57

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

T agree with the Court’s decision but propose to record some additional
views directed to matters of approach and perspective in respect of two
points. The first relates to the stage at which the dispute materialized. The
second relates to the question whether the dispute was one concerning the
interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agreement.

As to the first point, the decision of the Court has limited itself to find-
ing that “the opposing attitudes of the United Nations and the United
States show the existence of a dispute between the two parties to the
Headquarters Agreement”. The Court has not made any explicit findings
as to when the dispute materialized. Recognizing that various dates may
be eligible for consideration over a period of shifts and changes in an
evolving situation, I nevertheless have difficulty in resisting the impres-
sion that it is excessive judicial economy to leave in obscurity which of
these possible dates is the material one. A determination that a dispute is
in existence is not made in vacuo; it is necessarily made after reviewing a
dynamic course of events flowing over a period of time and determining
that it ultimately eventuated in a dispute at a certain stage, however
roughly this may be computed. It seems to me that the identification of
this stage is an integral and inescapable part of the declarable reasoning
process of the Court relating to what I regard as the central (though not
sole) issue in the case, namely, whether or not a dispute existed as at the
_ date of the General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion. Addition-
ally, the identification of that stage supplies a useful and perhaps neces-
sary analytical benchmark to differentiate between communications and
discussions forming part of the process leading up to the birth of the dis-
pute, and those directed to the resolution of the dispute after it had come
into being.

The bill in question had been introduced in the United States House of
Representatives on 29 April 1987 and in the Senate on 14 May 1987. The
United States Administration was opposed to the purpose of the bill but
recognized that that purpose was in fact to close the PLO Observer
Mission. The President being charged with responsibility to enforce the
laws of the State, the assent given by him to the bill on 22 December 1987
was reasonably capable of being interpreted as a commitment by the
Administration to enforce a closure of the Mission in obedience to the
command of the Act.

Against these unfolding events, the Secretary-General is on record as
objecting as from 13 October 1987 on the ground that such a law would

49
58 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

lead to a breach by the United States of its international legal obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement. In his letter of 7 December 1987 to
Ambassador Walters, United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, he made it clear that in his view the enactment of the legis-
lation would give rise to a dispute unless certain assurances were given.
The fair interpretation was that this looked to assurances to be given on
or before the enactment of the legislation, if only because of the need to
avoid any period of risk or uncertainty. No such assurances having been
given, the giving of assent to the Act on 22 December 1987 automatically
operated to bring the competing interests into collision and to precipitate
a dispute.

The Secretary-General’s formal declaration on 14 January 1988 of the
existence of a dispute was not necessary for its crystallization (see the
Chorzéw Factory case, P.C.I_J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 10-11, and the Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6,
p. 14). Save for Ambassador Okun’s letter of 5 January 1988, advising that
the assent had been given to the Act on 22 December 1987 and therefore
associated in substance with that fact, there were no new developments
between the date of assent and 14 January 1988 when the Secretary-Gen-
eral replied stating that a dispute existed and invoking the disputes settle-
ment procedure set out in section 21 of the Agreement. The Secretary-
General did not say as from when he considered that a dispute existed. His
letter is not necessarily inconsistent with a dispute having automatically
crystallized on 22 December 1987 in terms of the previous developments.
But, if this is wrong, it is clear that a dispute did at any rate come into being
on 14 January 1988. The record leaves no room for doubt that the dispute
which so arose on one or the other of those two dates has continued in
existence to this day.

On the second point, as to whether the dispute was one “concerning the
interpretation or application” of the Headquarters Agreement within the
meaning of section 21 of it, there seems to be an argument that, even
though there was a dispute, the dispute did not concern the “interpreta-
tion” of the Headquarters Agreement for the reason that the Secretary of
State shared the views of the Secretary-General as to the status of the PLO
Observer Mission under the Agreement; and that, further, the dispute did
not concern the “application” of the Agreement for the reason that a
closure of the PLO Observer Mission has not as yet been effected.

As to whether the dispute in this case related to a question of interpreta-
tion of the Agreement, it was indeed the case that the views of the State
Department coincided with those of the Secretary-General on the ques-
tion of the status of the PLO Observer Mission under the Agreement (see
the Secretary-General’s letter of 13 October 1987 to United States Perma-
nent Representative Ambassador Walters). But then different views on
the subject seemingly prevailed with the United States legislature, and

50
59 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

these would seem to have been upheld by the President when he assented
to the Act adopted by it.

I have, however, considered an argument that, even so, there is still no
conflict of views between the United States and the United Nations as to
the interpretation of the Agreement for the reason that the United States
has taken a position which may be interpreted to mean that, although the
Administration is obliged by domestic law to enforce the Act by closing
the PLO Observer Mission, it at the same time recognizes that it has
no right to do so under international law and will engage international
responsibility accordingly if it proceeds to a closure.

The argument is interesting, as much for its refinement as for its conse-
quences, for, if sound, it means that, provided a State is prepared to go on
record as admitting that it is consciously embarking on the violation of its
accepted treaty obligation — something few States are prepared to do (see
S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty, 1984, p. 11) — it can escape its obligation to
submit to an agreed procedure for the settlement of disputes concerning
the interpretation of the treaty on the ground that it is in fact in agreement
with the other party as to the meaning of the treaty, with the consequence
that there is no dispute as to its interpretation.

A proposition productive of such strange results may not unreasonably
be suspected of supplying its own refutation. I would suspect that, to
begin with, the superstructure of the argument bases itself too narrowly
on a possibly disjointed reading of the disputes settlement formula pre-
scribed by section 21 of the Agreement.

The phrase “interpretation and application” has occurred in one ver-
sion or another in a multitude of disputes settlement provisions extending
over many decades into the past. In the Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia case (P.C.L.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 14), it was held that it was
not necessary to satisfy both elements of the phrase taken cumulatively,
the word “and” falling to be read disjunctively. The phrase in this case
happens to be “interpretation or application”. Satisfaction of either ele-
ment will therefore suffice. But, further, since it is not possible to interpret
a treaty save with reference to some factual field (even if taken hypotheti-
cally) and since it is not possible to apply a treaty except on the basis of
some interpretation of it, there is a detectable view that there is little practi-
cal, or even theoretical, distinction between the two elements of the for-
mula (see L. B. Sohn, “Settlement of Disputes relating to the Interpreta-
tion and Application of Treaties”, Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit
international de La Haye, Vol. 150, 1976, p. 271). It seems arguable that
the two elements constitute a compendious term of art generally covering
all disputes as to rights and duties having their source in the controlling
treaty (see the language used in the Chorzéw Factory case, P.C_LJ., Series
A, No. 9, p. 24). It is, with much respect to the opposite view, not right to
adopt an approach which would seek to avoid this conclusion by dissect-

51
60 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

ing the phrase in question, focusing separately on its individual elements,
and then reading them as if they did not belong together in a single
formula whose force indeed derives from its constituent parts but is not
coextensive with their sum!.

Expansiveness is alien to the circumspect and cautious approach which
considerations of weight and solidity have long pointed out as appropri-
ate to a court circumstanced as this is. The construction proposed above
does not, I believe, surpass the bounds of a reasonably careful contextual
appreciation of the intendment of the clause in question. But, even if it
should for any reason be judged unacceptably in advance of the text on
which it is based, still it does appear to me that the aim of the opposite
contention distinctly exceeds its reach, falling short, as the latter does,
of all the ground that needs to be covered if the contention, assuming it
to be right, is to furnish a complete justification for returning a negative
answer to the General Assembly’s question.

This is because the contention is directed only to the situation which
will be created if and when the office of the PLO Observer Mission is ulti-
mately closed. It is only with respect to that situation that it may be said
that there is no dispute between the United Nations and the United States
concerning the interpretation of the Agreement, it being agreed by both of
them that it will be breached in that event. But the Secretary-General’s
claim covers an additional matter with respect to which it is clear that the
two sides are in disagreement over the interpretation of the Agreement.

The additional matter concerns the question whether, even if there is no
ultimate closure, the Agreement is currently being breached by reason of a
threat extended by the very enactment of the Act on 22 December 1987,
taken either separately from, or cumulatively with, its subsequent entry
into force on 21 March 1988, with the Attorney General’s closure directive
of 11 March 1988 (issued even before the Act entered into force and de-
scribed in the United States written statement to the Court as an “order”),
and with the consequential institution on 22 March 1988 of an action to
enforce a closure and its continuing pendency since then. It may reason-
ably be inferred from the material before the Court (oral proceedings in-
cluded) that the Secretary-General considers that there is a question as to
whether these matters are themselves currently at variance with the Agree-

1 The problem involved is probably a familiar one in all jurisdictions. J. Stamp con-
sidered it in Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium (1967) 2 All E.R. 576.

52
61 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

ment, in the sense of whether they are in violation of any right impliedly
conferred by the Agreement on the United Nations to ensure that its per-
manent invitees can function from their established offices without harass-
ment or unnecessary interference. It is equally clear from the material that
the United States does not accept that there is any current violation of the
Agreement, having consistently maintained that no question of a violation
can arise unless and until the Act is in fact enforced by effecting an actual
closure of the PLO Observer Mission’s office. It seems obvious that this
marked divergence of views ineluctably involves a dispute concerning the
interpretation of the Agreement.

So far for the question whether the dispute concerns the “interpreta-
tion” of the Agreement. Now for a brief word on the question whether the
dispute concerns the “application” of the Agreement.

There could not be any doubt that a closure of the PLO Observer
Mission’s office will in fact involve a question of the application of the
Agreement. As to whether the existing circumstances give rise to such a
question, the present position is that the office is in fact being allowed to
remain open but, according to the Secretary-General, this is subject to an
existing threat of interference arising from the enactment and operation of
the Act. It seems obvious that the position thus taken by the Secretary-
General does raise a question as to whether the application of the Agree-
ment is currently being affected by the suggested existence of such a
present threat of interference.

There is much in the United States position which is preoccupied with
the question whether any actual breach of its obligations under the Agree-
ment has as yet occurred and as to whether, in the absence of any such
breach, there could be any dispute concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Agreement. As the Court has pointed out, it would be ex-
ceeding its jurisdiction were it to enter into the question whether an actual
breach has occurred, that being a question to be reserved for the arbitral
tribunal in the event of the Court giving an affirmative answer to the preli-
minary question as to whether there is a dispute. Moreover, if it is correct
to say that in the absence of an actual breach there can be no dispute, this
inevitably involves the Court in determining whether there has been an
actual breach before it can conclude whether a dispute exists as to whether
there has been such a breach. So the substantive matter would be deter-
mined before the preliminary issues.

The disputes settlement procedure of section 21 of the Agreement
clearly applies to disputes arising out of complaints about an actual
breach of the Agreement, but equally clearly it is not limited to such cases
only. It extends to disputes arising out of opposition by one party to a
course of conduct pursued by the other party, or a threat by it to act, with a
view to producing what the complainant considers would be a breach of
the Agreement. In the view of the Secretary-General, as I interpret it, such
a course of conduct or threat was represented by the enactment of the

53
62 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, this having in fact been assented to by the host
country’s Head of State whose recognized duty it was to carry out the laws
of the State. Failing assurances to the contrary (which were sought but
never given) the Secretary-General was entitled to assume that the Presi-
dent, through his appropriate officers, would carry out that duty with con-
sequences which the Secretary-General considered would be at variance
with the Agreement. This conflict of both views and interests would give
rise to a dispute within the established jurisprudence on the subject,
whether or not any actual breach of the Agreement had as yet occurred
through the enforced closure of the Mission.

The framework of the Agreement does not link the concept of a dispute
to the concept of an actual breach. A claim by one party that the other
party is in actual breach of an obligation under the Agreement is not a
precondition to the existence of a dispute. And disputes as to the applica-
tion of the Agreement comprehend disputes as to its applicability (see the
Chorzéw Factory case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 20).

However, if this is wrong, with the consequence that a claim that there
has been an actual breach is required, then it is to be noted that, from the
record, it is a reasonably clear interpretation of the Secretary-General’s
position that it does include a claim that the host State is in current breach
of its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement by reason of the
enactment of the Act considered either separately from, or cumulatively
with, the subsequent actions taken pursuant to it. Such a claim may be
contested but cannot be considered so wholly unarguable as to be incap-
able of giving rise to a real dispute (see the Nuclear Tests case, I.CJ.
Reports 1974, p. 430, per Judge Barwick, dissenting).

The general approach taken above would seem to be reinforced by
three considerations. First, there seems to be no disposition in the juris-
prudence of the Court and of its predecessor to impose too narrow a con-
struction on the scope of disputes settlement provisions (see inter alia the
Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 5,
pp. 47-48 ; the Chorzéw Factory case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, pp. 20-25; the
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania case,
LC.J. Reports 1950, p.75; and the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the
ICAO Council case, I.C.J. Reports 1972, pp. 106-107, 125-126, and 147).
Arbitral jurisprudence likewise rejects the proposition that “insofar as
treaties of arbitration constitute conferrals of jurisdiction upon interna-
tional authority, they are to be restrictively construed” (Stephen M.
Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems, Cambridge,
1987, p. 149, note 12, citing Interpretation of Article 181 of the Treaty of
Neuilly (The Forests of Central Rhodope), Preliminary Question (1931)
UNRIAA, 1391, 1403).

Second, there is the amplitude and elasticity of the word “concerning”

54
63 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

as it occurs in the phrase “concerning the interpretation or application” of
the Headquarters Agreement. The word “concern” is defined in West's
Law and Commercial Dictionary in Five Languages, 1985, Volume 1,
page 300, as meaning : “To pertain, relate, or belong to; to be of interest or
importance to; to involve; to affect the interest of”. Cited in support is the
case of People v. Photocolor Corporation, 156 Misc. 47, 281, N.Y.S. 130.
Referring to the same case, Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, 1979,
page 262, gives substantially the same definition but adds: “have connec-
tion with; to have reference to ...”. See too the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 3rd edition, Volume 1, page 389, and Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary, 1986, page 470. And compare the somewhat similar
approach taken by Judge Schwebel to the interpretation of the words
“relating to” in the Yakimetz case (ILC.J. Reports 1987, pp. 113-114),
where he said:

“The terms of Article 11 of the Statute of the [United Nations Ad-
ministrative] Tribunal, as well as its travaux préparatoires, make clear
that an error of law ‘relating to’ provisions of the United Nations Char-
ter need not squarely and directly engage a provision of the Charter.
It is sufficient if such an error is ‘in relationship to’ the Charter, ‘has
reference to’ the Charter, or ‘is connected with’ the Charter.”

I consider that there are elements in that approach which are serviceable
here.

A third supporting consideration derives from the principle of interpre-
tation prescribed by section 27 of the Agreement which requires that the

“agreement shall be construed in the light of its primary purpose to
enable the United Nations at its headquarters in the United States,
fully and efficiently, to discharge its responsibilities and fulfil its pur-
poses”.

An interpretation which effectively leaves the United Nations without any
legal recourse in the circumstances presented can hardly be reconciled
with that covenanted principle of interpretation (see the analogous situa-
tion in the Chorzéw Factory case, P.C.L]. Series A, No. 9, pp. 24-25). Argu-
ments based on cases in which parties deliberately decided to leave
loopholes as expedient escape hatches in their treaty arrangements
would seem misplaced in the particular context under consideration.

Certainly, then, the Court should always take care to satisfy itself of its
authority to act. It is equally appropriate, however, for the Court to be
mindful of the risk of wishing to be so very certain of its powers as to be
astute to discover overly refined reasons for not exercising those which it

55
64 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

may fairly be thought to have. The Court has rightly avoided that risk in

this case.

Having given my best consideration to what, in the absence of assist-
ance from the host State, Ihave endeavoured to discern from the material
to be or may be its position, as well as to the position of the United
Nations, I can only conclude by agreeing with the decision reached.

(Signed) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

56


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING
FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT
AT LOCKERBIE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

ORDER OF 30 MARCH 1998

1998

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A DES QUESTIONS
D'INTERPRÉTATION ET D’APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971
RESULTANT DE L’INCIDENT AERIEN
DE LOCKERBIE

(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

ORDONNANCE DU 30 MARS 1998
Official citation:

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tion arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. United Kingdom), Order of 30 March 1998, 1. C.J. Reports 1998,
p. 237

Mode officiel de citation:

Questions d'interprétation et d'application de la convention de Montréal de
1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne
c. Royaume-Uni), ordonnance du 30 mars 1998, C.L.J. Recueil 1998,

p. 237

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N° de vente: 70 1
ISBN 92-1-070765-6

237

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNEE 1998 1998
‘ 30 mars
; Rôle général
30 mars 1998 n° 88

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES QUESTIONS
D'INTERPRÉTATION ET D'APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971
RESULTANT DE L’INCIDENT AERIEN
DE LOCKERBIE

(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. WEERAMANTRY, vice-président, faisant fonction de président
en l'affaire; M. SCHWEBEL, président de la Cour; MM. Opa,
BEDIAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER,
KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIMANS,
REZEK, juges; sir Robert JENNINGS, M. EL-KosuHeri, juges
ad hoc; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA, greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44 et 79 de son
Règlement,

Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 3 mars 1992, par
laquelle la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste a
introduit une instance contre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d'Irlande du Nord au sujet d’un «différend entre la Libye et le Royaume-
Uni concernant l'interprétation ou l'application de la convention de

4
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (ORDONNANCE 30 III 98) 238

Montréal» du 23 septembre 1971 pour la répression d’actes illicites
dirigés contre la sécurité de l’aviation civile,

Vu Pordonnance en date du 19 juin 1992, par laquelle la Cour, compte
tenu des demandes des Parties, a notamment fixé au 20 juin 1995 la date
d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire du Royaume-Uni,

Vu les exceptions préliminaires, portant sur la compétence de la Cour
pour connaître de l’affaire et sur la recevabilité de la requête, qui ont été
présentées par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dans le délai fixé pour
le dépôt du contre-mémoire;

Considérant que la Cour, par arrêt en date du 27 février 1998, a dit
qu’elle a compétence, sur la base du paragraphe I de l’article 14 de la
convention de Montréal du 23 septembre 1971, pour connaître des diffé-
rends qui opposent la Libye au Royaume-Uni en ce qui concerne l’inter-
prétation ou l’application des dispositions de cette convention; a dit que
la requéte déposée par la Libye le 3 mars 1992 est recevable; et a déclaré
que l’exception du Royaume-Uni, selon laquelle les résolutions 748 (1992)
et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité auraient privé les demandes de la
Libye de tout objet, n’a pas, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, un carac-
tère exclusivement préliminaire:

Considérant qu’aux fins de se renseigner auprès des Parties sur la suite
de la procédure le vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire,
a reçu leurs agents le 24 mars 1998;

Compte tenu des vues des Parties,

Fixe au 30 décembre 1998 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt
du contre-mémoire du Royaume-Uni;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le trente mars mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-huit, en
trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Grande
Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste et au Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord.

Le vice-président,
(Signé) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY.
Le greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.


248

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

Tout en regrettant que mon opinion diffère de celle de la Cour,
je donne une réponse affirmative aux deux questions, et ceci pour
les motifs suivants:

1. — Il est inutile de rappeler ici minutieusement l’évolution
du droit qui tend à porter à ses dernières conséquences l'exécution
de n’importe quelle sorte d’obligation ; on doit s'attacher à la
nature des prestations promises pour se résigner à des solutions
incomplètes ou imparfaites, comme celle des dommages et intérêts,
dans le seul cas d’une impossibilité de facto ou de jure.

Une fois réservé le respect de la personne humaine — nemo ad
factum precise cogi potest —, on poursuit donc l'exécution des
obligations de « faire » jusqu’à en venir à suppléer à une simple
déclaration de volonté que le débiteur s’obstine sans motif à refuser
de faire. En ce qui est du pactum de compromittendo, le droit inter-
national a pris même une certaine avance pour arriver plus tôt à
des formules réglant le passage de l'arbitrage in potentia à l'arbi-
trage in actu, notamment l'aspect de la désignation d’arbitres
par l'acte d’un tiers.

Cela s'explique par l’absence d’une organisation judiciaire com-
plète qui, dans le droit interne, fait obstacle au recours trop fréquent
à des juges privés. Mais la même raison, jouant dans un autre sens,
rend en général très difficile la tâche de combler les lacunes des
traités, faute d’une personne qui, dans le domaine international,
puisse assumer ce rôle délicat de procéder à la désignation de sup-
pléants aux arbitres.

En tout cas, on peut trouver plus facilement les moyens de
permettre que les engagements internationaux soient rite adim-
pleti, si l’on ne confond pas l'aspect relatif à la légitimité d’une
substitution de volonté avec celui de l'organe à qui incombe
une telle action.

2. — Devant la presque impossibilité de prévoir des normes
adéquates au jeu pratiquement infini des cas concrets, il suffit
à l’auteur d’une loi ou d’un traité d'élever une construction
susceptible de fonctionner normalement, le système juridique se
chargeant de l’adaptation exigée dans chaque cas, sans que ceci
implique une revision des actes. Au contraire, l’inutilité des conven-
tions se révélera souvent si l’on est disposé à céder facilement
devant les défauts attribués aux engagements, par fidélité exces-
sive à la lettre des textes, et à se résigner à faire appel à de vagues
sanctions surtout en face d’un propos de se soustraire aux compro-

mis assumés.
31
249 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

L’exécution im specie des contrats préliminaires n’affecte pas la
souveraineté même de l’État qui l’aurait aliénée à juste titre dans
la mesure nécessaire pour permettre un remplacement de son
propre choix — gue ab initio erant voluntatis ex post facto funt
necessttatis.

Peu importe aussi que les obligations internationales ne puissent
pas en général faire l'objet de sanctions directes, si l’on peut
poursuivre l'exécution de quelques-unes jusqu’à un certain point ;
ainsi, l’on ne doit pas hésiter à poursuivre les résultats utiles d’une
clause compromissoire, en abandonnant les problèmes soulevés
par l'exécution des décisions au moment où celles-ci seront rendues
par les arbitres. Ce sera une étape ultérieure plus facile à régler,
car le droit serait déjà déclaré.

3. — Dans le cas présent, les tractations minutieuses et prolon-
gées qui ont précédé la rédaction des traités en cause parviennent
à exclure la supposition de fautes et d'erreurs commises par les
parties mêmes ; d’autre part, il s’en dégage un certain caractère
de compromis qui conduit souvent à des formules pas tout à
fait satisfaisantes pour les deux parties.

On ne saurait pourtant y voir une renonciation, car on est
arrivé à écarter les résistances à l'égard de la désignation du tiers
membre, point plus grave que la substitution du représentant
d’une des parties. En effet, le choix d’un tiers membre, faute
d'accord préalable, va échapper à tout contrôle des parties,
atteignant également celui qui a essayé de bonne foi de trouver un
arbitre impartial et celui qui a fait échouer toute désignation de
ce genre, tandis que, pour la nomination d’un commissaire national,
chaque partie ayant toute liberté de le faire, l'intervention étrangère,
s'exerçant à titre punitif, frapperait le seul coupable. L'intérêt
normal d’avoir un membre librement choisi peut s’effacer devant le
dessein même d'éviter la constitution de l'organe arbitral.

4. — On est donc porté à admettre qu’au lieu d'accepter des
risques, les parties, tout en prévoyant des conflits, n'ont pas
envisagé des hypothèses aussi insolites que celles de la négation
des propres différends ou du refus radical de désigner des com-
missaires nationaux. Rien, dans les travaux d'aménagement des
traités, n'indique que les parties aient imaginé la possibilité que
tous les conflits puissent rester sans possibilité de solution, facili-
tant pratiquement l’inexécution des traités eux-mêmes.

De toute manière, une telle imprévision ne serait pas irrémédiable,
étant donné les principes juridiques ci-dessus rappelés et capables
de parer à une résistance indue, ainsi que Fa démontré un avis
de la Cour écartant le premier desdits obstacles. L'absence même
d’une clause prévoyant la substitution d’un membre national,
ainsi qu’on peut le trouver dans quelques traités, ne conduirait
non plus à un tel résultat irréparable.

32
250 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

5. — On arrive à constater qu'une haute autorité de l’Organi-
sation des Nations Unies a été, d’une manière tout à fait inusitée,
investie de larges pouvoirs, au delà des fonctions que la Charte
lui a attribuées. En effet, on a chargé le Secrétaire général de
plusieurs tâches fort nuancées mais qui aboutissent toutes à un
but principal unique — celui d’assurer des solutions pacifiques
à toute espèce de conflits surgissant entre les parties.

De cette façon, une interprétation stricte, limitée à l'examen
d’un seul texte et prenant comme données une intention partielle
des parties, ne peut, à mon avis, prévaloir, surtout si elle arrive
à entériner la paralysie complète de toute méthode de solution
de différends, bien qu’en reconnaissant en théorie une responsa-
bilité du fait du manquement à une obligation internationale.

Je pense au contraire que l’on voit s'imposer une interprétation
d'ensemble des traités, si l’on tient compte des buts qu'ils ont
visés. Aucun effort ne doit être épargné pour arriver à l'exécution
la plus exacte possible des engagements, en dépit des imperfections
et des inconvénients dûs exclusivement à l’obstruction de la partie
chargée d'accomplir la prestation.

6. — Mais la demande d’avis n’envisage pas le maximum de
résultat dans l’application de ces principes, comme si elle essayait,
par exemple, de pourvoir à la désignation des commissaires natio-
naux eux-mêmes sur la base d’une argumentation a fortiori tirée
de la nature et de l’étendue des pouvoirs conférés au Secrétaire
général.

La Question III ne vise guère la désignation du représentant
d’un État récalcitrant conjointement avec celle du tiers membre,
et la Cour doit simplement se limiter au problème de la nomination
d’un tiers membre indépendamment de celle des autres arbitres.

Pour savoir si la nomination du tiers membre doit nécessairement
succéder à la désignation des autres membres, on est tout d’abord
conduit à reconnaître que les textes des clauses pertinentes sont
tout à fait neutres et se prêtent indifféremment à plusieurs solutions.
On ne trouve donc pas la clarté suffisante pour écarter tout autre
procédé d'interprétation que celui qui se limite à la lettre des textes.

Certes, la pratique courante est de nommer le tiers membre
après les autres arbitres ou en même temps que ceux-ci, mais cette
constatation empirique n'autorise nullement à voir dans lesdits
textes une condition qui ne s’y trouve pas.

7. — Ce qui au contraire est le plus intéressant, c’est la nature
des fonctions attribuées au tiers arbitre dans chaque cas d’espèce.

Or, la pratique internationale distingue nettement entre deux
classes principales de ces fonctions.

33
251 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

Dans un certain nombre de cas, le tiers membre n’apparait sur
la scéne qu’au moment ott une divergence de vues se produit entre
les autres commissaires et sa fonction est en principe celle de
départager les voix ; il peut, a titre exceptionnel, étre autorisé 4
adopter une solution intermédiaire ou méme entiérement nouvelle.
Cette position est exclusivement accessoire et conditionnelle.

Dans d’autres cas, la nomination du tiers membre a lieu à
l'avance, et la tâche lui est même confiée de présider aux travaux
de la commission. Il joue un rôle principal qui, toutefois, s’amoindrit
lorsque les autres membres se mettent d'accord, même si on lui
permet d’exposer de toute façon son opinion personnelle.

8. — Il existe justement, dans les trois traités, des éléments
qui peuvent bien marquer le système qui a été préféré.

En fait, ces instruments visent la constitution de deux commis-
sions : l’une dite de « conciliation » pour les affaires d’ordre écono-
mique, et l’autre, qui n’a pas de nom, pour les différends en général.

La première a un caractère paritaire, quoique le nombre de ses
membres ne soit pas fixé avec précision ; néanmoins, on réclame
l’« adjonction » d’un tiers membre, désigné par le Secrétaire général,
ei un différend n’est pas réglé dans les trois mois de son introduction.
On y trouve (traités avec la Hongrie, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie,
respectivement articles 35, 31 et 32) un parfait modèle pour le
rôle de ce tiers arbitre qui doit à peine intervenir après l'échec
des efforts des autres membres.

Dans la seconde commission, on a aussi préféré le régime
de la coïncidence de deux opinions; mais la on fait dépendre
la désignation méme du tiers arbitre par le Secrétaire général,
non d’un délai imparti dés la soumission d’une certaine affaire,
mais simplement du désaccord entre les parties quant au choix
d’un ressortissant d’un tiers Etat, aprés un mois d’attente (traités
cités, articles 40, 36 et 38).

Cette comparaison fait ressortir l’opposition, dans les mémes
traités, entre des formules que la création d’une troisième com-
mission, prévue seulement dans le traité avec la Roumanie, met
davantage en relief (article 33). En effet, pour la fixation des prix
des marchandises livrées à titre de réparation, on a adopté une
troisième formule, en soumettant les conflits soulevés aux chefs
de mission diplomatique à Bucarest et, en cas de divergence, le
même Secrétaire général nomme un seul « arbitre », dont la décision
est obligatoire pour les parties. F est clair que cet arbitre n'est
lié par aucune des solutions proposées précédemment.

9. — Dans l'hypothèse dont il est maintenant question, il
semble donc arbitraire de charger encore le Secrétaire général de
contrôler une seconde circonstance, celle de la nomination, et

34
252 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

aussi peut-être l'acceptation des autres membres, dont le texte n’a
pas fait une condition. L'ordre du vote, au moment de la décision,
n’a rien à voir non plus avec celui de la désignation des membres de
l'organe, puisque tous doivent entrer simultanément en fonction.

Par souci de satisfaire à une intention hypothétique des parties,
on risque de perdre de vue l'aspect principal de la question, celui
du rôle du tiers arbitre, apprécié selon une distinction courante
en droit international. Cette préoccupation n’assure d’ailleurs
pas une parfaite interprétation et oblige, d'autre part, par une
inversion de l’ordre suivi dans la demande d’avis, à répondre à une
question qui doit finalement être tenue pour écartée, la Question IV.

10. — Sans doute la nomination de ce tiers membre resterait
inutile si, par la suite, la commission ne pouvait fonctionner, ce
qui a amené l'Assemblée générale à formuler la Question IV.

Avant d'y répondre, il faut toutefois mettre un autre accent sur la
fonction des membres de ladite commission : ceux qui doivent être
désignés par les parties ont été tout franchement considérés comme
leurs « représentants », ce qui permettra aux États qui les ont
accrédités de les remplacer plus facilement.

D'un autre côté, la position du tiers membre devient plus impor-
tante, car il sera en fait le seul et vrai arbitre, sous la réserve unique
qu'il ne pourra adopter une solution différente de celles qu’auraient
proposées les autres membres. Autour de lui se formera la majorité
responsable des décisions ; c’est lui qui Ja définira de telle manière
que cette majorité vienne à coïncider avec la simple juxtaposition
de deux voix dans le même sens.

Il est certain que si les deux représentants des parties se mettent
d’accord, il est inutile que le tiers membre prononce un verdict ;
mais en ce. cas il cesserait d’exister un différend, celui-ci ayant
été réglé par l’accord de ceux qui seraient alors de véritables
mandataires des États arrivant à une solution transactionnelle.

En revanche, il n’est pas moins certain que la notion de minorité
y perd toute utilité, en annulant le caractère relatif qu’on peut lui
attribuer ainsi qu'à la notion parallèle de majorité, celle-ci trans-
formée en unanimité.

11. — Les archives du droit international ont enregistré une
série de cas où un organe arbitral a vu sa composition initiale
dérangée par l'effet de la disparition d’un membre, à la suite soit
d’une circonstance accidentelle, soit d’une action de ce membre
ou de l’État qui l'avait nommé, action entreprise ouvertement ou
d’une manière déguisée.

La pratique du maintien en fonction d’un tribunal ainsi réduit
répond à la préoccupation de ne pas accorder de prime à la mauvaise
conduite ; la même solution doit donc prévaloir dans le ças de
l'absence ab initio d’un membre, surtout si le manquement ne

35
253 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

découle pas d’une circonstance étrangère à l’action de la partie
qui doit le désigner.

Dans le premier cas, la majorité se forme aussi par rapport aux
membres restants et perd même tout pendant, l'organe étant à
triple voix ; on n’y trouve ni un fait différent de celui qui a été
envisagé par les parties, ni même une revision du traité en vue
d'exiger une abstention de la part des juges restants et par consé-
quent la fermeture du tribunal. En réalité, on n’y voit que de
simples conséquences d’une sanction spécifique exigée par la
nature de l'obligation éludée par une des parties.

Or, entre ces deux situations, il n’y a pas de différence. essen-
tielle ; si l’on ne veut pas voir la forme l’emporter sur le fond, on
se voit contraint d’adopter la même solution ub: eadem ratio, ibi
idem jus.

Sauf à raison d’un attachement excessif à de simples formules,
on ne doit pas élargir un pur concept tel, par exemple, que celui
de l’« ordre procédural fondamental », parfois suggéré afin d’attri-
buer une importance exceptionnelle au moment de la constitution
d’un organe, au préjudice des exigences sociales et au bénéfice
exclusif de ceux qui oublient leurs engagements, fussent-ils individus
ou États.

12. — Le moment le plus critique, pour un organe délibérant,
n’est pas celui de son organisation, mais celui où, atteignant les
buts visés, il rend la décision qui, seule, va produire des effets
juridiques im casu.

L’organe qui perd un membre sans pouvoir le remplacer reste,
sous un autre angle, dans une situation plus grave que celui qui
a commencé à travailler incomplétement, mais avec l'espoir ou,
du moins, avec la possibilité d’une réintégration par suite d’un
changement d’attitude de l’État défaillant avant la fin de ses
travaux, et l’on ne peut jamais prévoir sûrement le maintien ou
l'abandon d’une position diplomatique.

On ne doit donc pas rejeter, par amour des abstractions, l’exten-
sion d’une solution raisonnable, qui est admise sans restrictions
par le droit international, telle que celle du fonctionnement incom-
plet d’un tribunal, dans un cas non seulement analogue, mais
dans lequel cette application se justifierait par des raisons majeures.

Certes, le rendement du travail de ces commissions ne serait
pas complet, car des décisions ne seront pas rendues en cas de
divergence entre les deux membres, mais le même résultat se
présenterait dans le cas où la perte d’un membre serait constatée
au cours des travaux.

Tout au moins la commission atteindrait en partie la fin visée,
en tranchant les cas où l'accord serait complet; on donnerait
ainsi une certaine satisfaction au principe de l'effet utile.

36
254 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. AZEVEDO

13. — On ne doit pas moins oublier la distinction entre les
notions de composition d’un organe et de quorum pour qu’il
puisse entrer en activité.

La Cour internationale de Justice, quoique composée de quinze
juges, ne pourrait, par exemple, s'installer avant que quelques
juges n'aient été élus (Statut, article 12, par. 3) ou que tous n’aient
accepté leur élection ?

14. — On peut remarquer sans doute que le membre le plus
apte à exposer le point de vue de l’État récalcitrant pourrait peut-
être en votant modifier l'opinion du tiers membre. Il y a là un
inconvénient indéniable, mais aussi grave que d’autres du même
genre, constamment constatés dans les hypothèses d’omission
fautive d'une partie et qui, par exemple, conduisent à une absence
de formulation précise des questions à décider, au défaut de règles
de procédure et de fond, et même à l'insuffisance de preuves.

Mais tout cela constitue une bonne, sinon la principale partie
de la sanction imposée à l'État défaillant, servant d’astreinte
pour amener celui-ci à se départir de son refus. On pourrait en dire
autant de la sorte de « veto » dont la partie présente à la commission
disposerait pratiquement, mais ce « veto » découle exclusivement
de la faute de l’autre contractant qui pourrait ainsi le supprimer
facilement en comblant à tout moment la place vide.

15. — De même, aucun de ces obstacles n’a suffi pour faire
écarter la procédure par défaut en des situations analogues par
le droit international.

L'absence des moyens de défense et celle des conseils est bien
plus grave que l'absence au jugement d’un membre national,
auquel le Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice a attribué
même un caractère purement facultatif; cependant, toutes ces
conséquences sont aussi admises comme une nouvelle sanction
atteignant la partie qui ne se présente pas devant la justice.

L'absence du « représentant » d’une des parties ne peut non plus,
à mon avis, se transformer en motif de défiance contre le tiers
arbitre dont la fonction n’est nullement modifiée par une telle
circonstance ; qu’il exerce ses fonctions devant un ou deux com-
missaires, il reste toujours libre de prononcer la parole définitive.

L'article 53 dudit Statut se contente de recommander à la Cour
internationale, en cas de défaut, un certain contrôle ex officio
qu'elle a déjà eu l’occasion d’appliquer ; rien n'empêche les organes
qui fonctionnent d’une manière incomplète de s'inspirer de ces
mêmes principes au moment de rendre leurs décisions; au
contraire, tout les y invite.

(Signé) PH. AZEVEDO.

37


589

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

1. Notwithstanding my agreement with the operative part of the Order,
I consider it necessary to make the following observations.

2. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is in force between the
Parties. It prescribes:

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.”

3. Yugoslavia maintains that the Respondent has violated:

“the obligation contained in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide not to impose deliberately on
a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of the group . . .” (Application of Yugoslavia,

p. 12).

Furthermore, during the public hearings Yugoslavia stated “in the cir-
cumstances the intensive bombing of Yugoslav populated areas consti-
tutes a breach of Article IT of the Genocide Convention” (CR 99/25,
p. 12, Brownlie).

4. The Respondent considers that it has not violated the Genocide
Convention, because no genocide crimes have been committed during or
as a result of the military intervention of the NATO countries in Yugo-
slavia.

5. In its Judgment of 11 July 1996 the Court admitted prima facie the
existence of a legal dispute between the Parties because of the existence
of:

“‘a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance
of certain treaty obligations’ (Interpretation of Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opin-
ion, LC.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)

and that, by reason of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints
formulated against it by Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘there is a legal
dispute’ between them (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), CJ.
Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22)” (Application of the Convention on

51
590 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OP. PARRA-ARANGUREN)

the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Prelimi-
nary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 614-615, para. 29).

6. Consequently, taking into account the allegations of the Parties in
these incidental proceedings, there appears to exist, prima facie, a “legal
dispute” between them regarding the interpretation and application of
the Genocide Convention. For this reason, Article IX of the Genocide
Convention is applicable and, in my opinion, the Court has prima facie
jurisdiction to entertain the request for provisional measures presented
by Yugoslavia.

7. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is the only prima facie basis
for jurisdiction of the Court in the present case. Therefore the only pro-
visional measures that it can indicate are those aiming to guarantee the
rights of the Applicant under the Genocide Convention.

8. Yugoslavia is requesting the Court to indicate that the Respondent
“shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain from
any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia” (CR 99/14, p. 63, Etinski). However, the threat or use of force
against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention. Consequently the provisional
measures requested by Yugoslavia do not aim to guarantee its rights
under the Genocide Convention, i.e., the right not to suffer acts which
may be qualified as genocide crimes by the Convention. Therefore, in my
opinion, the measures requested by Yugoslavia shall not be indicated.

(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

52


69

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES WINIARSKI AND

BADAWI

[Translation }
It is with great regret that we find ourselves unable to subscribe

to the decision of the Court which rejects the Sixth Objection of the

Indian Union and consequently finds that the Court has juris-

diction in the present case.

I. By its Declaration of 19 September 1929, ratified on 5 Febru-
ary 1930, India accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
for disputes that might arise after the date of ratification with
regard to situations or facts subsequent to that ratification.

The date of 5 February 1930—which we shall call the crucial
date—was maintained in the Indian Declaration of 28 February
1940. The twofold condition set out in that Declaration constitutes
an important limitation ratione temporis of the obligation assumed
by the Indian Union.

The Parties discussed at length the bearing of the Sixth Objec-
tion upon the present case; they did so in their written pleadings
and at the hearings, both in 1957, during the proceedings on the
Preliminary Objections, and in the present stage of the case con-
cerned with the merits. The fact that the Court, in 1957, decided to
join this objection to the merits shows how aware it was of the
importance, not to say the necessity, of only deciding upon the
fate of this objection when it had obtained sufficient knowledge
about the facts of the dispute.

Of the two limitations just mentioned, the Judgment rejects
the first: the Court has admitted the argument that the dispute
arose after 5 February 1930, the crucial date of the Indian Decla-
ration; the discussion of the merits furnished no evidence to the
contrary. On the other hand, the question whether the dispute
arose with regard to situations or facts subsequent to that date
should, in our opinion, be answered in the sense of the Indian
argument, thus involving as a consequence a finding by the Court
that it is without jurisdiction.

The final submission of Portugal on this point is inter alta:

“Whereas ... the situations or facts in respect of which the dispute
arose are likewise subsequent to 5 February 1930, since they also
date from 1954;

Whereas these situations or facts are really nothing but those
giving rise to the dispute, and whereas one must regard as such the
situations or facts imputed by the applicant State to the respondent
State as unlawful, i.e. as constituting violations of the respondent
State’s international obligations;

67
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI) 70

Whereas the situations or facts which Portugal imputes to the
Indian Union as unlawful also date from 1954, as has already bgen
pointed out;

For these reasons,

May it please the Court to dismiss the Objection.”

2. When the case was heard in Court, both Parties invoked the
Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Phosphates in Morocco case, seeking in it arguments to support
their respective claims.

That Judgment, with the Judgment given in the case of the
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, is an important contri-
bution by the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court to the study
of the question of limitations vatrone temporis to the obligations of
States which accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. We
feel bound to refer to it.

The Judgment quoted itself warns the parties against hasty
conclusions.

In one place it states “that the use of these two terms [situations
or facts] shows the intention of the signatory State to embrace, in
the most comprehensive expression possible, all the different factors
capable of giving rise to a dispute’. And it goes on to say: “The
Court [the Permanent Court of International Justice] also observes
that the two terms ‘situations’ and ‘facts’ are placed in conjunction
with one another, so that the limitation rafione temporis is common
to them both, and that the employment of one term or of the other
could not have the effect of extending the compulsory jurisdiction.”
In another passage the Judgment says: “The question whether a
given situation or fact is prior or subsequent to a particular date
is one to be decided in regard to each specific case, just as the
question of the situations or facts with regard to which the dispute
arose must be decided in regard to each specific case.”

It is the duty of the Court to establish a relationship contem-
plated by the Declaration between the dispute and the “situations
or facts”.

3. The Portuguese Counsel tried to keep the content of these
notions—situations or facts—within the narrowest possible limit.
In their view ‘‘the facts or situations’ must be understood to mean
those ‘which the applicant Party imputes to the respondent Party
as unlawful’. ‘A State commits certain acts, creates certain
situations. Another StÂte stigmatizes these acts or situations as
unlawful. It declares that they violate its right...” And again:
“All that has to be considered is the situation denounced as unlaw-
ful by the applicant State and what unlawful act that State puts
forward as the origin of that situation.”

It was observed in this connection that the Permanent Court
considered it sufficient, as a reason for holding itself to be without
jurisdiction, that the act which was the subject of the dispute

68
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI)  7I

between France and Italy was merely the application of a dahir
of 1920, that is, a date earlier than the crucial date, and held that
it was unnecessary to consider whether the dahir was or was not
contrary to the international obligations assumed by France. In
order to appreciate the Court’s meaning, the important point in
this statement to keep in mind is that, in order to dismiss the argu-
ments of Italy, the Court saw no need to determine that the situ-
ations or facts which gave rise to the dispute were unlawful acts.
A State does not commit an unlawful act, nor incur international
responsibility, simply by enacting a law containing provisions that
are incompatible with its international undertakings. If the appli-
cation of that law leads to acts which conflict with the State’s inter-
national undertakings, the judge will simply declare that that State
cannot validly invoke its law in support of those acts. The Perma-
nent Court of International Justice decided in that sense on two or
three occasions.

The dahirs of 1920 were not in themselves unlawful acts; never-
theless, the French objection was allowed, because they were the
source of the acts denounced by Italy as unlawful and they were
prior to the crucial date.

4. The Portuguese case appears to assign to the applicant State
the principal if not decisive part in determining the sources of the
dispute. It was said on behalf of Portugal that the facts and situ-
ations really deserving that name are “‘those facts or situations
which the applicant Party imputes to the Respondent as unlawful’.

The Court cannot simply register this claim by the applicant State,
especially as that State, confronted with the crucial date, may have
an interest in circumscribing the period of time; for instance, by
ignoring certain relationships or by minimizing their bearing upon
its case; in a word, by isolating the dispute from the situation of
which it is the result; just as the respondent State may tend to
antedate the sources of the dispute by attributing them to a time
when they would not be covered by the Declaration.

The Court remains entirely free in its examination of the connec-
tions between the facts and situations of the case and the subject
of the dispute. In some cases, where the facts are isolated and easily
ascertainable, that task will be comparatively easy; in other cases,
where the situation or state of affairs or skein of de facto and de jure
relationships is complex and difficult to unravel, the task may be a
hard one; but the first question of all to decide is the jurisdiction
of the Court.

5. We find it hard to accept the Portuguese argument for another
reason: it appears to confuse the facts of the dispute with the facts
and situations from which that dispute arose, to employ a formula
adopted by the Permanent Court. The facts of the dispute may be of

69
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI) 72

recent date and may be comprised within a comparatively short space
of time, whereas the facts or situations from which the dispute arose
may date back far enough to fall outside the jurisdiction of the
Court as accepted by the Declaration of the respondent State. In
the Judgment already quoted, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice said: “It would be impossible to admit the existence
of such a relationship [a really subsequent date] between a dispute
and subsequent factors [subsequent to the crucial date] which either
presume the existence or are merely the confirmation or develop-
ment of earlier situations or facts constituting the real causes of
the dispute.”

We will cite one more dictum of the Permanent Court: “The
dispute cannot be separated from the situation of which it is the
result.” Thus, the Permanent Court implies that there may be
cases in which one of the Parties tries to separate the dispute from
the situation of which it is the result.

In the case now before the Court, the applicant State declares
that all the facts and situations relating to the dispute are com-
prised within the year 1954, and do not date back farther; these
are-exclusively the acts which it imputes to the opposite Party as
unlawful. The latter, however, replies that the case is in fact not so
simple, that the facts and situations from which the dispute arose
already existed before 1930, to which the applicant State replies
that until 1954 it had no cause of complaint and that the various
incidents, differences of opinion, minor disputes, and even formal
prohibitions are to be ascribed only to the exercise by the terri-
torial State of a control and regulation which Portugal readily
admits to have been legitimate. Portugal declares that it has always
possessed and effectively exercised the right of passage, a general
right, within the limits necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty
over the enclaves, and that that right was respected by the terri-
torial State until 1954.

The Judgment seems to admit that the situation which forms
the origin of the dispute is both prior and subsequent to the crucial
date, but from this it draws conclusions to which we cannot
subscribe. It begins by finding that the limitation ratione temporis
in the Indian Declaration is drafted “in a positive manner ... indi-
cating the disputes which are included within that acceptance” . It
certainly does not proceed in a negative manner by excluding dis-
putes arising from situations or facts prior to the crucial date, but
there is no doubt that the Indian Union, when it accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court for subsequent situations or facts
giving rise to disputes, intended to exclude prior situations or facts.

The Judgment in the Phosphates in Morocco case, already quoted,
also says: “However, in answering these questions it is necessary
always to bear in mind the will of the State which only accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction within specified limits and consequently

70
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI) 73

only intended to submit to that jurisdiction disputes having actually
arisen from situations or facts subsequent to its acceptance.”

6. Portugal sees in the past, beginning with 1779 and continuing
till the events of 1954, only the source of its right of passage. The
terms are those which the Permanent Court of International Justice
had used in its Judgment in the Electricity Company of Sofia and
Bulgaria case. There the Bulgarian objection ratione temporis
invoked the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal which preceded the
crucial date. But the problem is a different one: the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal had been recognized by both parties to the dis-
pute as lawfully binding upon them; the fact was indisputable. The
dispute referred only to certain measures taken by the Bulgarian
authorities after the crucial date which Belgium considered to be
at variance with the terms of the arbitral decision. The Permanent
Court of International Justice found that the source of the dispute
was not prior to the crucial date fixed by the Bulgarian Declaration.

In our own case there is no law jointly recognized by both Parties.
Portugal claims to infer one, among other things, from practice,
that is to say from a series of acts and facts going back more than
150 years; the Indian Union relies upon the same long practice to
maintain that the alleged right of passage in Portugal’s favour has
no existence. For the problem which concerns us, we have not to
know who is right and who is wrong; the question to be deter-
mined is whether it is not the same situation which entered into an
acute stage and reached a climax in 1954, leading rapidly to a
dispute and giving rise to the proceedings before the Court. The
question is whether the acts denounced by Portugal as unlawful
have their origin in a situation going back beyond the crucial date.

We find it hard to subscribe to the interpretation of the Indian
Declaration whereby it is enough for the situation or fact concern-
ing the dispute to be subsequent to the crucial date, in order that
the Court’s jurisdiction may be admitted, still less to the distinc-
tion made between a situation and a fact, which, in our opinion
arbitrarily, ascribes to the notion of situation a purely geographical
meaning (the enclave), whereas that is only one factor in the situ-
ation, and the latter, a compound of relationships of fact and law,
covers the problem of passage in all its aspects as it presented it-
self to the Parties in the British and post-British periods. Moreover,
it is not possible, for the purposes of the interpretation of the
Indian Declaration, to join the facts of the dispute, which date from
1954, to the earlier situation and to regard them as a comprehen-
sive whole which ‘‘came into existence only after 5 February 1930”’.
This is at variance with the clearly expressed intention of the
Indian Declaration. If the situation from which the dispute arose
goes back beyond the crucial date the consent of the Indian Union
is lacking. We say advisedly: situation from which the dispute

71
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI) 74

arose; it is not a question of a more or less ancient treaty or of a
rule of law established a longer or shorter time ago.

7. What seems to us to be decisive is the nature of the action
brought by the Portuguese Government.

In the final Submissions of Portugal, the first and principal claim
is as follows:

“May it please the Court to adjudge and declare that the right
of passage between the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and
between these enclaves and the coastal district of Daman, as
defined above, is a right possessed by Portugal and which must be
respected by India.”

What the Portuguese Government is asking of the Court, there-
fore, is that it shall deliver in the first place a declaratory judgment.
The Permanent Court of International Justice delivered such judg-
ments. In its Judgment No. 11, interpreting Judgments Nos. 7 and
8, it said:

“The Court’s Judgment No. 7 is in the nature of a declaratory
judgment, the intention of which is to ensure recognition of a
situation at law once and for all and with binding force as between
the Parties; so that the legal position thus established cannot
again be called in question in so far as the legal effects ensuing
therefrom are concerned.”

That is exactly what the first Portuguese submission is asking
from the Court. There is therefore no question of unlawful acts;
and although this claim is followed by the two others, complemen-
tary and contingent, it constitutes the very essence of the case.

It is permissible to enquire whether, in the face of this first sub- .
mission, the arguments of Portugal with regard to the Sixth Objec-
tion retain any force. For here it is not simply a case of applying an
indisputable rule of law in order to provide a remedy for the vio-
lation of the right of one Party resulting from an unlawful act by
the other Party. The object of the suit, as it follows from the first
Portuguese Submission, is to obtain from the Court a recognition
and statement of the situation at law between the Parties; that is
not limited to the events of 1954 and cannot be regarded as part of
a collective whole subsequent to the crucial date. On the contrary,
all the factors in the dispute contested by one or the other Party
are to be found in the post-Maratha period; the Parties did not
view matters and their respective positions in the same light; the
origin of the present dispute could be seen in that prolonged situ-
ation.

It seems, however that we should be justified in going farther
than that.

Unable to admit that the right of passage claimed by Portugal has
its basis in a treaty, the Court was obliged to turn its attention to
the practice which might have been accepted as binding upon the

72
RIGHT OF PASSAGE (DISS. OP. JUDGES WINIARSKI AND BADAWI) 75

Parties. It then found itself faced with a very special situation in
which, even over a considerable period of time, the Parties were
unable to reach agreement as to their respective rights and cbli-
gations. They ask the Court to define them. In these circumstances
it is clear that not only the situation which gave rise to the present
dispute, but also the very subject of the dispute, as it follows from
the principal Portuguese claim, come within the period preceding
the crucial date of the Indian Declaration.

(Signed) B. WINIARSKI.
(Signed) A. BADAWI.

73


{NTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

NUCLEAR TESTS CASE
(NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE)

APPLICATION BY FIJI FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE

ORDER OF 12 JULY 1973

1973

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLÉAIRES
(NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE c. FRANCE)

REQUÊTE DE FIDJI A FIN D’INTERVENTION

ORDONNANCE DU 12 JUILLET 1973
Official citation:

Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application
to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 324.

Mode officiel de citation:

Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin
d'intervention, ordonnance du 12 juillet 1973, C.I.J.Recueil 1973, p. 324.

Nedeveate:, SOD

12 JULY 1973
ORDER

NUCLEAR TESTS CASE
(NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE)

APPLICATION BY FIJI FOR PERMISSION TO INTERVENE

AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES
(NOUVELLE-ZELANDE c. FRANCE)

REQUÊTE DE FIDJI À FIN D’INTERVENTION

12 JUILLET 1973
ORDONNANCE
324

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1973
12 July YEAR 1973

General List
No. 59

12 July 1973

NUCLEAR TESTS CASE
(NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE)

APPLICATION BY FIJI FOR PERMISSION
TO INTERVENE

ORDER

Present: President LACHS: Vice-President AMMOUN; Judges FORSTER,
GROS, BENGZON, PETREN, ONYEAMA, IGNACIO-PINTO, MoROZOV,
JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, Sir Humphrey WALDOCK, RUDA; Judge
ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICK; Registrar AQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,
Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 48 and 62 of the Statute of the Court,
Having regard to Article 69 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by New Zealand filed in the Registry
of the Court on 9 May 1973, instituting proceedings against France in
respect of a dispute as to the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests in the
South Pacific region,
325 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 12 VII 73)

Having regard to the application of the Government of Fiji dated 18
May 1973 and filed in the Registry the same day, by which the Govern-
ment of Fiji submits a request to the Court under the terms of Article 62
of the Statute of the Court for permission to intervene in the proceedings
instituted by New Zealand against France,

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas the application of Fiji by its very nature presupposes that
the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between New Zealand
and France and that New Zealand’s Application against France in respect
of that dispute is admissible;

2. Having regard to the position taken by the French Government in
a letter dated 16 May 1973 from the Ambassador of France to the
Netherlands, handed by him to the Registrar the same day, that the
Court was manifestly not competent to entertain New Zealand’s Applica-
tion;

3. Having regard to the fact that by its Order dated 22 June 1973 the
Court decided that the written proceedings in the case should first be
addressed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
dispute between New Zealand and France and of the admissibility of
New Zealand’s Application;

THE Court,
by 8 votes to 5,

Decides to defer its consideration of the application of the Government
of Fiji for permission to intervene in the proceedings instituted by New
Zealand against France until it has pronounced upon the questions to
which the pleadings mentioned in its Order dated 22 June 1973 are to be
addressed.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twelfth day of July, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-three, in four copies, one of which will be deposited
in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted to the Govern-
ment of Fiji, the Government of New Zealand, and the French Govern-
ment, respectively.

(Signed) Manfred Lacus,
President.

(Signed} S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.
326 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 12 VII 73)

Judge Gros makes the following declaration:

I have voted against the deferment of the consideration of the document
filed on 18 May; the question could and should have been settled imme-
diately, and independently of the problem of the Court’s jurisdiction in
the case referred to in the operative paragraph of the present Order, by a
finding to the effect that the document in question does not comply with
the provisions of Article 62 of the Statute of the Court, concerning inter-
vention.

Judge PETRÉN makes the following declaration:

Being of the opinion that the Court should have given its decision on
the application of the Government of Fiji at the present stage of the
proceedings, I have voted against the deferment of the consideration
thereof to a Jater phase of the case.

Judge ONYEAMA makes the following declaration:

I voted against the Order because in my view the application to inter-
vene should have been considered on its merits now and not put off; for
quite apart from what is postulated by the application itself, there is the
immediate question whether, in the absence of a jurisdictional link with
France, Fiji can intervene in a case in which France is impleaded.

Judge IGNACIO-PINTO makes the following declaration:

I do not share the opinion of the majority of the Court to the effect that
consideration of Fiji’s application to intervene in the cases concerning
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France) should be
deferred. There is no treaty link between France and that State capable
of authorizing such intervention on the latter’s part.

An examination should consequently have been carried out at the
present stage to determine whether the application was well-founded or
not, and it is my view that deferment to a later phase of the proceedings
was in no way justified ; I accordingly cast a negative vote.

(Initialled) M.L.
(Initialled) S.A.


                                                                                388

                         DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC GUILLAUME

                 [Translation]

                   Activities of the two States on disputed territory — Protection of the
                 environment — Need for co‑operation between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

                    1. In its Order of 8 March 2011 the Court requested both Nicaragua
                 and Costa Rica to refrain from “sending to, or maintaining in the disputed
                 territory . . . any personnel, whether civilian, police or security”. Consid-
                 ering these measures insufficient, in May 2013 Costa Rica complained of
                 the presence on that territory of Nicaraguan nationals belonging to the
                 Guardabarranco Movement and of the activities of those nationals. By
                 Order of 16 July 2013, the Court rejected Costa Rica’s request for provi-
                 sional measures. The Court, however, noted the presence in the area of
                 organized groups of Nicaraguan nationals, which “carrie[d] the risk of
                 incidents which might aggravate” the dispute, and expressed “its concerns
                 in this regard”.
                    2. Since then, these organized groups have remained in the disputed
                 territory. Furthermore, two caños have been dug in the area under the
                 direction of Mr. Pastora, “the Government Delegate for the Dredging
                 Works”, which risk altering the course of San Juan River. In addition, a
                 Nicaraguan military encampment has been established on a beach which,
                 prima facie, appears to be part of the disputed territory. It is in these
                 circumstances that Costa Rica has submitted a new request for provi-
                 sional measures to the Court.
                    3. In response to this request, the Court has reaffirmed the measures
                 indicated by it in 2011. It has further instructed Nicaragua to cease any
                 dredging and other activities in the disputed territory. It has requested it
                 to fill in the trench across the beach potentially connecting the eastern
                 caño with the sea. It has ordered Nicaragua to remove its personnel from
                 the area and, in particular, to evacuate the military encampment close to
                 the end of the eastern caño. Expressing regret at the fact that Nicaragua
                 has not acted on the concerns expressed by it in July 2013, the Court has
                 further ordered that any private persons under Nicaragua’s jurisdiction
                 or control, such as members of the Guardabarranco Movement, leave the
                 area. I have supported these various measures unanimously adopted by
                 the Court, for they were the inevitable consequences of the activities con-
                 ducted, tolerated or encouraged by Nicaragua in the disputed territory.
                 My only regret is that the Court has not also directed certain of these
                 measures at Costa Rica, and expressed the wish that it too should refrain
                 in the future from any activities in the disputed territory other than those
                 provided for in point 2 (E) of the Order.

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                       certain activities ; construction of a road (decl. guillaume)      389

                     4. That point provides as follows :
                         “Following consultation with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Con-
                       vention and after giving Nicaragua prior notice, Costa Rica may take
                       appropriate measures related to the two new caños, to the extent nec-
                       essary to prevent irreparable prejudice to the environment of the dis-
                       puted territory ; in taking these measures, Costa Rica shall avoid any
                       adverse effects on the San Juan River.”

                    5. I have been unable to concur with this last provisional measure,
                 which seems to me to be both of disputable utility and difficult to imple-
                 ment, for the following reasons.
                    6. It will be recalled that in 2011, when a first, larger caño was being
                 dug, the Court found that the disputed territory was part of an interna-
                 tional wetland of international importance, designated as such by Costa
                 Rica under the Ramsar Convention of 2 February 1971. The Court, hav-
                 ing asked itself whether the existence of the caño risked causing irrepara-
                 ble damage to the protected environment, found that this was not the
                 case and accordingly refrained from indicating provisional measures
                 designed to prevent such risks. The Court has adopted a similar attitude
                 in the present proceedings, and I agree with this.

                   7. However, in its Order of 8 March 2011, the Court nonetheless felt
                 that “civilian personnel charged with the protection of the environment”
                 should be able to visit the disputed territory, but only in so far as was
                 necessary to avoid irreparable prejudice in the future. To that end, the
                 Court decided that :

                       “Costa Rica may dispatch civilian personnel charged with the protec-
                       tion of the environment to the disputed territory, including the caño,
                       but only in so far as it is necessary to avoid irreparable preju-
                       dice being caused to the part of the wetland where that territory is
                       situated ; Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the
                       Ramsar Convention in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior
                       notice of them and use its best endeavours to find common solu-
                       tions with Nicaragua in this respect” (I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 27,
                       par. 86 (2)).
                    8. I had pointed out at the time that it seemed to me very unlikely that
                 the digging of the caño could cause irreparable prejudice to the environ-
                 ment. The San Juan River carries abundant sediment, which has a natural
                 tendency to be deposited in the channels of its delta. It accordingly
                 appeared to me that the caño would easily fill itself in again, and that its
                 natural vegetation would spontaneously regenerate. The visits conducted
                 since then by Costa Rica’s personnel and the documentation produced by
                 Nicaragua at the hearing of 17 October 2013 confirmed the view that I
                 had expressed at the time. I consider that the same applies a fortiori to the

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                     certain activities ; construction of a road (decl. guillaume)      390

                 two new small caños once measures have been taken to prevent them
                 from communicating with the sea.
                    9. I had also made it clear in 2011 that it would have been preferable,
                 for the reasons which I gave at the time, to have inspections of the area
                 carried out by the two States jointly. The same provision should have
                 been made in the present proceedings.
                    10. Finally, I note that in 2011 the Court had authorized the dispatch
                 of Costa Rican personnel charged with assessing the situation. Today the
                 Court states that Costa Rica may take appropriate measures related to
                 the two new caños, if these prove “necessary to prevent irreparable preju-
                 dice to the environment of the disputed territory”. It is clear that the
                 adoption of such measures must, as implied in the 2011 Order, be pre-
                 ceded by an assessment of the situation, and it is to be regretted that the
                 Court has not expressly so stated.

                                                           (Signed) Gilbert Guillaume.

                                                                                40

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