83

SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT AMMOUN
[Translation]

While subscribing to the Opinion arrived at by the Court, I feel obliged to
deal in this opinion with certain questions to which the Court did not address
itself, and with certain others that need to be developed at greater length, or
which received a solution or treatment that I am unable to agree with.

*

The Court has rightly held that legal ties existed, at the time of colonization
by Spain, between Morocco and Western Sahara.

Without sufficiently convincing reasons, however, it minimizes the nature
of those ties by maintaining that they consisted in an allegiance of the
Saharan population to the Sultan of Morocco. Paragraphs 95, 107 and 129
quite properly speak of “political” allegiance to the Sultan.

I shall develop the objections to this thesis at length. For the moment, I
should like to define the notion of allegiance to the Moroccan sovereign more
precisely in order to determine its exact bearing.

*
* *

In itself, allegiance to the sovereign is of a political and constitutional
character, as in certain countries that were subject to a military feudal system.
Furthermore, at the time of colonization by Spain, that is to say towards the
end of the nineteenth century, the Sultan combined in his person the
legislative and executive powers, to which was added the spiritual power. He
exercised those powers by means of dahirs, which were issued — a significant
fact — under his sole signature.

Does this not mean that the Sultan at that time personified the State, all of
whose powers he exercised? Therefore allegiance to the Sultan, or sovereign,
was equivalent to allegiance to the State. This entails acknowledging that the
legal ties between Morocco and Western Sahara recognized by the Court
took the form of political ties, indeed ties of sovereignty.

*
* *

We must, however, realize that these ties, which are of a political character,
are to be considered as such directly and not in the round about way adopted
in the Advisory Opinion, via allegiance to the Sultan.

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WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 84

This follows, on the international level, from international instru-
ments—treaties and unilateral declarations of foreign governments
—and internally, from acts of Moroccan authority.

*

It is first necessary to clear the ground by disposing of the thesis according
to which Western Sahara was not terra nullius, not because it had legal ties
with Morocco and Mauritania, but because the tribes inhabiting it were
politically organized and signed agreements with Spain (the ‘Tjil
Agreements).

I shall not pause to discuss the legal validity of those Agreements, which
were signed by private persons who had not been invested prior to the act of
signature with powers conferred by the Spanish State.

Even supposing them to be legally valid, one could not conclude from them
that Western Sahara, being the master of its own destiny, had no legal ties
with Morocco and Mauritania. For the capacity to sign agreements is not
incompatible with the existence of an authority superimposed on the local
authority.

In any case, if Western Sahara found itself cut off from any external
political power, this would certainly seem to be the effect of colonization.

This was generally the policy of colonialism: it let the local and regional
languages, literature and civilizations fall into decay, including the Arab
civilization of the countries of the Maghreb, upon whose philosophical and
scientific sources Europe drew from the Middle Ages up until the beginning
of the Renaissance.

In a second stage, the colonizers sought to win over the colonized peoples
to their own civilization, in order to bind them more closely to themselves.

In Western Sahara, this policy of encroachment did not, however, suppress
all ties with the other Arabs. Relations continued to exist from the Muslim
conquest onwards and under the successive Maghreb dynasties up until the
reigning ‘Alaweet dynasty.

If this is indeed the explanation for the origin of a certain autonomous way
of life on the part of the tribal populations in Western Sahara, one can
similarly suppose that the present separatist tendencies pointed to by counsel
for Spain (hearing of 22 July 1975, morning), namely the document sent by
the Jum‘a to the Head of the Spanish State on 23 March 1973, and the
statements made by various local groups, are also the result of a foreign
presence. We shall see, moreover (infra, p. 101), why Spain is so keen on a
referendum.

Mr. Benjelloun, Procureur général of the Supreme Court of Morocco, who
is well acquainted with the geography and history of his country, refuted this
argument in a learned address; he disposed of the argument which denies the
natural and human relationships and, in fact, the legal ties which make the
northern part of Western Sahara a territory forming part of the Empire of

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Morocco. The Procureur général concluded, very rightly, that, between the
Sahrawi and their Moroccan compatriots there existed something which
made of them one and the same nation, namely:

“... the shared past which they have wrought, the struggles carried out
side by side, the same shared ideal, a culture based on a concerted effort
and lasting will, a real determination to live together ...” (hearing of
30 June 1975).

Thus from the point of view of Morocco, the Spanish argument is
contradicted by a body of evidence based on diplomatic instruments, ethnic
considerations, common customs, one and the same social and cultural life, a
single language, common religion and religious practices, struggles carried
out side by side, submission to the authority of Moroccan Sultans, and finally
and above all the common aspirations which have ultimately constituted the
ties which as a matter of law link together the elements of one and the same
nation.

“TERRA NUELIUS”

Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya, Senior President of the Supreme Court of Zaire,
and Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algerian Ambassador in Paris, repre-
sentatives respectively of the Republic of Zaire and the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, both expressed penetrating views which compel
our attention with regard to the concept of terra nullius.

Anyone familiar with the philosophy of Zeno of Sidon or Citium and his
Stoic school cannot but be struck by the similarity between the ideas of that
philosopher and the views of Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya as to the links between
human beings and nature, between man and the cosmos. Further, the
spirituality of the thinking of the representative of Zaire echoes the
spirituality of the African Bantu revealed to us by Father Placide Tempels, a
Belgian Franciscan, in his work Philosophie bantoue. The author sees therein
a “striking analogy” with “that intense spiritual doctrine which quickens and
nourishes souls within the Catholic Church”.

Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya goes on to dismiss the materialistic concept of terra
nullius, which led to this dismemberment of Africa following the Berlin
Conference of 1885. Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya substitutes for this a spiritual
notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or “mother nature”, and the man

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who was born therefrom, remains attached thereto, and must one day return
thither to be united with his ancestors. This link is the basis of the ownership
of the soil, or better, of sovereignty. This amounts to a denial of the very
concept of terra nullius in the sense of a land which is capable of being
appropriated by someone who is not born therefrom. It is a condemnation of
the modern concept, as defined by Pasquale Fiore, which regards as terrae
nullius territories inhabited by populations whose civilization, in the sense of
the public law of Europe, is backward, and whose political organization is
not conceived according to Western norms.

One might go still further in analysing the statement of the representative
of Zaire so as to say that he would exclude from the concept of terra nullius
any inhabited territory. His view thus agrees with that of Vattel, who defined
terra nullius as a land empty of inhabitants.

This is the reply which may be given to the participants in the Berlin
Conference of 1885, who, during the fierce blaze of nineteenth-century
colonialism, the success of which they sought to ensure by eliminating
competition, regarded sub-Saharan Africa as an immense terra nullius
available for the first occupier, whereas that continent had been inhabited
since prehistoric times, and flourishing kingdoms had there been
established — Ghana, Mali, Bornu—whose civilization survived until the
colonial period, and only succumbed to the wounds inflicted by colonization
and the slave trade (1.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 86, separate opinion). It was in the
southern part of this continent and in Kenya that the ethnologists discovered
the remains of the first hominoids.

As for Mr. Mohammed Bedjaoui, in a bold survey of history from antiquity
up to modern times, he distinguishes, with consummate skill, three major
epochs:

(1) Roman antiquity, when any territory which was not Roman was nullius.

(2) The epoch of the great discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, during which any territory not belonging to a Christian
sovereign was nullius.

(3) The nineteenth century, during which any territory which did not belong
to a so-called civilized State was nullius.

In short, the concept of terra nullius, employed at all periods, to the brink
of the twentieth century, to justify conquest and colonization, stands
condemned. It is well known that in the sixteenth century Francisco de
Vittoria protested against the application to the American Indians, in order to
deprive them of their lands, of the concept of res nullius.

This approach by the eminent Spanish jurist and canonist, which was
adopted by Vattel in the nineteenth century, was hardly echoed at all at the
Berlin Conference of 1885. It is however the concept which should be

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adopted today. The Advisory Opinion, after mentioning the great diversity of
views among modern jurists, takes, in paragraph 80, a considerable step along
the path marked out by Vittoria, Vattel, Mr. Bedjaoui and Mr.
Bayona-ba-Meya.

RECOGNITION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF THE LEGAL
TIES BETWEEN MOROCCO AND WESTERN SAHARA

The Treaties

It must first be pointed out that the Advisory Opinion has left out of
account, or has misinterpreted, certain relevant treaties.

An analysis of these instruments points to the existence of a Moroccan
political or State authority extending as far as Cabo Bojador and embracing
the Sakiet El Hamra.

1. To begin with, there are two sixteenth-century treaties, quoted by the
historian Romeu (Vol. I): the Treaty of Alcaçovas and the Treaty of Cintra,
between Spain and Portugal.

The Treaty of Alcacovas fixed, by agreement between the two Powers, the
limits of the Kingdom of Marrakesh to the south of Cabo Bojador.

The Treaty of Cintra does the same thing for what it calls the Kingdom of
Fez.

These two treaties, whose relevance appears manifest, are not even
mentioned in the Advisory Opinion.

They do not simply record an allegiance to the Sultan, but recognize that
the authority of Morocco extended beyond Cabo Bojador.

2. Then there is the treaty between Morocco and Spain of 1 March 1767.

This treaty, according to Article 18 of which Sherifian sovereignty
extended beyond the Wad Noun, i.e., further south into the neighbouring
region of Sakiet El Hamra, gave rise to a controversy between Morocco and
Spain; it is rejected by the Advisory Opinion, the Court not having found it
necessary to resolve the controversy on the ground that Article 18 had been
superseded by Article 38 of the Hispano-Moroccan Treaty of 20 November
1861: in other words, that it had been abrogated. It was not, however,
expressly abrogated by any provision of the Treaty of 1861, nor does it appear
to have been tacitly abrogated by Article 38 of that Treaty, the function of
which was rather to supplement and reinforce it. I shall have more to say
about Article 38 later on. Furthermore, the recognition of the extent of
Moroccan territory in Article 18 was established, and could not subsequently
be denied.

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WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 88

We must therefore abide by Article 18 of the Treaty of 1767, which Spain
misinterprets on the basis of the Spanish text of the Treaty.

Morocco contended, in conformity with settled case-law, that, where two
texts of a treaty do not agree, it is the more limited text that should prevail —in
the present case, the Arabic text.

The Advisory Opinion mentions this contention by Morocco but does not
answer it. It could not reject it because, as I have said, it is based on settled
case-law. This is what the Arabic text says:

“His Imperial Majesty warns the inhabitants of the Canaries against
any fishing expedition to the coasts of Wad Noun and beyond. He
disclaims any responsibility for the way they may be treated by the Arabs
of the country, to whom it is difficult to apply decisions, since they have
no fixed residence, travel as they wish and pitch their tents where they
choose...”

Spain disputes the sense of this text, alleging it to mean, not that the
nomads were beyond the Sultan’s power to enforce decisions with respect to
them, but that they were beyond his jurisdiction.

The controversy turns on the word ahkam translated by the word
“decisions”.

A decisive argument in support of the Moroccan contention:is that the
sense which Spain wishes to give to the plural ahkam, that of jurisdiction, is
one which it can bear only in the singular hukm, whereas it is in the plural in
the text of Article 18. In French one speaks of the juridiction of the Sultan or
of the State, and not of the juridictions. In Arabic, similarly one says hukm
as-sultan or hukm ad-dawla in the singular, and not ahkamin the plural. This
signifies that ahkam in the text has the meaning of decisions in the plural.

A second argument:

One might have hesitated about the meaning given by Spain and Morocco
to the term ahkam independently of the above argument, but such hesitation
would only have been permissible if the term were taken out of its context.

For Article 18 includes in its terms an explanation: it is the nomadic
character of the populations of the Wad Noun and the regions beyond. Now
the nomadic character of those populations, which often makes it impossible
to catch them after the illegal act imputed to them, does not do away with the
authority which exists over the territory through which they pass. Their
nomadic existence can only render difficult the application and imple-
mentation of the decisions of the governing authority that pronounces
them.

Morocco rightly deduces from that the existence, in addition to allegiance
to the Sultan, of Sherifian authority over the Wad Noun and the regions
beyond in Western Sahara.

3. Furthermore, the Treaty of 20 November 1861, far from weakening the
Moroccan argument, is, as has been said, calculated to strengthen it. It
contains the following provision:

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WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 89

“If a Spanish vessel be wrecked at Wad Noun or on any other part of
its coast, the Sultan of Morocco shall make use of his authority to save
and protect the master and crew until they return to their country, and
the Spanish Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul, Consular Agent, or
person appointed by them shall be allowd to collect every information
they may require...”

To begin with, if the Sultan of Morocco is called upon to use his authority
to save the crew of the wrecked vessel, it must mean that he has authority in
the place where the shipwreck occurred. Moreover, if authorization or
permission is sought to enable the consul, etc., to collect information, it is
clearly because the Sultan possesses an authority with which the Spaniards
must treat.

4. The Treaty of 1 March 1767 is supported by several international
treaties, but they do not give us any more information about the limit to which
Moroccan sovereignty extends beyond the Wad Noun. They include that
between Morocco and Spain of 1 March 1799, Article 22; that between
Morocco and the United States of 16 September 1836, Article 10; and, finally,
the two treaties between Morocco and Great Britain, both of 9 December
1856, Articles 33 and 12 respectively.

5. Treaties likely to throw light on the limits of the confines of Morocco
and thereby to enable us to assess the ties that existed between that country
and Western Sahara are, however, not lacking.

To begin with, there is the Anglo-Moroccan Agreement of 13 March 1895.
Clause I of that agreement reads as follows:

“If this Government buy the building, etc., in the place above-named
from the above-named Company, no one will have any claim to the.
lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador, and which are
called Terfaya above-named, and all the lands behind it, because all this
belongs to the territory of Morocco.”

Great Britain thus recognizes that Moroccan territory extends to Cabo
Bojador, including Sakiet El Hamra.

The representatives of Spain have questioned the meaning of this text. The
Court has said that the provisions of the treaty appear to it to represent an
agreement by Great Britain not to question in future any pretension of the

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Sultan to the lands between the Dra‘a and Cape Bojador, and not a
recognition by Great Britain of previously existing Moroccan sovereignty
over those lands.

The Court does not say “represent” but “appear to represent” and on the
ground of this “appearance” which is not asserted as a fact proceeds to set
aside the treaty on the clear text of which Morocco relies. How, in the absence
of any premise whatever, was the Court able to decide what the provisions of
the treaty “appeared” to represent?

Moreover, according to settled case-law, a clear text is not to be
interpreted.

Where the chink in the armour appears is where Spain contends that the
agreement cannot be invoked against it, being res inter alios acta—as if what
was in question was a mere bilateral agreement and not one of the elements in
the international community’s recognition of the frontiers of a country.

Furthermore, did the statement that the text of the agreement did not
appear to be in a pure English style imply that in a bilateral agreement the
collaboration of the two parties in its drafting is not to be considered?

We thus see how inconsistent are the arguments to which Spain has
resorted in order to reject the clear text of the 1895 Treaty.

One is entitled to riposte by asking how a Government, after solemnly
recognizing a fact in an authentic instrument, can deny it through the voice of
its representatives. It is necessary to seek the motives for this volte-face.

They are to be found in the concerns of the Powers at the time when
colonialist expansion was at its height.

Under the Treaty of 8 April 1904, France undertook not to interfere with
the action of England in Egypt, in return for which England undertook not to
interfere with the action of France in Morocco. A similar agreement was
concluded between Germany and France, which abandoned Gabon to
Germany in return for freedom of action in Morocco.

Morocco rightly protested against the Anglo-French Treaty of 8 April
1904, which had been kept secret. ;

It is true that European colonialist law at that time did not forbid secret
treaties; but international morality has always condemned them; and it is the
precepts of morality that have justly received the consecration of positive law
in this case as in so many others.

The Treaty of 8 April 1904 was also morally wrong because it empowered
third parties to dispose of Moroccan sovereignty by secret negotiations,
unknown to Morocco.

This treaty explains the change in the attitude of England to Morocco, in
which, with the exception of Tangier, it ceased to take any political interest.
For England was obliged, under the provisions of the third of the secret
articles of the Anglo-French Treaty of 8 April 1904, to facilitate the
understanding which France was proposing to enter into with Spain for the
establishment of spheres of influence in Morocco with a view to its partition.
Great Britain was obliged to remove any obstacle to the conclusion of that

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understanding. It therefore waived its rights under the Anglo-Moroccan
Treaty of 1895; and British officials were to be heard denying the official
recognition of the Moroccan boundary at Cape Bojador.

The Advisory Opinion has thus taken account of the statements of one
party to the treaty in order to attribute to it a meaning to which the text in no
way lends itself in the absence of any intrinsic basis deduced from the terms of
the Convention: a meaning which appears to have sprung from nowhere and
to be, to say the least, a pure figment of the imagination. What is worse, the
interpretation has been made contra legem. Such an interpretation is
calculated to undermine the very foundation of relations between States,
namely the respect due to treaties.

Moreover, Spain itself had recognized that extension of Sherifian authority
to Cape Bojador, in the two treaties of Alcaçovas and Cintra already
mentioned. Nevertheless, in the Franco-Spanish Treaty (also secret) of
3 October 1904, the two contracting parties conceded to one another spheres
of influence in Morocco. They were obliged to keep this arrangement secret
for, on the very day of its signature, they published a declaration whose tenor,
contrary to the provisions of the treaty, was intended to allay the
apprehensions of the Moroccans, and which affirmed the determination,
contrary to the real intentions, of France and Spain, to guarantee the integrity
of Moroccan territory. This Treaty of 3 October 1904 incurred, in addition to
a reiteration of the criticisms of the Treaty of 8 April 1904, that of duplicity
because of the conflict—hidden from Morocco—between the Treaty of
3 October and the declaration issued that same day.

The Advisory Opinion also brushes aside without adequate justification a
text in which it is recognized that the territory of Morocco included the Sakiet
El Hamra. I have in mind the letters annexed to the Treaty of 4 November
1911 between France and Germany. These letters state:

“Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which France
and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other on the subject of
Morocco, it being understood that Morocco comprises all that part of
northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa
and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro.”

It is in vain that Spain has attempted to give to the expression “Rio de Oro”
the meaning of Western Sahara. The Rio de Oro stops at the southern

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boundary of Sakiet El Hamra, which is recognized in the exchange of letters
as forming part of the territory of Morocco.

As with the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1895, the Advisory Opinion makes
the Franco-German letters say something other than what they clearly state.
It attributes to them, by a pure figment of the imagination, the purpose of
simply recognizing spheres of influence over Moroccan territory, whereas the
letters make no allusion whatever to this stillborn practice of an expiring
colonialism.

Besides the treaties, there are other international instruments that are no
less conclusive. They consist of two declarations of international scope
emanating respectively from Spain and from France, both of which recognize
the Sakiet El Hamra as belonging to Morocco.

As early as 1454, at the time when Portugal was in competition with Spain,
the latter asserted that the limit of the Kingdom of Morocco was situated at
Cabo Blanco, and therefore included Sakiet El Hamra.

The Advisory Opinion makes no reference to this declaration. Had it done
so, it would no doubt have attributed the declaration to Spain’s wish to
discourage any Portuguese ambitions with regard to the territory in question.
This does not, however, make the declaration any less conclusive.

This point of view was shared by the French Government: in the
Instructions nautiques published by that Government in 1849 there is a
paragraph headed: “On the west coast of Africa, from Cape Spartel to Cape
Bojador (coast of Morocco).” The reference to the coast of Morocco is
significant.

INTERNAL MANIFESTATIONS OF MOROCCAN AUTHORITY OVER
WESTERN SAHARA

Having dealt with the diplomatic activities that support the existence of the
legal ties between Morocco and Western Sahara (Sakiet El Hamra), I now
turn to an examination of the manifestations of that sovereignty by the
exercise of legislative, executive and spiritual authority.

Legislative Activity

The Sultans legislated for the Sakiet El Hamra as they did for the national
territory north of the Dra‘a. That legislation took the form of dahirs of the
Sultan.

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WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 93

It extended to economic activity through the control of trade and
production, in particular as regards fishing, the monopoly of which was
generally reserved to the Sultan’s subjects, except in the case of special
concessions to foreigners; it also extended to the administration of the ports,
in order to open and close them to foreign trade, according to the
requirements of national policy.

The Sultan’s legislative authority also related to raw materials and fiscal
matters through the assessment, imposition and collection of taxes and dues.

Thus the Spanish historian Huici says in his political history of the
Almohad Empire (p. 193) that the Sultan Abdulmoumey levied taxes in the
Souss al-Aksa, or farthest Souss, which straddles the valley of the Sakiet El
Hamra.

Executive Power

The Sultans exercised executive power by means of dahirs, as in matters of
legislation. That was how they appointed and dismissed the caids to whom
they entrusted responsibilities of government in a region, on a coast, or over
a group of tribes. The caids are, according to the etymological meaning of the
term, military commanders who also have administrative functions.

The choice of the sovereign could fall on a personage because of his local
influence or family or tribal connections. That does not mean that the title of
caid tended to be an honorary one, as has been alleged. It is a practice current
in quite a number of countries, in the absence of a centralized authority, to
choose persons to govern who have the qualifications which enable them to
make their authority felt and carry out their tasks.

It is the dahirs of the nineteenth century which are primarily of interest to
us.

Of those dahirs submitted by Morocco, five relate to the regions of Western
Sahara. It is the dahirs in documents 4, 5 and 8 which appoint caids with
authority over the Sahara tribes of the Tidrareen and Oulad Tidrareen, whose
nomadic migration routes extend to the whole of Western Sahara according
to Mauritania’s maps numbers 2 and 3, and go beyond Cabo Bojador; the
dahir in document 4 also appoints the caid with authority over the Saharan
Tekna, whose nomadic migration route extends to the northern part of the
Sahara, or the Sakiet El Hamra, according to map number 3.

Then there were a whole series of caids in the Sakiet El Hamra, who were
mentioned in connection with the deeds attributed to them in the history of
Western Sahara, whether they held their post in the Sakiet El Hamra itself, or
governed it from a post which they held in the interior. And that was the case

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throughout the eighth, the eleventh, twelfth and fourteenth centuries, as
recounted by the historians Vernet, Domenech, Huici and Seco de Lucena, to
whom we shall refer in the pages which follow.

*

Historians

Five historians—a Frenchman, Vernet, and four Spaniards, Domenech
Lafuente, Seco de Lucena, Huici and Romeu — who inspire great confidence
with regard to the facts, supporting the Moroccan case, which they relate,
particularly in view of their nationality, tell of events going back, in the case
of Vernet, to the seventh century, concerning Western Sahara and its legal ties
with Morocco. Recourse has already been had to some of them, and will be to
all, depending on the subject.

Mention will also be made of a geographer of world-wide renown, El
Idrissi.

Vernet tells on page 36 of his work Islamisation how, after the Arab
conquest of Morocco by Okba in 681, Moussa ben Nosair (a Lebanese chief
converted to Islam, who was the companion of Tarek ben Ziad in the passage
of the Straits of Gibraltar and in the conquest of Spain) sent his son
Merouana to the furthest Souss. We know that the furthest Souss, or Sous
al-Aksa, is situated within the boundary of the Sakiet El Hamra.

Vernet also relates the following facts: in 740, the Moroccan governor (or
caid) called Ismail ben Obeidetallah was appointed to Sakiet El Hamra
(p. 48).

In 745, Okba’s great-nephew went as far as ‘Ijil, and dug the first wells in the
Sahara (p. 53), thus clearly showing occupation of the territory.

From the eighth to the eleventh centuries, that occupation was reinforced
by the building of roads across the Sahara (p. 138).

In 757, the town of Sijilmassa was founded and its governor extended his
authority over the Sahara (ibid.).

In 761, the Sahara had a Moroccan governor (or caid), called Mohamed
Sonjai, who conducted a campaign in the Sudan (p. 55).

From that time on, continues Vernet, the dynasty of the Idrissids did not
cease to govern the Sahara, until the advent of the following dynasty.

The Spanish historian Domenech Lafuente, no less illustrious than Vernet,
confirms in his book Quelque chose sur le Rio de Oro, the events related by the
latter, and goes on with the story.

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WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 95

He mentions that Sultan Abdullah ben Yasseen administered the south
until his death in 1040 (p. 19).

The Spanish historian Huici continues the list of facts which bear witness to
Moroccan authority over Western Sahara.

First of all, there is the information appearing in his Histoire politique de
l'empire almohade that the whole of the south was governed by the capital of
the Souss (p. 65); later he mentions that desert troops responded to the call of
Sultan Abdul Moumen and beseiged the town of Igli (p. 68).

Another Spanish historian, Seco de Lucena, in his work Le Maroc au début
du XIV siécle(p. 94), related that the Sultan Habib ben Othman, who reigned
from 1331 to 1351, made Sijilmassa the capital of the territory of Sahara.

One cannot conclude this list of the facts recorded by the historians,
providing indisputable evidence of the extension of the authority of Morocco
to the Sakiet El Hamra as far as Cape Bojador, without mentioning the
decisive support they received from the geographer El Idrissi.

El Idrissi, following in the tradition of Marinos of Tyre, the founder of
mathematic geography based on the calculation of longitudes and latitudes,
and precursor of the great Ptolemy, was the most illustrious geographer in the
Arab world and Europe of the Middle Ages. His knowledge was highly
esteemed by the Norman kings of Sicily, in whose kingdom he wrote, in 1154,
a great work describing the geography of northern Africa, Nouzhat al
Mouchtak. Taking the facts strictly into account, he situates the western
Sahara within the confines of Morocco.

Roads

Spain has alleged, in order to show that Western Sahara was distinct from
Morocco and had no ties with it, that the latter Power had left there no
building of the Moroccan architectural type. That is to forget that typical
Moroccan architecture belongs to the cities, and has nowhere left traces in the
desert.

On the other hand, Morocco built roads in Western Sahara which went
right across it, from north to south. Two main roads in particular have been
mentioned: the Lemtouna road and that of Jouder. Could it claim that they
were built by the Bedouin tribes? As far as the Lemtouna road is concerned,
there is no need to quote the historians who speak of it, for, 900 years after it
was built, it can still be used. In 1678 Sultan Moulay Rasheed used that road
in two of his expeditions beyond Western Sahara (Domenech, op. cit., p. 30).

The Jouder road was built later, in the time of Sultan Ahmad al-Mansour,
on the occasion of his expedition to the Soudan.

87
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 96

One can conclude definitely from the foregoing that three dynasties of the
Idrissids, the Almoravids and the Almohads have extended their authority
without a break over at any rate the north of the Sahara, at Sakiet El Hamra.

*

The Military Expeditions

The authority of the Sultans over Western Sahara, recognized by the
international community of former times, could not fail to make itself known
through the presence of armed forces.

The expeditions of the Sultans were of two kinds: some had as their purpose
control of Western Sahara, and more particularly the Sakiet El Hamra. The
expeditions of 1882 and 1886 are examples of these. The others went through
Western Sahara in order to go to the countries in the south, as far as the River
Niger and Timbuktu.

In her work Avec les rois Alaouites (p. 35), Odette de Puigaudeau notes that
“the Sherifian interventions lost their character of conquest and only retained
that of tours of inspection and prestige”.

This was at the time which is considered in the Opinion to be the time of
colonization by Spain.

The documents of the time show that history and the reports of diplomats
agree. For example, the French Consul in Mogador, in his report of 7 June
1886 to the French Minister in Tangier, wrote:

“The expedition of Sultan Moulay Hassan to the Souss can be
regarded as fully completed. It was a triumphal progress all the way. All
the tribes made their submission and swore allegiance to him. Even the
very nomads of the Sahara were bent on bringing him fast camels and
offering him their help in the Holy War.” (Documents submitted by the.
Kingdom of Morocco, No. 115.)

What should be noted in this report are the passages concerning the oaths
of allegiance of the tribes and the help which the tribes of the Sahara offered
the Sultan in connection with the Holy War. I shall revert to the point in
relation to the religious solidarity between Sahrawi and Moroccans.

It should also be stressed that the reason why the Sultan’s forces in 1882
and 1886 did not go right on into the heart of the Sahara was that only the
Sakiet El Hamra appertained to Morocco, and it was a matter, as has been
recalled, of tours of inspection and prestige.

*
* *

The other expeditions used the Saharan territory as a way through to the
Soudan (or Mali), Timbuktu and the Niger.

88
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 97

Those expeditions passed through Western Sahara without hindrance
as the armies which undertook them were on home territory. Sometimes
Saharan contingents joined the Moroccan forces and, in any case, the latter
received from the Saharans all the help they needed along the way.

Saharans even joined the Sultan’s troops in order to fight at their side. For
instance, Sultan Abdul Moumen got help, at the siege of Igli, from troops who
came from south of the Atlas and from the desert (Huici, p. 68).

*

It is in the writings of historians worthy of confidence that information
about those expeditions must be sought.

One reads in Vernet that in 707 Moussa ben Nosair, the Lebanese
converted to Islam, the companion of Tarek Ben Ziad in the historic passage
of the Straits of Gibraltar which is named after the latter, and also in the
conquest of Spain, sent his son Merouan to the furthest Souss to the Sakiet El
Hamra (op. cit., p. 36).

In 721, still according to Vernet, a nephew of Okba, the conqueror of
Morocco, penetrated as far as the Soudan (p. 71).

He adds that the Moroccan governor (or caid) of the Sahara, Muhammad
Sonjai and also Caid Mussa Ben Ali El Afia, went there, the former in 701 and
the latter in 1032, passing through the Sahara on their way (op. cit., pp. 55 and
216 ff.).

Domenech Lafuente, too, relates that in 1584 and 1589 Ahmad al-Mansour
el-Assadi undertook two expeditions to the Soudan (op. cit., pp. 28 and 30).

In 1618, Moulay Zidane sent an expedition through the Sahara which
reached Timbuktu.

In 1665, Moulay Rasheed, of the reigning ‘Alaweet dynasty, commanded
an expedition to the Soudan (op. cit., p. 33).

In 1678, he commanded two expeditions which followed the Lemtouna
route to the south (ibid.).

Between 1734 and 1736, Moulay Abdullah organized an expedition to the
Soudan (ibid.).

In 1730, Moulay Abdullah commanded a first expedition to the Senegal,
which went by way of Massa, Wadi Noun and the Sakiet El Hamra, and a
second between 1734 and 1736, to the Soudan (ibid.).

Between 1802 and 1809, Moulay Suleiman sent two expeditions to the
south (ibid.).

* *

The Sahrawi, moreover, themselves asked the Sultan for help in repelling
attacks by foreign forces, namely those of Spain and France.

89
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 98

Domenech, on page 33 of the work already quoted, writes that the Moors
considered that their ties with the Sultan of Morocco were so close that, when
the French troops arrived on the confines of Mauritania and the Hodh, the
threatened troops requested help and assistance from Moulay Abdul-‘Azeez,
the King of Morocco, who had claimed those regions as coming under his
sovereignty. The Sultan who succeeded him sent his own uncle, Moulay
Idriss, with arms and munitions to support the Holy War against the French,
whom he beseiged at Tijiqja.

Religious Ties

Religious feeling does not preclude ethnic or national solidarity between
Sahrawi and Moroccans. It tends, rather, to consolidate it.

That tie has been neglected in the Opinion. Yet there is no doubt that the
religious tie is one of the constituent elements in legal ties and in those of
nationality, being additional to ethnic, social, cultural and economic ties and
national aspirations, and making them more binding: the more so in that the
Sultan possessed both temporal and spiritual powers, and appointed the
caids who applied Muslim law. Modern examples showing the strength of
religious ties abound: Ireland, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the States with
constitutions which determine the religion of the Head of State or establish a
State religion.

The religious tie is thus a constituent element of the legal tie.

Notwithstanding the Spanish allegations, the documentation already
mentioned shows that the religious ties between the Sahrawi and the
Moroccans found expression even in recourse to the holy war. That was the
case even though holy wars, rendered illustrious by the crusading spirit and
later by the great epic of Saladin, each concerned with the holy places of
Christendom or Islam, had lost much of their zeal and effectiveness — witness
the attitude of the Powers, both Christian and Muslim, which remained deaf
to the appeal to rescue the holy places of Jerusalem.

The spirit of a holy war nevertheless remained more alive in Morocco and
Western Sahara, confronted with the Christian colonialist powers. I would
refer again to the historian Domenech (supra, p. 94 ff.) and to the report from
the French consul in Mogador (supra, p. 96).

To prove the existence of the religious tie between Sahrawi and the
Moroccans, one must quote in particular Paul Cambon, the French
Ambassador in Madrid, who reported the following observation in a
despatch to his Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“It has always been recognized that the territorial sovereignty of the
Sultan extends as far as his religious suzerainty, and as it is beyond doubt
that the peoples of Cape Juby are subject to him from the religious point

90
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 99

of view, we could consider his sovereignty as indisputable.” (Documents
diplomatiques français, 1871-1914, first series, Vol. VIII).

* *

Finally, let us recall that the Islamisation of the States of Western Africa
(Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, etc.) was the continuation of that Arab
conquest which generally set out from or through the province detached by
colonization under the name of Spanish Sahara. The Kingdoms of Mali and
of Ghana were thereby consolidated and remained strong and prosperous
until the European conquest, which undermined their foundations by the
partitioning of Africa and its colonization, and by the massive slave trade to
North and South America, which was on a scale without precedent since the
ancient days of Greece and Rome, and of which vestiges remain in apartheid
in South Africa and in racial discrimination and segregation there and
elsewhere.

The Opinion deals with the right of self-determination in paragraphs 54 to
59.

The latter paragraph ends by referring to certain instances where con-
sultation in application of the principle of self-determination was dispensed
with by the General Assembly. Such instances are very numerous.

The paragraph is certainly in fairly general terms, since it mentions in fine
“the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary in view of special
circumstances”.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is one case which deserves to be
mentioned specifically: that is the legitimate struggle for liberation from
foreign domination.

The General Assembly has affirmed the legitimacy of that struggle in at
least four resolutions, namely resolutions 2372 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498
and 2517 (XXIV), which taken together already constitute a custom.
Furthermore the Security Council too has affirmed it in resolution 269 (1969).

This recognition by the United Nations of the legitimacy of that struggle
comes within the framework of the developments in law affirmed by the Court
in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia (1.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31). The Court
there explained that: “in this domain as elsewhere the corpus juris gentium has
been considerably enriched, and this the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge
its functions, may not ignore” (ibid.).

I upheld this point of view on the occasion of the Advisory Opinion on
Namibia in 1971. I was not followed. I return to the charge, and I would have

91
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 100

liked the last sentence of paragraph 59 to be completed as follows: “and in
particular the legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination.”

x

Nothing could show more clearly the will for emancipation than the
struggle undertaken in common, with the risks and immense sacrifices it
entails. That struggle is more decisive than a referendum, being absolutely
sincere and authentic. Many are the peoples who have had recourse to it to
make their right prevail. It is, one need hardly repeat, that thousand-year
struggle which has established the right of peoples to decide their own fate, a
right which jurists, statesmen, constitutions and declarations, and the United
Nations Charter, have merely recognized and solemnly proclaimed.

Fa

In the forefront we find Algeria and Morocco.

Algeria, which, after having heroically resisted conquest, was purely and
simply annexed; Algeria, which sacrificed a million of its children to
reconquer its freedom.

As for Morocco, it fought for centuries to maintain its independence and
the integrity of its territory in the face of a coalition of the mighty ones of the
day; and when the State had to give way to superior force, the people, in the
felicitous phrase of Professor Dupuy, took over from the State, continuing
the fight on all fronts until the final victory, which showed, better than any
referendum, the irresistible will of the nation.

Going back through history, one can mention instances of liberation
without a referendum through the legitimate struggle of numerous countries.

The struggle is still being untiringly pursued for the liberation of the
peoples of Namibia and Arab Palestine.

*

Among the grounds put forward by Spain to convince the Court that it
should refuse to answer the General Assembly’s request for an advisory
opinion, it mentions the fact that the Assembly has already decided that a
referendum should be carried out, and that it cannot go back on that decision
which is binding on it; the Advisory Opinion would, it is alleged, in those
circumstances only be of academic interest.

That argument was rightly rejected by the Court.

But why is Spain so keen on the referendum?

92
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 101

One can find the explanation in the memorandum from the Spanish
Minister for Foreign Affairs to Morocco’s Ambassador in Madrid dated
5 April 1957, which lays down the procedures to be adopted for Spain’s
evacuation of the territory, which the memorandum states in the following
terms:

“4. The recognition in favour of Spain, in consideration of what it has
achieved, and in a form to be agreed, of special privileges, as well as the
grant of a right preferential to that of other countries with regard to the
economic development and joint exploitation of the said territory.”
(Hearing of 1 July 1975.)

Reference can be made again to the mention I made above of certain of the
struggles which the Sahrawi undertook in common with the Moroccans to
repel the Spanish and French troops (supra, p. 97). That joint struggle shows
their determination to be reintegrated into the mother country (ibid).

Allegiance to the Sultan and the Operative Part of the Opinion

While having agreed with the Court that Western Sahara has legal ties with
the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity, I do not accept that
those ties represented for Morocco nothing more than ties of allegiance
between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the nomadic tribes living in the
territory of Western Sahara.

The allegiance to the Sultan is only one of the elements of the legal ties.

Those ties were of a State or political character, as the Court has said.

On close examination of the text of paragraph 162, to which the operative
part of the Opinion refers, one notes, further, the following:

1. That text completely disregards the notion of territory in saying that
Morocco had legal ties with certain peoples.

Those peoples did not live suspended between the sky and the ground.

The territory of the Sakiet El Hamra which they have always inhabited and
traversed in all directions, exploiting its agricultural resources (palm groves,
grazing grounds, seasonal crops, water-holes, etc.) and its economic resources
(routes of communication and commercial transit)—is that territory not
theirs?

After all, Spain based itself on agreements with sheikhs to extend its
protectorate over the territory which they inhabited.

2. Further, one must refer to the question put by the General Assembly in
order to give it an appropriate answer: but Question I] is worded as follows:
“What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Mauritanian entity?”

93
WESTERN SAHARA (SEP. OP. AMMOUN) 102

The ties which the General Assembly request should be determined are
the legal ties of the territory, which (as obviously intended by the Gen-
eral Assembly) includes the population, not solely the ties with that popu-
lation.

3. The reply, as worded in the operative part, with the reference to the
grounds as stated, contains an internal contradiction.

Mention is made there of the territory of the Sahara, but it is immediately
explained, by the cross-reference, that it is the tribes that are meant.

In short, the considerations which I have set forth throughout my Opinion
establish that there exist legal ties of a political character between the territory
of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. I would emphasize: that
territory with the population living there.

At all events, allegiance to the Sultan was equivalent to allegiance to the
State, as has been explained above.

As regards the Mauritanian entity, the ethnic, social, cultural, economic
and religious ties indicated in the Opinion constitute the elements of the
political ties between Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity.

(Signed) Fouad AMMOUN.

94


                            COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                         AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                    DÉLIMITATION TERRESTRE ET MARITIME
                        ET SOUVERAINETÉ SUR DES ÎLES
                            (GABON/GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE)

                            ORDONNANCE DU 7 AVRIL 2021

                                   2021
                            INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                              REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                           ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                     LAND AND MARITIME DELIMITATION
                      AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS
                            (GABON/EQUATORIAL GUINEA)

                               ORDER OF 7 APRIL 2021

4 Ord_1223.indb 1                                            4/08/22 08:31

                                             Mode officiel de citation :
                           Délimitation terrestre et maritime et souveraineté sur des îles
                            (Gabon/Guinée équatoriale), ordonnance du 7 avril 2021,
                                            C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 192

                                                  Official citation:
                           Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands
                               (Gabon/Equatorial Guinea), Order of 7 April 2021,
                                          I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 192

                                                                                1223
                                                                    No de vente
                    ISSN 0074-4441                                  Sales number:
                    ISBN 978-92-1-003885-0

                                     © 2022 CIJ/ICJ, Nations Unies/United Nations
                                         Tous droits réservés/All rights reserved

                                         Imprimé en France/Printed in France

4 Ord_1223.indb 2                                                                            4/08/22 08:31

                                                    7 AVRIL 2021

                                                    ORDONNANCE

                    DÉLIMITATION TERRESTRE ET MARITIME
                        ET SOUVERAINETÉ SUR DES ÎLES
                       (GABON/GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE)

                     LAND AND MARITIME DELIMITATION
                      AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS
                        (GABON/EQUATORIAL GUINEA)

                                                    7 APRIL 2021

                                                      ORDER

4 Ord_1223.indb 3                                                  4/08/22 08:31

                                                                                192

                                INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                                YEAR 2021                                          2021
                                                                                7 April
                                                                                General List
                                                 7 april 2021
                                                                                No. 179

                      LAND AND MARITIME DELIMITATION
                       AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS
                                   (GABON/EQUATORIAL GUINEA)

                                                  ORDER

                Present: President Donoghue; Vice‑President Gevorgian; Judges
                         Tomka, Abraham, Bennouna, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf,
                         Xue, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Crawford, Salam,
                         Iwasawa, Nolte; Registrar Gautier.

                    The International Court of Justice,
                   Composed as above,
                   After deliberation,
                   Having regard to Articles 40 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and
                Articles 39, 40, 44, 46 and 48 of the Rules of Court,
                   Having regard to the “Special Agreement between the Gabonese Repu-
                blic and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea” concluded on 15 November
                2016 (hereinafter the “Special Agreement”);
                   Whereas, under Article 1 of the Special Agreement,
                    “[t]he Court is requested to determine whether the legal titles, treaties
                    and international conventions invoked by the Parties have the force of
                    law in the relations between the Gabonese Republic and the Republic
                    of Equatorial Guinea in so far as they concern the delimitation of their
                    common maritime and land boundaries and sovereignty over the islands
                    of Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros and Conga”;

                                                                                4

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                             delimitation and sovereignty (order 7 IV 21)                 193

                   Whereas Article 6 of the Special Agreement provides that “[t]his Spe-
                cial Agreement shall be notified to the Registrar of the Court by either
                Party as soon as possible after it enters into force”;
                   Whereas, as a consequence of the official notification of the Special
                Agreement by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on 5 March 2021, the
                Court is now seised of the dispute described above;
                   Whereas, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Rules of
                Court, the Government of the Gabonese Republic notified the Court of
                the appointment of H.E. Ms Marie‑Madeleine Mborantsuo as Agent and
                Mr. Guy Rossatanga‑Rignault, Mr. Guillaume Pambou Tchivounda,
                H.E. Mr. Serge Thierry Mickoto Chavagne and H.E. Ms Liliane Massala
                as Co-Agents; and whereas, for its part, the Government of the Republic
                of Equatorial Guinea notified the Court of the appointment of
                H.E. Mr. Carmelo Nvono Nca as Agent;
                   Whereas, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Special Agreement,
                the Parties
                    “agree, without prejudice to the burden of proof, that the number and
                    order of pleadings will be governed by the following provisions:

                    (a) One Party will file the first pleading no later than seven months
                        after the date on which this Special Agreement is notified to the
                        Registrar of the Court.
                    (b) The other Party will file the second pleading no later than seven
                        months after receiving from the Registrar a certified copy of the
                        first pleading.
                    (c) The Party that filed the first pleading will file the third pleading
                        no later than five months after receiving from the Registrar a
                        certified copy of the second pleading.

                    (d) The Party that filed the second pleading will file the fourth plead-
                        ing no later than five months after receiving from the Registrar a
                        certified copy of the third pleading”;

                  Whereas, at a meeting held by video link by the President of the Court
                with the Agents of the Parties on 30 March 2021 pursuant to Article 31 of
                the Rules of Court, the Agent of the Gabonese Republic indicated that
                her Government was of the opinion that the Republic of Equatorial Gui-
                nea would be better placed to file the first pleading, and that the Gabonese
                Republic would file the second pleading; and whereas the Agent of the
                Republic of Equatorial Guinea noted that his Government agreed to file
                the first pleading;
                  Taking account of the agreement of the Parties,
                  Fixes the following time-limits for the filing of the initial written plea-
                dings in the case:

                                                                                5

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                             delimitation and sovereignty (order 7 IV 21)              194

                 5 October 2021 for the Memorial of the Republic of Equatorial
                Guinea;
                 5 May 2022 for the Counter-Memorial of the Gabonese Republic; and
                    Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                  Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
                the Peace Palace, The Hague, this seventh day of April, two thousand and
                twenty-one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of
                the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Gabonese
                Republic and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

                                                          (Signed) Joan E. Donoghue,
                                                                       President.
                                                           (Signed) Philippe Gautier,
                                                                        Registrar.

                                                                                6

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                     ISBN 978-92-1-003885-0

4 Ord_1223.indb 12                            4/08/22 08:31


659

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ABI-SAAB

1. Ayant voté en faveur du dispositif de l’arrêt dans son ensemble, je me
trouve cependant obligé de joindre cette opinion individuelle, car je ne
peux m’associer à certains aspects du raisonnement de la Chambre et de ses
conclusions finales.

2. Le système de raisonnement de la Chambre est construit sur trois
piliers : l’arrêté 2728 AP du 27 novembre 1935, qui fonde la ligne dans la
région occidentale, dite des quatre villages ; la lettre 191 CM2 du 19 février
1935, qui fonde la ligne au centre et à l’est dans la région du Béli (ces deux
lignes coexistent mais ne coïncident pas dans la région de Fayando-
Toussougou) ; et enfin l’arrêté du 31 août 1927 et son «erratum» du
5 octobre 1927, qui fondent le point culminant de la ligne à l’est dans la
région des monts N’Gouma-gué de Kabia.

3. Seul ce dernier arrêté de 1927 n’est pas sujet à controverse entre les
Parties quant à sa pertinence en tant que titre juridique de la limite
territoriale telle qu’elle se présentait à la date critique, bien qu’elles ne
soient pas d’accord sur son interprétation.

En revanche la pertinence de l’arrêté 2728 AP et de la lettre 191 CM2
dépend entièrement de leur caractère descriptif (ou déclaratoire) ou au
contraire modificatif des limites territoriales préexistantes. Cela a amené la
Chambre à entreprendre une analyse par trop détaillée du droit colonial
français qui, à mon avis, est une tâche qui ne convient guère à un organe
juridictionnel international et dont elle aurait pu faire l’économie dans une
large mesure.

4. A cet égard, je souscris complètement 4 l’esprit et à la lettre de
l'énoncé de l’arrét au paragraphe 30 concernant la signification de l'examen
du droit colonial par la Chambre et plus particulièrement à la négation de
tout renvoi par le droit international au droit colonial, ou de l’existence de
tout relais juridique ou continuum juris entre eux. On ne saurait, par
conséquent, trouver par ce biais, en droit international contemporain —
même de manière indirecte — une quelconque légitimation rétroactive de
l'institution coloniale.

L’énoncé précise encore que si l’on fait appel au droit colonial ce n’est
pas

« en tant que tel ... mais seulement comme un élément de fait, parmi
d’autres, ou comme un moyen de preuve et de démonstration ... de
« l’instantané territorial » à la date critique ».

Je considère qu’en l’espèce l’arrêt est allé au-delà des limites de ce sage

109
660 DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER (OP. IND. ABI-SAAB)

énoncé, en fondant son raisonnement presque exclusivement et avec
abondance de détails sur cet élément.

5. Pour ce qui est de l’arrêté 2728 AP et de son application à la
région dite des quatre villages, à l’ouest, l'arrêt de la Chambre démontre
amplement, à mon avis, son caractère descriptif ou déclaratoire des
limites préexistantes. Mais même en l’absence de cet acte, la pratique
administrative, c’est-à-dire l'exercice du pouvoir public et des fonctions
gouvernementales, aussi bien avant qu’aprés l’adoption de l'arrêté,
prouve que pour les autorités coloniales cette région relevait du Soudan ;
et cela jusqu’à l'indépendance du Mali, date critique pour létablis-
sement de l’« instantané territorial » constituant le « legs colonial » de
celui-ci.

6. La situation n’est en revanche pas la même pour ce qui est de la région
orientale du Béli. En effet, dans cette zone qui se situe entre la région
couverte par l’arrêté 2728 AP et le point culminant de la frontière couvert
par l'arrêté de 1927, nous n’avons que deux points de repère sûrs : la mare
de Soum et celle d’In Abao. Mais il n’existe aucun acte réglementaire de
caractère général et la pratique administrative invoquée par les deux Par-
ties est par trop fluctuante, éparse et interpénétrante des deux côtés
(s'agissant surtout d’une zone de nomadisation et de transhumance) pour
dégager une limite administrative visible.

7. C’est pour combler cette lacune que l’arrêt de la Chambre fait inter-
venir la lettre 191 CM2 du 19 février 1935. Par cette lettre, le gouverneur
général de l’Afrique occidentale française propose au lieutenant-gouver-
neur du Soudan de fixer les limites entre les colonies du Soudan et du Niger
par un texte et suggère un tracé qui ne fait que transcrire en mots le tracé
figurant sur la carte Blondel la Rougery au 1/500 000 de 1925. Il s’agit
donc d’une simple proposition et non d’une décision administrative ;
proposition qui n’a pas abouti à son issue normale en forme d'acte régle-
mentaire.

8. Je suis d'accord avec la démonstration de l’arrêt que ni le statut
formel de la lettre ni l’issue de la démarche ne font obstacle à la possibilité
que son contenu soit descriptif ou déclaratoire des limites territoriales
préexistantes. Mais là où je ne peux plus suivre le raisonnement de l’arrêt,
c’est quand il tire de cette démonstration négative la conclusion positive
qu’étant donné que cette possibilité existe elle est nécessairement la seule
possible ; en d’autres termes de tirer de la possibilité que la lettre soit
descriptive la conclusion qu’elle l’est effectivement.

Il manque ici une étape logique qui requiert une preuve positive pour la
combler ; preuve qui, à mon avis, n’a pas été apportée. Carilest tout autant
possible qu’à cette occasion le gouverneur général ait voulu rationaliser
davantage le tracé .ou le rendre compatible avec la carte la plus utilisée
alors.

9. L'arrêt de la Chambre lui-même, ayant conclu au caractère descriptif
de la lettre, reflète néanmoins quelques hésitations à ce sujet quand il
prévoit, aux paragraphes 1 10 et 144, que là où la description de la limite par
des points géodésiques dans la lettre ne concorde pas avec les points de

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661 DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER (OP. IND. ABI-SAAB)

repère tirés d’autres titres ou preuves, ce sont les derniers qui priment ; ce
qui implique que du moins pour ce qui est de ces points de non-concor-
dance l’arrêt ne considère pas la lettre comme déclaratoire de la situation
préexistante.

10. De même, étant donné que le tracé indiqué dans l'arrêté 2728 AP
couvre une partie de la limite couverte également par le tracé indiqué dans
la lettre 191 CM2, mais que dans cette partie les deux tracés divergent, ils
ne peuvent être tous deux déclaratoires de la situation préexistante. Or, la
Chambre affirme que l'arrêté 2728 AP est déclaratoire ce qui implique que,
du moins pour ce qui est de la partie commune de la limite, la lettre ne l’est
pas.

11. En fait, fonder la ligne dans la région du Béli sur la lettre 191 CM2
(qui n’est qu’une transcription en mots de la ligne figurant sur la carte
Blondel la Rougery au 1/500 000 de 1925) sans apporter la preuve positive de
la concordance de son tracé avec la limite préexistante revient à conférer
de manière détournée une valeur de titre juridique subsidiaire à cette
carte.

12. Or, si je souscris entièrement à l’analyse générale qu’entreprend
l'arrêt de la valeur des cartes en matière de frontières (par. 53-56) et
notamment à la conclusion que les cartes n’ont de valeur « que comme
preuve à caractère auxiliaire ou confirmatif », « qui conforte une conclu-
sion à laquelle le juge est parvenu par d’autres moyens indépendants des
cartes », je considère que là aussi l’arrêt n’a pas suivi dans l’application
concrète ce qu’il a énoncé de manière générale. Car ainsi que le dit très
clairement Parrét — reflétant en cela la jurisprudence internationale cons-
tante en la matière — les cartes ne constituent jamais à elles seules un titre
juridique quelconque, qu’il soit principal ou subsidiaire. Mais par le tru-
chement de la lettre 191 CM2, qui n’a aucune valeur juridique intrinsèque,
et qui n’est que la représentation écrite de la carte Blondel la Rougery de
1925, l'arrêt arrive à ériger cette carte en titre subsidiaire (il s'approche
d’ailleurs de cette conclusion également par rapport à la carte IGN de
1960, dans son paragraphe 62).

13. Cette quête effrénée d’un « titre juridique écrit », au prix de faire
flèche de tout bois, vise à satisfaire une certaine conception du principe de
Puti possidetis.

Ce principe, comme tout autre, ne saurait être conçu de manière absolue
mais doit être toujours interprété à la lumière de sa fonction dans l’ordre
juridique international.

En effet, il peut paraître à première vue paradoxal que des peuples ayant
lutté pour leur indépendance tiennent tant à leur « legs colonial ». Cepen-
dant, à ses origines, au moment des indépendances latino-américaines,
l'élaboration du principe de l’uti possidetis servait un double objectif : un
objectif défensif, vis-à-vis du reste du monde, en la forme d’une négation
radicale de toute vacance de souveraineté (ou de terra nullius) dans les
territoires décolonisés, même dans les zones qui n'étaient pas explorées ou
contrôlées par le colonisateur ; et un objectif conservatoire, visant à éviter
ou du moins minimiser les conflits dans les rapports entre les successeurs,

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en gelant le découpage territorial en l’état dans lequel il se présentait au
moment de l'indépendance.

14. Ces deux objectifs présupposent donc l’existence d’une limite, d’un
découpage territorial étanche, au moment de l’indépendance, postulat qui
ne peut se vérifier dans les faits dans tous les cas que si l’on comprend par
limite une « ligne » dans l’acception géométrique de ce terme. Et c’est
seulement à ce prix que le fonctionnement du principe de Puti possidetis
peut éviter le sort d’une pure fiction qui fait violence à la réalité.

En effet, si l’on procède de la notion géométrique d’une « ligne » comme
étant engendrée par un « point qui se déplace » (Petit Larousse illustré,
1986), une ligne se définit minimalement par deux points. Dans ce sens, il
existerait toujours une ligne qui satisferait aux exigences logiques de
l'opération du principe de l’uti possidetis. Mais si l’on procède de la notion
courante de ligne comme un tracé concret dont chaque point est spécifi-
quement identifiable, le postulat serait loin de pouvoir être vérifié dans
tous les cas.

15. En procédant de la notion géométrique de ligne, qui est la seule a
pouvoir concilier le principe de l’uti possidetis avec les faits, nous pouvons
affirmer qu’il existe toujours une ligne qui définit la limite de la possession
légale. Mais le rôle de l’organe juridictionnel dans l'identification de cette
ligne est fonction du niveau de concrétisation de la ligne en question.
Moins il y a de points (ou points de repère) qui interviennent dans la
définition de la ligne, plus grande est la marge de liberté (ou « degrees of
freedom » au sens statistique du terme) de l’organe juridictionnel. Et c’est
là qu’interviennent les considérations d’équité infra legem, que l'arrêt
mentionne au paragraphe 28, pour guider l’organe juridictionnel dans
l'exercice de cette marge de liberté dans l'interprétation et l'application du
droit et des titres juridiques en présence.

16. En ce qui concerne la ligne de frontière qui nous occupe, au-delà
de la région de Toussougou/Féto Maraboulé à l’ouest et jusqu’au point
culminant à l’est (monts N’Gouma-gué de Kabia), nous ne disposons
que de deux points de repère, les mares de Soum et d’In Abao.

Dans cette région, traversée en grande partie par le Béli, l’« instantané
territorial » à la date critique n’a de profil visible, à mon avis, comme je l’ai
mentionné plus haut, ni à travers des textes réglementaires, ni à travers une
pratique administrative suffisamment évidente. Il revenait à la Chambre
de concrétiser la ligne — qui existe en tant que telle, définie par les points de
repère susmentionnés — en s'inspirant des considérations d’équité infra
legem.

17. L’arrét a choisi une ligne qui coïncide avec celle des cartes, cartes
qui ne constituent pas en elles-mémes un titre juridique ni ne reposent sur
un tel titre à proprement parler, s’agissant de la lettre 191 CM2.

Certes il s’agit là d’une solution juridique possible dans les limites de la
marge de liberté existant en l’espèce ; et c’est la raison pour laquelle je la
considère juridiquement acceptable. Mais elle n’est pas la seule qui soit
juridiquement possible, ni à mon avis la meilleure. J’en aurais préféré une

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autre qui, tout en respectant les points de repère (et ce n’est pas par hasard
s’ils sont tous les deux des points d’eau), soit plus imbue de considérations
d'équité infra legem dans l'interprétation et application du droit, s’agis-
sant d’une zone de nomadisation qui souffre de la sécheresse et où l’accès à
l’eau est donc d’une importance vitale.

(Signé) Georges ABI-SAAB.

113


DÉCLARATION DE M. ODA
[Traduction]

Je partage totalement l’opinion de la Cour selon laquelle

«il appartient à la Chambre constituée pour connaître de la présente
affaire de décider de l’admission de la requête à fin d'intervention en
vertu de l’article 62 du Statut, introduite par la République du Nica-
ragua le 17 novembre 1989»,

mais je considère qu’en l’espèce la Cour n’a pas besoin d’exprimer cette
opinion sous la forme d’une ordonnance. A mon avis, la compétence dont
la Chambre constituée conformément à l’article 26, paragraphe 2, du Sta-
tut jouit pour connaître d’une requête à fin d'intervention est établie sans
équivoque par l’article 62 du Statut, rapproché de l’article 90 du Règle-
ment, aux termes duquel:

«La procédure devant les chambres prévues aux articles 26 et... du
Statut est, sous réserve des dispositions du Statut et du présent Règle-
ment les visant expressément, réglée conformément aux dispositions
des titres I 4 III du présent Règlement applicables en matière conten-
tieuse devant la Cour»,

et par l’article 27 du Statut, aux termes duquel «tout arrêt rendu par l’une
des chambres prévues aux articles 26 et ... sera considéré comme rendu par
la Cour». L’«intervention» est l’une des «procédures incidentes» pré-
vues à la section D du titre III du Règlement de la Cour («Procédure
contentieuse »). L'autorisation d'intervenir dans une affaire dont connaît
une chambre ne saurait être demandée qu’à cette chambre; et il découle de
la nature de la présente affaire qu'aucune démarche entreprise auprès de
la Cour plénière par un Etat tiers ne peut, quel que soit le nom qu’on lui
donne, être considérée comme constituant une requête à fin d’interven-
tion, en bonne et due forme. La Cour n’était donc pas tenue de se rensei-
gner auprès des Parties à l’affaire sur cet aspect de la requête du
Nicaragua. La Chambre aurait pu statuer immédiatement sur la requête à
fin d'intervention que le Nicaragua avait adressée au Greffier de la Cour
le 17 novembre 1989.

Dans sa requête à la Cour plénière, le Nicaragua a sans doute demandé
à être autorisé par la Cour à intervenir, en précisant qu’il entendait par la
la Cour plénière, mais il a aussi fait allusion à la «conséquence pratique »
d’une «réponse favorable à la présente requête », à savoir la «reconstitu-
tion de la Chambre par rapport à sa composition actuelle ». En d’autres
termes, le Nicaragua envisage la «reconstitution » de la Chambre saisie de
la présente affaire en vertu de l’ordonnance du 8 mai 1987 (complétée par
l’ordonnance du 13 décembre 1989). Subsidiairement, le Nicaragua envi-

8
DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (DÉCL. ODA) 8

sage de suggérer que la Cour exclue du mandat de la Chambre certains
des pouvoirs dont celle-ci a été investie. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre,
une demande ainsi adressée à la Cour plénière par un Etat qui n’est pas
partie à l’affaire n’est pas susceptible d’être accueillie en vertu de Pune
quelconque des dispositions du Statut ou du Règlement de la Cour qui
régissent la procédure de celle-ci. En outre, dans la mesure où une telle
«reconstitution» pourrait amener l’intervenant, ou l’éventuel interve-
nant, à se prétendre en droit de désigner un juge ad hoc, seule la Chambre,
et non la Cour plénière, pourrait dûment examiner la question, comme
cela découle de l’article 26, paragraphe 2, du Statut et de l’article 17, para-
graphe 2, du Règlement (dispositions qui, toutes deux, concernent princi-
palement la constitution initiale ou originale d’une chambre) ainsi que du
caractère même de l’intervention, qui est une procédure incidente. Selon
moi, une fois qu’une chambre a été constituée, les pouvoirs de la Cour
plénière en ce qui concerne la composition de cette chambre sont limités :
elle ne peut que pourvoir aux vacances qui peuvent se produire dans la
composition originale de la chambre par suite de décès, démission ou
incapacité de certains de ses membres originaux. Je pense qu’il aurait été
préférable que la Cour inclue une conclusion explicite en ce sens dans
l’ordonnance qu’elle a jugé nécessaire de rendre.

(Signé) Shigeru ODA.


65

                  DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC KRESS

  Standard of plausibility — Genocidal intent — Protected group under the
Genocide Convention.

   1. I have voted in favour of all points contained in operative para-
graph 86 of the Order. I also concur with the essence of the Court’s rea-
soning. I only wish to add a few observations regarding the plausibility
standard, and, in particular, regarding its connection with the questions
of genocidal intent and protected groups under the Genocide Conven-
tion.
   2. It would seem that the plausibility of the rights claimed as a prereq-
uisite for the indication of provisional measures is by now quite ﬁrmly
anchored in the Court’s jurisprudence. At the same time, it would seem
that questions remain open regarding the precise scope of the requirement
and that it remains a challenge to describe the Court’s standard of plau-
sibility with precision 1.
   3. The partial rejection of plausibility of the rights claimed in the
Ukraine v. Russian Federation case (Application of the International Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures,
Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, pp. 131-132, para. 75) has
given rise to the interpretation that the Court has widened the scope of
the plausibility requirement so that it includes, at least partially, the plau-
sibility of breach of rights 2. Additionally, there is the question whether
the Court’s Order in that case may have set a comparatively demanding
standard of plausibility with respect to the mental elements of crimes in
question (see, in particular, the separate opinion of Judge Owada
in the aforementioned Order, ibid., pp. 147-148, paras. 21-23). It is against
this background, that Myanmar, in the current proceedings, has
placed special emphasis on the Ukraine v. Russian Federation case in
order to make the argument that the standard of plausibility extended
to the requirement of genocidal intent and that this standard was
not met (CR 2019/19, pp. 24-25, paras. 9-11 (Schabas)). As part of
this argument, Myanmar further advanced the view that in “a case
like this involving allegations of exceptional gravity” the Court
     1
     For a useful recent analysis, see Cameron Miles, “Provisional Measures and the ‘New’
Plausibility in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice”, British Yearbook of
International Law (2018, forthcoming), available at https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/bry011.
     2   Ibid., pp. 32-39 (provisional pagination).

66

66      application of the genocide convention (decl. kress)

should apply a “stricter plausibility standard” (CR 2019/19, p. 25, para. 13
(Schabas)).
   4. In paragraph 56 of the Order, the Court rejects the idea of such a
more stringent standard. I agree and wish to add that, rather than saying,
as Myanmar has done, that a strict standard to be applied at the merits
stage in case of exceptionally grave allegations, must apply “a fortiori”
“at the provisional measures phase” (ibid.), one might wonder whether
the distinct — that is, the protective — function of provisional measures
does not point in the opposite direction, precisely because fundamental
values are at stake.

   5. Irrespective of this last consideration, it is apparent from para-
graph 56 of the Order, read in its immediate context, that the Court has
applied a low plausibility standard with respect to the question of geno-
cidal intent. Whatever the correct interpretation of the standard applied
in the Court’s Order in the Ukraine v. Russian Federation case might be,
the Court, in the present case, has not proceeded to anything close to a
detailed examination of the question of genocidal intent. In that respect it
seems worth recalling that, in the separate opinion he appended to the
Pulp Mills case, Judge Abraham distinguished between fumus boni juris
and fumus non mali juris (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports
2006, pp. 140-141, para. 10). In my view, it is the latter formulation that
captures far better the approach taken by the Court in this Order with
respect to the question of genocidal intent. Drawing a distinction between
the words “boni” and “non mali” may be a “subtlety”, as Judge Abraham
suggested in his separate opinion. But in the present case at least, it would
be an important subtlety. I make this observation also because, even on
the basis of the low standard applied by the Court in this case, it is not
entirely without hesitation that I have come to the conclusion that the
materials provided by The Gambia so far are suﬃcient to enable the
Court to conclude that the plausibility test was met with respect to the
question of genocidal intent.

   6. While the exceptional gravity of the violations alleged in this case
does not justify the application of a stringent standard of plausibility as a
prerequisite for the indication of provisional measures, the same excep-
tional gravity does justify, and perhaps even calls for emphasizing that
this Order’s ﬁnding on plausibility in no way whatsoever prejudges the
merits.
   7. This is as true for the question of genocidal intent as it is for the
question whether the Rohingya in Myanmar constitute a protected group
under the Genocide Convention. The Order alludes to this issue in one
single sentence in paragraph 52. Here, the Court states that “the Rohingya
appear to constitute a protected group within the meaning of Article II of
the Genocide Convention”. I would have preferred seeing the Court

67

67     application of the genocide convention (decl. kress)

express more clearly than by the mere use of the word “appear” that, with
respect to the question of protected groups under the Genocide Conven-
tion, it cannot go beyond the point of plausibility at this stage of the
proceedings. This preference is based, not least, on the fact that the ques-
tion of protected groups under the Genocide Convention did not receive
closer attention during the proceedings.

                                                 (Signed) Claus Kress.

68