                                                                               278

  DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC AL-KHASAWNEH

[Traduction]

   Pouvoir discrétionnaire laissé aux juges en ce qui concerne la délimitation de la
ZEE et du plateau continental — Cour devant apprécier l’équité de la délimitation
de manière globale — Cour ne devant pas se limiter à vérifier l’absence de
disproportion flagrante lors de la troisième étape de la délimitation.

   La délimitation maritime impose de trouver un compromis entre deux
nécessités, d’une part, celle de respecter la certitude et la prédictibilité du
droit et, de l’autre, celle de tenir compte de réalités géographiques qui
diﬀèrent dans chaque aﬀaire.
   Il est demandé aux juges de ne pas « refaire la nature entièrement »
(Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République Fédérale d’Allemagne/
Danemark) (République Fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1969, p. 49-50, par. 91), ce qui pourrait n’être qu’une manière
singulière de dire qu’ils peuvent le faire à condition que ce « remo-
delage » ne soit pas total ou ﬂagrant. C’est en réalité ce qu’ils font
en permanence. Décider du poids à attribuer à une île donnée comporte
toujours une part de subjectivité. De même, il est impossible de détermi-
ner sur une base purement mathématique quand le tracé d’une ligne
d’équidistance constitue une « amputation ». Cette part de subjectivité est
à la fois normale et légitime, et j’ai toujours estimé que le législateur
devait laisser une marge d’appréciation au juge.
   S’agissant de la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du pla-
teau continental, il est assurément permis d’aﬃrmer que, pour autant que
les négociations ayant abouti à l’adoption de la convention sur le droit de
la mer puissent nous fournir des indications, les auteurs de cet instrument
ont sciemment laissé une grande marge d’appréciation au juge eu égard à
la quasi-impossibilité de prévoir des solutions législatives uniformes.
   Le juge étant naturellement prédisposé à limiter sa part de subjectivité,
il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que celle-ci est parvenue à trans-
former l’« équité créative » en une « équité corrective » plus restreinte, et
ce, en suivant certaines méthodes et techniques, dont la plus notable est la
méthode de délimitation en trois étapes qui a été employée dans la juris-
prudence récente. C’est une démarche rigoureuse et pertinente, à condi-
tion de ne pas perdre de vue qu’il ne s’agit que d’une méthode et que ce
qui importe, c’est que le résultat ﬁnal soit équitable. Ce modus operandi
présente un autre aspect moins engageant, en ce que la troisième étape est
liée au critère extrêmement facile à remplir (toutes les délimitations y
satisfont) de l’absence de disproportion ﬂagrante des droits maritimes par
rapport à la mesure objective de la longueur des côtes pertinentes des
parties. Cet élément est important pour vériﬁer l’absence de dispropor-

                                                                                143

   délimitation maritime et frontière terrestre (décl. al-khasawneh)       279

tion ﬂagrante, mais ce n’est pas le seul. La Cour s’impose de parvenir à
une solution équitable, contrainte qui ne trouve aucun appui dans le
libellé des articles 74 et 83 de la convention sur le droit de la mer, lesquels
laissent supposer une appréciation globale du caractère équitable du
résultat à la ﬁn du processus de délimitation, même s’il est reconnu qu’une
telle appréciation comprend une part de subjectivité.
   En ce qui concerne la délimitation opérée dans le Paciﬁque, je crois que
la Cour serait parvenue à un résultat plus équitable si elle avait accordé
un poids important mais néanmoins relatif à la péninsule de Nicoya. Cela
aurait été justiﬁé compte tenu de la proximité de cette péninsule avec le
point de départ de la délimitation et de l’absence de diﬀérence qualitative
avec celle de Santa Elena. Cela serait revenu, en somme, à refaire quelque
peu la nature, mais certainement pas à la refaire entièrement.

                                          (Signé) Awn Al-Khasawneh.

                                                                           144


ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (DÉCL. WALDOCK) 108

indiqué comme suit comment il différenciait ces deux catégories de ques-
tions (C.J. Recueil 1963, p. 102-103):

«la distinction, le texte réel, dépend semble-t-il du point de savoir si
l'exception repose ou est fondée sur la clause ou les clauses juridic-
tionnelles en vertu desquelles on prétend établir la compétence. Si
tel est le cas, l'exception porte essentiellement sur la compétence.»

L'article 17 de l’Acte général stipule que les différends visés dans cet
acte comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l’article 36 du Statut
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Au nombre des catégo-
ries de différends juridiques énumérés dans cet article figure «la réalité de
tout fait qui, s’il était établi, constituerait la violation d’un engagement
international» (les italiques sont de nous).

Au stade préliminaire, il semblerait donc suffisant de déterminer si les
parties se contestent réciproquement un droit. Il n'apparaît pas nécessaire
à ce stade d’aborder des questions qui relèvent en réalité du fond et qui
constituent le point essentiel de la décision qui interviendra par la suite
sur le fond, comme celle de l’établissement des droits des parties ou de
l’étendue du préjudice résultant des retombées radioactives.

Sir Humphrey WALDOCK, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Je souscris à l’ordonnance. Je voudrais seulement ajouter que, selon
moi, les principes énoncés à l’article 67, paragraphe 7, du Règlement,
devraient guider la Cour lorsqu'elle rendra sa décision en la phase sui-
vante de la procédure, que prévoit la présente ordonnance.

M. NAGENDRA SINGH, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Tout en souscrivant pleinement aux motifs de la décision rendue par la
Cour et en votant donc avec la majorité pour l'indication de mesures con-
servatoires en l’espèce, je voudrais bien faire ressortir, dans cette déclara-
tion, l’obligation faite à la Cour de s’assurer de sa compétence, même
prima facie, avant de statuer en vertu de l’article 41 du Statut et de l’ar-
ticle 66 du Règlement.

Certes aucune de ces dispositions ne précise le critère de la compétence
de la Cour ou de la recevabilité de la requête et de la demande, critère
que tout membre de la Cour n’en doit pas moins examiner pour s’assurer
qu’il existe un fondement valable possible à la compétence de la Cour et
que la requête est de prime abord recevable. J’approuve donc tout à fait
la Cour quand elle énonce un critère positif quant à sa compétence prima
facie, critère qui a été énoncé dans l'affaire de la Compétence en matière
de pêcheries! et qui, étant réaffirmé dans la présente espèce, peut être

1 Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande), C.I.J. Recueil 1972,
ordonnance du 17 août 1972, par. 15 à 17, p. 15-16.

13


ADVISORY OPINION No. II 42

ANNEX.

Documents transmitted by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
in accordance with the Council’s Resolution of March 13th, 1925.

1. — Print of the Treaty between Poland and the Free City of Danzig,
concluded at Paris on November 9th, 1920.

2. — Print of the Agreement between Poland and the Free City of Danzig,
signed at Warsaw on October 24th, 1921.

3. — Document C. 71. 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council the High Commissioner’s decision of February 2nd,
1925.

4. — Document C. 90. 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council the appeal of Poland against the High Commissioner's
decision of February 2nd, 1925.

5. — Document C. 90 (a). 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communic-
ating to the Council eleven annexes to the above appeal by the Polish
Government.

6. — Document C. 157. 1925. Note by. the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council observations by the President of the Senate of Danzig
upon the above appeal of Poland.

7. — Document C. 176. 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council observations of the Polish Delegation upon the observa-
tions by Dantzig contained in document C. 157. (No. 6 above.)

8. — Document C. 190. 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council a reply by Danzig to the observations by Poland
contained in document C. 176. 1925 (No. 7 above).

9. — Document C.177. 1925. Report presented to the Council by M. Quifiones
de Léon.

10. — Document C. 191. 1925. Note by the Secretary-General communicating
to the Council observations by Danzig upon the above report by
M. Quifiones de Léon.
11. — Copy of the decision of the High Commissioner (General Haking),
dated May 25th, 1922.
12. — Official Journal of the League of Nations, 3rd year, No. 10, October 1922,
containing (pp. 1103 & 1104):
a) the conclusions of the above-mentioned decision of May 25th, 1922 :
b) an interpretation of that decision given by the High Commissioner
on August 30th, 1922, and the record of the consequent withdrawal
of the appeal by Poland against that decision.

13. — Copy of the decision of the High Commissioner (General Haking)
dated December 23rd, 1922.

14. — Minutes of the 24th Session of the Council of the League of Nations
(Official Journal, 4th year, No. 6, June 1923) recording (Minute 913)
the confirmation by the Council of an Agreement dated April 48th,
1923, replacing the High Commissioner’s decision of December 23rd, 1922,
and giving (Annex 492) the text of the Agreement.

15. — Official Journal of the League of Nations, 2nd year, No. 9, November
1921, containing:

a) "Decision by High Commissioner (General Haking) dated August 15th,
(p. 974) ;

b) Agreement between Poland and Danzig, dated September 23rd,
1921, not to appeal against the decision of August 15th, 1921 (p. 978).

16. — Official Journal of the League of Nations, 3rd year, No. 5, May 1922,
containing on page 428 a correction of the French translation of the
decision of August 15th, 1921, as printed in the. Official Journal
for November 1921.

17. — Copies of letter from General Haking to the Commissioner-General
of the Polish Republic at Dantzig, dated January 6th, 1923, and of
the letter therein referred to addressed to General Haking by the
ADVISORY OPINION No. II 43

President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig on January
4th, 1923. ‘

18. — Official Journal of the League of Nations, 5th year, No. 11. Part 2,
November 1924, containing (p. 1708) an agreement between Poland and
Danzig, dated August 29th, 1924, concerning the Polish postal sorting
office for oversea parcels in the Danzig Harbour.

19. — Decisions of the High Commissioner (League of Nations}, 1921, 1922,
1923 and 1924. Four volumes in English and German, published by
the Free City of Danzig.

20. — Zbier Dokumentow urzedowych dotyczacych stosunku Wolnego Miasta
Gdanska do Rzeczypospolitej Polskie}. Vol. I, 1918-1920 ; Vol. II, 1921-1928.
Two volumes published by the Commissioner-General of the Polish
Republic at Danzig.

21. — Dossier containing copies of the annexes to the High Commissioner’s
(Mr. MacDonnell) decision of February 2nd, 1925, with schedule
of annexes (in the original languages as communicated to the Secre-
tariat by the High Commissioner). .

Schedule of papers accompanying copy of High Commissioner’s decision
dated February 2nd, 1925, concerning the extension of the Polish postal
service in Danzig, to Secretary-General. (Exclusive of Annexes I to IV
mentioned in paragraph 4 of decision).

No. Date. . From To
1. January 6th, 1925 Senate High Commissioner.
2. LE] 1 3th, 2? LE LE]
3. A 24st, 34, P.G.G. ”

22. — Copy of a memorandum No. P. A. 11. 124/25, dated February 3rd,
1925, addressed to the High Commissioner (Mr. MacDonnell) by Dan-
zig, as communicated to the Secretariat by the President of the Senate
of the Free City of Danzig.

23, — Minutes of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held
in the afternoon of March 13th, 1925.

24, — Letter from the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig
to the High Commissioner, December ist, 1924.

25. — Letter from the President of the Senate of the Free City to the
Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig, December ist, 1924.

26. — Letter from the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig to the President
of the Senate of the Free City, January 3rd, 1925.

Documents forwarded by the Secretary-General at the request of the Court.

27. — Minutes of meeting between the representative of the Polish Republic
and the President of the Senate of the Free City, which took place
at the offices of the Secretariat of the League of Nations on April
18th, 1923. |

28. — Report by the High Commissioner, Danzig, to the Council of the
League of. Nations, dated February 17th, 1925. (C. 19. 1925. 1.)

29. — Note by the Secretary-General communicating to the Council copy of
a letter dated February 7th, 1925, from the President of the Council
to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig, with
reference to the latter’s report to the Council (mentioned under No. 28
above) regarding certain aspects of the question of the Polish postal
service in Danzig. (C. 80. 1925.)

30. — Note by the Secretary-General communicating to the Council copy of
a letter dated February 14th, 1925, from the High Commissioner of
the League of Nations at Danzig, requesting that certain remarks on
paragraph 1 of the Polish note on his report of January 17th, and
contained in the above-mentioned letter, may be laid before the Council
of the League of Nations. (C. 78. 1925.)
31.

39.

ADVISORY OPINION No: II 44

— Registry files of the Secretariat of the League of Nations relating

to the High Commissioner’s decisions of August 15th, 1921, September
5th, 1921, December 6th, 1924, December 3rd, 1922, February 23rd,
1924.

Registry files of the Secretariat of the League of Nations relating
to the appeals by Poland against the High Commissioner’s decisions
of May 25th, 1922, and December 28rd, 1922. :

Preliminary Danzig-Polish Agreements of February ist, 1923.
Amendment to Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations,
held on March i3th, 1925.

Secretariat file of the League of Nations relating to the coming into
force of the Danzig-Polish Agreement of October 24th, 1921.

Memorandum by the Senate of Danzig addressed to the High Com-
missisner,.dated February 14th, 1925. (C. 186. 1925. 4.)

Letter from the High Commissioner to the Senate of Danzig, April
qeth, 1922.

a) Letter from the High Commissioner to the Senate of Danzig and
the Polish Commissioner-General, March 8th, 1922.

b) Letter from the Senate to the High Commissioner, April 6th, 1922.
c) Letter from the High Commissioner to the Polish Commissioner-
Gencral, April 12th; 1922.

Registry file of the League of Nations containing the appeal of Poland

against the High Commissioner’s decision of February 2nd, 1925, with
annexes.

Documents (other than Memoranda and Legal Opinions) presented bythe

interested Governments.

40. — Annexes to the Polish Memorandum :

Annex 1: Grundsätze für die Polnisch-Dantziger Abmachung aus
den Artikel 29 bis 32 der Pariser Konvention.

Annex 2: Stellungnahme der Sachverständigen-Mitglieder der Pol-
nischen Postkommission zum Gutachten der Sachverständigen-Mitglieder
der Danziger Postkommission vom 18. April 1921.

Annex 3: Protokoll über die Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen der
Postkommission am 13. Mai 1921.

Annex 4: Protokoll über die Konferenz der beiden Vorsitzenden der
Polnisch-Danziger Postkommission vom 11. Juli 1921.

Annex 5: Letter to Senator Dr. Paul Eschert, in Danzig (July 12th,
1921).

Annex 6: Schluss-Protokoll (August 48th, 1921). ‘

Annex 7: Letter from General Haking (March 8th, 1922).

Anneæ 8: Note from the Polish Postal Administration of the Free
City to the Polish postal authorities in Danzig (September 26th, 1922,
forwarding:

Gegenäusserung zu den zu Artikel 168 des Wirtschaftsabkommens
geäusserten polnischen Ansichten betr. die Punkte A-G (2. Juni 1922).

Annex 9: Stellungnahme der polnischen Post- und Telegraphen-
verwaltung zur Aeusserung der Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung der
Freien Stadt Danzig vom 2. Juni 1922 (6. Oktober 1922).

Annex 10: Note from the Polish Postal Administration of the Free
City to the Polish postal authorities in Danzig (November 21st, 1922).

Annex 11: Letter from the President of the Senate of Danzig to
the High Commissioner (October 19th, 1922).

Annex 12: Letter addressed to the President of the Senate of the
Free City (November 20th, 1922).

Annex 13: Note from the Postal and Telegraphic Administration
of the Free City to the Polish postal authorities in Danzig (Decem-
ber 29th, 1922).

Annez 14: Note from the Polish postal authorities to .the Postal
and Telegraphic Administration of the Free City (January 10th, 1923).
Al.

ADVISORY OPINION No. II 45

Annexes to the Memorandum of the Free City of Danzig:

Annex I: English text of the High Commissioner’s decision of February
2nd, 1925.

Annex II: Erklärung des Prasidenten des Senats der Freien Stadt
über die am 18. April 1923 in. Genf abgeschlossene Vereinbarung,
betreffend Entscheidung des Hohen Kommissars vom: 23. Dezember 1922.
Originals of three successive drafts for the Agreement of April 18th,
1923.

Annex to complementary Memorarndum by Senate of the Free City
of Danzig: Meeting on April 27th, 1922, regarding the direct Polish
postal service between the port of Danzig and the territory of Poland
(Projet d'accord).

Annex to complementary Polish Memorandum :

Declaration by M. Léon Plucinski (See 3:II).

Complementary declaration by President Sahm (See 3: II).


219

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES RUDA, MOSLER, AGO,
SIR ROBERT JENNINGS AND DE LACHARRIERE

1. Article 63 of the Statute of the Court provides for a right of inter-
vention in proceedings before it, “Whenever the construction of a con-
vention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is
in question”. Where those conditions are fulfilled, a State wishing to
intervene has a right to do so, and it is not for the Court to grant or
withhold permission. Nevertheless, it is for the Court to decide in each case
whether or not the conditions for such intervention, laid down in Article
63, are fulfilled.

2. Accordingly, Article 82 of the Court’s Rules provides that a State
desiring to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it by
Article 63 shall file a declaration ; which declaration shall contain inter
alia:

“(b) identification of the particular provisions of the convention the
construction of which it considers to be in question ;
(c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for which it
contends”.

3. We have voted with the majority of the Court in deciding that El
Salvador’s declaration of intervention is inadmissible in the present phase
of the proceedings, because we have not been able to find, in El Salvador’s
written communications to the Court, the necessary identification of such
particular provision or provisions which it considers to be in question in
the jurisdictional phase of the case between Nicaragua and the United
States ; nor of the construction of such provision or provisions for which it
contends. Furthermore, the brief references made in this regard have not
convinced us that El Salvador’s request is in accordance with what is
contemplated by Article 63 of the Court’s Statute.

4. We differ, however, from the Court on the question whether or not El
Salvador should have been granted an oral hearing. In our opinion, it
would have been more in accordance with judicial propriety if the Court
had granted a hearing to the State seeking to intervene, and had not
decided only on the basis of the written communications.

(Signed) J. M. RuDA.

(Signed) Hermann MOSLER.
(Signed) Roberto AGO.
(Signed) R. Y. JENNINGS.
(Signed) Guy DE LACHARRIERE.


                        COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                            RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                     AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                     VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
          DE DROITS SOUVERAINS ET D’ESPACES MARITIMES
                   DANS LA MER DES CARAÏBES
                          (NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)

                      ORDONNANCE DU 4 DÉCEMBRE 2018

                               2018
                        INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                          REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                       ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                         ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
              OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES
                        IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA
                          (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)

                         ORDER OF 4 DECEMBER 2018

3 CIJ1155.indb 1                                         20/06/19 09:22

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                         Violations alléguées de droits souverains et d’espaces maritimes
                              dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie),
                                         ordonnance du 4 décembre 2018,
                                            C.I.J. Recueil 2018, p. 712

                                                Official citation:
                          Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces
                                in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
                                          Order of 4 December 2018,
                                          I.C.J. Reports 2018, p. 712

                                                                                1155
                                                                 No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157354-1

3 CIJ1155.indb 2                                                                            20/06/19 09:22

                                                       4 DÉCEMBRE 2018

                                                        ORDONNANCE

                              VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
                   DE DROITS SOUVERAINS ET D’ESPACES MARITIMES
                            DANS LA MER DES CARAÏBES
                             (NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)

                               ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
                    OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES
                              IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA
                             (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)

                                                       4 DECEMBER 2018

                                                           ORDER

3 CIJ1155.indb 3                                                         20/06/19 09:22

                                                                                712

                                INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                                 YEAR 2018
                                                                                2018
                                                                                4 December
                                               4 December 2018                                 General List
                                                                                No. 155

                       ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
            OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES
                      IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA
                                      (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)

                                                   ORDER

                   Present:
                            President Yusuf; Vice‑President Xue; Judges Tomka, Abraham,
                            Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Gevorgian, Salam;
                            Registrar Couvreur.

                     The International Court of Justice,
                      Composed as above,
                      After deliberation,
                      Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
                   cles 31 and 80, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,
                      Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
                   26 November 2013, whereby the Government of the Republic of Nicara-
                   gua (hereinafter “Nicaragua”) instituted proceedings against the Republic
                   of Colombia (hereinafter “Colombia”) concerning a dispute in relation to
                   “the violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and maritime zones
                   declared by the Court’s Judgment of 19 November 2012 [in the case con-
                   cerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)] and
                   the threat of the use of force by Colombia in order to implement these
                   violations”,
                      Having regard to the Order dated 3 February 2014, whereby the Court
                   fixed 3 October 2014 and 3 June 2015 as the respective time‑limits

                                                                                4

3 CIJ1155.indb 5                                                                                20/06/19 09:22

                           sovereign rights and maritime spaces (ord. 4 XII 18)           713

                   for the filing of the Memorial of Nicaragua and the Counter‑Memorial of
                   Colombia,
                      Having regard to the Memorial of Nicaragua, filed within the time‑limit
                   so prescribed,
                      Having regard to the preliminary objections to jurisdiction raised by
                   Colombia within the time‑limit laid down by Article 79, paragraph 1, of
                   the Rules of Court,
                      Having regard to the Judgment of 17 March 2016, whereby the Court
                   declared that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact
                   of Bogotá, to rule on the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia
                   regarding alleged violations by Colombia of Nicaragua’s rights in the
                   maritime zones which, according to Nicaragua, the Court declared apper-
                   tain to Nicaragua in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 in the case con-
                   cerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
                      Having regard to the Order of 17 March 2016, whereby the Court fixed
                   17 November 2016 as the new time‑limit for the filing of the Counter‑
                   Memorial of Colombia,
                      Having regard to the Counter‑Memorial of Colombia, filed within the
                   time‑limit so prescribed, and to the four counter‑claims contained therein,
                      Having regard to the Order dated 15 November 2017, whereby the
                   Court found that the first two counter‑claims submitted by Colombia
                   were inadmissible as such and did not form part of the current proceed-
                   ings, and that the third and fourth counter‑claims submitted by Colombia
                   were admissible as such and did form part of the current proceedings,

                     Having regard to that same Order of 15 November 2017, whereby the
                   Court directed Nicaragua to submit a Reply and Colombia to submit a
                   Rejoinder relating to the claims of both Parties in the current proceed-
                   ings, and fixed 15 May 2018 and 15 November 2018 as the respective
                   time‑limits for the filing of those pleadings,

                      Having regard to the Reply filed by Nicaragua and the Rejoinder filed
                   by Colombia within the time‑limits thus fixed;
                      Whereas, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the rep-
                   resentatives of the Parties on 3 December 2018, the Agent of Nicaragua
                   indicated that his Government wished to present its views in writing a
                   second time on the Colombian counter‑claims, in an additional pleading,
                   and requested a time‑limit of four months for the filing of that additional
                   pleading; and whereas the representative of Colombia stated that his
                   Government had no objection to Nicaragua’s request to be permitted to
                   file an additional pleading but considered that a time‑limit of one or
                   two months would be sufficient to enable Nicaragua to prepare that
                   pleading;
                      Taking account of the views of the Parties,

                                                                                5

3 CIJ1155.indb 7                                                                                20/06/19 09:22

                           sovereign rights and maritime spaces (ord. 4 XII 18)          714

                      Authorizes the submission by the Republic of Nicaragua of an addi-
                   tional pleading relating solely to the counter‑claims submitted by the
                   Republic of Colombia;
                     Fixes 4 March 2019 as the time‑limit for the filing of that pleading;
                   and
                     Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                      Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
                   the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourth day of December, two thousand
                   and eighteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
                   of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Repu-
                   blic of Nicaragua and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, res-
                   pectively.

                                                     (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf,
                                                                     President.
                                                         (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                                       Registrar.

                                                                                6

3 CIJ1155.indb 9                                                                                20/06/19 09:22


TI4

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE SIR MUHAMMAD
ZAFRULLA KHAN
[Traduction ]

Je suis d’accord, d’une façon générale, avec le raisonnement de
ceux de mes collégues qui estiment que la Cour ne devrait pas rendre
un avis en cette affaire. Je désire cependant énoncer brièvement la
principale considération qui, à mon sens, aurait dû empêcher la
Cour de rendre un avis.

La Cour est un organe judiciaire et, même dans l'exercice de sa
fonction consultative, elle doit se conformer aux exigences de son
caractère judiciaire.

Le caractère judiciaire de la fonction que la Cour est appelée à
remplir exige notamment que les deux parties directement affectées
par les procédures qui se déroulent devant elle soient; à tous égards,
en position d'égalité, y compris au point de vue de l'exposé de leurs
vues et de leurs arguments devant la Cour.

Dans le cas actuel, par le jeu du Statut et du Règlement de la
Cour, l'Unesco est autorisée à présenter ses vues par écrit et a déve-
lopper des conclusions orales devant la Cour. Les fonctionnaires
intéressés n’en ont pas le droit.

On a tenté de surmonter cette difficulté en adoptant une procé-
dure par laquelle les observations des fonctionnaires ont été mises
à la disposition de la Cour par l'intermédiaire de l'Unesco et en
renonçant à la procédure orale. L'une et l’autre de ces méthodes
prêtent à de sérieuses objections et, en tout cas, leur adoption même
n’a pas placé les parties dans une position d'égalité complète.

Il est vrai qu’on n’a soulevé aucune objection à l'adoption de
cette procédure pour le compte des fonctionnaires intéressés, mais
cela ne dispense pas pour autant la Cour de la responsabilité de
s’assurer que les parties directement affectées par le résultat de la
procédure devant elle sont placées en position d'égalité complète.
Une procédure d’après laquelle l’une des parties intéressées de façon
vitale aux résultats de la procédure ne peut faire connaître ses vues
à la Cour que par la faveur de son adversaire et par l'intermédiaire
de celui-ci ne mérite guère d’être définie comme une procédure judi-
ciaire. A mon avis, la Cour ne devrait pas favoriser l'adoption d’une
telle procédure.

En se passant de la procédure orale, la Cour s’est privée d'un
moyen d'obtenir une aide utile dans l'exercice de l’une de ses fonc-
tions judiciaires. On n’a pas renoncé à la procédure orale parce que
la Cour a considéré que, par ce moyen, elle ne pouvait recevoir
aucune assistance, mais parce qu’il n’y avait pas de moyen de redres-
ser l'inégalité des parties au point de vue de la procédure orale.

Bien que la Cour eût fait savoir qu’elle avait décidé de renoncer
à la procédure orale, tout Etat ou organisation internationale admis

AI
OPIN. INDIV. DE SIR M. ZAFRULLA KHAN (AVIS 23 X 56) 115

à comparaître devant la Cour pouvait, aux termes de l’article 66,
paragraphe 2, du Statut, solliciter de la Cour une audience orale. Si
pareille demande s'était présentée, la Cour se serait trouvée en face
d’un dilemme. I eût été difficile de rejeter la demande. L’accorder
aurait signifié que la Cour se serait par là mise dans l'impossibilité
de rendre un avis. Si la Cour peut rendre un avis dans l'affaire
actuelle, c’est qu'elle n’a reçu aucune demande d’audience orale.
Cela signifie que, dans des hypothèses comme le cas actuel, un seul
Etat ou une seule organisation internationale ayant reçu notification
en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 66, peut exercer un veto sur
l'autorité de la Cour de rendre un avis. Selon mon humble opinion,
la Cour ne devrait pas répondre à une demande d’avis consultatif
dans un cas où il est nécessaire de recourir à de tels procédés et à de
tels artifices.

(Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN.

42


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE
AERIAL INCIDENT OF
JULY 27th, 1955

(UNITED KINGDOM v. BULGARIA)

ORDER OF MAY 27th, 1959

1959

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A
L’INCIDENT AERIEN DU
27 JUILLET 1955

(ROYAUME-UNI c. BULGARIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 27 MAI 1959
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955
(United Kingdom v. Bulgaria),
Order of May 27th, 1959: I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 206.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:
« Affaire relative à Vincident aérien du 27 juillet 1955
(Royaume-Uni c. Bulgarie),
Ordonnance du 27 mai 1959:-C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 206.»

Sales number 207
N° de vente :

206

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1959
May 27th YEAR 1959
General List:
No. 37 May 27th, 1959

CASE CONCERNING THE
AERIAL INCIDENT OF
JULY 27th, 1955

(UNITED KINGDOM v. BULGARIA)

ORDER

Present: President KLAESTAD; Vice-President ZAFRULLA KHAN;
Judges BASDEVANT, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI, BADAWI,
ARMAND-UGon, KoJEVNIKoV, Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT,
MorENO QuINTANA, CORDOVA, WELLINGTON Koo, SPIRO-

POULOS, Sir Percy SPENDER; Deputy-Registrar GARNIER-
COIGNET.

The International Court of Justice,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Article 37 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

Whereas by an Order of May roth, 1958, the time-limit for the
filing of the Counter-Memorial of the Government of the People’s
Republic of Bulgaria was extended to June gth, 1959;

Whereas by a letter dated May 14th, 1959, the Agent for the
Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria requested a two
months extension of this time-limit ;

4
207 AERIAL INCIDENT (U.K. v, BULGARIA) (ORDER 27 V 59)

Whereas by a letter of May 21st, 1959, the letter of the Agent
for the Bulgarian Government was communicated to the Agent
for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, who was asked to make known the views of
that Government on the request of the Agent for the Bulgarian
Government;

Whereas, on May 27th, 1950, the Agent for the Government of
the United Kingdom stated that that Government had no objection
to this extension;

THE COURT

decides to extend to August 1oth, 1959, the time-limit for the
filing of the Counter-Memorial of the Government of the People’s
Republic of Bulgaria.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authori-
tative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day
of May, one thousand nine huudred and fifty-nine, in three copies,
one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the
others transmitted to the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to the Government of
the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, respectively.

(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.


183

SEPARATE OPINION BY Mr. HUDSON.

While the result which I would reach in this case does not
differ greatly from that reached: by the Court, the reasoning
which I should adopt for reaching it differs on some important
points from that which the Court has adopted.

*

In my view, the principal object of the Belgian submissions
in their final form was to obtain from the Court a pronounce-
ment as to the juridical nature and effect of the arbitral
awards of January 3rd and July 25th, 1936. This is indicated
both by the text of the Belgian submissions A and B, and
by the fact that this text embodies modifications which clearly
changed the object sought to be accomplished by the earlier
formulations contained in the written Reply of the Belgian
Government. It is confirmed, also, by the declaration made
on behalf of the Belgian Government at the close of the oral
proceedings, in which its final submissions were described as
tendant à voir proclamer le caractère défimitif et obligatoire des
sentences, sans aucune réserve, avec les covollaires que cette déci-
sion comporte. In other words, the Belgian Government does
not confine itself to asking the Court to declare that certain
matters dealt with in the arbitral awards are now ves judicata
and recognized to be such by the Greek Government ; it goes
further and seeks a judgment establishing with the Court’s
authority the obligatory character of the awards.

It is true that the two arbitral awards given at Paris in
1936 were souveraines et sans appel. The agreement of the
Greek Government and the Société commerciale de Belgique to
this effect was expressed both in the contract of August 27th,
1925, and in the compromis of August 30th, 1934. Yet this
agreement did not preclude the Belgian Government, which has
espoused the claim of the Société commerciale de Belgique, from
asking for an examination and confirmation of the awards by
this Court. That is what, it seems to me, the Belgian Govern-
ment has done.

The Court’s jurisdiction to deal with these Belgian submis-
sions follows from the consent of the Greek Government. For
the Greek Government has not only refrained from objecting
to the jurisdiction of the Court; it has also asked for the
rejection of the Belgian submissions on the merits. See the
Upper Silesia Minorities Case, Series A, No. 15, pages 24-25.

4 27
A./B. 78 (“SOCIETE COMMERCIALE’’).—OP. HUDSON 184

Even on this interpretation of their principal object, however,
the Belgian submissions ought to be dismissed. The arbitration
which led to the awards of January 3rd and July 25th, 1936,
was between the Greek Government and the Société commerciale de
Belgique ; it was held in pursuance of a provision in the contract
of August 27th, 1925, concluded between the Greek Govern-
ment and the Société commerciale de Belgique. Hence, it is
quite clear that the juridical character of the two awards is
not derived from the law which governs the relations of States.
As was ‘said in the Serbian Loans Case, Series A, Nos. 20/21,
page 41, “any contract which is not a contract between States
in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on
the municipal law of some country’. The contract of 1925
and the arbitral awards of 1936 are governed not by inter-
national law but by national law, and the national law applic-
able to them is that of Greece. See the Serbian Loans Case,
Series A, Nos. 20/21, pages 41-44; the Brazilian Loans Case, id.,
pages 121-122. This being true, it would seem that if the Court
undertook to pronounce upon the legal character and effect of
the two arbitral awards, it would have to apply Greek law.

This phase of the case has not been presented to the Court
by the Parties. No indications have been furnished to the
Court as to the relevant provisions of the applicable Greek
law, either with respect to the arbitral clause in the contract
or with respect to the awards handed down in execution of
that arbitral clause. Nor has the Court been supplied with
information which would enable it to determine whether the
procedure followed by the arbitral commission at Paris was
that prescribed. by the law applicable. Under these circum-
tances, I think the Court is not called upon to undertake a
research to find the Greek law applicable. Where international
law is to be applied, the Court should not hesitate to go
beyond the presentation by the parties before it, and it must
conduct whatever research may be necessary for finding the
applicable law. Where municipal law is to be applied, a party
which asks for relief should furnish to the Court the materials
necessary for its finding the applicable law; and where as in
this case no such materials are furnished to the Court, it would
seem that the Court is not obliged to institute the research
necessary for that purpose, that on the contrary it is free to
deny the relief sought without instituting such a research.

This precise situation would seem to have been envisaged
by the Court in the Brazilian Loans Case in 1929, when it
said, Series A, Nos. 20/21, page 124:

28
A./B. 78 (“SOCIETE COMMERCIALE’’).—OP, HUDSON 185

“Though bound to apply municipal law when circumstances
so require, the Court, which is a tribunal of international law,
and which, in this capacity, is deemed itself to know what this
law is, is not obliged also to know the municipal law of the
various countries. All that can be said in this respect is that
the Court may possibly be obliged to obtain knowledge regard-
ing the municipal law which has to be applied. And this it
must do, either by means of evidence furnished it by the par-
ties or by means of any researches which the Court may think
fit to undertake or to cause to be undertaken.”

Additional reasons would seem to call for the dismissal of
two parts of the Belgian submission B.

By its submission B, 2, the Belgian Government asks the
Court to say that the conditions adopted for the settlement
of the Greek external debt are and must remain foreign to
the execution of the arbitral awards of 1936. Certainly the
Court should not attempt to prescribe for the future in this
way; such action might hamper the future negotiations which
both Parties regard to be necessary.

The Belgian submission B, 3, seems to refer to an attitude
alleged to have been taken up by the Greek Government at
some time in the past; at any rate, the submission is suscept-
ible of this construction. In my opinion, the premise that the
Greek Government had at some time sought to “impose” cer-
tain conditions on the Company or on the Belgian Government,
has not been established before the Court, and for this reason,
as well as for others, the submission should be dismissed.

*

On the Greek side, submissions (5) and (6) should be dismissed
on the ground that no legal basis exists for the invitation to
which submission (5) refers. The Court may have power in
some circumstances to invite two States represented before it
to engage in negotiations with a view to the settlement of
their dispute. In my opinion, it would not be justified in this
case in requiring such negotiations to be undertaken by the
Belgian and Greek Governments, nor in laying down the basis
for such negotiations as desired by the Greek Government.

Submission (4) of the Greek Government gives more diffi-
culty. Though it was doubtless presented partly for the purpose
of laying a foundation for submissions (5) and (6), I cannot say
that such was its only purpose.

In the first place, the text of submission (4) may be regarded
as formulating a reservation to the Greek Government’s recog-
nition of the principle of ves judicata in connection with the
arbitral awards of 1936. Indeed, in the Greek submission (3) of
May 17th, this formulation was avowedly put as a reservation

29
A./B. 78 (‘SOCIÉTÉ COMMERCIALE’’).—OP. HUDSON 186

to the Greek Government’s recognition of the application of
that principle; and the same meaning seems to be carried
in submission (4) of May 1roth by the word foutefois. On this
interpretation, submission (4) would raise a question as to the
legal effect of the budgetary and monetary situation of Greece
—a question which was discussed at length by Counsel for the
Greek Government in his presentation of the exception of force
majeure ; in my judgment that question would call for an exam-
ination of the municipal law applicable. On this interpreta-
tion, submission (4), like the Belgian submissions, would have
to be dismissed.

Another possible interpretation of submission (4) would be that
the Court is simply called upon to determine, as a fact, that
on account of the budgetary and monetary situation of Greece,
it is materially impossible for the Greek Government to carry
out the arbitral awards according to their terms. In the writ-
ten Rejoinder and in the earlier part of the oral proceedings,
it was stated that the Greek Government did not ask the Court
to deal with the question of Greece’s capacity to pay; that
Government was free to change its intention in this regard,
however. On this interpretation, submission (4) would have the
effect of raising the question of Greece’s capacity to pay. I
think the submission, thus interpreted, should be dismissed for
want of proof of the alleged impossibility. Most of the statistics
presented to the Court pertain to the budgetary and monetary
situation of Greece at an earlier period, and they relate
only indirectly to the situation as it now exists. The Court is
not asked to order an enquiry by experts, and the proofs fur-
nished do not seem to me to call for that course to be taken.

Emphasis is placed by the Greek Government’s submission
(4) upon the precise terms of the arbitral awards. The award
of July 25th, 1936, fixed the sum to be paid by the Greek
Government to the Société commerciale de Belgique ; it provided
for interest at the rate of 5 % from August rst, 1936, but it
did not otherwise provide for any period of time within which
the Greek Government was to make payment of the sum due.
In the declaration made on behalf of the Belgian Government
on May roth, it was said that the Belgian Government had
never intended to demand a single payment in full of the sum
due, the inference being that it does not so intend now. This
being the case, it would seem to be unnecessary to enquire into
the Greek. Government’s capacity to make a single payment in
full of the sum due; to this extent, submission (4), viewed as
a request for a finding of fact, ceased to have any object after
the Belgian declaration.

30
A./B. 78 (‘SOCIÉTÉ COMMERCIALE’’).—OP. HUDSON 187

As to submission (3) of the Greek Government, I agree that
the Court may take note of the Greek Government’s recogni-
tion of the principle of res judicata as applied to the two arbi-
tral awards of 1936, but I think that in admitting submission (3)
the operative part of the judgment should not go further
than this.

(Signed) MANLEY O. Hupson.

31


186

DISSENTING OPINION. OF Mr. DE VISSCHER
[ Translation. |

I regret that I am unable to concur in the second part ot the
Court’s answer to the question under letter (6). 1 concede that the
provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter do not impose on the
Union of South Africa a legal obligation to conclude a Trusteeship
Agreement, in the sense that the Union is free to accept or to refuse
the particular terms of a draft agreement. On the other hand, I
consider that these provisions impose on the Union of South Africa
an obligation to take part in negotiations with a view to concluding
an agreement. In this respect, the Court’s answer falls short of my
opinion on the obligations resulting from the Charter for the Man-
datory Power. My opinion is based on an interpretation of texts
which differs from that adopted in the Court’s Opinion.

The Opinion says : “The Charter has contemplated and regulated
only a single system, the International Trusteeship System.
It did not contemplate or regulate a co-existing Mandates
System.” Furthermore, the relevant articles of Chapter XII
dealing with the International Trusteeship System are clearly
imperative: Article 75: “The United Nations shall establish
under its authority an International Trusteeship System...” ;
“L’Organisation des Nations Unies établira, sous son autorité,
un régime de tutelle...” ; Article 77: “The Trusteeship System
shall apply...” ; “Le Régime de Tutelle s’appliquera....”.

The Mandates System was maintained by Article 80 of the
Charter only as a transitional measure. The terms of the first
paragraph alone: “and until such agreements have been con-
cluded”’ exclude the possibility of prolonged co-existence of the
two régimes. As to Article 80, paragraph 2, its legal bearing in
this connexion is clearly defined. It provides that the preceding
paragraph, which maintains the status quo until such agreements
have been concluded (the so-called safeguarding clause), ‘‘shall
not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement
of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing
mandated and other territories under the Trusteeship System as
provided for in Article 77”.

I consider that the Opinion does not give to these provisions
their proper place in the general framework of the provisions of
Chapter XII, and, as a result, does not deduce from them all
the consequences which follow therefrom. The Opinion minimizes
their import to the point of considering them merely as expres-

62
DISSENTING OPINION OF MY. DE VISSCHER 187

sing the expectation that “‘the mandatory States would follow
the normal course indicated by the Charter, namely, conclude
Trusteeship Agreements’.

It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty clauses
must not only be considered as a whole, but must also be inter-
preted so as to avoid as much as possible depriving one of them
of practical effect for the benefit of others. This rule is particularly
applicable to the interpretation of a text of a treaty of a con-
stitutional character like the United Nations Charter, above all
when, as in this case, its provisions create a well-defined inter-
national régime, and for that reason may be considered as com-
plementary to one another.

I cannot readily believe that the authors of the Charter would
have warned the mandatory Powers, by means of an express
and particularly emphatic provision, that the negotiation and
conclusion of Trusteeship Agreements could not, by reason of
the status quo temporarily guaranteed under Article 80, para-
graph I, “give grounds for delay or postponement” if the scope
of this provision amounted simply to the expression of an
expectation or, at the most, of a wish or an advice. The terms
of article 80, paragraph 2, do not favour this interpretation.

The negative character of the phrase is not an argument in
favour of the absence of an obligation. The warning given to
the mandatory Powers that the status quo referred to in the
preceding paragraph gives no valid ground for delaying or post-
poning the agreements which, as will be shown later, are the
instrument for the application of the Trusteeship System, is
clearly, in my opinion, a direction to those Powers to be ready,
at the earliest opportunity, to negotiate with a view to concluding
such agreements. What Article 80, paragraph 2, intended to
prevent was that a mandatory Power, while invoking on the
one hand the disappearance of the League of Nations, should
refuse on the other hand to recognize the United Nations or to
consider submitting itself to the only régime contemplated in
the Charter, namely, the Trusteeship System. What this same
provision intended to enact was that the mandatory Power should
take appropriate measures for the negotiation of a Trusteeship
Agreement.

If, as has already been said, we must endeavour to reconcile
the texts rather than to set them in opposition to one another,
and attempt to give each one its due by preserving its practical
effect within the system as a whole, we are led to the following
conclusions.

The wording of Articles 75, 77 and 79 is permissive in the
sense that the placing under Trusteeship is contingent upon the
conclusion of subsequent agreements, the mandatory Power being
free to accept or to reject the terms of a proposed agreement.

63
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. DE VISSCHER 188

This is where the so-called “‘optional” character of the Trusteeship
appears. It is impossible, however, to reconcile these permissive
provisions with Article 80, paragraph 2, and with the clear intent
of the authors of the Charter to substitute the Trusteeship System
for thé Mandates System, without admitting that the mandatory
Power, while remaining free to reject the particular terms of a
proposed agreement, has the legal obligation to be ready to take
part il negotiations and to conduct them in good faith with a
view ie concluding an agreement. |

Thât an obligation so understood may form the valid and
practical object of an international undertaking has been clearly
recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the following passage in its Advisory Opinion of October 15th,
1931 : ‘The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engage-
ment incumbent on the two Governments in conformity with the
Council’s Resolution is not only to enter into negotiations, but
also to pursue them as far as possible with a view to concluding
agreements.”’ The Court added, however: “But an obligation to
negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement 1”
It is reasonable to believe that Article 80, paragraph 2, which
mentions ‘‘the conclusion” in addition to ‘‘the negotiation’, had
no other meaning: the obligation to be ready to negotiate with
a view to concluding an agreement.

Nor should we overlook the psychological value of the
opening of negotiations, particularly when the object of the
negotiations, as is the case here, is only to apply in practice
principles forming part of a pre-established international régime.
The opening of such negotiations is often a decisive step towar
the conclusion of an agreement.

Difficulties of interpretation have arisen in connexion with the
word ‘‘voluntarily’” which appears in Article 77 only in respect
of territories in category (c). It seems to me impossible that this
provision, which is so clearly in contrast with the absence of any
similar indication regarding territories in categories {a) and (0),
should have been inserted without any definite purpose and
should not correspond in the general framework of the system
to a- well-defined interest.

The word ‘‘voluntarily” has here the meaning of ‘“‘spontaneously”’
It defines the unilateral act by which a State, while free. from
any obligation, decides of its own initiative to place a territory
under the Trusteeship System by concluding a subsequent agree-
ment as indicated in Chapter XU. It would be distorting the
natural meaning of the word ‘‘voluntarily” and depriving it of
its signification in the context to treat it as an equivalent of
by agreement, thus making it a synonym to the terms ‘by means

1 Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B,
fasc. No. 42, p. 116. -

64
DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. DE VISSCHER 189

of Trusteeship Agreements’ which appear at the beginning of
Article 77, or the terms ‘‘a subsequent agreement” in paragraph 2
of the same article. The Trusteeshiz Agreement is a condition
common to the three categories ofi territories enumerated by
Article 77 as territories which may be placed under Trustership,
whereas, on the contrary, the voluntary decision, that is the
spontaneous decision of a State to place under Trusteeship a terri-
tory in category (c}, is a condition peculiar to the last category.
The decision precedes the agreement; it is by no means identi-
fied with it.

The term ‘‘voluntarily” which thus finds its own place in the
context and its practical effect, shows that it is only with regard
to territories in category (c) that the conclusion of a Trusteeship
Agreement has been contemplated by the Charter as being free
from any pre-existing obligation, even in the realm of negotiations.
The difference in the wording is easy to explain by taking into
consideration the differences between the territories enumerated
in Article 77 from the point of view of the international interest
which they respectively presented at the time of the drafting
of the Charter: those in category (a) were already subject to
an international régime, and moreover, were clearly known and
defined ; those in category (5) were detached from enemy States
by the common victory of the Allied Powers. For various reasons
they both possessed an international element, which marked
them out as being prima facie the necessary objects of regulation
by international agreement. The position of territories in cate-
gory (c) was quite different in this respect. Complete freedom
of decision was left to the States responsible for their administration
to place them “‘voluntarily” under the system and consequently
to consent to negotiations to that effect, or to refuse to take
part in such negotiations. |

The Charter has created an international system which
would never have had more than theoretical existence if the
mandatory Powers had considered themselves under no obligation
to negotiate agreements to convert their Mandates into Trustee-
ship Agreements. In fact, apart from instances of accession to
independence and from the case of Palestine, all mandatory
Powers other than the Union of South Africa have consented to
this conversion. The obligation to be ready to negotiate with a
view to concluding an agreement represented the minimum of inter-
national co-operation without which the entire régime contem-
plated and regulated by the Charter would have been frustrated.
In this connexion one must bear in mind that in the interpretation
of a great international constitutional instrument, like the United
Nations Charter, the individualistic concepts which are generally
adequate in the interpretation of ordinary treaties, do not suffice.
Under Article 76 of the Charter, ‘the basic objectives of the
Trusteeship System” conform to ‘‘the purposes of the United
Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter”. In

65
INDIVIDUAL OPINION OF M. DE VISSCHER Igo

recognizing its obligation to be ready to negotiate with a view
to concluding a Trusteeship Agreement, a mandatory Power,
without thereby jeopardizing its freedom to accept or refuse
the terms of such an Agreement, co-operates in a particularly
important field in the attainment of the highest objectives of
the United Nations.

(Signed) CH. DE VISSCHER.

66


DECLARATION BY COUNT ROSTWOROWSKI.
{ Translation. |

Count RostworowskI, Judge, declares that he is unable
to concur in the Opinion given, because, in his view, the
two decrees in question of 1935 are not, in substance, incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig and
do not violate any of its provisions or conflict with any of
its principles.

On the other hand, he considers that these same decrees
of 1935, having been issued by the Senate alone, are, as regards
the form of their enactment, contrary to Article 43, paragraph 1,
of the Constitution, which requires that legislation must
receive the concurrent assent of the Volkstag and the Senate.
—The argument based on the Enabling Law of 1933 is not,
in his view, sound, since the law of 1933 itself, in effect,
profoundly modifies the constitutional régime of the Free City.
There being no provision in the Constitution authorizing this
law, it appears to be a deviation from the terms of the
Constitution which can only be made lawful by means of the
express approval of the League of Nations. In the absence
of such approval, the law of 1933 does not suffice to render
the impugned decrees of 1935 lawful and accordingly they
remain, as regards the form of their enactment, inconsistent
with the Constitution of Danzig.

(Signed) M. ROSTWOROWSKI.

22


                              COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                 RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                          AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                           VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
                      DU TRAITÉ D’AMITIÉ, DE COMMERCE
                      ET DE DROITS CONSULAIRES DE 1955
                       (RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D’IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
                                      D’AMÉRIQUE)

                             ORDONNANCE DU 3 FÉVRIER 2021

                                     2021
                              INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                               REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                            ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                              ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
                    OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
                       RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
                       (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
                                     OF AMERICA)

                               ORDER OF 3 FEBRUARY 2021

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                                              Mode officiel de citation :
                                Violations alléguées du traité d’amitié, de commerce
                    et de droits consulaires de 1955 (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis
                                    d’Amérique), ordonnance du 3 février 2021,
                                              C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 68

                                                  Official citation:
                        Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
                           and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
                                      of America), Order of 3 February 2021,
                                              I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 68

                                                                                1216
                                                                    No de vente
                 ISSN 0074-4441                                     Sales number:
                 ISBN 978-92-1-003877-5

                                     © 2022 CIJ/ICJ, Nations Unies/United Nations
                                         Tous droits réservés/All rights reserved

                                         Imprimé en France/Printed in France

00 Ord 1216 PT.indd 2                                                                             24/03/22 15:35

                                                      3 FÉVRIER 2021

                                                      ORDONNANCE

                             VIOLATIONS ALLÉGUÉES
                        DU TRAITÉ D’AMITIÉ, DE COMMERCE
                        ET DE DROITS CONSULAIRES DE 1955
                    (RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D’IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
                                   D’AMÉRIQUE)

                               ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
                     OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
                        RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
                    (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
                                  OF AMERICA)

                                                     3 FEBRUARY 2021

                                                         ORDER

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                                                                                68

                                INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                                 YEAR 2021
                                                                                2021
                                                                                3 February
                                               3 February 2021                              General List
                                                                                No. 175

                              ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
                    OF THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY, ECONOMIC
                       RELATIONS, AND CONSULAR RIGHTS
                          (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES
                                        OF AMERICA)

                                                  ORDER

                Present: President Yusuf; Vice‑President Xue; Judges Tomka, Abraham,
                          Bennouna, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Gevorgian,
                          Salam, Iwasawa; Judges ad hoc Brower, Momtaz;
                          Registrar Gautier.

                     The International Court of Justice,
                   Composed as above,
                   After deliberation,
                   Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
                Article 79ter, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court,
                   Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
                16 July 2018, whereby the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter “Iran”)
                instituted proceedings against the United States of America (hereinafter
                the “United States”) with regard to a dispute concerning alleged viola-
                tions by the United States of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
                and Consular Rights, which was signed by the two States in Tehran on
                15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 June 1957 (hereinafter the
                “Treaty of Amity”),
                   Having regard to the Order of 10 October 2018, whereby the Court
                fixed 10 April 2019 and 10 October 2019 as the respective time‑limits for

                                                                                4

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                                 1955 treaty of amity (order 3 II 21)                 69

                the filing of a Memorial by Iran and a Counter‑Memorial by the
                United States,
                  Having regard to the Order of 8 April 2019, whereby the President of
                the Court extended to 24 May 2019 and 10 January 2020, the respective
                time‑limits for the filing of a Memorial by Iran and a Counter‑Memorial
                by the United States,
                  Having regard to the Memorial of Iran filed within the time‑limit thus
                extended,
                  Having regard to the preliminary objections raised by the Government
                of the United States on 23 August 2019;
                  Whereas, under the provisions of Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules
                of Court of 14 April 1978, as amended on 1 February 2001, the filing of
                preliminary objections by the United States had the effect of suspending
                the proceedings on the merits;
                  Whereas, by its Judgment of 3 February 2021, the Court found that it
                had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty
                of Amity, to entertain the Application filed by Iran on 16 July 2018, and
                that the said Application was admissible,
                 Fixes 20 September 2021 as the time‑limit for the filing of the Counter‑
                Memorial of the United States of America; and
                 Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                  Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
                the Peace Palace, The Hague, this third day of February, two thou-
                sand and twenty‑one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the
                archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of
                the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the United States of
                America, respectively.

                                                  (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf,
                                                                  President.
                                                       (Signed) Philippe Gautier,
                                                                    Registrar.

                                                                                5

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TEMPLE DE PREAH VIHÉAR (ARRÊT DU 26 V 61) 35

*
* *

La conclusion ci-dessus étant suffisante par elle-méme pour
établir la compétence de la Cour et la question de compétence
étant la seule que la Cour ait à trancher à ce stade de l'affaire,
il devient inutile de procéder à un examen du deuxième motif
de compétence invoqué par le Cambodge et de l'exception soulevée
par la Thaïlande à cet égard.

Par ces motifs,

La Cour,
à l'unanimité,
rejette la première exception préliminaire de la Thaïlande et dit

qu'elle est compétente pour statuer sur le différend qui lui a été
soumis le 6 octobre 1959 par la requête du Cambodge.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-six mai mil neuf cent
soixante et un, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé
aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respec-
tivement au Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge et au
Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande.

Le Président,
(Signé) B. WiNIARSKI.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) GARNIER-COIGNET.

M. ALFARO, Vice-Président, fait la déclaration suivante:

Le fait qu’en l’espèce la Thaïlande a fondé sa première exception
préliminaire à la juridiction de la Cour sur les conclusions de l'arrêt
rendu en l'affaire relative à I’Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955
(Israël c. Bulgarie) établit un rapport étroit entre cette affaire et
l'affaire actuelle; et l’on peut être amené à se demander si l’assen-
timent au présent arrêt n implique pas accord avec les conclusions
de la Cour dans l'affaire ci-dessus mentionnée. C'est Pourquoi je
crois devoir déclarer qu'à mon grand regret je ne saurais m’associer
à ces conclusions; mais, même si je pouvais le faire, j'estime, en
raison des nombreux motifs exposés dans le présent arrêt, que les

2Z
TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR (ARRÊT DU 26 V 61) 36

conclusions de la Cour en l'affaire Isvaél c. Bulgarie concernant la
portée et l'effet du paragraphe 5 de l’article 36 du Statut ne sont
pas applicables à l'affaire actuelle.

M. WELLINGTON Koo, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Certains des motifs de l'arrêt se rapportant à la décision rendue
par la Cour en l'affaire relative à l'Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955
(Israël c. Bulgarie), Exceptions préliminaires, je désire indiquer
que, tout en me ralliant à la conclusion à laquelle est parvenue la
Cour en la présente affaire et d’une manière générale au raisonne-
ment qui l’y a amenée, je n’entends pas signifier par là que j’ap-
prouve ou que j'accepte la décision rendue en l'affaire Israël c.
Bulgarie; je maintiens au contraire les motifs et la conclusion
énoncés dans l'opinion dissidente collective qui y était jointe.

Je considère même que, sur la base de cette opinion, la décla-
ration d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour per-
manente faite par la Thaïlande en 1940 doit être considérée comme
s'étant transformée en acceptation visant la Cour actuelle par
application de l’article 36, paragraphe 5, du Statut, ainsi que la
Thaïlande reconnaît l'avoir voulu et ce au moment où, le 16 décem-
bre 1946, elle est devenue Membre des Nations Unies et par consé-
quent partie au Statut, ce fait constitue un motif additionnel et
plus simple de rejeter le principal argument avancé par la Thaïlande
à l'appui de sa première exception.

Cela est clair, mais il n’en reste pas moins que, les circonstances
des deux affaires étant essentiellement différentes, ni le fait qu’à
s’en tenir à ladite opinion la déclaration de 1940 s’est ainsi trans-
formée avant le 6 mai 1950, date où elle devait expirer, ni le fait
que, si l’on se fonde sur la décision rendue par la Cour en 1959,
cette déclaration est devenue caduque le 19 avril 1956, à la disso-
lution de la Cour permanente, n’ont un effet juridique déterminant
quant à la seule question décisive en litige dans la présente affaire,
à savoir la validité de la déclaration thaïlandaise du 20 mai 1950.

Sir Gerald FITzMAURICE et M. TANAKA, juges, font la déclaration
commune suivante:

Bien que nous soyons tout à fait d'accord avec le dispositif de
l'arrêt rendu par la Cour en l'espèce et avec les motifs sur lesquels
elle s’est fondée, nous avons une raison additionnelle et, pour
nous, plus directe de rejeter la première exception préliminaire de
la Thaïlande.

Cette exception préliminaire est fondée sur la conclusion à la-
quelle est parvenue la Cour quant à l'effet du paragraphe 5 de

23


46

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ODA

Lack of jurisdiction of the Court — Absence of a legal dispute within the pur-
view of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute — Mere belief of the Congo that
the Belgian Law violated international law not evidence or proof that a dispute
existed between it and Belgium -~ Failure of the Application instituting pro-
ceedings to specify the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is
said to be based or to indicate the subject of the dispute — Failure of the Congo
to cite any damage or injury which the Congo or Mr. Yerodia has suffered or
will suffer except for some moral injury — Changing of the subject-matter of
the proceedings by the Congo — Principle that a State cannot exercise its juris-
diction outside its territory —- National case law, treaty-made law and legal
writing in respect of the issue of universal jurisdiction — Inability of a State to
arrest an individual outside its territory — Arrest warrant not directly binding
without more on foreign authorities — Issuance and international circulation of
arrest warrant having no legal impact unless arrest request validated by the
receiving State — Question of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs
and of whether it can be claimed in connection with serious breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law Concluding remarks.

INTRODUCTION

1. I voted against all provisions of the operative part of the Judgment.
My objections are not directed individually at the various provisions
since I am unable to support any aspect of the position the Court has
taken in dealing with the presentation of this case by the Congo.

It is my firm belief that the Court should have declared ex officio that
it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Congo’s Application of 17 Octo-
ber 2000 for the reason that there was, at that date, no legal dispute
between the Congo and Belgium falling within the purview of Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, a belief already expressed in my declaration
appended to the Court’s Order of 8 December 2000 concerning the
request for the indication of provisional measures. I reiterate my view
that the Court should have dismissed the Application submitted by the
Congo on 17 October 2000 for lack of jurisdiction.

My opinion was that the case should have been removed from the
General List at the provisional measures stage. In the Order of 8 Decem-
ber 2000, however, I voted in favour of the holding that the case should
not be removed from the General List but did so reluctantly “only from
a sense of judicial solidarity” (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of
& December 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 205, para. 6, declaration of
Judge Oda). I now regret that vote.

47
47 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

2. It strikes me as unfortunate that the Court, after finding that “it has
jurisdiction to entertain the Application” and that “the Application . . . is
admissible” (Judgment, para. 78 (1) (B) and (D)), quickly comes to cer-
tain conclusions concerning “the immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of
[the Congo] enjoyed under international law” in connection with “the
issue against [Mr. Yerodia] of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000” and
“its international circulation” (Judgment, para. 78 (2)).

I. No LEGAL DISPUTE IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 36, PARAGRAPH 2,
OF THE STATUTE

3. To begin with, the Congo’s Application provides no basis on which
to infer that the Congo ever thought that a dispute existed between it and
Belgium regarding the arrest warrant issued by a Belgian investigating
judge on 11 April 2000 against Mr. Yerodia, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Congo. The word “dispute” appears in the Application
only at its very end, under the heading “V. Admissibility of the Present
Application”, in which the Congo stated that:

“As to the existence of a dispute on that question [namely, the
question that the Court is called upon to decide], this is established
ab initio by the very fact that it is the non-conformity with interna-
tional law of the Law of the Belgian State on which the investigating
judge founds his warrant which is the subject of the legal grounds
which [the Congo] has submitted to the Court.” (Emphasis added.)

Without giving any further explanation as to the alleged dispute, the
Congo simply asserted that Belgium’s 1993 Law, as amended in 1999,
concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law contravened international law.

4. The Congo’s mere belief that the Belgian law violated international
law is not evidence, let alone proof, that a dispute existed between it and
Belgium. It shows at most that the Congo held a different legal view, one
opposed to the action taken by Belgium. It is clear that the Congo did
not think that it was referring a dispute to the Court. The Congo,
furthermore, never thought of this as a /egal dispute, the existence of
which is a requirement for unilateral applications to the Court under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute. The Congo’s mere oppo-
sition to the Belgian Law and certain acts taken by Belgium pursuant to
it cannot be regarded as a dispute or a legal dispute between the Congo
and Belgium. In fact, there existed no such /egal dispute in this case.

I find it strange that the Court does not take up this point in the Judg-
ment; instead the Court simply states in the first paragraph of its decision
that “the Congo . . . filed in the Registry of the Court an Application

48
48 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

instituting proceedings against ... Belgium . . . in respect of a dispute
concerning an ‘international arrest warrant...” (Judgment, para. 1,
emphasis added) and speaks of “a legal dispute between [the Congo and
Belgium] concerning the international lawfulness of the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 and the consequences to be drawn if the arrest warrant was
unlawful” (Judgment, para. 27, emphasis added). To repeat, the Congo
did refer in its Application to a dispute but only in reference to the admis-
sibility of the case, not “Ti]n order to found the Court’s jurisdiction”, as
the Court mistakenly asserts in paragraph | of the Judgment.

5. While Article 40 of the Court’s Statute does not require from an
applicant State a statement of “the legal grounds upon which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court is said to be based”, Article 38, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court does and the Congo failed to specify those grounds in its
Application. Furthermore, the Congo did not indicate “the subject of the
dispute”, which is required under Article 40 of the Statute.

In its Application the Congo refers only to “Legal Grounds” (Sec-
tion I) and “Statement of the Grounds on which the Claim is Based”
(Section [V). In those sections of the Application, the Congo, without
referring to the basis of jurisdiction or the subject of dispute, simply men-
tions “[vliolation of the principle that a State may not exercise [its
authority] on the territory of another State and of the principle of
sovereign equality” and “[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State”.

6. The Congo’s claim is, first, that the 1993 Belgian Law, as amended in
1999, is in breach of those two aforementioned principles and, secondly,
that Belgium’s prosecution of Mr. Yerodia, Foreign Minister of the
Congo, violates the diplomatic immunity granted under international
law to Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The Congo did not cite any damage
or injury which the Congo or Mr. Yerodia himself has suffered or will
suffer except for some moral injury; that is, at most, Mr. Yerodia might
have thought it wise to forgo travel to foreign countries for fear of being
arrested by those States pursuant to the arrest warrant issued by the Bel-
gian investigating judge (that fear being ungrounded). Thus, as already
noted, the Congo did not ask the Court to settle a legal dispute with
Belgium but rather to render a legal opinion on the lawfulness of
the 1993 Belgian Law as amended in 1999 and actions taken under it.

7. I fear that the Court’s conclusions finding that this case involves a
legal dispute between the Congo and Belgium within the meaning of
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute (such questions being the only
ones which can be submitted to the Court) and upholding its jurisdiction
in the present case will eventually lead to an excessive number of cases
of this nature being referred to the Court even when no real injury has
occurred, simply because one State believes that another State has acted
contrary to international law. I am also afraid that many States will then

49
49 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

withdraw their recognition of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in
order to avoid falling victim to this distortion of the rules governing the
submission of cases. (See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of
8 December 2000, 1 C.J. Reports 2000, p. 204, declaration of Judge Oda.)

This “loose” interpretation of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
will frustrate the expectations of a number of law-abiding nations. I
would emphasize that the Court’s jurisdiction is, in principle, based on
the consent of the sovereign States seeking judicial settlement by the
Court.

Il. THE CONGo’s CHANGING OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER

8. In reaffirming my conviction that the Congo’s Application uni-
laterally submitted to the Court was not a proper subject of contentious
proceedings before the Court, I would like to take up a few other points
which I find to be crucial to understanding the essence of this inappro-
priate, unjustified and, if I may say so, wrongly decided case. It is to be
noted, firstly, that between filing its Application of 17 October 2000 and
submitting its Memorial on 15 May 2001, the Congo restated the issues,
changing the underlying subject-matter in the process.

The Congo contended in the Application: (4) that the 1993 Belgian
Law, as amended in 1999, violated the “principle that a State may not
exercise [its authority] on the territory of another State” and the “prin-
ciple of sovereign equality” and (i) that Belgium’s exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over Mr. Yerodia, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Congo, violated the “diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State”. The alleged violations of those first two
principles concern the question of “universal jurisdiction”, which remains
a matter of controversy within the international legal community, while
the last claim relates only to a question of the “diplomatic immunity”
enjoyed by the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs.

9. The Congo changed its claim in its Memorial, submitted seven
months later, stating that

“by issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 against [Mr. Yerodia], Belgium committed a violation
in regard to the DRC of the rule of customary international law con-
cerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal pro-
cess of incumbent foreign ministers” (Memorial of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of 15 May 2001, p. 64). / Translation by the
Registry. ]

Charging and arresting a suspect are clearly acts falling within the exer-
cise of a State’s criminal jurisdiction. The questions originally raised —

50
50 ARREST WARRANT (DISS, OP. ODA}

namely, whether a State has extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes con-
stituting serious violations of humanitarian law wherever committed and
by whomever (in other words, the question of universal jurisdiction) and
whether a Foreign Minister is exempt from such jurisdiction (in other
words, the question of diplomatic immunity) — were transmuted into
questions of the “issue and international circulation” of an arrest warrant
against a Foreign Minister and the immunities of incumbent Foreign
Ministers.

This is clearly a change in subject-matter, one not encompassed in “the
right to argue further the grounds of its Application”, which the Congo
reserved in its Application of 17 October 2000.

10. It remains a mystery to me why Belgium did not raise preliminary
objections concerning the Court’s jurisdiction at the outset of this case.
Instead, it admitted in its Counter-Memorial that there had been a dis-
pute between the two States, one susceptible to judicial settlement by the
Court, at the time the proceedings were instituted and that the Court was
then seised of the case, as the Court itself finds (Judgment, paras. 27-28).
Did Belgium view this as a case involving a unilateral application and the
Respondent’s subsequent recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction, instances
of which are to be found in the Court’s past?

Belgium seems to have taken the position that once Mr. Yerodia had
ceased to be Foreign Minister, a dispute existed concerning him in his
capacity as a former Foreign Minister and contended that the Court
lacked jurisdiction under those circumstances. Thus, Belgium also appears
to have replaced the issues as they existed on the date of the Congo’s
Application with those arising at a later date. It would appear that Bel-
gium did not challenge the Court's jurisdiction in the original case but
rather was concerned only with the admissibility of the Application or
the mootness of the case once Mr. Yerodia had been relieved of his duties
as Foreign Minister (see Belgium’s four preliminary objections raised in
its Counter-Memorial, referred to in the Judgment, paras. 23, 29, 33
and 37).

In this respect, I share the view of the Court (reserving, of course, my
position that a dispute did not exist) that the alleged dispute was the one
existing in October 2000 (Judgment, para. 38) and, although I voted
against paragraph 78 (1) (A) of the Judgment for the reasons set out in
paragraph 1 of my opinion, I concur with the Court in rejecting Bel-
gium’s objections relating to “jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility”
in regard to the alleged dispute which Belgium believed existed after
Mr. Yerodia left office.

Certainly, the question whether a former Foreign Minister is entitled to
the same privileges and immunities as an incumbent Foreign Minister
may well be a legal issue but it is not a proper subject of the present case
brought by the Congo in October 2000.

51
51 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

III. Dogs THE PRESENT CASE INVOLVE ANY LEGAL ISSUES ON WHICH
THE CONGO AND BELGIUM HELD CONFLICTING VIEWS?

11. Putting aside for now my view that that there was no legal dispute
between the Congo and Belgium susceptible to judicial settlement by the
Court under its Statute and that the Congo seems simply to have asked
the Court to render an opinion, I shall note my incomprehension of the
Congo’s intention and purpose in bringing this request to the Court
in October 2000 when Mr. Yerodia held the office of Foreign Minister.

In its Application of October 2000, the Congo raised the question
whether the 1993 Belgian Law, as amended in 1999, providing for the
punishment of serious violations of humanitarian law was itself contrary
to the principle of sovereign equality under international law (see Appli-
cation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 17 October 2000,
Part III: Statement of the Facts, A). Yet it appears that the Congo aban-
doned this point in its Memorial of May 2001, as the Court admits (Judg-
ment, para. 45), and never took it up during the oral proceedings.

12. It is one of the fundamental principles of international law that a
State cannot exercise its Jurisdiction outside its territory. However, the
past few decades have seen a gradual widening in the scope of the juris-
diction to prescribe law. From the base established by the Permanent
Court’s decision in 1927 in the “Lotus” case, the scope of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction has been expanded over the past few decades to
cover the crimes of piracy, hijacking, etc. Universal jurisdiction is increas-
ingly recognized in cases of terrorism and genocide. Belgium is known
for taking the lead in this field and its 1993 Law (which would make
Mr. Yerodia liable to punishment for any crimes against humanitarian
law he committed outside of Belgium) may well be at the forefront of a
trend. There is some national case law and some treaty-made law evi-
dencing such a trend.

Legal scholars the world over have written prolifically on this issue.
Some of the opinions appended to this Judgment also give guidance in
this respect. I believe, however, that the Court has shown wisdom in
refraining from taking a definitive stance in this respect as the law is not
sufficiently developed and, in fact, the Court is not requested in the
present case to take a decision on this point.

13. It is clear that a State cannot arrest an individual outside its terri-
tory and forcibly bring him before its courts for trial. In this connection,
it is necessary to examine the effect of an arrest warrant issued by a State
authority against an individual who is subject to that State’s jurisdiction
to prescribe law.

The arrest warrant is an official document issued by the State’s judi-
ciary empowering the police authorities to take forcible action to place

52
52 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

the individual under arrest. Without more, however, the warrant is
not directly binding on foreign authorities, who are not part of the law
enforcement mechanism of the issuing State. The individual may be
arrested abroad (that is, outside the issuing State) only by the authorities
of the State where he or she is present, since jurisdiction over that terri-
tory lies exclusively with that State. Those authorities will arrest the indi-
vidual being sought by the issuing State only if the requested State is
committed to do so pursuant to international arrangements with the
issuing State. Interpol is merely an organization which transmits the
arrest request from one State to another; it has no enforcement powers
of its own.

It bears stressing that the issuance of an arrest warrant by one State
and the international circulation of the warrant through Interpol have no
legal impact unless the arrest request is validated by the receiving State.
The Congo appears to have failed to grasp that the mere issuance and
international circulation of an arrest warrant have little significance.
There is even some doubt whether the Court itself properly understood
this, particularly as regards a warrant’s legal effect. The crucial point in
this regard is not the issuance or international circulation of an arrest
warrant but the response of the State receiving it.

14. Diplomatic immunity is the immunity which an individual holding
diplomatic status enjoys from the exercise of jurisdiction by States other
than his own. The issue whether Mr. Yerodia, as Foreign Minister of the
Congo, should have been immune in 2000 from Belgium’s exercise of
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the 1993 Law as amended in 1999 is two-
fold. The first question is whether in principle a Foreign Minister, the
post which Mr. Yerodia held in 2000, is entitled to the same immunity as
diplomatic agents. Neither the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations nor any other convention spells out the privileges of Foreign
Ministers and the answer may not be clear under customary international
law. The Judgment addresses this question merely by giving a hornbook-
like explanation in paragraphs 51 to 55. I have no further comment on
this.

The more important aspect is the second one: can diplomatic immu-
nity also be claimed in respect of serious breaches of humanitarian law —
over which many advocate the existence of universal jurisdiction and
which are the subject-matter of Belgium’s 1993 Law as amended in
1999 — and, furthermore, is a Foreign Minister entitled to greater immu-
nity in this respect than ordinary diplomatic agents? These issues are too
new to admit of any definite answer.

The Court, after quoting several recent incidents in European coun-
tries, seems to conclude that Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy absolute
immunity (Judgment, paras. 56-61). It may reasonably be asked whether

53
53 ARREST WARRANT (DISS. OP. ODA)

it was necessary, or advisable, for the Court to commit itself on this issue,
which remains a highly hypothetical question as Belgium has not exer-
cised its criminal jurisdiction over Mr. Yerodia pursuant to the 1993
Belgian Law, as amended in 1999, and no third State has yet acted in
pursuance of Belgium’s assertion of universal jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

15. I find little sense in the Court’s finding in paragraph (3) of the
operative part of the Judgment, which in the Court's logic appears to be
the consequence of the finding set out in paragraph (2) (Judgment,
para. 78). Given that the Court concludes that the violation of interna-
tional law occurred in 2000 and the Court would appear to believe that
there is nothing in 2002 to prevent Belgium from issuing a new arrest
warrant against Mr. Yerodia, this time as a former Foreign Minister and
not the incumbent Foreign Minister, there is no practical significance in
ordering Belgium to cancel the arrest warrant of April 2000. If the Court
believes that this is an issue of the sovereign dignity of the Congo and
that that dignity was violated in 2000, thereby causing injury at that time
to the Congo, the harm done cannot be remedied by the cancellation of
the arrest warrant; the only remedy would be an apology by Belgium.
But I do not believe that Belgium caused any injury to the Congo because
no action was ever taken against Mr. Yerodia pursuant to the warrant.
Furthermore, Belgium was under no obligation to provide the Congo
with any assurances that the incumbent Foreign Minister’s immunity
from criminal jurisdiction would be respected under the 1993 Law, as
amended in 1999, but that is not the issue here.

16. In conclusion, I find the present case to be not only unripe for
adjudication at this time but also fundamentally inappropriate for the
Court’s consideration. There is not even agreement between the Congo
and Belgium concerning the issues in dispute in the present case. The
potentially significant questions (the validity of universal jurisdiction, the
general scope of diplomatic immunity) were transmuted into a simple
question of the issuance and international circulation of an arrest war-
rant as they relate to diplomatic immunity. It is indeed unfortunate that
the Court chose to treat this matter as a contentious case suitable for
judicial resolution.

(Signed) Shigeru ODA.

54


                              DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE IWASAWA

[Traduction]

        Article 4 de la CIEDR imposant d’adopter les mesures destinées à éliminer l’incitation à la
haine et à la discrimination raciales en «tenant compte des principes formulés dans la Déclaration
universelle des droits de l’homme», notamment la liberté d’expression — Existence dans l’histoire
récente d’hostilités à grande échelle entre les Parties — Nécessité d’interpréter dans ce contexte les
déclarations faites par des organisations et des personnes privées.

          1. L’article 4 de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de
discrimination raciale (ci-après la «CIEDR») impose d’adopter les mesures destinées à éliminer
l’incitation à la haine et à la discrimination raciales en «tenant compte des principes formulés dans
la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme et des droits expressément énoncés à l’article 5 de
la … Convention» et, tout particulièrement, de la liberté d’expression. Celle-ci est une condition
indispensable au plein développement de l’individu et constitue le fondement de toute société libre
et démocratique. L’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression emporte des devoirs et responsabilités
particuliers. Il peut par conséquent faire l’objet de certaines restrictions, qui ne sont toutefois
autorisées que dans des conditions bien précises (voir paragraphe 3 de l’article 19 du pacte
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques). Les mesures destinées à éliminer l’incitation à la
haine et à la discrimination raciales sont compatibles avec la protection de la liberté d’expression,
pour autant qu’elles satisfassent à ces conditions.

         2. Les Parties à la présente affaire se sont, à deux reprises dans leur histoire récente, entre
1991 et 1994 puis à nouveau en 2020, affrontées dans le cadre d’hostilités à grande échelle. Il en
résulte que de l’animosité semble persister entre les deux Etats ainsi que dans quelques groupes de
leurs populations. C’est dans ce contexte qu’il convient d’interpréter les déclarations faites par des
organisations et des personnes privées.

        3. Dans la présente ordonnance, la Cour indique à l’Arménie de prendre, conformément aux
obligations que lui impose la CIEDR, toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher l’incitation et
l’encouragement à la haine raciale contre les personnes d’origine nationale ou ethnique
azerbaïdjanaise (point 1) du dispositif de l’ordonnance). Elle indique cette mesure dans les
circonstances décrites au paragraphe 2 ci-dessus.

                                                               (Signé)   IWASAWA Yuji.

                                             ___________