translation ]

1. Since the respondent State, in challenging as it has both the jurisdic-
tion of the Court and the admissibility of the Application, has laid
emphasis on the binding and paramount nature of Security Council reso-
lutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) in the light of Articles 25 and 103 of the
Charter of the United Nations, in my opinion the Judgment, with which
I agree, would more fully convey the lines of argument advanced by the
Parties were it to devote a few comments to the subject of the jurisdiction
of the Court in relation to that of the political organs of the Organiza-
tion.

2. Article 103 of the Charter is a rule for settling conflicts between
treaties: above all it postulates a conflict between the Charter of the
United Nations and another treaty obligation. It settles the conflict in the
Charter’s favour, regardless of the chronology of the texts. However, it is
not designed to operate to the detriment of customary international law .
and even less so to the detriment of the general principles of the law of
nations. Moreover, it is definitely the Charter of the United Nations (not
a Security Council resolution, nor a General Assembly recommendation,
nor a judgment of the International Court of Justice) which benefits from
the primacy established in this norm: it is the Charter with the full sig-
nificance of its principles, its system and the division of powers which it
establishes.

3. Furthermore, the Court is the definitive interpreter of the Charter of
the United Nations. It is the Court’s responsibility to determine the
meaning of each of its provisions and of the text as a whole, and this
responsibility becomes particularly serious when the Court finds itself
faced with a challenge to decisions taken by one of the Organization’s
two principal political organs. Ensuring the primacy of the Charter in its
true and full meaning is one of the most eminent of the tasks which fall to
the Court, and the Court, as of right and out of duty, acts to that end
whenever the occasion arises, even if this may in theory result in criticism
of another organ of the United Nations, or rather in disavowal of that
organ’s analysis of the Charter.

At the time of the East Timor case, Judge Skubiszewski had occasion
to recall that:

“The Court is competent, and this is shown by several judgments
and advisory opinions, to interpret and apply the resolutions of the
Organization. The Court is competent to make findings on their law-
fulness, in particular whether they were intra vires. This competence

4i
1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (SEP. OP. REZEK) 153

follows from its function as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. The decisions of the Organization (in the broad
sense which this notion has under the Charter provisions on voting)
are subject to scrutiny by the Court with regard to their legality,
validity and effect. The pronouncements of the Court on these mat-
ters involve the interests of all Member States or at any rate those
which are the addressees of the relevant resolutions. Yet these pro-
nouncements remain within the limits of Monetary Gold. By assess-
ing the various United Nations resolutions on East Timor in relation
to the rights and duties of Australia the Court would not be break-
ing the rule of the consensual basis of its jurisdiction.” (C.J.
Reports 1995, p. 251.)

In the past, judges as measured as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice have asserted
this jurisdiction, and in this they were supported by the authority of doc-
trine. As Professor Oliver Lissitzyn wrote years ago:

“If the organization is to gain strength, the authority to give bind-
ing interpretations of the Charter, at least in matters directly affect-
ing the rights and duties of states, must be lodged somewhere, pref-
erably in a judicial organ. The long-range purposes and policies laid
down in the Charter must be given some protection against the pos-
sible short-range aberrations of the political organs. Power without
law is despotism.” (O. J. Lissitzyn, The International Court of Jus-
tice, 1951, pp. 96-97.)

The argument that judicial scrutiny of a political organ’s interpretation
of the Charter can only take place in the exercise of advisory jurisdiction
is totally without scientific foundation. What is true is only that the sys-
tem does not authorize any State either to consult the Court on a con-
stitutional issue involving the United Nations or to raise such an issue by
means of direct action against the Organization or against an organ such
as the Security Council. However, the constitutional issue — relating,
say, to a case of excés de pouvoir — can perfectly well arise in the context
of a dispute between States. It is quite natural, within such a framework,
that an application should be directed against a State which, for some
reason, has taken it upon itself to execute the Council’s act although that
act was challenged from the viewpoint of the Charter or of any rule of
general international law. The respondent in the proceedings, therefore,
is not the legislator but the immediate executor of the law, as is normally
the case in domestic jurisdictions within the framework of a procedure of
habeas corpus and in the context of civil actions for the protection of
rights other than individual freedoms.

4. The Court has full jurisdiction to interpret and apply the law in a

42
1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION (SEP. OP. REZEK) 154

contentious case, even when the exercise of such jurisdiction might entail
the critical scrutiny of a decision of another organ of the United Nations.
It does not directly represent the States Members of the Organization
(this fact has been stated before the Court and attempts have been made
to infer from it the consequence that the Court is not competent, to
undertake a review of resolutions of the Council), but precisely because it
is impermeable to political injunctions the Court is the interpreter par
excellence of the law and the natural forum for reviewing the acts of
political organs in the name of the law, as is the rule in democratic
régimes. It would be surprising indeed if the Security Council of the
United Nations were to enjoy absolute and unchallengeable power in
respect of the rule of law, a privilege not enjoyed, in domestic law, by the.
political organs of most of the founding Members and other Members of
the Organization, starting with the respondent State.

It is the States Members of the United Nations, within the General
Assembly and the Security Council, which have the power to legislate, to
change if they so wish the rules that govern the working of the Organiza-
tion. In the exercise of their legislative function they may decide, for
example, that the Organization can do without a judicial organ, or that
this organ, contrary to national models, is not the ultimate interpreter of
the legal order of the Organization in matters which touch upon the
validity of a decision of another organ of the system. To my knowledge,
they have never even considered doing so and the Court should not,
I think; hold back from asserting a prerogative it enjoys on the basis of
the presumed will of the United Nations.

(Signed) Francisco REZEK.

43


599

DISSENTING OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT
WEERAMANTRY

My opinion in this case is the same, mutatis mutandis, as that which
I have delivered in Yugoslavia v. Belgium.

I do not need to repeat the text of that opinion here and it will suffice
to observe that all that I have said there applies equally to this case, and
should be considered to be incorporated mutatis mutandis in this opinion.

In the result I dissent from the Court’s Order dismissing the applica-
tion for provisional measures and hold that provisional measures should
have been issued for the reasons and in the manner indicated in my
opinion in Yugoslavia v. Belgium.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY.

61


282

DÉCLARATION DE M. FERRARI BRAVO

J’ai voté en faveur du présent avis consultatif sur la licéité des armes
nucléaires parce que je pense qu’il est du devoir de la Cour internationale
de Justice de n’épargner aucun effort pour répondre au mieux aux ques-
tions que lui posent les organes principaux des Nations Unies habilités à
la saisir, surtout lorsqu’une telle réponse peut augmenter les possibilités
de sortir d’une impasse qui, dans le cas actuel, perdure depuis plus de
cinquante ans en faisant peser une ombre triste et menaçante sur l’huma-
nité tout entière.

Dans sa fonction d’organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies (ar-
ticle 92 de la Charte), la Cour a été, entre autres, créée justement pour cela
et elle ne doit pas se demander si sa réponse, au mieux de ce qu’elle peut
faire, pourra contribuer à l’évolution de la situation. Elle n’a pas non
plus à se justifier si sa réponse n’est pas exhaustive. Je souscris par consé-
quent pleinement aux motifs qui étayent la décision prise par la Cour de
faire droit à la demande de l’Assemblée générale.

À ce propos, il est toutefois nécessaire de dire que la question se pré-
sente sous un angle tout à fait différent lorsque la saisine provient d’une
institution spécialisée des Nations Unies, dont la compétence pour s’adres-
ser à la Cour est, pour des raisons de principe, bien délimitée. Sai, par-
tant, voté aussi en faveur de l’avis, donné ce même jour, par lequel la
Cour décide de ne pas répondre à la demande de l'Organisation mondiale
de la Santé et je trouve qu’il y a de la logique dans ce comportement
(Licéité de l’utilisation des armes nucléaires par un Etat dans un conflit
armé, C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 87). La Cour, en effet, est l’organe judi-
ciaire principal des Nations Unies, mais elle ne l’est pas d’autres organi-
sations internationales dont le droit de la saisir demande à être soigneu-
sement limité si l’on veut conserver un partage correct de compétences —
et, donc, d'efficacité — entre organismes internationaux, en évitant que
des fonctions politiques, que la logique du système a confiées seulement
aux Nations Unies, soient usurpées par d’autres organisations qui, pour
ne rien dire d’autre, n’ont ni la compétence, ni la structure pour ce faire.

*
* *#

Cela dit, je reste toutefois fort insatisfait quant à certains passages cru-
ciaux de la décision car elle me semble, pour dire la vérité, peu coura-
geuse et parfois de lecture difficile.

Notamment, je regrette que la Cour ait arbitrairement réparti en deux
catégories la longue ligne des résolutions de l’Assemblée générale qui
commence par la résolution 1 (I) du 24 janvier 1946 et qui, au moins jus-

60
283 MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES (DÉCL. FERRARI BRAVO)

qu’à la résolution 808 (IX), se présente sous la forme d’une série de réso-
lutions adoptées à l'unanimité. Je pense que ces résolutions sont fonda-
mentales; tel est le cas surtout de la première, dont le libellé avait déjà été
arrêté à Moscou avant la création des Nations Unies (pour l’histoire de la
résolution ainsi que pour les démarches entreprises à Moscou en vue de
confier aux Nations Unies le contrôle de l’énergie atomique dont, à ce
moment là, seuls les Etats-Unis d'Amérique possédaient les clés, voir The
United Nations in World Affairs, 1945-1947, 1947, p. 391 et suiv.), et qui
pourrait, 4 la rigueur, étre assimilée aux stipulations de la Charte. Elle
démontre en effet, et à mon avis clairement, l’existence d’un véritable
engagement solennel d’éliminer toute arme atomique dont la présence
dans les arsenaux militaires était jugée illicite. La résolution disait ceci:

«5. … En particulier, la Commission [établie par la résolution]
présente des propositions déterminées en vue:

c) d'éliminer, des armements nationaux, les armes atomiques et
toutes autres armes importantes permettant des destructions
massives.» (Les italiques sont de moi.)

Ces idées ont été répétées à plusieurs reprises dans d’autres résolutions
de l’Assemblée générale immédiatement après la création des Nations
Unies (voir par exemple la résolution 41 (J) ou la résolution 191 (IID).

Je sais trés bien que la guerre froide intervenue peu aprés (et dont il ne
m’appartient pas de désigner les responsables, tout en soulignant qu’ils
ne se trouvent pas dans un seul camp) a empêché le développement de
cette notion d’illicéité (abandonnée par la suite par les Etats-Unis, qui en
avaient été les promoteurs), en suscitant l’apparition de toute une série
d’argumentations tournant autour du concept de dissuasion nucléaire qui
n’a (et c’est important, comme on le verra ci-après) aucune valeur juri-
dique.

Mais, à mon avis, il reste que l’illicéité existait déjà et que toute pro-
duction d’armes nucléaires devait, par conséquent, se justifier au vu de
cette tache noire d’illicéité que l’on ne pouvait pas effacer. On doit par
conséquent déplorer qu’une telle conclusion ne ressorte pas clairement du
raisonnement de la Cour qui, au contraire, est souvent d’une lecture com-
pliquée, sinueuse, et finalement peu efficace.

Cela mis à part, il reste à dire qu’un certain nombre de conclusions
auxquelles la Cour est arrivée ne sont pas reflétées dans les résultats dont
il est fait état dans le dispositif. Ce sont des lacunes graves, mais elles
s'expliquent par la difficulté de former, sur certaines composantes du pré-
sent avis consultatif, des majorités cohérentes.

Il est toutefois important de reconnaître qu’il reste le paragraphe 104
de Davis, introductif au dispositif, dont l’importance est vraiment cru-
ciale. Il suggère en effet au lecteur attentif d'évaluer dans son ensemble le

61
284 MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES (DÉCL. FERRARI BRAVO)

raisonnement fait par la Cour, de tenir compte de ces parties du raison-
nement qui ne sont pas reflétées dans des passages du dispositif et, qui
plus est, de se rendre compte des inévitables lacunes du raisonnement.
Que les lecteurs, et pas seulement les universitaires, en profitent en gar-
dant à l'esprit qu’un avis consultatif, malgré les similitudes procédurales,
mest pas un arrêt. Et celui-ci surtout.

*
* *

Certes, il n’existe pas une régle précise et spécifique qui interdise l’arme
atomique et qui tire toutes les conséquences de cette interdiction. La
théorie de la dissuasion, à laquelle l’avis consultatif ne réserve qu’une
rapide mention (surtout au paragraphe 96), aurait mérité quelques consi-
dérations supplémentaires. J’ai déjà dit qu’à mon avis l’idée de dissuasion
nucléaire n’a aucune valeur juridique et j'ajoute que la théorie de la dis-
suasion, tout en créant une pratique des Etats nucléaires et de leurs alliés,
n’est pas en mesure de créer une pratique juridique sur laquelle fonder le
début de création d’une coutume internationale. On pourrait arriver à
dire que l’on est en présence d’un anti-droit, si on pense aux effets qu’elle
a eus sur la Charte des Nations Unies.

Je ne vais pas jusque-là, mais je ne peux m'empêcher de constater que
c’est grâce à la doctrine de la dissuasion que la portée révolutionnaire de
l’article 2, paragraphe 4, de la Charte s’est réduite, alors que parallèle-
ment la portée de l’article 51, qui en était le contrepoint selon une logique
traditionnelle, s’est étendue avec la formation autour de cette norme de
toute une série de constructions conventionnelles, comme le montrent les
deux systèmes régissant respectivement l'Alliance atlantique d’une part
et, pendant sa durée d’existence, le pacte de Varsovie. Ce sont des sys-
tèmes qui sans doute sont régis par des règles juridiques mais qui procè-
dent d’une idée qui relève essentiellement d’un constat politique, donc non
juridique, qui consiste à prendre acte du fait que le Conseil de sécurité ne
peut pas fonctionner face à un conflit majeur, comme le serait le cas
échéant celui qui fait l’objet du présent avis consultatif.

Voici comment la rivière qui sépare l’article 2, paragraphe 4, de l’ar-
ticle 51 s’est élargie grâce aussi à l’énorme caillou de la dissuasion qu’on a
jeté dedans. Et cela a entraîné la nécessité pour enjamber la rivière de
jeter un pont et, pour ce faire, d’utiliser les matériaux dont nous dispo-
sons maintenant, à savoir l’article VI du traité sur la non-prolifération
nucléaire.

J'ai de forts doutes sur le point de savoir si ces développements sont
réellement partagés par la Cour, car la manière très ramassée que la Cour
a choisie pour traiter de la dissuasion ne permet pas de bien comprendre
si tel est réellement l’avis de la Cour. Mais elle ne permet pas non plus de
l’exclure. En tout cas les opinions individuelles ou dissidentes jointes à
lPavis (je ne vois pas une grande différence entre les unes et les autres)
contribueront à éclairer ce point (ainsi que d’autres, bien entendu).

62
285 MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES (DECL. FERRARI BRAVO)

De toute façon, telle est à mes yeux la raison fondamentale pour
laquelle l’avis de la Cour est obligé de contenir, dans sa partie finale, des
développements fondés sur une clause d’un traité qui, n’étant pas univer-
sel, ne devrait pas en bonne logique y figurer. Mais ces développements
sont tout à fait justifiés par la situation dans laquelle nous nous trouvons,
où le traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires se présente
comme le seul moyen pour arriver rapidement à une solution qui puisse
prévenir des conséquences catastrophiques.

a * x

En conclusion, je pense qu’une régle précise et spécifique qui interdise
l’arme atomique et qui tire toutes les conséquences de cette interdiction
n’existe pas encore.

Il est évident que dans la situation politique des années qui vont de
1945 à 1985 une telle règle n’aurait pas pu se former. Mais, dirais-je,
l’ensemble de la production normative des dernières cinquante années,
surtout en matiére du droit humanitaire de la guerre, est quand méme
inconciliable avec le développement technologique de la construction
d’armes nucléaires. Peut-on, par exemple, s’imaginer qu’au moment où le
droit humanitaire, partie essentielle et toujours plus importante du droit
de la guerre et (depuis peu) aussi de la paix, engendre toute une série de
principes pour la protection de la population civile ou pour la sauvegarde
de l’environnement, ce méme droit international continue d’abriter en
son sein la licéité par exemple de l’usage de la bombe à neutrons qui laisse
intact l’environnement mais... seulement avec la «petite» conséquence de
l’anéantissement de la population! Si tel est le cas, peu importe de trouver
une norme spécifique sur la bombe à neutrons car elle devient automati-
quement illicite par contraste avec la majorité des règles du droit interna-
tional.

Ce phénomène n’est pas nouveau, car à toute époque de son dévelop-
pement, dès le début de l’ère moderne, le droit international qui est essen-
tiellement un droit coutumier, donc de formation spontanée, a connu des
situations où la force de certaines règles empéchait les règles contraires de
s'établir ou de se maintenir.

Tout cela a été malheureusement obscurci dans l’avis de la Cour par la
crainte d’analyser courageusement l’évolution dans le temps des réso-
lutions de l’Assemblée générale qui, seulement à partir d’une certaine
époque (aux alentours des années soixante), ont provoqué l’apparition
de clivages nets entre Etats nucléaires (et leurs alliés) et Etats menacés par
la bombe.

Je répète: le fait qu’une règle interdisant l’arme nucléaire ait commencé
à se former au début de la vie des Nations Unies n'empêche pas que le
développement de cette formation et, par conséquent, le développement
de sa force propulsive aient été arrêtés au moment où les deux principales
puissances, toutes les deux dotées de l’arme nucléaire, sont entrées dans
la guerre froide et ont développé tout un instrumentaire, même conven-

63
286 | MENACE OU EMPLOI D’ARMES NUCLÉAIRES (DÉCL. FERRARI BRAVO)

tionnel, centré autour de l’idée de la dissuasion. Mais cela a seulement
empêché la mise en œuvre de l’interdiction (qu’on est forcé d’obtenir par
voie de négociation) alors que l’interdiction en tant que telle, Pinterdic-
tion «toute nue», si je peux m’exprimer ainsi, est demeurée en l’état et
produit toujours ses effets, au moins au niveau du fardeau de la preuve,
en rendant plus difficile aux puissances nucléaires de se justifier dans le
cadre de maintes applications de la théorie de la dissuasion qui, je le
répète, n'est pas une théorie juridique.

En d’autres termes, on doit, par un instrument juridique (l’accord)
parer au danger d’une entité, l’arme nucléaire, qui, en soi, n’a rien de juri-
dique sans qu’il soit possible, dans un cas d’espèce, de vérifier si les solu-
tions esquissées tiennent ou ne tiennent pas. Une telle vérification deman-
derait Pexplosion de la bombe. Mais, alors, la vérification aurait-elle
encore un sens?

Cet élément de déséquilibre normatif entre les raisons des Etats nu-
cléaires et celles des Etats non nucléaires devait et pouvait être soigneuse-
ment enregistré par la Cour et non pas de la façon parfois contradictoire
sous laquelle il est perçu dans l'avis consultatif.

(Signé) L. FERRARI BRAVO.

64


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. ITALIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 30 JUIN 1999

1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA v. ITALY)

ORDER OF 30 JUNE 1999
Mode officiel de citation:

Licéité de l'emploi de la force {Yougoslavie c. Italie),
ordonnance du 30 juin 1999, C.J. Recueil 1999, p. 1000

Official citation:

Legality of Use of Force {Yugoslavia v. Italy),
Order of 30 June 1999, L C.J. Reports 1999, p. 1000

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 745

ISBN 92-1-070817-2

30 JUIN 1999

ORDONNANCE

LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
{YOUGOSLAVIE c. ITALIE)

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v. ITALY)

30 JUNE 1999

ORDER
1999
30 juin
Rôle général
n° 109

1000

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1999

30 juin 1999

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA LICÉITÉ
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. ITALIE)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. WEERAMANTRY, vice-président, faisant fonction de prési-
dent en l'uffaire; M. SCHWEBEL, président de la Cour;
MM. Opa, BEDJAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI,
FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, M  HIGGINs,
MM.  PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOUMANS, REZEK, juges;
MM. Gala, KRECA, juges ad hoc; M. ARNALDEZ, greffier
adjoint.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44, 45, 48, 49 et 79
de son Règlement,

Vu la requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 29 avril 1999, par
laquelle la République fédérale de Yougoslavie a introduit une instance
contre la République italienne «pour violation de l'obligation de ne pas
recourir à l'emploi de la force»,

Vu la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par
la Yougoslavie le 29 avril 1999 et l'ordonnance rendue par la Cour le
2 juin 1999, aux termes de laquelle elle a rejeté ladite demande et réservé
la suite de la procédure;

4
1001 LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ORD. 30 VI 99)

Considérant qu’aux fins de se renseigner auprès des Parties sur la suite
de la procédure le vice-président de la Cour, faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire, a reçu leurs représentants le 28 juin 1999; considérant qu’au
cours de cette réunion l'Italie, se référant aux conclusions auxquelles la
Cour était parvenue dans son ordonnance susmentionnée du 2 juin 1999,
a demandé qu'il soit statué séparément, avant toute procédure sur le
fond, sur la question de la compétence de la Cour en l'espèce: considé-
rant qu’au cours de la même réunion, la Yougoslavie s’est opposée à cette
demande et a indiqué qu'elle souhaitait pouvoir présenter un mémoire
sur le fond, ainsi qu’envisagé dans le Règlement de la Cour, étant
entendu que l'Italie pourrait soulever des exceptions préliminaires dans le
délai fixé pour le dépôt de son contre-mémoire, conformément au para-
graphe | de l’article 79 dudit Règlement; et considérant que le deman-
deur a évoqué un délai d'environ six mois aux fins du dépôt de la pièce
qu'il souhaitait produire;

Considérant les vues des Parties et les dispositions pertinentes du
Règlement de la Cour,

Fixe comme suit les dates d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt des
pièces de la procédure écrite prescrites par l’article 45 du Règlement:

Pour le mémoire de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, le 5 janvier
2000;

Pour le contre-mémoire de la République italienne, le 5 juillet 2000;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en frangais et en anglais, le texte francais faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le trente juin mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-neuf, en
trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et
les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie et au Gouvernement de la République
italienne.

Le vice-président,
{Signé) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY.

Le greffier adjoint,
(Signé) Jean-Jacques ARNALDEZ.


                       INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                         REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                      ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                    OBLIGATION TO NEGOCIATE
                   ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                            (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                          ORDER OF 18 JUNE 2013

                              2013
                       COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                           RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                    AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                     OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER
                   UN ACCÈS À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                             (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                       ORDONNANCE DU 18 JUIN 2013

2 CIJ1046.indb 1                                        25/04/14 10:34

                                                Official citation :
                              Obligation to Negociate Access to the Pacific Ocean
                                   (Bolivia v. Chile), Order of 18 June 2013,
                                           I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 223

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                               Obligation de négocier un accès à l’océan Pacifique
                                (Bolivie c. Chili), ordonnance du 18 juin 2013,
                                           C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 223

                                                                                1046
                                                                 Sales number
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                No de vente:
                   ISBN 978-92-1-071161-6

2 CIJ1046.indb 2                                                                       25/04/14 10:34

                                                  18 JUNE 2013

                                                    ORDER

                    OBLIGATION TO NEGOCIATE
                   ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                         (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                     OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER
                   UN ACCÈS À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                         (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                                                 18 JUIN 2013

                                              ORDONNANCE

2 CIJ1046.indb 3                                                 25/04/14 10:34

                    223

                                   INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

        2013                                        YEAR 2013
       18 June
     General List
      No. 153
                                                   18 June 2013

                                OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
                               ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                                              (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                                                     ORDER

                    Present : President Tomka ; Vice‑President Sepúlveda‑Amor ; Judges
                               Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado
                               Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja,
                               Sebutinde, Bhandari ; Registrar Couvreur.

                        The International Court of Justice,
                       Composed as above,
                       After deliberation,
                       Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
                    cles 31, 44, 45, paragraph 1, 48 and 49 of the Rules of Court,
                       Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
                    24 April 2013, whereby the Government of the Plurinational State of
                    Bolivia instituted proceedings against the Republic of Chile with regard
                    to a dispute “relating to Chile’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and
                    effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a
                    fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” ;
                       Whereas on 24 April 2013 a signed copy of the Application was trans-
                    mitted to Chile ;
                       Whereas by letter dated 24 April 2013 accompanying its Application,
                    Bolivia notified the Court of the appointment of H.E. Mr. Eduardo

                    4

2 CIJ1046.indb 4                                                                                25/04/14 10:34

                   224 	       obligation to negotiate access (order 18 VI 13)

                   Rodríguez Veltzé as Agent ; and whereas by letter dated 7 May 2013,
                   Chile notified the Court of the appointment of H.E. Mr. Felipe Bulnes
                   Serrano as Agent ;
                      Whereas, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the
                   Agents of the Parties on 12 June 2013, the latter indicated that they had
                   come to an agreement that Bolivia should have a period of ten months at
                   its disposal, from the day of the present Order, in which to prepare its
                   Memorial, and that Chile should then have a period of ten months for the
                   preparation of its Counter-Memorial ;
                      Taking into account the agreement of the Parties,
                       Fixes the following time‑limits for the filing of the written pleadings :

                     17 April 2014 for the Memorial of the Plurinational State of Bolivia ;
                     18 February 2015 for the Counter‑Memorial of the Republic of Chile ;
                   and
                       Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                     Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
                   the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of June, two thousand
                   and thirteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
                   of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Pluri-
                   national State of Bolivia and the Government of the Republic of Chile,
                   respectively.

                                                                    (Signed) Peter Tomka,
                                                                              President.
                                                                (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                                              Registrar.

                   5

2 CIJ1046.indb 6                                                                                25/04/14 10:34


                      362

                                             DISSENTING OPINION
                                            OF VICE-PRESIDENT XUE

                         1. Regrettably, I disagree with the decision rendered by the Court
                      in this case. As a judicial duty, I shall explain the reasons for my position.

                                     1. The Issue Involved in the Present Case

                         2. My departure from the majority primarily derives from my position
                      on the question of jurisdiction (see Immunities and Criminal Proceedings
                      (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                      I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), joint dissenting opinion of Vice‑President Xue,
                      Judges Sebutinde and Robinson and Judge ad hoc Kateka, p. 340). This
                      case, as an example, highlights the importance of the identification of the
                      subject‑matter of a dispute and its close relationship with the question of
                      jurisdiction. As is illustrated in the factual background of the Judgment,
                      the status of the building at 42 avenue Foch in Paris (also referred to as
                      “the building”) is one, and an inseparable, part of the dispute between
                      Equatorial Guinea and France in relation to the immunities of the
                      high‑ranking official of Equatorial Guinea and its State property from the
                      jurisdiction of the French courts. In narrowing down the scope of its
                      jurisdiction to the interpretation and application of the Vienna Conven-
                      tion on Diplomatic Relations (also referred to as the “Vienna Conven-
                      tion” or the “Convention”), the Court has placed itself in a position
                      where it is unable to give a thorough and sufficient examination of the
                      evidence adduced before it and all the relevant issues in the case, and thus
                      fails to provide a sound judicial resolution to the dispute.
                         3. In essence, the status of the building at 42 avenue Foch in Paris
                      concerns immunities of State property from criminal jurisdiction of

                      foreign courts. In this regard, two issues are relevant. One is the trans
                       action of the building between Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue,
                       the Vice‑President of Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Equatorial
                       Guinea. The other is Equatorial Guinea’s right to designate it as the
                       premises of its diplomatic mission. On the first issue, evidence adduced by
                       Equatorial Guinea shows that the transaction was legally carried
                       out under the French law. Two pieces of evidence are pertinent and pro-
                      bative.

                        4. The first document, a form entitled “Cession de droits sociaux non
                      constatée par un acte à déclarer obligatoirement (Uncertificated transfer of

                      66

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                      363 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      shareholder rights subject to mandatory declaration)”, dated 17 October
                      2011, demonstrates that on 15 September 2011, Mr. Teodoro Nguema
                      Obiang Mangue transferred to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, at a
                      price of €6,353,428, the shareholder rights in the five Swiss companies
                      representing ownership in real property. For this registration, a droit
                      d’enregistrement (registration duty) in the amount of €317,672 was col-
                      lected by the French tax authority in Noisy-le-Grand (Annex 5 to the
                      replies of Equatorial Guinea to the questions put by Judge Bennouna and
                      Judge Donoghue, 26 October 2016).
                         5. The second document, entitled “Déclaration de plus‑value sur les ces
                      sions de biens meubles ou de parts de sociétés à prépondérance immobilière
                      (Declaration of capital gains on the transfer of movable assets or shares in
                      companies investing primarily in real property)”, dated 20 October 2011,
                      records that an impôt sur le revenu afférent à la plus‑value (tax on capital
                      gains) in the amount of €1,145,740 was collected by the French tax
                      authorities for the transfer — on 15 September 2011, between Mr. Teo-
                      doro Nguema Obiang Mangue and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea —
                      of the shares in the five Swiss companies that invested primarily in real
                      property (Annex 6 to the replies of Equatorial Guinea to the questions put
                      by Judge Bennouna and Judge Donoghue, 26 October 2016).
                         6. Although France contends that these deeds did not suffice to trans-
                      fer the title of the building to Equatorial Guinea, as the building was still
                      registered under the name of the five Swiss companies, this position was
                      not consistent with the finding of the French courts in respect of the own-
                      ership of the building. According to the latter’s view, the building was
                      owned by Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue through the five Swiss
                      companies since 20 December 2004 (see judgment rendered on 10 Febru-
                      ary 2020 by the Paris Cour d’appel in the case concerning Mr. Teodoro
                      Nguema Obiang Mangue, p. 62). Logically, if Equatorial Guinea could
                      not own the building through the five Swiss companies, the building could
                      not have belonged to Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, either.

                         7. Equatorial Guinea’s representations with France in regard to the
                      building were carried out not only at diplomatic level. On 14 February
                      2012, the President of Equatorial Guinea wrote to the French President a
                      letter, in which it was stated that the building at 42 avenue Foch
                           “is a property that was lawfully acquired by the Government of
                           Equatorial Guinea and is currently used by the Representative to
                            UNESCO, who is in charge of the Embassy’s property. The said prop-
                            erty is afforded legal and diplomatic protection under the Vienna
                            Convention and the bilateral agreements signed by the two States.”

                      France did not accept any of Equatorial Guinea’s representations.

                        8. These documents demonstrate that in the present case, the dispute
                      between the Parties goes well beyond the designation of the premises of a

                      67

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                      364 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      diplomatic mission. It is evident from the facts that France’s persistent
                      objection to Equatorial Guinea’s request to designate the building at
                      42 avenue Foch in Paris has little to do with the circumstances and condi-
                      tions under which a property may acquire diplomatic status. With the
                      controversy between the Parties over the ongoing criminal investigation
                      against Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, France, being the receiv-
                      ing State, has every means at its disposal to make sure that the said build-
                      ing would not acquire the legal status as desired by Equatorial Guinea;
                      there is no way for Equatorial Guinea to obtain France’s consent to the
                      designation of the building as the premises of its diplomatic mission.
                      Equatorial Guinea’s relocation of its Embassy into the building, to a
                      large extent, served as a means to prevent the building, which it deemed
                      as its State property, from being confiscated. Both Parties were fully
                      aware of these facts.

                         9. In respect of the second issue whether Equatorial Guinea has the
                      right to use the building for its diplomatic mission, the public acts of the
                      French authorities on the registration of the transfer of shareholder rights
                      in relation to the building and the collection of capital gains tax gave rise
                      to a reasonable belief by Equatorial Guinea that it has acquired the own-
                      ership of the building. If France wished to maintain the assets within the
                      private domain, it should have stopped these deeds at the outset of the
                      transaction so as to leave no doubt to Equatorial Guinea on the status of
                      the building. In addition to these public acts of its authorities, France
                      does not claim at any time during the proceedings that the transfer of the
                      building between Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue and Equatorial
                      Guinea was not genuine.
                         10. The dispute between the Parties over the status of the building
                      hinges on the ownership of the building. In the first place, the reason
                      given by France for its objection to Equatorial Guinea’s request directly
                      relates to the ownership of the building. In the Note Verbale dated
                      11 October 2011 addressed to the Embassy of Equatorial Guinea, the
                      Protocol Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated
                      that the building at 42 avenue Foch “does not form part of the premises
                      of Equatorial Guinea’s diplomatic mission. It falls within the private
                      domain and is, accordingly, subject to ordinary law.” This statement indi-
                      cates that France would not recognize that the building had become the
                      public property of Equatorial Guinea.
                         11. Secondly, the question of ownership has consequential effects on
                      the conduct of France in handling the building. Although the ownership
                      is irrelevant to the status of the premises of a diplomatic mission, if owned
                      by the sending State, however, the premises would enjoy the protection of
                      the Vienna Convention as well as customary rules on jurisdictional immu-
                      nities of a State and its property. As is stated in the Preamble of the Con-
                      vention, customary rules continue to govern matters that are not expressly
                      provided in the Convention. In the present case, such rules may come into
                      play in the examination of the lawfulness of the measures of search,

                      68

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                      365 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      attachment and confiscation imposed on the building by the French courts,
                      if the issue of the ownership of the building were duly considered.

                         12. In short, by narrowing down its jurisdictional basis in the present
                      case, the Court eschewed some crucial aspects of the dispute between the
                      Parties. Whether or not the building at 42 avenue Foch in Paris became
                      the State property of Equatorial Guinea through the transfer of owner-
                      ship is not a purely legal issue under the French law in the present case; it
                      ultimately boils down to the issue of the rights and obligations of a State
                      under international law in handling criminal cases concerning a foreign
                      State and its property.

                                   2. Interpretation of the Vienna Convention

                         13. I agree with the majority that the provisions of the Vienna Conven-
                      tion on Diplomatic Relations do not lay down at which point of time and
                      under what conditions a property acquires the status of “premises of the
                      mission” as defined in Article 1 (i) of the Convention and starts to enjoy
                      the privileges and immunities as provided for therein. In light of the
                      object and purpose of the Convention, the sending State cannot unilater-
                      ally impose its choice of premises on the receiving State. I disagree, how-
                      ever, with the reasoning of the Court which implies that the receiving
                      State, by its persistent objection to the sending State’s designation, would
                      unilaterally dictate the outcome of the matter. This interpretation, in my
                      view, is neither in line with the object and purpose of the Vienna Conven-
                      tion, nor reflective of State practice in diplomacy.
                         14. According to the majority’s view, a building cannot acquire the
                      status of the premises of the mission on the basis of the unilateral desig-
                      nation by the sending State, if the receiving State objects to its choice.
                      The receiving State, on the other hand, has the power to object to the
                      sending State’s assignment of a building to its diplomatic mission, thus
                      preventing the building in question from acquiring the status of premises
                      of the mission. Their rationale for this conclusion is threefold. First, by
                      virtue of Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, the establishment of diplo-
                      matic relations between States and of permanent diplomatic missions is
                      based on mutual consent. Unilateral designation by the sending State of
                      a building for its diplomatic mission against the objection of the receiving
                      State is contrary to this consensual basis. Secondly, to achieve the Con-
                      vention’s object to “contribute to the development of friendly relations
                      among nations”, the receiving State is obliged to afford significant privi-
                      leges and immunities to the diplomatic mission of the sending State. Such
                      weighty obligations, however, have to be balanced by the power of the
                      receiving State to object to the sending State’s choice of the premises of
                      its mission. Thirdly, the Convention’s immunity and inviolability régime
                      for diplomatic missions imposes restrictions on the sovereignty of the
                      receiving State, but without providing any mechanism to counterbalance

                      69

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                      366 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      potential misuse or abuse of such treatment. To overcome this vulnerabil-
                      ity of the receiving State, the régime should recognize its power to object
                      (see Judgment, paras. 63‑67).

                         15. I agree with the majority that international law of diplomacy, as a
                      self‑contained régime, does not provide a unilateral right for the sending
                      State to designate the premises of its diplomatic mission, but to put the
                      restriction on the sending State in such categorical terms, as if the matter
                      can only be decided by the receiving State, is apparently not a correct
                      interpretation of the Vienna Convention. The fundamental principle of
                      international law contained in the Preamble of the Convention, i.e. the
                      principle of sovereign equality, is the legal basis of international diplo-
                      macy law. Diplomatic privileges and immunities, “significant” or
                      “weighty” as they may be, are not accorded unilaterally by the receiving
                      State to the sending State. The diplomatic mission that the receiving State
                      establishes in the sending State enjoys the same treatment in the latter’s
                      territory. That is to say, diplomatic privileges and immunities are mutu-
                      ally granted and mutually beneficial. This reciprocity is a pivotal element
                      that keeps the stability of the diplomatic relations between States. The
                      establishment of permanent diplomatic missions, if it is to serve the pur-
                      poses of maintaining peace and security and fostering friendly relations
                      among nations, must be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and
                      equal treatment of States.

                         16. State practice relating to designation of the premises of diplomatic
                      missions, as the Court finds in this case, varies greatly; the matter is left
                      largely to the practice of States in light of the specific circumstances of
                      each country. This state of affairs nevertheless does not mean that there
                      exists no principle to follow in practice. The Parties in the present case
                      both acknowledge that, as reflected in its object and purpose, the Conven-
                      tion is rooted in the need to promote friendly relations between two sov-
                      ereign States. In order to achieve that aim, State parties must co‑operate
                      from the very beginning of their diplomatic relations. By virtue of the
                      principle of sovereign equality, the sending State has the right to choose
                      the location of its diplomatic mission in the capital city of the receiving
                      State, while the latter maintains its discretion to accept, or oppose to,
                      such designation. In accordance with Article 21 of the Vienna Conven-
                      tion, notwithstanding its right to object, the receiving State remains
                      obliged to facilitate the sending State to acquire its diplomatic premises.
                      Obviously, neither unilateral designation by the sending State nor persis-
                      tent objection of the receiving State could be the end of the story in prac-
                      tice, because neither way could lead to the establishment of a diplomatic
                      mission. Co-operation and consultation are the only way that can pro-
                      duce a mutually acceptable solution.

                      70

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                      367 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                        17. In the present case, what is relevant for the determination of the
                      dispute between the Parties in relation to the status of the building is the
                      consistent practice of France. The Court should first look at whether
                      France has adopted any legislation or official guidance regulating the
                      matter. If there exists no such regulation, France’s established practice
                      should govern. In refuting Equatorial Guinea’s argument that it had fol-
                      lowed the normal course of procedure, France did not produce convinc-
                      ing evidence to show that, in France’s practice, prior consent is consistently
                      required for a building to acquire diplomatic status. Moreover, its
                      repeated refusal of Equatorial Guinea’s assignment is related more to the
                      disputed criminal proceedings than to the procedure itself.

                         18. As is pointed out above, Equatorial Guinea’s designation of the
                      building at 42 avenue Foch as the premises of its diplomatic mission is
                      not a normal case. The building in question is not the first premises that
                      Equatorial Guinea assigned for its Embassy; it is a relocation site for the
                      mission. Its status is the very subject of the dispute relating to the immu-
                      nities of State property between the Parties. Under any circumstances, so
                      long as France maintains its position on the criminal proceedings in ques-
                      tion, it would not recognize the status of the building as the premises of
                      Equatorial Guinea’s Embassy. Therefore, a general examination of the
                      circumstances under which a property acquires the diplomatic status does
                      not address the real issue in the present case. The key question in
                      the present context is not whether France as the receiving State enjoys
                      the sovereign right to object to Equatorial Guinea’s choice of its diplo-
                      matic premises, but whether it has wrongfully exercised jurisdiction by
                      imposing measures of constraint on the State property of Equatorial
                      Guinea.

                                       3. The Criteria Applied by the Court

                          19. In the Judgment, the Court recognizes that the power of the receiv-
                      ing State to object to a sending State’s designation of its diplomatic
                      premises is not unlimited. To exercise such a power reasonably and in
                       good faith, the Court considers that the receiving State must raise its
                       objection in a timely, non‑arbitrary and non‑discriminatory manner. It
                       states that
                           “where the receiving State objects to the designation by the sending
                           State of certain property as forming part of the premises of its diplo-
                           matic mission, and this objection is communicated in a timely manner
                           and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory in character, that property
                           does not acquire the status of ‘premises of the mission’ within the
                           meaning of Article 1 (i) of the Vienna Convention, and therefore does
                           not benefit from protection under Article 22 of the Convention.
                           Whether or not the aforementioned criteria have been met is a matter
                           to be assessed in the circumstances of each case.” (Judgment, para. 74.)

                      71

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                      368 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      These three criteria for the manner in which the receiving State raises its
                      objection, i.e. timely, non‑arbitrary and non‑discriminatory, in principle
                      do not give rise to any questions. What should be examined is how to
                      apply them in practice.
                         20. On the first criterion of timely objection, there is no doubt that
                      each time when Equatorial Guinea notified the Protocol Department of
                      the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs of its designation or use of the
                      building as the premises of its diplomatic mission, the latter objected
                      without delay. Given the factual background of the case, the timely replies
                      from France to Equatorial Guinea’s requests are self‑explanatory; the
                      Parties were holding opposing views on the status of the building. Silence
                      or a delayed reply on the part of France might have been perceived or
                      taken as France’s acquiescence to Equatorial Guinea’s position.

                        21. In assessing whether France’s objection to Equatorial Guinea’s
                      designation of the building as its diplomatic premises was arbitrary, the
                      Court unavoidably refers to the criminal proceedings in question. Its rea-
                      soning, however, is predicated on the assumption that the criminal pro-
                      ceedings against Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue and measures of
                      constraint on the building were not in dispute between the Parties. Appar-
                      ently, that is wrong.

                        22. First of all, with regard to the Note Verbale of 11 October 2011,
                      which stated that the building at 42 avenue Foch in Paris “falls within the
                      private domain”, the Court states that,
                           “[s]een as a response to that notification, the French Note Verbale
                           cannot be interpreted as referring to the ownership status of the
                           building: the object of the Note Verbale was to contest Equatorial
                            Guinea’s assertion that the building was used for diplomatic pur-
                            poses, and hence that it fell within the ‘public domain’.” (Judgment,
                            para. 106.)
                      In the Court’s view, France’s position was justified by the fact that the
                      French authorities, in the context of the ongoing criminal investigation,
                      had conducted on‑site inspections and searches of the building and found
                      that it was not used and not being prepared for use as premises of Equa-
                      torial Guinea’s diplomatic mission.

                        23. Moreover, the Court considers that France’s objection is further
                      supported by the reason that the French authorities, for the purposes of
                      the criminal proceedings, may need to conduct more searches of the
                      building, or impose other measures of constraint on it, and therefore, to
                      accede to Equatorial Guinea’s assignment of the building to its diplo-
                      matic mission, “might have hindered the proper functioning of its crimi-
                      nal justice system” (ibid., para. 109).
                        24. Regarding Equatorial Guinea’s argument that France should have
                      sought to co‑ordinate with it before refusing its claim that the building

                      72

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                      369 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      enjoyed the status of premises of the mission, the Court takes the view
                      that France was not obliged under the Vienna Convention to consult with
                      Equatorial Guinea before communicating its decision of objection to it.
                         25. This line of reasoning is totally one‑sided. It reveals that the issue
                      of France’s objection to Equatorial Guinea’s designation of the building
                      as the premises of its diplomatic mission cannot be separated from the
                      question of immunities of State property in the criminal proceedings. At
                      the time when Equatorial Guinea first requested to assign the building for
                      its diplomatic mission, whether the building was used or being prepared
                      for use for its diplomatic mission was an irrelevant factor for France’s
                      objection, because that condition of the building did not in any way affect
                      Equatorial Guinea’s designation. To maintain the building under mea-
                      sures of constraint for the purpose of the criminal proceedings is the very
                      reason for France’s objection.

                         26. As the Court observes, the dispute between the Parties over the
                      criminal proceedings against Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue had
                      been going on for a number of years before the transfer of the building
                      took place. When Equatorial Guinea decided to designate the building
                      for its diplomatic premises, to say that there is no obligation under the
                      Vienna Convention for France to consult with Equatorial Guinea is con-
                      trary to the object and purpose of the Convention to “contribute to the
                      development of friendly relations among nations”. The dispute involves
                      not only the high‑ranking official of Equatorial Guinea, but also a sub-
                      stantial amount of its State assets. The fact that Equatorial Guinea took
                      over the building and used it as the premises of its diplomatic mission
                      cannot be considered “to benefit individuals”.
                         27. On the criterion of non‑discrimination, the Court’s reasoning is
                      rather simple: there are no comparable circumstances as those in the pres-
                      ent case to determine whether France has acted in a discriminatory man-
                      ner. In assessing France’s conduct, one does not have to rely on any
                      comparable case in France’s practice, but just to inquire whether, under
                      the same circumstances, France would have treated any other State, or
                      whether any other State would have accepted to be treated, in the same
                      way.
                         28. Evidence shows that Equatorial Guinea had made several notifica-
                      tions or statements to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informing
                      it that it designated or used the building for its diplomatic mission (among
                      which the Note Verbale dated 4 October 2011 (Memorial of Equato-
                      rial Guinea, Ann. 33), and the Notes Verbales dated 17 October 2011
                      (Ann. 36), 14 February 2012 (Ann. 37), 12 March 2012 (Ann. 44), 27 July
                      2012 (Ann. 47)). Even after the official communications of Equatorial
                      Guinea to that effect, the French authorities nevertheless conducted sev-
                      eral searches of the building, in the course of which various items were
                      seized and removed and personal belongings of Mr. Teodoro Nguema
                      Obiang Mangue were taken away and auctioned. Official protests of
                      Equatorial Guinea against such actions were to no avail. For almost four

                      73

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                      370 	    immunities and criminal proceedings (diss. op. xue)

                      years, i.e. from 27 July 2012, the date when Equatorial Guinea actually
                      moved its mission into the building, until it instituted proceedings against
                      France before this Court on 13 June 2016, the Embassy of Equatorial
                      Guinea used the building for the performance of the official functions of
                      its diplomatic mission, but without proper status and protection. Mean-
                      while, measures of constraint such as attachment and confiscation were
                      imposed on the building. This kind of situation cannot be deemed normal
                      in diplomatic relations; nor does it resemble the relationship between two
                      sovereign equals. These facts, per se, demonstrate that undue emphasis
                      on the power of the receiving State to object would upset the delicate bal-
                      ance established by the Vienna Convention between the sending State and
                      the receiving State.

                      (Signed) Xue Hanqin.

                      74

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172

1937. COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE

Le 6 novembre.
Rôle général
n° 72.

Ordonnance rendue le 6 novembre 1937.

ANNÉE JUDICIAIRE 1937
AFFAIRE BORCHGRAVE

Présents : M. GUERRERO, Président; sir CECIL Hurst, Vice-
Président ; le comte RosTworowskI, MM. FROMAGEOT,
DE BUSTAMANTE, ALTAMIRA, URRUTIA, NEGULESCO,
Jhr. van Eystnca, MM. CHenc, Hupson, DE VIsscHER,
quges.

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale,

ainsi composée,
après délibéré en Chambre du Conseil,

vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour,
vu les articles 38 et 62 du Règlement de la Cour,

rend l’ordonnance suivante :

Vu le compromis signé le 20 février 1937 entre le Gouverne-
ment belge et le Gouvernement espagnol, déposé et enregistré
au Greffe de la Cour le 5 mars 1937, en vertu duquel ces Gou-
vernements, considérant qu’une contestation s’est élevée entre
eux à propos de la mort du baron Jacques de Borchgrave, et
que les Parties sont tombées d'accord pour soumettre le diffé-
rend à la décision de la Cour, prient la Cour de dire si, étant
données les circonstances de fait et de droit concernant le cas,
la responsabilité du Gouvernement espagnol se trouve engagée ;

Vu l'ordonnance datée du rer avril 1937, par laquelle le Prési-
dent de la Cour — celle-ci ne siégeant pas — a fixé, confor-

18
173 A/B 72 (AFFAIRE BORCHGRAVE). — ORDONNANCE

mément aux propositions des Parties, les délais afférents au
dépôt des pièces de la procédure écrite ;

Vu les exceptions préliminaires soulevées le 29 juin 1937 par
le Gouvernement espagnol ;

Considérant qu'en conséquence de l'arrêt rendu en date de
ce jour sur lesdites exceptions il y a lieu, conformément à
l’article 62, alinéa 5, du Règlement, de fixer de nouveau les
délais pour la suite de l’instance,

La Cour

fixe comme il suit les délais pour le dépôt des pièces ulté-
rieures de la procédure écrite sur le fond :

pour le Contre-Mémoire du Gouvernement espagnol, le mardi
21 décembre 1937;

pour la Réplique du Gouvernement belge, le vendredi 4 février
1938 ;

pour la Duplique du Gouvernement espagnol, le lundi 21 mars
1938.

Fait au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le six novembre mil
neuf cent trente-sept, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera
déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront trans-
mis respectivement au Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique
et au Gouvernement de la République espagnole.

Le Président de la Cour:
(Signé) J. G. GUERRERO.

Le Greffier de la Cour:
(Signé) J. Lopez OLIVAN.

19