INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE LAND, ISLAND AND
MARITIME FRONTIER DISPUTE

(EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)

ORDER OF 8 MAY 1987
CONSTITUTION OF CHAMBER

1987

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU DIFFEREND FRONTALIER
TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME

(EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)

ORDONNANCE DU 8 MAI 1987
CONSTITUTION DE CHAMBRE
Official citation:

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras),
Constitution of Chamber, Order of 8 May 1987,
I.C.J. Reports 1987, p. 10.

Mode officiel de citation :

Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras),
constitution de chambre, ordonnance du 8 mai 1987,
C.J. Recueil 1987, p. 10.

Sales number 5 29
N° de vente :

1987
8 May
General List
No. 75

10

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1987

8 May 1987

CASE CONCERNING THE LAND, ISLAND AND
MARITIME FRONTIER DISPUTE

(EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)

ORDER
CONSTITUTION OF CHAMBER

Present: President NAGENDRA SINGH; Vice-President MBAYE; Judges
Lacus, Rupa, ODA, AGO, SETTE-CAMARA, SCHWEBEL, Sir Robert
JENNINGS, BEDJAOUI, NI, EVENSEN, TARASSOV; Registrar
VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,
Having regard to Article 26, paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 31 and

Article 48 of the Statute of the Court, and to Articles 17, 18, 31, 35 and
44 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas by a joint letter dated 11 December 1986, filed in the Regis-
try of the Court the same day, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Honduras and the Republic of El Salvador transmitted to the
Registrar a certified copy of a Special Agreement in the Spanish language
entitled “COMPROMISO ENTRE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR PARA SOMETER A

4
11 DISPUTE (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (ORDER 8 V 87)

LA DECISION DE LA CORTE INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIA LA CONTROVERSIA
FRONTERIZA TERRESTRE, INSULAR Y MARITIMA EXISTENTE ENTRE LOS DOS
ESTADOS, SUSCRITO EN LA CIUDAD DE ESQUIPULAS, REPUBLICA DE GUATE-
MALA, EL DIA 24 DE MAYO DE 1986”, and entering into force on 1 Octo-
ber 1986;

2. Whereas by letters dated 11 December 1986 and 19 March 1987 the
Government of Honduras informed the Court of the appointment of
Mr. Carlos Roberto Reina as Agent and Mr. Mario Carias as Co-Agent;
and whereas the Government of El Salvador informed the Court, by
a letter dated 16 February 1987, of the appointment of Mr. Francisco
Roberto Lima as Agent, by a letter of 7 March 1987 of the appoint-
ment of Mr. Alfredo Martinez Moreno as Co-Agent, and by a letter
of 27 March 1987 of the appointment of Mr. Abel Salazar Rodezno as
Co-Agent;

3. Whereas in the said joint letter of 11 December 1986, written in
English, the Special Agreement was referred to as the “Special Agreement
between El Salvador and Honduras to submit the land, island and mari-
time frontier dispute between the two States to the International Court of
Justice for a decision, signed in the City of Esquipulas, Republic of Gua-
temala, on 24 May 1986”; and whereas in a further joint letter in English
dated 8 February 1987, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs referred to “the
Special Agreement between Ei Salvador and Honduras, submitting to the
decision of the Court the land, insular and maritime frontier controversy
between both States” ;

4. Whereas up to the present the Parties have not supplied the Court
with an agreed translation of the Special Agreement into one of the offi-
cial languages of the Court, nor has either Party submitted a translation of
its own; whereas the Government of El Salvador has indicated that it had
no observations to make on translations of the Special Agreement into
English and French prepared by the Registry of the Court, subject to a
reservation as to the translation of the title of the Special Agreement;
whereas however the Government of Honduras, having also been sup-
plied with the translations prepared by the Registry, has indicated that
it accepts only the Spanish text “and its literal translations, as the ones
made in French and in English in New York”, effected by the Secretariat
of the United Nations, on the deposit of the Special Agreement under
Article 102 of the Charter;

5. Whereas for the purposes solely of determining the title to be given
to the case, it is therefore appropriate to use the form of words adopted by
both Parties in the joint letter of 11 December 1986, namely the “land,
island and maritime frontier dispute” between the Parties, the adoption of
this title being without prejudice to the proper interpretation of the provi-
sions of the Special Agreement defining the subject of the dispute;

6. Whereas the Special Agreement, according to both existing transla-
tions into the official languages of the Court already referred to, defines in
Article 2 the questions submitted for decision, and provides in Article |

5
12 DISPUTE (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (ORDER 8 V 87)

that the Parties submit those questions to a Chamber of the Court com-
posed of three members, and further that in addition, the Chamber shall
comprise two judges ad hoc, who may have the nationality of the Parties;
and whereas the Court understands the Special Agreement as requesting
the Court to form a Chamber to deal with the case in accordance with
Article 26, paragraph 2, of its Statute;

7. Whereas the Parties were duly consulted, on 17 February 1987, as to
the composition of the proposed Chamber of the Court in accordance
with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17, paragraph 2, of
the Rules of Court;

8. Whereas the Parties in the course of such consultation confirmed the
indication, given in the Special Agreement, that as regards the number of
judges to constitute such chamber, they approve, pursuant to Article 26 of
the Statute, that number being fixed at five judges, including two judges
ad hoc chosen by the Parties pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 3, of the
Statute;

9. Whereas by a letter dated 7 March 1987 the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of El Salvador notified the Court of its choice of Mr. Nicolas
Valticos to sit as judge ad hoc in the Chamber; and whereas by a letter
dated 8 April 1987, the Agent of Honduras notified the Court of its
choice of Mr. Michel Virally to sit as judge ad hoc in the Chamber; and
whereas no objection has been raised by either Party to the choice of
judge ad hoc made by the other, and no objection to such choice appears
to the Court itself;

THE Court,
unanimously,

1. Decides to accede to the request of the Governments of El Salvador
and Honduras to form a special Chamber of five judges to deal with the
present case; .

2. Declares that at an election held on 4 May 1987 Judges Oda, Sette-
Camara and Sir Robert Jennings were elected to form, with the above-
named judges ad hoc, a Chamber to deal with this case, and that accord-
ingly such a Chamber is duly constituted by the present Order, with the
following composition:

Judges Oda,
Sette-Camara,
Sir Robert Jennings,

Judges ad hoc Valticos,
Virally ;

and reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of May, one thousand

6
13 DISPUTE (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (ORDER 8 V 87)

nine hundred and eighty-seven, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted to the Gov-
ernment of El Salvador and to the Government of Honduras, respectively.

(Signed) NAGENDRA SINGH,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Judge Opa makes the following declaration:

In the case of a chamber provided for in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court, the consent of the two parties is essential and, as that
provision clearly states, the number of judges to constitute such a chamber
shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties. At the
same time, regarding the composition of the chamber, the views of the
parties shall be ascertained by the President in accordance with Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. The Court, being sovereign in judicial
proceedings, is free to choose any composition it likes; yet the possibility
must also be borne in mind that sovereign States have the legal right to
withdraw a case if they prefer a composition different from that deter-
mined by the Court. In practical terms, therefore, it is inevitable, if a cham-
ber is to be viable, that its composition must result from a consensus be-
tween the parties and the Court. To ensure that viability, it accordingly
behoves the Court to take account of the views of the parties when pro-
ceeding to the election. Nevertheless, the chamber is a component of the
Court, bound by its Statute and Rules; and the process of election
whereby it comes into being should be as judicially impartial as its subse-
quent functioning.

(Initialled) N.S.
(Initialled) E.V.O.


                        COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                            RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                     AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                      OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER
                    UN ACCÈS À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                              (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                       ORDONNANCE DU 15 JUILLET 2014

                               2014
                        INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                          REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                       ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                   OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS
                        TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                             (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                           ORDER OF 15 JULY 2014

2 CIJ1069.indb 1                                         2/03/15 10:08

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                               Obligation de négocier un accès à l’océan Pacifique
                                (Bolivie c. Chili), ordonnance du 15 juillet 2014,
                                            C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 475

                                                Official citation :
                              Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean
                                   (Bolivia v. Chile), Order of 15 July 2014,
                                          I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 475

                                                                                1069
                                                                 No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-071183-8

2 CIJ1069.indb 2                                                                       2/03/15 10:08

                                               15 JUILLET 2014

                                               ORDONNANCE

                      OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER
                    UN ACCÈS À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                          (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                   OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS
                        TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                          (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                                               15 JULY 2014

                                                    ORDER

2 CIJ1069.indb 3                                                 2/03/15 10:08

                                                                                475

                                INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                                 YEAR 2014                                       2014
                                                                                15 July
                                                 15 July 2014                                 General List
                                                                                No. 153

                             OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
                            ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                                            (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                                                   ORDER

                     The President of the International Court of Justice,
                     Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
                 cle 79, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Rules of Court,
                     Having regard to the Order of 18 June 2013, whereby the Court fixed
                 17 April 2014 and 18 February 2015 as the respective time‑limits for the
                 filing of a Memorial by the Plurinational State of Bolivia and a Counter‑
                 Memorial by the Republic of Chile,
                     Having regard to the Memorial of Bolivia filed within the time‑limit
                 thus fixed ;
                     Whereas, on 15 July 2014, Chile filed a preliminary objection to the
                 jurisdiction of the Court ;
                     Whereas, consequently, under the provisions of Article 79, paragraph 5,
                 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings on the merits are suspended and a
                 time‑limit must be fixed within which the other Party may present a writ-
                 ten statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary
                 objection ;
                     Taking account of Practice Direction V, according to which the
                 time‑limit for the presentation of such a written statement shall generally
                 not exceed four months from the date of the filing of preliminary objec-
                 tions,
                   Fixes 14 November 2014 as the time‑limit within which the Plurinational
                 State of Bolivia may present a written statement of its observations and

                                                                                4

2 CIJ1069.indb 137                                                                                2/03/15 10:08

                            obligation to negotiate access (order 15 VII 14)              476

                 submissions on the preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Chile ;
                 and
                   Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                    Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
                 the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of July, two thousand and
                 fourteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
                 Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Plurinational
                 State of Bolivia and the Government of the Republic of Chile, respec-
                 tively.

                                                                (Signed) Peter Tomka,
                                                                         President.
                                                            (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                                          Registrar.

                                                                                5

2 CIJ1069.indb 139                                                                               2/03/15 10:08


842

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. RANJEVA

Jai voté en faveur du présent arrêt pour deux raisons:

— sur le fond du droit de la procédure: la solution retenue par la Cour
s'impose. Il était nécessaire et suffisant qu’un des moyens invoqués
par le défendeur dans sa demande d’exception préliminaire fût écarté
pour que la compétence de la Cour fût fondée;

— sur la structure du dispositif: en statuant en un seul article sur le sort
réservé à la demande introduite par la Partie défenderesse, l’arrêt est
respectueux de la distinction à établir entre d’une part l’exception
préliminaire stricto sensu, c’est-à-dire la demande incidente introduite
par le défendeur pour faire écarter la demande principale, et d’autre
part les moyens exposés pour soutenir l’exception préliminaire. En
structurant le dispositif tel qu’il est dans son paragraphe 55 l'arrêt
contribuera à faciliter la compréhension de ses décisions.

Mais la référence à l’article X du traité de 1955 (voir ci-après I) est cri-
tiquable en raison des problèmes juridiques liés à un risque de confusion
qu’on peut commettre dans l’interprétation du présent arrêt à propos du
titre de compétence de la Cour (II); des relations véritables entre excep-
tions préliminaires et question de fond (IID; et la question du préjugé
dans un arrêt avant-dire droit (IV).

J. REFERENCE À L'ARTICLE X DU TRAITÉ DE 1955

La lecture du dispositif de l’arrêt crée une certaine confusion dans
l'esprit du lecteur. En effet, on peut interpréter et le dispositif et la struc-
ture du raisonnement comme fondant la compétence de la Cour sur les
dispositions du premier paragraphe de l’article X du traité de 1955, pris
isolément. La Cour rejette ou retient l’exception sur la base de l’interpré-
tation qu’elle donne des articles invoqués I, IV et X. En posant, à juste
titre, la question de savoir si le différend soumis devant elle entrait dans
les prévisions de la clause compromissoire, la Cour n’est-elle pas allée au-
delà de l'objet stricto sensu de la présente phase incidente? Cette question
pose le problème du véritable titre de compétence de la Cour.

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843 PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (OP. IND. RANJEVA)
IT. TITRE DE COMPETENCE DE LA COUR

Le titre de compétence de la Cour est, dans le présent litige, la clause
compromissoire dont les termes ne soulèvent aucune difficulté d’interpré-
tation. Ratione materiae la clause compromissoire vise expressis verbis
les différends ayant pour objet «l’interprétation ou l’application» du
traité de 1955. Aussi est-ce à juste titre que la Cour n’a pas retenu les
notions de lien raisonnable, condition que la Partie défenderesse a tenté
de plaider. La jurisprudence en la matière est constante.

Mais, en se posant la question de savoir si le différend soumis devant
elle entrait dans les prévisions de la clause compromissoire, la Cour a
transposé la méthode qu'elle a suivie dans l’affaire de Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide ( Bos-
nie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie). Mais n'est-elle pas allée au-delà de
l’objet de la procédure d’exception préliminaire jusqu’à poser le pro-
blème de la distinction entre les questions relevant de l’examen du fond
de la demande et celles devant être résolues au stade actuel de la pro-
cédure ?

III. EXCEPTIONS D’INCOMPETENCE ET QUESTIONS DE FOND

Les exceptions préliminaires sont le plus souvent envisagées dans leur
portée et non dans leur définition intrinsèque, car il n’est pas aisé de faire
le départ entre ces questions préliminaires et celles relevant du fond,
lorsqu'il y a lieu d’avoir affaire à un cas concret. L’essentiel n’est pas de
faire œuvre théorique mais montre de sens pratique et utile: vider défini-
tivement les problèmes liés à la compétence et veiller à ne pas affecter
autant les moyens de défense au fond des parties litigantes. La compa-
raison du présent arrêt avec celui de l’affaire de l’Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide ( Bos-
nie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie) amène à s'interroger sur l'étendue de
Panalyse des moyens de droit tirés des articles du traité dont la violation
est alléguée par la Partie demanderesse. I] y a en effet apparemment des
différences qu’il convient de soulever bien que les situations de droit et de
fait ne soient identiques ni transposables.

Avec tout le respect dû à la Cour, il convient d’observer que la Cour a
fait une inexacte application de la jurisprudence de l’affaire du génocide.
La différence entre les deux affaires tient au fait que dans le présent litige
la clause compromissoire définissait ratione materiae la compétence de la
Cour: différend relatif à l’interprétation ou à l'application du traité.
Dans l’affaire de l Application de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie)
Vexception d’incompétence ratione materiae portait sur l’applicabilité de
la convention à un type particulier d’acte: le génocide commis par un
Etat. Dans ces conditions l’applicabilité de la clause compromissoire était
subordonnée par la réponse à une question préalable portant sur le

44
844 PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (OP. IND. RANJEVA)

domaine d’application de la convention de 1948. Dans la présente espèce,
si la condition nécessaire était satisfaite, elle apparaissait néanmoins
insuffisante aux yeux de la Cour.

Il ne suffit pas que les parties soutiennent des propositions contraires
pour qu’un différend soit établi; en effet il appartient à la Cour non pas
de se limiter à une interprétation passive de sa fonction judiciaire en se
contentant de prendre acte des divergences des thèses en soi. Elle doit éta-
blir le caractère plausible de chacune d’elles par rapport aux dispositions
de référence qu’est le texte du traité et de ses articles. Il revenait à la Cour
de vérifier et d'établir lesquels des arguments semblent devoir être admis.
En d’autres termes il ne s’agit pas, au stade des exceptions préliminaires,
de dire que les propositions sont vraies ou fausses au regard du droit mais
de les analyser pour s’assurer qu’elles n’ont rien d’absurde ni de contraire
à la norme juridique de droit positif. Les exigences de la logique et le
souci de réalisme, liés à l’interprétation juridique et judiciaire, amènent à
envisager, lors de l’examen des éléments de fait et de droit aux termes des
paragraphes 2, 5 et 6 de l’article 79 du Règlement, une classification des
propositions selon leur degré de probabilité ou de possibilité. Mais en rai-
son de la nature consensuelle du fondement de sa compétence, la Cour
s'impose une contrainte particulière à sa démarche: entre le possible et le
probable celui-ci doit recueillir sa préférence; l’aspect subjectif de l’idée
de possibilité confère un degré moindre d’assentiment à cette modalité
par rapport à celle de probabilité. Cette exigence est de rigueur: en
matière de compétence de la Cour la règle de l’interprétation stricte du
consentement est incoercible.

Mais la mise en pratique de ces principes n’est pas pour autant aisée.
Le caractère équipollent du niveau de qualité de l'argumentation respec-
tive des parties n’offre au juge qu’une aire restreinte pour adjuger de la
rencontre des arguments. La difficulté tient au fait que dans une procé-
dure incidente d’exception préliminaire et malgré la souplesse qui carac-
térise les dispositions de l’article 79 du Règlement, le défendeur n’a aucun
intérêt à ce que l'affaire soit jugée au fond ou même simplement discutée
avant le prononcé d’une décision sur la compétence. Ces considérations
amènent à apprécier à leur juste valeur les idées selon lesquelles le règle-
ment judiciaire des différends tout comme l’exercice de sa compétence
par la Cour auraient un caractère exceptionnel. L'idée d’incompétence
serait, en quelque sorte, psychologiquement antérieure à celle de la com-
pétence. Ainsi qu'il a été maintes fois rappelé, le règlement juridictionnel
n’est que le succédané du règlement diplomatique, la thèse de l’incompé-
tence de principe serait, alors, la confirmation de la place véritable recon-
nue à l'institution judiciaire. Mais en s’imposant de considérer comme
douteuses les propositions sur lesquelles on invoque sa compétence,
la Cour, dans la phase de la procédure préliminaire, met à l'épreuve ces
thèses en rejetant dans le domaine du possible ce qui n’est pas démontré
pour ne retenir que le cadre probable au sein duquel se circonscrit l’ins-
tance judiciaire. En agissant de cette façon, la Cour assure la plénitude de

45
845 PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (OP. IND. RANJEVA)

sa fonction juridictionnelle et la pleine effectivité du consentement à sa
compétence judiciaire.

A moins que l'exception ne porte sur la compétence de la compétence
comme dans l'affaire du génocide ou sur l’exception à caractère général
soulevée dans la présente affaire, la conclusion que la Cour peut prendre
se limite à une réponse affirmative ou négative à la demande d’exception
sous risque de soulever un problème de préjugé. En 1972, la possibilité
d’une exception n’ayant pas un caractère exclusivement préliminaire a été
entendue de manière restrictive voire très exceptionnelle.

IV. LE PRÉJUGÉ DANS LE PRÉSENT ARRÊT

La mise en œuvre de ces principes méthodologiques a abouti dans le
présent arrêt à un préjugé susceptible d’hypothéquer la suite de la procé-
dure lorsque l’arrêt a procédé à l'examen des articles du traité d’amitié,
de commerce et de droits consulaires de 1955. L'interprétation de l’article
premier a été effectuée au détriment de l’exégèse. La solution de conti-
nuité consacrée par la formalisation dans l’article premier des obligations
d'amitié et de paix n’a pas été suffisamment évaluée à sa juste mesure. La
Cour a privilégié, au contraire, la référence aux idées que les pratiques
des Etats se font de l’objet des traités d’amitié, de commerce et de naviga-
tion. Si l'interprétation maximaliste selon l’Iran ne peut être retenue, il est
néanmoins difficile de n’y trouver que des principes exhortatifs alors que
précisément l’innovation exceptionnelle du traité de 1955 réside dans le
transfert de ces concepts de paix et d’amitié du domaine des préambules
vers le corps des règles de droit positif conventionnel. Si pour des raisons
psycho-politiques l’idée d’une obligation positive de paix ou d’amitié
peut paraître non pertinente, la conception que se fait l'arrêt de l’idée de
commerce ne justifie pas une interprétation aussi restrictive de l’article
introductif du traité au point de ne même pas énoncer l'existence d’une
obligation négative de comportement inhérente aux prescriptions d'amitié
et de paix.

En revanche, malgré l’affirmation selon laquelle l’article premier avait
pour fonction d'éclairer la compréhension des autres dispositions du
traité, il est à déplorer que l'interprétation de l’article IV ait été effectuée
dans un cadre analytique c’est-à-dire de manière autonome. En effet,
prima facie le traitement visé audit article envisage celui des étrangers
dans le cadre classique du droit international, c’est-à-dire les conditions
de jouissance des droits par un étranger. Mais les effets combinés de
l'exclusion de la référence territoriale et des dispositions de l’article pre-
mier amènent à poser le problème de la validité de l'interprétation que
retient l’arrêt du concept de traitement. Il est indiscutable qu’en soi l’idée
de traitement vise fréquemment des considérations essentiellement for-
melles; elles sont relatives à la formalisation, dans des actes législatifs ou
réglementaires, de la manière dont un Etat s’acquitte de ses obligations
vis-à-vis de son partenaire à l'égard des ressortissants et des entreprises de

46
846 PLATES-FORMES PÉTROLIÈRES (OP. IND. RANJEVA)

ce dernier. Mais est-on parfaitement fondé de penser que l’article IV
excluait de son champ d’application les comportements effectifs et volon-
taires des parties contractantes à l’égard d’entreprises relevant de l’autre?
Le langage courant, entre autres significations, désigne aussi par traite-
ment: l’attaque et la destruction d’un objectif militaire (voir dictionnaire
Le Robert). Par ailleurs, en statuant de manière négative sur le point de
savoir si les actions de destruction des plates-formes pétrolières étaient
visées par l’article IV, l'arrêt exclut l’applicabilité de cette disposition à
des comportements consistant à traiter une entreprise en otage dans une
conjoncture de relations d’hostilité entre les parties à la convention de
1955. La réponse ne peut que résulter de l’examen du fond de l’affaire.

Enfin dans la mesure où le premier paragraphe de l’article X a été
retenu comme la base de la compétence de la Cour et en raison des dis-
positions de l’article 80 du Règlement sur les demandes reconvention-
nelles, une question se pose à propos de l’intégrité des droits des Etats-
Unis d'Amérique: comment s’établit le lien de connexité entre la liberté
du commerce et de navigation avec une éventuelle demande en répara-
tion pour destruction de navires de guerre?

Ces considérations liées à des exigences de prudence judiciaire fixent les
limites de l’objet des débats préliminaires afin d’éviter les risques de pré-
jugés. La rupture doit être définitivement consommée entre l’objet de
l'exception préliminaire de l’article 79 du Règlement de ce qu’on appelle
base de compétence. L’exception ne porte que sur la compétence de la
Cour ou bien sur la recevabilité tandis que ce qu’on désigne par base de
compétence couvre les moyens exposés à l’appui de la demande. Dans ces
conditions l’interprétation des «bases de compétence» n’affecte pas les
droits des parties si elle est limitée à la rencontre des arguments sur le seul
terrain de la vraisemblance des thèses exposées par rapport à la problé-
matique inhérente aux termes des dispositions dont la violation est invo-
quée par la Partie demanderesse. La référence à l’article X du traité dans
le second alinéa du dispositif de Parrét paraît dans ces conditions
critiquable.

(Signé) Raymond RANIEVA.

47


                     161

                                   SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KEITH

                        1. I agree with the conclusions the Court has reached and largely with
                     its reasons. My purpose in preparing this opinion is to emphasize how the
                     rules of international law recognizing or not the immunity of a foreign
                     State from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State are firmly based
                     on principles of international law and on policies of the international
                     legal order. That emphasis is designed to supplement the exhaustive and
                     persuasive discussion of State practice included in the Judgment.

                        2. A basic principle of international law at play in this area of law is
                     the principle of sovereign equality of States, the first principle declared in
                     Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. In terms of the elabora-
                     tion of that principle in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Interna-
                     tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
                     in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, all States have
                     equal rights and duties and are juridically equal (General Assembly reso-
                     lution 2625 (XXV)). By definition, in cases raising issues of State immu-
                     nity, that principle and the rights and obligations arising from it apply to
                     two States — the State of the forum where the case is being brought and
                     the foreign State which is the defendant or intended defendant. The juris-
                     diction of the courts of the former State arises from the sovereignty of
                     that State. If the particular court has jurisdiction over the matter brought
                     before it when the defendant is an individual or a legal person, why
                     should the fact that the defendant be a foreign State make a difference ?
                     But to the contrary are the sovereign equality and the independence of
                     the foreign State, principles supporting immunity : an equal cannot have
                     jurisdiction over an equal.

                        3. How are those two propositions to be reconciled ? Answers are to be
                     found in the decisions given by national courts, the laws passed by
                     national parliaments, the treaties and the law reform and the diplomatic
                     processes and negotiations leading to them, and other State practice,
                     much of it reviewed in the Judgment in this case, as well as in scholarly
                     writing. The answers have given and continue to give particular attention
                     to the character of the act at issue in the litigation. In broad terms, is the
                     act an act of a public character or, in other words, to be seen as the exer-
                     cise of the sovereign authority of the State, or is the act one of a private
                     character, indistinguishable from the act of any other person acting under
                     the local law ? In the former case, the need for respect for another sover-
                     eignty, the ideas of reciprocity and the possible risks to international rela-

                     66

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                     162 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                     tions may have major significance and indicate that immunity is available.
                     In the latter case, the similarities of the foreign State’s acts to the acts of
                     other persons under local law and the correlative rights and obligations of
                     the other (non‑State) party in the litigation may indicate that immunity
                     should not be available. That may be so if, for instance, the act is of a
                     commercial or trading character ; or the act is an alleged delict or tort
                     under local law committed on the territory of the forum State ; or the
                     action relates to locally situated property. The answers, based on those
                     matters, have changed over time and no doubt will continue to change, in
                     the direction of a narrowing of immunity. In this case, Italy contends that
                     the position taken by its courts conforms with that narrowing. Germany
                     argues to the contrary.

                        4. Those matters began to appear 200 years ago. To demonstrate that,
                     I take from the nineteenth century two judgments and a resolution
                     adopted by the Institut de droit international. I make those choices from
                     the many available because they highlight the principles and the other
                     factors I have mentioned ; they show that the common law and lawyers
                     from that tradition — often represented as adhering to a rule of absolute
                     immunity well into the twentieth century — had, along with those in
                     other jurisdictions, early recognized the balance of the factors mentioned ;
                     and they usefully present the law in two parts : those areas where the local
                     courts have jurisdiction over foreign States and those where they do not
                     because of the immunity of the foreign State. I do of course appreciate
                     that it is unusual in the practice of this Court and its predecessor to draw
                     on the decisions of national courts. But, as appears from the Judgment in
                     this case, the Court, for good reason, does give such decisions a major
                     role. In this area of law it is such decisions, along with the reaction, or
                     not, of the foreign State involved, which provide many instances of State
                     practice. Further, the reasoning of the judges by reference to principle is
                     of real value.

                       5. I begin with Chief Justice Marshall, speaking 200 years ago for the
                     United States Supreme Court. In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
                     (11 US 116 (1812)), he began with these propositions :

                            “The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed
                          by the nation as an independent sovereign power.

                     67

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                     163 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                             The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
                          exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
                          by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
                          source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the
                          restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
                          that power which could impose such restriction.” (11 US 116, 136.)

                     He then examined what he referred to as several instances of consent of
                     the territorial State tested by common usage, and by common opinion,
                     growing out of that usage. Sixty years later, an English judge, Sir Rob-
                     ert Phillimore, rejected a plea of immunity made by the Khedive of Egypt.
                     He began his examination of the immunity of the sovereign prince from
                     the court’s jurisdiction, by
                          “stat[ing] with precision the foundation upon which this privilege
                          rests. Upon principles of general jurisprudence the presence of a per-
                          son or of property within the limits of a State founds the jurisdiction
                          of the tribunals of that State . . . The sovereign prince or his repre-
                          sentative is exempted from the operation of this principle, absolutely,
                          so far as his person is concerned, and with respect to his property, at
                          least so far as that property is connected with the dignity of his posi-
                          tion and the exercise of his public functions.

                             Upon what grounds is this exemption allowed ? Not upon the pos-
                          session on behalf of the sovereign of any absolute right in virtue of
                          his sovereignty to this exemption ; such a right on his part would be
                          incompatible with the right of the territorial sovereign . . . The true
                          foundation is the consent and usage of independent States, which
                          have universally granted this exemption from local jurisdiction in
                          order that the functions of the representative of the sovereignty of a
                          foreign State may be discharged with dignity and freedom, unembar-
                          rassed by any of the circumstances to which litigation might give
                          rise.” (The Charkieh (1873), LR 4 A & E 59, 88.)
                     The references by the judges to common usage and common opinion aris-
                     ing out of that usage tend to suggest that the consent of the territorial
                     State was coming to be seen as a fiction. The reconciliation between the
                     competing sovereignties, in my understanding of the development of the
                     law, ceased to rely on ideas of consent, but weighed the other matters
                     mentioned above and, in particular, the character of the act in issue. The
                     combination of that matter, (implied) consent, and principle may be seen
                     in a second feature of the two judgments in which the judges indicated
                     situations in which territorial sovereignty may prevail over the sover-
                     eignty of the foreign State.
                        6. Chief Justice Marshall looked at what he saw as a manifestly dis-
                     tinct situation. That situation concerned the private property of the

                     68

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                     164 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                     prince. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may
                     possibly be considered, he said, “as subjecting that property to the territo-
                     rial jurisdiction ; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince,
                     and assuming the character of a private individual” (11 US 116, 145) ; or,
                     it may be added, the elements of sovereignty, equality, independence and
                     dignity are absent and the consent, this time of the foreign State and gen-
                     erally implicit, may, with that absence, be seen as denying immunity.
                     Similarly, Sir Robert Phillimore focused on the fact that the vessel which
                     was the subject of the proceeding before him was “employed for the ordi-
                     nary purposes of trading. She belongs to what may be called a commer-
                     cial fleet.” (LR 4 A & E 59, 99.) He had earlier said :

                             “The object of international law, in this as in other matters, is not
                          to work injustice, not to prevent the enforcement of a just demand,
                          but to substitute negotiations between governments, though they
                          may be dilatory and the issue distant and uncertain, for the ordinary
                          use of courts of justice in cases where such use would lessen the
                          dignity or embarrass the functions of the representatives of a foreign
                          State ; and if the suit takes a shape which avoids this inconvenience,
                          the object both of international and of ordinary law is attained — of
                          the former, by respecting the personal dignity and convenience of the
                          sovereign ; of the latter, by the administration of justice to the sub-
                          ject.

                             The universally acknowledged exceptions to the general rule of the
                          sovereign’s immunity when examined prove the truth of this propo-
                          sition. For instance, the exemption from suit is admitted not to apply
                          to immoveable property. One reason may be that the owner of such
                          property has so incorporated himself into the jural system of the
                          state in which he holds such property, that the argument of general
                          inconvenience to States from allowing the exemption outweighs the
                          argument from convenience on which the exemption in other matters
                          is bottomed. But another reason surely is . . . that such a suit can be
                          carried on without the necessity of serving process upon the sove-
                          reign, or of interfering in any way with such personal property as
                          may be requisite for the due discharge of his functions. The exemp-
                          tion must be taken away for one of three reasons, either those which
                          I have suggested, or a third, that the acquisition of immoveable pro-
                          perty amounts to a waiver of privilege.” (LR 4 A & E 59, 97‑98.)

                       7. The first of those two paragraphs valuably highlights the distinction
                     between the substantive obligation of the foreign State and the proce-
                     dural or institutional means by which it is to be enforced or pursued — in
                     the one case the “just demand” was pursued through a court process and

                     69

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                     165 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                     in the other the available means was negotiation between States. That
                     distinction between right and process is critical in the law in general and
                     in the present case in particular (see Part III (3) of the Judgment). The
                     second paragraph, in addition to recalling other instances where territo-
                     rial sovereignty prevails, gives reasons for that result.
                        8. The Institut de droit international in 1891 in its draft International
                     Rules on the jurisdiction of courts over proceedings against foreign
                     States, sovereigns and heads of State provided an exhaustive list of six
                     situations in which court actions against foreign States were permitted.
                     Included on that list were actions for damages arising from a delict or
                     quasi delict committed on the territory of the forum State (Art. 4 (6)).
                     That list was immediately followed by a bar, among other things, on
                     actions brought against acts of sovereignty (Art. 5). A similar approach
                     can be seen in the resolution on State immunity in relation to jurisdiction
                     and enforcement adopted by the Institut a century later with Ian Brown-
                     lie as the Rapporteur (“Contemporary Problems concerning the Immu-
                     nity of States in relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and Enforcement”
                     (1991)). Nine criteria are listed as indicating that judicial and other organs
                     of the forum State have jurisdiction and five as giving the opposite indica-
                     tion. Among the first are proceedings “concerning the death of, or per-
                     sonal injury to, a person, or loss of or damage to tangible property, which
                     are attributable to activities of a foreign State and its agents within the
                     national jurisdiction of the forum State” (Art. 2 (2) (e)). Among the lat-
                     ter indications, tending to deny jurisdiction, are (1) “the relation between
                     the subject‑matter of the dispute and the validity of the transactions of
                     the defendant State in terms of public international law” (Art. 2 (3) (b)),
                     and (2) “the organs of the forum State should not assume the competence
                     to inquire into the content or implementation of the foreign, defence and
                     security policies of the defendant State” (Art. 2 (3) (d)).

                        9. That resolution was adopted just a few weeks after the International
                     Law Commission had completed its draft articles on jurisdictional immu-
                     nities of States and their property, the draft which became the basis of the
                     2004 United Nations Convention. In 1991 the Commission reaffirmed as
                     still generally applicable the commentary it had adopted in 1980, a com-
                     mentary based on a review of much State practice, including legislation,
                     executive action and court decisions, treaties, and many authorities. The
                     commentary said this, under the heading “Rational Basis of State Immu-
                     nity” :

                            “The most convincing arguments in support of the principle of
                          State immunity may be found in international law as evidenced in
                          the usage and practice of States and as expressed in terms of the
                          sovereignty, independence, equality and dignity of States. All these
                          notions seem to coalesce, together constituting a firm international

                     70

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                     166 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                          legal basis for State immunity. State immunity is derived from sov
                          ereignty. Between two co‑equals, one cannot exercise sovereign will
                          or authority over the other : par in parem imperium non habet.” (Year‑
                          book of the International Law Commission (YBILC), 1980, Vol. II (2),
                          p. 156, para. 55 of commentary to draft Article 6 ; ibid., 1991,
                          Vol. II (2), pp. 22‑23, para. 5 of commentary to Article 5.)

                        10. Throughout its work on the topic, the Commission continued to
                     draw the distinction, which had been appearing since early in the nine-
                     teenth century between the public and the private, to use that shorthand.
                     In the former sphere, the principles of sovereign equality, independence,
                     reciprocity and dignity, possible risks to international relations, and, if
                     needed, the (implied) consent of the territorial State to the waiving of its
                     territorial jurisdiction prevailed. In the latter, the foreign State, by operat-
                     ing in effect as a private person within the local legal system, either sub-
                     jected itself to the local law and judicial system or became subject to that
                     law and system. A choice between those alternatives was made by the
                     International Law Commission in its drafting of the eight provisions
                     which now appear in Part III of the United Nations Convention under
                     the heading “Proceedings in which State Immunity Cannot Be Invoked”.
                     The phrase “the State is considered to have consented to the exercise of”
                     the local jurisdiction which had been included in four of the provisions in
                     that part was replaced by the phrase “the State cannot invoke” immunity
                     from that jurisdiction (YBILC, 1991, Vol. II (2), p. 34, para. 2 of com-
                     mentary to Article 10). The implied or fictional consent of the foreign
                     State has gone. The propositions supporting territorial sovereignty now
                     appear as statements of general law.

                       11. With that consideration of principle in mind, I go to the facts
                     which lie at the heart of the claims brought before the Italian courts. Ger-
                     man forces inflicted untold suffering on the Italian people during the
                     period from September 1943 until the liberation of Italy in May 1945.
                     Germany acknowledges those facts and their illegality and says that it
                     accepts full responsibility for those terrible events. May the Italian courts
                     exercise jurisdiction over claims, based on those facts, brought against
                     Germany ? How is the contest of equal sovereignties to be resolved ?

                        12. One answer proposed by Italy was based on the local tort or delict
                     rule. As indicated, that rule has been long recognized, at least in doctrine ;
                     the acts in issue in this case would be plainly unlawful under any conceiv-
                     able system of national law, as well as under international law. But what
                     is the extent of that rule ? The 1891 and 1991 formulations by the Institut
                     de droit international require a territorial element : that the wrong was
                     committed in the territory or within the national jurisdiction of the forum

                     71

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                     167 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                     State (see para. 8 above). The same element appears in a more detailed
                     form in Article 12 of the 2004 United Nations Convention :

                             “Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State
                          cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another
                          State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to
                          pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person, or damage
                          to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is
                          alleged to be attributable to the State, if the act or omission occurred
                          in whole or in part in the territory of that other State and if the
                          author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time
                          of the act or omission.”

                         13. The whole emphasis in the text of Article 12 and the International
                       Law Commission commentary on it is on the local character of that legal
                       proceeding as well as on its private nature. There must be a right under
                       local law to compensation ; the actor must have been in the territory when
                       the act occurred ; and that act must have occurred there in whole or in
                       part. According to the Commission, the exception to immunity is “appli-
                     cable only to cases or circumstances in which the State concerned would
                     have been liable under the lex loci delicti commissi” ; a local court is the
                     most convenient ; and the rule of non‑immunity would prevent the possi-
                     bility of the insurance company hiding behind the cloak of State immu-
                     nity (most of the injury and damages likely to be covered will be insurable)
                     (YBILC, 1991, Vol. II (2), pp. 44‑45, paras. 2‑4 of commentary to
                     Article 12). The proposition stated in Article 12, assuming it to be a state-
                      ment of customary international law, and its rationale plainly do not
                      address delictual or tortious acts committed elsewhere, in this case out-
                      side Italy.
                         14. The Commission also contemplates that political assassinations (at
                      the direction or with the knowledge of the foreign State, I assume) would
                      be covered. I can see the force of that even though the act might be said
                      in one sense to be of a very public, governmental, character ; it is likely
                      also to be a serious breach of the local law giving rise to civil liability and
                      proceedings in the local courts. To return to the beginning point, as stated
                      by Chief Justice Marshall, of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the
                      local sovereign, I can see no justification in terms of equal sovereignty,
                      independence, dignity, reciprocity or possible risks to international rela-
                      tions, or the implied consent of the territorial sovereign for denying
                      jurisdiction in respect of that violation of the law of the land.

                       15. Acts committed in the course of armed conflict between States, are,
                     in my view, of a markedly different kind. They are acts at the interna-

                     72

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                     168 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                     tional, inter‑State level, of a sovereign nature relating to the implementa-
                     tion of foreign, security and defence policies of the defendant State and
                     are to be assessed according to international law, to return to the terms of
                     the Institut texts (see para. 8 above). Those acts are not acts to be assessed
                     primarily by reference to local law, although they might also involve
                     breaches of local criminal law so far as it incorporates provisions of inter-
                     national law, for instance creating or declaring crimes for which individu-
                     als may be individually responsible and in respect of which they are not
                     likely to have immunity.

                         16. The International Law Commission commentary states flatly that
                     its draft Article 12 does not “apply to situations involving armed con-
                     flicts” (YBILC, 1991, Vol. II (2), p. 46, para. 10 of commentary to
                     Article 12). While it would have been helpful had the United Nations Con-
                      vention made it express, as the European Convention does, that the Con-
                      vention does not apply to claims arising from armed conflicts or from
                      actions of the armed forces (1972 European Convention on State Immu-
                      nity, Art. 31), the statement of 25 October 2004 by the Chairman of the
                      Ad Hoc Committee when introducing the report of that Committee on
                      the draft Convention follows the Commission’s position and is clear : one
                      of the issues that had been raised was whether military activities were
                      covered by the Convention ; the general understanding had always pre-
                      vailed that they were not (A/C6/59/SR13, para. 36 ; see also the reference
                      in the last preambular paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 59/38,
                      adopting the Convention, to the “statement of the Chairman of the Ad
                      Hoc Committee”). Norway and Sweden when ratifying the Convention
                      have made explicit their understandings to similar effect. The Chairman’s
                      statement indicates to me that the exclusion of war claims went almost
                      without saying.

                       17. Also supporting that exclusion is the analogy provided by national
                     law which in many countries at first recognized the absolute immunity of
                     States from proceedings in their own courts, and later limited it. The ILC
                     said this about the earlier period :

                             “It was in the nineteenth century that the doctrine of State immu-
                          nity came to be established in the practice of a large number of States.
                          In common law jurisdictions, especially in the United Kingdom and
                          the United States of America, the principle that foreign States are
                          immune from the jurisdiction of the territorial States has to a large
                          extent been influenced by the traditional immunity of the local sov-
                          ereign, apart altogether from the application of international comity
                          or comitas gentium. In the United Kingdom, at any rate, the doctrine

                     73

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                     169 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                          of sovereign immunity has been a direct result of the British consti-
                          tutional usage expressed in the maxim ‘The King cannot be sued in
                          his own courts’. To implead the national sovereign was therefore a
                          constitutional impossibility . . . The immunity of the Crown was later
                          extended to cover also the sovereign heads of other nations, or foreign
                          sovereigns with whom at a subsequent stage of legal development
                          foreign States have been identified.” (YBILC, 1980, Vol. II (2), p. 144,
                          para. 9.)
                     But by 1932 it was possible for those responsible for the extensively
                     researched and carefully prepared Harvard draft convention on the Com-
                     petence of Courts in regard to foreign States to say that

                            “Exceptions [to the rule of absolute immunity] . . . have made their
                          appearance as the necessities of modern life have changed and devel-
                          oped. More and more States have adopted legislation by which they
                          have submitted to suits by private persons in their own courts. The
                          old English principle that the King can do no wrong has lost much
                          of its force as an operative legal doctrine.” ((1932) 26 AJIL
                          Supp. 527‑528 ; the text was prepared by a group with Profes-
                          sor Philip C. Jessup as reporter.)
                     The draft accordingly included a number of exceptions to immunity.
                     Twenty years later, Professor Hersch Lauterpacht pressed the national
                     law analogy with reference to recent legislative changes in common law
                     countries limiting the immunity of the local state from court proceedings
                     (“The Problem of the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States”
                     (1951), 28 BYBIL 220‑221, 233‑235). Many of those changes in national
                     law had as their purpose, with reference to the principles of the rule of
                     law and the equality of the State and its citizens under the law, the plac-
                     ing of the State as litigant in the same position as the individual as liti-
                     gant. To recall the distinction made earlier in this opinion, the new
                     legislation was concerned with the State being made subject to jurisdic-
                     tion in respect of private law claims. That legislation did not, by contrast,
                     allow claims arising from actions of the armed forces of the State in
                     defence of the State or even more broadly. Such matters were dealt with
                     at the national level by general policies such as war pensions and other
                     measures for the rehabilitation of returned members of the armed forces.
                     (See e.g., P. W. Hogg and P. J. Monahan, Liability of the Crown,
                     3rd ed., 2000, 7 (6) (b).) While that parallelism with private acts is not to
                     be pressed beyond its limits, it is of interest, as Sompong Sucharitkul, the
                     ILC’s first special Rapporteur wrote in 1959, that in Italy

                          “[t]he doctrine of State immunity was also generally applied by Ita-
                          lian courts in the nineteenth century. But at the very beginning, Ita-
                          lian courts adopted a restrictive view of immunity based upon the

                     74

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                     170 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                          double personality of the State. This was principally because in Italy
                          the local sovereign himself was subject to the jurisdiction of an Ita-
                          lian judge in respect of acts performed in his private capacity.” (State
                          Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law, 1959, p. 11.)

                        18. At the international level, claims in respect of war damages and
                     losses against former belligerents are in practice dealt with by inter‑State
                     negotiations and agreements, as shown in the present case by the treaties
                     of 1947 and 1961 (see paragraphs 22 and 24‑25 of the Judgment) ; such
                     agreements deal with the claims of loss on a general footing, often on a
                     reciprocal basis and not by way of individual claims, whether based on
                     fault or not. That international practice recognizes consequences of the
                     widespread devastation and destruction that follow major armed con-
                     flicts. That destruction, along with the overwhelming need for former bel-
                     ligerent States to reconstruct their societies and their economies, as
                     recognized in that practice, makes completely impracticable, as best as I
                     understand the matter, the Italian proposition in these terms :
                             “States (both the State of the victims and the State which is respon-
                          sible for the violations) when negotiating . . . agreements [for war
                          damages] must ensure that (a) all categories of (if not all individual)
                          victims of war crimes are covered ; (b) there be sufficient financial
                          means to make the reparation more than symbolic ; (c) there be
                          appropriate mechanisms for ensuring that the reparation is made to
                          the victims. Thus, it would not be sufficient for a State just to say that
                          the counterpart agreed to waive all claims in exchange for a sum of
                          money. There must be certainty that the sum of money is sufficient
                          and appropriate ; there must be criteria for the identification of vic-
                          tims and for its distribution to victims.” (Counter‑Memorial of Italy,
                          para. 5.26.)

                     How could the stated requirements (a) and (b) possibly be satisfied in
                     Europe following six years of unrelenting warfare ? In practice any repa-
                     ration received has often, and understandably, been used by States for
                     general recovery purposes. And (c) is not an obligation recognized in law
                     or always in fact.

                         19. Professor Louis Henkin, referring primarily to many post‑war
                     settlement agreements concluded by the United States throughout its
                      history, has said that :
                          “governments have dealt with such private claims as their own, trea
                          ting them as national assets, and as counters, ‘chips’, in international
                          bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims
                           deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental
                            in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims might
                            be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political

                     75

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                     171 	 jurisdictional immunities of the state (sep. op. keith)

                          considerations unrelated to debts. In result, except as an agreement
                          might provide otherwise, international claims settlements generally
                          wipe out the underlying private debt, terminating any recourse under
                          domestic law as well . . .

                             Often there was no assurance that the lump sum settlement was
                          the best ‘deal’ that citizens were not sacrificed to some other national
                          interest ; often, surely, one could not be certain that the private party
                          recovered the full ‘value’ of his (her) claim.” (Foreign Affairs and the
                          US Constitution, 2nd ed., 1996, p. 300.)
                     The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently
                     quoted the first part of that passage and, in terms of “larger political con-
                     siderations”, recalled a position stated in 1952 by the United States in
                     relation to the Peace Treaty with Japan of 1951 :

                             “Obviously insistence upon payment of reparations in any propor-
                          tion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their
                          nationals would wreck Japan’s economy, dissipate any credit that it
                          may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create
                          misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism
                          would flourish.” (Joo v. Japan (2005) 413 F. 3d 45, 52.)

                     That very long‑established practice, recognizing harsh post‑war realities
                     and the need for former enemy States to establish new relationships,
                     strongly supports the conclusion that a former belligerent State may not
                     be subject, without its consent, to the jurisdiction of a foreign court in
                     cases such as those which are the subject of the present proceedings.

                       20. To conclude, I emphasize again that the Judgment in the present
                     case does not in any way deny the responsibility of Germany for the
                     dreadful violations of international law it committed against Italian citi-
                     zens between 1943 and 1945. Germany has indeed, in the words of its
                     Agent before the Court, “accepted full responsibility [for] the terrible war
                     time events”. But that responsibility, along with the related obligations, is
                     not before the Court. What is before the Court is only Germany’s claim
                     to immunity from the jurisdiction of Italian courts over the proceedings
                     based on those events brought against it by individual Italian citizens.

                                                                    (Signed) Kenneth Keith.

                     76

6 CIJ1031.indb 148                                                                                22/11/13 12:25


       INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

         REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
      ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

         JUDGMENT NO. 2867
 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
   OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
 ORGANIZATION UPON A COMPLAINT
 FILED AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL
UND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
     (REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

          ORDER OF 29 APRIL 2010

              2010
       COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

           RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
    AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

   JUGEMENT N° 2867 DU TRIBUNAL
 ADMINISTRATIF DE L’ORGANISATION
    INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL
        SUR REQUÊTE CONTRE
      LE FONDS INTERNATIONAL
    DE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE
     (REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

       ORDONNANCE DU 29 AVRIL 2010

                         Official citation :
dgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
bour Organization upon a Complaint Filed against the International
   Fund for Agricultural Development, Order of 29 April 2010,
                   I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 298

                    Mode officiel de citation :
  Jugement n° 2867 du Tribunal administratif de l’Organisation
internationale du Travail sur requête contre le Fonds international
     de développement agricole, ordonnance du 29 avril 2010,
                   C.I.J. Recueil 2010, p. 298

                                           No de vente :
SN 0074-4441
BN 978-92-1-071091-6
                                           Sales number    981

                               29 APRIL 2010

                                    ORDER

          JUDGMENT NO. 2867
  OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
    OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
  ORGANIZATION UPON A COMPLAINT
  FILED AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL
FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

  (REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

    JUGEMENT N° 2867 DU TRIBUNAL
  ADMINISTRATIF DE L’ORGANISATION
     INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL
         SUR REQUÊTE CONTRE
       LE FONDS INTERNATIONAL
     DE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE

  (REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

                              29 AVRIL 2010

                             ORDONNANCE

           COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                           ANNÉE 2010                                           2010
                                                                              29 avril
                                                                            Rôle général
                            29 avril 2010                                      no 146

    JUGEMENT N° 2867 DU TRIBUNAL
  ADMINISTRATIF DE L’ORGANISATION
     INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL
         SUR REQUÊTE CONTRE
       LE FONDS INTERNATIONAL
     DE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE
           (REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

                         ORDONNANCE

ésents : M. TOMKA, vice-président ; MM.       SHI, AL-KHASAWNEH,
         BUERGENTHAL, SIMMA, ABRAHAM, KEITH, SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR,
         BENNOUNA, SKOTNIKOV, CANÇADO TRINDADE, YUSUF, GREEN-
         WOOD, juges ; M. COUVREUR, greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,
Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu les articles 48, 65 et 66, paragraphes 2 et 4, du Statut de la Cour et
 articles 13, paragraphe 3, et 104 de son Règlement,

Rend l’ordonnance suivante :
Considérant que, le 22 avril 2010, lors de sa quatre-vingt-dix-neuvième
sion, le Conseil d’administration du Fonds international de dévelop-
ment agricole a adopté la résolution suivante :
                                                                       4

   « Le Conseil d’administration, ...
   Attendu que, dans son jugement no 2867 en date du 3 février 2010,
le Tribunal administratif de l’Organisation internationale du Travail
(le Tribunal) a affirmé sa compétence en relation avec la requête
formée par Mme A. T. S. G. contre le Fonds international de dévelop-
pement agricole,
  Attendu que l’article XII de l’annexe du Statut du Tribunal admi-
nistratif de l’Organisation internationale du Travail dispose que :

     « 1. Au cas où le Conseil exécutif d’une organisation internatio-
  nale ayant fait la déclaration prévue à l’article II, paragraphe 5, du
  Statut du Tribunal conteste une décision du Tribunal affirmant sa
  compétence ou considère qu’une décision dudit Tribunal est viciée
  par une faute essentielle dans la procédure suivie, la question de la
  validité de la décision rendue par le Tribunal sera soumise par
  ledit Conseil exécutif, pour avis consultatif, à la Cour internatio-
  nale de Justice.

    2. L’avis rendu par la Cour aura force obligatoire. »,
   Attendu que le Conseil d’administration, après examen, souhaite
se prévaloir des dispositions dudit article,
  Décide de soumettre à la Cour internationale de Justice, pour avis
consultatif, les questions juridiques ci-après :
     « I. Le Tribunal avait-il compétence, en vertu de l’article II de
  son Statut, pour examiner la requête dirigée contre le Fonds inter-
  national de développement agricole (ci-après dénommé « le
  Fonds »), en date du 8 juillet 2008, formée par Mme A. T. S. G.,
  une personne physique qui était membre du personnel du Méca-
  nisme mondial de la Convention des Nations Unies sur la lutte
  contre la désertification dans les pays gravement touchés par la
  sécheresse et/ou la désertification, en particulier en Afrique (ci-
  après dénommée « la Convention »), vis-à-vis duquel le Fonds
  joue simplement le rôle d’organisation d’accueil ?
     II. Etant donné qu’il ressort du dossier que les parties au litige
  à la base du jugement no 2867 du Tribunal sont convenues que le
  Fonds et le Mécanisme mondial sont des entités juridiques distinc-
  tes et que la requérante était membre du personnel du Mécanisme
  mondial, et en considération de tous les documents, règles et prin-
  cipes pertinents, l’assertion du Tribunal, en appui à sa décision
  affirmant sa compétence, selon laquelle « le Mécanisme mondial
  doit, à toutes fins administratives, être assimilé aux divers services
  administratifs du Fonds » et que « la conséquence en est que les
  décisions administratives prises par le directeur général au sujet du
  personnel du Mécanisme mondial sont, en droit, des décisions du

                                                                      5

     Fonds », relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou constituait-elle une
     faute essentielle de la procédure suivie par le Tribunal ?
        III. L’assertion générale du Tribunal, en appui à sa décision
     affirmant sa compétence, selon laquelle « les membres du person-
     nel du Mécanisme mondial sont des fonctionnaires du Fonds »,
     relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou constituait-elle une faute essen-
     tielle de la procédure suivie par le Tribunal ?
        IV. La décision du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence pour exa-
     miner l’argument de la requérante selon lequel la décision du
     directeur général du Mécanisme mondial était entachée d’abus de
     pouvoir relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou constituait-elle une
     faute essentielle de la procédure suivie par le Tribunal ?
        V. La décision du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence pour exa-
     miner l’argument de la requérante selon lequel la décision du
     directeur général de ne pas renouveler le contrat de la requérante
     constituait une erreur de droit relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou
     constituait-elle une faute essentielle de la procédure suivie par le
     Tribunal ?
        VI. La décision du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence pour
     interpréter le Mémorandum d’accord entre la Conférence des
     Parties à la Convention des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre la
     désertification dans les pays gravement touchés par la sécheresse
     et/ou la désertification, en particulier en Afrique, et le FIDA (ci-
     après dénommé « le Mémorandum »), la Convention et l’Accord
     portant création du FIDA relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou
     constituait-elle une faute essentielle de la procédure suivie par le
     Tribunal ?
        VII. La décision du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence pour
     déterminer que, en s’acquittant d’un rôle d’intermédiaire et de
     soutien, en application du Mémorandum, le président agissait au
     nom du FIDA relevait-elle de sa compétence et/ou constituait-elle
     une faute essentielle de la procédure suivie par le Tribunal ?
        VIII. La décision du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence pour
     substituer à la décision discrétionnaire du directeur général du
     Mécanisme mondial sa propre décision relevait-elle de sa compé-
     tence et/ou constituait-elle une faute essentielle de la procédure
     suivie par le Tribunal ?
        IX. La décision rendue par le Tribunal dans son jugement
     no 2867 est-elle recevable ? » » ;
Considérant que des copies certifiées conformes des versions française
 anglaise de la résolution susmentionnée ont été transmises à la Cour
us le couvert d’une lettre du président du Fonds international de déve-
ppement agricole datée du 23 avril 2010 et reçue au Greffe de la Cour
26 avril 2010 ;
Considérant que le président du Fonds a indiqué dans sa lettre que,

                                                                         6

 nformément à l’article 65 du Statut, tout document pouvant servir à
ucider la question serait transmis à la Cour ;
 Considérant que, par lettres en date du 26 avril 2010, le greffier a noti-
 la requête pour avis consultatif à tous les Etats admis à ester devant la
our, conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 66 du Statut,
 1. Décide que le Fonds international de développement agricole et ses
 ats membres admis à ester devant la Cour, les Etats parties à la
onvention des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre la désertification et
 mis à ester devant la Cour, ainsi que les institutions spécialisées des
ations Unies ayant fait une déclaration reconnaissant la compétence du
 ibunal administratif de l’Organisation internationale du Travail en
rtu du paragraphe 5 de l’article II du Statut du Tribunal, sont jugés
sceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur les questions soumises à la
our pour avis consultatif ;
 2. Fixe au 29 octobre 2010 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel
s exposés écrits sur ces questions pourront être présentés à la Cour
nformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 66 de son Statut ;
 3. Fixe au 31 janvier 2011 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel les
 ats ou organisations qui auront présenté un exposé écrit pourront pré-
nter des observations écrites sur les autres exposés écrits conformément
   paragraphe 4 de l’article 66 du Statut ;
 4. Décide que le président du Fonds international de développement
 ricole devra transmettre à la Cour tout exposé de l’opinion de la requé-
nte dans la procédure l’opposant au Fonds devant le Tribunal admi-
  tratif de l’Organisation internationale du Travail que ladite requérante
uhaiterait porter à la connaissance de la Cour ; et fixe au 29 octobre
 10 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel un exposé éventuel de
 pinion de la requérante visée par le jugement pourra être présenté à la
our et au 31 janvier 2011 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel des
 servations éventuelles de la requérante pourront être présentées à la
our ;
 Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
ix, à La Haye, le vingt-neuf avril deux mille dix.

                                                    Le vice-président,
                                              (Signé) Peter TOMKA.
                                                       Le greffier,
                                          (Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.

                                                                           7