                     498

                             OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE ABRAHAM

                        1. A mon grand regret, je ne suis pas en mesure de souscrire à la
                     conclusion à laquelle parvient la majorité de mes collègues dans la pré-
                     sente affaire, à savoir qu’il existe un titre de compétence permettant à la
                     Cour de connaître du différend entre le Guyana et le Venezuela, qui est
                     essentiellement un différend territorial, dont elle a été saisie par la requête
                     unilatérale du Guyana.
                        2. Selon l’arrêt, la compétence de la Cour résulte de la combinaison de
                     trois éléments. Le premier est le paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 du Statut, qui
                     étend la compétence de la Cour « à tous les cas spécialement pré-
                     vus … dans les traités et conventions en vigueur ». Le deuxième est le
                     paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de l’accord de Genève du 17 février 1966, qui
                     lie les deux Parties à la présente instance, accord qui, selon son intitulé,
                     tend « à régler le différend relatif à la frontière entre le Venezuela et la
                     Guyane britannique ». Le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV dudit accord pré-
                     voit que si, à une certaine date, les parties ne sont pas parvenues à s’en-
                     tendre sur le choix d’un des moyens prévus à l’article 33 de la Charte des
                     Nations Unies en vue de régler leur différend, « [elles] s’en remettront,
                     pour ce choix, à un organisme international compétent sur lequel [elles] se
                     mettront d’accord, ou, [si elles] n’arrivent pas à s’entendre sur ce point, au
                     Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ». Enfin, le troi-
                     sième chaînon du raisonnement de la majorité est constitué par la lettre
                     du Secrétaire général en date du 30 janvier 2018, adressée aux deux Par-
                     ties, par laquelle le Secrétaire général faisait savoir que, sur la base du
                     paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de l’accord de Genève, il avait « retenu la
                     Cour internationale de Justice comme prochain moyen d’atteindre cet
                     objectif » (à savoir le règlement du différend).
                        3. Ces trois éléments combinés suffisent-ils pour conférer à la Cour
                     compétence pour connaître du différend opposant les deux Etats voisins,
                     sur la requête unilatérale de l’un d’entre eux ? Je ne le pense pas, et je vais
                     expliquer pourquoi.
                        4. Je commencerai par mentionner tous les points du raisonnement
                     développé par la majorité avec lesquels je suis en accord. Cela me permet-
                     tra ensuite de mettre le doigt sur le moment précis à partir duquel je ne
                     me sens plus capable d’adhérer à ce raisonnement.
                        5. En premier lieu, il n’est pas douteux — et il n’est d’ailleurs pas
                     contesté — que lorsque le Secrétaire général (de l’époque) a commencé à
                     exercer la responsabilité que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de
                     l’accord, soit en 1983, les conditions prévues par cet instrument étaient
                     remplies. La commission mixte prévue par l’accord n’était pas parvenue à
                     définir les termes d’une solution du différend dans les quatre ans suivant

                     47

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                     499 	sentence arbitrale du 3 octobre 1899 (op. diss. abraham)

                     la date de l’accord, et, dans le délai prévu à partir du rapport final de la
                     commission, les deux parties n’étaient pas parvenues à s’entendre « sur le
                     choix d’un des moyens de règlement prévus à l’Article 33 de la Charte des
                     Nations Unies ». Il revenait donc au Secrétaire général (les parties ne
                     s’étant pas non plus entendues sur le choix d’un organisme international
                     à cette fin) de choisir lui-même l’un des moyens de règlement prévus à
                     l’article 33. C’est ce que fit le Secrétaire général, après d’amples consulta-
                     tions, en 1990, en choisissant la procédure des bons offices.
                        6. En deuxième lieu, une fois constaté l’échec de la procédure des bons
                     offices, après de très longs et patients efforts en vue de rapprocher les
                     parties, soit au début de l’année 2018, il n’est pas discutable que le Secré-
                     taire général avait le pouvoir en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de
                     l’accord de Genève, de choisir « un autre des moyens stipulés à l’Ar-
                     ticle 33 ».
                        7. Le choix du Secrétaire général s’étant porté, par sa lettre du 30 jan-
                     vier 2018, sur la Cour internationale de Justice, on est conduit à ce stade
                     du raisonnement à aborder deux questions sur lesquelles, les Parties étant
                     en désaccord, la Cour prend parti dans le présent arrêt : la Cour interna-
                     tionale de Justice est-elle au nombre des moyens de règlement qu’il était
                     loisible au Secrétaire général de choisir ? Dans l’affirmative, le Secré-
                     taire général pouvait-il choisir cette Cour sans avoir préalablement eu
                     recours sans succès aux autres moyens énumérés à l’article 33 de la
                     Charte ? Sur ces deux points, je suis en accord avec la position adoptée
                     par l’arrêt.
                        8. L’article 33 de la Charte, auquel renvoie l’article IV de l’accord,
                     mentionne, on le sait, comme moyens de régler les différends qui peuvent
                     survenir entre Etats, la négociation, l’enquête, la médiation, la concilia-
                     tion, l’arbitrage, le règlement judiciaire, le recours aux organismes ou
                     accords régionaux, ainsi que tout « autre moyen pacifique » choisi par les
                     parties. On trouve donc, dans l’énumération de l’article 33, le « règlement
                     judiciaire ». Le recours à la Cour internationale de Justice étant une des
                     modalités du « règlement judiciaire », et même, dans le contexte de la
                     Charte, la principale, je ne vois aucune raison de considérer que le Secré-
                     taire général était empêché de choisir la Cour comme moyen adéquat
                     pour régler le différend entre le Guyana et le Venezuela. C’est ce que dit
                     l’arrêt, que j’approuve pleinement sur ce point.
                        9. Par ailleurs, rien dans le libellé du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de
                     l’accord, qui dispose que si un moyen choisi par le Secrétaire général ne
                     permet pas de régler le différend, le Secrétaire général « choisira un autre
                     des moyens stipulés à l’Article 33 … et ainsi de suite, jusqu’à ce que le
                     différend ait été résolu ou jusqu’à ce que tous les moyens … envisagés
                     dans la Charte aient été épuisés » — je reviendrai plus loin sur cette for-
                     mulation —, n’oblige le Secrétaire général à suivre un ordre particulier
                     dans le choix des moyens successifs entre lesquels il peut choisir. J’en
                     déduis que le Secrétaire général est libre quant à l’ordre de ses choix, et
                     qu’il pouvait donc, ainsi qu’il l’a fait en janvier 2018, choisir la Cour
                     comme moyen de règlement du différend, alors même qu’il n’avait préala-

                     48

4 Ord_1205.indb 92                                                                                20/12/21 15:50

                     500 	sentence arbitrale du 3 octobre 1899 (op. diss. abraham)

                     blement pas eu recours à certains autres moyens mentionnés à l’article 33,
                     tels que la conciliation ou l’arbitrage. La seule obligation que le para-
                     graphe 2 de l’article IV de l’accord impose au Secrétaire général — pour
                     autant qu’il accepte d’exercer la fonction qui lui est confiée — est de choi-
                     sir un nouveau moyen de règlement chaque fois que le moyen précédem-
                     ment choisi n’a pas permis d’aboutir à une solution, « et ainsi de suite »,
                     comme le dit l’accord. En somme, j’estime, comme la majorité de la Cour,
                     que le Secrétaire général a exercé les fonctions dont il a été investi par le
                     paragraphe 2 de l’article IV sans encourir le moindre reproche.
                        10. Enfin, pour en finir avec les points à propos desquels je suis d’ac-
                     cord avec la majorité, je suis d’avis que le choix par le Secrétaire général
                     d’un moyen de règlement n’est pas une simple recommandation dépour-
                     vue d’effet contraignant, mais qu’il engendre pour les deux parties en
                     cause des obligations. A cet égard, les termes de l’article IV de l’accord
                     me paraissent suffisamment clairs. A défaut de conclusion positive sur la
                     solution du différend au sein de la commission mixte, les parties « choisi-
                     ront sans retard » (en anglais : « shall without delay choose ») l’un des
                     moyens de règlement énoncés à l’article 33. Si elles n’y parviennent pas
                     dans les trois mois, elles « s’en remettront, pour ce choix » (en anglais :
                     « shall refer the decision as to the means of settlement ») ou bien à un
                     organisme international qu’elles désigneront d’un commun accord, ou
                     bien, à défaut, au Secrétaire général. Tout indique donc que le choix, par
                     le Secrétaire général, d’un moyen de règlement constitue une décision qui
                     impose aux parties certaines obligations.
                        11. La majorité de la Cour a estimé que l’ensemble des éléments qui
                     précèdent suffisait à fonder la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de la
                     requête du Guyana. Tel n’est pas mon avis. C’est une chose de dire que le
                     choix d’un moyen — en l’occurrence le règlement judiciaire — par le
                     Secrétaire général crée des obligations pour les parties ; c’est autre chose
                     que de voir dans le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de l’accord, combiné avec
                     la décision du Secrétaire général, l’expression du consentement des deux
                     Parties au règlement de leur différend par la Cour.
                        12. Comme le rappelle à juste titre l’arrêt, la compétence de la Cour
                     repose sur le consentement des parties, et, s’il est vrai que ce consente-
                     ment n’est pas soumis à l’observation d’une forme déterminée, « [l]a Cour
                     doit toutefois s’assurer qu’il existe une manifestation non équivoque de la
                     volonté des parties au différend d’accepter de manière volontaire et indis-
                     cutable sa compétence » (par. 113). Je ne crois pas que ce soit le cas en
                     l’espèce.
                        J’observe d’abord que, si l’on met à part pour un instant le règlement
                     judiciaire, tous les autres moyens que le Secrétaire général est susceptible
                     de choisir dans la liste de l’article 33 imposent, pour être efficaces, une
                     entente entre les parties postérieurement à la décision du Secrétaire géné-
                     ral. Même l’arbitrage, qui possède en commun avec le règlement judi-
                     ciaire la caractéristique d’aboutir à une décision juridiquement
                     contraignante réglant le différend, ne pourrait déboucher sur un règle-
                     ment, dans le cas où le Secrétaire général aurait choisi un tel moyen, qu’à

                     49

4 Ord_1205.indb 94                                                                                20/12/21 15:50

                     501 	sentence arbitrale du 3 octobre 1899 (op. diss. abraham)

                     la condition que les parties négocient et concluent un compromis sans
                     lequel la procédure arbitrale ne pourrait être mise en œuvre. Autrement
                     dit, si le Secrétaire général avait choisi l’arbitrage, les parties auraient été
                     selon moi tenues de négocier de bonne foi un compromis permettant le
                     règlement de leur différend et conférant compétence à cette fin à un tribu-
                     nal arbitral ; mais la décision du Secrétaire général, quoique obligatoire
                     pour les parties, n’aurait pas constitué elle-même la base de compétence
                     d’un organe arbitral, lequel aurait tenu sa compétence de l’accord subsé-
                     quent entre les parties.
                        13. Il n’y a pas de raison à mes yeux qu’il en aille autrement dans le cas
                     présent, celui du choix du règlement judiciaire par le Secrétaire général.
                        Certes, il existe une différence évidente entre les deux situations : alors
                     que le tribunal arbitral doit être créé par l’accord des parties, et sa com-
                     pétence délimitée par cet accord, la Cour n’a le plus souvent besoin, en
                     pratique, d’aucun instrument supplémentaire (autre que son Statut et son
                     Règlement) pour pouvoir exercer sa compétence sur la base d’une requête
                     unilatérale. Mais pour importante que soit cette différence en pratique,
                     elle ne change rien quant à la question centrale du consentement des par-
                     ties. Je ne vois pas, dans les termes du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV de
                     l’accord, l’expression non équivoque d’un consentement des parties à la
                     compétence de la Cour, mais seulement l’acceptation par elles de l’idée
                     que leur différend est susceptible de trouver in fine sa solution par la voie
                     du règlement judiciaire.
                        14. A juste titre, la Cour indique qu’en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
                     ticle IV « les Parties ont accepté l’éventualité que le différend soit réglé par
                     cette voie [la voie judiciaire] » (arrêt, par. 82). Jusqu’à ce point je suis
                     d’accord, mais c’est à mes yeux insuffisant pour établir le consentement
                     des Parties à la juridiction.
                        J’ajoute qu’en l’espèce un compromis entre les Parties postérieurement
                     à la décision du Secrétaire général aurait été particulièrement utile pour
                     délimiter l’objet du différend soumis à la Cour, qui ne l’est pas clairement
                     par l’accord de Genève lui-même.
                        15. Si la Cour, dans le présent arrêt, trouve dans l’accord lui-même le
                     consentement des Parties à sa compétence, dès lors que le Secrétaire géné-
                     ral a choisi la Cour comme moyen de règlement, c’est — principale-
                     ment — parce qu’elle accorde une importance primordiale à l’objet et au
                     but de l’accord en vue d’interpréter c elui-ci.
                        La démarche est en elle-même parfaitement légitime, et l’arrêt rappelle
                     à bon droit que les articles 31 et 32 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit
                     des traités reflètent les règles du droit international coutumier en matière
                     d’interprétation des traités.
                        16. Mais je suis en désaccord avec la Cour en ce qui concerne la
                     manière dont elle comprend l’objet et le but de l’accord de Genève. Selon
                     l’arrêt, l’accord vise à mettre en place un mécanisme de règlement du dif-
                     férend tel que, une fois l’ensemble des dispositions de l’accord complète-
                     ment et correctement appliquées, ce différend trouvera nécessairement
                     une solution. La Cour s’appuie notamment, à cet égard, sur le titre de

                     50

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                     502 	sentence arbitrale du 3 octobre 1899 (op. diss. abraham)

                     l’accord, qui présente ce dernier comme « tendant à régler le diffé-
                     rend … relatif à la frontière ». Elle en déduit qu’il convient d’écarter toute
                     interprétation de l’accord qui aurait pour effet de permettre que, une fois
                     l’accord complètement mis en œuvre, le différend subsiste — sans avoir
                     pu être réglé — et donner, au contraire, la préférence à une interprétation
                     qui garantisse que, au terme du processus, le différend sera réglé. Voilà
                     pourquoi elle estime devoir écarter toute interprétation qui subordonne-
                     rait la mise en œuvre du règlement judiciaire à un « nouveau consente-
                     ment des Parties » postérieurement à la décision du Secrétaire général :
                     c’est qu’une telle exigence (qui supposerait la conclusion d’un compromis
                     ou toute autre forme d’expression du consentement) « serait contraire … à
                     l’objet et au but de l’accord, qui consistent à garantir le règlement définitif
                     du différend » (arrêt, par. 114).

                        17. Je pense pour ma part que, s’il est tout à fait évident qu’en concluant
                     l’accord de Genève les parties ont entendu favoriser le règlement de leur
                     différend, et permettre d’atteindre un tel règlement dans toute la mesure
                     du possible, elles n’ont pas cherché à mettre en place un mécanisme
                     contraignant visant à garantir qu’un tel règlement sera obtenu, par la
                     négociation si possible, par la voie judiciaire au besoin. Elles n’ont donc
                     pas entendu donner par avance leur consentement au règlement judiciaire.
                        Plusieurs dispositions de l’accord de Genève indiquent très clairement,
                     à mes yeux, que les parties ont accepté l’éventualité que la mise en œuvre
                     de l’accord n’aboutisse pas nécessairement au règlement de leur différend.
                        18. Il s’agit d’abord du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV, qui prévoit que
                     c’est normalement aux parties elles-mêmes de choisir un des moyens de
                     règlement pacifique énoncés à l’article 33 de la Charte, dans le cas où la
                     commission mixte n’a pas réussi à parvenir à une solution du différend. Si
                     les parties se mettent d’accord sur le choix d’un des moyens autres que le
                     règlement judiciaire (par exemple la médiation ou la conciliation), la mise
                     en œuvre subséquente du moyen ainsi choisi peut échouer à permettre
                     d’atteindre un règlement du différend : l’accord de Genève aura alors été
                     complètement appliqué, et le différend subsistera. L’hypothèse d’une
                     absence de règlement même après une mise en œuvre complète de l’accord
                     a donc été parfaitement envisagée par les parties.
                        Au cas d’espèce, les Parties à l’accord ne se sont pas entendues sur le
                     choix d’un moyen, et c’est donc le paragraphe 2 de l’article IV qui a
                     trouvé à s’appliquer, avec cette particularité que, dans le cadre de ce
                     mécanisme, le Secrétaire général ne doit pas se borner à choisir un moyen,
                     mais, si celui-ci échoue, en choisir un autre « et ainsi de suite ».
                        19. Mais même le paragraphe 2, tel que je le comprends, envisage et
                     accepte l’hypothèse que le différend puisse ne pas être réglé au terme du
                     processus.
                        Il y est indiqué, en effet, que le choix successif des moyens de règlement
                     par le Secrétaire général doit se faire : « ainsi de suite, jusqu’à ce que le
                     différend ait été résolu ou jusqu’à ce que tous les moyens de règlement
                     pacifique envisagés dans la Charte aient été épuisés ». Si l’intention des

                     51

4 Ord_1205.indb 98                                                                                20/12/21 15:50

                      503 	sentence arbitrale du 3 octobre 1899 (op. diss. abraham)

                      parties avait été de donner par avance leur consentement au règlement
                      judiciaire, le libellé du paragraphe 2 de l’article IV se serait achevé sur les
                      mots « ait été résolu ». En effet, le dernier membre de phrase (« ou jusqu’à
                      ce que tous les moyens de règlement … aient été épuisés ») est dépourvu
                      de tout effet utile si l’interprétation que retient la Cour — suivant en cela
                      le Guyana — est correcte. Si les parties ont donné, par la conclusion
                      même de l’accord, leur consentement au règlement judiciaire, et puisque
                      le Secrétaire général est tenu de choisir successivement, au besoin, tous les
                      moyens mentionnés à l’article 33, dont le règlement judiciaire, il en résulte
                      qu’au terme du processus le différend aura nécessairement été résolu. Par
                      suite, si le texte du paragraphe 2 s’était arrêté après « ait été résolu », il
                      aurait eu exactement le même sens que celui que lui attribue la Cour dans
                      le présent arrêt : cela signifie que la Cour tient pour sans effet le dernier
                      membre de phrase du paragraphe 2, elle le néglige. C’est que cette der-
                      nière partie laisse nettement entendre qu’il est possible, dans l’esprit des
                      rédacteurs de l’accord, qu’au terme du processus le différend pourrait
                      subsister ; elle ne cadre donc pas avec la définition de l’objet et du but de
                      l’accord que retient la Cour, à savoir la mise en place d’un mécanisme
                      permettant d’aboutir nécessairement au règlement du différend.
                         L’arrêt tente de répondre à cette objection dans son paragraphe 86.
                      Mais il le fait en des termes dont la clarté — avec le respect que je dois à
                      mes collègues — n’est pas la principale qualité, et qui ne peuvent que
                      laisser le lecteur perplexe.
                         20. En fin de compte, si je considère attentivement l’ensemble des argu-
                      ments que retient la Cour pour conclure que les Parties ont consenti à sa
                      compétence pour connaître de leur différend sur la base de la requête uni-
                      latérale de l’une d’elles, je ne suis pas convaincu. Je ne trouve pas dans
                      l’accord de Genève la manifestation non équivoque d’un tel consente-
                      ment. Je pense que la Cour aurait dû décliner sa compétence.

                      (Signé) Ronny Abraham.

                      52

4 Ord_1205.indb 100                                                                                20/12/21 15:50


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A CERTAINS
EMPRUNTS NORVEGIENS
(FRANCE c. NORVEGE)

ORDONNANCE DU 24 AVRIL 1956

1956

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE OF CERTAIN NORWEGIAN
LOANS
(FRANCE v. NORWAY)

ORDER OF APRIL 24th, 1956
La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire relative à certains emprunts norvégiens,
Ordonnance du 24 avril 1956: C.I. J. Recueil 1956, p. 18.»

This Order should be cited as follows :

“Case of certain Norwegian Loans,

Order of April 2gth, 1956: I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 18.”

Ne de vente: 1 48
Sales number

18

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1956
April 24th
General List :

YEAR 1956 . No. 29

April 24th, 1956

CASE OF CERTAIN NORWEGIAN
LOANS

(FRANCE v, NORWAY)

ORDER

The International Court of Justice,
having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
having regard to Article 62 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order :

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry on
July 6th, 1955, whereby the Government of the French Republic
instituted proceedings against the Kingdom of Norway -in the
matter of the payment of certain Norwegian Loans ;

Having regard to the Order of September 19th, 1955, fixing the
time-limits for the filing of the Memorial and the Counter-Memorial
in this case and reserving the rest of the procedure for further
decision ;

Having regard to the Memorial filed by the Government of the
French Republic within the time fixed ;

Whereas on April 2oth, 1956, that is, within the time fixed for
the filing of the Counter-Memorial, the Government of the King-

4
CERTAIN NORWEGIAN LOANS (ORDER OF 24 IV 56) 19

dom of Norway filed a document setting out certain preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and contending that the
claim submitted by the Application is inadmissible ;

Whereas, accordingly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 62,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits
are suspended and a time-limit should be fixed for the presentation
by the other Party of a written statement of its observations and
submissions on the said preliminary objections ;

THE CouRT

Fixes June 4th, 1956, asthe time-limit within which the Govern-
ment of the French Republic may present a written statement of
its observations and submissions in regard to the Objections raised
by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway ;

Reserves the rest of the procedure for further decision.

Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fourth day of April,
one thousand nine hundred and fifty-six, in three copies, one of
which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of the French Republic and to
the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, respectively.

(Signed) GREEN H. Hackwortu,

President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,

Deputy-Registrar.


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON CONSULAR RELATIONS

(PARAGUAY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER OF 9 APRIL 1998

1998

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE
A LA CONVENTION DE VIENNE
SUR LES RELATIONS CONSULAIRES

(PARAGUAY c. ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 9 AVRIL 1998
Official citation:

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 9 April 1998, I C.J. Reports 1998, p. 248

Mode officiel de citation:

Convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires
(Paraguay c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 9 avril 1998, C.J. Recueil 1998, p. 248

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N° de vente: 7104
ISBN 92-1-070768-0

248

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1998 YEAR 1998
9 April |
General List
No. 99 9 April 1998

CASE CONCERNING
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON CONSULAR RELATIONS

(PARAGUAY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Present: Vice-President WEERAMANTRY, Acting President; President
SCHWEBEL; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA,
HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIMANS, REZEK; Registrar
VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
3 April 1998, whereby the Republic of Paraguay (hereinafter “Para-
guay”) instituted proceedings against the United States of America (here-
inafter “the United States”) for “violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations [of 24 April 1963]” (hereinafter the “Vienna Conven-
tion”) allegedly committed by the United States,

4
249 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)
Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas, in its aforementioned Application, Paraguay bases the
jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the
Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (“the Optional Protocol”);

2. Whereas, in the Application, it is stated that in 1992 the authorities
of the Commonwealth of Virginia arrested a Paraguayan national,
Mr. Angel Francisco Breard; whereas it is maintained that he was
charged, tried, convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to death
by a Virginia court (the Circuit Court of Arlington County) in 1993,
without having been informed, as is required under Article 36, subpara-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, of his rights under that provision;
whereas it is specified that among these rights are the right to request that
the relevant consular office of the State of which he is national be advised
of his arrest and detention, and the right to communicate with that
office; and whereas it is also alleged that the authorities of the Common-
wealth of Virginia also did not advise the Paraguayan consular officers of
Mr. Breard’s detention, and that those officers were only able to render
assistance to him from 1996, when the Paraguayan Government learnt by
its own means that Mr. Breard was imprisoned in the United States;

3. Whereas, in the Application, Paraguay states that Mr. Breard’s sub-
sequent petitions before federal courts in order to seek a writ of habeas
corpus failed, the federal court of first instance having, on the basis of the
doctrine of “procedural default”, denied him the right to invoke the
Vienna Convention for the first time before that court, and the inter-
mediate federal appellate court having confirmed that decision; whereas,
consequently, the Virginia court that sentenced Mr. Breard to the death
penalty set an execution date of 14 April 1998; whereas Mr. Breard,
having exhausted all means of legal recourse available to him as of right,
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
requesting it to exercise its discretionary power to review the decision
given by the lower federal courts and to grant a stay of his execution
pending that review, and whereas, while this request is still pending
before the Supreme Court, it is however rare for that Court to accede to
such requests; and whereas Paraguay stated, moreover, that it brought
proceedings itself before the federal courts of the United States as early
as 1996, with a view to obtaining the annulment of the proceedings ini-
tiated against Mr. Breard, but both the federal court of first instance and
the federal appellate court held that they had no jurisdiction in the case
because it was barred by a doctrine conferring “sovereign immunity” on
federated states; whereas Paraguay also filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari in the Supreme Court, which is also still pending; and whereas
Paraguay furthermore engaged in diplomatic efforts with the Govern-

5
250 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

ment of the United States and sought the good offices of the Department
of State;

4. Whereas, in its Application, Paraguay maintains that by violating its
obligations under Article 36, subparagraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention,
the United States prevented Paraguay from exercising the consular functions
provided for in Articles 5 and 36 of the Convention and specifically for
ensuring the protection of its interests and of those of its nationals in the
United States; whereas Paraguay states that it was not able to contact
Mr. Breard nor to offer him the necessary assistance, and whereas accordingly
Mr. Breard “made a number of objectively unreasonable decisions during the
criminal proceedings against him, which were conducted without transla-
tion”; and “did not comprehend the fundamental differences between the
criminal justice systems of the United States and Paraguay”; and whereas
Paraguay concludes from this that it is entitled to restitutio in integrum, that
is to say “the re-establishment of the situation that existed before the United
States failed to provide the notifications . . . required by the Convention”;

5. Whereas Paraguay requests the Court to adjudge and declare as
follows:

“(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convict-
ing, and sentencing Angel Francisco Breard, as described in the
preceding statement of facts, violated its international legal
obligations to Paraguay, in its own right and in the exercise of
its right of diplomatic protection of its national, as provided by
Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention;

(2) that Paraguay is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum;

(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
not to apply the doctrine of ‘procedural default’, or any other
doctrine of its internal law, so as to preclude the exercise of the
rights accorded under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention;
and

(4) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
to carry out in conformity with the foregoing international
legal obligations any future detention of or criminal proceed-
ings against Angel Francisco Breard or any other Paraguayan
national in its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative,
executive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a
superior or a subordinate position in the organization of the
United States, and whether that power’s functions are of an
international or internal character;

and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(1) any criminal liability imposed on Angel Francisco Breard in
violation of international legal obligations is void, and should
251 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

be recognized as void by the legal authorities of the United
States;

(2) the United States should restore the status quo ante, that is, re-
establish the situation that existed before the detention of, pro-
ceedings against, and conviction and sentencing of Paraguay’s
national in violation of the United States’ international legal
obligations took place; and

(3) the United States should provide Paraguay a guarantee of the
non-repetition of the illegal acts”;

6. Whereas, on 3 April 1998, after having filed its Application, Para-
guay also submitted an urgent request for the indication of provisional
measures in order to protect its rights, pursuant to Article 41 of the Stat-
ute of the Court and to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court;

7. Whereas, in its request for the indication of provisional measures,
Paraguay refers to the basis of jurisdiction of the Court invoked in its
Application, and to the facts set out and the submissions made therein;
and whereas it reaffirms in particular that the United States has violated
its obligations under the Vienna Convention and must restore the status
quo ante;

8. Whereas, in its request for the indication of provisional measures of
protection, Paraguay states that, on 25 February 1998, the Circuit Court of
Arlington County, Virginia, ordered that Mr. Breard be executed on
14 April 1998; whereas it emphasizes that “[t]he importance and sanctity of
an individual human life are well established in international law” and “[aJs
recognized by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, every human being has the inherent right to life and this right shall
be protected by law”; and whereas Paraguay states in the following terms
the grounds for its request and the possible consequences of its dismissal:

“Under the grave and exceptional circumstances of this case, and
given the paramount interest of Paraguay in the life and liberty of its
nationals, provisional measures are urgently needed to protect the
life of Paraguay’s national and the ability of this Court to order the
relief to which Paraguay is entitled: restitution in kind. Without the
provisional measures requested, the United States will execute
Mr. Breard before this Court can consider the merits of Paraguay’s
claims, and Paraguay will be forever deprived of the opportunity to
have the status quo ante restored in the event of a judgment in its
favour”;

9. Whereas Paraguay asks that, pending final judgment in this case,
the Court indicate:

“(a) that the Government of the United States take the measures
necessary to ensure that Mr. Breard not be executed pending
the disposition of this case;

(b) that the Government of the United States report to the Court
252 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

the actions it has taken in pursuance of subparagraph (a)
immediately above and the results of those actions; and

(c) that the Government of the United States ensure that no
action is taken that might prejudice the rights of the Republic
of Paraguay with respect to any decision this Court may
render on the merits of the case”;

and whereas it asks the Court moreover to consider its request as a mat-
ter of the greatest urgency “in view of the extreme gravity and immediacy
of the threat that the authorities . . . will execute a Paraguayan citizen” ;
10. Whereas, on 3 April 1998, the Ambassador of Paraguay to the
Netherlands addressed a letter to the President of the Court requesting
the Court to fix an early date for a hearing on his Government’s request
for provisional measures, asking the Member of the Court who, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 1, and Article 32,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, would exercise the functions of Presi-
dent in the case to “call upon the United States of America to ensure that
Mr. Breard is not put to death before the Court’s ruling on Paraguay’s
request for provisional measures”; and indicating that he had been
appointed as Agent of Paraguay for the purposes of the case;

11. Whereas, on 3 April 1998, the date on which the Application and
the request for provisional measures were filed in the Registry, the Regis-
trar advised the Government of the United States of the filing of those
documents, communicated the text of them to that Government by fac-
simile and sent it a certified copy of the Application, in accordance with
Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and Article 38, para-
graph 4, of the Rules of Court, together with a certified copy of the request
for the indication of provisional measures, in accordance with Article 73,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; and whereas the Registrar also sent
the Government of the United States a copy of the letter addressed that
day to the President of the Court by the Agent of Paraguay;

12. Whereas, by identical letters dated 3 April 1998, the Vice-President
of the Court addressed both Parties in the following terms:

“Exercising the functions of the presidency in terms of Articles 13
and 32 of the Rules of Court, and acting in conformity with Ar-
ticle 74, paragraph 4, of the said Rules, I hereby draw the attention
of both Parties to the need to act in such a way as to enable any
Order the Court will make on the request for provisional measures
to have its appropriate effects”;

and whereas, at a meeting held the same day with the representatives of
both Parties, he advised them that the Court would hold public hearings
on 7 April 1998 at 10 a.m., in order to afford the Parties the opportunity
of presenting their observations on the request for provisional measures ;
253 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

13. Whereas, by a letter dated 5 April 1998, received in the Registry on
6 April 1998, the Ambassador of the United States to the Netherlands
informed the Court of the appointment of an Agent and a Co-Agent of
his Government for the case;

14. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute of the Court and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by trans-
mission of the printed text, in two languages, of the Application to the
Members of the United Nations and to other States entitled to appear
before the Court, the Registrar, on 6 April 1998, informed those States of
the filing of the Application and of its subject-matter, and of the request
for the indication of provisional measures;

15. Whereas, on 6 April 1998, the Registrar, in accordance with
Article 43 of the Rules of Court, addressed the notification provided for
in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to the States, other than the
Parties to the dispute, which on the basis of information supplied by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary appeared to be
parties to the Vienna Convention and to the Optional Protocol;

16. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 7 April 1998, in accord-
ance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral statements
on the request for the indication of provisional measures were presented
by the Parties:

On behalf of Paraguay: H.E. Mr. Manuel Maria Caceres,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Mr. Barton Legum,
Dr. José Emilio Gorostiaga;

On behalf of the United States: Mr. David R. Andrews,
Ms Catherine Brown,
Mr. John R. Crook,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson;

and whereas at the hearings a question was put by a Member of the
Court, to which a reply was given orally and in writing; .

« * x

17. Whereas, at the hearings, Paraguay reiterated the line of argument
set forth in its Application and its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures;

18. Whereas at the hearing, the United States argued that Mr. Breard’s
guilt was well established, and pointed out that the accused had admitted
his guilt, which Paraguay did not dispute; whereas it recognized that
Mr. Breard had not been informed, at the time of his arrest and trial, of his
rights under Article 36, subparagraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention,
and indicated to the Court that this omission was not deliberate; whereas
it nonetheless maintained that the person concerned had had all neces-

9
254 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

sary legal assistance, that he understood English well and that the assist-
ance of consular officers would not have changed the outcome of the pro-
ceedings brought against him in any way; whereas, referring to State
practice in these matters, it stated that the notification provided for by
Article 36, subparagraph 1 (6), of the Vienna Convention is unevenly
made, and that when a claim is made for failure to notify, the only con-
sequence is that apologies are presented by the Government responsible;
and whereas it submitted that the automatic invalidation of the proceed-
ings initiated and the return to the status quo ante as penalties for the
failure to notify not only find no support in State practice, but would be
unworkable;

19. Whereas the United States also indicated that the State Depart-
ment had done everything in its power to help the Government of Para-
guay as soon as it was informed of the situation in 1996; and whereas it
stated that when, on 30 March 1998, Paraguay advised the Government
of the United States of its intention to bring proceedings before the Court
if the United States Government did not take steps to initiate consulta-
tion and to obtain a stay of execution for Mr. Breard, the Government of
the United States had emphasized inter alia that a stay of execution
depended exclusively on the United States Supreme Court and the Gov-
ernor of Virginia;

20. Whereas the United States furthermore maintained that Para-
guay’s contention that the invalidation of the sentence of a person who
had not been notified pursuant to Article 36, subparagraph 1 {b}, of the
Vienna Convention could be required under that instrument, has no
foundation in the relevant provisions, their travaux préparatoires or the
practice of States, and that, in the event, Mr. Breard has not been preju-
diced by the absence of notification; and whereas it pointed out that pro-
visional measures should not be indicated where it appears that the
Applicant’s argument will not enable it to be successful on the merits;

21. Whereas the United States also stated that, when the Court indi-
cates provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute, it must take the
rights of each of the Parties into consideration and ensure that it main-
tains a fair balance in protecting those rights; whereas that would not be
the case if it acceded to Paraguay’s request in these proceedings; and
whereas the measures requested by Paraguay would prejudice the merits
of the case;

22. Whereas the United States finally alleged that the indication of the
provisional measures requested by Paraguay would be contrary to the
interests of the States parties to the Vienna Convention and to those of
the international community as a whole as well as to those of the Court,
and would in particular be such as seriously to disrupt the criminal jus-
tice systems of the States parties to the Convention, given the risk of pro-
liferation of cases; and whereas it stated in that connection that States
have an overriding interest in avoiding external judicial intervention

10
255 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

which would interfere with the execution of a sentence passed at the end
of an orderly process meeting the relevant human rights standards;

x * x»

23. Whereas on a request for the indication of provisional measures
the Court need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them,
finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but
whereas it may not indicate them unless the provisions invoked by the
Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be founded;

24. Whereas Article [ of the Optional Protocol, which Paraguay
invokes as the basis of jurisdiction of the Court in this case, is worded as
follows:

“Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a
party to the present Protocol”;

25. Whereas, according to the information communicated by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary, Paraguay and the
United States are parties to the Vienna Convention and to the Optional
Protocol, in each case without reservation;

26. Whereas Articles II and III of the aforementioned Protocol pro-
vide that within a period of two months after one party has notified the
other of the existence of a dispute, the parties may agree to resort not to
the International Court of Justice but to an arbitration tribunal or alter-
natively first to conciliation; but whereas these Articles

“when read in conjunction with those of Article I and with the Pre-
amble to the Protocols, make it crystal clear that they are not to be
understood as laying down a precondition of the applicability of the
precise and categorical provision contained in Article I establishing
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of disputes
arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Con-
vention .. .” (United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 25-26);

27. Whereas, in its Application and at the hearings, Paraguay stated
that the issues in dispute between itself and the United States concern
Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention and fall within the compulsory
sjurisdiction of the Court under Article I of the Optional Protocol; and
whereas it concluded from this that the Court has the jurisdiction neces-
sary to indicate the provisional measures requested;

ii
256 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

28. Whereas at the hearing, the United States contended, for its part,
that Paraguay had not established that the Court had jurisdiction in
these proceedings, even prima facie; whereas it argued that there is no
dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation of Article 36, subpara-
graph 1 {b), of the Vienna Convention and nor is there a dispute as to its
application, since the United States recognizes that the notification pro-
vided for was not carried out; whereas the United States maintained
that the objections raised by Paraguay to the proceedings brought
against its national do not constitute a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Vienna Convention; and whereas it added
that there was no entitlement to restitutio in integrum under the terms of
that Convention;

29. Whereas the United States moreover indicated to the Court that it
had expressed its regret to Paraguay for the failure to notify Mr. Breard
of his right to consular access, engaged in consultations with Paraguay
on the matter and taken steps to ensure future compliance with its obli-
gations under the Vienna Convention at both the federal and state level;

30. Whereas Paraguay asserts that it is nevertheless entitled to resti-
tutio in integrum, that any criminal liability currently imposed on
Mr. Breard should accordingly be recognized as void by the legal authori-
ties of the United States and that the status quo ante should be restored
in that Mr. Breard should have the benefit of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention in any renewed proceedings brought against him, no objec-
tion to his continued detention meanwhile being made by Paraguay;
whereas however the United States believes that these measures are not
required by the Vienna Convention, would contravene the understanding
underlying the adoption of Article 36 as well as the uniform practice of
States, and would put this Court in a position of acting as a universal
supreme court of criminal appeals;

31. Whereas there exists a dispute as to whether the relief sought by
Paraguay is a remedy available under the Vienna Convention, in particu-
lar in relation to Articles 5 and 36 thereof; and whereas this is a dispute
arising out of the application of the Convention within the meaning of
Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes of 24 April 1963;

32. Whereas the United States claimed nevertheless that prima facie
there is no jurisdiction for the Court in this case as Paraguay has no
legally cognizable claim to the relief it seeks nor any prospect ultimately
of prevailing on the merits, because no prejudice to Mr. Breard has
occurred ;

33. Whereas the existence of the relief sought by Paraguay under the
Convention can only be determined at the stage of the merits; and

12
257 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

whereas the issue of whether any such remedy is dependent upon evi-
dence of prejudice to the accused in his trial and sentence can equally
only be decided upon at the merits;

34. Whereas the Court finds that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction under
Article I of the aforesaid Optional Protocol to decide the dispute between
Paraguay and the United States;

x x

35. Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
under Article 41 of its Statute is intended to preserve the respective rights
of the parties pending its decision, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute
in judicial proceedings; whereas it follows that the Court must be con-
cerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may subsequently
be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant, or to the
Respondent; and whereas such measures are only justified if there is
urgency ;

36. Whereas the Court wili not order interim measures in the absence of
“irreparable prejudice . .. to rights which are the subject of dispute . . .”
(Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of
22 June 1973, .C.J. Reports 1973, p. 103; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December
1979, I C.J. Reports 1979, p. 19, para. 36; Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I C.J. Reports 1993, p. 19, para. 34);

37. Whereas the execution of Mr. Breard is ordered for 14 April 1998;
and whereas such an execution would render it impossible for the Court
to order the relief that Paraguay seeks and thus cause irreparable harm to
the rights it claims;

38. Whereas the issues before the Court in this case do not concern the
entitlement of the federal states within the United States to resort to the
death penalty for the most heinous crimes; and whereas, further, the
function of this Court is to resolve international legal disputes between
States, inter alia when they arise out of the interpretation or application
of international conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal;

+ * x

39. Whereas, in the light of the aforementioned considerations, the
Court finds that the circumstances require it to indicate, as a matter of
urgency, provisional measures in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute;

40. Whereas measures indicated by the Court for a stay of execution
would necessarily be provisional in nature and would not in any way pre-

13
258 VIENNA CONVENTION (ORDER 9 IV 98)

judge findings the Court might make on the merits; and whereas the
measures indicated would preserve the respective rights of Paraguay and
of the United States; and whereas it is appropriate that the Court, with
the co-operation of the Parties, ensure that any decision on the merits be
reached with all possible expedition;

41. For these reasons,

THE CouRT

Unanimously,

I. Indicates the following provisional measures:

The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure
that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in
these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which
it has taken in implementation of this Order;

Il. Decides, that, until the Court has given its final decision, it shall
remain seised of the matters which form the subject-matter of this Order.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this ninth day of April, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-eight, in three copies, one of which will be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Republic of Paraguay and the Government of the United States of
America, respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

President SCHWEBEL and Judges Opa and Koroma append declara-
tions to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled) C.G.W.
(Initialled) E.V.O.

14


316

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SHI

To my regret, I am unable to concur with the findings of the Court
that, given the limitation ratione temporis contained in the declaration of
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (hereinafter Yugoslavia), the Court lacked prima facie juris-
diction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, to which both the
Applicant and the Respondent are parties. This conclusion prevented the
Court from exercising its power under Article 41, paragraph 1, of the
Statute to indicate provisional measures to the Parties.

Yugoslavia signed the declaration of acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court on 25 April 1999. By that declaration, Yugosla-
via recognized compulsory jurisdiction “in all disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard to
the situations or facts subsequent to this signature . . .”.

This limitation ratione temporis of recognition of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion belongs to the category of the so-called “double exclusion formula”.
In cases where the Court is confronted with this “double exclusion for-
mula”, it has to ascertain both the date of the dispute and the situations
or facts with regard to which the dispute has arisen.

Regarding the first aspect of the limitation ratione temporis in the
present case, that is to say, whether the date on which the dispute arose is
before or after the signature by Yugoslavia of the declaration of accept-
ance, the Court has, in this connection, to consider what is the subject of
the dispute, as it did in a similar situation in the Right of Passage case,
where the Court stated:

“In order to form a judgment as to the Court’s jurisdiction it is
necessary to consider what is the subject of the dispute.” (Right of
Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, 1 C.J. Reports
1960, p. 33).

In the present case, the Application of Yugoslavia contains a sec-
tion bearing the title “Subject of the Dispute”, which indicates the subject
as acts of the Respondent

“by which it has violated its international obligation banning the use
of force against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the
internal affairs of another State, the obligation not to violate the
sovereignty of another State, the obligation to protect the civilian

61
317 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. SHI)

population and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect
the environment, the obligation relating to free navigation on inter-
national rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights
and freedoms, the obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the
obligation not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to
cause the physical destruction of a national group”.

As in the Right of Passage case, the legal dispute before the Court, as
shown above, consists of a number of constituent elements. Prior to the
coming into existence of all the constituent elements, the dispute cannot
be said to arise. None of the above elements existed before the critical
date of 25 April 1999. It is true that the aerial bombing of the territory of
Yugoslavia began some weeks before this critical date of signature of the
declaration. But aerial bombing and its effects are merely facts or situa-
tions and as such do not constitute a legal dispute. The constituent ele-
ments of the present dispute are not present before the critical date and
only exist at and from the date of Yugoslavia’s Application on 29 April
1999. It is true that, prior to the critical date, Yugoslavia had accused
NATO (Security Council Meetings of 24 and 26 March 1999, S/PV.3988
and 3989) of illegal use of force against it. However, this complaint con-
stitutes at the most one of the many constituent elements of the dispute.
Besides, in no way could NATO be identified with the Respondent, and
NATO cannot be the Respondent in the present case ratione personae.
The legal dispute only arose at the date of the Application, which is sub-
sequent to the signature of the declaration of acceptance. Therefore, the
time condition in order for the present dispute to be within the scope of
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction ratione temporis, as contained in
Yugoslavia’s declaration, has been satisfied.

With respect to the second aspect of Yugoslavia’s double exclusion for-
mula, the situations or facts which the Court has to consider are those
with regard to which the dispute has arisen, 1.e., those situations or facts
which are the source of the present legal dispute.

Article 25, paragraph |, of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
adopted at first reading by the International Law Commission, provides:

“1. The breach of an international obligation by an act of the
State having a continuing character occurs at the moment when that
act begins. Nevertheless, the time of commission of the breach
extends over the entire period during which the act continues and
remains not in conformity with the international obligation.” ULC
Yearbook, 1978, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 89.)

62
318 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. SHI)

This concept of the duration of a “continuing” wrongful act is com-
monly accepted by international! tribunals and legal scholars.

In the present case, the dispute relates to the alleged breach of various
international obligations by acts of force, in the form of aerial bombing
of the territories of Yugoslavia, which are attributed by the Applicant to
the respondent State. It is obvious that the alleged breach of obligations
by such a “continuing” act first occurred at the moment when the act
began, weeks before the critical date of 25 April 1999. Given that the acts
of aerial bombing continued well beyond the critical date and still con-
tinue, the time of commission of the breach extends over the whole
period during which the acts continue and ends only when the acts of the
respondent State cease or when the international obligations alleged to be
breached by the acts of that State cease to exist or are no longer in force
for it.

The conclusion may be drawn from the above analysis that the limita-
tion ratione temporis in the double exclusion formula contained in Yugo-
slavia’s declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction in no
way constitutes a bar to founding prima facie jurisdiction upon
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute for the purpose of indication of
provisional measures in the present case.

It is regrettable that, as a result of its mistaken findings on this point,
the Court was not in a position to indicate provisional measures to the
Parties in the urgent situation of human tragedy with loss of life and
human suffering in the territories of Yugoslavia arising from the use of
force in and against that country.

Moreover, I am of the opinion that, confronted with that urgent situa-
tion, the Court ought to have contributed to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in so far as its judicial functions permit. The
Court would have been fully justified in point of law if, immediately upon
receipt of the request by the Applicant for the indication of provisional
measures, and regardless of what might be its conclusion on prima facie
jurisdiction pending its final decision, it had issued a general statement
appealing to the Parties to act in compliance with their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations and all other rules of international law
relevant to the situation, including international humanitarian law, and
at least not to aggravate or extend their dispute. In my view, nothing in
the Statute or Rules of Court prohibits the Court from so acting. Accord-
ing to the Charter of the United Nations, the Court is after all the prin-
cipal judicial organ of the United Nations, with its Statute as an integral
part of the Charter; and by virtue of the purposes and principles of the
Charter, including Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the Court
has been assigned a role within the general framework of the United

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319 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. SHI)

Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. There is
no doubt that to issue such a general statement of appeal is within the
implied powers of the Court in the exercise of its judicial functions. It is
deplorable that the Court has failed to take an opportunity to make its
due contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security
when that is most needed.

Furthermore, in his letter addressed to the President and the Members
of the Court, the Agent of Yugoslavia stated:

“Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection I kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requests proprio motu or to fix a date for a hearing
at earliest possible time.”

In the recent LaGrand case, the Court, at the request of the applicant
State and despite the objection of the respondent State, decided to make
use of its above-mentioned power under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court without hearing the respondent State in either written or
oral form (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Order of
3 March 1999, I. C.J. Reports 1999, pp. 13 and 14, paras. 12 and 21). By
contrast, in the present case the Court failed to take any positive action
in response to the similar request made by the Agent of Yugoslavia in a
situation far more urgent even than that in the former case.

It is for these reasons that I felt compelled to vote against the operative
paragraph 47 (1) of the present Order.

(Signed) Sui Jiuyong.

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