111

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

Reasons for dissenting opinion — Unable to justify Advisory Opinion on the
face of the Convention, general principles of justice and peculiar circumstances
of this case — Dispute not about human rights of Special Rapporteur or
whether Government of Malaysia is in breach of its obligations under Human
Rights Conventions to which it is a party — Dispute is about whether Special
Rapporteur is immune from legal process for words spoken in performance of
his mandate and Malaysia’s obligations — Circumstances of the case — Inter-
view given to International Commercial Litigation — Defamation lawsuits —
Finding by Secretary-General that Special Rapporteur immune from legal pro-
cess — Differences between Organization and Government of Malaysia — Mat-
ter referred to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) by Secretary-General
— ECOSOC’s formulation of question — ECOSOC entitled to formulate ques-
tion but real question must be answered by Court — Court should have exer-
cised discretion and declined to answer question because of its role as a judicial
organ — For Court to determine applicability of Convention necessary to
enquire into the merits — Insufficient for Court to rely on finding of another
organ — Court's statement that United Nations experts must take care not to
exceed scope of their mandate not without particular import and significance in
this case — Obligation of Malaysia one of result and not of means — Conven-
tion does not stipulate particular method of implementation — Even in exercis-
ing advisory function, Court should not depart from essential rules guiding its
activity as a judicial organ.

1. Much as I would have liked to vote in favour of the Advisory Opin-
ion, as it might assist in settling the differences which had arisen between
the United Nations and the Government of Malaysia with regard to the
interpretation and application of the General Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Conven-
tion”), however, in view of the fact that the Opinion is to be regarded as
an authoritative legal pronouncement by the Court on the Convention,
and is to be accepted as decisive by the Parties, and in view of the pecu-
liar circumstances surrounding the dispute, I find myself unable to sup-
port and justify the Opinion, by reason of the terms of the Convention,
the general principles of justice, the peculiarities of the dispute and my
own legal conscience. 1 have therefore been constrained to vote largely
against the Opinion and my views for doing so are set out in this opinion.

2. At the outset it should be noted that this dispute is not about the

53
112 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

human rights of Mr. Cumaraswamy, Special Rapporteur of the Human
Rights Commission, as such. Nor is it about whether Malaysia is in
breach of its obligations under the Human Rights Conventions to which
it is a party. The dispute is about whether Article VI, Section 22, of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is
applicable to Mr. Cumaraswamy — that is to say, whether words spoken
or written by him were done so in his capacity as Special Rapporteur and
in the course of the performance of his mission — and about the legal
obligations of Malaysia.

3. The circumstances of this case are unusual. According to the
material presented to the Court, Mr. Cumaraswamy, in an interview pub-
lished in the 5 November 1995 issue of the magazine International Com-
mercial Litigation, and in which he was referred to as Special Rapporteur
on the independence of judges and lawyers, was reported to have said
with reference to a specific case (the Ayer Molek case), that it looked like
“a very obvious, perhaps even glaring example of judge-choosing”, while
stressing that he had not finished his investigation. Mr. Cumaraswamy
was also quoted as having said: “Complaints are rife that certain highly
placed personalities in the business and corporate sectors are able to
manipulate the Malaysian system of justice.” He added: “But I do not
want any of the people involved to think I have made up my mind.” He
was further reported to have said: “It would be unfair to name any
names, but there is some concern about this among foreign businessmen
based in Malaysia, particularly those who have litigation pending.”

4. Asa result of that interview a number of lawsuits were filed against
Mr. Cumaraswamy by companies and individuals asserting that the pub-
lished article contained defamatory words that had “brought them into
public scandal, odium and contempt”, and sued for damages including
exemplary damages for slander.

5. The Legal Counsel of the United Nations acting on behalf of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and later the Secretary-General
himself, having considered the circumstances of the interview and the
controverted passages of the interview, determined that Mr. Cumara-
swamy was interviewed in his official capacity as Special Rapporteur and
requested the Malaysian authorities to promptly advise the Malaysian
courts of the Special Rapporteur’s immunity from legal process with
respect to the lawsuits.

6. On 12 March 1997 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia
filed a certificate with the trial court in which that court was invited to
determine at its own discretion whether immunity applied, the certificate
having stated that this was the case “only in respect of words spoken or
written and acts done by him in the course of the performance of his mis-
sion”.

7. On 28 June 1997 the Judge of the Malaysian High Court concluded

54
113 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

that she was “unable to hold that the Defendant is absolutely protected
by the immunity he claims”, in part because she considered that the Sec-
retary-General’s note was merely “an opinion” with scant probative
value and no binding force upon the court and that the Minister for For-
eign Affairs’ certificate “would appear to be no more than a bland state-
ment as to a state of fact pertaining to the Defendant’s status and man-
date as a Special Rapporteur and appears to have room for interpreta-
tion”. The Malaysian court ordered that the Special Rapporteur’s motion
be dismissed with costs; that the costs be taxed and paid forthwith by
him and that he file and serve his defence within 14 days. On 8 July the
Court of Appeal of Malaysia dismissed Mr. Cumaraswamy’s motion for
a stay of execution.

8. After efforts to resolve the dispute did not materialize in a negoti-
ated settlement, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy advised that the
matter should be referred to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.
The Government of Malaysia acknowledged the Organization’s right to
refer the matter to the Council to request an advisory opinion in accord-
ance with Section 30 of the Convention, advised the Secretary-General’s
Special Envoy that the United Nations should proceed to do so, and indi-
cated that, while it would make its own presentation to the International
Court of Justice, it did not oppose the submission of the matter to the
Court through the Council.

9. The note by the Secretary-General (E/1998/94), referring the matter
to the Council, concluded with a paragraph 21 containing a proposal for
two questions to be submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion:

“Ol...

‘Considering the difference that has arisen between the United
Nations and the Government of Malaysia with respect to the
immunity from legal process of Mr. Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, in
respect of certain words spoken by him:

1. Subject only to Section 30 of the Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the United Nations, does the Secretary-
General of the United Nations have the exclusive authority to
determine whether words were spoken in the course of the per-
formance of a mission for the United Nations within the meaning
of Section 22 (6) of the Convention?

2. In accordance with Section 34 of the Convention, once the
Secretary-General has determined that such words were spoken in
the course of the performance of a mission and has decided to
maintain, or not to waive, the immunity from legal process, does
the Government of a Member State party to the Convention have
an obligation to give effect to that immunity in its national courts

55
114 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

and, if failing to do so, to assume responsibility for, and any costs,
expenses and damages arising from, any legal proceedings brought
in respect of such words?

399

10. Section 30 of the Convention provides:

“Section 30: All differences arising out of the interpretation or
application of the present convention shall be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the
parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a differ-
ence arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Mem-
ber on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory
opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96
of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The
opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the
parties.”

11. After considering the note by the Secretary-General, ECOSOC,
without any explanation, changed the question, as it was entitled to do,
and requested the Court to render an advisory opinion

“on the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22,
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations in the case of Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence
of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out
in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General, and on
the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case”.

Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immuni-
ties of the United Nations provides that

“Section 22. Experts (other than officials coming within the scope
of Article V) performing missions for the United Nations shall be
accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions during the period of their mis-
sions, including the time spent on journeys in connection with their
missions. In particular they shall be accorded:

(b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in
the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from
legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process
shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons
concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United
Nations.” (Emphasis added.)

In other words, the Convention would be applicable to an expert in
respect of words spoken or written and acts done by him in the course of
the performance of his mission.

56
115 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

12. The Court in its Advisory Opinion reached the conclusion that
Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention is applicable in the case of
Mr. Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and that Mr. Cuma-
raswamy is entitled to immunity from legal process of any kind for the
words spoken by him during an interview as published in an article in
the November 1995 issue of /nternational Commercial Litigation.

13. In my respectful opinion, for the Court to conclude that the Con-
vention is applicable to Mr. Cumaraswamy in this case, that question is
intrinsically and inextricably related to a finding whether the contro-
verted words were spoken in the course of the performance of his mis-
sion. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to reach such a conclusion
by applying only the first part of the provision. It would also be injudi-
cious as well as insufficient for the Court in making such a determination
to rely on the findings of some other organ or institution to reach its con-
clusion, as the Court would appear to have done in this case. The refer-
ences (see paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Opinion) to the authority and
responsibility of the Secretary-General as chief administrative officer of
the Organization and protector of the mission with which an expert 1s
entrusted are, while incontestable, irrelevant to the question posed by
ECOSOC. Indeed, the Court itself has stated that it is the Council’s ques-
tion as formulated which is to be answered by the Court. It cannot there-
fore be both ways. Nor, in my view, is it necessarily conclusive that

“In the present case, the Secretary-General, or the Legal Counsel
of the United Nations on his behalf, has on numerous occasions
informed the Government of Malaysia of his finding that Mr. Cuma-
raswamy had spoken the words quoted in the article in /nternational
Commercial Litigation in his capacity as Special Rapporteur of the
Commission and that he consequently was entitled to immunity
from ‘every kind’ of legal process.”

While such information is to be given due weight and respect, the Con-
vention does not stipulate that it is conclusive, let alone binding. Nor
should it be considered adequate in order for the Convention to be appli- -
cable, or for the judicial purposes of this case, that it has become stand-
ard practice for Special Rapporteurs of the Commission to have contact
with the media. It is one thing to have contact with the media to enable
a Special Rapporteur to carry out his mandate, but, as the Court implied
in paragraph 66 of the Advisory Opinion, special rapporteurs, like all
agents of the United Nations, must take care not to exceed the scope of
their functions, and must express themselves with requisite prudence so
as to remain within their mandate.

57
116 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

14. The question whether the Convention ts applicable to Mr. Cumara-
swamy is one of mixed law and fact, and would have required the Court
not only to undertake an interpretation of the Convention but an enquiry
into the facts before arriving at its conclusion. It therefore does not seem
sufficient for this case for the Court to conclude that the Convention is
applicable to Mr. Cumaraswamy based on the formality of his appoint-
ment as Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, or on the
fact that he may have been entrusted not only to do research but also
with the task of monitoring human rights violations and reporting on
them. With respect, notwithstanding his appointment or the fact that he
has been entrusted with a mission by the United Nations, this does not of
itself allow a special rapporteur to operate outside his mandate, and
whether or not the Special Rapporteur was acting within the scope of his
mandate, given the facts and circumstances of this case, ought to have
been enquired into for the Court to be in a position to conclude that the
Convention is applicable to him. It is also my considered view that this
requirement is not vitiated or become superfluous by the fact that it has
become standard practice for special rapporteurs of the Human Rights
Commission to have contact with the media. Having contact with the
media cannot be regarded as a licence for a special rapporteur to operate
outside his mandate; whether or not the Special Rapporteur did so or not
in this particular case and for the purposes of the Convention is a matter
to be determined by the Court before it can conclude that the Convention
is applicable.

15. It is also my considered opinion that this request for an advisory
opinion, because of the peculiar circumstances! of the dispute, the issues
it involves, and its implication for the judicial character and function of
the Court, ought not to have been submitted to the Court. The dispute
between the Organization and the Government of Malaysia should rather
have been resolved on the basis of Article VIII — Settlement of Disputes
— (Section 29) of the Convention which provides as follows

“Section 29. The United Nations shall make provisions for appro-
priate modes of settlement of:

(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private
law character to which the United Nations is a party.”

On the other hand, once the request had been submitted, the Court
should have exercised its judicial discretion and declined to answer the
question put to it. Nor do I find the argument persuasive that, because no
party had argued against giving the advisory opinion, the Court should
therefore have rendered an opinion. For the Court itself has emphasized

' See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations
(Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948, 1 C.J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 61.

58
117 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

that it is the guardian of its role as a judicial organ and has made it clear
that, although it considers the rendering of an advisory opinion as a duty,
at the same time, as a judicial organ, it has certain limits to its duty to
reply to a request for an opinion*. The Court should not have felt con-
strained to exercise its discretion of not answering the question as formu-
lated because of the Advisory Opinion it had earlier rendered in the
Mazilu case*. In my view, not only is the instant case not identical with
Mazilu, but the circumstances are entirely different. Had due account
been taken of those differences as well as of the peculiar circumstances, a
different conclusion might have been reached.

16. Furthermore, and as noted earlier, the note of the Secretary-Gen-
eral referring this matter to ECOSOC concluded with a paragraph 21 in
which he proposed two questions to be submitted to the Court for an
advisory opinion.

17. The Council, after considering the note at the forty-seventh and
forty-eighth meetings of its substantive session held on 31 July 1998 and
pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations
and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 89 (1) authorizing
the Council to request an advisory opinion from the Court, adopted deci-
sion 1998/297, in which it requested the Court to give an opinion, on a
priority basis, on

“the legal question of the applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations in the case of Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy as Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the independence
of judges and lawyers, taking into account the circumstances set out
in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secretary-General, and on
the legal obligations of Malaysia in this case”.

18. As indicated in paragraph 33 of the Advisory Opinion, following
submission of the request to the Court, the Legal Counsel of the United
Nations presented a written statement on behalf of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, in which he requested the Court:

“to establish that, subject to Article VIII, Sections 29 and 30 of the
Convention, the Secretary-General has exclusive authority to deter-
mine whether or not words or acts are spoken, written or done in the
course of the performance of a mission for the United Nations and
whether such words or acts fall within the scope of the mandate
entrusted to a United Nations expert on mission”.

2 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase,
LC J. Reports 1950, p. 71.

3 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, L C.J. Reports 1989, p. 177.

59
118 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

19. Similarly, States participating in the proceedings expressed varying
views as to whether the General Convention requires dispositive legal
effect to be given to the Secretary-General’s determination. According to
the United States, “the views of the Secretary-General in a given case are
highly relevant” (emphasis added); the United Kingdom takes the posi-
tion that it is “essential that all due weight is given to [the views of the
Secretary-General] by the national courts” (emphasis added). Italy had
expressed the following viewpoint on the issue:

“once... a decision has been adopted, both the government and the
judicial authorities of the State where the issue of immunity has been
raised are nonetheless obliged to give immediate and careful consid-
eration to the delicate problems of immunity, and they must take
due account of the weight to be accorded to the determination made
in this regard by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It would be going too far to say that this imposes a legal duty on
the courts of the State where the issue of immunity has been raised to
stay all proceedings until the issue of immunity has been settled at
the international level. But, at the very least, it is to be expected that
those courts would display caution by avoiding hasty decisions
which might entail responsibility on the part of that State.” (Empha-
sis added.)

20. Malaysia, for its part, as stated in the Advisory Opinion, con-
tended that the advisory opinion of the Court should be restricted to the
existing difference between the United Nations and Malaysia, which in
its view consists of the question, as formulated by the Secretary-General
himself, whether the Secretary-General of the United Nations has the
exclusive authority to determine whether words or acts of an expert on
mission are spoken, written or done in the course of the performance of
his or her mission and if, in consequence, the expert is entitled to immu-
nity from legal process pursuant to Section 22 (6) of the General Con-
vention. In its written statement Malaysia maintains that it

“considers that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has not
been vested with the exclusive authority to determine whether words
were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission for the
United Nations within the meaning of Section 22 (6) of the Conven-
tion”.

In its oral pleadings, Malaysia maintained that

“in implementing Section 30, ECOSOC is merely a vehicle for
placing a difference between the Secretary-General and Malaysia
before the Court. ECOSOC does not have an independent position
to assert as it might have had were it seeking an opinion on some
legal question other than in the context in the operation of Section 30.
ECOSOC .. . is no more than an instrument of reference, it cannot

60
119 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

change the nature of the difference or alter the content of the ques-
tion.” (Emphasis added.)

21. In the light of the foregoing, it is to be observed that the question
asked by ECOSOC corresponds neither with the questions proposed by
the Secretary-General in his note to ECOSOC nor with those same issues
as were raised and discussed by the participating States in their written
statements or at the oral proceedings. A difference exists between the
legal question posed by ECOSOC relating to the applicability of Ar-
ticle VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, and the one recommended by the Secretary-Gen-
eral and understood and addressed by Malaysia and a number of partici-
pating States, which concerns the issue of whether the Secretary-General
of the United Nations is vested with exclusive authority to determine
whether words were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission
for the United Nations and whether such words fall within the meaning
of Section 22 (b) of the Convention.

22. Where a request to the Court for an advisory opinion involving the
interpretation and application of the Convention is in conformity with
Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, that is to say it con-
tains an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is
required, and is also in conformity with Article 96 of the Charter, then it
would appear, as in this case, formally to meet all the required criteria for
the Court to perform its advisory function. However, notwithstanding
the fulfilment of such procedural criteria, the Court has in the past taken
the position that, while it is in principle under a duty to give an answer to
a request, it need not give the opinion requested. In other words, the
Court will answer the real question as it sees it, even though it is bound
by the request*. Accordingly, the Court has stated that, in answering a
question, it must have full liberty to consider all the relevant data and
circumstances available to enable it to form an opinion on the question
submitted to it for an advisory opinion.

23. As pointed out above, in this instant matter not only is the ques-
tion posed by ECOSOC not identical with that which had been proposed
to it by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for submission to
the Court, and which had constituted the difference between the Secre-
tary-General and Malaysia and was also the question which the majority
of the States that participated in the proceedings had addressed, but there
is in fact no dispute between Malaysia and the United Nations whether

4 Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol,
Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 16, Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1 CJ.
Reports 1950, p. 65, and ibid, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, LC.J. Reports 1950,
p. 221.

61
120 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

the Convention applies to the Special Rapporteur as such, which as we
have seen is not the real question.

24. Accordingly, either the dispute should have been properly pre-
sented to the Court or the Court’s judicial character should have been
observed. While it is for ECOSOC to formulate the question to be sub-
mitted to the Court for an advisory opinion, the Court is, however, not
obliged to answer such a question, if it would have a negative implication
for its judicial character and function. The Court is enjoined by its Stat-
ute to observe the principles of judicial integrity, even in exercising its
advisory jurisdiction, and not to lose sight of its judicial character. Its
role as a judicial organ would come under a cloud, not to say be
impaired, where a question submitted to it was formulated in such a way
as to appear tendentious or ambiguous or have as its underlying purpose
to support or promote a particular point of view, or merely to obtain a
judicial affirmation of that viewpoint. If a question submitted to the
Court were to appear to suffer from any of these defects, I consider it the
Court’s duty and an exercise of the judicial function as well as in the
interest of justice that it should decline to answer the question as submit-
ted and not give a judgment which cannot be obtained by the proper pro-
cedure. In other words, where it would appear that the object of a request
to the Court is simply to obtain a formal endorsement of the requesting
party’s position, the Court, as a judicial body, should decline to answer
the question. The Court cannot dissociate itself from the effect to which
its decision is going to be put. This is all the more so in the instant case,
whose specific facts and circumstances are so very different from the
Mazilu case, where the Court had held that

“Section 22 of the General Convention is applicable to persons
(other than United Nations officials) to whom a mission has been
entrusted by the Organization and who are therefore entitled to
enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in this Section with
a view to the independent exercise of their functions.”* (Emphasis
added.)

25. It is also worth recalling that, under Section 30 of the Convention,
the advisory opinion given in this case is to be regarded as decisive and
binding and would have effect for the State concerned. Indeed, in para-
graph 39 of the Advisory Opinion the Court stated that the request of the
Council does not only pertain to the threshold question but also to the
consequences of the answer thereto. In my view, for a judicial determina-
tion of the consequences to be reached, the Court would have to enter

5 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, LC.J. Reports 1989, pp. 195-196.

62
121 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

into the merits of the dispute, as the question whether words spoken were
done in performance of a mission is one of mixed law and fact. The
Court, in determining whether words spoken by the Special Rapporteur
were spoken in the performance of his mission and whether he is there-
fore entitled to immunity, must do so in the light of all the circumstances
of the case.

26. The question whether, in this case, the Convention is applicable to
Mr. Cumaraswamy and the obligations of Malaysia thereunder is not an
abstract one. Nor did the question require clarification as in the Peace
Treaties case. Viewed from this perspective, the Convention would be
applicable to Mr. Cumaraswamy as Special Rapporteur of the Human
Rights Commission and therefore an expert under the Convention, if the
words spoken were done in the performance of his mandate. Malaysia, as
a party to the Convention, would be under obligation to afford Mr.
Cumaraswamy such immunities. The request asked to take into account
the circumstances set out in paragraphs 1 to 15 of the note by the Secre-
tary-General. What the Court had to determine was whether the Conven-
tion should be applicable to the Special Rapporteur and whether he
should therefore be immune from legal process of every kind, in respect
of words spoken in the performance of his mission, a matter, which in my
view, is one for assessment by the Court.

27. The Court’s statement in paragraph 56 of the Advisory Opinion
that it is not called upon in the present case to pass upon, to adjudge, the
aptness of the terms used by a Special Rapporteur, or his assessment of
the situation, but that in any event, and in view of all the circumstances of
this case, it is of the opinion that the Secretary-General correctly found
that Mr. Cumaraswamy, in speaking the words quoted in the article,
was acting in the course of the performance of his mission as Special
Rapporteur of the Commission is not without import and significance in
terms of this case. The Court also found it necessary to warn that

“It need hardly be said that all agents of the United Nations, in
whatever official capacity they act, must take care not to exceed the
scope of their functions, and should so comport themselves as to
avoid claims against the United Nations”.

I fully concur with these statements of the Court.

28. I have voted against operative paragraph 2, as I consider it is not
the proper response to the question posed to the Court. I also voted
against that paragraph because Malaysia’s obligation under the Conven-
tion is one of result and not one of method of implementation of the obli-
gation. In this regard the Court stated in paragraph 60 of the Advisory
Opinion that the Secretary-General has the authority to request (empha-
sis added) the Government of a member State to bring his finding to the
knowledge of the local courts if acts of an agent have given rise to court
proceedings. In my view, whereas the Secretary-General is authorized to

63
122 IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

make such request, how a party implements its obligations under the
Convention is a matter for that State. The Court was not asked to pass
on the means or methods of implementation. Once the Court has
responded that the Convention is applicable to the matter, Malaysia
would assume its obligations, including making Mr. Cumaraswamy finan-
cially harmless for any taxed costs imposed upon him. To have included
this as an operative paragraph was unnecessary. Nor does the Conven-
tion stipulate any particular method of implementation, or for that mat-
ter a uniform method of implementation. Therefore, to hold a State in
breach of its obligation for not adopting a particular method or means of
implementing or achieving the object appears to find no justification on
the face of the Convention.

29. Finally, I share the Court’s position as reflected in its jurispru-
dence that its response to a request for an advisory opinion should be
seen as participation in the work of the Organization with a view to the
achievement of its aims and objectives, and that only compelling reasons
should restrain the Court from answering a request. I, however, consider
it more important that this Court, as a judicial organ, cannot and should
not, even in giving an advisory opinion, depart from the essential rules
guiding its activity as a court®.

(Signed) Abdul G. Koroma.

® Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.LJ., Series B, No. 5, p. 27.

64


260

DECLARATION OF JUDGE ODA

1. I voted in favour of the Court’s Order with great hesitation as
I believed and I still believe that the request for the indication of provi-
sional measures of protection submitted by Paraguay to the Court should
have been dismissed. However, in the limited time — one or two days —
given to the Court to deal with this matter, | have found it impossible to
develop my points sufficiently to persuade my colleagues to alter their
position.

2. First of all, I would like to express some of my thoughts in connec-
tion with this request.

I can, on humanitarian grounds, understand the plight of Mr. Breard
and recognize that owing to the fact that Paraguay filed this request on
3 April 1998, his fate now, albeit unreasonably, lies in the hands of the
Court.

I would like to add, however, that, if Mr. Breard’s rights as they relate
to humanitarian issues are to be respected then, in parallel, the matter of
the rights of victims of violent crime (a point which has often been over-
looked) should be taken into consideration. It should also be noted that
since his arrest, Mr. Breard has been treated fairly in all legal proceedings
within the American judicial system governed by the rule of law.

The Court cannot act as a court of criminal appeal and cannot be peti-
tioned for writs of habeas corpus. The Court does not have jurisdiction to
decide matters relating to capital punishment and its execution, and
should not intervene in such matters.

* Ok

3. As stated earlier, Paraguay’s request was presented to the Court on
3 April 1998 in connection with and at the same time as its Application
instituting proceedings against the United States for violations of the
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Paraguay’s Application
was unilaterally submitted to the Court on the basis of the Optional Pro-
tocol. I very much doubt that, on the date of filing of the Application and
the request, there was any “dispute[s] arising out of the interpretation or
application of the [Vienna] Convention” (Optional Protocol, Article I).

If there was any dispute between Paraguay and the United States con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, it
could have been that the United States was presumed to have violated the

16
261 VIENNA CONVENTION (DECL. ODA)

Convention at the time of the arrest of Mr. Breard in 1992, as the United
States did not inform the Paraguayan consul of that event.

This issue was raised by Paraguay when it became aware of Mr.
Breard’s situation. In 1996, negotiations took place between Paraguay
and the United States concerning the consular function provided for
under the Convention. In July 1997, the United States proceeded to
remedy the violation by sending a letter to the Government of Paraguay
apologizing for its failure to inform the consul of the events concerning
Mr. Breard and giving an assurance that this failure would not be
repeated in future. In my view, the United States was thus released from
its responsibility for violation of the Vienna Convention.

From that time, the question of violation of the Vienna Convention,
which may have led to a dispute concerning its application and interpre-
tation, no longer existed. However, this question was raised once more
on 3 April 1998, the date on which Paraguay’s Application was filed.

4. What did Paraguay ask the Court to decide in its Application of
3 April 1998? Paraguay asked mainly for a decision relating to
Mr. Breard’s personal situation, namely, his pending execution by the
competent authorities of the State of Virginia.

Paraguay requested restitutio in integrum. However, if consular con-
tact had occurred at the time of Mr. Breard’s arrest or detention, the
judicial procedure in the United States domestic courts relating to his
case would have been no different. This point was clarified in the course
of the oral pleadings.

* Ox

5. I would like to turn to some general issues relating to provisional
measures. First, as a general rule, provisional measures are granted in
order to preserve rights exposed to imminent breach which is irreparable
and these rights must be those to be considered at the merits stage of the
case, and must constitute the subject-matter of the Application or be
directly related to it. In this case, however, there is no question of such
rights (of States parties), as provided for by the Vienna Convention,
being exposed to an imminent irreparable breach.

6. Secondly, in order that provisional measures may be granted by the
Court, the Court has to have, at the very least, prima facie jurisdiction to
deal with the issues concerning the rights of the States parties. However
I believe that, as regards the present request for provisional measures, the
Court does not even have prima facie jurisdiction to handle this matter.

7. Thirdly, if the request in the present case had not been granted, the
Application itself would have become meaningless. If that had been the
case, then I would have had no hesitation in pointing out that the request
for provisional measures should not be used to ensure that the main

17
262 VIENNA CONVENTION (DECL. ODA)

Application continue. In addition the request for provisional measures
should not be used by applicants for the purpose of obtaining interim
judgments that would affirm their own rights and predetermine the main
case.

8. I have thus explained why I formed the view that, given the funda-
mental nature of provisional measures, those measures should not have
been indicated upon Paraguay’s request.

I reiterate, however, that I voted in favour of the Order, for humani-
tarian reasons, and in view of the fact that, if the execution were to be
carried out on 14 April 1998, whatever findings the Court might have
reached might be without object.

(Signed) Shigeru ODA.

18


                                                                                164

                  OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC BERMAN

                [Traduction]

                   Appel devant être rejeté mais Cour ayant manqué une occasion d’apporter les
                éclaircissements qui s’imposaient concernant l’article 84 de la convention de
                Chicago — Enoncé distinct selon lequel le Conseil de l’OACI a « compétence »
                n’étant pas demandé dans les conclusions des Parties et risquant, s’il n’est pas assorti
                de précisions ou d’explications, de faire naître méprise ou confusion à l’avenir —
                Nombreuses difficultés dans la compréhension et l’interprétation de l’article 84 en soi
                et à la lumière des pouvoirs que la convention de Chicago confère par ailleurs au
                Conseil — Cour et Parties n’ayant pas tenté de démêler pourquoi l’article 84 porte
                principalement sur les « désaccords » et non les différends — Différend présupposant
                un désaccord, mais désaccord ne constituant pas nécessairement un différend —
                Raisons multiples liées à la nature, à la composition et au mode opératoire du
                Conseil, ainsi qu’au Règlement qu’il a lui‑même établi, démontrant qu’il ne s’agit pas
                d’un organe judiciaire dont les fonctions de règlement des différends auraient un
                caractère judiciaire justifiant le terme « compétence » — Fonctions du Conseil
                consistant plutôt à rendre des décisions faisant autorité, fondées sur son expertise
                dans un domaine spécialisé, dans le cadre ou non de différends particuliers entre
                Etats — Pareille interprétation étant conforme aux termes de la convention et aux
                réalités pratiques, et permettant de préciser et de faciliter le rôle de la Cour elle‑même
                dans le cadre de sa fonction d’appel — Nécessité d’attendre une occasion future de
                trancher ces questions, celles‑ci n’ayant regrettablement pas été soulevées par les
                Parties — Absence d’effet restrictif sur la compétence du Conseil du choix des
                demandeurs d’invoquer un moyen de défense étranger à la convention de Chicago
                impliquant que ledit choix ne puisse pas non plus étendre les responsabilités conférées
                au Conseil par l’article 84, et regret que la Cour n’ait pas été disposée à le dire —
                Regret que la Cour n’ait pas examiné de manière plus nuancée le traitement cavalier
                réservé aux considérations relatives à la régularité de la procédure dans l’arrêt de
                1972 — Nécessité de ne pas donner la moindre impression qu’un vice grave de
                procédure n’est pas source de préoccupation pour la Cour ou pourrait, s’il se
                produisait, entraîner la nullité d’une décision du Conseil ou priver celle‑ci d’effet
                juridique — Cour ayant à juste titre rappelé que l’article 84 lui‑même impose au
                Conseil de respecter certaines obligations juridiques de fond, notamment celle de
                motiver ses décisions, pour donner effet aux fonctions d’appel de la Cour.

                   1. C’est sans grande difficulté que je m’associe à la décision de la Cour
                de rejeter le présent appel. Les Etats demandeurs n’ont établi aucun des
                trois moyens d’appel qu’ils avancent contre la décision du Conseil de
                l’OACI (désigné ci‑après, pour plus de commodité, le « Conseil »), ce dont
                il découle inévitablement que l’appel, en tant que tel, doit être rejeté. La
                Cour a toutefois estimé utile d’ajouter, dans la seconde partie du disposi-
                tif de son arrêt, une conclusion formelle à l’effet de dire que le Conseil « a
                compétence pour connaître » de la requête dont il a été saisi par le Qatar.
                Cet énoncé de large portée n’est guère en rapport avec les conclusions
                réellement présentées à la Cour par l’une et l’autre des Parties. En outre,
                il risque fort, s’il n’est pas assorti de précisions ou d’explications, de faire

                                                                                87

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 171                                                                                12/07/21 13:57

                                            conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)           165

                naître méprise ou confusion dans l’application future de l’article 84 de la
                convention de Chicago. Or, la Cour n’ayant pas saisi cette occasion pour
                apporter dans son arrêt les explications, ou même les précisions, qui s’im-
                posaient, je me suis trouvé contraint de voter contre le point 2) du para-
                graphe 126. Je souhaite ici expliquer les raisons de ce choix, dans l’espoir
                que cela pourra présenter une réelle utilité pour le Conseil lorsque, à
                l’avenir, celui‑ci exécutera la tâche difficile et aux contours peu nets qui
                lui a été confiée par l’article 84. Quoique mes réflexions puissent se révéler
                plus utiles, en pratique, dans le cas d’une décision définitive que le Conseil
                rendrait au fond sur une question d’interprétation ou d’application de la
                convention de Chicago, elles ne sont pas pour autant dépourvues de per-
                tinence dans une procédure d’appel portant sur ce que l’arrêt désigne
                comme une question de « compétence » présageant une décision ultérieure
                sur le fond.
                   2. L’article 84 est une disposition complexe et problématique qui sou-
                lève de nombreuses questions quant à son interprétation, ainsi que des
                incertitudes sur l’intention qui sous‑tendait sa rédaction. Il est peu surpre-
                nant de constater, dans les documents historiques, que cette disposition a
                régulièrement suscité, au sein même du Conseil, perplexité et inquiétude
                sur ce que celui‑ci pouvait et devait faire — et selon quelles modalités —
                pour exécuter le mandat que lui confie l’article 84. C’est ce que traduisent
                en grande partie les controverses et incertitudes qui ont marqué les choix
                opérés par l’OACI dans son traitement de la plainte initiale du Qatar, et
                qui se sont à nouveau manifestées dans la présente procédure devant la
                Cour.
                   3. Si l’article 84 est relativement clair — ou, à tout le moins, suffisam-
                ment clair (voir toutefois, sur ce point, les paragraphes 12 et 18 ci‑après) —
                quant à la compétence conférée à la Cour en matière d’appel, il l’est
                beaucoup moins en ce qui concerne le pouvoir qu’il vise à confier au
                Conseil de l’OACI en sus de ceux qui découlent des autres dispositions de
                la convention de Chicago, envisagée dans son ensemble. Ainsi, le Conseil
                a déjà pour fonctions « obligatoires » 1, selon l’article 54, d’« examiner
                toute question relative à la Convention dont il est saisi par un Etat
                contractant », et de « signaler aux Etats contractants toute infraction à la
                présente Convention ». Ce qu’apporte l’article 84 doit donc concerner la
                nature ou le statut juridique de la décision que rend le Conseil sur une
                requête dont il est saisi en vertu de cette disposition, et non sa compétence
                pour connaître de cette requête. En employant, dans le dispositif, le terme
                « compétence » — avec toutes les notions de pouvoir et de procédure judi-
                ciaires qui lui sont généralement associées — au sujet des fonctions que
                tient le Conseil de l’article 84, la Cour a regrettablement contribué à
                maintenir cette confusion au lieu de s’employer à la dissiper.
                   4. Selon son libellé, l’article 84 parle des « désaccords » entre Etats
                contractants « à propos de » l’interprétation ou l’application de la conven-
                tion. Quoique le terme « différends » apparaisse dans l’intitulé de l’article
                    1    Le terme est tiré de l’intitulé de l’article 54.

                                                                                88

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 173                                                                           12/07/21 13:57

                                       conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)                                 166

                et figure également, au singulier, à deux reprises dans son texte même, ce
                à quoi l’article ouvre la voie et ce sur quoi le Conseil doit donc « sta-
                tue[r] », ce sont les « désaccord[s] entre deux ou plusieurs Etats contrac-
                tants » qui, s’ils ne sont pas réglés entre ces derniers, peuvent être soumis
                au Conseil par tout Etat « impliqué dans » le désaccord en question. On
                ne peut que regretter que la Cour ne se soit aucunement intéressée à l’em-
                ploi que fait l’article 84 de ces deux termes distincts. C’est évidemment à
                juste titre qu’elle souligne (au paragraphe 29), en se référant à l’arrêt
                qu’elle a rendu en l’affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine
                (arrêt no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A no 2), que l’existence d’un « différend »
                présuppose celle d’un « désaccord » ; toutefois, cela n’implique nullement
                qu’un désaccord constitue nécessairement un différend. On pourrait sans
                aucune difficulté attribuer à chacun de ces deux termes, tels qu’ils sont
                employés dans le présent contexte, tout le sens qui lui est propre, afin
                d’éclairer le rôle et la fonction que confère l’article 84 au Conseil.
                   5. Si l’article 84, pris dans son ensemble, s’inscrit donc assurément,
                dans une certaine mesure, dans le régime du « règlement des différends »
                — au sens large et œcuménique de l’article 33 de la Charte des
                Nations Unies, et des moyens tels que la négociation, l’enquête, la média-
                tion ou la conciliation qui y sont mentionnés —, les termes employés ne
                sont toutefois pas ceux du règlement judiciaire. Or, c’est bien le règlement
                judiciaire qui emporte la notion de « compétence », ou « juridiction » (jus
                dicere), et, partant, celle de résultat juridiquement contraignant qui
                découle de son exercice.
                   6. La Cour a, là encore à juste titre, clairement indiqué que le Conseil
                ne saurait être considéré comme un organe judiciaire, quel que soit le sens
                ordinaire attribué à ce terme. Au paragraphe 60 de l’arrêt, elle l’explique
                par certaines raisons impérieuses, qui peuvent aisément être complétées
                d’autres éléments, notamment le fait, largement mentionné dans les argu-
                mentations respectives des Parties, que les membres du Conseil sont répu-
                tés agir selon les instructions de leurs gouvernements, y compris dans
                l’exercice des fonctions que leur confère l’article 84. Il convient, de mon
                point de vue, d’y ajouter un autre facteur, peut‑être plus important
                encore, soit le fait que le Conseil lui‑même, lorsqu’il a établi son propre
                Règlement aux fins de la mise en œuvre de l’article 84 2, a expressément
                fait fond sur la notion de « désaccord » ne pouvant être « réglé par voie de
                négociation » qui figure dans cet article. Il s’est ainsi imposé l’obligation
                (article 6 du Règlement) de rechercher dès le début s’il y a lieu d’inviter les
                Etats concernés à entrer en négociation directe, s’autorisant même expres-
                sément à, notamment, suspendre sa procédure à cet effet, prêter assistance
                aux parties, désigner des conciliateurs ou encore faire procéder à des
                enquêtes et des expertises (articles 8 et 14 du Règlement). Ces mesures
                sont naturellement et généralement associées aux prérogatives de l’organe
                exécutif suprême d’un organisme technique de premier plan, ou à celles

                   2 Lequel est d’ailleurs intitulé « Règlement pour la solution des différends » (les italiques

                sont de moi).

                                                                                89

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 175                                                                                12/07/21 13:57

                                       conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)                                167

                d’un amiable compositeur, mais pas à celles d’une instance judiciaire,
                quelle qu’elle soit. Quoique la Cour aborde ce point au paragraphe 87 de
                l’arrêt, elle le fait bien trop brièvement, voire presque incidemment, et
                n’en tire donc pas les conclusions qu’elle aurait dû en tirer.
                   7. Tous les éléments qui précèdent sont si éloignés des concepts fonda-
                mentaux — ancrés dans une appréciation objective, indépendante et déta-
                chée des arguments de fait et de droit — qui sous‑tendent le règlement
                judiciaire ou juridique des différends qu’ils doivent donner à réfléchir.
                Plus précisément, ils invitent à examiner si les Etats contractants de la
                convention de Chicago, ou par la suite le Conseil lui‑même, lorsqu’il a
                entendu donner effet à leurs souhaits, ont vraiment pu envisager l’ar-
                ticle 84 comme conférant au Conseil un quelconque pouvoir judiciaire
                pour statuer, avec effet juridique contraignant, sur un différend entre des
                Etats membres A et B. On peut noter à cet égard que, si, à l’article 86, la
                convention de Chicago va jusqu’à qualifier de « définitives et obligatoires »
                les décisions rendues par la Cour (ou un tribunal d’arbitrage) siégeant en
                appel, elle ne dit rien, quelques lignes plus haut, du statut en droit d’une
                décision rendue par le Conseil sur un « désaccord entre deux ou plusieurs
                Etats contractants à propos de l’interprétation ou de l’application de
                la … Convention ».
                   8. En outre, le texte même de l’article 84 me semble révéler un autre
                indice important : il dit que le droit de faire appel d’une telle décision du
                Conseil est ouvert non pas à tout Etat « partie » à un « différend », pas
                même à tout Etat « impliqué dans un désaccord », mais à tout Etat contrac‑
                tant de la convention, sans autre précision. Si ce libellé dit bien ce qu’il
                veut dire, on est fort éloigné d’une quelconque procédure normale de
                règlement de différend, et plus encore d’une procédure comportant des
                éléments qui ne relèvent pas du régime de la convention de Chicago.
                Certes, les Parties n’ont guère abordé de questions textuelles de cette
                nature dans leurs argumentations respectives, et cela peut justifier, dans
                une certaine mesure, que la Cour ne les ait pas elle‑même examinées en
                détail. Il me paraît toutefois évident que tout arrêt reposant sur une
                notion de « compétence » doit inclure un examen préalable et rationnel de
                la nature et de la qualité réelles des pouvoirs ou prérogatives conférés à
                l’organe supposé avoir cette « compétence ». Or, cet examen passe
                lui‑même nécessairement par une analyse approfondie de l’article 84 et
                des dispositions connexes, laquelle doit être effectuée conformément à la
                formule consacrée de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, soit
                en discernant le sens ordinaire à attribuer à leurs termes dans leur contexte
                et à la lumière de l’objet et du but du traité pris dans son ensemble.
                   9. La Cour a toujours accordé une attention particulière et minutieuse
                à ce type de disposition 3. Elle était d’autant plus tenue de procéder à

                   3 Voir, tout récemment, Application de la convention internationale pour la répression

                du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les
                formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires,
                arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (II), p. 584, par. 57.

                                                                                90

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 177                                                                                12/07/21 13:57

                                    conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)                     168

                l’examen approfondi de l’interprétation qu’il convient de faire de l’ar-
                ticle 84 qu’elle était encline à attribuer audit article ce caractère de clause
                « attributive de compétence ». Plus encore, peut‑être, que toute autre dis-
                position — puisque, outre le consentement général à être lié par le traité
                dans son ensemble, elle consacre le consentement spécifique de chaque
                Etat contractant à l’exercice de la compétence et aux conséquences de cet
                exercice —, une clause réellement « attributive de compétence » doit être
                interprétée telle qu’elle est formulée, avec toutes ses difficultés et ses ambi-
                guïtés, et non de la manière dont des commentateurs l’interprétant ulté-
                rieurement l’auraient rédigée si la tâche leur en avait été confiée.
                   10. Pour toutes les raisons qui précèdent et d’autres encore, une lecture
                différente peut, à mon avis, être faite de l’article 84, tel qu’il s’inscrit dans
                la convention de Chicago dans son ensemble, et en particulier dans le
                contexte des autres pouvoirs et fonctions conférés au Conseil. Cette lec-
                ture consiste à considérer que celui‑ci est investi non pas d’une quelconque
                « compétence » pour régler des différends entre Etats membres particu-
                liers, mais d’une haute fonction administrative, fondée sur les connais-
                sances et l’expertise particulières qui sont les siennes dans le domaine de
                l’aviation civile, en vertu de laquelle il rend des décisions faisant autorité
                sur le sens à donner aux dispositions de la convention et les obligations
                qui en découlent, que ces questions s’inscrivent ou non dans le cadre de
                différends particuliers entre des Etats membres concernant leurs droits et
                obligations mutuels. Dès lors que l’on envisage les choses de ce point de
                vue, les questions en litige entre les Parties dans la présente espèce
                prennent, pour une large part, un tout autre visage et leur résolution s’en
                trouve facilitée. Tel est le cas, de fait, de nombre des questions d’interpré-
                tation textuelles soulevées ci‑dessus.
                   11. Une telle lecture de l’article 84 présenterait en outre un avantage
                inestimable, ou plutôt deux.
                   12. Tout d’abord, loin d’être, comme ce serait le cas si le Conseil avait
                un rôle de règlement des différends, soumises à la règle commune consa-
                crée par l’article 59 du propre Statut de la Cour, selon laquelle elles n’au-
                raient force obligatoire qu’entre les Etats concernés et à l’égard d’une
                situation particulière, les décisions du Conseil seraient considérées comme
                des déclarations faisant autorité et s’appliquant de manière générale et
                avec la même force à l’égard de tous les Etats contractants de la conven-
                tion de Chicago, pour le plus grand bénéfice du régime essentiel de l’avia-
                tion civile internationale, dont le monde moderne est, à tant d’égards,
                tributaire. Et cette interprétation permettrait aussi de préciser et de facili-
                ter le rôle de la Cour elle‑même au titre de sa fonction d’appel, lequel
                serait délimité par les dispositions de la convention correctement interpré-
                tées et dûment appliquées, évitant en outre à la Cour d’avoir à trancher
                des questions de politique en matière d’aviation à l’égard desquelles elle se
                trouverait aussi démunie que le Conseil à l’égard de questions de droit
                international.
                   13. En d’autres termes, de nombreux éléments militent en faveur d’une
                telle lecture, qui est conforme aux termes mêmes de l’article 84 et des

                                                                                91

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 179                                                                              12/07/21 13:57

                                   conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)                    169

                dispositions qui lui sont associées et, de surcroît, logique d’un point de
                vue pratique. Il me faut toutefois faire preuve de prudence dans mes
                réflexions sur ce sujet, puisque les considérations qui les sous‑tendent
                n’ont, à mon grand regret, pas été examinées par les Parties dans leurs
                argumentations respectives. La question demeure donc ouverte et devra
                être tranchée par la Cour à un stade ultérieur, lorsque l’occasion se pré-
                sentera et le besoin s’en fera sentir.
                   14. Je souhaiterais à présent soulever deux autres points plus particu-
                liers, qui concernent des aspects précis de l’arrêt.
                   15. Le premier a trait au paragraphe 49 de l’arrêt.
                   16. Je déplore en particulier le refus inexplicable de la Cour de tirer le
                corollaire de la conclusion principale énoncée dans ce paragraphe, qui est
                essentielle au règlement de la présente affaire dans son ensemble. La Cour
                dit (à juste titre, selon moi) que le Conseil de l’OACI ne saurait se voir
                priver de la compétence qu’il tient de l’article 84 par le simple fait que
                l’une des parties à un désaccord invoque, pour justifier ses actes, un
                moyen de défense ne relevant pas de la convention de Chicago. Or, il
                s’ensuit nécessairement que l’invocation d’une défense juridique plus large
                ne saurait non plus avoir pour effet d’élargir ou d’étendre cette même
                compétence. Si cela ressort implicitement de l’énoncé qu’elle formule, la
                Cour, en ne l’ayant pas dit expressément, a toutefois manqué une occa-
                sion précieuse de préciser au Conseil ce qu’il est autorisé à faire dans les
                limites du cadre posé par l’article 84, ce qui lui aurait assurément été utile
                à l’avenir.
                   17. Le second point concerne les questions liées à la régularité de la
                procédure qui ont été soulevées comme premier moyen d’appel et qui
                sont évacuées un peu abruptement aux paragraphes 122 et 123 de l’arrêt.
                Dans ces deux courts paragraphes, la Cour ne fait guère plus que rappe-
                ler, sous forme résumée et sans autre analyse, la démarche qu’elle avait
                adoptée dans l’unique précédent, il y a une quarantaine d’années.
                   18. Le traitement cavalier que la Cour avait réservé à cette question en
                1972, et qu’elle s’abstient (regrettablement) de soumettre aujourd’hui à
                l’examen plus nuancé qu’imposeraient les conditions actuelles, fait abs-
                traction de l’éventualité où, pour une raison particulière ou un ensemble
                de raisons, une irrégularité de procédure fondamentale viendrait entacher
                une décision du Conseil au point que la Cour se trouverait dans l’obliga-
                tion de déclarer cette décision nulle et non avenue. Il serait aussi parfaite-
                ment concevable que, du fait d’une grave irrégularité de procédure, la
                réponse apportée à une question de droit ne puisse tout simplement être
                considérée comme juridiquement « correcte ». En pareil cas, la Cour
                devrait répondre à la question de savoir ce qui doit s’entendre comme
                implicite dans la notion d’« appel », telle que celle‑ci est envisagée dans
                l’article 84, s’agissant de ses fonctions en tant qu’instance d’appel et de
                l’étendue des remèdes auxquels elle peut recourir à ce titre. Il est évidem-
                ment à espérer qu’une telle situation ne se produira jamais au sein d’un
                organisme spécialisé de haut niveau tel que l’OACI, mais improbable
                n’est pas impossible, et il serait malheureux qu’une formulation trop large

                                                                                92

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 181                                                                           12/07/21 13:57

                                   conseil de l’oaci (op. ind. berman)                    170

                donne la moindre impression que la question des irrégularités de procé-
                dure laisse la Cour indifférente. On ne peut donc que se féliciter que
                celle‑ci ait au moins rappelé, au paragraphe 125 de l’arrêt, que le cadre
                même posé par l’article 84 impose certaines conditions obligatoires aux-
                 quelles le Conseil est lui aussi tenu de satisfaire pour traduire effective-
                 ment dans la pratique le droit d’appel énoncé dans cet article. On voit
                 mal, par exemple, comment la Cour pourra à l’avenir, notamment si la
                 contestation porte sur une décision de fond, exercer correctement ses
                 fonctions d’instance d’appel à l’égard de cette décision si celle‑ci n’a pas
                été motivée et son raisonnement sous‑jacent, expliqué par le Conseil. Il est
                donc décevant de constater que, au mépris des règles directement appli-
                cables qu’il avait lui‑même établies, le Conseil a adopté les décisions
                contestées sans fournir le moindre élément quant au raisonnement suivi,
                se réfugiant, semble‑t‑il, derrière la possibilité (prévue par d’autres règles
                de procédure) de recourir au scrutin secret. Il a, ce faisant, placé un outil
                procédural au‑dessus non seulement des règles de fond applicables, mais
                également de la convention internationale même dont celles‑ci découlent.
                Cela est juridiquement inacceptable. En outre, ce point peut, en soi,
                être envisagé comme une question concernant « l’interprétation ou
                l’application de la convention de Chicago », et il eût été souhaitable que
                 la Cour fût disposée à le dire, afin d’aider le Conseil dans ses décisions
                 futures.

                (Signé) Franklin Berman.

                                                                                93

7 CIJ1191_Ord.indb 183                                                                           12/07/21 13:57


ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (ORDONNANCE 20 XII 74) 536

La Cour,
A l’unanimité,

Dit que la requête par laquelle le Gouvernement fidjien demande à
intervenir dans l'instance introduite par la Nouvelle-Zélande contre
la France tombe et que la Cour n’a plus aucune suite à lui donner.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, ie vingt décembre mil neuf cent soixante-quatorze,
en quatre exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour
et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement
fidjien, au Gouvernement néo-zélandais et au Gouvernement de la
République française.

Le Président,
(Signé) Manfred LACHS.

Le Greffier.
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

M. Gros, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
[Translation ]

I voted in favour of the present decision for reasons other than those
stated in the Order. The document filed by the Government of Fiji on
18 May 1973 could not in any way be regarded as a request to be per-
mitted to intervene within the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute, and
the request should have been dismissed in /imine.

M. ONYEAMA, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
{Traduction ]

J'ai voté pour l'ordonnance, bien que, selon moi, le motif sur lequel
elle repose, à savoir que la demande de l'Etat requérant est désormais
sans objet et qu’en conséquence il n’existe désormais plus d’instance sur
laquelle l'intervention puisse se greffer, implique une prémisse que je ne
suis pas en mesure d’accepter. Cette prémisse est que, si la demande avait
eu un objet et si la Cour avait été appelée à se prononcer à son égard, il
aurait existé une possibilité d'intervention en l’espèce.

A aucun moment qui intéresse la présente instance, Fidji n’a été partie à
l’Acte général de 1928 et n’a accepté la clause facultative du Statut de la
Cour, qui ont été invoqués par l’Etat demandeur pour établir la compé-

5


23

DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ANZILOTTI.
{ Translation. |

In my opinion the Court should have ruled that the request
for an interpretation by the German Government could not
be entertained; and that on the following grounds:

1.—The question which arises in the first place is what is to
be understood by a “dispute as to the meaning or scope of the
judgment” in the terms of Article 60 of the Statute.

I must begin by saying that I regard proceedings for inter-
pretation as contentious proceedings, the subject matter of
which is constituted by the dispute contemplated in the article,
and in which the Court has to give judgment upon the sub-
missions of the Parties just as in any other contentious pro-
ceedings. In my opinion Article 60 of the Statute contains
a clause establishing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
for a certain category of disputes.

The first object of Article 60 being to ensure, by excluding
every ordinary means of appeal against them, that the Court’s
judgments shall possess the formal value of ves judicata, it is
evident that that article is closely connected with Article 59
which determines the material limits of ves judicata when
stating that ‘the decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the Parties and in respect of that particular
case” : we have here the three traditional elements for identifica-
tion, persona, petitum, causa petendi, for it is clear that “that
particular case” (le cas qui a été décidé) covers both the object and
the grounds of the claim.

It is within these limits that the Court’s judgment is binding,
and it is within these same limits that Article 60 provides that
any Party shall have the right, in the event of a dispute, to
request the Court to construeit. It appears to me to be clear that
a binding interpretation of a judgment can only have reference
to the binding portion of the judgment construed.

2.—To say that the request for an interpretation can only
‘relate to the binding part of the judgment is equivalent to
JUDGMENT No. II.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ANZILOTTI 24

saying that it can only relate to the meaning and scope of the
operative part thereof, as it is certain that the binding effect
attaches only to the operative part of the judgment and not
’ to the statement of reasons. |

The grounds of a judgment are simply logical arguments, the
aim of which is to lead up to.the formulation of what the
law is in the case in question. And for this purpose there is
no need to distinguish between essential and non-essential
grounds, a more or less arbitrary distinction which rests on
no solid basis and which can only be regarded as an inaccurate
way of expressing the different degree .of importance which the
various grounds of a judgment may possess for the interpreta-
tion of its operative part.

When I say that only the terms of a judgment are binding,
I do not mean that only what is actually written in the
operative part constitutes the Court’s decision. On the contrary,
it is certain that it is almost always necessary to refer
to the statement of reasons to understand clearly the operative
part and above all to ascertain the causa petendi. But, at all
events, it is the operative part which contains the Court’s
binding decision and. which, consequently, may form the sub-
ject of a request for an interpretation.

3.—Having said this, it seems to me that in so far as the
first of the submissions made by the German Government is
concerned, the Court need merely place on record the follow-
ing declaration, which is to be found on page 6 of the Observa-
tions of the Polish Government upon the request for interpretation of
Judgments Nos.7 and8:

[Translation.|—‘‘Passing now from the grounds for Judgment
No. 7 to its operative part, it should be observed that the
Polish Government has never claimed, nor does it now claim,
that by the latter a right was reserved to that Government
of cancelling by process of law the agreement of December
24th, 1919, and the entry in the land registers, in pursuance
of this agreement, of the Oberschlesische as owners. Such
a reservation, or even a recognition of the right in question,
would moreover have been purposeless.”

This declaration is incompatible with the existence of any
dispute coming within the terms of Article 60 of the Statute,
JUDGMENT No. II.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ANZILOTTI 25

as interpreted above, and reduces the divergence between the
views of the two Governments to a question of words.

As to the second of the submissions made by the German
Government, the situation is different. In my opinion, the
real proposition, which is concealed in somewhat obscure
language, must be understood as follows: The Court, on
being made cognizant of the German Government’s Applica-
tion of May 15th, 1925, found it necessary to give a decision,
and did in fact do so, in regard to the Oberschlesische’s right
_ of ownership, and this decision is final and binding even in respect
of the claim for compensation now pending before the Court.

I shall now proceed to consider the question whether a
request for an interpretation having this object can be enter-
tained.

4.—It is a well-known principle that the objective limits of
res judicata are determined by the claim. °

The German Government’s claim on which Judgment No. 7
was based was, in so far as relates to the present case, for-
mulated as follows in No. 2 a of the submissions of that Gov-
ernment :

“To give judgment ....that the attitude of the Polish Govern-
ment in regard to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke and
Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Companies was not in conformity
with Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Con-
vention.””

No claim for restitution or compensation was then made by
the German Government, which, according to the statements
of its Agent, only sought to obtain a declaratory judgment.
It should also be recalled that the claim reproduced above and
relating to the Oberschlesische and Bayerische Companies
was submitted as being the application in an individual case, -
chosen from amongst several of a more general claim, that
is to say the claim to the effect that Articles 2 and 5 of the
Polish law of July r4th, 1920, were not in conformity with
Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention.

In accordance with the German Government’s claim, the
Court, after having decided that the application both of
Article 2 and of Article 5 of the Polish law of July 14th, 1920,
in Polish Upper Silesia constituted a measure contrary to
JUDGMENT No. II.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ANZILOTTI 26

Article 6 and the following articles of the Convention in
question, laid down in paragraph 24 of the operative part of
the judgment, ‘that the attitude of the Polish Government in
regard to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke and Bayerische
Stickstoffwerke Companies was not in conformity with Article 6
and the following articles of the Geneva Convention”.

5.—It is certain that before arriving at this conclusion the
Court had also to consider the question whether, under German
municipal law, the Oberschlesische Company was indeed the
owner of the Chorzéw factory ; for only if that was the case
would the dispossession of the Company by the Polish Govern-
ment constitute a measure contrary to the Geneva Convention.

And the Court did in fact say that it would consider the
question from this point of view also. At the same time,
however, it expressly stated that, in the exercise of the juris-
diction bestowed by Article 23 of the Geneva Convention, it
would only consider as an incidental or preliminary point the
question whether any rights existed under German law.

It is therefore clear that the decision in regard to the ques-
tion whether the Oberschlesische was the owner of the prop-
erty of which it was dispossessed, can only be regarded as.
an incidental or, more exactly, as a preliminary decision to
that which the Court had to give upon the claim of the
Applicant. The German Government expressly admits this.

6.—No one denies or could deny that the Oberschlesische’s.
right of ownership is to be regarded as having been established.
once and for all in so far as concerns the question decided
by Judgment No. 7; that is to say, the non-conformity of
the attitude adopted by the Polish Government in regard to
that Company with Article 6 and the following articles of the
Geneva Convention.

It is, moreover, clear that, under a generally accepted rule
which is derived from the very conception of res judicata,
decisions on incidental or preliminary questions which have
been rendered with the sole object of adjudicating upon the
Parties’ claims (incidenter tantum) are not binding in another
case. |
JUDGMENT No. II.—DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ANZILOTTI 27

Does this general rule also cover the case of an action for
indemnity following upon a declaratory judgment in which the
preliminary question has been decided ?

In my opinion that is in reality the question submitted to
the Court; and there seems to me to be no doubt that that
question is neither a question involving the interpretation of
the operative part of Judgment No. 7, which has been referred
to earlier in this note, nor a question involving the interpreta-
tion of the operative part of Judgment No. 8, which was
merely a decision as to the jurisdiction of the Court to take
cognizance of the action for indemnity. It is a question
which exclusively relates to proceedings actually pending before
the Court, and must consequently be considered and adjudicated
upon in those proceedings and not by the indirect method of
an interpretative judgment.

7.—In coming to this conclusion, I have relied upon prin-
ciples obtaining in civil procedure ; this I feel justified in doing
for the following reasons :

As I have already observed, the Court’s Statute, in Article 59,
clearly refers to a traditional and generally accepted theory
in regard to the material limits of ves judicata ; it was only
natural therefore to keep to the essential factors and fund-
amental data of that theory, failing any indication to the
contrary, which I find nowhere, either in the Statute itself
or in international law.

In the second place, it appears to me that if there be a
case in which it is legitimate to have recourse, in the absence
of conventions and custom, to ‘the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations’, mentioned in No. 3 of Article 38
of the Statute, that case is assuredly the present one. Not
without reason was the binding effect of ves judicata expressly
mentioned by the Committee of Jurists entrusted with the
preparation of a plan for the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice, amongst the principles included
in the above-mentioned article (Minutes, p. 335).

(Signed) D. ANZILOTTI.