                               SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC GUILLAUME

[Translation]

       1. The Court found that, contrary to Kenya’s claims, the maritime boundary between Kenya
and Somalia does not follow a parallel of latitude. It fixed the starting-point of the boundary in
accordance with the agreements concluded between Italy and the United Kingdom in 1927 and 1933.
It then delimited the territorial sea, in effect along the line at right angles to the general direction of
the coast set out in those same agreements. As regards the exclusive economic zone (hereinafter the
“EEZ”) and the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, the Court did not adopt the equidistance
line put forward by Somalia. With a view to achieving an equitable solution, it made a significant
adjustment to this line in favour of Kenya. Finally, it rejected Somalia’s submission seeking a finding
against Kenya on account of its unlawful activities in the disputed area. I support these decisions, but
I disagree with some points of the reasoning adopted by the Court, and I consider it necessary to
express my differences of opinion here.

       2. Somalia requested the Court to delimit the maritime areas appertaining to it and to Kenya.
Both States are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
“UNCLOS”). The delimitation must therefore be effected in accordance with Articles 15, 74 and 83
of that Convention. Failing agreement between the Parties, the rules set out in those articles, as
interpreted in the jurisprudence, must be applied. Consequently, the Court had first to determine
whether there were any agreements in existence between Kenya and Somalia concerning all or part
of their maritime boundary.

                              I. Is there a tacit agreement between the Parties about
                                      delimitation along a parallel of latitude?

       3. Kenya claims there is. It asserts that it has fixed the northern limit of its maritime areas at
the parallel 1° 39' 43.2" S. It contends that Somalia agreed to this limit by way of acquiescence. The
limit is therefore the boundary. Somalia disputes this on three grounds. It claims:

(a) that a maritime boundary cannot be established by acquiescence 1;

(b) that in any event Somalia has not acquiesced to Kenya’s unilateral claims 2; and

(c) lastly, that Kenya itself has acknowledged that its boundary has never been fixed 3.

      4. The Court rightly rejected the first argument. International law is not formalistic. It
recognizes that territorial sovereignty may be transferred and that boundaries may be fixed by tacit
agreement or by acquiescence, as recalled by the Court in the Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh case
between Malaysia and Singapore 4. According to that Judgment, tacit agreement arises from the
convergent conduct of the parties. Acquiescence, for its part, results from the absence of reaction by
one State to the positions taken by another. It is not always easy to distinguish between the two and,
in the aforementioned Judgment, the Court itself avoided taking a stance on the approach to be

       1 Reply of Somalia, Vol. I, para. 1.11.

       2 Ibid., para. 2.12.

       3 Ibid., para. 2.29.

         4 Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 50, paras. 120-121; see also the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Simma and Abraham,
ibid., p. 117, para. 3.

                                                        -2-

followed. Acquiescence and tacit agreement both convey the consent of the States in question. In
both cases, through different processes, the States manifest their agreement.

       Somalia contends, however, that Articles 15, 74 and 83 of UNCLOS provide for the
delimitation of maritime spaces by way of agreement. It acknowledges that these agreements may be
express or tacit, but maintains that UNCLOS precludes delimitation by acquiescence. Yet it is
difficult to see why the drafters of UNCLOS would have recommended that States fix their maritime
boundaries by agreement, but excluded the possibility of the agreed solution resulting from the
acquiescence of one party to the positions taken by the other. It is clear that the drafters wanted States
to reach mutually acceptable solutions, regardless of how this was achieved. The term “agreement”
in the Convention must be understood to include any solution arising from the parties’ consent.

       The solution adopted in the jurisprudence for stretches of land 5 is therefore valid for maritime
areas, as the Court ruled in the Gulf of Maine case, moreover 6. The limits of those areas may result
from one State’s silence in the face of another State’s positions.

      5. The facts of the case must also lead to the conclusion that, through its long silence, Somalia
acquiesced to the parallel of latitude adopted by Kenya. The facts in this respect must be clear and
“without any doubt” 7.

      What is the situation? Kenya claims to have repeatedly asserted that its maritime boundary
with Somalia was constituted by a parallel of latitude. These assertions are said to have been notified
to Somalia, which should have reacted, but failed to do so for 35 years. Kenya claims that Somalia
thus consented to this line as the boundary. That acquiescence is said to be confirmed by the Parties’
conduct. Somalia denies this.

       6. For Kenya, the facts are as follows:

(a) Kenya extended its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles by Presidential Proclamation of 13 June
    1969 8. Section 2, subsection 4, of the Act of 16 May 1972 states: “On the coastline adjacent to
    neighbouring States the breadth of the territorial sea shall extend to [the] Median Line” 9.

(b) By Presidential Proclamation of 28 February 1979, Kenya endowed itself with an EEZ of
    200 nautical miles. The Proclamation states that “the Exclusive Economic Zone of Kenya
    shall . . . in respect of its northern territorial waters boundary with [the] Somali Republic be on
    eastern latitude South of Diua Damasciaca Island being latitude 1° 38' South” 10.

(c) Section 3, subsection 4, of the Maritime Zones Act of 25 August 1989 provides: “On the coastline
    adjacent to neighbouring states, the breadth of the territorial waters” shall be determined by the

        5 In this regard, see Island of Palmas case (Netherlands/USA), Award of 4 April 1928, Reports of International

Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. II, p. 839. See also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 24-30. Lastly, in respect of the island of Meanguera, see Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 577, para. 364.
        6 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 305, para. 130.
       7Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 51, para. 122; see also pp. 50-51, paras. 120 et seq.
       8 Counter-Memorial of Kenya (hereinafter “CMK”), Vol. II, Ann. 1.

       9 Memorial of Somalia (hereinafter “MS”), Vol. III, Ann. 16.

       10 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 19, Art. 1 (b).

                                                       -3-

    equidistance line 11. Section 4, subsection 4, adds that “[t]he northern boundary of the exclusive
    economic zone with Somalia shall be delimited by notice in the Gazette by the Minister pursuant
    to an agreement between Kenya and Somalia on the basis of international law” 12.

(d) By Presidential Proclamation of 9 June 2005, Kenya declared that “the Exclusive Economic Zone
    of Kenya shall . . . [i]n respect of its northern territorial waters boundary with [the] Somali
    Republic be on eastern latitude South of Diua Damascia[ca] Island being latitude
    1° 39' 34" degrees south”. Two appended tables specify the seaward co-ordinates of the territorial
    sea and the EEZ 13.

(e) On 6 May 2009, Kenya made a submission to the Commission responsible for fixing the outer
    limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (CLCS), with a view to establishing
    those limits. According to the co-ordinates provided and the map appended, its maritime
    boundary with Somalia continues beyond 200 nautical miles along the parallel of latitude used
    for the EEZ 14.

       In sum, until 2005, Kenya used the median line to delimit its boundary with Somalia in the
territorial sea. In 1979, it declared that the northern limit of its EEZ followed the parallel of latitude.
However, its 1989 Act stated that this boundary would be delimited pursuant to an agreement to be
reached with Somalia. Lastly, since 2009, Kenya has adopted the parallel of latitude for the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

      7. It is not in dispute that the 1979 and 2005 proclamations were transmitted by Kenya to the
United Nations Secretariat and communicated by the latter to all United Nations Member States.
They were also published by the Secretariat and placed on the United Nations website 15.

      8. Did Somalia react to Kenya’s declarations? It claims that it did, relying in particular on its
own legislation. This is detailed below:

(a) By Law of 10 September 1972, Somalia fixed the breadth of its territorial sea at 200 nautical
    miles 16.

(b) By Law of 1988-1989 17, Somalia reduced its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, declared an EEZ
    of 200 nautical miles and recognized that its continental shelf might ultimately extend beyond
    that distance. Article 4 of this Law provides:

      11 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 20.

      12 Ibid.

      13 Ibid., Ann. 21.

      14 Ibid., Ann. 59.

      15 CMK, Vol. II, Anns. 20 and 65; MS, Vol. III, Ann. 56.

      16 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 9, Art. 1.

      17 The 1988 Law was promulgated by a presidential decision of 26 January 1989. MS, Vol. III, Ann. 11.

                                                        -4-

      “If there is no multilateral treaty, the Somali Democratic Republic shall consider that
      the border between the Somali Democratic Republic and the Republic of Djibouti and
      the Republic of Kenya is a straight line toward the sea from the land as indicated on the
      enclosed charts.” 18

    Those charts were not communicated to the Court by Somalia.

        The Parties disagree on the interpretation to be given to this text. Somalia claims that the
    straight line mentioned is the equidistance line. Kenya contends that it is the parallel of latitude.
    It is regrettable that the charts appended to the Law were not produced by Somalia. Without these
    crucial documents, we are reduced to conjecture. It seems to me highly likely that the straight
    line shown on the chart was not the equidistance line. Indeed, if that were the case, it would be
    hard to understand why that line should be expressly mentioned in the Yemen delimitation but
    not in the delimitation with Somalia. Without the chart, however, we cannot be certain of this.

(c) By a Presidential Proclamation of 30 June 2014, Somalia reaffirmed its rights over the EEZ.
    Article 4 of that Proclamation states that in any case where Somalia’s EEZ is adjacent or opposite
    to the EEZ of another coastal State, Somalia “is prepared to enter into negotiations with the
    coastal State concerned with a view to delimiting their respective Exclusive Economic Zones” 19.

(d) From August 2009 onwards, Somalia repeatedly stated that the equidistance line should govern
    the delimitation of the maritime spaces appertaining to it and to Kenya and in particular its
    continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 20.

      9. All things considered, it appears that:

(a) Kenya did not claim the parallel of latitude for the territorial sea until 2005. It did so implicitly,
    in the table of co-ordinates annexed to the Proclamation. Somalia objected to this position
    in 2009. Somalia’s four-year silence on a proclamation formulated in this way cannot constitute
    acquiescence.

(b) Kenya claimed the same parallel of latitude for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
    in 2009. Somalia immediately objected to this. It therefore never acquiesced.

(c) The situation is not so clear cut as regards the EEZ. Indeed, Kenya claimed the parallel of latitude
    in 1979 and 2005 by presidential proclamations circulated to all United Nations Member States,
    and Somalia raised no objection until 2009. However, it may be asked whether, in matters of
    such importance, circulation of this kind is sufficient to give rise to a tacit agreement by
    acquiescence, or whether a State is required to notify its neighbour of its claims directly. It should
    also be noted that, prior to 2018, both in its negotiations with Somalia and before the Court,
    Kenya never claimed that Somalia had acquiesced, and it behaved as if the EEZ boundary had
    yet to be established.

      It is for these reasons that I ultimately supported the Court’s solution on this point.

      18 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 10.

      19 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 14, Art. 4.

      20 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 37, Letter of 19 Aug. 2009. Ibid., Anns. 31 and 32, Records of the 2014 negotiations.

                                                            -5-

                      II. Does the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement between Italy and
                             the United Kingdom delimit the territorial sea?

       10. In 1924, 1927 and 1933, the former colonial Powers, Italy and the United Kingdom,
concluded three agreements establishing their boundary. As successor States, Kenya and Somalia are
bound by these agreements. The Court deemed this to be so (Judgment, paragraph 98). Nor could
there be any doubt in this regard, in view of Articles 11 and 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in respect of Treaties 21, the application in Africa of the rule of uti possidetis
juris enshrined by various decisions of the Organization of African Unity 22, and the jurisprudence of
the Court 23 and arbitral tribunals 24.

       11. It was thus for the Court to determine whether the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement fixed the
starting-point and course of the maritime boundary in all or part of the territorial sea.

       12. The 1933 agreement gives binding effect to the conclusions reached by the Parties’
officials in 1927. It fixes with extreme precision the course of the land boundary from beacon to
beacon, and reproduces it to the same effect on a map. Moreover, it provides that from the final
beacon, PB 29, to the point known as Dar Es Salam, the boundary runs “in a south-easterly direction,
to the limit of territorial waters in a straight line at right angles to the general trend of the coastline
at Dar Es Salam, leaving the islets of Diua Damasciaca in Italian territory” 25.

       13. This provision makes it possible to fix the starting-point of the maritime boundary.
Contrary to what is claimed by Kenya, this cannot be the inland beacon PB 29. The land boundary
thus continues from this beacon along the short stretch of around 41 metres which separates it from
the sea. It does so in a straight line at right angles to the general trend of the coastline. The
starting-point of the maritime boundary is therefore at the intersection of that line and the coast, as
rightly determined by the Court.

       14. In the territorial sea, the boundary must follow the same direction. Indeed, the
1927/1933 treaty arrangement indicates that, from beacon PB 29, the boundary continues in that
direction up to the limit of the territorial sea. The arrangement further indicates that, as a result of
this delimitation, the islets of Diua Damasciaca will be in Italian territory, confirming that the
boundary thus fixed does indeed extend as far as the outer limit of the territorial sea.

        21 In the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the Court acknowledged the customary nature of

Article 12 of the Convention (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 72,
para. 123). The same conclusion must be drawn a fortiori with regard to Article 11, according to which “[a] succession of
States does not as such affect . . . a boundary established by a treaty”.
        22 The African Union has on several occasions expressed its support for respecting the borders existing at the time

independence is achieved (resolution AHG/Res.16(I) of 21 July 1964 and Art. 4, para. (b) of the Constitutive Act of the
African Union of 11 June 2000). In the case concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, the Court
stated that uti possidetis is “a principle of a general kind which is logically connected with this form of decolonization
wherever it occurs”. Hence, in this respect, the African Union’s statements are “declaratory rather than constitutive”
(Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 566, paras. 23-24).
       23 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 145; see also P.C.I.J., Series A,

No. 24, p. 17; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 6-38;
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 72, para. 123.
       24 Delimitation of maritime boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, Decision of 31 July 1989,

United Nations, RIAA, Vol. XX, p. 178, paras. 62 et seq.
        25 MS, Vol. III, Ann. 4, Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the

Italian Government regarding the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland (22 Nov. 1933), Appendix I, First Part.

                                                          -6-

        15. In response to a question put by one of the judges at the hearings, Somalia nonetheless
claimed that neither Party “accepts, or has ever accepted, that the boundary in the territorial sea”
follows the line provided for under the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement. Somalia thus concluded that
this line could not be adopted. Kenya, for its part, mentioned the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement in its
Counter-Memorial in respect of the delimitation of the territorial sea 26. It did not comment on
Somalia’s response to the question put at the hearing.

        16. The Court noted that “neither Party asks it to confirm the existence of any segment of a
maritime boundary or to delimit the boundary in the territorial sea on the basis of the
1927/1933 treaty arrangement” (Judgment, paragraph 109). It also recalled that neither Party referred
to this arrangement in its legislation or during the 2014 negotiations. The Court therefore concluded
that it was “unnecessary to decide whether the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement had as an objective the
delimitation of the boundary in the territorial sea” (ibid.).

        17. I cannot support this line of reasoning. A treaty remains in force until such time as it is
abrogated. So long as it is in force, the courts must apply and interpret it. Somalia’s pleadings in
effect raised the question whether the two Parties had, by tacit agreement, abrogated the contested
provision in so far as it applies to the territorial sea, while retaining it for the purposes of fixing the
final segment of the land boundary and the starting-point of the maritime boundary. Tacit
agreements, however, are not easily proved, as the Court moreover recalled with regard to the parallel
of latitude claimed by Kenya (Judgment, paragraph 52). In this case, there is no evidence that such
an agreement ever existed, nor was it claimed that one did.

      In these circumstances, the Court should, in my view, have applied the 1927/1933 treaty
arrangement not only in fixing the starting-point of the maritime boundary, but also in plotting the
course of that boundary in the territorial sea. It did not have the option of dispensing with it.

       18. A delicate issue remains: at the time of the treaty arrangement, the breadth of the territorial
sea was generally 3 nautical miles. Today it is 12 miles. Should the line fixed under the arrangement
stop at 3 miles or continue up to 12?

       That depends on the common intention of the Parties when the arrangement was made 27. In
this instance, however, the travaux préparatoires are silent. In such an event, the Court makes a
determination based on whether or not the terms used are generic.

       The 1927/1933 treaty arrangement refers to the territorial sea without mentioning its breadth.
While Great Britain was firmly committed to the 3-mile limit at the time, that limit was already
disputed, by Italy in particular 28. The negotiators must therefore have been aware that the breadth of
the “territorial waters” might change. In my view, account must be taken of the developments that
have occurred since 1933, and the 12-mile limit must be adopted.

       26 CMK, Vol. I, para. 34.

       27 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,

pp. 242-244, paras. 63-71. In some instances, the Court has retained the original meaning of terms (see Rights of Nationals
of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America) and Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana/Namibia)). In others, the Court has adopted the evolving meaning (see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.
Turkey) and Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)).
       28 D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I, 1982, p. 165.

                                                 -7-

       The Parties’ boundary in the territorial sea thus continues up to the 12-mile point in a straight
line running in a south-easterly direction at right angles to the general direction of the coast at
Dar Es Salam, in accordance with the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement.

       19. The Court adopted a delimitation line which is virtually the same as that set out in the
treaty arrangement. However, it reached this result by drawing a median line in accordance with
Article 15 of UNCLOS. It nevertheless observed that the median line closely corresponds to that
provided for under the 1927/1933 treaty arrangement (Judgment, paragraph 118).

      20. I therefore agree with the co-ordinates adopted by the Court and, consequently, voted in
favour of the third subparagraph of the operative clause. I cannot support the reasoning adopted,
however. In accordance with Article 15 of UNCLOS, the Court should have first determined whether
there was an agreement between the Parties; it should then have concluded that such an agreement
did exist, and applied it.

                                                             (Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

                                            ___________


459

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. PARRA-ARANGUREN
{Traduction ]

1. Je souscris au dispositif de l’ordonnance mais j'estime indispensable
de formuler les observations ci-après.

2. L'article IX de la convention sur le génocide est en vigueur entre les
Parties. Cette disposition prescrit ce qui suit:

«Les différends entre les Parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpré-
tation, l'application ou l'exécution de la présente convention, y com-
pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocide
ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’une partie
au différend.»

3. La Yougoslavie soutient que le défendeur a violé:

«l'obligation énoncée dans la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide de ne pas soumettre intentionnelle-
ment un groupe national à des conditions d'existence devant entrai-
ner sa destruction physique...» (requête de la Yougoslavie, p. 13).

En outre, lors des audiences publiques, la Yougoslavie a déclaré que «le
bombardement intensif de zones habitées yougoslaves constitue en
l'occurrence une violation de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide»
(CR 99/25, p. 12, Brownlie).

4. Le défendeur considère qu'il n’a pas violé la convention sur le géno-
cide parce qu’il n’a pas été commis de crimes de génocide pendant l’inter-
vention militaire des pays de l'OTAN en Yougoslavie, ni à la suite de
cette intervention.

5. Dans son arrêt du I! juillet 1996, la Cour a admis qu'il existait
prima facie un différend d'ordre juridique entre les Parties parce qu'il
existait :

«une situation dans laquelle les points de vue des deux parties,
quant à l'exécution ou à la non-exécution de certaines obligations
découlant d’[un traité], sont nettement opposés» (Unterpréta-
tion des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la
Roumanie, première phase, avis consultatif, C.J. Recueil 1950,
p. 74);

et que, du fait du rejet, par la Yougoslavie, des griefs formulés a son
encontre par la Bosnie-Herzégovine, «il existe un différend d’ordre
juridique» entre elles (Timor oriental ( Portugal c. Australie), CLS.
Recueil 1995, p. 100, par. 22)» (Application de la convention pour la

4]
LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. PARRA-ARANGUREN) 460

prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, exceptions prélimi-
naires, C.J. Recueil 1996 (IT), p. 614-615, par. 29).

6. Par conséquent, compte tenu des allégations formulées par les Parties
lors de la procédure incidente dont il s’agit, il semble exister prima facie
un «différend d’ordre juridique» entre elles au sujet de l’interprétation
et de l'application de la convention sur le génocide. C’est pourquoi l’ar-
ticle IX de la convention sur le génocide est applicable et, à mon avis, la
Cour est compétente prima facie pour connaître de la demande en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires présentée par la Yougoslavie.

7. Cet article IX de la convention sur le génocide est le seul fondement
de compétence prima facie de la Cour en l'espèce. Les seules mesures
conservatoires que la Cour puisse indiquer sont par conséquent celles qui
visent à préserver les droits du demandeur au titre de la convention sur le
génocide.

8. La Yougoslavie demande à la Cour d'indiquer que le défendeur
«doi[t] cesser immédiatement de recourir à l'emploi de la force et doilt]
s abstenir de tout acte constituant une menace de recours ou un recours à
l'emploi de la force contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie»
(CR 99/14, p. 63, (Etinski)). Or, la menace de recours à l'emploi de la
force ou l'emploi de la force contre un Etat ne constitue pas en soi un
acte de génocide au sens de la convention sur le génocide. Les mesures
conservatoires demandées par la Yougoslavie ne visent par conséquent
pas à garantir ses droits en vertu de la convention sur le génocide, c’est-
à-dire le droit de ne pas subir des actes qui risquent d’être qualifiés de
crimes de génocide selon la convention. C’est pourquoi, à mon avis, il ne
faut pas indiquer les mesures conservatoires demandées par la Yougo-
slavie.

(Signé) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

42


OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

N'étant pas d’accord sur l’arrét qui précède, j'estime qu’il.
est de mon devoir, aussi bien envers la Cour qu’envers ma
conscience, d’exposer les motifs qui m’empéchent d’y sous-
crire. |

La Cour se trouve saisie de l'affaire des emprunts serbes
par un compromis conclu entre le Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique française et le Gouvernement du Royaume des Serbes,
Croates et Slovènes. Quelle est la contestation que les deux
Gouvernements soumettent ainsi à la Cour? Une contestation
entre le Gouvernement. serbe-croate-slovéne et les porteurs
francais des emprunts serbes, une contestation -entre un Etat
et des personnes privées, des particuliers d’une autre natio-
nalité. C’est bien précisé dans le préambule du compromis:
« Considérant qu'une contestation s’est élevée entre le Gouver-
nement du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovénes et les

porteurs français... », et plus loin: « Le Gouvernement du
Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovénes payant et considé-
rant ...., les porteurs français considérent.... », et cela se

répète dans l’article premier: «La Cour.,.. sera priée de dire
et juger: a) si, selon l'avis du Gouvernement du Royaume des
Serbes, Croates et Slovènes ...., 2) ou, au contraire, selon l'avis
des porteurs français... » Et dans le n° 3 de l’article premier,
on dit: «comment, pour les paiements ci-dessus, la valeur du
franc-or sera déterminée entre les Parties». La valeur du franc-or
doit être déterminée entre le Gouvernement yougoslave et les
porteurs. En les englobant par le terme: les Parties, on répète
que ce sont bien les Parties au procès.

. La même idée se retrouve dans l’article IT: « Au cas où
la sentence de la Cour reconnaitrait le bien-fondé des réclama-'
tions des porteurs...» (et non pas du Gouvernement fran-
çais). Est-ce que la Cour peut juger un différend entre un
État et des particuliers ?
° 77 ARRÊT N° I4. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

D'après le Statut de la Cour, la Cour ne peut juger que
les différends entre Etats; l’article 34 le dit expressément :
« Seuls les États ou les Membres de la Société des Nations
ont qualité pour se présenter devant la Cour » (et le texte
anglais: « Only States .... can be parties in cases before the
Court »). Si-Varticle 36 dit que la compétence de la Cour
s'étend à toutes affaires que les Parties lui soumettront, cela
ninfirme en rien l'article 34: toutes affaires, bien entendu,
mais entre Etats.

Sans doute, à l’origine d’un différend entre deux Etats, il
peut bien exister une contestation entre un Etat et des par-
ticuliers, la lésion par un Etat des intérêts privés des ressortis-
sants d’un autre Etat. Le cas s’est présenté, par exemple,
dans Vaffaire du Wimbledon (Arrêt n° zr de la Cour), dans
Vaffaire des. concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine (Arrêts
n° 2,.5, 11), dans Vaffaire des intérêts allemands en Haute-
Silésie (Arrêts n% 6, 7, 9, 13). Mais, dans l'affaire du Wim-
bledon, ce qui était en cause, c’étaient l’interprétation et l’ap-
plication de l’article 380 du Traité de Versailles; dans l'affaire
Mavrommatis, il s'agissait de l’application du Protocole XII
annexé au Traité de paix de Lausanne de 1923 et du Mandat
pour la Palestine conféré à Sa Majesté britannique le 24 juil-
let 1922; dans l'affaire des intérêts allemands en Haute-
Silésie, il s'agissait de l’application du Traité de Versailles, pour
lequel le Gouvernement allemand soutenait que la Pologne y
était contrevenue par ses lois. Dans tous ces cas, donc, le
différend portait sur l’application de traités entre Etats; ce
qu'il y avait à examiner, c’était une violation de droit inter-
national public, et, par rapport a ce litige de droit public, la
contestation originaire devenait subsidiaire, et la protection
des intéréts des particuliers n’entrait en cause que comme
conséquence de l’application d’un traité. Si l'État se substi-
tuait à l'individu, c’est parce qu'il soutenait qu'il existait une
violation du droit international public, violation qui mettait
en cause non seulement les droits des particuliers, mais aussi
les droits de l'État. Et c’est cette lésion des droits d’un État,
et non pas des droits d’un individu, qui faisait entrer le
différend. dans le domaine du droit international public et
donnait compétence à la Cour.
78 ARRÊT N° 14. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

La Cour l’a bien constaté dans ses arrêts précédents : « En
prenant fait et cause pour l’un des siens, en mettant en mou-
vement, en sa faveur, l’action diplomatique ou l'action judi-
ciaire internationale, un État fait, à vrai dire, valoir son
droit propre, le droit qu’il a de faire respecter en la personne
de ses ressortissants, le droit international. » (Arrêt n° 2, p. 12.)
« .... la Cour a affirmé sa compétence pour statuer sur la répa-
ration demandée parce qu’elle considérait la réparation comme
le corollaire de la violation des obligations résultant d’un enga-
gement entre États. Cette manière de voir, conforme au carac-
tère général d’une juridiction internationale qui, en principe,
ne connaît que des rapports d'État à Etat, s'impose avec
une force particulière en l'espèce... » (Arrêt n° 13, p. 27.)

Dans l'affaire des emprunts serbes, nous avons d’un côté
le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène, et de l'autre côté les
porteurs français, qui se font représenter par le Gouvernement
français, mais seulement représenter, et rien de plus. Ni dans
le compromis, ni dans les Mémoires et Contre-Mémoires, ni
dans les plaidoiries, on n’a à aucun moment soutenu que
l'État serbe-croate-slovène aurait violé un traité international,
ou qu’il aurait méconnu ou violé une règle admise dans le droit
des gens. Les porteurs n’ont eu recours à aucune juridiction
nationale pour qu’il y ait eu déni de justice de la part
de l'État serbe-croate-slovéne, ou refus de se conformer au
jugement d’une Cour nationale, faits qui seraient le fondement
d’une responsabilité internationale de l’État serbe-croate-slo-
vène. Et, pour qu’un État soit internationalement responsable,
il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait, comme dans le cas présent, une
divergence d'interprétation d’un contrat privé entre cet État
et des ressortissants étrangers (divergence dans l'interprétation
et pas même inexécution, puisque l’État serbe-croate-slovène
a continué et continue toujours à exécuter les contrats d’em-
prunt, mais en les interprétant d’une façon différente de
celle des porteurs). Cette divergence d'interprétation peut
léser les intérêts privés des individus, et ces individus peuvent
soutenir qu’il existe une violation du contrat et s'adresser à
des tribunaux nationaux pour faire établir le bien-fondé de
leurs réclamations. Mais l’État dont ces individus sont les
ressortissants ne peut pas être encore en cause, et puisque son
‘79 ARRÊT N° 14. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

droit propre ne se trouve pas violé, il ne peut valoir son droit
propre. Aucun engagement entre l'État français et l'État
serbe-croate-slovène, engagement dont les obligations auraient
été violées, n’a été invoqué devant la Cour. L'État serbe-
croate-slovène. n’a donc encouru aucune responsabilité inter-
nationale, et c’est aussi l’absence de cette responsabilité
qui empêche de considérer la présente contestation comme un
différend entre États.

On a soutenu, cependant, que des négociations ont eu lieu
entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement serbe-
croate-slovène, que ces négociations n’ont pas abouti, et que
c'est justement ce désaccord entre les deux Gouvernements
qui est porté devant la Cour. Mais dans quelle mesure peut-on
tenir compte de ces négociations ? Aucune précision n'a été
apportée ni quant à l'étendue ni quant à la substance de ces
négociations, et le compromis n’y fait même pas allusion, au
contraire: le compromis ne parle que du désaccord entre l'État
serbe-croate-slovène et les porteurs. Dans ces conditions, il est
difficile de prendre ces négociations en considération.

Une autre difficulté surgit du fait qu’on n'est pas en pré-
sence d’un différend entre États, mais d’une contestation entre
un État et des particuliers. C’est la difficulté des règles à
appliquer. Les Parties n’ont invoqué devant la Cour que des
contrats et des lois. Mais un contrat d'emprunt ou un titre au
porteur sont soumis aux lois internes : il y a donc lieu de leur
appliquer uniquement les lois internes. Et cependant la Cour,
qui est l’organe du droit international et qui a été créée pour
appliquer le droit international, doit appliquer ce droit. (arti-
cle 38 du Statut). C’est ainsi qu’elle a procédé jusqu’à présent, et
si elle a appliqué parfois le droit interne, c’est seulement d’une
manière incidente. Dans le cas actuel, elle est obligée cepen-
dant d'appliquer le droit interne, et rien que le droit interne.
Quant aux législations nationales, la Cour a eu déjà l’occasion
de prononcer dans des affaires précédentes qu’elle ne pouvait
pas se porter juge des lois nationales, mais envisager la loi
avec la jurisprudence seulement comme un fait.
80 ARRÊT N° I4. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

Il y a lieu cependant de tenir compte de ce que la Cour n’a
pas été saisie par une requête unilatérale mais par un compro-
mis. Les deux États, signant le compromis, s'adressent à la
Cour comme à un arbitre, et ils lui demandent de se prononcer
— comme ils l’auraient demandé à des jurisconsultes experts —
sur une. question d'interprétation de contrats, sur laquelle ils
ne sont pas d'accord. C’est un avis qu’ils demandent à la
Cour, non pas un avis consultatif — puisqu’un tel avis, en
vertu du Pacte et de l’article 72 du Règlement de la Cour, ne
peut être émis que sur une requête écrite, signée du Président
de l’Assemblée ou du Président du Conseil ou du Secrétaire
général de la Société des Nations —, mais un avis qui serait
le point de départ des négociations directes entre l’État serbe-
croate-slovène et les porteurs, ou, à défaut d'accord, d'un
second arbitrage.

En s'adressant à la Cour pour cet avis, les deux Etats
signataires du compromis ont eu certainement les meilleures
intentions, mais ils ont mis involontairement la Cour dans une
position difficile, parce que le Statut pour elle est obligatoire,
et parce que, précisément d’après ce Statut, elle n’a pas com-
pétence, selon mon avis, à trancher la question. La Cour peut
assumer la tâche d’arbitre, et en l’assumant elle peut même ne
pas appliquer strictement les règles qu’elle est tenue autrement
d'appliquer, puisque le dernier alinéa de l'article 38 du Statut
Vautorise à statuer ex æquo et bono si les Parties sont d'accord,
mais il fallait que les Parties fussent d'accord là-dessus et que
cela eût été précisé dans le compromis. Autrement, il est
impossible. d'appliquer le dernier alinéa de l’article 38. Il ya
incompatibilité entre le Statut et le compromis tel qu’il a été
rédigé, et le seul moyen de remédier à cette incompatibilité eût
été que les deux États signataires du compromis se missent
d'accord pour donner à l'arbitre une extension de pouvoirs,
en l’autorisant à examiner la question sous toutes les faces et
à la trancher entièrement, ex æquo et bono. Puisque cette
extension de pouvoirs n’a pas eu lieu, le dernier alinéa de
l'article 38 est inapplicable, et la Cour se trouve dans l’impos-
sibilité d'assumer l'arbitrage, ses pouvoirs étant trop limités
par le compromis.
81 ARRÊT N° I4. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

Si l’on arrive à la conclusion que la Cour est incompétente,
cette conclusion dispense d’examiner le fond de l'affaire. N’étant
pas d’accord sur le fond non ‘plus, je crois nécessaire cependant
de faire quelques observations, qui ne font que confirmer
Vimpossibilité dans laquelle la Cour se trouve de statuer.

Plusieurs pages de l’arrêt sont consacrées à la question de
savoir si la clause or peut être considérée comme paralysée
dans son exécution par les lois d’ordre public existant dans les
pays où les paiements se font. Et, après avoir exposé les points
de vue opposés que les Parties ont soutenus dans leurs plai-
doiries, la Cour constate que la jurisprudence française s’est
fixée dans le sens qu’ y a lieu de distinguer entre les paie-
ments internes et les paiements internationaux, et que dans
ceux-ci la clause or n'est pas paralysée par les lois d'ordre
public. La Cour ne peut pas juger le bien-fondé ou le mal-fondé
de cette jurisprudence, d’autant moins que les motifs qui ont
inspiré cette jurisprudence ne sont pas d’ordre juridique, mais
des motifs d'intérêt national, motifs dont la Cour, qui est
internationale, ne peut pas s'occuper. Comme il est dit dans
- l'arrêt, il ne serait pas conforme à la tâche pour laquelle la
Cour a été établie, et il ne correspondrait pas non plus aux
principes gouvernant sa composition, qu’elle dût entreprendre
elle-même une interprétation indépendante des lois nationales.
En effet, ce n'est pas possible, et la Cour devait se borner à
cette constatation, sans même entrer dans la question, quel
est l’état de la jurisprudence française, d’autant plus que le
compromis ne mentionne pas ce point. Mais, en laissant cette
question de côté, la Cour ne tranchait l'affaire qu’incomplete-
ment, si bien qu’elle se trouvait dans une impasse: ou bien ne
trancher l'affaire que partiellement, ow bien entrer dans un
domaine qui n’est pas le sien mais celui des juridictions natio-
nales. L’incompétence était la seule issue de cette position
difficile. |
82 ARRÊT N° 14. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

Les questions soumises à la Cour auraient dû être envisagées
et résolues du point de vue concret, du point de vue adopté
par les Parties dans leurs Mémoires, Contre-Mémoires et plai-
doiries. En se plaçant à ce point de vue, on aurait eu en face
de l'État serbe-croate-slovène le Gouvernement français et le
groupe des porteurs français. Mais, de ce point de vue, on eût
été obligé de tenir compte de toutes les exceptions soulevées
contre le Gouvernement français et contre le groupement des
porteurs français. Le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène a mis
ces exceptions en valeur dans ses plaidoiries, il a cité des
documents dans le but de prouver que l'exécution des emprunts
pendant toute une suite d'années a été acceptée sans réserve
par les porteurs, quoique le service des emprunts se fit en
francs français, déjà dévalorisés. Les deux Parties se sont
longuement étendues sur l'exécution des contrats, et le Gou-
vernement serbe-croate-slovène s’est efforcé de démontrer, en
s'appuyant surtout sur cette exécution des contrats, que l’inten-
tion des Parties n'avait pas été d'exécuter les emprunts en
francs-or, mais dans la monnaie légale française. Il est à
retenir que certains arguments invoqués par le Gouvernement
serbe-croate-slovène n’ont pas été réfutés par la Partie adverse.
Le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène a soutenu devant la
Cour, en se fondant sur les textes des prospectus, que les
souscriptions aux. emprunts ont été versées en francs français
en France, et au cours du change à vue sur Paris sur les
autres places; que la Serbie n’a pas reçu de l’or de ses créan-
ciers, mais que le produit des emprunts a été porté au crédit
du Gouvernement serbe sur les livres de banque en francs
français ; que lorsque, exceptionnellement, la Serbie a demandé
de l'or effectif, elle a dû payer une prestation supplémentaire
pour obtenir cet or, et l'opération a été inscrite dans les livres
de banque comme vente de l’or ; que le solde de l'emprunt de
1913 a été versé par les banques à l’État serbe-croate-slovène
après la guerre en francs français, quoique ces francs fussent
déjà bien au-dessous de l'or; que les porteurs français ont
accepté jusqu’en 1925 le paiement en francs français sans
aucune protestation ni réserve, et qu'ils étaient ainsi d’accord
avec le Gouvernement serbe-croate-slovène qu'il ne s'agissait pas
d'une valeur or; que tous ces faits démontrent qu’en dépit
de la clause or les Parties avaient en vue le franc français.
83 ARRÊT N° I4. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

Et si la Partie adverse a soutenu que telle n’était pas Vin-
tention des Parties, elle n’a pas apporté de preuves réfutant
tous les faits invoqués par le Gouvernement serbe-croate-
slovène. En outre, en se plaçant à ce même point de vue
concret, on aurait dû conclure que la volonté des Parties avait
été de soumettre l'exécution des contrats à la législation fran-
çaise et non pas à la législation serbe, puisque c’est à Paris
que la Serbie s’acquittait de ses annuités, quel que soit l’en-
droit où se trouve le porteur, puisque c’est à Paris donc que
se trouve le lieu de paiement et d'exécution du contrat. Si
lon applique la législation française, il faut l'appliquer inté-
gralement. Enfin, il y aurait eu lieu d’examiner la question, si
le Gouvernement français pouvait se substituer aux porteurs
et réclamer pour eux le paiement d’une valeur or, s’il était
démontré, comme on l’a soutenu dans les plaidoiries, que lui-
même se considérait comme valablement libéré en s’acquittant en
francs français, et que ses tribunaux considéraient les citoyens
français comme libérés dans les mêmes conditions envers leurs
créanciers étrangers. Pour éclaircir tous ces points, des plai-
doiries complémentaires et des expertises s’imposaient.

La Cour a rejeté l’aspect concret de la question, et a envi-
sagé seulement le côté abstrait, considérant qu'il s’agit de
titres au porteur, titres impersonnels. Dans l'obligation basée
sur le titre au porteur, il n’y a qu’une personne qui soit déter-
minée : c’est le débiteur. Le créancier est anonyme, variable,
il peut changer d’un moment à l’autre. L'idée est juste, mais
il faut en tirer toutes les conséquences, et conclure qu'il ne
peut pas être question de porteurs français, mais de porteurs
tout court, de quelque nationalité qu’ils soient.

Si l’on s’en tient à la notion abstraite, toutes les exceptions
tirées de l'exécution des contrats tombent, puisque le porteur
momentané n'est pas lié par les actes des porteurs précédents.
Mais d’un autre côté, en se tenant à la notion abstraite, on
ne voit en face de l’État serbe-croate-slovène qu’un créancier
anonyme, impersonnel, et alors il n’y a plus de porteurs fran-

çais, et, partant, personne que l’État français serait dans la
84 ARRÊT N° I4. — OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. NOVACOVITCH

nécessité de protéger. Dans ces conditions, la Cour peut-elle
s'occuper de laffaire ?

Ce sont ces raisons qui m'ont amené à la conclusion que la
Cour ne peut pas être compétente, et qui m’empéchent de
souscrire à l'arrêt.

(Signé) M. NOVACOVITCH.

e


20

DISSENTING OPINION.

The Court, by the preceding Order, has decided to afford
the Parties a further period of time in which to come to an
amicable agreement on the subject of the questions on which
they are at issue, it being understood that if no agreement
is reached, the Court will deliver judgment on all questions
of law but not on those covered by Article 2, paragraph 2,
of the Special Agreement.

While supporting the proposal that the Parties should be
given a further opportunity of reaching an amicable settlement
of the dispute relating to the free zones, the undersigned
are unable to concur in the statement of the legal situation
of the present position of the Court embodied in the recitals
of the Order. .

The Order which the Court issued on August rgth, 1929,
concluded the first stage of the proceedings in the dispute
between France and Switzerland as to the zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex, which was submitted to it
by the Special Agreement of October 30th, 1924.

Since the issue of that Order, the composition of the Court
has undergone a change. Of the six judges who are parties to
the present opinion, three were among those who dissented
from the recitals of the Order of August 19th, 1929, and two
did not take part in the proceedings during the first stage.
It is therefore necessary to state that the parties to the
present opinion, while maintaining any previous opinion they
may have expressed, do not desire to reopen or to contest
the views which were expressed by the Court in the recitals
of that Order. The Order embodies the conclusion reached by
the Court in 1920, and is regarded by the parties to this
opinion as a fait acquis at any rate for the present.

When the moment comes for the Court to deliver judgment,
it will be called upon, in addition to answering the question
formulated in Article x of the Special Agreement, to settle
all the questions involved by the execution of Article 435,
DISSENTING OPINION 2T

paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles. The point upon
which the parties to the present opinion feel unable to agree
with the majority of the Court is whether, in carrying out
this task, the Court is bound under the Special Agreement
and irrespective of the merits of the question, to maintain
the free zones in being. In the opinion of the majority, the
Court, after recognizing the rights of Switzerland in the reci-
tals of the Order of August 19th, 1929, is bound to do so,
unless and until Switzerland agrees to their suppression. In
the opinion of the undersigned, no such limitation is imposed
upon the Court.

The first paragraph of Article 2 of the Special Agreement
is worded as follows: |

“Failing the conclusion and ratification of a convention
between the two Parties within the time specified, the
Court shall, by means of a single judgment rendered in
accordance with Article 58 of the Court’s Statute, pro-
nounce its decision in regard to the question formulated
in Article r and settle for a period to be fixed by it
and having regard to present conditions, all the questions
involved by the execution of paragraph 2 of Article 435
of the Treaty of Versailles.”

Paragraph 2 of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles was
as follows :

“The High Contracting Parties also agree that the
stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other
supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Upper
Savoy and the Gex District are no longer consistent
with present conditions, and that it is for France and
Switzerland to come to an agreement together with a
view to settling between themselves the status of these
territories under such conditions as shall be considered
suitable by both countries.”

This is the provision which has to be executed; the task
of the. Court is to settle all the details involved in such
execution.

It will be seen that this paragraph of Article 435 consists :
of two parts. The first embodies an opinion on the part of
the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. It is that the stipu-
lations of the treaties of 1815 and of the other supplement-
DISSENTING OPINION 22

ary acts concerning the free zones of Upper Savoy and the
Gex District are no longer consistent with present condi-
tions. The second part of the paragraph embodies a charge
to France and Switzerland to take certain action, viz. to
come to an agreement to settle between them the status
of these territories. |

The natural meaning of the word “execute” is to
“carry out”, to ‘fulfil’. An opinion expressed by the signa-
tories of the Treaty of Versailles is not a matter which can
be executed. À mere expression of opinion does not of itself
involve any further action. On the other hand, the conclusion
of an agreement to settle the status of territory is a matter
which can be executed, and the execution of which may give
rise to many questions, between the two States who are to
be Parties to it.

By reference, therefore, to the terms of paragraph 2 of
Article 435, the task of the Court under Article 2, paragraph x,
of the Special Agreement begins to be clear. The Court is
to settle every question which France and Switzerland would
have had to settle in concluding an agreement on the subject
of the status of the territories constituting the free zones.

The reason why France and Switzerland were charged with
the duty of coming to this agreement is disclosed exactly in the
opinion expressed by the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles
in the first part of paragraph 2 of Article 435. It is that the
stipulations of the old treaties, so far as they relate to the
free zones, are no longer consistent with present conditions.

Assuming that the four instruments enumerated in Article 1
of the Special Agreement constitute the “treaties of 1815 and
other supplementary acts”, an examination of their terms shows
that the only provisions in them which in essence relate
to the free zones are those providing for the withdrawal from
the political frontier of the French and Sardinian customs
lines and fixing the place where the customs lines are to be
established.

It is this withdrawal of the customs line which in fact
created the free zones. If the signatories of the Treaty of
Versailles stated that in their opinion the provisions in the
DISSENTING OPINION 23

old treaties were no longer consistent with present conditions,
they must have meant that what was no longer consistent
with present conditions was the withdrawal of the customs
line from the political frontier.

It is now necessary to determine Switzerland’s position and
the measure of her rights vis-à-vis France and the other
signatories of the Treaty of Versailles.

That position is defined in the recitals of the Court’s Order
of August 19th, 1029. Switzerland possessed a right or interest
in the zones which could not be taken away without her
consent. Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles had not abrog-
ated the old treaties and consequently did not affect the right
‘which Switzerland enjoyed under them. Nor was she a party
to that Treaty and bound by its provisions as such. She had
been consulted as to the wording of Article 435, but only
acquiesced therein to the extent indicated in the note of the
Federal Council dated May 5th, 1919, annexed to the article.
That note made it clear that Switzerland was not then dis-
posed to acquiesce in the suppression of the zones. So long
as she refused to be a party to any new agreement settling
the status of these territories, paragraph 2 of Article 435
of the Treaty of Versailles could not be executed and the
zones would remain in existence.

The Swiss attitude subsequently underwent a modification.
The negotiations between her and France, of which the notes
annexed to Article 435 formed part, culminated in 1921 in
the conclusion of a convention, and by this convention the
Swiss Government agreed to the suppression of the zones.

As this convention was rejected by the Swiss people and
therefore never went into effect, it has no bearing on the legal
situation, but it is important to observe that the third para-
graph of the Preamble of the convention shows that the
Parties regarded themselves, when concluding the conven-
tion which suppressed the zones, as concluding the agree-
ment provided for in Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty
of Versailles. |

It was after the failure of this convention that France pro-
ceeded to act upon the view which she held of the legal
situation. Believing that the effect of Article 435 was to
DISSENTING OPINION 24

abrogate the treaties of 1813 and the other acts establishing
the zones, she moved her customs line to the political frontier,
thereby suppressing the zones by a unilateral act. The conclu-
sion reached by the Court in the recitals of the Order of
August 19th, 1929, shows that this act of the French Govern-
ment was without legal justification and that, in dealing with
the dispute, the Court must leave out of account any conse-
quences which havé resulted from it.

The ensuing tension between the two Governments produced
a situation from which arbitration afforded the only means
of escape, and it was by virtue of the Special Agreement which
was in due course concluded that the Court became seized
of the dispute, and it is the terms of that Special Agreement
which determine the extent to which the Parties have placed
themselves in the hands of the Court.

The task which the Special Agreement lays upon the Court
is that of deciding the legal point formulated in Article 1,
and then (in certain events which have sirce come to pass) of
settling all the questions involved in the execution of para-
graph 2 of Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles.

It is worth noting that the word ‘‘settle’ (in French:
régler), used in Article 2 of the Special Agreement, is the same
word as is used in paragraph 2 of Article 435, which says
that France and Switzerland are to settle the status of the
territories (ie. the zones) because the old treaties were out
of date, and in paragraph 2 of Article 1, which provides
that, after obtaining the Court’s opinion on the legal point
formulated in the first paragraph, the Parties are to have a
reasonable time to seftle the new régime in those districts.
As pointed out above, the Parties themselves, in their draft
convention of August 7th, 1921, have interpreted Article 435,
paragraph 2, as comprehending an agreement which would,
if it had come into force, have suppressed the zones, and it
has not been suggested that the Parties might not have come .
to a similar agreement in the negotiations provided for in
‘Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Special Agreement. It would
seem natural to conclude that the powers of the Court, when
settling every question involved by the execution of this
provision in the Treaty of Versailles, must be equally wide.
At any rate it would be necessary to find some good reason
DISSENTING OPINION 25

for excluding the natural conclusion to be drawn from the
use of the same word in these three provisions.

- It is contended that the powers of the Court cannot be so
wide as those of the Parties, because it would have been use-
less for the Parties to have asked for a determination by the
Court, under Article x1 of the Special Agreement, of the ques-
tion whether the old treaties and other acts which are the
basis of the Swiss rights have been abrogated, if the Court is
to be at liberty, in deciding the questions involved in the execu-
tion of Article 435, to set those rights aside. It is admitted
that Switzerland herself, in making the new agreement fore-
shadowed in Article 435, could agree to the suppression, but it
is urged that the powers of the Court under Article 2, para-
graph 1, of the Special Agreement, cannot be equally wide,
because the Court must respect the rights which it has itself
recognized.

This argument misunderstands both the economy of the
Special Agreement and the position between France and Switzer-
land at the time of its conclusion.

At the time when the agreement to bring the dispute before
the Court was concluded, France had taken action suppres-
sing the zones by unilateral action. She was upholding the
view that Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, with its
annexes, had abrogated the old treaties, which were the found-
ation of the Swiss right to the maintenance of the zones,
that this right had ceased to exist, and that she was therefore
justified in transferring her customs line to the political frontier,
whether an agreement was concluded with Switzerland or not.

It was to decide whether or not this view was correct that
the question formulated in Article r of the Special Agreement
was put to the Court.

What was contemplated in Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles was an agreement between France and Switzerland,
action in common by the two Parties, not singlehanded action
by one of them. It is the settlement of the questions arising
in the execution of what should have been an action of the
two Parties together, viz. the making of an agreement, that
is now entrusted to the Court by the two Powers through the
‘ Special Agreement. The fact that the recitals of the Order of
DISSENTING OPINION 26

1929 recognized the right of Switzerland to the maintenance
of the zones as against singlehanded action by France affords
no reason why the same rule must obtain when the Court is
fulfilling the task laid upon it on behalf of the Powers jointly.

It has also been contended that, in settling the questions
involved in the execution of Article 435, paragraph 2, ie.
the making of an agreement between France and Switzerland
as to the future of these territories, the Court cannot go
beyond the limits which Switzerland herself laid down, when
in her note of May 5th, 1919, annexed to Article 435, she
made it clear that she did not intend to agree to the suppres-
sion of the zones, but only to regulate in a manner more
appropriate to the economic conditions of the present day the
terms of the exchange of goods between the regions concerned.
This was the only undertaking which was binding on Switzer-
land, and constitutes therefore the only agreement which the .
Court can execute.

The answer to this contention is that what Switzerland, by
Article 2 of the Special Agreement, gave the Court power to
do, was to settle every question involved in the execution of
Article 435, paragraph 2. The Swiss intimation of willing-
ness to agree to a more appropriate regulation of the exchange
of goods between the territories concerned without suppressing
the zones is not found in Article 435, paragraph 2, but in
one of the annexes to that article. The Special Agreement
specifically mentions the annexes to Article 435 when it intends
them to be included. When it makes no mention of them, it
must therefore be inferred that they are not to be included.
Article 1 calls upon the Court to decide whether Article 435,
paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Versailles, with tts annexes,
has abrogated the treaties there enumerated. It was necessary
to refer to them because the Parties were called upon sub-
sequently to negotiate, but this necessity disappeared as soon
as Article 2 of the Special Agreement came into play, that is
to say, as soon as the Court was called to settle the details
of the régime. Hence Article 2 makes no mention of the
annexes, and no sound principle of judicial interpretation
justifies the Court in reading the words “‘with its annexes”
into Article 2 when they are not there. |
DISSENTING OPINION 27

. An additional objection to the contention that what Art-
icle 435, paragraph 2, had in view was an agreement between
France and Switzerland with regard to the exchange of goods
between Switzerland and the zones, is that such a stipulation
in the Treaty of Versailles was quite unnecessary. France
and Switzerland had always before 1919 regulated the exchange
of goods between Switzerland and the zones in bilateral agree-
ments, and these ,they were at liberty to abrogate, revise or
renew as they pleased. No authorization from other Powers
was necessary to enable them to do so.

The reason’ why paragraph 2 of Article 435 of the Treaty
of Versailles declared that it was for France and Switzerland.
to come to an agreement about the “status of the territories’
was that this status was established by instruments which
formed part of the great European settlement after the Napo-
leonic wars. In that settlement all the great Powers of Europe
had been concerned, and it was not for France alone, or for
France and Switzerland alone, to vary the settlement so far
as regards the existence of the zones.

Confirmation of this view is to be found in the fact that,
after the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, Spain and
Sweden, who were parties to the settlement of 1815 but not
parties to the Treaty of Versailles, were asked to agree to the
stipulations of Article 435. Their adhesion is recorded in the
Preamble to the Convention of August 7th, 1921. Nothing
could show more clearly that what this paragraph in the
Treaty of Versailles had in mind was some agreement which
might involve a modification in the settlement of 1815, and
nothing in that settlement related to the zones except the
provisions which brought them into being, viz. the withdrawal
of the customs line from the political frontier.

The parties to the present opinion can see no sound reason
why the liberty enjoyed by the Court in settling every ques-
tion involved in the execution of Article 435, paragraph 2,
is more restricted than that which the Parties themselves
would have enjoyed in determining the effect of “‘present condi-
tions” upon the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and 1816.
If that proposition is correct, it follows that the Court is not

4
_DISSENTING OPINION 28

prevented, in carrying out its task under Article 2, paragraph 1,
of the Special Agreement, from placing the French customs
line at the political frontier, if satisfied that this would be the
régime most in conformity with present day requirements.

It is a mistake to suppose that the advantages which Switzer-
land has enjoyed under the régime of the zones would not
be safeguarded if the Court should ultimately be led to the
conclusion that the wisest solution of the problem would be
to place the French customs line at the political frontier.

What Article 435, paragraph 2, provided for was an agreement
between France and Switzerland, ‘‘under such conditions as’
shall be considered suitable by both countries”. Manifestly it
would therefore be the duty of the Court under Article 2
of the Special Agreement to see that the arrangement was so
framed as not to prejudice the interests of Switzerland.

So many diverse elements, however, would have to be taken into
account in settling the régime of the territories, that it is
most desirable that the Parties should come to an agreement
upon the question, after negotiations directed to the satisfaction
of the real interests of every kind concerned, and not merely
to the perpetuation of rights without reference to the question
whether they are in harmony with present conditions.

(Signed) D. G. NYHOLM.
{ ,, ) RAFAEL ALTAMIRA.

( , ) C. J. B. Hurst.

( ,, ) Micx. P. YovanovITou.
( ) DEMETRE NEGULESCO.
( )

D
EUGÈNE DREYFUS.


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE ANGLO-NORVÉGIENNE
DES PÉCHERIES

ORDONNANCE DU 10 JANVIER 1951

1951

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

ANGLO-NORWEGIAN
FISHERIES CASE

ORDER OF JANUARY 10th, 1951

SOCIETE D’EDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF’S

LEYDE LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire anglo-norvégienne des pêcheries, Ordonnance du
10 janvier 1957: C.I. J. Recueil 1951, p. 8. »

This Order should be cited. as follows :

“Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, Order of January roth, 1951:
I. C. J. Reports 1951, p. 8.”

N° de vente: 55
Sales number

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1957 ANNÉE 1951

Le ro janvier
Rôle général
n° 5 Ordonnance du ro janvier 1951

AFFAIRE ANGLO-NORVÉGIENNE
DES PECHERIES

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,
vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour,
vu l’article 37 du Règlement de la Cour,

vu l’Ordonnance du g novembre 1949 par laquelle le Président
en exercice de la Cour a fixé les délais pour la présentation des
pièces de la procédure écrite dans l'affaire anglo-norvégienne des
pêcheries,

vu les Ordonnances du 29 mars et du 4 octobre 1950, par les-
quelles la Cour a prorogé les délais précités ;

Considérant que, par lettre du 14 décembre 1950, l'agent du
Gouvernement de Norvège a sollicité la prorogation jusqu’au
30 avril 1951 du délai imparti pour la présentation de la Duplique
du Gouvernement norvégien et fixé au 31 janvier 1951 par l’Ordon-
nance du 4 octobre 1950 ;

Considérant que dans cette lettre du 14 décembre 1950 l'agent
du Gouvernement de Norvège rappelle que, par lettre du 29 septem-
bre 1950, il a consenti à la prorogation du délai imparti pour la
présentation de la Réplique du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni,
tout en se réservant le droit, après avoir pris connaissance de cette
Réplique, de solliciter une prorogation du délai fixé pour la présen-
tation de la Duplique du Gouvernement norvégien ;

Considérant que dans cette lettre du 14 décembre 1950 l'agent

du Gouvernement norvégien fait valoir diverses considérations à
Vappui de sa demande ;

Considérant que la demande de l’agent du Gouvernement norvé-
gien ayant été communiquée, par lettre du 18 décembre 1950, à
l'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, celui-ci, par lettre du

4
9 ORDONN. DU I0 I 5I (AFFAIRE DES PECHERIES)

4 janvier 1951, a fait valoir diverses considérations qui l’ont conduit
à s’opposer à cette demande, tout en ajoutant qu'il ne se serait pas
opposé à une prolongation d’un mois ou de six semaines ;

Considérant la nature de l'affaire dont la solution, d’une part, est
susceptible d’affecter de manière durable le statut territorial de la
Norvège, et, d'autre part, s’il vient à être reconnu qu’un empéche-
ment temporaire a été injustement mis à l'exercice de leurs droits
par les pêcheurs britanniques, peut donner lieu à un redressement de
la situation par voie de réparation du préjudice causé ;

Considérant qu’en des affaires analogues, affectant le statut
territorial des États, des délais correspondant à celui actuellement
sollicité ont été parfois accordés ;

Considérant l'ampleur de la Réplique présentée au nom du
Royaume-Uni et l'importance des cartes qui y sont jointes et du
commentaire que ladite Réplique donne de ces cartes ;

Considérant qu’à réduire le délai demandé pour se rapprocher du
désir du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de voir la présente affaire
terminée avant l’ouverture de la prochaine saison de pêche, on ne
saurait assurer ce résultat en raison, d’une part, du fait que d’autres
affaires doivent précéder celle-ci à l’audience de la Cour, d’autre
part, du risque ainsi ouvert de lacunes dans la procédure écrite,
entrainant comme conséquence une prolongation des plaidoiries,
alors qu’il est, au contraire, souhaitable que, sans reprendre ce que
les-écritures auront suffisamment élucidé, les plaidoiries se limitent
à ce qui paraîtra alors essentiel pour l’exposé et la défense des thèses
en présence,

Décide
de proroger au 30 avril 1951 le délai fixé par l’Ordonnance du

4 octobre 1950 pour la présentation de la Duplique du Gouverne-
ment norvégien.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix à La Haye, le dix janvier mil neuf cent cinquante-
et-un, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de
la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouver-
nement du Royaume-Uni et au Gouvernement du Royaume de
Norvège.

Le Président de la Cour,
(Signé) BASDEVANT.

Le Greffier de la Cour,
(Signé) E. HAMBRO.


66

OBSERVATIONS BY M. RABEL.

Whilst in general agreement with the judgment delivered
by the Court, I find myself, to my regret, compelled to
disagree with it in regard to some points, one of which I
feel it my duty to deal with below (No. II). Before doing so, I
wish briefly to explain my point of view in accepting the solu-
tion adopted by the Court in regard to the main question concern-
ing the fixing of the indemnity due by the Respondent (No. I).

I.—In Chapter III, the judgment begins by saying that if
the expropriation effected by the Polish Government had been
lawful, the compensation due by it therefore should correspond
to the value of the undertaking at the time of dispossession,
plus interest on this sum to the date of payment. The
judgment goes on to say that this limitation of the compen-
sation is not admissible in the present case because the Polish
Government had no right of expropriation and that, conse-
quently, the German Government is entitled to be compensated
for all the losses suffered by its nationals as a result of the
seizure of the undertaking.

Being convinced of the justice of these arguments, I have
accepted them, believing that the principles resulting from the
unlawful nature of the expropriation, which principles are
subsequently set out in the judgment, are applicable in prac-
tice whenever the damage caused appears greater than the
compensation which would be due if expropriation had been
lawful, as may be the case in the present suit.

It is in fact obvious that the expropriator’s responsibility
must be increased by the fact that his action is unlawful.
Nevertheless, it is in my opinion also obvious that the unlaw-
ful character of his action can never place the expropriator
in a more favourable position, nor the expropriated Party in
a more unfavourable position, either by reducing the indemnity
due or by increasing the burden. of proof resting upon the
Applicant. This point of view, with which the Court in its
judgment has not thought fit expressly to deal, appears to
me to be in accordance with the general principles of law.
JUDGMENT No. I3.—OBSERVATIONS BY M. RABEL 67

Tt corresponds to the notion which has been very clearly
established, for instance in the application of German civil
law, namely that the fact that an act is of an unlawful
character—in the same way as if it were of a deceptive or
defective character—though in principle aggravating the
consequences of the act, nevertheless leaves intact, in favour
of the injured Party, and to be asserted by him should he
choose to do so, the rights to. which the act would have
given rise if it had been lawful or less culpable.

It appears to me therefore that the obligation resulting
from an unlawful seizure may be simply expressed as follows:
A government which has expropriated an object—with no
tight to do so—is obliged to pay the value of the object at
the moment of dispossession plus interest on this value, and
it is also responsible for damage caused in so far as such
damage exceeds the amount mentioned above. |

The questions put by the Court to the experts meet this
view, though, in my opinion, they are not in all points
necessary or expedient.

IJ.—I cannot concur in the Court’s decision in regard to
the so-called question of set-off.

1. This question first arose in a note of the Polish Govern-
ment of February ist, 1927, to the effect that that Govern-
ment had claims against Germany in respect of various
amounts, one of which, arising out of social insurances in Upper
Silesia, had been fixed by an award of the League of Nations
at 25 million Reichsmarks. In these circumstances, it contended
that the respective claims should be set off against each other.
It is to be observed that this statement related to the note
and aide-mémoire of the German Government, dated Jan-
uary roth, 1927, which “in regard to the question of the method
of payment, which tended more and more to become the main
question”, demanded “in principle a full and immediate pay-
ment” and proposed, as regards some portions of the payment,
the delivery of bills of exchange. :

As will be seen, the Polish Government, in asserting its
- right to set-off, did not specify the claims in question, except
the claim arising out of social insurance in Upper Silesia. Now
the Arbitral Tribunal of Interpretation, established between

9
JUDGMENT No. I3.—OBSERVATIONS BY M. RABEL 68

the Reparation Commission and Germany to hear disputes
concerning the so-called Dawes Plan, gave, on March 24th, 1926,
a decision having the force of ves judicata as between Germany
and Poland, to the effect that the payment of the 25 millions
referred to is included in the annuities which, under the Dawes
Plan, Germany has to pay to the Agent-General for Repara-
tion Payments. As these annuities consist of fixed sums, the
Polish Government’s contention was therefore designed to make
the German Government—contrarily to the award of the Arbi-
tral Tribunal of Interpretation—bear the burden of this claim,
by causing it to lose the indemnity due for the dispossession
of the Oberschlesische, which had been established by another
international judgment, namely the Court’s Judgment No. 7.

2. In the course of the proceedings leading up to Judgment
No. 8, as well as those leading up to the present judgment, in
spite of the invitations of the Applicant on the subject and
notwithstanding the exhaustive statements made by both
Parties.on the question of set-off, the Polish Government has
neither put forward specific claims to which it is entitled, nor said
that it would not maintain its submission that judicial or extra-
judicial set-off against the future judgment should be allowed.

The German Government in the course of the proceedings
has several times pressed that the Court should decide this
question which, being the real cause of the breakdown of the
diplomatic negotiations, is, in its opinion, a question of vital
importance in this suit, and that, unless it were decided, the.
dispute concerning the Chorzôw factory would not really be
completely adjusted. :

3. The Court considers that it has not jurisdiction to pass
upon this difference of opinion under Article 23 of the Geneva
Convention.

It should be observed that the terms of the judgment which
dismisses the German claim in regard to the question of set-off
in so far as they are based on the said opinion, do not seem
to me to have any bearing on claims directly seeking judgment
for an actual payment in money. For the Court, having
decided in its judgment that the said Article 23 of the Geneva
Convention gives it jurisdiction to determine the form and
JUDGMENT No. I3.—-OBSERVATIONS BY M. RABEL 69

method of the reparation due, seems undoubtedly to cover,
in this definition of its jurisdiction the question whether, in
this case, a money indemnity should be actually paid in
money or in other values.

4. The judgment deals rather with the abstract question
raised by the Applicant as to whether and under what con-
ditions a respondent condemned by a judgment of the Court
to pay a certain sum, may put forward a counter-claim to be
set off against this obligation. This question also seems to me
to enter into the present proceedings and not to relate to a
point necessarily distinct from them, such as should only be
taken at a subsequent stage.

A judgment imposing a penalty creates an obligation and
lays down in what that obligation consists. In a system of
municipal law, the judge may and should confine himself to
certain observations and technical points, which observations
may be read in the light of relevant municipal legislation.
. Thus municipal law will define what is meant by a payment
which the defendent is ordered to make and in particular
whether and under what conditions the setting-off of a counter-
claim is equivalent to payment in money of the judgment debt.
If, on the other hand, in an international case, the Parties
are at issue as to the action to be taken by the defendent
in complying with the judgment, it appears to me that the
nature of this action must be defined in the judgment in
order to avoid any possible uncertainty.

As regards the other conditions necessary for the granting of
the claim in question, I will merely point out that in my
opinion they also are fulfilled in the present case.

(Signed) E. RABEL.