                   637

                            Declaration of Judge Cançado Trindade

                      1. The situation which the Court has just faced before delivering the
                   present Order is far from satisfactory, and the Order itself can hardly be
                   seen as entirely satisfactory either : although it amounts to a step condu-
                   cive to a decision on reparations in the present case of Ahmadou Sadio
                   Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo), yet a deci-
                   sion to that effect is, once again, postponed by the Court. In my under-
                   standing, the Court could, and should, have already decided on the
                   reparations due ultimately to Mr. A. S. Diallo, in its Judgment on the
                   merits, of 30 November 2010. This would have been more in conformity
                   with the principle of humanity, the principle of the good administration
                   of justice (la bonne administration de la justice), and the mens legis of the
                   applicable law in the cas d’espèce, namely, the 1966 UN Covenant on
                   Civil and Political Rights and the 1981 African Charter on Human and
                   Peoples’ Rights, in addition to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
                   Relations (Art. 36 (1) (b)) 1. The material content and the hermeneutics
                   of the rights breached are to be borne in mind for the purpose of repara-
                   tions.
                      2. The mens legis of the human rights treaties which form the applicable
                   law in the cas d’espèce is also to be kept in mind. Both the International
                   Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human
                   and Peoples’ Rights contain provisions extending protection to individuals
                   against unreasonable delays in legal proceedings 2. Non‑compliance with
                   those provisions entail consequences for reparations. In my extensive sepa-
                   rate opinion in the Court’s Judgment of 30 November 2010 in the present

                       1 I pointed this out on the occasion of the Court’s adoption of its Judgment of

                   30 November 2010, in my separate opinion. In fact, the successive episodes in the whole
                   case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo took place at intra‑State (rather than inter‑State) level, and
                   concerned a subject of rights who is not a State, but rather an individual, Mr. A. S. Diallo.
                   The rights violated in the cas d’espèce were : (a) the right to liberty and security of persons ;
                   (b) the right not to be expelled from a State without a legal basis ; (c) the right not to be
                   subjected to mistreatment ; and (d) the right to information on consular assistance in the
                   framework of the guarantees of the due process of law. The victim in this case is an indi-
                   vidual, national of the claimant State and subject to the jurisdiction of the respondent State
                   (during the occurrence of the facts of the case at issue).
                       2 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that all persons shall be entitled,

                   in full equality, “[t]o be tried without undue delay” (Art. 14 (3) (c)). The Covenant adds
                   that the court seised of a case of deprivation of liberty by arrest or detention is to “decide
                   without delay” on the lawfulness of the detention and is to order the release of the person
                   concerned if the detention is not lawful (Art. 9 (4)). The African Charter on Human and
                   Peoples’ Rights, for its part, determines that every individual shall have “the right to be
                   tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal” (Art. 7 (1) (d)).

                   6

4 CIJ1024.indb 8                                                                                17/06/13 08:49

                    638 	        ahmadou sadio diallo (decl. cançado trindade)

                    case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, I deemed it fit to leave on the records my
                    reflections on the right to reparation in the cas d’espèce. Almost one year
                    later, I feel obliged to recall them now, under the merciless pressure of time,
                    on the occasion of the Court’s adoption of the present Order of today,
                    20 September 2011. I expressed therein my concern as to the decision then
                    taken that the provision of adequate reparation was to wait still further,
                    until the contending Parties failed to reach an agreement on this issue
                    within the forthcoming six months. To my mind, this resembled “an arbi-
                    tral, rather than a truly judicial procedure”, looking “somewhat disquiet-
                    ing” to me (para. 200).

                       3. Even more so considering the “prolonged length of time that the
                    handling of this case by the Court has taken”, since Guinea’s Application
                    of 1998 until the delivery by the Court of its Judgment on the merits of
                    30 November 2010 (para. 201). Yet, ever since, almost another year has
                    gone by, with the Order the Court has just adopted today, 20 Septem-
                    ber 2011 : the Court has been handling this case now for almost 13 years,
                    from the end of December 1998 to this end of September 2011. This once
                    again suggests that the time of human justice is not the time of human
                    beings. As I pondered in this respect in my lengthy separate opinion on
                    the Court’s Judgment of 30 November 2010, further delays could, and
                    should, have been avoided, “particularly when reparation for human rights
                    breaches is at stake” (para. 202) 3.

                         4. The Court, being the master of its own jurisdiction, in the present cir
                    cumstances of the Diallo case could, and should, have proceeded ex officio,
                    sponte sua, to the determination of the reparations due to Mr. A. S. Diallo.
                    The Court is the master also of its own procedure, and unreasonable
                    prolongation of time-limits for the performance of procedural acts to com-
                     ply with obligations under international law is to be curtailed and
                     avoided. Yet, the issue of reparation has now, after the Judgment of
                     30 November 2010, once again been postponed. This should not have
                     occurred, as the present case has taken the Court well beyond the

                     inter‑State dimension. Reparations could already have been ordered by
                      the Court, since its Judgment of 30 November 2010, largely on the basis
                      of considerations of equity. In my understanding, the State exists for
                      the human person, and contemporary international law — the new jus

                       3 After all, “the subject (titulaire) of the rights breached in the present case is not the

                    applicant State, but the individual concerned, Mr. A. S. Diallo, who is also the ultimate
                    beneficiary of the reparations due” (para. 203). The victim and the titulaire of the right to
                    reparation is the individual, whose rights have been breached (paras. 204‑205). One can
                    no longer keep on reasoning within the hermetic parametres of the exclusively inter‑State
                    dimension (paras. 206‑207). In the same separate opinion, I reviewed the available forms
                    of reparation (paras. 208‑210), bearing in mind the general obligation of States parties set
                    forth under Article 2 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the fact that
                    the duty to provide reparation reflects a fundamental principle of general international law,
                    as acknowledged by this Court in its jurisprudence constante.

                    7

4 CIJ1024.indb 10                                                                                17/06/13 08:49

                    639 	     ahmadou sadio diallo (decl. cançado trindade)

                    gentium — likewise comes into operation for the human person. One
                    should never lose sight of the classic maxim : justice delayed is justice
                    denied.

                                         (Signed) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.

                    8

4 CIJ1024.indb 12                                                                               17/06/13 08:49


189

OPINION CONJOINTE
DE M. MOSLER ET DE SIR ROBERT JENNINGS

[Traduction]

Nous avons voté en faveur de lordonnance indiquant des mesures
conservatoires, mais nous tenons à souligner deux choses :

Premièrement, que les obligations, imposées par les dispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies et par la Charte de l'Organisation des Etats
américains, de s’abstenir, dans les relations internationales, de recourir à la
menace ou à l'emploi de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l’indé-
pendance politique d’un Etat et de ne pas intervenir dans des affaires qui
relèvent essentiellement de sa compétence nationale s’appliquent à l'Etat
demandeur tout autant qu’à l’Etat défendeur.

Deuxièmement, nous désirons aussi mettre l’accent sur l’obligation
incombant aux deux Parties, dans la situation complexe et délicate qui
règne actuellement en Amérique centrale, de mener de bonne foi des
négociations dans le cadre des arrangements régionaux approuvés par le
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et qui ont l’appui de l'Organisation
des Etats américains.

(Signé) Hermann MOsLER.
(Signé) Robert Y. JENNINGS.

24


ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (DÉCL. WALDOCK) 144

rait la préjuger maintenant: il n’est pas impossible, à priori, que les écri-
tures qui seront présentées et les autres éléments d’appréciation pertinents
modifient les opinions ou convictions actuelles.

*

La question que l’ordonnance présente comme celle de l’existence, à
Pégard de ces demandes, d’un «intérêt juridique autorisant la Cour à
accueillir la requête» (paragraphe 24) est caractérisée, dans le dispositif,
comme ayant trait à la recevabilité de la requête. On s’est demandé si la
Nouvelle-Zélande peut se prévaloir d’un droit propre — distinct d’un
intérêt collectif ou général — ou si elle a été ou pourrait être victime d’un
préjudice réel. Pour ce qui est du pouvoir de la Cour de statuer au fond,
le problème consiste à déterminer si le litige soumis à la Cour est un
«différend au sujet duquel les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un
droit», comme l’exige la clause juridictionnelle invoquée par la Nouvelle-
Zélande. Il semble donc qu’il s’agisse la d’une question de portée limitée
concernant la juridiction plutôt que la recevabilité. Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice a indiqué comme suit comment il différenciait ces deux catégories
de questions (C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 102-103):

«la distinction, le test réel, dépend semble-t-il du point de savoir si
l'exception repose ou est fondée sur la clause ou les clauses juridic-
tionnelles en vertu desquelles on prétend établir la compétence. Si tel
est le cas, l'exception porte essentiellement sur la compétence.»

L'article 17 de l’Acte général stipule que les différends visés dans cet
acte comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l’article 36 du Statut
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Au nombre des catégo-
ries de différends juridiques énumérés dans cet article figure «la réalité de
tout fait qui, s’il était établi, constituerait la violation d’un engagement
international» (les italiques sont de nous). Au stade préliminaire, il
semblerait donc suffisant de déterminer si les parties se contestent réci-
proquement un droit. Il n'apparaît pas nécessaire à ce stade d’aborder des
questions qui relèvent en réalité du fond et qui constituent le point essen-
tiel de la décision qui interviendra par la suite sur le fond, comme celle
de l'établissement des droits des parties ou de l'étendue du préjudice résul-
tant des retombées radioactives.

Sir Humphrey WALDOCK, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Je souscris à l'ordonnance. Je voudrais seulement ajouter que, selon
moi, les principes énoncés à l’article 67, paragraphe 7, du Règlement, de-
vraient guider la Cour lorsqu'elle rendra sa décision en la phase suivante
de la procédure, que prévoit la présente ordonnance.

13


103

ANNEX 3.

LETTER FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Foreign Office, S.W.1, April roth, 1031.
Sir,
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to request that

you will insert in the agenda of the Sixty-Third Session of
the Council of the League of Nations the following item:

‘“‘Austro-German Protocol for the establishment of a Customs
Union.”

2. The Members of the Council, whose attention has
doubtless been drawn to the above Protocol, will probably
be aware that doubts have been expressed whether the
régime which it contemplates would be compatible with the
obligations of the Austrian Government under the Protocols
of October 4th, 1922.

3. Seeing that the last named Protocols were negotiated
under the auspices of the Council, His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom consider it of the highest importance
that all such doubts as have been expressed should be
. cleared up at ‘the earliest possible moment, and with this
object they think it appropriate that the matter should be
examined by the Council itself. ~

(Signed) ORME SARGENT.

70


335

                DECLARATION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN

  The present Opinion makes an important contribution to the law of decolonization
and to the Court’s advisory function — The unnecessary statement of responsibility
made in paragraph 177 blurs the distinction between the Court’s advisory and
contentious jurisdiction.

   1. In my view the present Opinion makes an important contribution
both to the law of decolonization and to the Court’s advisory function.
Being in agreement with the Court’s reasoning, I voted in favour of its
ﬁndings on both jurisdiction and admissibility, and the answers given to
the questions referred to it by the General Assembly. However, I would
like to record my disagreement with the Court’s statement of responsibil-
ity made in paragraph 177 of the Opinion. In this declaration, I shall set
the reasons why.

   2. In order to consider this question, it is important to recall the dis-
tinction between the Court’s contentious and advisory jurisdiction. This
distinction, already drawn by the PCIJ in Eastern Carelia, was formu-
lated as follows in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion:

          “In certain circumstances . . . the lack of consent of an interested
       State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with
       the Court’s judicial character. An instance of this would be when the
       circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the eﬀect of
       circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its
       disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent. If
       such a situation should arise, the powers of the Court under the dis-
       cretion given to it by Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, would
       aﬀord suﬃcient legal means to ensure respect for the fundamental
       principle of consent to jurisdiction.” 1
   3. In the present case, the Court has been requested to determine
whether Mauritius’ decolonization process was “lawfully completed”
(ﬁrst question of the General Assembly). If not, the Court is asked to
ascertain the legal consequences arising from the “continued administra-
tion” by the United Kingdom of the Chagos Archipelago (second ques-
tion). In my opinion, this Request, more than any other before, sits on
the borderline between, on the one hand, the provision of legal assistance
to the General Assembly in relation to decolonization (a matter in rela-

   1 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 33. See also Status
of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 5, pp. 27-28.

244

336            separation of the chagos (decl. gevorgian)

tion to which the Court’s advisory function is fully appropriate), and on
the other, the settlement of a bilateral dispute by way of contentious pro-
ceedings without the required consent of the Parties. One cannot deny
that the Request concerns a situation in which two States claim sover-
eignty over a territory; indeed, Mauritius has repeatedly attempted to
bring the matter of Chagos to the attention of this Court, but the
United Kingdom has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction —a deci-
sion that it is free to make in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute.
   4. In such circumstances, the Court’s task in the present Opinion is
limited to considering the lawfulness of Mauritius’ decolonization process
(and to stating any legal consequences arising therefrom) without dealing
with the bilateral aspects of the pending dispute. For this purpose, the
Court must rely on the law of decolonization as developed by the
United Nations Charter and subsequent resolutions and practice, leaving
aside any determination of State responsibility.
   5. For the most part, the present Opinion adequately focuses on such
questions in a manner that I ﬁnd persuasive. In particular, I agree with
the reasoning in paragraph 136, where the Court rightly points out that
the
         “General Assembly asks the Court to examine certain events which
      occurred between 1965 and 1968, and which fall within the framework
      of the process of decolonization of Mauritius as a non-self-governing
      territory. It did not submit to the Court a bilateral dispute over sov-
      ereignty which might exist between the United Kingdom and Mauri-
      tius.”
However, in paragraph 177 the present Opinion goes beyond this state-
ment in ruling that the United Kingdom’s continued administration of
the Chagos Archipelago constitutes a wrongful act entailing the interna-
tional responsibility of that State. I do not disagree with the substance of
this conclusion, but in my view such a statement crosses the thin line
separating the Court’s advisory and contentious jurisdiction.
   6. One may argue that the Court has already made similar determina-
tions in the Namibia and the Wall Advisory Opinions. However, the cir-
cumstances in both cases were diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst, the United Nations
Security Council had already declared in resolution 276 (1970) that “the
continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal
and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa
on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate
are illegal and invalid” 2. Such a ﬁnding is missing in the present case.
Similarly, in the Wall the Court was able to rely on the United Nations

   2 Resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January, paragraph 2 (see also Legal Consequences for

States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p. 58, para. 1 of the dispositif).

245

337             separation of the chagos (decl. gevorgian)

Security Council’s determination that the occupation of Palestinian terri-
tory was illegal, notably in resolution 242 (1967) 3.

  7. It follows that the above-mentioned statement of responsibility is
not only pointless — it is not reﬂected in the dispositif, and should not be
so — but also unsupported by the Court’s case law. This is without preju-
dice to my agreement with the Court’s answer to the second question, as
reﬂected in the dispositif.

                                                      (Signed) Kirill Gevorgian.

   3 Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November, paragraph 1 (see also Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 201, para. (3) A of the dispositif). The resolution was mentioned
not only in the Court’s Opinion (ibid., p. 166, para. 74 and p. 201, para. 162), but also in
the preamble to resolution A/RES/ES-10/14, which requested an advisory opinion from
the Court (adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 2003 at its Tenth Emergency
Special Session).

246


                                     DECLARATION OF JUDGE XUE

      1. With regard to Colombia’s third counter-claim relating to the artisanal fishing rights of the
inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that Colombia fails
to prove the existence of its traditional practice of artisanal fishing that extends to the area that falls
within Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone. In regard to traditional or historic fishing rights,
however, I wish to make a few observations in this declaration.

       2. First of all, traditional fishing rights are recognized and protected under customary
international law. Under the law of the sea, traditional fishing generally refers to artisanal fishing
that may have existed for centuries. Although there may be improvements in the techniques of
navigation and communication or in the techniques of fishing, traditional fishing is distinct from
habitual fishing and traditional industrial fishing. Traditional fishing rights are acquired from a long
process of historical consolidation of socio-economic conditions and conduct, which reflects certain
cultural patterns, local customs and traditions. Given their nature, substance and origin, the existence
of traditional fishing rights must be examined and determined on a case-by-case basis.

       3. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, when the breadth of the
territorial sea was being considered, fishery limits was one of the issues raised by States, as expansion
of the breadth of the territorial sea from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles would inevitably have
a bearing on the fishing interests of States in coastal waters. It was realized, nevertheless, that there
were diverse situations in different parts of the world and that it was impossible to take account of
every special case (Eighth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 30 March 1960,
UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, paras. 6-12 (Brazil); Fifteenth Meeting of the Committee of the
Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, para. 12 (New Zealand); Nineteenth Meeting
of the Committee of the Whole, 7 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, paras. 34-36
(Lebanon)). Meanwhile the idea to set up an exclusive fishing zone, separate but adjacent to the
territorial sea, to give the coastal State certain rights in respect of the exploitation of fishery resources
in the zone so as to satisfy the growing needs of its people was gaining wide recognition, particularly
among the developing countries (Eighth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 30 March, 1960,
UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, paras. 34 and 39-40 (Yugoslavia); Fifteenth Meeting of the
Committee of the Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, para. 24 (Ceylon);
Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 7 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19,
para. 7 (Tunisia)).

       4. At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, States held divergent views
as to whether a coastal State should enjoy exclusive rights to exploit living resources in the exclusive
economic zone and to what extent traditional fishing may be maintained. In this regard, both
traditional artisanal fishing and long-established industrial and commercial fishing were mentioned.

       5. In the present case, examples cited by Nicaragua, which refer to the positions taken by States
such as Japan, the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, on the protection of
traditional fishing rights, largely concern the long-established industrial and commercial fishing.
Contrary to Nicaragua’s assertion that the developing countries “strenuously objected” to the
protection of traditional fishing rights, these countries were actually very critical of foreign industrial
and commercial fishing practices, particularly of those “prescriptive rights” acquired under
colonialism (Summary Records of Plenary Meetings, 23rd plenary meeting, 1 July 1974,
UN doc. A/CONF.62/SR.23, para. 53 (Argentina); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second
Committee, 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 72 (Zaire); Summary
Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 29th meeting, 6 August 1974,

                                                  -2-

UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29, para. 3 (Burma)). They were mainly concerned about “leav[ing]
the door open for the traditional distant-water fishing nations which had enjoyed and sometimes
abused the freedom of fishing in a region with which they had no geographical or economic
connexion” (Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974,
UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 92 (Barbados) (emphasis added)). At the same time, they
were sympathetic to the fishing interests of the developing countries whose economy depended on
fisheries. In Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law
of the Sea, a document to which Nicaragua refers in support of its claim, it is stated that “the ‘historic
rights’ acquired by certain neighbouring African States in a part of the Sea which may fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of another State w[]ould be recognized and safeguarded” (Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction (1972), UN doc. A/8721, Annex 3, p. 75). Apparently, traditional fishing rights have to
be considered in each specific context.

       6. The establishment of the exclusive economic zone régime is one of the major achievements
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which largely responds to the general
concerns of the coastal States over the exploitation of living resources by industrial and commercial
fishing of foreign fleets in their coastal waters and the need to ensure optimum utilization of natural
resources of the sea. Under Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(hereinafter “UNCLOS”), the coastal State is entitled to establish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea. It enjoys sovereign rights in the exploration,
exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources in the exclusive economic zone
and has the jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, marine scientific
research as well as the protection and preservation of the marine environment in that zone. It shall
determine the allowable catch of the living resources and take conservation and management
measures to ensure sustainable development and utilization of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone. This new régime has fundamentally changed the fishery limits in the sea and put an
end to the freedom of fishing in the areas that fall within the exclusive economic zone of the coastal
States.

       7. Article 51, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS explicitly recognizes the traditional fishing rights of
the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in the archipelagic waters. According to Nicaragua,
this provision is the only exception, as a carve-out, that preserves traditional fishing rights under
UNCLOS. The drafting history of Part IV on archipelagic States, however, does not support that
interpretation. The travaux préparatoires show that Article 51, paragraph 1, is the outcome of the
negotiations of States on the recognition of the status of archipelagic States. It was intended to
maintain a balance of rights and interests between the archipelagic States and their regional
neighbours whose fishing interests would be substantially jeopardized by the enclosure of the
archipelagic waters (see Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 36th meeting,
12 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.36; Summary Records of Meetings of the Second
Committee, 37th meeting, 12 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37, on the positions taken
by Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan). Confined to a special régime,
Article 51, paragraph 1, concerns solely traditional fishing rights in the archipelagic waters. There is
no legal basis in international law to preclude the existence of traditional fishing rights under other
circumstances.

       8. Article 62, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS provides a number of relevant factors for giving access
to other States to the surplus of the allowable catch in the exclusive economic zone, among which is
the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the
zone. According to Nicaragua, by taking into account this “habitually fished” factor, the Convention
has settled the relationship between the exclusive economic zone and traditional fishing rights; the
former thereby supersedes the latter. This conclusion is apparently over-sweeping. Among all

                                                 -3-

relevant factors, Article 62, paragraph 3, highlights five factors for consideration, namely national
interests of the coastal State, rights of land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged States,
the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region, and the need to minimize economic
dislocation in States whose foreign nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made
substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. Those factors reflect the principles of
distributive justice and fairness that underlie the régime of the exclusive economic zone under
UNCLOS. Habitual fishing may include certain types of traditional fishing activities carried out by
individual fishermen of other States, but in the context of the Article, that factor alone cannot be
taken to presume that all situations relating to traditional fishing rights are encompassed by that
Article.

       9. The advent of the régime of the exclusive economic zone, as set forth in UNCLOS, does
not by itself extinguish traditional fishing rights that may be found to exist under customary
international law. According to the settled jurisprudence of the Court, a treaty provision may
“embod[y]” or “crystallize[]” a pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law (Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 38, para. 24), or may
“constitute[] the foundation of, or has generated a rule which . . . has since passed into the general
corpus of international law” (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 41, para. 71). For
pre-existing rights under customary international law, however, unless and until they are explicitly
negated by treaty law or new customary rules, they continue to exist and apply under customary
international law, even as regards States that are parties to the relevant treaty (see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 424, para. 73). The Court has also
held that where the content of a customary rule is “confirmed and influenced by [a treaty referring to
and embodying this rule]”, the fact that the treaty “does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of
[the] content” of the rule in question, “demonstrates that . . . customary international law continues
to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by these two sources of law thus do not overlap
exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 94, para. 176.)

       10. The existence of traditional fishing rights must be proved by evidence. As noted, such
rights are derived from long, continuous and peaceful exercise of certain practices. In the absence of
specific conventional provisions that expressly negate all traditional fishing rights, general
international law will continue to govern on the matter, whenever a case arises. As the Preamble of
UNCLOS affirms, “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules
and principles of general international law”.

       11. Indeed, States party to UNCLOS continue to recognize, through bilateral agreements,
historic and traditional fishing rights that existed prior to the conclusion of the Convention. For
example, in 1974 India and Sri Lanka agreed on the delimitation of historic waters of Palk Bay,
where the traditional fishing rights of both States’ fishermen are recognized and protected. Article 6
of the Agreement provides that “[t]he vessels of Sri Lanka and India will enjoy in each other’s waters
such rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein” (1974 Agreement between India and Sri Lanka
on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters, United Nations,
Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1049, p. 26). Likewise, the 1978 boundary agreement between Australia
and Papua New Guinea acknowledges and protects the “traditional way of life and livelihood” of the
local population, including traditional fishing, in the Protected Zone established (Article 10 (3) of
the 1978 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, including the Area
Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, UNTS, Vol. 1429, p. 215).

                                                   -4-

       12. Traditional fishing rights are also recognized in international jurisprudence. For instance,
in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, Tunisia claimed that it had had
historic rights over sedentary and other fisheries in a certain zone since time immemorial, “deriv[ing]
from the long-established interests and activities of its population in exploiting the fisheries of the
bed and waters of the Mediterranean off its coasts” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 72, para. 98).
Although the Court did not find it necessary to address Tunisia’s claim, it clearly acknowledged that
such rights exist under customary international law, notwithstanding the exclusive economic zone
régime (ibid., p. 74, para. 100).

        13. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the issue was squarely addressed by the tribunal. It
explicitly recognized the existence of traditional fishing rights of Eritrea’s fishermen both within and
beyond the territorial sea around the Yemeni islands (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage
of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute),
Decision of 9 October 1998, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),
Vol. XXII, pp. 329-330, para. 526; Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the
proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999,
RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361, para. 109). In reaching its conclusion regarding traditional fishing rights,
the tribunal emphasized that “[i]n finding that the Parties each have sovereignty over various of the
Islands the Tribunal stresses to them that such sovereignty is not inimical to, but rather entails, the
perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime in the region” (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the
first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the
Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 329-330, para. 526). On the relationship
between the traditional fishing régime and UNCLOS, the arbitral tribunal observed:

              “By its very nature, [this traditional fishing régime] is not qualified by the
      maritime zones specified under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
      Sea . . . The traditional fishing regime operates throughout those waters beyond the
      territorial waters of each of the Parties, and also in their territorial waters and ports . . .
      Accordingly, it does not depend, either for its existence or for its protection, upon the
      drawing of an international boundary by this Tribunal.” (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal
      in the second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime
      Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361,
      paras. 109-110.)

       14. The findings in Eritrea/Yemen were cited by the arbitral tribunal in the Abyei arbitration
concerning the delimitation of land boundaries in the Abyei area between Sudan and South Sudan.
That tribunal concluded that, according to general principles of law, “traditional rights, in the absence
of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been deemed to remain unaffected by any
territorial delimitation” (Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Abyei Area between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Movement/Army, Final Award, 22 July 2009, RIAA,
Vol. XXX, pp. 408-410 and 412, paras. 753-760 and 766).

       15. In the present case, Nicaragua refers to the case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area ((Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1984, p. 246) in support of its claim that traditional fishing rights have been extinguished by
the establishment of the exclusive economic zone and that the coastal States now enjoy a “legal
monopoly” over the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. This is a far-fetched claim. In
the Gulf of Maine case, first of all, the dispute between the parties did not concern traditional fishing
rights. The United States claimed a certain “predominance” of its fishing activities in the relevant
area, which related to established industrial and commercial fishing. Secondly, the United States

                                                   -5-

invoked its preferential situation as a relevant circumstance for the purpose of equitable delimitation,
which was rejected by the Chamber of the Court. Neither in law nor in fact is this case relevant to
the issue of traditional fishing rights.

       16. Two principal elements have been mentioned in jurisprudence for the establishment of
traditional fishing rights: first, traditional fishing rights had to be borne out by “artisanal fishing”,
and secondly, such fishing activities continued consistently for a lengthy period of time (see Award
of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime
Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 359, para. 103; Award of the
Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 244-245,
para. 129). As the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal stated, at the core of the traditional fishing activities is “the
presence of deeply-rooted common patterns of behavior”, which is often linked with local traditions
and customs that continued consistently for a long time (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first
stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the
Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 244, para. 129). The first element is
applied primarily to distinguish traditional fishing from industrial fishing, while the second element
has to be assessed under the circumstances of each case. In principle, the duration of the fishing
activities cannot be measured by a fixed number of years, but it has to be sufficiently long to reflect
the existence of such tradition and culture. In this regard, certain flexibility with regard to the types
of evidence and duration of time may be called for. In the present case, although the evidence
adduced by Colombia is not considered sufficient to prove its claim, the statements of the Nicaraguan
President do not deny the existence of traditional fishing of the inhabitants of the San Andrés
Archipelago, particularly of the Raizales. In order to preserve the local tradition and custom of the
San Andres Archipelago, an agreement on fisheries for the benefit of the Raizales community
between the Parties, in my view, would contribute to a stable and co-operative relationship in the
region.

                                                                  (Signed)     XUE Hanqin.

                                              ___________


449

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. TARASSOV
[Traduction]

Dans la présente décision, la Cour réaffirme son ordonnance du 8 avril
1993 dans laquelle elle indiquait trois mesures conservatoires (dont deux
— À 1)et À 2) — étaient adressées à la Yougoslavie et la troisième — B —
aux deux Parties) et souligne que toutes ces mesures doivent être immé-
diatement et effectivement mises en œuvre. En avril 1993, j'ai voté en
faveur de deux de ces mesures mais n’ai pu apporter mon soutien à la
mesure conservatoire À 2), expliquant mon vote négatif à ce sujet dans
une déclaration jointe à l’ordonnance. Ma position par rapport à cette
mesure n’a pas changé: j'estime qu’elle en arrive presque à préjuger le
fond et qu’elle impose des exigences mal définies et pratiquement illimi-
tées.

La seconde demande de la Bosnie-Herzégovine soumise à la Cour le
27 juillet 1993 ne fait que confirmer mes pires appréhensions quant à cette
mesure. En effet, cette nouvelle demande se fonde entièrement sur des
actes prétendument commis par les Serbes dans la guerre civile en Bosnie,
que les Bosniaques attribuent tous à la Yougoslavie, sans qu’aucun effort
ne soit fait pour démontrer un lien de causalité ou une relation logique
permettant d'établir la responsabilité du Gouvernement de la Yougosla-
vie quant à la commission de ces actes (même si leur caractère d’actes
génocides, qui est très douteux et n’a en tout état de cause pas encore été
établi par la Cour, devait être prouvé à un stade ultérieur de la procédure
judiciaire). Il serait très dangereux pour le droit des gens et les relations
internationales qu’un Etat, du seul fait qu’il compte une population ethni-
quement homogène, soit tenu responsable des actions commises sur le
territoire d’un autre Etat par des membres du même groupe ethnique y
demeurant. (Dans sa seconde demande, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, dans le
sous-titre portant «Chronologie des violations par le défendeur de l’or-
donnance rendue par la Cour le 8 avril 1993», est allée jusqu’à se réfé-
rer, entre autres, à des rapports faisant état d’actions prétendument
commises par des Croates vivant en Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui n’ont abso-
lument rien à voir avec la Yougoslavie!.)

Ainsi que je l’ai déjà dit, j’ai voté pour la mesure A 1), aux termes de
laquelle le Gouvernement de la République fédérative de Yougoslavie
« doit immédiatement … prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir afin de
prévenir la commission du crime de génocide». Les écritures des Parties
et leurs plaidoiries lors des audiences ont fourni à la Cour certains motifs

! Voir, par exemple, les communications datées des 18 et 20 mai et des 1° et 7 juin
1993 dans la demande du 27 juillet 1993.

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APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GENOCIDE (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 450

d’adopter une telle mesure. Alors, seule la Bosnie avait présenté à la Cour
des documents sur les événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine qui, selon elle,
constituaient des actes de génocide commis «sous la direction, sur l’ordre
et avec l’aide de la Yougoslavie ». Cette dernière, en raison des délais très
courts qui lui avaient été impartis pour la préparation de ses plaidoiries,
s’est bornée à une déclaration selon laquelle «un génocide et des actes de
génocide sont perpétrés à l’encontre de la population serbe sur le territoire
de la Bosnie-Herzégovine». Dans sa lettre en date du 1% avril 1993, le
ministre des affaires étrangères de la République fédérative de Yougosla-
vie, au nom de son gouvernement, a prié la Cour:

«de constater la responsabilité des autorités sous le contrôle de
M. A. Izetbegovic pour les crimes de génocide commis à l’encontre
du peuple serbe à l’intérieur de la « République de Bosnie-Herzégo-
vine», au sujet desquels [le Gouvernement de la Yougoslavie] pré-
sentera ultérieurement les preuves pertinentes ».

Tout en ayant soutenu la mesure A 1), j'ai bien précisé dans ma déclara-
tion jointe à l’ordonnance du 8 avril 1993 que cette mesure devait s’adres-
ser non seulement au Gouvernement de la Yougoslavie, mais également à
celui de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il m’apparaissait en effet évident que ce
dernier gouvernement était responsable des actes commis sur son territoire
par ses propres citoyens, qu'il s’agisse de Musulmans, de Serbes ou de
Croates, d’agents publics ou de particuliers. Et, comme je l’ai alors
souligné, les deux Parties devaient bien entendu prendre toutes les
mesures réellement en leur pouvoir afin de prévenir la commission d’actes
de génocide.

La Cour elle-même, au paragraphe 45 de l’ordonnance du 8 avril 1993,
a souligné que:

«de l’avis de la Cour, compte tenu des circonstances portées à son
attention … il existe un risque grave que des actes de génocide soient
commis; considérant que la Yougoslavie et la Bosnie-Herzégovine,
que de tels actes commis dans le passé puissent ou non leur être
imputés en droit, sont tenues de l’incontestable obligation de faire
tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour en assurer la prévention à l’ave-
nir».

Tout en rappelant dans la présente ordonnance la conclusion susmention-
née, la Cour se borne malheureusement dans son dispositif à réaffirmer la
mesure 52 A 1)sous sa formeinitiale, à l’adresse du seul Gouvernement de
la Yougoslavie. Elle ne mentionne pas l’obligation analogue du Gouver-
nement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine même si, à l’occasion de cette seconde
demande, la Yougoslavie a officiellement et formellement prié la Cour
d'indiquer, à titre de mesure conservatoire, que le Gouvernement de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine

«doit immédiatement, conformément à l'obligation qui est la sienne
en vertu de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide du 9 décembre 1948, prendre toutes les mesures en son

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APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GENOCIDE (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 451

pouvoir afin de prévenir la commission du crime de génocide contre
le groupe ethnique serbe»;

et a présenté à la Cour des éléments qui lui donnent toutes raisons d’impo-
ser également pareille obligation au Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzé-
govine.

Vu que les deux Parties ont soumis des demandes en indication de
mesures conservatoires au cours de cette nouvelle procédure et vu les
nombreux documents sur lesquels elles se fondent, concernant des actes
qui constitueraient un crime de génocide et qui sont présentés comme
ayant été commis dans ce conflit civil interethnique en Bosnie-Herzégo-
vine par tous les groupes ethniques les uns contre les autres, la décision de
la Cour de rendre une ordonnance faisant peser sur la Yougoslavie l’essen-
tiel de la responsabilité pour ce qui est de la prévention des actes de géno-
cide en Bosnie-Herzégovine résulte d’une approche partiale, basée sur des
idées préconçues, qui en arrive presque à préjuger le fond et suppose un
traitement inégal des différents groupes ethniques en Bosnie-Herzégovine,
qui ont tous souffert de façon indicible dans cette guerre fratricide. En tant
que juge, je ne puis souscrire à une telle approche. Elle est particulièrement
dangereuse en ce moment où, grâce aux efforts considérables déployés par
les représentants de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de la Commu-
nauté européenne, les hostilités commencent à faire place, à Genève, à des
négociations pacifiques entre les trois principaux groupes ethniques
bosniaques, avec la participation de représentants de la Serbie et de la
Croatie. La présente ordonnance a été adoptée par la Cour alors que toutes
les parties à ces négociations avaient, le 30 juillet, accepté un accord consti-
tutionnel en vue d’une Union des Républiques de Bosnie-Herzégovine qui
devait faire partie d’un règlement global de paix ou, en d’autres termes, la
création dans ce pays de trois républiques constitutives dans le cadre d’une
union indépendante et souveraine. Au paragraphe 1 du dispositif de sa
résolution 859 (1993), adoptée à l’unanimité le 24 août 1993 (la veille même
des audiences des 25 et 26 août 1993 et avant la présente décision de la
Cour), le Conseil de sécurité a noté

« avec satisfaction … les derniers développements intervenus dans les
conversations de paix de Genève et /prie] instamment les parties, en
coopération avec les coprésidents, de conclure dès que possible un
règlement politique juste et global librement agréé par elles ».

Il est à regretter que la Cour n’ait, quant à elle, fait aucune référence à la
nécessité pour les deux Parties de faciliter l'aboutissement des négocia-
tions de Genève, sous la forme d’un règlement pacifique, alors qu’il s’agit
là de la mesure la plus urgente et la plus efficace en vue de la prévention de
toute éventuelle commission du crime de génocide en Bosnie-Herzégo-
vine. Comme l’a souligné il y a longtemps la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale:

«le règlement judiciaire des conflits internationaux, en vue duquel
la Cour est instituée, n’est qu’un succédané au règlement direct et

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APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (OP. DISS. TARASSOV) 452

amiable de ces conflits entre les Parties; que, dès lors, il appartient
à la Cour de faciliter, dans toute la mesure compatible avec son
Statut, pareil règlement direct et amiable...» (Zones franches de la
Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, ordonnance du 19 août 1929, C.P.J.I.
série À n° 22, p. 13).

La présente Cour a fait sienne cette considération fort importante (voir
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicara-
gua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), C.IJ. Recueil 1986, p. 143, par. 285). Qui
plus est, la Cour a souligné qu’elle devait «s’abstenir de tout acte qui
risquerait de faire inutilement obstacle à un règlement négocié » (ibid.). Et
si l’ordonnance partiale et déséquilibrée de la Cour ne constitue pas
nécessairement un «obstacle à un règlement négocié», il est évident
qu’elle n’en facilitera pas la survenance. La Cour ne saurait ignorer le fait
que des représentants de la Serbie, qui fait partie de la République fédéra-
tive de Yougoslavie, ont été invités à participer aux négociations de
Genève, de même que des représentants de la Croatie, de sorte que la
Yougoslavie — Partie à la présente affaire devant la Cour — n’est pas
étrangère à ces négociations.

Les immenses souffrances de tous les groupes ethniques et religieux de
la population de Bosnie-Herzégovine — Musulmans, Serbes, Croates et
autres — (et les graves difficultés subies par la population de la Yougosla-
vie elle-même en raison des sanctions imposées) donnaient à mon avis à la
Cour une excellente occasion d’affirmer son autorité morale — comme l’a
récemment fait le Conseil de sécurité — en encourageant les deux Parties
au présent différend à contribuer de façon positive au succès des négocia-
tions de paix de Genève. Malheureusement, tout en citant des décisions
antérieures du Conseil de sécurité, dont certaines à mon avis n’étaient pas
pertinentes quant à l'indication de mesures conservatoires en la présente
affaire, la Cour a préféré garder le silence sur la question la plus vitale
pour tous les secteurs de la population de la Bosnie-Herzégovine qui
risquent de devenir les victimes du crime de génocide, à savoir la cessation
des hostilités et la conclusion d’un règlement politique juste et global.

(Signé} Nikolai K. TARASSOV.

131