                  JOINT DISSENTING OPINION
            OF JUDGES AL-KHASAWNEH AND YUSUF

   Unable to accept paragraph 6 of dispositif — Violation of Diallo’s rights as sole
associé — Causal link between expulsion and violations to rights as associé —
Dangerous precedent for foreign investors — Difference with treaty protected
 nvestors — Modern developments in area of foreign investments — Unsatisfac-
 ory state of law — Distinction between corporate personality and personality
of the shareholder — Inherent in limited liability concept — However not abso-
 ute — Distinctions with Barcelona Traction — Triangular relation — State of
nationality of company same State whose responsibility is invoked — Consid-
erations of equity — Barcelona Traction overtaken by events — 2007 Judgment
 s res judicata — Concept of direct rights of associé does not detract from
 es judicata — Includes right of ownership — Importance of company size and
persons running the company — By not accepting Diallo’s rights Court missed
a chance to provide redress — Also to take account of modern developments in
 nvestment laws and in human rights.

  We are, regrettably, unable to concur in paragraph 6 of the dispositif
according to which the Court : “Finds that the Democratic Republic of
 he Congo has not violated Mr. Diallo’s direct rights as associé in
Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire” ; nor are we persuaded by the
reasoning and considerations on which this finding is based.

   Quite the contrary, we feel that by arresting and detaining Mr. Diallo
 wice, first in 1988-1989 (which the Court found inadmissible) and a
 econd time in 1995-1996 when his incarceration was followed by expulsion
 rom the territory of the DRC, a grave injustice was committed against
Mr. Diallo not only as a person but also as sole associé and gérant of his
 wo companies ; an injustice compounded by the horrendous delay in
deciding this case, i.e., 12 years after the filing by the Republic of Guinea
of its Application.

  This injustice begins with the Court’s acknowledgment of the illicit
nature of Mr. Diallo’s treatment at the hands of the DRC authorities in
1995-1996 (Judgment, para. 165 (2) (3) (4)) and of the arbitrariness of the
“arrest and detention aimed at [the] expulsion measure”, as well as the

65

Court’s recognition — in what may be this part of the Judgment’s only
concession to reality — that

     “it is difficult not to discern a link between Mr. Diallo’s expulsion
     and the fact that he had attempted to recover debts which
     he believed were owed to his companies by, amongst others, the
     Zairean State or companies in which the State holds a substantial
     portion of the capital, bringing cases for this purpose before
     civil courts” (Judgment, para. 82).

   Nevertheless, the Judgment refuses to draw the manifest and inescap-
able conclusion that ought, in our respectful opinion, to have been drawn
 rom the Court’s aforementioned findings. It is plain that the expulsion of
Mr. Diallo was not an end in itself. Its intended consequence was, in all
probability, to frustrate Mr. Diallo’s attempts to recover his debts. At the
very least it had that effect, something that the DRC authorities knew or
ought to have known.
   The enormity of the injustice committed against Mr. Diallo may also
be measured in another way. Mr. Diallo was not one of a multitude of
shareholders “[s]eparated from the company by numerous barriers” and
 herefore “[could not] be identified with it” as paragraph 41 of the Bar-
celona Traction Judgment contemplated (Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 34, para. 41). He was for all intents and purposes
one and the same with the two companies. Nor were his parts sociales a
small amount of his wealth, they were practically all his wealth with the
result that, as a consequence of the actions taken by the DRC authorities
against him, he was reduced to destitution.

   But this injustice will not, in light of the Judgment, be confined to
Mr. Diallo. Instead it could become a dangerous precedent for foreign
 nvestors. A State seeking to expropriate the assets of a unipersonal com-
pany (the term unipersonal is used here to include a societé privée à
responsabilité limitée which has evolved to have only one associé gérant
and allowed to do business as such, or one composed of a small number
of associés) would only have to expel the associé from its territory. If that
expropriating State also happens to be the State of nationality of the
company and hence in theory the protector State, there would be no pos-
sibility of redress whatsoever for the investor. In other words the net
result would be an indirect expropriation without compensation or the
need to show a justifying public interest.

  Luckily, those foreign investors whose investments in foreign States
are protected by bilateral or multilateral investment treaties would be
shielded from such a risk. These treaties typically go much further than
what Guinea has asked for in this case, namely in affording protection

66

 hrough well-established techniques such as compulsory arbitration, dis-
pensing with the need to exhaust local remedies, broadening the scope of
 he term “investment”, incorporating in the State of nationality of share-
holders or in a third State, etc. These developments in the field of foreign
 nvestments have led to the wholesale abandonment of the distinction
between the corporate personality of the company on the one hand and
 hat of the shareholders on the other, resulting in a wide discrepancy
between the customary international law standard and the standard con-
 ained in most investment treaties, with the customary law standard (if at
all represented by what is contained in Barcelona Traction) being signifi-
cantly lower than the one existing in the realm of investment treaties. The
 east that can be said about the state of customary international law
given this discrepancy is that it is unsatisfactory.

   The underlying motif of the 24 May 2007 Judgment on Preliminary
Objections and of the present one is that the distinction between the
rights of the company on the one hand and the “mere interests of the
shareholders” on the other, is inherent in and flows from the very nature
of the limited liability companies whether they be private or public. Thus
 he argument goes that just as shareholders are protected in municipal
 aw (from which the concept was transposed by analogy into interna-
 ional law) from risk extending to all their assets, they must, by the same
 ogic, be ready to accept loss confined to that part of their wealth which
had been separately incorporated, Fortuna being a capricious Goddess
whose moods the law cannot guarantee, but can at best regulate through
 imited liability. In the language of paragraph 42 of Barcelona Traction :
“the shareholders’ rights in relation to the company and its assets remain
 imited, this being, moreover, a corollary of the limited nature of their
 iability” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Bel-
gium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 35,
para. 42 ; emphasis added).

  This may indeed be true as a general proposition. However, in the
realm of municipal law from which the concept of limited liability ema-
nated, shareholders were never denied the protection which Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his separate opinion in Barcelona Traction,
explained balances what he called the “hegemony” of the company (ibid.,
p. 68, para. 8). In that celebrated opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice analysed
why, in municipal law, an action cannot be brought by shareholders on
behalf of the rights of the company notwithstanding that injury to the
company may recoil or repercuss onto the shareholder :

       “The true rationale (outside but underlying the law) of denying to
     the shareholder the possibility of action in respect of infringements

67

     of company rights is that, normally, he does not need this. The com-
     pany will act and, by so doing, will automatically protect not only its
     own interests but those of the shareholders also. That is the assump-
     tion ; namely that the company is both capable of acting and will do
     so unless there are cogent reasons why, in the interests of the com-
     pany and, hence, indirectly of the shareholders, it should refrain.”
     (I.C.J. Reports 1970, separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmau-
     rice, pp. 68-69, para. 10.)
   This assumption does not hold in the sphere of international law. A
State of nationality of a company retains discretion whether to act on
behalf of the company or not. It would be recalled that Judge Fitzmau-
rice’s remarks were addressed to the facts of Barcelona Traction where
Canada, the protecting State, though it acted at times on behalf of the
company, refrained for the most part from doing so.

  This situation is a priori even more applicable in the circumstances of
 he present case where the State of nationality of the two companies,
Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire, was the same State accused of
wrongdoing.
  Elsewhere in his separate opinion Judge Fitzmaurice contemplated this
very situation :
        “It seems that, actually, in only one category of situation is it more
     or less definitely admitted that intervention by the government of for-
     eign shareholders is allowable, namely where the company concerned
     has the nationality of the very State responsible for the acts or dam-
     age complained of, and these, or the resulting circumstances, are such
     as to render the company incapable de facto of protecting its inter-
     ests and hence those of the shareholders. Clearly in this type of case
     no intervention or claim on behalf of the company as such can, in the
     nature of things, be possible at the international level, since the com-
     pany has local not foreign nationality, and since also the very
     authority to which the company should be able to look for support
     or protection is itself the author of the damage. Consequently, the
     normal rule of intervention only on behalf of the company by the
     company’s government becomes not so much inapplicable as irrele-
     vant or meaningless in the context. The efficacity of the corporate
     entity and its capability of useful action have broken down, and the
     shareholders become as it were substituted for the management to
     protect the company’s interests by any method legally open to them.
     If some of them have foreign nationality, one such way is to invoke
     the intervention of their government, and in the circumstances this
     must be regarded as admissible.” (Ibid., p. 72, para. 14 ; emphasis
     added.)

68

In support of this assertion Judge Fitzmaurice cited Paul de Visscher 1 :

        “From this it necessarily results that if the rational justification for
     the mechanism of the corporate entity is brought to a collapse by the
     act of the very State whose law governs the status and allegiance of
     the corporate entity, its personality is no longer anything but a fic-
     tion void of all meaning, in which there can now be seen nothing but
     a bundle of individual rights.”
   It may be said that this is but a separate opinion and that the main
Judgment in Barcelona Traction did not adopt this line of thinking. This
 s demonstrably not the case.

  It is important to recall that in Barcelona Traction, the Court was deal-
 ng with what it called a “triangular relationship” (I.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 42, para. 69) with Canada, Spain and Belgium each representing an
apex in that relationship. Reviewing the contacts between the three Gov-
ernments the Court came to the conclusion that :
        “In sum, the record shows that from 1948 onwards the Canadian
     Government made to the Spanish Government numerous represen-
     tations which cannot be viewed otherwise than as the exercise of dip-
     lomatic protection in respect of the Barcelona Traction company.
     Therefore this was not a case where diplomatic protection was refused
     or remained in the sphere of fiction.” (Ibid., pp. 43-44, para. 76 ;
     emphasis added.)
   Notwithstanding the fact that the Court was concerned primarily with
a triangular relationship, it nevertheless contemplated a situation where,
as a matter of equity, the State of nationality of the shareholders could
 ake up their protection when the State whose responsibility is invoked is
 he same State of nationality of the company. The Court had the follow-
 ng to say :
        “It is quite true that it has been maintained that, for reasons of
     equity, a State should be able, in certain cases, to take up the protec-
     tion of its nationals, shareholders in a company which has been the
     victim of a violation of international law. Thus a theory has been
     developed to the effect that the State of the shareholders has a right
     of diplomatic protection when the State whose responsibility is
     invoked is the national State of the company. Whatever the validity
     of this theory may be, it is certainly not applicable to the present
     case, since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction.
        On the other hand, the Court considers that, in the field of diplo-
     matic protection as in all other fields of international law, it is neces-

  1 Paul de Visscher, “La protection diplomatique des personnes morales”, Recueil [Col-

ected Courses] of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1961, Vol. 102, p. 465.

69

     sary that the law be applied reasonably. It has been suggested
     that if in a given case it is not possible to apply the general rule that
     the right of diplomatic protection of a company belongs to its nation-
     al State, considerations of equity might call for the possibility of
     protection of the shareholders in question by their own national
     State. This hypothesis does not correspond to the circumstances of
     the present case.
        In view, however, of the discretionary nature of diplomatic protec-
     tion, considerations of equity cannot require more than the possibil-
     ity for some protector State to intervene, whether it be the national
     State of the company, by virtue of the general rule mentioned above,
     or, in a secondary capacity, the national State of the shareholders
     who claim protection.” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 48, paras. 92-94.)
   To be sure, the Court went on to speak of practical considerations that
might argue against basing the right of protection on considerations of
equity especially when there are numerous investors from different nation-
alities and with minority shareholdings. But the Court never precluded,
as a matter of principle, the operation of diplomatic protection of share-
holders when there is no protecting State. We cannot think of a situation
where considerations of equity would have been more appropriate than
 n the present case, all the more so since there was no danger of “confu-
sion and insecurity in international economic relations” as a result of
“opening the door to competing diplomatic claims” (ibid., p. 49, para. 96).

   Moreover the Court, in Barcelona Traction, was careful to stress that
 ts conclusion (as to the separate corporate personality from that of the
shareholders) was confined to the particular circumstances of Barcelona
Traction. It stated that “[f]or the above reasons, the Court is not of the
opinion that in the particular circumstances of the present case, jus standi
 s conferred on the Belgian Government by considerations of equity”
 ibid., p. 50, para. 101 ; emphasis added), thereby acknowledging that the
 ocus standi in judicio could a contrario be conferred as a matter of equity
 equity infra legum) in other cases.

   It is also significant that those judges who supported the conclusions
regarding lack of standing of the shareholders state in Barcelona Trac-
 ion were motivated, in large part, by a practical and what may be a
 egitimate apprehension that opening the door for protection of share-
holders by their national State would lead to abuse by capital-exporting
countries and the creation of economic neo-colonization 2. Thus
Judge Ammoun cited, inter alia, the work of the Institut de droit inter-
national in the following words :

  2 Judge Ammoun cites the opinions of Mr. Nagendra Singh (India), Mr. Kamil

Yasseen (Iraq) and Mr. Nihat Erim (Turkey), and in a footnote the observations of Pro-
essor Rolin.

70

        “As for the Institut de droit international, at its Nice session in
     1967 it had to study the problem of investment in developing coun-
     tries. The jurists of the Afro-Asian group who took part in the pro-
     ceedings of that session expressed the opinion of their group by
     replying in the negative to the question whether ‘shareholders are
     entitled to ask for diplomatic protection of their State in cases in
     which the company in which they have invested cannot or will not
     ask for it itself, as against the developing country’.” (I.C.J. Reports
     1970, separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, p. 330, para. 39.)

   The irony of the foregoing is that those concerns were overtaken by
events. The proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties,
and the assertion by some States of a right, sometimes expressed in
 egislation 3, of intervention to protect the interests of national shareholders
 n foreign companies, together with a parallel development in the field of
human rights, to which we shall return later, have all meant that the low
standard of protection of shareholders under customary law is now con-
fined to the wretched of the earth like Mr. Diallo. Such a result could not
have been contemplated by those judges whose uppermost concern was,
 n the words of Professor Rolin :

     “to encourage investments for the benefit of developing countries, by
     giving guarantees on both sides, both to those countries themselves
     in order to avoid a form of economic neo-colonialism, which would
     bring about their subjection to the rich countries, and in order to put
     investors out of reach of certain risks” (cited by Judge Ammoun,
     ibid., p. 330, footnote 83).
   Be this as it may, it was a narrow and, in our respectful opinion, an
unwarranted interpretation of Barcelona Traction that found its way into
 he 2007 Judgment on Preliminary Objections where the Court upheld
 he DRC objection “in so far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo in respect
of alleged violations of rights of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-
Zaire” (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic
of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
p. 617, para. 1 (b)). This conclusion is now fortified by the force of res
 udicata.

  However the 2007 Judgment rejected the DRC objection “in so far as
t concerns protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as associé in Africom-Zaire

   3 According to the United Kingdom’s 1985 Rules Applying to International Claims

“where a United Kingdom national has an interest, as a shareholder or otherwise, in a
 ompany incorporated in another State and of which it is therefore a national and that
State injures the company, Her Majesty’s Government may intervene to protect the inter-
 sts of the United Kingdom national” (Rule VI, reprinted in ICLQ, Vol. 37 (1988),
p. 1007).

71

and Africontainers-Zaire” (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 617, para. 1 (a)
of the operative paragraphs). It is to those rights untouched by res judi-
cata that we shall now turn.

   It would be recalled that Barcelona Traction drew a distinction between
 he rights of the company and the interests of the shareholders on the one
hand 4 (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 36, para. 46), and the rights of the com-
pany and the direct rights of the shareholders, on the other (ibid., p. 36,
para. 47).
         “The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed at the
      direct rights of the shareholder as such. It is well known that there
      are rights which municipal law confers upon the latter distinct from
      those of the company, including the right to any declared dividend,
      the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the right to share in
      the residual assets of the company on liquidation. Whenever one of
      his direct rights is infringed, the shareholder has an independent
      right of action. On this there is no disagreement between the Parties.
      But a distinction must be drawn between a direct infringement of the
      shareholder’s rights, and difficulties or financial losses to which he
      may be exposed as the result of the situation of the company.” (Ibid.,
      p. 36, para. 47.)
   In the event, the Court did not pursue the consequences of this distinc-
 ion because : “[t]he Belgian Government did not base its claim on an
 nfringement of the direct rights of the shareholders. Thus it [was] not
open to the Court to go beyond the claim as formulated by the Belgian
Government” (ibid., p. 37, para. 49).
   By contrast, in the present case, Guinea did (re)formulate its claim in
 erms of the infringement of the direct rights of Mr. Diallo as an associé
 para. 13 of the Judgment). Further, since the enumeration of those
rights was non-exhaustive (evidenced through the use of the word “includ-
 ng”), Guinea added to the three rights mentioned in the Barcelona Trac-
 ion Judgment, a fourth set of rights, namely, the rights “of ownership
and management in respect of the companies founded by him in the
DRC”, and in which he was the sole associé ; the rights of “pursuing
recovery of the numerous debts owed to him — to himself personally and
 o the said companies — both by the DRC itself and by other contractual
partners” ; and the right to be free from de facto expropriation.

   Those rights and their infringements cannot be measured by a single
criterion regardless of the size of the company concerned, or the central-

   4 With regard to the latter distinction the Court in Barcelona Traction expounded those

 ights as follows : “[n]ot a mere interest affected, but solely a right infringed involves
 esponsibility, so that an act directed against and infringing only the company’s rights
does not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests are
affected.” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 36, para. 46.)

72

 ty of the role played by certain persons, in running such a company. In
Barcelona Traction — where the individual shareholder was “[s]epa-
rated from the company by numerous barriers, [and where] the share-
holder [could not] be identified with it” (Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 34, para. 41 ; emphasis added) — it would have
made perfect sense to speak of the right to hold general meetings and to
appoint a gérant.
   The present case undoubtedly differs from Barcelona Traction in that
regard. The two companies had become one-man companies which oper-
ated as such in the DRC — a fact which is not contested by the Parties —
and where the sole associé was also the gérant. To require the associé to
hold general meetings or to invoke his failure to do so as justification for
 he assertion that his rights to participate and vote in general meetings, or
 o appoint a gérant, or to monitor the management of the companies,
were not violated is quite surrealistic (an exiled destitute associé/gérant
participating in a general meeting with himself ?)

  Paragraph 115 of the present Judgment is patently apologetic. It is
worth quoting in full :
        “In the following paragraphs, the Court is careful to maintain the
     strict distinction between the alleged infringements of the rights of
     the two SPRLs at issue and the alleged infringements of Mr. Diallo’s
     direct rights as associé of these latter (see I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
     pp. 605-606, paras. 62-63). The Court understands that such a
     distinction could appear artificial in the case of an SPRL in which
     the parts sociales are held in practice by a single associé. It is none-
     theless well-founded juridically, and it is essential to rigorously observe
     it in the present case. Guinea itself accepts this distinction in the
     present stage of the proceedings, and most of its arguments are
     indeed based on it. The Court has to deal with the claims as they
     were presented by the Applicant.”

   Of course Guinea had to accept this distinction in view of the res judi-
cata of the 2007 Judgment. However, we believe it was well within the
Court’s power to take cognizance of the reality of the situation, in par-
 icular that where there is in effect one associé/gérant the infringement of
 he company rights is ipso facto infringement of the direct rights of the
owner.
   By insisting on a dogmatic application of a one-size-fits all approach,
Barcelona Traction (or rather on a narrow interpretation of Barcelona
Traction that did not take account of the absence of a protecting State),
 he Court missed a chance to provide redress to Mr. Diallo as a matter of
equity without at the same time detracting from the formal force of its
2007 Judgment. Equally importantly, the Court missed a chance to bring
 nto line the standard of protection of investors like Mr. Diallo with the

73

standard now found in jurisprudence emanating from regional courts
and arbitral tribunals. This latter standard, as had been previously alluded
 o, has arguably become an international minimum standard to which
even those investors not covered by bilateral or multilateral investment
 reaties may be entitled.

  It is to those pertinent developments that we shall now turn in the
remainder of this joint dissenting opinion with the aim of ascertaining the
current state of the law.

  We start however by stressing that when we speak of modern
developments we do not imply a paucity in older authorities, such as
Delagoa Bay Railway Company case ; Mexican Eagle Company case,
Romano-Americana case 5 ; El Triunfo Award of 8 May 1902 6 ; Deutsche
Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft Oil Tankers Award of 5 Aug-
ust 1926 7.

   There are, we believe, three developments in the modern law regulating
States’ treatment of foreign investments which, taken cumulatively, may
ustify revisiting the Barcelona Traction rule on standing. These are : pro-
 ection against indirect expropriation ; diplomatic protection of share-
holders against the national State of the company and the reach coverage
of bilateral investment treaties.

   Thus in respect of indirect expropriation, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
defined expropriation as occurring “where the State interferes with
property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless
 hat they must be deemed to have been expropriated” (122 Iran-US
Claims Tribunal Reports, p. 154). Similarly in Tecmed v. United Mexican
States, Award of 29 May 2003 (ICSID) 8, the Award spoke of expropria-
 ion [occurring] if the claimant “was radically deprived of the economical
use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto . . .
had ceased to exist” (p. 43, para. 115).

  Such injury is the one suffered by Mr. Diallo’s companies, caused by
his (unarguably wrongful) expulsion. In Biloune and Marine Drive Com-

 5 Delagoa Bay Railway Company case, Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, p. 648 ; Mexi-

an Eagle Company (El Aguila), M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. VIII, pp. 1272-
274 ; Romano-Americana case, Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. V, p. 841.
 6 El Triunfo, Award of 8 May 1902, RIAA, Vol. XV, p. 467.

  7 Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft Oil Tankers, Award of 5 August 1926,

RIAA, Vol. II, p. 790.
  8 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, Award of 29 May

2003, ICSID, case No. ARB (AF)/00/2.

74

plex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre 9, also dealing with the expulsion
of the central figure of a unipersonal company (though incorporated as a
company with limited liability), the Tribunal based itself on the central
role of Mr. Biloune in promoting, financing and managing MDCL, to
determine that his expulsion from the country effectively prevented
MDCL from further pursuing the project. Such prevention would con-
stitute constructive expropriation of MDCL’s contractual rights in the
project and, accordingly, the expropriation of the value of Mr. Biloune’s
 nterest in MDCL, unless the Respondent can establish by persuasive evi-
dence sufficient justification for those events.

   With respect to the protection of shareholders in international law, it
suffices to recall that paragraph 92 of the Barcelona Traction Judgment
may, and has been read, for example by the International Law Commis-
sion, as not passing negative judgment on the theory that had been devel-
oped to the effect that “the State of the shareholders has a right of
diplomatic protection when the State whose responsibility is invoked is
 he national State of the company” 10. The Court merely noted that
“[w]hatever the validity of this theory may be, it is certainly not applica-
ble to the present case, since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona
Traction” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 48, para. 92). With regard to bilateral
 nvestment treaties, it should be noted that the scope of protection
afforded to the covered investments is significantly more extensive than
 he protection sought by Guinea in the present case. Indeed, investment
 reaties extend their protection to cases where the shareholder and the
corporation are not as closely identified as they were in the case of
Mr. Diallo and his two companies, by inter alia extending it to minority
shareholders, and to shareholders whose corporation is incorporated in a
 hird State (as was the case in Barcelona Traction).

   Lastly we wish to point briefly to the impact of developments in the
field of human rights on the right to be free from indirect or direct expro-
priation. Thus the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that
 he sole owner of a company may claim to be a “victim” (within the
meaning of Article 34 of the 1950 Rome Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) of measures taken against
his company, because in the case of a single shareholder company, there
 s no risk of differences of opinion among shareholders or between share-
holders, and the board of directors, as to the fact of infringements of the

 9 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Gov-

rnment of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 184.
  10 International Law Commission Commentary to Draft Article 11 (b) on Diplomatic

Protection (58th Session), 1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006, UN doc. A/61/10,
pp. 62-65.

75

rights protected under the Convention or concerning the most appropri-
ate way of reacting to such infringement (see Ankarcrona v. Sweden
 dec.), No. 35178/97, 27 June 2000 ; Dyrwold v. Sweden, No. 12259/86,
Commission decision, 7 September 1990). In the recent case of Nosov v.
Russia (dec.), No. 30877/02, 20 October 2005, the Court decided that
disregarding a company’s legal personality as per the question of the
shareholder being a victim will be justified only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as where it is clearly established that it is impossible for
 he company to apply to the Court through the organs set up under its Arti-
cles of Incorporation or — in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy —
 hrough the liquidators or trustee in bankruptcy.

   In sum, the finding by the Court that Mr. Diallo’s direct rights as
associé have not been violated by the DRC authorities, should not have
been adopted by the Court for a number of cogent reasons. First, the
clear causal link which existed between the DRC authorities actions culm-
 nating in Mr. Diallo’s incarceration and eventual expulsion and the
resultant loss of his rights of ownership in his companies amounted to an
undeclared expropriation. Secondly, the finding is based on a narrow
and unwarranted reading of Barcelona Traction, which is in any case
distinguishable from the present case, in that Barcelona Traction contem-
plated a triangular relationship while in the present case, the State of
nationality of the companies (the DRC) was the same State accused of
wrongdoing.

  Thirdly, we believe that this case sets a dangerous precedent for foreign
 nvestors unprotected by bilateral investment treaties. The low standard
of protection outside BITs is in stark contrast to the wide reach of mod-
ern foreign investment law, which goes far beyond what Guinea had
asked for in the present case. The Court missed a chance to do justice to
Mr. Diallo, and at the same time, to bring the standard of protection of
customary international law up to the standard of modern investment
 aw.

                             (Signed) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
                                (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed YUSUF.

76


OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

L'affaire soumise à la Cour comporte deux questions: celle
de la compétence et celle (au fond) de l'interprétation des
articles 74 et 131 de la Convention de Genève du 15 mai 1922.

Elle a été traitée en quatre parties: 1) l’exception d’incom-
pétence soulevée par la Pologne est-elle tardive? 2) l’excep-
tion a-t-elle été abandonnée et, par ce fait, un accord a-t-il
été établi entre les Parties d’où résulterait la compétence de
la Cour? 3) cette compétence est-elle fondée sur d’autres
motifs que l'accord ? 4) le fond de l'affaire.

L'arrêt rejette l'argumentation de forclusion pour le motif
que l’article 38 du Règlement de la Cour prescrivant la présen-
tation d’une exception d’incompétence simultanément avec
. le Contre-Mémoire ne concerne qu'un cas spécial où le défen-
deur demande un arrêt séparé sur l'exception.

D'ailleurs, le Règlement de la Cour n'aurait pu prescrire
une règle de procédure qui aurait pour conséquence de déter-
miner la compétence de la Cour. La Cour décide sur sa com-
pétence, mais elle ne la fixe pas. La règle, qui n’est pas pres-
crite sous peine de nullité, a un caractère plutôt administratif,
et son sens est que le Greffe ne recevra pas d'exception après
le délai fixé. Elle ne peut avoir un effet judiciaire pour le
seul motif que le texte vise aussi les exceptions ratione
materiæ ; à celles-ci s'applique le principe immuable qu’elles
sont recevables en tout état de cause.
57 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

IT.

L'arrêt conclut à la compétence de la Cour en se basant
sur le principe que la volonté des Parties détermine la com-
pétence de la Cour (Statut, article 36); mais, en l'espèce,
cette volonté n’a pas trouvé son expression d'une manière
suffisante. D'après l’article 36, la juridiction de la Cour repose
sur deux bases seulement, qui sont soit un traité, soit un |
compromis. L'affaire actuelle est introduite sur la base d’un
traité: la Convention de Genève du 15 mai 1922. Cependant,
ce n’est pas là que l’arrêt trouve en réalité la fixation de la
cornpétence ; mais il résout la question de compétence en
estimant que les Parties auraient fixé cette compétence par
un «accord» spécial entre elles. Pourtant, lorsqu'il s’agit
d'interpréter un article d’une convention déterminée, il semble-
rait naturel de rechercher en première ligne dans la conven-
. tion elle-même les règles de la compétence, sans recourir dès
l’abord à une autre base, telle que la volonté des Parties.
Mais, en tout cas, faut-il encore prouver qu'il existe un
compromis en due forme, c’est-à-dire constituant une preuve
précise et exacte de la volonté des Parties.

Il est incontestable que la volonté des Parties puisse, sous
forme de compromis, déterminer la compétence de la Cour.

Cependant, il paraît qu’on ne saurait se passer des forma-
lités qui, selon les règles et l'esprit du Statut et du Règle-
ment, doivent présider à l'élaboration d’un compromis. C'est
à tort, semble-t-il, que l'arrêt renvoie à un précédent dans
l'affaire Mavrommatis (Arrêt n° 5), en faisant valoir qu’au cours
de la procédure, sans aucune autre formalité, les Parties fixaient
par accord entre elles la compétence de la Cour sur un point

déterminé.

Dans l'affaire Mavrommatis, une exception d’incompétence
avait été régulièrement plaidée et rejetée. Pendant les plai-
doiries subséquentes au fond, les Parties ont fait ce qui
n’était en substance qu’un acte de procédure, en priant la
58 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

Cour de se prononcer également sur un point qui ne lui avait
pas encore été spécialement soumis. Il s’agissait donc plutôt
d'un changement ou de l'élargissement des conclusions. Une
allusion précise quant à la compétence de la Cour ne paraît
pas avoir été faite, et la demande par laquelle la Cour était
invitée à se prononcer était faite sans indication spéciale
d'une compétence ‘qui n’était pas assurée d’avance. Un précé-
dent pour l’omission des formalités accompagnant l'introduction

d'un compromis ne paraît donc pas exister.

Mais, même en faisant abstraction de ces formalités, il est
tout au moins certain que le compromis implique une volonté
précise des deux Parties, conçue en des termes exprès.

Y at-il, en l'espèce, volonté précise? Tout d’abord, une
déclaration . concordante des deux Parties fait absolument
défaut. Nulle part la Pologne n’a déclaré accepter la compé-
tence de la Cour. |

Mais, néanmoins, y a-t-il en fait acceptation ? Encore non.
Au contraire, jusqu'à ses dernières conclusions (plaidoiries
orales du 15 mars 1928), la Pologne a expressément maintenu
son exception d’incompétence.

L'arrêt, qui ne peut invoquer à l’appui de la thèse qu'il
énonce ni déclaration expresse ni acceptation même tacite,
se borne à soutenir que, par le fait que la Pologne a plaidé
le fond «sans réserves», il s’est formé un compromis. Pour-
tant, les réserves existent tout au long des plaidoiries. Si
Varrét fait allusion au fait que la Pologne a déposé son
Contre-Mémoire avec des conclusions sur le fond sans «soulever
une exception», il est avéré que, dans la suite des plaidoiries
et aussitôt que l'attitude de l'Allemagne en a fourni l’occasion,
la Pologne a conclu à l’incompétence. En tout cas, les plai-
doiries devant la Cour — par écrit et orales — forment une
unité. Elles contiennent deux phases et elles finissent par la
duplique orale ; et il n’est pas possible de conclure avec l’arrêt
qu’une acceptation tacite s’est produite par le fait que la
Pologne a commencé les plaidoiries par le dépôt d’un Contre-
Mémoire sur le fond. Un argument décisif contre cette pré-
tention existe d’ailleurs dans le fait qu'il s’agit, en l'espèce,
d’une exception vatione materiæ et qui peut donc être soulevée
59 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

en tout état de cause. L'arrêt paraît, en définitive, adopter
le point de vue qu'il y a acceptation implicite (pas même
tacite) du simple ‘fait que la Pologne, à un moment où la
Cour était saisie des conclusions ef sur Vincompétence ef sur
le fond, aurait plaidé le, fond. Il suffit de relever qu’une
pareille théorie renverse l’axiome de procédure selon lequel
une exception peut être jointe au fond, d’où il résulte qu'il
est possible de plaider en même temps et l’incompétence et
le fond.

Il doit donc être considéré comme impossible de constituer
un «compromis» entre deux Parties, dont l’une ne fait que
protester contre l'existence d’un accord. |

Au surplus, on doit ajouter qu’en l'espèce les Parties me
pouvaient même pas conclure un accord sur la compétence de
la Cour. La Convention, sur la base de laquelle l'affaire est
introduite, a été imposée aux Parties par la Conférence des
Ambassadeurs qui a prescrit entre autres les règles de compé-
tence. L'Allemagne et la Pologne ne sauraient donc changer
ou fixer ces règles de leur propre volonté.

III.

La compétence de la Cour ne peut donc être admise en
l’espèce sur la base d’un «accord» qui n’existe pas et qui ne
peut pas exister.

Il est, partant, nécessaire de s’adonner — chose du reste
toute naturelle — à une interprétation de la Convention de
‘Genève, laquelle sert de base à l'affaire. L’arrét ne s’en occupe
que d’une manière plutôt passagère (voir pages 26-27). En
complément ou en remplacement des remarques de l'arrêt,
on peut renvoyer à la Convention qui contient, en effet, des
‘éléments suffisants pour décider de la question de compétence.

Pour s'orienter dans le texte, il y a lieu de relever ce qui
suit. L'article 131 soumis à l'interprétation se trouve dans le
titre II de la partie de la Convention qui s'occupe des mino-
rités, savoir la troisième Partie qui contient les articles 64
60 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

à 158. Cette Partie est divisée en trois: la première de l’ar-
ticle 64 à l’article 72, la seconde de l’article 73 à l’article 146.
À ce second titre se joint un titre III concernant les voies
de recours (articles 147 à 158). En se référant au texte, qu’il est
nécessaire de consulter pour la discussion de la compétence, on
peut relever ici que le titre premier n’est qu’une reproduction du
Traité des Minorités, conclu entre la Pologne et les Principales
Puissances alliées et associées le 28 juin 1919, tandis que le
titre II est l’œuvre de la Commission chargée de rédiger la
Convention.

Des règles de compétence se trouvent dans le titre premier à
Particle 72, dans le titre III aux articles 147 et suivants.
L'article 72 confère compétence à la Cour pour les articles « qui
précèdent », c’est-à-dire les articles 65 à 72. L'article 147 confère
compétence au Conseil de la Société des Nations pour ce qui
concerne toute la troisième Partie, soit pour le premier et
aussi pour le second titre. En comparant les susdites remar-
ques avec le texte, on arrive à comprendre l'interprétation
qui s'impose à première vue et qui a été soutenue: savoir
que la Cour est compétente jusqu’à l’article 72 et le Conseil de
l’article 73 à l’article 158. Et, puisque l’article 131 se trouve dans
la partie qui est du domaine du Conseil, on pourrait aboutir
à la conclusion que Vincompétence de la Cour est prouvée.

Mais, en considérant la genèse de la Convention et le sys-
tème de rédaction adopté par la Commission, on arrive pour-
tant à un autre résultat.

Après la conclusion du Traité du 28 juin I9r9, qui visait
la protection des droits des minorités, les principes de ce
Traité devaient être développés et détaillés, et la Conférence
des Ambassadeurs décida alors le 20 octobre 1921 que, en vue
de la mise en pratique des principes du Traité, les Gouverne-
ments allemand et pclonais devaient «conclure une convention
à l'effet de consacrer les dispositions suivantes : ....», savoir
celles contenues dans les articles x, 2, 7, 8, 9 (alinéas 1 et 2),
10, 11 et 12 du Traité.

La Commission chargée de l'élaboration de la Convention
pouvait choisir deux voies: soit prendre comme base les
articles du Traité en ajoutant à chaque article, sous forme de
commentaires, tous les articles nécessaires pour développer en
61 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

x

détail les principes du Traité, soit procéder à un amalgame des
principes avec les stipulations de détail. C’est cette dernière
voie qui à été choisie. En effet, le titre II constitue, avec
les principes et avec les nouvelles règles détaillées, un ensemble.
En même temps, les articles du Traité étaient réimprimés
comme une espèce de préannexe ou préambule et étaient
numérotés dans le cadre de la Convention de l’article 65 à
l’article 72. L'emploi de ce procédé est relaté dans le préambule
au titre IT qui dit: le contenu des articles 65 à 72 se trouve

x

répété au présent titre à seule fin de donner une vue d’ensemble.

Le titre II forme donc en soi seul la Convention. Les prin-
cipes du Traité de r9r9 y sont insérés, formant un ensemble
avec les détails que la Commission devait y ajouter.

La première conséquence à tirer de ceci est que les mots
«qui précèdent» perdent leur importance. Naturellement, la
règle de la compétence de la Cour pour les articles 65 à 72
reste intacte, mais les mots « qui précédent » ne sont plus une
barriére excluant la compétence de la Cour pour les articles 75
el sqg., savoir pour le titre II. Ce titre, qui représente
seul la Convention, est soumis a la compétence de la Cour,
non seulement en ce qui concerne les principes, mais encore
en ce qui concerne les articles qui les détaillent et qui ne
sont qu’un développement de ces principes, et on ne saurait
isoler ces articles puisqu'ils forment un tout avec ies principes.
Il serait inadmissible d’extraire quelques articles, en retenant
pour eux seuls la compétence de la Cour. En parcourant les
articles du titre II, on constate que chacun d’eux sans excep-
tion est lié à un des principes du Traité, de manière à ne pas
permettre une scission des règles de compétence. Les articles 69
et 131 en forment précisément un exemple. Les prescrip-
tions de l’article 69 quant à l’enseignement, telles qu’elles
résultent du Traité des Minorités, sont très sommaires. On
constate dans le titre II quelle foule de prescriptions de détail
il a fallu établir à côté de la règle principale de l’article 69.

Mais le titre II, qui est soumis à la compétence de la
Cour, Vest aussi à celle du Conseil.
62 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

A ce propos, il est pourtant d’une importance extrême ‘de
relever que le Conseil n’est compétent que pour des pétitions
et demandes venant des particuliers, tandis que la compétence
de la Cour n'existe que pour les disputes surgissant entre,
d’une part, les Gouvernements polonais ou allemand, et, d’autre
part, l’une quelconque des Principales Puissances alliées et
associées ou toute autre Puissance membre du Conseil de la
Société des Nations. Cette fixation de la compétence établie par
la Commission dans la Convention est appropriée aux conditions
pratiques et créée pour satisfaire ce but. La compétence du
Conseil est fixée en vue des très nombreuses disputes surgis-
sant à propos des stipulations de détail de la Convention
(titre II). Pour le moment, plus de 700 affaires sont en cours.
Et la Cour ne devrait pas s’en occuper. Si, tout de même,
on admet la compétence de la Cour pour le titre IT, c’est en
se plaçant au point de vue que la Cour ne s’occupe que des
affaires soulevées par des Etats et qu’on s’est fié au discerne- |
ment d’un Etat pour ne pas introduire des recours à propos
de cas insignifiants, mais seulement lorsqu'il arrive qu’à propos
d'un article de détail il se pose des questions de principes de
droit ou des faits qui peuvent entraîner d'importantes consé-
quences. Tel est, en effet, le cas d’espèce où un fait apparem-
ment sans importance, savoir l'interprétation d'une déclaration
d'inscription d’un enfant à l’école, a eu pour effet l’arrêt
momentané de l'éducation d'un grand nombre d'enfants.

Ces considérations démontrent justement la nécessité de
l’action des États, et il ne serait pas admissible de repousser
cette action; on trouve donc ici un motif pour soutenir la
compétence de la Cour à l'égard des articles de détail du
titre IT.

IV.

La réponse que donne l'arrêt à la question de savoir si
la déclaration de l’article 131 est de caractère subjectif ou
objectif paraît conçue dans des termes qui n'arrivent pas à
résoudre le problème d’une manière satisfaisante. L'arrêt recon-
naît comme de juste l'importance du texte précis, selon lequel
la déclaration ne peut être ni vérifiée ni contestée, mais il
63 ; OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

n’en tire pas la conclusion nécessaire. En effet, le dispositif
de Varrét admet que la déclaration ait le caractère objectif
en décidant qu’elle «doit » porter sur ce que son auteur estime
être la situation de fait et qu'il n’existe pas une faculté illi-
mitée de choisir la langue de l’enfant visé par la déclaration.

Il paraît y avoir ici une contradiction. Une déclaration qui
ne peut pas être contestée ni vérifiée est inattaquable de tous les
côtés. Il n’est pas possible de soumettre cette déclaration à
des règles de droit. L’exigence selon laquelle la déclaration
devrait être exacte quant aux faits n’est qu'un souhait pieux, et
toute prescription en ce qui concerne sa sincérité reste absolu-
ment dans le domaine moval. S'il est défendu d'examiner la
déclaration et si toutes objections ou contestations sont exclues,
le déclarant n’est pas soumis à une obligation juridique, et la
déclaration doit être prise telle quelle. Par conséquent, l’auteur
peut, de sa propre volonté, formuler la déclaration sans s’occu-
per de sa concordance avec la réalité.

L’Allemagne, qui conclut pourtant fermement au droit du
déclarant de formuler la déclaration librement, a inséré dans
ses conclusions que «ie parent doit déclarer selon sa conscience
et sous sa responsabilité personnelle ». Puisque l'Allemagne n’a
pas voulu accepter la thèse objective, l’idée qu’expriment les-
dits mots doit être que l’auteur peut formuler sa déclaration
comme il le veut, vraie ou fausse, mais qu’en la formulant
il doit, du point de vue moral, réfléchir sur le contenu que
doit avoir sa déclaration.

La règle de l’article 131 s'explique par la situation spéciale
en Haute-Silésie: il n’y existe pas de limites précises ni
pour la nationalité, ni pour la langue. A côté des deux langues
littéraires: le polonais et l'allemand, on trouve des patois
comme dans tous les pays, et même un patois général considé-
rablement différent des langues polonaise et allemande. La

classe ouvrière parle couramment — et dans la vie intérieure
exclusivement ce patois, qui, par suite, est l’unique moyen
d'expression — à l'exclusion de l'allemand et du polonais —

des enfants jusqu’au moment où ces derniers commencent leurs
‘64 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

études scolaires. Or, la déclaration ne prévoit d’option qu’entre
deux langues: la langue allemande et la langue polonaise. Dans
ces conditions, et vu l’état de choses relaté ci-dessus, il est
des cas où la déclaration, en indiquant soit V’allemand soit
le polonais, ne saurait répondre à la réalité des faits. De cette
situation, il résulte encore que l’examen ordonné par la Société
des Nations ne peut aboutir à prouver que la langue de
l’enfant examiné n'est pas l'allemand. L'enfant ne sait pas
non plus le polonais. Il ne possède que le patois. La demande
de l'inscription de l'enfant à l’école minoritaire ne peut être
considérée en général comme ayant pour but de soustraire
“un enfant réellement polonais à sa nationalité. Le motif peut
être autre, par exemple que le parent, voyant que l'enfant
apprendra automatiquement le polonais, langue du pays,
désire lui faire apprendre pour des raisons pratiques la langue
allemande enseignée dans l’école minoritaire. La Pologne ne
saurait se plaindre de l’article 131 ni chercher à le changer par
interprétation puisque, vu la nature réciproque du Traité, la
même règle s'applique au district allemand. On peut ajouter
encore que la plainte polonaise quant à l’application de l’article 131
se tourne principalement contre ses propres sujets, c’est-
à-dire contre des Polonais qui amènent leurs enfants à l’école
allemande.

Pour les grandes personnes, on a appliqué (article 74) les
mêmes principes pour la définition de nationalité, race et
religion. Il en paraît résulter que, étant donné la situation en
Haute-Silésie, la solution établie repose sur une base rationnelle
selon les conditions du pays.

Aux remarques qui précèdent il est intéressant d’ajouter
des renseignements sur ce qui s’est passé au sein de la Com-
mission lors de la préparation de la Convention. A la réunion
du 15 février 1922, du côté allemand il a été relevé que le
principe admis par le projet était celui «que chaque individu
détermine lui-même s'il appartient à une minorité». Pour laisser
le droit de libre disposition s'exercer sans être entravé et sans
subir l'influence des autorités, il a été prescrit expressément
que les autorités ne doivent pas procéder à une vérification.
C'est de rigueur, précisément, étant donné la situation parti-
culiére de la Haute-Silésie où la langue n’est pas le critérium
65 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

unique qui décide si un individu appartient à une minorité.
Et, de même, il est surtout peu de mise d’y donner une défi-
nition rigide et objective de la notion «minorité» parce que les
rapports linguistiques, religieux et ethniques s’y enchevétrent.
La définition des minorités basée uniquement sur le principe sub-
jectif doit permettre par exemple à chaque individu de se
compter au point de vue religieux parmi une minorité; d’autre
part, il ne doit pas étre impossible pour lui de se considérer
comme appartenant à la minorité dans le domaine de l’école,
mais à la majorité dans d’autres domaines, par exemple dans
celui des associations. La délégation allemande croit que sa
proposition tient compte de cette situation particulière.

Contre les susdits principes aucune objection n’a été faite
au cours de la réunion.

Si la déclaration est donc inattaquable, il échet de regarder
encore le problème qui est effectivement celui qui intéresse
les Parties. Jusqu'à quel point peut-on enquêter sur la déclara-
tion? L'article 131 défend toute contestation et vérification
par «les autorités scolaires ». Il n'y a aucune raison pour res-
treindre les mots «autorités scolaires » aux préposés subalternes
de chaque école. Les mots «autorités scolaires» doivent com-
prendre tous les organes de l’État qui s'occupent des affaires
scolaires, depuis les plus inférieurs jusqu'aux plus hauts.

Pour les autorités non spécialisées comme «scolaires», on
ne peut établir selon l'esprit de la Convention un pouvoir
d'examen. .

Toute enquête pour vérification quant à la langue signifie
donc une entrave contraire au droit de liberté.

Cependant, on pourrait objecter que les autorités de l'État
pourraient, du point de vue administratif, examiner non pas si
la déclaration est conforme à la vérité, mais s’il existe en
réalité une déclaration au sens de l'article, c’est-à-dire, par
exemple, si la personne qui a fait une déclaration avait la
capacité nécessaire pour ce faire.
66 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NYHOLM

L'on ne saurait nier qu'à cet égard des abus puissent se
produire. Ceci n’est pas contesté par l’Allemagne. La Pologne
aura la possibilité d'intervenir dans ces cas, mais la bonne foi
dans l’exécution de la Convention exige que de tels cas par-
ticuliers ne fournissent pas de motifs pour des mesures géné-
rales contraires au contenu de l’article 131. Mais il y a lieu de
se reporter à la bonne foi des deux États, vu que les stipula-
tions de la Convention sont réciproquement applicables et au
district polonais et au district allemand, et que, par conséquent,
elles peuvent, le cas échéant, être invoquées contre l’un ou
l’autre des États.

(Signé) D. G. NYHOLM.


                    284

                                SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SEBUTINDE

                       This is not a proper case for the Court to exercise its function under Article 50
                    of the Statute of the Court and Article 67 of the Rules of Court as it is not a case
                    involving “technical complexities” that the Court cannot handle without recourse
                    to external experts — The Parties to this case have had ample opportunity to
                    tender sufficient evidence before the Court in order to enable it to perform its
                    judicial function without assistance from experts — The proposed terms of
                    reference of the experts contained in the Order have the effect of unfairly interfering
                    with the allocation of the burden of proof and tilting the balance in favour of one
                    Party to the detriment of the other, contrary to the principles of a fair hearing and
                    equality of arms — Alternatively, the terms of reference have the effect of
                    inappropriately delegating the judicial function to the experts.

                                                      Introduction

                        1. In accordance with the well‑settled principle of onus probandi
                     incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party that asserts certain facts to
                     establish the existence of such facts 1. I am constrained to write this sepa-
                    rate opinion because, in my respectful view, this is not a proper case in
                    which the Court should appoint experts to exercise its powers under Arti-
                    cle 50 of the Statute of the Court and Article 67 of the Rules of Court. In
                    particular, I disagree with the role assigned to the Court’s experts in this
                    case, as contained in the “terms of reference”. Since 13 May 2015, when
                    the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed its “New Application”
                    requesting the Court to reopen proceedings in order to determine the
                    amount of reparations due to it from the Republic of Uganda, both
                    Parties have had ample opportunity over the last five years to tender
                     whatever evidence they deem necessary or sufficient (including facts, data
                     and methodology) to prove their respective claims. What remains is not
                     for the Court to seek further evidence outside that already submitted by
                     the Parties, but rather to perform its judicial function by examining the
                     evidence already on record and determining the reparations due. In
                     my opinion, this is not a case involving “complex issues” that require tech-
                     nical, scientific or specialized knowledge or expertise that is outside the
                     realm of normal judicial expertise. The proposed terms of reference of the
                     experts contained in the Order have the effect of unfairly assisting one of
                     the Parties in buttressing its evidence and discharging its evidentiary bur-

                       1 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

                    2010 (I), p. 71, para. 162.

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                    den where that evidence may be wanting, contrary to the principles of a
                    fair hearing and equality of arms. Alternatively, the terms of reference
                    have the effect of inappropriately delegating the judicial function to the
                    experts. The fact that the Parties will have an opportunity to comment on
                    the experts’ report or to cross-examine those experts during oral proceed-
                    ings, offers little comfort in the circumstances of the present case.

                             Circumstances Justifying Court‑appointed Experts

                      2. From the outset I wish to make it clear that I am not generally
                    opposed to the Court exercising its powers pursuant to Article 50 of the
                    Statute of the Court and Article 67 of the Rules of Court to appoint
                    experts, where circumstances so warrant.
                      3. Article 50 of the Statute of the Court provides: “The Court may, at
                    any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other
                    organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry
                    or giving an expert opinion.”
                      4. Article 67 of the Rules of Court provides:
                         “1. If the Court considers it necessary to arrange for an enquiry or
                             an expert opinion, it shall, after hearing the parties, issue an order
                             to this effect, defining the subject of the enquiry or expert opinion,
                             stating the number and mode of appointment of the persons to
                             hold the enquiry or of the experts, and laying down the procedure
                             to be followed. Where appropriate, the Court shall require per-
                             sons appointed to carry out an enquiry, or to give an expert opin-
                             ion, to make a solemn declaration.
                          2. Every report or record of an enquiry and every expert opinion
                             shall be communicated to the parties, which shall be given the
                             opportunity of commenting upon it.”
                       5. Faced with increasingly complex cases, the International Court of
                    Justice (ICJ) (as well as its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Interna-
                    tional Justice (PCIJ)) has sparingly drawn on its powers under the above
                    provisions, appointing experts only in “complex cases” requiring techni-
                    cal, scientific or specialized knowledge or expertise that is outside the
                    realm of normal judicial expertise. While the above provisions appear to
                    give the Court unfettered discretion when appointing experts, the Court
                    has been careful to ensure that the experts appointed are neutral and that
                    it does not inadvertently shift the burden of proof from the parties, or
                    delegate the judicial function to those experts. This is due, in part, to the
                    fact that jurisdiction of the Court is based on the consent of the States
                    appearing before it. It is also for this reason that the Court consults the

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                    286 	                    armed activities (sep. op. sebutinde)

                    parties to a case and takes into account their views before appointing
                    experts. A careful balance should be drawn whereby, on the one hand,
                    the Court must have adequate knowledge of the underlying issues in
                    order to identify and apply the correct rules of international law to the
                    case at hand, whilst on the other, expert opinion must be limited only to
                    those complex issues requiring technical, scientific or specialized knowl-
                    edge or expertise that is outside the realm of normal judicial expertise.
                    This is, of course, without prejudice to the rights of the parties themselves
                    to adduce their own expert evidence to prove their case.

                      6. The jurisprudence of the Court is instructive regarding the type of
                    cases in which the Court has appointed experts pursuant to Article 50 of
                    the Statute of the Court and Article 67 of the Rules of Court.

                                                   The Court’s Jurisprudence

                       7. After the Factory at Chorzów case, in which the PCIJ appointed
                    experts to provide an expert opinion regarding the data tendered by Ger-
                    many for assessment of reparations payable by Poland in respect of a
                    factory at Chorzów, but which expert opinion was rendered redundant
                    after the parties reached a settlement 2, the first case before the ICJ invol
                    ving Court‑appointed experts was the Corfu Channel (United King‑
                    dom v. Albania) case 3. That case is particularly pertinent because it not
                    only involved complex technical issues outside the realm of normal
                    judicial expertise, but in addition, Albania, the respondent State, chose
                     not to appear. As a result, the Court held ex parte proceedings pursuant
                     to Article 53 of the Statute of the Court, which provision enjoins the
                     Court to ensure, inter alia, that “the claim is well founded in fact and law”.
                     Notwithstanding Albania’s non‑appearance, the Court ensured that the
                     respondent State received copies of the experts’ reports and had ample
                     opportunity to respond to the experts’ findings, although Albania chose
                     not to respond. In addition, both Parties were given the opportunity to
                     make suggestions to the experts regarding any points to which their inves-
                    tigations and experiments should be directed, as well as to submit written
                    observations upon the experts’ findings.

                       8. In October 1946 two Royal Navy ships belonging to the United King-
                    dom struck mines in Albanian territorial waters whilst passing through
                    the North Corfu Channel. As a result of the damage, loss of life and
                    injuries caused by the explosions, the United Kingdom claimed that
                    Albania had breached its obligations under international law and was

                         2   Factory at Chorzów, Order of 25 May 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 19, p. 13.
                         3 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4.

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                    obliged to pay reparations. A key issue was whether Albania had — or
                    ought to have had — knowledge of a minelaying operation being carried
                    out in its territorial waters. Such knowledge would engage Albania’s
                    responsibility arising from its obligation to warn passing ships of the
                    imminent danger posed by the minefields in accordance with “elementary
                    considerations of humanity . . ., the principle of the freedom of maritime
                    communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its
                    territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States” 4. The
                    Court considered that this knowledge could be inferred from two aspects,
                    namely, (a) Albania’s attitude before and after the event, and (b) the
                    feasibility of Albanian authorities observing minelaying operations from
                    the Albanian coast. While the Court gleaned Albania’s attitude from wit-
                    ness statements, the actions of Albanian authorities and the lack of an
                    investigation following the incidents 5, it relied heavily on two expert
                    reports commissioned under Article 50 of the Court’s Statute for the sec-
                    ond aspect of its findings. This latter aspect was one requiring specialized
                    knowledge or expertise outside the realm of normal judicial expertise. In
                    its Order under Article 50 6, the Court submitted the following question to
                    a panel of three naval experts:

                           “[Y]ou are requested to examine . . . the possibility of mooring
                         those mines with those means without the Albanian authorities being
                         aware of it, having regard to the extent of the measures of vigilance
                         existing in the Saranda region.”
                       9. In addition, the experts conducted site visits to Saranda in Albania
                    in order to undertake experiments and make observations that could pro-
                    vide conclusive answers to the Court’s questions. Heavily relying upon
                    the experts “indisputable conclusion” that Albania must have had knowl-
                    edge of the minelaying activities if they had kept normal lookouts at var-
                    ious points along their coastline 7, the Court concluded that the Albanian
                    Government must have had the requisite knowledge and that by failing to
                    warn the British warships of the minefield, Albania’s responsibility was
                    engaged 8.

                      10. The Court subsequently commissioned two members of the Royal
                    Netherlands Navy to “examine the figures and estimates stated in the last
                    submissions filed by the Government of the United Kingdom regarding
                    the amount of its claim for the loss of the Saumarez and the damage

                       4 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949,

                    p. 22.
                       5 Ibid., p. 18.
                       6 Ibid., Order of 17 December 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947‑1948, p. 126.
                       7 Ibid., Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22.
                       8 Ibid., p. 23.

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                    288 	               armed activities (sep. op. sebutinde)

                    caused to the Volage” and to file an Article 50 report 9. The Order appoint-
                    ing the experts did not request them to advise on the amount of the
                    United Kingdom’s claim for “loss of life” or “injuries to life and limb” as
                    the Court considered the quantum regarding these claims to be in the
                    realm of normal judicial expertise. On 1 December 1949, the experts con-
                    cluded that the claim submitted by the United Kingdom “may be taken
                    as a fair and accurate estimate of the damage sustained”. The Court
                    agreed with the experts’ findings.

                       11. In the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
                    (Canada/United States of America) case 10, the parties referred their dis-
                    pute to the Court by way of a special agreement or compromis between
                    themselves. The parties asked a Chamber of the Court to determine “the
                    course of the single maritime boundary that divides the continental shelf
                    and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States of America”, in and
                    reaching from, the Gulf of Maine. Both parties not only requested the
                    Chamber to appoint a technical expert to assist it in carrying out this
                    task 11, but actually co‑nominated a former commander of the British
                    Royal Navy to serve as the expert to the Chamber. Although the compro‑
                    mis made no reference to Article 50 of the Statute of the Court,
                    the Chamber explicitly referred to the article in its Order 12 appointing
                    the expert, thereby giving the latter primacy over the former. Based on
                    the expert’s findings, the Chamber drew a maritime boundary in the Gulf
                    of Maine area based not on strict equidistance but on geometrical calcu-
                    lations and data set out in the expert’s report.

                       12. Lastly and more recently, in Maritime Delimitation in the Carib‑
                    bean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 13 the Court
                    had to decide the question of sovereignty concerning the northern part of
                    Isla Portillos, a matter not addressed in its earlier 2015 Judgment 14. In its
                    2015 Judgment, the Court interpreted the “1858 Treaty of Limits” as pro-
                    viding that “the territory under Costa Rica’s sovereignty extends to the
                    right bank of the Lower San Juan River as far as its mouth in the Carib-

                       9 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Order of 19 November 1949,

                    I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 238.
                       10 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United

                    States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 252‑256.
                       11 Ibid., p. 253.
                       12 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United

                    States of America), Appointment of Expert, Order of 30 March 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
                    p. 165.
                       13 Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v.

                    Nicaragua) and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nica‑
                    ragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 139.
                       14 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nica‑

                    ragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v.
                    Costa Rica), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2015 (II), p. 665.

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                    bean Sea” 15. However, the absence of “detailed information”, which had
                    been observed in the 2015 Judgment, had left the geographical situation
                    of the area in question somewhat unclear with regard to the configuration
                    of the coast of Isla Portillos, in particular regarding the existence of mar-
                    itime features off the coast and the presence of a channel separating the
                    wetland from the coast 16. The Court — after hearing from both Parties,
                    neither of whom objected to the idea — appointed two independent
                    experts who conducted two site visits of the area in question (during the
                    dry and rainy seasons) and informed the Court as to “the state of the
                    coast between the points suggested by either party as the starting‑point of
                    their maritime boundary in the Caribbean Sea”. The experts were accom-
                    panied by two staff members of the Court serving as the Secretariat, as
                    well as by a delegation from each Party.

                      13. The assessment of the Court‑appointed experts, which was not
                    challenged by the Parties, “dispelled all uncertainty about the present
                    configuration of the coast and the existence of a channel linking the San
                    Juan River with Harbor Head Lagoon”. The experts ascertained that “off
                    the coastline, there are no features above water even at low tide” and
                    that, west of Harbor Head Lagoon, “the coast is made up of a broad
                    sandy beach with discontinuous and coast‑parallel enclosed lagoons in
                    the backshore”, while “[i]n the westernmost portion, close to the mouth
                    of the San Juan River, there are no lagoons with free‑standing water in
                    the backshore”. Significantly, the experts observed that “there is no l onger
                    any water channel connecting the San Juan River with Harbor Head
                    Lagoon” 17. Based on the experts’ report, the Court determined that
                    “Costa Rica has sovereignty over the whole of Isla Portillos up to where
                    the San Juan River reaches the Caribbean Sea”, and that

                              “the starting‑point of the land boundary is the point at which the right
                              bank of the San Juan River reaches the low-water mark of the coast
                              of the Caribbean Sea . . . located at the end of the sandpit constitut-
                              ing the right bank of the San Juan River at its mouth” 18.

                      14. The above cases clearly demonstrate that in exercising its powers
                    pursuant to Article 50 of the Statute of the Court and Article 67 of the
                    Rules of Court, the following minimum parameters are met, namely,
                    (a) the Court resorts to appointing experts only in “complex cases”

                         15
                          I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 703, para. 92.
                         16
                          Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v.
                    Nicaragua) and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nica‑
                    ragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 167, para. 70.
                       17 Ibid., pp. 167‑168, para. 71.
                       18 Ibid., p. 168, par. 71.

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                    290 	               armed activities (sep. op. sebutinde)

                    requiring technical, scientific or specialized knowledge or expertise that is
                    outside the realm of normal judicial expertise; (b) that the role of
                    Court‑appointed experts is limited to providing specialized information
                    or insight into the scientific or technical intricacies of the evidence already
                    submitted by the parties and that their input should not interfere with the
                    allocation of the burden of proof or tilt the balance in favour of one party
                    or the other; (c) that the ultimate task of discharging the judicial func-
                    tion rests with the Court, and must not be delegated to the experts;
                    (d) that prior consultations between the Court and the concerned parties
                    (concerning the identity of the experts and their terms of reference) are
                    held and, as far as possible, the consent (through a compromis) or at least
                    acquiescence of both parties is obtained before the appointment of the
                    experts; (e) that the experts appointed by the Court are neutral; (f) that
                    the experts’ reports are availed to the parties for their comment; and (g)
                    that the parties are availed every opportunity to put questions to the
                    experts, before the Court makes its conclusions. In the present case, I am
                    not satisfied that the above minimum parameters have been met.

                                        Factual Background to the Order

                       15. Much of the relevant procedural history has been accurately
                    rehearsed in the Order. It will be recalled however, that the Court in its
                    2005 Judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
                    (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) case — while reserving the
                    question of reparation due to each of the Parties for determination during
                    a subsequent phase of the proceedings (in the event that the Parties failed
                    to agree thereupon) — made it clear that at the reparations stage, the
                    onus would be upon the DRC “to demonstrate and prove the exact injury
                    that was suffered as a result of specific actions of Uganda constituting
                    internationally wrongful acts for which it is responsible” 19. Similarly the
                    Court stated regarding the responsibility of the DRC for the breach of its
                    international obligation to guarantee the inviolability of Uganda’s
                    diplomatic premises, for the maltreatment of Ugandan diplomats at the
                     Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa, for the maltreatment of Ugandan diplo-
                    mats at Ndjili International Airport, and for attacks on the seizure of
                    property and archives from Ugandan diplomatic premises, the onus
                    would be upon Uganda to demonstrate “the specific circumstances of
                    these violations as well as the precise damage suffered by Uganda and the
                    extent of the reparation to which it is entitled” 20.

                      19 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.

                    Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 257, para. 260.
                      20 Ibid., p. 279, para. 344.

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                    291 	                 armed activities (sep. op. sebutinde)

                       16. It will also be recalled that at this stage of the proceedings, each
                    Party has had ample opportunity to discharge its burden of proof by
                    adducing sufficient evidence of the reparations due to it as a result of the
                    internationally wrongful acts committed against it by the other, as dem-
                    onstrated in the “procedural history” part of the Order. In this regard,
                    the DRC filed an Application 21 and each Party filed a Memorial 22 and
                    Counter‑Memorial 23. Thereafter, the Court granted the Parties a further
                    opportunity to clarify certain evidentiary issues by answering specific
                    questions contained in a letter from the Court dated 11 June 2018. The
                    Parties filed their responses to the questions raised by the Court by
                    1 November 2018. Furthermore, the DRC revised its responses to these
                    questions on 12 November 2018 and again on 20 November 2018 in what
                    it referred to as its “final version”. Each Party then filed its comments on
                    the other Party’s answers within the time‑limit fixed by the Court (see
                    paragraph 5 of the Order). It now remains for the Court to perform its
                    judicial function by assessing that evidence and determining the repara-
                    tions due.

                                    The Terms of Reference Proposed by the Court

                        17. In my view, the terms of reference that the Court has proposed for
                    the experts have the effect of unfairly assisting the DRC in augmenting its
                    claim and unfairly buttressing its evidence where it may be wanting,
                    contrary to the principles of a fair hearing and equality of arms.

                    Alternatively, they have the effect of inappropriately delegating the

                    judicial function to the experts. As noted in paragraphs 10 and 11 of
                     the Order, while the DRC is favourably disposed to the Court seeking
                     expert opinion at this stage of the proceedings, Uganda on the other
                     hand is of the view that “the questions before the Court are not of the
                     sort contemplated for the appointment of experts pursuant to Article 50
                     of the Statute and Article 67, paragraph 1 of the Rule of Court”.
                     Accordingly, Uganda

                              “strongly objects to the proposal to appoint an expert or experts for
                              the stated purpose because it amounts to relieving the DRC of the
                              primary responsibility to prove her claim (or any particular heads of
                              claim), and assigning that responsibility to third parties, to the
                              prejudice of Uganda and in violation of the relevant principles of
                               international law”.

                         21
                          Application of the DRC dated 8 May 2015.
                         22
                          See DRC’s Memorial dated 28 September 2016 and Uganda’s Memorial dated
                    28 September 2016.
                       23 See DRC’s Counter‑Memorial dated 6 February 2018 and Uganda’s Counter‑

                    Memorial dated 6 February 2018.

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                       18. With regard to the term of reference entitled “loss of human life”,
                    I particularly take issue with the Court requesting the experts to make
                    “a global estimate of the lives lost among the civilian population (broken
                    down by manner of death) due to the armed conflict on the territory of
                    the [DRC] in the relevant period” and to determine “the scale of compen-
                    sation due for the loss of individual human life”. The Court has already
                    sought and received this information directly from the DRC through the
                    pleadings and the answers to some of the questions it posed to the Parties.
                    The Court should not be seen to unfairly assist either Party in augment-
                    ing its claim or buttressing its evidence where it may be wanting, to the
                    detriment of the other and contrary to the principles of a fair hearing and
                    equality of arms. In my view, the type of issues arising from the evidence
                    relating to reparations for loss of life are those within the realm of normal
                    judicial expertise and do not require technical, scientific or specialized
                    knowledge or expertise. Alternatively, this term of reference has the effect
                    of inappropriately delegating the judicial function — namely, the analysis
                    of the evidence on record and determination of the quantum of repara-
                    tions arising from loss of human life — to the experts.

                       19. Similarly, the term of reference with regard to “loss of natural
                    resources” is inappropriate. The Court already has evidence on record
                    from the DRC regarding this head of claim. By asking the experts again
                    to “approximate the quantity of natural resources such as gold, diamond,
                    coltan and timber unlawfully exploited during the occupation by Ugan-
                    dan armed forces” and to “evaluate the damage” arising therefrom, the
                    Court is in effect asking the experts to unfairly assist the DRC in aug-
                    menting its claim and discharging its evidentiary burden where its own
                    evidence may be wanting, contrary to the principles of a fair hearing and
                    equality of arms. In my view, the type of issues arising from the evidence
                    relating to reparations for loss of natural resources does not require tech-
                    nical, scientific or specialized knowledge or expertise that is outside the
                    realm of normal judicial expertise. Alternatively, this term of reference
                    has the effect of inappropriately delegating the judicial function —
                    namely, the analysis of the evidence on record and determination of the
                    quantum of reparations arising from loss of natural resources — to the
                    experts.

                       20. Lastly, the term of reference with regard to “property damage” is
                    inappropriate. The Court already has evidence on record from the DRC
                    regarding this head of claim. By asking the experts again to “approximate
                    the number and type of properties damaged or destroyed by Ugandan
                    armed forces” and to “approximate the cost of rebuilding the kind of
                    schools, hospitals and private dwellings destroyed . . .” arising therefrom,
                    the Court is unfairly assisting the DRC in augmenting its claim and but-
                    tressing its evidence where it may be wanting, contrary to the principles

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                    293 	            armed activities (sep. op. sebutinde)

                    of a fair hearing and equality of arms. In my view, the type of issues aris-
                    ing from the evidence relating to reparations for property loss does not
                    require technical, scientific or specialized knowledge or expertise that is
                    outside the realm of normal judicial expertise. Alternatively, this term of
                    reference has the effect of inappropriately delegating the judicial func-
                    tion — namely, the analysis of the evidence on record and determination
                    of the quantum of reparations arising from property damage — to the
                    experts.

                                                   Conclusion

                      21. In conclusion, I respectfully disagree that this is a proper case for
                    the Court to exercise its function under Article 50 of the Statute of the
                    Court and Article 67 of the Rules of Court.

                    (Signed) Julia Sebutinde.

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