85

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON
[Translation ]

Being to my regret unable to concur in the Court’s decision on
Objections Nos. 3 and 4(a), I think it is my duty to set forth the
reasons for my dissenting opinion.

I

1. The Third Objection is founded upon the rule of the exhaus-
tion of local remedies. It is not included as a qualification of the
American declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court; it is invoked as a general principle of international law.
The plea is an objection to the admissibility of the Application;
it contests that admissibility only and is not directed against the
Court’s jurisdiction. The rule of the exhaustion of local remedies
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court, which may be compe-
tent, even if internal remedies have not been exhausted. Accord-
ingly, the question of the admissibility of the Application lies out-
side the field of jurisdiction. In its Judgment in the Corfu Channel
case this Court admitted the distinction between admissibility and
jurisdiction (.C_J. Reports 1947-1948, pp. 26-27); in other cases it
has said that the exhaustion of the remedies is an argument in
defence directed to the admissibility of ithe claim (J.C. J. Reports
1952, p. 114, and 1953, p.23). The present judgment reaches the
same conclusion. The Permanent Court had upheld the same con-
tention. Therefore the Court cannot adjudicate on the admissibility
of the Application until it has established its jurisdiction (Series
A/B, No. 67, p. 24).

*
* *

2. On October 2nd, 1957, the day on which the Swiss Application
was filed, the local remedies were, in the opinion of the United
States Government, exhausted: The Aide-Mémoire to the Note of :
the Department of State dated January 11th, 1957, says that ‘‘the
(Interhandel) case now stands dismissed without any qualifica-
tion”. ‘‘Interhandel has had the benefits of both remedies (adminis-
trative and judicial). Both its claim and suit have been dismissed.”
“Interhandel has received due process of law. The claim of Inter-
handel to the shares in question has thus been defeated.”” When the
Application was filed, the United States Government was about to
proceed with the sale of 70% of the shares of GAF.

Those are the circumstances in which Switzerland filed its Appli-
cation. On October 3rd, 1957, the Swiss Government submitted a
request for the indication of interim measures of protection.

83
INTERHANDEL (DISS, OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 86

At the public hearing on October 12th, 1957, dealing with interim
measures, Mr. Dallas $. Townsend, Co-Agent of the United States
of America, made the following statement:

“Chemie unsuccessfully exhausted its appellate remedies to the
Supreme Court, and when the six months period of grace had
expired, without Chemie making the production, the District Court
entered the order and in 1956 held that Chemie’s complaint stood
dismissed. Again Chemie appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of
Appeals and in this way attempted to get back into the case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed and now Chemie, in its second trip
to the Supreme Court, is making another effort to get back into
the case by petitioning the Supreme Court to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals. This petition is now pending before the
Supreme Court of the United States.” (7.C.]. Reports 1957, pp. 108-
109, cited in the Memorial, paragraph 79.)

While the Court on October 3rd, 1957, was examining the Swiss
Application for the indication of interim measures, the Supreme
Court of the United States, on October 14th, 1957, received a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari filed by Interhandel on August 6th, 1957,
in which Counsel for the Parties were asked to discuss the question
whether the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia was justified in dismissing Interhandel’s claim by application
of a rule of procedure on the grounds that it had not obeyed an
order for the production of the documents.

Do declarations by the representatives of the American Govern-
ment express that Government’s official opinion? Is the effect of an
application for a writ of certiorari, by its mere presentment, to
reopen a case which had been closed since August 6th, 1957, the
date of the judgment given by the Court of Appeals? Were the
Parties in agreement that local remedies were exhausted at the
time when the Swiss Application was filed? Was that point in
dispute at the time of its filing? In view of these circumstances, was
the Application admissible and was the Swiss Government acting in
good faith? A definite answer to all these questions presupposes
information which the documents in the case do not at this stage
of the proceedings furnish. Was it only on the date of the decision
by the Supreme Court to grant the request for a writ of certiorari
that the case was reopened 1?

1 The examination of this request led to the decision of the Supreme Court of
June 16th, 1958, by which the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.
The last part of the judgment of the Supreme Court says:

“On remand, the District Court possesses wide discretion to proceed im
whatever manner it deems most effective. It may desire to afford the Govern-
ment additional opportunity to challenge petitioner’s good faith. It may wish.
to explore plans looking towards fuller compliance. Or it may decide to com-

84
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 87

3. The principle of the exhaustion of local remedies is not absolute
and rigid; it has to be applied flexibly according to the case. Some
situations or facts may entitle the Court to accede to a request,
even if the remedies have not been completely exhausted.

A limit is placed upon the rule of exhaustion if the period within
which the remedies will be exhausted is not known. The Permanent
Court acknowledged this limitation in its Order of February 4th,
1933, in the Prince von Pless case, on the grounds of an unwarrant-
able delay by the Polish tribunal, and the Court decided not to
adjudicate upon the applicability of the principle of exhausting
local remedies (Series A/B, No. 52, p. 16).

The Interhandel case, first brought before the American courts
on October 27th, 1948, passed through various stages and was still
not settled by June 16th, 1958 (nearly ten years later). A further
unknown period will therefore have to elapse before the remedies
are exhausted. That being so, are such slow remedies “‘adequate”’
and “effective”, as is required by the arbitral award in the case
of the Finnish vessels? (Reports of International Arbitral Awards,
Vol. III, p. 1495.)

4. The substance of the Interhandel claim is to obtain from the
American courts the restitution and the taking immediate posses-
sion of the vested shares and the handing over by the defendants
to the claimant of all dividends and interest pertaining thereto.
This claim is founded in law on the fifth amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States and the amended law of October 6th,
1917, relating to trading with the enemy. The Application of the
Swiss Government in its final submission A, requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Government of the United States
of America is under an obligation to restore the assets of Interhandel;
it takes its stand upon Article IV of the Washington Accord and
on the principle of international law which forbids the confiscation
of neutral property. The two claims, that of Interhandel and that
of the Swiss Government, are based upon different legal grounds}.

mence at once trial on the merits. We decide only that on this record dismissal
of the complaint with prejudice was not justified.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded
to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this Opinion.
It is so ordered.”’

It is seen therefore that the District Court may select alternatives or different
expedients. .

1 The Swiss Government is not acting in the present dispute as the represent-
ative of its national; the reparation claimed is not of the same legal character as
that asked for by its national and the damage suffered by Switzerland is not iden-
tical with that incurred by Interhandel. The Permanent Court examined these
questions very carefully in its Judgment (Series A, No. 17, pp. 27-28), as follows:

“It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may
consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of

85
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 88

The Interhandel claim seeks to obtain by methods of local redress
a decision by the American courts that the (in Interhandel’s opinion)
unlawful act of vesting is a violation of domestic law, whilst the
Application of the Swiss Government is based upon damage caused
by the breach of an international agreement and of the law of na-
tions. It is not known whether, at this stage of the proceedings,
Interhandel could or could not pursue its claim before the American
courts and introduce there the legal grounds relied upon by the
Swiss Government with a view to the claim being decided by the
American courts. That would be a modification of Interhandel’s
claim and it would have to be ascertained whether American proce-
dure permits such action. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in its decision of June 16th, 1958, reversing the earlier decision in
the Interhandel case, makes no allusion in its directives to the
District Court to the questions of international law which, accord-
ing to the Application of the Swiss Government, constitute the
subject-matter of the dispute. According to the American Agent,
the courts could examine that case. On the other hand, the Swiss
Agent says that it would be impossible. This difference of opinion
turns mainly upon the question of the application by the national
courts of the Washington Accord in its character of Executive
Agreement, a treaty which, not having been approved by Congress,
is not incorporated in United States domestic law.

5. Even if such action proved to be possible, it would still have
to be borne in mind that the Swiss Government is not a party to the
dispute before the American courts. It would therefore seem that
the local remedies sought in those courts might not afford a final
redress to satisfy the case put forward by the Swiss Government.
Where a question of international law is involved, only an inter-
national court can give a final decision.

The purpose of the local remedies rule is simply to allow the
national tribunals in the first stage of the case to examine the
international responsibility of the defendant State as presented in

the injured State have suffered as the result of the act which is contrary to
international law. This is even the most usual form of reparation; it is the form
selected by Germany in this case and the admissibility of it has not been dis-
puted. The reparation due by one State to another does not however change
its character by reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for
the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as the
measure. The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of international
law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law governing
relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the
individual who has suffered damage. Rights or interests of an individual the
violation of which rights causes damage are always in a different plane to
rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be infringed by the same
act. The damage suffered by an individual is never therefore identical in kind
with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient
scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State.”’

86
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 89

the Application; that examination would of course have to be made
by a national court. If that court is not competent to make a com-
plete examination of the Swiss case from the point of view of its
own law, the purpose of the rule of exhaustion would not be ful-
filled.

For the moment, however, and without further information the
Court cannot enter the field of hypotheses; it must abide by the
terms of the Interhandel claim. The Application of the Swiss Gov-
ernment seeks (rightly or wrongly) reparation for direct damage
caused to a State.

The unlawful act really derives from the failure of the American
Government (according to Switzerland) to execute the decision of
the Swiss Authority of Review, which is to be regarded as a
judgment by an international arbitral tribunal, within the frame-
work of the Washington Accord, and therefore binding upon the
Parties to the dispute.

The examination of the Third Objection means prejudging a
point which can only be dealt with along with the merits. The
rule of the exhaustion of local remedies does not apply to a case
in which the act complained of directly injures a State. Is that
act or is it not a breach of international law?

6. The Permanent Court was very cautious in upholding an
objection based upon the local remedies rule and was in no hurry
to relinquish its jurisdiction. In three cases it joined the objection
to the merits (Series A/B, No. 54, Series A/B, No. 67, and Series
A/B, No. 75); it upheld the objection in one case (Series A/B,
No. 76) as a defence on the merits; in another case (Seties A/B,
No. 77) the Court accepted it on the basis of a treaty clause. The
same objection was dismissed in two cases (Series A, No. 6, and
Series A, No. 9). The present Court also dismissed it in the Amba-
tielos case. (7.C.J. Reports 1953, pp. 18, 22 and 23.)

This is therefore the first time that the Court is upholding,
without joining it to the merits, a preliminary objection based
upon the rule of exhaustion of local remedies and not included
in the Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. The
judicial precedents mentioned should not have been abandoned.

7. In its examination of the preliminary objections the Court
has to avoid prejudging matters relating to the merits of the
dispute, particularly when the questions raised, whether of fact
or of law, show that the parties are in disagreement and when these
questions are closely linked to the merits. Any such encroachment
upon the merits of the dispute deprives the parties of the right given
them by the Statute and Rules of Court to submit written pleadings
and make oral statements on the merits of the dispute (Series A/B,
No. 67, p. 24). :

87
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 90

8. The Permanent Court laid down wise directives when the
objection on grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies touches
upon the merits. In its decision (Series A/B, No. 75, p. 55) it
said:

“Whereas, at the present stage of the proceedings, a decision
cannot be taken either as to. the preliminary character of the
objections or on the question whether they are.well founded, and
any such decision would raise questions of fact and law in regard
to which the Parties are in several respects in disagreement and
which are too closely linked to the merits for the Court to adjudicate
upon them at the present stage;

Whereas, in view of the said disagreement between the Parties,
the Court must have exact information as to the legal contentions
respectively adduced by the Parties and the arguments in support
of these contentions;

Whereas the Court may order the joinder of preliminary ob-
jections to the merits, whenever the interests of the good admin-
istration of justice require it.”

For these reasons, at the present stage of the proceedings, it
seems that the Third Objection to the Swiss principal submission
should rightly and reasonably have been joined to the merits.

I

I. The United States Government submitted to the Court a
Fourth Preliminary Objection, as follows:

“(a) That there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or
determine any issues raised by the Swiss Application or Memorial
concerning the sale or disposition of the vested shares of General
Aniline and Film Corporation (including the passing of good and
clear title to any person or entity) for the reason that such sale
or disposition has been determined by the United States of America,
pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to this
country’s acceptance of this Court’s jurisdiction, to be a matter
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of this country.”

Andit adds, further, that the decision of the United States “‘applies
to all the issues raised in the Swiss Application and Memorial,
including, but not limited to, the Swiss-United States Treaty of
Arbitration and Conciliation of 1931 and the Washington Accord of

1946”.

88
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) gi

2. That objection has not been abandoned or withdrawn by the
Government of the United States at this stage of the proceedings.
The Swiss Government also asks the Court to adjudicate upon this
form of the Fourth Objection.

Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court provides that
“after hearing the parties the Court shall give its decision on the
objection or shall join the objection to the merits’. To give a
decision on an objection means either to uphold or to dismiss it,
or to join it to the merits. When it admits an objection which puts
a definite end to the Application, the Court may refrain from
examining other objections. In the present case it has upheld an
objection founded upon the rule of exhaustion of local remedies,
which has a delaying character. The Swiss Government might be
entitled to submit its Application afresh, if the local remedies
have not exhausted the facts and legal arguments upon which its
claim is based. The admission of the Third Objection by the Court
does not have the effect of finally and fully dismissing the Swiss
Application; the Court ought therefore to have decided on Objec-
tion 4 (a)—which would have that effect.

There is another reason why the Court ought to have done this.
Examination of its jurisdiction was necessary in order that it might
duly consider the Third Objection, which belongs to the class of
objections to admissibility. But that objection could only be con-
sidered by the Court after it had established that it had jurisdic-
tion.

3. The Declaration of the United States made under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court provides that the Declara-
tion shall not apply to: (6) disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States
of America as determined by the United States of America’.

This Declaration consists of two parts, acceptance of the Court’s
jurisdiction and reservations to that acceptance. Those two ele-
ments of a single juridical act are separable. Nothing justifies us,
when reading the text, in considering them as an indivisible whole.

4. A declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction is a secondary
act, one which can be linked to the application of paragraphs 2, 3
and 6 of Article 36 of the Statute. These clauses provide it with a
legal substratum. The declaration has the character of a secondary
act dependent upon a primary one. The Court, whose duty it is to
safeguard its Statute, is certainly empowered to determine whether
the secondary part of the declaration is in accord with the primary
text; in doing so, it may appraise the legality of the different parts
of the declaration in order to determine whether the relevant
clauses of the Statute have been correctly applied. The declaration
cannot run counter to the Statute. There can be no doubt of that.

89
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 92

The last part of paragraph (6) of the United States reservation
lays down that the United States of America will determine whether
a dispute submitted to the Court relates to questions which le
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America.
The clause ‘‘as determined by the United States of America’’, as
applied in the present case, is incompatible with paragraph 6 of
Article 36 of the Statute, which says: “In the event of a dispute as
to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled
by the decision of the Court.”

5. States may make reservations when accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36, but those reser-
vations cannot limit the right conferred upon the Court by the
Statute to determine the question of its jurisdiction. No reservation
is admissible in regard to paragraph 6. The Court is sole judge of its
jurisdiction.

“Paragraph 6 of Article 36—the Court has maintained—merely
adopted a rule consistently accepted by general international law
in the matter of international arbitration.”’ (Nottebohm case, Prelimi-
nary Objection, 1.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 119.) And a little later the
Court further emphasizes: “But even 1f this were not the case, the
Court, ‘whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it’ (Article 38, paragraph 1,
of the Statute), should follow in this connection what is laid down
by general international law. The judicial character of the Court
and the rule of general international law referred to above are
sufficient to establish that the Court is competent to adjudicate on
its own jurisdiction in the present case.” (Lbzd., p. 120.)

In this matter no country which has announced its accession to
the Optional Clause can reserve for itself the right to make its
opinion prevail over the jurisdiction of the Court, once the Court
has been seised of a case. From that moment the powers of the
Court cannot be curtailed; they must be exercised as established by
the Statute. It lies exclusively with the Court to settle any dispute
about jurisdiction. No government can impose its view upon the
Court in this matter. The question of the Court’s jurisdiction is one
which only the Court can finally settle. That intention is clearly set
out in paragraph 6 of Article 36, which is binding upon all States
acceding to the Statute of the Court.

Judge Kellogg rightly argued this when he said: “Every Special
Agreement submitting a case to this Court must be considered to
have, as tacitly appended clauses thereto, all the pertinent articles
of ‘the Court’s Statute, and must, in case of doubt as to its meaning,
be interpreted in the light of such provisions of the Statute of the
Court” (Series A, No. 24, p. 33). The same is true of any declaration
founded upon paragraph 2 of Article 36.

go
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 93

6. The Parties to a dispute cannot depart from the Statute of the
Court unilaterally or by agreement between themselves. The Per-
manent Court had occasion to adjudicate on this latter point. In
the Free Zones case the parties had agreed in their Special Agree-
ment to request the Court to let them know unofficially the content
of its deliberations before delivering judgment. That request was
refused as contrary to Articles 54; paragraph 3 (Secrecy of Deliber-
ations), and 58 (Reading of Judgment in open Court) of the Statute.
The same Court declared in its Order of August 19th, 1929: “In
contradistinction to that which is permitted by the Rules (Arti-
cle 32), the Court cannot, on the proposal of the parties, depart
from the terms of the Statute.”

Another instance may be given: a declaration of the parties
whereby they do not consider themselves bound by the Court’s
judgment, cannot be allowed, being contrary to Article 59 of the
Statute (Series A/B, No. 46, p. 161). The rules of substance and
procedure fixed by the Statute must be regarded as immutable:
neither the Court nor the parties can break them.

7, Since the reservation in regard to paragraph 6 of Article 36
contained in (6) of the American Declaration (‘as determined”,
etc.) is obviously contrary to that paragraph, and cannot be linked
to the application of any text in the Statute, the Court should
regard it as unwritten and inoperative in the present case. That is
to say, the respondent Government cannot rely upon it in support
of its Objection 4 (a). The clause in question, not being provided for
in any part of the Statute, should be declared without effect vis-à-
vis the Court.

That conclusion does not imply that the acceptance of the Court’s
jurisdiction, given in the American Declaration, is altogether with-
out value and to be considered as null and void in its entirety. Such
a view would run counter to the clear intention of the respondent
State, which has submitted cases to the Court’s decision both as
claimant and respondent. The way in which this Declaration was
employed by the Government of the United States in those cases
shows that the reservation in paragraph (b) was not a determining
factor at the time of its formulation and submission. The United
States Government even stated in the present case, when objecting
to the jurisdiction of the Court, during the hearings on the indica-
tion of interim measures of protection, that it did not “intend to
imply that it envisages use of paragraph (0) ... with respect to all
aspects of the Interhandel controversy which may be involved in
the (Swiss) submission. The United States Government will in due
course, upon further study, disclose its position in these respects in
further detail.” Indeed, in the United States objections to the
Swiss Application, paragraph (0) is restricted to the ‘‘matter of the
sale or disposition of such shares (GAF}, including the passing of
good and clear title to any person or entity’. In the view of the

gt
INTERHANDEL (DISS. OPIN. OF JUDGE ARMAND-UGON) 94

United States Government, paragraph (6) of its reservation can be
separated from the rest of the acceptance and even from the other
reservations. The Declaration as a whole is not linked to the clause
mentioned in paragraph (b), which is an accessory stipulation.

Consequently, this objection 4 (a) should be dismissed and the
jurisdiction of the Court upheld.

(Signed) ARMAND-UGon.

92


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

(NAURU v. AUSTRALIA)

ORDER OF 18 JULY 1989

1989

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINES TERRES
A PHOSPHATES A NAURU

(NAURU c. AUSTRALIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 18 JUILLET 1989
Official citation :

Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia),
Order of 18 July 1989, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 12.

Mode officiel de citation :

Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie),
ordonnance du 18 juillet 1989, C.LJ. Recueil 1989, p. 12.

Sales number 5 6 1
N° de vente :

12

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1989

18 juillet 1989

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINES TERRES
À PHOSPHATES À NAURU

(NAURU c. AUSTRALIE)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. Rupa, Président; M. MBAYE, Vice-Président; MM. LACHS,
ODA, AGO, SCHWEBEL, sir Robert JENNINGS, MM. BEDJAOUI,
EVENSEN, TARASSOV, GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN, PATHAK,
juges; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA, Greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44, 45 et 48 de son
Règlement,

Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 19 mai 1989 par la-
quelle la République de Nauru a introduit une instance contre le Com-
monwealth d'Australie au sujet d’un différend relatif à la remise en état de
certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru exploitées sous administration
australienne avant l’indépendance de Nauru;

Considérant que, le 19 mai 1989, une copie de la requête a été transmise
au Commonwealth d'Australie par l'intermédiaire de son ambassadeur
aux Pays-Bas;

Considérant que la République de Nauru a désigné comme agent
M. V.S. Mani, secrétaire en chef de la République de Nauru, et que le
Commonwealth d'Australie a désigné comme agent M. Tom Sherman,
secrétaire adjoint au bureau de |’ Attorney-General;
TERRES À PHOSPHATES À NAURU (ORDONNANCE 18 VII 89) 13

S’étant renseignée auprès des Parties,

Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt des
pièces de la procédure écrite:

Pour le mémoire de la République de Nauru, le 20 avril 1990;

Pour le contre-mémoire du Commonwealth d’ Australie, le 21 janvier
1991;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le dix-huit juillet mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-neuf, en
trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique de Nauru et au Gouvernement du Commonwealth d'Australie.

Le Président,
(Signé) José Maria RUDA.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.


85

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. ODA.

Puisque la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour n’est pas la règle
et que l’article 26 du Mandat pour la Palestine en constitue une
clause exceptionnelle, aucune interprétation extensive de la portée
de cet article n’est admissible.

D'après l’article 26, pour qu’un différend puisse être soumis à
la Cour, il faut : 1° qu’il soit un différend entre un Membre de la
Société des Nations et le Mandataire; 2° qu’il ne soit pas susceptible
d'être réglé par des négociations ; 3° qu'il soit relatif à l’interpréta-
tion ou à l’application des dispositions du Mandat.

Parmi ces trois conditions, les deux premières sont les conditions
de forme et la dernière celle de fond.

Au vu des exposés de fait des Parties, il est bien difficile de con-
clure que les conditions de forme ont été remplies. Le différend ne
s’est engagé qu'entre le Colonial Office et un individu, et après
que le Gouvernement grec vint intervenir pour protéger cet individu
il n’y eut qu'un seul échange de vues entre le Foreign Office et la
Légation de Grèce à Londres. Même en admettant que les condi-
tions de forme fussent remplies, il manque absolument la condition
de fond. Le différend qui a trait à la validité de certaines conces-
sions et à la revendication de certains droits que le concessionnaire
prétend lésés, ne se rapporte nullement à l'interprétation ou à
l’application des dispositions du Mandat.

D'après l'historique de l’article 11 du Mandat, le texte actuel
de la réserve a remplacé, en raison d’une nécessité inéluctable, le
texte qui se trouvait dans le projet primitif et qui était ainsi conçu :
«sous réserve des dispositions de l’article 311 du Traité de paix
avec la Turquie» ; il s’ensuit qu’il est parfaitement raisonnable de
donner au texte actuel la même portée —ni plus ni moins —qu’avait
le projet. Partant de ce principe, il est indubitable que les obliga-
tions internationales acceptées par la Grande-Bretagne, et que cite
le texte actuel, sont celles résultant des dispositions spéciales d'une
convention, — telle que par exemple, en l'espèce, le Protocole de
Lausanne, — et qu’elles restent complètement étrangères aux rap-
ports juridiques que crée le Mandat.
86 ARRÊT N° 2, — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. ODA

Pour les conclusions à tirer du Protocole, la qualité du Manda-
taire ne doit nullement étre prise en considération, puisque les
relations résultant du Mandat, et qui existent seulement entre la
Grande-Bretagne et les Membres de la Société des Nations, ne
jouent pas sans autre entre les Puissances signataires du Protocole.
Le mot «Mandataire» qui se trouve dans la réserve de l’article 11:
n'est qu'un terme de désignation commode, parce que conforme au
texte des autres articles du Mandat. Il est nécessaire de distinguer
les rapports juridiques dérivant du Mandat, qui n’existent qu’entre
les Membres de la Société des Nations, des obligations provenant de
la succession d’Etats, qui existent à l’égard de toutes les nations du
monde, y compris les Membres de la Société des Nations, en dehors
des obligations du Mandat. Il faut considérer en même temps que
l'État mandataire se voit chargé de certaines obligations spéciales
et lourdes en sus de celles découlant de sa qualité d'État successeur,
et que, par conséquent, ces obligations du Mandataire ne s'étendent
d'aucune manière au delà des limites fixées par le Mandat.

Ainsi considéré, le Protocole de Lausanne ne constitue ni une
loi spéciale, ni un règlement complémentaire par rapport au Man-
dat ; ses dispositions sont tout à fait à part et ne font en aucune
façon partie de celles du Mandat. Dès lors, le différend soulevé à
propos des concessions accordées sous la domination ottomane
n’a trait ni à l'interprétation, ni à l’application des dispositions du
Mandat et ne rentre pas par sa nature dans la compétence de la
Cour.

Étant donné que le Mandat institue des rapports juridiques
spéciaux, il est naturel que la Société des Nations, quiest leMandant,
ait des droits de surveillance envers le Mandataire. Suivant le
Mandat, outre le droit de surveillance directe du Conseil de la
Société des Nations (articles 24 et 25), un droit de surveillance
indirecte est donné à la Cour, à la condition qu'il puisse être exercé
seulement à la demande d’un Membre de la Société des Nations
(article 26). Il faut donc considérer que la requête de celui-ci doit
être présentée exclusivement en vue de sauvegarder un intérêt
général et que la simple subrogation de l’État à un individu pour
faire valoir un intérêt privé, est inadmissible. Cela est clair, si l’on
se réfère à l’article 13 du Mandat de l'Est Africain, dans lequel la
substitution d’un Membre de la Société des Nations à un de ses
ressortissants, pour faire valoir des intérêts privés, est spécialement
87 ARRÊT N° 2. —. OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. ODA

autorisée. On ne peut pas savoir pourquoi l'insertion de la stipula-
tion spéciale fut faite seulement dans le Mandat de l’Est Africain ;
mais comme il semble que dans tous les projets du Mandat «Brily.
avait la même stipulation, qui fut supprimée dans les textes défini-
tifs, sauf dans le cas du Mandat de l'Est Africain, il est clair tout
au moins que l’on a voulu faire une différence entre les Mandats « B»
et les Mandats « A », dont fait partie le Mandat pour la Palestine. Il
en résulte logiquement qu’une réclamation motivée par des intérêts
privés est exclue par l’article 26 du présent Mandat et que, à ce
même point de vue, la Cour n’est pas compétente en l'affaire des
concessions Mavrommatis.

(Signé) Y. Opa.


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY +. ICELAND)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM MEASURES
OF PROTECTION

ORDER OF 17 AUGUST 1972

1972

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA COMPETENCE
EN MATIERE DE PECHERIES

(REPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE c. ISLANDE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 17 AOÛT 1972
Official citation:

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Interim
Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, 1.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 30.

Mode officiel de citation:

Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d'Allemagne c.
Islande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 17 août 1972, CIJ.
Recueil 1972, p. 30.

Sales number
N° de vente : 367 |

17 AUGUST 1972

ORDER

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ». ICELAND)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA COMPETENCE
EN MATIERE DE PECHERIES

(REPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D’ALLEMAGNE c. ISLANDE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

17 AOUT 1972
ORDONNANCE
30

1972 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
17 August
General List
No. 56 YEAR 1972

17 August 1972

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE
(FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY y. ICELAND)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF INTERIM
MEASURES OF PROTECTION

ORDER

Present: President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN; Vice-President
AMMOUN; Judges Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, PADILLA NERVO,
FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETREN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, MOROZOV, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA:
Registrar AQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above.

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,
Having regard to Article 61 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the Federal Republic of Germany
filed in the Registry of the Court on 5 June 1972, instituting proceedings
against the Republic of Iceland in respect of a dispute concerning the
proposed extension by the Government of Iceland of its fisheries juris-
diction, by which the Government of the Federal Republic asks the
Court to declare that Iceland’s claim to extend its exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction to a zone of 50 nautical miles around Iceland has no basis
in international law and could therefore not be opposed to the Federal
Republic and to its fishing vessels,

4
31

FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER 17 VIII 72)

Makes the following Order:

1. Having regard to the request dated 21 July 1972 and filed in the
Registry the same day, whereby the Government of the Federal Repub-
lic, relying on Article 41 of the Statute and Article 61 of the Rules of
Court, asks the Court to indicate, pending the final decision in the case
brought before it by the Application of 5 June 1972, the following interim
measures of protection:

“(a)

(b)

(ec)

(d)

(e)

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Iceland
should each of them ensure that no action of any kind is
taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted
to the Court.

The Republic of Iceland should refrain from taking any
measure purporting to enforce the Regulations issued by
the Government of Iceland on 14 July 1972 against or
otherwise interfering with vessels registered in the Federal
Republic of Germany and engaged in fishing activities in the
waters of the high seas around Iceland outside the 12-mile
limit of fisheries jurisdiction agreed upon in the Exchange
of Notes between the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Government of Iceland dated 19 July 1961.
The Republic of Iceland should refrain from applying or
threatening to apply administrative, judicial or other sanctions
or any other measures against ships registered in the Federal
Republic of Germany, their crews or other related persons
because of their having been engaged in fishing activities in the
waters of the high seas around Iceland outside the 12-mile limit
as referred to in paragraph 22 (b) [of the request].

The Federal Republic of Germany should ensure that vessels
registered in the Federal Republic of Germany do not take
more than 120,000 metric tons of fish in any one year from
the ‘Sea Area of Iceland’ as defined by the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea as area Va (as marked
on the map [annexed to the request] as Annex B).

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Iceland
should each of them ensure that no action is taken which
might prejudice the rights of the other party in respect of
the carrying out of whatever decision on the merits the Court
may subsequently render’;

2. Whereas the Government of Iceland was notified of the filing
of the Application instituting proceedings, on the same day, and a
copy thereof was at the same time transmitted to it by air mail;

3. Whereas the submissions set out in the request for the indication
of intcrim measures of protection were on the day of the request com-
municated to the Government of Iceland, by telegram of 21 July 1972,

5
32 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER 17 VIII 72)

and a copy of the request was at the same time transmitted to it by express
air mail, and in the telegram and the letter it was indicated that the Court,
in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 8, of the Rules of Court, was
ready to receive the observations of the Government of Iceland on the
request in writing, and would hold hearings, opening on 2 August at
10 a.m., to hear the observations of the Parties on the request;

4. Whereas the Application founds the jurisdiction of the Court on
Article 36, paragraph J, of the Statute and on an Exchange of Notes
between the Governments of Iceland and of the Federal Republic of
Germany dated 19 July 1961;

5. Whereas by a letter dated 27 June 1972 from the Minister for For-
eign Affairs of Iceland, received in the Registry on 4 July 1972, the Govern-
ment of Iceland asserted that the agreement constituted by the Exchange
of Notes of 19 July 1961 was not of a permanent nature, that its object
and purpose had been fully achieved, and that it was no longer applicable
and had terminated; that there was on 5 June 1972 no basis under the
Statute of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in the case; and that the
Government of Iceland, considering that the vital interests of the people
of Iceland were involved, was not willing to confer jurisdiction on the
Court, and would not appoint an Agent;

6. Whereas by a telegram dated 28 July 1972, received in the Registry
of the Court on 29 July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, after
reiterating that there was no basis under the Statute for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction in the case to which the Application of the Federal
Republic referred, stated that there was no basis for the request for pro-
visional measures and that, without prejudice to any of its previous argu-
ments, the Government of Iceland objected specifically to the indication
of provisional measures by the Court under Article 41 of the Statute and
Article 61 of the Rules of Court in the present case, where no basis for
jurisdiction was established;

7. Whereas at the opening of the public hearing which had been fixed
for 2 August 1972, there were present in court the Agent, counsel and
other advisers, of the Government of the Federal Republic;

8. Having heard the observations of Professor Dr. Giinther Jaenicke
on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic, on the request for
provisional measures;

9. Noting that the Government of Iceland was not represented at the
hearing:

10. Having taken note of the written replies given on 4 and 5 August
1972 by the Agent of the Government of the Federal Republic to questions
put to him by the Court on 2 August 1972 on two points raised in the oral
observations;

11. Whereas according to the jurisprudence of the Court and of the
Permanent Court of International Justice the non-appearance of one of
the parties cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of

6
33 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER !7 VIII 72)

provisional measures, provided the parties have been given an oppor-
tunity of presenting their observations on the subject;

*

12. Whereas in its message of 28 July 1972, the Government of Iceland
stated that the Application of 5 June 1972 was relevant only to the legal
position of the two States and not to the economic position of certain
private enterprises or other interests in one of those States, an observation
which seems to question the connection which must exist under Article
61, paragraph 1, of the Rules between a request for interim measures of
protection and the original Application filed with the Court;

13. Whereas in the Application by which the Government of the
Federal Republic instituted proceedings, that Government requested the
Court to declare that the contemplated measures of exclusion of foreign
fishing vessels could not be opposed by Iceland to the Federal Republic
and to its fishing vessels:

14. Whereas the contention of the Applicant that its fishing vessels
are entitled to continue fishing within the above-mentioned zone of 50
nautical miles is part of the subject-matter of the dispute submitted to the
Court, and the request for provisional measures designed to protect such
rights is therefore directly connected with the Application filed on 5 June
1972;

15. Whereas in its message of 28 July 1972, the Government of Iceland
further recalled that the Federal Republic of Germany had only accepted
the jurisdiction of the Court by its declaration of 29 October 1971,
transmitted to the Registrar of the Court on 22 November 1971, after it
had been notified by the Government of Iceland, in its aide-mémoire of
31 August 197], that the object and purpose of the provision for recourse
to judicial settlement of certain matters had been fully achieved ;

16. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need
not, before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on
the merits of the case, yet it ought not to act under Article 41 of the
Statute if the absence of jurisdiction on the merits is manifest;

17. Whereas paragraph 5 of the Exchange of Notes between the
Governments of Iceland and of the Federal Republic dated 19 July 1961
reads as follows:

“The Government of the Republic of Iceland shall continue to
work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution of 5 May
1959 regarding the extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland.
However, it shall give the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany six months’ notice of any such extension; in case of a dis-
pute relating to such an extension, the matter shall, at the request of
either party, be referred to the International Court of Justice”;
34 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER 17 VIIE 72)

18. Whereas the above-cited provision in an instrument emanating
from both Parties to the dispute appears, prima facie, to afford a possible
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;

19. Whereas the complaint outlined in the Application of the Federal
Republic is that the Government of Iceland has announced its intention,
as from 1 September 1972, to extend unilaterally its exclusive jurisdiction
in respect of the fisheries around Iceland to a distance of 50 nautical
miles from the baselines mentioned in the 1961 Exchange of Notes;
and whereas on 14 July 1972 the Government of Iceland issued Regula-
tions to that effect;

20. Whereas the contention of the Government of Iceland in its
letter of 27 June 1972, that the above-quoted clause contained tn the Ex-
change of Notes of 19 July 1961 has been terminated, and the question
raised by that Government in its message of 28 July 1972 as to the date
of the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by the Federal Republic,
will fall to be examined by the Court in due course;

21. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case or any questions relating to the merits themselves and
leaves unaffected the right of the Respondent to submit arguments
against such jurisdiction or in respect of such merits;

22. Whereas the right of the Court to indicate provisional measures
as provided for in Article 41 of the Statute has as its object to preserve the
respective rights of the parties pending the decision of the Court, and
presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights
which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the
Court’s judgment should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative re-
garding the measures which are in Issue;

23. Whereas the immediate implementation by Iceland of its Regula-
tions would, by anticipating the Court’s judgment, prejudice the rights
claimed by the Federal Republic and affect the possibility of their full
restoration in the event of a judgment in its favour;

24. Whereas it is also necessary to bear in mind the exceptional impor-
tance of coastal fisheries to the Icelandic economy as expressly recog-
nised by the Federal Republic in its Note addressed to the Foreign
Minister of Iceland dated 19 July 1961;

25. Whereas from that point of view account must be taken of the
need for the conservation of fish stocks in the Iceland area;

26. Whereas the total catch by vessels of the Federal Republic in
that area in the year 1970 was 111,000 metric tons and in the year 1971
was 123,000 metric tons; and whereas the figure of 120,000 metric tons
mentioned in the Federal Republic's request for interim measures was
based on the average annual catch for the period 1960-1969:

27. Whereas in the Court's opinion the average of the catch should,
35 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER 17 VIII 72)

for purposes of interim measures, and so as to reflect the present situation
concerning fisheries of different species in the Iceland area, be based on
the available statistical information before the Court for the five years
1967-1971, which produces an approximate figure of 119,000 metric tons,

Accordingly,
THE COURT,
by fourteen votes to one,

(1) Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted
on 5 June 1972 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the
Republic of Iceland, the following provisional measures:

{a) the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Iceland
should each of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the
Court:

(b) the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Iceland
should each of them ensure that no action is taken which might
prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying
out of whatever decision on the merits the Court may render;

(c) the Republic of Iceland should refrain from taking any measures
to enforce the Regulations of 14 July 1972 against vessels
registered in the Federal Republic and engaged in fishing acti-
vities in the waters around Iceland outside the 12-mile fishery
zone:

(d) the Republic of Iceland should refrain from applying adminis-
trative, judicial or other sanctions or any other measures against
ships registered in the Federal Republic, their crews or other
related persons, because of their having engaged in fishing
activities in the waters around Iceland outside the 12-mile
fishery zone:

(e) the Federal Republic should ensure that vessels registered in
the Federal Republic do not take an annual catch of more than
119,000 metric tons of fish from the “Sea Area of Iceland” as
defined by the International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea as area Va;

(f) the Government of the Federal Republic should furnish the
Government of Iceland and the Registry of the Court with all
relevant information, orders issued and arrangements made
concerning the control and regulation of fish catches in the area.

(2) Unless the Court has meanwhile delivered its final judgment in the
9
36 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (ORDER 17 VIII 72)

case, it shall, at an appropriate time before 15 August 1973, review
the matter at the request of either Party in order to decide whether the
foregoing measures shall continue or need to be modified or revoked.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace. The Hague, this seventeenth day of August, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-two, in four copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted
respectively to the Government of the Republic of Iceland, to the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council.

(Signed) ZAFRULLA KHAN,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

Vice-President AMMOUN and Judges Forster and JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA
make the following joint declaration:

We have voted for this Order taking into account that the serious
problems of the contemporary law of the sea which arise in this case
are part of the merits, are not in issue at the present stage of the proceed-
ings and have not in any way been touched upon by the Order. When
indicating interim measures the Court must only take into account
whether, if action is taken by one of the Parties pending the judicial
proceedings, there is likelihood of irremediable damage to the rights
which have been claimed before it and upon which it would have to
adjudicate. It follows therefore that a vote for this Order cannot have the
slightest implication as to the validity or otherwise of the rights protected
by such Order or of the rights claimed by a coastal State dependent on the
fish stock of its continental shelf or of a fishery zone. Those substantive
questions have not been prejudged at all since the Court will, if it declares
itself competent, examine them, after affording the Parties the oppor-
tunity of arguing their cases.

Judge PADILLA NERVO appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the
Court.
(Initialled) Z. K.

(Initialled) S. A.

10


189

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES MOSLER AND JENNINGS

We have voted in favour of this Order indicating interim measures of
protection, but in doing so we wish to emphasize two things :

First, that the duties, in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter, and in accordance with the Charter of the Organization
of American States, to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political inde-
pendence of any State, and to refrain from intervention in matters within
the domestic jurisdiction of a State, are duties which apply to the Applicant
State as well as to the Respondent State.

Second, we wish also to emphasize the obligation of both the Parties, in
the compiex and delicate situation in Central America at the present time,
to pursue in good faith negotiations within the context of the regional
arrangements approved by the Security Council of the United Nations and
endorsed by the Organization of American States.

(Signed) Hermann MOSLER.

(Signed) Robert Y. JENNINGS.

24


                                          9 JUNE 2006

                                            ORDER

  STATUS VIS-A
             v -VIS THE HOST STATE OF A DIPLOMATIC
           ENVOY TO THE UNITED NATIONS
   (COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA v. SWITZERLAND)

STATUT VIS-A
           v -VIS DE L’ÉTAT HÔTE D’UN ENVOYÉ DIPLOMA-
  TIQUE AUPRÈS DE L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
      (COMMONWEALTH DE DOMINIQUE c. SUISSE)

                                         9 JUIN 2006

                                       ORDONNANCE

                                                                         107

              COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                              ANNÉE 2006                                           2006
                                                                                9 juin
                                                                                Rôle général
                                9 juin 2006                                       no 134

 AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU STATUT VIS-A
                                v -VIS
     DE L’ÉTAT HÔTE D’UN ENVOYÉ
      DIPLOMATIQUE AUPRÈS DE
  L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
         (COMMONWEALTH DE DOMINIQUE c. SUISSE)

                            ORDONNANCE

Présents : Mme HIGGINS, président ; M. AL-KHASAWNEH, vice-président ;
           MM. KOROMA, PARRA-ARANGUREN, BUERGENTHAL, OWADA,
           SIMMA, ABRAHAM, KEITH, SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR, BENNOUNA, SKOT-
           NIKOV, juges ; M. COUVREUR, greffier.

  La Cour internationale de Justice,
   Ainsi composée,
   Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
   Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et le paragraphe 1 de l’article 89 de
son Règlement,
   Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 26 avril 2006, par
laquelle le Commonwealth de Dominique a introduit une instance contre
la Confédération suisse au sujet d’un différend relatif à la
    « violation de la convention de Vienne sur les relations diploma-
    tiques du 18 avril 1961..., de l’accord de siège conclu entre la Suisse
    et l’Organisation des Nations Unies les 11 juin et 1er juillet 1946, de
    l’accord sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Organisation des
    Nations Unies conclu entre la Suisse et l’ONU le 11 avril 1946, de la

                                                                           4

       STATUT D’UN ENVOYÉ DIPLOMATIQUE (ORDONNANCE 9 VI 06)                 108

     convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies du
     13 février 1946, ainsi que des règles et principes généraux bien établis
     du droit international concernant l’accréditation et le retrait d’accré-
     ditation de diplomates, l’immunité diplomatique, l’égalité entre les
     Etats et les droits de légation passive de l’Organisation des
     Nations Unies » ;
   Considérant qu’une copie certifiée conforme de cette requête a immé-
diatement été transmise au Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse
conformément au paragraphe 4 de l’article 38 du Règlement ;
   Considérant que, par lettre du 15 mai 2006, reçue au Greffe par télé-
copie le 24 mai 2006 sous couvert de deux lettres du représentant perma-
nent du Commonwealth de Dominique auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies, et dont l’original est parvenu au Greffe le 6 juin 2006, le
premier ministre du Commonwealth de Dominique, se référant à l’ar-
ticle 89 du Règlement, a fait savoir à la Cour que le Gouvernement du
Commonwealth de Dominique « ne souhait[ait] pas poursuivre l’instance
introduite contre la Suisse » et a prié la Cour de rendre une ordonnance
« prenant acte de [son] désistement sans condition » de l’instance et « pres-
crivant la radiation de l’affaire sur le rôle général » ;
   Considérant que copie de cette lettre a immédiatement été transmise au
Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse ;
   Considérant que, par lettre du 24 mai 2006, reçue au Greffe par télé-
copie le même jour, l’ambassadeur de Suisse à La Haye a fait savoir à la
Cour qu’il n’avait pas manqué d’informer les autorités suisses compé-
tentes du désistement notifié par le premier ministre de la Dominique ;
   Considérant que le Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse n’a pas
fait acte de procédure,
  Prend acte du désistement du Commonwealth de Dominique de l’ins-
tance introduite par la requête enregistrée le 26 avril 2006 ;

  Ordonne que l’affaire soit rayée du rôle.

   Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le neuf juin deux mille six, en trois exemplaires, dont
l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront transmis
respectivement au Gouvernement du Commonwealth de Dominique et
au Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse.

                                                       Le président,
                                              (Signé) Rosalyn HIGGINS.
                                                          Le greffier,
                                             (Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.

                                                                              5


                                                                                670

   OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC POCAR

[Traduction]

   Compétence ratione materiae de la Cour au titre de la CIRFT — Interprétation
de l’article 2 de la CIRFT — Responsabilité encourue par l’Etat au regard de la
CIRFT faute d’avoir pris des mesures efficaces pour prévenir et réprimer l’infraction
visée à l’article 2 — Adhésion à l’interprétation faite de l’expression
« toute personne » utilisée à l’article 2 — Large interprétation de l’expres-
sion « toute personne » étayée par l’objet et le but de la CIRFT ainsi que par la
pratique internationale relative à la conclusion de traités analogues —
Nécessité de raisonner autrement pour conclure que l’interprétation de la
définition du terme « fonds » employé à l’article premier doit être réservée au
stade du fond — Définition des « biens » étroitement liée aux faits et donc
ressortissant au fond.

   1. Souscrivant à l’arrêt de la Cour et à sa décision de rejeter les excep-
tions préliminaires soulevées en l’espèce par la Fédération de Russie, je
me bornerai à préciser brièvement ma position sur quelques questions lar-
gement débattues entre les Parties, qui concernent la compétence ratione
materiae de la Cour.
   2. Fidèle à sa jurisprudence, la Cour a rappelé que,
     « pour déterminer si elle a compétence ratione materiae au titre d’une
     clause compromissoire visant les diﬀérends concernant l’interpréta-
     tion ou l’application d’un traité, il lui faut rechercher si les actes dont
     le demandeur tire grief « entrent dans les prévisions » du traité conte-
     nant la clause. Il peut ainsi se révéler nécessaire d’interpréter les dis-
     positions qui déﬁnissent le champ d’application du traité. » (Arrêt,
     par. 57.)
La Cour a ainsi entrepris d’interpréter certaines des dispositions qui déﬁ-
nissent le champ d’application de la convention internationale pour la
répression du ﬁnancement du terrorisme (ci-après la « CIRFT »), le but
étant d’établir en particulier I) si le fait pour tout Etat de ﬁnancer un acte
prohibé par l’article 2 en son paragraphe 1 a) ou b) peut constituer une
infraction au sens dudit paragraphe 1, et II) si l’article 2 vise la commis-
sion de l’infraction de ﬁnancement du terrorisme envisagée en son
paragraphe 1 par une personne privée uniquement, ou également par
un agent de l’Etat. S’agissant en revanche d’une autre question III) —
l’interprétation à donner à la déﬁnition du terme « fonds » ﬁgurant au
paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIRFT —, la Cour a fait observer
qu’« il n’[était] nul besoin de traiter de cette question touchant au champ
d’application de la CIRFT au stade actuel de la procédure » (arrêt,
par. 62).

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         I. Financement par l’État au regard de la CIRFT

   3. A propos de la première question, la Cour conclut que, dans la
mesure où la CIRFT s’applique aux infractions commises par des indivi-
dus et où l’article 4 requiert que chaque Etat partie érige en infractions
pénales au regard de son droit interne les infractions visées à l’article 2 en
les frappant de peines appropriées, le ﬁnancement par un Etat d’actes de
terrorisme « n’est pas visé par la CIRFT » et « n’entre pas dans le champ
d’application de la convention » (arrêt, par. 59). Je souscris à cette conclu-
sion. Une convention qui fait aux Etats parties obligation d’incriminer
dans leur législation une conduite individuelle donnée, ainsi que de la pré-
venir et de la réprimer, suppose inévitablement que tous les Etats ayant
adhéré à cet instrument ne se livreront pas eux-mêmes à une telle conduite.
Leur en faire spéciﬁquement obligation pourrait donc paraître superﬂu.
   4. Cependant, tout Etat qui commettrait directement l’infraction visée à
l’article 2 n’en verrait pas moins sa responsabilité engagée au regard de la
convention, du fait non pas de la commission même de cette infraction
mais de son omission de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour la prévenir et
la réprimer. En tout état de cause, même si sa conduite n’entrait pas dans
le champ d’application de la CIRFT, l’Etat pourrait voir sa responsabilité
engagée au regard du droit international coutumier du fait de la commis-
sion de l’infraction. De plus, toute autre juridiction compétente pourrait, le
cas échéant, s’autoriser des constatations faites par la Cour pour juger une
demande fondée sur la responsabilité de l’Etat en droit international.

  II. Financement d’actes de terrorisme par des agents de l’État

   5. S’agissant de la deuxième question susmentionnée, celle de savoir si
la commission, par un agent de l’Etat, d’une infraction de ﬁnancement du
terrorisme au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la CIRFT tombe sous
le coup de cette disposition, la Cour conclut que les termes « toute per-
sonne » « visent les individus de manière générale » et que « la convention
ne contient aucun élément de nature à exclure quelque catégorie de per-
sonnes que ce soit », et notamment pas celle des agents de l’Etat (arrêt,
par. 61). Partant, « les Etats parties à la CIRFT sont tenus de prendre les
mesures nécessaires et de coopérer pour prévenir et réprimer les infrac-
tions de ﬁnancement d’actes de terrorisme commises par quelque per-
sonne que ce soit ». Bien que cette question ait été l’objet d’échanges
intenses et développés entre les Parties, la conclusion de la Cour me
semble aller de soi et emporter la conviction.
   6. Pour parvenir à cette conclusion, la Cour invoque expressément le
sens ordinaire de l’expression « toute personne » utilisée au paragraphe 1
de l’article 2 de la CIRFT. Si cette invocation est assurément suﬃsante en
elle-même, j’estime toutefois que la conclusion de la Cour est aussi solide-
ment étayée par un examen de l’objet et du but de la CIRFT, selon la
règle générale d’interprétation énoncée à l’article 31 de la convention de

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Vienne sur le droit des traités, ainsi que par la pratique internationale
observée à l’occasion de la conclusion de traités analogues.
    7. Premièrement, la CIRFT a pour but et objet de prévenir et réprimer
le ﬁnancement d’actes de terrorisme, prescrivant aux Etats parties d’incri-
miner le fait pour toute personne de fournir ou réunir des fonds dans
l’intention de les voir utilisés ou en sachant qu’ils seront utilisés, en tout
ou partie, en vue de commettre : a) un acte qui constitue une infraction au
regard et selon la déﬁnition d’autres traités énumérés en annexe, et b) cer-
tains autres actes dirigés contre des civils ou des personnes qui ne parti-
cipent pas aux hostilités dans une situation de conﬂit armé, actes
constitutifs de violations du droit international humanitaire. Compte
tenu de cet objet et de ce but de la convention, il serait foncièrement
contradictoire de faire aux Etats parties obligation de prendre les mesures
nécessaires et de coopérer pour prévenir et réprimer la commission de
l’infraction de ﬁnancement du terrorisme qui est visée au paragraphe 1 de
l’article 2, tout en les dispensant de cette obligation dès lors que leurs
agents seraient en cause. Il convient de rappeler à cet égard que, dans la
mesure où tout acte de prévention ou de répression incomberait aux
agents de l’Etat, consacrer leur impunité en droit aurait inévitablement et
certainement pour eﬀet de contrarier la réalisation du but de la conven-
tion. Ainsi, exclure les agents de l’Etat du champ de l’expression « toute
personne » irait clairement à l’encontre non seulement du texte du para-
graphe 1 de l’article 2, mais aussi de l’objet et du but de la CIRFT.
    8. Deuxièmement, cette interprétation de l’article 2 de la CIRFT est
conﬁrmée par la pratique internationale observée lors de la conclusion de
traités analogues portant répression de telle ou telle conduite individuelle
illicite.
    9. Il en est certainement ainsi de traités prescrivant aux Etats parties
d’incriminer des actes communément qualiﬁés de terroristes, comme les
conventions et protocoles visés à l’alinéa a) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2
et énumérés dans l’annexe de la CIRFT, la plupart desquels retiennent la
même expression « toute personne » ou, dans deux cas (nos 3 et 5 de l’an-
nexe), le terme « auteur » sans autre précision, et sans exclure d’aucune
façon l’agent de l’Etat. Le fait d’étendre la juridiction pénale aux infrac-
tions commises par des agents de l’Etat n’est donc nullement contraire à
la pratique internationale. Il ressort même de cette pratique que, lors-
qu’une restriction est ménagée, elle vient au contraire soustraire à la loi
pénale l’individu agissant à titre privé, en limitant l’établissement de la
responsabilité pénale individuelle aux agents de l’Etat. C’est ainsi que la
convention du 10 décembre 1984 contre la torture et autres peines ou trai-
tements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants qualiﬁe le crime de torture de
répréhensible, aux ﬁns de ses dispositions, « lorsqu’une … douleur ou
de[s] … souﬀrances sont inﬂigées par un agent de la fonction publique ou
toute autre personne agissant à titre oﬃciel ou à son instigation ou avec
son consentement exprès ou tacite » (art. premier, par. 1).
    10. Une approche non restrictive dans la qualiﬁcation de l’auteur de
l’infraction se retrouve également dans les conventions qui prescrivent

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aux Etats parties d’incriminer les violations du droit international huma-
nitaire, comme les actes visés à l’alinéa b) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2
de la CIRFT. A cet égard, les dispositions pertinentes de chacune des
quatre conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 et du protocole addition-
nel I du 8 juin 1977, qui instituent le régime dit des « infractions graves »,
prévoient que les Etats parties « s’engagent à prendre toute mesure légis-
lative nécessaire pour ﬁxer les sanctions pénales adéquates à appliquer
aux personnes ayant commis, ou donné l’ordre de commettre, l’une ou
l’autre des infractions graves à la présente Convention déﬁnies à l’article
suivant » (article 146, paragraphe 1, de la convention IV ; les trois autres
conventions comportent une disposition identique : article 49 de la
convention I, article 50 de la convention II ; article 129 de la conven-
tion III). Aucune restriction n’est apportée quant à la qualité de ces per-
sonnes. Toutefois, dès lors que les conventions et le protocole I visent les
seules infractions commises en temps de conﬂit armé international, les
auteurs en seront généralement des agents de l’Etat et non des individus
agissant à titre privé. Une fois de plus, lorsqu’une restriction est formulée,
elle vise l’incrimination de tout ou tous actes commis par l’individu agis-
sant à titre privé, et non par l’agent de l’Etat.
   11. Enﬁn, force est de rappeler qu’une conclusion venant limiter la res-
ponsabilité pénale de l’agent de l’Etat par rapport à celle de l’individu
agissant à titre privé irait à l’encontre de la pratique interne des Etats en
matière d’incrimination pénale. Dans tout Etat démocratique, la loi
pénale n’établit aucune distinction selon la qualité de l’auteur, si ce n’est
pour retenir la qualité d’agent public comme une circonstance aggravante
aux ﬁns de la sanction à imposer à l’auteur de l’infraction considérée.

   12. Je conclus qu’il résulte sans équivoque aussi bien du sens ordinaire
du texte que de l’objet et du but de la convention, ainsi que de la pratique
internationale observée par les Etats en concluant des traités analogues,
que l’expression « toute personne » employée au paragraphe 1 de l’ar-
ticle 2 de la CIRFT doit s’entendre comme visant à la fois l’individu agis-
sant à titre privé et l’agent de l’Etat.

       III. L’interprétation de la définition du terme « fonds »
                            relève du fond

  13. S’agissant maintenant de la troisième question évoquée plus haut,
à savoir celle de l’interprétation de la déﬁnition du terme « fonds » ﬁgu-
rant au paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIRFT, la Cour rappelle
que, d’après ladite disposition, ce terme s’entend
    « des biens de toute nature, corporels ou incorporels, mobiliers ou
    immobiliers, acquis par quelque moyen que ce soit, et des documents
    ou instruments juridiques sous quelque forme que ce soit, y compris
    sous forme électronique ou numérique, qui attestent un droit de pro-

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     priété ou un intérêt sur ces biens, et notamment les crédits bancaires,
     les chèques de voyage, les chèques bancaires, les mandats, les actions,
     les titres, les obligations, les traites et les lettres de crédit, sans que
     cette énumération soit limitative ».
  14. A propos de l’interprétation de cette déﬁnition, la Cour déclare ce
qui suit dans son arrêt :
        « Cette déﬁnition englobe de nombreuses sortes d’instruments
     ﬁnanciers ainsi que d’autres biens. La Fédération de Russie n’ayant
     pas soulevé d’exception d’incompétence particulière au sujet de la
     portée du terme « fonds », et en particulier en ce qui concerne la four-
     niture d’armes mentionnée par l’Ukraine dans ses conclusions, il
     n’est nul besoin de traiter de cette question touchant au champ d’ap-
     plication de la CIRFT au stade actuel de la procédure. L’interpréta-
     tion de la déﬁnition de ce terme pourrait toutefois être pertinente, le
     cas échéant, lors de l’examen au fond. » (Arrêt, par. 62.)
   15. Je conviens avec la Cour que l’interprétation de la déﬁnition du
terme « fonds » est à réserver au stade de l’examen au fond, mais j’estime
que la Cour aurait dû motiver cette conclusion autrement. Au para-
graphe 62 de l’arrêt, la Cour semble inférer que la question de l’interpré-
tation du terme « fonds » aurait pu donner lieu à une exception préliminaire
de la part de la Fédération de Russie, qui aurait porté sur le champ d’ap-
plication de la CIRFT et aurait donc pu avoir une incidence sur sa com-
pétence ratione materiae. Je ne suis pas de cet avis. Premièrement, en
déclarant simplement que la déﬁnition du terme « fonds », contenue au
paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIRFT, « englobe de nombreuses
sortes d’instruments ﬁnanciers ainsi que d’autres biens » (les italiques sont
de moi), la Cour risque d’induire en erreur. En fait, cette disposition vise
principalement « des biens de toute nature, corporels ou incorporels,
mobiliers ou immobiliers, acquis par quelque moyen que ce soit » et ne
vise des documents ou instruments juridiques qu’en tant qu’ils sont sus-
ceptibles d’attester l’existence d’un droit de propriété sur ces biens ; lesdits
documents peuvent inclure, sans s’y limiter, des instruments ﬁnanciers. La
disposition met ainsi l’accent sur les biens, et non sur les instruments
ﬁnanciers, lesquels ne peuvent être pris en considération que pour autant
qu’ils attestent quelque droit de propriété sur de tels biens. Quand on sait
en outre que l’énumération des instruments ﬁnanciers n’est pas limitative,
ces documents juridiques et instruments ﬁnanciers ne sauraient en aucun
cas contribuer à circonscrire le champ d’application de la convention.
   16. En ce qui concerne les biens, le paragraphe 1 de l’article premier en
donne également une déﬁnition non limitative, puisqu’il se réfère à des
« biens de toute nature ». Autrement dit, il s’agit non pas d’établir la
nature des biens compris dans cette déﬁnition, mais de rechercher si les
biens utilisés dans tel ou tel cas peuvent servir à la commission des actes
visés à l’alinéa a) ou b) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la CIRFT. Il
faut donc déterminer quels biens ont eﬀectivement été fournis ou réunis

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dans l’intention qu’ils soient utilisés aux ﬁns illicites envisagées à l’ali-
néa a) ou b) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2, ou en sachant qu’ils le seraient.
S’agissant de l’existence de l’intention requise chez l’auteur, cette question
soulève des points de droit et surtout de fait qu’il convient d’examiner au
stade du fond.
   17. Je relève, à propos de l’existence des éléments moraux requis, que
la Cour conclut que les questions y aﬀérentes « n’ont pas d’incidence sur
la portée de la convention et ne sont donc pas pertinentes pour ce qui est
de la compétence ratione materiae » (arrêt, par. 63). A mon avis, la Cour
aurait dû raisonner de la même façon en ce qui concerne l’interprétation
de la notion de « fonds ».
   18. En conclusion, de mon point de vue, la Fédération de Russie a eu
raison de ne pas soulever la question de la déﬁnition du terme « fonds »
pour contester la compétence de la Cour. Toute exception ainsi soulevée
aurait dû être rejetée pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus.

                                                  (Signé) Fausto Pocar.

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