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    OPINION INDIVIDUELLE COMMUNE DE MME LE JUGE
    HIGGINS ET MM. LES JUGES KOOIJMANS, ELARABY,
                   OWADA ET SIMMA

[Traduction]

   Lecture appropriée de l’avis consultatif de la Cour de 1951 — Questions dont
la Cour n’a pas été, et n’aurait pu être, saisie en 1951 — Problèmes survenus —
Evolution de la pratique des juridictions des droits de l’homme et des organes de
surveillance institués par les traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme — Pratique
concordante de la Cour internationale en 2002 et 2006 — Article IX de la
convention sur le génocide et objet et but de cette convention — La Cour de-
vrait réexaminer sa conception actuelle selon laquelle une réserve à l’ar-
ticle IX n’est pas incompatible avec l’objet et le but de la convention.

  1. Au paragraphe 67 de son arrêt, la Cour a déclaré :
        « La réserve du Rwanda à l’article IX de la convention sur le géno-
     cide porte sur la compétence de la Cour et n’affecte pas les obliga-
     tions de fond qui découlent de cette convention s’agissant des actes
     de génocide eux-mêmes. Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, la Cour
     ne peut conclure que la réserve du Rwanda, qui vise à exclure un
     moyen particulier de régler un différend relatif à l’interprétation, à
     l’application ou à l’exécution de la convention, doit être regardée
     comme incompatible avec l’objet et le but de cette convention. »

   2. Nous avons voté en faveur du dispositif (par. 128) mais certaines
questions sous-jacentes au paragraphe 67 nous préoccupent grandement.
   3. Notre propos, dans cette brève opinion, est double : faire ressortir
l’importance de certains aspects récents de la jurisprudence de la Cour en
matière de réserves ; et examiner la raison qui sous-tend la conclusion
répétée de la Cour qu’une réserve à l’article IX de la convention sur le
génocide n’est pas contraire à l’objet et au but de ce traité.
   4. On relève depuis quelques années une tendance, de la part de cer-
tains Etats, et de certains commentateurs, à considérer que l’avis consul-
tatif rendu par la Cour en 1951 sur les Réserves à la convention pour la
prévention et la répression du crime de génocide stipule, en matière de
réserves, un régime de laisser-faire interétatique, en ce sens que même si
ceux qui formulent des réserves à une convention et ceux qui font objec-
tion à ces réserves sont censés les uns et les autres garder présents à
l’esprit l’objet et le but de la convention, tout serait, en dernière analyse,
laissé à la décision des Etats eux-mêmes.
   5. Une lecture appropriée de l’avis consultatif de 1951 montre, selon
nous, que c’est là une conclusion hâtive. En 1951, la Cour répondait à

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                       66

certaines questions précises que lui avait posées l’Assemblée générale, et
ce qu’elle a dit doit être interprété dans ce contexte.
   6. Il était posé à la Cour trois questions, dont les deux premières sont
pertinentes pour notre propos. Des problèmes étaient survenus, touchant
notamment les fonctions de dépositaire du Secrétaire général de l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies, parce que certains Etats parties à la conven-
tion sur le génocide avaient fait objection à des réserves faites par
d’autres Etats. Bien que formulées en termes abstraits, les questions
posées à la Cour visaient en réalité des réserves qui avait été faites à
l’article IX, lequel attribue compétence à la Cour pour le règlement des
différends relatifs à cette convention. Il était demandé à la Cour i) si
un Etat ayant formulé une réserve peut être considéré comme partie à la
convention aussi longtemps qu’il maintient sa réserve si une ou plu-
sieurs parties à la convention font une objection à cette réserve, les autres
parties n’en faisant pas, et ii) dans l’affirmative, quel est l’effet de la ré-
serve dans les relations entre l’Etat qui a formulé la réserve et a) les par-
ties qui ont fait une objection à la réserve et b) celles qui l’ont acceptée
(Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de
génocide, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 16).
   7. Toutes ces questions postulaient que, même si la convention sur le
génocide était muette sur la question, des réserves étaient en principe
admises. La Cour a établi à sa satisfaction, sur la base des travaux pré-
paratoires et d’autres éléments, qu’il n’y avait effectivement pas d’inter-
diction de principe des réserves (ibid., p. 22-23). Elle a ensuite cherché à
déterminer « le caractère des réserves qui peuvent être formulées » (ibid.,
p. 23). Soulignant les traits particuliers de la convention sur le génocide et
le fait qu’il était souhaitable qu’elle bénéficie d’une adhésion universelle,
la Cour est arrivée à la conclusion bien connue que
     « c’est la compatibilité de la réserve avec l’objet et le but de la
     convention qui doit fournir le critère de l’attitude de l’Etat qui joint
     une réserve à son adhésion et de l’Etat qui estime devoir y faire une
     objection » (ibid., p. 24).
La Cour n’a pas admis que l’efficacité d’une réserve à un traité multilatéral
puisse être subordonnée à l’assentiment de toutes les parties (ibid., p. 25).
  8. Passant à l’examen de la deuxième question, la Cour a conclu que :
        « Comme ... aucun Etat ne peut être lié par une réserve à laquelle
     il n’a pas consenti, il en résulte nécessairement qu’en fait chaque Etat
     qui fait objection à une réserve, s’inspirant de son appréciation per-
     sonnelle de celle-ci dans les limites du critère de l’objet et du but
     énoncé ci-dessus, peut ou non considérer l’Etat qui a formulé la
     réserve comme partie à la convention » (ibid., p. 26).
  9. La Cour, en 1951, n’avait manifestement pas conscience des dangers
inhérents à ses réponses, en ce sens qu’elles donneraient naissance à tout
un réseau d’obligations réciproques variées à l’intérieur du cadre d’une
convention multilatérale. (Voir sur ce point l’opinion dissidente com-

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                        67

mune de M. Guerrero, sir Arnold McNair et MM. Read et Hsu Mo,
C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 31 et suiv.) Dans son avis, la Cour a concédé que
« l’on ne saurait, pour une convention de ce type, parler d’avantages ou
de désavantages individuels des Etats, non plus que d’un exact équilibre
contractuel à maintenir entre les droits et les charges » (ibid., p. 23) et elle
a admis que « [l]es inconvénients qu’entraîne cette divergence éventuelle
de vues ... sont réels » (ibid., p. 26).
   10. En l’occurrence, les problèmes que la Cour pouvait envisager
dès 1951 se sont révélés beaucoup plus considérables qu’elle n’eût pu le
prévoir. En 1951, la convention sur le génocide était pratiquement seule
de son espèce dans le domaine des droits de l’homme. Depuis, il est venu
s’y adjoindre une multitude de conventions multilatérales, que les Etats
n’ont pas hésité à assortir d’une pléthore de réserves — dont la nature
soulève souvent de graves inquiétudes quant à leur compatibilité avec
l’objet et le but du traité concerné. Et la grande majorité des Etats, dont
la Cour pensait en 1951 qu’ils examineraient attentivement de telles ré-
serves et y feraient objection, ont failli à cette tâche. (A l’heure actuelle,
vingt-huit réserves ont été faites par des Etats à la convention sur le géno-
cide et dix-huit Etats ont fait des objections ; cinquante-sept Etats ont fait
des réserves à la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les
formes de discrimination raciale et vingt-six ont fait des objections ;
soixante-quinze Etats ont fait des réserves à la convention sur l’élimina-
tion de toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes et dix-
huit ont fait des objections ; cinquante-huit Etats ont fait des réserves au
Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et dix-sept ont fait
des objections ; quarante-cinq Etats ont fait des réserves au Pacte inter-
national relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels et dix ont fait
des objections ; et soixante-quatorze Etats ont fait des réserves à la
convention internationale relative aux droits de l’enfant et treize ont fait
des objections. Voir les états tenus par le Haut Commissariat des Nations
Unies aux droits de l’homme, http ://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification/index.htm, mis à jour au 13 décembre 2005.)
   11. Le postulat dont partait la Cour en 1951, à savoir que
     « c’est la compatibilité de la réserve avec l’objet et le but de la
     convention qui doit fournir le critère de l’attitude de l’Etat qui joint
     une réserve à son adhésion et de l’Etat qui estime devoir y faire une
     objection » (ibid., p. 24),
de manière à maintenir un équilibre entre la liberté de faire des réserves et
la faculté qu’ont les autres Etats de les examiner et d’y faire objection, ne
s’est pas confirmé dans la réalité : les Etats qui usent de cette faculté ne
sont qu’une poignée. Pour la grande majorité, les considérations poli-
tiques semblent l’emporter.
   12. La Cour elle-même n’était pas invitée, en 1951, à se prononcer sur
la compatibilité de réserves particulières à la convention sur le génocide
avec l’objet et le but de cette convention, ni d’ailleurs sur le point de
savoir si ses réponses quant au rôle des Etats en matière de formulation

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                        68

de réserves et de réaction à celles-ci ne l’empêchaient pas de le faire.
Depuis 1951, il s’est posé au sujet des réserves beaucoup d’autres ques-
tions dont la Cour n’était pas non plus, et n’aurait pas pu être, saisie à
l’époque. L’une d’elles est de savoir s’il convient de confier aux organes
de surveillance institués en vertu des traités multilatéraux des
Nations Unies relatifs aux droits de l’homme un rôle d’appréciation de la
compatibilité avec l’objet et le but. Une autre question connexe qui n’a
pas été posée à la Cour en 1951 concerne l’étendue des pouvoir conférés
aux juridictions qui sont au centre des grands traités relatifs aux droits de
l’homme, telles la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, la Cour
européenne des droits de l’homme et, pour l’avenir, la Cour africaine des
droits de l’homme et des peuples. En 1951, la Cour n’a pas eu l’occasion
de se pencher sur l’application du droit des traités à la question de la divi-
sibilité dans le contexte des réserves à des traités relatifs aux droits de
l’homme. La convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités conclue en 1969
n’est pas totalement dépourvue d’ambiguïté sur ces points, particulière-
ment en son article 19. Beaucoup d’autres questions encore concernant
les réserves n’ont pas été abordées par la Cour dans son avis consultatif
de 1951, soit parce qu’elles ne lui avaient pas été soumises, soit parce
qu’elles ne s’étaient pas encore posées dans la pratique des Etats.
   13. Ainsi, l’avis consultatif rendu par la Cour en 1951 n’a pas résolu
toutes les questions soulevées par les réserves. Dire cela, c’est constater
un fait, et non tenter de fragmenter quelque corps de règles de droit
mythique qui embrasserait la totalité des questions relatives aux réserves.
Dans son avis consultatif de 1951, la Cour a exposé le droit sur les points
qui lui étaient soumis, et sur ces seuls points ; elle n’excluait pas pour
l’avenir de nouveaux développements juridiques dans des domaines non
encore balisés.
   14. La question soulevée ici intéresse les réserves en général, et non pas
seulement les réserves aux traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme — même
si c’est sans doute cette catégorie de réserves qui retient le plus l’attention.
Il existe désormais sur nombre de ces problèmes une pratique substan-
tielle et une abondante doctrine. Ce n’est ni le moment ni le lieu, dans une
opinion individuelle jointe à un arrêt de la Cour, de nous livrer à une
analyse savante, et nécessairement fort longue, de cette pratique et cette
doctrine. L’étude des réserves aux traités, dans toute sa complexité, est en
cours au sein de la Commission du droit international. (Sur les points
abordés dans la présente opinion, voir, en particulier : deuxième rapport
sur les réserves aux traités, par M. Alain Pellet, rapporteur spécial, rap-
port de la Commission du droit international à l’Assemblée générale sur
les travaux de sa quarante-neuvième session, Annuaire de la Commission
du droit international, vol. II, deuxième partie (1997), p. 44-58 (chap. V :
« Les réserves aux traités ») ; dixième rapport sur les réserves aux traités,
par M. Alain Pellet, rapporteur spécial, rapport de la Commission du
droit international, cinquante-septième session, Nations Unies, doc. A/
CN.4/558 (1er juin 2005), A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 juin 2005), A/CN.4/558/
Add.2 (30 juin 2005).)

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                      69

   15. La pratique aussi, dans l’intervalle, a témoigné d’une certaine évo-
lution. Ni la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ni la Cour intera-
méricaine des droits de l’homme n’ont suivi l’approche favorable au
« laisser-faire » que l’on a prêtée à la Cour internationale au vu de son
avis consultatif de 1951 ; elle se sont chacune prononcées sur la compati-
bilité de réserves précises à la convention européenne des droits de
l’homme et à la convention américaine des droits de l’homme, respecti-
vement. Elles n’ont pas estimé avoir simplement affaire à des ensembles
d’obligations de caractère bilatéral, dont l’appréciation était laissée aux
différents Etats parties à la convention en cause. (Voir en particulier Beli-
los c. Suisse, arrêt du 29 avril 1988, CEDH (série A), vol. 132 (1988) ;
Loizidou c. Turquie, arrêt du 23 mars 1995, exceptions préliminaires,
CEDH (série A), vol. 310 (1995) ; The Effect of Reservations on the Entry
into Force of the American Convention, avis consultatif OC-2/82, Cour
interaméricaine des droits de l’homme (série A), no 2 (1982) ; Restrictions
to the Death Penalty, avis consultatif OC-3/83, Cour interaméricaine des
droits de l’homme (série A), no 3 (1983) ; voir aussi Rawle Kennedy c. Tri-
nité-et-Tobago, Comité des droits de l’homme, communication no 845,
Nations Unies, doc. CCPR/C/67D/845/1999 (31 décembre 1999).)
   16. L’analyse qu’a faite le Comité des droits de l’homme dans son
observation générale no 24 (52), où il s’est efforcé d’apporter quelques
réponses à des problèmes contemporains à propos du Pacte international
relatif aux droits civils et politiques, est très proche de celle de la Cour
européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Cour interaméricaine. La pra-
tique de tels organes ne doit pas être considérée comme « faisant excep-
tion » au droit tel que l’a dit la Cour internationale en 1951 ; nous y
voyons plutôt un nouveau développement, destiné à répondre à des inter-
rogations dont la Cour n’a jamais été saisie à l’époque et à résoudre des
problèmes nouveaux ayant surgi par la suite.
   17. En 1999, la Cour a rendu des ordonnances déboutant la Yougo-
slavie des demandes qu’elle avait introduites contre l’Espagne et contre
les Etats-Unis. La Cour a jugé suffisant de motiver sa décision en ces
termes :
       « Considérant que la convention sur le génocide n’interdit pas les
    réserves ; que la Yougoslavie n’a pas présenté d’objection à la réserve
    faite par les Etats-Unis à l’article IX ; et que cette réserve a eu pour
    effet d’exclure cet article des dispositions de la convention en vigueur
    entre les Parties. » (Voir Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie
    c. Espagne), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
    C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 772, par. 32 et 33, et Licéité de l’emploi
    de la force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), mesures conser-
    vatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 924,
    par. 24 et 25.)
   18. L’Espagne s’était contentée de faire valoir que l’article IX ne
s’appliquait pas dans les relations mutuelles entre l’Espagne et la You-
goslavie. Les Etats-Unis, et c’est là un point intéressant, étaient allés plus

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                        70

loin et avaient soutenu que leur réserve n’était pas contraire à l’objet et
au but de la convention. La Yougoslavie (contrairement à ce qui se passe
dans la présente affaire) n’avait pas essayé de plaider que les réserves
étaient contraires à l’objet et au but de la convention. Aussi la Cour ne
s’est-elle pas prononcée sur ce point.
   19. Dans l’ordonnance sur les mesures conservatoires qu’elle a ren-
due le 10 juillet 2002 en la présente affaire, la Cour ne s’est pas bornée
à rappeler que le Congo n’avait pas fait objection à la réserve du
Rwanda. Elle a aussi cherché à répondre brièvement à divers autres
arguments du Congo, notamment celui selon lequel cette réserve était
contraire à l’objet et au but de la convention. Au paragraphe 72, la
Cour a déclaré :
       « Considérant ... que ladite réserve ne porte pas sur le fond du
     droit, mais sur la seule compétence de la Cour ; qu’elle n’apparaît
     dès lors pas contraire à l’objet et au but de la convention... » (Voir
     Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête : 2002)
     (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), mesures conser-
     vatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 246,
     par. 72.)
   20. La Cour a ainsi ajouté sa propre appréciation de la compatibilité
de la réserve du Rwanda avec l’objet et le but de la convention sur le
génocide. Le paragraphe 67 du présent arrêt sur la compétence ne géné-
ralise pas davantage cette conclusion.
   21. La Cour ne s’est pas limitée non plus, dans le présent arrêt, à pren-
dre note de la réserve formulée par un des Etats et de l’absence d’objec-
tion de la part de l’autre Etat. Les termes du paragraphe 67 (cité plus
haut au paragraphe 1) ne sont pas absolument identiques à ceux du para-
graphe comparable (par. 72) de l’ordonnance de 2002. Selon nous, il est
désormais clair que l’intention n’était pas de laisser entendre que le fait
qu’une réserve a trait à la compétence et non au fond emporte nécessai-
rement sa compatibilité avec l’objet et le but de la convention en cause.
Cela dépend beaucoup de la convention particulière et de la réserve parti-
culière dont il s’agit. Dans le cas de certains traités, les réserves à des dis-
positions de fond précises ne seront pas toutes nécessairement contraires
à l’objet et au but du traité. Certaines, se rapportant à des dispositions
de fond particulières, figurant par exemple dans les pactes internationaux
relatifs aux droits civils et politiques ou aux droits économiques sociaux
et culturels, pourront ne pas l’être. A l’inverse, une réserve concernant
une disposition « procédurale » précise d’une certaine convention pourra
être contraire à l’objet et au but du traité. Par exemple, les organes de
surveillance institués en application de certaines conventions des
Nations Unies sont des éléments centraux dont dépend sans doute toute
l’efficacité de ces instruments. Comme le Comité des droits de l’homme
l’a souligné dans son observation générale 24, la présentation périodique
de rapports à ce comité par les Etats parties, et l’étude de ces rapports,
sont au cœur du système des pactes. Si un Etat prétendait accepter les

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                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                       71

obligations de fond découlant du pacte tout en refusant de rendre compte
de leur exécution ou de participer à l’examen des rapports des Etats par
le Comité, cela pourrait être contraire à l’objet et au but du pacte. Il en va
sans doute de même en ce qui concerne les organes de suivi d’autres ins-
truments dont l’efficacité repose tout entière sur un système de présenta-
tion des rapports par les Etats.
   22. Les juridictions des droits de l’homme n’ont pas considéré que
l’avis consultatif rendu par la Cour en 1951 leur interdisait de faire
davantage que noter si un Etat donné avait fait objection à une réserve.
Cette évolution ne crée pas pour autant un « schisme » entre le droit inter-
national général représenté par l’avis consultatif de la Cour de 1951 et
une « déviation » de ce droit qu’auraient introduite les diverses juridic-
tions en cause.
   23. Il faut y voir plutôt un développement du droit permettant de
répondre aux réalités contemporaines, développement que rien dans les
conclusions énoncées en 1951 par la Cour n’interdit. D’ailleurs, il est clair
que la pratique même de la Cour internationale reflète cette tendance des
juridictions en question à se prononcer elles-mêmes, quand le besoin s’en
fait sentir, sur la compatibilité avec l’objet et le but.

                                    * * *
   24. Nous en venons maintenant à notre second point. Bien que nous
ayons voté en faveur du paragraphe 128 de l’arrêt, il nous apparaît que
certains aspects demandent à être étudiés plus avant.
   25. Il est gravement préoccupant qu’en ce début du XXIe siècle on
laisse encore au bon vouloir des Etats le soin de consentir ou non à ce que
la Cour statue sur les allégations de génocide qui seraient formulées à
leur encontre. Il faut considérer comme très grave qu’un Etat soit à même
de soustraire à l’examen judiciaire international une requête le mettant en
cause pour génocide. Un Etat qui agit ainsi se montre aux yeux du
monde bien peu assuré de ne jamais, au grand jamais, commettre de
génocide, l’un des plus grands crimes que l’on connaisse.
   26. Le règlement judiciaire des contestations relatives au crime de
génocide est hautement souhaitable. Pour autant, on ne saurait dire que
tout le dispositif de la convention sur le génocide s’effondrera nécessai-
rement si certains Etats formulent des réserves à l’article IX. Si tel était le
cas, l’acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour aurait dû être rendue obli-
gatoire, comme le prévoit maintenant la convention européenne des
droits de l’homme pour ce qui est de la Cour européenne des droits de
l’homme. La Cour internationale, en 1951, a considéré qu’aucune inter-
diction de formuler des réserves ne devait être inférée du silence de la
convention elle-même sur le génocide. Qui plus est, elle l’a fait en ayant
pleinement conscience que les réserves en question se rapportaient en fait
à l’article IX. Rappelons à ce propos que la convention définit le génocide
(art. II) et énumère les actes qui « seront punis » (art. III). Les articles IV
à VII concernent les mesures que doivent prendre les Etats pour punir les

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                    ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES (OP. IND. COM.)                     72

personnes accusées de génocide, et principalement la législation qu’ils
doivent édicter sur leur propre territoire. Il est également prévu de tra-
duire ces personnes « devant la cour criminelle internationale qui sera
compétente à l’égard de celles des Parties contractantes qui en auront
reconnu la juridiction ». La Cour internationale de Justice n’est manifes-
tement pas la juridiction criminelle envisagée pour juger et punir les indi-
vidus en question.
   27. Tels sont à n’en pas douter les éléments que la Cour a pris en
considération pour dire jusqu’à présent qu’une réserve à l’article IX n’est
pas incompatible avec les objets et buts de la convention.
   28. Mais il est d’autres éléments qui continuent à nous préoccuper. Si
la Cour n’est pas un organe de surveillance conventionnel au sens où on
l’entend habituellement (dans la mesure où elle ne reçoit pas de rapports
que les Etats seraient tenus de lui présenter et qu’elle examinerait pour
déterminer si les Etats se conforment au traité en cause), la convention
sur le génocide lui assigne néanmoins un rôle important. Selon cette
convention, ce sont les Etats qui se contrôlent mutuellement pour vérifier
que chacun respecte l’interdiction du génocide. Si un Etat pense qu’un
autre Etat commet le crime de génocide, l’article IX lui donne alors la
possibilité de saisir la Cour. L’article IX vise les différends qui portent
non seulement sur l’interprétation ou l’application de la convention, mais
aussi sur son « exécution ». En outre, les différends pouvant être soumis à
la Cour aux termes de l’article IX comprennent « ceux relatifs à la res-
ponsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide ».
   29. Il n’est donc pas évident qu’on ne puisse pas considérer une réserve
à l’article IX comme incompatible avec l’objet et le but de la convention,
et nous pensons que c’est là une question sur laquelle la Cour devrait
revenir afin de l’examiner plus avant.

                                          (Signé) Rosalyn HIGGINS.
                                         (Signé) Pieter H. KOOIJMANS.
                                           (Signé) Nabil ELARABY.
                                            (Signé) Hisashi OWADA.
                                            (Signé) Bruno SIMMA.

                                                                         70


311

DÉCLARATION DE M. RANJEVA

Le caractère unique de la présente décision justifiait à mon avis le
respect de la structure du raisonnement adopté dans le paragraphe 63 de
l'arrêt de 1974. Il aurait été préférable, dans ces conditions, de traiter en
premier lieu ce que le paragraphe 48 de l'ordonnance qualifie de second
volet de la question. Les conclusions auxquelles est parvenue d’ailleurs la
Cour sur le «point de savoir si le «fondement» de cet arrêt a été «remis
en cause» au sens de son paragraphe 63» rendaient sans objet les déve-
loppements consacrés aux questions procédurales. La démarche adoptée
dans l’ordonnance, contrairement aux prescriptions du paragraphe 63 de
l’arrêt de 1974, privilégie le formalisme procédural sur le fond du droit.

(Signé) Raymond RANJEVA.

27


45

DISSENTING OPINION
OF M. GUERRERO, COUNT ROSTWOROWSKI,
MM. FROMAGEOT AND URRUTIA.

[Translation.]

While agreeing, in substance, with the Court’s reply to the
first question submitted by the Council, the undersigned
judges differ from the majority in regard to the reply given
to the second question, concerning the interpretation of Arti-
cle 104 (5) of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, and of
Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Polish-Danzig Convention of
Paris, of November gth, 1920.

Article 104 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles contains
an engagement—not presenting any of the legal character-
istics of a mandate—whereby the Principal Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers undertook to negotiate a convention between
Poland and Danzig. This convention, known later as the
Convention of Paris of November gth, 1920, was to ensure
the observance and execution of the various provisions of the
said article, which was intended to determine the rights of
Poland, and the treatment to which Poles were entitled, at
Danzig.

It does not result, as a consequence of the Convention
having been negotiated in this way, that the Treaty is left
with nothing more than a contingent interpretative value.

The Convention of Paris is an executive Convention, which
implements the Treaty, and consequently leaves intact the
force of the latter. It is one of those arrangements or agree-
ments “made thereunder’ which are explicitly referred to in
Article 103, together with the Treaty of Peace itself, as sub-
jects for the arbitration of the High Commissioner of the
League of Nations at Danzig, in case of differences arising
between Poland and the Free City of Danzig.

When one considers the repeated declarations of the Con-
ference of Ambassadors (May 7th, 1920, October 2oth, 1920)
to the effect that the rights of Poland in regard to Danzig
were ‘‘recognized” and “‘assured” by the Treaty of Versailles ;

45
DISSENTING OPINION 46

when one considers the similar declarations by Viscount Ishii,
Rapporteur to the Council of the League of Nations (Novem-
ber r7th, 1920) to the effect that the rights of Poland in
regard to Danzig were ‘conferred’? upon her by the Treaty,
and that the restrictions to the sovereignty of the Free City,
and the obligations incumbent on the Free City, were
“imposed” by the Treaty of Peace ; when one considers that the
Free City herself (see Memorial, dated September zoth, 1921,
concerning the access of Polish war vessels) also declares that
Article 104 mentions the economic rights which ‘‘Poland enjoys
in regard to the Free City by the terms of the Treaty of
Versailles” ; when one considers that the High Commissioner,
for his part, declared (see decision of December 6th, 1921)
that the Treaty of Versailles and the Polish-Danzig Con-
vention are the two documents upon which every decision must
be based; and finally, when one considers that Article 104
is, in fact, the only article of the Treaty of Peace which
relates to the rights of Poland at Danzig, it is difficult to
see how it can be maintained, to-day, that the provisions of
Article 104 do not contain treaty law governing the relations
between Poland and Danzig.

Indeed, the exact opposite is clearly implied in the actual
terms of the question, as worded by the Council in the present
case, and also in the terms of its question in the preceding
case concerning the access of warships to the port of Danzig
(Opinion of December 1th, 1932).

In the last-named case, when considering, in accordance
with the Council’s request, whether Part III, Section XI, of
the Treaty of Peace—i.e. Articles 100 to 108—had conferred
rights or attributions upon Poland in regard to the access of
warships, the Court did not throw any doubt on the full value
of Article 104 as the basis of Polish rights at Danzig.

It was subject to these organic stipulations that the Free
City was created and constituted. These stipulations have
been, and continue to be, the fundamental basis of the rights
of Poland at Danzig.

The authors of the Peace Treaty, the Council of the League
of Nations, the High Commissioner, the Free City, and lastly
the Court itself, have always hitherto taken this view. There

46
DISSENTING OPINION 47

appears no valid reason to-day for departing from so well-
founded an opinion.

According to Article 104 (5), no discrimination is permitted
at Danzig to the detriment of Polish nationals or other persons
of Polish origin or speech.

That is a provision of an absolutely general character.

There is nothing to justify the addition thereto of any
restrictions—whether directly or indirectly. There is nothing
to justify any limitation of their scope, whether by seeking
to circumscribe the category of persons as compared with
whom discrimination is forbidden, or by seeking to limit the
category of Polish elements entitled to the benefit of the
clause, or again, indirectly, by requiring proof that the dis-
crimination is based on an intention to cause prejudice to
the Poles.

It cannot be maintained that the discrimination forbidden
is to be understood only as based upon the Polish character
of those against whom it is practiced. It is easy to see that
the effect of Article 104 (5) of the Treaty of Peace would thus
be restricted, in the case of Polish nationals at Danzig, who
would merely be entitled to equality of treatment with for-
eigners in general residing in the Free City. It will be readily
perceived that, if this were so, a measure which placed the
Polish nationals at Danzig in a position of inferiority to the
nationals of Danzig would not constitute discrimination ‘such
as is forbidden by the Treaty, provided only that it was
declared applicable to all persons of other than Danzig nation-
ality. .

The only difference between the Polish and Danzig elements
at Danzig is that Poles who are not nationals of the Free City
do not possess, by reason of that circumstance, any of the
rights and duties of a political character which are an essen-
tial element of allegiance.

Not only would the opposite interpretation, if admitted,
add an arbitrary restriction to the entirely general import of
the provisions of Article 104 (5), but it would further result
in annihilating one of the clauses of the Peace Treaty, which
separated the almost wholly German city of Danzig from
Germany, with the sole object of ensuring that Poland—though
not invested with sovereignty—and- her nationals and other

47
DISSENTING OPINION 48

Polish elements should enjoy an entirely. special position—a
position differing from that to which foreign countries and their
nationals can lay claim in a foreign city, under ordinary law. —

Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Convention of Paris. remains
within the framework of Article 104 (5) of the Treaty of
Peace, to which it makes express reference, and to which it
states that it conforms. It is a special undertaking by which
Danzig has bound herself, in regard to the various. Polish
elements at Danzig, to provide for the observance of these
conditions which governed the creation and establishment of
the Free City. |

Thus, Article 33, paragraph I, not only provides for the
protection of the minority elements of the Danzig population—
including the members of the Polish minority—but also for
the full application of the régime, laid down in the Treaty
of Peace, to all Poles in general.

It cannot be successfully argued that a draft which the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers had, at one time,
desired to regard as definitive, provides ground for deducing,
in this respect, a further restriction limiting the scope of
Article 33, paragraph 1x, to a mere application of the Polish
Minorities Treaty of June 28th, 1919, to the minorities at
Danzig. That draft was not retained, for the very good
reason that it was recognized by the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers as incomplete, and because it was neces-
sary that the Polish-Danzig Convention, which they had to
negotiate in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty, should
secure the full benefits of Article ro4 (5) to all the Polish
inhabitants, in order that it might be in conformity with the
said Treaty.

To sum up, under Article 33, paragraph I, of the Con-
vention of Paris, the Free City undertakes not only to observe,
in her treatment of the Poles of Danzig nationality forming a.
minority of the Danzig population, the rules for the protection
of minorities, already stipulated in the Treaty concluded
between Poland and the Principal Powers at the same time
as the Peace Treaty with Germany; she further undertook,
at the same time, not to subject other Polish elements at
Danzig to a different treatment from that applied to other

48
DISSENTING OPINION 49

inhabitants of the Free City, whether of Danzig or of other
nationality.

The observance of the provisions regarding the various
Polish elements at Danzig in accordance with the terms of
Article 104 (5) of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, could
only be and are fully secured in this way.

FOR THESE REASONS,

In regard to the second question asked by the Council, the
undersigned judges are of opinion that:

Article 104 (5) of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, which
conferred on Poland her rights in the Free City of Danzig,
and Article 33 (x) of the Danzig-Polish Convention of Paris,
which provided for the observance and application of the
first-mentioned stipulation, must be construed as meaning
that, as regards Polish nationals and other persons (including
Danzig nationals) of Polish origin or speech, these articles
ensure in the fullest possible way that in the territory of
the Free City of Danzig, there may be no discrimination to
the detriment of these various Polish elements, as compared
either with foreigners in general or with Danzig nationals
who are not of Polish origin or speech, except as regards
rights of a political character inherent in the capacity of a
citizen of Danzig, no matter what the basis of such discrim-
ination may be or the intention underlying it.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO.
( ,, ) M. RostworowskI1.
(_,, ) HENRI FROMAGEOT.

( ,; ) Francisco José URRUTIA.

49


72

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE STASSINOPOULOS
[Translation]

Very much to my regret, I am unable to concur in the Judgment. I
therefore avail myself of the right conferred upon me by Article 57 of the
Statute of the Court to indicate the reasons for my dissent.

1. The Court has been unwilling to adopt a position as to whether the
1928 General Act has continued in force. It could however, in my view,
have done so, since the Applicant has a legitimate interest in learning what
the Court considers to be the status of this convention, which was the main
basis of jurisdiction relied upon. Moreover, as the Judgment observes:

“itis evident that any pronouncement of the Court as to the status
of the 1928 Act, whether it were found to be a convention in force or to
be no longer in force, may have implications in the relations between
States other than Greece and Turkey” (para. 39).

In an organized international society, therefore, the settlement of this
question, after the three cases already submitted to the Court (Nuclear
Tests and Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War), would present a more
general interest. The fact that the Judgment leaves on one side the question
whether the Act remains in force gives rise, on the other hand, to some
difficult situations. If the General Act were not in force, the Greek reser-
vation would be without effect and there would therefore be no point in
dealing with its substance. Then again, the Court has based parts of its
reasoning on a treaty whose contents it has refrained from examining. For
example, paragraph 43 of the Judgment says that Turkey’s statement about
the reservation “must be considered as constituting an ‘enforcement’ of the
reservation within the meaning of, and in conformity with, Article 39, para-
graph 3, of the Act” (emphasis added).

2. In the event the Court had examined the question of the validity of
the General Act, I would have favoured an affirmative conclusion, above
all for the following reasons:

3. The parties to the Act have not evinced the will to cease to be parties
to it. Quite apart from the formal steps known to classic international law,
such as denunciation, one may also consider it possible to deduce the
termination of a treaty if that may be clearly and unequivocally inferred
from the parties’ subsequent conduct. But where it is a question of a treaty
not being used, not only does customary international law refuse to admit
this as a cause of extinction but the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties deliberately avoided mentioning desuetude in the 1969 Conven-
tion as a cause of extinction of States’ international obligations.

73
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 73

The existence and validity of the General Act cannot be denied on
grounds of oblivion, for it is impossible to contemplate that the host of
treaties binding States could lose their force just because they have not
been invoked or put to use.

Since the Nuclear Tests cases, so much publicity has been given to the
existence of the General Act that it is inconceivable that Turkey could have
forgotten to take any action needed to manifest its desire to be bound by
that instrument no longer. Since the 1973 dispute wherein Australia and
New Zealand were opposed to France, two States, France and the United
Kingdom, have taken care to denounce the Act so that it no longer binds
them.

Further publicity was given to the General Act by the Trial of Pakistani
Prisoners of War case, inasmuch as the Court was requested to say to what
extent the Act bound India through considerations of State succession.

That being so, Turkey was not unaware of the existence of the Act when
Greece instituted the present proceedings. The fact, which Turkey has
raised, that it was not alluded to at a certain stage of the talks does not in
any way affect the standing of the Act as a conventional instrument
providing a direct path of access to the Court. To justify a claim that the
Act has ceased to be in force it would be necessary for some radical
Situation touching its object and mechanism to have arisen. But no such
situation capable of casting doubt on the validity of the General Act has
come into being.

4. One of the arguments put forward in the Turkish letter of 1976 is that
the General Act allegedly failed to survive the League of Nations. Yet right
from the time when the Act was drafted it was clearly stated that, unlike the
Geneva draft protocol of 1924, it was to have no institutional or structural
connection with the League of Nations—chiefly because the intention was
to have the General Act function in parallel with the League, attract States
not members thereof, and offer alternative machinery to the Geneva
organization with its highly politicized atmosphere. The 1928 records of
the League Council bear witness that governments, and in particular the
British Government, were anxious to dissociate the General Act from the
League of Nations. It may likewise be pointed out that the arbitration
procedure provided for in the General Act was bound up with the 1907
Hague Convention, and not the machinery of the League.

As for the procedure for judicial settlement instituted by Articles 17 ff.
of the Act, that is independent, and the reference to the Permanent Court
of International Justice is now governed by Article 37 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, whereby those provisions continue to be
applicable within the framework of the transfer of jurisdiction to the
latter.

The provisions relating to the depositary functions of the League Secre-
tariat are to be taken as applying to the Secretariat of the United Nations

74
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 74

by virtue of resolution A/24 (1), adopted by the General Assembly of the
latter Organization in 1946. Since then the Secretary-General of the United
Nations has exercised those functions.

The General Act provides for the accession of third States to be acquired
via a communication to be sent them by the Council of the League. The
documents produced by Greece demonstrate that the role of the League of
Nations in this connection has its historical explanation in the fact that
certain governments wished to make sure that parties to the General Act
possessed all the attributes of sovereignty as understood at the time.

In any case, this consideration has no effect on relations between Greece
and Turkey within the framework of the General Act, because both
acceded to it as member States of the League of Nations.

5. I shall now consider the questions which arise concerning the Greek
reservation to the General Act.

INVOCATION OF THE RESERVATION

Having regard to the procedures followed in the present case, are the
conditions for the invocation of reservations by reciprocity fulfilled?

Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General Act, which concerns the condi-
tions for activating the reciprocity of reservations, is worded as follows: “If
one of the parties to a dispute {parties en litige] has made a reservation, the
other parties may enforce the same reservation in regard to that party.”
The use of the words “one of the parties fo a dispute” instead of just “one of
the parties”, and of the verb “may”, implies that this provision must be
interpreted as excluding the supposition that reciprocity comes into play
automatically: its implementation is clearly made dependent on the will of
the other party to the litige. The party in question—meaning a party
participating in the proceedings '—must, to enforce that reciprocity,
express its will before the Court in a formal manner, and in particular in
the way laid down in Article 67 of the Rules of Court with respect to
preliminary objections.

In the present instance, the Turkish letters of 1976 and 1978 do not
constitute a preliminary objection raised in accordance with the formali-
tics laid down in Article 67 of the Rules of Court; those formalities should
however be observed, considering that the objection is one so crucial to the
interests of the Applicant.

The point is that reciprocity is a mechanism which may operate to the
detriment of the State which has made the reservation; it should therefore
be subject to at least a minimum of safeguards for that State, to ensure that
it cannot be triggered at just any time, without formality. It should not, in

' The Nouveau petit Larousse illustré, 400th edition, defines litige as “contestation en

justice”, i.e., a dispute before a court. Hence parties en litige means “parties present before
a court”.

75
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 75

my view, be accepted that reciprocity may take effect unless a State
participating in the proceedings raises an objection in accordance with the
procedures and within the time-limits laid down. The benefit of reciprocity
should thus be refused to a State which is not present in the proceed-
ings.

I well understand the way in which the Court applies certain rules of
procedure customary in municipal courts, concerning the procedural situ-
ation of parties which fail to appear. I have a deep respect for that system,
especially when it is a matter of seeking the truth on the question of the
Court’s jurisdiction. But since it is here more precisely a matter of permit-
ting a State to enjoy the benefit of reciprocity, it would in my opinion be
only proper that this special and concrete right, one likely to harm the
interests of the Applicant, should not be regarded as available to a State
which not only is absent from the proceedings but has all along declared
that it is not, and does not wish to be in any way, a party to the case, when
Article 39, paragraph 3, of the General Act refers specifically to the parties
“en litige”.

6. Furthermore, the reservation in question was in my view eliminated,
so far as the present case is concerned, by the Brussels Joint Communiqué
of 31 May 1975.

I shall be going into the legal nature of that instrument below. For the
moment I must simply state that, even if the majority of the Court deny it
the character of an international treaty (which is in my view its real
character), this communiqué is still an international agreement, created by
the merging of wills of two Prime Ministers who decided to submit, be it in
principle, the present dispute to the Court. But the least effect of a legal
kind which this communiqué must be admitted to have is that Turkey has
renounced its right to enforce the reservation; one cannot, even in prin-
ciple, give consent to the submission of this case to the Court and at the
same time retain the right to invoke a reservation which (in Turkey’s view)
excludes that very case from the Court’s jurisdiction. To hold otherwise
would be to permit a flagrant self-contradiction, one inadmissible in
international relations.

For these reasons, I believe that the way Turkey set about bringing the
reciprocity of the reservation into play was irregular and that, as its
reliance on that reservation was inoperative, it would be superfluous in
consequence to examine its contentions regarding the sense of the reser-
vation.

INTERPRETATION OF THE RESERVATION
7. I now come to the question of the interpretation of the reservation.
The basic elements of this interpretation were put forward in the Memorial

and oral arguments of 1978, and not necessarily in the hectic atmosphere of
the crisis which occurred in the summer of 1976, when the Applicant’s

76
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 76

main attention was devoted to the factors tending to justify the indication
of measures of protection.

8. By way of immediate clarification of the history of the reservation
formulated by Greece when it acceded to the General Act in 1931, it should
be recalled that two years previously, in 1929, Greece acceded, subject to a
reservation, to the optional clause for compulsory Jurisdiction of the
Court, under Article 36, paragraph 2; of the Statute.

This 1929 reservation removed from the jurisdiction of the Court two
categories of disputes:

“{a) disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece, including
disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and
lines of communication;

(b) disputes relating directly or indirectly to the application of trea-
ties or conventions accepted by Greece and providing for an-
other procedure.”

This 1929 reservation was formulated following a suggestion by Profes-
sor N. Politis, made with a view to protecting Greece against claims by
Bulgaria over Thrace and in relation to Bulgarian-speaking minorities. In
these circumstances, Greece formulated an independent reservation con-
cerning its territorial status, and included in that reservation rights of
sovereignty over its ports and lines of communication.

Greece thus sought to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court al!
disputes relating to its territorial status, being fully aware that Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute relates to legal disputes involving the State
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

9. The form of words used in the reservation inserted in the 1931
instrument of accession by Greece to the General Act is entirely differ-
ent.

This reservation, which was formulated pursuant to Article 39, para-
graph 1, of the General Act, was made up of two parts, namely:

(a) by part (a), which relates to the time element, those disputes are
excluded which result from facts prior to the accession—a category
corresponding to subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Article 39 of the
General Act;

(b) by part (b}, Greece’s intention was to exclude from the jurisdiction of
the Court

“disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely

within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes

relating to the territorial status of Greece, including disputes relating

to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of communica-
tion”.

10. What is the meaning of reservation (b)? More particularly, does it

exclude from the Court’s jurisdiction the present dispute, which concerns

77
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 77

the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea? The answer to
this question must be a clear negative, for the reasons given below.

The Literal Meaning of the Reservation

11. As is clearly apparent even on an initial reading of the text of the
reservation, it excludes from the Court’s jurisdiction one single category of
disputes, namely those which by international law are solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of the States. The reservation singles out for par-
ticular mention, from within this whole category, disputes relating to the
territorial status of Greece which at the same time belong to the group of
“disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of States”.

Thus the reservation did not exclude two categories of dispute. That
would be the case if its text had been drawn up as follows:

(a) disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and
(b) disputes relating to territorial status.

But the text mentions only one category, that is to say disputes concerning
questions which by international law are solely within the domestic juris-
diction of States, and, among these, the reservation mentions “in particular
[notamment]” disputes relating to territorial status.

The drafting is such as to leave no doubt as to the meaning of the
reservation. The French word “notamment” ! signifies, according to all
literary sources, that it is thought necessary to mention more particularly a
special element of a concept already mentioned. The “genus” as.a whole
had been mentioned, and a part or parcel of that whole is mentioned more
particularly. It is as if the text of the reservation read: “I exclude disputes
which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction, but I
think it necessary to mention, within this category taken as a whole,
‘disputes relating to territorial status’.”

12. The Greek word, which is used in the Greek text, is the word
elduc@repov. In Greek, eiôuxcrepor signifies “more particularly”, and it is

a comparative adverb, derived from the word <idos :

eidos = species

cidixds = special (adjective)

cldixkarepos = more special (comparative adjective)

cidixdds = specially (adverb)

eiSucestepov = more specially or more particularly (comparative ad-
verb).

1 Notamment and et notamment have exactly the same meaning, the conjunction et
having no other significance than linking the genus to the species.

78
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 78

Thus, as I have observed, the group comprising “disputes relating to
territorial status”, excluded by reservation (b), is not the totality of all
disputes relating to territorial status, but only a part of that totality,
namely “the disputes relating to territorial status which by international
law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States”. If what is in
question is a dispute which relates to territorial status, but which is not by
international law solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States, such
dispute is not excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court, and that is
exactly the case of the continental shelf, the status of which is not a
question which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of States, but is a question governed by international law.

Thus the dispute relating to the delimitation of the Aegean Sea conti-
nental shelf, being a dispute which by international law is not solely within
the domestic jurisdiction of Greece, is not excluded by virtue of reservation
(b) from the jurisdiction of the Court.

Greece Did not Intend to Exclude Disputes concerning the
Continental Shelf

13. Greece, when formulating reservation (b), did not intend to exclude
the dispute concerning the delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental
shelf. The real intention of Greece in this particular case is made suffi-
ciently clear by the letter from Mr. Politis, who suggested the wording of
the reservation, in order to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court
disputes which might arise out of Bulgaria’s claims to transit across the
territory of Thrace, which went beyond the treaty provisions.

This intention of Greece to protect itself against Bulgarian demands,
both territorial and non-territorial, was amply justified, since Bulgaria had
clearly indicated that it sought to upset the territorial and political arran-
gements crystallized in the peace treaties. From Greece’s point of view,
there was thus a danger that it might find these demands, of a political
nature, covered by the procedures of the General Act, since that Act
included, in addition to judicial procedures designed for legal disputes,
procedures for conciliation and arbitration capable of leading to settle-
ments ex aequo et bono for questions of a political nature, like those raised
by the claims of Bulgaria. Greece therefore had to take precautions against
any challenging of its territorial status as laid down in the treaties. But the
Athens Government (in order to contribute towards the atmosphere of
appeasement prevailing at the time and to the generalized application, as
far as possible, of the peaceful settlement of disputes) did not think fit to
make a reservation of all disputes concerning territorial status; it merely
reserved those disputes which by international law are solely within
domestic jurisdiction. This narrower category included disputes which
might arise out of Bulgaria’s demands, which were revisionist in nature in
relation to the treaties in force.

79
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 79

That being so, questions relating to the territorial status of Greece, as
defined by the treaties, do not fall within the reservation made to the
General Act. What do fall within that reservation are political demands
tending to overturn existing commitments.

The Concept of “Territorial Status” Does not Include the Status of the
Continental Shelf, Still Less the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

14. The concept of territorial status does not include the status of the
continental shelf. The continental shelf lies below the high seas, which are
free; and the specific sovereign rights of the coastal State (the right to
explore and exploit the seabed and the subsoil thereof) are of an economic
character and, in any case, are not such as to situate the continental shelf in
the territory of the State. Third States are not forbidden to engage in
activities other than the exploration and exploitation of the continental
shelf: they can even use it for military purposes! If, therefore, any third
State whatever can deploy weapons and use the bed of the high seas for
military purposes, how can one speak of “territory” or of “territorial
extension” of the coastal State?

The “status” of the continental shelf could not therefore be considered
as falling within the concept of the “territorial status of the State”.

Distinction Between “Status” and “Delimitation”

15. In any case, the dispute submitted to the Court by the Greek
Government’s Application does not concern the “territorial status” of
Greece, but the delimitation of the continental shelf. Even if the status of
the continental shelf were considered to be included in “territorial status”
(which I do not concede), the Greek Application still concerns not the
status but the delimitation of the continental shelf. Status is one thing,
delimitation another. Status is the legal situation, the legal condition, the
whole set of rules defining a legal situation, whereas delimitation merely
concerns the correct application of those rules of international law in order
to draw the boundaries of the continental shelf.

Therefore this question of delimitation cannot in any way be regarded
as included in something which is quite a different question, that of the
determination of the legal status of the continental shelf.

The Reservation Must Be Interpreted Restrictively
16. A final argument of a general nature should be added in favour of

this interpretation. It is an argument derived from the principle, which may
indirectly be deduced from the case-law of this Court, that reservations

80
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 80

must be interpreted strictly, and not read broadly. Such a restrictive
interpretation is required:

(a) because reservations are exceptions to a general rule, and all excep-
tions, restrictions and limitations of a rule are, as a general principle of
law, always interpreted restrictively;

(b) because every reservation constitutes an exception to the general rule
of peaceful settlement of disputes adopted by the General Act, and a
broad and extensive interpretation of the reservation would operate to
the detriment of the general rule of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Reservation Has Ceased to Operate Since the Brussels
Communiqué

17. Finally, and in any event, the Greek reservation has been neutra-
lized by the Joint Communiqué of Brussels of 31 May 1975, as I have
already indicated above.

Ï shall have more to say as to the character of this Communiqué, which
constitutes an international agreement giving rise to international rights
and obligations. I must at once, however, express my view that from
31 May 1975 onwards, that is from the date of the agreement enshrined in
the Joint Communiqué of the two Prime Ministers, the Greek reservation
of 1931 has ceased to operate; its interpretation, therefore, has become a
moot issue. As I have already stated, it is not legally possible for the
Turkish Government to rely before this Court on a reservation which, with
the express and deliberate consent of Turkey, has been eliminated so far as
the present case is concerned since 31 May 1975.

18. In these circumstances I have the greatest difficulty in following the
Court’s reasoning in the interpretation which it gives to the Greek reser-
vation. It sets aside the clear grammatical meaning of the French text.
Subsequently, in support of its view that the words “et, notamment,” do not
designate a species within a broader category, the Court picks out a
sentence from the Greek text of the exposé des motifs of the bill submitted
to the Greek Parliament and then immediately refers to the French text,
without taking into account the Greek text of the actual law approving the
accession, a text which must be taken into consideration in the very first
place and includes the word cidixotepov; this quite unequivocally
means “more specially” in all cases, even if it is placed between two
commas.

19. Moreover, in the Greek reservation “territorial status” does not
appear merely as an example of a question relating to domestic jurisdiction
but implies the firm intention of Greece to exclude from the procedures of
the General Act anything which might tend to a revision of its territorial
status.

Furthermore, so far as the historical realities of the Balkan peninsula are

81
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 81

concerned, the circumstances in which Greece acceded to Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute were not the same as those which induced it to
accede to the General Act. As the Agent of Greece pointed out, the
political barometer of the region used to change far too rapidly for it to be
possible to say that the position in 1931 was the same as in 1929.

20. The argument that Greece renewed its 1929 reservation in 1934 and
1939 without amending it proves absolutely nothing compared with the
reasons which caused it to formulate the reservation to the General Act
and the clear text of that reservation.

21. Lastly, to conclude consideration of the questions raised with regard
to this reservation, I must point out that the concept “territorial and
political unity of Greece” relied upon in the Application means that the
mainland and insular portions of Greece may in no way be treated differ-
ently.

DOES THE COMMUNIQUE OF 31 May 1975 CoNFER JURISDICTION
ON THE COURT TO ENTERTAIN THE PRESENT DISPUTE?

22. The Joint Communiqué issued in Brussels on 31 May 1975, far from
being a mere “press release”, as Turkey claimed in its letter of 10 October
1978, constitutes an oral international agreement (recorded in writing)
reached between the Heads of the two Governments at the summit meeting
which took place in Brussels.

In this Communiqué the two Prime Ministers declare very clearly that
they “decided” that the problems of the continental shelf “should be
resolved by the International Court of Justice”.

First of all, the expression “decided” means that a decision had already
been arrived at by the merging of the two wills, and not merely an intention
to reach an agreement in the future. The expression is therefore a full and
complete declaration of intention, which gives rise to international obli-
gations and which is not, moreover, made subject to any condition.

The verb “doivent [in the present tense] être résolus” means that the
jurisdiction of the Court recognized by this Communiqué is considered by
the two parties to exist from the moment at which the Communiqué was
published, and not from some point in the future. The two parties did not
say that the disputes “devront [will have to]” or “devraient [ought to] être
résolus par la Cour”; they said “doivent étre résolus par la Cour”. This is an
affirmation demonstrative of a decision already taken, and a jurisdiction
already conferred. How could the words “ont décidé [decided, or have
decided}” and “doivent [should, or are to be]” be distorted to mean that the
decision has not yet been taken and that the disputes should not yet be
submitted to the Court, or that all this is merely a prospect to be realized in
the future?

This efficacy of the Joint Communiqué is not affected by the fact that
Turkey has shown reluctance to conform to the agreement concluded in
Brussels, admitting, nevertheless, that the submission of the present

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AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) | 82

dispute to the Court had been decided “in principle” and that all that
remained was for the “terms” for the submission to be determined through
negotiations.

An oral agreement can give rise to international commitments; the
Court has already had occasion to confirm the lack of strict formal re-
quirements for international commitments and the consistency of oral
agreements with international law. .

23. Turkey itself was fully aware of the significance of the agreement
concluded between the two Prime Ministers in Brussels. The Turkish
Prime Minister, Mr. Suleiman Demirel, in his letter addressed to the Greek
Prime Minister, Mr. C. Karamanlis (annexed to the Turkish letter of 10
October 1978), stresses that “Turkey is willing and determined to adhere to
the Brussels Agreement to the letter”. The agreement in question was
another one, concerning Cyprus, but from “the letter” of this statement
one may infer (a) that Turkey considers such decisions to be international
agreements, and (b) that it considers itself bound by them and reaffirms its
will to remain faithful to the implementation of what was decided—faithful
implementation “to the letter”. What is, then, “the letter” of the decision
taken in Brussels on 31 May 1975? It is to be found in the text of the
Communiqué: “They decided that those problems should be resolved
peacefully by means of negotiations and as regards the continental shelf of
the Aegean Sea by the International Court at The Hague.”

I conclude that the Joint Communiqué is fully valid as a source of
jurisdiction of the Court in pursuance of Article 36, paragraph 1, of its
Statute.

FINAL OBSERVATION

24. If any doubt were felt as to the jurisdiction of the Court, I venture to
submit that, in the event of such a doubt, the decision should be taken in
favour of jurisdiction.

In all fields of law there are general principles designed to facilitate the
work of the judge, who is often reluctant to choose between two solutions
which seem to him to be equally plausible. These principles then come into
play to help the judge to settle difficult and thorny problems to which he
sometimes cannot find a solution. Without these general principles, many
laws and many institutions, in their totality, would lose a large part of their
value. But, thanks to these principles, “le juge peut maîtriser la loi”, in the
words of the French writers, and a court may thus convert texts which are
often modest and spiritless into ideas capable of moulding and stimulating
the life of a society.

This role played by general principles is much more important in those
fields of law which are characterized by the absence of a stable and rigid
system of rules, as is the case with international law.

Thus, in constitutional law, unlike civil law, there being no “code” of

83
AEGEAN SEA (DISS. OP. STASSINOPOULOS) 83

rules, the original source of general principles is to be found in the idea of
freedom and democracy and, beyond that, in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. In dubio, pro libertate, as the saying goes: in the event of
doubt, the most liberal solution, that which is most conducive to demo-
cratic freedom, must be chosen.

In international] law, and particularly in the field of international justice,
the source of general principles must be sought in the dominant ideas
which have led to the establishment of the major international bodies for
the purpose of securing peace and the peaceful settlement of international
disputes. In case of doubt, an international court must, in my opinion,
incline towards the broader scope of its jurisdiction, and the effectiveness
of its mission. After two world wars, a supreme appeal was addressed to the
civilized nations, calling upon them to conform to higher rules with a view
to securing the peaceful settlement of their differences. The broader those
rules, the more effective this universal appeal would be.

I therefore venture to put forward the idea that the Court would take a
step of historical importance if, in the case of doubt as to its jurisdiction (in
this case, with regard to the meaning of the Greek reservation), it allowed
itself to be guided by this basic principle of the universality of its juris-
diction, which contributes to the maintenance of peace.

(Signed) Michel STASSINOPOULOS.

84


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
NOTWITHSTANDING SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

ORDER No. 3 OF 26 JANUARY 1971

1971

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

CONSEQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ETATS DE
LA PRESENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE No 3 DU 26 JANVIER 1971
Official citation:

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa

in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Reso-

lution 276 (1970), Order No. 3 of 26 January 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p. 9.

Mode officiel de citation:

Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l Afrique

du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276

(1970) du Conseil de sécurité, ordonnance n° 3 du 26 janvier 1971, CLIJ.
Recueil 1971, p. 9.

Node vente: 350

‘COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1971 1971
26 janvier
. Rôle général
26 janvier 1971 n° 53

CONSEQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ETATS DE
LA PRESENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE
(n° 3 du 26 janvier 1971)

Présents: Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président; M. AMMOUN,
Vice-Président; sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, MM. PADILLA NERVO,
FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETRÉN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, JIMENEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, juges;
M. AQUARONE, Greffier.

La Cour,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante:

Vu Vexposé écrit présenté par le Gouvernement de la République
sud-africaine le 19 novembre 1970, où des objections sont faites à la
participation de certains membres de la Cour a la présente procédure,
NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) (ORDONNANCE 26 I 71) 10

La Cour

Par dix votes contre quatre,

Décide,

En ce qui concerne M. Morozov, juge, de ne pas faire droit à l’objec-
tion soulevée. .

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-six janvier mil neuf cent soixante et onze en
quatorze exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour,
un autre sera transmis au Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies et les autres seront transmis aux gouvernements des
Etats suivants: Afrique du Sud, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande,
France, Hongrie, Inde, Nigéria, Pakistan, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tchéco-
slovaquie, Yougoslavie.

Le Président,
(Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.


604

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VERESHCHETIN

The extraordinary circumstances in which Yugoslavia made its request
for interim measures of protection imposed a need to react immediately.
The Court should have promptly expressed its profound concern over the
unfolding human misery, loss of life and serious violations of interna-
tional law which by the time of the request were already a matter of pub-
lic knowledge. It is unbecoming for the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, whose very raison d’étre is the peaceful resolution of
international disputes, to maintain silence in such a situation. Even if
ultimately the Court may come to the conclusion that, due to constraints
in its Statute, it cannot indicate fully fledged provisional measures in
accordance with Article 41 of the Statute in relation to one or another of
the respondent States, the Court is inherently empowered, at the very
least, immediately to call upon the Parties neither to aggravate nor to
extend the conflict and to act in accordance with their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations. This power flows from its responsi-
bility for the safeguarding of international law and from major consid-
erations of public order. Such an authoritative appeal by the “World
Court”, which would also be consistent with Article 41 of its Statute and
Article 74, paragraph 4, and Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules, could
have a sobering effect on the Parties involved in the military conflict, un-
precedented in European history since the end of the Second World War.

The Court was urged to uphold the rule of law in the context of large-
scale gross violations of international law, including of the Charter of the
United Nations. Instead of acting expeditiously and, if necessary, proprio
motu, in its capacity as “the principal guardian of international law”, the
majority of the Court, more than one month after the requests were
made, rejected them in a sweeping way in relation to all the cases brought
before the Court, including those where, in my view, the prima facie juris-
diction of the Court could have been clearly established. Moreover, this
decision has been taken in a situation in which deliberate intensification
of bombardment of the most heavily populated areas is causing unabated
loss of life amongst non-combatants and physical and mental harm to the
population in all parts of Yugoslavia.

For the foregoing reasons, I cannot concur with the inaction of the
Court in this matter, although I concede that in some of the cases insti-

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605 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

tuted by the Applicant the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, at this stage
of the proceedings, is open to doubt, and in relation to Spain and the
United States is non-existent.

*
* *

Apart from the considerations set out in the preceding general state-
ment, I would like to clarify my position with regard to the Applications
by Yugoslavia instituted against Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and
Portugal.

I have no doubt that the prima facie jurisdiction under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court does exist in respect of these States
and, as far as Belgium and the Netherlands are concerned, the Court also
has prima facie jurisdiction under the Agreements signed between Bel-
gium and Yugoslavia on 25 March 1930 and between the Netherlands
and Yugoslavia on 11 March 1931.

The arguments to the contrary advanced by the respondent States and
upheld in the Orders of the Court rest upon two cornerstone proposi-
tions. The first concerns all of the four States recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court, the second relates only to Belgium and the
Netherlands. The first proposition is that the text of the Yugoslav decla-
ration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, and in particular the word-
ing of the ratione temporis reservation contained therein, allegedly does
not grant prima facie jurisdiction to the Court. The second proposition is
that the timing of the presentation by Yugoslavia of the additional bases
for jurisdiction allegedly does not allow the Court to conclude that it has
prima facie jurisdiction in respect of the cases instituted against Belgium
and the Netherlands. I cannot give my support to either of the above
basic propositions, for the following reasons.

As concerns the interpretation of the Yugoslav declaration of accept-
ance of the Court’s jurisdiction, the reasoning of the Court centres upon
the time-limit in the reservation to the above declaration, which stipu-
lates that Yugoslavia recognizes the Jurisdiction of the Court “in all dis-
putes arising or which may arise after the signature of the present Dec-
laration, with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this
signature”. The wording of this reservation is said to exclude even the
prima facie jurisdiction of the Court over the disputes submitted for the
Court’s resolution, since the disputes in question, as well as the situations
and facts generating the disputes, arose at least one month before the
filing of the Applications. It is also suggested that the text of the Yugo-
slav reservation deprives the Court of the plausible consensual element in
the declarations made by the Applicant and by the Respondents which
is indispensable for the indication of provisional measures. I cannot agree
with such an interpretation of the Yugoslav declaration, on a number of
grounds.

It has to be admitted that the wording of the Yugoslav declaration is

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606 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

not without ambiguity and, strictly speaking, it excludes from the Court’s
consideration disputes, situations and facts which occurred before the so-
called “critical date”, i.e., 25 April 1999, when the declaration was signed.
On this basis one cannot, however, conclude that each and every dispute
presented for resolution by the Court in the separate Applications of
Yugoslavia must be viewed by the Court as a single dispute or disputes
which existed before 25 April 1999 or, for that matter, that the Court
cannot consider situations and facts relating to these disputes which
arose after that date.

After the beginning of the bombardment of Yugoslavia by the NATO
military alliance the dispute as a whole was treated and is being treated at
various political levels, including the United Nations Security Council, as
a dispute between Yugoslavia and NATO or as a dispute between Yugo-
slavia and all the 19 member States of NATO. The resolution of this gen-
eral political dispute transcends the scope of the Court’s competence. The
Court is dealing with the specific legal disputes of Yugoslavia with the
individual respondent States. Each of these separate disputes may have
the same origin but they became distinct bilateral legal disputes between
individual States only after they had been presented as “the claim of one
party .. . positively opposed by the other” (South West Africa, Prelimi-
nary Objections, Judgment, LC.J. Reports 1962, p. 328). In the cases
under consideration, it coincided with the filing of the Applications by
Yugoslavia against ten individual States. This individualization of the
disputes, which occurred after “the critical date”, was recognized by the
Court when it affirmed the right of those respondent States whose
nationals were not permanently represented on the bench to appoint
judges ad hoc.

From a different perspective, even after “the critical date” Yugoslavia
has, with good reason, complained of a number of new major breaches of
international law by the NATO States. Each of these alleged new major
breaches, whose existence was denied by the NATO States, may be seen
as constituting specific disputes between the Parties concerned, disputes
which clearly occurred after 25 April 1999,

The possibility of distinguishing between a “dispute of a general nature”
on the one hand, and “specific disputes” on the other, was admitted by
the Court in one of its recent cases (Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1 C.J. Reports 1998, p. 21, para. 29).
Nothing in the jurisprudence of the Court justifies the suggestion that a
specific legal dispute between the Parties may not be considered by the

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607 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

Court solely on the ground that it is linked with, or part of, a dispute
excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction.

Another ground on which I disagree with the majority is their complete
disregard of the clear intention of Yugoslavia. Quite recently the Court
had occasion to reiterate its position on the necessity to take into account
the intention of a State making a declaration. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada) case the Court interpreted the relevant words of the
declaration in question “having due regard to the intention of the State
concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court” (Judgment, C.J. Reports 1998, p. 454, para. 49; see also Temple
of Preah Vihear, I. C.J. Reports 1961, p. 31).

In its Orders in the present cases, the Court, by refusing to take into
account the clear intention of Yugoslavia, has taken an approach to the
Yugoslav declaration which could lead to the absurd conclusion that
Yugoslavia intended by its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s juris-
diction to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court over its Applications insti-
tuting proceedings against the Respondents.

In relation to Belgium and the Netherlands, apart from the jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute, Yugoslavia invoked
additional grounds of jurisdiction, namely the Convention on Concilia-
tion, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration signed on 25 March 1930 by
Yugoslavia and Belgium and the Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation signed on 11 March 1931 by Yugoslavia and the
Netherlands.

Both instruments provide for the right of the parties, under certain
conditions, to apply unilaterally to the Permanent Court of International
Justice for the resolution of their disputes. Moreover, the Agreements
stipulate that if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts
already committed or on the point of being committed, the Permanent
Court of International Justice “shall indicate within the shortest possible
time the provisional measures to be adopted” (Art. 30 of the Convention
between Belgium and Yugoslavia; Art. 20 of the Treaty between the
Netherlands and Yugoslavia). Also, significantly, the Agreements pro-
vide that they “shall be applicable between the High Contracting Parties
even though a third power has an interest in the dispute” (Art. 35 and
Art. 21 respectively). Finally, the Agreements contain a clause whereby
disputes relating to their interpretation shall be submitted to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (Art. 36 and Art. 22 respectively).

In the course of the hearings, a number of objections were raised by
the respondent States against reliance on these agreements by the Court
in order to establish its jurisdiction. I propose to deal only with the prin-
cipal objection finally upheld by the majority of the Court. It concerns
the timing of the invocation by Yugoslavia of the additional bases of
jurisdiction.

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608 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

It will be noted that, in filing its Applications, Yugoslavia reserved the
right to amend and supplement them. Such a reservation to an applica-
tion instituting proceedings is standard, and in relation to grounds of
jurisdiction has for a long time been interpreted by the Court as permit-
ting the addition of a basis of jurisdiction, provided that the Applicant
makes it clear that it intends to proceed upon that basis, and also pro-
vided that the result is not to transform the dispute brought before the
Court by the Application into another dispute, different in character. The
above approach to the additional grounds of jurisdiction is clearly
expressed in the following pronouncements of the Court.

In the Judgment of 26 November 1984 in the Nicaragua case, the
Court observed that:

“The Court considers that the fact that the 1956 Treaty was not
invoked in the Application as a title of jurisdiction does not in itself
constitute a bar to reliance being placed upon it in the Memorial.
Since the Court must always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction
before proceeding to examine the merits of a case, it is certainly
desirable that ‘the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the
Court is said to be based’ should be indicated at an early stage in the
proceedings, and Article 38 of the Rules of Court therefore provides
for these to be specified ‘as far as possible’ in the application. An
additional ground of jurisdiction may however be brought to the
Court’s attention later, and the Court may take it into account pro-
vided the Applicant makes it clear that it intends to proceed upon
that basis (Certain Norwegian Loans, LC.J. Reports 1957, p. 25),
and provided also that the result is not to transform the dispute
brought before the Court by the application into another dispute
which is different in character (Société Commerciale de Belgique,
P.C.LJ., Series AIB, No. 78, p. 173).” (Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 426-427, para. 80.)

In its Order dated 13 September 1993 in the Genocide case, the Court
pointed out that:

“Whereas the Applicant cannot, simply by reserving ‘the right to
revise, supplement or amend’ its Application or requests for provi-
sional measures, confer on itself a right to invoke additional grounds
of jurisdiction, not referred to in the Application instituting proceed-
ings; whereas it will be for the Court, at an appropriate stage of the
proceedings, to determine, if necessary, the validity of such claims;
whereas however, as the Court has recognized, ‘An additional ground
of jurisdiction may .. . be brought to the Court’s attention’ after the
filing of the Application,

‘and the Court may take it into account provided the Applicant
makes it clear that it intends to proceed upon that basis . . . and

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609 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

provided also that the result is not to transform the dispute
brought before the Court by the application into another dispute
which is different in character . . . (Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, LCI.
Reports 1984, p. 427, para. 80);

whereas the Court thus concludes that, for the purposes of a request

for indication of provisional measures, it should therefore not exclude

a priori such additional bases of jurisdiction from consideration, but

that it should consider whether the texts relied on may, in all the cir-

cumstances, including the considerations stated in the decision

quoted above, afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court

to entertain the Application might prima facie be established.”

(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the Crime of Genocide, 1. C.J. Reports 1993, pp. 338-339, para. 28.)

In my view, the conditions set out by Article 38 of the Rules of Court

and in its jurisprudence are fully satisfied in the present cases. The juris-

prudence of the Court clearly shows that for the purposes of a request for

indication of provisional measures additional grounds of jurisdiction may

be brought to the Court’s attention after filing of the Application. In such

a case, the Court should be primarily concerned with determining objec-

tively whether the additional grounds of jurisdiction “afford[s] a basis on

which the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Application might
prima facie be established”.

The legitimate concern of the Court over the observance of “the prin-
ciple of procedural fairness and the sound administration of justice” can-
not be stretched to such an extent as to exclude a priori the additional
basis of jurisdiction from its consideration, solely because the respondent
States have not been given adequate time to prepare their counter-
arguments. Admittedly, it cannot be considered normal for a new basis
of jurisdiction to be invoked in the second round of the hearings. How-
ever, the respondent States were given the possibility of presenting their
counter-arguments to the Court, and they used this possibility to make
various observations and objections to the new basis of jurisdiction. If
necessary, they could have asked for the prolongation of the hearings. In
turn, the Applicant may reasonably claim that the belated invocation of
the new titles of jurisdiction was caused by the extraordinary situation in
Yugoslavia, in which the preparation of the Applications had been
carried out under conditions of daily aerial bombardment by the Res-
pondents. It will also be recalled that it is for the Court to determine
the validity of the new basis of jurisdiction, which at this stage of the
proceedings may not and should not be decided conclusively.

The refusal of the majority to take into consideration the new bases of
jurisdiction clearly goes contrary to Article 38 of the Rules of Court and

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610 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DISS. OP. VERESHCHETIN)

its jurisprudence. The refusal to have due regard to the intention of a
State making a declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is
also incompatible with the case-law of the Court and customary rules of
interpreting legal instruments. In my view, all the requirements for the
indication of provisional measures, flowing from Article 41 of the Court’s
Statute and from its well-established jurisprudence, have been met, and
the Court should undoubtedly have indicated such measures so far as the
above four States are concerned.

(Signed) Vladlen S. VERESHCHETIN.

72