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OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. TARASSOV
[Traduction]

Jai malheureusement été contraint de voter contre l’ordonnance par
laquelle la Cour a décidé que la requête à fin d'intervention introduite
par le Nicaragua en vertu de l’article 62 du Statut dans l'affaire du Diffé-
rend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras)
devait être examinée par la Chambre constituée pour connaître de ladite
affaire.

La Cour a motivé son ordonnance en invoquant la règle selon laquelle
c’est l’organe qui dans une affaire est appelé à statuer sur le fond qui doit
connaître de la requête à fin d’intervention parce que «toute intervention
est un incident de procédure » (Haya de la Torre, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 76).

La décision de la Cour n’aurait pas appelé de réserves de ma part si la
requête du Nicaragua n’avait pas soulevé de très importantes questions et
n'avait pas eu trait au caractère particulier de l'affaire et à la composition
de la Chambre constituée pour en connaître. En fait, cette requête va
beaucoup plus loin qu’une requête ordinaire à fin d’intervention.

Tout d’abord, le requérant considère que le différend existant au sujet
de la situation juridique des espaces insulaires et maritimes tant à l’inté-.
rieur du golfe de Fonseca qu’adjacents à celui-ci est de nature trilatérale et
non bilatérale (requête du Nicaragua, par. 2 e)). Le requérant déclare:

«Alors que l’examen du statut du golfe intéresse nécessairement
les trois Etats riverains, deux de ces Etats se sont vu offrir la possibilité
d'établir un calendrier et des modalités de procédure dont le Nicaragua
est exclu et dont le contenu a été fixé sans son consentement. » (Jbid.,
par. 13; les italiques sont de moi.)

Cela amène le requérant à formuler l’opinion suivante:

«Une réponse favorable à la présente requête aura pour consé-
quence pratique une reconstitution de la Chambre par rapport à sa
composition actuelle et le réagencement de la procédure écrite telle
qu’elle a été fixée par l'ordonnance du 27 mai 1987.» (Ibid., par. 23;
les italiques sont de moi.)

Toutefois, le Nicaragua déclare qu’il entend:

«proposer non pas de reconstituer sans autre la Chambre et le fon-
dement de sa compétence, mais uniquement d’opérer les modifica-

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 12

tions strictement nécessaires pour maintenir les normes minimales d’ef-
ficacité et d'équité procédurale» (requête du Nicaragua, par. 23; les
italiques sont de moi).

Il dit aussi qu’à titre subsidiaire il demandera que:

«la Cour exclue de toute façon du mandat de la Chambre tous pou-
voirs de détermination de la situation juridique des espaces mari-
times situés à l’intérieur du golfe de Fonseca aïnsi que dans l’océan
Pacifique et qu’en fait elle limite le mandat de la Chambre aux aspects
de la frontière terrestre qui sont en litige entre El Salvador et le Hon-
duras » (ibid., par. 24; les italiques sont de moi).

Pour le cas où la Cour procéderait à une telle limitation, le Nicaragua
serait disposé:

«à s’en remettre, avec l’accord d’El Salvador et du Honduras, à la
décision que la Cour ou une chambre dûment constituéerendrait sur la
détermination de la situation juridique des espaces maritimes situés
à l’intérieur du golfe de Fonseca ainsi que dans l’océan Pacifique»
(ibid. ; les italiques sont de moi).

Il ressort très clairement de toutes ces déclarations que, de l’avis du
Nicaragua, la présente Chambre, constituée par la Cour sur la base d’un
compromis entre El Salvador et le Honduras et sans sa participation, ne
peut être apte à examiner sa requête que moyennant sa reconstitution
totale ou partielle. A défaut, le mandat de cette Chambre devrait être
limité au différend frontalier terrestre bilatéral entre El Salvador et le
Honduras et une nouvelle chambre devrait être constituée avec la partici-
pation du Nicaragua sur un pied d’égalité avec les Parties initiales. Il est
évident que toutes les transformations proposées, c’est-à-dire la reconsti-
tution totale ou partielle de la Chambre, ou la modification ou la limita-
tion de son mandat, ne peuvent être effectuées par la Chambre existante
elle-même. Seule la Cour plénière, qui a constitué la présente Chambre
pour connaître d’un différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime
entre El Salvador et le Honduras et lui a ainsi conféré son mandat «pour
connaître de la présente affaire » (C.LJ. Recueil 1987, ordonnance du 8 mai
1987, p. 12), a le pouvoir d’y procéder.

Je crois que c’est à bon droit que pour faire valoir les conclusions sus-
mentionnées le requérant s’est adressé à l’organe qui est pleinement habi-
lité pour procéder aux modifications demandées. De plus, c’est cette voie
que le requérant a choisie, soulignant dans sa requête que la question
posée dans celle-ci relevait «exclusivement de la compétence de la Cour
plénière en matière de procédure » (requête du Nicaragua, observations
préliminaires, dernier alinéa).

Ni le Statut ni le Règlement de la Cour ne contiennent de dispositions
pouvant être interprétées comme interdisant à la Cour plénière d’exami-
ner ces conclusions du requérant. Pas plus le Statut et le Règlement de la

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 13

Cour que sa propre pratique ne la privent totalement de fonctions en ce
qui concerne les chambres une fois que celles-ci ont été constituées. C’est
précisément la Cour plénière qui apporte des modifications à la composi-
tion d’une chambre, en élisant de nouveaux membres ou en approuvant la
désignation de nouveaux juges ad hoc pour pourvoir aux sièges devenus
vacants et en fixant les délais pour l'échange des pièces écrites. Il n’est que
naturel qu’il revienne à la Cour plénière de connaître d’une requête à fin
de reconstitution de la Chambre. C’est un fait que la requête du Nicaragua,
délibérément adressée à la Cour plénière, concerne aussi directement la
composition de la Chambre. Des cinq juges qui composent celle-ci, seuls
deux — une minorité — sont actuellement membres de la Cour. (Le prési-
dent de la Chambre, dont la période de fonctions à la Cour est venue à
expiration, continue de siéger à la Chambre en application de Particle 17
du Règlement de la Cour. Les deux autres juges sont des juges ad hoc,
choisis par El Salvador et le Honduras respectivement.)

Il est clair que la Cour, qui est responsable de la Chambre qu’elle a cons-
tituée, a toute confiance dans la haute compétence professionnelle des
membres de celle-ci et dans leur impartialité judiciaire. Il faut présumer que
le requérant a la même confiance. Il est néanmoins très difficile de faire abs-
traction du fait que les Parties initiales ont exercé une certaine influence
— nullement négligeable — sur la composition de la Chambre, non seule-
ment en choisissant leurs juges ad hoc respectifs mais aussi en informant
le Président de la Cour de leurs vues «au sujet de la composition de la
Chambre», en application de l’article 17 du Règlement de la Cour, alors
même que l’article 26, paragraphe 2, du Statut dispose expressément que
l’assentiment des parties n’est requis qu’en ce qui concerne «le nombre
de juges de cette chambre » fixé par la Cour (les italiques sont de moi).

L'article 17, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la Cour autorise une inter-
prétation plus large de cette disposition du Statut, permettant au Président
de s’informer des vues des parties en ce qui concerne les juges que celles-ci
souhaiteraient voir élus comme membres de la chambre. Normalement,
lorsqu'elle constitue une chambre, la Cour se conforme à ces vues. Il en
résulte que les parties initiales exercent bien une influence non seulement
quant au nombre mais aussi quant à la personne des juges qui composent
la chambre.

L'Etat intervenant n’a pas cette possibilité et d’un point de vue procédu-
ral sa situation devant une chambre n’est pas identique à celle des parties
initiales. Une telle inégalité peut être particulièrement préjudiciable à la
partie intervenante si elle sollicite la reconstitution ou la modification du
mandat d’une chambre existante.

Dans les observations du Nicaragua sur la question de savoir si la
requête à fin d'intervention relève de la compétence de la Chambre consti-
tuée pour connaître de l’affaire ou de la compétence de la Cour plénière, le
requérant déclare :

«Considérer que c’est la chambre elle-même qui doit connaître
d’une contestation de sa constitution motivée par l’étendue de la

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 14

compétence ratione materiae qui lui a été conférée reviendrait à assu-
jettir totalement la volonté souveraine de la partie intervenante à
celle des parties initiales telle que celle-ci est reflétée dans la compo-
sition de la Chambre.»

La Cour ne pouvait pas ne tenir aucun compte des arguments du requé-
rant et, par une décision purement administrative, se contenter de trans-
mettre la requête au président de la Chambre sans l’examiner. Par sa
décision du 14 décembre 1989, comme il ressort de la présente ordon-
nance, la Cour a donné aux deux Parties à l’affaire:

«la possibilité de lui présenter leurs observations sur la question ...
soulevée [par le Nicaragual, celle de savoir s’il doit être statué sur
la requête à fin d'intervention par la Cour plénière ou par la
Chambre...»

En vertu de la même décision du 14 décembre 1989, copie de ces obser-
vations a été communiquée au Nicaragua qui a alors présenté de nou-
velles observations. Dans les observations du Honduras datées du
15 janvier 1990, le Gouvernement hondurien a informé la Cour qu’à son
avis «la Cour plénière n’est pas compétente pour connaître de l’affaire qui
oppose le Honduras et El Salvador...» et que «la requête à fin d’interven-
tion du Nicaragua doit être examinée par la Chambre et non par la Cour
plénière ».

Le Gouvernement salvadorien, dans ses observations du 8 janvier 1990,
a fait part à la Cour de son intention « de s’opposer à la requête à fin d’in-
tervention du Nicaragua, y compris la demande tendant à une reconstitu-
tion de la Chambre...» Toutefois, bien que s’opposant ainsi à l’interven-
tion du Nicaragua et à la reconstitution de la Chambre proposée par
celui-ci, El Salvador n’a pas, à l’instar du Honduras, exclu par principe la
possibilité que la Cour plénière puisse examiner la requête du Nicaragua.
El Salvador a formulé l’opinion suivante:

« Estimant que les raisons de s’opposer à la requête sont tout aussi
valables devant la Cour pléniére que devant la Chambre, le Gouver-
nement d’El Salvador n’a pas d’observations à formuler sur la ques-
tion préliminaire de savoir si la requête du Nicaragua relève de la
compétence de la Chambre ou de celle de la Cour plénière. »

Quelles sont les principales conclusions à tirer de ces vues des Parties
initiales ? En premier lieu, il est tout à fait clair qu’en gros ces Parties ne
sont pas favorables à la requête du Nicaragua en tant qu’elle demande que
la Cour plénière, et non la Chambre, examine ses propositions concernant
une éventuelle reconstitution de la Chambre ou une redéfinition de son
mandat, et qu’à franchement parler elles ne sont pas favorables à une
intervention du Nicaragua dans l’affaire. Cette attitude négative peut-elle
avoir un impact sur la manière dont la requête du Nicaragua pourra être
examinée par la Chambre dans sa composition actuelle ? En théorie, c’est
exclu, car tous les membres d’une chambre, y compris les juges ad hoc,
sont indépendants des parties et gardent une totale impartialité pendant

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 15

toute la durée de la procédure. Personne bien sûr ne devrait garder à l’es-
prit les positions adoptées parles Parties sur la procédure durant la consti-
tution de la chambre et les diverses options qui s’offraient à elles à
l’époque. Ces considérations valent pour toutes les chambres et sont peut-
être seulement un peu plus pertinentes s’agissant des chambres consti-
tuées sur la base d’un compromis. Des parties qui sont convenues par le
biais d’un compromis de soumettre leur différend à une chambre peuvent,
si toutes deux ne sont pas satisfaites du déroulement de la procédure
ou des décisions interlocutoires de la chambre, mettre fin à la procédure
simplement en retirant leur compromis — quoique en théorie l'existence de
cette possibilité ne puisse en aucune manière exercer une pression sur la
chambre. Toutefois, le problème est de savoir s’il est juste qu’un Etat qui
doit protéger des intérêts peut-être vitaux et qui se trouve dans une situa-
tion procédurale telle que celle où se trouve actuellement le Nicaragua se
retrouve totalement à la merci d’une construction théorique de ce type.
Jestime que la Cour, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce
et des diverses conclusions formulées par le Nicaragua dans sa requête,
qui, comme je l’ai montré, va beaucoup plus loin qu’une simple requête à
fin d'intervention et soulève des questions sur lesquelles la Chambre n’est
pas compétente pour statuer, devrait elle-même donner au requérant la
possibilité de défendre sa position devant elle dans le cadre d’une procé-
dure orale — à tout le moins pour ce qui est des questions de procédure. Je
pense qu’une telle attitude de la part de la Cour serait d’autant plus justi-
fiée que les documents qui la régissent ne donnent à la Cour aucune indi-
cation expresse quant à la manière d’agir lorsqu'elle reçoit une requête
à fin d’intervention dans une affaire pendante devant une chambre
lorsque cette requête contient aussi une demande de reconstitution de
ladite chambre !. La décision que prendra la Cour sur cette question créera
donc un précédent important pour la pratique future et c’est pourquoi elle
devrait se fonder non seulement sur un ensemble de règles formelles qui
concernent exclusivement les requêtes à fin d’intervention ordinaires,
mais aussi sur une analyse approfondie de toutes les situations procédu-
rales auxquelles les demandes du Nicaragua ont donné naissance et sur
une explication exhaustive par chacune des Parties en cause de ses posi-
tions réelles en ce qui concerne la procédure.

1 Cette lacune dans les documents de base de la Cour est toutefois bien compréhen-
sible, car le Statut de la Cour et son Règlement (même la version la plus récente, celle de
1978) ont été élaborés et adoptés à une époque où les chambres ad hocn’existaient prati-
quement pas. On sait bien que pour que des règles de procédure soient à la fois cohé-
rentes et utiles elles doivent être élaborées sur la base d’une expérience pratique
prolongée et traduire la totalité de cette expérience. L'élaboration théorique des dispo-
sitions actuelles du Règlement dans ce domaine s’est fondée principalement sur linten-
tion louable de permettre plus facilement aux Etats de régler pacifiquement leurs
différends tout en développant l’activité de la Cour internationale de Justice. Il est signi-
ficatif que ce soit précisément l’expérience concrète d’affaires récentes devant des
chambres qui ait éveillé l’intérêt des membres de ia Cour internationale de Justice pour
cette institution utile et prometteuse (voir l’opinion dissidente de M. Shahabuddeen
jointe à la présente ordonnance, ci-après p. 21, note de bas de page).

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 16

Malheureusement, la Cour s’est satisfaite d'observations écrites très
brèves (une ou deux pages) d’El Salvador et du Honduras, et les Etats en
question n’ont de plus été autorisés à traiter, en vertu de la décision de la
Cour, que de la seule question de savoir «si c’est la Cour plénière ou la
Chambre qui doit statuer sur la requête à fin d'intervention» (les italiques
sont de moi). La Cour n’a pas invité les Parties en cause à exprimer leur
opinion sur une éventuelle reconstitution de la Chambre et les autres
questions procédurales abordées dans la requête.

Dans ces conditions, je suis convaincu qu’une procédure orale à
laquelle participeraient tous les Etats concernés est plus que nécessaire.
Néanmoins, l'ordonnance de la Cour est en fait fondée sur l'opinion d'un
seul des trois Etats qui ont pu présenter leurs observations, à savoir l’opi-
nion du Honduras. Comme on l’a montré, El Salvador a éludé la question
qui lui était posée en se contentant de dire: «le Gouvernement d’El Salva-
dor n’a pas d’observations à formuler». Le Nicaragua a réitéré Popinion
qu’il avait déjà exprimée, à savoir que « c’est la Cour plénière qui est com-
pétente pour trancher la question ... et, dans les circonstances de l’espèce,
elle devrait décider d'exercer cette compétence ».

Je suis convaincu que ces divergences d’opinions auraient dû être
considérées comme une raison supplémentaire pour la Cour de tenir des
audiences. Et une autre considération me conforte dans cette conviction.
Selon l’article 27 du Statut, un arrêt rendu par une chambre ad hoc est
considéré comme rendu par la Cour plénière. Du fait de l’adoption de la
présente ordonnance par une majorité des membres de la Cour, il ne res-
tera au requérant que deux possibilités : il pourra soit renoncer à sauvegarder
et défendre ses intérêts contre une éventuelle violation résultant d’une pro-
cédure judiciaire devant la Cour internationale de Justice, soit soumettre
sa requête à la Chambre. S’il choisit cette dernière possibilité, il devra
respecter la décision de cinq juges dont deux seulement sont membres de
la Cour mais dont la décision aura néanmoins le statut d’arrêt de la Cour.
Si sa requête à fin d’intervention est sommairement rejetée, ou si l’arrêt sur
le fond ne sauvegarde pas convenablement ses intérêts légitimes en tant
que Partie intervenante, le requérant ne pourra se pourvoir en appel, étant
donné que l’arrêt de la Cour aura été rendu!

Pourtant, en théorie, il serait possible dans une telle situation que l’arrêt
soit adopté par une majorité de juges non membres de la Cour, les deux
membres de la Cour votant contre. Une telle possibilité n’est pas seule-
ment un paradoxe — il y a des conséquences pratiques très importantes
pour le requérant. Si l'affaire ne devait pas être examinée par une chambre
de la Cour mais par un tribunal arbitral, et si un Etat tiers considérait la
décision comme préjudiciable a ses intéréts, cet Etat aurait la possibilité
d’essayer de défendre ces intéréts devant la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice, alors méme que le tribunal en question aurait pu étre composé exclu-
sivement de membres de la Cour. Néanmoins, puisqu’en l’espèce les
Parties ont décidé de ne pas soumettre leur différend à l’arbitrage mais de
le porter devant une chambre de la Cour, l'Etat tiers est automatiquement
privé de ce recours devant la Cour plénière. Ce n’est qu’à l’issue d’une

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 17

procédure orale, à laquelle tous les Etats concernés auraient pleinement
participé en bénéficiant de droits égaux en matière de procédure, que la
Cour aurait pu à bon droit aboutir à une conclusion prima facie sur le
point de savoir s’il y avait des risques d’intrusion dans la sphère d’intérêts
de l'Etat tiers. Si elle avait conclu à l’absence de tels risques, elle aurait pu
rejeter les conclusions de l’Etat demandant à intervenir sans renvoyer sa
requête à la Chambre.

En même temps, la Cour aurait pu d’une manière ou d’une autre donner
au requérant l’assurance qu’il ne serait pas porté atteinte à ses droits légi-
times (comme elle l’a fait pour l'Italie dans l'affaire du Plateau continental
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte). Si au contraire elle avait conclu que
certains intérêts de l’Etat tiers pouvaient être mis en cause ou directement
menacés par une décision rendue par la Chambre à l’égard des Parties ini-
tiales, la Cour aurait pu, en consultation avec le président de la Chambre
et lesdites Parties, établir des garanties procédurales permettant effec-
tivement audit Etat de défendre ses droits. Si tant les Parties au différend
principal que le requérant ont exprimé, à titre préliminaire, des opinions
très différentes quant à l'instance devant connaître de la requête, on ne
peut exclure qu’ils eussent pu, avec l’aide de la Cour, trouver des compro-
mis mutuellement acceptables durant la procédure orale.

Mon vote contre la présente ordonnance traduit mon espoir sincère que
la décision de la Cour que concrétise cette ordonnance ne se verra pas
accorder le caractère de précédent, servant à exclure — pour des motifs
purement formalistes — toute possibilité que la Cour puisse examiner des
questions concernant les affaires dont sont saisies des chambres mais que
ces chambres ne peuvent résoudre. Justifier ainsi une inaction future
pourrait non seulement entraîner une dévalorisation du rôle de la Cour
elle-même, mais aussi une regrettable dévalorisation du mécanisme des
chambres, en plaçant une barrière insurmontable entre celles-ci et la Cour
plénière et, par voie de conséquence, en les coupant de l’organe judiciaire
principal des Nations Unies. Si cela devait arriver, les chambres ad hoc
seraient transformées en une sorte d’hybride à mi-chemin entre le proces-
sus judiciaire international et l’arbitrage.

(Signé) Nikolai K. TARASSOv.

18


gr

DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA.
[Translation.]

I regret that I cannot concur either in the decision reached
in the foregoing judgment or in the grounds on which that
decision is based. My main reasons for dissenting are two in
number: first, I interpret differently the relevant articles .of
the Convention of Saint-Germain and, secondly, take a differ-
ent conception of the question of law which confronts the
Court having regard to “all the circumstances of the case”.
In this opinion I shall confine myself to explaining and justi-
fying these two points of difference.

In point A, 1, of the Special Agreement submitting the
“Oscar Chinn’ case to the Court, the latter is asked to say
whether ‘‘the above-mentioned measures complained of by the
Government of the United Kingdom ..:. were .... in conflict
with the international obligations of the Belgian Government
towards the Government of the United Kingdom”. The import
of the words ‘the above-mentioned measures” is clearly indic-
ated in the preamble to the Special Agreement. They were
“certain measures taken and applied in the month of June 1931
and subsequently thereto by the Belgian Government (which
is responsible for the Colonial Administration) in connection
with the limited liability Company “Union nationale des Trans-
ports fluviaux (commonly known as Unatra), and in relation to
fluvial transport on the waterways of the Belgian Congo”:
Furthermore, the Court has received sufficient enlightenment
as to the precise nature of these measures in the course of the
written and oral proceedings in the case. It appears therefore
that this part of the text of point A, I, requires no further
explanation in order to be properly understood.

There might, however, be some doubt whether, by the defini-
tion of these measures given in the preamble of the Special
Agreement as quoted above, they are restricted to measures
‘ directly affecting Unatra to the exclusion of measures affecting
any other company or person. An interpretation as narrow as
this would leave outside the scope of the question submitted
to the Court facts and documents such as, for instance, those
relating to the Company known as Socca, which, as I shall
explain later, are of great importance for a correct understand-
ing of the present question. It appears evident to me, how-
ever, that there can be no doubt of this kind. Not only have
the Parties discussed the measures taken by the Belgian Govern-
ment in regard to Socca and other commercial enterprises,
besides that of Mr. Chinn, as being essential to a full under-

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A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 02

standing of the facts, but furthermore it is certain that the
measures affecting concerns other than Unatra followed directly
upon and were closely linked to the measures affecting the
latter Company.

The question of law involved in point A, 1, of the Special
Agreement is to ascertain whether or not the Belgian Govern-
ment’s measures as defined above are inconsistent with any or
all of the international obligations of the Belgian Government
towards the Government of the United Kingdom. We must,
therefore, in the first place, see what these international obliga-
tions are.

In so far as treaty law is concerned, the source of these
obligations is the Convention of Saint-Germain of Septem-
ber roth, 1919. Their source might possibly also be traced to
the general principles of international law. Let us first of all
consider the Convention. .

In Article x of the Convention, the fundamental words, in
my view, are those which describe the international engagement
entered into as one to maintain ‘a complete commercial equal-
ity”. The signatories of the Convention have therefore under-
taken to “maintain” ‘a complete commercial equality” in the
territories indicated thereafter, which include the territory in
which the waterways of the Belgian Congo are situated. This
equality clearly covers all kinds of trade whether by land,
river or otherwise. Accordingly, what we have to examine and
define in this case is the general conception of commercial
equality. It undoubtedly covers the commercial activities of
Mr. Chinn’s river transport business. |

The idea of equality expressed in Article 1 of the Conven-
tion is certainly tantamount to a prohibition of any discrim-
ination between the respective nationals of signatory Powers
and of States, Members of the League of Nations, acceding to
the Convention. It follows from the fact that the Article says:
“a complete equality’, that the discrimination prohibited by
it embraces in principle any kind of discrimination which would
involve a transgression of this very widely conceived principle
of equality. It is however true that the word “complete”
cannot have so absolute a meaning as to render it impossible
for the governments bound by the Convention to carry out
any act or measure of a commercial nature in their own terri-
tory and within the sphere of their own sovereignty. A large
proportion of such acts and measures they are certainly free
to carry out, even in relation to the commercial activities of
foreign nationals. Nevertheless, this freedom, though very wide,
cannot be exercised beyond the point where it would entail
infringement of the equality accorded to such nationals in
their commercial activities. This point would be reached as

31
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP, ALTAMIRA 93

soon as the measure taken by the Belgian Government affected
fundamentally the commercial activities which foreigners are
entitled to engage in the Congo under the same basic condi-
tions as Belgian nationals. It is clear that this does not imply
the slightest encroachment on the sovereignty of Belgium, since
it was in the exercise of this sovereignty that the Belgian
Government accepted the obligations contained in the Conven-
tion of Saint-Germain. The Court has expressly enunciated
this principle in its Judgment No. 1 (p. 25), and has referred
to and confirmed it in Advisory Opinions Nos. 10 and 14.

I think that a more precise definition of what is covered by
the equality mentioned in Article 1 is to be found in the other
articles of the Convention. At all events, this definition must
be sought within the four corners of the Convention and not
elsewhere. The idea of equality in fact dominates the whole
of the Convention to such an extent that it constitutes the
common denominator of the articles following Article 1. We
already begin to find evidence of what I have just said in
Article 2, which prescribes “free access’ for the merchandise
of every signatory State to the interior of the regions speci-
fied in Article 1, as well as access to all the coast and to all
maritime ports. And, in order to determine the precise import
of this “free access” in the intention of the Convention, the
term is immediately followed in the same Article by a clause
to the effect that “no differential treatment shall be imposed
upon the said merchandise on importation or exportation”.
The same prohibition is repeated in connection with the access
of vessels to the coast and ports; this means that equality is
also prescribed in this respect, and thus concrete shape is given
to one aspect of the idea of “‘complete commercial equality”
enunciated in Article 1, an idea which is different from the
mere “‘access’’ prescribed in the previous sentence of Article 2.
The last paragraph of the same Article further confirms this
general aim of the Convention, since, in reserving to the States
concerned “complete liberty of action as to the customs and
navigation regulations and tariffs to be applied in their terri-
tories’, it makes this liberty of action subject to the preceding
provisions in the same Article (“subject to these provisions”).

Article 3 of the Convention, like Article 2, adds something
further to the definition of what is meant by complete com-
mercial equality: it lays down that foreign, nationals shall
enjoy in the territories specified in Article r “the same
treatment and the same rights as the nationals of the Power
exercising authority in the territory’. This applies as regards

“the protection of their persons and effects’) ‘‘the acquisition
and transmission of their movable and real property”, and
“the exercise of their professions’; here, again, we have

32
A8. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 94

different aspects of equality which cover a wider legal sphere
than that of commerce, but nevertheless include the latter by
the reference to the exercise of professions. The provision
concerning the “exercise of their professions’ should be
especially noted here, since a part of the business carried on
by Mr. Chinn in the Congo was a profession which in the
codes of all countries, as well as in common parlance, is
described as commercial, a point which moreover is well
brought out in the judgment.

The same prohibition of differential treatment is to be
found in Article 4, though it does not relate to matters
relevant to the present case. On the other hand, Article 5,
paragraph 1, prescribes a special right which directly concerns
the fluvial traffic in issue, the right of free navigation ‘for
merchant vessels and for the transport of goods and_ pas-
sengers’’.

The interpretation of the word ‘‘navigation’’ would seem to
present no difficulty, since it expresses a common conception
and one understood by all in the two senses which are well
- explained in the judgment. This conception is fully confirmed,
as regards the kind. of navigation with which we are con-
cerned, by the phrase above quoted which specifies the
economic activities which the Convention meant. the term
“navigation” to cover, by reference to the different functions
served by navigation: .commerce proper, the transport of
goods and that of passengers. But the difficulty begins when
we have to interpret the word “‘navigation’’ in conjunction
with “freedom”, since the latter may apply equally well to
the ship itself as to the economic function which it serves
and which is the chief reason why freedom of movement is
essential to it. Accordingly, whereas if one were to consider
“freedom” as applying only to the movement of ships in the
direction, in the regions and at the times demanded by the
object in view, any impediment of another character would
be consistent with the rule laid down in Article 5, if, on the
other hand, one considers ‘‘freedom’’ from the standpoint of
the ultimate economic aim of navigation (trade, the transport
of goods or passengers), the term would also cover freedom
from impediments likely to render economically impossible
the attainment of this aim. The consequences of these two
interpretations differ of course considerably, and, in the present
case, they would lead to entirely contrary conclusions. The
first would render the first paragraph of Article 5 applicable
to the present case only “if Mr. Chinn’s vessels had been
actually prevented from proceeding on their voyages; the
second would make that paragraph applicable even if there
were no actual impediment to navigation, provided that some
other cause resulting from a measure taken by the Belgian

33
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 95

Government in regard to fluvial traffic on the Congo rendered
the carrying on of the transport enterprise in question eco-
nomically or otherwise impossible. Upon reflection, it does not
appear to me that the second interpretation is possible,
because paragraph x of Article 5 does not cover the exercise
of the calling with which the economic purpose served by the
vessels is connected. An economic impediment may convert
a favourable venture into a ruinous one which it is impossible
to proceed with, since the aim of business life is to reap
profits and not incur loss; but such an impediment would
not prevent the movement of ships for any other purpose
served by navigation. Economic or, in other words, profes-
sional aims have been dealt with in Article 3, and there is
nothing to indicate that they are again contemplated here.

On the other hand, paragraph 2 of Article 5 contains a
phrase similar to that occurring in Article 1: “‘a footing of
perfect equality’, a footing on which “craft of every kind
belonging to the nationals of the signatory Powers” are to be
treated “in all respects’. This can only be regarded as another
concrete aspect of what is meant by commercial equality which,
to be “complete”, must necessarily cover not only the persons
of foreign nationals and their commercial activities, but also
their merchandise and vessels. As regards the latter, it is clear
that the Convention covers them in the widest possible manner,
since Article 5 contains the phrase already quoted: “‘in all
respects’, which may well cover all respects in connection with
and necessary to, not merely actual navigation, but also the
fulfilment of its various possible and lawful objects. The phrase
“in all respects”, in fact, will easily bear this interpretation,
since access of vessels and merchandise and customs regula-
tions and tariffs have already been dealt with in Article 2,
since Article 6 deals with other charges, duties and obliga-
tions, and paragraph 1 of Article 5 which we are now considering
covers the other movements of vessels, which leads naturally
to the supposition that the phrase ‘‘all respects’ in the second
paragraph of the same Article may well possess an import
much wider than the simple movement of vessels.

Article 6, as already stated, also concerns navigation; it
exempts shipping from dues and taxes with the exception of
certains charges duly specified in regard to which the Article
repeats that they shall ‘‘not admit of any differential treat-
ment”. Article 7 extends the provisions of Article 5 to the
tributaries of the rivers and lakes specified in the latter, as
well as to roads, railways or lateral canals, and, in authorizing
the collection of certain tolls, it says that, ‘‘as regards the

34
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 96

tariff of these tolls, the nationals of the signatory Powers ....
shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality’. Finally,
Article 9, though it permits the governments exercising author-
ity to establish such systems “as may be required” for the
maintenance of public safety and order and other general
necessities, on certain rivers and their tributaries and on cer-
tain lakes, stipulated that such regulations “shall not admit
of any differential treatment”.

After this analysis of the various articles relevant to the pre-
sent case, I can once more affirm that the idea dominating
the Convention with regard to the international obligations
contracted therein is clearly the idea of equality of treatment
in every matter dealt with.

Before turning to another point, we must now consider
Article 10 of the Convention, although it does not belong to
the group of articles which concern the matter before us. The
fact that the words ‘‘freedom of trade” do not occur in these
articles may have been noticed; instead of them we find
“commercial equality’ in Article 1, and ‘‘freedom of naviga-
tion” in Article 5. Only in Article 10, which is practically
copied from Article 35, Chapter IV, of the Act of Berlin, do
we find a reference to ‘freedom of trade” in conjunction with
freedom of transit; but this reference serves rather to empha-
size that the Convention is governed by a conception some-
what different to that represented by the phrase “freedom of
trade” in the sense in which it was understood in 1885. The
full text of this Article demonstrates this sufficiently clearly:

“The signatory Powers recognize the obligation to maintain
in the regions subject to their jurisdiction an authority and
police forces sufficient to ensure protection of persons and of
property and, if necessary, freedom of trade and of transit.”

As regards the last paragraph of Article 1 of the Act of
Berlin—-which is annexed to Article r of the Convention of
Saint-Germain but for the purpose indicated therein only—the
phrase “free trade” also occurs in that paragraph, but, in my
opinion, the only purpose which it serves in the Convention
is to explain the scope of the obligations embodied therein in
relation to international life as a whole.

As regards the source of any international obligations which
might be deduced from the general principles of international
law, I have nothing to say, being in agreement with the
Court’s judgment on this point.

Having thus analysed the sources of law, we must now consider
the measures taken and applied in June 1931 and subsequently

5 35
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS, OP. ALTAMIRA 97

by the Belgian Government, in order to see whether they are
consistent with the international obligations noted above. :

In examining these measures, I shall take account of the
“circumstances of the case” referred to in point A, 1, of the
Special Agreement, in so far as relevant to the question put
therein. To my mind there is no doubt that these “circum-
stances’? include the facts for which the Belgian Government
is responsible (and accordingly the “measures’’ referred to in
Article 1 of the Special Agreement) as well as those in connec-
tion with Mr. Chinn’s activities in the river transport business.
Since the Special Agreement is an agreement between the two
Governments who were parties to the present dispute, the
words “having regard to all the circumstances of the case”
can only be meant to cover both the opposing standpoints,
that is to say both that of the Belgian Government and that
of the Government of the United Kingdom, and likewise the
circumstances in connection with the person whose case the
latter Government has taken up. Accordingly, we must “have
regard” on the one hand to “‘circumstances” in connection with
the Belgian Government’s measures, their explanation and justi-
fication, and, on the other hand, to ‘‘circumstances’”’ in connec-
tion with the effects of these measures as regards Mr. Chinn
and the latter’s reaction to them.

The first of the Belgian Government’s measures contemplated
by the Special Agreement is the decision of June 2oth, 1931.
This decision was taken by the Belgian Minister for the Colo-
nies. Practically speaking, it consists, on the one hand, of
a reduction in the rates applying at that date to the trans-
port and handling of certain colonial products of the Congo,
the reason for the reduction being “the collapse of the prices
obtainable for colonial products in the European markets”,
and, on the other hand, a promise to refund any losses occa-
sioned by this reduction to certain companies, which refunds
would be recoverable by the Colony “when the economic situa-
tion made it possible again to raise the rates above mentioned”’.

The decision states that the reductions in rates are to be
applied in so far as concerns Unatra ‘for all voyages”. A
differentiation between upstream traffic and downstream traffic,
as regards the application of the new rates, is not expressly men-
tioned but seems to be implied ‘in so far as concerns colonial
products properly so-called which, as a rule, will be intended
for export to Europe, thus involving transport downstream
only. These products being the most plentiful and important
in the colony, must in reason constitute a vast preponderance
of the traffic, certainly of downstream traffic. In reality, how-
ever, and for the purposes of this case, this distinction between
the two streams of traffic on the river is not very important.

36
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 98

It may be of importance in connection with the appraisement
of the economic effects (larger or smaller losses; greater or
less degree of the financial impossibility of carrying on trans-
port business), since an impediment affecting navigation traffic
in one direction only (upstream or downstream) will certainly
be a factor exercising great influence on shipping engaged in
the transport of merchandise. For transporters are most careful
to secure cargoes for the voyage in both directions, since other-
wise the venture might be so financially unprofitable to them
that they might be impelled to lay up their vessels, as experi-
ence shows to be sometimes the case. On the other hand, it
in no way affects the commercial inequality resulting from the
decision of June 2oth, 1931, which I shall demonstrate later.
Nor does the inconsistency of this measure with the interna-
tional obligations of the Belgian Government towards the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom depend on what was the economic
aim pursued by the former Government in the decision
of 1931, or on the question whether it had more than one
intention in taking that decision. In any case, the relation in
which the decision stands to certain articles of the Convention
of Saint-Germain will remain the same. That is why I see
no use in discussing the British and Belgian standpoints in
regard to this question.

The companies affected by the decision and enumerated therein
were four land transport concerns, one river transport concern
(Unatra), and another the nature of which is not specified.
These six companies did not constitute all the concerns at
that time engaged in the transportation business in the Congo ;
over and above the companies to which the decision of June 2oth,
1931, applied were other concerns, both Belgian and foreign,
which are grouped together under the heading of ‘“‘private
transporters”. It is difficult to understand the reasons which
led to this exclusion, seéing that the crisis was at that time
a general phenomenon which affected every branch of economic
activity in the Congo, and that one of the enterprises excluded
(that of Mr. Chinn) was at that moment the only one besides
Unatra (a fact which is not disputed) engaged in fluvial trans-
portation proper—the other enterprises being in reality produ-
cers who transported their own produce. The only reason for
this exclusion which would, appear at all comprehensible, is
that it was impossible for the Belgian Government to compel
companies, other than those mentioned in the decision, to
reduce their transport tariffs. But, even disregarding a point
which is not without importance, namely the actual wording of
the decision, that calls on the enterprises in question to “‘consent”’
to these reductions being imposed on them (the Government’s
only right, so far as we know, in this respect was that of

37
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 99

approving Unatra’s transport tariffs, but that did not include
the imposing of any freight rates, even upon that Company),
it is clear that there was nothing to prevent the Government
from making a similar proposal to the so-called “private” enter-
prises, and in case of their acceptance, from offering them the
above-mentioned repayment—as it actually did, as we shall
see later, in 1932. That shows that there was no fundamental
impossibility in this respect. It might even be added that the
Belgian Government ought to have taken this step in 1937,
seeing that, although the depression’ was primarily affecting
trade in products of the Congo, it could not fail, by an inevi-
table reaction, to affect the carriers of those products, that is
to say, not only those referred to in the decision of June 2oth,
1931, but also those who were excluded from the benefits of
that decision, though they constituted an integral part of the
economic life of the Congo, in the same way as the others.
There is nothing in the text of the decision of June 20th which
gives even an indication of such an elementary consideration.
It is interesting to observe that, a few years before that date,
namely in 1928, when the Belgian Government was authorizing
this very Unatra Company, which is the chief subject of the
decision, to introduce certain reductions which it had asked
leave to make in its transport tariffs in order to meet the
competition of other carriers, it added some reservations which
revealed its solicitude for the rights of other enterprises. Thus,
the letter written by the Minister of the Colonies on October 24th,
1928, contains the following passage :

(Lvanslation.] “I should see no objection to the tariffs that are
submitted for my approval being regarded as maximum rates; in
these circumstances you would be able to conclude special transport
contracts; but I draw your attention to the need of treating all
the carriers of the same category on a footing of equality. I do
not wish to receive any justifiable complaints; the smallest such
complaint would lead me to contemplate the withdrawal of the
approval which I convey to you in the present despatch.”

In view of the different circumstances surrounding the
decision of June 2oth, 1931, the legal description which best
fits it is, in truth, that it constituted a privilege. It does
not, of course, acquire that character simply because it
affirms the necessity and the intention of reducing tariffs, as
was done, with the consequence, so far as the transport
enterprises were concerned, of costly sacrifices, attended by
grave financial consequences. We might even agree that it
did not become a privilege because, at the outset, it applied
the tariff reductions to some only of the transporters operating
on the Congo. But it undoubtedly became a privilege when
it confined to one group only of the transporters its offer of
enabling them to offset the losses which must necessarily

38
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 100

follow the lowering of tariffs, and when it failed to extend
this favour to the. other enterprises. And yet the ‘private
transporters’ were inevitably placed by the Belgian Govern-
ment’s decision in a mariifestly weaker position for resisting
the crisis which must immediately overtake the transport
business ; in other words, they were faced with the certainty
of loss without being offered the hope of compensation. And
the privilege thus conferred solely upon one group of trans-
porters is nothing else than an inequality of treatment
affecting a particular branch of commerce.

It is true that this inequality would not, in principle, be
regarded as an injustice in the normal life of a State. It
might arise, without giving any ground for justified complaint
on the part of enterprises not admitted to participate in
advantages such as those which were offered, in a period of
general commercial depression, by the decision of June zoth.
But, in the case of the Congo, where the special Statute
created by the Convention of Saint-Germain is in force, the
question presents itself in a very different light. Having
regard to the international obligations which that Convention
imposes on the riparian States, and in particular upon the
Belgian State, in the matter of commerce, the above-mentioned
decision undoubtedly constitutes one of those cases of inequal-
ity that is prohibited by the Convention. That inequality is
not dispelled owing to the difference that exists between the
special position of Unatra in the economic life of the Congo,
and in its relations with the Belgian Government, and the
position of the other companies. Even if that difference were.
as profound as has been alleged, that would be no ground
for concluding that Unatra’s affairs—-however closely that
Company may be controlled by the Belgian Government—are
outside the boundary of the international obligations arising
from the Convention of Saint-Germain. It appears to me
that, from the point of view of that Convention, Unatra can
only be regarded in the light of its commercial character and
of its Belgian nationality, and not in its capacity as a con-
trolled or an uncontrolled Company—a point which is imma-
terial for the legal issue in the present case. The same
reasoning should apply, in good logic and in good law, to the
theory that the decision of June 2oth, 1931, may be con-
sidered as a kind of xovatio of the contract between Unatra
and the Belgian Government. No modification of that kind
could go so far as to override the obligations undertaken in
the Convention.

Also, owing to the fact that, as already mentioned, one of the
enterprises excluded by the decision was that of Mr. Chinn, a
British subject, and, still more, owing to the circumstance that
Mr. Chinn was, apart from Unatra, as has been pointed out,

39
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA IOI

the only carrier, in the strict sense of the term, the conflict
which results with the rules of the Convention of Saint-Germain
is a “conflict with the international obligations of the Belgian
Government towards the Government of the United Kingdom”,
in regard, in particular, to Articles 1, 3 and 5 of that Con-
vention.

The following objection may be made against this conclu-
sion. Even if one admits, as a consequence of the foregoing
arguments, that the decision of June 20th, 1931, produced a
commercial inequality of treatment, did that inequality fulfil
the condition, said to be required by the Convention, of being
based on the ground of nationality? Or does the fact that
the group of enterprises excluded by the decision (the “private
transporters’) comprised both Belgian and foreign nationals
show that the above-mentioned condition was not fulfilled, and
that, consequently, there was no inequality of treatment in
the sense of the Convention ?

I do not think so. First, because the idea of nationality
appears to me to mean something quite different in the Con-
vention of Saint-Germain from what it means in the treaties
in which the ground of nationality is the characteristic feature,
namely, the treaties relating to Minorities properly so-called.
The standpoint of those treaties is indeed very different from
that which the Convention of Saint-Germain may have had—
and, in my opinion, really had. Moreover, there is nothing
to show that a conception of nationality such as might jus-
tify the objection we are now considering, played any part
in the negotiations which led to the framing of that Conven-
tion. It would indeed be difficult to regard the presence of a
certain number of foreigners of different nationalities in the
Congo as evidence of the existence of minorities who would
have need of rules for their protection similiar to those pro-
vided for minorities in the treaties referred to above.

The signatory Powers of the Convention of Saint-Germain
and the signatories of the Berlin Act were not moved to give
contractual form to the freedom, equality, and guarantees,
which are stipulated in those two treaties, by any need of
affording protection in the Congo to some minority of nation-
ality, language, or religion present therein, and attached to
the respective Powers by -political or other ties. Their aim—
apart from matters relating to the natives and from some
words in Article 11—was the economic object of ensuring for
the citizens of certain States in these African territories free-
dom to engage in all economic activities, and protection for
their civil rights against the system of monopolies which had
long characterized the financial policy of the colonizing coun-
tries. Thus, when the Convention refers to ‘‘nationals’’, it is

40
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 102

because that word is best suited to designate the link that
unites the persons referred to therein to the contracting
States. But these persons are not considered in the Conven-
tion with reference to their nationality, or with a view to
safeguarding anything inherent in their status as nationals,
but with reference to their commercial, shipping or other
associations which, it must be repeated, are the special con-
cern of this Convention. It is in order to safeguard them in
the exercise of those avocations that the Treaty was con-
cluded, and it follows that it is the inequality of treatment to
which they might be subjected in that respect which is for-
bidden in the Treaty, irrespective of the grounds on which it
is based.

In view of the above considerations, it appears to me impos-
sible to agree that acts of discrimination can only be regarded
as infractions of the international obligations arising out of the
Convention of Saint-Germain if the discrimination affects for-
eign nationals as compared to Belgian nationals. To demonstrate
the fallacy of this view, one needs only to observe that, if
that theory were adopted, the result would be to abolish inter-
national obligations in a number of cases. It would suffice
that, as a result of an error or oversight, a measure which
was discriminatory in itself, happened to apply both to nation-
als and to foreigners, for the said measure to be regarded
as compatible with the international obligation of equality of
treatment. The earnest solicitude for ‘‘complete commercial
equality’* which is shown by the Convention of Saint-Germain
could not be reconciled with an interpretation which would
presume an oversight on the part of the signatory Powers,
fraught with consequences inimical to their essential purpose.

One must also consider the fact (a very important ‘‘cir- -
cumstance of the case’) that, in the present instance and
because in 193r there were no fluvial transporters, properly
so-called, other than Unatra and Mr. Chinn—the inequality
suffered by the latter really results from a difference of treat-
ment as between a Belgian national (Unatra) and a foreign
national (Mr. Chinn); for the other transporters on the Congo
were not—as has been already shown—working under the same
conditions that characterized the position of Unatra and Mr. Chinn.
Accordingly, even if the hypothesis which I am now consider-
ing were correct, it could not, in my view, cover the present
case.

The conclusion that there was inequality of treatment is
based solely—as has been seen—on the decision of June 2oth,
1931. The subsequent facts are recited in the judgment. I
will only select from among them the fresh decision of July 28th,

41
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 103.

1931, which most signally endows the decision of June 2oth
with the character of a privilege, inconsistent with the terms
of the Convention. - .

For, although the decision of June zoth, 1931, confined itself
to offering repayment of future losses to a particular group of
companies, there was nothing in the text of that decision
which prevented a similar favour from being conceded to the
other companies, if they also reduced their tarifis to the same
scale as that laid down by the Belgian Government. As a
fact, this possibility at once occurred to some of the private
transporters ; it was raised in particular by Socca in its letter
of June 26th, 1931, to which I shall return. One finds other
evidence of the same fact in the letter dated June 27th, 1931, :
from the President of the Leopoldville Chamber of Commerce,
in the representations made by the Association des intérêts
coloniaux belges in August of the same year, and in the recom-
mendations made by the Council of the Colonial Government
at Leopoldville on July 11th, 1931, and also at its meeting on
October 14th. Evidence to the same effect is to be found in reci-
tals of the judgment of the Court of first instance at Leopoldville
(Sept. 21st, 1932), which show that other private transporters,
in addition to Socca, had perceived the perfectly justifiable
possibility of the advantages offered by the decision of June zoth
being further extended. The judgment in question says:
“Whereas .... the associated plaintiffs have brought an action
against the Colonial Government for damages on account of
the prejudice they claim to have suffered owing to the fact
that the Colonial Government concluded an arrangement with
the Société nationale des Transporis fluviaux known as
“Unatra’’ without admitting them to the benefits of similar
treatment...”

The Socca Company, as has already been said, had made
formal application to that effect to the Belgian Minister of the
Colonies in a letter dated July 26th. It is noteworthy that
Socca does not ask, in that letter, for any special favour, but
that it assumes from the outset—as something too self-evident
to require proof—that the repayments promised in the deci-
sion of June zoth are naturally applicable to companies other
than those enumerated in that decision. Accordingly, Socca
confines itself to asking for the necessary information as to
the conditions with which it must comply in order to qualify
for the said repayments, that is to say, in order to come under
the régime of June 20th. Thus, paragraph 2 of Socca’s letter
reads: “As our Company maintains a regular transport serv-
ice, carried on by several vessels, we should be glad if you
would inform us as to the conditions with which we must
comply in order to be compensated by the Government for
the losses we are incurring, as a direct consequence of your

42
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA I04

recent decision in regard to transport.” Socca was right, in my
opinion, in believing that there could be no logical obstacle to
its participation in the new régime.

The reply from the Minister of the Colonies to the letter
of June 26th is dated July 28th. It consists of five para-
graphs. The first states clearly the request made by Socca ;
the second gives a description of the decision of June 2oth,
saying that ‘‘the measure in regard to the lowering of trans-
port tariffs was taken in the general interest and was made
necessary by the conditions in regard to prices of Congo pro-
ducts in the European markets’. This statement is of great
importance for the present question, as it offers a confirma-
tion of the chief reason which is given for the necessity
of the decision of June zoth; but whereas one would expect
this statement to be followed by the natural conclusion
ensuing from the general character thus attributed to the
measure taken in June, one finds on the contrary that, in its
last paragraph, the Minister’s letter abandons the position
taken up in the second paragraph and refuses Socca’s request
for reasons of a totally different kind. This fifth and last
paragraph says: “It follows that the Government’s interven-
tion must be confined to those transport enterprises whose
tariffs it has the right to control. I regret that I am not
therefore able to comply with the request you have submitted.”
To show even more clearly the lack of continuity between the
reasoning in this fifth paragraph and that of the earlier para-
graphs of the same letter, it should be mentioned that the
remainder of paragraph 2 and paragraphs 3 and 4 merely give
explanations regarding the text of the concluding paragraphs
of the decision of June, and point out that those paragraphs
are only concerned with fixing the character of the reimburse-
ments promised, and the conditions upon which they will be
paid and, in due course, refunded, to the Colonial Exchequer.
They contain no argument which would enable the conclusion
in paragraph 5 to follow from what is stated in paragraph 2.
. Omitting all other possible comments—which would be

superfiuous at this time—on this letter of July 28th, the
fact which results from the refusal it conveys is that it
definitely confirms the differential treatment which was already
so clearly indicated by the decision of June 2oth. The reply
of the Minister of the Colonies of July 28th, 1931, is there-
fore in obvious conflict with the Convention of Saint-Germain
and especially with its Articles x and 3.

On the other hand, I have not been led to the same
conclusion, that there was a conflict with the international

6 43
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 105

obligations arising from the Convention—in regard to the
thesis based on the allegation that it became absolutely
impossible for the “private transporters’ to continue their busi-
ness, aS a consequence of the Minister’s refusal of July 28th,
taken in conjunction with the decision of June 2oth; and
that Mr. Chinn not being a merchant, was therefore not
able to protect himself by trading from the consequences of
the injury done to his transport enterprise. Apart from the
uncertainty as to whether his business was in fact rendered
impossible—a point which is disputed by the Belgian Govern-
ment, but which is not in my view an essential issue—there
is also the uncontested fact that Mr. Chinn did abandon his
business (on July ist) a few days after the publication of
the decision of June zoth, and that he does not seem to
have taken the same steps as Socca to seek a natural solution
of the situation created by the decision of June 2oth, before
he had recourse to the courts in 1932. In these circum-
stances, it would be rash to conclude that—in addition to
the inequality prohibited by the Convention of Saint-Germain
—he suffered prejudice on the ground that it was made
impossible for him to continue his business. I think that
the prejudice would be found to consist—if. it had been
possible now to make a thorough investigation—not in the
fact referred to above, but perhaps in the inevitable losses
resulting from the position of mequality in which the so-called
“private” transporters were placed by the decision of June 2oth.
But all those points are now immaterial to the issue, and
I think there is no need for me to dwell upon them.

I have still a few words to say regarding certain facts

subsequent to July 28th, 1931.
' Fifteen months after that date, a “Public Notice”, issued
by the Governor-General of the Congo in pursuance of a
decision by the Minister of the Colonies, modified the policy
expressed in the decision of June 2oth, 1931, and in the
letter of July 28th of the same year, and declared that
“private transporters who ask for it will be granted, as an
advance and subject to the requisite guarantees, repayment
of the losses suffered as a result of the transport of produce
downstream at the reduced tariffs. This loss to be calculated
... On the basis of the loss sanctioned by Unatra on
December 31st, 1932”; that is to say, it would not be
calculated upon the basis of the losses suffered by the private
transporters.

I will not examine the substantial value of this new offer,
having regard to the conditions attached to it and to the
terms of the fresh Notice of November 5th, 1932, as these
facts are irrelevant, from my point of view, to the legal

44
A./B. 63 (CHINN).—DISS. OP. ALTAMIRA 106

issue stated in A, 1, of the Special Agreement. I. will content
myself with pointing out that this rectification of the policy
which the Belgian Government had declared in June 1931,
and which it reaffirmed on July 28th, confirms my reasoning.
Moreover, the fresh decision of October 3rd, 1932, could not
obliterate the effects of the former policy which had been
felt by the private transporters (including Mr. Chinn) during
the past fifteen months; or the fact that discriminatory
treatment had continued throughout that period, not to
mention the disastrous consequences to business which natu-
rally ensued from it. That, in my opinion, suffices to cause
an affirmative answer to be given to point A, 1, of the Special
Agreement.

(Signed) RAFAEL ALTAMIRA.

45


                                                                             265

             DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE OWADA

[Traduction]

  Je souscris à tous les points du dispositif de l’arrêt relatifs à la compé-
tence et au fond, sauf un. En effet, j’ai voté contre l’alinéa d) du point 1,
qui a trait à la compétence de la Cour pour statuer sur le différend
concernant les mandats d’arrêt délivrés le 27 septembre 2006 à l’encontre
de deux hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens.
  Je tiens donc à faire la présente déclaration afin de préciser ma position
à cet égard.

                                     *   *
   1. La Cour, ainsi qu’elle le fait observer à juste titre, « est [pour] la pre-
mière fois ... amenée à trancher au fond un différend porté devant elle par
une requête fondée sur le paragraphe 5 de l’article 38 de son Règlement »
(arrêt, par. 63). Si « [s]a compétence ... peut être fondée sur le forum pro-
rogatum selon des modalités diverses, que le paragraphe 5 de l’article 38
du Règlement n’épuise nullement » (ibid., par. 64), la Cour ne peut, en la
présente espèce, exercer sa compétence sur la base du forum prorogatum
que dans la mesure où l’Etat défendeur a, par sa conduite devant elle ou
dans ses relations avec la Partie demanderesse, agi de manière telle qu’il a
accepté sa compétence (ibid., par. 61).
   2. Il apparaît donc clairement que, dans la présente affaire, le fonde-
ment et l’étendue de la compétence de la Cour doivent être déterminés
strictement par référence à l’étendue du consentement donné par le défen-
deur dans sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006 en réponse à l’invitation formulée
par le demandeur dans sa requête. Autrement dit, les éléments conver-
gents contenus dans ces deux documents, qui forment le consentement
commun des Parties, définissent l’étendue précise de la compétence que
celles-ci ont conférée à la Cour en la présente espèce.
   3. Réduite à ces éléments essentiels, la présente affaire — qui a été por-
tée devant la Cour sur la base d’un forum prorogatum — ne se distingue
pas, d’un point de vue juridique, d’une instance introduite en application
du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut par la voie de deux déclarations
unilatérales d’acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour en vertu de la
clause facultative, hormis le fait que le défendeur a, en l’espèce, donné un
consentement ad hoc par sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006 et que ce consente-
ment est strictement limité à ce qu’il a accepté, à savoir une compétence
ratione materiae partielle par rapport à ce qu’envisagerait le demandeur
dans sa requête.
   4. Dès lors, s’il est vrai que, « [p]our que la Cour soit compétente sur la
base d’un forum prorogatum, l’élément de consentement doit être expli-

                                                                              92

      QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (DÉCL. OWADA)            266

cite ou pouvoir être clairement déduit de la conduite pertinente de l’Etat »
(arrêt, par. 62), lorsque l’élément de consentement requis est, comme en
la présente espèce, exprimé par écrit sous la forme d’une lettre du défen-
deur et non par une conduite de sa part qui, comme ce fut le cas en
l’affaire du Détroit de Corfou (Royaume-Uni c. Albanie), pourrait per-
mettre à la Cour de le déduire, la tâche de cette dernière devrait être la
même que dans une affaire fondée sur deux déclarations faites en vertu de
la clause facultative ; il suffit d’interpréter et d’appliquer les deux docu-
ments pertinents, de sorte que l’étendue du consentement commun des
Parties puisse être définie avec précision à partir des éléments convergents
desdits documents.
   5. Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour prétend suivre ce principe. Selon moi,
elle établit cependant une distinction entre la présente espèce — en
laquelle sa compétence est fondée sur un forum prorogatum — et des
affaires antérieures dans lesquelles tel n’était pas le cas, tout du moins en
ce qui concerne l’étendue de l’objet du différend à l’égard duquel elle
exerce sa compétence.
   6. Il est indiqué dans l’arrêt que, « [l]à où la compétence est fondée sur
le forum prorogatum, une attention toute particulière doit être portée à
l’étendue du consentement tel qu’il est circonscrit par l’Etat défendeur »
(arrêt, par. 87). S’interrogeant plus particulièrement sur la question de
savoir si elle a compétence à l’égard d’événements postérieurs à la date du
dépôt de la requête — c’est-à-dire la convocation à témoigner adressée en
2007 au président de Djibouti et les mandats d’arrêt délivrés en 2006 à
l’encontre de deux hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens —, la Cour précise
que les critères établis par sa jurisprudence aux fins de déterminer si les
faits ou événements postérieurs au dépôt de la requête sont indissociable-
ment liés aux faits ou événements relevant expressément de sa compé-
tence, de sorte qu’ils puissent entrer dans le champ du différend, sont
dépourvus de pertinence en la présente espèce (voir, par exemple, Com-
pétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c.
Islande) ; LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) ; et Mandat
d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgi-
que)). Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour opère une distinction en indiquant
que, « [d]ans aucune de ces affaires [s]a compétence ... n’était fondée sur
un forum prorogatum ». Elle ajoute que si, « [d]ans la présente espèce, où
tel est le fondement de sa compétence, la Cour est d’avis qu’il n’est pas
pertinent de savoir si les éléments postérieurs en question « dépassent
l’objet déclaré de [l]a requête » »,

    « ce qui est décisif ... pour répondre à la question de savoir si elle est
    compétente pour connaître des demandes relatives à ces mandats,
    n’est pas sa jurisprudence relative aux notions de « continuité » et de
    « connexité », qui constituent des critères pertinents pour déterminer
    les limites ratione temporis de sa compétence, mais ce que la France
    a expressément accepté dans sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006 » (arrêt,
    par. 88).

                                                                           93

      QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (DÉCL. OWADA)             267

   7. Il convient cependant de relever que la jurisprudence en question
relative à la « continuité » et à la « connexité » s’est développée non pas
tant dans le contexte d’une limitation ratione temporis que précisément
aux fins de délimiter l’objet qui forme la base de l’acceptation par les
parties de la compétence de la Cour. Ainsi, en l’affaire de la Compétence
en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande), la
Cour a indiqué que « [l]a conclusion se fond[ait] sur des faits postérieurs
au dépôt de la requête mais découlant directement de la question qui fai-
[sait] l’objet de cette requête » et que, « [à] ce titre, elle rel[evait] de la
compétence de la Cour telle qu’elle a[vait] été définie dans la clause com-
promissoire de l’échange de notes du 19 juillet 1961 » (C.I.J. Recueil 1974,
p. 203, par. 72 ; les italiques sont de moi). Selon moi, telle est exactement
la situation en la présente espèce pour ce qui concerne les convocations à
témoigner. Autrement dit, la seule question qui se pose est de savoir si les
événements de 2006 relatifs aux mandats d’arrêt délivrés postérieurement
au dépôt de la requête de Djibouti découlaient directement ou non du
différend qui fait l’objet de la requête.
   8. La Cour précise que, « [b]ien que ces mandats d’arrêt puissent être
perçus comme un moyen d’exécuter les convocations à témoigner, ils
représentent de nouveaux actes juridiques au sujet desquels la France ne
peut être considérée comme ayant accepté implicitement [s]a compé-
tence » et que, « [p]ar conséquent, les demandes relatives aux mandats
d’arrêt concernent des questions qui n’entrent pas dans le champ de [s]a
compétence ratione materiae » (arrêt, par. 88 ; les italiques sont de moi).
   9. Il est cependant difficile de comprendre pourquoi le fait de délivrer
des mandats d’arrêt, ce qui, après tout, n’est rien d’autre que la consé-
quence juridique qui découle nécessairement du refus de déférer à des
convocations (article 109 du Code de procédure pénale français), consti-
tue un nouvel acte juridique qui devrait être exclu du champ de la com-
pétence de la Cour, alors que la seconde convocation adressée au prési-
dent était une « répétition de la précédente » — dont le défendeur a lui-
même reconnu qu’elle était nulle et non avenue — et qu’il s’agissait donc
« en substance de la même convocation » (arrêt, par. 91), laquelle entrait,
partant, dans le champ de la compétence de la Cour.
   10. Selon moi, la question est, dans les deux cas, la même. Il s’agit de
savoir si les actes postérieurs au dépôt de la requête entrent dans le
champ de l’acceptation par la France de la compétence ratione materiae
de la Cour tel qu’il peut être déduit des termes employés par la France
dans sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006, et notamment de l’expression « pour le
différend qui fait l’objet de la requête et dans les strictes limites des
demandes formulées dans celle-ci par la République de Djibouti » (ibid.,
par. 77).
   11. Je pense, en accord avec l’arrêt, que la limitation de la compétence
de la Cour imposée par la France dans sa lettre n’est, de toute évidence,
pas une limitation ratione temporis mais une limitation ratione materiae.
C’est précisément pour cette raison que la question de savoir si les deux
éléments susmentionnés entrent dans le champ du « différend qui fait

                                                                            94

      QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (DÉCL. OWADA)             268

l’objet de la requête » a trait à une limitation de fond et non temporelle.
En examinant attentivement la requête de Djibouti, on constate que les
éléments contenus aux alinéas e), f) et h) ii) du paragraphe 4 se rappor-
tent clairement à une situation donnée (la violation de certaines immuni-
tés) à la date de cette requête et non à des événements particuliers (l’émis-
sion de convocations) qui s’étaient produits avant son dépôt (requête,
p. 6, par. 4). En ce sens, la jurisprudence de la Cour telle qu’établie dans
les affaires susmentionnées (voir paragraphe 6 ci-dessus) est pertinente en
la présente espèce pour ce qui concerne la limitation de fond — et non
temporelle — aux fins d’interpréter le contenu de la lettre d’acceptation
de la France. (Il en irait différemment si la lettre de la France avait fait
état d’une limitation ratione temporis précise, excluant expressément de
la compétence de la Cour tous les événements postérieurs à la date du
dépôt de la requête).
   12. Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, je suis au regret de ne pouvoir
souscrire à l’arrêt sur ce point, en ce qu’il s’écarte de la jurisprudence bien
établie de la Cour sur la question de l’étendue de l’« objet du différend »
en retenant un nouveau critère aux fins de déterminer si les événements
postérieurs au dépôt de la requête étaient ou non de « nouveaux actes
juridiques » (arrêt, par. 88). A l’aune de ce critère, la seconde convocation
adressée au président de Djibouti en 2007 devrait elle aussi être « un nou-
vel acte juridique ».
   13. J’ajouterai que, en dépit de cette réserve, je souscris à l’arrêt de la
Cour en ce qui concerne les éléments de fond de la question relative à
l’immunité des hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens. Dès lors, la réserve que
j’ai exprimée sur cet aspect de la compétence n’a, en définitive, aucune
incidence sur la conclusion à laquelle la Cour est parvenue sur cette
question.

                                                 (Signé) Hisashi OWADA.

                                                                            95


31

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE NAGENDRA SINGH

While voting for the Judgment of the Court, I have felt that there are
certain aspects of the case which need to be emphasized.

(i) It appears from the Court’s Judgment that the object of intervention
is of great importance to a tribunal when applying the provisions of Article
62 of the Statute to the facts of a case. In this respect, Italy has demon-
strated a twofold aspect of its object in presenting its own request to the
Court. First, at the very outset, Italy has emphasized in the present pro-
ceedings before the Court that it is making no claim against either of the
two Parties and, furthermore, that it is not seeking a decision by the Court
to delimit its own areas of continental shelf. It has gone further even in
stating that it does not seek a decision declaring the principles and rules of
international law to be applicable to such a delimitation. The counsel for
Italy has stated precisely what Italy expects from the Court in the following
words:

“Italy is asking the Court . . . to take into consideration the interests
of a legal nature which Italy possesses in relation to various areas
claimed by the main Parties, or certain parts of those areas, and
accordingly . . . to ensure that they do not, when they conclude their
delimitation agreement pursuant of the Court’s judgment, include
any areas which, on account of the existence of rights possessed by
Italy, ought to be the subject either of delimitation between Italy and
Malta or of delimitation between Italy and Libya, or of a delimitation
agreement as between all three countries.” (Hearing of 25 January
1984. Emphasis added.)

If the intention was thus to apprise the Court of the areas of Italian concern
of which the Court should be cautioned and warned, so that the Judgment
does not trench on the sovereign rights and claims of Italy, it would appear
that such a purpose has been effectively served by the exercise which the
Court has undertaken under Article 62 of the Statute by giving a hearing
not only to Italy but also to the Parties to the dispute. There can be no
doubt that the Court has now been made fully aware of Italian interests
and where they lie so that there should be no possibility of it even inad-
vertently encroaching upon or undermining Italian claims and interests in
this case. In answer to the question asked by Judge de Lacharriére at the
hearings, the Italian written reply has given a precise answer defining the
four corners of the parameters of Italian interest which concern the Court
here. No tribunal could ever disregard this aspect, which has been effec-
tively presented by Italy. The Court in its Judgment has taken proper
precautions to safeguard the interests of Italy in paragraphs 42 and 43,

32
32 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. NAGENDRA SINGH)

with which J entirely agree. When the would-be intervener is not permitted
to be present before the Court, it becomes the bounden duty of the tribunal
to safeguard its rights and on no account to allow them to be downtrodden
in the adjudication of the dispute between the parties before the Court.
While pointing out this aspect, it is felt that the object of Italy in cautioning
the Court in this case has already been achieved inasmuch as the Court has
been warned how far to proceed in its delimitation. This is not to suggest
that the institution of intervention as embodied in Article 62 could ever be
reduced to the mere practice of giving a hearing to the applicant on the
point of admissibility of its request, because much more than a mere
preliminary hearing is contemplated by that article of the Statute. In
addition to the above there is also another consideration of vital impor-
tance which is mentioned in paragraph (ii) below.

The second aspect of the Italian pleading noted by the Court relates to
the role of the Court which Italy seemed to be asking the Court to
undertake in “defining”, “safeguarding”, “protecting” and “recognizing”
the rights of Italy which gives the appearance that the Court is required to
undertake an exercise in adjudication. This would certainly need a juris-
dictional link between the intervener and the Parties to the dispute, and I
agree with the Court’s finding that this aspect of the object of Italian
‘ intervention could not be met without a proper jurisdictional link between
Italy and Malta and Italy and Libya.

In short, therefore, both aspects of the Italian object of intervention are
met to the full extent that the Court could help to meet them. The purpose
of warning the Court as to the area of Italian concern has indeed been
totally fulfilled. Again, as far as the other aspect of the object of inter-
vention is concerned, which was to have Italian interests “recognized”,
“safeguarded” and “protected”, the Court has expressed its inability to
proceed without a jurisdictional link between the intervener and the Par-
ties to the dispute. In short, therefore, the Court has done its utmost in the
circumstances to meet the Italian viewpoint in so far as it was within the
limits prescribed by Article 62 of the Statute and could be accomplished
without a jurisdictional link and in the teeth of opposition from both
Parties to the dispute. The Court apparently has felt helpless when con-
fronted with the request relating to “recognition” of Italian nghts which
would involve the Court in an exercise in jurisdiction, and that could not be
undertaken without.the consent of the Parties to the dispute.

Thus, whatever the Court could offer to Italy within the limits of Article
62, and devoid of a jurisdictional link, would appear to have been offered
to Italy in this case. It is true, of course, that intervention has been refused,
but that does not in any way amount to an injustice. This indeed is the basic
reason for my voting for the Court’s Judgment, because even without
granting intervention to Italy the Court has duly emphasized that Italian
interests in the area will remain the paramount concern of the Court. In the
circumstances, the granting of intervention would not have added any-
thing to the process of cautioning the Court. On the other hand, agreeing to
the Italian request would have clearly resulted in making Italy subject to

33
33 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. NAGENDRA SINGH)

the obligations imposed by Article 59 on the parties before the Court. In
short, therefore, it would appear that the Court has given to Italy by this
Judgment all that it could be entitied to in the circumstances of this case,
and that, too, without holding it bound by the forthcoming judgment in the
Libya/ Malta case by virtue of Article 59. The net result should therefore
satisfy Italy.

(i) Furthermore, what I wish to emphasize relates to the need to allow
the would-be intervener to have access to the pleadings of the parties to a
dispute, because it does not answer the call of judicial propriety if the
would-be intervener is asked to plead, blindfold so to speak, without the
pleadings of the parties. This essential facility was denied to Malta in 1981
and now to Italy in this case, although it was pleaded by the Parties to the
present dispute that the applicant, having had its say when invoking
Article 62 of the Statute, need not be given a further hearing by way of
intervention as stipulated in Articles 82 to 85 of the Rules of Court. In
other words, it has been argued by the Parties that if the would-be inter-
vener was heard once it should suffice for the purpose of cautioning the
Court. If it was ever so, it would appear that the would-be intervener must
be supplied with the pleadings of the parties in order to have its full say
with a view to effectively warning the Court of its interests. It is true, of
course, that Parties objected in both these cases to their pleadings being
made available to the would-be intervener, but then they could not argue
that the applicant had had its full say in the matter. It would therefore
appear to be in the interests of the parties to a dispute to agree to make their
pleadings available to the would-be intervener in order that they may be
fully apprised of third party interests, of which the Court would also like
to be equally and fully informed. In the present case, the fact that the
pleadings of the Parties to the dispute were not made available to the
applicant weighs to the extent that, as a consequence, the applicant could
have failed to present to the Court as complete, clear and precise a state-
ment of its interests as might have been possible had it had access to those
pleadings. Such a statement is manifestly desirable also for the Court so as
to enable it to decide correctly on the admissibility of the intervention
itself. Thus, it is in the interests of justice that the would-be intervener
should have access to the pleadings of the parties to a dispute. However, I
am satisfied that in the present case, despite this lacuna, the Court has been
able to get a sufficient overall picture of the Italian interests to enable it to
come to a decision on the Application. Nevertheless, the aspect relating to
pleadings of parties being made accessible to the would-be intervener
should be borne in mind by ail concerned in future cases of interven-
tion.

(iti) Lastly, I wish to emphasize that despite the two negative decisions
of the Court in 1981 and in this case, the institution of intervention which
exists as enshrined in Article 62 of the Statute is still very much available to
the community, provided it is sought within the limits prescribed by that
Article. The Court has now made it abundantly clear that if the intervener
expects determination of any of its claims, which involves an exercise in

34
34 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. NAGENDRA SINGH)

adjudication, this would necessitate a jurisdictional link between the par-
ties to the dispute and the intervener. However, as far as cautioning the
Court of the interests of the third party is concerned, this can always be
achieved by an application under Article 62 without establishing any
jurisdictional link. The said provision of the Statute has therefore a utility
of its own, however limited it may be.

(Signed) NAGENDRA SINGH.

35


                             COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                         AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                             ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES
                        SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO
                   (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

                          ORDONNANCE DU 10 DÉCEMBRE 2015

                                    2015
                             INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                          REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY
                               OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                            ARMED ACTIVITIES
                     ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
                    (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)

                              ORDER OF 10 DECEMBER 2015

2 CIJ1087.indb 1                                                   13/05/16 12:22

                                           Mode officiel de citation :
                                  Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo
                               (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda),
                          ordonnance du 10 décembre 2015, C.I.J. Recueil 2015, p. 662

                                               Official citation :
                               Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
                               (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
                            Order of 10 December 2015, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 662

                                                                                1087
                                                                No de vente :
                   ISSN 0074-4441                               Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157279-7

2 CIJ1087.indb 2                                                                        13/05/16 12:22

                                                     10 DÉCEMBRE 2015

                                                      ORDONNANCE

                                 ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES
                            SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO
                   (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

                                  ARMED ACTIVITIES
                           ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
                    (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)

                                                    10 DECEMBER 2015

                                                           ORDER

2 CIJ1087.indb 3                                                        13/05/16 12:22

                     662

                                    COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                                    ANNÉE 2015
         2015
     10 décembre
     Rôle général                                 10 décembre 2015
        no 116

                                     ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES
                                SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO
                         (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA)

                                                  ORDONNANCE

                         Le président de la Cour internationale de Justice,
                        Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les paragraphes 3 et 4 de l’ar-
                     ticle 44 de son Règlement,
                        Vu l’ordonnance du 1er juillet 2015, par laquelle la Cour a fixé au 6 jan-
                     vier 2016 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt, par la République
                     démocratique du Congo, d’un mémoire portant sur les réparations qu’elle
                     estime lui être dues par la République de l’Ouganda et pour le dépôt, par
                     la République de l’Ouganda, d’un mémoire portant sur les réparations
                     qu’elle estime lui être dues par la République démocratique du Congo ;
                        Considérant que, par une lettre datée du 16 novembre 2015 et déposée
                     au Greffe le 23 novembre 2015 par le coagent de la République démocra-
                     tique du Congo, le ministre congolais de la justice, garde des sceaux et
                     droits humains, a prié la Cour, pour les raisons exposées dans ladite
                     lettre, de proroger le délai pour le dépôt des mémoires de la République
                     démocratique du Congo et de la République de l’Ouganda jusqu’à la « fin
                     avril ou [la] mi-mai 2016 » ;
                        Considérant que, par une lettre datée du 3 décembre 2015 et reçue au
                     Greffe le 8 décembre 2015 sous le couvert d’un courriel du coagent de la
                     République de l’Ouganda, l’agent de l’Ouganda a indiqué que son gou-
                     vernement ne voyait pas d’objection à la prorogation de délai sollicitée
                     par la République démocratique du Congo ;
                        Compte tenu des vues des Parties,
                       Reporte au 28 avril 2016 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt, par
                     la République démocratique du Congo, d’un mémoire portant sur les

                     4

2 CIJ1087.indb 136                                                                                13/05/16 12:22

                     663 	          activités armées (ordonnance 10 XII 15)

                     réparations qu’elle estime lui être dues par la République de l’Ouganda et
                     pour le dépôt, par la République de l’Ouganda, d’un mémoire portant sur
                     les réparations qu’elle estime lui être dues par la République démocra-
                     tique du Congo ;
                        Réserve la suite de la procédure.

                         Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
                     la Paix, à La Haye, le dix décembre deux mille quinze, en trois exem-
                      plaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres
                      seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République
                      démocratique du Congo et au Gouvernement de la République de
                     l’Ouganda.

                                                                             Le président,
                                                                    (Signé) Ronny Abraham.
                                                                               Le greffier,
                                                                  (Signé) Philippe Couvreur.

                     5

2 CIJ1087.indb 138                                                                                13/05/16 12:22

                     PRINTED IN FRANCE

                                         ISSN 0074-4441
                                         ISBN 978-92-1-157279-7

2 CIJ1087.indb 140                                                13/05/16 12:22


   COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

       RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

      AFFAIRE JADHAV
        (INDE c. PAKISTAN)

   ORDONNANCE DU 13 JUIN 2017

          2017
   INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

     REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
  ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

        JADHAV CASE
        (INDIA v. PAKISTAN)

      ORDER OF 13 JUNE 2017

                                           Mode officiel de citation :
                                          Jadhav (Inde c. Pakistan),
                             ordonnance du 13 juin 2017, C.I.J. Recueil 2017, p. 279

                                                Official citation :
                                          Jadhav (India v. Pakistan),
                               Order of 13 June 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 279

                                                                                1124
                                                                 No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157322-0

1 CIJ1124.indb 2                                                                       27/03/18 16:26

                       13 JUIN 2017

                      ORDONNANCE

 AFFAIRE JADHAV
(INDE c. PAKISTAN)

  JADHAV CASE
(INDIA v. PAKISTAN)

                      13 JUNE 2017

                        ORDER

                                                                       279

              INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                               YEAR 2017
                                                                                2017
                                                                                13 June
                              13 June 2017                                      General List
                                                                                No. 168

                         JADHAV CASE
                        (INDIA v. PAKISTAN)

                                ORDER

  The President of the International Court of Justice,
   Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
cles 44 and 45, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
   Having regard to the Application ﬁled in the Registry of the Court on
8 May 2017, whereby the Republic of India instituted proceedings against
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, concerning alleged violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 “in the mat-
ter of the detention and trial of an Indian National, Mr. Kulbhushan Sud-
hir Jadhav”, sentenced to death in Pakistan,
   Having regard to the request for the indication of provisional measures
submitted by India on 8 May 2017 and to the Order by which the Court
indicated provisional measures on 18 May 2017;
   Whereas, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the
Agents of the Parties on 8 June 2017, pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules
of Court, the Agent of India requested that each Party be granted a
period of four months for the preparation of its pleading; and whereas
the Agent of Pakistan indicated that periods of two months would be suf-
ﬁcient;
   Taking into account the views of the Parties,
  Fixes the following time-limits for the ﬁling of the written pleadings:

  13 September 2017 for the Memorial of India;
  13 December 2017 for the Counter-Memorial of Pakistan; and

                                                                            4

                        jadhav (order 13 VI 17)                        280

  Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

   Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirteenth day of June, two thousand
and seventeen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Repub-
lic of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
respectively.

                                           (Signed) Ronny Abraham,
                                                       President.
                                          (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                        Registrar.

                                                                         5