       OPINION DISSIDENTE COMMUNE DE M. LE JUGE
             AL-KHASAWNEH, VICE-PRÉSIDENT,
       ET DE MM. LES JUGES RANJEVA, SHI, KOROMA,
            TOMKA, BENNOUNA ET SKOTNIKOV

[Texte original français]

   1. A notre regret, nous avons dû voter contre l’ordonnance édictant
des mesures conservatoires, étant persuadés que les conditions pour
 ’indication de telles mesures, posées par l’article 41 du Statut et par la
 urisprudence de la Cour, ne sont pas remplies dans la présente affaire. Il
va sans dire que notre vote ne devrait pas être interprété comme déchar-
geant les Parties de leurs obligations, soit en vertu de la convention inter-
nationale pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale (CIEDR), soit
plus généralement en vertu du droit international. Au contraire, nous
considérons que les Parties sont toujours tenues d’agir en pleine confor-
mité avec leurs engagements internationaux.
   2. Le pouvoir de la Cour d’indiquer des mesures conservatoires
est inhérent à sa fonction judiciaire puisqu’il lui permet de veiller, en
 onction des circonstances, à ce que l’objet même du différend qui lui
est soumis soit préservé avant qu’elle ne rende son jugement. C’est pour
cela qu’elle a toute latitude pour édicter des mesures conservatoires en
dehors même de celles figurant dans la requête du demandeur, ou d’en
décider proprio motu. Ces mesures étant obligatoires pour les deux parties
 LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2001, p. 506, par. 109), la Cour doit être d’autant plus vigilante dans
 ’appréciation des conditions requises pour leur indication.
   3. Dans la présente affaire, ainsi que le souligne la Cour, les droits
dont la Géorgie réclame la protection au travers des mesures conserva-
 oires « sont des droits ... dont la Géorgie prétend qu’ils ont été violés par
 a Russie » au cours de ce que la Géorgie qualifie « de troisième phase de
 ’intervention de la Russie en Ossétie du Sud et en Abkhazie » (ordon-
nance, par. 93), et qu’elle fait remonter au mois d’août 2008 (soit à partir
des 7-8 août, date de l’éclatement du conflit armé entre les deux Parties).
   Il est pour le moins curieux que la Géorgie, qui fait remonter les pré-
 endus actes de discrimination raciale qui auraient été commis par la
Russie, en violation de la CIEDR, au début de la décennie quatre-vingt-
dix, ait attendu le conflit armé, dont elle était partie prenante avec la Rus-
sie, sans compter les forces sud-ossètes, pour saisir immédiatement la
Cour d’un différend relatif à l’application de cette convention.
   4. Quoi qu’il en soit, en présence d’un recours engagé même dans de
 elles circonstances, la Cour se devait de vérifier si les conditions néces-
saires pour l’indication des mesures conservatoires étaient, en l’occur-
rence, réunies.

51

  5. La Géorgie invoque comme la base de la compétence de la Cour
’article 22 de la CIEDR, qui dispose que
     « [t]out différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant
     l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente Convention qui n’aura
     pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des procé-
     dures expressément prévues par ladite Convention sera porté, à la
     requête de toute partie au différend, devant la Cour internationale
     de Justice pour qu’elle statue à son sujet, à moins que les parties
     au différend ne conviennent d’un autre mode de règlement » (ordon-
     nance, par. 2).
  6. Il n’est pas contesté que la Géorgie et la Fédération de Russie sont
parties à ladite Convention, et sont liées par son article 22. Néanmoins,
en ce qui concerne la compétence de la Cour en vertu de l’article 22 de la
Convention, les Parties sont en désaccord sur deux points :
1) s’il existe un différend entre elles « touchant l’interprétation ou l’appli-
   cation de la présente Convention » ;
2) si la condition préalable que le différend « n’aura pas été réglé par voie
   de négociation ou au moyen des procédures expressément prévues par
   ladite Convention » a été satisfaite dans la présente affaire.
   7. Nous allons nous pencher d’abord sur le premier point qui divise
 es Parties en ce qui concerne la compétence de la Cour dans la pré-
sente affaire, c’est-à-dire l’existence d’un différend touchant l’application
de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de la discrimination
raciale.
   8. Un tel différend doit exister préalablement à la saisine de la Cour.
C’est pour cela que celle-ci devait se demander si les deux Parties se sont
opposées quant à l’interprétation ou à l’application de la Convention.
Certes, il est établi qu’une telle opposition ne s’est jamais manifestée
avant le 8 août, mais l’a-t-elle été après les 7-8 août et le déclenchement
des hostilités entre les deux pays ? En d’autres termes, les violences que
 a Géorgie impute à la Russie sont-elles susceptibles « d’entrer dans les
prévisions » de la CIEDR, pour reprendre la terminologie que la Cour
a utilisée pour rejeter la compétence prima facie dans son ordon-
nance du 2 juin 1999 sur la Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie
c. Belgique) (mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 138, par. 41) ? La Cour avait alors considéré
que « le recours ou la menace du recours à l’emploi de la force contre un
Etat ne sauraient en soi constituer un acte de génocide au sens de l’ar-
 icle II de la convention sur le génocide » (ibid., par. 40).
   9. On pourrait en dire de même dans l’affaire qui nous concerne ; les
actions armées de la Russie après le 8 août ne sauraient en elles-mêmes
constituer des actes de discrimination raciale, au sens de l’article premier
de la CIEDR, à moins qu’il ne soit prouvé qu’elles visaient la mise en
place d’une « distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondée sur la
race, la couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine ethnique ». Or les circonstances

52

de l’affrontement armé déclenché dans la nuit du 7 au 8 août sont
 elles que cela ne pouvait être le cas. Certes, le conflit armé qui s’en est
suivi a concerné une région où existaient de sérieuses tensions ethniques
et cela pouvait entraîner des infractions au droit humanitaire, mais il est
difficile de considérer que les actions armées en elles-mêmes, qu’il s’agisse
de celles de la Russie ou de celles de la Géorgie, entrent dans les prévi-
sions de la CIEDR.
   10. D’ailleurs la majorité, ne pouvant trouver aucune preuve que
 es actes allégués par la Géorgie entraient dans les prévisions de la
CIEDR, s’est contentée de constater qu’un différend paraît exister sur
 ’interprétation et l’application de la CIEDR parce que les deux
Parties ont montré leur désaccord sur l’applicabilité des articles 2 et 5 de
 a Convention. Autrement dit, une argumentation développée à l’au-
dience devient la preuve de l’existence d’un différend entre les Par-
 ies (ordonnance, par. 112) ! Et, pour finir sur ce point, la majorité
procède par affirmation péremptoire : « les actes allégués par la Géorgie
paraissent pouvoir porter atteinte à des droits conférés par la CIEDR,
même si certains de ces actes pourraient également être couverts par
d’autres règles de droit international, notamment de droit huma-
nitaire » (ibid., par. 112).
   11. Même si l’on acceptait, arguendo, qu’un différend susceptible
d’entrer dans les prévisions de la CIEDR existait entre la Géorgie et la
Russie avant la saisine de la Cour, il faut se demander s’il s’agit d’un dif-
 érend « qui n’aura pas été réglé par voie de négociation ou au moyen des
procédures expressément prévues par ladite Convention », pour rappeler
 es termes exprès de l’article 22 de la CIEDR.
   12. En ce qui concerne les négociations, la Cour commence par sol-
 iciter le sens littéral de l’article 22, selon lequel il « ne donne pas à
penser que la tenue de négociations formelles ... ou le recours aux
procédures visées à l’article 22 constituent des conditions préalables aux-
quelles il doit être satisfait avant toute saisine de la Cour » (ibid.,
par. 114), ce qui reviendrait à dénier à cette mention tout effet utile
et toute portée juridique. La Cour en vient ensuite à admettre que les
questions relevant de la CIEDR devaient être soulevées entre les Parties
et elle invoque à ce sujet les contacts bilatéraux entre les Parties et des
représentations adressées au Conseil de sécurité (ibid., par. 115), mais
 a Géorgie n’a à aucun moment accusé la Russie de discrimination
raciale. Par conséquent, à notre avis, la substance même de la CIEDR
n’a jamais fait débat entre les Parties jusqu’au dépôt d’un recours
devant la Cour.
   13. Il est très surprenant que la Cour se soit ainsi débarrassée de cette
condition préalable à tout recours judiciaire, alors que la Géorgie elle-
même a reconnu que, même s’il existe une « obligation de négocier préa-
 ablement à la saisine de la Cour, il est évident que les parties ne sont pas
 enues de poursuivre des négociations dont tout indique qu’elles seront
vaines » (CR 2008/25, p. 19 (Crawford)). En effet, c’est bien ce qui ressort
de la jurisprudence de la Cour et de l’institution qui l’a précédée, la Cour

53

permanente de Justice internationale. Pour que la condition de négocia-
 ion préalable soit remplie, il suffit qu’elle ait été tentée et qu’il devienne
clair à un moment qu’elle n’avait aucune chance d’aboutir. En tout cas, il
est clair que, lorsque la négociation est prévue expressément par un traité,
 a Cour ne peut passer outre sans s’expliquer ; nulle part elle n’a
rejeté cette condition en constatant simplement que la question n’a
pas été réglée par négociation. L’affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis
en Palestine sera, sur ce point, reprise souvent par la jurisprudence ulté-
rieure :
        « L’objection sera réduite à sa juste valeur si l’on considère que
     l’appréciation de l’importance et des chances de réussite d’une négo-
     ciation diplomatique est essentiellement relative. Une négociation ne
     suppose pas toujours et nécessairement une série plus ou moins
     longue de notes et de dépêches ; ce peut être assez qu’une conver-
     sation ait été entamée ; cette conversation a pu être très courte :
     tel est le cas si elle a rencontré un point mort, si elle s’est heurtée
     finalement à un non possumus ou à un non volumus péremptoire
     de l’une des Parties et qu’ainsi il est apparu avec évidence que
     le différend n’est pas susceptible d’être réglé par une négociation
     diplomatique. » (Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt
     nº 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A nº 2, p. 13 ; les italiques sont dans
     l’original.)
  14. Dans l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (nou-
velle requête : 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), la
présente Cour a rendu une ordonnance le 10 juillet 2002 où elle rappelle
que
     « le Congo prétend par ailleurs fonder la compétence de la Cour
     sur l’article 29 de la convention sur la discrimination à l’égard des
     femmes, qui dispose :
           « Tout différend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties concer-
        nant l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente convention qui
        n’est pas réglé par voie de négociation est soumis à l’arbitrage, à la
        demande de l’un d’entre eux. Si, dans les six mois qui suivent la
        date de la demande d’arbitrage, les parties ne parviennent pas à se
        mettre d’accord ..., l’une quelconque d’entre elles peut soumettre
        le différend à la Cour internationale de Justice, en déposant une
        requête conformément au Statut de la Cour. » » (Mesures conser-
        vatoires, ordonnance du 10 juillet 2002, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 246-
        247, par. 76.)
La Cour a considéré que, « à ce stade de la procédure, le Congo n’appor-
 [ait] pas la preuve que ses tentatives en vue d’entamer des négociations
ou d’engager une procédure d’arbitrage avec le Rwanda ... visaient
’application de l’article 29 de la convention » (ibid., par. 79).
   15. Ainsi il ne suffit pas qu’il y ait eu des contacts entre les Parties
 voir paragraphe 12 ci-dessus), il faut encore qu’ils aient porté sur l’objet

54

du différend, soit l’interprétation ou l’application de la convention. De
même, ce précédent ne peut être écarté en l’espèce du fait que les deux
clauses compromissoires sont différentes, dans la mesure où l’article 29
 ntercale l’arbitrage entre la négociation et la saisine de la Cour. En effet,
 orsqu’elle a rendu son arrêt le 3 février 2006 sur la compétence, la Cour
a jugé que l’article 29 posait des conditions cumulatives et qu’il « incom-
b[ait] donc à la Cour d’examiner si chacune des conditions préalables à sa
saisine ... [avait] été respectée en l’espèce » (Activités armées sur le terri-
 oire du Congo (nouvelle requête : 2002) (République démocratique du
Congo c. Rwanda), compétence de la cour et recevabilité de la requête,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 39, par. 87).

   16. Le moins que pouvait faire la Cour dans la présente affaire, c’est
de se demander si la négociation avait été entamée et si elle était sus-
ceptible de conduire à un quelconque résultat, mais elle ne l’a pas
 ait. On comprend dès lors qu’un Etat partie à la CIEDR, soit la
Russie, trouve inacceptable d’être actionné devant la Cour sans avoir
été avisé, au préalable, des griefs de la Géorgie par référence à cette
convention.
   17. Nous venons maintenant à l’autre condition préalable, alternative,
prévue dans l’article 22 de la CIEDR, à savoir « les procédures expressé-
ment prévues par ladite Convention ».
   18. La Cour, là aussi comme pour la négociation, se contente de
constater que « ni l’une ni l’autre des Parties n’avancent que les ques-
 ions en litige ont été portées à l’attention du Comité [pour l’élimination
de la discrimination] » (article 11 de la Convention) (ordonnance,
par. 116), pour en déduire que le différend n’a pas été réglé par le
moyen des procédures prévues par la Convention. On ne peut que s’éton-
ner de cette interprétation, que ne confirment ni le sens ordinaire de
 ’article 22, ni l’objet et le but qu’il poursuit — qui est d’encourager le
maximum de pays à souscrire à la compétence de la Cour, avec l’assu-
rance que les procédures prévues par la Convention seront d’abord
sollicitées —, et pas davantage les travaux préparatoires auxquels cet
article a donné lieu au sein de la Troisième Commission de l’Assemblée
générale des Nations Unies.
   La Cour aurait pu considérer que la gravité de la situation du conflit
armé les 7-8 août ne permettait pas de recourir à ces procédures, mais ce
serait faire peu de cas de la procédure d’urgence et d’alerte rapide mise en
place par le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale en
1993 afin de lui permettre d’intervenir avec plus d’efficacité en cas de vio-
 ation de la Convention (rapport du Comité pour l’élimination de la dis-
crimination raciale, doc A/48/18, annexe III).

   19. En conséquence, nous considérons que c’est à tort que la majorité
a estimé que la Cour a compétence prima facie, en vertu de l’article 22 de
 a CIEDR, pour connaître de cette affaire, dans la mesure où elle n’est
pas parvenue à établir l’existence d’un différend portant sur l’interpréta-

55

 ion ou l’application de ladite Convention, ni à démontrer que la condi-
 ion préalable à la saisine de la Cour a été satisfaite.
   20. Même si la compétence prima facie était établie, deux conditions
additionnelles pour l’indication des mesures conservatoires doivent
être, selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, satisfaites, à savoir l’exis-
 ence d’un risque de préjudice irréparable aux droits en question et
 ’urgence.
   21. A notre avis, nulle part l’ordonnance ne démontre l’existence d’un
quelconque risque de préjudice irréparable aux droits que la Géorgie tien-
drait de la CIEDR. La Cour se limite à une pétition de principe en décla-
rant que « les droits en cause en l’espèce ... sont de nature telle que le
préjudice qui leur serait porté pourrait être irréparable » (ordonnance,
par. 142), sans définir ni de quelle manière précise ils seraient menacés ni
 e préjudice irréparable qu’ils subiraient. La Cour semble ainsi laisser
entendre que certains droits peuvent automatiquement remplir le critère
requis de préjudice irréparable sans analyser ni les faits réels sur le terrain
ni l’effectivité des menaces contre lesdits droits. Quant aux expulsions
alléguées par la Géorgie et attribuées par elle à la Russie, elles ne peuvent
en elles-mêmes être considérées comme un préjudice irréparable, la Cour
pouvant ordonner, si elle en arrive à la phase du fond de cette affaire, le
retour des personnes concernées à leurs domiciles et l’octroi à celles-ci
de compensations appropriées. Il est d’autant plus difficile d’avancer
un préjudice irréparable aux droits invoqués que les organes appro-
priés des Nations Unies ont fait état de milliers de personnes qui
sont, depuis la cessation des hostilités, retournées dans leurs foyers
en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud, et qu’il est prévu, dans le cadre
de l’accord de cessez-le-feu du 12 août 2008, l’ouverture prochaine
à Genève, le 15 octobre 2008, de négociations entre toutes les parties
 ntéressées, entre autres choses, sur le retour progressif des personnes
déplacées.
   22. Quant à l’urgence, elle n’existe tout simplement pas puisque, après
 a conclusion de l’accord de cessez-le-feu, des observateurs de l’Union
européenne sont désormais déployés pour contrôler le cessez-le-feu et le
retour des troupes des deux pays sur leurs positions d’avant le 7 août 2008,
et que les observateurs de la Mission d’observation des Nations Unies en
Géorgie ainsi que ceux de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopéra-
 ion en Europe continueront leurs missions respectives en Abkhazie et en
Ossétie du Sud.
   23. Dès lors, force est de constater que non seulement la Cour n’a pas
compétence prima facie pour se prononcer au fond sur cette affaire, mais
que les conditions posées par la jurisprudence pour indiquer des mesures
conservatoires ne sont à l’évidence pas réunies.
   24. Cette faiblesse de l’ordonnance, qui n’a pas échappé complètement
à la majorité dans cette affaire, trouve un écho dans le dispositif puisqu’il
demande finalement aux deux Parties de respecter la Convention, ce
qu’elles sont tenues de faire de toutes façons avec ou sans mesures
conservatoires.

56

  25. Ainsi, bien que nous soyons d’accord avec cette conclusion évi-
dente, nous avons dû voter contre cette ordonnance de la Cour, qui n’est
pas bien fondée en droit.

                             (Signé) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
                                  (Signé) Raymond RANJEVA.
                                     (Signé) SHI Jiuyong.
                                  (Signé) Abdul G. KOROMA.
                                     (Signé) Peter TOMKA.
                                 (Signé) Mohamed BENNOUNA.
                                  (Signé) Leonid SKOTNIKOV.

57


223

DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE KOROMA
[Traduction]

Alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX du traité de 1955 et principes de
droit international — Non ultra petita — Ordre dans lequel les questions ont été
traitées — Charge de la preuve et faits — Conclusion en droit.

Bien qu'ayant voté en faveur de l’arrêt, il me semble nécessaire d’indi-
quer ce qui suit.

La Cour a rendu, en accord avec sa jurisprudence, une conclusion fon-
damentale, à savoir que les mesures impliquant un recours à la force
armée et prétendument prises au titre de l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l’article XX du traité de 1955 doivent être examinées à la lumière du prin-
cipe de l’interdiction en droit international de l’emploi de la force, tel que
limité par le droit naturel de légitime défense.

L’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX dispose que:

«Le présent traité ne fera pas obstacle à l’application de mesures:

d) ... nécessaires à l’exécution des obligations de l’une ou l’autre des
Hautes Parties contractantes relatives au maintien ou au réta-
blissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales ou à la pro-
tection des intérêts vitaux de cette Haute Partie contractante sur
le plan de la sécurité.»

La Cour a appliqué cette règle, ainsi qu’il lui incombait de le faire, et a
conclu que cet article n’avait pas été conçu comme devant être mis en
œuvre de manière totalement indépendante du droit international général
relatif à l’emploi de la force, de sorte qu’il justifierait, y compris dans le
cadre limité d’une réclamation fondée sur une violation du traité, un
emploi illicite de la force. La Cour affirme donc — à juste titre, selon
moi — que l’application du droit international général à cette question
fait partie intégrante de la tâche d'interprétation qui lui a été confiée. En
d’autres termes, la question de savoir si une action présentée comme jus-
tifiée par l’alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 constituait ou non un recours illicite
à la force doit être tranchée au regard des critères de la Charte des
Nations Unies et du droit international général.

En se fondant sur ces critères, la Cour a délibéré et jugé que l’alinéa d)
du paragraphe 1 de l’article XX du traité de 1955 ne pouvait permettre de
conclure à la licéité des actions menées contre les installations pétrolières
les 19 octobre 1987 et 18 avril 1988 en tant que mesures nécessaires à la
protection des intérêts vitaux des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité, dès
lors que ces actions constituaient un recours à la force armée, ne pou-

66
PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (DÉCL. KOROMA) 224

vaient être considérées, au regard de la Charte des Nations Unies et du
droit international général, comme des actes de légitime défense, et, par-
tant, ne relevaient pas de la catégorie des mesures prévues par cette dis-
position du traité. La Cour répondait ainsi, selon moi, aux conclusions
des Parties, qu’elle est fondée à interpréter et tenue de trancher — ce
qu'elle a fait en déclarant contraires au droit international les actions
ayant conduit à la destruction des plates-formes. Le principe non ultra
petita ne saurait donc être invoqué à ce propos, pas davantage qu'il ne
saurait s’appliquer à la conclusion de la Cour sur la question de savoir si
les actions menées contre les plates-formes étaient contraires au para-
graphe 1 de l’article X du traité de 1955. A cet égard, la Cour estime que la
protection de la liberté de commerce prévue dans cette disposition s’éten-
dait aux plates-formes, et que ces attaques ont, en principe, entravé la
liberté de commerce de l’Iran au sens que revêt cette expression dans le
paragraphe. Cette conclusion n’est pas sans importance.

Il convient également de noter que l’ordre dans lequel la Cour a exa-
miné les questions dont elle était saisie non seulement se justifiait pour les
raisons énoncées dans son arrêt ainsi qu’au regard de sa jurisprudence
(Application de la convention de 1902 pour régler la tutelle des mineurs,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1958, p. 62), mais encore relevait de sa discrétion,
ainsi que les Parties elles-mêmes l’ont l’une et l’autre affirmé dans leurs
plaidoiries.

Quant à la charge de la preuve, il n’aura échappé à personne qu’en ren-
dant sa décision la Cour n’a pas seulement garanti le respect de la règle,
ainsi qu'il lui incombait de le faire, mais a aussi examiné les faits avec
attention et soigneusement apprécié la valeur des éléments de preuve pro-
duits; si les faits doivent être pris en considération, la conclusion rendue
dans l’arrêt doit l’être sur la base du droit.

J'estime que ces aspects méritent d’être soulignés dans le cadre de
l'arrêt.

(Signé) Abdul G. KOROMA.

67


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU DETROIT
DE CORFOU

(FIXATION DU MONTANT DES REPARATIONS
DUES PAR LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE D’ALBANIE
AU ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE

ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD) |

ARRET DU 15 DECEMBRE 1949

1949

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

THE CORFU
CHANNEL CASE

(ASSESSMENT OF THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
DUE FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND)

JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 15th, 1949

SOCIÉTÉ D’EDITIONS A.W. SIJTHOFE’S

LEYDE LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
Le présent arrét doit étre cité comme suit:

« Affaire du Détroit de Corjou, Arrét du 15 décembre 1949 :
C.I. J. Recueil 1949, p. 244.»

This Judgment should be cited as follows :

“Corfu Channel case Judgment of December 15th, 1949:
T.C. J]. Reports 1949, p. 244.”

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244

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1949 1940

December ist
General List

December 15th, 1949 No. 1

THE CORFU
CHANNEL CASE

(ASSESSMENT OF THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
DUE FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND)

Assessment of amount of compensation due où account of acts involv-
ing the international vesponsibtlity of a State.— Objection to the Courts
jurisdiction ; res judicata.— Procedure in default.—Application and
interpretation of Article 53 of the Statute.— Technical nature of the
questions involved.—lWarships.—-Enqguiry bly experts.---Medsure of

compensation,—Documentary evidence.

JUDGMENT

Present: Acting President GUERRERO; Judges ALVAREZ, HACKk-
WORTH, WINIARSKI, Zoricié, DE VISSCHER, Sir Arnold
McNair, KLAESTAD, BADAWI PAsHA, KRYLOV, READ,
Hsu Mo, AzEvebo ; M. EËER, Judge ad hoc; M. Hamsro,
Registrar.

4
JUDGMENT OF 135 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 245

In the Corfu Channel case (assessment of the amount of compen-
sation),

between

the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, represented by:

Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal adviser to the Foreign
Office, as Agent and Counsel, assisted by Sir Frank Soskice, K.C.,
M.P., Solicitor-General, as Counsel ;

and

the Government of the People’s Republic of Albania, not repre-
sented,

THE Court,
composed as above,

delivers the following judgment :

By a Judgment delivered on April 9th, 1949, in the Corfu
Channel case (merits), the Court declared the People’s Republic of
Albania responsible under international law for the explosions
which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and
for the damage and loss of human life that resulted therefrom
to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4).

In that judgment the Court decided that it had jurisdiction
to assess the amount of compensation but stated that it
could not do so in the same judgment, as the Albanian Govern-
ment had not yet stated which items, if any, of the various sums
claimed it contested, and as the United Kingdom Government
had not submitted its evidence with regard thereto. The Court
therefore stated that further proceedings on this subject were
necessary and that the order and time-limits of these proceedings
would be fixed by an order of the same date.

In this order, the Court, after noting that the Government
of the United Kingdom had stated, in its Memorial of October Ist,
1947, the various amounts claimed by way of compensation, and
after reserving the right of the Parties to avail themselves of the
provisions of Article 68 of the Rules of Court, fixed, in accordance
with Article 48 of the Statute, the following time-limits : June 25th,
1949, for the observations of the Albanian Government ; July 25th,

5
JUDGMENT OF I5 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 246

1949, for the reply of the United Kingdom Government, and
August 25th, 1949, for the reply of the Albanian Government.
Finally, the Court directed that further procedure, including
the appointment of experts in case of agreement being reached
by the Parties both as to the subject of the experts’ opinion and
as to the names of the experts, should be regulated by order of
the President of the Court in this case.

On June 24th, 1949, the President of the Court made an
order in which it was stated that by telegram, dated at Tirana,
June 23rd, 1949, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania
had asked for the extension of the time-limit for the presentation
of the Albanian observations to July Ist, 1949, and that there
was no reason for refusing that request. The President accordingly
decided to extend the time-limits fixed by the Order of the Court
of April 9th as follows: July 1st, 1949, for the observations of
the Albanian Government ; August Ist for the reply of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom ; September ist for the reply of the
Albanian Government.

In a letter dated June 29th, 1949, the Agent for the Albanian
Government informed the Court that, in the opinion of his Govern-
ment : ‘‘in accordance with the Special Agreement signed between
the Agents of the People’s Republic of Albania and of Great
Britain, on March 25th, 1948, and presented to the Court on the
same day, the Court had solely to consider the question whether
Albania was, or was not, obliged to pay compensation for the
damage caused to the British warships in the incident of Octo-
ber 22nd, 1946, and the Special Agreement did not provide that
the Court should have the right to fix the amount of the compen-
sation and, consequently, to ask Albania for information on that
subject”.

The United Kingdom Government filed its observations
within the time fixed and invoked Article 53 of the Statute. The
Albanian Government filed no reply or other document. The
case became ready for hearing after September Ist, 1949, and
the date of the commencement of the hearing was fixed for
November 17th.

In a telegram dated November 15th, the Deputy-Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Albania reasserted the opinion expressed in
the Albanian Agent’s letter of June 29th, and stated that the
Albanian Government did not consider it necessary to be repre-
sented at the hearing.

At the public hearing on November 17th, the Court heard
statements by Sir Eric Beckett, K.C., Agent, and Sir Frank Soskice,
K.C., Counsel for the United Kingdom. The latter asked the Court
to give judgment that the amount of compensation due was the

6
JUDGMENT OF 15 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 247

amount stated in the final submissions contained in the written
Observations of the United Kingdom dated July 28th, 1949,
namely :

in respect of H.M.S. Saumarez. . . . {700,087
in respect of H.M.S. Volage . . . . . £ 93,812

in respect of deaths and injuries of naval
personnel. . . . . . . . . . . £ 50,048
Total . . . . . . £843,947

The Albanian Government was absent and made no submis-
sions.

At the same sitting, after the Agent for the United King-
dom Government had been heard, the President announced that the
Court had decided, in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Article 53 of
the Statute, to examine the figures and estimates submitted by the
. United Kingdom Government, and, in conformity with Article 50
of the Statute, to entrust this investigation to experts as it involved
questions of a technical nature.

In an Order dated November 19th, 1949, the Court appointed
as experts Rear-Admiral J. B. Berck, of the Royal Netherlands
Navy, and Mr. G. de Rooy, Director of Naval Construction, Royal
Netherlands Navy, with instructions to ‘‘examine the figures and
estimates stated in the last submissions filed by the Government
of the United Kingdom regarding the amount of its claim for the
loss of the Sawmarez and the damage caused to the Volage”. The
Court fixed December 2nd as the time-limit for the filing of the
experts’ Report. This document was filed within the time fixed,
and duly communicated to the Parties. A time-limit expiring on
December 10th was given them for the submission of observations.

As some members of the Court had asked for certain explana-
tions in regard to the Report, the experts, summoned to a meeting
of the Court, replied on December 3rd to questions put to them.
These replies were immediately communicated to the Parties.

The United Kingdom Government, by telegram dated
December 6th, 1949, and confirmed by a letter of the same date,
stated that it noted that the experts had come to the conclusion
that the claim submitted by that Government might be taken as a
fair and accurate estimate of the damage sustained and did not
therefore wish to make any observations on the particular calcula-
tions of the experts.

On the expiry of the time-limit granted to the Parties for
the submission of their written observations, a letter signed by

7
JUDGMENT OF I5 NII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 248

the Albanian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, and dated December roth,
1949, was handed to the Registrar of the Court. This letter asked
for a change in the procedure instituted by the Court for the’
submission of observations and, failing that, for a prolongation of
the appointed time-limit until December 23rd. The Court points
out that it has given ample opportunity to the Albanian Govern-
ment to defend its case; that, instead of availing itself of this
opportunity, that Government has twice disputed the Court’s
jurisdiction in the present part of the proceedings, that it did not
file submissions and declined to appear at the public hearing on
November 17th. In those circumstances the Court cannot grant
the request of the Albanian Government.
* * *

As has been said above, the Albanian Government dis-
puted the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the assess-
ment of damages. The Court may confine itself to stating
that this jurisdiction was established by its Judgment of
April gth, 1949 ; that, in accordance with the Statute (Article 60),
which, for the settlement of the present dispute, is binding upon
the Albanian Government, that Judgment is final and without
appeal, and that therefore the matter is res judicata.

The position adopted by the Albanian Government brings
into operation Article 53 of the Statute, which applies to procedure
in default of appearance. This Article entitles the United Kingdom
Government to call upon the Court to decide in favour of its
claim, and, on the other hand, obliges the Court to satisfy itself
that the claim is well founded in fact and law. While Article 53
thus obliges the Court to consider the submissions of the Party
which appears, it does not compel the Court to examine their
accuracy in all their details ; for this might in certain unopposed
cases prove impossible in practice. It is sufficient for the Court
to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that
the submissions are well founded.

It was in view of these considerations and on account of the
technical nature of the questions involved in the assessment of
compensation in the present case that the Court ordered the expert
enquiry mentioned above.

The claim of the United Kingdom Government is under
three separate heads which will be considered in succession.

1. Loss of the destroyer ‘“Saumarez”’

In the final submissions contained in its written Observations
of July 28th, 1949, and maintained in its oral statement of
November 17th, 1949, the United Kingdom Government estimates

8
JUDGMENT OF 13 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 249

the damage sustained by the total loss of the destroyer Saumarez
at { 700,087; this sum represents the replacement value of the ship
at the time of its loss in 1946 (after deducting the value of usable
parts—equipment, scrap), and the value of stores that must be
considered as lost.

The experts, for their part, estimated the whole of this
damage at a somewhat higher figure, £ 716,780.

The Court considers the true measure of compensation in
the present case to be the replacement cost of the Saumarez
at the time of its loss. The Court is of the opinion that the
amount of compensation claimed by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment has been justified. It cannot award more than the amount
claimed in the submissions of the United Kingdom Government.

2. Damage to the destroyer ‘‘Volage”

In the final subinissions as stated in its written Observations
of July 28th, 1949, and maintained in its statement in Court, the
United Kingdom Government, under the head of damage caused
to this vessel, claimed a sum of £ 93,812. The slightly lower figure
of the experts, £ 90,800, may, as their Report points out, be explained
by the necessarily approximate nature of the valuation, especially
as regards stores and equipment.

The Court considers that the figures submitted by the United
Kingdom Government are reasonable and that its claim is well
founded. In this matter it takes note of the following conclusion
in the experts’ Report : ‘‘During their enquiry and calculations,
and as a result of their experience and of the information placed
before them, the experts have become convinced that the claim
of £ 793,899 submitted by the United Kingdom Government may
be taken as a fair and accurate estimate of the damage sustained.”

3. Claims in respect of deaths and injuries of naval personnel

In the final submissions as stated in its written Observations of
July 28th, 1949, and maintained in its statement in Court, the
United Kingdom Government claimed under this head a sum of
£50,048, representing the cost of pensions and other grants made
by it to victims or their dependants, and for costs of administration,
medical treatment, etc.
JUDGMENT OF I5 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 250

This expenditure has been proved to the satisfaction of the
Court by the documents produced by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment as Annexes 12 and 13 to its Memorial, and by the supple-
mentary information and corrections made thereto in Appendices I,
II and III of that Government’s Observations of July 28th, 1949.

Finally, the Court points out that the United Kingdom
Government, in paragraph 6 of its written Observations of
July 28th, 1949, mentioned certain damage, for which it
expressly stated that it did not ask for compensation. The Court
need therefore express no view on this subject.

FOR THESE REASONS,
THE COURT,
by twelve votes to two,

Gives judgment in favour of the claim of the Government of
the United Kingdom, and

Fixes the amount of compensation due from the People’s
Republic of Albania to the United Kingdom at £ 843,947.

Done in French and English, the French text being author-
itative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of
December, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, in three
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court
and the others transmitted to the Governments of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the
People’s Republic of Albania respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,

Acting President

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,

Registrar

10
JUDGMENT OF I5 XII 49 (CORFU—COMPENSATION) 251

Judge Krytov declares that he is unable to agree either with
the operative clause or with the reasons for the Judgment.

Judge Etrer, judge ad hoc, declaring that he is unable to
concur in the Judgment of the Court, has availed himself of the

right conferred on him by Article 57 of the Statute and appended
to the Judgment a statement of his dissenting opinion.

(Initialled) J. G.G.

(Initialled) E. H.

II
257

ANNEX 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
AFTER THE JUDGMENT OF APRIL oth, 1949

DOCUMENT DEPOSITED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Affidavit signed by the Deputy-Secretary of the British Admiralty
(November 7th, 1949).

17
253

ANNEX 2

EXPERTS’ REPORT OF DECEMBER Ist, 1049

Replacement value : ‘‘Saumarez”

The experts have made an estimate of the cost of construction of
a destroyer of the Saumarez type, with the aid of the information placed
at their disposal by the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands
shipyards. This estimate has been checked in respect of wages, output,
organization and of the rise in prices in England, and thus a new estimate
on a British basis has been arrived at.

The “interest on the growing capital outlay” has not been taken into
account in this calculation, as its inclusion did not seem to be justifiable
in the present proposal. On the other hand, a sum in respect of insurance,
on a post-war basis, has been included.

The experts applied the cost of building a completed destroyer to
a destroyer of the Saumarez type ; they also made a new calculation on
a British basis. The smaller of the above two figures, which differ but
little one from the other, was taken, and a cost price of £739,470 on
a 1946 basis was arrived at.

In estimating the true replacement value, account was taken of the
fact that during the first year of a ship’s service, the decrease in value
of the ship is counterbalanced by additions and alterations and, inter
alia, by the extra cost of preparing the ship as a flotilla leader. After
the first year, a depreciation begins to occur and grows steadily greater
with the lapse of time. Taking the life of a ship as fifteen years, the
depreciation during the first three years would be respectively o—1—2 6;
thus, the replacement value of H.M.S. Saumarez in 1946 must be
reckoned at £717,280.

Value of stores

With the help of the blue prints of a former British destroyer of
the same class, the experts made an approximate calculation of the
damage sustained through the loss, damaging and unserviceability due
to sea-water, of the stores contained in the bows of the ship. They
estimate this damage at £23,300.

Value of still serviceable equipment

The total value of £74,870 mentioned for equipment is in agreement
with the data placed at the experts’ disposal from similar ships.

T8
CORFU CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) — EXPERTS’ REPORT 259

As it has been stated by the United Kingdom that the equipment
in question had been in the ship since 1946, it may be assumed that,
besides that part that was damaged by mine-explosion or by sea-
water, the rest has seriously deteriorated through lack of upkeep; conse-
quently, an estimate of its value must be in the nature of speculation.
Taking all risks into consideration, a claim of £20,000 is considered
reasonable.

Scrap

Taking into consideration the necessary cost of salvaging and cutting
up, as well as the cost of transporting the material from Malta to the
scrap plants, {3,800 may be taken as a reasonable figure.

Compensation for “Saumarez”
In view of what has been stated, the experts have arrived at the
following figure for damage to H.M.S. Saumarez :

Replacement value. . . . . . . . £717,280

Stores . . . . . . . . . . . . of 23,300
£740,580
‘Less £ 20,000 + £3,800 . . . . . . £ 23,800
£716,780

Damage “‘Volage”’

The experts were in the fortunate position of having directed the
carrying out of similar repairs to a former British destroyer in 1946.
It is true that in the former case, only a small part of the bows had
to be replaced; but this afforded a good basis of comparison. In
arriving at their figures, the experts had to take account of the fact
that the more extensive repairs to H.M.S. Volage required a long period
of 205 days in dock ; this had considerable influence on the total cost.
The greater cost of transport of material had also to be consideréd,
and lastly the cost of the trials after the completion of repairs. In
the experts’ opinion, these trial voyages are inseparably connected with
such extensive repairs.

The experts estimate the total of these costs at £64,300.

Stores

As regards the valuation of lost stores, what has been said in the
case of H.M.S. Saumarez holds good. Taking into consideration the loss
of anti-submarine equipment, this figure is estimated at £26,500.

Compensation for “‘Volage”’

Repairs Volage. . . . . . . . . . £64,300
Stores and equipment . . . . . . . £26,500

£90,800
19
CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) — EXPERTS’ REPORT 260
OMPENSATION :

£716,780
£ 90,800

£807,580

The experts would point out that their figures are an approximation,
especially in the case of the value of stores and equipment, and still
more as a considerable part of the equipment is of a secret nature, and
further that the portions of equipment that remain would have to be
dismantled and examined before an exact estimate of their value were
possible.

During their enquiry and calculations, and as a result of their expe-
rience and of the information placed before them, the experts have
become convinced that the claim of £793,899 submitted by the United
Kingdom Government may be taken as a fair and accurate estimate of
the damage sustained.

This Report was drawn up in English in one copy at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this first day of December, one thousand nine hundred
and forty-nine.

(Signed) BERCK
(Signed) G. DE Rooy

20
201

ANNEX 3

QUESTIONS PUT BY MEMBERS OF THE COURT AND REPLIES
OF THE EXPERTS (MEETING OF DECEMBER 3rd, 1940)

Present: Acting-President Guerrero, Judges Alvarez, Hackworth,
Winiarski, Zoritié, De Visscher, Sir Arnold McNair, Klaestad, Badawi
Pasha, Krylov, Read, Hsu Mo, Azevedo, M. Eéer, Judge ad hoc ; Regis-
trar Hambro. Also present as Experts. Rear-Admiral J. B. Berck, of
the Royal Netherlands Navy, Mr. G. de Rooy, Director of Naval Con-
struction of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

The PRESIDENT {éranslationi.—The Court is now sitting. We have
asked the experts to come for a few moments to to-day’s sitting, to
enable them to supply certain members of the Court with explanations
that they would like to have on the Experts’ Report.

You have before you the questions on which our colleagues would
like to have explanations. Would the Experts kindly reply to Judge
De Visscher’s question :

Would the experts explain the difference between the two methods
of calculation referred to respectively in paragraphs 1 and 3 of
page x of the Report?

Rear-Admiral BERCK.—The evaluation of the construction costs of
the destroyer Saumarez was approached by two ways :

In the first instance, we started from the actual costs of a completed
destroyer of 1,925 tons standard displacement, revised the calculation
for the Saumarez of 1,730 tons, taking into account differences in labour
wages, labour performance and costs of materials, and arrived at a cost
for new construction in 1946 of £751,750.

In the second place, we followed the normal proceedings in planning
a new ship. We calculated the building costs of shipbuilding, engin-
eering, electrical engineering, armament, torpedoes and special equip-
ment, all on a 1946 British basis. The result was a new construction

figure of £737,470.

This last figure, having been obtained in the most accurate way,
was inserted in our report, the first figure serving only as a control.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—Is M. De Visscher satisfied ?
M. DE VisscHER [translation].—Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT [éranslation].—Will the Expert now reply to Judge
Azevedo’s question ?

1 See p. 258, paras. 1 and 3.
21
CORFU CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) — QUESTIONS AND REPLIES 262

1. What is the progressive rate of depreciation of a destroyer,
during each year of its existence, which is estimated at fifteen
years ?

Rear-Admiral Berck.—1. The depreciation value of a destroyer is
due, in the first place, to the normal wear and tear of the ship. In
the second place, the installed war equipment becomes in the long
run more or less obsolete, depending on the development of new
equipment.

This last influence becomes most marked in the second five years,
as in the last five years the destroyer cannot any longer be considered
as a first line ship, although it is still usable for many war purposes.

In our experience, the yearly depreciation must be fixed as follows :
First year, 0% ; second year, 1% ; third year, 2% ; fourth year, 3% ;
fifth year, 4% ; sixth to tenth year, 7% ; eleventh to fifteenth year,
10%, leaving at the end of fifteen years a residual value of 5%. This
is more than the actual scrap value, as the ship is still usable for special
purposes, training, etc.

2. What was the rate of increase in the cost of building a
destroyer in 1946 and in 1949, as compared with its cost in 1943 ?

2. The increased cost of building in England in 1946, as compared
with 1943, is about 30%. Our own information tallies in this respect
with the data given in Mr. Powell’s affidavit. I regret we have not
had time to obtain the necessary data for 1949. I would, however,
roughly estimate it at 50 to 60% for warships. For merchant ships it
would be 43%.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—Is Judge Azevedo satisfied with the
reply ?

Judge AZEVEDO [translation}.—Yes.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—There are now the four questions’
asked by Judge Eéer.

Judge EÉËER [translation].—An answer was given to my questions 2
and 3 in the explanations furnished to Judges De Visscher and Azevedo.
. Only questions x and 4 remain to be answered.

I. On page 1, paragraph 21, of the Report, it is said: “On
the other hand, a sursin respect of insurance, on a post-war basis,
has been included.”

(a) Can the experts mention this sum ?

(6) I would draw the experts’ attention to Mr. Powell’s affidavit,

in which two figures are given:

in paragraph 5 — £21,359.
in paragraph 7 — £ 2,000.

1 See p. 258, para. 2.
22
CORFU CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) — QUESTIONS AND REPLIES 2063

It seems to me that the difference may be explained as
follows : in paragraph 5, the figure covers two classes of risks,
the builder’s and the King’s Enemy risks ; whereas the amount
in paragraph 7 only covers the builder’s risks.

Am I right ?

Rear-Admiral BERcK.—1 (a) As the insurance for builder’s risk is
. fixed at the London Exchange, we put into our calculation the same
figure as Mr. Powell, namely, £2,000.

(5) As His Excellency Judge Eéer rightly points out, the higher
figure in Mr. Powell’s affidavit also covers the additional risks in
war-time.

4. On page 21, under ‘‘Value of still serviceable equipment”, the
Report says: ‘‘The total value of {74,870 mentioned for equipment
is in agreement with the data placed at the experts’ disposal from
similar ships.”

Could the experts say:
(a) Where this figure of £74,870 has been mentioned ?

(5) If this figure represents the value of still serviceable equipment,
why do the experts consider reasonable the sum of £20,000,
mentioned in paragraph 13 of the United Kingdom Observa-
tions ?

(c) Why is it said in the Report that a claim of £20,000 is reasonable,
when it is not a claim but, on the contrary, a reduction of the
United Kingdom claim ?

Rear-Admiral BERcK.—Regarding question 4, at the public sitting
of this Court held on Thursday, November 17th, Sir Frank Soskice
announced that the different departments of the Admiralty had made
lists of equipment suited for possible re-use. The estimated value of
this equipment as new, was £74,870.

For destroyers of the same class now in service in the Royal Nether-
lands Navy, we made the same valuation and found that the figure
mentioned by the United Kingdom Government for equipment as new,
was acceptable.

As we pointed out in our report, the assessment of the present day
value is of a speculative nature.

The equipment had been in the ship for three years without proper
maintenance, in the sub-tropical climate of Malta, and under the
influence of salty air. Deterioration and corrosion is to be expected.
Before being used again, each instrument has to be taken apart, cleaned
and checked, and corroded parts will have to be replaced. Taking into
account labour and transportation costs, a reduction of £20,000 is fair
and, in the opinion of the experts, on the high side.

1 See p. 258.
23
CORFU CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) —QUESTIONS AND REPLIES 264

Regarding question 4 (c), we regret that in the haste of finishing the
report, the £20,000 was put down as a claim. As Judge Eter rightly
points out, it is not a claim, but a reduction of the total claim.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—Is Judge Eter satisfied ?
Judge Eéer [translation].—Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT [translation]|.—We have now Judge Winiarski’s
question.

In their Report of December ist, paragraph 27, the experts say
that ‘The ‘interest on the growing capital outlay’ has not been
taken into account in this calculation, as its inclusion did not seem
to be justifiable in the present proposal.”

(a) Why?

(2) What, in your opinion, were the reasons for including it in

Mr. Powell’s calculation ?

Rear-Admiral BERCK.—Regarding the question of Judge Winiarski,
the builder of a warship is not paid on delivery of the ship, but during
the time of construction, in instalments. A first instalment is as a
rule made after the signing of the contract ; further payments when
principal parts, for instance, hull, main machinery, etc., are completed.

heoretically, it seems right to add to the building costs the interest
on the growing capital outlay.

In our experience, however, this interest is never added to the building
costs.

In Mr. Powell’s affidavit, the interest on growing capital outlay is
mentioned, but not included in the final claim.

We are not able to judge the reasons for including this amount in
Mr. Powell’s affidavit.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—Is Judge Winiarski satisfied ?

Judge Winarski [translation].—Yes, Mr. President.

‘The PRESIDENT [translation].—Do other members of the Court. wish
to put questions to the experts ?

Judge Zoritié [translation].—If I understood rightly, Rear-Admiral
Berck, in reply to Judge De Visscher’s question, said that a sum
of £737,470 was reached, whereas the amount in the report is £739,470.
This point must be cleared up in order that the verbatim record should
not contradict the Report.

Rear-Admiral BERCK.—As a matter of fact, the figure of {737,470
is the new construction figure. There must be added the insurance
costs of £2,000, and we kept the new construction figure clear of that.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—Are there any further questions ?

1 See p. 258, para. 2.

24
COKFU CHANNEL (COMPENSATION) — QUESTIONS AND REPLIES 265

Judge E¢er [éranslation].—If the experts have examined all the
details of the damage, I should like to ask them whether they can say
that all the damage to the Volage mentioned in the United Kingdom
document is the direct consequence of the explosion.

Rear-Admiral Berck.—We have seen the details as given by the
United Kingdom Government about the damage to the Volage, and we
must consider this as a direct consequence of the mine explosion.

The PRESIDENT [translation].—It remains for me to thank the experts
for the explanations they have given us; their replies will be useful to
the Court in fixing the amount of the reparations.

Rear-Admiral Bercx.—The experts would like to thank the Court
for having given them the opportunity of having participated in a small
way in the Court’s work.

The Court rose at II a.m.

25


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA SOCIETE
« ÉLECTRICITÉ DE BEYROUTH »

(FRANCE c. LIBAN)

ORDONNANCE DU 20 OCTOBRE 1953

1953

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

“ELECTRICITE DE BEYROUTH”
COMPANY CASE

(FRANCE v. LEBANON)

ORDER OF OCTOBER 20th, 1953

SOCIÉTÉ D'ÉDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF’S

LEYDE LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire de la Société « Électricité de Beyrouth »,
Ordonnance du 20 octobre 1953: C.I. J. Recueil 1953, p. 41.»

This Order should be cited as follows :

“Électricité de Beyrouth’ Company case,
Order of October 20th, 1953: I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 41.”

Ne de vente: 108
Sales number

41

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

Le 20 octobre ANNEE 1953

Rôle général
n° 20
20 octobre 1953

AFFAIRE DE LA SOCIETE
« ELECTRICITE DE BEYROUTH »

(FRANCE c. LIBAN)

ORDONNANCE

La Cour internationale de Justice,
vu les articles 40 et 48 du Statut de la Cour,

vu les articles 32 et 37 du Régiement de la Cour ;

Rend l'ordonnance suivante :

Considérant que, le 14 août 1953, le chargé d’affaires ad interim
de Franee à La Haye a déposé au Greffe une requête introduisant
devant la Cour contre la République du Liban une instance relative
à un différend entre le Gouvernement français ct le Gouvernement
libanais concernant diverses concessions pour Vexploitation de
services publics au Liban, octroyées par ce dernier Gouvernement
à la société « Électricité de Beyrouth »,

Considérant qu’en vue d'établir la compétence de la Cour, la
requête mentionne l’article 23 d’un accord conclu le 24 janvier 1948
entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement libanais,

Considérant, en outre, que la requête contient Vindication de
l'objet de la demande et un exposé succinct des faits et motifs par
lesquels la demande est prétendue justifiée,

Considérant que, dans ces conditions, la requête satisfait aux
conditions de forme posées par le Règlement,

Considérant que, par lettre du 14 août 1953, le chargé d’affaires
ad interim de France à La Haye a notifié la désignation de M. André

4
42 (ÉLECTRICITÉ DE BEY ROUTH » (ORDONN. DU 20 X 53)
Gros, jurisconsulte du ministère des Affaires étrangères, comme
agent du Gouvernement français,

Considérant que, par télégramme daté du 23 septembre 1053,
le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement libanais a
notifié la désignation de M. Émile Tyan, professeur, comme agent
de ce Gouvernement ;

La Cour,

Après s'être renseignée auprès des Parties sur les questions de
procédure et avoir pris leurs propositions en considération,

Fixe comme suit la date d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt
par les Parties desdites pièces :

pour le mémoire du Gouvernement de la République française :
I8 janvier 1954;

pour le contre-mémoire du Gouvernement de la République
libanaise : 28 avril 1954;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, 4 La Haye, le vingt octobre mil neuf cent cin-
quante-trois, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment aux Gouvernements de la République frangaise et de la
République libanaise.

Le Président,
(Signé) ARNOLD D. McNair.

Le Greffier adjoint,
(Signé) GARNIER-COIGNET.


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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AL-KHASAWNEH

Immunity of a Foreign Minister functional — Its extent is not clear ~~ Dif-
ferent from diplomatic representatives — Also different from Heads of State —
Ministers entitled to immunity from enforcement when on official missions —
But not on private visits — Belgian warrant did not violate Mr. Yerodia's
immunity — Express language on non-enforceability when on official mission —
Circulation of warrant not accompanied by Red Notice — More fundamental
question is whether there are exceptions in the case of grave crimes — Immunity
and impunity Distinction between procedural and substantive aspects of
immunity artificial — Cases postulated by the Court do not address questions of
impunity adequately Effective combating of grave international crimes has

assumed a jus cogens character — Should prevail over rules on immunity —
Development in the field of jurisdictional immunities relevant — Two faulty
premises — Absolute immunity — No exception »- Dissent.

1. As a general proposition it may be said without too much fear of
contradiction that the effective conduct of diplomacy — the importance
of which for the maintenance of peaceful relations among States needs
hardly to be demonstrated — requires that those engaged in such con-
duct be given appropriate immunities from — inter alia — criminal pro-
ceedings before the courts of other States. The nature and extent of such
immunities has been clarified in the case of diplomatic representatives in
the 1961 Vienna Convention, as well as in extensive jurisprudence since
the adoption of that Convention. By contrast, and this is not without
irony, the nature and extent of immunities enjoyed by Foreign Ministers
is far from clear, so much so that the ILC Special Rapporteur on Juris-
dictional Immunities of States and Their Property expressed the opinion
that the immunities of Foreign Ministers are granted on the basis of com-
ity rather than on the basis of established rules of international law. To
be sure the Convention on Special Missions — the status of which as a
reflection of customary law is however not without controversy — covers
the immunities of Foreign Ministers who are on official mission, but
reserves the extent of those immunities under the unhelpful formula:

“The Head of the Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and other persons of high rank, when they take part in a special mis-
sion of the sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a
third State, in addition to what is granted by the present Conven-
tion, the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by interna-
tional law.” (Art. 21, para. 2.)

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Nor is the situation made any clearer by the total absence of precedents
with regard to the immunities of Foreign Ministers from criminal
process. What is sure however is that the position of Foreign Ministers
cannot be assimilated to diplomatic representatives for in the case of
the latter the host State has a discretion regarding their accreditation
and can also declare a representative persona non grata, which in itself
constitutes some sanction for wrongful conduct and more importantly
opens the way — assuming good faith of course — for subsequent
prosecution in his/her home State. A Minister for Foreign Affairs
accused of criminal conduct — and for that matter criminal conduct that
infringes the interests of the community of States as a whole in terms
of the gravity of the crimes he is alleged to have committed, and the
importance of the interests that the community seeks to protect and
who is furthermore not prosecuted in his home State — is hardly under
the same conditions as a diplomatic representative granted immunity
from criminal process.

2. If the immunities of a Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot be
assimilated to a diplomatic representative, can those immunities be estab-
lished by assimilating him to a Head of a State? Whilst a Foreign Min-
ister is undoubtedly an important personage of the State and represents it
in the conduct of its foreign relations, he does not, in any sense, personify
the State. As Sir Arthur Watts correctly puts it:

“heads of governments and foreign ministers, although senior and
important figures, do not symbolize or personify their States in the
way that Heads of States do. Accordingly, they do not enjoy in
international law any entitlement to special treatment by virtue of
qualities of sovereignty or majesty attaching to them personally.”
(A. Watts, “The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of
States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers”, Recueil des
cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, 1994, Vol. 247,
pp. 102-103).

3. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that immunity is by definition
an exception from the general rule that man is responsible legally and
morally for his actions. As an exception, it has to be narrowly defined.

4. A Minister for Foreign Affairs is entitled to immunity from enforce-
ment when on official mission for the unhindered conduct of diplomacy
would suffer if the case was otherwise, but the opening of criminal inves-
tigations against him can hardly be said by any objective criteria to con-
stitute interference with the conduct of diplomacy. A faint-hearted or
ultra-sensitive Minister may restrict his private travels or feel discomfort
but this is a subjective element that must be discarded. The warrant

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issued against Mr. Yerodia goes further than a mere opening of investi-
gation and may arguably be seen as an enforcement measure but it con-
tained express language to the effect that it was not to be enforced if
Mr. Yerodia was on Belgian territory on an official mission. In fact press
reports — not cited in the Memorials or the oral pleadings — suggest
that he had paid a visit to Belgium after the issuance of the warrant and
no steps were taken to enforce it. Significantly also the circulation of the
international arrest warrant was not accompanied by a Red Notice
requiring third States to take steps to enforce it (which only took place
after Mr. Yerodia had left office) and had those States acted they would
be doing so at their own risk. A breach of an obligation presupposes the
existence of an obligation and in the absence of any evidence to suggest a
Foreign Minister is entitled to absolute immunity, I cannot see why the
Kingdom of Belgium, when we have regard to the terms of the warrant
and the lack of an Interpol Red Notice was in breach of its obligations
owed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

5. A more fundamental question is whether high State officials are
entitled to benefit from immunity even when they are accused of having
committed exceptionally grave crimes recognized as such by the interna-
tional community. In other words, should immunity become de facto
impunity for criminal conduct as long as it was in pursuance of State
policy? The Judgment sought to circumvent this morally embarrassing
issue by recourse to an existing but artificially drawn distinction between
immunity as a substantive defence on the one hand and immunity as a
procedural defence on the other. The artificiality of this distinction can be
gleaned from the ILC commentary to Article 7 of the Draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which states: “The
absence of any procedural immunity with respect to prosecution or pun-
ishment in appropriate judicial proceedings” — and it should not be for-
gotten that the draft was intended to apply to national or international
courts — “is an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive
immunity or defence. It would be paradoxical to prevent an individual
from invoking his official position to avoid responsibility for a crime only
to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid the conse-
quences of this responsibility.”

6. Having drawn this distinction, the Judgment then went on to pos-
tulate four cases where, in an attempt at proving that immunity and
impunity are not synonymous, a Minister, and by analogy a high-ranking
official, would be held personally accountable:

(a) for prosecution in his/her home State;
(6) for prosecution in other States if his/her immunity had been waived;

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98 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

(c) after he/she leaves office except for official acts committed while in
office;
(d) for prosecution before an international court.

This paragraph (Judgment, para. 61) is more notable for the things it
does not say than for the things it does: as far as prosecution at home
and waiver are concerned, clearly the problem arises when they do not
take place. With regard to former high-ranking officials the question of
impunity remains with regard to official acts, the fact that most grave
crimes are definitionally State acts makes this more than a theoretical
lacuna. Lastly with regard to existing international courts their jurisdic-
tion ratione materiae is limited to the two cases of the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda and the future international court’s jurisdiction is limited
ratione temporis by non-retroactivity as well as by the fact that primary
responsibility for prosecution remains with States. The Judgment cannot
dispose of the problem of impunity by referral to a prospective interna-
tional criminal court or existing ones.

7. The effective combating of grave crimes has arguably assumed a jus
cogens character reflecting recognition by the international community of
the vital community interests and values it seeks to protect and enhance.
Therefore when this hierarchically higher norm comes into conflict with
the rules on immunity, it should prevail. Even if we are to speak in terms
of reconciliation of the two sets of rules, this would suggest to me a much
more restrictive interpretation of the immunities of high-ranking officials
than the Judgment portrays. Incidentally, such a restrictive approach
would be much more in consonance with the now firmly established
move towards a restrictive concept of State immunity, a move that has
removed the bar regarding the submission of States to jurisdiction of
other States often expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imper-
ium. It is difficult to see why States would accept that their conduct with
regard to important areas of their development be open to foreign judi-
cial proceedings but not the criminal conduct of their officials.

8. In conclusion, this Judgment is predicated on two faulty premises:

(a) that a Foreign Minister enjoys absolute immunity from both
jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign States as opposed to only
functional immunity from enforcement when on official mission, a
proposition which is neither supported by precedent, opinio juris,
legal logic or the writings of publicists;

(b) that as international law stands today, there are no exceptions to the
immunity of high-ranking State officials even when they are accused
of grave crimes. While, admittedly, the readiness of States and
municipal courts to admit of exceptions is still at a very nebulous
stage of development, the situation is much more fluid than the

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ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

Judgment suggests. I believe that the move towards greater personal
accountability represents a higher norm than the rules on immunity
and should prevail over the latter. In consequence, I am unable to
join the majority view.

(Signed) Awn AL-KHASAWNEH.