72

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. NAGAOKA

J'ai le vif regret de ne pas être à même de me rallier à
l’arrêt de la Cour. Dans son opinion individuelle, le juge
M. O. Hudson a indiqué amplement son point de vue, avec
lequel je suis entièrement d’accord. Il ne me reste donc plus
beaucoup à y ajouter. Je veux seulement préciser mon opinion
sur les points suivants.

1. D’après les requêtes des trois ressortissants hongrois, les
procès dits « de la deuxième série » ont été intentés contre la
Vougoslavie en vue de lui réclamer l’indemnité locale (nationale)
pour les propriétés expropriées par l’application de la loi agraire.
Il n’y a donc aucun doute que ces procès ont été intentés à
propos des réformes agraires à la suite de l’application de la
nouvelle loi yougoslave. Cependant, la question qui se pose est
celle de savoir si les procès, au cas où ils sont intentés à propos
des réformes agraires, doivent tous être nécessairement compris
dans le cadre des procès visés à l’article premier de l’Accord II.
En d’autres termes, la question est de savoir si les auteurs des
Accords de Paris voulaient faire entendre par les mots « tous
les procès » toutes sortes de procès, quels qu'ils soient, quand
ils sont intentés à propos des réformes agraires.

2. Cette question, qui est l’essence même du problème, ne
saurait être tranchée d’une manière nette et précise si l’on ne
recherchait pas quel est l’esprit des Accords de Paris. Il est
donc essentiel qu’on se base sur la réalité des faits qui ont
amené les Puissances à la conclusion de ces Accords; autrement,
il est impossible de saisir la vraie portée de l’article premier de
VAccord II.

L'état de choses qui existait avant les Conférences de La
Haye et de Paris a été bien décrit comme suit par M. Loucheur,
président de la Conférence de Paris: « Le Gouvernement
roumain, et cette thése était également celle des Gouverne-
ments de Prague et de Belgrade, arguait de ce que l’article 250
a pour objet de protéger les ressortissants hongrois contre les
mesures prises contre eux en cette dite qualité, mais ne sau-
rait s’appliquer à propos des réformes agraires qui ont atteint
également tous les possesseurs de terres, quelle que fût leur
nationalité. Les Hongrois répliquaient que l’article 250 devait
être pris à la lettre, et que ses dispositions protégeaient les
ressortissants hongrois de façon absolue contre toute saisie ou
liquidation. » C'est-à-dire que les ressortissants hongrois ont
réclamé, en s'appuyant sur l’article 250 du Traité de Trianon,

46
73  A/B 68 (AFF. PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY). — OP. NAGAOKA

la restitution des terres frappées des réformes agraires ou les
indemnités représentant la valeur complète de ces terres, tandis
que les trois Etats de la Petite-Entente n’acceptaient que le
paiement des indemnités nationales.

L'agent du Gouvernement yougoslave confirme ces faits dans
sa Duplique (p. 1), savoir: « L'objet principal de la Réplique
paraît être de vouloir démontrer : a) que les procès des ressor-
tissants hongrois intentés devant les tribunaux arbitraux mixtes
avant le 20 janvier 1930 avaient pour but d’obtenir une indem-
nité complète; à) que les États de la Petite-Entente ont tou-
jours insisté sur le fait que leur législation agraire est basée sur
le principe de complète égalité entre leurs nationaux et les
ressortissants hongrois. Ces deux faits n’ont jamais été contestés
du côté yougoslave. »

Il est donc clair qu'il n’y aurait eu aucun conflit entre les
États de Ja Petite-Entente et la Hongrie, si les ressortissants
hongrois s’étaient contentés, dés le début, des indemnités locales.

Quelle était la combinaison par laquelle on a abouti a
une entente afin de dissiper ce conflit ? Les Accords de Paris la
démontrent très clairement :

a) D'une part, on s’est contenté de ne réclamer aux trois
États de la Petite-Entente que les versements au titre des
indemnités locales. D'autre part, pour satisfaire aux demandes
des ressortissants hongrois, on s’est décidé à verser, en sus des
versements ci-dessus, les annuités prévues par l’article 2 de
l'Accord III a charge des Puissances autres que les trois pays
susindiqués.

b) Toutes ces sommes seront versées au Fonds agraire créé
par l’Accord II de Paris.

c) Le Fonds agraire n’est tenu à aucun paiement avant
d’avoir reçu notification de la totalité des jugements (art. IV
de l’Accord IT); et, aussitôt que la Commission de gestion,
qui représente le Fonds en vertu de l’article 4 de l’Accord III,
aura reçu la totalité des sentences rendues dans les procès visés
à l’article premier de l'Accord II, mais en tout cas avant
le 3x décembre 1932, elle procédera entre les bénéficiaires des-
dites sentences à une répartition proportionnelle du Fonds en
conformité de l’article VI de l'Accord II.

4. De ce qui précède, nous pouvons tirer deux conclusions :
1° les procès visés à l’article premier de l’Accord IT doivent être
de ceux dont l’objet est de recevoir les indemnités du Fonds
agraire, c’est-à-dire les indemnités supérieures aux indemnités

47
74 A/B 68 (AFF. PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY). — OP. NAGAOKA

locales ; 2° le Fonds agraire a été créé pour s'occuper unique-
ment du paiement de ces indemnités supérieures aux indemnités
locales.

5. Ces deux conclusions ou prémisses rendent claire la vraie
portée de l’alinéa x de l’article premier de l'Accord II, qui dit
que « les responsabilités du défendeur dans tous les procès qui
ont été intentés jusqu’au 20 janvier 1930 par des ressortissants
hongrois devant les tribunaux arbitraux mixtes .... à la You-
goslavie, à propos des réformes agraires, incomberont exclusive-
ment à un Fonds dit « Fonds agraire ». Il n’y a aucun doute
qu'il s’agit ici de «tous les procès » qui réclament les
indemnités dites « complètes ». Il en sera de même des procès
visés à (2) du même article, parce qu’il y est prévu que le
défendeur de ces procès doit être toujours le Fonds agraire
qui est créé uniquement pour le paiement des indemnités com-
plètes.

Les procès visés à l’article premier de l'Accord II ne com-
prennent donc que les procès intentés pour obtenir, à la charge
du Fonds agraire, des indemnités supérieures aux indemnités
locales. Par conséquent, les procès dits « de la deuxième série »
ne rentrent pas dans le cadre des procès prévus à l’article premier
de l’Accord II, bien qu'ils aient été intentés devant le Tribunal
arbitral mixte à propos de la réforme agraire yougoslave.

6. La compétence de la Cour comme instance d'appel ayant
été ainsi établie pour la présente requête, je m’abstiendrai
d’entrer dans l’examen des questions soulevées par les Parties
comme subsidiaires. Je m'’abstiendrai également, étant donné
l'arrêt de la Cour, de procéder à l'examen des sentences
dont est appel, quoique j'estime qu’elles sont mal fondées et

devraient être réformées.

Pour terminer, je veux souligner encore une fois que ni la
Conférence de La Haye ni la Conférence de Paris n’a tranché
que les questions qui ont troublé pendant des années l’Europe
centrale. Les questions concernant la demande des indemnités
locales ne s’y posaient pas; elles ne pouvaient faire l’objet de
l'étude de ces deux conférences, parce que ce sont précisément
les États de la Petite-Entente qui ont soutenu la thèse du
traitement national égalitaire et du paiement des indemnités
locales. Si, comme je l’ai déjà signalé, les ressortissants hongrois
avaient accepté cette thèse, on n'aurait eu aucun besoin de
chercher une solution en matière de réforme agraire.

Entre les procès tendant à demander des indemnités com-
plétes et ceux qui sont relatifs aux indemnités locales, il n'y

48
75  A/B 68 (AFF. PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY). — OP. NAGAOKA

a aucune connexité. Les Accords de Paris ne changent en rien
la situation des ressortissants hongrois en ce qui concerne leur
droit de demander les indemnités locales. Le paiement forfai-
taire au Fonds agraire par la Yougoslavie, conformément à
l’article ro de l'Accord ITI, ne saurait acquitter celle-ci de ses
indemnités locales dues aux ressortissants hongrois. Il ne s’agit
que de l’acquittement des obligations de la Yougoslavie envers
le Fonds agraire, dont la mission consiste à répartir ses dis-
ponibilités aux bénéficiaires en vertu des sentences rendues dans
les procès visés à l’article premier de l'Accord IT. C'est-à-dire que
l’annuité versée au Fonds agraire par la Yougoslavie a pour
but unique de couvrir une partie des indemnités complètes que
le Fonds agraire aura à répartir aux bénéficiaires. Cette annuité
n’a, par conséquent, aucun rapport avec les indemnités locales
dont les ressortissants hongrois réclament le paiement à l’État
yougoslave.

L'essentiel est d'assurer aux ressortissants hongrois le traite-
ment national sur un pied d'égalité avec les ressortissants you-
goslaves. La reconnaissance, par les Accords de Paris, de droits
supérieurs à ceux qui sont accordés aux nationaux yougoslaves,
ne saurait porter aucune atteinte aux droits fondamentaux
reconnus aux ressortissants hongrois.

(Signé) H. NAGAOKA.

49


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
(BURKINA FASO/MALI)

ORDONNANCE DU 3 OCTOBRE 1985

1985

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE FRONTIER DISPUTE
(BURKINA FASO/MALI)

ORDER OF 3 OCTOBER 1985
Mode officiel de citation :

Différend frontalier, ordonnance du 3 octobre 1985,
CIS. Recueil 1985, p. 189.

Official citation :

Frontier Dispute, Order of 3 October 1985,
LCS. Reports 1985, p. 189.

N° de vente : 5 1 6

Sales number

1985
3 octobre

189

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
ANNÉE 1985

Rôle général

n° 69

3 octobre 1985

AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
(BURKINA FASO/MALI)

ORDONNANCE

Le président de la Chambre de la Cour internationale de Justice cons-
tituée pour connaître de l'affaire du Différend frontalier entre le Burkina
Faso et le Mali,

Vu l'article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 18, paragraphe 3, 31, 44.
46 et 92 de son Règlement,

Vu le compromis conclu le 16 septembre 1983 entre la République du
Burkina Faso (alors Haute-Volta) et la République du Mali en vue de
soumettre à une chambre de la Cour un différend concernant la délimi-
tation de leur frontière commune,

Vu l’ordonnance prise par le Président de la Cour le 12 avril 1985 par
laquelle la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’un mémoire par
chaque Partie était fixée au 3 octobre 1985 ;

Considérant que les mémoires du Burkina Faso et du Mali ont été
déposés dans le délai susvisé ;

Considérant que l’article HI, paragraphe 2 c), du compromis susmen-
tionné prévoit qu'un contre-mémoire sera soumis par chacune des Parties
au plus tard six mois après l'échange des mémoires ; et que les Parties,
interrogées à ce sujet le 3 octobre 1985, ont confirmé leur accord pour que
les contre-mémoires soient déposés dans ce délai ;

Fixe au 2 avril 1986 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt d’un
contre-mémoire par chaque Partie ;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.
190 DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER (ORDONNANCE 3 X 85)

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le trois octobre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-cinq, en trois
exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour, et dont les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Burkina Faso
et au Gouvernement du Mali.

Le président de la Chambre,
(Signé) Mohammed BEDJAOUI.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Santiago TORRES BERNARDEZ.


                     342

                                 SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DONOGHUE

                        Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court — Jurisdiction over counter-
                     claims — Termination of the title of jurisdiction taking effect after the filing of the
                     Application but before the submission of counter-claims — Consequence of such
                     termination on the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.

                        1. Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of the Court provides: “The
                     Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes within the jurisdic-
                     tion of the Court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of the
                     claim of the other party.”
                        2. I consider that the Court has jurisdiction over Colombia’s counter-
                     claims only to the extent that each counter-claim falls within the dispute
                     that was the subject-  matter of Nicaragua’s Application. As I do not
                     believe that the first and second counter-claims meet this requirement, I
                     find them to be inadmissible and have voted in favour of operative para-
                     graphs 82 (A) (1) and 82 (A) (2). The third counter-claims falls within the
                     scope of the dispute that was the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s Applica-
                     tion and the conditions of jurisdiction contained in the Pact of Bogotá
                     have been met. The Court has jurisdiction over that counter-claim, which
                     is directly connected to the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s claims against
                     Colombia. I therefore have voted in favour of operative para-
                     graph 82 (A) (3). The fourth counter-claim falls outside the scope of the
                     dispute that is the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s Application and thus is
                     outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. On that basis, I have voted against
                     operative paragraph 82 (A) (4). I submit this separate opinion to set out
                     the reasons for these conclusions.

                        3. Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá provides that the Pact “may be
                     denounced upon one year’s notice”. Colombia denounced the Pact on
                     27 November 2012. On 26 November 2013, Nicaragua filed the Applica-
                     tion in the present case. One day later, the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in
                     force between the Parties. Thereafter, Colombia presented four counter-
                     claims in its Counter-Memorial.
                        4. According to Colombia, because the Pact of Bogotá was in force
                     between the Parties as of the date of Nicaragua’s Application, the Court
                     has jurisdiction over its counter-claims. Nicaragua, on the other hand,
                     maintains that the “critical date” is the date on which the counter-claims
                     were presented to the Court, which took place after termination of the
                     Pact of Bogotá as between the Parties.

                     57

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                     343 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                       5. Thus, both Parties take an all-or-nothing approach to the question
                     of the Court’s jurisdiction over Colombia’s counter-claims, focusing on
                     the date to be used in determining the Court’s jurisdiction. Neither Party
                     convinces me.
                       6. By becoming parties to the Pact of Bogotá, both Colombia and
                     Nicaragua consented broadly to the Court’s jurisdiction. Their shared
                     consent to the Court’s jurisdiction came to an end, however, when Colom-
                     bia’s termination of the Pact of Bogotá took effect. After that date, nei-
                     ther State could file an application relying on the Pact as the title of
                     jurisdiction. In particular, had Colombia made its claims against Nicara-
                     gua in an application filed after the termination of the Pact of Bogotá had
                     taken effect, the Pact would not have provided a basis for the Court’s
                     jurisdiction. Nonetheless, according to Colombia, the Court should
                     approach its jurisdiction over the counter-claims as if there had been no
                     change in Colombia’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.

                        7. The approach urged by Nicaragua is also problematic. An applicant
                     that terminates a title of jurisdiction immediately after filing an applica-
                     tion could prevent the respondent from making any counter-claim in the
                     case. If instead (as is the case here) it is the respondent that notifies its
                     intention to terminate a title of jurisdiction, the applicant could cut off
                     the ability of the respondent to file a counter-claim, however closely
                     linked to the applicant’s claims, by filing the application just before the
                     termination of the title of jurisdiction takes effect.

                        8. Although the Nottebohm case did not involve a counter-claim, I
                     find the reasoning that the Court followed there to be instructive in deter-
                     mining the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over Colombia’s counter-
                     claims.

                       9. In the Nottebohm case, the respondent argued that the Court lacked
                     jurisdiction over the case because the respondent’s optional clause decla-
                     ration had lapsed after the application was filed. The Court rejected this
                     argument, stating that

                          “[w]hen an Application is filed at a time when the law in force
                          between the parties entails the compulsory jurisdiction of the
                          Court . . . the filing of the Application is merely the condition required
                          to enable the clause of compulsory jurisdiction to produce its effects
                          in respect of the claim advanced in the Application. Once this condi-
                          tion has been satisfied, the Court must deal with the claim; it has
                          jurisdiction to deal with all its aspects, whether they relate to jurisdic-
                          tion, to admissibility or to the merits. An extrinsic fact such as the
                          subsequent lapse of the Declaration . . . cannot deprive the Court of
                          the jurisdiction already established.” (Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v.

                     58

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                     344 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                          Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953,
                          p. 123.)
                          10. Both in the Nottebohm case and in the present case, the Parties had
                     given their consent to the Court’s jurisdiction through a title of jurisdic-
                     tion that was broad, ratione materiae, was in force as between the Parties
                     on the date of the application and conferred jurisdiction upon the Court
                     with respect to “disputes” between States. Here, as in the Nottebohm case,
                     the subsequent lapse of the title of jurisdiction (the Pact of Bogotá) did
                     not deprive the Court of the jurisdiction that was established by the filing
                     of the application. But what is the scope, ratione materiae, of the jurisdic-
                     tion that is established by a State’s application?
                          11. Applying the Court’s approach, when a State acts to terminate a
                     title of jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless retains jurisdiction over any
                     claim by that State that falls within the scope of that title of juris
                     diction, ratione materiae, so long as the claim is presented in the form of
                     a counter-claim in response to an application filed before the title of
                     jurisdiction terminated. This conclusion ignores a central insight of the
                      Nottebohm case — that it is the application that enables a title of juris
                       diction to produce its effect, which cannot be vitiated by the subsequent
                       lapse of the title of jurisdiction.
                          12. Nicaragua’s Application did not have the effect of establishing in
                       all respects the Court’s jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá. It enabled
                       the title of jurisdiction to produce its effect only with respect to the
                       subject-matter of the dispute presented by the Application. After the ter-
                       mination of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court retained jurisdiction only to
                       that extent. Thus, when Colombia submitted its counter-           claims, the
                       Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae was limited to claims fitting within
                       the subject-matter of the dispute presented in Nicaragua’s Application.
                       Because of this jurisdictional limitation, the present case is unlike most
                       cases, in which counter-claims directly connected to the applicant’s claim
                       may “widen the original subject-matter of the dispute” (Application of the
                       Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
                       (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-          Claims, Order of
                       17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256, para. 27).
                          13. To determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over Colombia’s
                       counter-claims, it is necessary, first, to identify the subject-matter of the
                       dispute presented in Nicaragua’s Application over which the Court estab-
                       lished its jurisdiction and then to consider whether each counter-claim fits
                       within that subject-matter.
                          14. The subject-matter of a dispute is not identical to the claims that
                       appear in the application. As the Court has repeatedly stated,
                          “[i]t is for the Court itself . . . to determine on an objective basis the
                          subject-matter of the dispute between the parties, that is, to ‘isolate
                          the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim’
                          (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,
                          p. 262, para. 29; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment,

                     59

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                     345 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                          I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 466, para. 30). In doing so, the Court examines
                          the positions of both parties, ‘while giving particular attention to the
                          formulation of the dispute chosen by the [a]pplicant’ (Fisheries Juris-
                          diction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment,
                          I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 448, para. 30; see also Territorial and Maritime
                          Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                          I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 848, para. 38).” (Obligation to Negotiate
                          Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection,
                          Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 602, para. 26.)

                        15. In identifying the subject-matter of the dispute presented by Nica-
                     ragua’s Application and over which the Court established its jurisdiction,
                     I consider the Application and the pleadings of the Parties. I also take
                     account of the Court’s Judgment of 17 March 2016.
                        16. Nicaragua’s Application states that its dispute with Colombia
                     “concerns the violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and maritime
                     zones declared by the Court’s Judgment of 19 November 2012 and the
                     threat of the use of force by Colombia in order to implement these viola-
                     tions” (Application of Nicaragua, p. 4, para. 2). In 2016, however, the
                     Court concluded that the dispute between the Parties did not extend to
                     the alleged violations of the obligation not to use or threaten the use of
                     force (Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the
                     Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judg-
                     ment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 33, para. 78).

                        17. Nicaragua appends to its Application and its Memorial various
                     statements made by President Santos in the wake of the 2012 Judgment,
                     whereby he “reject[ed]” the Court’s delimitation (Application of Nicara-
                     gua, p. 28 (Annex 1)) and indicated that Colombia would not apply the
                     Judgment until a treaty protecting the rights of Colombians is concluded
                     (ibid., p. 54 (Annex 9)). According to Nicaragua, Colombia has violated
                     Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones that appertain to Nicaragua
                     pursuant to the 2012 Judgment by establishing an “Integral Contiguous
                     Zone” which overlaps with Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone as
                     delimited by the Court. Nicaragua also alleges incidents of enforcement
                     and harassment by Colombia against vessels operating in Nicaragua’s
                     exclusive economic zone in the area around the Luna Verde Bank and
                     complains of the issuance of “fishing licenses and marine research autho-
                     rizations to Colombians and nationals of third States operating in” Nica-
                     ragua’s exclusive economic zone (ibid., pp. 12‑20, paras. 10‑15; Memorial
                     of Nicaragua, pp. 26‑51, paras. 2.11‑2.52).

                        18. In its 2016 Judgment, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction,
                     pursuant to the Pact of Bogotá, to adjudicate the “dispute regarding the
                     alleged violations by Colombia of Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime

                     60

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                     346 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                     zones which, according to Nicaragua, the Court declared in its 2012 Judg-
                     ment appertain to Nicaragua” (I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 42,
                     para. 111 (1) (b); p. 43, para. 111 (2)). As the Court noted in 2016, after
                     the 2012 Judgment, senior officials of the Parties spoke of a possible
                     treaty or agreement. However, for Nicaragua, negotiations were to be
                     “restricted to the modalities or mechanisms for the implementation” of
                     the boundary established in the 2012 Judgment, whereas Colombia sought
                     a treaty “that establishes the boundaries” (ibid., p. 38, para. 98).
                        19. In speaking of a possible agreement, the two Presidents also
                     addressed the particular question of fishing by Colombians in waters
                     lying on Nicaragua’s side of the boundary, but they did so in different
                     terms. For example, in one of the statements that Nicaragua appends to
                     its Application, President Santos is quoted as stating:
                            “I have given peremptory and precise instructions to the Navy; the
                          historical rights of our fishermen are going to be respected no matter
                          what. No one has to request permission to anybody in order to fish
                          where they have always fished.” (Application of Nicaragua, p. 38
                          (Annex 6).)
                     Nicaragua also points to a statement in which President Santos is reported
                     to have said that “his Government would ‘not rule out any action’ to
                     defend Colombia’s rights, especially those of the inhabitants on the island
                     of San Andrés and surrounding archipelago” (Memorial of Nicaragua,
                     p. 351 (Annex 25)).
                        20. These statements are to be compared with those attributed by
                     Nicaragua to its President, who reportedly stated that Nicaragua is “not
                     denying the right to fish to any sister nation, to any peoples” and that,
                     within the framework of an agreement or treaty recognizing the delimita-
                     tion of the Court,
                          “Nicaragua will authorize [Colombian] fisheries in that area, where
                          they have historically practiced fisheries, both artisanal and industrial
                          fisheries, in that maritime area, in that maritime space, where even
                          before the ruling by the Court, the permit was granted by Colombia
                          and now, the permit is granted by Nicaragua” (ibid., p. 360
                          (Annex 27)).
                        21. Thus, the statements on which Nicaragua has relied indicate that
                     Colombia asserted that certain of its inhabitants maintained the “right”
                     to fish without Nicaraguan authorization, whereas Nicaragua asserted
                     the prerogative to “authorize” fisheries by Colombians, in maritime areas
                     attributed to Nicaragua by the Court. As Nicaragua has stated in
                     responding to Colombia’s counter-claims, the dispute that it submitted in
                     its Application “concerns Colombia’s violations of Nicaragua’s exclusive
                     sovereign rights and jurisdiction as determined by the Court in 2012”
                     (Written Observations of Nicaragua on the Admissibility of Colombia’s
                     Counter-Claims, p. 20, para. 2.33).

                     61

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                     347 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                        22. Taking into account the Application, the Parties’ pleadings and the
                     Court’s 2016 Judgment, I therefore conclude that the subject-matter of
                     the dispute is whether Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones appertain-
                     ing to it by virtue of the 2012 Judgment are exclusive to Nicaragua as a
                     coastal State, as Nicaragua maintains, or are subject to limitations indi-
                     cated by the actions and statements of Colombia.
                        23. I consider next whether Colombia’s counter-claims fit within the
                     subject-matter of the dispute.
                        24. Colombia’s first and second counter-claims. Colombia bases its first
                     two counter-claims on alleged conduct that it characterizes as “activities
                     of predatory fishing by Nicaraguan vessels that . . . threaten the marine
                     environment” (Counter-Memorial of Colombia, Vol. I, p. 247 para. 8.11).
                     Most of the incidents on which these counter-claims are based allegedly
                     took place in the maritime area around the Luna Verde Bank, an area
                     which is part of both the Seaflower Biosphere Reserve and the Seaflower
                     Marine Protected Area (ibid., p. 251, para. 8.17). The first counter-claim
                     alleges “Nicaragua’s violation of its duty of due diligence to protect and
                     preserve the marine environment of the Southwestern Caribbean Sea”.
                     Colombia’s second counter-claim, which it describes as a “logical conse-
                     quence of the first one” is that Nicaragua has violated “its duty of due
                     diligence to protect the right of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archi-
                     pelago, in particular the Raizales, to benefit from a healthy, sound and
                     sustainable environment” in the same maritime area around the Luna
                     Verde Bank (ibid., pp. 243‑244, para. 8.2).

                        25. These two counter-claims do not appear to fall within the subject-
                     matter of the dispute presented by Nicaragua’s Application. In making
                     these claims, Colombia does not counter Nicaragua’s assertion that its
                     rights in its exclusive economic zone are exclusive, nor does it invoke as a
                     basis for these claims the series of incidents that, according to Nicaragua,
                     violate those rights. Instead, it presents in its Counter-Memorial another
                     set of alleged incidents that, according to Colombia, support its claim
                     that Nicaragua has failed to meet certain duties that Nicaragua has in the
                     area around the Luna Verde Bank.

                        26. Colombia’s third counter-claim. In support of its third counter-
                     claim, Colombia asserts that some residents of the San Andrés Archipel-
                     ago engage in “artisanal” fishing in areas that are located within maritime
                     areas allocated to Nicaragua by the Court, or are located within
                     areas that appertain to Colombia, but that are reached by transiting areas
                     appertaining to Nicaragua (ibid., p. 75, para. 2.90; p. 300, para. 9.24).
                     Colombia maintains that there exists a “local customary right” for
                     these residents of the Archipelago to fish in maritime zones appertaining
                     to Nicaragua “without having to request an authorization”, and that
                     Nicaragua has infringed these rights (ibid., pp. 152‑154, paras. 3.109

                     and 3.112).

                     62

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                     348 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                         27. As noted earlier, Nicaragua has supported its Application by
                     invoking statements of Colombia’s President asserting certain rights to
                     fishing by Colombian nationals in waters appertaining to Nicaragua,
                     whereas Nicaragua has maintained that it has the exclusive right to
                     authorize activities in its exclusive economic zone. Colombia’s third
                     counter-claim, which claims that no Nicaraguan authorization is required
                      for fishing by Colombians who are engaged in “artisanal” fishing, therefore
                      fits within the dispute that is the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s Applica-
                      tion. The third counter-claim is within the jurisdiction, ratione materiae,
                      that was established by the filing of Nicaragua’s Application, notwith-
                      standing the termination of the title of jurisdiction after the Application
                      was filed.
                         28. The Parties have also addressed two conditions of the Court’s
                      jurisdiction — the existence of a dispute and the precondition contained
                      in Article II of the Pact of Bogotá, requiring that the “controversy . . . in
                      the opinion of the parties, cannot be settled by direct negotiations”.

                        29. The above-cited statements of the Presidents of both States make
                     clear the Parties’ held opposing views on the question whether the inhab-
                     itants of the Colombian islands have a right to fish in maritime areas
                     allocated to Nicaragua by the 2012 Judgment without Nicaraguan autho-
                     rization, and that each Party was aware of the position of the other (see
                     Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Carib-
                     bean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                     I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), pp. 32‑33, para. 73; Obligations concerning Nego-
                     tiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
                     Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objec-
                     tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II), p. 850, para. 41).

                        30. With respect to the negotiation precondition, as the Court noted in
                     the 2016 Judgment, there were indications that both Parties were willing
                     to discuss the issue of fishing by the inhabitants of the Colombian islands
                     (I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 38, para. 97). However, the Parties’ overall
                     approaches to a possible agreement diverged. It appears that Colombia
                     was seeking an agreement establishing maritime boundaries and protect-
                     ing the historical rights of Colombian fishermen whereas Nicaragua was
                     considering an agreement based on the maritime boundary already estab-
                     lished by the Court and authorizing fishing activities by Colombian fish-
                     ermen. Given that the overall dispute concerning the violation of the
                     maritime zones as delimited by the Court could not be settled by negotia-
                     tion (ibid., pp. 38‑39, paras. 100‑101), it cannot be said that the Parties
                     considered that there was a possibility of resolving through negotiation
                     their differences regarding the particular question of fishing by Colom-
                     bian nationals in waters appertaining to Nicaragua pursuant to the
                     2012 Judgment.
                        31. I therefore consider that the Court has jurisdiction over the third
                     counter-claim. For the reasons set out in the Order, the third counter-

                     63

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                     349 	sovereign rights and maritime spaces (sep. op. donoghue)

                     claim is “directly connected with the subject-matter” of Nicaragua’s
                     claims against Colombia. The third counter-claim is thus admissible.

                       32. Colombia’s fourth counter-claim. Colombia’s fourth counter-claim
                     concerns
                          “Nicaragua’s straight baselines decree which extended its internal
                          waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf, in
                          violation of international law and of Colombia’s sovereign rights and
                          jurisdiction” (Written Observations of Colombia on the Admissibility
                          of its Counter-claims, p. 77, para. 3.62).

                           The exclusive rights of a coastal State that Nicaragua invokes in its
                     Application, which Colombia allegedly violated, are neither predicated
                     on nor affected by Nicaragua’s assertion of straight baselines. Regardless
                     of whether Nicaragua’s straight baselines are applied, both the area
                     around the Luna Verde Bank (where the incidents cited by Nicaragua
                     allegedly occurred) and Colombia’s “Integral Contiguous Zone” overlap
                     with Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone. These areas are simply too far
                     from Nicaragua’s land territory to fall within its territorial sea, even using
                     Nicaragua’s straight baselines. It therefore appears that the fourth
                     counter-claim does not fit within the subject-matter of the dispute pre-
                      sented in Nicaragua’s Application. For this reason, the Court lacks
                      jurisdiction over the fourth counter-claim. (I do not express any view
                       here about Nicaragua’s statement that its 200-nautical-mile limit would
                       be the same whether measured from its asserted straight baselines or
                       from normal baselines (Written Observations of Nicaragua on the
                       Admissibility of Colombia’s Counter-Claims, p. 46, para. 3.49), as the
                        accuracy of this statement and the legality of Nicaragua’s straight base-
                        lines are not matters to be decided today.)

                     (Signed) Joan Donoghue.

                     64

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239

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KORETSKY

I can in no way concur in the present Judgment mainly because the
Court reverts in essence to its Judgment of 21 December 1962 on the same
cases and in fact revises it even without observing Article 61 of the
Statute and without the procedure envisaged in Article 78 of the Rules of
Court.

The Court has said in the operative part of its Judgment that “the
Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal right or
interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present
claims ...”.

But the question of the Applicants’ “legal right or interest” (referred
to in short as their “‘interest’’) in their claims as a ground for instituting
proceedings against the Respondent as Mandatory for South West
Africa was decided already in 1962 in the first phase (the jurisdictional
phase) of these cases.

Atthat time, the Respondent, assertingin its third preliminary objection
that the conflict between the Parties “is by reason of its nature and
content not a ‘dispute’ as envisaged in Article 7 of the Mandate for
South West Africa”, added, “more particularly in that no material
interests of the Governments of Ethiopia and/or Liberia or of their
nationals are involved therein or affected thereby” (italics added).
The adjective “material” (interests) was evidently used not in its narrow
sense—as a property interest.

In dismissing the preliminary objection of the Respondent the Court
then said that “the manifest scope and purport of the provisions of this
Article (i.e., Article 7) indicate that the Members of the League were under-
stood to have a legal right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory
of its obligations both toward the inhabitants of the mandated territory,
and toward the League of Nations and its Members”. (Italics added.)
(P. 343.) And a little later the Court said: “Protection of the material
interests of the Members of their nationals is of course included within
its compass, but the well-being and development of the inhabitants
of the mandated territory are not less important” (p. 344).

So the question of the Applicants’ interests in their claims was decided
as, one might say, it should have been decided, by the Court in 1962.
The question of an applicant’s “interest” (as a question of a “qualité’’)
even in national-law systems is considered as a jurisdictional question.
For example, “le défaut d’intérét” of an applicant is considered in the
French law system as a ground for “‘fin de non-recevoir de procédure”.

237
240 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

The Rules of Court, and the practice of the Court, do not recognize
any direct line of demarcation between questions of the merits and
those of jurisdiction. The circumstances of the case and the formulation
of the submissions of the parties are of guiding if not decisive significance.

The Respondent, as noted above, raised the question of the Appli-
cants’ interests. The Court decided this question at that time. It did
not consider it necessary to join it to the merits as the character of the
Applicants’ interests in the subject-matter of their claims was evident.
Both Parties dealt with this question in a sufficiently complete manner.
The Applicants, as will be noted later, did not seek anything for them-
selves; they asserted only that they have a “legal interest to seeing to it
through judicial process that the sacred trust of civilization created
by the Mandate is not violated”. To join the question of the Applicants’
“interests” in their claims to the merits would not “reveal’’ anything
new, as became evident at this stage of the cases. And it is worthy of
note that in the dissenting opinion of President Winiarski (pp. 455 ff.),
in the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice (pp. 548 ff.) and in the dissenting opinion of Judge
ad hoc van Wyk (pp. 660 ff.), the question of the Applicants’ interests
was considered on a jurisdictional plane.

The Respondent did not raise this question in its final submissions
at this stage of the merits. The Court itself has now raised the question
which was resolved in 1962 and has thereby reverted from the stage of
the merits to the stage of jurisdiction. And thus the “‘door’’ to the Court
which was opened in 1962 to decide the dispute (as the function of the
Court demands (Article 38 of the Statute)), the decision of which would
have been of vital importance for the peoples of South West Africa
and to peoples of other countries where an official policy of racial
discrimination still exists, was locked by the Court with the same key
which had opened it in 1962.

Has the 1962 Judgment of the Court a binding force for the Court
itself?

The Judgment has not only a binding force between the parties (Article
59 of the Statute), it is final (Article 60 of the Statute). Being final, it is
—one may say—final for the Court itself unless revised by the Court
under the conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in Article 61 of the Statute and Article 78 of the Rules of Court.

In discussing the meaning of the principle of res judicata, and its
applicability in international judicial practice, its significance is often
limited by the statement that a given judgment could not be considered
as binding upon other States or in other disputes. One may sometimes
easily fail to take into consideration the fact that res judicata has been
said to be not only pro obligatione habetur, but pro veritate as well. And
it cannot be said that what today was for the Court a veritas, will to-
morrow be a non-veritas. A decision binds not only the parties to a given
case, but the Court itself. One cannot forget that the principle of immuta-

238
241 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

bility, of the consistency of final judicial decisions, which is so important
for national courts, is still more important for international courts.
The practice of the Permanent Court and of this Court shows the great
attention they pay to former judgments, their reasons and opinions.
Consideration must be given even to the, question whether an advisory
opinion of the Court, which is not binding for the body which requested it,
is binding for the Court itself not only vi rationis but ratione vis as well.

Could it possibly be considered that in a judgment only its operative
part but not the reasons for it has a binding force? It could be said that
the operative part of a judgment seldom contains points of law. Moreover,
the reasons, motives, grounds, for a given judgment may be said to be
the “reasons part” of the judgment. The two parts of a judgment—the
operative part and the reasons—do not “stand apart” one from another.
Each of them is a constituent part of the judgment in its entirety. It
will be recalled that Article 56 of the Statute says: “The judgment shall
state the reasons on which it is based” (italics added). These words are
evidence that the reasons have a binding force as an obligatory part of
a judgment and, at the same time, they determine the character of
reasons which should have a binding force. They are reasons which
substantiate the operative conclusion directly (“on which it is based’’).
They have sometimes been called “consideranda’’. These are reasons
which play a role as the grounds of a given decision of the Court—a role
such that if these grounds were changed or altered in such a way that
this decision in its operative part would be left without grounds on
which it was based, the decision would fall to the ground like a building
which has lost its foundation.

To define the binding force of the reasons for a judgment a reference
has sometimes been made to the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
Court relating to Polish Postal Service in Danzig (1925, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 11, p. 30). But the Permanent Court said on that occasion “by no
means ... every reason given in a decision constitutes a decision”. It
is evident that the Court did not assert then that reasons—as a part of
a decision—have no binding force at all. It considered that not all reasons
for a decision constitute a binding part of it. Somewhat earlier it con-
trasted “binding” reasons and “non-binding” ones; it said: “it is certain
that the reasons contained in a decision, at least in so far as they go
beyond the operative part, have no binding force as between the parties
concerned.”

The reason of the 1962 Judgment relating to “a legal right or interest”
of the Applicants served as a ground for the Court’s decision to dismiss
the third preliminary objection submitted by the Respondent. And
what was then decided with the reasons ‘‘on which it is based” is finally
not provisionally decided. And I repeat that these reasons cannot be
reversed in the way chosen by the Court.

239
242 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

The 1962 Judgment met with a somewhat widespread response in
legal periodicals. I consider it worthwhile to cite at least from one
article as it came from juridical circles in South Africa. I have in mind an
article which was published in The South Africa Law Journal, 1964.
The author (R. Ballinger) said there, almost paraphrasing the words of
the Judgment:

“The broad, clear and precise language (of Article 7) made it
obvious that Members of the League had been understood to have
a legal interest in the observance of its obligations towards the
inhabitants of South West Africa by the Mandatory.” (P. 46.)

And some pages later he wrote, evaluating the Judgment in a general
way:

“We must accept that one thing has been finally settled in inter-
national law by the Judgment on the Preliminary Objections:
the Mandate as a whole is still legally in force and the Republic
cannot unilaterally rule in the territory.”

Ea
* *

But since the Court based its judgment on the assumption of an
absence of any legal right or interest on the part of the Applicants in
their claims and since they, in the Court’s words “cannot be considered
to have established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the
subject-matter of the present claims. . .” one has to return to the question
of the nature of the Applicants’ interest in their claims.

One might accept an old principle “pas d’intérêt, pas d’action”. But
the question is how to define a notion of “interest” and how to say
what an interest is about. Should we have recourse to the notion which
was developed in civil law doctrine and practice, of which the inherent
characteristic was and still is to regard all interests in the light of material,
property interest, a man’s personal (subjective), proper, own interest
(which, though sometimes a moral interest, is more often expressed
“in cash” as well)?

Long ago there were warnings against the danger of an unreserved
transference of the principles of civil law and process into international
(public) law and into the procedure of international courts. Here the
character of relations and rights is of another kind. Here one cannot
think in civil law categories. The notion of a “general interest” finds
wider scope in international law. It may be seen that the notion of a
“general interest” and actions in a general interest are now not alien
to national law systems (particularly in socialist law systems, even in
their civil-law procedures).

The French authors H. Solus and R. Perrot (in their Droit judiciaire
privé, 1961), speaking (p. 98) about the Roman principle “no right,

240
243 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

no action”—“‘this early concept of the action lived on after the Roman
procedure, and endured through the passing centuries’—have noted
further:

[Translation]

“Throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, this concept
was admitted without difficulty by private law theorists until the
time when the intense development of contentious business in the
administrative courts, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
made it necessary for the theorists to reconsider the traditional
concept, which was a legacy from Roman law and which the classical
doctrine had conserved. It was indeed no longer adapted to pro-
ceedings ultra vires the essential object of which is not to settle
a dispute between two individuals who claim concurrent rights,
but to ensure respect for legality’, ... and, for that purpose, “it
was necessary to assimilate proceedings ultra vires to a real action
at law; the theorists of public Jaw strove to fit the structure of those
proceedings into the notion of action but concerned themselves
only with the seisin of the court and carefully avoided all reference
to any subjective right’ (italics added).

Might one say, paraphrasing the Solus-Perrot words, that the essential
object of the Applicants was to ensure respect for a proper interpretation
and application of the provisions of the Mandate and that they had and
have a right to apply to the Court without making any reference to “any
subjective right’’?

It is necessary to turn to the history of the inclusion of the juris-
dictional clause in the mandate instrument. It is a fact that the Mandates
Commission (usually called the Milner Commission) was set up in June
1919 for the purpose of drafting mandates instruments ‘B’ and ‘C’.
There were two tendencies that arose at once (a) to defend first of all the
interests of commercial and industrial circles (this was reflected in
seeking to include in the drafts clauses concerning the ‘‘open-door”,
and “commercial equality’), and (b) to protect indigenous peoples.
The French member of the Commission (M. Simon) expressed the view
“that the idea of commercial equality preceded that of the Mandates,
that it embraced the whole theory of the Mandates, that the Mandates
had been devised to ensure: (1) commercial equality; (2) the protection
of indigenous populations” and that “the Mandate could not exist
without those two conditions”. /Translation.] But the President of the
Commission (Lord Milner) did not agree with this.

He said:

[Translation]

“He maintained that the ‘C’ Mandate differed from the ‘B’
Mandate precisely in respect of commercial equality. Territories
which came within the category of the ‘C’ Mandate were attached
to the State of the mandatory Power and were consequently subject

241
244 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

only to the stipulations concerning the protection of indigenous
peoples ...” (italics added).

And this difference between the two kinds of mandates “B’ and ‘C’

resulted in two kinds of jurisdictional clauses in drafts relating to them.

The draft of mandate ‘B’ had Article 15 which consisted of two para-
graphs: one which corresponds to the present Article 7 (2) of the Mandate
and a second which read as follows:

[Translation ]

“The subjects or citizens of States Members of the League of
Nations may likewise bring claims concerning infractions of the
rights conferred on them by Articles 5, 6, 7, 7a and 75 of this
Mandate before the said Court for decision.”

The draft of mandate ‘C’ contained a jurisdictional clause (Article VE)
consisting of one paragraph only, which repeated the wording of the
corresponding (first) paragraph of Article 15 of the draft of mandate ‘B’.

As this might have some importance for the interpretation of Article
7 (2) of the present Mandate it is worthy of note that Article 15 (2)
dealt not with national rights of member States but with the rights of
nationals of such States. An attempt was then made on the basis of
this paragraph to allow private persons and companies to be parties
in cases before the Court. But that idea met with strong objection, and
then, on Lord Cecil’s proposal, the paragraph was drafted as follows:

[Translation]

“The Members of the League of Nations will likewise be entitled
on behalf of their subjects or citizens to refer claims for breaches
of their rights, etc.”

This was a typical formula for a clause providing for diplomatic
(judicial) intervention.

The Cecil formula did not omit any references (see “etc.”) to Article 5
(about the commercial and industrial rights of citizens), Article 6 (about
the freedom of conscience and religion), Article 7 (about equal treatment),
Article 7a (about concessions), Article 7b (about tariffs), and it is clear
that possible claims based on those Articles, which were transformed by
the new text from being rights of nationals of member States to being
national (special) rights of these States, did not and do not limit the
rights of member States which were envisaged in other Articles of the
drafts, such as Articles 3, 4 and 10 (obligations in relation to indigenous
peoples), Article 8 (about the prohibition of the traffic in opium), etc.

The wording of paragraph 2 was omitted in the subsequent texts of
the Mandates (except that of Tanganyika) but one cannot interpret the
omission as a ground for asserting that Article 7 (2) confers on a member
State the right to submit to the Court a dispute with the Mandatory
relating to the interpretation and application of the Mandate only if

242
245 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

it can establish its own legal right or interest in its claim. The Court
in its 1962 Judgment stated rightly in this connection: “Protection of
the material interests of the Members or their nationals is of course
included within its [Article 7] compass, but the well-being and develop-
ment of the inhabitants of the Mandated territory are not less important.”
(P. 344.)

All this relates to a “B’ mandate. A ‘C’ mandate had (and has) no
provisions which could be connected (directly at least) with the specific
legal rights and interests of member States or their nationals (save
perhaps in some measure Article 5, which was added for reasons which
were not aimed at protecting direct State interests). And accordingly the
draft of a ‘C’ mandate had no paragraph 2 analogous to that of a ‘B’
mandate.

But why at that time was a system of judicial supervision in regard
to the correctness of the interpretation and the application of the pro-
visions of the Mandate introduced into the mandates system?

Some general considerations are necessary by way of explanation.

The mandates system arose in the conflicting conditions of the post-
War I international situation, when the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, or some of them, realized that they should try—parallel with
their endeavour to reconcile their contradictions—to mitigate the colon-
ial forms of undisguised domination, to respond, in the epoch of national
liberation movements in colonial territories, to the struggle of dependent
peoples striving for independence, to pacify them, to give a hope to those
peoples that they would be able to achieve their freedom by peaceful
means, through the mandates system. It was then that the notion of a
sacred trust of civilization found expression.

This made it possible for the Court to say in its 1950 Advisory Opinion
(p. 132): “The Mandate was created in the interest of the inhabitants of
the territory and of humanity in general, as an international institution
with an international object—a sacred trust of civilization.” Reference
was made in the Court to President Wilson’s words: “The fundamental
idea would be that the world was acting as trustee through a mandatory.”

To defend such a system (as created in the interest of indigenous
peoples), seemed to some to be a “common cause”.

Two kinds of securities for the performance of this trust were created:
(a) political supervision by the Council of the League of Nations, to
whose satisfaction the Mandatory. was required to make an annual
report, and (b) judicial supervision by the Permanent Court, which had
to decide whether the Mandatory’s interpretation or application of the
provisions of the Mandate were correct.

It is not necessary to dwell at any length on the concrete reasons why
243
246 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

the task of supervision was divided between the Council of the League
and the Permanent Court. It was said that it was rather difficult to settle
disputes relating to the Mandate in the Council as under the unanimity
rule the vote of a Mandatory was a deciding one, that it would sometimes
be more convenient to turn a dispute relating to the interpretation or
the application of the provisions of the Mandate into the channel of
calm judicial consideration.

But who was entitled to institute proceedings against a Mandatory?
Neither the League itself nor its Council could bring an action in the
Court. And then the right to apply to the Court in defending the “‘com-
mon cause” was entrusted to any Member of the League.

Was this something strange at that time? [ venture to cite an excerpt
from a pamphlet of the League: La Cour permanente de Justice inter-
nationale (Geneva, 1921, p. 19):

[Translation]

“The question has been raised whether the principal organs of
the League—above all, the Council—should not be able, as such,
to be a party to a dispute before the Court. This idea has, however,
been discarded both by the Council at its Brussels meeting and by
the Assembly. On the other hand, it is understood, as is expressly
stated in the report on the Statute approved by the Assembly, that
groups of States may appear as a party. Consequently, there is
nothing to prevent the individual States represented at a given
moment on the Council from instituting an action collectively,
but not as the Council of the League. This possibility may prove
to be of special value when it comes to enforcing certain stipulations
of the treaties concerning the protection of racial, religious, etc.
minorities.”

And one could find in the minorities treaties, which were concluded
afterwards, a jurisdictional clause, for example in the declaration,
concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania, 2 October 1921,
Article 7.

“Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising
out of these Articles [of the Treaty] between the Albanian Govern-
ment and any Power a Member of the Council of the League of
Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character
under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any
such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred
to the Permanent Court of International Justice . . .”

It is important to emphasize that any Member of the Council of the
League had a right to apply to the Permanent Court in regard to ques-
tions connected with any of the provisions of the Treaty without re-
quiring any specific personal interest of a given Member or its nationals
in a dispute with the government concerned. The Article mentioned

244
247 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

only “any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact ...”.
The fact that in the minorities treaties the circle of possible Applicants
was limited does not prevent their jurisdictional clauses from being
considered as a manifestation of a new (in international judicial pro-
cedure) principle of the recognition of actions in a general interest.

This principle had to be developed in the mandates system. And
that was done. It is relevant to cite Judge Oda, who said in his dissenting
opinion in the Mavrommatis case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 86):

“Since the Mandate establishes a special legal relationship it is
natural that the League of Nations, which issues the Mandate,
should have rights of supervision as regards the Mandatory. Under
the Mandate, in addition to the direct supervision of the Council
of the League of Nations (Articles 24 and 25) provision is made for
indirect supervision by the Court; but the latter may only be exercised
at the request of a Member of the League of Nations (Article 26).
It is therefore to be supposed than an application by such a Member
must be made exclusively with a view to the protection of general
interests...” (Italics added.)

These “‘general interests” in relation to a ‘C’ mandate might be only
the interest of protecting the indigenous peoples, which were (and
are) under the Mandate. And if the judgment of the Court insists that
the Applicants had to establish their own legal interests in the subject-
matter of their claims, one might say that the general interest in a proper
observance of the provisions of the Mandate became the interest of
any Member of the League on his own, as his proper interest.

This is confirmed by what might appear to be merely a detail:
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate puts the word the “provisions of the
Mandate” in the plural—that is to say, the Applicants possessed the
right to apply to the Court on questions relating to the interpretation
or the application of all provisions of the Mandate (and not merely
relating to provision 5 (the missionaries clause)).

But this does not mean that the Applicants could be considered as
some kind of individual control organ. The Court itself was and is a
judicial supervisory organ in respect of the questions envisaged in
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate, but the right to institute proceedings against
a Mandatory by bringing an application against him was in the hands of
any Member of the League. When Judge Nyholm (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 11, p. 26) spoke of “a right of control which a State Member of the
League may exercise”, he added “by applying to the Court” (italics
added), so a State Member did not “by applying to the Court” convert
itself into an organ of judicial control. It was endowed with a right,
one may say, of judicial initiative within the limits defined by Article 7 (2).

245
248 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

To exercise this judicial initiative was the real interest of tne Applicants
in these cases. They have, from the very beginning, asserted (Memorials,
pp. 91-92) that they have a “‘legal interest to seeing to it through judicial
process that the sacred trust of civilization created by the Mandate is
not violated’.

And, to prove the Applicants’ right to apply to the Court on this
ground, it is not necessary to assert that the Mandate was established
“on behalf of the Members of the League in their individual capacities”
(Judgment, para. 20), or that the Applicants (as former Members of
the League) were separate parties to the instrument of mandate as such,
that they had a status, analogous to that of a beneficiary or—which is
much the same—that they were tertii in favorem of whom the Mandate’
was instituted. To lay down these conditions would be beside the point
as the Applicants themselves did not rest their right to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court upon such grounds.

Article 7 (2) does not call for such conditions. Its wording is quite
clear to anyone who is not seeking to read into it what it does not contain.
It provides for the submission to the Permanent Court of “any dispute
whatever ... between the Mandatory and another Member of the League
of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the pro-
visions of the Mandate”. This is the basic legal criterion (to use the
words of the Judgment in the Mavrommatis case (P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 2, p. 16)) which (as was said there) determined and limited the
jurisdiction of the Court in cases related to Mandates. If one wants to
differentiate in these cases between a right to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court and the substantive right (which underlies the claims) it is
practically impossible to do so as in these cases the substantive right
of the Applicants, their legal right or interest, in the subject-matter of
the claims, one may say, coincides with their right to submit to the
Court their dispute relating to the interpretation or the application of
the provision. In the Applications they did not seek anything for them-
selves. They asked the Court to declare and adjudge (if we generalize
their final submissions) mainly on the question of the rightful interpre-
tation and application of the provisions of the Mandate, as the Respond-
ent denied that its official policy of apartheid is inconsistent with Arti-
cle 22 of the Covenant and more especially with Article 2 of the Man-
date. Here the question is not that of claiming from the Mandatory
the carrying out of the “conduct of the Mandate” provisions of the
Mandate. This would be in some sense a “‘displacement” of the real
position of the Applicants.

They do not dictate to the Mandatory how to carry out the Mandate;
they have laid before the Court the question of how to interpret the
provisions of the Mandate; whether they are rightiy applied by the
Mandatory; whether the Mandatory’s policy in the Territory of South
West Africa, which has caused so much concern to world public opinion
and to Members of the United Nations, is consistent with the provisions
of the Mandate and with its purpose and principles. Such a right of

246
249 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (DISS. OP. KORETSKY)

the Applicants to apply to the Court on these matters was established
not aliter vel aliunde (see para. 65), but in Article 7 (2). This right is
a tight of judicial initiative, which one might compare mutatis mutandis
with legislative initiative.

(Signed) V. KORETSKY.

247


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER
INDIAN TERRITORY
(PORTUGAL v. INDIA)

ORDER OF AUGUST 28th, 1958

1958

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU
DROIT DE PASSAGE

SUR TERRITOIRE INDIEN
(PORTUGAL c. INDE)

ORDONNANCE DU 28 AOUT 1958
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
Order of August 28th, 1958: I.C.]. Reports 1958, p. 40.

La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit:

« Affaire du droit de passage sur territoire indien,
Ordonnance du 28 août 1958: C.I. J. Recueil 1958, p. 40.»

Sales number 192
N° de vente:

40

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1958
Le 28 août
Rôle général
n° 32

ANNÉE 1958

28 août 1958

AFFAIRE DU
DROIT DE PASSAGE

SUR TERRITOIRE INDIEN
(PORTUGAL c. INDE)

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et l’article 37 du Règlement
de la Cour;

vu l'ordonnance du 10 février 1958 par laquelle le délai fixé pour
le dépôt de la duplique du Gouvernement de l’Inde a été reporté
au 25 septembre 1958;

Considérant que, par lettre du 12 août 1958, l'agent du Gouver-
nement de l’Inde a demandé une prorogation de cinq mois pour le
dépôt de la duplique;

Considérant que, par lettre du 26 août 1958, l’agent du Gouver-
nement du Portugal a fait savoir que son Gouvernement ne s’oppo-
serait pas à une prorogation de deux mois, à condition que le délai
accordé pour la préparation des plaidoiries ne soit pas inférieur à
celui dont le Gouvernement de l'Inde aura disposé pour la prépa-
ration de sa duplique;

4
DROIT DE PASSAGE SUR TERRITOIRE INDIEN (ORD. DU 28 VIII 58) 41

Décide, sans accepter la condition énoncée par le Gouvernement
du Portugal, de reporter au 25 novembre 1958 la date d'expiration
du délai fixé pour le dépôt de la duplique du Gouvernement de
l'Inde.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-huit août mil neuf cent
cinquante-huit, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment au Gouvernement de la République du Portugal et au Gouver-
nement de la République de l’Inde.

Le Président,
(Signé) Helge KLAESTAD.

Le Premier Secrétaire
faisant fonction de Greffier,

(Signé) S. AQUARONE.


ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES (ORDONNANCE 12 VII 73) 326

M. Gros, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

J'ai voté contre le renvoi de l’examen du document déposé le 18 mai
1973; la question pouvait et devait être tranchée immédiatement, et en
dehors du problème de la compétence de la Cour dans l'affaire visée au
dispositif de la présente ordonnance, en constatant que ledit document ne
répond pas aux dispositions de l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour sur l’inter-
vention.

M. PETRÉN, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Etant d’avis que c’est au stade actuel de la procédure que la Cour aurait
dû se prononcer sur la requête du Gouvernement de Fidji, j’ai voté contre
le renvoi de son examen à une phase ultérieure de l'affaire.

M. ONYEAMA, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Vai voté contre l'ordonnance parce que la requête à fin d’intervention
aurait dû, selon moi, être examinée au fond maintenant et non ultérieure-
ment; en effet, indépendamment de ce que la requête même postule, il
aurait fallu trancher immédiatement la question de savoir si, en l’absence
d’un lien juridictionnel avec la France, Fidji peut intervenir dans une
affaire où la France est en cause.

M. IGNACIO-PINTO, juge, fait la déclaration suivante:

Je ne partage pas l'opinion de la majorité de la Cour selon laquelle
l'examen de la requête à fin d'intervention de Fidji en l'instance Australie
c. France d’une part et Nouvelle-Zélande c. France d’autre part au sujet
des essais nucléaires devrait être renvoyé. Il n’y a aucun lien conventionnel
entre la France et ledit Etat susceptible d’habiliter ce dernier à une telle
intervention.

Il eût fallu en conséquence examiner dès à présent si cette requête est
fondée et le renvoi à une phase ultérieure de la procédure n’est nullement
justifié à mon avis; en conséquence Je vote contre.

(Paraphé) M.L.
(Paraphé) S.A.