        DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA

 ranslation]

Propriety of the Court giving an advisory opinion — Respect for the integrity
 the Court’s judicial function — Frivolous requests for advisory opinions —
bstitution of the Court for the Security Council in exercising its political
 ponsibilities — Scope and meaning of the question put to the Court —
 cordance with international law of the declaration of independence adopted in
  context of a territory under United Nations administration — Identity of the
thors of the unilateral declaration of independence — Consequences of the
 lemate in the Security Council — Interpretation of “silence” in international
w — Lex specialis and general international law — Constitutional Framework
 ablished by UNMIK.

 1. Before turning to the reasons which have prevented me from con-
rring with the Opinion of the Court, I should first like to consider the
opriety of the Court embarking on an exercise that is so hazardous for
 as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, by responding to
e request for an advisory opinion submitted to it by the General
 sembly in resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008.
 2. That resolution was adopted in circumstances that are without prec-
ent in the history of the United Nations. It is the first time that the
eneral Assembly has sought an advisory opinion on a question which
 s not, as such, on its agenda and which it had until then dealt with
 entially in terms of authorizing the expenditure of the United Nations
ission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It is recognized that, in substance, the
hole of this question had fallen under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
curity Council for at least ten years or so, in particular since the latter
cided to place the territory of Kosovo under international administra-
 n (resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999) — with the exception, however, of
eneral Assembly resolution 54/183 on the Situation of Human Rights in
osovo, of 17 December 1999 (Advisory Opinion, para. 38).

 3. I believe that if it had declined to respond to this request, the Court
 uld have put a stop to any “frivolous” requests which political organs
 ght be tempted to submit to it in future, and indeed thereby protected
e integrity of its judicial function. What is at issue above all in this case
 protecting the Court itself against any attempts to exploit it in a poli-
 al debate, rather than protecting the balance between the prin-
pal political organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly and
 curity Council), a matter which the Court discusses at some length
 id., paras. 37-48), or indeed the question of the self-determination and
dependence of Kosovo, which has rightly been disregarded as lying

                                                                          101

yond the scope of the request for an opinion (Advisory Opinion,
ra. 83).

   1. THE PROPRIETY OF THE COURT GIVING AN ADVISORY OPINION

4. It should be recalled that, when the Court receives a request for an
visory opinion, pursuant to Article 65 of its Statute, it is not obliged to
mply with the request if it considers that giving a reply to the question
 sed would be “incompatible with the Court’s judicial character” (West-
n Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 33).

5. It is true that the Court has recalled on several occasions in its juris-
udence that it has discretion to consider the propriety of giving an
visory opinion (since the case concerning Interpretation of Peace Treaties
  h Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion,
C.J. Reports 1950), but it has hitherto never exercised that authority,
 the extent that scholarly opinion has begun to cast doubt on whether
actually exists. The Court is reaching the point of making the propriety
  giving its opinion dependent on the requesting organ itself, thereby
priving itself of its own discretionary power (Robert Kolb, “De la pré-
ndue discrétion de la Cour internationale de Justice de refuser de don-
r un avis consultatif”, The International Legal System in Quest of
 uity and Universality : Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab, 2001,
 . 609-627). The Court has shown itself to be very reluctant to decline to
 rticipate in United Nations action when asked to do so by one of the
gans of the United Nations. It has thus strictly circumscribed its discre-
 n, stipulating as a condition for exercising it the existence of “compel-
 g reasons” for not giving an opinion, yet without making clear what it
eans by that.
6. However, the question of the compatibility of a request for an opin-
n with the functions of the Court and its judicial character still stands,
en if no case of incompatibility has yet been recorded.
7. In the Kosovo case, the Court has been confronted with a situation
at has never occurred before, since it has ultimately been asked to set
elf up as a political decision-maker, in the place of the Security Coun-
. In other words, an attempt has been made, through this request for
  advisory opinion, to have it take on the functions of a political organ
  the United Nations, the Security Council, which the latter has not
en able to carry out.
8. The Court has been asked to give its opinion on whether the uni-
 eral declaration of independence (UDI) of 17 February 2008 by the
ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance
th international law ; however, the reply to this question cannot be
 tricted to an analysis of the declaration as a formal act — it is neces-
ry for the Court to consider its content and scope, as well as the cir-
mstances in which it was adopted. In this respect, the Court may not

                                                                        102

nfine itself to general reflections according to which it cannot substitute
  own assessment for that of the requesting organ or is unable to form
view as to whether its opinion would be likely to have an adverse effect
 dvisory Opinion, para. 35).
9. As will be seen below, the declaration was adopted by the
ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo established by res-
ution 1244 of the Security Council. It follows the mission which the
cretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, gave to
   Special Envoy, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, in November 2005, which was
  lead the political process aimed at determining the future status of
osovo, in the context of resolution 1244, by means of a negotiated set-
 ment.
10. Mr. Martti Ahtisaari was thus called upon to act as a mediator
tween Serbia and the representatives of the institutions of Kosovo (the
 sembly) so that they reach an agreement on the future status of the
 ritory ; such an agreement would then have to be endorsed by the
curity Council.
11. In his final report of 26 March 2007 on Kosovo’s future status,
 nsmitted to the Security Council by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
 d with his support, Mr. Ahtisaari took the view that “[i]ndependence is
e only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo”,
 d proposed that such independence should be supervised and sup-
 rted for an initial period by international civilian and military pres-
ces. Mr. Ahtisaari concluded by urging the Security Council to endorse
   proposal (Report transmitted to the President of the Security Council
  letter from the Secretary-General, 26 March 2007, S/2007/168).

 12. In the end, it was the Assembly of Kosovo that did so, thereby
bstituting itself for the Security Council. Serbia then asked the Court,
rough the General Assembly of the United Nations, to pronounce on
e declaration of independence of 17 February 2008, whereby that sub-
tution occurred, in order to establish whether it is in accordance with
 ernational law. It is therefore clear that, by giving the advisory opinion
hich has been requested of it, the Court is assessing, albeit indirectly,
e validity of the conclusions of the Ahtisaari Report, a role which
longs solely to the Security Council, a political organ on which the
nited Nations Charter confers primary responsibility for the main-
nance of international peace and security. That organ, by adopting
 olution 1244 on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, established an
 erim administration in Kosovo and has initiated, after some ten years,
process for bringing it to an end, at the same time determining the final
 tus of the territory.
 13. How, in these circumstances, can the Court pronounce on the
cordance with international law of Kosovo’s declaration of independ-
ce, when such an assessment is a matter for the Security Council alone
 d that organ has not sought its opinion on the question?
 14. That is why the Court, in this case, should have exercised its dis-

                                                                       103

etionary power and declined to give its opinion on a question which is
compatible with its status as a judicial organ. Beyond the question of
e accordance with international law of the declaration of independence,
hat is at issue here is the exercise of the powers of a political organ of
e United Nations, the Security Council. As for the Ahtisaari Report, as
ng as the Security Council makes no finding in this respect, it commits
 ly its author.
 15. It is essential for the Court to ensure, in performing its advisory
nction, that it is not exploited in favour of one specifically political
 ategy or another, and, in this case in particular, not enlisted either in
e campaign to gather as many recognitions as possible of Kosovo’s
dependence by other States, or in the one to keep these to a minimum ;
hereas the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for pro-
 uncing on the option of independence, has not done so.

 16. I am aware of the fact that the Court has a duty to contribute to
nited Nations action in legal terms, but here, the decision on the future
  tus of Kosovo is not a matter for the General Assembly, which has
bmitted the request for an opinion to the Court, but for the Security
ouncil. In this case, the Court cannot pronounce on the legality of the
claration of independence without interfering in the political process of
aintaining peace established by the Security Council some ten years
 o, which that organ has been unable to bring to a conclusion.
 17. A response from the Court would have been conceivable if the
bstantive debate on Kosovo had moved from the Security Council to
e General Assembly, for example through the convening of an emer-
ncy special session of the General Assembly under the terms of resolu-
 n 377 A (V), entitled “Uniting for peace”, as was the case with
e request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly concerning
e Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
 lestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I),
 . 145-146, paras. 18-19). In that case, however, the General Assembly
 d been continuously involved in the debate on the issue of the Middle East
 d the Palestinian question since the partition plan of 1947, and these
 re included year after year on its agenda. In contrast, the Kosovo case
 s been solely the responsibility of the Security Council since the armed
 ervention by NATO forces in Serbia in 1999.
 18. Consequently, while Serbia initiated the inclusion on the General
 sembly’s agenda of a request for an advisory opinion of the Court,
at was not in order to allow the Court to pronounce on certain legal
pects of the debate which the General Assembly had started on the
osovo case, but because it saw in this the only opportunity still avail-
 le to it to challenge the unilateral declaration of independence of
  February 2008. What is involved here is not the “motives of individual
ates which sponsor . . . a resolution requesting an advisory opinion”,
hich “are not relevant to the Court’s exercise of its discretion”
 dvisory Opinion, para. 33), but rather an assessment of the situation in

                                                                       104

osovo and of the handling of it, by the United Nations, at the point
hen the General Assembly adopted the request for an opinion on
October 2008.
 19. Moreover, there was no real debate on the question of the status of
osovo when the General Assembly adopted resolution 63/3 requesting
  advisory opinion of the Court (General Assembly, Sixty-third session,
 63/PV.22, 8 October 2008).
 20. It may be questioned, therefore, whether the request for an advi-
ry opinion adopted by the General Assembly (by 77 votes to six, with
  abstentions) is compatible with the Court’s functions as a judicial
gan, as defined by the Charter of the United Nations and by the Stat-
e of the Court.
 21. Furthermore, whatever the Court’s response to the question put by
e General Assembly, it will not in any way assist that political organ,
 ich cannot, in the light of the opinion, either modify Security Council
 olution 1244 or interpret it accordingly, since that task falls to the organ
 ich adopted it. It is not enough to say that only the Assembly can
 preciate the reasons which have led it to request an advisory opinion
 dvisory Opinion, para. 34), since that would mean the Court abandon-
g outright the exercise of its discretion as to the propriety of giving such
  opinion. All the protagonists in the Kosovo case have stated in advance,
 particular before the Court, that the opinion, whatever it may be, will
 ve no impact on their position in relation to the declaration of independ-
ce. Therefore, the advisory opinion can only be used as an argument in
e political debate taking place between the supporters of recognizing
osovo’s independence and those who are against it.
 22. By becoming enlisted in this way, the Court has everything to lose
 this political contest, without contributing in any real way either to
ducing the tensions caused by the unilateral declaration of independ-
ce or to clarifying the functions and responsibility of the United
ations in respect of a territory placed under its administration.
 23. In addition, since the declaration of independence of 17 February
 08, the fait accompli of the creation of Kosovo as an independent
tity has been reflected on the ground, with the increasing de facto mar-
nalization of the United Nations presence and its administration. Such
situation makes the propriety of responding to the question posed by
e General Assembly yet more dubious and problematic, while the
nited Nations has given the impression of adapting to the new state of
 airs (though how could it do otherwise ?).
 24. The Court itself has to make sure the integrity of its judicial func-
 n is respected, in contentious as well as in advisory matters, as it made
ry clear in its Judgment of 2 December 1963 in the case concerning
orthern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objec-
 ns :

   “both the Permanent Court of International Justice and this Court
   have emphasized the fact that the Court’s authority to give advisory

                                                                         105

   opinions must be exercised as a judicial function. Both Courts have
   had occasion to make pronouncements concerning requests for advi-
   sory opinions, which are equally applicable to the proper role of the
   Court in disposing of contested cases ; in both situations, the Court
   is exercising a judicial function. That function is circumscribed by
   inherent limitations which are none the less imperative because they
   may be difficult to catalogue, and may not frequently present them-
   selves as a conclusive bar to adjudication in a concrete case. Never-
   theless, it is always a matter for the determination of the Court
   whether its judicial functions are involved. This Court, like the Per-
   manent Court of International Justice, has always been guided by
   the principle which the latter stated in the case concerning the Status
   of Eastern Carelia on 23 July 1923 :
        ‘The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving
     advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their
     activity as a Court.’ (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, p. 29.)” (Northern
     Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objec-
     tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 30.)
25. While the Court cannot substitute itself for the Security Council in
ercising its responsibilities, nor can it stand legal guarantor for a policy
 fait accompli based simply on who can gain the upper hand. Its duty
to preserve its role, which is to state the law, clearly and independently.
 at is how it will safeguard its credibility in performing its functions, for
e benefit of the international community.

 26. Those are the reasons which led me to vote against the Court’s
cision to give an advisory opinion in this case. Having said that, the
ourt’s response to the request of the General Assembly did not strike
e as convincing, and I shall now explain why.

        2. THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE QUESTION POSED

 27. This second aspect of the opinion is of course linked with the first.
hereas the Court declines to consider either the motivation of the Gen-
al Assembly or the aims it was pursuing by means of its request for an
 inion, it has nonetheless deemed itself authorized to modify the word-
g of the request, to the point of completely altering its meaning and
ope.
 28. The Court relies on the fact that neither the agenda item under
hich resolution 63/3 was debated, nor the title of the resolution specified
e identity of the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence,
 d that the question of their identity was not raised during the debate
  the draft resolution. The Court then concludes that it is “free to . . .
cide for itself whether that declaration was promulgated by the Provi-

                                                                         106

 nal Institutions of Self-Government or some other entity” (Advisory
pinion, para. 54).
 29. However, the General Assembly’s question could not be more
 ar, and there is nothing in the debate which preceded the adoption of
 olution 63/3 of 8 October 2008 to suggest that the General Assembly’s
 ly concern was the accordance with international law of the declara-
 n of independence, regardless of who the authors were. Does the fact
at the participants in the debate on the draft resolution (A/63/PV.22)
d not raise the question of the identity of the authors of the declaration
 ply that it is not a relevant consideration for the requesting organ, or is
rather precisely because the question is such an obvious one for all the
nited Nations Member States that they consequently did not consider it
cessary to discuss or contest it ? As for the difference noted by the
ourt between the title of the agenda item, the title of the resolution, and
e question submitted to the Court, it is hard to see any significance in
 s since what matters for the Court is the content of the question put by
e General Assembly.
 30. This question therefore does not need to be interpreted in any way.
nd the Court acknowledges this : “the question posed by the General
 sembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific.”
 dvisory Opinion, para. 51.) The General Assembly did not request the
ourt to give its opinion on just any declaration of independence, but on
e one adopted on 17 February 2008 by the Provisional Institutions of
lf-Government of Kosovo, which were established with specific com-
tences by the United Nations. On 2 October 2008, however, before the
 option of resolution 63/3, the representative of the United Kingdom
 dressed a note of issues to the President of the General Assembly in
hich he indicated that :

     “It would be useful to know whether Serbia is seeking to focus on
   a narrower question about the competence of the Provisional Insti-
   tutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, and, if so, precisely how that
   question relates to Kosovo’s status at the present time.” (A/63/461 of
   2 October 2008.)
31. The answer to that question has been given by Serbia and by the
eneral Assembly. It is indeed a matter of assessing an act adopted by
e Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, and not just
 y act emanating from a hundred or so persons who supposedly declared
emselves to be representing the people.
32. At that point in time, the only institution recognized by the United
ations as representing the people of Kosovo was the elected Assembly
 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Even supposing that
e Court comes to the conclusion that the declaration of independence
 s not adopted by the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
overnment of Kosovo, acting as such, contrary to the assertion of the
eneral Assembly of the United Nations, should it not then exercise its

                                                                        107

 cretionary power and decline to respond to a question that would no
nger have any content or scope ? Ultimately, the General Assembly
 es not expect the Court to provide its legal opinion on a question
hich it has not put to it, i.e., a declaration issued by a hundred or so
rsons, unconnected with the United Nations.
 33. The Court has in the past extended the question posed in order to
ply to it as fully as possible (Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March
 51 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
 80, pp. 88-89, para. 35). It took the same approach in the Advisory
pinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para-
aph 2, of the Charter) (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 156-157), in which it
  out to “examine Article 17 in itself and in its relation to the rest of the
harter” ; likewise, the Court was obliged to clarify the question posed
hen this appeared to be “infelicitously expressed and vague” (Applica-
 n for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administra-
 e Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 348, para. 46). In
ese instances, however, the Court remained within the bounds of its
dicial functions in taking account of all the applicable law or interpret-
g a confused or imprecise text.
 34. Never, though, has the Court amended the question posed in a
anner contrary to its object and purpose, which in this case are to
termine whether the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008
d or did not fall within the competence of the Provisional Institutions
  Self-Government of Kosovo, as indicated by the United Kingdom
presentative in his above-mentioned note of 2 October 2008 to the
esident of the General Assembly.
 35. If the Court were able to employ discretion to such an extent, by
plying in the end to a question which it has itself adjusted beforehand
 order to make it fit a certain mould, then it would seriously prejudice
e sense of judicial security that ought to prevail among the States and
gans of the United Nations applying to the Court.

              3. ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
         OF THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

36. The General Assembly made a point of characterizing the declara-
 n of independence as unilateral to make it clear that it issued from
 ly one of the parties (the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of
lf-Government of Kosovo) involved in the political process, based on
curity Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, for the determination
 Kosovo’s final status.
37. The Court was requested by the General Assembly to give its
 inion on the accordance of the declaration with international law. In
ndering its opinion, the Court should first of all have ascertained the
 ernational law applicable in this area.

                                                                         108

 38. But, while the Court does describe the legal régime established by
e Security Council through resolution 1244 and regulations adopted by
e Secretary-General’s Special Representative and UNMIK (Advisory
pinion, paras. 58-63), it fails first to identify the applicable rules of gen-
al international law and to explain how it will go about determining
hether the unilateral declaration is in accordance with these two sets of
 ndards. Ordinarily, the Court should first look into the applicable lex
ecialis (that is to say the law of the United Nations) before considering
hether the declaration is in accordance with general international law.
  observed by the Chairman of the International Law Commission’s
udy Group on the Fragmentation of International Law : “[P]reference
 s often given to a special standard because it not only best reflects the
quirements of the context, but because it best reflected the intent of
ose who were to be bound by it.” (Report of the International Law
ommission, 2004, A/59/10, p. 286.)
 39. The Court has chosen instead to examine “the lawfulness of dec-
 ations of independence under general international law” (Advisory
pinion, para. 78). The General Assembly did not however ask the
ourt to opine in the abstract on declarations of independence generally
 t rather on a specific declaration adopted in a particular context —
at of a territory which the Council has placed under United Nations
 ministration — and this at a time when Security Council resolu-
 n 1244 was in force, and it still is. It would moreover make no sense to
sess the accordance with international law of a declaration of inde-
ndence without regard to who the author(s) are or to the background
 ainst which it was adopted. Likewise, the Court’s conclusion in this
 pect is itself meaningless :
   “the Court considers that general international law contains no
   applicable prohibition of declarations of independence. Accordingly,
   it concludes that the declaration of independence of 17 Febru-
   ary 2008 did not violate general international law.” (Ibid., para. 84.)

40. This is at best a sophism, in other words reasoning that is logical in
pearance alone, because it proceeds from the proposition that what is
lid for the whole is valid for the part. Since the principles of general
 ernational law, i.e., territorial integrity and self-determination, call
re for analysis in the context of a territory under United Nations
ministration, the Court could not announce its conclusion before
amining the law governing the territory as it relates to the declaration
 independence.

41. It is only in a second stage that the Court reaches the conclusion
at : “Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional
amework form part of the international law which is to be considered
 replying to the question posed by the General Assembly in its request
r the advisory opinion” (ibid., para. 93).

                                                                          109

 42. While resolution 1244 was indeed concerned with setting up an
 erim framework of self-government for Kosovo, as the Court notes, I
  not see anything to justify the assertion the Court then makes : “at the
me of the adoption of the resolution, it was expected that the final
 tus of Kosovo would flow from, and be developed within, the frame-
ork set up by the resolution” (Advisory Opinion, para. 104).
 43. It was simply a matter of UNMIK facilitating a political process
signed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the
ambouillet accords. That political process is what the Special Envoy,
r. Ahtisaari, was asked by the Security Council to lead through nego-
 tions between Serbia and the elected representatives of Kosovo (the
 sembly) ; as the two parties were unable to reach agreement,
r. Ahtisaari proposed a settlement plan to the Council, but the Council
ver approved it.
 44. The facts that the authors of the Declaration, members of the
 sembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo,
 ed the breakdown of negotiations and that they did not intend to act
thin the framework of the interim régime of self-government (ibid.,
 ra. 105) do not by themselves change the legal nature of an act adopted
  the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
osovo. In law, it is not merely because an institution has adopted an act
ceeding its powers (ultra vires) that the legal bond between the insti-
 ion and the act is broken. In such a case, the institution must be con-
 ered to be in breach of the legal framework that justifies and legiti-
 zes it.
 45. Similarly, it is not because the Assembly trespassed on the powers
 the Special Representative (ibid., para. 106) by involving itself in mat-
 s of Kosovo’s external relations that it must be considered as acting in
different capacity or as an entity no longer related to the Provisional
stitutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. Here as well, the Assembly
mply committed an act which is illegal under international law.

46. The Court’s reasoning, aimed at dispelling any inkling of the
claration’s illegality under the law of the United Nations, consisted of
vering it from the institution (the Assembly) that was created within
 s framework :
   “the authors of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008
   did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govern-
   ment . . . but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity
   as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of
   the interim administration” (ibid., para. 109).
 reach this conclusion, the Court relies upon the language used and the
ocedure employed (ibid., para. 107). Thus it was enough for the authors
 the declaration to change the appearance of the text, and to hold
emselves out as “the democratically-elected leaders of [the] people” in
der for them to cease to be bound by the Constitutional Framework

                                                                      110

r Kosovo, which states that “[t]he Provisional Institutions of Self-Gov-
nment and their officials shall . . . [e]xercise their authorities consistent
 th the provisions of UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the terms set forth in this
onstitutional Framework”. If such reasoning is followed to its end, it
ould be enough to become an outlaw, as it were, in order to escape
 ving to comply with the law.
 47. With a view to shedding light on this aspect of the question, during
e oral proceedings I asked participants generally, and the authors of
e declaration of independence specifically (CR 2009/33, p. 24), whether
e question of adopting such a declaration had been raised in any form
 ring the campaign for election to the Assembly of the Provisional Insti-
  ions in November 2007. A response in the negative was received both
om the authors of the declaration of independence and from Serbia
 plies by the authors of the declaration of independence and by the
  public of Serbia, dated 22 December 2009). If the members of the
 sembly, who had been elected on 17 November 2007, had wished to
 press the “will of [their] people” in a declaration made on 17 Febru-
y 2008, they should at least have told their electors so.
 48. It is very significant that when he reported to the Security Council
  the meeting held on 18 February 2008 (S/PV.5839), the day after the
 option of the declaration of independence of Kosovo dated 17 Febru-
y 2008, the Secretary-General of the United Nations did so as follows :
Yesterday, my Special Representative for Kosovo informed me that the
 sembly of Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government held
  ession during which it adopted a declaration of independence, which
 clares Kosovo an independent and sovereign State.”

 49. On the other hand, in his report of 28 March 2008 to the Security
ouncil on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
osovo (S/2008/211) the Secretary-General added, after noting that the
 ctoral process in Kosovo had concluded on 19 December 2007 and that
e members of the Assembly of Kosovo had taken their oath on 4 Janu-
y 2008 : “On 17 February, the Assembly of Kosovo held a session dur-
g which it adopted a ‘declaration of independence’, declaring Kosovo
  independent and sovereign State.” I would infer that the Secretary-
eneral as well as his special representative were also relying on the
 dress by the Prime Minister of Kosovo on 17 February 2008, when he
oke before the extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of Kosovo :

      “Today, the President of Kosovo and myself, as the Prime Minister
   of Kosovo, have officially requested from the President of the Assembly,
   Mr. Krasniqi ; to call for a special session with two agenda items,
      This invitation for a special session is extended in accordance with
   the Kosovo Constitutional Framework, whereby we present two
   items on the agenda :
   1. Declaration of independence for Kosovo, and

                                                                         111

   2. Presentation of Kosovo State symbols.” (Written Contribution
      of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence,
      17 April 2009, Ann. 2.)
50. Thus, there was no doubt in the minds of the Secretary-General
d his Special Representative in Kosovo that the declaration was in fact
e work of the recently elected Assembly of the Provisional Institutions
 Self-Government of Kosovo.
51. Of course, the serious problem the declaration raised in respect of
e United Nations Mission and the mandate it had been given by the
curity Council did not escape the Secretary-General :
      “I immediately drew this development to the attention of the
   Security Council, so that it could consider the matter. In doing so, I
   reaffirmed that, pending guidance from the Security Council, the
   United Nations would continue to operate on the understanding
   that resolution 1244 (1999) remains in force and constitutes the legal
   framework for the mandate of UNMIK, and that UNMIK would
   continue to implement its mandate in the light of the evolving cir-
   cumstances.” (Report of the Secretary-General on the United
   Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/211 of
   28 March 2008.)
52. It must also be kept in mind that when, in its resolution on
November 2002, the Assembly of Kosovo had previously asserted the
 ht to determine Kosovo’s future status, the Special Representative of
e United Nations Secretary-General stated on the same day :
      “Kosovo is under the authority of UN Security Council resolu-
   tion 1244 (1999). Neither Belgrade nor Pristina can prejudge the
   future status of Kosovo. Its future status is open and will be decided
   by the UN Security Council. Any unilateral statement in whatever
   form which is not endorsed by the Security Council has no legal
   effect on the future status of Kosovo.”

 53. Accordingly, no unilateral declaration affecting Kosovo’s future
 tus, whatever the form of the declaration or the intentions of its
 thors, has any legal validity until it has been endorsed by the Security
ouncil. Contrary to what the Court implies, it is not enough for the
 thors simply to step beyond the bounds of the law to cease being sub-
 t to it.
 54. The Court believes the inaction of the Security Council, the Secretary-
eneral and his Special Representative, in response to the declaration
 independence, to be confirmation that the declaration was not the work
 the Assembly of Kosovo, and it contrasts this inertia with the actions
ken between 2002 and 2005, when
   “the Special Representative had qualified a number of acts as being
   incompatible with the Constitutional Framework on the ground that

                                                                        112

   they were deemed to be ‘beyond the scope of [the Assembly’s] com-
   petencies’ (United Nations dossier No. 189, 7 February 2003) and
   therefore outside the powers of the Assembly of Kosovo” (Advisory
   Opinion, para. 108).

 55. However, the Security Council was prevented, by a lack of
 reement among its permanent members, from taking a decision on the
osovo question after receiving the Ahtisaari Report in March 2007.
nd, as is often the case within the United Nations, this deadlock in the
ouncil had a reverberating effect on the Secretary-General, charged with
 plementing its decisions, and his Special Representative.
 56. A stalemate in the Security Council does not release either the
 rties to a dispute from their obligations or by consequence the mem-
 rs of the Assembly of Kosovo from their duty to respect the Constitu-
 nal Framework and resolution 1244. Were that the case, the credibility
  the collective security system established by the United Nations Char-
   would be undermined. This would, in fact, leave the parties to a dis-
 te to face off against each other, with each being free to implement its
wn position unilaterally. And in theory the other party, Serbia, could
 ve relied on the deadlock to claim that it was justified in exercising full
 d effective sovereignty over Kosovo in defence of the integrity of its
 ritory.
 57. In my view, stalemate within the Security Council at a particular
 int cannot justify unilateral acts performed, or faits accomplis created,
   either party, or be deemed tacit approval of them. A failure by the
ouncil to take a decision on account of the veto power of one of its
 rmanent members is contemplated in the Charter. Its legal effect ends
ere ; inaction is itself a political act.
 58. On the other hand, although unable to reach a decision on the
htisaari Report, referred to it in March 2007, the Council nevertheless
 couraged attempts at mediation between the parties, in particular when
decided to send a mission, made up of members of the Council and led
   Johan C. Verbeke, representative of Belgium, to Belgrade and Pris-
 a, in April 2007 (S/2007/220 of 20 April 2007), and when it supported
e attempts by the troika (made up of the European Union, United
ates and Russia) created by the Contact Group to reconcile the two
 rties (from July to December 2007).
 59. This being the case, I cannot endorse the Court’s interpretation of the
 lence” of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which
 pposedly confirms that the declaration of independence was not the
ork of the Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
  Kosovo.
 60. We know just how delicate it can be to interpret an actor’s “silence”
 international law. In all events, silence must be interpreted by reference
  the entirety of the direct context and its background. Here, the dead-
ck in the United Nations bodies during the process to determine
osovo’s future status does not justify the conclusion that a unilateral

                                                                        113

claration of independence hitherto not in accordance with international
w is suddenly deserving of an imprimatur of compliance. In fact, the
ason why the Special Representative of the Secretary-General took no
tion was not that he considered the declaration to be in accordance
th international law, but simply that the political body to which he was
swerable was unable to reach a decision on advancing in the process
 der way to determine the future status of Kosovo.

 61. The Court then reflects on resolution 1244 and arrives at the con-
usion that the resolution does not contain a prohibition binding on the
 thors of the declaration of independence (Advisory Opinion, para. 118).
nd for good reason, since the Provisional Institutions had yet to be cre-
ed and the authors in question could not yet be identified. In reality,
e issue at this juncture is not establishing whether resolution 1244 was
med at prohibiting action by the authors of the declaration of inde-
 ndence, but simply recalling the mandatory force of this text, which is
nding on the institutions to be created “to provide an interim adminis-
 tion . . . under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial
 tonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (paragraph 10 of
 olution 1244 (1999) of the Security Council).

 62. UNMIK thus adopted the Constitutional Framework and set up
e interim administration on the basis of the mandate it had received
om the Security Council in resolution 1244. A violation of the Consti-
 ional Framework therefore entails a simultaneous violation of the
curity Council resolution, which is binding on all States and non-State
tors in Kosovo as a result of the territory having been placed under
nited Nations administration. This being the case, it is difficult to see
 w the Court could find that “Security Council resolution 1244
999) did not bar the authors of the declaration of 17 February 2008 from
 uing a declaration of independence from the Republic of Serbia”
 dvisory Opinion, para. 119). In my view, it does establish such a bar,
  at least two counts : because the declaration is not within the Consti-
 ional Framework established pursuant to the mandate given to
NMIK in the resolution ; and because the declaration is unilateral,
hereas Kosovo’s final status must be approved by the Security Council.
 63. Finally, even if it is assumed that the declaration of 17 February
 08 was issued by a hundred or so individuals having proclaimed them-
 ves representatives of the people of Kosovo, how is it possible for them
 have been able to violate the legal order established by UNMIK under
e Constitutional Framework, which all inhabitants of Kosovo are sup-
 sed to respect ?
 64. The Court responds merely by asserting that, when adopting the
claration of independence, the authors were not bound by the Consti-
 ional Framework and that the declaration was not an act intended to
ke effect within the legal order put in place by the United Nations
 id., para. 121). But then what legal order governed the authors and the

                                                                     114

claration itself ? It was not, in any case, the legal order of Serbia nor
at of a new sovereign State. And not being part of the interim institu-
 ns does not exempt the authors from the legal order established by
NMIK regulation 1999/1, providing that “[a]ll legislative and executive
 thority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the
diciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Repre-
ntative of the Secretary-General”. This simply means that all those liv-
g in Kosovo are subject to such authority and must comply with the
gime of self-government established by the United Nations. Hence, in
y opinion, it does not matter whether or not the authors of the declara-
 n of independence are considered to be members of the Assembly of
osovo ; under no circumstances were they entitled to adopt a declara-
 n that contravenes the Constitutional Framework and Security Coun-
  resolution 1244 by running counter to the legal régime for the admin-
ration of Kosovo established by the United Nations.
65. That said, the Court has minimized the purport and scope of its
pinion, since it has limited it to the declaration as such, severed from its
 al effects. It may therefore be asked : how can this Opinion, wherein it
concluded that a declaration adopted by some one hundred individu-
 , self-proclaimed representatives of the people, does not violate inter-
 tional law, guide the requesting organ, the General Assembly, in
 pect of its own action ?
66. This remains a complete mystery, even if the Opinion will be
ploited for political ends.
67. Expressing my personal view, I would be tempted to say that the
 ult is that the Court’s assistance to the General Assembly has emerged
vialized, and this is yet another reason why the Court should have
ercised its discretion by refraining from acceding to the request for an
 inion.
68. Finally, the Court in this case has not identified the rules, general
 special, of international law governing the declaration of independence
 17 February 2008 ; according to the Opinion, general international law
 inoperative in this area and United Nations law does not cover the
uation the Court has chosen to consider : that of a declaration arising
 an indeterminate legal order. Accordingly, there is apparently nothing
  the law to prevent the United Nations from pursuing its efforts at
ediation in respect of Kosovo in co-operation with the regional organi-
tions concerned.
69. Such declarations are no more than foam on the tide of time ; they
nnot allow the past to be forgotten nor a future to be built on frag-
ents of the present.

                                      (Signed) Mohamed BENNOUNA.

                                                                        115


COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE

INTERNATIONALE.
1923.
TT Le 15 ter
Dossier F. c.”
TROISIEME SESSION Rôle II. .

Présents :

MM. Lover, Président,
Weiss, Vice-Président,
Lord FINLAY,
MM. NYHoL,
DE BUSTAMANTE,
ALTAMIRA, Juges titulaires,
ODA, ;
ANZILOTTI,
HUBER,

M. WANG, Juge suppléant.

AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7.

A la date du 7 juillet 1923, le Conseil de la Société des
Nations a adopté une résolution ainsi congue :

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations ayant été saisi de la
question suivante :

Le Gouvernement polonais a décidé de traiter cer-
taines personnes, anciens ressortissants allemands, comme
n’ayant pas acquis la nationalité polonaise et comme con- .
tinuant a posséder la nationalité allemande, ce qui les
expose en Pologne à l’application à leur égard du régime
concernant les personnes de nationalité non polonaise,
notamment de nationalité allemande :

D'une part, sur la base du fait que ces personnes
sont nées sur le territoire qui fait actuellement partie .
de la Pologne, leurs parents y étant domiciliés au moment
de cette naissance, il est invoqué qu’en vertu de l’arti-
cle 4, alinéa 1, du Traité du 28 juin 1979, intervenu entre
les Principales Puissances alliées et associées et la Pologne,
elles possèdent de plein droit la nationalité polonaise
7 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7
e

et jouissent, par conséquent, de tous les droits et garan-
ties que les stipulations du Traité susmentionné ont
reconnus aux ressortissants polonais appartenant aux
minorités de race, de religion ou de langue ;

D'autre part, le Gouvernement polonais se croit
en droit de ne pas reconnaître à ces personnes la natio-
nalité polonaise, si leurs parents n’ont pas été domiciliés

‘sur le territoire susdit aussi bien au moment de la naïs-
sance de l'individu qu’à la date de l’entrée en vigueur du
Traité précité, à savoir le ro janvier 1920. Par conséquent,
ces personnes ne pourraient pas jouir en droit des garanties
accordées par le Traité ;

Prie la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de donner,
si possible au cours de la présente session, son avis consul-
tatif sur les questions suivantes :

1) La question concernant la situation des personnes
susdites, en tant qu’elles appartiennent à des minorités
de race et de langue, résultant de l’application par la
Pologne de l’article 4 du Traité du 28 juin 1019 inter-
venu entre les Principales Puissances alliées et associées
et la Pologne, relève-t-elle de la compétence de la Société
des Nations aux termes dudit traité ?

2) Dans l’affirmative, l’article 4 du Traité susmen-
tionné se réfère-t-il uniquement au domicile des parents
au moment de la naissance de l'individu, ou requiert-il
aussi le domicile des parents au moment de l’entrée en
vigueur du traité ?

Le Secrétaire général est autorisé à soumettre cette
requête à la Cour, ainsi que tous documents relatifs
à la question, à exposer à la Cour l’action du Conseil
en la matière, à donner toute l’aide nécessaire à l’exa-
men de l'affaire et à prendre, le cas échéant, des dispo-

sitions pour être représenté devant la Cour.

Le 11 juillet suivant, le Secrétaire général de la Société des
Nations a adressé à la Cour permanente de Justice interna-
tionale une requête ainsi formulée :
8 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

Le Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations,
en exécution de la résolution du Conseil du 7 juillet
1923

et en vertu de l'autorisation donnée par le Conseil,
a l'honneur de présenter à la Cour permanente de
Justice internationalé une requête demandant à la
Cour de bien vouloir, conformément à l’article r4 du Pacte,
donner au Conseil un avis consultatif sur les questions
qui ont été renvoyées à la Cour par la Résolution du 7
juillet 1923.

Il a également l'avantage de joindre à la présente
communication une note exposant l’action du Conseil
en la matière, ainsi qu’un exemplaire des documents,
relatifs aux points envisagés, qui ont été jusqu’à présent
communiqués aux Membres du Conseil et qui ne se trou-
vent pas encore en la possession de la Cour.

Le Secrétaire général se tiendra à la disposition
de la Cour pour donner toute l’aide nécessaire à l’exa-
men de l'affaire et prendra, le cas échéant, des dispo-
sitions pour être représenté devant la Cour.

Conformément à l’article 73 du Règlement de la Cour, la
requête pour avis a été notifiée aux Membres de la Société des
Nations par l'intermédiaire de son Secrétaire général ainsi
qu'aux Etats mentionnés à l’annexe au Pacte. En outre, le
Grefher fut chargé de la notifier au Gouvernement allemand.

Le Secrétaire général transmit avec la requête, et plus tard
encore, un certain nombre de documents ayant trait à la
question. En même temps, le Secrétaire général se référa à
d’autres documents qu'il avait transmis à la Cour avec
la requête pour avis consultatif au sujet de la question con-
cernant les colons allemands en Pologne, question qui forme
l’objet de l'avis émis par la Cou le Io septembre 1923 sous le
n° 6.

D'autre part, la Cour a entendu les explications orales
qu'ont été admis à fournir, sur la demande du Gouvernement
polonais, le représentant de ce Gouvernement, le Comte
9 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

Rostworowski, Professeur à l'Université de Cracovie, et
sur la demande du Gouvernement allemand, son représen-
tant M. Schiffer, ancien Ministre de la Justice du Reich.

Le Gouvernement roumain, avisé à la date du 6 août par
le Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations de la demande
d'avis consultatif formulée par le Conseil, a fait connaître
à la Cour, le 25 seulement, son désir d’être entendu au cours
des débats sur cette demande d’avis. La Cour, usant de la
liberté d’appréciation qui lui appartient en matiére d’avis
consultatif, s’est empressée de déférer au désir ainsi exprimé
et a fixé pour l’audition du représentant roumain un délai
expirant le 3 septembre. Ce délai a été jugé trop court par la
Roumanie, mais il n’a pas été possible de le prolonger au dela
de la date déjà fixée, étant donné l’imminence de la clôture
des travaux de la Cour et le désir du Conseil que la question
fat résolue, si possible, au cours de la présente session.

Il appert des documents ") placés sous les yeux de la Cour

#
1) LISTE DES, DOCUMENTS TRANSMIS A LA COUR PAR LE SECRÉTAIRE
GENERAL DE LA SOCIETE DES ERE ONS OU AUXQUELS IL S’EST
REFERE.

1. Exposé de laction du Conseil de la Société des Nations en Vaffaire,
Ti juillet 1923. .

2. Note du Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations aux Membres du
Conseil, en date du 25 avril 1923.
Appendice : Lettre du Représentant du Brésil au Secrétaire général de la
Société des Nations, en date du 21 avril 1923.

3. Rapport présenté au Conseil par le Représentant du Brésil, en date du 4 juillet

4. Note du Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations aux Membres du
Conseil, en date du 27 juin 1923.

Appendice: Lettre du Délégué polonais à la Société des Nations au
Secrétaire général de la Société, en date du 26 juin 1923.

. Procés-verbal de la cinquième séance de la vingt-cinquième session du
Conseil de la Société des Nations.

. Procès-verbal de la douzième séance de la vingt-cinquième session du
Conseil de la Société des Nations.

. Rapport des Représentants de la Belgique, de lItalie et du Japon,
approuvé par le Conseil le 17 mai, 1922.

. Pétition du «Deutschtumsbund », en date du 12 novembre 1921.

. Mémoire de la Délégation polonaise à la Société des Nations, en date du
26 janvier 1922. ‘

10. «Informations essentielles de fait et de droit, prévues: dans les alinéas
1 et 2 de la Résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations du 17 mai
1922 » présentées au Conseil le 5 juillet 1922 par le Délégué polonais à la
Société des Nations.

11. Mémoire émanant du «Deutschtumsbund », en date du ler août 1922.

12. Rapport du Représentant du Brésil et Résolution adoptée par le Conseil
de Ia Société des Nations le 9 septembre 1922.

13. Rapport du Représentant du Brésil et Résolution adoptée par le Conseil
de la Société des Nations le 30 septembre 1922.

14. Note du Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Pologne au Président du Con-
seil de la Société des Nations, en date du 7 décembre 1922. ,

15. Rapport du Représentant du Brésil et Résolution adoptée par le Conseil
de la Société des Nations le 3 février 1923.

OO I HM oO
Io AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

que, tandis que la question concernant les colons allemands en
Pologne a été portée à la connaissance de la Société des Nations
par un télégramme de |’Association allemande pour la sauve-
garde des droits des minorités en Pologne, de Bydgoszcz,
adressé au Secrétaire général le 8 novembre 19217, la question
concernant l’interprétation de l’article 4 du traité signé a
Versailles le 28 juin 1919 entre les Principales Puissances
alliées et associées et la Pologne, a été mentionnée pour la
première fois dans la pétition que ladite Association adressait
à la Société des Nations le 12 novembre 1921. Cette pétition
traitait également de la question des colons et, par la suite, le
Conseil de la Société s’est occupé simultanément des deux
questions.

La pétition fut portée à la connaissance du représentant .
de la Pologne auprès du Secrétariat et fut communiquée
aux Membres du Conseil en exécution d’une Résolution du
Conseil sur la protection des minorités datée du 27 juin 1927.
Le Conseil constitua, suivant la procédure établie par sa
résolution du 25 octobre 1920, un comité composé de trois
de ses Membres, pour examiner les questions qui avaient
été portées à la connaissance de la Société des Nations par
l'Association allemande en Pologne. Le Comité, sur la base
d'informations fournies par le représentant de la Pologne
à Genève et par ladite Association, prépara un rapport qui
fut approuvé par le Conseil le 17 mai 1922. Dans la résolu-
tion approuvant le rapport, le Conseil pria le Gouvernement
polonais de bien vouloir surseoir à toutes mesures administra-
tives ou judiciaires qui pourraient préjuger la situation nor-
male des cultivateurs de race allemande dont la qualité de
ressortissants polonais dépendait de la solution qui serait
donnée aux questions d'interprétation soulevées dans le rap-
port du Comité.

Plus tard, des renseignements supplémentaires sont parve-
nus au Conseil de la part de l’Association allemande en Pologne
et du Gouvernement polonais, et le 9 septembre 1922, le repré-

sentant du Brésil présenta au Conseil, alors réuni à Genève,
un rapport recommandant que la question de l’interpréta-
tion de l’article 4 du traité polonais de Minorités fût soumise à
un Comité de juristes. Le Conseil approuva cette suggestion et
II AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

nomma le Comité, qui fut composé de MM. Botella (Espagne),
Fromageot (France), Sir Cecil Hurst (Grande-Bretagne)
et van Hamel (Secrétariat de la Société des Nations). Par sa
Résolution du 30septembre, le Conseil décida d'inviter le repré-
sentant du Gouvernement polonais à porter à la connaissance
de son Gouvernerhent dans le plus bref délai le rapport pré-
senté par ce Comité. Ce Gouvernement informa le Président
du Conseil de la Société des Nations qu'il ne saurait se ral-
lier à l'interprétation de l’article 4 du traité polonais des mino-
rités, adoptée dans le rapport, et ajouta que, suivant son avis
ledit article n’est pas de ceux qui sont placés sous la garantie
de la Société des Nations.

Lorsque, le 3 février 1923, le Conseil décida de soumettre à
la Cour pour avis consultatif la question relative aux colons
- allemands, il déclara, en même temps, qu’étant donné que
Vinterprétatior de l’article 4 du traité polonais de minorités
faisait alors l’objet de négociations entre les délégations
allemande et polonaise à Dresde, il y aurait peut-être lieu,
pour raisons pratiques, de ne pas soumettre cette question
à la Cour pour le moment mais d'attendre le résultat des négo-
ciations en cours, étant entendu toutefois que la Société des
Nations se réservait la plénitude de ses droits conformément
au traité de minorités. |
En l’absence d'informations au sujet du progrès des négo-
ciations de Dresde, le représentant du Brésil au Conseil, le
21 avril, invita le Secrétaire général à demander au Gouver-
nement de Pologne de bien vouloir fournir toutes informations
utiles en la matière pour que le Conseil puisse examiner à
nouveau la question. Le Secrétaire général ayant donné suite
à cette invitation, le délégué polonais à la Société des Nations
l’avisa, le 26 juin, qu'au cours des pourparlers de Dresde,
les bases d’un accord relatif à l'interprétation de l’article 4
avaient été jetées et que ledit accord était soumis à l'étude
des deux Gouvernements. En conséquence, le Gouvernement
polonais priait le Conseil de bien vouloir ne pas faire figurer
la question de l'interprétation de l’article 4 du traité de mino-
rités à son ordre du jour. |
IZ AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

Néanmoins, ladite question ayant été inscrite à l’ordre du:
jour pour la vingt-cinquième session du Conseil et le consul
allemand à Genève ayant informé, le 6 juillet, le Secrétaire
général que le Gouvernement allemand ne prévoyait pas la
possibilité de sa solution rapide par voie de négociations
directes, le Conseil décida de soumettre à la Cour pour avis
consultatif les deux questions suivantes :

1) La Société des Nations est-elle compétente pour
traiter la question de l’article 4 du traité du 28 juin
1919 entre les Principales Puissances alliées et associées
et la Pologne ?

2) Si la Société des Nations est compétente, quelle
est l'interprétation exacte de cet article ?

Sur l'invitation du Conseil, son Président accepta d’arrêter
le texte définitif de la requête adressée à la Cour. C’est ce
texte qui se trouve reproduit au début du présent avis.
La rédaction nouvelle donnée à la deuxième question attire
l'attention de la Cour sur la difficulté soulevée par les mots
«nés de parents y étant domiciliés» dans l’article 4.

La première question à résoudre est celle de savoir si l’affaire
dont traite la requête est de la compétence de la Société des
Nations.

La Pologne, en contestant la compétence de la Société
pour s'occuper de la question concernant l'interprétation
de l’article 4 du traité polonais de minorités par rapport
à certaines personnes, anciens ressortissants allemands et
concernant l'application par la Pologne dudit article à ces
personnes, allègue que la garantie de la Société des Nations,
établie par le traité, ne s’étend pas aux dispositions de ses
articles 3 à 6.

La thèse polonaise à ce sujet est la suivante : l article 12
du traité de minorités débute ainsi :
13 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

«La Pologne agrée que, dans la mesure où les stipu-
lations des articles précédents affectent des personnes
appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de
langue, ces stipulations constituent des obligations
d'intérêt international et seront placées sous la garan-
tie de la Société des Nations. Elles ne pourront être
modifiées sans l’assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de
la Société des Nations. »

La garantie de la Société des Nations ne s’étend donc aux
articles précédents du traité que dans la mesuré où les dis-
positions de ces articles affectent des personnes appartenant à
des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue. Or, la Pologne
conteste que les personnes visées à l’article 4 appartiennent
en fait à une minorité dans le sens du traité. Le premier alinéa
de l’article 4 est ainsi libellé :

«La Pologne reconnaît comme ressortissants polonais,
de plein droit et sans aucune formalité, les personnes
de. nationalité allemande, autrichienne, hongroise ou
russe qui sont nées sur ledit territoire de parents y
étant domiciliés, encore qu’à la date de la mise en
vigueur du présent traité elles n'y $oient pas elles-
mêmes domiciliées. »

Suivant la thèse polonaise, pour faire partie d’une minorité
dans le sens du traité, il faut être ressortissants polonais. Or, les
personnes visées au texte ci-dessus — en l'espèce des personnes
de race allemande — ne sauraient être considérées comme
des ressortissants polonais, alors qu’il s’agit précisément de
savoir si, d’après ledit article, elles ont ou non cette qualité.
Elles ne sauraient être considérées tout au plus que comme des
candidates à la qualité de membre d’une minorité, de sorte
que la compétence de la Société des Nations, telle qu’elle
est définie à l’article 12 du traité, ne s’étend pas à ces
personnes. oo | .

La première question qui se pose est donc celle de savoir
ce qu’il faut entendre par une minorité — et en l'espèce, une.
minorité allemande — au sens du traité polonais de minorités.
Pour répondre à cette question, il convient de rappeler dans
T4 ‘AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

quelles conditions le traité de minorités fut conclu et quels
sont les rapports entre ce traité et le Traité de Paix signé le
même jour.

C'est par ledit Traité de Paix que l'indépendance du nou-
vel Etat polonais fut définitivement reconnue. En même temps,
la Pologne a assumé certains engagements envers les Princi-
pales Puissances alliées et associées, co-signataires des traités
de paix et de minorités. C’est ainsi que par l’article 93 du
Traité de Paix:

«La Pologne accepte, en en agréant l'insertion dans
un. Traité avec les Principales Puissances alliées et
associées, les dispositions que ces Puissances jugeront
nécessaires pour protéger en Pologne les intérêts des
habitants qui diffèrent de la majorité de la population
par la race, la langue ou la religion. »

C'est ainsi encore que, dans le préambule au traité de
minorités, la Pologne déclare

«désirer conformer ses institutions aux principes de
liberté et de justice et en donner une sûre garantie à
tous les habitants des territoires sur'lesquels elle a assumé
la souveraineté. »

Il est à remarquer que ces deux dispositions qui servent
de point de départ aux stipulations formulées dans le traité
de minorités ne parlent pas d’une manière restrictive des res-
sortissants de la Pologne, c’est-à-dire des personnes qui, en
tant que ressortissants polonais, forment des minorités par rap-
port à l’ensemble des nationaux du pays; elles élargissent con-
sidérablement les conceptions de minorité et de population en
parlant, d’une part, des Aabitr:s5 des territoires sur lesquels
la Pologne a. assumé la souveraineté, et, d’autre part, des habi-
tants qui diffèrent de la majorité de la population par la race,
la langue ou la religion. L'expression «population » semble
ainsi se référer à tous les habitants d’origine polonaise des
territoires rattachés à la Pologne; d’autre-part, le terme « mino-
rité» semble viser les habitants qui diffèrent de cette popula-
tion par la race, la langue ou la religion, c’est-à-dire, entre
autres, les habitants d’origine non-polonaise de ces territoires,
5 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

qu'ils soient ou non ressortissants polonais. Cette conclusion
se trouve confirmée par les termes de l’article 2 du traité de
minorités par lesquels le Gouvernement polonais s'engage
à accorder à tous les habitants pleine et entière protection
de leur vie, de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de
nationalité, de langage, de race’ ou de religion, et déclare que
tous les habitants de la Pologne jouiront de certains droits
qui s’y trouvent énumérés.

Le texte de l’article 12, qui fixe l’étendue de la compétence
de la Société des Nations, correspond entièrement à la con-
ception plus large de la minorité résultant des articles susindi-
qués, lorsqu'il parle de « personnes appartenant à des minori-
tés de race, de religion ou de langue » sans s’attacher à l’allé-
geance politique de ces personnes.

D'ailleurs, les traités dits de minorités en général, et notam-
ment le traité polonais, ont été conclus avec des Etats nou-
veaux ou qui, à la suite de la guerre, ont vu leur territoire
considérablement agrandi, et dont, en conséquence, la popu-
lation n’était pas nettement fixée au point de vue de l’allé-
geance politique. Un des premiers’ problèmes qui se posaient
en vue d'assurer la protection des minorités était d’em-
pêcher que ces Etats, pour des considérations de race, de
religion ou de langue, ne refusassent leur nationalité à cer-
taines catégories de personnes malgré le lien effectif qui les
rattache au territoire attribué à l’un ou à l’autre desdits
Etats. Ce n’est évidemment pas par hasard que les traités
pour la protection des minorités contiennent des dispositions
relatives à l’acquisition de la nationalité. D’autre part, le
fait que ces dispositions ne font quelquefois que répéter, en
tout ou en partie, des principes adoptés dans les traités de
paix, semble devoir s'expliquer par le propos d'étendre à ces
‘principes la garantie de la Société des Nations, quels que soient
les points de différence et de ressemblance entre ces divers
traités. ay

Ainsi la Pologne, à l'heure de sa reconnaissance définitive
comme Etatindépendant et de la délimitation de ses frontières, |
a signé des clauses qui établissent un droit à la nationalité
polonaise, et ces clauses, pour autant qu’ellessont inséréés dans
16 “AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

le traité de minorités, sont reconnues par la Pologne comme
lois fondamentales contre lesquelles aucune loi, aucun règle-
ment. ni aucune action officielle ne pourront prévaloir (article
premier du traité de minorités). Si, d’une manière géné-
rale, il est vrai qu’un Etat souverain ait le droit de déterminer
quelles personnes seront considérées comme ses ressortis-
sants, il n’est pas moins vrai que ce principe n’est applicable
que sous réserve des engagements conventionnels visés.
ci-dessus. |

L'observation par la Pologne des dispositions concernant
l’acquisition de sa nationalité qu’elle a acceptées en signant
le Traité de Paix constitue un intérêt primordial pour les
personnes d’originenon-polonaise qui pourront se prévaloir des
dispositions en question pour devenir ressortissants polonais.

Etant donné l’importance de cet intérêt, les Principales
Puissances alliées et associées ont désiré créer en sa faveur
une garantie sûre ; dans cet ordre d'idées, elles ont inséré des
clauses le concernant dans lé traité de minorités, marquant
ainsi l'intention de le faire bénéficier de la protection accor-
dée par l’article 12. Le fait même de l'inclusion des articles
3 à 6 dans le traité de minorités semble ainsi indiquer que,
dans la mesure où ces articles créent pour des personnes. de
nationalité allemande un droit à la nationalité polonaise, ce
droit se trouve placé sous la garantie de la Société des Nations,
institution toute désignée pour assumer la protection des per-
sonnes de race allemande visées au traité de minorités dont
l’Allemagne n’était pas co-signataire.

Il paraît donc clair que, puisque le traité de minorités
en général, et notamment son article 4, ne vise pas exclusi-
vement des minoritaires ressortissants polonais, ni des mino-
ritaires habitant le territoire polonais, la Pologne, en agréant,
aux termes de l’article 12 du traité, que les articles précédents
soient placés sous la garantie de la Société des Nations dans la
mesure où ils affectent les personnes appartenant aux mino-
rités de race ou de langue, agrée l'extension de cette protec-
tion aussi à l'application des articles 3à6.

Et s’il en était autrement, la valeur et le champ d’applica-
tion du traité seraient singulièrement diminués. Or, déjà,
dans l’avis consultatif qu'elle a émis au sujet des questions
194 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

à elle posées relativement aux colons allemands en Pologne,
la Cour a exprimé l'opinion qu’une interprétation qui dépouil-
lerait le traité de minorités d’une grande part de sa valeur
ne saurait être admise. En l'espèce, elle serait d’autant moins
admissible qu’elle se trouverait en contradiction avec les
termes mêmes du traité lorsqu'il dispose dans son article 12
que les stipulations précédant cet article et, en conséquence,
aussi celles contenues à l’article 4 sont placées sous la garan-
tie de la Société des Nations.

Il.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a demandé, en second
lieu, à la Cour, de lui faire connaître son avis sur le sens qu’il
convient d’attribuer à la disposition déjà mentionnée de
l’article 4, alinéa premier, du traité de minorités du 28 juin
1919, intervenu entre les Principales Puissances alliées
et associées et la Pologne, spécialement sur les mots « y étant
domiciliés ». |

Le Gouvernement polonais soutient que, lorsque le traité
lui fait une obligation de reconnaître la nationalité polonaise
aux personnes de nationalité allemande, autrichienne,hon-
groise ou russe, nées sur le territoire aujourd’hui polonais, de
parents y étant domiciliés, il a été entendu par là que, parmi _
les individus d’origine allerhande nés sur ce territoire, ceux-là
seulement peuvent se dire polonais dont les parents y étaient
domiciliés aussi bien au jour de la mise en vigueur du traité
(10 janvier 1920) qu'au jour de la naissance.

Une telle affirmation est en contradiction avec les termes
de la stipulation qu’elle prétend interpréter et elle ne
trouve pas d'appui dans les précédents fournis par la pratique
internationale.

Dire que la nationalité polonaise est reconnue aux indi-
vidus nés sur les territoires cédés à la Pologne de parents
y dant domiciliés, c'est manifestement se placer au jour de la
naissance de ces individus, c’est établir une étroite corréla-
tion, un synchronisme voulu entre le fait de la naissance et
l’existence du domicile des parents. Par contre, ce serait
18 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

ajouter au texte et le dépasser que d’exiger en outre le main-
tien ou le rétablissement de ce domicile à l’époque de l’entrée |
en vigueur du traité ; les individus dont les parents auraient
eu alors, mais alors seulement, leur domicile dans la nouvelle
Pologne, ne seraient pas nés de personnes y ayant leur domi-
cile et l’on n’a jamais songé à les faire tomber sous l’applica-
tion de l’article 4. Pourquoi le fait que les parents avaient
eu antérieurement leur domicile sur le territoire cédé change-
rait-il le sens naturel des mots ?

Ayant à faire son choix entre les deux systèmes qui, sous
des formes et avec des combinaisons diverses, ont toujours
été suivis, lorsqu'il s’agit de déterminer Vinfluence qu'un
remaniement territorial peut exercer sur la nationalité des
habitants du territoire annexé ou cédé, le traité s’est pro-
noncé à la fois pour le système du domicile et pour celui de
l’origine ; il a combiné ces deux systèmes.

Par son article 3, venant se joindre à l’article gt du Traité de
Paix de Versailles, il déclare, d’une part, Polonais, sous réserve
d’un droit d'option individuel, tous les ressortissants alle-
mands domiciliés dans les territoires incorporés à la Pologne.

Par l’article 4, il reconnaît d’autre part la même nationa-
lité à ceux qui sont nés sur lesdits territoires, c’est-à-dire
aux originaires, pourvu qu'ils soient nés de parents y étant
domiciliés et qu'ils ne renoncent pas, dans le délai de deux
ans, à la nationalité qui leur est acquise. En formulant la
condition relative au domicile des parents, les rédacteurs
du traité ont voulu réduire autant que possible la part du
hasard. Ce ne sera pas une naissance fortuite, survenue au
cours d’un déplacement ou d’une villégiature, que celle qui
se sera produite dans une famille ayant sur le territoire l’éta-
blissement régulier et permanent que suppose le domicile.
Un tel établissement de ses parents crée entre l’enfant et son
pays natal un lien moral qui justifie pour lui l'attribution de la
nationalité de ce pays ; il renforce le lien matériel déjà créé
par le fait de la naissance et il complète ce lien.
19 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

Exiger de plus que les parents aient acquis ou conservé
leur domicile dans les régions cédées à l’époque où le traité
de minorités est entré en vigueur, c’est formuler une condition
inutile qui ne se rencontre pas dans les traités d’annexion
conclus jusqu’à ce jour. Le domicile des parents, au jour de
l'entrée en vigueur du traité, ne concerne en rien et n’inté-
resse en rien les individus dont il s’agit de déterminer la natio-
nalité, Beaucoup de ces individus sont sans doute arrivés à
l’âge d'homme ; quelques-uns sont peut-être déjà aux limites
de la vie humaine; dans tous les cas, la plupart se sont
créé une existence indépendante et un foyer distinct. A quoi
servirait-il, dés lors, de rechercher si des parents, dont ils
ont quitté la demeure et.dont ils ne partagent plus la destinée,
étaient ou non domiciliés dans les territoires réunis à la Pologne
au jour ultérieur de cette réunion ? La recherche ainsi pres-
crite serait tout arbitraire ; elle ne pourrait avoir de raison
d’être que si le domicile des parents sur les territoires envi-
sagés impliquait ou était de nature a faire présumer le domi-
cile des enfants eux-mêmes, et, comme conséquence de ce
domicile, un attachement plus étroit, plus fort et plus dura-
ble à la Pologne devenue leur patrie. Mais c’est précisément
une pareille présomption que l’article 4, alinéa premier, lui-
même, a pris soin d’écarter en termes formels, lorsqu'il
déclare qu’il n’est pas nécessaire qu’à la date de la mise en’
vigueur du traité, les individus dont il s'occupe soient eux-
mêmes domiciliés sur les territoires rattachés à la Pologne.
Cette solution, adoptée par le traité, paraît être justifiée aussi
par égard aux nombreuses personnes, qui par suite des événe-
ments de la guerre, ont du abandonner leur domicile dans le

- territoire actuel de la Pologne.

Et puis, quelle sera la situation de ceux dont les parents
sont décédés antérieurement au Io janvier 1920, ou ont trans-
féré leur domicile à l'étranger dans l'intervalle qui sépare cette
date de celle de la naissance ? Ce décès ou ce transfert, dont
les enfants ne sont à aucun degré responsables, les empêchera-

. t-il de se prévaloir de l’article 4 s’ils y trouvent intérêt ?
L’affirmative paraît seule conciliable avec la thèse qui fait
20 AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

du domicile des parents en Pologne, au jour où le traité est
entré en vigueur, une condition nécessaire et rigoureuse.
Elle suffirait à condamner cette thèse.

Est-il nécessaire enfin de remarquer que l'adoption du
point de vue polonais ne rendrait nullement impossible le
cumul des nationalités, dont ses défenseurs ont entendu se
prévaloir en en dénonçant le danger ? Sans doute elle aurait
pour conséquence de rendre ce danger moins fréquent en
diminuant le nombre des personnes devenues polonaises
en vertu de l'article 4. Mais la source des doubles nationalités
ne serait nullement tarie. Seul un accord international entre
les puissances intéressées pourrait avoir cet effet désirable.

Le devoir de la Cour est nettement tracé. Placée en présence
d’un texte dont la clarté ne laisse rien à désirer, elle est tenue
de l’appliquer tel qu'il est, sans qu’elle ait à se demander si
d’autres dispositions auraient pu lui être ajoutée ou sub-
stituées avec avantage. Le traité de minorités (article 4,
alinéa premier) reconnaît la nationalité polonaise de plein
droit aux personnes nées sur le territoire du nouvel Etat
«de parents y étant domiciliés ». Ces mots se rapportent au
domicile qui est celui des parents à l’époque de la naissance
de l'enfant, et à cette époque seulement. Il faut et il suffit
. qu'au jour de la naissance les parents ‘aient eu, sur le terri-
toire devenu plus tard polonais, leur domicile, c’est-à-dire
‘un établissement sérieux, permanent, avec l'intention d’y
rester. Imposer à l'acquisition de la nationalité polonaise
une condition supplémentaire qui n’est pas écrite dans le

traité du 28 juin 19709, ce ne serait plus interpréter ce traité,
ce serait le refaire.
21. AVIS CONSULTATIF N° 7

PAR CES MOTIFS:
LA CoUR EST D’AVIS

Que la situation des personnes dont il s’agit dans la réso-
lution du Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 7
juillet 1923, telle qu’elle résulte de l’application par la Pologne
de l’article 4 du traité du 28 juin 1910, intervenu entre les
Principales Puissances alliées et associées et la Pologne,
relève de la compétence de la Société des Nations aux termes
dudit traité ;

Que l’article 4 du traité susmentionné se réfère uniquement
au domicile des parents au moment de la naissance de Vindi-
vidu.

Le présent avis ayant été rédigé en français et en anglais,
c'est le texte français qui fera foi.

Fait au Palais de la Paix, à la Haye, le quinze septembre
mil neuf cent vingt-trois, en deux exemplaires, dont l’un
restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont l’autre sera
transmis au Conseil de la Société des Nations

Le Président,
(Signé) LODER.

Le Greffier,
_ (Signé) À. HamMarsKyOLp.

M. le Juge Moore a pris part aux délibérations au sujet du
présent avis, mais a dû quitter la Haye avant la rédaction
finale. Il a déclaré se rallier aux conclusions de cet avis.

Lord Finlay, tout en se ralliant aux conclusions de la Cour
sur les deux questions à elle soumises, désire faire les obser-
vations qui suivent sur la question de la compétence de la
Société des Nations en l'espèce.

(Paraphé) L

À.H.


                                                                           316

           DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT YUSUF

[Original English Text]

   1. Under Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, two require-
ments must be met for the Court to be able to entertain a counter-claim
at the same time as the principal claim, namely, that the counter-claim
“comes within the jurisdiction of the Court” and, that it “is directly con-
nected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party”.
   2. The Court has expounded the second limb of this test — the requi-
site direct connection — in the previous cases that dealt with the admis-
sibility of counter-claims. The Court has not, however, elaborated on
what is meant by the ﬁrst limb — “comes within the jurisdiction of the
Court” — in the context of Article 80. This lack of clariﬁcation of the
jurisdictional requirement may give the impression that jurisdiction must
in all cases be assessed de novo for each counter-claim. This is of course
the case if the title of jurisdiction invoked for the counter-claims diﬀers
from that of the principal claim. However, as I will try to explain in this
declaration, there is no need to do so where counter-claims have the same
title of jurisdiction as the principal claim. Consequently, it was also
unnecessary for the Court to examine whether a dispute existed between
the Parties in the present proceedings.

            I. Jurisdiction under Article 80, Paragraph 1,
                         of the Rules of Court

   3. One of the principal points of disagreement between the Parties in
this case relates to the jurisdiction required by Article 80. Colombia con-
tended that jurisdiction under Article 80 means jurisdiction over the prin-
cipal claim. In its view, “[s]ince the Court has found that it has jurisdiction
over the main proceedings, jurisdiction is also established over the
counter-claims”. Nicaragua, on the other hand, argued that counter-
claims are autonomous legal acts for which jurisdiction must be assessed
de novo.

   4. Nicaragua is correct that counter-claims have been characterized by
the Court as “an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a
new claim to the Court . . . [and] thus to widen the original subject-matter
of the dispute by pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal of the
claim of the Applicant in the main proceedings” (Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos-

                                                                            31

         sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. yusuf)                317

nia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December
1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256, para. 27).
   5. The autonomous nature of counter-claims is, however, just one
aspect of their character. As the Court emphasized in its Order on
counter-claims in the Bosnian Genocide case, counter-claims are intimately
linked to the procedure initiated by the principal claim:

    “[a counter-claim] is linked to the principal claim, in so far as, formu-
    lated as a ‘counter’ claim, it reacts to it . . . the idea is essentially to
    achieve a procedural economy whilst enabling the Court to have an
    overview of the respective claims of the parties and to decide them
    more consistently; and whereas the admissibility of the counter-claims
    must necessarily relate to the aims thus pursued and be subject to
    conditions designed to prevent abuse” (ibid., pp. 256-257, paras. 27
    and 30).

   6. It is this second aspect of counter-claims — the intimate link with
the principal claim — that allows the Court to achieve procedural econ-
omy by giving it a more thorough and detailed overview of all the facts
relevant to the dispute that has been submitted to the Court. In this
respect, the counter-claim is grafted onto the ongoing procedure that was
initiated by the principal claim. One might say that counter-claims are
functionally autonomous in that they are addressed separately from the
principal claim, but that they are also incidental in that they must be
aﬃxed to the main proceedings.
   7. In paragraph 67 of the present Order, the Court states that “[o]nce
the Court has established jurisdiction to entertain a case, it has jurisdic-
tion to deal with all its phases”, including incidental proceedings, such as
counter-claims. As the Court notes, the subsequent lapse of jurisdiction
cannot deprive the Court of the jurisdiction already established. The
Court then continues to assess whether the third and fourth counter-
claims submitted by Colombia fall within the jurisdiction of the Court on
the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá.

   8. I agree with much of this reasoning. The scope of jurisdiction of the
Court in any given case is established according to the limits set forth in
the instrument that founds the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court only
has jurisdiction to address disputes within those limits. It is therefore
imperative for the Court, when examining the admissibility of counter-
claims that purport to be based on the same title of jurisdiction as the
principal claim, to ensure that those counter-claims fall within the scope
of the jurisdiction thus prescribed (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports
2010 (I), pp. 316-321, paras. 17-31). The Court does not, however, have
to establish its jurisdiction over the counter-claims de novo.

                                                                             32

         sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. yusuf)              318

                      II. The Court’s Examination
                      of the Existence of a Dispute

   9. The Court did not follow, in my view, this line of reasoning to its
logical conclusion. The jurisdiction of the Court, for which the existence
of a dispute is a necessary condition, has already been established by the
Court in its Judgment on preliminary objections. It is therefore unneces-
sary for the Court to examine whether a “dispute” exists between the
Parties, as the Court did in the present case in relation to the third and
fourth counter-claims. A dispute has already been found to exist and that
is suﬃcient to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s enquiry at
this stage of proceedings should simply be limited to ascertaining whether
the counter-claims fall within the bounds of the jurisdiction that the
Court has already found to exist under the Pact of Bogotá, and whether
the counter-claims are directly connected, in law and in fact, to the prin-
cipal claims.
   10. This conclusion is not only logical but is also judicious. The
requirement that a counter-claim be directly connected with the principal
claim allows the Court to hear arguments related to another aspect of the
dispute over which it has already asserted jurisdiction, thus enabling the
Court to adjudicate in a holistic manner on the dispute brought before
the Court. This is one aspect of the procedural economy aﬀorded by
counter-claims to which the Court referred in its Order in the Bosnian
Genocide case, cited in paragraph 5 above. The Court does not need to
ascertain the existence of a dispute anew.

   11. The Court has most commonly addressed counter-claims that pur-
port to be based on the same title of jurisdiction as the principal claim
(see e.g. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy),
Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 316;
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November
2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 678; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March
1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 203; and Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997,
I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256). However, Article 80 does not preclude the
invocation of a title of jurisdiction diﬀerent from that of the principal
claim. It is when the Court is faced with reliance on a diﬀerent title of
jurisdiction, and in that kind of scenario only, that it will have to address
the question of jurisdiction over the counter-claims separately from the
question of jurisdiction over the principal claim. In such a case, jurisdic-
tion over the principal claim will not be decisive in terms of jurisdiction

                                                                          33

         sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. yusuf)          319

over a counter-claim based on some other title, and the validity of the
jurisdictional basis of the counter-claims must be assessed at the moment
such counter-claims are brought to the Court.

                                      (Signed) Abdulqawi A. Yusuf.

                                                                      34


459

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

1. Notwithstanding my agreement with the operative part of the Order,
1 consider it necessary to make the following observations.

2. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is in force between the
Parties. It prescribes:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.”

3. Yugoslavia maintains that the Respondent has violated:

“the obligation contained in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide not to impose deliberately on
a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group .. .” (Application of Yugoslavia,
p. 12).

Furthermore, during the public hearings Yugoslavia stated “in the cir-
cumstances the intensive bombing of Yugoslav populated areas consti-
tutes a breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention” (CR 99/25,
p. 12, Brownlie).

4. The Respondent considers that it has not violated the Genocide
Convention, because no genocide crimes have been committed during or
as a result of the military intervention of the NATO countries in Yugo-
slavia.

5. In its Judgment of 11 July 1996 the Court admitted prima facie the
existence of a legal dispute between the Parties because of the existence
of:

“a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance
of certain treaty obligations’ (/nterpretation af Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opin-
ion, 1 C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)

and that, by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints
formulated against it by Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘there is a legal
dispute’ between them (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), LC.
Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22)” (Application of the Convention on

4l
460 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. PARRA-ARANGUREN)

the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Prelimi-
nary Objections, LC.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 614-615, para. 29).

6. Consequently, taking into account the allegations of the Parties in
these incidental proceedings, there appears to exist, prima facie, a “legal
dispute” between them regarding the interpretation and application of
the Genocide Convention. For this reason, Article IX of the Genocide
Convention is applicable and, in my opinion, the Court has prima facie
jurisdiction to entertain the request for provisional measures presented
by Yugoslavia.

7. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is the only prima facie basis
for jurisdiction of the Court in the present case. Therefore the only pro-
visional measures that it can indicate are those aiming to guarantee the
rights of the Applicant under the Genocide Convention.

8. Yugoslavia is requesting the Court to indicate that the Respondent
“shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain from
any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia” (CR 99/14, p. 63, Etinski). However, the threat or use of force
against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention. Consequently the provisional
measures requested by Yugoslavia do not aim to guarantee its rights
under the Genocide Convention, i.e., the right not to suffer acts which
may be qualified as genocide crimes by the Convention. Therefore, in my
opinion, the measures requested by Yugoslavia shall not be indicated.

(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

42