          INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

           REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
        ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

          ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
   RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
   (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
                 OF AMERICA)

             ORDER OF 8 APRIL 2019

                 2019
          COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

             RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
      AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

       VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
  DU TRAITÉ D’AMITIÉ, DE COMMERCE
  ET DE DROITS CONSULAIRES DE 1955
   (RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D’IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
                  D’AMÉRIQUE)

          ORDONNANCE DU 8 AVRIL 2019

                               Oﬃcial citation :
    Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
       and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
                    of America), Order of 8 April 2019,
                         I.C.J. Reports 2019, p. 352

                         Mode oﬃciel de citation :
             Violations alléguées du traité d’amitié, de commerce
 et de droits consulaires de 1955 (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis
                  d’Amérique), ordonnance du 8 avril 2019,
                          C.I.J. Recueil 2019, p. 352

                                             Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441
ISBN 978-92-1-157369-5
                                             No de vente:    1167

                                    8 APRIL 2019

                                       ORDER

           ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
 OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
    RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
              OF AMERICA)

         VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
    DU TRAITÉ D’AMITIÉ, DE COMMERCE
    ET DE DROITS CONSULAIRES DE 1955
(RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D’IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
               D’AMÉRIQUE)

                                   8 AVRIL 2019

                                  ORDONNANCE

               352

                              INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
                                               YEAR 2019
   2019
  8 April                                      8 April 2019
General List
 No. 175
                         ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
               OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
                  RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
                        (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
                                      OF AMERICA)

                                                 ORDER

                   The President of the International Court of Justice,
                  Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
               cle 44, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Rules of Court,
                  Having regard to the Order dated 10 October 2018, whereby the Court
               ﬁxed 10 April 2019 and 10 October 2019, respectively, as the time-limits
               for the ﬁling of the Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
               Counter-Memorial of the United States of America;
                  Whereas, by a letter dated 1 April 2019 and received in the Registry on
               the same day, the Co-Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran requested the
               Court to extend by one and a half months the time-limit for the ﬁling of
               the Memorial, and indicated the reasons for that request; and whereas,
               on receipt of that letter, the Deputy-Registrar, referring to Article 44,
               paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, transmitted a copy thereof to the
               Agent of the United States of America;
                  Whereas, by a letter dated 5 April 2019 and received in the Registry on
               the same day, the Agent of the United States of America indicated that
               her Government had no objection to the extension of the time-limit
               requested by the Islamic Republic of Iran,
                 Extends to 24 May 2019 the time-limit for the ﬁling of the Memorial of
               the Islamic Republic of Iran;

               4

353               1955 treaty of amity (order 8 IV 19)

 Extends to 10 January 2020 the time-limit for the ﬁling of the Counter-
Memorial of the United States of America; and
    Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

  Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of April two thousand and
nineteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively.

                                    (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf,
                                                    President.
                                        (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                     Registrar.

5


                      371

                                         DECLARATION OF JUDGE GAJA

                         Assignment of a building for the use as premises of a diplomatic mission —
                      Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations — Absence of a requirement that the
                      receiving State gives its consent — Application of laws and regulations of the
                      receiving State — Positions taken by certain receiving States with regard to the
                      location of premises of missions — Alleged abuse of rights by the sending State —
                      Compliance by the receiving State with its obligations under the Convention.

                         1. I agree with the decision of the Court that France did not commit
                      any violation of its obligations under Article 22 of the Vienna Conven-
                      tion on Diplomatic Relations (hereinafter the “Convention”) with regard
                      to the building located at 42 avenue Foch in Paris. However, in reaching
                      this conclusion, I do not share the view that, by objecting to the notifica-
                      tions made by Equatorial Guinea on 4 October 2011 and again on later
                      dates, France prevented the building at 42 avenue Foch from acquiring
                      the status of premises of a diplomatic mission.
                         2. The issue is whether consent, expressed or implied, of the receiving
                      State is a precondition for the sending State to be able to use a building
                      as premises of a diplomatic mission. The starting‑point of an analysis of
                      this issue is the definition of “premises of the mission” contained in the
                      Convention, to which both France and Equatorial Guinea are parties.
                      According to Article 1 (i) of the Convention, “the ‘premises of the mis-
                      sion’ are the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto,
                      irrespective of ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including
                      the residence of the head of the mission”.

                         3. Article 1 (i) of the Convention refers to the use of a building by the
                      sending State, whether as owner or as otherwise entitled to do so. The
                      provision does not specify how a building may be chosen by the sending
                      State in order to be “used for the purposes of the mission”. The definition
                      in the Convention does not include any reference to a requirement that
                      the receiving State previously consents, or at least does not object, to the
                      sending State’s choice of the building. The text points to the absence of
                      any such requirement.
                         4. The definition of premises of the mission has to be considered also
                      in the context of other provisions of the Convention. A reference to the
                      use of a building as premises of the mission may be found in Article 12,
                      which reads: “The sending State may not, without the prior express con-
                      sent of the receiving State, establish offices forming part of the mission in
                      localities other than those in which the mission itself is established.” This
                      suggests that, on the basis of an a contrario argument, no consent, or at

                      75

6 Ord_1204.indb 146                                                                                19/01/22 08:24

                      372 	     immunities and criminal proceedings (decl. gaja)

                      least no express consent, is required for the use as premises of the mission
                      of a building located where “the mission itself is established”, ordinarily
                      the capital city. Although this a contrario argument may not appear to be
                      decisive, Article 12 reinforces the interpretation of the Convention to the
                      effect that it does not require the receiving State’s consent in the far more
                      frequent case of buildings located in the capital city. If consent of
                      the receiving State were required for the choice of a building assigned to
                      be premises of the mission, there would have been no need for the provi-
                      sion contained in Article 12, except for the specification that, when the
                      buildings are located outside the capital city, consent needs to be
                      “express”.
                         5. Another relevant reference to the premises of the mission is con-
                      tained in Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention, according to which
                      “[t]he receiving State shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory,
                      in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises necessary for
                      its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other
                      way”. The purpose of this provision is to make it easier for the sending
                      State to find a suitable building, not to prevent it from using a building as
                      premises of the mission. Also, this provision casts doubts on the existence
                      of an implicit requirement for the receiving State’s consent.
                         6. Thus, considered in its text and context, Article 1 (i) does not indi-
                      cate that consent of the receiving State is required under the Convention.
                      This finds an additional reason in the fact that an objection made by the
                      receiving State would likely cause considerable inconvenience and finan-
                      cial loss to the sending State if it came after the acquisition of the building
                      was completed.
                         7. To suggest, as the majority does, that an objection of the receiving
                      State, when it passes a test of timeliness, non-     arbitrariness and non-
                      discrimination, precludes the use of a building for the purposes of the
                      mission would be tantamount to setting forth a general requirement of
                      consent on the part of the receiving State.
                         8. It has been maintained that respect for the sovereignty of the receiv-
                      ing State implies the need to let that State have a say in the location of the
                      premises of the mission. However, the conception that these premises are
                      “extraterritorial” has long been abandoned and has not been endorsed by
                      the Convention. The premises of the mission are inviolable, but they do
                      not impinge on the territorial sovereignty of the receiving State.

                         9. This does not mean that certain interests of the receiving State can-
                      not be protected with regard to the location of diplomatic premises. Since
                      premises of missions are placed in the receiving State’s territory, legisla-
                      tion of the receiving State applies to the relevant building. As specified
                      in Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Convention with regard to diplomatic
                      privileges and immunities, “laws and regulations of the receiving State”
                      need to be respected. These laws and regulations include provisions
                      on town planning and on zoning for security reasons. However, no issue
                      of town planning or zoning was raised in the present case. There are

                      76

6 Ord_1204.indb 148                                                                                19/01/22 08:24

                      373 	     immunities and criminal proceedings (decl. gaja)

                      premises of diplomatic missions of several States in the area around
                      42 avenue Foch. Correspondence concerning a mission located at 64 avenue
                      Foch was supplied by France (Counter-Memorial of France, Anns. 12
                      and 13).
                         10. A certain number of receiving States have enacted legislation or
                      sent circular notes to foreign missions asserting a right to refuse their
                      consent to the sending States’ future choice of buildings as diplomatic
                      premises. So far as is known, these statements have not elicited any objec-
                      tion by the sending States concerned, either in general or in a case where
                      the receiving State refused consent. However, this practice, most of which
                      is recent, is insufficient for establishing a customary rule or an “agreement
                      between the parties regarding the interpretation” of the Convention,
                      which would be relevant according to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the
                      Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Legislation and circular notes
                      are meant to address the specific situation of missions located in the terri-
                      tory of the receiving State. Many States which failed to react to the posi-
                      tion taken by a receiving State did not necessarily acquiesce to acquiring
                      an obligation to secure the receiving State’s consent for the location of
                      future premises. Some States may have refrained from reacting because
                      they considered themselves unlikely to be affected by the position taken
                      by the receiving State in question. Nevertheless, should a receiving State’s
                      position concerning the requirement of consent have been accepted by
                      one or more sending States, this would lead to the establishment for those
                      States of an obligation to secure the receiving State’s consent before being
                      able to assign a building as premises of their diplomatic mission.

                         11. While there is the possibility that certain sending States agreed to
                      the requirement that consent be secured from a receiving State, it seems
                      difficult to reach the conclusion that such a requirement has been set
                      forth for sending States in their relations with France. There is no evi-
                      dence of a claim by France that, in general, the location of premises of
                      missions in Paris is conditional on the receiving State’s consent or at least
                      on the lack of objection on its part. In the absence of such a claim, no
                      agreement concerning a requirement of the receiving State’s consent for
                      the assignment of premises of diplomatic missions in Paris may be said to
                      have come into existence under international law. There is no mention of
                      consent among the criteria summarized by the French Ministry of For-
                      eign and European Affairs in its note of 11 October 2011 to the French
                      Ministry of Justice when answering an inquiry by investigating judicial
                      authorities (Memorial of Equatorial Guinea, Ann. 35).

                        12. Even in its relations with Equatorial Guinea, France’s objection to
                      the assignment of the building was, from October 2011 to July 2012,
                      focused on the lack of an effective use of the building for the purposes of
                      the mission (ibid., Anns. 34 and 45). Only on 6 August 2012 did the

                      77

6 Ord_1204.indb 150                                                                                19/01/22 08:24

                      374 	     immunities and criminal proceedings (decl. gaja)

                      French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs refer, as the reason for
                      its objection, to criminal proceedings concerning the building and thus
                      implicitly to the need for a form of consent on the part of the receiving
                      State (Memorial of Equatorial Guinea, Ann. 49).

                         13. France’s subsidiary argument that the assignment of the building
                      at 42 avenue Foch for the purpose of the diplomatic mission constituted
                      an abuse of right by Equatorial Guinea is based on the idea that the
                      attachment of the building (saisie pénale immobilière) and the subsequent
                      confiscation in the criminal proceedings would have been affected by that
                      step. However, neither measure was precluded, or could have been pre-
                      cluded, by the assignment of the building as premises of a diplomatic
                      mission. These measures relate to the ownership of the building, not to its
                      use as premises of a diplomatic mission. Therefore, the assignment of the
                      building as premises of the mission, whatever its intended purpose, can-
                      not be viewed as an abuse of rights.
                         14. Should the use of the building at 42 avenue Foch as premises of the
                      diplomatic mission have started on 27 July 2012, as indicated in the
                      Note Verbale of the sending State of the same date (ibid., Ann. 47),
                      France was bound from that date to respect its obligations under Arti-
                      cle 22 of the Convention with regard to that building. Equatorial Guinea
                      failed to substantiate any claim that these obligations have been violated
                      by France.

                      (Signed) Giorgio Gaja.

                      78

6 Ord_1204.indb 152                                                                                19/01/22 08:24


866

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE HIGGINS

Limitations ratione temporis to declarations made under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute — “Disputes” — “Situations or Facts” — Reciprocity
— “Continuing” events or violations of law — Prima facie jurisdiction for pur-
poses of Article 41 of the Statute — Matters to be decided at provisional meas-
ures phase and matters to be reserved for more thorough later consideration —
Two alternative consequences of an absence of prima facie jurisdiction — Judi-
cial authority and creativity dependent on jurisdiction.

1. Where one State has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute with a limitation ratione temporis
and the other State has accepted the jurisdiction without such a limita-
tion,

“nevertheless, as a consequence of the condition of reciprocity stipu-
lated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, it is
recognized that this limitation holds good as between the Parties”
(Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.LJ., Series A/B,
No. 74, p. 22).

2. The declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction made
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 25 April 1999 states in part
that:

“T hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro-
city, the jurisdiction of the said Court in all disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement . . .”

This follows, with a small variation, the well-known so-called “Belgian
declaration” of 1925 by which any retrospective jurisdiction of the Court
ratione temporis was precluded both as to disputes and as to situations
and facts.

3. The declaration made by the United Kingdom contains no such
limitation, but it applies inter se to identify the scope ratione temporis of

44
867 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

the Court’s jurisdiction, for the reason set out in paragraph 1 of this
opinion.

4. It may, of course, be the case that, while the dispute has clearly
arisen subsequent to the critical date for jurisdiction, the situations or
facts giving rise to the dispute appear to have occurred before that date.
That was exactly the situation in the Phosphates in Morocco case, where
the Permanent Court addressed the possibility that acts “accomplished
after the crucial date”, when “taken in conjunction with earlier acts to
which they are closely linked, constitute as a whole a single, continuing
and progressive illegal act which was not fully accomplished until after
the crucial date” (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.LJ,
Series A/B, No. 74, p. 23). Equally, there exists the possibility that acts
carried out prior to the crucial date “nevertheless gave rise to a perma-
nent situation inconsistent with international law which has continued to
exist after the said date” (ibid. ). This latter eventuality is indeed reflected
in the International Law Commission’s Draft Article 25 on State Respon-
sibility (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. IL, Part II,
p. 80).

5. It is not the Court alone which has had to formulate Jurisprudence
on the concept of “continuing events”: so has the European Court of
Human Rights (see Yagci and Sargin v. Turkey, European Human Rights
Reports, 1995, p. 505); and so also has the Human Rights Committee
(see Guye et al. v. France, No. 196/1985, 3 April 1989, 35th Session); and
Siminek v. The Czech Republic (No. 516/1992, 31 July 1995, 54th Session).

6. The Court gave its own answers to this issue in Phosphates in
Morocco. It explained that the problem of whether there were “continu-
ing events” that gave rise to a cause of action after the crucial date must
be examined in the particular context of each case. But two factors
always have to be borne in mind: the first is that

“it is necessary always to bear in mind the will of the State which
only accepted the compulsory jurisdiction within specified limits,
and consequently only intended to submit to that jurisdiction dis-
putes having actually arisen from situations or facts subsequent to
its acceptance” (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.LJ.,
Series AIB, No. 74, p. 24).

And second, it was necessary to see if the facts were merely a neces-
sary and logical consequence of earlier ones which were barred from
scrutiny by the temporal reservation. On the particular facts of the
Phosphates case, the Court found that the cited facts and situations
could not be viewed as “a final step and crowning point” of the
earlier events (ibid., p. 26) nor did they “alter the situation which had

45
868 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

already been established” (P.C1J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 27). Nor
could they be separated from those that had arisen before the crucial
date.

7. That this particular jurisdictional problem, as any other, requires
close attention to be given to the intention of the State issuing its declara-
tion with limitations or reservations was stated by the Permanent Court
in the Phosphates in Morocco case and recently affirmed by this Court in
the case of Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Judgment (1 C.J. Reports 1998, p. 454, para. 49). It is striking that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not advance arguments before
the Court suggesting either continuing events or a continuing dispute (the
latter not having been an issue in Phosphates in Morocco). It squarely
based itself on a dispute it perceived as arising, and situations and facts
that it perceived as occurring, after the crucial date of 25 April. It did not
wish any dispute there may have been between itself and the United
Kingdom prior to 25 April to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, nor
any situations and facts relating to such dispute; which element may be
thought to have been covered by the first part of paragraph 1 (iit) of the
United Kingdom’s own declaration. That was the intention of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia and it was clear. But within that intent there
was also a hope — the hope that there could be identified a dispute that
arose only after 25 April. Certainly there were events, occurring after
25 April, that were the subject of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s
complaint (though these were not specified by date or in any detail). But
the Court has not been able to see a dispute arising only after 25 April.
The claim that aerial bombing by NATO, and NATO States, was illegal,
was made in the Security Council on 24 March and 26 March, and rebut-
ted there. The conditions specified in the Mavrommatis case (Mavrom-
matis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.LJ., Series À,
No. 2) for the existence of a dispute were thus met at that time.

8. No doubt the continuation of the bombing and the targets hit after
25 April has aggravated and intensified the dispute. But every aerial bom-
bardment subsequent to 25 April does not constitute a new dispute. In
short, there are situations and facts occurring subsequent to the crucial
date, but there is not at the present time a dispute arising subsequent to
that date. In effectively realizing the intention (which the Court must
respect) of its declaration, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not
able also to realize its hope. Its declaration accordingly fails to invest the
Court with jurisdiction.

46
869 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

9. Of course, in the Phosphates in Morocco case the Court was address-
ing temporal limits at the phase of preliminary objections. But because
the Court must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, at least prima facie,
before considering whether the conditions of Article 41 of the Statute are
met for the indication of interim measures of protection, the question
must be dealt with here at this stage, albeit on a provisional basis.

10. Complex issues arise for the Court in satisfying itself that it has a
jurisdiction at least sufficient to consider indicating provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute.

11. Minimal guidance is provided in the Statute and in the Rules of
Court as to legal requirements relating to the indication of provisional
measures. Article 41 of the Statute merely provides that the Court “shall
have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require,
any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respec-
tive rights of either party”. This shows both the function of interim meas-
ures and the fact that the Court has a discretion as to their indication —
but nothing else. The Rules of Procedure in their successive versions have
provided little guidance on the application of Article 41 of the Statute,
with those of 1936 and 1978 reflecting the most significant developments
in the practice (for details, see Guyomar, Commentaire du Règlement de
la Cour Internationale de Justice, 2nd ed.). It has been through the case
law of the Court that the many different legal elements relating to pro-
visional measures have evolved (no interim judgment to be given: case
concerning the Factory at Chorzôw, P.C.LJ., Series A, No. 12; nexus
between rights to be protected and the measures sought: Legal Status of
the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, P.C.1.J., Series AlB, No. 48;
Polish Agrarian Reform and German Minority, P.C.LJ., Series AB,
No. 58; meaning of the protection of the rights of the parties; the ques-
tion of extension and aggravation of the dispute: Electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J., Series AlB, No. 79).

12. It is equally through its case law that the Court has had to address
the jurisdictional problems that arise when a request for the indication of
provisional measures is made before the Court has definitively estab-
lished its jurisdiction in a case.

13. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Court stated that, because
“it cannot be accepted a priori” that the claim “falls completely outside
the scope of international jurisdiction” the Court could entertain the
request for interim measures of protection (/nterim Protection, Order of
J July 1951, LC.J. Reports 1951, p. 93). At the same time, the Court
noted that the indication of such measures “in no way prejudges the
question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the
case and leaves unaffected the right of the Respondent to submit argu-
ments against such jurisdiction” (ibid. }.

47
870 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

14. This latter statement of the consequences for subsequent phases of
an Order for interim measures has remained essentially unchanged over
the years. However, the jurisdictional prerequisites for the issuance of
interim measures of protection have undergone important developments
in the jurisprudence. Indeed, the debate had already been heavily engaged
within the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case itself. In their dissenting opinions,
Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha viewed the Court as finding that it
was competent to indicate interim measures of protection “if prima facie
the total lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not patent, that is . . . there
is a possibility, however remote, that the Court may be competent”
(LC.J. Reports 1951, p. 97). But observing that interim measures of pro-
tection were in international law even more exceptional than in municipal
law, as they were “a scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs of a sov-
ereign State”, they ought not to be indicated unless the Court’s jurisdic-
tion was “reasonably probable”.

15. In Fisheries Jurisdiction ( United Kingdom v. Iceland), the Court
refined the formula, stating that when considering a request for the indi-
cation of provisional measures, it had no need “finally to satisfy itself
that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to act
under Article 41 of the Statute if the absence of jurisdiction on the merits
is manifest” (Interim Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, LC.J. Reports
1972, p. 15).

16. In the Nuclear Tests case (1973), France insisted that the Court
was “manifestly not competent in the case”. The Court, departing in part
from the formula it had used the year before in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case, stated that it “need not . . . finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdic-
tion on the merits of the case”, but that it ought not to indicate provi-
sional measures “unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might
be founded” (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection,
Order of 22 June 1973, L C.J. Reports 1973, p. 101). In none of the next
three provisional measures cases (Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War,
Order of 13 July 1973, I C.J. Reports 1993, p. 328; Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf. Order of 11 September 1976, 1 C.J. Reports 1976, p. 3;
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Order of
17 December 1979, I C.J. Reports 1979, p. 7) was the question of juris-
diction the main basis for the order.

17. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
Provisional Measures (Order of 10 May 1984, I C.J. Reports 1984,
p. 179) the Court came back to the issue, repeating the exact formula of
the Nuclear Tests case. That formula is now firmly established (Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989, Provisional Measures, Order of 2 March 1990,
LC.J. Reports 1990, pp. 68-69; Passage through the Great Belt ( Finland

48
871 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, 1. C.J. Reports
1991, p. 17; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April
1993, LC.J. Reports 1993, p. 11, and Order of 13 September 1993, ibid,
pp. 16-17; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria,
Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, LC.J. Reports 1996 (I),
p. 12; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, I C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 255, para. 23; and LaGrand, Provisional Measures,
Order of 3 March 1999, I C.J. Reports 1999, p. 13, para. 13).

18. Thus a party seeking the indication of provisional measures must
show a prima facie basis upon which the Court’s jurisdiction in the case
might be founded. That being said, several questions (which have a par-
ticular relevance in the present case) remain. What is sufficient to show
the required “prima facie” basis for jurisdiction? And what jurisdictional
matters will the Court look at, as necessary for this purpose, at the pro-
visional measures stage, and what will it reserve for any further hearings
on jurisdiction?

19. It is the practice of the Court that weighty and complex arguments
relating to its jurisdiction will not usually be addressed at the provisional
measures phase but rather will be regarded as appropriate for resolution
only at the preliminary objections phase. The Co-Agent of the Swiss
Government in the Interhandel case suggested that the Court would not
wish, at the interim measures phase, to adjudicate “upon so complex and
delicate a question as the validity of the American reservation” (/nter-
handel, Interim Protection, Order of 24 October 1957, LC.J. Reports
1957, p. 111). The Court, there being able to base its refusal to indicate
provisional measures on other grounds, gave no answer to this question.
In the Nuclear Tests case of 1973, Australia advanced detailed arguments
alleging the continued validity and applicability of the General Act of
1928 as a separate basis for jurisdiction. Without distinguishing the Gen-
eral Act from Article 36 of the Statute, the Court satisfied itself with say-
ing that “the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to
afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded”
(Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of
22 June 1973, 1 C.J. Reports 1973, p. 102).

20. In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicara-
gua case (1984), the Court was faced, at the provisional measures stage,
with very complicated arguments relating both to the legal effect of the
United States declaration of 6 April 1984 and to the apparent failure of
Nicaragua to have deposited an instrument of ratification of the protocol

49
872 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

to bring its adherence to the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice into effect. The Court briefly recounted the legal problems
associated with each of these provisions and stated that it:

“will not now make any final determination of the question of the
present validity or invalidity of the declaration of 24 September
1929, and the question whether or not Nicaragua accordingly was
or was not, for the purpose of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Stat-
ute of the Court a ‘State accepting the same obligation’ as the
United States of America at the date of filing of the Application, so
as to be able to rely on the United States declaration of 26 August
1946, nor of the question whether, as a result of the declaration of
6 April 1984, the present Application is excluded from the scope of
the acceptance by the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court ...” (Order of 10 May 1984, LC.J. Reports 1984,
p. 180).

The Court satisfied itself with saying that “the two declarations do
nevertheless appear to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the
Court might be founded” (ibid. ).

21. In the present case the Court has also not made any final determi-
nation upon the question of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s status
or otherwise as a Member of the United Nations and thus as a party to
the Statute having the right to make a declaration under Article 36, para-
graph 2, thereof. This is clearly a matter of the greatest complexity and
importance and was, understandably, not the subject of comprehensive
and systematic submissions in the recent oral hearings on provisional
measures.

22. Of course, just as with the question of Nicaragua’s ratification of
its adherence to the Statute of the Permanent Court in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, it might be thought
that the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a necessary
“préalable” to everything else. But when dealing with provisional meas-
ures the Court is faced with unavoidable tensions between the demands
of logic and the inability to determine with finality when operating under
urgency in response to a request for provisional measures. The opera-
tional principle is that matters of deep complexity will if possible be left
to one side in determining the prima facie jurisdiction of the Court for
purposes of Article 41.

23. In the Nuclear Tests cases and in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities case, the Court equally held over certain arguments relating to
declarations under the Statute. By contrast, the Court in this case has
addressed, for purposes of provisional measures, both the terms of the
declarations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United King-

50
873 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

dom and the interaction of the declarations of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.

24. The prima facie test of jurisdiction does not make it sufficient
merely to note the very existence of two declarations at this stage. This is
not to be deduced from the statement of the Court in the Cameroon
v. Nigeria provisional measures case that “the declarations made by the
Parties in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute con-
stitute a prima facie basis upon which its jurisdiction in the present
case might be founded” (Z CJ. Reports 1996 (1), p. 21, para. 31). The
Nigerian request for a reconsideration of the rule in the Rights of
Passage case, as it bore on the interpretation of its own declaration,
clearly fell into that category of complex and weighty objections to juris-
diction that had to be deferred for proper consideration until the prelimi-
nary objections phase. In that particular light (and because the Rights
of Passage principle was well established in the Court’s case law), the
declarations would in the meantime be treated as establishing prima facie
jurisdiction.

25. The same guiding principles apply to treaties said to provide a
basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus the several complicated argu-
ments that had been advanced in connection with Article IX of the Geno-
cide Convention were not addressed in the provisional measures phase of
the Genocide case of 1993; and it was against that background that the
Court said that Article IX of the Convention appeared to “afford a basis
on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded” (Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, LC.J. Reports 1993,
p. 16; and Order of 13 September 1993, LC.J. Reports 1993, p. 342).

26. But it should not be thought that mere invocation of a jurisdic-
tional clause, with nothing more, suffices to establish a prima facie basis
of the Court’s jurisdiction. It cannot be otherwise, because the jurisdic-
tion of the Court — even if one might regret this state of affairs as we
approach the twenty-first century — is based on consent. And consent to
jurisdiction cannot be established, even prima facie, when it is clear from
the terms of the declarations themselves that the necessary consent is not
prima facie present, or simply is not present, simpliciter. As Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht put it in his separate opinion in the /nterhandel case, the test
of jurisdiction of the Court prima facie is met if, in the relevant instru-
ments, there are “no reservations obviously excluding its Jurisdiction”
(LC.J. Reports 1957, pp. 118-119). Reservations relevant for this purpose
are both those in a State’s own declaration and those that it may rely on
reciprocally.

Si
874 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

27. Yugoslavia made no submission at all to the Court on either the
Optional Clause declaration of the United Kingdom or on its interplay
with its own reservation. It did not explain why the provisions of para-
graph | (iii) of the declaration of the United Kingdom did not exclude
the jurisdiction of the Court on the particular facts of this case. Nor did
the United Kingdom rely reciprocally on Yugoslavia’s declaration, no
doubt deeming that to be inconsistent with the position it took alleging
the declaration to be invalid. But the Court cannot fail to consider these
matters, and none of them is so obscure and complicated that it could
not be dealt with at this stage; and nor was that suggested by Yugo-
slavia.

28. As the Court stated in the Norwegian Loans case: “since two
unilateral declarations are involved [reciprocal] jurisdiction is conferred
upon the Court only to the extent to which the Declarations coincide in
conferring it” (Judgment, LC.J. Reports 1957, p. 23). And the Court
clearly stated in Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) that:

“Conditions or reservations thus do not by their terms derogate
from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to
define the parameters of the State’s acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.” (LC. J. Reports 1998, p. 453, para. 44.)

Each of these dicta appears in the judgments on jurisdiction, these not
having been provisional measures cases. But a State seeking the introduc-
tion of provisional measures must show that jurisdiction prima facie
exists, notwithstanding conditions, reservations and the operation of reci-
procity between declarations.

29. The restraint upon the liberty of action of a State that necessarily
follows from the indication of provisional measures will not be counte-
nanced unless, prima facie, there is jurisdiction. But an absence of prima
facie jurisdiction at this stage and for this purpose does not necessarily
mean that jurisdiction may not, in the event, later be established. How-
ever, if in considering whether there is jurisdiction prima facie for pur-
poses of Article 41 of the Statute, it is clear beyond doubt that no juris-
diction exists in a particular case, good administration of justice requires
that the case be immediately struck off the List in limine.

+ * x

30. Finally, it should not be thought that the Court, because it has had
to address the question of its prima facie jurisdiction in the case brought

52
875 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. HIGGINS)

by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is indifferent to the great suffer-
ing in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Indeed, the preambular paragraphs to its
Order show otherwise. Nor does it seek to avoid making its contribution
to an elucidation of the heavily contested issues of law. But the Court can
take on its responsibilities within the United Nations system and use its
judicial authority and creativity only when it has jurisdiction. In this case,
the Court’s jurisdiction has yet to be established even prima facie.

(Signed) Rosalyn Hiccins.

53


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE ARBITRAL AWARD MADE
BY THE KING OF SPAIN
ON 23 DECEMBER 1906

(HONDURAS wv. NICARAGUA)
ORDER OF 7 OCTOBER 1959

1959

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE
A LA SENTENCE ARBITRALE
RENDUE PAR LE ROI D’ESPAGNE
LE 23 DÉCEMBRE 1906

(HONDURAS c. NICARAGUA)
ORDONNANCE DU 7 OCTOBRE 1959
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain
on 23 December 1906, Order of 7 October 1959: I.C.]. Reports

1959, D. 273.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:

« Affaire relative à la sentence arbitrale rendue par le roi
d'Espagne le 23 décembre 1906, Ordonnance du 7 octobre 1959:
C. I. J. Recueil 1959, p. 273. »

Sales number 217
N° de vente:

273

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

7 October YEAR 959
General List: 7 October 1959

CASE CONCERNING
THE ARBITRAL AWARD MADE
BY THE KING OF SPAIN

ON 23 DECEMBER 1906
(HONDURAS v. NICARAGUA)

ORDER

Present: President KLAESTAD; Vice-President ZAFRULLA KHAN;
judges BASDEVANT, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI, BADAWI,
ARMAND-UGON, KoJEvnikov, Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT,
MORENO QUINTANA, WELLINGTON Koo, SPIROPOULOS,
Sir Percy SPENDER; Deputy-Registray GARNIER-COIGNET.

The International Court of Justice,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Article 37 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order :

Having regard to the Order of 3 September 1958 fixing 3 Novem-
ber 1959 as the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua;

4
274 ARBITRAL AWARD OF 23 XII 1906 (ORDER 7 X 59)

Whereas, by letter of 22 September 1959, the Agent of the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua has requested the extension by two months
of this time-limit ;

Whereas, by a letter of 22 September 1959, the letter of the
Agent of the Government of Nicaragua was communicated to the
Agent for the Government of Honduras, who was asked to make
known the views of that Government on the request of the Agent
of the Government of Nicaragua;

Whereas, by a letter of 29 September 1959, the Agent for the
Government of Honduras stated that Honduras would raise no
objection to a reasonable extension of the time-limit;

THE CouRT

decides to extend to 4 January 1960 the time-limit for the filing
of the Rejoinder of the Government of Nicaragua.

Done in English and in French, the English text being author-
itative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this seventh day of Octo-
ber, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine, in three copies, one
of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of the Republic of Honduras and
to the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua, respectively.

(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.


282

DECLARATION OF JUDGE FERRARI BRAVO
[Translation |]

I have voted in favour of the present Advisory Opinion on the legality
of nuclear weapons because I think it is incumbent upon the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to spare no pains in answering, to the best of its
ability, the questions put to it by such principal organs of the United
Nations as are entitled to seise the Court, particularly when such an
answer may increase the likelihood of resolving a deadlock which, in the
present case, has been perpetuated for over 50 years, casting a sombre,
threatening shadow over the whole of mankind.

The Court, functioning as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations (Article 92 of the Charter), was set up to do just that — among
other things — and does not have to ask itself whether its reply, given to
the best of its ability, can contribute to the development of the situation.
Neither does it have to justify itself if that reply is less than exhaustive.
I accordingly subscribe fully to the reasons given in support of the
Court’s decision to allow the question put by the General Assembly.

In that regard, it is however necessary to point out that the matter
appears in a quite different light when the Court is seised by a specialized
agency of the United Nations, whose competence to make application to
the Court is, for reasons of principle, clearly defined. I accordingly also
voted in favour of the Opinion, given this same day, whereby the Court
decided not to answer the question put to it by the World Health Organi-
zation (Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, C.J. Reports 1996, p. 87), and consider my conduct to have
been consistent. The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, but it is not the judicial organ of other international bodies
whose right to seise the Court needs to be carefully restricted if the inten-
tion is to maintain a correct division of powers — and hence of effective-
ness — among the international organizations, in a bid to prevent those
political functions that the logic of the system has entrusted only to the
United Nations from being usurped by other organizations which, to say
the least, have neither the power nor the structure to assume them.

* * *

Having said this, I am however deeply dissatisfied with certain crucial
passages of the decision as, to tell the truth, it strikes me as not very
courageous and at times rather difficult to read.

More particularly, I regret that the Court should have arbitrarily
divided into two categories the long succession of General Assembly
resolutions which begins with resolution 1 (1) of 24 January 1946 and

60
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DECL. FERRARI BRAVO) 283

which, at least down to resolution 808 (IX), takes the form of a series of
unanimously adopted resolutions. In my view these resolutions are fun-
damental, particularly the first of them, whose wording had already been
determined in Moscow before the United Nations was created (for the
history of the resolution and for the steps taken in Moscow with a view
to entrusting the United Nations with the supervision of atomic energy to
which, at that time, only the United States had the key see The United
Nations in World Affairs, 1945-1947, 1947, pp. 391 et seq.), and which
could, at a pinch, be placed on the same footing as the provisions of the
Charter. As a matter of fact that resolution establishes — and in my view
clearly establishes — the existence of an actual undertaking of a solemn
nature to eliminate all atomic weapons whose presence in military arse-
nals was considered illegal. The resolution was worded as follows:

#5.... In particular, the Commission [established by the resolu-
tion] shall make specific proposals:

(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons
and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”
(Emphasis added.)

These ideas were repeated on several occasions in other General Assem-
bly resolutions immediately after the founding of the United Nations (see
for example resolution 41 (1) or resolution 191 (IID).

I am very well aware that the cold war which broke out shortly after-
wards (and it is not for me to say who was responsible, although I would
stress that responsibility did not lie with just one side), prevented the
development of that concept of illegality (which was subsequently aban-
doned by the United States which had been its promoter), while giving
rise to a whole series of arguments focusing on the concept of nuclear
deterrence which (and this is important, as we shall see) has no legal
force.

However, in my view that illegality nevertheless already existed and
any production of nuclear weapons had, as a consequence, to be justified
in the light of that stigma of illegality which could not be effaced. It is,
then, to be regretted that such a conclusion is not clear from the reason-
ing followed by the Court — a reasoning which, on the contrary, is often
difficult to read, tortuous and ultimately rather inadequate.

This apart, it remains to be said that a number of conclusions reached
by the Court are not reflected in the results set forth in the operative part.
These are serious lacunae, but can be explained by the difficulty of
obtaining consistent majorities with respect to certain components of the
Advisory Opinion.

It is however important to acknowledge that there is still para-
graph 104 of the Advisory Opinion, which introduces the operative part
and whose importance is really crucial. It in fact suggests that the atten-

61
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DECL. FERRARI BRAVO) 284

tive reader should evaluate the whole of the reasoning given by the Court,
take account of those parts of the reasoning which are not reflected
in the various paragraphs of the operative part and, what is more,
take account of the inevitable gaps in that reasoning. May its readers —
and not only academics — take heed of this advice while bearing in mind
that an advisory opinion, in spite of the procedural similarities, is not
a judgment of the Court. And this one above all.

«a * x

To be sure, there is no precise and specific rule that prohibits nuclear
weapons and draws the fullest conclusions from that prohibition. The
theory of deterrence, to which the Advisory Opinion makes no more than
passing reference (para. 96), would have merited further consideration.
I have already said that, in my view, the idea of nuclear deterrence has no
legal validity and I would add that the theory of deterrence, while cre-
ating a practice of nuclear-weapon States and their allies, is not able to
create a legal practice which could serve as the basis for the creation of an
international custom. One might even say that it is contrary to the law, if
one thinks of the effect it has had upon the Charter of the United
Nations.

I will not go so far myself, but feel bound to note that it is thanks to
the doctrine of deterrence that the revolutionary scope of Article 2, para-
graph 4, of the Charter has been reduced, while at the same time the
scope of Article 51, which was traditionally considered as its counter-
point, has been extended as a whole series of conventional constructions
have taken shape around that norm, as can be seen from the two systems
governing respectively the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and on the
other the Warsaw Pact, while it was in existence. These are systems which
are doubtless governed by legal rules but which proceed from an idea
derived essentially from the political — and hence not legal — conclusion
that the Security Council cannot function in the face of a major conflict
as would probably be the type which is the subject of the present Advi-
sory Opinion.

It is in this way that the gulf separating Article 2, paragraph 4, from
Article 5] has widened, as a result also of the great obstacle of deterrence
which has been cast into it. To overcome this guif a bridge has therefore
had to be built over it, using the materials currently available to us to do
so, namely, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I very much doubt whether these arguments are really endorsed by the
Court, as the very condensed manner in which the Court has chosen to
deal with deterrence does not enable one clearly to understand whether
this is really its view. However, it does not allow the exclusion of that pos-
sibility either. In any case, the separate or dissenting opinions appended to
the Advisory Opinion (and I do not see any great difference between
them) will help to shed light upon this point (and upon others, of course).

62
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DECL. FERRARI BRAVO) 285

In any case, this is in my view the fundamental reason why the Opinion
of the Court is bound to include, in its final part, certain arguments based
upon a clause of a treaty which should not logically be given a place there
as it is not of a universal character. These arguments are, however, fully
justified by the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, in which
the Non-Proliferation Treaty would seem to be the only means of arriv-
ing rapidly at a solution capable of averting catastrophic consequences.

*
* *

In conclusion, I take the view that there is as yet no precise and specific
rule prohibiting nuclear weapons and drawing the fullest consequences
from that prohibition.

It is obvious that no such rule could have come into existence in the
political situation that prevailed between 1945 and 1985. However,
I would point out that all the rules produced over the last 50 years, par-
ticularly with regard to the humanitarian law of armed conflict, are irre-
concilable with the technological development of the construction of
nuclear weapons. Can one, for example, imagine that just as humanitar-
ian law, an essential and increasingly significant part of the international
law of warfare and (of late) of peace as well, is bringing into being a
whole series of principles for the protection of the civilian population or
the environment, that same international law should continue to accom-
modate the lawfulness of, for example, the use of the neutron bomb,
which leaves the environment intact, albeit with the “slight” drawback
that the people living in it are wiped out! If that is the case, it matters
little whether a rule specific to the neutron bomb can be found, since it
becomes automatically unlawful as being quite out of keeping with the
majority of the rules of international law.

This phenomenon is not new, as at every period in its development,
since the beginning of the modern era, international law which is essen-
tially a customary law — and hence has come into being spontaneously —
has encountered situations in which the force of certain rules prevented
contrary rules from being established or maintained.

All these considerations are unfortunately obscured, in the Court’s
Advisory Opinion, by its fear of engaging in a courageous analysis of the
development over time of the General Assembly resolutions which, only
from a certain period (around the 1960s), occasioned certain clear-cut
divisions between nuclear-weapon States (and their allies) and those
States that were threatened by the bomb.

I would point out once again that the fact that a rule prohibiting
nuclear weapons began to take shape right at the beginning of the life of
the United Nations does not mean that the development of that tendency
and, as a consequence, the development of its propulsive force, were not
cut short at the time when the two principal Powers, both in possession
of nuclear weapons, embarked on the cold war and developed a whole

63
THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (DECL. FERRARI BRAVO) 286

body of instruments — even treaties and conventions — that were
focused upon the idea of deterrence. However, this only prevented the
implementation of the prohibition (that could only be achieved by means
of negotiations), whereas the prohibition as such — the “naked” prohibi-
tion, if I may express myself thus — has remained the same and still oper-
ates, at least as regards the burden of proof, rendering it more difficult
for the nuclear-weapon States to justify themselves by references to vari-
ous applications of the theory of deterrence which, as I said before, is not
a legal theory.

In other words, one must, by a legal instrument (the agreement) ward
off the danger of an entity — the atomic weapon — which as such has
nothing legal about it, without its being possible, in any given case, to
verify whether the proposed solutions hold good or not. Such a verifica-
tion would require the explosion of the bomb. But would that verification
still be meaningful, in that event?

This element of normative imbalance between the reasons advanced by
the nuclear-weapon States and those advanced by the non-nuclear-
weapon States should and could have been placed on record by the Court
carefully, rather than in the sometimes contradictory manner in which it
is perceived in the Advisory Opinion.

(Signed) L. FERRARI BRAVo.

64