                                                                          619

          DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC MAHIOU

[Translation]

   1. In replying to the preliminary objections raised by the DRC seeking
to assert that Guinea’s Application is inadmissible, the Court begins by
identifying the three categories of rights whose protection Guinea wishes
to ensure by resorting to diplomatic protection and which are as follows :
the rights of Mr. Diallo as an individual, his direct rights as associé in the
two companies Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire and, lastly, the
rights of those companies. As regards the prejudice to Mr. Diallo’s per-
sonal rights arising among other things from his arrest and expulsion and
also the mistreatment suffered and the prejudice to his direct rights as
associé, I fully endorse the Court’s conclusions that Guinea has standing,
that it has satisfied the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies and that
it can therefore take up the case of its national for the protection of these
two categories of rights.

   2. However, I shall add a brief comment on Mr. Diallo’s direct rights
as associé in order to point out that the Court has thus confirmed and
clarified the position it had previously adopted in the Barcelona Traction
case ; indeed, in the Judgment of 15 February 1970, the Court introduced
a distinction between the rights of the company and the direct rights of
the shareholders by stating :

       “The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed at the
    direct rights of the shareholder as such. It is well known that there
    are rights which municipal law confers upon the latter distinct from
    those of the company . . . Whenever one of his direct rights is
    infringed, the shareholder has an independent right of action.” (Bar-
    celona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v.
    Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 36,
    para. 47.)

The shareholder’s own right of recourse is thus recognized, independently
of that of the company ; this also means that it is possible for the State
whose shareholder is a national to resort to diplomatic protection when
that national has suffered prejudice to his direct rights, regardless of the
nationality of the company concerned. This right now forms part of the
rules of customary international law, since every State is entitled to exer-
cise its diplomatic protection in the event of the violation of the rights of
its national, and Article 12 of the draft Articles of the International Law
Commission (ILC) on Diplomatic Protection, adopted in 2006, merely
confirms this rule by stating that :

                                                                           41

                  AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (DECL. MAHIOU)                      620

        “To the extent that an internationally wrongful act of a State
     causes direct injury to the rights of shareholders as such, as distinct
     from those of the corporation itself, the State of nationality of any
     such shareholders is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in
     respect of its nationals.” (United Nations, Official Records of the
     General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10),
     Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
     Fifty-eighth Session, p. 66.)
   3. As regards the rights of the companies of which Mr. Diallo is the
sole shareholder and owner, while sharing the premises in the arguments
adopted by the Court, I am unable to endorse the conclusion it reaches.
Indeed, as the starting-point of its reasoning, the Court takes the position
adopted on this problem in the Barcelona Traction case cited above ;
after setting out the solution of principle, according to which the rights of
a company can only be protected by a State of its nationality and not by
the State or States of the shareholders, the Court instances a possible
exception by saying that :

        “It is quite true that it has been maintained that, for reasons of
     equity, a State should be able, in certain cases, to take up the protec-
     tion of its nationals, shareholders in a company which has been the
     victim of a violation of international law. Thus a theory has been
     developed to the effect that the State of the shareholders has a right
     of diplomatic protection when the State whose responsibility is
     invoked is the national State of the company. Whatever the validity
     of this theory may be, it is certainly not applicable to the present
     case, since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction.”
     (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium
     v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 48,
     para. 92.)
   4. So this is a “theory” which the Court confined itself to instancing,
but without discussing it or, a fortiori, taking a position on it, as the cir-
cumstances of the Barcelona Traction case did not lend themselves to
that ; indeed, there, it was a triangular relationship involving three States :
Spain as the host country of the company, Canada as the country of
nationality of the company and Belgium as the country of nationality of
the company shareholders. We know that another occasion presented
itself to the Chamber of the Court with the case concerning Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy) since, this
time, this was indeed an Italian company, whose American shareholders
complained of measures taken by the Italian authorities against that
company. However, the Chamber of the Court ruled upon and settled the
problem without having to consider the discussion referred to in 1970,
and it is most striking to note that the Chamber glossed over the Barce-
lona Traction case throughout the Judgment of 20 July 1989 ; the fact

                                                                            42

                 AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (DECL. MAHIOU)                     621

that it failed to mention it may appear surprising, although it is true that
this may be explained by the fact that, on the one hand, the problem was
not set out clearly before the Chamber by the Respondent, which did not
raise the question of the jus standi of the United States and, on the other
hand, that the solution was based on the bilateral agreements concluded
between Italy and the United States regarding the protection of invest-
ments, without there being any need to give particular consideration to
other aspects, notably whether there was a rule of customary interna-
tional law which might justify the protection of the shareholders in such
a case.
   5. Now the Court is once again asked in the present case to consider
the same problem in order to complete its jurisprudence and provide use-
ful clarifications on this question of the diplomatic protection of share-
holders. Although it is true that the question has meanwhile matured
owing to the additions to doctrine, the practice of States, bilateral or
multilateral international conventions and the jurisprudence of interna-
tional courts, the solution is not yet clear and one might have expected
the Court to settle the question of whether there is a customary rule in
this area. The Court has not met this expectation because it finds that
there is a lack of sufficiently convincing elements to draw a clear and firm
conclusion ; this position is perhaps too prudent, but it is understandable
in so far as the Court does not wish to act as legislator, above all because
the question has been under discussion by States since they have had to
consider the draft ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. It is for States
to indicate the solution which should be adopted on the basis of the ILC
proposals and more precisely of Article 11 of the above-mentioned draft,
which states :
      “A State of nationality of shareholders in a corporation shall not
    be entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of such share-
    holders in the case of an injury to the corporation unless :
    (a) The corporation has ceased to exist according to the law of the
         State of incorporation for a reason unrelated to the injury ; or
    (b) The corporation had, at the date of injury, the nationality of
         the State alleged to be responsible for causing the injury, and
         incorporation in that State was required by it as a precondition
         for doing business there.” (Op. cit., p. 59.)
   6. Were such a solution to be adopted, it seems to me that it would
allow for a balance between the legitimate protection of shareholders and
the desire not to question the classical diplomatic protection régime ; it
seeks to identify the conditions making it possible to allow for an excep-
tion in this régime, yet without going as far as excessive interference in
the relations between a State and companies of its nationality and nor-
mally falling entirely within its jurisdiction. Clarifying and developing the
argument outlined by the Court in 1970, the ILC believes that there is a
possible exception, provided that its implementation is subject to restric-
tions so as not to open the way to excessive or abusive claims likely to

                                                                          43

                 AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (DECL. MAHIOU)                     622

create upsets in international economic relations ; there are two such con-
ditions, stemming respectively from a requirement of nationality and a
statutory requirement.
   7. On the one hand, the company affected by the prejudice must have
the nationality of the State having taken the prejudicial measures ; in such
a situation, there is no longer any diplomatic protection since :
— on the one hand, the national State of the company is not going to
  exercise it against itself, as one would then be in the situation described
  by Judge Tanaka in 1970 in his separate opinion, where he states that
  “the protection of the shareholders by the national State of the com-
  pany cannot be expected, either factually or legally” (I.C.J. Reports
  1970, p. 134) ;
— and on the other hand, no other State can espouse the cause of that
  company owing to the absence of a bond of nationality.
   Consequently, if one wishes to offer foreign shareholders a minimum
of protection, the only possible solution is to grant them the benefit of the
diplomatic protection of the State of which they have the nationality.
This solution, highly controversial a few years ago, is less so today owing
to the development already referred to and above all the much more
favourable climate towards the encouragement of foreign investment.
   8. On the other hand, the incorporation of the company in that State
must be required for it to be able to trade ; if the company no longer has
any choice regarding the siting of its registered office, that constraint,
which prevents the normal operation of diplomatic protection of the
company by another State, must not deprive foreign shareholders in that
company of all protection ; they must be able to defend their rights and
thus, where appropriate, enjoy the right of diplomatic protection by the
State of which they are nationals. It thus appears that it is not a matter of
defending every shareholder in any company, but of seeing the circum-
stances in which the exception is justified and in which the conditions
required for it to come into play are reasonable and convincing ; in such
circumstances and conditions, the protection of the shareholder’s rights is
justified as a last resort, as pointed out by the Court in paragraph 88 of
the Judgment.
   The Court considers that the present case falls within the second excep-
tion laid down in Article 11 (b) of the draft ILC Articles, which the
Commission’s commentaries succinctly but adequately explain in order
to justify their basis ; in paragraph 88 of the Judgment, the Court states :

       “The theory of protection by substitution seeks indeed to offer
    protection to the foreign shareholders of a company who could not
    rely on the benefit of an international treaty and to whom no other
    remedy is available, the allegedly unlawful acts having been commit-
    ted against the company by the State of its nationality.”

                                                                          44

                 AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (DECL. MAHIOU)                    623

   9. However, while referring to this diplomatic protection theory, the
Court considers that it does not apply in this particular case, thus espous-
ing the solution in the Barcelona Traction case, but on a different basis.
Indeed, after noting that the first condition has been met — since the two
companies concerned do indeed have the nationality of the Congolese
State, the perpetrator of the unlawful acts — it considers that the second
condition has not been met, since that nationality stems from the free
choice of their owner and not from a requirement of domestic law that
would make it possible to invoke diplomatic protection. Admittedly, the
choice of Congolese nationality was made by Mr. Diallo, but it seems
hasty and questionable to conclude that it was a free choice, as the Court
does in paragraphs 92 and 93 of the Judgment.
   10. The freedom of choice is more appearance than reality when one
analyses Congolese law. According to Legislative Order No. 66-341 of
7 June 1966, any undertaking whose principal activity is in the Congo
was obliged to have its registered office and administrative seat in that
country. Although the Legislative Order appears to draw a distinction
between the administrative seat (Art. 1) and the registered office, it even-
tually confuses them (Arts. 2-3) and ultimately makes it an obligation for
both the administrative seat and registered office to be in the Congo,
when the “main centre of operations is situated in the Congo” (Art. 1).
Considering that the main — and one may even say only — centre of
operations of Mr. Diallo’s two companies is in fact situated in the
Congo, this necessarily means their establishment and incorporation in
that country. They had no choice for, failing such incorporation, “they
will be struck off the Trade Register” (Art. 2 (2)), which would prevent
them from existing or trading in the Congo. Consequently, owing to this
situation of fact and law, it seems clear that, in this case, we are consid-
ering matters from the standpoint of Article 11 (b) of the ILC draft, cor-
responding to the situation in which it would be legitimate for the right
to diplomatic protection by the shareholders’ State of nationality to come
into play when prejudicial measures have been taken by the State against
the company of its nationality. This is why, while endorsing the Court’s
approach, I cannot, however, endorse either the interpretation it gives of
Congolese legislation or, consequently, its final conclusion on that basis
in paragraph 1 (b) and paragraph 3 (c) of the operative part of the
Judgment.
   11. I should now like to deal with another aspect of the problem which
has come to light as a result of new developments since the end of the
oral proceedings. Whereas the case appeared to fall solely within Arti-
cle 11 (b) of the ILC draft, the case could also fall under Article 11 (a),
inasmuch as one of Mr. Diallo’s two companies — Africom-Zaire — has
allegedly disappeared through the action of the Congolese authorities,
which have struck it off the commercial register of companies established
in that country.
   12. In paragraph 22, basing itself on the DRC’s letter of 31 Janu-
ary 2007 relating to Africom-Zaire, the Judgment points out that the lat-

                                                                         45

                 AHMADOU SADIO DIALLO (DECL. MAHIOU)                      624

ter company had allegedly “ceased all activity in the mid-1980s”, which
had led to its being automatically struck off the Trade Register. This is a
new element — which has arisen since the end of the oral proceedings on
the preliminary objections — which may have a direct bearing on the
progress of the present case that merits consideration. Paragraph 59 of
the Judgment refers to this problem, but in a way which does not seem to
me satisfactory ; it is not enough, in my opinion, to reserve all the future
implications, and what counts above all is to ensure that the Court’s deci-
sion on the preliminary objections does not prevent the Applicant from
raising the problem when the case is considered on the merits. Indeed,
were the disappearance of Africom-Zaire to be confirmed, it would create
a situation in which there was no longer any possibility for that company
to argue its case for itself and thereby to defend the rights and interests of
its sole shareholder. This complete impossibility of any action through
the company would thus deprive its sole shareholder of any remedy, if he
were refused diplomatic protection by Guinea ; we would then be faced
with an unjust solution running not only counter to equity but also to the
fundamental principles governing the rights of defence and human rights.
The Court, the International Law Commission and doctrine have all
been concerned by this problem.

   13. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court expressly refers to this as
the first exception to the classical rule of diplomatic protection in para-
graphs 64-68 (I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 40-41). It is true that the Court
concludes in that case that the company did not disappear and, conse-
quently, that this exception was not relevant in the case. However, it may
be inferred from the Court’s reasoning that, if the hypothesis of disap-
pearance had been proven, it would without any doubt have ruled in
favour of the operation of the exception. This is the solution adopted in
the above-mentioned Article 11 (a) of the ILC draft, which makes it the
first exception to the general rule of diplomatic protection, enabling the
State of nationality of shareholders to exercise protection where “the cor-
poration has ceased to exist according to the law of the State of incor-
poration”. This solution, already supported in the past by part of doc-
trine, now, since the Barcelona Traction case, appears to enjoy widespread
support. In conclusion, it seems to me that the Court ought to have said
more clearly and precisely, in the present Judgment, that it expressly
reserved the situation which might result from the confirmation of the
disappearance of Africom-Zaire, with the consequences likely to arise
therefrom for the subsequent procedure.

                                              (Signed) Ahmed MAHIOU.

                                                                           46


DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETREN
{ Translation ]

Having voted against the adoption of the Order, [ append a dissenting
opinion.

Considering the identity of claims and submissions between this case
and the Nuclear Tests case ( Australia v. France), as well as the coincident
circumstances of fact and law, [ was of the opinion that the two cases
should have been joined even at the present stage of the proceedings. The
Court having rejected that proposal, it only remains for me to express the
same opinion here as in the other case.

I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority either with regard
to the deferment, to a later stage in the proceedings, of the questions of
the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, or with
regard to the indication of provisional measures.

In my view, the questions of the Court’s jurisdiction and of the admis-
sibility of the Application, and also the question of the indication of
provisional measures, fall into a common framework as follows:

Before undertaking the examination of the merits of the case, the
International Court of Justice, like any other court, has the duty of
making sure as far as possible that it possesses jurisdiction and that the
application is admissible. The absence of the State against which applica-
tion is made does not alter this requirement in any way. On the contrary,
Article 53 of the Statute lays an obligation on the Court to satisfy itself
as to its possession of jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application
on the basis of the elements at its disposal. Among the latter in the present
case are the arguments put forward by France in the letter handed in by
its Ambassador, and by New Zealand in its Application and in its oral
pleadings of 24-25 May 1973. It is, however, the Court’s duty also to
consider any other elements that it may find relevant. The fact that New
Zealand has requested provisional measures does not dispense the Court
from the obligation of beginning by an examination of the questions of
its jurisdiction and of the admissibility of the Application; indeed, it
makes that examination, if anything, more urgent.

For it to be possible for the Court to consider that it has jurisdiction
on the merits of the case, it would, as I see it, be necessary for it to approve
at least one of three propositions which would serve to underpin the
Application of the New Zealand Government:

1. The reservation expressed by France when in 1966 it renewed its accep-
tance of the Court’s jurisdiction, a reservation referring to activities

28
NUCLEAR TESTS (DISS. OP. PETREN) 160

connected with French national defence, is not valid;

2. The nuclear tests referred to in the New Zealand Application are not
connected with French national defence;

3. The General Act of 1928 has remained in force as between States
parties to that Act in 1944, the consequence of which is that reserva-
tions made by such States in accepting after 1945 the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice are without effect in their relations
among themselves.

The questions thus raised for the Court do not concern the merits of the
case. They occur in a general framework of international law and, in my
view, the Court would not have needed any further explanations from
the New Zealand Government in order to resolve them, and it could and
should have settled them on the basis of the elements at its disposal.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the question of
jurisdiction raises the issue of the extent to which the 1928 General Act
can have survived the disappearance of the League of Nations and its
organs, as also of the effect, if any, of such survival on the reservations
made by States parties to that Act when accepting the jurisdiction of the
present Court. Now Article 63 of the Statute required that these States
should be notified without delay that such questions were submitted to
the Court in the present case. If they had been so notified, they would
already have had the opportunity of manifesting their astonishment,
their satisfaction or their indifference in regard to the contention of the
New Zealand Government mentioned under 3 above. But the fact that
the required notification has not yet been made does not justify the Court
in today inviting the New Zealand Government to present, at a later
stage in the proceedings, further argument on the question of jurisdiction.

I am therefore of the opinion that the Court should not have opened
a new phase of the case for that purpose but, on the contrary, should have
requested the New Zealand Government to complete its argument on that
issue in the present stage of the case.

As the Court has now deferred its decision on the question of juris-
diction, I am unable to indicate here and now my own assessment of the
various factors entering into the consideration of that question.

Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government’s request for the indication
of provisional measures obliges me to examine whether the pre-conditions
for the Court’s ability to indicate such measures have been fulfilled.

Among those pre-conditions, certain relate to the question of juris-
diction. In that connection the New Zealand Government has referred
inter alia to the Orders made by the Court on 17 August 1972 in the two
Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. In both of these Orders the Court considered
that on a request for provisional measures it need not, before indicating
them, finally satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction on the merits of the
case, but that it ought not to act under Article 41 of the Statute if the
absence of jurisdiction was manifest.

29
NUCLEAR TESTS (DISS. OP. PETREN) 161

The New Zealand Government sought to draw from this consi-
derandum the conclusion that it is only when the absence of the Court’s
jurisdiction is manifest that it ought not to act under Article 41 of the
Statute. It is not possible to accept such an interpretation. The paragraph
in question simply alludes to two extreme situations: one in which the
jurisdiction of the Court is finally established and another in which the
absence of jurisdiction is manifest. It says that the existence of the first
situation is not a necessary pre-condition for the indication of provisional
measures and that, in the second situation, the Court should not indicate
such measures, which is a self-evident observation that does not lend
itself to broader conclusions. The paragraph does not say in accordance
with what criteria, within the area lying between finally established
jurisdiction and manifest absence of jurisdiction, the line must be drawn
between the situations which permit the application of Article 41 and
those which do not permit it. It is only in a later paragraph, which the
two Orders also have in common, that a reply is found to that question.
There the Court indicates that it considers that a provision in a certain
instrument emanating from the Parties appears, prima facie, to afford a
possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded.

In the present case, it appears from paragraph 14 of the Order that the
Court has been guided by that precedent, for it there expresses the opinion
that it ought not to indicate interim measures unless the provisions
invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded. I can agree to this formula,
which in my view signifies that for Article 41 of the Statute to be appli-
cable it is not sufficient for a mere adumbration of proof, considered in
isolation, to indicate the possibility of the Court’s possessing jurisdiction:
that there must also be a probability transpiring from an examination of
the whole of the elements at the Court’s disposal.

I have therefore been impelled to carry out such an examination. In the
event, however, I do not find it probable that the three propositions
mentioned above, or any one of them, may afford a basis on which to
found the jurisdiction of the Court. For the reason already mentioned,
I find myself, at the present stage of the proceedings, prevented from
setting forth the considerations which have led me to that conclusion and
preclude me from voting for the indication of provisional measures.

Alongside the question of the Court’s jurisdiction, there arises that of the
admissibility of New Zealand’s Application. As I understand that term, it
includes the examination of every question that arises in connection with
the ascertainment of whether the Court has been validly seised of the case.
But what is first and foremost necessary from that point of view is to ask
oneself whether atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons are, generally spea-
king, already governed by norms of international law, or whether they do
not still belong to a highly political domain where the norms concerning
their international legality or illegality are still at the gestation stage.

30
NUCLEAR TESTS (DISS. OP, PETREN) 162

Certainly, the existence of nuclear weapons and the tests serving to
perfect and multiply them, are among the foremost subjects of dread for
mankind today. To exorcise their spectre, is, however, primarily a matter
for statesmen. One must hope that they will one day succeed in estab-
lishing a state of affairs, both political and legal, which will shield the
whole of mankind from the anxiety created by nuclear arms. Meanwhile
there is the question whether the moment has already come when an
international tribunal is the appropriate recipient of an application like
that directed in the present case against but one of the present nuclear
Powers.

The Order defers the question of the admissibility of the Application,
like that of the Court’s jurisdiction, to a later stage in the proceedings.
Iam unable to concur in this decision, because I consider that the Court
could and should have settled in its present session the whole of the
preliminary and urgent questions which arise in the case and concerning
which it is incumbent upon the Court to take up a position proprio motu.

To avoid anticipating such vote as I may cast in the new phase of the
proceedings, 1 must, I feel, refrain from saying anything more on the
question of the admissibility of the Application. [ do not, moreover, find
it necessary to answer the question whether it appears probable that the
Application is admissible, which constitutes one of the conditions
enabling the Court to cross the threshold of Article 41 of its Statute and
indicate provisional measures. Having already found Article 41 in-
applicable in this instance owing to the improbability that France, despite
the reservation it has attached to its acceptance of the Court’s juris-
diction, could be held subject thereto in the present case, | have no need
to pronounce upon any other aspects of the question of the applicability
of Article 41.

(Signed) S. PETRÉN.

31


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA v. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

ORDER OF 18 MARCH 1965

1965

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRES DU SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN

(ETHIOPIE c. AFRIQUE DU SUD;
LIBERIA c. AFRIQUE DU SUD)

ORDONNANCE DU 18 MARS 1965
Official citation:
South West Africa, Order of 18 March 1965,
I.C.]. Reports 1965, p. 3.

Mode officiel de citation:
Sud-Ouest africain, ordonnance du 18 mars 1965,

C.I.J. Recueil 1965, p. 3.

Sales number 99 3
N° de vente:

1965
18 March
General List:
Nos. 46 & 47

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1965

18 March 1965

SOUTH WEST AFRICA CASES

(ETHIOPIA v. SOUTH AFRICA;
LIBERIA v. SOUTH AFRICA)

ORDER

Present: President Sir Percy SPENDER; Vice-President WELLING-
TON Koo; Judges WINIARSKI, BADAWI, SPIROPOULOS,
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, KORETSKY, TANAKA, JESSUP,
MORELLI, FORSTER, GROS; Judges ad hoc Sir Louis
MBANEFO, VAN WYK; Deputy-Registray AQUARONE.

THE COURT,

composed as above,
after deliberation,
having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,

In the proceedings instituted before the Court by the Applications
filed in the Registry of the Court on 4 November 1960 by the
Government of Ethiopia and the Government of Liberia against
the Government of South Africa,

makes the following Order :

Having regard to the notification to the Court by the Respondent
on 14 March 1965 of its intention to make an application to the
Court relating to the composition of the Court for the purposes of
the cases now before it;

4
4 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (ORDER OF 18 III 65)

Whereas the said notification was duly communicated to the
Agents for the Applicants;

Whereas, in accordance with the terms of Article 46 of the Statute
of the Court, the Court decided to hear the contentions of the
Parties with regard to the application of the Respondent concerning
the composition of the Court, in closed hearings by the Court;

Having heard the contentions of the Parties at closed hearings
held on 15 and 16 March 1965,

THE CourT

by eight votes to six,
decides not to accede to the said application.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authori-
tative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of
March, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five, in four copies,
one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the
others transmitted to the Government of Ethiopia, the Government
of Liberia and the Government of South Africa, respectively.

(Signed) Percy C. SPENDER,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Deputy-Registrar.


                                                                                271

                                           OPINION DISSIDENTE
                                      DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC DUGARD

                    [Traduction]

                       Membres du Mouvement Guardabarranco de défense de l’environnement
                    interdits d’accès au territoire litigieux en application de l’ordonnance de 2011, en
                    tant que pouvant être considérés comme des agents civils — Incompatibilité de leur
                    présence avec l’objet et le but de l’ordonnance de 2011 — Risque de préjudice
                    irréparable pesant sur le Costa Rica du fait de leur accès au territoire litigieux.

                       1. En 2011, à la suite de l’entrée des forces armées du Nicaragua à Isla
                    Portillos et de leur occupation de ce territoire (ci-après le « territoire liti-
                    gieux »), la Cour, tout en déclarant que la souveraineté revendiquée par
                    le Costa Rica sur celui-ci était plausible, a ordonné aux deux Parties de
                    s’abstenir d’y envoyer ou d’y maintenir « des agents, qu’ils soient civils, de
                    police ou de sécurité » (Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la
                    région frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), mesures conservatoires,
                    ordonnance du 8 mars 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 27, par. 86, point 1).
                    La Cour entendait ainsi exclure du territoire litigieux toute personne sus-
                    ceptible d’aggraver le différend ou dont la présence aurait pu avoir une
                    incidence sur sa décision définitive quant au fond. Telle est la raison pour
                    laquelle, tout en jugeant « plausible » la souveraineté revendiquée par le
                    Costa Rica, elle a ordonné aux agents des deux Parties de rester en dehors
                    de ce territoire (ibid., p. 20, par. 59). Telle est également la raison pour
                    laquelle elle n’a autorisé que les agents civils costa-riciens chargés de la
                    protection de l’environnement à entrer dans le territoire litigieux — encore
                    cette autorisation est-elle assortie de conditions très strictes (ibid., p. 27,
                    par. 86, point 2). Il fallait en effet assurer la protection de l’environne-
                    ment en attendant que le différend soit réglé et la Cour ne pouvait assi-
                    gner cette tâche qu’au Costa Rica, lui seul ayant été réputé détenir un
                    titre plausible sur le territoire en question, et lui seul étant responsable
                    d’en protéger l’environnement au titre de la convention de Ramsar. La
                    troisième mesure conservatoire, qui prescrit aux Parties de « s’abst[enir]
                    de tout acte qui risquerait d’aggraver ou d’étendre le différend dont la
                    Cour est saisie » (ibid., p. 27, par. 86, point 3 ; les italiques sont de moi),
                    doit être interprétée comme soulignant la nécessité d’empêcher la pré-
                    sence dans le territoire litigieux de toute autre personne que celles expres-
                    sément autorisées à s’y trouver. Si, dans la présente ordonnance, la Cour
                    exprime sa « préoccupation » quant au fait que « la présence de groupes
                    organisés de ressortissants nicaraguayens dans le territoire litigieux com-
                    porte un risque d’incidents susceptibles d’aggraver le … différend »
                    (ordonnance, par. 37), elle ne modifie toutefois pas son ordonnance du
                    8 mars 2011 pour préciser que la présence de tels groupes organisés est

                                                                                45

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                         certaines activités ; construction d’une route (op. diss. dugard)     272

                    incompatible avec celle-ci. L’absence de toute précision à cet égard ouvre
                    la voie à de nouvelles incursions de groupes organisés de ressortissants
                    nicaraguayens dans le territoire litigieux et, partant, à un préjudice irrépa-
                    rable pour le Costa Rica. Pour cette raison, je ne puis souscrire à la pré-
                    sente ordonnance.
                       2. Dans sa demande, le Costa Rica priait la Cour de modifier son
                    ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires de 2011 afin de pré-
                    ciser que, dans l’attente de sa décision au fond, les deux Parties ne devaient
                    laisser quiconque, si ce n’est les agents environnementaux costa-riciens
                    spécialement autorisés par cette ordonnance, se rendre dans le territoire
                    litigieux afin d’empêcher qu’un préjudice irréparable ne puisse être causé
                    tant à des personnes qu’à l’environnement. Une telle précision n’était
                    peut-être pas nécessaire, du moins en ce qui concerne les activités de
                    groupes de jeunes écologistes soutenus par l’un ou l’autre des deux gou-
                    vernements, si l’on considère que l’ordonnance de 2011 leur barre déjà
                    l’accès au territoire litigieux. Toutefois, pour que ce point soit bien clair,
                    le Costa Rica demandait la modification de l’ordonnance de 2011.
                       3. Avant d’examiner la demande de modification présentée par le
                    Costa Rica au titre de l’article 76 du Règlement de la Cour, il y a lieu de
                    se poser la question de savoir si l’interdiction imposée aux deux Parties
                    dans le cadre de la première mesure conservatoire de 2011, qui leur pres-
                    crit de « s’abst[enir] d’envoyer ou de maintenir sur le territoire litigieux, y
                    compris le caño, des agents, qu’ils soient civils, de police ou de sécurité »,
                    s’applique aux membres du Mouvement Guardabarranco de défense de
                    l’environnement (ci-après le « Guardabarranco »). Il s’agit là d’une ques-
                    tion qui, en toute rigueur, relève du fond. Néanmoins, la demande de
                    modification du Costa Rica visant pour l’essentiel à obtenir de la Cour
                    des précisions et une interprétation quant à la portée de son ordonnance
                    de 2011, cette question doit être examinée à ce stade. Elle est même incon-
                    tournable puisqu’elle est essentielle pour apprécier l’opportunité de modi-
                    fier ou non les mesures conservatoires existantes, le Costa Rica cherchant
                    par sa demande à faire en sorte que, en attendant la décision au fond,
                    aucun préjudice irréparable ne soit causé à son droit plausible sur le terri-
                    toire litigieux du fait de l’incursion de membres du Guardabarranco.
                       4. La réponse à la question de savoir si les membres du Guardabar-
                    ranco entrent dans les prévisions de l’ordonnance de 2011 dépend de l’in-
                    terprétation du terme « agents ». Dans la présente ordonnance, la Cour
                    n’examine pas le sens de ce terme mais semble tenir pour acquis que
                    celui-ci désigne les employés gouvernementaux étant donné que, en 2011,
                    le Costa Rica tirait uniquement grief de la présence de forces armées,
                    voire de police (paragraphe 80 de l’ordonnance de 2011), sans faire
                    aucune mention de la présence de personnes privées dans le territoire liti-
                    gieux (voir le paragraphe 23 de la présente ordonnance). Le terme
                    « agents » doit toutefois s’entendre en un sens plus large afin d’englober
                    les membres du Guardabarranco, pour les raisons suivantes.
                       5. Tout d’abord, le terme « agents » (personnel en anglais) peut s’inter-
                    préter comme englobant les personnes qui font partie d’une organisation

                                                                                46

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                         certaines activités ; construction d’une route (op. diss. dugard)      273

                    assurant un service donné. Le Free Online Dictionary définit ce terme
                    anglais comme l’« ensemble des personnes employées ou actives dans une
                    organisation, une entreprise ou un service ». Pour le Concise Oxford Dic‑
                    tionary, il s’agit d’un « groupe de personnes engagées dans une mission de
                    service public ». Le Guardabarranco est manifestement une organisation
                    engagée au service de la protection de l’environnement du territoire qu’il
                    considère comme nicaraguayen. Ses membres pourraient donc être vus
                    comme « des agents civils » frappés par l’interdiction contenue dans la
                    première mesure conservatoire indiquée dans l’ordonnance de 2011.
                       6. Cette ordonnance prescrivant à chaque Partie de s’abstenir d’en-
                    voyer dans le territoire litigieux « des agents, qu’ils soient civils, de police
                    ou de sécurité », il pourrait en être déduit que les agents civils doivent au
                    moins être des personnes engagées au service du Nicaragua — encore
                    qu’il ne soit suggéré nulle part que leur action doive prendre la forme
                    d’un engagement rémunéré. Or, à en juger par les faits présentés à la
                    Cour, il est clair que le Guardabarranco et ses membres sont engagés
                    dans une mission de service public pour le compte du Nicaragua.
                       7. La nature précise du Guardabarranco n’est pas claire. Ce mouve-
                    ment semble poursuivre deux objectifs : la protection de l’environnement
                    et la défense de la patrie nicaraguayenne. Selon un article de M. Tim Rogers
                    publié dans le Nicaragua Dispatch du 26 septembre 2012, dont le Nicara-
                    gua n’a pas contesté l’authenticité, M. Oscar Garcia, un ingénieur forestier
                    du ministère de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles, a présenté le
                    Guardabarranco comme ayant vocation à « susciter une prise de conscience
                    écologique, [à] créer un sentiment de fierté nationale et de défense de la
                    patrie ». Il est généralement admis que le Guardabarranco entretient des
                    liens étroits avec la jeunesse sandiniste, l’aile jeune du parti au pouvoir au
                    Nicaragua. Le Nicaragua n’a pas davantage nié que des membres du
                    Guardabarranco avaient hissé le drapeau nicaraguayen en plusieurs
                    endroits du territoire litigieux et qu’ils arboraient celui-ci lors de leurs mis-
                    sions dans ce territoire. Peut-être le Nicaragua a-t-il raison de relever que
                    le Guardabarranco n’agit pas sous sa direction ou son contrôle. Il n’est
                    d’ailleurs pas nécessaire de déterminer à ce stade si les actes des membres
                    de ce mouvement peuvent être attribués au Nicaragua, cette question rele-
                    vant du fond. Il n’en reste pas moins que le Guardabarranco est un mou-
                    vement de jeunes nationalistes lié à la jeunesse sandiniste dont l’action vise
                    à la fois à protéger l’environnement du territoire litigieux et à y affirmer la
                    souveraineté du Nicaragua. La frontière est très ténue entre, d’une part,
                    une simple tolérance du Nicaragua à l’égard de la présence de ces per-
                    sonnes dans le territoire litigieux et, de l’autre, des encouragements de sa
                    part. Son soutien va manifestement au-delà de la simple tolérance à en
                    juger par la lettre dans laquelle M. Samuel Santos López, son ministre des
                    affaires étrangères, « se félicite » des activités menées par des groupes de
                    jeunes dans le territoire litigieux. En faisant référence dans son ordon-
                    nance à des « groupes organisés de personnes » (par. 25) ou à des « groupes
                    organisés de ressortissants nicaraguayens » (par. 37), la Cour ne rend pas
                    compte de la véritable nature du Guardabarranco en tant que mouvement

                                                                                47

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                         certaines activités ; construction d’une route (op. diss. dugard)       274

                    de jeunesse nationaliste entretenant des liens avec le parti sandiniste au
                    pouvoir au Nicaragua. Le Guardabarranco n’est peut-être pas un groupe
                    organisé de fonctionnaires rémunérés du Nicaragua, mais il peut assuré-
                    ment être considéré comme un groupe de personnes employées ou actives
                    dans une organisation au service des objectifs et intérêts du Gouvernement
                    nicaraguayen. En résumé, il s’agit d’« agents civils » au sens de la première
                     mesure conservatoire indiquée par la Cour dans son ordonnance de 2011.
                        8. Bien que les activités du Guardabarranco apparaissent comme rele-
                    vant des termes de l’ordonnance de 2011, le Nicaragua nie que tel soit le
                    cas. Aussi le Costa Rica a-t-il demandé la modification de cette ordonnance
                    pour qu’il soit précisé que les activités en question tombent effectivement
                    sous le coup de ses dispositions. Ce faisant, il a fait valoir que, si les activi-
                    tés du Guardabarranco n’entraient pas dans les prévisions expresses de l’or-
                    donnance de 2011, elles étaient contraires à l’objet et au but de celle-ci.
                        9. L’objet et le but de l’ordonnance de 2011 consistaient à faire en
                    sorte que toutes les personnes non autorisées, qu’elles soient ressortis-
                    santes du Nicaragua ou du Costa Rica, restent en dehors du territoire
                    litigieux en attendant le règlement de l’affaire au fond. La référence faite
                    aux « agents » des Parties dans la première mesure conservatoire visait
                    peut-être uniquement les représentants du gouvernement (encore que je
                    conteste cette interprétation, voir par. 4-7), étant donné que, en 2010-
                    2011, seuls des représentants du Gouvernement et de l’armée du Nicara-
                    gua étaient entrés dans le territoire contesté et que l’entrée de personnes
                    privées dans celui-ci n’avait été envisagée ni par le Costa Rica ni par la
                    Cour (voir les paragraphes 23 et 25 de la présente ordonnance). Toute-
                    fois, l’intention de la Cour d’exclure toute personne non autorisée du ter-
                    ritoire litigieux ressortait clairement de la deuxième mesure conservatoire,
                    qui prévoyait que seuls les agents civils costa-riciens chargés de protéger
                    l’environnement de ce territoire pourraient s’y rendre, sous réserve de cer-
                    taines conditions strictes. Il n’est laissé à entendre nulle part que les
                    « agents civils » en question devaient être des employés rémunérés du
                     Gouvernement costa-ricien : des écologistes liés à des ONG environne-
                    mentales auraient sans doute pu être mandatés à cette fin. Ce qui était
                    clair, en revanche, c’est qu’il était interdit au Costa Rica d’envoyer dans
                    le territoire litigieux une multitude d’étudiants militant pour la protection
                    de l’environnement. Il s’ensuit nécessairement que des membres d’un
                    mouvement costa-ricien semblable au Guardabarranco ne pouvaient
                    accéder au territoire litigieux afin d’y mener des activités destinées à
                    protéger l’environnement, bien que le titre du Costa Rica eût été jugé
                     « plausible ». Les trois premières mesures conservatoires indiquées dans
                     l’ordonnance de 2011 ne peuvent donc tout simplement pas être interpré-
                    tées comme autorisant des personnes privées affiliées à une quelconque
                    organisation costa-ricienne ou nicaraguayenne à se rendre dans le terri-
                    toire litigieux, que ces personnes aient ou non à cœur de défendre l’envi-
                    ronnement. L’accès à ce territoire est, à plus forte raison, interdit à des
                    mouvements de jeunesse nationalistes luttant pour protéger l’environne-
                    ment et l’intérêt national de l’une ou l’autre des Parties.

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                         certaines activités ; construction d’une route (op. diss. dugard)      275

                       10. Se pose ensuite la question de savoir si la demande du Costa Rica
                    tendant à la modification de l’ordonnance de 2011 répond aux conditions
                    requises pour que des mesures conservatoires puissent être indiquées.
                       11. La Cour a conclu que la présence dans le territoire litigieux de
                    groupes organisés de personnes n’entrant pas dans les prévisions de l’or-
                    donnance de 2011 constituait « un changement de situation au sens de
                    l’article 76 du Règlement, que le Costa Rica pou[v]ait être fondé à invo-
                    quer au soutien de sa demande tendant à la modification de ladite ordon-
                    nance » (voir le paragraphe 25 de l’ordonnance). La Cour a estimé inutile
                    de réexaminer les exigences relatives à la plausibilité, à tout le moins, des
                    droits allégués par le Costa Rica et à l’existence d’un lien entre les droits
                    faisant l’objet de l’instance pendante devant elle et les mesures conserva-
                    toires sollicitées (Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région
                    frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance
                    du 8 mars 2011, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 19‑21, par. 58-62).
                       12. La Cour a déclaré que le Costa Rica n’avait pas démontré que la
                    présence de membres du Guardabarranco dans le territoire litigieux
                    constituait un risque réel et imminent de préjudice irréparable pour ses
                    droits à la souveraineté sur ce territoire ou pour l’environnement de
                    celui-ci (voir le paragraphe 35 de l’ordonnance). Je ne suis pas d’accord
                    avec cette conclusion.
                       13. La raison de mon désaccord tient à l’appréciation que la Cour a
                    faite de la nature du Guardabarranco et du risque posé par ce mouve-
                    ment pour les droits du Costa Rica sur le territoire en cause. Ainsi qu’ex-
                    posé ci-dessus (par. 7), le Guardabarranco n’est pas un groupe de jeunes
                    écologistes sans frontières dont le seul souci serait la protection de l’envi-
                    ronnement. Il s’agit d’un mouvement de jeunes nationalistes qui est lié à
                    la jeunesse sandiniste et dont l’action vise à la fois à protéger l’environne-
                    ment et à défendre la patrie nicaraguayenne. Soutenu et encouragé par le
                    Gouvernement nicaraguayen, ce mouvement considère que la patrie
                    inclut le territoire litigieux. Nous n’avons pas affaire à un petit groupe
                    d’écologistes studieux effectuant des visites sérieuses dans le territoire liti-
                    gieux pour en étudier l’environnement de manière scientifique. Il est diffi-
                    cile de savoir précisément combien de membres du Guardabarranco se
                    sont rendus dans ce territoire au cours des dernières années, mais plus
                    de 6000 se sont livrés à des activités dans la région du fleuve San Juan. Le
                    Nicaragua ne conteste pas ce chiffre mais précise que ces 6000 membres
                    du Guardabarranco sont allés dans la région du fleuve San Juan, qui
                    englobe à la fois des zones nicaraguayennes et le territoire litigieux. Ces
                    personnes ne voyagent pas en petits groupes, elles se déplacent en grand
                    nombre en brandissant le drapeau nicaraguayen, comme tel est le propre
                    de tout mouvement nationaliste. Heureusement, le Costa Rica n’a ni
                    encouragé ni autorisé de jeunes Costa-Riciens à se comporter ainsi. Si le
                    Costa Rica — qui, à la différence du Nicaragua, a démontré être titulaire
                    d’un titre plausible sur le territoire litigieux — avait agi de la sorte, ce
                    territoire aurait sans nul doute été le théâtre d’affrontements entre groupes
                    écologistes rivaux.

                                                                                49

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                        certaines activités ; construction d’une route (op. diss. dugard)   276

                       14. De mon point de vue, la présence de membres du Guardabarranco
                    dans le territoire litigieux est l’étincelle qui risque de mettre le feu aux
                    poudres. L’histoire abonde en exemples de violences commises par des
                    mouvements de jeunesse champions d’une cause nationale. Ces précé-
                    dents historiques ne peuvent être tout simplement ignorés. Il existe un
                    risque réel d’atteintes à l’intégrité physique de personnes et de dommages
                    à l’environnement. En effet, si rien n’est fait pour mettre un terme à la
                    situation actuelle, il est raisonnablement permis de craindre une escalade
                    et, partant, un préjudice. La situation revêt en outre un caractère urgent.
                    Empêché par l’ordonnance du 8 mars 2011 d’envoyer son armée ou ses
                    représentants dans le territoire litigieux, le Gouvernement du Nicaragua a
                    usé d’un stratagème en faisant appel à une armée de jeunes écologistes
                    nationalistes pour agir à leur place. En exprimant sa « préoccupation »
                    (voir le paragraphe 37 de l’ordonnance) sans s’alarmer davantage, la
                    Cour rejette ce stratagème sans grande fermeté et ne mesure pas la gravité
                    de la situation.
                       15. Dans ces circonstances, j’estime que la Cour aurait dû accéder à la
                    demande du Costa Rica tendant à la modification de l’ordonnance du
                    8 mars 2011 afin de préciser que la présence de membres du Guardabar-
                    ranco ou d’entités similaires, qu’elles soient nicaraguayennes ou costa-
                    riciennes, était contraire à celle-ci. Ce faisant, la Cour aurait fait savoir
                    aux deux Parties qu’elles étaient tenues de contrôler l’accès au territoire
                    litigieux et d’en interdire l’entrée aux groupes de personnes privées, qu’il
                    s’agisse d’écologistes ou non. Pareille modification aurait été conforme
                    à la première mesure conservatoire indiquée dans l’ordonnance du
                    8 mars 2011, prise en son sens large, ainsi qu’à l’objet et au but de cette
                    ordonnance. Elle aurait également été conforme à la troisième mesure
                    conservatoire, prescrivant aux deux Parties de « s’abst[enir] de tout acte
                    qui risquerait d’aggraver ou d’étendre le différend dont la Cour est saisie
                    ou d’en rendre la solution plus difficile ».

                                                                     (Signé) John Dugard.

                                                                                50

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305

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

1. Notwithstanding my agreement with the operative part of the Order,
I consider it necessary to make the following observations.

2. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is in force between the
Parties. It prescribes:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.”

3. Yugoslavia maintains that the Respondent has violated:

“the obligation contained in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide not to impose deliberately on
a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group . . .” (Application of Yugoslavia,
p. 12).

Furthermore, during the public hearings Yugoslavia stated “in the cir-
cumstances the intensive bombing of Yugoslav populated areas consti-
tutes a breach of Article II of the Genocide Convention” (CR 99/25,
p. 12, Brownlie).

4. The Respondent considers that it has not violated the Genocide
Convention, because no genocide crimes have been committed during or
as a result of the military intervention of the NATO countries in Yugo-
slavia.

5. In its Judgment of 11 July 1996 the Court admitted prima facie the
existence of a legal dispute between the Parties because of the existence
of:

“‘a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance
of certain treaty obligations’ (/nterpretation of Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opin-
ion, LC.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)

and that, by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints
formulated against it by Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘there is a legal
dispute’ between them (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1 CJ.
Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22)” (Application of the Convention on

50
306 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. PARRA-ARANGUREN)

the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Prelimi-
nary Objections, LC.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 614-615, para. 29).

6. Consequently, taking into account the allegations of the Parties in
these incidental proceedings, there appears to exist, prima facie, a “legal
dispute” between them regarding the interpretation and application of
the Genocide Convention. For this reason, Article LX of the Genocide
Convention is applicable and, in my opinion, the Court has prima facie
jurisdiction to entertain the request for provisional measures presented
by Yugoslavia.

7. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is the only prima facie basis
for jurisdiction of the Court in the present case. Therefore the only pro-
visional measures that it can indicate are those aiming to guarantee the
rights of the Applicant under the Genocide Convention.

8. Yugoslavia is requesting the Court to indicate that the Respondent
“shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain from
any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia” (CR 99/14, p. 63, Etinski). However, the threat or use of force
against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention. Consequently the provisional
measures requested by Yugoslavia do not aim to guarantee its rights
under the Genocide Convention, Le., the right not to suffer acts which
may be qualified as genocide crimes by the Convention. Therefore, in my
opinion, the measures requested by Yugoslavia shall not be indicated.

(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

51


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
ELETTRONICA SICULA S.p.A. (ELSI)

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ITALY)

ORDER OF 20 DECEMBER 1988
COMPOSITION OF CHAMBER

1988

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE
DE L’ELETTRONICA SICULA S.p.A. (ELSI)

(ÉTATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE c. ITALIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 20 DÉCEMBRE 1988

COMPOSITION DE LA CHAMBRE
Official citation :

Elettronica Sicula S.p.4. (ELSI),
Composition of Chamber, Order of 20 December 1988,
C.J. Reports 1988, p. 158.

Mode officiel de citation :

Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELST),
composition de la Chambre, ordonnance du 20 décembre 1988,
C.LJ. Recueil 1988, p. 158.

Sales number 5 48
N° de vente : d

1988
20 December
General List
No. 76

158

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1988

20 December 1988

CASE CONCERNING
ELETTRONICA SICULA S.p.A. (ELSI)

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA y. ITALY)

ORDER

COMPOSITION OF CHAMBER

Present: President RUDA; Vice-President MBAYE; Judges LACHS, ODA,

AGO, SCHWEBEL, Sir Robert JENNINGS, BEDJAOUI, Ni, EVENSEN,
TARASSOV, GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN; Registrar VALENCIA-
OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court,
and to Articles 17, 18 and 31 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Order made by the Court on 2 March 1987 by

which the Court (inter alia) declared a Chamber to deal with the case

concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) to have been duly constituted
with the following composition: Judge Nagendra Singh, President of the
Chamber; Judges Oda, Ago, Schwebel and Sir Robert Jennings;

Whereas Judge Nagendra Singh, President of the Chamber, died on
11 December 1988;

Whereas the Parties have been further consulted with regard to the
159 ELETTRONICA SICULA (ORDER 20 XII 88)

composition of the Chamber in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the Rules of Court;

Declares:

(1) that at an election held on 20 December 1988, Judge Ruda was elected
a Member of the Chamber to fill the vacancy left by the death of
Judge Nagendra Singh;

(2) that as a result of this election the Chamber is composed as follows:

President Ruda,
Judges Oda,
Ago,
Schwebel,
Sir Robert Jennings.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of December, one thou-
sand nine hundred and eighty-eight, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted to the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America and to the Government of Italy,
respectively.

(Signed) José Maria Rupa,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.