472

JOINT DECLARATION OF JUDGES RANJEVA, SHI, KOROMA
             AND PARRA-ARANGUREN

  “Pre-preliminary” nature of access to the Court — The Court has already
determined that the Respondent lacked access to it during the relevant time and
has never definitively determined that Serbia had access — Reliance on the
Mavrommatis case is misguided because Mavrommatis did not concern access
to the Court, the issue in the present case is not procedural, the defect in the
present case is not short-lived, and the defect in the present case concerns
the Respondent rather than the Applicant — Jurisdiction must be assessed at
the time of the filing of the Application — Fundamental importance of the
equality of the Parties — The Applicant itself has previously argued that the
Respondent lacked access — Consistency of Judgments — Jurisdiction cannot
be founded on 1992 declaration — Jurisdiction lacking.

   1. We, as four remaining Members of the Court who took part in the
1996 proceedings on preliminary objections in the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) case, and one of whom also par-
ticipated in the 1993 proceedings on the indication of provisional meas-
ures in that case, are constrained to point out that at no time between
1992 and 2000 did the Court ever definitively declare that Serbia — the
Respondent in the present case — had the necessary access to bring a
dispute before the Court. In fact, the Court deliberately avoided the issue
of whether Serbia had access to it. In its 2004 Judgment on the Legality
of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy), the Court held that at
a time prior to 2000 Serbia lacked access to bring a case to the Court
(Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (III), p. 910, para. 114).
We are therefore constrained to append the following declaration to this
Judgment, which, in our opinion, not only lacks legal validity and con-
sistency but is even contra legem and untenable. This Court is not en-
titled to exercise jurisdiction based on a contra legem interpretation of a
convention, such as the United Nations Charter or the Statute of the
Court. Any such Judgment cannot but be extra-legal. It is regrettable
that this Court, as a court of law, should have taken such a position.

   2. In our view, the crucial question which the Court has to determine
in this phase of the proceedings is whether the Respondent, Serbia, had
access to the Court at the relevant time, namely at the filing on 2 July 1999
of the Application alleging breaches of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This question is both pre-
preliminary to the issue of jurisdiction and also fundamental, as the

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473         APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

Court can exercise its judicial function only in respect of those States
which have access to it.
   3. Whether a State has the capacity under the Statute to be a party to
proceedings before the Court is an issue of primordial importance, as it
governs whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a dispute
brought before it. Under the Court’s Statute, a State must have access to
the Court in order to participate in a contentious case ; the Court’s juris-
dictional authority is limited to those States with access to it. (See Legal-
ity of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 295, para. 36, (con-
cluding that “[t]he function of the Court to enquire into the matter [of a
party’s access to the Court is]. . . mandatory upon the Court. . .”)).

  4. In its Judgment in the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro v. Belgium) case, the Court reached the conclusion that :

      “at the time of filing of its Application to institute the present pro-
      ceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999, the Applicant in the
      present case, Serbia and Montenegro, was not a Member of the
      United Nations, and, consequently, was not, on that basis, a State
      party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It follows
      that the Court was not open to Serbia and Montenegro under Arti-
      cle 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.” (Ibid., pp. 314-315, para. 91.)
Thus, if Serbia and Montenegro at the time of filing of its Application on
29 April 1999 was neither a Member of the United Nations nor a party to
the Statute, and therefore did not have access to the Court under Arti-
cle 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, then it could not have had access to
the Court in the present case when the Government of Croatia filed its
Application on 2 July 1999. The Court’s other Judgments dealing with
parallel proceedings either support or, at the very least, do not contradict
this finding. (See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo-
slavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
p. 623, para. 47 (concluding that the Court had jurisdiction over the case
without considering the question of access, which the Parties had not
raised); Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo-
slavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 71 (concluding that the
admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
on 1 November 2000 “cannot have changed retroactively the sui generis
position” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the Organiza-
tion); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montene-
gro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 90-91, paras. 115-116 (find-

65

474         APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

ing that the Court had jurisdiction over Serbia by virtue of the doctrine
of res judicata as applied to the 1996 jurisdictional Judgment, without
entering into an analysis of Serbia’s status or access) ; and pp. 266-275,
joint dissenting opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma (emphasiz-
ing that the question of access to the Court had not been settled by the
1996 Judgment on jurisdiction in that case because it had not been spe-
cifically raised by the Parties ; re-examining the question de novo ; and
concluding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not been a
Member of the United Nations at the time the case was filed, and there-
fore had no access to the Court at the relevant time) (Judge Parra-
Aranguren did not take part in that Judgment for reasons known to the
Court).)
   5. Thus, in none of its prior Judgments has the Court concluded
definitively that Serbia and Montenegro had access to it in the period
between 1992 and 2000, and in the Legality of Use of Force cases it con-
cluded definitively that the State did not have such access. These findings
notwithstanding, the Court has held in the present Judgment that it is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction in this matter, even though at the filing of
the Application on 2 July 1999 the Respondent was neither a Member of
the United Nations nor a party to the Statute of the Court, and therefore
lacked access to the Court. To reach its conclusion in the present case,
the Court has relied on the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case,
where the Permanent Court of International Justice held that a treaty
defining certain procedural and substantive norms at issue (Protocol XII
of the Treaty of Lausanne) could be applied to the dispute even though it
had not come into force until after the Application was filed. According
to that Judgment :

         “Even assuming that before that time the Court had no jurisdic-
      tion because the international obligation referred to. . . was not yet
      effective, it would always have been possible for the applicant to re-
      submit his application in the same terms after the coming into force
      of the Treaty of Lausanne. . .” (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
      Series A, No. 2, p. 34).
The Judgment went on to state : “Even if the grounds on which the insti-
tution of proceedings was based were defective for the reason stated, this
would not be an adequate reason for the dismissal of the applicant’s suit”
(ibid.), and then : “The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not
bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which
they might possess in municipal law.” (Ibid. ; emphasis added.) According
to the present Judgment, the Court should thus consider that Serbia has
access to it because, following the logic of the Mavrommatis case, Ser-
bia’s non-membership in the United Nations at the relevant time can be
treated as a mere temporary procedural defect which was cured on
1 November 2000 when it became a new Member of the United Nations.

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475        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

   6. For the Court to conclude, on the basis of this obiter dictum in
the Mavrommatis case, that the Respondent has access to it and it has
jurisdiction over the Respondent is a misapplication of the Permanent
Court’s comment. The present case does not lend itself to the approach
taken in Mavrommatis, because the Mavrommatis case did not concern
access. Indeed, the Permanent Court did not consider, let alone decide,
the issue of whether the State in question had access to the Court, nor
did it rule on the status of a Member State. In fact, the Mavrommatis
reasoning as applied in that case was not even technically concerned
with the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, which was based on
Articles 26 and 11 of the Mandate for Palestine, not on Protocol XII.
The Court determined it had jurisdiction based on Articles 26 and 11 of
the Mandate (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 29)
before it even entered into its discussion of Protocol XII (ibid., p. 34 ; see
also ibid., p. 31 (stating that Article 11 of the Mandate, not Protocol XII,
is “the very clause from which the Court derives its jurisdiction”)).
Protocol XII served merely to complement the jurisdictional grant in
Article 11 of the Mandate through the provision of additional procedural
and substantive rules (ibid., p. 31 : “In this respect, the Protocol is the
complement of the provisions of the Mandate in the same way as a set
of regulations alluded to in a law indirectly form part of it.”). The
procedural defect at issue in Mavrommatis, therefore, did not concern
an imperfection in the jurisdictional clause itself, and it certainly
did not concern an issue of access to the Court.

   7. Moreover, the issue in the present case is not “procedural” (con-
cerning what a party has filed or could file), as it was in Mavrommatis,
but is decidedly preliminary and fundamental (concerning the
status of that party under the Charter of the United Nations and
the Statute of the Court). A party can correct a procedural error, but
cannot simply change a fundamental characteristic of the opposing
party’s legal status. This fact, which somehow escaped the attention
of the majority, is somewhat obscured in the present case by the
retrospective application of the Mavrommatis dictum to a situation
which has since resolved itself (i.e., examining Serbia’s status
retrospectively). In fact, the logic of the Mavrommatis approach
was meant to be applied prospectively, in particular to excuse
procedural imperfections that the applicant could rectify ex ante
by re-filing a corrected application. Such is not the situation in the
present case, which involves, rather, a fundamental question which
is only known to resolve itself ex post. In applying the Mavrommatis
principle retroactively, the majority sets a dangerous precedent
that threatens the finality of all of the Court’s judgments, as any
jurisdictional decision could be reopened further to new
developments.

  8. Further, Mavrommatis and all of its progeny dealt with very short-

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476        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

lived defects. For example, in the Court’s 1996 Judgment on Preliminary
Objections in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, the procedural
defect at issue was remedied after merely nine days (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 612,
para. 24). To apply the same principle to a long-lasting defect like the one
in the present case would create a jurisprudential slippery slope in respect
of the Court’s jurisdiction, to the detriment of judicial certainty and final-
ity. If procedural defects could be rectified even years later, the Court’s
jurisdiction would be open to endless challenge, even with regard to cases
long considered to have been definitively settled. The present Judgment
proposes no limit to this uncertainty. According to the Court’s settled
jurisprudence, its jurisdiction in a case must exist at the time of filing the
Application.

   9. Additionally, the Mavrommatis procedural-defect approach has
been applied where it has been the applicant or both parties, but not the
respondent alone, which failed to fulfil one of the conditions necessary
for the Court to find jurisdiction at the date the proceedings were insti-
tuted (see the present Judgment, para. 84). Where an application is
imperfect and the applicant could perfect and merely re-file it, logically
the Mavrommatis doctrine holds that the Court should not bar the appli-
cation because of a mere procedural imperfection easily rectifiable by the
applicant. For example, in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia case, the Permanent Court emphasized that “the Court cannot
allow itself to be hampered by a mere defect of form, the removal of
which depends solely on the Party concerned” (Jurisdiction, Judgment
No. 6, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 14 ; emphasis added). The
present situation, in which the Respondent failed to fulfil one of the pre-
conditions necessary for the Court to find jurisdiction at the date the pro-
ceedings were instituted, is entirely different, because the Court can in no
way have known at the date of filing whether the Applicant would ever
be in a position to file a procedurally correct Application. This depended
on the status of the Respondent, which in turn depended on actions of
the international community (in granting or withholding recognition of
the Respondent as a Member State of the United Nations). Thus, the
present case does not involve a “mere” procedural defect susceptible of
correction in a fresh application made by the same party responsible for
the defective instrument.

  10. Instead of relying on the Mavrommatis case to uphold the Court’s
jurisdiction now that it is clear that the Respondent ultimately became a
State with access to the Court, the Court should, with respect to this
decidedly non-procedural matter, have determined whether, under its
Statute and jurisprudence, the Parties had access to it at the relevant

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477         APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

time. Thus, the Court was required to proceed from the fundamental
premise that the determination was to be made at the time Croatia filed
its Application. As the Court rightly observes in the present Judgment, it
has reiterated in numerous precedents that : “the jurisdiction of the Court
must normally be assessed on the date of the filing of the act instituting
proceedings” (para. 79 ; emphasis added, citing Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos-
nia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 613, para. 26 ; Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 44).
Yet, the Court in the present Judgment chose two different strategies to
contravene this fundamental principle. First, it argued that jurisdiction
could be reconsidered as of the date of the Court’s consideration of the
case, stating :
         “What matters is that, at the latest by the date when the Court
      decides on its jurisdiction, the applicant must be entitled, if it so
      wishes, to bring fresh proceedings in which the initially unmet con-
      dition would be fulfilled” (Judgment, para. 85).

As stated, this proposition would appear to be fundamentally self-
contradictory. The majority is trying to have it both ways. It states, on the
one hand, that it does not matter that the Court did not have jurisdiction
ratione personae over Serbia when Croatia filed its Application, that it is
just a matter of form, and that, since Serbia is a party to the Statute of
the Court now, the Court can exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, it
states that it is irrelevant that Serbia later entered a reservation to Arti-
cle IX of the Genocide Convention because what matters is that, at the
time the Application was filed, this reservation did not yet exist. The
Court cannot take one approach to jurisdiction on one issue and a dif-
ferent approach to jurisdiction on another issue in the same case.

   Second, the Court also argued that jurisdiction could be reconsidered
as of the date of the Memorial, concluding that because Croatia’s Appli-
cation was “a short text comprising some ten pages” (ibid., para. 90),
while its Memorial, presented after Serbia gained access to the Court,
was “a document of 414 pages” (ibid.), this somehow allows for recon-
sideration of access at the date of the Memorial because the Memorial
thus breaks new ground. The Court’s jurisprudence does not support
either of these alternative approaches. Despite these two attempts to
change the date at which access to the Court is to be determined to either
the date of the Memorial or the date of the Court’s consideration of the
case, the fundamental premise remains — and the present Judgment
acknowledges — that access to the Court is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the Application.

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478         APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

   11. In a nutshell, when the Applicant instituted proceedings against
the Respondent in 1999, the Respondent was not a party to the Statute of
the Court and therefore had no access to the Court. This fact cannot be
rectified by recourse to the approach taken by the Permanent Court in
the Mavrommatis case.
   12. In choosing to exercise jurisdiction in the present case, the Court
will not only be in flagrant violation of the provisions of the United
Nations Charter, the Statute of the Court, General Assembly resolu-
tion 47/1, and Security Council resolution 777, but will also be ignoring
one of the fundamental principles of international justice, that of equality
between the applicant and the respondent. Stating that the Court can
exercise jurisdiction because the Respondent has subsequently been admit-
ted to the United Nations, and that this thus validates the Application, is
to ignore the fact that as a non-Member State of the United Nations and
non-party to the Statute of the Court, Serbia and Montenegro was not
entitled to institute proceedings before the Court against Croatia without
the latter’s consent. Indeed, when the Respondent in the present case
attempted to do so against other States in the Legality of Use of Force
cases, this Court ruled that the present Respondent as Applicant in those
cases had no access to the Court and that the Court therefore could not
exercise its jurisdiction.
   13. It should also be noted that, indeed, the Applicant itself has pre-
viously taken the position that the Respondent lacked the capacity to
participate in proceedings before the Court at the relevant time. In a let-
ter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in May 1999,
concerning the question of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Appli-
cant stated as follows :

         “Since a new application for membership in the United Nations,
      pursuant to Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, has not
      been made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
      tenegro) to date, and it has not been admitted to the United Nations,
      the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia therefore cannot be considered
      to be ipso facto a party to the Statute of the Court by virtue of Arti-
      cle 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations. Neither
      has the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
      become a contracting party of the Statute of the Court under Arti-
      cle 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which states that a non-member
      State can only become a contracting party of the International
      Court of Justice’s Statute under conditions set by the General Assem-
      bly on the recommendation of the Security Council on a case-by-
      case basis. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
      and Montenegro) has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court
      under the conditions provided for in Security Council resolution 9
      (1946) and adopted by the Council by virtue of powers conferred on
      it by article 35, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court.” (Letter
      dated 27 May 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia

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479        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

      and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Repub-
      lic of Macedonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
      General, United Nations doc. A/53/992, 7 June 1999.)

   14. In the light of the foregoing, for the Court now to decide that it
has jurisdiction in this case is inconsistent not only with its earlier find-
ings but also with the express position of the Applicant in this case at the
relevant times. Hence, not only may this Judgment be seen as unjustified
and even contra legem, but it is also in contradiction with the factual situ-
ation as previously characterized by the Applicant.

   15. Finally, a point should be made about the consistency of the
Court’s judgments. On at least three occasions, the Court reiterates that
decisions taken in previous proceedings (not involving exactly the same
parties) are not res judicata under Article 59 of the Statute of the Court,
but that the Court “will not depart from its settled jurisprudence unless it
finds very particular reasons to do so” (Judgment, para. 53 ; see also
paras. 54 and 76). The Court also notes that this is the position taken by
both of the Parties to the present dispute (ibid., para. 71). However, the
present Judgment addresses this issue through weak attempts to distin-
guish the 2004 Judgment. First, it reasons that the Applicant in 2004 did
not raise the issue of access while the Applicant in this case did (ibid.,
paras. 88-89). This is unconvincing: access is not a condition which may
be satisfied merely upon request by the applicant (and certainly not
access for the opposing party !) ; rather, it is a fundamental characteristic
that arises out of a party’s status and is required by the Charter and the
Statute of the Court. If Serbia lacked access to the Court in 2004, Croatia
absolutely cannot provide it with access in the present case simply by
making a request to the Court to that effect. The Court also attempts to
distinguish the 2004 case by arguing that “[i]t was clear [in that case, con-
trary to the present case] that Serbia and Montenegro did not have the
intention of pursuing its claims by way of new applications” (ibid.,
para. 89). This assumption by the Court is also an unconvincing basis on
which to rest such an important distinction, as the Court overlooks the
fact that the Applicant could not file a new application because of Ser-
bia’s reservation to the Genocide Convention.

  16. Since the Respondent in this case did not fulfil the conditions
required to gain access to the Court at the time when the Applicant insti-
tuted proceedings in 1999, the Court cannot exercise a jurisdiction that
has not been conferred on it. In other words, the conditions for the Court
to exercise jurisdiction in this case — the concordance of jurisdiction
ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis — were not met

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480        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

and the Court, therefore, wholly lacked jurisdiction at the time and still
lacks it today. This conclusion is also in conformity with General Assem-
bly resolution 55/12, admitting Serbia and Montenegro to membership of
the United Nations and by virtue of which Serbia and Montenegro
became a party to the Statute. Consequently, the Court’s present Judg-
ment is not only contra legem and therefore inadmissible to provide a
basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, but it also contradicts the Court’s juris-
prudence. If the Respondent lacked access to the Court when it filed its
Applications against some States in 1999, as the Court held in 2004, it
cannot be deemed to have had access to the Court as Respondent when
Croatia filed its Application against it, also in 1999.

   17. In addition to our views on the foregoing issues concerning access,
we also express concern regarding the Court’s position on jurisdiction,
which it concludes is established based on the declaration made on
27 April 1992 regarding commitments that “the SFR of Yugoslavia
assumed internationally. . . [to remain] bound by all obligations. . .”
(Judgment, para. 44). First, this declaration was made on the basis of a
claimed State continuity which, as it turned out, was not accepted by the
United Nations, including the Applicant, and thus such a declaration
cannot form the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction. Second, the Court’s
analysis of the validity of the declaration is based on a flawed premise.
The Court states that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time of
the declaration “was then claiming to be the continuator State of the
SFRY, but it did not repudiate its status as a party to the Convention
even when it became apparent that that claim would not prevail. . .”
(ibid., para. 111 ; emphasis added). The Court’s statement is factually
inaccurate. Quite the contrary — and as the Court even notes later in its
Judgment (ibid., para. 116) — on 6 March 2001 the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia specifically repudiated the 27 April declaration, stating that :

         “NOW it has been established that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
      slavia has not succeeded on April 27, 1992, or on any later date, to
      treaty membership, rights and obligations of the Socialist Federal
      Republic of Yugoslavia in the Convention on the Prevention and
      Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. . .

         THEREFORE, I am submitting on behalf of the Government of the
      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia this notification of accession to the
      Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
      Genocide. . .” (Notification of Accession to the Genocide Conven-
      tion by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 6 March 2001, Applica-
      tion for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case con-
      cerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
      Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.

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481        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (JOINT DECL.)

      Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and
      Herzegovina), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 25, para. 52).
Thus, not only did the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia repudiate the
27 April declaration, but its action of acceding to the Genocide Conven-
tion cannot but lead to the conclusion that it also accepted that it was not
a party to the Genocide Convention during the relevant time. Third, even
if, hypothetically, this declaration could provide a basis for the Court’s
jurisdiction, it would not be a complete basis because, as discussed in the
beginning of this declaration, a fundamental pre-condition to its exer-
cise — Serbia’s access to the Court — has not been established.

   18. In conclusion, because we are firmly convinced both that Serbia
lacked access to the Court at the relevant time (and thus the Court lacked
jurisdiction ratione personae) and that Serbia’s 27 April declaration is not
sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction, we conclude that the Court is
wholly lacking jurisdiction to hear the case.

                                    (Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.
                                        (Signed) SHI Jiuyong.
                                    (Signed) Abdul G. KOROMA.
                                (Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

73


104

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. WINIARSKI

La fonction consultative de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, introduite par l’article 14 du Pacte de la Société des
Nations, a été l’objet de doutes sérieux et de préoccupations graves
pour la Cour permanente au début de son activité, comme elle
l’avait été pour les juristes lors de l'élaboration du Pacte et, plus
tard, lors de la préparation, en 1920, du Statut de la Cour. Pendant
la session préliminaire de 1922, consacrée à l'établissement du
premier Règlement, le juge J. B. Moore a pu commencer ainsi son
important rapport sur la matière : « Aucune question relative à
l'organisation de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale n’a
provoqué autant de confusion et de perplexité que celle de savoir
si la Cour doit donner des avis consultatifs et dans quelles condi-
tions. »

Le grand problème à résoudre, pour la Cour, c'était de concilier
sa fonction consultative avec son caractère de Cour de justice,
organe judiciaire et indépendant du droit international. D’un côté
les avis, sans force obligatoire, devraient s'imposer par leur haute
autorité, autrement, comme l’a observé J.B. Moore dans son
rapport, il pourrait en résulter du discrédit pour la Cour. D’un autre
côté, l’article 14 stipulait : « Elle (la Cour) donnera aussi (en anglais :
may give) des avis consultatifs sur tout différend ou tout point dont
la saisira le Conseil ou l’Assemblée », ce qui semblait indiquer la
possibilité d'introduire la juridiction obligatoire par la voie détournée
des avis : en effet, en donnant un avis sur une question de droit
relative à un différend né entre États, la Cour se prononcerait en
substance sur le différend même pour lequel les parties n’avaient
pourtant pas admis sa juridiction.

A ce double danger, la Cour permanente a paré par deux moyens.
D'abord, elle a entouré l'exercice de sa fonction consultative des
formes et garanties judiciaires ; ensuite, elle a reconnu qu'elle peut
refuser de donner un avis au cas où d'importantes raisons s'opposent
à ce que l’avis soit donné, ceci en accord avec la conclusion du
rapport Moore : si la Cour reçoit une demande d’avis, «elle y donne
la suite qu’elle jugera opportune d’après la nature et les circons-
tances de chaque cas particulier». Déjà en 1923, dans le cas
célèbre de la Carélie orientale, la Cour a formulé des principes qui
l’avaient déterminée à ne pas donner l’avis demandé par le Conseil ;
elle les a résumés dans la phrase bien connue : « La Cour, étant une
cour de justice, ne peut pas se départir des règles essentielles qui
dirigent son activité de tribunal, même lorsqu'elle donne des avis

31
105 OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 X 56)

consultatifs. » (Avis n° 5, p. 20.) En 1935, le Président Anzilotti, en
rappelant l'attitude constante de la Cour permanente, ajouta cette
idée qui garde toute sa valeur: «Il est difficile de voir de quelle
manière pourrait être sauvegardée l'indépendance de la Cour
vis-à-vis des organes politiques de la Société des Nations, s’il était
dans le pouvoir de l’Assemblée et du Conseil de l’obliger à répondre
à n'importe quelle question qu'ils jugeraient opportun de lui
soumettre » (A/B n° 65, p. 61).

L’attitude de la Cour internationale de Justice ne diffère pas de
celle de la Cour permanente. Dans son avis du 30 mars 1950, après
avoir constaté que la réponse, en principe, ne devrait pas être
refusée, la Cour déclare : « L'obligation de la Cour de répondre a
une demande d’avis comporte toutefois certaines limites. La Cour
n’est pas seulement «organe des Nations Unies», elle est aussi
essentiellement leur «organe judiciaire principal» (art. 92 de la
Charte et art. 1 du Statut). » Et plus loin : « L'article 65 du Statut est
permissif. [1 donne à la Cour le pouvoir d'apprécier si les circons-
tances de l’espèce sont telles qu’elles doivent la déterminer à ne pas
répondre 4 une demande d’avis » (pp. 71-72). A une autre occasion,
en rappelant les principes ainsi énoncés, la Cour a déclaré : «La
disposition permissive de l’article 65 du Statut reconnaît à la Cour
le pouvoir d'apprécier si les circonstances de l’espèce sont telles
qu’elles doivent la déterminer à ne pas répondre à la demande
d'avis » (Rec. 1951, p. 19). Dans les circonstances du cas qui lui
est actuellement soumis, la Cour n’a pas cru trouver des éléments
qui la détermineraient à s'abstenir de répondre, et c’est ici que, à
mon regret, je ne puis être d'accord avec sa décision.

J'ai indiqué tout à l'heure que la Cour permanente a dès le début
entouré l'exercice de sa fonction consultative des formes et garanties
judiciaires. À l’occasion de la première revision du Règlement
(1926-1927), le comité nommé par la Cour permanente et composé
des juges Loder, Moore et Anzilotti, a dit dans son rapport:
« La Cour dans l'exercice de ses pouvoirs a délibérément et inten-
tionnellement assimilé Ia procédure consultative à la procédure
contentieuse, et les résultats obtenus ont abondamment justifié
cette attitude. Le prestige dont peut jouir la Cour actuellement,
en tant que tribunal judiciaire, est dans une large mesure dû à
l'importance de son activité consultative et à la façon judiciaire
dont elle a réglé cette activité. En réalité, lorsqu’en fait il se trouve
des parties en présence, il n’y a qu'une différence purement nomi-
nale entre les affaires contentieuses et les affaires consultatives. »
(4% Rapport annuel, 1927-1928, p. 72.)

A la conférence de 1929 pour la revision du Statut de la Cour
permanente, on a donné de l’article 68 revisé explication suivante,
qui fut transmise plus tard à l’Assemblée : « Il serait parfaitement
inutile et vain de donner un avis consultatif aprés avoir entendu
seulement une seule voix. Pour que l’avis soit utile, il faut entendre
les deux parties. C’est pourquoi il est tout naturel de prévoir dans

32
106 OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 X 56)

le Statut de la Cour qu’en matière d'avis consultatif la Cour procède
à tous égards comme en matière contentieuse. »

Le Statut revisé de 1929 et le Règlement revisé en 1936 ont été
les dernières étapes de l’évolution qui a dû conduire à l'assimilation
considérable des deux procédures, assimilation presque complète
en ce qui concerne le cas des différends « actuellement nés » entre
deux ou plusieurs États.

La position de la Cour internationale de Justice en ce qui concerne
la fonction consultative est restée pratiquement la même, et si
l’article 65 du Statut, en conformité avec l’article 96 de la Charte,
a abandonné la différence entre «un point» et «un différend » et
parle de « toute question juridique », l’article 68 du Statut est resté
sans changement et l’article 82 (modifié) du Règlement statue
toujours : «La Cour recherche avant tout si la demande d’avis a
trait ou non à une question juridique actuellement pendante entre
deux ou plusieurs Etats », ceci pour s’inspirer des dispositions du
Statut et du Règlement relatives à la procédure contentieuse, dans
la mesure où elle les reconnaît applicables.

En dirigeant ainsi son activité consultative, la Cour obéit d’abord
au principe de l’indépendance des Etats qui s'oppose à ce que
leurs différends soient tranchés sans leur consentement par voie
d'avis, même indirectement, et ensuite aux deux principes fonda-
mentaux de procédure dont, tribunal judiciaire, elle ne saurait se
départir : audiatur et aliera pars et l'égalité des parties devant le
juge. L'observation religieuse de ces principes, la volonté constante
de la Cour d’être complètement éclairée dans l’étude des questions
qui lui sont soumises devaient assurer à ses avis l’autorité nécessaire.

Le cas actuellement soumis à la Cour ne rentre dans aucune des
deux catégories de questions pour lesquelles la fonction consultative
de la Cour a été prévue : ce n’est ni une question abstraite, ni une
«question actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats ».
La Cour, qui a le devoir de dégager la réalité des rapports se trou-
vant à la base de la question à laquelle elle doit répondre, n’a pas
manqué de constater qu'elle se trouve devant le stade final d’un
procès entre l’Unesco et ses anciens fonctionnaires. Régulièrement
saisie par une Organisation autorisée à cet effet par l’Assemblée
générale, saisie d’une question de droit qui rentre dans le cadre de
l'activité de cette Organisation, la Cour est compétente pour y
répondre ; cependant, comme l'avis le constate, la procédure ainsi
engagée «se présente comme faisant, dans une certaine mesure,
fonction de recours judiciaire» contre les quatre jugements du
Tribunal administratif, et cette utilisation de la voie consultative
n'a certainement pas été envisagée par les auteurs de la Charte
et du Statut de la Cour.

33
107 OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 X 56)

Certes, ce n’est pas un recours régulier en appel. De tels appels
avaient été envisagés par la délégation du Venezuela à la Conférence
de San Francisco, ce qui aurait nécessité une modification appro-
priée de l’article 34 du Statut, modification que cette délégation
a formulée comme suit : « Siégeant en degré d’appel la Cour prend
connaissance des litiges jugés en première instance par des tribu-
naux administratifs des Nations Unies, dont le Statut contiendra

une disposition à cet effet.» Cette proposition a été rejetée (Doc.
284, IV/1/24).

Il est concevable qu'une question relative à la validité d’un
jugement du Tribunal administratif puisse être soumise à la Cour
isolément, dans le cadre de son activité consultative normale et
conformément aux règles et principes qui président à cette activité ;
mais même dans un tel cas le problème présenterait des difficultés
graves. Dans le cas actuellement devant la Cour, le caractère de
règlement final au moyen de recours organisé contre les quatre
jugements ressort du fait que la demande d'avis a été présentée
conformément à l’article XII du Statut du Tribunal ; l'effet obliga-
toire de l'avis n’affecte pas par lui-même la compétence de la Cour,
mais il constitue une nouvelle preuve qu'il s’agit d’un recours sous
forme de demande d’avis consultatif.

Pour ce qui est de la procédure, l'Unesco, en s’adressant à la
Cour, s’est inspirée des dispositions spéciales arrétées par le Conseil
de la Société des Nations dans le cas des anciens fonctionnaires de
la Sarre — dispositions qui, d’ailleurs, n’avaient jamais été appli-
quées — ainsi que de la résolution récemment votée par l’Assemblée
générale en vue d’amender le Statut du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies. Le Directeur général, dans «le souci d’assurer
dans toute la mesure du possible l'égalité des droits aux intéressés »,
s’est déclaré disposé à transmettre à la Cour leurs exposés (déclara-
tion du Conseiller juridique lue à la séance du Conseil exécutif le
25 novembre 1955, Doc. 42 Ex/SR/1-27). Ce procédé auquel la
Cour ne s’est pas opposée a abouti à une situation dans laquelle
une des parties au procès devant le Tribunal administratif ne peut
adresser ses observations à la Cour que par l'intermédiaire de la
partie adverse.

Pour ce qui est de la procédure orale, l'Unesco a, pour les mêmes
raisons, exprimé son intention de s’abstenir de présenter un exposé
oral. La déclaration du Conseiller juridique ci-dessus mentionnée
ajoute cependant : «Il convient par ailleurs d’observer que pour
atteindre son but — qui est d’assurer, dans la mesure du possible,
une égalité des droits — l’abstention de présentation des exposés
oraux doit être complète et viser non seulement l'Organisation
intéressée, mais aussi bien les autres organisations internationales.

34
108 OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 X 56)

et les États Membres. » C’est ainsi que, les fonctionnaires intéressés
ne pouvant pas se présenter devant la Cour, les Etats, les organi-
sations et la Cour même ont dû renoncer aux débats oraux qui sont
de règle dans la procédure consultative.

Le fait que cette procédure inusitée n’a pas soulevé d’objection
de la part des intéressés et qu’elle a même reçu l’assentiment du
conseil des fonctionnaires est sans pertinence. Ces fonctionnaires
n’ont pas de place dans la procédure consultative normale. L’impor-
tant est que la procédure orale, moyen habituel pour la Cour de
s’éclairer sur la question qui lui est soumise, a été supprimée à
l'avance.

L’Unesco seule a pu s'adresser à la Cour pour contester les juge-
ments du Tribunal administratif. Il était juridiquement impossible
d'accorder le même droit aux fonctionnaires. Ils ont gagné leur
procès devant le Tribunal ; s’ils l'avaient perdu, aucun recours ne
leur était ouvert. Cette inégalité, prise en elle-même, peut ne pas
constituer un empêchement à ce que la Cour donne son avis en
l'espèce ; mais elle ajoute à la situation où la Cour se trouve et qui
ne s'accorde pas avec son caractère judiciaire. D'autre part, toute
tentative de diminuer, sinon d'éliminer, ces inégalités entre l’'Orga-
nisation et les individus conduit à mettre davantage en évidence
les contradictions entre cette procédure hybride et le Statut de la
Cour, car en définitive elle se heurte d’une part à la disposition
fondamentale de l’article 34, d’après lequel «seuls les États ont
qualité pour se présenter devant la Cour» et d'autre part aux
dispositions des articles 65 et 66 en vertu desquels seuls les Etats
et les Organisations internationales ont place dans la procédure
consultative.

Pour ces raisons, je suis d'avis que la Cour suivrait une voie plus
sûre en s’abstenant de donner l'avis qui lui est demandé. Comme
la Cour a décidé autrement, je me rallie aux réponses qu'elle a
données, sans partager par ailleurs tous les motifs de son avis.

(Signé) Bohdan WINIARSKI.

Co
Ga


301

OPINION DISSIDENTE
DE SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, PRÉSIDENT

[Traduction]

Je regrette beaucoup de ne pas pouvoir approuver la décision de la
Cour rejetant l'exception préliminaire de l’ Australie fondée sur le fait que
la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas également parties à
l'instance (voir alinéa 1 g) du paragraphe 72 de l'arrêt). Les difficultés que
me pose cette partie de l’arrêt peuvent être exposées très brièvement.

Cette exception préliminaire soulève une question importante touchant
le fondement consensuel de la compétence de la Cour lorsque des intérêts
juridiques d’Etats tiers sont en jeu dans une affaire. Les articles 62 et 63 du
Statut de la Cour, qui autorisent l’intervention, montrent que les parties à
une affaire peuvent faire juger leurs prétentions par la Cour, même lors-
que les intérêts juridiques d’Etats tiers peuvent être affectés par la déci-
sion de celle-ci. Il y a toutefois une limite à l’exercice de la compétence
dans une affaire affectant les intérêts juridiques d’un Etat tiers, et cette
limite est que, pour reprendre la formule bien connue utilisée dans
l'affaire de l Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943 (question préliminaire), «les
intérêts juridiques de [l’Etat tiers] seraient non seulement touchés par une
décision, mais constitueraient l’objet même de ladite décision» (C.LJ.
Recueil 1954, p. 32).

Que les intérêts juridiques de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni
constitueront l’objet même de toute décision dans l’affaire Nauru contre
Australie est très certainement manifeste. Le mandat sur Nauru a été
conféré en 1920 à «Sa Majesté britannique»; l’accord de tutelle de 1947
désignait «conjointement »

«les Gouvernements de l’Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du
Royaume-Uni (ci-après appelés «l’autorité chargée de l’administra-
tion») … comme l’autorité qui exercera l’administration du Terri-
toire»;

la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni étaient deux des trois membres
des British Phosphate Commissioners; et ces pays étaient tous deux
parties à l’accord de Canberra de 1967. Il ne s’agit là que des illustrations
les plus marquantes des liens inextricables des intérêts juridiques de ces
deux Etats avec la présente affaire.

De plus, l’on doit envisager la situation qui existera nécessairement si,
sur le fond, il était question d'évaluer la réparation pouvant être due par
l'Australie (voir paragraphe 48 de l’arrêt). Que les obligations d’où
découle la responsabilité soient jugées solidaires {joint and several), de
telle manière que l’Australie soit tenue de la totalité de la réparation, ou
qu’à l’inverse elle ne soit jugée tenue que d’une partie du montant total, il

65
TERRES À PHOSPHATES À NAURU (OP. DISS. JENNINGS) 302

est clair que dans un cas comme dans l’autre la Cour rendra inévitable-
ment et simultanément une décision sur les intérêts juridiques de ces deux

autres Etats.

Pour ces raisons, il me semble que l’exception préliminaire de l’Austra-
lie sur ce point est bien fondée, et que la Cour n’est pas compétente dans
cette affaire.

(Signé) R. Y. JENNINGS.

66


DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH.

I concur, but for different reasons, in the conclusion of the
Court that the United Nations Organization has capacity to bring
an international claim against the responsible government, with
a view to obtaining reparation due in respect of damage caused
by that government to the Organization. But I regret that I
am unable to concur in.that part of the Opinion having to do
with the capacity of the Organization to sponsor an international
claim in behalf of one of its agents.

The authority of the Organization to make a claim for damage
caused to it by the wrongful act of a State can be very simply
stated, as follows :

(1) Article 104 of the Charter gives the Organization ‘‘such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfilment of its purposes’.

(2) Paragraphs x and 2 of Article 105 specify that the Organi-
zation ‘‘shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of
its purposes”, and that officials of the Organization shall ‘‘similarly
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the
Organization”.

(3) The Convention on Privileges and Immunities, adopted
by the General Assembly on February 13th, 1946, recognizes
that the United Nations shall possess juridical personality, with
capacity (a) to contract ; (6) to acquire and dispose of immovable
and movable property; and (c) to institute legal proceedings ;
also that the Organization and its officials shall enjoy certain
specified privileges and immunities.

The Convention has not been approved by all the Members
of the Organization, but we may assume, for present purposes,
that it is fairly representative of the views of most of them.

(4) It stands to reason that, if the Organization is to make
contracts, to acquire and dispose of property, to institute legal
proceedings, and to claim the benefits of the privileges and
immunities to which it is entitled, it must be able to carry on
negotiations with governments as well as with private parties.
It must therefore be able to assert claims in its own behalf. No
other conclusion consistent with the specified powers and with
the inherent right of self-preservation could possibly be drawn.
The Organization must have and does have ample authority to

26
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 107

take needful steps for its protection against wrongful acts for
which Member States are responsible. Any damage suffered by
the Organization by reason of wrongful acts committed against
an agent, while in the performance of his duties, would likewise
be within its competence.

This is a proper application of the doctrine of implied powers.

(5) I, therefore, find no difficulty in giving an affirmative
answer to Question I (a) of the Assembly’s request.

Such a claim by the United Nations would include any element
of damage susceptible of proof under customary rules relating to
damages in international claims. It would include any reasonable
payments made by the Organization to the victim of the wrongful
act or to those entitled through him, provided that such payments
were made pursuant to contractual undertakings of the Organiza-
tion, or on the basis of an established policy in such cases.

(6) Thus it would appear that under I (a) the Organization
has ample and unquestionable authority to safeguard itself against
derelictions by States, and to vindicate the dignity, honour and
authority of the Organization. To this extent I am in agreement
with the conclusions of the majority of the Court.

*
* *

As to Question I (8), having to do with a claim for reparation
due in respect of damage caused to the victim of a wrongful act
or to persons entitled through him, as distinguished from a claim
on behalf of the Organization itself, a different situation is presented.

The Court is asked to state its opinion as to whether the Organiza-
tion has capacity to espouse such a claim. In giving our answer,
we must look to the traditional international practice of nations
with respect to private claims, and to the express treaty stipulations
as regards the Organization.

As to international practice, we find at once that heretofore only
States have been regarded as competent to advance such inter-
national claims,

As to the Organization, we find nothing to suggest that it too
has capacity in this field. Certainly there is no specific provision
in the Charter, nor is there provision in any other agreement of
which I am aware, conferring upon the Organization authority to

27
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 198

assume the rêle of a State, and to represent its agents in the espousal
of diplomatic claims on their behalf. I am equally convinced that
there is no implied power to be drawn upon for this purpose.

It is stated in the majority opinion that the Charter does not
expressly provide that the Organization should have capacity to
include, in “‘its claim for reparation’, damage caused to the victim
or to persons entitled through him, but the conclusion is reached
that such power is conferred by necessary implication. This
appears to be based on the assumption that, to ensure the efficient
and independent performance of missions entrusted to agents of
the Organization, and to afford them moral support, the exercise
of this power is necessary.

The conclusion that power in the Organization to sponsor private
claims is conferred by “‘necessary implication” is not believed to be
warranted under rules laid down by tribunals for filling lacunæ
in specific grants of power.

There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Organization is
one of delegated and enumerated powers. It is to be presumed
that such powers as the Member States desired to confer upon it
are stated either in the Charter or in complementary agreements
concluded by them. Powers not expressed cannot freely be implied.
Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are
limited to those that are ‘“‘necessary’’ to the exercise of powers
expressly granted. No necessity for the exercise of the power here
in question has been shown to exist. There is no impelling reason,
if any at all, why the Organization should become the sponsor of
claims on behalf of its employees, even though limited to those
arising while the employee is in line of duty. These employees
are still nationals of their respective countries, and the customary
methods of handling such claims are still available in full vigour.
The prestige and efficiency of the Organization will be safeguarded
by an exercise of its undoubted right under point I (a) supra.
Even here it is necessary to imply power, but, as stated above,
the necessity is self-evident. The exercise of an additional extra-
ordinary power in the field of private claims has not been shown
to be necessary to the efficient performance of duty by either
the Organization or its agents.

But we are presented with an analogy between the relationship
of a State to its nationals and the relationship of the Organization

28
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 199

to its employees ; also an analogy between functions of a State in
the protection of its nationals and functions of the Organization
in the protection of its employees.

The results of this liberality of judicial construction transcend,
by far, anything to be found in the Charter of the United Nations,
as well as any known purpose entertained by the drafters of the
Charter. |

These supposed analogies, even assuming that they may have
some semblance of reality, which I do not admit, cannot avail to
give jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is otherwise lacking. Capacity
of the Organization to act in the field here in question must rest
upon a more solid foundation.

The Court advances the strange argument that if the employee
had to rely on the protection of his own State, his independence
might well be compromised, contrary to the intention of Article 100
of the Charter.

This would seem to be placing a rather low estimate upon the
employee’s sense of fidelity. But let us explore this a step further.

Article 100 provides that :

“x, In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General
and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
government or from any other authority external to the Organiza-
tion. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on
their position as international officials responsible only to the
Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the
Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them
in the discharge of their responsibilities.”

This is a classical provision. It is found in this identical, or
a slightly modified, form in each of the agreements establishing
the various Specialized Agencies—some concluded before, and some
subsequent to, the signing of the Charter.

For example, we find in Article 59 of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation, signed in 1944, the following provision:

“The President of the Council, the Secretary-General and other
personnel shall not seek or receive instructions in regard to the
discharge of their responsibilities from any authority external
to the Organization. Each contracting State undertakes fully to
respect the international character of the responsibilities of the
personnel and not to seek to influence any of its nationals in
the discharge of their responsibilities.”  ( earbook of the United

Nations, 1946-1947, pp. 728, 736.)
29
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 200

Article XII of the articles of agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, negotiated in 1944, provides in Section 4 (c) :

“The Managing Director and the staff of the Fund, in the
discharge of their functions, shall owe their duty entirely to the
Fund and to no other authority. Each member of the Fund
shall respect the international character of this duty and shall
refrain from all attempts to influence any of the staff in the
discharge of his functions.” (II, United Nations Treaty Series,

1947, pp. 40, 86.)

Article V of the contemporary agreement relating to the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development is practically
identical with the provisions just quoted. (Zbid., pp. 134, 166.)

Article 9, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the Constitution of the Inter-
national Labour Organization, as amended, provides :

“4. The responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff
shall be exclusively international in character. In the performance
of their duties, the Director-General and the staff shall not seek
or receive instructions from any government or from any other
authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from
any action which might reflect on their position as international
officials responsible only to the Organization.

5. Each Member of the Organization undertakes to respect
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of
the Director-General and the staff and not to seek to influence
them in the discharge of their responsibilities.” (Yearbook of
the United Nations, 1946-1947, pp. 670, 672.)

To the same effect see:

Article VIII of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (ibid., pp. 693, 695) ; Article VI of the Constitution
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization (ibid., pp. 712, 715) ; Article 37 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization (ib7d., pp. 793, 797) ; and Article 9 of
the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (édid.,
pp. 810, 813).

Is it to be supposed that each of the Organizations has the
capacity to make diplomatic claims in behalf of its agents, and that
this should be done in order that their fidelity to the Organization
and their independence may not be compromised ? Reasons for
such a conclusion would seem to have as great force here as in
the case of the United Nations. The language employed in the
respective instruments bears the same meaning.

Article 100 of the Charter, which, it should be remarked, relates
only to the Secretary-General and the staff, cannot be drawn
upon to claim for the Organization by indirection an authority
which obviously cannot be claimed under any direct authorization.

30
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 201

The most charitable, and indeed the most realistic construction
to be given the article is that it is designed to place service with
the United Nations on a high plane of loyalty and fidelity and to
require Member States to respect this status and not to seek to
influence the Secretary-General or members of the staff in the
discharge of their duties.

This bond between the Organization and its employees, which
is an entirely proper and natural one, does not have and cannot
have the effect of expatriating the employee or of substituting
allegiance to the Organization for allegiance to his State. Neither
the State nor the employee can’ be said to have contemplated
such a situation. There is nothing inconsistent between continued
allegiance to the national State and complete fidelity to the Organ-
ization. The State may still protect its national under inter-
national law. One can even visualize a situation where that
protection might be directed against acts by the Organization
itself,

The purpose of the article as stated in the Report of the Secretary
of State to the President of the United States on the Results of
the San Francisco Conference, June 26th, 1945, is:

‘.. to make it perfectly clear that the nationals of Member
States serving on the staff of the Secretariat couid not, in any
sense of the word, be considered as agents of their governments”.
(Department of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71,

pp. 150, 151.)

It has also been suggested, as an argument in support of the
proposition that the United Nations Organization should be
regarded as having capacity in these cases, that the State of nation-
ality would not be in a position to base an international claim
in behalf of a national on the ground that privileges or immunities
to which employees are entitled under the Charter or under provi-
sions of the Convention relating to Privileges and Immunities had
been violated.

If this be a sound view, it must be because the privileges and
immunities are not for the personal benefit of the individual
himself. That this is true is admitted by the Court and is made
clear by Article V, Section 20, and Article VI, Section 23, of the
Convention. The former specifies :

“Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the
interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit
of the individuals themselves.” (I, United Nations Treaty Series,

1946-1947, pp. 16, 26.)

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DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 202

Since, according to this provision, the privileges and immunities
inure to the benefit of the United Nations and not to the benefit
of the individuals, any claim based upon a breach of them should
be in favour of the Organization and would fall to be dealt with
under I (a) above, and not under I (8).

Any claim on behalf of the individual must rest, not upon
stipulations contained in the Convention, but upon general prin-
ciples of international law.

What reason, then, is there for thinking that the United Nations,
rather than the national State, should interpose on behalf of the
individual? It may well be that the weight of the Organization’s
authority would, in some cases, be more persuasive than that of
the national State, but this is not a judicial reason, nor does it
supply the legal capacity to act.

Aside from remedies afforded by local law under which private
claimants may be allowed access to judicial or other tribunals for
the adjustment of their claims against a government, the only
remedy known to international law in such cases is through the
government of the State of which the claimant is a national. “A
citizen of one nation, wronged by the conduct of another nation,
must seek redress through his own government. His government
must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it need
not be considered.” (United States v. Diekelman, 92 US. 520; VI,
Moore’s Digest of International Law, 607.)

Such claims must be presented through the diplomatic channel
(ibid.).

Diplomatic protection is in its nature an international proceeding,
constituting ‘‘an appeal by nation to nation for the performance of
the obligations of the one to the other, growing out of their mutual
rights and duties” (Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
abroad, 354 ; VI, Moore’s Digest, 257).

A claim by one State against another on account of an injury toa
national of the claimant State is based on the theory that the State
has been injured through injury to its national. Equally sound
is the theory that for the allegiance owed by the national to his
State the latter owes the national its protection. Nationality is a
sine qua non to the espousal of a diplomatic claim on behalf of a
private claimant. Aside from the special situation of protected
persons under certain treaties and that of seamen and aliens serving
in the armed forces, all of whom are assimilated to the status
of nationals, it is well settled that the right to protect is confined

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DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 203

to nationals of the protecting State. If the private claimant is not
a national of the State whose assistance is sought, the government
of that State cannot properly sponsor the claim, nor is the respon-
dent government under any legal duty to entertain it.

International law on this subject is well settled, and any attempt
to engraft upon it, save by international compact, a theory, based
upon supposed analogy, that organizations, not States and hence
having no nationals, may act as if they were States and had nationals,
is, in my opinion, unwarranted. The Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice stated well the true situation when it said in the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, February 28th, 1939:

“In the opinion of the Court, the rule of international law on
which the first Lithuanian objection is based is that in taking
up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State
is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the
person of its nationals respect for the rules of international law.
This right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its
own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement,
it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual
which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic
protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic
protection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect.
for the rules of international law must be envisaged. Where
the injury was done to the national of some other State, no claim
to which such injury may give rise falls within the scope of the
diplomatic protection which a State is entitled to afford nor can
it give rise to a claim which that State is entitled to espouse.”
{P.C.I.J. Series A./B., No. 76, p. 16.)

See also to the same effect the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
Case (P.C.I.J., Series A., No. 2, 1924, p. 12); and the case
concerning the Payment of various Serbian Loans issued in France
(P.C.I.J., Series A., Nos. 20/21, 1929, p. 17).

It is generally admitted that the State of the employee's
nationality has a right to sponsor a claim, such as is here in question,
and the General Assembly obviously envisaged the possibility of
complications in this respect, as is shown by its second question,
wherein it inquires how, in the event of an affirmative reply on
point I (8), action by the United Nations is ‘‘to be reconciled with

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DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE HACKWORTH 204

such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim
is a national”.

The answer which I have suggested for point I (a) would probably
give the Organization all that it needs from a practical point of
view. .

If it desires to go further and to espouse claims on behalf of
employees, the conventional method is open. If the States should
agree to allow the Organization to espouse claims on behalf of their
nationals who are in the service of the Organization, no one could
question its authority to do so. The respondent State would be
relieved of the possibility of demands from two sources, the employee
or his dependants would know to whom to look for assistance, and
the whole procedure would be free from uncertainty and irregularity.

(Signed) GREEN H. HACKWORTH.

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