COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIES
ET ORDONNANCES

1999
(I)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS
AND ORDERS

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA DELIMITATION MARITIME
ET DES QUESTIONS TERRITORIALES
ENTRE QATAR ET BAHREIN

(QATAR c. BAHREIN)

ORDONNANCE DU 17 FEVRIER 1999

1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION
AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN

(QATAR ry. BAHRAIN)

ORDER OF 17 FEBRUARY 1999
Mode officiel de citation:

Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales
entre Qatar et Bahreïn, ordonnance du 17 février 1999,
C.LJ. Recueil 1999, p. 3

Official citation:

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain, Order of 17 February 1999,
1 C.J. Reports 1999, p. 3

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 7 1 9

ISBN 92-1-070788-5

17 FEVRIER 1999

ORDONNANCE

DELIMITATION MARITIME ET QUESTIONS TERRITORIALES
ENTRE QATAR ET BAHREIN

(QATAR c. BAHREIN)

MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN

(QATAR r. BAHRAIN)

17 FEBRUARY 1999

ORDER
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1999

17 February 1999

CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION
AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN

(QATAR v. BAHRAIN)

ORDER

Present: President SCHWEBEL: Vice-President WEERAMANTRY; Judges
ObA, BEDJIAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCH-
HAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN,
KOOLMANS, REZEK; Judge ad hoc Torres BERNARDEZ; Regis-
trar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 48 and 49 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 44, 49 and 50 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Order dated 30 March 1998, whereby the Court,
taking into account the views of the Parties,

“Fixfed] 30 September 1998 as the time-limit for the filing by
Qatar of an interim report, to be as comprehensive and specific as
possible, on the question of the authenticity of each of the docu-
ments challenged by Bahrain in the case;

Direct{ed] the submission of a Reply on the merits by each of the
Parties, and decide/d} that the Reply of Qatar [would] contain its

4

1999
17 February
General List
No. 87
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS (ORD. 17 II 99) 4

detailed and definitive position on the question of the authenticity of
each of the documents challenged by Bahrain and that the Reply of
Bahrain [would] contain its observations on the interim report of
Qatar; and fixfed/ 30 March 1999 as the time-limit for the filing of
[those] pleadings” ;

Whereas, on 30 September 1998, Qatar, referring to the above-
mentioned Order, submitted an “Interim Report”, to which were appended,
inter alia, four experts’ reports prepared in the summer of 1998, the first
two of which concerned the material authenticity of the Qatari docu-
ments, while the other two dealt with the historical consistency of the
content of those documents; whereas, in that Report, Qatar, after explain-
ing the origin of the documents in question and the reasons which had led
it to submit those documents to the Court, stated on the one hand
that, on the question of the material authenticity of the documents, there
were differing views not only between the respective experts of the
Parties, but also between its own experts, and on the other hand that, as
far as the historical aspects were concerned, the experts that it had con-
sulted considered that Bahrain’s assertions showed exaggerations and
distortions; and whereas Qatar ended its Report with a conclusion in the
following terms:

“As indicated above, after receiving its various expert’s reports
and in the light of the conflicting views amongst the Parties’ experts,
Qatar has decided that it will disregard all the 82 challenged docu-
ments for the purposes of the present case so as to enable the Court
to address the merits of the case without further procedural compli-
cations. It does so, however, with the proviso that it does not accept
Bahrain’s distortions of the historical facts or its exaggerations of
the effect of the challenged documents on Qatar’s case”;

and whereas, on the same day, the Registrar transmitted a certified copy
of the said Report and its annexes to the Agent of Bahrain;

Whereas, under cover of a letter with annexes dated 27 November
1998, the Agent of Bahrain, referring to the “Interim Report” of Qatar,
supplied the Court with a list of the 82 documents challenged by its Gov-
ernment, together with certain comments which it wished to submit “on
the insufficiency of Qatar’s explanations” ; and whereas, in that letter, the
Agent expressed himself as follows:

“The Order [of 30 March 1998] does not require Bahrain to sub-
mit its observations on that Report before its Reply. However, in
view of the effective abandonment by Qatar of all of the impeached
documents in the face of Bahrain’s proof of forgery, Bahrain con-
siders it appropriate even now to note the situation resulting from
the terms of that Report.
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS (ORD. 17 1199) 5

Although the Court’s Order contemplated that Qatar could make
known its ‘definitive’ position in regard to the 82 documents in the
Reply due on 30 March 1999, the fact is that Qatar has already
taken a position which is as ‘definitive’ as it can possibly be. There is
thus no scope for any further definition of Qatar’s position in its
Reply. The status of documents explicitly declared to be non-
existent leaves no room for amplification or qualification by any
subsequent statement.

It follows that Qatar cannot make any further reference to the 82
forged documents, that it will not adduce the content of these docu-
ments in connection with any of its arguments and that, in general,
the merits of the case will be adjudicated by the Court without
regard to these documents. (A list of the documents thus excluded
appears as Annex | to this letter.)”;

and whereas a copy of this letter and its annexes was duly transmitted
to the Agent of Qatar by the Deputy-Registrar;

Whereas, by a letter dated 11 December 1998, the Agent of Qatar
informed the Court that its Government

“[was] .. . preparing its Reply on the merits [but that], in view of
the fact that until 30 September 1998 its attention had been directed
principally to the preparation of its Interim Report on the docu-
ments challenged by Bahrain, Qatar consider[ed] that it [would] not
be possible to finalize its Reply by 30 March 1999”

and accordingly requested “a two-month extension of the time-limit for
the filing of a Reply by each of the Parties, to 30 May 1999”: and
whereas the Registrar, referring to Article 44, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, transmitted a copy of this letter to the Agent of Bahrain;

Whereas, by a letter dated 15 December 1998, the Agent of Qatar,
referring to the letter with annexes, dated 27 November 1998, from the
Agent of Bahrain, stated the following:

“by setting out in its Interim Report the results of its forensic and
historical examination of all of the documents in question and by
indicating its decision to disregard all the challenged documents for
the purposes of the present case, Qatar has given its position with
regard to those documents in advance of the time-limit of 30 March
1999 that was fixed by the Court’s Order. In effectively removing the
documents from consideration in the case, Qatar’s intention was to
enable the Court to address the merits of the case and the Parties to
prepare their replies without further procedural complications”:

and whereas, after challenging the terms of the letter from the Agent of
Bahrain, the Agent of Qatar concluded his letter as follows:
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS (ORD. 17 II 99) 6

“As Qatar pointed out in its Interim Report, it goes without say-
ing that if Qatar had had doubts as to the authenticity of these docu-
ments, it would not have introduced them into evidence in these
proceedings. However, so that there be no misunderstanding on this
point, Qatar would like to express here its regret at the situation that
has arisen and the inconvenience that this has caused to the Court
and Bahrain”:

and whereas a copy of this letter was duly transmitted to the Agent of
Bahrain by the Deputy-Registrar;

Whereas, by a letter dated 13 January 1999, the Agent of Bahrain,
acknowledging receipt of the letters of 11 and 15 December 1998 from
the Agent of Qatar, stated that his Government “appreciate[d] Qatar’s
expression of regret for the situation resulting from the submission of the
forged documents”, and that, with regard to the request by Qatar for an
extension of the time-limit, its position was as follows:

“Bahrain has no objection to the modification of the Court’s
Order of 30 March 1998 to accommodate Qatar’s request for a two-
month extension of the time-limit for the Replies. In connection
therewith, Bahrain recalls that the final paragraph of the Order
called for Qatar to provide its ‘definitive position’ on the documents
in its Reply, due on 30 March 1999, Since Qatar states that it has
‘given its position with regard to these documents in advance of the
time-limit’ to the effect that it is ‘removing the documents from con-
sideration in the case’, Bahrain respectfully requests that any modi-
fication of the Order take note of this development” ;

and whereas a copy of this letter was duly transmitted to the Agent of
Qatar by the Deputy-Registrar;

Whereas, in a letter dated 1 February 1999, the Agent of Qatar stated
that he was pleased to note that Bahrain had no objection to the two-
month extension of the time-limit for the filing of the Replies; whereas he
stressed that his Government could not accept the description of the
documents challenged by Bahrain as “forged”; whereas, referring to the
position adopted by Qatar with regard to those documents in its Interim
Report of 30 September 1998, he added:

“This is Qatar’s definitive position. Qatar hereby confirms that it
will not rely on any of those documents in its Reply; nor will it make
any further observations as to their authenticity. In its Reply Qatar
will, however, address the consequences of Qatar’s decision to dis-
regard the challenged documents with respect to its previous
written pleadings, and will provide a document to illustrate
such consequences”:
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS (ORD. 17 IT. 99) 7

and whereas, as far as the Order to be issued by the Court was concerned,
the Agent stated that his Government took the view that “the question of
the nature and substance of such an Order is a matter for the Court
alone”; and whereas a copy of this letter was duly transmitted to the
Agent of Bahrain by the Registrar;

Taking into account the concordant views of the Parties on treatment
of the disputed documents and their agreement on the extension of time-
limits for the filing of Replies,

Places on record the decision of Qatar to disregard, for the purposes of
the present case, the 82 documents challenged by Bahrain;

Decides that the Replies whose submission was directed by the Order
of 30 March 1998 will not rely on these documents;

Extends to 30 May 1999 the time-limit for the submission of those
Replies; and

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague. this seventeenth day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the State of Qatar and the Government of the State of
Bahrain, respectively.

(Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.


227

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE SIR HUMPHREY WALDOCK
[Traduction]

1. Je souscris à l’ensemble du dispositif et des motifs sur lesquels se
fonde l’arrêt de la Cour. Toutefois comme j'ai une réserve à formuler à
l'égard du sous-paragraphe 5 du dispositif et que certains aspects de
l'affaire auraient dû, à mon avis, être davantage mis en relief dans l’arrêt,
je crois devoir en traiter dans une opinion individuelle.

* *

2. L'arrêt se réfère à l'échange de notes du 19 juillet 1961 et en tire
certaines conclusions concernant la reconnaissance par la République
fédérale d'Allemagne de la dépendance exceptionnelle de l’Islande à
l'égard de ses pêcheries côtières et la reconnaissance par l'Islande de
l’activité traditionnelle de pêche de la République fédérale dans les eaux
proches de l’Islande. L’arrét ne donne cependant pas à l’échange de notes
de 1961 l'importance que me paraît revêtir nécessairement cet accord en
tant que traité instituant un régime juridique particulier régissant les
relations entre les Parties en ce qui concerne la pêche dans les eaux en
question. L’échange de notes de 1961, qui avait été négocié et conclu juste
après que la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer eut
échoué dans sa tentative pour résoudre le problème des limites de pêche,
avait expressément pour objet de régler un différend qui opposait l’[s-
lande et la République fédérale au sujet des pêcheries. A cette fin, l'accord
contenait des dispositions qui énonçaient des règles précises pour tenir
compte de l’éventualité où l'Islande prétendrait plus tard élargir sa zone
de pêche au-delà de la limite des 12 milles que la République fédérale lui
reconnaissait dans cet accord. A mon avis, il s’ensuit qu’il faut prendre
comme point de départ pour déterminer les droits et obligations des
Parties en la présente espèce l'échange de notes de 1961 que la Cour,
dans son arrêt du 2 février 1973, a considéré comme valable, en vigueur et
applicable à la question de l'élargissement par l'Islande de sa compétence
sur les pêcheries qui est maintenant soumise à la Cour.

3. Un échange de notes analogue a été conclu en 1961 entre l’Islande
et le Royaume-Uni et j’ai exposé longuement mes observations sur ses
conséquences dans mon opinion individuelle en l'affaire de la Compétence
en matière de pêcheries qui oppose ces deux pays. II est vrai que l'échange
de notes entre l'Islande et la République fédérale a été conclu environ
quatre mois après l'échange de notes entre l'Islande et le Royaume-Uni et
dans le cadre de négociations distinctes et qu’à la différence du Royaume-

56
COMPETENCE PECHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 228

Uni la République fédérale ne possède aucun compte rendu détaillé sur
ces négociations. II reste que l’échange de notes du 11 mars 1961 entre
l'Islande et le Royaume-Uni a servi de modèle à celui que l'Islande et la
République fédérale ont conclu et que l’objet et les dispositions des deux
accords sont, en conséquence, presque identiques. Je ne crois donc pas
utile de répéter ici les vues que j'ai exprimées sur cette question aux para-
graphes 2 à 32 de l'opinion que j'ai déposée dans l’autre affaire soumise à
la Cour. It me suffira de dire que j'estime qu’elles s'appliquent mutatis
mutandis à la présente espèce.

* *

4, Je rappellerai cependant qu’au stade de la compétence la République
fédérale a nettement précisé la portée qu’elle attribuait à la clause
compromissoire. À l’audience du 8 janvier 1973, son agent s'est exprimé
en ces termes:

«Je voudrais encore ajouter quelques remarques pour montrer que
l’objet du différend soumis à la Cour dans la requête de la République
fédérale d’Allemagne s’inscrit rigoureusement dans les limites de la
compétence de la Cour telle qu'elle est définie au paragraphe 5 de
l'échange de notes de 1961. Je voudrais rappeler que, aux termes de
cette disposition, la compétence de la Cour s'étend à tous les
différends ayant trait à un élargissement par l'Islande de sa juridiction
en matière de pêcheries sur les eaux surjacentes de son plateau
continental au-delà de la limite de 12 milles. Constituent des
différends ayant trait à l'élargissement de la juridiction sur les
pêcheries des différends qui naissent de toute mesure par laquelle le
Gouvernement islandais entend exercer ses droits ou pouvoirs
juridictionnels sur les activités de pêche dans les eaux situées au-delà
de la limite de 12 milles. Le champ et la portée de cette juridiction qui
peut donner lieu à un différend n’ont qu’une importance secondaire ;
la juridiction revendiquée peut varier quant à la largeur de la zone
dans laquelle l'Islande veut exercer sa juridiction et aussi bien quant
à la portée des droits et pouvoirs que l'Islande veut y exercer. La
revendication islandaise peut aller jusqu'à réclamer l'exclusivité des
droits de pêche dans la zone élargie ou peut être limitée à des droits
prioritaires de pêche. Elle peut consister aussi dans la publication et
l'application de mesures de conservation discriminatoires ou non
discriminatoires. Toute mesure de ce type constitue un élargissement
de la juridiction au sens du paragraphe 5 de l’échange de notes et
toutes les fois qu’une telle extension ou les modalités d’une telle
extension donnent lieu à un différend entre la République fédérale
d'Allemagne et l'Islande, la Cour est compétente pour connaître de
ce différend à la requête de l’une ou l’autre Partie.»

Cette interprétation me paraît en parfaite harmonie avec la conclusion
de la Cour, figurant dans son arrêt sur la compétence du 2 février 1973

57
COMPETENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 229

en l’affaire introduite par le Royaume-Uni, au sujet du sens de la clause
compromissoire, qui est identique à celle qui s’applique en la présente
espéce. La Cour a dit:

«l'intention véritable des parties était de donner au Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni des assurances réelles ... le droit de contester
devant la Cour la validité de tout nouvel élargissement de la compé-
tence de l’Islande en matière de pêcheries dans les eaux recouvrant
son plateau continental...» (C.1.J. Recueil 1973, p. 13-14, par. 23;
les italiques sont de nous).

* *

5. Dans sa première conclusion, la République fédérale demande à la
Cour de dire que I’élargissement unilatéral par l'Islande de sa zone de
compétence exclusive sur les pécheries jusqu’a 50 milles «n’a aucun
fondement en droit international à l'encontre de la République fédérale
d’ Allemagne et west donc pas opposable à la République fédérale d’Alle-
magne...». Le point de savoir si cette conclusion est censée se limiter à
la question de l’«opposabilité» à la République fédérale de l'élargisse-
ment décidé par l'Islande ou si elle tend à faire reconnaître que l’élargis-
sement est dépourvu de validité erga omnes et n’est donc pas opposable à
la République fédérale n'apparaît peut-être pas très clairement. Quoi
qu'il en soit, pour les motifs que j'ai exposés aux paragraphes 33 a 36 de
mon opinion individuelle en l'affaire Royaume-Uni c. Islande, 1 me
semble que le véritable problème juridique qui se pose est de déter-
miner si l'élargissement par l'Islande de sa juridiction sur les pêcheries
au-delà de la limite des 12 milles convenue en 1961 est opposable à un
Etat qui, comme la République fédérale, n’a ni consenti ni acquiescé à
cet élargissement et qu’il n’est pas de savoir si, en droit international
général, cet élargissement est objectivement dépourvu de validité erga
omnes. Sur ce point également, il me paraît suffisant d'indiquer que,
mutatis mutandis, les vues que j'ai exprimées dans mon opinion indivi-
duelle en l'affaire Royaume-Uni c. Islande s'appliquent aussi à la présente
espèce.

* *

6. Contrairement à ce qu'a fait le Royaume-Uni dans l’autre instance
soumise à la Cour, la République fédérale d'Allemagne a maintenu la
demande, énoncée dans sa quatrième conclusion, tendant à obtenir
réparation pour les actes de harcèlement que les garde-côtes islandais
auraient commis contre ses navires de pêche. Je souscris à l’avis formulé
par la Cour au paragraphe 72 de l’arrêt, d’après lequel cette conclusion
relève de la compétence de la Cour dans la présente instance. Bien que la
Cour n'ait pas exposé les motifs de cette attitude et que je n’aie moi-même
aucun doute à cet égard, je voudrais indiquer brièvement les raisons qui
me poussent à partager l'avis de la Cour.

58
COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 230

7. La demande en réparation pose, relativement à la compétence de la
Cour pour en connaître, deux problèmes dont le premier est de savoir si
cette demande est visée par les termes de la clause compromissoire: «au
cas où surgirait un différend en la matière, [l'élargissement de la juridic-
tion sur les pêcheries] la question sera portée, à la demande de l’une ou
l'autre partie, devant la Cour internationale de Justice ». I] me semble que
ce serait donner une interprétation trop étroite de ces termes que de con-
sidérer qu'ils limitent la compétence de la Cour à la question de l’élargis-
sement de la juridiction en tant que telle. A mon avis, les incidents qui se
produisent parce que l'Islande a étendu les limites de sa compétence en
matière de pêche et les réclamations relatives à de tels incidents se rat-
tachent manifestement à «un différend en la matière », expression de
portée très générale. De fait, tout acte visant à imposer la juridiction de
l'Islande au-delà de la limite des 12 milles constitue réellement à tous
égards un élargissement de sa juridiction au-delà de la limite convenue.
En outre, comme la Cour l’a souligné aux paragraphes 21-22 de son arrêt
sur la compétence rendu le 2 février 1973 en l'affaire Royaume-Uni c.
Islande, l'objet même de la clause compromissoire était d'assurer «qu'en
cas de différend aucune mesure tendant à élargir les limites de pêche ne
serait prise sans que la Cour internationale en soit saisie» (C.1J.
Recueil 1973, p. 13; les italiques sont de nous). Il me semble donc
tout à fait justifiable de considérer que la demande en réparation de
la République fédérale relève en principe de la compétence générale at-
tribuée à la Cour pour tout différend relatif à un élargissement de la juri-
diction sur les pêcheries.

8. Au surplus, comme M. Jiménez de Aréchaga l’a fait observer dans
l'affaire de l'Appel concernant la compétence du Conseil de VOACI (C.L.J.
Recueil 1972, p. 147), la Cour actuelle et la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale ont décidé toutes deux que, si une clause juridictionnelle
prévoit que tout désaccord survenu à propos de l'interprétation ou de
l'application d’un traité sera porté devant un tribunal international, la
compétence attribuée à ce tribunal s'étend aux questions relatives à
l'exécution ou à l’inexécution du traité. Ainsi, dans Vavis consultatif sur
l'Interprétation des traités de paix, la Cour a jugé que les différends relatifs
à l'exécution ou à la non-exécution des obligations prévues dans un traité
«sont nettement de ceux qui portent sur l'interprétation ou sur l’exécu-
tion» des traités dont il s'agit (C.1.J. Recueil 1950, p. 75). Plus précise
encore aux fins qui nous intéressent est l'observation suivante de la
Cour permanente dans l'affaire de l’Usine de Chorzow (C.P.J.I. série A
n° 9, p. 21):

«C'est un principe de droit international que la violation d'un
engagement entraîne l'obligation de réparer dans une forme adé-
quate. La réparation est donc le complément indispensable d'un man-
quement à l’application d'une convention, sans qu’il soit nécessaire
que cela soit inscrit dans la convention même. Les divergences rela-
tives à des réparations, éventuellement dues pour manquement à l'appli-

59
COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 231

cation d’une convention, sont, partant, des divergences relatives à lap-
plication. » (Les italiques sont de nous.)

A mon avis, comme je l’ai indiqué plus haut, le présent différend, relatif à
un élargissement par l’slande de sa juridiction sur les pêcheries, est en
même temps un différend relatif à l’application de l’échange de notes de
1961. En tout cas, raisonnant par analogie, il me paraît évident qu’une
clause juridictionnelle attribuant compétence à la Cour pour statuer sur
la validité d’un élargissement de la juridiction en matière de pêcheries
s’applique aussi aux divergences relatives à des réparations éventuelle-
ment dues en raison du défaut de validité de cet élargissement.

*

9. Le second problème concerne la question de savoir si la demande
entre dans le cadre de l’affaire portée devant la Cour par la République
fédérale dans sa requête du 5 juin 1972. Cette requête ne contenait que
deux conclusions, l’une touchant le caractère illicite de l’extension unila-
térale de la zone de pêche, et l’autre relative à la nécessité d’un accord sur
des mesures de conservation. La requête n’envisageait ni les actes de
harcèlement ni la réparation due de ce chef, pour la simple raison qu’elle
avait été déposée avant que le nouveau règlement islandais entre en vi-
gueur, le 1er septembre 1972, et avant qu'aucun acte de harcèlement ait
été commis. De fait, peu de temps après le dépôt de la requête, la Répu-
blique fédérale a essayé de parer à tout risque de ce genre en sollicitant
une ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires que la Cour lui a
accordée. Certes, le mémoire de la République fédérale sur la compétence,
déposé le 5 octobre 1972 après que certains actes de harcèlement se furent
produits, ne les mentionnait pas davantage. Mais la Cour avait prescrit
que le premier mémoire de la République fédérale porte expressément sur
la question de sa compétence pour connaître de la requête, et la question
du harcèlement ne s’y rapportait pas. Aussi est-ce dans le mémoire sur le
fond que pour ia première fois les actes de harcèlement ont été invoqués
comme base d’une action judiciaire et que, pour la première fois, une
demande en réparation a figuré au nombre des conclusions.

10. I s’agit donc de savoir si la demande en réparation présentée par la
République fédérale dans son mémoire sur le fond et de nouveau dans ses
conclusions finales constitue une modification acceptable des conclusions
énoncées dans la requête. En d’autres termes, la demande de réparation
apporte-t-elle aux conclusions formulées dans la requête une modification
que permettent l’article 40 du Statut et l’article 32, paragraphe 2, du
Règlement? Dans la pratique de la Cour permanente les parties à une ins-
tance introduite par une requête unilatérale avaient une certaine latitude
pour amender leurs conclusions, tant que leurs amendements ne trans-
formaient pas l'objet du différend. La Cour permanente a dit par exemple
en l’affaire de la Société commerciale de Belgique:

«Il y a lieu d'observer que la faculté laissée aux parties de modifier
60
COMPETENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 232

leurs conclusions jusqu’a la fin de la procédure orale doit étre com-
prise d’une manière raisonnable et sans porter atteinte à l’article 40
du Statut et à l’article 32, alinéa 2, du Règlement, qui disposent que
la requête doit indiquer l’objet du différend. La Cour n’a pas eu,
jusqu’à présent, l’occasion de déterminer les limites de ladite faculté,
mais il est évident que la Cour ne saurait admettre, en principe, qu’un
différend porté devant elle par requête puisse être transformé, par voie
de modifications apportées aux conclusions, en un autre différend dont
le caractère ne serait pas le même.» (C.P.J.I. série A[B n° 78, p. 173;
les italiques sont de nous.)

Pour ce qui est de la Cour actuelle, dans l'affaire relative à Certains
emprunts norvégiens, M. Read a évoqué la pratique qui «permet aux
Parties de modifier leurs conclusions jusqu'à la fin de la procédure orale »,
mais il a fait observer que «lorsque la modification est importante,
l’autre Partie doit avoir une occasion équitable de présenter ses commen-
taires sur les conclusions amendées ». Il a ajouté: « La deuxième condition
est que l'amendement doit être un amendement. Il ne faut pas que le
demandeur essaie, par ce moyen, de soumettre un nouveau litige différent
à la Cour» (C.J. Recueil 1957, p. 80-81). Il est donc intéressant de
relever que, dans l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar, la Cour a fait droit
à une demande de restitution des objets enlevés du temple par les autorités
thaïlandaises depuis 1954, que le Cambodge avait présentée pour la
première fois dans ses conclusions finales lors de la procédure orale
(C.LJ. Recueil 1962, p. 6).

11. Dans la présente espèce, l'Islande aurait pu, en déposant un contre-
mémoire, répondre à la demande en réparation de la République fédérale
et, si elle avait estimé que cette demande n’entrait pas dans le cadre de la
requête, élever une exception d’irrecevabilité. Mais elle a décidé de ne pas
participer à l'instance. Quant a la demande elle-même, elle me paraît se
rattacher à l’objet de la requête plus directement que la demande de res-
titution des objets enlevés dans l'affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar: elle
découle de la première conclusion de la République fédérale, qui la con-
tient implicitement. I] est vrai qu’elle se fonde sur des faits postérieurs à la
requête et qu’elle introduit par conséquent un nouvel élément dans l’af-
faire. Mais cela ne me paraît pas «transformer le différend » porté devant
la Cour par la requête en «un autre différend ne présentant pas les mêmes
caractères ». Au contraire, la demande se rattache directement à la ma-
tière dont traite la première conclusion de la requête et résulte directe-
ment des actes accomplis par l'Islande elle-même dans ce domaine alors
que la Cour était déjà saisie. Du fait même que la nouvelle demande porte
sur des sujets expressément visés dans l'ordonnance en indication de
mesures conservatoires de la Cour, il me paraît difficile d'y voir une modi-
fication inadmissible des conclusions figurant dans la requête. II en
découle selon moi que la demande en réparation ne devrait pas être
écartée au motif qu'elle n’était pas énoncée dans la requête.

* *

61
COMPÉTENCE PÊCHERIES (OP. IND. WALDOCK) 233

12. Ma réserve à l'égard du sous-paragraphe 5 du dispositif tient à ceci:
je doute que la Cour doive se borner à dire qu’elle ne peut pas donner suite
à la quatrième conclusion de la République fédérale, rejetant ainsi en fait
entièrement la demande en réparation. Dans la mesure où l’on peut consi-
dérer que cette conclusion tend à ce que la Cour dise de façon définitive
que l'Islande est tenue d'accorder réparation en raison de certains actes
d’ingérence précis, je pense, comme la Cour, qu’en l’état actuel du dossier
elle n’est pas à même de se prononcer faute de preuves suffisantes. De
plus, il apparaît que la République fédérale prie la Cour de statuer défini-
tivement en l’espèce et qu’elle ne l'invite, n1 à examiner sa demande en
réparation dans une phase ultérieure de l’instance, ni à lui réserver la
faculté de saisir la Cour d’une telle demande si les Parties n’aboutissaient
pas à un accord sur ce point. En conséquence, il ne serait peut-être pas
opportun que la Cour réserve de sa propre initiative l'examen de la ques-
tion de la réparation pour une phase ultérieure de la procédure.

13. Toutefois, dans la mesure où l’on peut interpréter la quatrième
conclusion comme demandant une simple déclaration de principe selon
laquelle l'Islande serait tenue de réparer les actes d’ingérence dont l'illi-
céité résulte des sous-paragraphes | et 2 du dispositif de l’arrêt de la Cour,
je ne vois pas la même difficulté a ce que la Cour donne suite à la demande.
La Cour a dit que l'élargissement unilatéral par l'Islande de sa zone de
pêche exclusive jusqu’à 50 milles n’est pas opposable à la République
fédérale et que l'Islande n’est pas en droit d’exclure unilatéralement les
navires de pêche de la République fédérale des régions situées au large
des limites convenues dans l'échange de notes de 1961. Il s'ensuit donc
automatiquement que les actes visant à faire observer cet élargissement
par les navires de pêche de la République fédérale sont illicites et engagent
la responsabilité internationale de l'Islande envers la République fédérale.
Comme c’est un principe bien établi de droit international que toute
violation d’une obligation internationale entraîne l’obligation de réparer,
le droit à réparation existe sans même qu'il soit mentionné. On peut donc
dire, comme on l'a fait d’ailleurs dans l'affaire du Détroit de Corfou
{C.LJ. Recueil 1949, p. 23-24), qu'il est superflu de présenter une demande
en réparation; si la Cour accueille une demande tendant à ce que des
actes soient déclarés illicites, il s’ensuit qu’en droit la réparation est due.
Un demandeur peut néanmoins attacher de l'importance à obtenir la
satisfaction consistant à ce que la Cour déclare, dans le dispositif de
l'arrêt, qu’une réparation est due et je ne vois aucun obstacle empêchant
la Cour de faire droit à une telle demande.

(Signé) H. WALDOCK.

62


106

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

I agree with the decision reached by the Court. My thought is that, on
some aspects, it could have been stronger than it is. On the main issue as to
whether the Tribunal should have answered the second question put to it
by the Arbitration Agreement, the Court sustains the Award on the
ground that, in holding that it was not competent to reply to that question,
the Tribunal interpreted the Agreement in a way in which it could have
been interpreted without manifest breach of its competence. The Court
did not go on to consider whether the Tribunal’s interpretation was
indeed correct. The explanation lies in the view which the Court took of
the scope of its own authority in these proceedings. I give my reasons
below for holding, first, that, subject to considerations of security of the
arbitral process with respect to finality of awards, the scope of the Court’s
authority did not preclude it from pronouncing on the correctness of the
Tribunal’s interpretation; and, second, that the latter was in fact the cor-
rect interpretation.

I. WHETHER IT Was COMPETENT FOR THE COURT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE
CORRECTNESS OF THE TRIBUNAL’S INTERPRETATION OF THE COMPROMIS

Guinea-Bissau’s chief complaint is that the Arbitration Tribunal failed
to accomplish its mission, in that it was required to answer the second
question put to it by the Arbitration Agreement but did not do so, and that
on this account the Award is a nullity. It appears to me that, the Court
having held that it had jurisdiction, the appropriate course was for it to
determine, in accordance with the applicable principles of treaty interpre-
tation, whether the Arbitration Agreement did require the Tribunal to
answer that question. If the Court’s interpretation differed from that of
the Tribunal, the next step was to see if the latter was equally plausible
with the former. If the two were equally plausible, as being each justified
by some legitimate process of interpretation, considerations of security of
the arbitral process with respect to finality of awards would suggest that
the Court should refrain from substituting its own interpretation for that
of the Tribunal. The Court would be justified in making a substitution
only where it was satisfied that the Tribunal’s interpretation disclosed a
compellingly clear and substantial error as to its powers. A marginal or
debatable case would not suffice.

I should have thought, with respect, that this approach was reasonably
straightforward ; that it had the advantage of enabling the Court to resolve

37
107 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

the point of substance, and of obvious concern to Guinea-Bissau, as to
whether the Tribunal’s interpretation was right or wrong; and that it pro-
vided all the safeguards fairly needed to ensure the stability of the interna-
tional arbitral process.

That has not however been the course followed by the Court. The drift
of the Court’s reasoning moves, indeed, in the direction of a finding that
the Tribunal was right in holding that it was not competent to answer the
second question, and the reader of the Judgment (particularly para-
graph 56) may well think that this is the natural result. The Court, how-
ever, stops short of making a finding to that effect, limiting itself to a
holding in these terms:

“The Tribunal could thus find, without manifest breach of its
competence, that its answer to the first question was not a negative
one, and that it was therefore not competent to answer the second
question.” (Judgment, para. 60.)

The Judgment thus stands arrested at the threshold of the issue whether
the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the compromis on the spe-
cific point as to whether it was competent to answer the second question.
The reason is to be found in the Court’s use of the distinction between
nullity and appeal in relation to decisions made in exercise of la compé-
tence de la compétence. Referring to Guinea-Bissau’s argument on the
point in question, the Judgment reads:

“By its argument set out above, Guinea-Bissau is in fact criticizing
the interpretation in the Award of the provisions of the Arbitration
Agreement which determine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and propos-
ing another interpretation. However, the Court does not have to
enquire whether or not the Arbitration Agreement could, with regard
to the Tribunal’s competence, be interpreted in a number of ways,
and if so to consider which would have been preferable. By proceed-
ing in that way the Court would be treating the request as an appeal
and not as a recours en nullité. The Court could not act in that way in
the present case. It has simply to ascertain whether by rendering the
disputed Award the Tribunal acted in manifest breach of the com-
petence conferred on it by the Arbitration Agreement, either by
deciding in excess of, or by failing to exercise, its jurisdiction.” (Judg-
ment, para. 47.)

The problem with this approach is that, apart from leaving undeter-
mined a question of importance to one of the litigants as to whether the
Tribunal’s interpretation was in fact correct, it, at least theoretically,
leaves open the possibility that the interpretation was not. For, to charac-
terize the Tribunal’s interpretation as being merely one which could be
placed on the Arbitration Agreement “without manifest breach of its
competence” is to leave open the possibility that some other interpretation
could also be placed on it “without manifest breach of its competence”;

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108 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

paragraph 47 of the Judgment, quoted above, accepts as much. All of such
possible interpretations could not be right.

The foundation of the Court’s approach lies in the concept of la compé-
tence de la compétence. Certain aspects of the scope and basis of this power
may be briefly noticed for present purposes.

First, as to the scope of the power. This is indeed wide. But, wide as is
the power, its exercise is, of course, limited by the consideration that its
purpose is to ensure that the mission authorized by the compromis does
not fail for want of power to interpret the latter, as historically it was once
feared possible; the purpose is not to permit the Tribunal, through pos-
sible misinterpretations, to endow itself with an original jurisdiction
materially different from that contemplated by the Parties. This, if it hap-
pened, would be ruinous to the older and even more fundamental principle
extra compromissum arbiter nihil facere potest. As observed by one commen-
tator, recalling the position taken by the United States commissioner in
The Betsey, “La règle de la compétence de la compétence et l’excès de pou-
voir ne se concevaient pas l’un sans l’autre: mieux ils s’expliquaient l’un
par l’autre” (Georges Berlia, “Jurisprudence des tribunaux internationaux
en ce qui concerne leur compétence”, Collected Courses of the Hague
Academy of International Law, Vol. 88, p. 109, at p. 129). In the words of
another, “si l'arbitre est juge de sa compétence, il n’en est pas le maitre”
(Charles Rousseau, Droit international public, Vol. 5, 1983, p. 326,
para. 312). That the two principles referred to are in tension has been
noticed in the literature (R. Y. Jennings, “Nullity and Effectiveness in
International Law”, in Cambridge Essays in International Law, Essays in
Honour of Lord McNair, 1965, p. 64, at p. 83). In the present case, that
general tension surfaces as a specific legal problem needing to be
addressed and resolved by the Court. In short, la compétence de la compé-
tence being not absolute but qualified, the question here, as in all cases, is
not whether the Tribunal has exercised the competence simpliciter, but
whether the Tribunal has exercised it within the bounds to which it is
always and necessarily subject.

Next, as to the basis of the power. The question has been discussed in
the books as to whether the finality of an arbitral award rests on the treaty
of submission or on the authority which international law attaches to deci-
sions of tribunals vested with jurisdiction to decide with obligatory force,
or indeed on both (see, inter alia, Louis Cavaré, “L’arrét de la CIJ du
18 novembre 1960 et les moyens d’assurer l’exécution des sentences arbi-
trales”, in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin, 1964, p. 39, at pp. 41-42; and
J.C. Witenberg, L'organisation judiciaire, la procédure et la sentence inter-
nationales, 1937, pp. 352-353). That the treaty of submission does have a
role is, however, generally admitted. Hertz connected the two ideas this
way:

59
SENTENCE ARBITRALE (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 108

qui serait elle aussi une interprétation qui pouvait être retenue sans qu'il y
ait «méconnaissance manifeste de sa compétence »; le paragraphe 47 de
l'arrêt, cité ci-dessus, admet ces conclusions. Or, toutes les interprétations
possibles ne sauraient être justes.

La démarche de la Cour s’appuie sur le concept de la compétence de la
compétence. Certains aspects de la portée et du fondement de ce pouvoir
méritent qu’on s’y arrête brièvement.

Pour ce qui est de la portée de ce pouvoir, elle est certes très large. Mais
aussi large fût-elle, son exercice est évidemment limité par une considéra-
tion relative à son but, qui est de faire en sorte que la mission que le
compromis confie au Tribunal n’en vienne pas à échouer par absence de
compétence à interpréter le compromis — comme, historiquement, on l’a
craint — et non de permettre au Tribunal, par d'éventuelles fausses inter-
prétations, de s’arroger une compétence originelle sensiblement diffé-
rente de celle envisagée par les Parties. Si tel était le cas, ce serait la fin
d’un principe plus ancien et plus fondamental encore, celui qu’exprime
l’adage extra compromissum arbiter nihil facere potest. Comme l’a fait
observer un commentateur, en rappelant la position prise par le délégué
des Etats-Unis dans l’affaire The Betsey: « La règle de la compétence de la
compétence et l’excés de pouvoir ne se concevaient pas l’un sans l’autre:
mieux ils s’expliquaient l’un par l’autre.» (Georges Berlia, « Jurispru-
dence des tribunaux internationaux en ce qui concerne leur compé-
tence», Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international de La Haye,
t. 88, p. 129.) Ou, comme l’a dit un autre auteur: «si l'arbitre est juge de sa
compétence, il n’en est pas le maître » (Charles Rousseau, Droit internatio-
nal public, vol. 5, 1983, p. 326, par. 312). L’antagonisme existant entre ces
deux principes a été relevé par la doctrine (R. Y. Jennings, « Nullity and
Effectiveness in International Law», dans Cambridge Essays in Interna-
tional Law, Essays in Honour of Lord McNair, 1965, p. 83). En cette
instance, cet antagonisme général constitue le probléme juridique
spécifique que la Cour se doit d’examiner et de résoudre. Bref, la com-
pétence de la compétence n’est pas absolue, mais qualifiée; la question
qui se pose dans cette affaire, comme dans toute affaire, est non de savoir
si l’arbitre a exercé sa compétence simpliciter, mais s’il l’a exercée dans
les limites auxquelles cette compétence est toujours et nécessairement
soumise.

Quant au fondement de ce pouvoir, la question a été posée dans de
nombreuses études de savoir si le caractère définitif d’une sentence arbi-
trale repose sur le compromis ou sur l'autorité que le droit international
confère aux décisions des tribunaux investis du pouvoir de rendre des
décisions obligatoires, ou encore sur les deux (voir, entre autres,
Louis Cavaré, « L'arrêt de la CIJ du 18 novembre 1960 et les moyens
d’assurer l’exécution des sentences arbitrales», dans Mélanges offerts à
Henri Rolin, 1964, p. 41-42, et J.C. Witenberg, L'organisation judiciaire, la
procédure et la sentence internationales, 1937, p. 352-353). Il est cependant
généralement admis qu’un rôle revient au compromis. Hertz met en
rapport ces deux idées comme suit:

59
110 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

From the point of view of the scope and basis of la compétence de la
compétence, the juridical problem which arises may therefore be
expressed thus : when the parties invest an arbitrator, whether expressly or
by implication of law, with competence to interpret the compromis, within
what limits, if any, are they to be understood as thereby engaging to be
bound by an exercise of the competence by the arbitrator which results in
a misinterpretation by him of the compromis concerning his powers? In
the present case, the question would be whether it was the will of the Part-
ies that they should be bound by a misinterpretation — if there was any —
of the compromis on the important and major issue as to whether the
second question was required to be answered. Conceivably, in the larger
interests of securing a resolution of their dispute, the Parties might be
understood as having undertaken to be bound by decisions made within
some tolerable margin of appreciation as to competence in minor matters
even though erroneous. Should they be understood as having undertaken
to be likewise bound by erroneous decisions as to the powers of the Tribu-
nal going to the substance of its mission ? Scarcely so. But then, when such
a question arises, as it in effect arises here, how is it to be answered unless
the Court can say whether, as a matter of treaty interpretation, the Tribu-
nal’s decision was indeed correct? It is not clear why the Court must
instead regard the matter as concluded by the fact that the Tribunal has
placed on the compromis an interpretation which could have been placed
on it without manifest breach of its competence. That way of putting it
leaves open the possibility that, while such an interpretation might well be
right, it could, at least in theory, be also wrong.

It may be useful to consider two cases involving contentions of nullity
of an arbitral award, namely, the Orinoco Steamship Co. case and the case
of the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906.

In the Orinoco Steamship Co. case the Permanent Court of Arbitration
made the point that “the appreciation of the facts of the case and the inter-
pretation of the documents were within the competence of the umpire”
and that —

“his decisions, when based on such interpretation, are not subject to
revision by this tribunal, whose duty it is not to say if the case has
been well or ill judged, but whether the award must be annulled; that
if an arbitral decision could be disputed on the ground of erroneous
appreciation, appeal and revision, which the Conventions of the
Hague of 1899 and 1907 made it their object to avert, would be the
general rule” (The Hague Court Reports, ed. J. B. Scott, 1916, p. 226, at
p. 231).

These remarks, particularly about “the appreciation of the facts of the
case and the interpretation of the documents” being “within the compe-
tence of the umpire”, related to decisions made by him on the merits of the
case, not to decisions made by him in exercise of la compétence de la

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111 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

compétence, the point being that a challenge of nullity against a decision of
the latter kind does not entitle the reviewing forum to revise the Tribunal’s
appreciation of the facts and documents leading to its decision on the
merits. As to decisions made in exercise of la compétence de la compétence
(relating in the particular case to a duty under the compromis to apply
absolute equity), it would seem that the Permanent Court of Arbitration
proceeded directly to consider whether the decision made by the umpire
as to his powers, or the way they should be exercised, was correct.

The decision of this Court in the case concerning the King of Spain's
Award likewise did point out “that the Award is not subject to appeal and
that the Court cannot approach the consideration of the objections raised
by Nicaragua to the validity of the Award as a Court of Appeal” (Z.CJ.
Reports 1960, p. 214, and paragraph 25 of the Judgment in this case). How-
ever, itis difficult to see this consideration at work when the Court came to
deal with what appeared to be a challenge to an exercise of the arbitrator’s
compétence de la compétence. The Court did dispose of one branch of the
arguments by taking the view that certain possible interpretations of the
articles of the Gamez-Bonilla Treaty relating to the procedure for appoint-
ing the arbitrator were interpretations which could have been placed on
those provisions in exercise of the power of the two national arbitrators to
interpret them; but this concerned the constituent “power of the [two
national] arbitrators to interpret and apply the articles in question in order
to discharge their function of organizing the arbitral tribunal” (ibid,
p. 206), and not the functions of the tribunal after it had been set up. As
regards these functions, one question which did arise was whether the
adjudicating arbitrator misconstrued the compromis in assuming that it
gave him power to grant compensations in order to establish a well-
defined natural boundary line. It does not appear that the Court
approached the problem on the basis that the only question before it was
whether the interpretation made by the arbitrator was one which could
have been made by him without manifest breach of competence; it deter-
mined that the interpretation made by him was in fact correct, and it did so
after carrying out its own “examination of the Treaty” and making its own
interpretation (ibid., p. 215). My understanding is that when the Court said
that it was not a Court of Appeal and added that it “is not called upon to
pronounce on whether the arbitrator’s decision was right or wrong” (ibid.,
p. 214), the decision of the arbitrator to which it was there referring was his
decision on the merits of the case, not his decision interpreting the compro-
mis as to his powers when dealing with the merits. As mentioned above,
my impression is similar as regards the corresponding remark by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Orinoco Steamship Co. case.

In both of the two cases mentioned, the references by the reviewing
forum to the distinction between appeal and nullity seemed intended by it
as a reminder to itself that in a case of nullity it should not stray into a
re-assessment of the merits of the decision being challenged, the only
issue before it being whether the decision resulted from a valid exercise of

62
112 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

adjudicating power, not whether, if it did, it was correct on the merits.
Without dogmatically excluding the possibility of other interpretations, I
do not understand either of the two cases to be suggesting that, where a
case of nullity is based on a challenge to the correctness of an interpreta-
tion made by the tribunal of the compromis concerning its powers, the
reviewing forum is confined to asking merely whether the interpretation
made by the tribunal was one which could have been made by it without
manifest breach of its competence and is excluded from pronouncing on
the correctness of the interpretation where this is held to be one which
could have been so made. In the exercise of such powers of adjudication
as it may in fact have, a tribunal undeniably has powers of appreciation
over the factual and documentary material laid before it for evaluation
and decision. So also, to some extent, where the competence of the tribu-
nal depends on its appreciation of some matter in its relationship to the
jurisdictional provisions of the compromis (Interpretation of the Greco-
Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory
Opinion, 1928, P.C.LJ., Series B, No. 16, pp. 19-22; and J. L. Simpson and
Hazel Fox, International Arbitration, Law and Practice, 1959, p. 252). But
such powers of appreciation are of a significantly different order from
powers of appreciation as to what powers of adjudication are in the first
instance conferred on the tribunal by the compromis itself.

For practical purposes, the difference between the Court’s view and
that offered here may well be one of approach, rather than one of result.
But perhaps some importance may be attached to the approach. I agree
with the view, underlying the Court’s decision, that its authority to review
the Tribunal’s interpretation of the compromis is limited, but I differ as to
the basis of the limitation. I regard the limitation not as one which in
principle precludes the Court from pronouncing on the correctness of the
Tribunal’s interpretation, but as one which requires a certain measure of
caution on the part of the Court when so pronouncing: I would link the
limitation directly and firmly to considerations of stability of the arbitral
process with respect to finality of awards, and to the consequential need
for the Court to observe appropriate standards of cogency in determining
whether its own interpretation of the compromisis so convincingly clear as
to warrant displacement of the Tribunal’s, should the two be different. I
believe this view conforms to the tendency of such jurisprudence as there
is on the point. I do not see the limitation as being linked to any idea that,
as seems implied by paragraphs 47 and 60 of the Judgment of the Court,
because these are not appeal proceedings, the Tribunal should be
regarded by the Court as having an unreviewable freedom to select any
of a number of possibly different interpretations of the compromis as to the
substance of its mission, provided they are interpretations which could be
made “without manifest breach of its competence”.

With respect, then, I am not persuaded that it is a satisfactory approach
to a challenge of nullity to seek to determine it by merely asking whether

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113 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

the tribunal’s interpretation of the compromis as to its powers was one
which could have been made without manifest breach of its competence.
More particularly, I consider that there was nothing in law to prevent the
Court from pronouncing on the issue whether the Tribunal in this case
was correct in interpreting the Arbitration Agreement to mean that it was
not called upon to reply to the second question put to it.

II. WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL WaS CORRECT IN INTERPRETING THE
COMPROMIS TO MEAN THAT IT Was NOT CALLED UPON TO ANSWER THE
SECOND QUESTION

I am of opinion that the Tribunal was correct in interpreting the compro-
mis to mean that it was not called upon to reply to the second question.

Guinea-Bissau’s contention that recourse should have been had to the
second question is based on its argument that the overriding object and
purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, particularly as suggested by the
Preamble, was that there should in any event be a delimitation by a single
line of all the maritime spaces of the Parties which were the subject of the
dispute between them. This was the premise on which learned counsel for
Guinea-Bissau put its case when he said:

“the first and second questions asked in Article 2 were the parts of an
overall question: what is the maritime boundary, namely the boun-
dary of all the maritime spaces? If it derived from the exchange of
letters, the reply to the overall question would stem from that to the
first question; otherwise, it would stem from the reply to the second.”
(Public sitting of 9 April 1991 (afternoon), CR 91/7, p. 58, Profes-
sor Galväo Teles.)

This interpretation of the two questions, founded on the desideratum of a
comprehensive delimitation, is attractive; some support for it may indeed
be claimed from the jurisprudence which, in several well-known cases,
warns of the limitations of a narrow grammatical approach which, by inhi-
biting the Court from ascertaining what the parties really did mean when
they used the words falling to be construed, could result in the defeat of
the true object and purpose of a treaty.

But, taking full account of the flexibility of that jurisprudence, is
Guinea-Bissau’s reading of the two questions reasonably reconcilable
with their actual formulation? Without any necessity to call upon the fra-
vaux préparatoires, | would grant that the Arbitration Agreement itself
does indicate a general desire of the Parties for a comprehensive settle-
ment of their dispute. Yet, it appears to me that the operative provisions of
the Agreement demonstrate a specific intention not fully congruent with
that general desire, in the sense that the intention, as so demonstrated, was
indeed to realize that desire, and to realize it through the arbitration pro-
vided for, but only subject to a condition precedent which, as it turned out,

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114 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

was not satisfied. It is this partial discrepancy between apparent wish and
specific machinery which constitutes the special legal problem in this
case. How is the problem to be resolved?

The key provisions of the Arbitration Agreement, as set out in Article 2,
put two questions to the Tribunal, stated in such a way as to make it clear
that, while the first question had to be answered in any event, the second
had to be answered only “[iln the event of a negative answer to the first
question .. .”. Thus, the very structure of the provision contemplated the
distinct possibility that only the first of the two questions might require to
be answered. This being so, to make good the argument that the Tribunal
was obliged to produce a comprehensive delimitation in any event, it
would have to be shown that the Tribunal was both competent and bound
to produce such a delimitation by way of answer to the first question if, for
any reason, that question alone fell to be answered. However, it seems
clear (and this aspect is revisited below) that a comprehensive delimita-
tion could in no circumstances be produced by way of answer to the first
question. It being also clear that that question could nevertheless be the
only question requiring to be answered, it follows that the argument that
the Tribunal was obliged in any event to produce a comprehensive delimi-
tation fails. With that failure, the conceptual foundation of Guinea-
Bissau’s case is removed. And the case ends.

What, however, is the position if this conclusion is wrong? As has been
seen, Guinea-Bissau’s argument was this — that a comprehensive delimi-
tation was necessary in any event, and that, accordingly, if the answer of
the Tribunal to the first question did not in fact produce such a delimita-
tion, it was necessary to pass to the second question in search of one. This
argument might seem to imply that Guinea-Bissau was taking the position
that the first question did embrace the possibility of establishing a com-
prehensive delimitation under it. However, it has to be recalled that, in the
arbitral proceedings, Guinea-Bissau resisted, and successfully resisted, a
contention by Senegal that an answer to the first question, upholding the
1960 Agreement, could produce a comprehensive delimitation. Senegal,
for its part, accepted the Tribunal’s decision on this point. Before this
Court neither side took the position that it was possible, even theoreti-
cally, fora comprehensive delimitation of any kind to be produced by any
conceivable answer to the issue raised in that question as to whether the
1960 Agreement had the force of law in the relations between the Parties.
That question was simply not directed to the establishment of a compre-
hensive delimitation of any kind. Thus, although it is perfectly true, as
repeatedly emphasized by Guinea-Bissau, that the Tribunal’s answer to
the first question did not in fact produce a comprehensive delimitation,
there is no point in saying so if, to begin with, that question was not
directed to the establishment of any such delimitation. There would be no
point in saying so because the statement would be based on a non-existent
premise. Accordingly, the fact that no such delimitation was effected

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115 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

under the first question did not in logic provide a reason for having
recourse to the second question.

It may be argued that, although, for the reasons given by the Tribunal,
the 1960 line could not constitute a comprehensive delimitation, this did
not mean that the first question could not be construed as asking the Tribu-
nal to say whether that line, if upheld, constituted such a delimitation,
and that the answer which the Tribunal gave amounted to a partially nega-
tive answer to the question thus understood. It is difficult, however, to
discover in the wording of the question the ingredients of such a construc-
tion. A possible argument is that the reference in the question to “the rela-
tions” between the Parties was a reference to their relations in respect of
the boundary throughout all of the existing maritime spaces, and not
merely those maritime spaces which existed in 1960, with the result that
the Tribunal, if it upheld the 1960 Agreement, would be required to con-
sider whether the Agreement governed all of their relations in this com-
prehensive sense. My difficulty with the argument is that it seems
necessary to distinguish “the relations” between the Parties from the sub-
ject-matter of the relations. The word “relations” by itself means the “var-
ious modes in which one country, state, etc., is brought into contact with
another by political or commercial interests” (The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1984, p. 1796), or “the connections between . ..
nations” (Webster’s New Dictionary and Thesaurus, Concise Edition, 1990,
p. 459). It appears to me that these “connections” may concern a variety of
interests and that a reference to the former does not by itself suffice to
identify the latter. Accordingly, the reference in the first question to “the
relations” between the Parties does not by itself identify the particular
maritime spaces which those relations concern. These are to be collected
from the reference in the question to the 1960 Agreement, which of course
concerned only some of the existing maritime spaces of the Parties. In
effect, in asking whether the 1960 Agreement had the force of law in the
relations between the Parties, the first question was asking whether the
Agreement had such force as regards the boundary delimiting the mari-
time spaces referred to in the Agreement, and not also as regards maritime
spaces not therein referred to. There is nothing in the question which sup-
ports the view that it was asking the Tribunal to say whether the 1960 line,
if upheld, was to have an extended application throughout all of the exist-
ing maritime spaces of the Parties.

It may be said that this conclusion does not represent the Tribunal’s
own interpretation of the first question. Having held that the 1960 Agree-
ment had the force of law in the relations between the Parties, the Tribunal
passed on to consider the spatial application of the Agreement. Senegal
had contended that, by reason of certain factors, the line laid down by the
1960 Agreement applied to all of the maritime spaces of the Parties as now
known to international law, and was accordingly no longer restricted to
the spaces specified in the Agreement itself. Speaking in this connection,
the Tribunal said:

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116 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

“The Tribunal is not attempting to determine at this point whether
there exists a delimitation of the exclusive economic zones based ona
legal norm other than the 1960 Agreement, such as a tacit agreement,
a bilateral custom or a general norm. It is merely seeking to determine
whether the Agreement in itself can be interpreted so as to cover the
delimitation of the whole body of maritime areas existing at present.”
(Award, para. 83.)

Do these remarks mean that the Tribunal understood the first question to
be asking it to say whether the delimitation effected by the 1960 Agree-
ment, if upheld, governed all of the maritime areas existing at present? If
so, the answer which it gave — that the Agreement applied only to the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the continental shelf — may well
be regarded as a negative answer to the first question and as therefore
requiring recourse to the second.

However, reading the quoted statement in context, I do not think it
shows that the Tribunal understood the first question to be asking it to say
whether the 1960 line applied comprehensively. In response to Senegal’s
contention, the Tribunal carefully differentiated between the delimitation
effected by the 1960 Agreement itself and any possible additional delimi-
tation subsequently effected on the basis of “a legal norm other than the
1960 Agreement, such as a tacit agreement, a bilateral custom or a general
norm”. The Tribunal held that the first question was confined to the
1960 delimitation and raised no issue about any other possible delimita-
tion. Consequently, the Tribunal was concerned under the first question
only with the spatial application of the delimitation effected by the
1960 Agreement itself, and not also with the spatial application of any
possible additional delimitation subsequently effected on a basis other
than that Agreement. It was precisely because the Tribunal understood
the first question in this limited way that it rejected Senegal’s contention
that the 1960 Agreement applied to all existing maritime spaces. That was
a negative answer to a question raised by Senegal; it was not a negative
answer to the first question presented by the Arbitration Agreement.

Nor could the Tribunal’s answer be regarded as a partial answer to the
first question. The non-applicability of the 1960 Agreement to maritime
spaces not referred to in it does not mean that the Agreement was not
wholly in force. How far the Agreement had the force of law in the rela-
tions between the Parties was to be measured by reference to the maritime
spaces to which it referred, not by reference to maritime spaces to which it
did not refer. The Agreement was in force between the Parties to the entire
extent visualized by its own terms; it was fully in force.

There could be argument — and such argument was in fact advanced by
Senegal — that the Tribunal’s task was merely to say whether the

67
117 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

1960 Agreement had the force of law “in the relations between the” Part-
ies, and that it was not required to determine the field of application of the
Agreement, if upheld. I do not pursue that question, because even if the
Tribunal was so required, the answer which it gave, both as to the applica-
bility and the scope of the Agreement, could not, in my opinion, be
regarded as a negative answer so as to require recourse to the second
question.

For the reasons given, it appears to me that the two questions were not
directed to the achievement of the same thing. They were both concerned
with the same general subject, but they were addressed to different aspects
of it. I agree with the Court that the first question was concerned with the
issue whether the 1960 Agreement had the force of law in the relations
between the Parties, while the second was directed to the making of a mar-
itime delimitation in the event that the Agreement did not have such force.
The Tribunal was indeed required to undertake a delimitation of all the
maritime areas of the Parties, but only on condition that it first found that
the 1960 Agreement did not have the force of law in the relations between
them. As this condition — a condition precedent — was not satisfied, the
duty to undertake such a delimitation was never triggered off. To hold
otherwise is effectively to say that the Tribunal was bound to answer the
second question whatever was its answer to the first — a proposition
needing only to be stated to be dismissed.

It may be said that there is little to recommend a method of interpreta-
tion which is so strict as to lead to a construction of the Arbitration Agree-
ment “according to which it would . . . fail entirely to enunciate the
question really in dispute ...” (see remarks of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of
Gex, P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 96, at p. 139). Since the actual dispute
between the Parties in this case extended to all of their existing maritime
spaces, it may be contended that any interpretation which excluded the
possibility of a comprehensive settlement through recourse to the second
question is an interpretation which fails to enunciate the question really in
dispute. On the other hand, to require recourse to be had to the second
question notwithstanding the Tribunal’s affirmative answer to the first is
so palpable a disregard of the preclusive words with which the second
question begins as to invite attention to other applicable considerations.

In his earlier capacity as a Member of this Court, Judge André Gros,
one of the two arbitrators who voted for the Award, had occasion, first in
1974 and then again in 1984, to refer to the following passage from
Charles De Visscher (Problèmes d'interprétation judiciaire en droit interna-
tional public, 1963, at pp. 24 and 25):

“The function of interpretation is not to perfect a legal instru-
ment with a view to adapting it more or less precisely to what one may
be tempted to envisage as the full realisation of an objective which
was logically postulated, but to shed light on what was in fact the
will of the Parties.” (Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland),

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118 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

LCJ. Reports 1974, dissenting opinion, p. 149; and, Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), L.CJ. Reports 1974,
dissenting opinion, pp. 238-239. See likewise the Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
dissenting opinion, p. 388, where the English translation is slightly
different.)

Judge Anzilotti is on record as observing that, were the Permanent
Court of International Justice to confine itself to answering only part of
the question “which has been put to it”, the Court would be committing
“an abuse of its powers” (Customs Régime between Germany and Austria,
Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 41, p. 37, at p. 69). How-
ever, to avoid a petitio principii, it must first be determined what is the ques-
tion requiring to be answered (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of
Gex, P.C.IJ., Series C, No. 58, at pp. 445, 610-613, Professor Logoz, for
Switzerland, arguendo). Thus, although a compromis may show that the
parties desire an answer to all of certain questions, the way in which the
questions are actually framed can conceivably prevent the tribunal from
dealing with all of them. Treating of a case of this kind, in which it held
that one of certain questions could not be answered because of the way it
was constructed, the Permanent Court of International Justice seemed
unmoved by the circumstance that the Court was expressly required by
the compromis to answer all of the questions “by a single judgment”. Nor
did it yield to argument that —

“the conclusion of the Special Agreement represented a compromise
between the opposing views of the Parties — one of the two States
being particularly interested in the legal question submitted to the
Court in Article 1, and the other in the subjects dealt with in
Article 2 — and that to give judgment only on the question of law
submitted by Article | was unjust, as it destroyed the balance
between the two Parties” (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District
of Gex, Judgment, 1932, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 96, at p. 163).

That argument, it may be thought, carries a certain analogical force in this
case. However, without entering into the reasons why it failed in that case,
I take the view that it would fail equally in this case; reflections about
possible difficulties created by the Award for the completion of a compre-
hensive delimitation, though deserving of consideration, are not decisive.
Referring to the way the particular question had been formulated in the
Free Zones case, the Permanent Court of International Justice said:

“If the obstacle to fulfilling part of the mission which the Parties
intended to submit to the Court results from the terms of the Special
Agreement itself, it results directly from the will of the Parties .. .”
(Ibid.)

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119 ARBITRAL AWARD (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

It seems to me that in the case at bar such an obstacle is presented by the
will of the Parties themselves as expressed by them in the prefatory words
of the second question. Moreover, those words having been introduced at
the instance of Guinea-Bissau itself, there is a sense in which it is apposite
to bear in mind that, as was once said by Judge Anzilotti, “it is only fair
that a government should bear the consequences of the wording of a docu-
ment for which it is responsible” (Polish Agrarian Reform and German
Minority, P.CIJ., Series A/B, No. 58, p. 175, dissenting opinion, at p. 182).
The controlling words in this case are clear. Every effort to put a gloss on
them founders on Professor Rolin’s remark, “la Cour estimera sans doute
qu'il faut lire ce qui est écrit” (1.C.J. Pleadings, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., p. 486).

The international arbitral process provides a useful procedure of peace-
ful settlement. The international community rightly values the process.
Clearly, its utility must be protected against open-ended challenges to the
finality of awards. Equally clearly, it would be misconceived to seek to
protect the system by suffering any serious fault in its operation to remain
remediless : the preservation of the system and the vindication of its credi-
bility are interlinked. In my opinion, however, the complaint in this case
has not been made out. True, the Award of the Tribunal did not result in a
delimitation of all the maritime areas in dispute. However, this is a com-
ment not on the Award, but on the way the Parties chose to frame the
questions put to the Tribunal. As to why they framed the questions in the
way they did, a court of law need not look beyond the words of
Charles De Visscher:

“II n’est pas rare qu'il faille considérer comme adéquate une inter-
prétation qui n’assigne au traité qu’une efficacité restreinte, à pre-
mière vue peu conforme à ce qui, en bonne logique, pourrait appa-
raître comme son but. Cette inefficacité partielle peut s’expliquer,
en fait, par la volonté réfléchie des contractants de ne pas s'engager
au-delà d’un certain point.” (De Visscher, op. cit., p. 77.)

(Signed) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

70


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

ANTARCTICA CASE
(UNITED KINGDOM +. CHILE)

ORDER OF MARCH 16th, 1956

1956

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE L’ANTARCTIQUE
(ROYAUME-UNI c. CHILI)

ORDONNANCE DU 16 MARS 1956
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Antarctica case (United Kingdom v. Chile),
Order of March roth, 1956: I.C. J. Reports 1956, p. 15.”

La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire de l'Antarctique (Royaume-Uni c. Chili),
Ordonnance du 16 mars 1956: C.I. J. Recueil 1956, p. 15.»

Sales number 1 47
N° de vente: :

15

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1956
March 16th

General List : YEAR I 9 56

No. 27
March 16th, 1956

ANTARCTICA CASE
(UNITED KINGDOM v. CHILE)

ORDER OF MARCH 16th, 1956

ORDER

Present : President HACKWORTH ; Vice-President BADAWI; Judges
BASDEVANT, WINIARSKI, KLAESTAD, READ, Hsu Mo,
ARMAND-UGON, KoJEVNIKOV, Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA
Kuan, Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT, MORENO QUINTANA,
Cérpova ; Registrar LOPEZ OLivAn,

The International Court of Justice,

composed as above,

after deliberation,

having regard to Articles 36 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,

Makes the following Order :

Whereas, on Mav 4th, 1955, there was filed in the Registry an
Application by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland instituting proceedings before the
Court against the Republic of Chile concerning a dispute relating
to the sovereignty over certain islands and lands in the Antarctic
which lie between longitudes 53° and 80° West and to the south-
wards of latitude 58° South :

4
16 ANTARCTICA (UNITED KINGDOM/CHILE) (ORDER OF 16 111 56)

Whereas the Application was duly communicated by the Registry
on May 6th, 1955, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Chile ;

Whereas the Application was also duly communicated by the
Registry to the Members of the United Nations through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the other States
entitled to appear before the Court ;

Whereas the Application contains the following :

“40. The United Kingdom Government ... declares that it hereby
submits to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purposes of the case
referred to the Court in the present Application... The Chilean
Government has not, so far as the United Kingdom Government
is aware, yet filed any declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction
either generally under Article 36 (2) of the Statute or specially in
the present case. The Chilean Government, which has frequently
expressed its adherence to the principle of judicial settlement of
international disputes, is, however, legally qualified to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. Consequently, upon
notification of the present Application to the Republic of Chile by
the Registzar in accordance with the Rules of Court, the Chilean
Government, under the settled jurisprudence of the Court, can take
he necessary steps to that end, and thereby cause the Court’s
jurisdiction in the case to be constituted in respect of Parties.

41. The United Kingdom Government founds the jurr “iction of
the Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 29 (1) of
the Court’s Statute ; ...”

Whereas, in a letter dated July 15th, 1955, addressed to the
Registrar, and handed to him on August 2nd, 1955, the Chilean
Minister to the Netherlands, on the instructions of his Government,
recalled that on various occasions in the past his Government had
“indicated to the Government of the United Kingdom that recourse
to the International Court of Justice cannot be applicable in the
case of the Chilean Antarctic’, and after setting forth the text of
a note adressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Chile to the British Embassy in Santiago on May 4th, 1955,
in which recourse to the Cuurt for the settlement of the controversy
was declined, the Minister concluded :

“My Government consequently will confine itself on this occasion
to stating that the application of the Government of the United
Kingdom is unfounded and that it is not open to the International
Court of Justice to exercise jurisdiction in this case.”

Whereas a copy of the above-mentioned letter was communicated
to the Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom on
August 3rd, 1955; .

Whereas, in a letter dated August 31st, 1955, addressed to the
Registrar, the Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom

5
17 ANTARCTICA (UNITED KINGDOM/CHILE) (ORDER OF I6 III 56)

stated that it regarded the letter of July 15th, 1955, from the
Chilean Minister to the Netherlands as amounting to a rejection
of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the
purposes of the present case; |

Whereas, in these circumstances, the Court finds that it has not
before it any acceptance by the Government of Chile of the juris-
diction of the Court to deal with the dispute which is the subject
of the Application submitted to it by the United. Kingdom Govern-
ment and that therefore it can take no further steps upon this
Application ;

Tue Court

orders that the case shall be removed from the list.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of March, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-six, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted
to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and to the Government of the Republic of Chile,
respectively.

(Signed) GREEN H. HACKWORTH,

President.

(Signed) J. Lopez O1iva4n,

Registrar.