38

SEPARATE OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA.

[Translation]

My dissent from the foregoing judgment is mainly in respect
of the two following points: the interpretation of the Treaty
of 1863 and the findings upon the submissions of the Applicant.

I will confine myself to indicating my interpretation of the
Treaty in so far as is necessary to explain why I cannot accept
all the grounds on which the judgment is based, though this
does not prevent me from arriving for different legal reasons
at the same conclusions as the findings of the judgment, with
the sole exception of the finding in regard to the Neerhaeren
Lock.

I.

The Treaty of May 12th, 1863, constitutes, in my view, a
well constructed and complete system in which the various
articles are interconnected, each serving to explain and com-
plete the others, thus achieving the objects which are fully
and reasonably set out in the Preamble itself.

Regarding the Treaty as a whole, it is possible to discern
three groups of provisions: one comprising Articles I, II, ITI,
IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and XI, which deal with the feeding
of and navigation upon certain canals referred to in Article I;
another comprising Articles X and XIII which relate to the
carrying out of works made necessary by the provisions of the
first group, and a third comprising Articles IX and XII, which
concern navigation on the Meuse at different points. This
structure of the Treaty, which is due to the needs with which
the Parties were concerned in 1863, serves to explain the import
of the Preamble.

Before analyzing the articles of the Treaty, I find it neces-
sary to make two general observations.

First of all, I would say that, in my view, every one of the
obligations, whether common to the two contracting Parties or
peculiar to one of them, contained in the Treaty, is essential
in respect of the type of interests to which it relates; but it
follows that none of them takes precedence over the others
and still less can render them superfluous. On the contrary,
each article of the Treaty requires the precise fulfilment of that
part of the agreement between the contracting States which
it represents; the interdependence which may exist between
that part and the provisions of other articles (e.g. Art. IV and
Arts. III, V and XI) merely places conditions or limits upon
the exercise of each right or the fulfilment of each obligation ;
but, subject to these conditions or limits, where they exist, the

38
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 39

provisions of each article remain intact and nothing should
prevent their application. For otherwise the Treaty would
cease to be a harmonious whole and would fail to fulfil one or
more of its objects instead of serving them all in accordance
with the plan jointly adopted by the Parties.

Besides this general consideration which, in my view, governs
the Treaty as a whole and each of its articles, there is the
fact—entirely natural since we are dealing with a treaty—that
the Treaty of May 12th, 1863, involves obligations and that
these obligations must be fulfilled. The fact that the Treaty
is chiefly concerned with the adjustment of the Parties’ interests
and not with differences of a really legal nature does not mean
that no legal relationship is established as regards the fulfilment
of the agreement in regard to interests. These interests may
have been the reason. for the conclusion of the Treaty, but
once the Treaty has come into existence, the rights and
obligations which it expressly or implicitly creates take pre-
cedence. The interests remain in the background and can
only be taken into account in so far as is permitted by the
legal provisions embodied in the agreement between the Parties.
They can never take the place of these provisions or impede
their execution.

Having made these general observations, I now come to the
interpretation of the articles of the Treaty.

Article I is for many reasons of considerable importance for
a proper understanding of the Treaty. It has been very much
discussed by the Parties in this case. It is connected with all
the other articles relating to the diversion and allocation of
water, and more especially with Article II and Article IV.

An analysis of its terms gives the following results: an
obligation to construct at Maestricht a work for the diversion
of water from the Meuse; the definition of this work as ‘‘the
feeder’, i.e. the only feeding conduit for certain canals and
irrigation channels; the qualification of these canals by the
words “situated below’ Maestricht, and of the irrigation channels
as those “of Campine and of the Netherlands”. The character
of the new feeding conduit as the only feeder which is expressed
by the wording of the Article, is confirmed by the terms of
the last paragraph of Article IV, which stipulates that the intake
of Meuse water previously existing at Hocht is not to be used,
that is to say its abolition in practice, since no other source
for the feeding of the canals referred to in Article I may exist
once the feeding conduit through which is discharged the
volume of water taken from the Meuse at Maestricht has been
constructed.

Two obligations naturally ensue from this circumstance. One—
common to both Parties—is the obligation not to make—or

39
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 40

not to retain—another intake having the same purpose or the
same result in practice as that which the Maestricht feeder is
henceforward alone to serve. To my mind, it is obvious that
the obligation covers the two following points: the intention
to supply water and the actual fact of the supply of water to
canals “below Maestricht”, since though it is impossible to
imagine that an intake would be made with the express object
of feeding these canals unless that object were fulfilled—for
otherwise the intention would not be carried out—there is the
possibility that though the object were lacking, the feeding
might nevertheless take place. It is clear that, in Article I, the
actual feeding of the canals and not the construction of the intake
with its feeding conduit is the essential point. Unless the
feeding actually takes place, the intake would be of no use for
the fulfilment of the object of the agreement between the Parties.

The other obligation, likewise common to both Parties, is
the obligation to do nothing which—apart from a supplying of
. Water from a source forbidden by the first obligation—would
make it impossible to execute Article I completely and conse-
quently also the other articles which constitute its complement
or corollary. This second obligation, so far as Belgium is
concerned, relates to the volume of water to be assigned to the
Maestricht intake which naturally depends on the total volume
of water in the Meuse above Maestricht in Belgium territory.
Thus, if intakes intended for the supply of water for some
object other than canals referred to in Article I, were made
above Maestricht to carry off quantities of water which would
make it impossible for the Maestricht feeder to fulfil its
function under the conditions laid down by the Treaty, it
is clear that this would be contrary to Article I, as well as—
as we shall see—to Articles IV and V. Of course, though this
obligation appears particularly to concern Belgium, it also
concerns the Netherlands in so far as it may be possible for
action taken in their territory to interfere with the fulfilment
of the function of the treaty feeder. In my opinion, this is
all that is to be found or can be deduced from the terms of
Article I—which is very clear—without going beyond its scope.
Any further obligation or right on the part of the Netherlands
Government or the Belgian Government is only to be found in
the following articles of the Treaty.

As regards what canals were referred to by the words in
the Article “below Maestricht’’, everyone knew quite well in
1863 which canals were.meant, and the Treaty did not need
to enumerate them. It is fair to assume that the authors
of the Treaty thought it unnecessary to mention them by
name. Moreover, the judgment does so in more than one
passage in its grounds, and there is nothing further to add.

40
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 41

The first paragraph of Article II simply draws a conclusion
from Article I. If the new intake was thenceforth to be the
sole ‘‘feeder’’ for the canals—a service hitherto performed by
the intake at Hocht, about to be abolished—the lock connected
with the Hocht intake became useless where it was. But
since the function it performed was still required for purposes
of navigation, it had to be transferred to the place where the
new intake was to be built. We shall see later that this para-
graph ‘of Article II has also a special significance in connection
with the finding concerning Neerhaeren.

The second paragraph of this Article II is only important
in the present case as emphasizing the importance of naviga-
tion on the canals. It anticipates a consequence following from
the execution of Article I, the first paragraph of Article IT
and the last paragraph of Article IV and, to remedy the
resulting inconvenience, orders the execution of certain hydraulic
works. Article III pursues the same aim on another part of
thé canal.

Paragraphs x and 2 of Article IV fix the quantity of water
which can be taken from the Meuse by the Maestricht intake,
varying with the level of water in the river. Thus they deter-
mine the flow of the intake provided for in Article J. The two
paragraphs mark the limits of this flow and thereby impose an
obligation upon the Netherlands, in whose territory the new
feeder operates, not to exceed these limits, subject to a right
in favour of the Netherlands Government, which is not expressed
in Article IV, but in paragraph 2 of Article V.

The third paragraph of Article IV prescribes the placing at
the mouth of the new intake of a gauge indicating the low
water level fixed in the preceding paragraph.

‘Finally, the last paragraph of Article IV formulates expressly,
as already said in reference to Article I, one of the main conse-
quences ensuing from that Article: viz., the discontinuance
of the Hocht intake, already mentioned in Article IT—an intake
which was situated in Belgian territory above Maestricht.

Article V, paragraph x, fixes, on the basis of the maximum
volume which can be taken from the Meuse by the Maestricht
feeder, the distribution of this water between the two interested
countries. The allocation is not made on terms of equality,
Belgium being the more favoured Party, but the reasons for
this inequality of treatment are of no importance to the ques-
tions now at issue. We need only note the obligation which
this paragraph imposes upon the Netherlands to discharge the

41
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 42

two cubic metres per second allotted them (14 when bound by
the minimum as provided in Art. IV) through lock 17 at Loozen
in the direction of Netherlands territory, these two metres
being intended for ‘‘the canals and irrigation channels of the
Netherlands”.

On the other hand, paragraph 2 of Article V grants permis-
sion to the Netherlands Government to ‘‘increase the volume of
water taken at Maestricht” (ie. the total maximum volume
fixed in Art. IV and requiring to be passed through the new
feeder). This increase will in practice affect the quantity of
water allowed to the Netherlands by paragraph 1 of Article V,
as is clearly shown by the words in this same paragraph 2:
“this surplus water will also be discharged through lock 17 at
Loozen’’ (as well as the two cubic metres of para. I).

The right thus to increase the volume of water especially
assigned to the Netherlands is not restricted to a certain num-
ber of cubic metres, but is limited in this same paragraph by
the fact that the increase may not be of such amount as to
cause ‘‘the speed of the current in the canal .... to exceed the
limits fixed in Article IIT”. This ‘‘average” speed shall not
exceed “a maximum of 25 to 27 centimetres per second”.

Within these limits therefore, the right granted to the Nether-
lands is purely discretionary.

Article VI deals particularly with irrigation, which, according
to the Preamble, is the second aim of the Treaty. I need not
analyze this Article, as it is of little importance to our case.
The same applies to Article VII, which imposes a further
obligation upon Belgium, and to Article VIII.

Article IX introduces the second group of treaty provisions
to which IJ referred at the beginning. It concerns the improve-
ment of navigation, not on the canals mentioned in Article I,
but on the Meuse in the part of the river between Maestricht
and Venlo, which in 1863 presented serious obstacles to safe
navigation. It has no connection with the Maestricht feeder
nor with the supply of the canals referred to in Article I.

Article X is again concerned with the intake of Article I,
but only from the technical point of view of works to be
constructed there and of the works mentioned in Article IT.
It adds nothing essential in regard to the questions now at
issue. The same is true of Articles XII and XIII. Article XIV
deals only with ratification of the Treaty.

Article XI, on the other hand, supplements paragraph 2 of
Article V in case the exercise of its right by the Netherlands

42
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 43

Government should require the execution by it of certain
hydraulic works. In this event, but only in this event, ‘‘the ques-
tion of the co-operation of the Belgian Government .... will be
settled between the two Governments”, in regard to the “meas-
ures necessary to secure discharge of the water through the Zuid-
Willemsvaart”. It appears to me clear that, as long as the
increased volume granted to the Netherlands Government is
furnished by the Maestricht feeder, the water is bound to be
discharged into the Zuid-Willemsvaart, since the feeder com-
municates only with that canal. Article XI seems to me to
provide for the possibility of new hydraulic works being con-
structed between the feeder and the said canal or in some other
way allowing the surplus water permitted by Article V to be
discharged in some other direction. The possible effect of this
surplus water on the current of the canal is already provided
for in Article V.

In this interpretation of the 1863 Treaty, I have been at
pains to state by an analysis of its articles the express or implied
obligations contained in each of them. The Treaty does not
seem to me to impose any other obligation upon either Party.
In my view, however, each of these obligations must be observed
irrespective of the others, and the fulfilment of the others can-
not excuse the non-fulfilment of one.

Before concluding this part of the present opinion, I would
point out, among the practical consequences to be drawn from
an interpretation of the 1863 Treaty—thus passing beyond the
sphere of law—the fact that the obligations under this Treaty
are perhaps somewhat restrictive, having regard to circum-
stances that have since developed. ‘This is certainly not a question
for the Court or for a judge to examine, but it arises quite
naturally from a study of the legal elements contained in the
Treaty and from knowledge of present-day conditions. As long
as the Treaty remains in force, it must be observed as it
stands. It is not for the Treaty to adapt itself to conditions.
But if the latter are of a compelling nature, compliance with
them would necessitate another legal instrument.

II.

To explain the grounds of my dissent from the finding
concerning the Neerhaeren Lock, as contained in the reasons
for the present judgment, I need only apply my interpretation

6 43
A./B. 70 (WATER FROM THE MEUSE).—OP. ALTAMIRA 44

of Article I of the Treaty of 1863 and my general remarks on
the Treaty system.

The canals referred to in Article I may not be fed otherwise
than from the Maestricht intake and its feeding conduit, firstly
because that is the only place where feeding is permitted and
secondly because the quantity of water to be diverted for this
purpose may not exceed the maximum volume fixed by
Article IV, and, as regards the surplus allowed to the Nether-
lands by Article IV, paragraph 2, only the Netherlands Govern-
ment may supply it within the limits fixed in that paragraph.

The case of lock 19 cannot, in my view, be invoked to refute
the foregoing argument. This lock was created by the Treaty,
and this fact confers upon it a legal status which renders it
consistent with the rest of the convention, a status which no
other lock not recognized by the Treaty and discharging water
into the canals by conduits other than the Maestricht feeder,
would possess. Nor is there anything in Article II which, in
my view, would justify the deduction that the Treaty recognizes
the general principle that water discharged by locks, of which
water the principal and normal purpose is not that of feeding
the canals referred to in Article I but which in fact does
constitute a feeding of such canals with water not taken from
Maestricht, may be assimilated to water from the new lock 19,
and still less to water passing into the Zuid-Willemsvaart by
the Maestricht conduit. The fact that the water hitherto
discharged by the Neerhaeren Lock has not increased the speed
of the current does not seem to me to alter the character of the
supply of water discharged by that lock. The provisions of
Articles I, IV and V are in my view contrary to this conclusion.

(Signed) RAFAEL ALTAMIRA.


                                                                         181

  Déclaration de M. le juge Tomka, vice-président

[Texte original français]

   Je suis très largement d’accord avec ce qui est dit dans l’arrêt de la
Cour et j’ai, par conséquent, voté en faveur de la conclusion générale
selon laquelle la Cour n’a pas compétence pour connaître de la requête
de la Géorgie. Je m’associe également à la conclusion selon laquelle
aucune des deux conditions préalables à la saisine de la Cour, prévues à
l’article 22 de la convention sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de dis-
crimination raciale, n’a été satisfaite par la Géorgie. Je souscris aussi à
l’analyse approfondie menée par la Cour, dont il ressort qu’il « n’exis-
tait … aucun différend d’ordre juridique entre la Géorgie et la Fédération
de Russie [durant la période allant de 1999 à juillet 2008] au sujet du
respect par celle-ci de ses obligations en vertu de la CIEDR » (arrêt,
par. 105).
   Je m’écarte toutefois de l’analyse de la majorité sur la question spéci-
fique de savoir s’il existait un différend d’ordre juridique en vertu de la
CIEDR en août 2008, avant que la Géorgie ne dépose sa requête. Selon
mes éminents collègues, plusieurs déclarations attestent l’existence d’un
différend entre les Parties à propos du respect par la Fédération de Russie
de ses obligations au titre de la CIEDR, à savoir : les déclarations faites
par le président géorgien à l’occasion d’une conférence de presse devant
les journalistes étrangers et dans le cadre d’une interview accordée à
CNN, toutes deux tenues dans le contexte d’un grave affrontement mili-
taire ayant fait suite à une « attaque à l’artillerie lourde » lancée par la
Géorgie (ibid., par. 106) ; les échanges chargés d’émotion entre les repré-
sentants des deux Etats au cours de la réunion du Conseil de sécurité du
10 août, qui avait été convoquée à la demande de la Géorgie en raison de
l’affrontement militaire en cours ; et la réponse du ministre des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie à une question posée lors de la
conférence de presse conjointe tenue après sa réunion avec le ministre
finlandais des affaires étrangères. A la lumière des circonstances dans les-
quelles ces déclarations ont été faites, je considère que la conclusion de la
majorité est assez artificielle.
   Dans l’affaire relative à Certains biens, la Cour se trouvait également
confrontée à une objection soulevée au motif qu’il n’existait aucun diffé-
rend d’ordre juridique entre les Parties. Elle a conclu que
    « la position adoptée par l’Allemagne dans le cadre de consultations
    bilatérales et dans la lettre … émanant du ministre des affaires
    étrangères confort[ait] l’affirmation selon laquelle les revendications
     du Liechtenstein [s’étaient] heurtées à l’opposition manifeste de
    l’Allemagne et que cette dernière l’a[vait] reconnu » (Certains biens

                                                                         115

      convention sur la discrimination raciale (décl. tomka)            182

    (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
    Recueil 2005, p. 19, par. 25 ; les italiques sont de moi).
   Je me suis rallié à cette conclusion.
   Dans le cadre des dernières observations qu’il a formulées au sein de la
Cour, le regretté juge Fleischhauer, qui siégeait alors en l’affaire en qua-
lité de juge ad hoc, s’est inscrit en faux, estimant que
    « pareille formulation risqu[ait] de fixer un seuil trop bas en matière
    de détermination de l’existence d’un différend et, partant, de faire
    hésiter les Etats qui y seraient pourtant disposés à s’engager sur la
    voie du règlement pacifique des différends » (ibid., p. 69).
   En la présente espèce, je crains que la majorité n’ait encore abaissé ce
seuil. Elle s’est en effet contentée de juxtaposer de manière quelque peu
formaliste les termes employés par les représentants des Parties pendant
la brève période d’hostilités militaires ouvertes entre les deux pays. Selon
moi, le fait que les Parties aient, en pareil contexte, fait référence à un
« nettoyage ethnique » n’est rien de plus qu’une des expressions récentes
de la rhétorique de temps de guerre visant à mettre en cause et à discrédi-
ter l’adversaire. En réalité, aucune accusation ne fut portée contre la
Fédération de Russie relativement à ses obligations au titre de la CIEDR,
et il n’y eut ni négociations ni consultations. Si des négociations ou
consultations avaient été menées, ou s’il avait au moins été tenté d’en
mener, cela aurait certainement été utile pour définir adéquatement le dif-
férend. En conséquence, je suis au regret de ne pouvoir m’associer à la
majorité sur ce point.

                                                  (Signé) Peter Tomka.

                                                                        116


                    251

                                        DECLARATION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN

                       Disagreement with certain aspects of the Court’s reasoning as regards the
                    second ground of appeal — Paragraph 48 of the Judgment — The Court’s reliance
                    on jurisprudence regarding its own competence when addressing the competence of
                    the ICAO Council is unjustified — Certain key differences exist between the
                    Council and the Court — Paragraph 61 of the Judgment — The Court goes too
                    far in endorsing a broad conception of the ICAO Council’s competence to examine
                    matters outside of civil aviation — The Council’s dispute settlement mandate is
                    limited to the ICAO treaties — In principle States have not consented to the
                    Council adjudicating matters unrelated to civil aviation.

                       1. I have voted in favour of the Court’s findings in the dispositif, as I
                    believe each of the Applicants’ three grounds of appeal ought to have
                    been rejected. However, I disagree with the Court’s expansive view of the
                    ICAO Council’s competence to address matters unrelated to civil avia-
                    tion, particularly as expressed in paragraphs 48 and 61 of the Judgment.
                    In this declaration, I shall set out the reasons for this disagreement.

                        2. In my view, the Applicants’ arguments concerning jurisdiction rati‑
                    one materiae can be rejected by adhering to the Court’s 1972 decision
                    in‑Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v.
                    Pakistan). In that case, the Court clearly rejected the notion that the
                     characterization of a defence on the merits as falling outside the scope of
                     the Chicago Convention and IASTA can deprive the ICAO Council
                     of jurisdiction 1. The same reasoning applies in the present case, as the
                      Applicants’ contention that their aviation restrictions constitute
                     lawful countermeasures is, in essence, a defence on the merits 2.

                          3. However, the propriety of the ICAO Council addressing matters

                       1 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment,

                    I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 61, para. 27. The Court wrote that
                              “[t]he fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form, cannot affect the
                              competence of the tribunal or other organ concerned, —otherwise parties would be
                              in a position themselves to control that competence, which would be inadmissible.
                              As has already been seen in the case of the competence of the Court, so with that of
                              the Council, its competence must depend on the character of the dispute submitted
                              to it and on the issues thus raised — not on those defences on the merits, or other
                              considerations, which would become relevant only after the jurisdictional issues had
                              been settled.”
                          2   See paragraph 49 of the present Judgment.

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                    252 	                   icao council (decl. gevorgian)

                    unrelated to civil aviation as part of its dispute settlement function is not
                    nearly as unequivocal as the present Judgment suggests. Given the impor-
                    tance of the principles at stake — most notably the principle of consent in
                     inter‑State dispute settlement — the Council’s competence should
                    be clearly defined and limited to those matters with which the States
                    parties have affirmatively entrusted it. The Court in the present Judg-
                     ment goes too far in appearing to endorse an expanded definition of the
                    Council’s competence, according to which the Council may (and perhaps
                    must) consider issues unrelated to civil aviation in resolving disputes
                    under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of
                     IASTA.

                       4. In paragraph 48 of the Judgment, the Court relies upon a pro-
                    nouncement from United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
                    (United States of America v. Iran) for the proposition that the existence
                    of a broader context behind the Parties’ dispute “does not deprive the
                    ICAO Council of its jurisdiction under Article 84 of the Chicago
                    Convention” 3. According to the Court’s Judgment in that case, the fact
                    that a legal dispute may form part of a wider political dispute between the
                    States involved does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over that legal
                    dispute 4. To hold otherwise would be to “impose a far‑reaching and
                    unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solu-
                    tion of international disputes” 5.

                      5. While this principle has been upheld numerous times in the con-
                    text of proceedings before the Court 6, it does not, in my view, apply to
                    other international institutions that were not created exclusively for the
                    purpose of the peaceful settlement of disputes. In particular, the political
                    contexts referred to in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
                    Tehran may have a greater impact on proceedings before a body com-
                    posed of representatives of States than on proceedings before the Court.
                    In other words, it is one thing to say that the existence a broader political
                    dispute should not affect the competence of a body that is composed of

                          3
                         See paragraph 48 of the present Judgment.
                          4
                         United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v.
                    Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 20, para. 37.
                       5 Ibid.
                       6 See e.g. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the

                    Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
                    of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judg‑
                    ment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 576, para. 28; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic
                    of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
                    2019 (I), p. 23, para. 36; Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v.
                    Chile), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 604, para. 32.

                    84

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                    253 	                        icao council (decl. gevorgian)

                    “independent judges” 7, and quite another to apply the same principle to
                    a body made up of States parties to the treaty in question 8, each of which
                    is likely to have its own political agenda and the potential to be influenced
                    by non-legal considerations.

                       6. The Court does not provide an explanation for why it considers its
                    reasoning from United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran to
                    apply to the Council. This omission is notable given that, elsewhere in the
                    present Judgment, the Court highlights significant differences between
                    itself and the ICAO Council 9, particularly that the Council is composed
                    not of independent judges, but of “contracting States elected by the
                    Assembly” 10.

                       7. Several other considerations bear mentioning. For instance, Mem-
                    bers of the Council act on instructions from their Governments when vot-
                    ing in proceedings under Article 84 11 — a fact which clearly illustrates the
                    Council’s non-   judicial nature. Moreover, while the Court’s principal
                    function relates to the peaceful settlement of legal disputes, Article 54 of
                    the Chicago Convention assigns to the ICAO Council a wide array of
                    responsibilities, most of which are of a technical or administrative nature
                    (for instance, it must “[a]dminister the finances of the Organization”, and
                    “[a]dopt . . . international standards and recommended practices” relating
                    to civil aviation). Finally, while the Court’s Statute empowers it to con-
                    sider “any question of international law”, the ICAO Council has a far
                    narrower dispute settlement mandate relating solely to the interpretation
                    and application of the ICAO treaties.

                      8. These are all reasons to consider that jurisdictional principles which
                    apply to the Court do not apply equally to the ICAO Council. I therefore
                    disagree with the Court’s reliance on the pronouncement from
                    United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran in its approach to
                    the Applicants’ second ground of appeal.

                          7
                         See Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
                          8
                         See Article 50 (a) of the Chicago Convention.
                       9 See paragraph 60 of the present Judgment.
                       10 Ibid.
                       11 See G. F. Fitzgerald, “The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the

                    Appeal relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council”, Canadian Yearbook of Interna‑
                    tional Law, Vol. 12 (1974), pp. 168‑169 (observing that
                              “[i]n the case of the ICAO Council, the persons sitting on the bench are demonstrably
                              the national representatives of the respective member States . . . Indeed, a perusal
                              of the minutes of the Council meetings of July 28-29, 1971 [in the India v. Pakistan
                              case], shows that some of the members wanted to defer decisions because they wished
                              to await instructions from their governments. Other representatives had apparently
                              received their instructions . . . The best that can be said is that, in the case of the
                              settlement of disputes in ICAO, the States as such act as judges and their representa-
                              tives speak on behalf of the States, and not as individuals.”)

                    85

10 CIJ1192_Ord.indb 166                                                                                10/08/21 10:34

                    254 	                   icao council (decl. gevorgian)

                       9. For similar reasons, I am also in disagreement with the Court’s rea-
                    soning in paragraph 61 of the Judgment. Given the aforementioned dif-
                    ferences between itself and the ICAO Council, the Court declines to apply
                    the concept of “judicial propriety” per se to the Council 12. However, the
                    Court then proceeds to hold that the “integrity of the Council’s dispute
                    settlement function would not be affected if the Council examined issues
                    outside matters of civil aviation” for the sole purpose of deciding a dis-
                    pute over which it has jurisdiction 13.
                       10. In my view, this categorical statement is too broad. Nothing like a
                    doctrine of “judicial propriety” can properly be applied to the
                    ICAO Council, as the Council is a body of a primarily technical and
                    administrative nature, whose Members act as representatives of their
                    Governments and need not be well‑versed in international law, and whose
                    dispute settlement mandate is narrowly limited to the interpretation and
                    application of the ICAO treaties. These factors weigh against a general
                    pronouncement that it is appropriate for the Council to consider matters
                    unrelated to civil aviation, so long as it does so for the purpose of resolv-
                    ing a dispute over which it otherwise has jurisdiction.

                       11. The basic principle remains that States should be subjected to the
                    jurisdiction of the Council only to the extent they have consented to it. As
                    the Court has observed with respect to its own competence, “the Court
                    has jurisdiction in respect of States only to the extent that they have con-
                    sented thereto” 14, and when consent is expressed in a compromissory
                    clause in an international agreement, the terms of the clause “must be
                    regarded as constituting the limits” on that consent 15.

                       12. These considerations apply with even greater force to an institution
                    like the ICAO Council, given its narrow mandate. As Article 84 of the
                    Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of IASTA only provide the
                    Council with jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes relating to those instru-
                    ments, States have not, in principle, consented to having matters unrelated
                    to civil aviation adjudicated by the Council. In establishing that the integ-
                    rity of the Council’s dispute settlement function “would not be affected”
                    by the Council considering matters unrelated to civil aviation in exercis-
                    ing its jurisdiction, the Court endorses a broad vision of the Council’s
                    competence that in the future may do harm to the fundamental principle
                    of consent in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

                          13. In summary, I am of the view that the Court goes in a wrong direc-

                          12
                          See paragraphs 60-61 of the present Judgment.
                          13
                          See paragraph 61 of the present Judgment.
                       14 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic

                    Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
                    2006, p. 32, para. 65.
                       15 Ibid., p. 39, para. 88.

                    86

10 CIJ1192_Ord.indb 168                                                                                10/08/21 10:34

                    255 	               icao council (decl. gevorgian)

                    tion in attempting to define the ICAO Council’s ability to address argu-
                    ments unrelated to civil aviation. The Court could have relied on its
                    1972 Judgment in the India v. Pakistan case to reject the Applicants’ sec-
                    ond ground of appeal. That decision made clear that the Council is not
                    deprived of jurisdiction ratione materiae simply because the respondent
                    characterizes a defence on the merits as falling outside the Council’s com-
                    petence. Instead, whether willingly or unwillingly, the Court appears to
                    widen the competence of the ICAO Council — a body whose role is to
                    settle discrete aviation disputes. In so doing, the Judgment, without sub-
                    stantial legal basis, risks in the future unduly subjecting States to the
                    Council’s dispute settlement procedures without their consent. For
                    the reasons described above, I consider this neither necessary nor appro-
                    priate.

                    (Signed) Kirill Gevorgian.

                    87

10 CIJ1192_Ord.indb 170                                                                           10/08/21 10:34


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU MANDAT D’ARRET
DU 11 AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 13 DÉCEMBRE 2000

2000

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE ARREST WARRANT
OF 11 APRIL 2000

(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO y. BELGIUM)

ORDER OF 13 DECEMBER 2000
Mode officiel de citation:

Mandat d'arrêt du 11 avril 2000 ( République démocratique
du Congo c. Belgique), ordonnance du 13 décembre 2000,
CLJ. Recueil 2000, p. 235

Official citation:
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic

of the Congo v. Belgium), Order of 13 December 2000,
LC J. Reports 2000, p. 235

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 804
ISBN 92-1-070903-9

13 DÉCEMBRE 2000

ORDONNANCE

MANDAT D’ARRET DU 11 AVRIL 2000
(RÉPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ARREST WARRANT OF I! APRIL 2000
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO y. BELGIUM)

13 DECEMBER 2000

ORDER
235

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

2000 ANNÉE 2000

13 décembre
Rôle général

n° 121 13 décembre 2000

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU MANDAT D’ARRET
DU 11 AVRIL 2000

(RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ORDONNANCE

Le président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 44 et 45, para-
graphe |, de son Règlement,

Vu la requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 17 octobre 2000, par
laquelle la République démocratique du Congo a introduit une instance
contre le Royaume de Belgique au sujet d’un différend concernant un
«mandat d'arrêt international qu'un juge d'instruction belge ... a décerné
le 11 avril 2000 contre le ministre des affaires étrangères en exercice de la
République démocratique du Congo, M. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi»,

Vu lordonnance du 8 décembre 2000 par laquelle la Cour s'est pro-
noncée sur la demande en indication de mesure conservatoire présentée
par la République démocratique du Congo le 17 octobre 2000, telle que
précisée lors des audiences pour tenir compte en particulier du fait que, le
20 novembre 2000, M. Yerodia Ndombasi «avait cessé d'exercer les fonc-
tions de ministre des affaires étrangères et s’était vu confier celles de mi-
nistre de l’éducation nationale»;

Considérant que la Cour, dans cette ordonnance, a déclaré qu’«il est
souhaitable que les questions soumises à la Cour soient tranchées aussitôt
que possible» et que «dès lors, il convient de parvenir à une décision sur
la requête du Congo dans les plus brefs délais»;

Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion que le président de la Cour a
236 MANDAT D’ARRET (ORDONNANCE 13 XII 00)

tenue avec les agents des Parties le 8 décembre 2000, celles-ci sont conve-
nues que les pièces de procédure comprendraient en l'espèce, dans l’ordre,
un mémoire de la République démocratique du Congo et un contre-
mémoire du Royaume de Belgique, et que ces pièces traiteraient à la fois
des questions de compétence et de recevabilité et du fond; et considérant
que, au cours de la même réunion, les Parties sont également convenues
des délais pour le dépôt desdites pièces;

Compte tenu de l’accord des Parties,

Fixe comme suit les dates d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt des
pièces de la procédure écrite:

Pour le mémoire de la République démocratique du Congo, le 15 mars
2001:

Pour le contre-mémoire du Royaume de Belgique, le 31 mai 2001;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix, a La Haye, le treize décembre deux mille, en trois exemplaires,
dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République démocra-
tique du Congo et au Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique.

Le président,
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.


608

          DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA

[Original English Text]

   Exercise in pure formalism — Introduction of a subjective criterion in
determining the existence of the dispute — Sound administration of justice —
Realism and flexibility of the case law of the Court — The existence of the dispute,
a question to be objectively decided.

   The Court has declared that it lacks jurisdiction in the three cases
brought by the Marshall Islands against India, Pakistan and the United
Kingdom respectively, on the same grounds: the non-existence of a dis-
pute between the Parties. Consistently, I have voted against each of the
three Judgments adopted by the Court, and for the same reasons set forth
in this opinion.
   Naturally, the Marshall Islands has invoked the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as customary inter-
national law in the proceedings against the United Kingdom, these
two States being parties to the treaty. However, the Marshall Islands
has referred only to customary international law regarding India and
Pakistan, which are not parties to the NPT.
   The reasoning of the Court, however, does not address the issue of
the customary nature of Article VI of the NPT which goes to the merits
of the case. The same applies to the Court’s consideration of whether or
not the Respondents have complied with the obligation to negotiate,
which is the subject-matter of the proceedings brought by the Marshall
Islands.
   Yet, with regard to the existence of a dispute, the Court has followed
the same approach to achieve a similar result in each of the three Judg-
ments.

                                          *
                                      *       *

   The Marshall Islands has brought before the Court a dispute between
itself and nine countries which hold, or are presumed to hold, nuclear
weapons, regardless of whether those countries are parties to the NPT.
The Court listed three cases against India, Pakistan and the United
Kingdom, which have made declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of
the Court, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The Court
has found that it lacks jurisdiction in these three cases, on the grounds
that no disputes exist between each of the three States and the Marshall
Islands.
   This is the ﬁrst time that the International Court of Justice has found
that it has no jurisdiction on the sole basis of the non-existence of a dis-

60

609     nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

pute between the Parties. A reading of the Judgment of the Court reﬂects
the fact that the majority came to this conclusion only by an exercise in
pure formalism, artiﬁcially stopping the time of law and analysis at the
date of submission of the request by the Marshall Islands. And as if that
were not enough, the majority has resorted to a “criterion” bearing no
relation to the well-established case law whereby in order for a dispute to
exist, the respondent must have been “aware, or could not have been
unaware, that its views were ‘positively opposed’ by the applicant”
(para. 38).
   The introduction of this criterion, linked to the subjective views of the
Respondent and of those conducting the analysis, clearly goes against the
entire case law of the ICJ and PCIJ, according to which the existence of a
dispute is determined objectively by the Court on the basis of the evidence
available to it, when it adopts its judgment. The Court has thus been able
to administer justice soundly and avoid the absurd situation in which it
now ﬁnds itself after declaring that it lacks jurisdiction in the three
Judgments on Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of
the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament. Indeed, the Parties
have disagreed clearly before the Court on points of fact and law, thereby
demonstrating the existence of legal disputes on the questions submitted
to it.
   In other words, the disputes are indeed there — and it would be suﬃ-
cient for the Marshall Islands to ﬁle fresh applications before the Court in
order to prevent the ground of lack of jurisdiction on which it has based
itself in handing down its Judgments from being invoked again!
   The Court, when faced with such situations, has ﬁrst noted that its
jurisdiction must normally be ascertained at the time of the institution of
the proceedings. But it has gone further and recalled that “like its prede-
cessor, [it] has also shown realism and ﬂexibility in certain situations in
which the conditions governing the Court’s jurisdiction were not fully
satisﬁed when proceedings were initiated but were subsequently satisﬁed,
before the Court ruled on its jurisdiction” (Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 438,
para. 81)
   In particular, the Court refused to declare itself incompetent when it
was suﬃcient for the Applicant to “ﬁle a new application, identical to the
present one, which would be unassailable in this respect” (Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 614, para. 26). Many more instances
could be cited in which the PCIJ, and then the ICJ, have rejected resort-
ing to a formalism that is excessive and contrary to the sound administra-
tion of justice.
   In the relationship between international law and time, there is a ratio-
nal element, namely the determination of a point in time beyond which,
theoretically, one must stop the watch, and a pragmatic element in order

61

610      nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

to take into account the particular circumstances of the situation. The
judge in exercising its art, has to strike the right balance between these
elements, so that justice is done and seen to be done.
   International judges had a duty to be even more vigilant in the present
case, which concerns a question of crucial importance for security in the
world. That is another reason for the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations to undertake its role fully. Indeed, how can it shelter
behind purely formalistic considerations which both legal professionals
and ordinary citizens would ﬁnd diﬃcult to understand, rather than con-
tributing, as it should do, to peace through international law, which is the
raison d’être of the Court.
   The only issue here was the scope of the obligation to negotiate laid
down in Article VI of the NPT, an obligation that is also part of custom-
ary international law according to the Marshall Islands:
         “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotia-
      tions in good faith on eﬀective measures relating to cessation of the
      nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
      on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
      eﬀective international control.”
   This obligation is well known to all those who have attended the meet-
ings of States parties to the NPT, which have been held regularly for
more than 40 years or so. It is also known to the Court, which, in its
famous Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, pronounced clearly on the subject as follows:

         “The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere
      obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation
      to achieve a precise result — nuclear disarmament in all its aspects —
      by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of
      negotiations on the matter in good faith.” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),
      p. 264, para. 99.)
   For the background to the dispute in question, its human substance,
we have to consider a small State, the Marshall Islands, whose population
of a few tens of thousands of people has suﬀered terribly from the nuclear
testing carried out in an area of its territory. This State has turned to the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations to seek justice, so that such
suﬀering does not occur again in future, through compliance with a con-
ventional and/or customary obligation under international law. That,
however, is a matter which the Court would have had to deal with when
considering this case on the merits. And we have not reached that point,
we are simply at the stage of jurisdiction.
   But what is the Court doing? Something novel, by concluding that no
dispute exists, so that it does not have to consider the merits of the case.
In a sense, the Court is setting little store by its jurisprudence, which is
nonetheless what ensures that it is both visible and credible.

62

611       nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

   Judge Abraham referred to the well-established approach of the Court,
in his separate opinion appended to the Judgment in the Georgia v. Rus-
sian Federation case (Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 1 April 2011):
         “I shall ﬁrst observe that until the present case the Court, whenever
      required to decide on a preliminary objection based on the respond-
      ent’s contention that there was no dispute, has made its decision —
      rejecting the objection — in a few short paragraphs, and has made
      the determination as of the date on which it was ruling, ﬁnding that
      the parties held clearly conﬂicting views at that date on the matters
      constituting the subject of the application and consequently that a
      dispute existed between them.” (I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 226,
      para. 8.)
   However, the Court did not change its position when dealing with that
case between Georgia and the Russian Federation in 2011. In fact, it
accepted that a dispute existed between the parties about the interpreta-
tion or application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), as Judge Abraham
acknowledged. But it was obliged to decline jurisdiction in the case
because the compromissory clause in the Convention on which the case
was based (Art. 22) relates to “[a]ny dispute . . . which is not settled by
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Conven-
tion”. It was this prior condition for referral to the Court which had not
been satisﬁed, and not that of the existence of the dispute.
   We therefore do indeed have a jurisprudence which takes “a strictly
realistic and practical view, free of all hints of formalism”, as Judge Abra-
ham put it in his opinion (Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Rus-
sian Federation), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 228, para. 14), and
which allows the Court to determine the existence of a dispute not only
on the basis of acts that took place prior to the ﬁling of the Application,
but also on that of the positions adopted by the parties in the course of
the written and oral proceedings. The important thing is to establish “a
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conﬂict of legal views or of
interests”, to use the classic wording of the PCIJ’s Judgment in the Mav-
rommatis Concessions case in 1924 (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 11).
   In the cases brought before the Court by the Marshall Islands, the lat-
ter has placed emphasis on the statement that it made, before the ﬁling of
its Application, at the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of
Nuclear Weapons, held in Narayit (Mexico) on 13 and 14 February 2014,
when it declared:
        “Indeed we believe that States possessing nuclear arsenals are fail-
      ing to fulﬁl their legal obligations in this regard. Immediate com-
      mencement and conclusion of such negotiations is required by legal
      obligation of nuclear disarmament resting upon each and every State

63

612      nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

      under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary
      international law. It also would achieve the objective of nuclear dis-
      armament long and consistently set by the United Nations, and fulﬁl
      our responsibilities to present and future generations while honouring
      the past ones.”

   The Court has recalled on numerous occasions that its determination
of the existence of a dispute “must turn on an examination of the facts”,
and that “[t]he matter is one of substance, not of form” which requires
“objective determination”. Such a dispute “may be inferred from the fail-
ure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is
called for” (Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 84, para. 30).
Hence in the present case, in order for the Court to determine objectively
that the dispute exists, it is suﬃcient to establish that the Marshall Islands
has clearly accused the “nuclear” States of failing to comply with Arti-
cle VI of the NPT or the corresponding customary obligation, and that
the Respondent countries have maintained, each for its own part, that
they were fulﬁlling the obligation in question.
   In its previous case law, the Court took account of the positions
adopted by the parties during the proceedings when it sought to deter-
mine the dispute objectively. If it had not proceeded in such a way, the
Court could have arrived at an absurd conclusion by making time stand
still on the date when the Application was ﬁled; the subject of the dispute
might have changed, or even disappeared, according to the positions set
forth before the Court. Let us even suppose that the premises of a dispute
have taken shape before the ﬁling of the Application and that the oppos-
ing views have been expressed clearly during the proceedings, can the
Court then declare that it lacks jurisdiction on the basis of a question of
form and not of substance or content? At the risk, as in the present case,
of seeing the Applicant ﬁle a new application immediately after the ﬁnd-
ing of lack of jurisdiction is announced! Where is the sound administra-
tion of justice in all of that?
   The Court has in fact operated in a “realistic and practical” way, and
with pragmatism, since its function is to settle disputes when they are
established before it, and not to shelter behind some kind of formalism,
at the risk of witnessing a deterioration in the situation between the par-
ties.
   Thus, in the Judgment on preliminary objections delivered on 11 July
1996 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia), Yugoslavia contested the existence of a dispute with Bosnia
and Herzegovina regarding violation of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Court found that
Yugoslavia had “wholly denied all of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s allega-

64

613      nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

tions, whether at the stage of proceedings relating to the requests for the
indication of provisional measures, or at the stage of the . . . proceedings
relating to [preliminary] objections” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 614,
para. 28), i.e., after the date when the Application was ﬁled.

   In the Judgment on preliminary objections delivered on 10 February
2005 in the case concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany),
the Court referred to the parties’ positions during the proceedings in
order to determine the existence of a dispute. It thus found that “in the
present proceedings complaints of fact and law formulated by Liechten-
stein against Germany are denied by the latter”, concluding that “[i]n
conformity with well-established jurisprudence . . . there is a legal dis-
pute . . . between Liechtenstein and Germany” (I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 19,
para. 25). The Court relied in this respect on the precedent from the
Genocide case in 1996, as cited above. For the sake of completeness, it
should be mentioned that:
      “[t]he Court further notes that Germany’s position taken in the course
      of bilateral consultations and in the letter . . . of 20 January 2000
      [before the ﬁling of the Application] has evidentiary value in support
      of the proposition that Liechtenstein’s claims were positively opposed
      by Germany” (ibid.).
   In other words, the Court took note of the positions of the parties
prior to the ﬁling of the Application only once it had determined the exis-
tence of a dispute on the basis of the exchanges between them during the
proceedings. All of this serves to reinforce the practical, realistic and
pragmatic nature of the Court’s jurisprudence, in accordance with the
principle of consent upon which its jurisdiction is founded and with the
principle of equality between the parties.
   In light of the Court’s well-established jurisprudence on the existence of
a dispute, which takes account of all the evidence available to the Court
at the point when it decides on and adopts its judgment, one might have
thought that the positive opposition between the respective views of the
Marshall Islands and each of the Respondents should logically have led
the Court to dismiss the objection of lack of jurisdiction based on the
absence of a dispute. However, the matters at stake in these cases are such
that the majority has sought to adduce another argument, of a subjective
nature, which has nothing to do with that jurisprudence. This is said to be
the “determination” that the Respondent “was aware or could not have
been unaware that its views were ‘positively opposed’ by the Applicant”.
The majority relies in this respect on the Judgment on preliminary objec-
tions delivered on 17 March 2016 in the case concerning Alleged Viola-
tions of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) (I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 3). First, however,
the Marshall Islands and the Respondent States had no knowledge of
that Judgment, since it was handed down on 17 March 2016, after the
closure of the oral proceedings in the present case, which took place from

65

614     nuclear arms and disarmament (diss. op. bennouna)

9 to 16 March 2016. And, second, it concerned a case in which, in the face
of all the evidence, Colombia argued that it was unaware of Nicaragua’s
position with regard to the implementation of and compliance with a
judgment of the Court.
   The second Judgment invoked in support of this subjective argument
employed in order to conclude that there is no dispute is taken from the
Georgia v. Russian Federation case. In that case, however, the point at
issue was the application of a compromissory clause, Article 22 of CERD,
which lays down, as a precondition for the Court’s jurisdiction, the exis-
tence of a dispute that falls within the scope of that Convention and,
above all, the holding of negotiations on the matter beforehand between
the parties.
   To my mind, the so-called determination of “being aware or having
been aware” cannot be used as a lifeline for a decision which is in no way
related to the well-established case law of the Court on this question. The
majority has tried to remove these two cases from their contexts. In the
Nicaragua v. Colombia case, the latter could not have been unaware of the
problem posed by the application of a judgment in a case to which it had
been party. In putting forward, on that basis, a new criterion for the exis-
tence of a dispute, the majority is seriously compromising the approach of
the Court in future to the question of whether a dispute exists.
   By placing itself, in this way, in a diﬃcult position which it has
attempted to justify, but without success, the majority is consequently not
allowing the Court to fulﬁl its function as the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations, whose task is to assist the parties in settling their
disputes and thereby to contribute to peace through the implementation
of international law.

                                        (Signed) Mohamed Bennouna.

66


196

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

[Traduction]

Je me rallie, encore que pour des motifs différents, à la conclu-
sion de la Cour selon laquelle l'Organisation des Nations Unies
a qualité pour présenter contre le gouvernement responsable une
réclamation internationale en vue d’obtenir la réparation des
dommages caus‘s par ce gouvernement à l'Organisation. Mais je
regrette de ne pouvoir être d’accord sur la partie de l'avis qui
traite de la capacité de l'Organisation pour prendre en mains une
réclamation internationale pour le compte d’un de ses agents.

La capacité de l'Organisation pour présenter une demande à
raison du dommage qui lui a été causé par l’acte dommageable
d’un Etat peut être énoncée très simplement dans les termes
suivants :

1) L'article 104 de la Charte confère à l'Organisation « la capacité
juridique qui lui est nécessaire pour exercer ses fonctions et atteindre
ses buts ».

2) Les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l’article 105 disposent que l'Orga-
nisation «jouit, sur le territoire de chacun de ses Membres, des
privilèges et immunités qui lui sont nécessaires pour atteindre ses
buts», et que les fonctionnaires de l'Organisation « jouissent
également des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont nécessaires
pour exercer en toute indépendance leurs fonctions en rapport
avec l'Organisation ».

3) Dans la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, adoptée
le 13 février 1946 par l'Assemblée générale, il est reconnu que
l'Organisation des Nations Unies possède la personnalité juridique
et qu'elle a la capacité a) de contracter, b) d'acquérir et de vendre
des biens mobiliers et immobiliers, et c) d’ester en justice; cette
convention dispose en outre que l'Organisation et ses fonctionnaires
jouissent de certains privilèges et immunités qui y sont énumérés.

La Convention n’a pas été approuvée par tous les Membres de
l'Organisation, mais nous pouvons, aux fins de la présente analyse,
présumer qu'elle traduit assez exactement la manière de voir de
la plupart d’entre eux.

4) H est évident que, si l'Organisation doit conclure des contrats,
acquérir des biens et en disposer, ester en justice, et réclamer le béné-
fice des privilèges et immunités auxquels elle a droit, il faut qu'elle
puisse engager des négociations avec des gouvernements, aussi
bien qu'avec les personnes privées. Elle doit donc être en mesure
de présenter des demandes pour son propre compte. On ne saurait
tirer aucune autre conclusion qui puisse se concilier avec les pouvoirs
mentionnés explicitement et avec le droit inhérent de conservation

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197 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

de soi-même. L'Organisation doit posséder, et possède, des pouvoirs
amplement suffisants pour lui permettre de prendre les dispositions
nécessaires, afin de se protéger contre des actes dommageables
dont seraient responsables les États Membres. Tout dommage
subi par l'Organisation à raison d'actes dommageables qui seraient
commis sur l'un de ses agents, dans l’exercice de ses fonctions,
rentrerait de même dans sa compétence.

C’est-la une application appropriée de la doctrine des pouvoirs
présumés.

5) Je n’éprouve donc pas de difficulté à répondre affirmative-
ment à la question I a) posée par l’Assemblée générale.

Pareille demande, introduite par les Nations Unies, comprendrait
tout élément de préjudice dont l'existence pourrait être prouvée
conformément aux règles d’usage relatives aux dommages, en
matière de réclamations internationales. La demande des Nations
Unies comprendrait tout paiement raisonnable fait par 1’Organisa-
tion à la victime de l’acte dommageable ou à ses ayants droit,
pourvu que ce paiement ait été effectué conformément aux engage-
ments contractuels de l'Organisation ou sur la base d’une ligne de
conduite bien établie dans les cas de cet ordre.

6) Il semble donc que, selon la question I a), l'Organisation
dispose incontestablement d'un ample pouvoir lui permettant de
se garantir contre les manquements commis par des États et de
défendre la dignité, l'honneur et l'autorité de l'Organisation.
Dans cette mesure, je suis d'accord sur Jes conclusions auxquelles
est arrivée la majorité de la Cour.

*
* 2k

La question I 8) traite d'une demande en réparation présentée
à raison du dommage causé à la victime d’un acte dommageable
ou à ses ayants droit, indépendamment d’une demande introduite
pour le compte de l'Organisation elle-même ; la situation est ici
différente.

La Cour est invitée à donner son avis sur le point de savoir
si l'Organisation a qualité pour faire sienne une telle demande.
En répondant à cette question, nous devons rechercher quelle
est, traditionnellement, la pratique internationale des États en
matière de réclamations privées, et examiner les dispositions
expresses des traités à l'égard de l'Organisation.

En ce qui est de la pratique internationale, nous constatons
immédiatement que, jusqu'à présent, seuls les États ont été
considérés comme ayant qualité pour présenter des réclamations
internationales de cet ordre.

En ce qui est de l'Organisation, nous ne trauvons rien qui
nous porte à considérer qu'elle aussi possède une capacité dans
ce domaine. La Charte ne contient certainement aucune disposition
explicite et, à ma connaissance, dans aucun autre accord on ne

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198 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

trouve une stipulation conférant à l'Organisation le pouvoir
d'assumer le rôle d’un Etat et de représenter ses agents en prenant
à son compte des réclamations diplomatiques introduites dans.
leur intérêt. Je suis également convaincu qu'il n’existe pas de:
pouvoir présumé sur lequel on puisse se fonder pour ce faire.

Suivant l'avis de la majorité de la Cour, la Charte ne dispose:
pas expressément que l'Organisation ait capacité pour faire figurer
«dans sa demande de réclamation» les dommages causés à la
victime ou à ses ayants droit ; mais on arrive à la conclusion
que ce pouvoir est conféré à l'Organisation par voie d’implication
nécessaire, Cette manière de voir semble se fonder sur l'hypothèse
selon laquelle, afin de garantir que les missions confiées à des.
agents de l'Organisation soient remplies de manière efficace et
indépendante et afin de leur assurer un appui moral, l'exercice
de ce pouvoir s'impose.

La conclusion que le pouvoir appartenant à l'Organisation de
prendre en mains des réclamations émanant de personnes privées.
lui est conféré « par voie d’implication nécessaire » ne serait pas.
motivée d’après les règles posées par les tribunaux pour remplir
les lacunes en cas de concessions de pouvoirs particulières.

I] est incontestable que l'Organisation tient ses pouvoirs d’une
délégation. On doit supposer que les pouvoirs que les États
Membres désireraient lui conférer se trouvent exposés soit dans
la Charte, soit dans les accords complémentaires conclus par ces
Etats. Des pouvoirs qui ne sont pas expressément conférés
ne sauraient être présumés. Des pouvoirs présumés découlent de
l'octroi de pouvoirs exprès ; n'existent que ceux qui sont « néces-
saires » à l'exercice des pouvoirs expressément conférés. L'existence
de cette nécessité pour l'exercice des pouvoirs dont il s’agit ici
n'a nullement été démontrée. Il n’y a ici aucune raison déter-
minante, à supposer qu’il en existe d'aucune sorte, pour que
l'Organisation prenne en mains des réclamations présentées pour
le compte de ceux qu’elle emploie, même en se bornant aux
réclamations nées lorsque l’agent se trouvait dans l'exercice de
ses fonctions. Ces employés sont encore les ressortissants de leurs
pays respectifs, et les façons de procéder généralement adoptées
à propos de ces réclamations peuvent toujours être employées
avec pleine efficacité. Le prestige et le rendement de l'Organisation
seront garantis par l'exercice du droit incontestable qui lui appar-
tient aux termes de la question I a) ci-dessus. Ici même il est
nécessaire de présumer le pouvoir, mais, ainsi qu'il a été dit plus
haut, la nécessité s’impose d’elle-méme. I] n'a pas été établi que
l'exercice d’un pouvoire extraordinaire de plus, dans le domaine
des réclamations relatives à des intérêts privés, fût nécessaire au
bon exercice de leurs fonctions par FOrganisation ou ses agents.

Nous voici donc en présence d’une analogie entre le lien qui unit
un Etat et son ressortissant et le lien qui unit l'Organisation à ses

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199 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

fonctionnaires ; une autre analogie existe entre le rôle d’un État
dans la protection de ses ressortissants et celui de l'Organisation
dans la protection de ses fonctionnaires.

Les effets de cette largeur d'interprétation judiciaire dépassent
de loin tout ce que l’on peut trouver dans la Charte des Nations
Unies, aussi bien que toutes les intentions connues des rédacteurs
de la Charte.

Ces prétendues analogies, en admettant même qu’elles puissent
avoir un semblant de réalité, ce qui n’est pas mon opinion, ne
sauraient autoriser l’octroi d’une compétence, là où la compétence
fait autrement défaut. La qualité appartenant à l'Organisation
pour agir dans le domaine dont il s ‘agit ici doit reposer sur un
fondement plus solide.

La Cour avance largument étrange suivant lequel le fonction-
naire, s’il avait à compter sur la protection de l'État dont il est
ressortissant, pourrait voir son indépendance compromise, contrai-
rement au but visé dans l’article 100 de la Charte.

Voilà qui semble évaluer bien bas le sens de la fidélité chez cet
employé. Mais approfondissons encore ce point.

L'article 100 dispose que:

«I. Dans l’accomplissement de leurs devoirs, le Secrétaire général
et le personnel ne solliciteront ni n’accepteront d’instructions
d'aucun gouvernement ni d'aucune autorité extérieure à l’Organi-
sation. Ils s’abstiendront de tout acte incompatible avec leur
situation de fonctionnaires internationaux et ne sont responsables
qu’envers l’Organisation.

2. Chaque Membre de l'Organisation s'engage à respecter le
caractère exclusivement international des fonctions du Secrétaire
général et du personnel et à ne pas chercher à les influencer dans
l'exécution de leur tâche, »

Ceci est une disposition classique. On la trouve, en termes iden-
tiques ou légèrement modifiés, dans chacun des accords en vertu
desquels ont été établies les diverses institutions spécialisées ;
certains de ces accords ont été conclus avant, d’autres après la
signature de la Charte.

Par exemple, nous trouvons, dans l’article 59 de la Convention
relative à l'Aviation civile internationale, signée en 1944, la dis-
position suivanet :

«Le Président du Conseil, le Secrétaire général et les autres
membres du personnel ne devront, relativement à l'exercice de
leurs fonctions, ni demander ni recevoir d'instructions d'aucune
autorité en dehors de l'Organisation. Chaque État contractant
s'engage à respecter en tout point le caractère international des
fonctions de ce personnel et à ne chercher à influencer aucun de ses
ressortissants dans l'exercice de ses fonctions.» (Annuaire des
Nations Unies, 1948, page 741.)

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200 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

L'article XII de l'accord relatif au Fonds monétaire interna-
tional (négocié en 1944) prévoit ce qui suit dans la Section 4 c) :

«Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, le Directeur général et le
personnel du Fonds. seront entiérement au service du Fonds, a
l’exclusion de toute autre autorité. Chaque Etat Membre du Fonds
respectera le caractére international de cette obligation et s’abstien-
dra de toute tentative d’influence sur un Membre quelconque du
personnel dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. » (Nations Unies, Recueil
des Traités, II, 1947, p._ 87.)

L'article V de l’accord, de même date, relatif à la Banque inter-
nationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement, est pratique-
ment identique aux dispositions qui viennent d’être citées. (Zbid.,
p. 167.)

L'article 9, paragraphes 4 et 5, de la Constitution amendée de
l'Organisation internationale du Travail, dispose comme il suit:

«4. Les fonctions du Directeur général et du personnel auront
un caractère exclusivement international. Dans l’accomplissement
de leurs devoirs, le Directeur général et le personnel ne solliciteront
ni n’accepteront d'instructions d'aucun gouvernement ni d’aucune
autorité extérieure à l’Organisation. Ils s’abstiendront de tout acte
incompatible avec leur situation de fonctionnaires internationaux
qui ne sont responsables qu’envers l'Organisation.

5. Chaque Membre de l'Organisation s'engage à respecter le
caractère exclusivement international des fonctions du Directeur
général et du personnel et à ne pas chercher à les influencer dans
l'exécution de leur tâche.» (Annuaire des Nations Unies, 1948,

p. 676.)

Dans le même sens, voir :

Article VIII, Organisation des Nations -Unies pour VAlimenta-
tion et l'Agriculture (tbid., p. 700) ; article VI de la Constitution
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'Éducation, la Science
et la Culture (ibid., p. 719) ; article 37 de la Constitution de 1’Orga-
nisation mondiale de la Santé (2bid., p. 803) ; et article 9 de la
Constitution de l'Organisation internationale pour les Réfugiés
{:bid., p. 819).

Doit-on supposer que chacune de ces organisations a qualité
pour présenter des réclamations diplomatiques au nom de ses agents,
et cela afin que l’indépendance de ceux-ci et leur fidélité envers
l'organisation ne puissent être compromises ? Des motifs condui-
sant à la même conclusion paraissent posséder ici une aussi grande
force que dans le cas des Nations Unies. Les termes employés
dans les instruments respectifs ont la même signification.

On ne saurait se fonder sur l’article 100 de la Charte qui, il
convient de l’observer, n’a trait qu’au Secrétaire général et au
personnel, pour revendiquer indirectement en faveur de l’'Organisa-
tion un pouvoir auquel aucune autorisation directe ne lui permet

30
201 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

évidemment de prétendre. L’interprétation la plus charitable et,
en fait, la plus conforme 4 la réalité, de cet article, est la suivante :
Vobjet de l’article est d'établir à un niveau élevé de loyauté et de
fidélité les fonctions exercées au service des Nations Unies et de
demander aux Etats Membres qu'ils respectent ce statut sans
chercher à influencer le Secrétaire général ou les membres du per-
sonnel dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.

Ce lien entre l’Organisation et ses employés, qui est entièrement
naturel et approprié, n’a pas et ne saurait avoir pour effet l’expa-
triation des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies ni la substitution a
leur allégeance envers leur Etat d’origine, une allégeance envers
Y Organisation. On ne peut dire que soit I’ Etat, soit le fonctionnaire,
aient envisagé une situation de cet ordre. Il n’y a aucune incompa-
tibilité entre la continuation de l’allégeance envers l'État national
et la fidélité complète envers l'Organisation. L’ État peut encore
protéger son ressortissant conformément au droit international.
On peut même envisager une situation dans laquelle cette protec-
tion pourrait intervenir contre des actes exercés par l'Organisation
elle-même.

L'objet de l’article, tel qu’il est énoncé dans le rapport adressé
par le secrétaire d’État au Président des Etats-Unis sur les résultats
de la Conférence de San-Francisco (26 juin 1945) est le suivant :

«.... établir très clairement que les ressortissants des Etats
Membres qui font partie du personnel du Secrétariat ne peuvent
en aucun sens être considérés comme des agents de leurs gouverne-
ments». (Département d’État, Publication 2349, Série des Confé-
rences 7I, pp. 150, 151.)

On a également fait valoir, pour appuyer l’assertion selon laquelle
l'Organisation des Nations ‘Unies devrait être considérée comme
ayant qualité dans les cas de cet ordre, que l’État national ne
serait pas en mesure de fonder une demande internationale présentée
pour le compte d’un ressortissant sur le motif qu'il aurait été porté
atteinte aux priviléges et immunités auxquels ont droit les fonction-
naires des Nations Unies, en vertu de l’article ou des dispositions
de la Convention relative aux privilèges et immunités.

Si cette maniére de voir est juste, c’est nécessairement parce
que les priviléges et immunités ne sont pas conférés dans son
intérêt personnel à l'individu lui-même. L’exactitude de cet
argument admise par la Cour ressort clairement de l’article V,
section 20, et de l’article VI, section 23, de la Convention.
Le premier dispose comme il suit :

« Les privilèges et immunités sont accordés aux fonctionnaires
uniquement dans l’intérêt des Nations Unies et non à leur avantage
personnel.» (Nations Unies, Recueil des Traités, I, 1946-1947,

p. 27.)

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202 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

Etant donné que, selon cette disposition, les priviléges et
immunités sont accordés dans l’intérét des Nations Unies et non
dans l'intérêt des fonctionnaires individuels, toute demande
fondée sur un manquement à cette convention devrait être pré-
sentée en faveur de l'Organisation et tomberait sous l’application
de la question I a) ci-dessus, et non sous l’application de la
question I b). |

Toute demande présentée en faveur du fonctionnaire individuel
_ doit se fonder, non pas sur les dispositions énoncées dans la
convention, mais bien sur les principes généraux du droit inter-
national.

Quel est donc le motif permettant de penser que ce seraient
les Nations Unies, plutôt que l’État national, qui devraient s’inter-
poser dans l'intérêt du fonctionnaire ? Il est possible que l'autorité
de l'Organisation ait, dans certains cas, plus de poids, et possède
une force de persuasion plus grande que celle de l'État national ;
mais il n’y a pas là un motif judiciaire, et ce motif ne fournit pas
la capacité juridique d'agir.

Indépendamment des remèdes fournis par la législation locale
en vertu de laquelle des demandeurs privés peuvent obtenir accès
à des tribunaux judiciaires ou autres, pour le règlement des
demandes introduites par eux contre un gouvernement, le seul
remède connu en droit international, dans les cas de cet ordre,
consiste à passer par l'entremise du gouvernement de l'Etat
dont le demandeur est un ressortissant. « Le ressortissant d’un
État, qui subit un préjudice à raison de la conduite d’un autre
État, doit chercher à obtenir réparation par l'entremise de son
propre gouvernement. Son gouvernement doit assumer la respon-
sabilité de la présentation de sa demande, sans quoi celle-ci n’a
pas besoin d'être examinée.» (United States v. Diekelman, 92
US. 520; VI, Moore’s Digest of International Law, 607.)

Ces demandes doivent être présentées par la voie diplomatique
(ibid.).

La protection diplomatique est, par nature, une méthode inter-
nationale constituant « un appel d’État à Etat en vue de l'exécution
des obligations de l’un ou de l’autre, naissant de leurs droits et
devoirs mutuels ». (Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
abroad, 354; VI, Moore’s Digest, 257.)

Une réclamation présentée par un Etat contre un autre Etat,
à raison d’un dommage causé à un ressortissant de l’État deman-
deur, se fonde sur la théorie selon laquelle l’État a subi un préjudice,
du fait du dommage causé à son ressortissant. La théorie selon
laquelle, en contre-partie de l’allégeance due par le ressortissant à
son Etat national, ce dernier doit audit ressortissant sa protection,
est également exacte. La nationalité est une condition sine qua
ñon pour que l’on puisse prendre en mains une réclamation diplo-
matique présentée pour le compte d’un demandeur privé. Indé-
pendamment de la situation particulière dans laquelle se trouvent

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203 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

des personnes protégées en vertu de certains traités, et celle des
marins et des étrangers qui servent dans les forces armées —
toutes ces personnes sont assimilées, au point de vue de leur
statut, à des nationaux —, c’est un principe bien établi que le
droit de protection est limité aux ressortissants de l’État pro-
tecteur. Si le demandeur privé n'est pas un ressortissant de l’État
dont on cherche à obtenir l'assistance, le gouvernement de cet
Etat ne peut, à juste titre, prendre en mains la réclamation, et
le gouvernement défendeur n’est nullement astreint à un devoir
juridique d’accueillir cette réclamation.

Le droit international est bien établi en cette matière, et toute
tentative en vue de greffer sur lui — sinon par la voie d'une conven-
tion internationale — une théorie fondée sur une analogie supposée,
selon laquelle des organisations qui ne sont pas des Etats et, en
conséquence, ne possèdent pas de ressortissants, pourraient agir
comme si elles étaient des Etats et avaient des ressortissants —
cette tentative, à mon sens, n’est pas justifiée. La Cour permanente
de Justice internationale a bien exposé la situation exacte quand,
dans l'affaire du chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis (Arrêt du
28 février 1939), elle s’est exprimée comme il suit:

« De l’avis de la Cour, la règle de droit international sur laquelle
se fonde la première exception lithuanienne est qu’en prenant fait
et cause pour l’un de ses ressortissants, en mettant en mouvement
en sa faveur l’action diplomatique ou l’action judiciaire interna-
tionale, cet Etat fait valoir son droit propre, le droit qu’il a de
faire respecter en la personne de ses ressortissants le droit inter-
national. Ce droit ne peut nécessairement être exercé qu’en faveur
de son national, parce que, en l’absence d’accords particuliers,
c’est le lien de nationalité entre l’État et l'individu qui seul donne
à l'État le droit de protection diplomatique. Or, c'est comme partie
de la fonction de protection diplomatique que doit être considéré
l'exercice du droit de prendre en mains une réclamation et d'assurer
le respect du droit international. Lorsqu'un dommage a été causé
au national d’un pays tiers, une réclamation à raison de ce dommage
ne tombe pas dans le domiaine de la protection diplomatique que
puisse accorder l'État et ne saurait donner ouverture à une récla-
mation que l’État soit en droit d’endosser. » (C. P. J.I., Série A/B,
n° 76, p. 16.)

Voir également, dans le même sens, l'arrêt rendu dans l’affaire
des concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine (C. P. J. I., Série A, n° 2,
1924, p. 12) ; et l'arrêt rendu dans l’affaire concernant le paiement
de divers emprunts serbes émis en France (C. P. J. I, Série A,
no 20/21, 1929, p. 17). _

Il est généralement admis que l’État dont le fonctionnaire possède
la nationalité a le droit de prendre en mains une réclamation telle
que celles dont il est question ici, et l’Assemblée générale envisa-
geait évidemment la possibilité de complications à cet égard,
ainsi qu’il ressort de la deuxième question posée à la Cour, par
laquelle il est demandé à celle-ci comment, en cas de réponse

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204 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. HACKWORTH

affirmative sur le point I b), l’action de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies doit «se concilier avec les droits que l’État dont la victime
est ressortissant pourrait posséder ».

La réponse que j’ai proposé de donner à la question I a) procu-
rerait sans doute à l'Organisation tout ce dont elle a besoin au
point de vue pratique.

Si elle désire, allant au delà, endosser des demandes introduites
au nom de ses fonctionnaires, la voie des accords lui est ouverte.
Si les Etats acceptaient d’autoriser l'Organisation à prendre en
mains des demandes présentées pour le compte de leurs ressortis-
sants qui sont au service de celle-ci, personne ne pourrait mettre
en question le pouvoir qu’aurait l’ Organisation de ce faire. L’Etat
défendeur serait affranchi de la possibilité de se voir présenter
des demandes provenant de deux sources, le fonctionnaire ou ses
ayants droit sauraient à qui s’adresser pour obtenir aide et assis-
tance, et la procédure tout entière serait exempte d'incertitude
et d’irrégularité.

(Signé) GREEN H. HACKworTH.

34