                     559

                                    SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF

                        The Court’s jurisdiction cannot be founded on Article 30 of the CAT — The
                     conditions contained in Article 30 have not been met — Negotiations between the
                     Parties were never deadlocked — Negotiations continued even after submission of
                     the case to the Court — There was no inability to agree on arbitration — No
                     proposals were made by either Party on modalities for the organization of arbitral
                     proceedings — Only inability to agree on organization of arbitration triggers
                     Court’s jurisdiction — This was not the case here — Judgment elevates preliminary
                     inquiry to level of full investigation — No general standard for conduct of such
                     inquiries exists — The nature and scope of preliminary inquiry is determined by
                     domestic law — Senegal conducted such an inquiry in 2000, but failed to do so in
                     2008 — Distinction should have been made between the two events — Obligation
                     under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the CAT is to submit case for prosecution —
                     Failure to do so engages State’s international responsibility — Extradition is an
                     option, but not an obligation under the CAT — State may extradite suspect only
                     to relieve itself of its obligation to prosecute.

                                                    I. Introduction

                         1. I feel bound to append this separate opinion for several reasons.
                     First, contrary to the conclusions of the Court, I am of the view that the
                     jurisdiction of the Court in the present case cannot be founded on
                     Article 30 of the Convention against Torture (CAT) since the conditions
                      set out in that provision have not been met. Secondly, I have voted
                      against subparagraph 4 of the operative part of the Judgment because
                      I believe that the choice of means for the conduct of the preliminary
                      inquiry prescribed by Article 6, paragraph 2, of the CAT, as well as the
                      scope of such inquiry, is determined by the State party on whose territory
                      the suspect is present in accordance with its domestic law. Consequently,
                      there was no valid reason, in my view, for the Court to conclude that the
                      circumstances and procedures related to the questioning of Mr. Habré by
                      the Senegalese investigating judge in February 2000, followed by his
                      indictment by the same judge, did not constitute a preliminary inquiry.
                      Thirdly, it is my view that the nature and meaning of the obligation laid
                      down in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the CAT could have been further ela
                      borated and clarified in the Judgment, particularly in view of the fact that
                      Belgium continued to insist on the extradition of Mr. Habré while S   enegal
                      was preparing for his prosecution in its territory, and mobilizing funds for
                      that purpose.

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                                                   II. Jurisdiction

                         2. In its Application to the Court, Belgium invoked two separate bases
                     of jurisdiction. It relied equally on the Declarations made by Belgium and
                     Senegal under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute and on
                     Article 30 of the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT).
                      I believe that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of the declarations
                      made by Belgium and Senegal under Article 36, paragraph 2, respectively
                      on 17 June 1958 and 2 December 1985. The Court’s jurisdiction cannot,
                      however, be founded in the present case on Article 30 of the CAT.
                         3. Four conditions have to be met, under Article 30 of the CAT, for
                      the Court to have jurisdiction on disputes between parties to the Conven-
                      tion. First, there has to be a dispute between the parties concerning the
                      application or interpretation of the Convention. Secondly, the dispute has
                      to be one which cannot be settled by negotiation. Thirdly, one of the par-
                      ties to the dispute must have requested that it be submitted to arbitration.
                      Fourthly, if within six months from the date of the request, the parties are
                      unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of them
                      may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The parties
                      agree that these conditions are cumulative. Thus, all four must be met
                      before the jurisdiction of the Court can be established. As explained
                      below, it is my view that two of these conditions have not been met,
                      namely : (a) the condition that the dispute could not be settled through
                      negotiation ; and (b) that the Parties must have been unable to agree on
                      the organization of the arbitration. I will examine these conditions below.

                            A. A Dispute Which “Cannot Be Settled through Negotiation”
                        4. It should be stressed at the outset that Article 30 of the CAT refers
                     to a dispute which “cannot be settled through negotiation”, a condition
                     that is vastly different from the formula used in other conventions where
                     the reference is to a dispute which “is not settled by negotiation”. The
                     latter expression, viz. “is not settled by negotiation”, implies a factual
                     finding, and not an assessment of whether a deadlock or a refusal by one
                     of the parties has occurred.
                        5. The Court rightly notes in paragraph 57 of the Judgment that
                           “[t]he requirement that the dispute ‘cannot be settled through nego-
                           tiation’ could not be understood as referring to a theoretical impos-
                           sibility of reaching a settlement. It rather implies that . . . ‘no
                           reasonable probability exists that further negotiations would lead to
                           a settlement’ (South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa ; Liberia v.
                           South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
                           p. 345).”
                     The Court does not, however, draw the correct conclusions from these
                     statements, particularly on the strength of the evidence before it in this
                     case.

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                     This evidence clearly shows that neither a deadlock nor an impasse was
                     ever reached in the negotiations between the Parties, and that those nego-
                     tiations continued for a long time even after the filing of Belgium’s Appli-
                     cation with the Court. Thus, there is nothing in the material placed before
                     the Court by the Parties which indicates that the dispute could not be
                     settled through negotiations and that the Parties fully and definitively
                     gave up any hope of reaching a settlement through negotiations. The fact
                     that the negotiations between the Parties were never permanently inter-
                     rupted, but were resumed on many occasions, even after the filing of the
                     Application by Belgium, demonstrates that the possibility of a settlement
                     through negotiations never disappeared.
                         6. Ascertaining whether negotiations have taken place, but have not
                     resulted in the settlement of the dispute, in accordance with the condition
                     stipulated in certain conventions regarding “a dispute which is not settled
                     by negotiations”, is a question of factual verification and requires no
                     inquiry into the exhaustion of the possibilities of settling the dispute
                     through negotiations. The formula used in the CAT, i.e., “cannot be
                     settled through negotiations” requires such an inquiry and a determina-
                      tion by the Court that further negotiations became futile and showed no
                      reasonable probability that they could result in a settlement of the dis-
                      pute. This determination does not appear to have been made in the
                      Judgment. As a matter of fact, in assessing whether the dispute was one
                       which could not be settled by negotiation, the Court limited itself to the
                       consideration of the Notes Verbales by Belgium to Senegal of 11 January
                       2006, 9 March 2006, 4 May 2006 and 20 June 2006. These diplomatic
                       Notes form the only evidence that the Court relies on to conclude that
                           “[t]here was no change in the respective positions of the Parties con-
                           cerning the prosecution of Mr. Habré’s alleged acts of torture during
                           the period covered by the above exchanges. The fact that, as results
                           from the pleadings of the Parties, their basic positions have not sub-
                           sequently evolved confirms that negotiations did not and could not
                           lead to the settlement of the dispute.” (Judgment, para. 59.)
                        7. It is true that in its Note Verbale of 20 June 2006, which Senegal
                     affirmed not to have received, Belgium noted that “the attempted negotia-
                     tion with Senegal, which started in November 2005” had not succeeded,
                     and accordingly asked Senegal to submit the dispute to arbitration
                     (Memorial of Belgium, Ann. B.11). But this was not, and cannot be con-
                     sidered, clear evidence of an impossibility to settle the dispute through
                     negotiations. It simply reflects the viewpoint of one of the Parties, which
                     apparently wanted to submit the dispute to arbitration. The material
                     placed before the Court by both Parties contains additional evidence of
                     continued negotiations between the Parties up to, and beyond, the date
                     of submission of Belgium’s Application to the Court. This additional evi-
                     dence shows that the positions of the Parties continued to evolve, particu-
                     larly with the adoption by Senegal in 2007 of constitutional and legislative
                     reforms aimed at facilitating the prosecution of Mr. Habré in Senegal for

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                     crimes allegedly committed in Chad, and the consequent co‑operation
                     between the Parties, both directly as well as through the African Union
                     and the European Union, to mobilize the necessary funds for the organi-
                     zation of Mr. Habré’s trial in Senegal.

                        8. To illustrate the evolution of the positions of the Parties through
                     their diplomatic exchanges from 2007 and until very recently (17 Janu-
                     ary 2012), reference may be made to, inter alia, Senegal’s Notes Verbales
                     of 18 July 2007 and 5 October 2007, in which it announced the intention
                     to organize a meeting of potential donors and informed Belgium of its
                     decision to organize the Hissène Habré trial (Memorial of Belgium,
                     Anns. D.14 and B.15). Further diplomatic correspondence was sent by
                     Senegal to Belgium on 5 October 2007 and 7 December 2007 regarding
                     the organization of the donor meeting and the financial aspects of the
                     trial (ibid., Ann. D.16).
                        On 2 December 2008, in a Note Verbale to Senegal, Belgium refers to
                     the dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation and applica-
                     tion of the provisions of the CAT, and takes note of the constitutional
                     and legislative amendments adopted by Senegal with a view to the sub-
                     mission for prosecution to its competent authorities of the case of
                     Mr. Habré (ibid., Ann. B.16). Belgium reaffirms, in the same Note Ver-
                     bale, its readiness to establish the necessary modalities for international
                     judicial co‑operation with Senegal on the Habré case, in particular
                     through the transmission to Senegal of the dossier compiled by the Bel-
                     gian investigating judge following a letter rogatory from the competent
                     Senegalese authorities. In this context, Belgium also confirms the readi-
                     ness of the Belgian investigating judges to receive the Senegalese judges
                     responsible for the Hissène Habré case, and requests Senegal to provide it
                     with the contact details of the Senegalese judges in charge of the investi-
                     gation and prosecution of the case. Finally, Belgium expresses in this
                     Note Verbale the hope that this co‑operation would result in decisive
                     progress in the coming few weeks.
                        These exchanges clearly constitute, in my view, an evolution of the
                     positions of the Parties and indicate the emergence of new factors (modi-
                     fication of Senegalese legislation, preparations for the organization of
                     trial, co‑operation in the mobilization of funds for the trial, offer of judi-
                     cial co‑operation by Belgium and of the transmission of the Habré dossier
                     compiled by its magistrates) indicating a clear evolution of the negotia-
                     tions and of the positions of the Parties subsequent to the period, and to
                     the Notes Verbales, on the basis of which the Court concluded that the
                     condition set forth in Article 30, paragraph 1, of the CAT has been met.
                        9. Moreover, after the filing of its Application before the Court, and
                     until recently, Belgium continued its exchanges with Senegal on the
                     financing of the trial of Hissène Habré in Senegal, on its own financial
                     contribution to such a trial, as well as judicial co‑operation on the basis
                     of the international letter rogatory requested by Belgium in its Note Ver-
                     bale of 2 December 2008 (ibid., Ann. B.16). Thus, in a Note Verbale of

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                     the Embassy of Belgium in Dakar to the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign
                     Affairs on 23 June 2009, Belgium extended an invitation to the Senegalese
                     investigating judges responsible for the case to visit Belgium to meet with
                     their Belgian counterparts and offered to bear the costs of the visit
                     (Memorial of Belgium, Ann. B.17). The Senegalese authorities welcomed
                     this offer and designated two of the investigating judges to travel to Bel-
                     gium (Note Verbale of 14 September 2009, ibid., Ann. B.19).

                        The negotiations and discussions on the letter rogatory held between
                     the Foreign Ministers of Senegal and Belgium on 26 May 2010 constitute
                     further evidence of the continuation of negotiations between the Parties.
                     Likewise, in November 2010, Belgium attended the donors’ round-table
                     in Dakar, in which the participants discussed the budget for organizing
                     the Habré trial in Senegal, and made co‑operation arrangements amongst
                     themselves, including between Belgium and Senegal. Indeed, Belgium
                     pledged a maximum of €1 million to the organization of the trial
                     (Counter‑Memorial of Senegal, Anns. 5, 10‑4, and 11).

                        10. Negotiations continued as recently as 17 January 2012, when Bel-
                     gium submitted a fourth extradition request to Senegal. Belgium noted, in
                     its Note Verbale of 17 January 2012, that without prejudice to the case
                     pending before the ICJ, it is in favour of the Habré trial being organized
                     in Africa by the country on whose territory Mr. Habré is present. In addi-
                     tion, Belgium confirmed that it was still ready to co‑operate with Senegal
                     by judicial means, and this on 17 January 2012. Is it persuasive, under
                     such circumstances, for the Court to conclude that the dispute could not
                     be settled through negotiation or that negotiations had been exhausted
                     and offered no further prospect for the settlement of the dispute already
                     in 2006 allowing for resort to arbitration under Article 30 of the CAT ?

                                      B. The Inability of the Parties to Agree
                                       on the Organization of the Arbitration
                        11. The requirement under Article 30 relating to the inability of the
                     parties “to agree on the organization of the arbitration” implies, in
                     my view, an attempt to initiate the organization of the arbitration, or a
                     suggestion of modalities by one or both parties regarding such organi
                     zation, on which the parties have, however, failed to agree. The proposal
                     or initiative by one or both parties, showing an effort to organize arbitra-
                     tion, is to be distinguished from the request for arbitration and has to be
                     subsequent to it. In the present case, it does not appear to me that either
                     of the two parties has made a proposal or has attempted to initiate the
                     organization of an arbitration on whose terms the Parties failed to agree.
                     As a matter of fact, Belgium does not even claim that it has done any-
                     thing regarding the organization of an arbitration, and limits its argu-
                     ments to the fact that it requested Senegal to submit the dispute to an
                     arbitration, and subsequently reminded Senegal of that request.

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                        12. In its reply to a question posed by a Member of the Court, Belgium
                     stated that : “a State requesting arbitration under Article 30 is not required
                     to make proposals for, or even to raise questions concerning the organi-
                     zation of the arbitration at the outset or at any specific moment”
                     (CR 2012/6, p. 40, para. 14 (Wood)). It is also recognized in the Judgment
                     that “Belgium did not make any detailed proposal for determining the
                     issues to be submitted to arbitration and the organization of the arbitra-
                     tion proceedings”. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that : “this does not
                     mean that the condition that ‘the Parties are unable to agree on the orga-
                     nization of the arbitration’ has not been fulfilled. A State may defer pro-
                     posals concerning these aspects to the time when a positive response is
                     given in principle to its request to settle the dispute by arbitration.”
                     (Judgment, para. 61.)

                          This is in my view an erroneous interpretation of the provision on arbi-
                     tration in Article 30 of the CAT. In the first instance, it is very clear from
                     a simple reading of the text that it is not enough to request the submission
                     of the dispute to arbitration. Such a request must be followed by an effort
                     or a proposal to organize arbitration proceedings, which is either opposed
                     by the other party, or does not result in an agreement between the parties.
                     Thus, it is only a failure to agree on the organization of arbitration, in the
                     sense that an attempt had been made to organize or to propose modalities
                     for the organization of arbitration without, however, reaching an agree-
                     ment, which triggers the possibility to refer the dispute to the Court.
                     Secondly, it should be recalled that, in the present case, following B
                                                                                elgium’s
                      initial reference to the arbitration procedure on 4 May 2006,
                      Senegal responded by acknowledging and taking note of the “possibility
                       of Belgium having recourse to the arbitration procedure provided for in
                       Article 30 of the [Convention]” (Memorial of Belgium, Ann. B9). In light
                       of such acknowledgment, the onus lay on Belgium, as the requesting State,
                       to take steps to suggest the procedure for organizing the said arbitration.
                          The present case is thus different from DRC v. Rwanda (Armed Activi-
                       ties on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic
                       Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)) and from Libya v. USA (Questions of
                       Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
                       from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
                       States of America), where the Conventions concerned included similar
                       treaty provisions. Unlike, for example, the Respondent in the Libya v.
                       USA case, Senegal did not express an intention to reject the proposal for
                       arbitration. On the contrary, Senegal took note of Belgium’s request to
                       submit the matter to arbitration in its Note Verbale of 9 May 2006 (ibid.,
                       Ann. B10). Belgium should have followed this up with a proposal on the
                       modalities for the organization of the arbitration, rather than reiterate a
                       request to submit the dispute to arbitration. The condition that the par-
                       ties were unable “to agree on the organization of the arbitration” con-
                       tained in Article 30 must be met before the matter can be referred to the
                       Court for adjudication. Absent such clear disagreement on the organiza-

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                     tion of arbitral proceedings, the dispute cannot be submitted to the Court,
                     and if any one of the Parties does so, the Court has to declare that it lacks
                     jurisdiction. This is the case here, and the Court should have concluded,
                     in my view, that it had no jurisdiction under Article 30 of the CAT.

                                 III. Senegal’s Obligation to Make Immediately
                                       a Preliminary Inquiry into the Facts

                        13. I find the reasoning of the Court, according to which the interroga-
                     tion by the investigating judge in 2000 does not amount to a preliminary
                     inquiry under Article 6, paragraph 2, of CAT, very unpersuasive, and dis-
                     agree with its conclusion that the events of 2000 may be lumped together
                     with those of 2008 where Senegal clearly failed to conduct a preliminary
                     inquiry following a further complaint against Mr. Habré, after the legisla-
                     tive and constitutional amendments made by Senegal in 2007. The Court
                     should have made a clear distinction between the steps taken by Senegal
                     in 2000 and the absence of an inquiry following the complaints submitted
                     to the Senegalese authorities in 2008.

                        14. The CAT provides little guidance on the specifics of the prelimi-
                     nary inquiry required by Article 6, paragraph 2. The Judgment also fails
                     to shed light on what is meant by a preliminary inquiry under Article 6,
                     paragraph 2, of the CAT and consequently provides no reliable basis for
                     the assessment of whether or not Senegal, through the actions undertaken
                     by its investigating judge, was able to satisfy the requirements of this pro-
                     vision of the Convention. Instead, in paragraph 83 of the Judgment, the
                     concept of a preliminary inquiry under the Convention appears to have
                     been elevated to the level of a full investigation. In that paragraph, the
                     Court notes that the preliminary inquiry provided for in Article 6, para-
                     graph 2, is
                           “intended, like any inquiry carried out by the competent authorities,
                           to corroborate or not the suspicions regarding the person in question.
                           That inquiry is conducted by those authorities which have the task of
                           drawing up a case file and collecting facts and evidence ; this may
                           consist of documents or witness statements relating to the events at
                           issue and to the suspect’s possible involvement in the matter con-
                           cerned.”
                        15. The preliminary inquiry provided for under Article 6, paragraph 2,
                     of the CAT can only be based, at that stage of the investigations, on the
                     information made available by the victims or by those who have filed the
                     complaint against the suspect and brought his presence in the country,
                     and the crimes allegedly committed by him, to the attention of the
                     authorities. Moreover, the nature of the inquiry to be carried out under
                     this provision will depend to a large extent on the legal system concerned,

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                     and on the particular circumstances of the case. It would therefore be
                     erroneous to suggest, as paragraph 83 of the Judgment appears to do,
                     that a general standard for the conduct of such inquiries exists.
                        The Court rightly observes in paragraph 86 that the choice of means
                     for conducting the preliminary inquiry remains in the hands of the States
                     parties, taking account of the case in question. This observation however
                     stands in contradiction with the Court’s findings that the indictment of
                     Mr. Habré by the Senegalese investigating judge in 2000 is insufficient to
                     fulfil the obligation in Article 6, paragraph 2. Without a proper assess-
                     ment of Senegal’s legal system and practice, the Court cannot conclu-
                     sively state that
                           “[t]he questioning at first appearance which the investigating judge at
                           the Tribunal régional hors classe in Dakar conducted in order to estab-
                           lish Mr. Habré’s identity and to inform him of the acts of which he
                           was accused cannot be regarded as performance of the obligation laid
                           down in Article 6, paragraph 2, as it did not involve any inquiry into
                           the charges against Mr. Habré” (Judgment, para. 85).

                        In coming to this conclusion, the Court disregards Senegal’s explana-
                     tion that under its legal system
                           “in criminal proceedings, the investigating judge may be seised either
                           by a complaint with civil‑party application or by an application from
                           the public prosecutor to open an investigation. The preliminary
                           inquiry is aimed simply at enabling the basic facts to be established ;
                           it does not necessarily lead to prosecution, since the prosecutor may,
                           in the light of the results, consider that there are no grounds for
                           further proceedings.” (CR 2012/7, p. 34, paras. 39‑40 (Thiam) ; see
                            also CR 2012/7, p. 17, para. 7.)
                        16. It does not also appear logical to assume that an indictment would
                     have been issued by a Senegalese magistrate without a preliminary
                     inquiry. While Senegal did not provide adequate material to show the
                     exact nature of the inquiry carried out by the competent authorities fol-
                     lowing the allegations against Mr. Habré, the conduct of an inquiry, par-
                     ticularly one of a preliminary nature, is implicit in the fact that Mr. Habré
                     was indicted by the investigating magistrate, and placed under house
                     arrest. The Court should not have been so dismissive of the peculiarities
                     of the Senegalese legal system, and the manner in which the indictment of
                     Mr. Habré was arrived at, particularly in view of the fact that the exact
                     nature and scope of the preliminary inquiry is determined on the basis of
                     domestic law.
                        17. Thus, it is my view that the only instance in which Senegal failed to
                     comply with its obligation to carry out a preliminary inquiry was the one
                     relating to the lack of action by the competent Senegalese authorities fol-
                     lowing the filing of new allegations of torture against Mr. Habré in 2008.
                     The Court should have, therefore, noted that notwithstanding the possi-

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                     bility that Senegal may have met its obligations under Article 6, para-
                     graph 2, in 2000, Senegal was under an obligation to conduct such an
                     inquiry in 2008 when, following the legislative and constitutional reforms
                     in 2007, new allegations of torture were brought against Mr. Habré.
                     Despite the fact that four investigating judges were assigned to the case,
                     there is no evidence that a preliminary inquiry, even of the same nature
                     and scope as the one conducted in 2000, was ever carried out. It is on the
                     basis of this failure to conduct a preliminary inquiry in 2008 that the
                     Court should have found that Senegal breached its obligations under
                     Article 6, paragraph 2, and not by setting aside the inquiry and the indict-
                     ment of 2000.

                               IV. The Nature and Meaning of the Obligation in
                                           Article 7, Paragraph 1

                        18. I believe that the Court could have brought further clarification to
                      the meaning and nature of the obligation aut dedere aut judicare con-
                     tained in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the CAT, which is at the heart of the
                     present case. The prevalence of the formula aut dedere aut judicare, which
                     can be found in over 60 multilateral instruments, has led to some confu-
                     sion within legal scholarship over the relationship between extradition
                     and prosecution in conventional clauses containing this formula. Used
                     loosely, the expression can be misleading as it is generally understood to
                     mean an obligation to extradite or prosecute. However, depending on the
                     legal instrument under consideration, the obligation may be placed on
                     prosecution, rather than extradition, or vice versa. It is for this reason
                     that the statement contained in paragraph 95 of the Judgment is useful,
                     but could have benefited from further elaboration and elucidation. In
                     that paragraph the Court notes that, within the context of the CAT, the
                     choice between extradition or submission for prosecution does not mean
                     that the two alternatives are to be given the same weight. Rather,
                     “[e]xtradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention, whereas
                     prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the vio-
                     lation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State”
                     (Judgment, para. 95).
                        19. Despite the importance of this clarification, the Court stops short
                     of elaborating further on the meaning of the obligation, and differentiat-
                     ing the formula in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the CAT from that of the
                     conventions which impose an obligation to extradite. Such elaboration is
                     necessary to avoid ambiguity, especially with respect to the interpretation
                     of treaties containing the formula aut dedere aut judicare. The conven-
                     tions containing the formula aut dedere aut judicare may be divided gen-
                     erally into two broad categories : (a) clauses that impose an obligation to
                     extradite, and in which prosecution becomes an obligation only after the
                     refusal of extradition ; and (b) clauses that impose an obligation to
                     prosecute, with extradition being an option available to the State. The latter

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                     category also includes clauses that impose an obligation to prosecute, but
                     extradition becomes an obligation if the State fails to submit the case for
                     prosecution.
                        20. Multilateral instruments belonging to the first category include the
                     1929 International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting
                     Currency where the obligation to initiate proceedings against the suspect
                     is “subject to the condition that extradition has been requested and that
                     the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person
                     accused for some reason which has no connection with the offence”
                     (Art. 9 (2)). Further illustration of this type of provision can be found in
                     Article 15 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Com
                     bating Corruption which provides that
                           “where a State party in whose territory any person charged with or
                           convicted of offences is present and has refused to extradite that per-
                           son on the basis that it has jurisdiction over offences, the requested
                           State party shall be obliged to submit the case without undue delay
                           to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution . . .”.

                       Additionally, Article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
                     the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and
                     child pornography provides that

                           “if an extradition request is made with respect to an offence described
                           in Article 3, paragraph 1, and the requested State party does not or
                           will not extradite on the basis of the nationality of the offender, that
                           State shall take suitable measures to submit the case to its competent
                           authorities for the purpose of prosecution”.
                        21. It is clear that category (a) conventions are structured in a manner
                     that extradition to the State in whose territory the crime is committed is
                     given priority. In the majority of these treaties, there is no general obliga-
                     tion on States parties to prosecute the alleged offender. On the contrary,
                     prosecution by the State on whose territory the alleged offender is found
                     only becomes an obligation if a request for extradition has been refused,
                     or certain factors such as nationality of the suspect exist.

                       22. In category (b) conventions, it is evident that extradition is not
                     given the same predominance. For example, a State party under the 1949
                     Geneva Conventions is obligated to prosecute persons alleged to have
                     committed grave breaches of these conventions. However, “if it prefers,
                     and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation”, it may
                     “hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party con-
                     cerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
                     case”. In these conventions the State on whose territory the alleged
                     offender is found is not obliged to extradite him. Other modifications to
                     the formula include Article 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Sup-

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                     pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, on which Article 7, paragraph 1,
                     of CAT is modelled. Prosecution is clearly given priority, and a State
                     party is obligated to prosecute, or submit a case for prosecution, regard-
                     less of the existence of an extradition request. Even where an extradition
                     request has been made, some conventions, such as the 1949 Geneva Con-
                     ventions, do not require extradition, while others can be interpreted, in
                     accordance with the object and purpose of the particular treaty, as estab-
                     lishing an obligation to extradite if the State refuses to prosecute.

                         23. This clarification is important in the present case, since, as noted in
                     paragraph 50 of the Judgment, it has repeatedly appeared in the corre-
                     spondence between the Parties as well as in their pleadings before the
                     Court that the two obligations were often placed on the same footing as
                     alternatives within the context of the CAT. For instance in its Note Ver-
                     bale of 11 January 2006, Belgium stated its interpretation of the Conven-
                     tion, specifically the obligation “aut dedere aut judicare” as “only laying
                     obligations on a State, in this case, in the context of the extradition appli-
                     cation of Mr. Hissène Habré, the Republic of Senegal” (Memorial of
                     Belgium, Ann. B.7). Similarly, Belgium made clear to Senegal in its Note
                      Verbale of 9 March 2006, that negotiations which it claimed were under
                      way were with regard to “the extradition application in the case of
                      Mr. Hissene Habré, in application of [Article 30 of the Convention
                      against Torture]” (ibid., Ann. B.8). Furthermore, in its Application, Bel-
                      gium requested the Court to adjudge and declare that “failing the prose-
                      cution of Mr. H[issène] Habré, the Republic of Senegal is obliged to
                      extradite him to the Kingdom of Belgium so that he can answer for these
                      crimes before the Belgian courts” (emphasis added). Belgium also insisted
                      during the oral proceedings that Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Conven-
                      tion is to be interpreted as requiring the forum State “to submit the case
                      to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless it
                      extradites that person to the State which so requests” (CR 2012/2, p. 15,
                      para. 13 (Rietjens)). Additionally, counsel for Belgium argued that the
                      preliminary inquiry required in Article 6, paragraph 2, was necessary to
                      “implement the obligation to prosecute or, in default of prosecution, to
                      extradite if an extradition request has been made” (CR 2012/3, p. 11
                      para. 11 (Wood) ; emphasis added).

                        24. Belgium had no right to insist upon the extradition of Mr. Habré,
                     and Senegal was under no obligation to extradite him to Belgium, as long
                     as Senegal complied with its obligation to submit Mr. Habré’s case to its
                     competent authorities for prosecution. It is only the violation of the obli-
                     gation to submit the case for prosecution which engages the responsibility
                     of the State on whose territory the suspect is present. Should such a State,
                     however, prefer to extradite the suspect, instead of prosecuting him or her
                     in its tribunals, it has the choice of doing so. Additionally, with respect to
                     extradition within the context of the Convention against Torture, it

                     151

6 CIJ1033.indb 298                                                                                28/11/13 12:50

                     570 	 obligation to prosecute or extradite (sep. op. yusuf)

                     should be stressed that the State to which a request for extradition has
                     been made is not under an obligation to extradite the suspect to the
                     requesting State. Thus, Senegal had no obligation to extradite Mr. Habré
                     to Belgium, unless it decided to do so simply because it wanted to relieve
                     itself of the obligation to submit his case for prosecution by its own
                     authorities and on its territory.

                                                             (Signed) Abdulqawi A. Yusuf.

                     152

6 CIJ1033.indb 300                                                                                28/11/13 12:50


144

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. KOOÏIJMANS
[Traduction]

1. Pai voté en faveur du dispositif de l'arrêt car je pense, comme la
Cour, que celle-ci est compétente pour connaitre de la requéte introduite
par la Libye et que cette requête est recevable. Je partage également l’opi-
nion exprimée dans l’arrêt selon laquelle un certain nombre des excep-
tions présentées par le défendeur n’ont pas un caractère exclusivement
préliminaire. Toutefois, comme l’arrét ne prend pas pleinement en compte
mes propres considérations, je tiens à ce qu’il soit pris acte de mes vues en
ce qui concerne certains des arguments formulés par les Parties. Je le ferai
assez succinctement pour les exceptions d’incompétence et un petit peu
plus longuement pour les exceptions d’irrecevabilité et l’exception selon
laquelle les demandes libyennes ont été privées de tout objet, ou selon
laquelle la Libye ne peut obtenir les mesures qu’elle demande, du fait de
l'adoption subséquente des résolutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) par le
Conseil de sécurité.

I. QUESTIONS CONCERNANT LA COMPETENCE

2. Ce serait un truisme d’affirmer que, politiquement, la présente
affaire est extrêmement délicate. Comme la Cour l’a déjà déclaré à de
nombreuses reprises, le fait qu’un différend porté devant elle a des conno-
tations politiques sérieuses et le fait que le Conseil de sécurité est simul-
tanément saisi de ce différend ne l’empéchent pas d’en connaître. |

En l'espèce, le défendeur ne s’est pas contenté de souligner ces élé-
ments. Il a laissé entendre que la Libye n’a pas invoqué la compétence de
la Cour en vertu de la convention de Montréal pour régler un différend
né dans le cadre de cette convention mais pour d’autres raisons, sans
aucun lien avec elle.

Comme l'ont dit les Etats-Unis dans leurs écritures:

«Ce différend n’a pas trait à la convention de Montréal. Il a en
effet trait aux obligations de la Libye de se conformer aux décisions
du Conseil de sécurité ... la Cour ne doit pas permettre à la Libye
d’abuser de la compétence de celle-ci pour lui faire connaître de
différends qui ne se trouvent pas fondés sur la convention de
Montréal.» (Exceptions préliminaires des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
p. 76, par. 3.22.)

3. Non seulement le défendeur nie qu’il existe un différend avec la
Libye sur l'interprétation ou l’application de la convention de Montréal,
mais il met aussi sérieusement en doute les motifs qui poussent la Libye à

33
CONVENTION DE MONTREAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIJMANS) 145

invoquer un tel différend; la Cour ne doit pas se laisser entraîner dans
une telle mystification motivée par des considérations politiques. J’ai
choisi de libeller la phrase qui précède en des termes assez extrêmes afin
de montrer combien il est facile de représenter la Cour comme un instru-
ment utilisé par l’une des parties à des fins extrajudiciaires. Et ce risque
devient un grave danger si limpression naît que la Cour est utilisée
comme un pion dans une partie d’échecs à laquelle participent d’autres
organes principaux de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

4. Dans ce contexte, il semble opportun et utile de souligner une fois
de plus quelle est la fonction de la Cour selon la Charte et le Statut, qui
fait partie intégrante de la Charte. Cette fonction a été décrite de manière
appropriée par la Cour elle-même dans son arrêt rendu le 20 décembre
1988 dans l'affaire relative à des Actions armées frontalières et transfron-
taliéres:

«la Cour n’ignore pas que tout différend juridique porté devant elle
peut présenter des aspects politiques. Mais, en tant qu’organe judi-
ciaire, elle doit seulement s’attacher 4 déterminer d’une part si le dif-
férend qui lui est soumis est d’ordre juridique, c’est-à-dire s’il est
susceptible d’être résolu par application des principes et des règles du
droit international, et d’autre part si elle a compétence pour en
connaître et si l’exercice de cette compétence n’est pas entravé par
des circonstances qui rendent la requête irrecevable. L'objet de la
saisine de la Cour est le règlement pacifique de tels différends. La
Cour se prononce en droit et n’a pas à s’interroger sur les motiva-
tions d’ordre politique qui peuvent amener un Etat, à un moment
donné ou dans des circonstances déterminées, à choisir le règlement
judiciaire.» (Actions armées frontalières et transfrontaliéres ( Nica-
ragua c. Honduras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.LJ. Recueil
1988, p. 91, par. 52.)

5. Tout autre est la question de savoir si la conclusion finale de la
Cour quant au fond est compatible avec des décisions obligatoires d’autres
organes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en particulier le Conseil de
sécurité, et, de l’avis de la Cour, cette question doit être examinée à un
stade ultérieur. La première tâche de la Cour lorsqu'une affaire lui est
soumise est d'examiner si cette affaire concerne un différend juridique et
si elle a compétence pour en connaître. Comme la déclaré la Cour dans
les affaires des Essais nucléaires: «L'existence d’un différend est donc la
condition première de l’exercice de sa fonction judiciaire.» La Cour a
aussi dit qu’«on ne peut se contenter à cet égard des affirmations d’une
partie» et, pourrait-on ajouter, il ne suffit pas non plus que l’autre partie
nie qu'il y ait un différend. Se référant à son avis consultatif dans l’affaire
de l’Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie
et la Roumanie (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 74), la Cour a déclaré que «l’exis-
tence d’un différend international demande à être établie objectivement
(Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, CI.J. Recueil 1974, p. 271,
par. 55).

34
CONVENTION DE MONTREAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOLMANS) 146

6. Partant, si la Cour se prononce sur l’existence ou la non-existence
d’un différend juridique, elle exerce régulièrement sa fonction judiciaire.
Il est à mon avis indifférent à cet égard que le défendeur ne s’appuie pas
sur la convention de Montréal et soutienne qu'aucun différend ne l’oppose
à la Libye en ce qui concerne l'interprétation et l’application de cette
convention. Il n’est pas contesté par les Parties qu’en eux-mêmes les faits
de l’incident de Lockerbie peuvent être considérés comme constitutifs
d’un acte visé à l’article premier de la convention de Montréal, ce qui
impliquerait que cette convention pourrait être applicable à cet incident
et — dans des circonstances normales — lui serait applicable. Le défen-
deur a déclaré que cela ne signifie pas que d’autres règles du droit inter-
national ne soient pas applicables à ces faits, et qu’en portant la situation
à l’attention du Conseil de sécurité comme une menace potentielle contre
la paix et la sécurité résultant d’un terrorisme parrainé par un Etat, il a
fait fond sur les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies. Dans ces
conditions, la convention de Montréal ne serait pas, comme l’affirme le
demandeur, le seul instrument applicable ou exclusivement applicable.

7. La divergence d’opinions qui en résulte n’est donc pas un désaccord
abstrait quant à l’applicabilité de la convention de Montréal: il s’agit d’un
différend juridique très précis sur l’applicabilité de cette convention aux
faits mêmes de l’affaire dont la Cour est saisie. Le fait qu’en adoptant la
résolution 731 (1992) le Conseil de sécurité ait implicitement nié que la
convention fût applicable à ces faits ne peut en aucune manière restreindre
la compétence et la responsabilité propres de la Cour s’agissant de déter-
miner si, au regard du paragraphe 1 de l’article 14 de la convention de
Montréal, le différend que lui a soumis le demandeur est un différend rele-
vant du règlement judiciaire, lequel règlement lui est confié. Conclure
autrement porterait atteinte à la fonction propre de la Cour telle que
celle-ci est définie dans la Charte et le Statut. Par voie de conséquence,
la Cour est aussi compétente pour connaître des demandes de la Libye,
à savoir dire et juger que le défendeur n’a pas respecté les droits que l’ar-
ticle 7 de la convention confère à la Libye et n’a pas exécuté les obligations
que l’article 11 lui impose à lui-même, puisque telles sont les demandes
spécifiques du demandeur. La réponse à la question de savoir si la Cour
devra connaître de ces demandes spécifiques dépendra bien sûr de la
conclusion qu’elle adoptera sur la question préliminaire de l’applicabilité
de la convention eu égard aux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité.

8. La compétence de la Cour est à mon avis limitée aux questions que
je viens de mentionner et qui sont couvertes par les termes du para-
graphe 1 de l’article 14 de la convention de Montréal, c’est-à-dire les
questions de l’applicabilité et du respect ou non-respect de ce texte. En
particulier, les moyens par lesquels ce non-respect se traduit et la ques-
tion de savoir si ces moyens ne sont pas conformes à la Charte des
Nations Unies et aux règles impératives du droit international général ne
relèvent pas de la compétence de la Cour telle que celle-ci a été consen-
suellement acceptée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 14 de la convention.

9. C’est pourquoi je souscris pleinement à la conclusion de la Cour

35
CONVENTION DE MONTREAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIJMANS) 147

selon laquelle elle est compétente pour connaitre du différend entre le
demandeur et le défendeur conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 14
de la convention de Montréal. J’ai néanmoins exprimé certaines opinions
personnelles sur la question de la compétence parce que j’estime impor-
tant de souligner que les compétences du Conseil de sécurité et de la Cour
sont à cet égard distinctes et peuvent être nettement distinguées, et
qu’elles ne doivent pas être confondues, encore moins considérées comme
pouvant être en conflit. De même que tout Etat a le droit de porter une
situation à l’attention du Conseil de sécurité et le Conseil le droit de se
prononcer sur cette situation et de la qualifier de menace contre la paix et
la sécurité internationales, tout Etat a le droit d'introduire devant la
Cour une requête contre un autre Etat au sujet d’un différend dont il
estime qu’il relève du règlement judiciaire. C’est à la Cour et à la Cour
seulement qu’il appartient de déterminer si elle est compétente pour
connaître de la demande sur la base des dispositions juridiques applicables.

II. QUESTIONS CONCERNANT LA RECEVABILITÉ ET LE DÉFAUT D’OBJET
DES DEMANDES

10. La question de savoir si la Cour, une fois qu’elle s’est déclarée com-
pétente, doit exercer sa fonction judiciaire dans toutes les circons-
tances est une question tout à fait différente. Le défendeur a soutenu
que les droits que la Libye pourrait avoir en vertu de la convention de
Montréal sont de toute façon supplantés par les obligations que lui im-
posent les résolutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité,
qui ont été adoptées postérieurement à l'introduction de la requête de la
Libye. En conséquence, tout arrêt sur le fond serait vide de sens parce qu’il
ne serait ni applicable ni exécutable.

11. Il ne semble guère pertinent de savoir si cette exception doit être
considérée comme une exception d’irrecevabilité et rejetée en consé-
quence, puisque les résolutions en question ont été adoptées après la date
de lintroduction de la requête qui, aux termes de l’arrêt, est la seule date
pertinente aux fins d’apprécier la recevabilité de celle-ci ou de déterminer
si elle doit être qualifiée d’«exception sur laquelle le défendeur demande
une décision avant que la procédure sur le fond se poursuive» au sens du
paragraphe 1 de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour.

12. On peut contester qu’il soit nécessaire ou même possible de clas-
ser les exceptions préliminaires en catégories distinctes. À cet égard
S. Rosenne déclare:

«Tout ce qu’on peut déduire de l’expérience est qu’il s’agit d’une
question particulière qui doit être appréciée à la lumière de toutes les
circonstances de chaque affaire.» (S. Rosenne, The Law and Prac-
tice of the International Court of Justice, 1920-1996, 1997, p. 883.)

A cet égard, on peut aussi se reporter à l’affaire du Cameroun septen-
trional dans laquelle la Cour, commentant les divers sens attribués par les
Parties, entre autres, au terme «recevabilité», a déclaré:

36
CONVENTION DE MONTREAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIJMANS) 148

«La Cour reconnaît que, dans des contextes différents, ces termes
peuvent avoir des sens différents mais elle n’estime pas nécessaire en
Pespéce d’en examiner la signification. Aux fins de la présente espèce,
une analyse des faits tenant compte de certains principes directeurs
peut suffire pour résoudre les questions qui retiennent l’attention de
la Cour.» (Cameroun septentrional, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 28.)

13. Qu'il faille ou non distinguer les exceptions préliminaires selon des
catégories, cette analyse contextuelle est exactement ce à quoi la Cour
s’est livrée dans le présent arrêt. Tenant compte de toutes les circons-
tances de l’espèce, elle est parvenue à la conclusion que l’exception selon
laquelle les résolutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité
auraient rendu la demande libyenne sans objet est une exception qui a un
caractère préliminaire et relève des dispositions de l’article 79 du Règle-
ment de la Cour. La Cour a néanmoins conclu que cette exception n’avait
pas un caractère exclusivement préliminaire au sens du paragraphe 7 de
l’article 79 et devait, en conséquence, être examinée avec le fond.

14. Je partage cette opinion de la Cour. F’ai cependant le sentiment
qu'il y a lieu de faire des observations additionnelles étant donné que le
défendeur n’a pas nié que cette exception pouvait toucher le fond du dif-
férend. Il estime qu’il devrait être néanmoins mis fin à l’instance durant la
phase actuelle au motif que tout arrêt au fond serait dépourvu d'effet
pratique puisque la Cour ne peut faire droit aux demandes de la Libye en
raison des effets juridiques supérieurs des résolutions obligatoires du
Conseil de sécurité. Comme l’a dit le conseil des Etats-Unis:

«La Cour n’est pas tenue de se prononcer sur le bien fondé des
demandes formulées par la Libye au titre de la convention de
Montréal si elle croit, comme c’est notre cas, que ces demandes ont
été supplantées en droit positif par les décisions du Conseil, que ces
demandes soient ou non valables au regard de la convention. Rien
n’empêche la Cour de trancher l’affaire sur cette base sans avoir à
examiner plus avant les thèses développées par la Libye en vertu de
la convention.» (CR 97/19, p. 47; les italiques sont de moi.)

A cet égard, on a cité ce qu’avait déclaré la Cour dans laffaire du
Cameroun septentrional, à savoir:

«L’arrét de la Cour doit avoir des conséquences pratiques en ce
sens qu'il doit pouvoir affecter les droits ou obligations juridiques
existants des Parties, dissipant ainsi toute incertitude dans leurs rela-
tions juridiques.» (C_LJ. Recueil 1963, p. 34.)

15. On peut toutefois se demander si cette référence a l’affaire du Came-
roun septentrional est justifiée. Dans cette affaire, le raisonnement de la
Cour reposait sur l’idée qu’un arrêt sur le fond ne pourrait être effectivement
appliqué puisque la décision de l’Assemblée générale (résolution 1608 (XV))
de mettre fin à la tutelle sur le Cameroun britannique (décision qui ren-
dait l'instance sans objet entre le Royaume-Uni et la République du Came-

37
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIJMANS) 149

roun) était une mesure administrative ayant la nature d’une décision et un
caractère définitif. Une conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle des dispo-
sitions juridiques avaient été violées n’aurait pu entraîner une réparation
puisque l’Assemblée générale n’était plus compétente en ce qui concernait le
territoire par suite de la cessation de la tutelle par l’effet de la résolution 1608
(XV) et, en conséquence, l’ancienne puissance administrante ne pouvait
donner effet à aucune décision de la Cour (CI J. Recueil 1963, p. 35).

16. La référence par les Etats-Unis à la décision rendue par la Cour en
1974 dans une des affaires des Essais nucléaires, dans laquelle elle a
déclaré que «la demande présentée par l'Australie [le demandeur] ne
comporte plus d’objet» et que par conséquent «il n’y a rien à juger», est
encore moins pertinente. La Cour a ainsi conclu parce qu’elle estimait
que le différend porté devant elle n’existait plus puisque le défendeur (la
France) avait contracté unilatéralement une obligation qui satisfaisait
pleinement à la demande de l'Etat demandeur. Il faut toutefois noter que
la Cour a indiqué que l’affaire pourrait être rouverte si le défendeur
n’honorait pas son engagement (C.1.J. Recueil 1974, p. 270 et suiv.).

17. Il ressort clairement des affaires du Cameroun septentrional et des
Essais nucléaires que la Cour ne décidera qu’une demande n’a plus
objet que dans un contexte extrêmement concret. Ce sont «les circons-
tances qui se sont produites» qui amènent la Cour à juger qu’«il n’entre
pas dans la fonction juridictionnelle de la Cour de traiter des questions
dans l’abstrait, une fois qu’elle est parvenue à la conclusion qu’il n’y a
plus lieu de statuer au fond» (CI J. Recueil 1974, p. 272).

18. En l’espèce, les circonstances sont différentes: il n’y a pas de
mesure administrative ayant la nature d’une décision et un caractère défi-
nitif prise par un organe de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, et la
demande du demandeur n’a pas été satisfaite. Les résolutions adoptées
par le Conseil de sécurité en vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte peuvent
avoir des effets juridiques de vaste portée, mais elles ne sont pas irrévo-
cables ni inaltérables. Il est loisible au Conseil de sécurité, dans l’exercice
de ses fonctions, de les confirmer, de les révoquer ou de les modifier, et on
ne peut en conséquence les qualifier de «définitives» même si, pendant la
période où elles sont en vigueur, elles peuvent déterminer les droits et
obligations des Etats Membres, leurs dispositions Pemportant sur les
droits et les obligations que ces Etats peuvent avoir en vertu d’autres trai-
tés. Il est généralement admis que le Conseil de sécurité est pleinement
compétent en vertu du chapitre VII pour constater qu’une situation de
fait constitue une menace contre la paix et la sécurité internationales et
qu’il peut prendre les mesures juridiquement obligatoires nécessaires
pour parer à cette menace, mais qu’il n’est pas compétent pour dire le
droit, et l’on a contesté que le Conseil de sécurité puisse modifier le droit
lorsqu'il l’applique à un ensemble de faits particuliers (voir, par exemple,
Malcolm Shaw, «The Security Council and the International Court of
Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function», dans A. S. Muller et
autres, dir. publ., The International Court of Justice — Its Future Role
after Fifty Years, 1997, p. 219 et suiv.).

38
CONVENTION DE MONTREAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIJMANS) 150

19. Comme les résolutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécu-
rité ont tranché les questions en cause avec autorité mais non définitive-
ment et pour une période indéfinie, la Cour a a juste titre conclu que
Pexception des défendeurs selon laquelle les demandes libyennes ont été
privées de tout objet (sont devenues «moot») n’a pas «un caractére ex-
clusivement préliminaire» et serait examinée avec le fond. Ce faisant, la
Cour agit conformément à sa fonction telle que celle-ci est définie à Par-
ticle 38 de son Statut, à savoir «régler conformément au droit internatio-
nal les différends qui lui sont soumis», tout en respectant pleinement les
compétences qui sont celles du Conseil de sécurité en vertu de la Charte.

20. Il est à mon avis essentiel aux fins de ce que M. Lachs a appelé
«une interaction fructueuse» entre ces deux principaux organes de l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies de distinguer soigneusement entre les fonc-
tions propres au Conseil de sécurité et celles propres à la Cour. Ces
fonctions sont complémentaires et, en ce sens, peuvent se soutenir mutuel-
lement.

III. OBSERVATIONS FINALES

21. On peut faire une observation finale. Le défendeur a invoqué la
notion d’«économie judiciaire» lorsqu'il a demandé qu'il soit mis fin à
laffaire dans sa phase préliminaire. Il a prévenu que la procédure quant
au fond serait longue, difficile et extrêmement complexe, et a ajouté que
cette procédure

«serait en outre tout à fait dépourvu[e] d’objet si, en fin de compte, la
Cour venait 4 conclure que la Libye devait se soumettre aux décisions
du Conseil et livrer les deux individus accusés afin que ceux-ci puissent
être jugés aux Etats-Unis ou au Royaume-Uni ... Il relève clairement
du pouvoir de la Cour d’éviter d'effectuer un examen inutile de cer-
taines questions plus complexes de droit et de fait sans incidence».
(Exceptions préliminaires des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, p. 112-113.)

On ne peut exclure que tel puisse être effectivement le cas, bien que cela
ne soit aucunement certain comme cela l’était dans l’affaire du Cameroun
septentrional.

22. L'économie judiciaire peut toutefois jouer au détriment de l’oppor-
tunité judiciaire, qui appelle une délicate mise en balance des intérêts de
toutes les parties au différend. A cet égard, ce qu’a dit M. Read dans son
opinion dissidente dans l’affaire de l’Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. mérite d’être
rappelé:

«Il m’est impossible de méconnaître la grave injustice que cause-
rait à un Etat demandeur un arrêt qui admettrait une exception
d’incompétence et refuserait d’autoriser un prononcé sur le fond,
tout en tranchant en même temps, à l’encontre de l’Etat demandeur,
un important point de fait ou de droit faisant partie du fond. Le
refus d’autoriser un jugement du différend aurait pour effet de ren-

39
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. KOOIMANS) 151

voyer l'Etat demandeur et l’Etat défendeur à d’autres mesures juri-
diques ou politiques, en vue de régler le différend. Au moment de
rechercher une autre solution au différend, ni le demandeur ni le
défendeur ne devraient être placés dans un état d'infériorité à la suite
d'une décision sur un point de fait ou de droit touchant le fond.»
(C.LJ. Recueil 1952, p. 149; les italiques sont de moi.)

23. On ne peut certainement pas prévoir que d’autres solutions, par
exemple sur la base de suggestions faites par des organisations régionales
ou d’autres groupements internationaux ou nationaux, seront trouvées
et, pour le moment, cela peut méme sembler improbable, mais on ne peut
non plus l’exclure. La Cour ne doit pas être perçue comme faisant obs-
tacle 4 d’éventuels efforts de conciliation.

{Signé) P. H. Kooumans.

40


                     762

                                DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC MENSAH

                        Agrees with decision not to uphold Nicaragua’s final submission I (3) —
                     Disagrees with reliance on statement from Nicaragua v. Honduras regarding
                     continental shelf claims beyond 200 nautical miles — Does not accept argument
                     that Nicaragua needs to establish outer limits of continental shelf pursuant to
                     UNCLOS Article 76 for purposes of delimitation vis-à-vis non‑parties to
                     UNCLOS — Coastal States have entitlements to continental shelf beyond 200
                     nautical miles under customary international law — Rights over continental shelf
                     do not depend on occupation or express proclamation — UNCLOS does not
                     impose obligations on parties vis-à-vis non‑parties — Nicaragua’s evidence on its
                     entitlement to continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles was inadequate —
                     Evidence not sufficient for the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
                     also not adequate for the Court — Court lacks sufficient basis to accede to
                     Nicaragua’s delimitation request — No automatic bar for courts and tribunals to
                     delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles where outer limits have not
                     been established pursuant to Article 76 — Article 59 may not be adequate to
                     protect third States that are affected by the Judgment.

                        1. I agree with the conclusion of the Court that Nicaragua’s final sub-
                     mission I (3), which requests the Court to effect the delimitation between
                     the respective continental shelves of Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200
                     nautical miles, cannot be upheld. As I see it, the correct (and sufficient)
                     reason for this conclusion is as indicated in paragraph 129 of the Judg-
                     ment, namely, that Nicaragua has failed to “establish” that it has a con-
                     tinental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia’s
                     200‑nautical‑mile entitlement to a continental shelf.

                        2. I do not believe that the reason given in paragraph 126 of the Judg-
                     ment for rejecting Nicaragua’s request is correct in the circumstances of
                     this case. In particular, I do not consider that the reference to the Court’s
                     statement in the case of Nicaragua v. Honduras, to the effect that “any
                     claim to continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance
                     with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the
                     Limits of the Continental Shelf established thereunder”, is either appro-
                     priate or necessary (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
                     and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
                     I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 759, para. 319). That statement might have
                     been valid and unobjectionable in the circumstances of the Nicaragua v.
                     Honduras case, since both the Parties in the case were States parties to the
                     1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).

                     142

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                     763 	     territorial and maritime dispute (decl. mensah)

                     However, it is neither correct nor relevant in the present case, given that
                     one of the Parties is not a State party to UNCLOS. In this connection, I
                     find a trifle implausible the suggestion in the Judgment that the expres-
                     sion “any claim” in the Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment was intended to
                     mean “any claim by a State party to UNCLOS”. In the context of that
                     case, the qualification to the Court’s statement (assuming that any such
                     qualification had in fact been intended) would and should go further to
                     refer to “any claim by a State party to UNCLOS as against another State
                     party”.

                       3. As indicated in paragraph 118, the Court has determined that, since
                     Colombia is not a party to UNCLOS, the law applicable to the case is
                     “customary international law”. Although both Nicaragua and Colombia
                     agree that some provisions of Article 76 reflect customary international
                     law, they disagree on which provisions fall into this category. Specifically,
                     Colombia denies that paragraphs 4 to 9 of Article 76 can be considered to
                     be rules of customary international law ; and the Court itself has stated
                     that it does not need to decide as to which provisions of Article 76 of
                     UNCLOS, other than paragraph 1, form part of customary international
                     law. Accordingly, it is reasonable to operate on the assumption that other
                     provisions of Article 76 of UNCLOS (and certainly paragraphs 4 to 9 to
                     which Colombia objects) are not included in the provisions deemed to be
                     applicable in this case.

                        4. In spite of this, the Judgment seeks to justify the reference to the
                     Nicaragua v. Honduras Judgment on the ground that, although in the
                     present case one of the Parties (Colombia) is not a State party to
                     UNCLOS, the Court’s statement in Nicaragua v. Honduras is still rele-
                     vant because, in the view of the Court, the fact that Colombia is not a
                     party to UNCLOS does not relieve Nicaragua “of its obligations under
                     Article 76 of that Convention” (Judgment, para. 126). This would seem
                     to suggest that Nicaragua is obliged to follow the procedure set forth
                     under Article 76 of UNCLOS if it seeks to establish outer limits for its
                     continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles that are “final and binding”,
                     even as against Colombia. Although I find this argument interesting, I do
                     not consider that it is sustainable.
                        5. In the first place, Nicaragua does not seek to establish final and
                     binding outer limits for its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles ;
                     nor does it request the Court to establish or pronounce on such an outer
                     limit. As the Court pertinently notes in paragraph 128, Nicaragua in the
                     second round of oral argument stated that it was “not asking [the Court]
                     for a definitive ruling on the precise location of the outer limit of Nicara-
                     gua’s continental shelf”, but was rather “asking [the Court] to say that
                     Nicaragua’s continental shelf entitlement is divided from Colombia’s con-
                     tinental shelf entitlement by a delimitation line which has a defined
                     course”. The Court’s response to this request (ibid., para. 129), with which

                     143

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                     764 	      territorial and maritime dispute (decl. mensah)

                     I fully agree, is that it is not in a position to delimit a continental shelf
                     boundary between the Parties, “even using the general formulation pro-
                     posed [by Nicaragua]”.

                        6. In my view this conclusion of the Court does not justify the refer-
                     ence to the statement in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, or the argument
                     in paragraph 126. That argument, taken to its logical conclusion, suggests
                     that a State which is a party to UNCLOS can only assert its right to a
                     continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, as against a State which is
                     not a party to the Convention, if it follows the procedure in paragraphs 8
                     and 9 of Article 76 of UNCLOS. Furthermore, placing emphasis on the
                     procedure set out in Article 76 of UNCLOS (including the role of the
                     Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (the “Commission”))
                     appears to leave little or no room for a State which is not a party to
                     UNCLOS to assert its right to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
                     miles vis-à-vis third States, whether or not such third States are parties to
                     UNCLOS, since it is at least arguable that this procedure is not available
                     (certainly not as of right) to non‑parties to UNCLOS.

                        7. Thus, while in the context of the Nicaragua v. Honduras case the
                     statement quoted might have been correct and pertinent, I do not think it
                     is correct or helpful in the present case. In my view, the use of the state-
                     ment in this context would appear to suggest that the Court’s decision in
                     Nicaragua v. Honduras (and by implication its decision in this case) puts
                     in doubt the possibility that a State which is not a party to UNCLOS
                     may assert a right to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles or,
                     alternatively, that the claim of such a State to a continental shelf beyond
                     200 nautical miles may never be opposable vis‑à‑vis third States. This
                     would in effect mean that a State which is not a party to UNCLOS may
                     not be able to establish rights to a continental shelf beyond the limits of
                     its exclusive economic zone. In my view, there is no legal justification for
                     such a proposition. In this connection, it is important to note that Arti-
                     cle 77 of UNCLOS (which clearly reflects customary international law)
                     categorically states that the rights of the coastal State over the continental
                     shelf do not depend on occupation or express proclamation. Accordingly,
                     it can plausibly be argued that the entitlement of a coastal State to a con-
                     tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles arises ipso facto and ab initio
                     under customary international law, whether or not the State is a party to
                     UNCLOS. The procedure by which a non‑UNCLOS State can assert its
                     right may be different, but the ability to assert it should be recognized
                     where the necessary conditions exist.

                       8. I emphasize that I do not wish or intend in any way to detract from
                     or diminish the obligations which Article 76, paragraphs 8 and 9, of
                     UNCLOS impose on States parties that seek to establish “final and bind-
                     ing” outer limits of their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles.

                     144

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                     765 	      territorial and maritime dispute (decl. mensah)

                     And I certainly do not question or underestimate the clear object and
                     purpose of UNCLOS to establish “a legal order for the seas and oceans”
                     or the need and desirability for universal application of the UNCLOS
                     régime. But I do not believe or agree that the special character of
                     UNCLOS, as set out in its Preamble, makes the rights and obligations of
                     States parties to UNCLOS fundamentally different from the rights and
                     obligations of State parties under other treaties. Specifically, I do not sub-
                     scribe to the view that the “object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated
                     in its Preamble”, in and by themselves, impose on parties to the Conven-
                     tion obligations vis‑à‑vis other States which have taken a conscious deci-
                     sion not to agree to be bound by that Convention. Whilst it is true that
                     “the fact that Colombia is not a party [to UNCLOS] does not relieve
                     Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76 of that Convention”, there
                     is nothing in the Preamble or any provision of UNCLOS that can legiti-
                     mately be interpreted to mean that the obligations under that Convention
                     are owed also to States that are not parties thereto. In my opinion, the
                     obligations under Article 76, paragraphs 8 and 9, are “treaty obligations”
                     that apply only as between States that have expressed their consent to be
                     bound by the UNCLOS treaty. Those provisions cannot be considered as
                     imposing mandatory obligations on all States under customary interna-
                     tional law. As such they only apply where all the States concerned are
                     parties to UNCLOS.

                       9. In any event, I would have preferred the Judgment to make it clear
                     that the evidence submitted by Nicaragua to the Court was considered to
                     be inadequate, not because the required information has not been submit-
                     ted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, or because
                     the Commission has not made recommendations pursuant to Article 76,
                     paragraph 8, of UNCLOS. Rather it is because the information presented
                     does not provide a sufficient basis to enable the Court to proceed to the
                     delimitation of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles of the coast
                     of Nicaragua. In my view, it is not appropriate to conclude that the evi-
                     dence is inadequate merely because Nicaragua has failed to satisfy the
                     procedural requirements for obtaining a positive recommendation from
                     the Commission under Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS. As previ-
                     ously pointed out, these requirements are only applicable where the States
                     concerned are all parties to UNCLOS.

                        10. If it were considered necessary or useful to explain further the
                     nature of the evidence that would have satisfied the Court, it would have
                     been enough to note that the information so far provided by Nicaragua
                     is, by Nicaragua’s own admission, only “preliminary” and thus would not
                     be sufficient to satisfy the Court, just as it would not be sufficient to sat-
                     isfy the Commission. In this connection, it is worth pointing out that the
                     submission of “preliminary” data to the Commission is not for the pur-

                     145

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                     766 	      territorial and maritime dispute (decl. mensah)

                     pose of enabling the Commission to make recommendations. Rather it is
                     to “buy time” for the coastal State concerned.
                        11. While a full submission to the Commission should not necessarily
                     be required in every case to enable a court or tribunal to delimit a conti-
                     nental shelf beyond 200 miles, information that would satisfy the Com-
                     mission should normally also be sufficient to serve as a basis for the court
                     or tribunal to delimit a continental shelf, in cases where (as in the present
                     case) submission to the Commission is not mandatory. In this regard, it is
                     pertinent to recall that in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, the conclusion
                     of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea that both Bangla-
                     desh and Myanmar have entitlements to a continental shelf beyond
                     200 nautical miles from their coasts was stated to be based partly on
                     “uncontested scientific information” that had been submitted during the
                     proceedings, and partly on information that the two States had submitted
                     to the Commission, even though the Commission had not pronounced
                     itself on those submissions (Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Mari‑
                     time Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal
                     (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS, pp. 129‑131,
                     paras. 443‑449).
                        12. My concern is that the present Judgment might be interpreted to
                     suggest that a court or tribunal should, in every case, automatically rule
                     that it is not able to decide on a dispute relating to the delimitation of the
                     continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles whenever one of the Parties to
                     the dispute has not followed, or is unable to follow, the procedure set out
                     in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Rather, I think the possibility should be left
                     open that, in principle, a court or tribunal may be able and willing to
                     adjudicate on a dispute relating to delimitation of the continental shelf
                     beyond 200 nautical miles depending on the information presented to it
                     on the geology and geomorphology of the area in which delimitation is
                     sought. In particular, it should be made clear that, in a case of the delim-
                     itation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles involving two
                     States, neither of which is a State party to UNCLOS, the court or tribu-
                     nal is not obliged to declare itself unable to adjudicate over the dispute
                     solely on the ground that one or the other of the States concerned has not
                     followed the procedure mandated in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Where the
                     States concerned are not States parties to UNCLOS, the procedure under
                     Article 76 of UNCLOS should not apply as between them and may, in
                     any event, not be available to them. In any case, as previously stated, I
                     consider that paragraph 126 of the Judgment is unnecessary. It does not
                     add anything substantive to the reasoning of the Court, but could have
                     implications that I consider to be both wrong and unhelpful.
                        13. With regard to the actual delimitation effected by the Court, I
                     share the view of Judge ad hoc Cot that the rights and interests of third
                     States are affected by the Judgment. In particular, I do not think that
                     enough weight has been given to the effect and significance of bilateral
                     agreements concluded in the area. I, too, consider that these agreements
                     constitute an informal multilateral framework for the management of the

                     146

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                     767 	     territorial and maritime dispute (decl. mensah)

                     Western Caribbean Sea, and are intended to have significant implications
                     for the “public order of the oceans”. As the Court rightly notes in refer-
                     ring to the judgment of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad
                     and Tobago case, a delimitation that contributes to such a public order
                     should be “both equitable and as practically satisfactory as possible,
                     while at the same time in keeping with the requirements of achieving a
                     stable legal outcome” (Award of 11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol. XXVII,
                     p. 215, para. 244 ; ILR, Vol. 139, p. 524). I am not sure that reliance on
                     Article 59 of the Court’s Statute alone would offer adequate protection
                     for the rights of third States, and achieve the objective of stability and
                     practicability, in this case.

                                                              (Signed) Thomas A. Mensah.

                     147

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