                                                                                26

      DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC TORRES
                      BERNÁRDEZ

[Translation]

   Agreement and disagreement with the Order — The question of the prima
facie jurisdiction of the Court and of the admissibility of the request submitted
by Uruguay — Argentina’s arguments based on a lack of jurisdiction and on
inadmissibility are not justified either by the facts of the case or by the appli-
cable law — Agreement with the Order’s conclusion that the Court has jurisdic-
tion to entertain Uruguay’s request — The question of the existence of a risk of
irreparable prejudice to Uruguay’s disputed rights and of the urgency of rem-
edying it — Uruguay’s right to build the Orion mill at Fray Bentos — Uru-
guay’s right that the Court determine the dispute — Uruguay’s arguments on
matters concerning Argentina’s international responsibility relate to the merits
of the dispute and not to these incidental proceedings — Existence of a “present
risk” of irreparable prejudice to Uruguay’s rights in issue — The Court’s power
under Article 41 of the Statute to establish whether the circumstances of the
case require the indication of provisional measures — In light of the situation
created by the facts underlying Uruguay’s request, the Court should have indi-
cated, in the operative part of the Order, two provisional measures ; (a) the first,
similar to the first measure requested by Uruguay, indicating that Argentina
should end and prevent on its territory the closure, blockading or obstructing of
traffic on access roads to the international bridges linking the two countries in
order to preserve Uruguay’s right to build the Orion mill at Fray Bentos and
also the integrity of the pending legal settlement ; (b) the second based on the
content of the second measure requested by Uruguay to avoid the aggravation or
extension of the dispute, but addressed to both Parties — Dismissal of the third
measure requested by Uruguay.

   1. Argentina having decided to object to the jurisdiction of the Court
to entertain the request for provisional measures submitted by Uruguay,
on 29 November 2006, in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) and to the admissibility of Uruguay’s
request, the Court first had to resolve the question of jurisdiction and
admissibility before being able to rule on the merits of the request, in
other words on whether or not to indicate the provisional measures
requested by Uruguay. I fully share the Court’s reasoning and conclu-
sions on jurisdiction and admissibility. On the other hand, I do not
wholly share the reasoning, and certainly not the conclusions in the
Order on the merits. This is why I voted against the Order.

                                         *
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   2. Uruguay’s request for the indication of provisional measures of
29 November 2006 indicates in the introduction that it was submitted
pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 73 of its
Rules and that the provisional measures “are urgently needed to protect
the rights of Uruguay that are at issue in these proceedings from immi-
nent and irreparable injury, and to prevent the aggravation of the present
dispute”. The request goes on to set out the grounds on which it is based,
the consequences which would ensue from its dismissal and the three pro-
visional measures requested (Art. 73, para. 2, of the Rules). In para-
graph 25, the request also refers to the basis of the jurisdiction of the
Court relied on by Argentina in its Application instituting proceedings in
the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uru-
guay) of 4 May 2006 and its request for the indication of provisional
measures of the same date.
   3. It was on the basis of Article 60 of the 1975 Statute of the River
Uruguay that the Court concluded, in its Order of 13 July 2006, that it
had prima facie jurisdiction to hear the above case and, therefore, to con-
sider the request for the indication of provisional measures which had
then been submitted to it by Argentina. At no time has Uruguay disputed
the prima facie jurisdiction of the Court in the case and its request for the
indication of provisional measures also relies on Article 60 of the Statute
of the River Uruguay as basis for the prima facie jurisdiction of the
Court. Nor has Uruguay objected to the admissibility of Argentina’s
Application instituting proceedings. Hence, in the present case, no pre-
liminary question arises as regards the prima facie admissibility of Argen-
tina’s Application, just as in the case concerning Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Pro-
visional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),
p. 21, paras. 32 and 33).

   4. However, Argentina now disputes the jurisdiction of the Court to
entertain Uruguay’s request for the indication of provisional measures
and the admissibility of that request. During the oral hearings, its counsel
expended much more effort demonstrating the Court’s lack of jurisdic-
tion and the inadmissibility of Uruguay’s request than on refuting the
proof of the existence of a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights in
issue and of urgency. They even went so far as to assert that the Court
“manifestly lacked jurisdiction” and to mention examples of cases where
the Court manifestly lacked jurisdiction and decided to remove the case
concerned from its List.
   5. But these efforts were fruitless because Uruguay’s request is not a
principal request, in other words, an application introducing a new case,
nor is it a sort of would-be counter-claim not directly connected with the
object of Argentina’s Application instituting proceedings in the case con-
cerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).

  6. Counsel of Argentina forcefully asserted that the first provisional

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measure requested by Uruguay, namely the one calling upon the Court to
indicate to Argentina that it
    “shall take all reasonable and appropriate steps at its disposal to
    prevent or end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and
    Argentina, including the blockading of bridges and roads between
    the two States” (Application, para. 28 (i)),
would be tantamount to calling upon the Court to rule not on the initial
dispute regarding the Statute of the River Uruguay as set out by Argen-
tina’s Application of 4 March 2006, but on a dispute relating to freedom
of transport and freedom of commerce between the two countries
covered by substantive law and the settlement procedures of Mercosur
(Treaty of Asunción and Protocol of Olivos).
   7. Further, it has been argued by Argentina that the fact that Uruguay
had called for an ad hoc Mercosur Arbitral Tribunal to rule on previous
blockades of bridges and roads, under the provisions of the relevant Mer-
cosur instruments, created a situation of estoppel which rendered the
request for the indication of provisional measures submitted to the Court
by Uruguay inadmissible (see the Award of the ad hoc Mercosur Tribu-
nal of 6 September 2006, Annex 2 of Uruguay’s request for the indication
of provisional measures). The present Order replies to this argument, and
rightly so, that the rights relied on by Uruguay before the ad hoc
Mercosur Tribunal are different from those whose protection it is calling
for in the present case (Order, para. 30).

   8. Uruguay’s request for the indication of provisional measures was
described by counsel for Argentina as a request totally unconnected with
the Statute of the River Uruguay, and also with the respective rights
of the Parties to the dispute submitted to the Court by Argentina. It
allegedly concerns other problems, another treaty, another court. These
arguments, I regret to say, overlook the nature, content and purpose
of Uruguay’s request as well as the purpose of Argentina’s Application
instituting proceedings. Uruguay’s request sits perfectly well with the
subject of the case brought before the Court by Argentina’s Application.

   9. All Uruguay is asking for, in its first submission, is for the Court to
indicate to Argentina, as territorial sovereign, to take what it considers to
be all reasonable and appropriate steps at its disposal, as a Party to the
present proceedings, to prevent or end, pendente lite, the interruption of
transit between Uruguay and Argentina (including the blockading of
bridges and roads between the two States) and to do so in order to pre-
serve rights under the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay which, accord-
ing to Uruguay, are at issue in the dispute, in particular the right to build
the Orion mill on the Uruguayan bank of the River Uruguay at Fray
Bentos and the right for the Court to determine the dispute submitted to
it by Argentina. Hence, the request asks the Court to indicate to Argen-
tina, the Applicant in this case, a measure consisting of an injunction on

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acting in a certain way in order to preserve the rights claimed by Uru-
guay as Respondent in the same case. By no means is it a question of
obtaining a provisional or final ruling on the merits of the claims of either
of the Parties to the case, or on unrelated claims, but of protecting
pendente lite the substance of the rights claimed by Uruguay in the
case.

   10. Uruguay’s request also adds nothing new to the subject-matter of
the dispute as set out in Argentina’s Application instituting proceedings.
By no means is it a counter-claim in disguise. The disputed rights which
Uruguay requests the Court to safeguard by indicating the provisional
measure concerned form part of the subject-matter of the dispute as
determined by Argentina’s Application, its legal grounds and submis-
sions. In paragraph 2 of Argentina’s Application, the subject-matter of
the dispute is set out in the following terms :
      “The dispute concerns the breach by Uruguay of obligations
    under the Statute of the River Uruguay . . . in respect of the authori-
    zation, construction and future commissioning of two pulp mills on
    the River Uruguay, having regard in particular to the effects of such
    activities on the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay and on
    the areas affected by the river.”
As for the legal grounds invoked by Argentina, paragraph 24 of the
Application indicates that :
       “The law applicable to the present dispute is the 1975 Statute and
    the conventional and customary principles and rules relevant to its
    interpretation and application, and in particular the treaties and
    other international obligations in force for either party to which the
    Statute refers. By virtue of these provisions, Uruguay is in breach of
    the following international obligations : . . .”

  11. Paragraph 24 of Argentina’s Application later goes on to list no
fewer than eight obligations which Uruguay is said to have breached,
these being :
    “(a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for the optimum
         and rational utilization of the River Uruguay ;
     (b) the obligation to provide prior notification to CARU and to
         the Government of Argentina in respect of the construction of
         two pulp mills on the left bank of the River Uruguay ;
     (c) the obligation to comply with the procedures prescribed by
         Chapter II of the 1975 Statute in regard to the carrying out of
         ‘any . . . works which are liable to affect navigation, the
         régime of the river or the quality of its waters’ ;
     (d) the obligation not to authorize construction of the proposed

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                PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                30

         works without having first followed the procedure prescribed
         by the 1975 Statute ;
     (e) the obligation to preserve the aquatic environment and to pre-
         vent its pollution, by adopting appropriate measures, includ-
         ing recourse to best environmental practice and best available
         technology, in accordance with applicable international agree-
         ments and in keeping with the guidelines and recommenda-
         tions of international technical bodies ;
     (f) the obligation not to cause transboundary environmental
         damage to the opposing bank of the river, or to areas affected
         by the river ;
     (g) the obligation not to prevent use of the river for lawful pur-
         poses ; and
     (h) other obligations deriving from the procedural and substan-
         tive provisions of general, conventional and customary inter-
         national law which are necessary for the application of the
         1975 Statute.”
  12. Finally, “[o]n the basis of the foregoing statement of facts and
law”, the submissions in paragraph 25 (1) of Argentina’s Application
request the Court to adjudge and declare :
    “1. that Uruguay has breached the obligations incumbent upon it
        under the 1975 Statute and the other rules of international law
        to which that instrument refers, including but not limited to :
        (a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for the opti-
             mum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay ;
        (b) the obligation of prior notification to CARU and to Argen-
             tina ;
        (c) the obligation to comply with the procedures prescribed in
             Chapter II of the 1975 Statute ;
        (d) the obligation to take all necessary measures to preserve
             the aquatic environment and prevent pollution and the
             obligation to protect biodiversity and fisheries, including
             the obligation to prepare a full and objective environmen-
             tal impact study ;
        (e) the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of pollution
             and the protection of biodiversity and of fisheries.”

   13. The subject-matter of the dispute and the submissions of the
Application are thus defined in the Application in very broad general
terms covering the rights and duties of the Parties set out in a number of
the provisions of the Statute of the River Uruguay. The rights of which
Uruguay requests protection through the indication of provisional
measures fall within that subject-matter and sit perfectly well with it.
The resolution of the dispute on the merits will necessarily involve the
interpretation or application by the Court of several provisions of the

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                 PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                   31

Statute of the River Uruguay. This probably explains why the submissions
of both Argentina’s Application and Uruguay’s request avoid any
reference to particular articles of the Statute of the River Uruguay.

                                      *
   14. As regards provisional measures, the Court exercises a basic, purely
statutory jurisdiction defined in Article 41 of its Statute and that remedial
jurisdiction of the Court is not limited or conditioned in any respect by
either the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute or by the
scope of the jurisdictional title or titles governing the Court’s jurisdiction
on the merits in the case concerned. By virtue of that power, the Court
may, in the cases submitted to it, provisionally indicate all manner of
protective measures, when it considers that circumstances require the
adoption of the measure concerned in order to safeguard pendente lite
the rights of either of the Parties at issue in the dispute at hand. As the
Permanent Court of International Justice stated in 1933 in the case con-
cerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority (Interim
Measures of Protection), according to the text of Article 41 of the
Statute, the essential condition which must necessarily be fulfilled in order
to justify a request for the indication of provisional measures, should
circumstances so require, is that such measures should have the effect
of protecting the rights forming the subject of the dispute submitted to
the Court (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 58, p. 177).
   15. Thus, for example, in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic
of Mali) case, the applicable jurisdictional title was a special agreement
granting a Chamber of the Court jurisdiction only to determine the fron-
tier line between the two countries in a disputed area defined by the
special agreement, the law applied by the Chamber to settle the dispute
being the principles and rules of international law concerning land delimi-
tations. When the case was in deliberation, serious incidents occurred
between the armed forces of the two countries and the Chamber was
asked to indicate provisional measures. In so doing, it was not at all
limited in this task either by the scope of its jurisdiction on the merits
or by the substantive law applicable to the boundary dispute concerned,
as is clearly apparent from the measures set out in the operative part
of the Order of 10 January 1986 (I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 11-12). The
Chamber’s jurisdiction to do so, on the sole basis of Article 41 of the
Statute of the Court, was, moreover, never challenged.
   16. In the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), the Court’s jurisdiction
was founded upon the declarations made by the two States under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, whereas the object
of the dispute submitted by Cameroon was defined by that country’s
claims as solely a delimitation of the land and maritime boundary
between the two countries. When, pendente lite, serious armed incidents
took place in one of the territories forming the subject of the proceedings

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before the Court, Cameroon requested the indication of the following
provisional measures :
    “(1) the armed forces of the Parties shall withdraw to the position
         they were occupying before the Nigerian armed attack . . . ;
     (2) the Parties shall abstain from all military activity along the
         entire boundary until the judgment of the Court takes place ;
     (3) the Parties shall abstain from any act or action which might
         hamper the gathering of evidence in the present case” (I.C.J.
         Reports 1996, p. 18, para. 20).
The fact that the subject-matter of the provisional measures requested by
Cameroon did not correspond to the definition of the subject-matter of
the dispute on the merits of the case was not regarded as a ground of the
inadmissibility of the request for provisional measures, as the purpose of
the measures sought was the interim protection of Cameroon’s rights on
the merits. And there are many other examples.
   17. Thus the substantive admissibility of a request for the indication of
provisional measures as a general rule depends solely on the Court’s
appraisal of whether the purpose of the measure sought really is the
interim protection of the right or rights at issue in the dispute, as the
exercise by the Court of the power conferred on it by Article 41 of the
Statute is aimed solely at safeguarding the rights at issue before the Court
pending a final decision on the merits. This conclusion is borne out by the
case law. For example, in the case concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform
and the German Minority (Interim Measures of Protection), the German
Government’s request was dismissed because the measures sought were
not aimed solely at the protection of the subject-matter of the dispute or
the subject-matter of the principal Application itself, as they had been
submitted to the Court by Germany’s Application instituting proceed-
ings. Before the present Court, the request for the indication of provi-
sional measures by Guinea-Bissau in the case concerning the Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 was dismissed because “the alleged rights sought
to be made the subject of provisional measures [were] not the subject of
the proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case” (I.C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 70, para. 26). For other examples, see also the Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf case (I.C.J. Reports 1976, p. 11, para. 34) and the
case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro) (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 19, para. 35).
   18. The situation described above simply does not arise in these inci-
dental proceedings. The necessary link between the request for the indica-
tion of provisional measures by Uruguay and the substance of the case
submitted by Argentina is clear. Since there is no other substantive issue
of connection, of law or of fact, to prevent the admissibility of a request
such as Uruguay’s, all that remains is to address Argentina’s argument
concerning the formal “connection”, based on an “alleged” lack of preci-
sion in the Uruguayan request regarding “the rights to be protected and

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the interim measures of which the indication is proposed”. It need only
be noted in this respect that this phrase, included in the Rules of 1936,
1946 and 1972, no longer features in Article 73, paragraph 2, of the
current Rules, in which it was purposely replaced by the expression
“[t]he request shall specify the reason therefor”, which the Uruguayan
request certainly does in paragraphs 2 to 23.
   19. The legal contentions on which Argentina’s oral arguments con-
cerning the Court’s lack of jurisdiction and/or the inadmissibility of the
Uruguayan request are based do not seem to us acceptable either, as they
would ultimately entail partitioning the power held by the Court under
Article 41 of the Statute, with no apparent advantage for States overall,
or for the Court in the exercise of its protective or emergency jurisdiction.

   20. In light of all the aforementioned considerations, as well as the
relevant reasons in the Order, I wholly concur with the Court on the
question of jurisdiction, including admissibility, as stated in paragraph 30
of the Order.

                                     *
   21. The Court’s dismissal of Argentina’s objections to its jurisdiction
and to the admissibility of Uruguay’s request for the indication of pro-
visional measures clearly implies that the rights claimed by Uruguay, as a
party to the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay — and for which it
requested protection through the indication of provisional measures by
the Court — are not prima facie non-existent rights or rights not germane
to the dispute. They are rights in dispute, very plausible, sufficiently
important and serious to warrant potentially being the object of protec-
tive measures against conduct by a party which could prejudice them. I
therefore consider that Uruguay’s request for the indication of provi-
sional measures meets the criterion of fumus boni juris or fumus non mali
juris (see the separate opinion of Judge Abraham appended to the Order
of 13 July 2006 in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 24).

   22. All that remains now is to ascertain whether, in view of the cir-
cumstances of the case as they now present themselves based on the
information in the Court’s possession, the safeguarding of the rights
invoked by Uruguay in its request does or does not require the indication
of the provisional measures sought or, possibly, other provisional
measures.

                                     *
   23. The Court has many times declared that its power to indicate pro-
visional measures under Article 41 of its Statute presupposes that “irrepa-
rable prejudice” should not be caused to the rights which are the subject

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of judicial proceedings and that it follows that “the Court must be con-
cerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may be subse-
quently adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the
Respondent” (see, for example, the Order of 8 April 1993 in the case con-
cerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 19, para. 34).
Yet the prejudice itself clearly does not need to have already occurred for
provisional measures to be indicated, as the purpose of such measures is
essentially “preventative”.
   24. There need only be a serious “risk” of irreparable prejudice to the
rights in dispute, in the particular circumstances of the case — including
the situation of the State in danger of suffering such prejudice — for the
Court to act. This is why it is well established in the case law of the Court
that the purpose of provisional measures is not to address “irreparable
prejudice” per se, but the “risk of irreparable prejudice” to the rights in
dispute. And it is indeed this “risk” and the “urgency” of remedying it
which must be demonstrated when either of the parties to the proceedings
seeks such measures.
   25. Before turning to the central issue of the existence or not of a “risk
of irreparable prejudice” in the present case, it should be noted that
counsel of Uruguay sometimes raised questions of international respon-
sibility which, in my opinion, relate to the substance of the dispute. For
example, regarding the imputability of certain acts to Argentina or the
characterization of a particular conduct of Argentina as an interna-
tionally wrongful act. I do not therefore consider those observations and
declarations in my discussion below on the existence in the present case
of a “risk of irreparable prejudice” to Uruguay’s disputed rights. In these
incidental proceedings, it is the facts which count. I will therefore
try to answer the question of the existence of the risk essentially on the
basis of factual elements.

                                     *
   26. The notion of “irreparable prejudice” has not been given an
abstract definition by the Court. However, it emerges from the case law
and definitions can also be found in the oral pleadings and doctrine (see,
for example, CR 2006/54, pp. 46 et seq.). As far as the “irreparability” of
the prejudice is concerned, I concur with the general conclusion of Pro-
fessor Higgins in her statement on behalf of the United Kingdom in the
case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie to the
effect that “the preservation of the integrity and efficacy of the judgment
would certainly seem to be the central element in the Court’s considera-
tion of whether circumstances require the indication of interim measures”
(ibid., CR 92/3 of 26 March 1992). As for the “prejudice”, in the Court’s
case law the term has been used in a fairly broad and elastic manner. It

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can certainly not be limited to economic injury or loss alone.

   27. For the majority of the judges in this case, Uruguay has not dem-
onstrated the risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights in dispute and/or
the imminence, that is to say urgency, of that risk. This is the ground on
which the Court relies in the present Order to dismiss the first interim
measure requested by Uruguay outright (paras. 40-43 of the Order). I
disagree with this finding. The events described in the Order in my view
entail a present and serious risk of irreparable prejudice not just to par-
ticular rights claimed by Uruguay, but also to the sound administration
of international justice. In this case, the “circumstances” referred to in
Article 41 of the Statute of the Court are really unique. They require the
indication of measures tailored to the case, that is to say highly specific.
It is rare for a respondent State to find itself exposed, as a litigant, to
economic, social and political injury as a result of measures aimed at
coercion adopted by nationals of the applicant State inside the latter’s
territory. The avowed purpose of those coercive actions in the present
case is to put an end to construction of the Orion mill or have it
relocated, that is, to prejudice the principal right at issue for Uruguay
in the case.

   28. Nor does an applicant State often “tolerate” such a situation by
relying on a domestic policy of persuasion rather than repression as
regards social movements, for that reason refraining from adopting the
measures of due diligence imposed by international law on the territorial
sovereign in that domain, including first and foremost the obligation not
to allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States (Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22).
The fact that, in the present case, the rights claimed by Uruguay, which
are the target of the demonstrators of Gualeguaychú and the surround-
ing area, are “rights in dispute” before the Court, does not alter the
aforementioned obligations of Argentina at all.

   29. Further, as a Party to the proceedings, Argentina is procedurally
bound to conduct itself towards the other Party so as not to anticipate
the final decision of the Court on the “rights in dispute” in the case which
Argentina itself referred to the Court. In any event, the situation is
deteriorating too fast by the day for the Court to be able to end the
present incidental proceedings by simply declaring — as it did in the
Order of 13 July 2006 —that the circumstances, as they now present
themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its
power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.
Since the end of November 2006 the circumstances have been very
different. They call for the Court to exercise its power to indicate pro-
visional measures in order to preserve Uruguay’s disputed rights and

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to reverse the clear slide towards the aggravation and extension of the
dispute.

                                     *
   30. Despite the foregoing considerations, the Court, in paragraph 43
of the Order, has found that the circumstances of the present case are not
such as to require the indication of the first provisional measure requested
by Uruguay, to “prevent or end the interruption of transit” between the
two States and particularly “the blockading of [the] bridges and roads”
linking them.
   31. The reasoning behind this finding is set out in paragraphs 40 to 42
of the Order as follows :
(1) notwithstanding the blockades, the construction of Botnia mill pro-
    gressed significantly since the summer of 2006 and is now well
    advanced ;
(2) it has also been shown that other routes have been used for the
    transit of tourists and goods, including the supplies required for the
    Botnia mill’s installations ;
(3) the construction of the plant is continuing ;
(4) the Court — without addressing whether the roadblocks may have
    caused or may continue to cause damage to the Uruguayan
    economy — is not convinced, in view of the foregoing, that the
    blockades risk prejudicing irreparably the rights which Uruguay
    claims in the present case from the 1975 Statute as such ; and

(5) it has not been shown that, were there such a risk of prejudice to the
    rights claimed by Uruguay in the case, that risk is imminent.

   32. These points do not cast any doubt on the substance of the facts as
such concerning the blockading of the access roads to the international
bridges. However, the Court does not see in this “an imminent risk” of
irreparable prejudice to Uruguay’s right pendente lite to construct the
Orion mill in Fray Bentos. I disagree with this conclusion of the Order, as
it is based on a “reductionist” approach to the concept of “imminent risk
of irreparable prejudice” and to the scope of “Uruguay’s rights in dis-
pute” in this case.

   33. This “reductionism” is explained by the fact that the Court has
refrained — wrongly in my view — from considering the issue of whether
the roadblocks have caused and/or may continue to cause economic and
social prejudice to Uruguay. Yet that was the raison d’être of Uruguay’s
request for the indication of provisional measures. Uruguay requested
the indication of provisional measures precisely to protect itself from the
considerable harm caused to its trade and tourist industry inherent in the
situation created by the blockades. Why do I say wrongly ? Because

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the aim of those responsible for the blockades was to make Uruguay
pay a price for being able to continue the building of the Orion mill in
Fray Bentos, in other words a “toll”. Through these events — tolerated
by Argentina — Uruguay is faced with the following dilemma : either it
halts construction of the mill or it pays an economic and social “toll” to
continue building it.

   34. Things being as they are, the fact that the construction of the mill
is continuing is not of itself apt to dispel the “risk of prejudice” to Uru-
guay’s rights which are affected by the blockades. On the contrary, the
prejudice represented by the so-called “toll” grows with every passing
day. Further, there is an undoubtable and acknowledged relationship
between the facts which have objectively created the “toll” and the
“right” claimed by Uruguay to build the mill in Fray Bentos pending the
final decision by the Court. In no way is the defence of this right by Uru-
guay subject to the imposition of any form of “toll” by virtue of the
1975 Statute of the River Uruguay or of the procedure of the Court.
Also, the “toll” raises a security problem, as the acts of the protestors are
a source of alarm and social tension, which could trigger border or trans-
border incidents.
   35. The “toll” in question may essentially be viewed as lost profit for
the Uruguayan economy, one which carries “a risk of prejudice” for the
rights that the country is defending in the instant case on the basis of the
Statute of the River Uruguay, particularly the right to continue construc-
tion of the Orion mill in Fray Bentos and the right to have the legal dis-
pute between Argentina and Uruguay over the pulp mills decided in
accordance with Article 60 of the Statute of the River. As the Court has
acknowledged “subsequent events may [in fact] render an application
without object” (Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1988, p. 95, para. 66). For example, certain submissions in Argentina’s
Application of 4 May 2006 have been overtaken by events, ENCE’s
planned CMB mill having been relocated to Punta Pereyra on the Uru-
guayan bank of the River Plate. Therein lies the “risk of prejudice” to the
rights in dispute for Uruguay in this case. Social peace is much appre-
ciated by industrial concerns. The protestors are well aware of this, as
proved by the fact that they began the current road and bridge blockades
shortly after Botnia’s Orion project was approved by the World Bank
and its lending institutions.
   36. The prejudice in question is, by its very nature, irreparable, since,
as stated by counsel of Uruguay during the hearings, the Court’s judg-
ment will not be able to restore the Orion project to Fray Bentos should
Botnia decide to leave. Although this is not so for the moment, it is not
the point. What matters is the “risk of prejudice” and this risk is a real
and present one. Argentina has not taken the measures necessary to put
an end to the situation objectively caused by the blockades, or to prevent
a repetition of them in future. The “irreparable prejudice” also urgently

                                                                          38

                 PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                    38

needs to be eliminated as there is much more than a “more or less
imminent risk”. It is indeed a “present risk” for Uruguay, one which
exists and has steadily increased since the end of November 2006 with the
regrettable consequences that can be readily imagined for the sustain-
able economic development of the country.
   37. This “present risk” also impairs the right relied on by Uruguay to
have the dispute settled by the Court in accordance with Article 60 of the
Statute of the River Uruguay and not unilaterally. The need to protect
that right immediately is not in doubt in my view for the continuation of
the prejudice created by the “toll” threatens the very integrity of the legal
settlement of the dispute. Nowhere is it stated that the Respondent must
tolerate such a situation in order to assert its right in a case before the
Court. Moreover, in the practice of the Court, there are examples of pro-
visional measures indicated in accordance with the principle of the sound
administration of international justice.
   38. I would add that the prejudice caused to Uruguay’s economy by
the blockades is by no means a prejudice which Uruguay is supposed to
suffer under the substantive law applicable to the legal dispute before the
Court — in other words, the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay — nor
under the Court’s Statute or Rules or a decision of the Court, given that
the Order of 13 July 2006 dismissed the request for the indication of pro-
visional measures submitted by Argentina on 4 May 2006 when filing its
Application instituting proceedings.
   39. Further, this is not prima facie a situation of damnum sine injuria
esse potest. Uruguay has a right of action to request the cessation of the
blockades and actions of the protesters, which are causing the said preju-
dice to its economy and Argentina has particular obligations here as the
State on whose territory the acts in question are being committed, and
also as a State party to the present case. It is surprising that, hitherto,
these two obligations have not prompted the Argentine authorities to put
an end to the blockading of the Argentinian access roads to the interna-
tional bridges by organized groups of Argentine nationals, who openly
state that the object of their action is to halt Uruguay’s construction of
the Orion mill at Fray Bentos or for it to site the mill elsewhere. Argen-
tina’s duties here do indeed objectively exist by virtue of the geographical
location of the events which are the cause of the risk of irreparable preju-
dice in the territory of the Argentine Republic and also by virtue of the
nationality of the protesters.

   40. The question of the building of the Orion mill at Fray Bentos is
one of the elements of the legal dispute on the interpretation and applica-
tion of the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay which the Argentine
Republic has asked the Court to settle. If, as we should, we view matters
in the context of that Statute, which is a bilateral treaty between Argen-
tina and Uruguay, we note prima facie, in Article 1, that the optimum
and rational utilization of the river, strictly respecting the rights and obli-
gations deriving from the treaties and other international instruments in

                                                                            39

                 PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                    39

force with respect to either of the Parties, is a basic principle of the treaty
and one of the objectives of the Statute of the River.
   41. This being so, I can only conclude prima facie that there is also a
legal relation between : (1) the facts relating to the blockades of roads and
bridges by the protesters, tolerated by the Argentine authorities, (2) the
present risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Uruguay in issue,
(3) the principle of the optimum and rational utilization of the River
Uruguay and its waters, including for industrial purposes, respecting the
régime of the river or the quality of its waters (Art. 27 of the 1975 Stat-
ute), and (4) the legal settlement of disputes arising under the Statute.
For me, this legal relation is more than adequate in these incidental pro-
ceedings for the Court to be able to indicate provisional measures in
order to put an end to the blockades concerned. My conclusion is con-
firmed by the submissions in the Application instituting proceedings,
in which Argentina requests the Court to adjudge and declare that
“Uruguay has breached the obligations incumbent upon it under the 1975
Statute and the other rules of international law to which that instru-
ment refers, including but not limited to . . .” (Order, para. 3).
   42. In light of the above considerations, and bearing in mind the argu-
ments of the Parties and the documentation presented by them, I con-
sider that the circumstances of the case are such as to support the indica-
tion of the first provisional measure requested by Uruguay, namely that
Argentina :
     “shall take all reasonable and appropriate steps at its disposal to
     prevent or end the interruption of transit between Uruguay and
     Argentina, including the blockading of bridges and roads between
     the two States”.

                                      *
   43. I therefore disagree with the dismissal in the Order of the first pro-
visional measure requested by Uruguay. And I also disagree with the fail-
ure to indicate, in the operative paragraph of the Order, a provisional
measure seeking to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute or
render its settlement more difficult, which is the question posed by the
second provisional measure requested by Uruguay. In any event, the
ground (paras. 49 and 50 of the Order) on which the Order dismisses the
indication of the second provisional measure requested by Uruguay does
not prevent me from supporting it, for I have just concluded above that
the circumstances and conditions for the indication of the first pro-
visional measure requested by Uruguay are satisfied in my view.

  44. I consider that the particular circumstances of the case — includ-
ing those subsequent to the hearings which are in the public domain —
urgently call for the indication of provisional measures relating to the
non-aggravation and non-extension of the dispute addressed to both
Parties. On the latter aspect, I therefore diverge from Uruguay’s wording

                                                                            40

                PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                 40

of the second measure it requests. I do so pursuant to Article 75, para-
graph 2, of the Rules of Court.
   45. The case law of the Court in recent years has stressed the full
importance of the Court’s power to indicate provisional measures with a
view to preventing the aggravation or extension of a dispute indepen-
dently of the parties’ requests. For example, in 1996 — in other words,
before the Judgment in the LaGrand case — the reasoning in the Order
indicating provisional measures in the case concerning the Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria stated :
    “independently of the requests for the indication of provisional
    measures submitted by the Parties to preserve specific rights, the
    Court possess by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute the power to
    indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing the aggrava-
    tion or extension of the dispute (cf. Frontier Dispute, Provisional
    Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9,
    para. 18)” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 22-23, para. 41).

Similar statements have also been incorporated into the reasoning in
other Orders after the LaGrand case (see I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 111,
para. 39).
   46. In any event, as the circumstances of the present case are
deteriorating, the Court should have indicated provisional measures
for both Parties to avoid the aggravation and extension of the dispute.
If the Court’s dismissal of the first measure requested by Uruguay
created any impediment whatever to the indication of such a measure
in the operative paragraph of the present Order, the Court could have
relied on international law, namely, on the
    “ ‘principle universally accepted by international tribunals and like-
    wise laid down in many conventions . . . to the effect that the parties
    to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a
    prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be
    given and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken
    which might aggravate or extend the dispute’ (Electricity Company
    of Sofia and Bulgaria, Order of 5 December 1939, P.C.I.J.,
    Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199)” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
    America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 503, para. 103).

                                    *

  47. Lastly, I concur with the Order as regards its dismissal of the third
provisional measure requested by Uruguay, but not for the reason indi-
cated (Order, para. 51). I reject the third measure because it is too vague
and insufficiently specific and because I consider that the circumstances

                                                                        41

                PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. TORRES BERNÁRDEZ)                41

of the case do not currently require the indication of a measure so broad
in scope.

                                    *
  48. In short, I concur with the conclusion in the Order regarding the
prima facie jurisdiction of the Court to entertain Uruguay’s request for
the indication of provisional measures and with the dismissal of the third
measure requested. On the other hand, I disagree with the Order as
regards its dismissal of the first measure requested and as regards its
dismissal of the second measure reformulated so as to be addressed to
both Parties. These two points of disagreement have prevented me from
voting in favour of the Order.

                              (Signed) Santiago TORRES BERNÁRDEZ.

                                                                       42


35

                         Separate opinion
                    of Judge Sepúlveda-Amor

   Agreement to provide interim measures of protection — Need to clearly define
“plausibility” for the purposes of interim protection under Article 41 of the
Statute — Disagreement with the second provisional measure — Unsatisfactory
treatment of the risk of irreparable prejudice to possible Costa Rican rights and to
the “caño” — The Court should have entrusted to both Parties the responsibility
for any measures required to prevent irreparable prejudice to the environment in
Isla Portillos.

   1. I agree that interim measures of protection should be afforded by
the Court in the present case. Although it would appear rather obvious,
it is worth recalling, as the Order does, that the Court has the power to
indicate any provisional measure it may deem necessary in order to pre-
serve the respective rights of either party, and that the measures indicated
may be different, in whole or in part, from those originally requested.
Additionally, I do not find it futile to reaffirm, as the Court does on this
occasion, that an Order on the indication of provisional measures has a
binding effect and that the Parties to the case must comply with any inter-
national obligation arising under the Order.
   2. In its Order, the Court addresses an important concern : the devel-
opment of criminal activity in the disputed territory. The Court has
decided, and rightly so, to give each Party the responsibility for policing
the area over which it unquestionably has sovereignty. It is only to be
hoped that the effectiveness of the bilateral collaboration required will be
sufficient to keep the operation of organized crime away from this transi-
tory no‑man’s land.
   3. On a different note, I believe the Court should have seized the
opportunity to elucidate further the “plausibility requirement” for the
purposes of Article 41 of the Statute. The indeterminacy surrounding the
concept of plausibility in the Order could prove problematic in future
Requests for the indication of provisional measures, as will be shown in
this opinion.
   4. Although I concur with the need to grant measures of interim pro-
tection in the present case, I do not subscribe to the second paragraph of
the operative clause of the Order, nor do I share some of the reasons
adduced in it as a basis for the Court’s decision. I consider insufficient
and unsatisfactory the treatment given by the Court in the Order to the
imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the possible rights of Costa
Rica. I am of the view that the provisional measures indicated fall far

33

36 	         certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

short of what is needed to properly preserve and protect the Humedal
Caribe Noreste. It must be recalled that the Humedal is intimately linked
to both the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo and the Refu-
gio de Vida Silvestre Río San Juan Ramsar site. The fact that these wet-
lands are interconnected means that their environmental protection
requires a wider bilateral collaboration and the full assistance of the
Ramsar Secretariat.

       I. “Plausibility” as a Pre-condition for the Indication
                       of Provisional Measures

  5. In its jurisprudence, the Court has consistently underscored that
decisions in incidental proceedings on interim protection in no way pre-
judge any questions relating to the merits of a dispute submitted to it for
consideration. It has repeatedly recalled that, in the exercise of its powers
under Article 41 of the Statute, it
     “cannot make definitive findings of fact or of imputability, and the
     right of each Party to dispute the facts alleged against it, to challenge
     the attribution to it of responsibility for those facts, and to submit
     arguments in respect of the merits, must remain unaffected by the
     Court’s decision” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
     Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
     Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order
     of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 22, para. 44 ; Land and Mari‑
     time Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria),
     Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),
     p. 23, para. 43 ; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem‑
     ocratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures,
     Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, pp. 127‑128, para. 41).
   6. A slightly different issue — and one which the Court has only
recently started to address — is whether, when called upon to rule on a
Request for the indication of provisional measures, it is appropriate for
the Court to make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the rights
asserted by the party seeking interim protection (and, if so, to what
extent).
   7. It is widely held that, in the exercise of its powers under Article 41
of the Statute, the Court should proceed on the assumption that the
claimed rights do in fact exist, and confine its inquiry to ascertaining
whether those rights are liable to suffer irreparable injury pending the final
judgment on the merits, in the absence of measures for their prote-
ction.
   8. The Court has entertained numerous cases in which the respondent
has objected to the request for interim protection filed by the applicant on

34

37 	            certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

the grounds that the rights asserted by the claimant do not exist, thus invit-
ing the Court to look at the merits of the case, albeit provisionally, so as to
establish whether to exercise its powers under Article 41 of the Statute 1.
   9. Only in its recent decision in the case concerning Questions relating
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) has the
Court openly taken a position on this matter and ruled, for the first time,
that “the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures should be
exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the rights asserted by a party
are at least plausible” 2.
   10. The present Order confirms the stance taken by the Court in Bel‑
gium v. Senegal and goes a step further by appearing to make the “plau-
sibility” of rights a definite requirement for interim protection under
Article 41 of the Statute.

   11. Whereas I take no issue with the rationale underlying the Court’s
ruling, there is, in my view, an urgent need to define with greater preci-
sion the applicable legal standard for the present purposes. Firstly, “plau-
sible” and “plausibility” are not terms of art, and their ordinary meaning
is of limited assistance when it comes to explaining what is legally required
by way of a prima facie demonstration of rights in the context of Article 41
of the Statute 3.
   12. Are States which request the indication of provisional measures
expected to show prima facie the validity of their claims on the merits, or
is fumus non mali juris sufficient, i.e., is it enough to ascertain that the
claimed rights are not patently non-existent according to the information
available to the Court? 4 Does it suffice to demonstrate the possibility or
reasonableness of the existence of a right 5, or is probability the relevant
standard?

   1 See, for instance, case concerning Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v.

Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 12 ; case
concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures,
Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 113 ; case concerning Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of
28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 139.
   2 Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 151, para. 57.
   3 This is the case in English at least. According to the Oxford English Dictionary

Online, “plausible” may have any of the following meanings : acceptable, agreeable, plea-
sing, gratifying ; winning public approval, popular (1.a.) ; Expressing applause or approba-
tion ; plausive, applausive (2) ; Deserving of applause or approval ; praiseworthy, laudable,
commendable (3) ; Of an argument, an idea, a statement, etc. : seeming reasonable,
probable, or truthful ; convincing, believable ; (formerly) spec. having a false appearance of
reason or veracity ; specious (4.a.).
   4 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures,

Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, separate opinion of Judge Abraham, p. 140,
para. 10.
   5 Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of

29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p 31.

35

38 	         certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

   13. These are not academic subtleties. The answers are likely to have
direct implications on how Requests for provisional measures will be
pleaded in the future and on the degree to which the Court considers the
merits of the case in the course of the incidental proceedings on interim
protection.
   14. The Court should have seized the opportunity to clarify these mat-
ters, inter alia, by refining the language used to describe the “plausibility
requirement”. To this effect, it would have been preferable to avoid the
perpetuation of indeterminate terminology which, arguably, only adds
confusion to an already complex topic.
   15. I fear that the imprecision surrounding the “plausibility require-
ment” and the unwarranted emphasis placed upon that in this Order
might ultimately encourage States seeking interim protection to over-
address the substance of the dispute at an early stage and, as a result,
overburden proceedings under Article 41 of the Statute with matters that
should actually be dealt with by the Court when adjudicating on the
merits.
   16. This Order should not be read as introducing a new requirement
under Article 41 of the Statute, or interpreted as signalling a departure
from the Court’s jurisprudence on provisional measures. Rather, as I see
it, it should be understood as an attempt on the part of the Court to
“name” or “label” a requirement already implicit in the Court’s case law.
As already noted, greater definition is required in order to ensure that
consideration of the merits remains within the strict limits called for in
proceedings under Article 41 of the Statute.

            II. Risk of Irreparable Prejudice in Relation
          to the Environmental Consequences of the Caño

   17. Overall, the “irreparable prejudice” requirement should have been
the object of closer examination and more thorough analysis on the part
of the Court. Notwithstanding the importance of this issue in the oral pro-
ceedings, and in contrast to the prominence accorded to the question of
“plausibility”, this matter has been only cursorily addressed in this Order.
   18. And yet the crucial question in this case is whether, as claimed by
Costa Rica, the now navigable caño connecting the San Juan River to the
Harbor Head Lagoon poses a risk of irreparable prejudice to its rights by
reason of the possible threat of irreparable environmental damage to a
portion of territory which the Court may ultimately adjudge to belong to
the Applicant in its decision on the merits.
   19. In its final submissions, Costa Rica requested the Court to indicate
provisional measures ordering Nicaragua not to undertake, inter alia, any
of the following activities in the area comprising the entirety of Isla Por-
tillos (Order, para. 73) :

36

39 	         certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

  (i) engage in the construction or enlargement of a canal ;
 (ii) fell trees or remove vegetation or soil ;
(iii) dump sediment.
   20. At the hearings, it became apparent that the “cleaning and clearing
operations” conducted by Nicaragua in the disputed area were over and
finished. Consequently, Nicaragua observed that the issue of the felling of
trees and the dumping of sediment in certain areas along the caño “no
longer arises” (Order, para. 71).
   21. The fact that the very situation that Costa Rica had sought to avert
with its Request for interim protection has materialized prior to the
Court’s Order does not render the indication of provisional measures
without object, if the Court considers that such measures are still required
in order to preserve the rights at issue.
   22. It is well established that the Court is not bound by the Parties’
requests and “Article 75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court recognizes
the power of the Court, when a request for provisional measures has been
made, to indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those
requested” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish‑
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September
1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 347, para. 47 ; see also Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda),
Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 128,
para. 43 ; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Pro‑
visional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 397,
para. 145).
   23. Whether, as asserted by the Applicant, Nicaragua has constructed
an artificial canal within Costa Rican territory or, as claimed by the
Respondent, Nicaragua has limited itself to clearing a pre-existing canal
connecting the San Juan River to the Harbor Head Lagoon, is something
to be decided in the merits phase, and has no bearing on the Court’s rul-
ing on Costa Rica’s request at this stage of the proceedings.
   24. The important question, and the one on which the Parties funda-
mentally disagree, is whether the mere existence of the caño as a navigable
channel across Isla Portillos poses a risk of irreparable environmental
damage, taking into consideration that the disputed territory is part of
the “Humedal Caribe Noreste” wetland, which Costa Rica designated for
inclusion on the List of Wetlands of International Importance in 1996, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Convention on Wetlands of 1971
(“Ramsar Convention”), to which Nicaragua is also a Contracting Party.

  25. In my view, the evidence before the Court supports the conclusion
that even in its current state — i.e., even if Nicaragua does not pursue any
further “clearing activities” or other works in the area — the caño poses
an imminent risk of irreparable damage to the ecological characteristics

37

40 	         certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

of Isla Portillos and, therefore, provisional measures are required in order
to prevent the materialization of such a risk.
   26. This is not tantamount to saying that the clearing or construction
of the caño has already caused irreparable environmental damage to Isla
Portillos. For the purposes of interim protection under Article 41 of the
Statute, irreparable prejudice does not have to be established, just the risk
thereof.
   27. Of particular importance in this regard are the findings of the
report prepared by the Ramsar Advisory Mission on the basis of Arti-
cle 3 (2) of the Ramsar Convention (hereinafter the “Ramsar Report”),
and submitted to the Court in the course of the proceedings.
   28. Firstly, the Report identifies a threat of damage to the ecology of
the wetland in the medium and long term, including through a loss of
habitat for terrestrial fauna, progressive erosion and changes in the
groundwater aquifer recharge beneath the wetland.

   29. Moreover, it points out that the ecology of the Harbor Head
Lagoon, which is not part of the disputed territory and is located in
another Ramsar wetland of international importance, namely the Refu-
gio Vida Silvestre Río San Juan in Nicaragua, is most at risk as a result
of the hydraulic connection made between the San Juan River and the
lagoon by the clearing or construction of the caño. In particular, it is esti-
mated that “the sandbank currently separating [the Harbor Head Lagoon]
from the Caribbean Sea is in danger of being breached due to the change
in hydrodynamic balance that maintains it between the flow of the San
Juan River and the tidal limit” (Ramsar Report, at paragraph 32). As a
result, the Harbor Head Lagoon could be partially or completely lost
within six to twelve months.
   30. The foregoing underscores the interconnectedness between the pro-
tection of the environment in Isla Portillos, on the one hand, and the
protection of the adjacent wetland located in what is indisputably Nicara-
guan territory, on the other.
   31. According to the Report,
     “[d]ue to its geographical location and dynamics closely linked to the
     Refugio de Vida Silvestre Corredor Fronterizo and to the Refugio de
     Vida Silvestre Río San Juan Ramsar site, the preservation of Humedal
     Caribe Noreste calls for substantial cooperation and collaboration
     between the two bordering countries of both Ramsar sites” (Ramsar
     Report, p. 35).
   32. Significantly, the Court falls short of declaring the existence of an
imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica’s rights in connec-
tion with the clearing or construction of the caño. And yet the Applicant
alone is allowed to dispatch civilian personnel to “avoid irreparable prej-
udice being caused to” the wetland in the disputed area, without the
Court having first established that there is indeed a risk that such a preju-
dice may actually occur.

38

41 	         certain activities (sep. op. sepúlveda-amor)

   33. In the light of the first provisional measure, designed to exclude the
presence of both Parties in the disputed territory, it is difficult to discern
the rationale behind the second measure indicated by the Court. One is
left to wonder whether the Court may not in fact have assessed the “plau-
sibility” of the Parties’ claims (both the Applicant’s and the Respondent’s)
in far broader terms than those advanced in paragraphs 53 to 62 of the
Order and, as a result, anticipated a decision on the merits in favour of
Costa Rica. This, it is submitted, is not the proper role of “plausibility”
in the context of Article 41 of the Statute.

   34. To conclude, the Court should have acknowledged that there is
indeed an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica’s possible
rights by reason of the clearing or construction of the caño. However,
given the interconnectedness between the Humedal Caribe Noreste and
the Refugio de Vida Silvestre Río San Juan, the Court should have
entrusted to both Parties, in consultation with the Ramsar Secretariat,
the responsibility for taking the necessary measures to avoid irreparable
prejudice being caused in the disputed territory.

                                  (Signed) Bernardo Sepúlveda‑Amor.

39


OPINION INDIVIDUEELE DE M. ONYEAMA
Traduction?

Je me suis prononcé sur le fond de la demande d’avis, bien que je ne
partage pas l’opinion exprimée par la Cour au sujet de la compétence;
selon moi c’est à la Cour qu’il appartient de décider à cet égard confor-
mément à l’article 36, paragraphe 6, de son Statut. La décision adoptée
règle le problème en l’espèce et elle s'impose à tous les membres de la
Cour, sous réserve de leur droit, prévu par l'article 57 du Statut, de
présenter une opinion individuelle. Une fois cette opinion exprimée, ils
doivent aborder le reste de l’affaire en partant du principe que la décision
prise par la Cour sur sa compétence est correcte.

* *

Je pense que la Cour, dans son avis, a eu raison de répondre par la
négative aux questions qui lui étaient soumises et de repousser les préten-
tions de M. Fasla.

[J ne saurait y avoir non-exercice de juridiction lorsqu'un tribunal dont
le jugement est attaqué au motif qu’il a omis d’exercer sa juridiction a
examiné les questions dont il était saisi et s’est prononcé à leur sujet. I y
a non-exercice lorsque le tribunal décide, à tort, qu’il n'a pas compétence
pour connaître de la matière qui lui est soumise, ou lorsqu'il néglige ou
omet de statuer. On ne saurait légitimement parler de non-exercice de la
juridiction du tribunal à propos d'une décision sur le fond susceptible
d’être infirmée en appel. «Une contestation de l’affirmation de compé-
tence ne peut être transformée en une procédure contre la façon dont la
compétence a été exercée ou contre le fond de la décision.!» De même, on
ne peut établir que le grief de non-exercice de juridiction est fondé en
démontrant que Ie Tribunal intéressé a abouti à une décision erronée sur
le fond ou a commis une erreur d’interprétation du droit matériel appli-
cable.

Quant à l'erreur procédurale essentielle qui aurait provoqué un mal-
jugé, je n'ai rien à ajouter à ce qui est dit à ce sujet dans l’avis et j'y
souscris entièrement.

* *
Je me sens toutefois tenu de joindre à l’avis l’exposé de mon opinion

1 C.LJ. Recueil 1956, p. 98-99.
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individuelle car j’éprouve des doutes sérieux à propos de la recevabilité
des questions posées à la Cour par l’organe qui prétend les soumettre, à
savoir, le Comité des demandes de réformation de jugements du Tribunal
administratif (ci-après dénommé Je Comité).

Par sa résolution 957 (X) concernant la procédure de réformation des
jugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, l’Assemblée
générale a créé le Comité et l’a autorisé, en vertu de l’article 96, para-
graphe 2, de la Charte des Nations Unies, à consulter la Cour s’il estime
que la demande de réformation d’un jugement du Tribunal repose sur des
bases sérieuses.

Le passage pertinent du statut du Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies tel qu'il a été adopté par la résolution 957 (X) de l’Assemblée
générale le 8 novembre 1955 est l’article 11 qui est ainsi libellé:

«1. Si un Etat Membre, le Secrétaire général ou la personne qui a
été l’objet d’un jugement rendu par le Tribunal (y compris toute
personne qui a succédé mortis causa à ses droits) conteste le juge-
ment en alléguant que le Tribunal a outrepassé sa juridiction ou sa
compétence ou n’a pas exercé sa juridiction ou a commis une erreur
de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies
ou a commis, dans la procédure, une erreur essentielle qui a provo-
qué un mal-jugé, cet Etat Membre, le Secrétaire général ou l'inté-
ressé peut, dans les trente jours suivant le jugement, demander par
écrit au Comité créé en vertu du paragraphe 4 du présent article de
prier la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif
sur la question.

2. Dans les trente jours suivant la réception de la demande visée au
paragraphe | du présent article, le Comité décide si cette demande
repose sur des bases sérieuses. S’il en décide ainsi, il prie la Cour de
donner un avis consultatif et le Secrétaire général prend les dispo-
sitions voulues pour transmettre à la Cour l'opinion de la personne
visée au paragraphe 1.

3. Si aucune demande n’est faite en vertu du paragraphe 1 du
présent article ou si le Comité ne décide pas de demander un avis
consultatif dans les délais prescrits par le présent article, le jugement
du Tribunal devient définitif. Chaque fois que la Cour est priée de
donner un avis consultatif, le Secrétaire général ou bien donne effet
à l’avis de la Cour, ou bien prie le Tribunal de se réunir spécialement
pour confirmer son jugement initial ou rendre un nouveau jugement,
conformément à l'avis de la Cour. S’il n’est pas invité à se réunir
spécialement, le Tribunal, à sa session suivante, confirme son juge-
ment ou le rend conforme à l’avis de la Cour.

4. Aux fins du présent article, il est créé un Comité, autorisé en
vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 96 de la Charte à demander des

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avis consultatifs à la Cour. Le Comité est composé des Etats Mem-
bres représentés au Bureau de la dernière en date des sessions ordi-
naires de l’Assemblée générale. Le Comité se réunit au siège de l’Or-
ganisation et établit son propre réglement.

5. Lorsque le Tribunal a accordé une indemnité a la personne
intéressée et que le Comité a prié la Cour de donner un avis consul-
tatif en application du paragraphe 2 du présent article, le Secrétaire
général, s’il considère qu’il serait difficile à l’intéressé de défendre ses
intérêts, lui avance, dans les quinze jours suivant la décision du
Comité demandant un avis consultatif, un tiers de l’indemnité totale
accordée par le Tribunal, déduction faite des prestations de licen-
ciement qui auraient déjà été versées. Cette avance est faite étant
entendu que, dans les trente jours suivant la décision que le Tribunal
rend en application du paragraphe 3 du présent article, lintéressé
rembourse à l'Organisation des Nations Unies la différence éven-
tuelle entre cette avance et la somme à laquelle il a droit en vertu de
l’avis de la Cour.»

Il ressort clairement de cet article que le Comité a été créé à seule fin de
décider s’il y a lieu ou non de demander un avis consultatif à la Cour.
L’Assemblée générale ne lui a attribué aucune autre fonction, ni dans cet
article, ni dans d’autres textes.

L'article fait référence au paragraphe 2 de l’article 96 de la Charte qui
dispose:

«Tous autres organes de l'Organisation et institutions spécialisées
qui peuvent, à un moment quelconque, recevoir de l’Assemblée
générale une autorisation à cet effet, ont également le droit de de-
mander à la Cour des avis consultatifs sur des questions juridiques
qui se poseraient dans le cadre de leur activité.»

C’est cette disposition de la Charte qui confère à l’Assemblée générale
le pouvoir d’autoriser d’autres organes des Nations Unies à demander à
la Cour des avis consultatifs.

Lorsqu'elle le fait, l’Assemblée générale doit, selon moi, s’en tenir
strictement aux dispositions de cet article de la Charte qui, à cet égard,
me paraît imposer les conditions ci-après:

1. L'autorisation doit concerner un organe des Nations Unies.

2. L’organe doit exercer certaines fonctions, ou se livrer à des activités
qui lui sont confiées par l’Assemblée générale.

3. L'autorisation doit être limitée à la possibilité de demander des avis
consultatifs sur des questions juridiques qui se poseraient dans le cadre de
l’activité des organes subsidiaires autorisés. (Les italiques sont de nous.)

Il me semble que si l’une quelconque ou l’ensemble de ces conditions ne
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sont pas satisfaites, l'autorisation n’a pas l'effet recherché et l’organe
«autorisé» est juridiquement incompétent pour demander à la Cour un
avis consultatif.

L'Assemblée générale tire son pouvoir de créer des organes subsidiaires
de l’article 22 de la Charte des Nations Unies qui dispose que l’Assemblée
générale peut créer les organes subsidiaires qu’elle juge nécessaires à
l'exercice de ses fonctions.

L’expression «organe subsidiaire» n’a pas été définie dans la Charte et,
dans la pratique, des termes ou expressions tels que commissions, comités,
organes subsidiaires et organismes subsidiaires | ont été utilisés indifférem-
ment, Mais quel que soit le nom qu’on lui donne, une des caractéristiques
d’un organe subsidiaire est d’avoir été constitué pour exercer certaines
fonctions en vue d’aider l’organe principal qui l’a créé — fonctions
entrant dans le cadre des fonctions générales de l’organe principal et
correspondant étroitement à son activité légitime.

Jestime que l’Assemblée générale ne peut valablement créer un organe
subsidiaire chargé d’exercer des fonctions qui n’ont pas été expressément
conférées à l’Assemblée elle-même, ou qui n’entrent pas dans le cadre de
ses fonctions.

Ainsi, le Comité pour une juridiction criminelle internationale créé par
l’Assemblée générale, en vertu de sa résolution 489 (V), afin de préparer
des avant-projets de convention et de formuler des propositions con-
cernant la création et le statut d’une cour criminelle internationale, a
déclaré dans son rapport:

«Aux termes de la Charte, la Cour ne pourrait être qu’un organe
subsidiaire. L’organe principal serait vraisemblablement l’Assem-
blée générale, mais un organe subsidiaire ne peut avoir une compétence
plus étendue que l’organe dont il relève, et il est douteux que I’ Assem-
blée générale soit compétente pour rendre la justice.2» (Les italiques
sont de nous.)

Dans son avis consultatif relatif à Effet de jugements du Tribunal ad-
ministratif des Nations Unies accordant indemnité3 la Cour a déclaré, au
sujet d’une opinion qui avait été exprimée, d’aprés laquelle le jugement
d’un organe subsidiaire lie l’organe principal qui a créé cet organe:

«Il a été soutenu en troisième lieu que le Tribunal administratif est
un organe subsidicire, subordonné ou secondaire, et que, par con-
séquent, ses jugements ne sauraient lier l’Assemblée générale qui Pa
créé.

1 Répertoire de la pratique des Nations Unies I, p. 244.
2 Assemblée générale (VII), suppl. n° 11 (A/2136), par. 21.
3 C.LJ. Recueil 1954, p. 60-61.

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Cette conception part de l’idée qu’en adoptant le statut du Tribu-
nal administratif, l’Assemblée générale créait un organe qu’elle
jugeait nécessaire à l'exercice de ses propres fonctions. Mais la Cour
ne peut accepter ce point de départ. La Charte n’a pas conféré de fonc-
tions judiciaires à l’Assemblée générale, et les rapports entre le per-
sonnel et l'Organisation rentrent dans le cadre du chapitre XV de la
Charte. En absence d’un tribunal administratif, la charge de tran-
cher les différends entre le personnel et l'Organisation pourrait in-
comber au Secrétaire général, en vertu des dispositions des articles 97
et 101. C’est ainsi que, pendant les trois ans et plus qui ont précédé la
création du Tribunal administratif, le Secrétaire général a fait face à
ce problème au moyen d’un organisme administratif paritaire con-
duisant à une décision définitive du Secrétaire général. En créant
le Tribunal administratif, l’Assemblée générale ne déléguait pas
l'exercice de ses propres fonctions; elle exerçait un pouvoir, qu’elle
tenait de la Charte: celui de réglementer les rapports avec le person-
nel. A l'égard du Secrétariat, l’Assemblée générale a reçu de la
Charte le pouvoir de fixer des règles, mais non de se prononcer
judiciairement sur des cas d’espèce, ou d’en traiter autrement.»

Selon moi, cela revient à dire que l’Assemblée générale, en créant le
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, ne peut avoir agi en vertu des
dispositions de l’article 22 de la Charte, celle-ci ne conférant pas de fonc-
tions judiciaires à l’Assemblée générale, mais qu’elle exerçait le pouvoir
qui est le sien de réglementer les rapports avec le personnel conformément
au chapitre XV de la Charte.

La Cour paraît assimiler la création d’un organe subsidiaire par l’As-
semblée générale à une délégation par celle-ci de l’exercice de ses propres
fonctions (C.L.J. Recueil 1954, p. 61).

Vu ce qui précède, il ne semble pas que le Comité, à qui est confiée une
fonction judiciaire très limitée, soit un organe subsidiaire relevant de la
catégorie des organes visés à l’article 22 de la Charte.

Dans le présent avis, la Cour admet toutefois que le Comité a été
valablement créé pour la raison que «le pouvoir de l’Assemblée générale
de réglementer les relations avec le personnel englobe aussi celui de créer
un organe constituant un rouage pour la réformation des jugements du
Tribunal [administratif des Nations Unies]».

Selon moi, en créant le Comité, l’Assemblée générale a constitué un
organe judiciaire ou pour le moins quasi judiciaire chargé de «filtrer» les
demandes d’avis consultatifs adressées à la Cour conformément à l’article
11 du statut du Tribunal administratif, et de décider dans chaque espèce
si la demande repose sur des bases sérieuses. I] y a donc entre le Comité et
le Tribunal administratif un lien suffisant pour justifier l'opinion ex-
primée par la Cour suivant laquelle la création du Comité relevait de

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l’exercice du pouvoir de l’Assemblée de réglementer les relations avec le
personnel.

* *

Les fonctions du Comité sont définies a l’article 11 du statut du Tribu-
nal administratif des Nations Unies; elles consistent a:

1) recevoir d’un Etat Membre, du Secrétaire général ou de la personne
qui a été l’objet d’un jugement rendu par le Tribunal toute demande
écrite tendant à ce que le Comité prie la Cour de donner un avis consul-
tatif ;

2) décider dans les trente jours si cette demande repose sur des bases
sérieuses; et, dans l’affirmative,

3) prier la Cour de donner un avis consultatif.

Le Comité n’est pas chargé de réformer le jugement du Tribunal. Il ne
s'occupe que de la demande dont il a été saisi et étudie le jugement du
Tribunal à seule fin de décider si les objections soulevées dans la demande
ont quelque consistance.

Ces fonctions délimitent et déterminent le cadre de l’activité du Comité
et c’est dans ce cadre que doivent se poser les questions juridiques sur
lesquelles l’avis consultatif de la Cour peut à bon droit être sollicité, aux
termes de l’article 96, paragraphe 2, de la Charte.

*
* *

Une requéte pour avis consultatif semble avoir pour objet d’éclairer
Porgane qui la formule et de lui permettre de régler avec plus d’assurance
les questions juridiques qui peuvent lui poser des difficultés dans
l’exercice de ses fonctions. C’est ainsi que, dans sa résolution 171 A (IT)
intitulée « Nécessité pour l’Organisation des Nations Unies et pour ses
organes d’utiliser davantage les services de la Cour internationale de
Justice», l'Assemblée générale a recommandé que les organes de l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies et les institutions spécialisées, à condition d’y
être dûment autorisés aux termes de l’article 96, soumettent à la Cour
pour avis consultatif les points de droit de la compétence de la Cour qui
sont «soulevés au cours de leurs travaux et … {quil concernent des questions
de principe qu’il est désirable de voir régler...» (les italiques sont de nous).

Dans l'avis consultatif qu'elle a rendu le 23 octobre 19561 la Cour a
déclaré:

«La question posée à la Cour est une question juridique. Elle
s’est posée dans le cadre de l’activité de l’Unesco, au moment où le
Conseil exécutif avait à examiner les mesures à prendre à la suite des

1 CLS. Recueil 1956, p. 84.
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quatre jugements. La réponse qui lui sera donnée affectera le résultat
de la contestation élevée par le Conseil exécutif au sujet de ces juge-
ments. Le Conseil exécutif, en présentant la demande d’avis, a cherché
à s'éclairer sur Paspect juridique d’une affaire dont il s'occupait.» (Les
italiques sont de nous.)

Le champ d’action du Comitéestextrêmement restreint et les quatre cas
dans lesquels il est «autorisé» à demander un avis consultatif à la Cour ne
sauraient se présenter dans le cadre de sa propre activité. L’unique raison
d’être du Comité semble être de solliciter des avis consultatifs sur des
questions juridiques qui se posent dans le cadre de l’activité du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies. Le Comité ne fait aucunement partie de
ce Tribunal et ne participe en aucune manière à son activité sauf, comme
on l’a souligné, lorsqu'il demande des avis consultatifs sur des questions
juridiques qui se rattachent à cette activité.

L'avis consultatif demandé, et les raisons qui peuvent être invoquées à
l'appui de cette demande, n’affectent en rien la manière dont le Comité
s’acquittera de sa tâche qui consiste essentiellement à décider si, dans un
cas d'espèce, une demande de réformation d’un jugement du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies par la voie d'un avis consultatif de la
Cour repose sur des bases sérieuses, et à solliciter cet avis. En d’autres
termes, les questions juridiques sur lesquelles il est autorisé à demander un
avis consultatif n’ont aucun rapport avec son activité propre.

À mon sens, une autorisation se fondant sur l’article 96, paragraphe 2,
de la Charte, et de nature à permettre à un organe des Nations Unies de
demander un avis consultatif sur des questions juridiques qui ne se posent
pas dans le cadre de son activité, est incompatible avec Ie texte sur lequel
elle prétend s'appuyer. Il en va ainsi dans le cas du Comité et J’estime donc
que, bien que la Cour ait la compétence voulue pour répondre à une de-
mande d’avis consultatif, la présente requête n’émane pas d’un organe
juridiquement autorisé à la présenter et n’est pas recevable devant la
Cour.

(Signé) Charles D. ONYEAMA.

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