SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

I write this separate opinion, firstly, because I am unable to agree with
the Court’s treatment of the issue of jurisdiction (para. 44). Not only was
the Court’s jurisdiction contested by Turkey but the Court was in my
view under an obligation to consider the issue proprio motu and make
clear its provisional views thereon, notwithstanding the negative answer
it felt bound to give the request for interim measures.

Secondly, and this is for me a subject of serious preoccupation, I
have some doubts with regard to the manner in which the Court has
disposed of that request. Greece applied simultaneously to the Court and
the Security Council, thus seeking both legal and political relief. The
Court is called upon to pronounce after a period of negotiations. The
Order it has made appears after a resolution in which the Security
Council has urged Greece and Turkey to “do everything in their power to
reduce the present tensions in the area, so that the negotiating process
may be facilitated’’, and called upon the two States “to resume direct
negotiations over their differences”. Thus further negotiations may now
ensue. This is the general background against which the Court has to
consider the request, and which lends the case a specific and most unusual
character. The time of seisin of the Court is never of its own choice, but
lies in the hands of applicants. It sometimes falls in a twilight zone as
regards the situations either of fact or of law.

Emphasis has been placed by the Court on the strict interpretation of
the wording of the Greek request. But this, to my mind, should have been
viewed as just one among several possible responses to the provisions of
Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, according to which “the
request shall specify...the rights to be protected, and the interim
measures of which the indication is proposed”. In fact, the same Article of
the Rules reveals how it is the situation concerning the dispute as a whole
with which the Court is expected to concern itself.

In general, it is true, the Court must take a restrictive view of its powers
in dealing with a request for interim measures. Such proceedings may not
be the best framework for the enunciation by the Court of such judicial
opinions as it has been ready to articulate in many a final decision. Yet
even if the Court had to reach the present negative decision, I feel that a
positive contribution to the solution of the dispute in question was still a
possibility.

20
20 AEGEAN SEA (SEP. OP. LACHS)

This brings me to a wider issue. The Court does not, to my way of
thinking, arrogate any powers excluded by its Statute when, otherwise
than by adjudication, it assists, facilitates or contributes to the peaceful
settlement of disputes between States, if offered the occasion at any stage
of the proceedings.

On one occasion the Permanent Court observed:

**_, . the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to
which the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to the
direct and friendly settlement of such dispute between the Parties;
... consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compa-
tible with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement” (P.C.LJ.,
Series A, No. 22, p. 13).

On another occasion, while unable to find on a submission said to lie
outside the scope of the proceedings, the Court found it possible to stress
at the end of its reasoning the great desirability of a negotiated settlement
(P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 178). A fortiori the present Court, whose
Statute is much more intimately bound up with the United Nations
Charter than that of its predecessor with the Covenant of the League,
should the more readily seize the opportunity of reminding the member
States concerned in a dispute referred to it of certain obligations deriving
from general international law or flowing from the Charter. In the present
instance some of these obligations have been mirrored in the Security
Council’s resolution of 25 August 1976.

The Court has given due prominence to this resolution in the reasoning
of the Order.

There was in my view no statutory bar to its spelling out the legal
consequences of the Security Council’s resolution and the official state-
ments of the representatives of the two States. The pronouncements of the
Council did not dispense the Court, an independent judicial organ, from
expressing its own view on the serious situation in the disputed area.

While it would not be proper specifically to advise Greece and Turkey
“as to the various courses” they should follow (.C.J. Reports 1951,
p. 83), the Court, acting proprio motu, should, even while not indicating
interim measures, have laid greater stress on, in particular, the need for
restraint on the part of both States and the possible consequences of any
deterioration or extension of the conflict. In going further than it has, the
Court, with all the weight of its judicial office, could have made its own
constructive, albeit indirect, contribution, helping to pave the way to the
friendly resolution of a dangerous dispute. This would have been con-
sonant with a basic role of the Court within the international community.

(Signed) Manfred LAcus.

21


208 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DECL. DILLARD)

They were committed pendente lite despite the obligations assumed by
Iceland in the Exchange of Notes of 1961 which the Court had declared
to be a treaty in force. That their unlawful character engaged the
international responsibility of Iceland is also clear. In the Phosphates in
Morocco case (P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 28) the Court linked the
creation of international responsibility with the existence of an “‘act being
attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of
another State”. It is hardly necessary to marshal authority for so
elementary a proposition. It follows that, in effect, the Court was merely
asked to indicate the unlawful character of the acts and to take note of
the consequential liability of Iceland to make reparation. It was not
asked to assess damages.

The Court recognized this point in paragraph 74 of the Judgment but
instead of stressing the limited nature of the submission it preferred to
attribute to it a more extensive character. As indicated above, its inter-
pretation led naturally to the conclusion that it could not accede to the
submission in the absence of detailed evidence bearing on each concrete
claim. While conceding the force of the Court’s reasoning, I would have
preferred the more restrictive interpretation.

I wish to add that on this matter I associate myself with the views
expressed by Judge Sir Humphrey Waldock in his separate opinion.

Judge IGNACIO-PINTO makes the following declaration:

To my regret, I have been obliged to vote against the Court’s Judgment.
However, to my mind my negative vote does not, strictly speaking, signify
opposition, since in a different context I would certainly have voted in
favour of the process which the Court considered it should follow to
arrive at its decision. In my view that decision is devoted to fixing the
conditions for exercise of preferential rights, for conservation of fish
species, and historic rights, rather than to responding to the primary claim
of the Appiicant, which is for a statement of the law on a specific point.

I would have all the more willingly endorsed the concept of preferential
rights inasmuch as the Court has merely followed its own decision in the
Fisheries case.

It should be observed that the Applicant has nowhere sought a decision
from the Court on a dispute between itself and Iceland on the subject of
the preferential rights of the coastal State, the conservation of fish
species, or historic rights—this is apparent throughout the elaborate
reasoning of the Judgment. It is obvious that considerations relating to
these various needs, dealt with at length in the Judgment, are not subject
to any dispute between the Parties. There is no doubt that, after setting

37
209 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DECL. IGNACIO-PINTO)

out the facts and the grounds relied on in support of its case, the Applicant
has asked the Court only for a decision on the dispute between itself and
Iceland, and to adjudge and declare:

“That the unilateral extension by Iceland of its zone of exclusive
fisheries jurisdiction to 50 nautical miles from the present baselines,
... has, as against the Federal Republic of Germany, no basis in
international law . . .”’ (Judgment, para. 12 (1)).

This is clear and precise, and all the other points in the submissions
are only ancillary or consequential to this primary claim. But in response
to this basic claim, which was extensively argued by the Applicant both
in its Memorial and orally, and which was retained in its final sub-
missions, the Court, by means of a line of reasoning which it has
endeavoured at some length to justify, has finally failed to give any
positive answer.

The Court has deliberately evaded the question which was placed
squarely before it in this case, namely whether Iceland’s claims are in
accordance with the rules of international law. Having put this question
on one side, it constructs a whole system of reasoning in order ultimately
to declare that the Regulations issued by the Government of Iceland
on 14 July 1972 and ‘‘constituting a unilateral extension of the exclusive
fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautica! miles from the baselines specified
therein are not opposable to the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany”.

In my view, the whole problem turns on this, since this claim is based
upon facts which, at least under present-day law and in the practice of
the majority of States, are flagrant violations of existing international
conventions. It should be noted that Iceland does not deny them. Now
the facts complained of are evident, they undoubtedly relate to the
treaty which binds the States which are Parties, for the Exchange of Notes
of 19 July 1961 amounts to such an instrument. For the Court to consider
after having dealt with the Applicant’s fundamental claim in relation to
international law, that account should be taken of Iceland’s exceptional
situation and the vital interests of its population, with a view to drawing
inspiration from equity and to devising a solution for the dispute, would
have been the normal course to be followed, the more so since the Appli-
cant supports it in its final submissions. But it cannot be admitted that
because of its special situation Iceland can ipso facto be exempted from
the obligation to respect the international commitments into which it has
entered. By not giving an unequivocal answer on that principal claim, the
Court has failed to perform the act of justice requested of it.

For what is one to say of the actions and behaviour of Iceland which
have resulted in its being called upon to appear before the Court? Its
refusal to respect the commitment it accepted in the Exchange of Notes of
19 July 1961, to refer to the International Court of Justice any dispute
which might arise on an extension of its exclusive fisheries zone, which

38
210 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DECL. IGNACIO-PINTO)

was in fact foreseen by the Parties, beyond 12 nautical miles, is not this
unjustified refusal a breach of international law?

In the same way, when—contrary to what is generally recognized by
the majority of States in the 1958 Geneva Convention, in Article 2, where
it is clearly specified that there is a zone of high seas which is res com-
munis—Iceland unilaterally decides, by means of its Regulations of 14
July 1972, to extend its exclusive jurisdiction from 12 to 50 nautical miles
from the baselines, does it not in this way also commit a breach of inter-
national law? Thus the Court would in no way be open to criticism if it
upheld the claim as well founded.

For my part, I believe that the Court would certainly have strengthened
its judicial authority if it had given a positive reply to the claim laid
before it by the Federal Republic of Germany, instead of embarking on
the construction of a thesis on preferential rights, zones of conservation of
fish species, or historic rights, on which there has never been any dispute,
nor even the slightest shadow of a controversy on the part either of the
Applicant or of the Respondent.

Furthermore, it causes me some concern also that the majority of the
Court seems to have adopted the position which is apparent in the present
Judgment with the intention of pointing the way for the participants in
the Conference on the Law of the Sea now sitting in Caracas.

The Court here gives the impression of being anxious to indicate the
principles on the basis of which it would be desirable that a general inter-
national regulation of rights of fishing should be adopted.

I do not discount the value of the reasons which guided the thinking
of the majority of the Court, and the Court was right to take account of
the special situation of Iceland and its inhabitants, which is deserving of
being treated with special concern. In this connection, the same treatment
should be contemplated for all developing countries in the same position,
which cherish the hope of seeing all these fisheries problems settled, since
it is at present such countries which suffer from the anarchy and lack of
organization of international fishing. But that is not the question which
has been laid before the Court, and the reply given can only be described
as evasive.

In taking this viewpoint I am not unaware of the risk that I may be
accused of not being in tune with the modern trend for the Court to
arrogate a creative power which does not pertain to it under either the
United Nations Charter or its Statute. Perhaps some might even say that
the classic conception of international law to which J declare allegiance
is out-dated; but for myself, 1 do not fear to continue to respect the
classic norms of that law. Perhaps from the Third Conference on the
Law of the Sea some positive principles accepted by all States will emerge.
I hope that this will be so, and shall be the first to applaud—and further-
more I shall be pleased to see the good use to which they can be put, in
particular for the benefit of the developing countries. But since 1 am
above all faithful to judicial practice, 1 continue fervently to urge the

39
211 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DECL. IGNACIO-PINTO)

need for the Court to confine itself to its obligation to state the law as
it is at present in relation to the facts of the case brought before it.

I consider it entirely proper that, in international law as in every other
system of law, the existing law should be questioned from time to time
—this is the surest way of furthering its progressive development—but
it cannot be concluded from this that the Court should, for this reason
and on the occasion of the present dispute between Iceland and the
Federal Republic of Germany emerge as the begetter of certain ideas
which are more and more current today, and are even shared by a
respectable number of States, with regard to the law of the sea, and which
are in the minds, it would seem, of most of those attending the Conference
now sitting in Caracas. It is advisable, in my opinion, to avoid entering
upon anything which would anticipate a settlement of problems of the
kind implicit in preferential and other rights.

To conclude this declaration, I think I may draw inspiration from the
conclusion expressed by the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations
Sea-Bed Committee, Mr. Jean-Pierre Lévy, in the hope that the idea it
expresses may be an inspiration to States, and Iceland in particular
which, while refraining from following the course of law, prefers to
await from political gatherings a justification of its rights.

I agree with Mr. Jean-Pierre Lévy in thinking that:

“|... it is to be hoped that States will make use of the next four or
five years to endeavour to prove to themselves and particularly to
their nationals that the general interest of the international community
and the well-being of the peoples of the world can be preserved by
moderation, mutual understanding, and the spirit of compromise;
only these will enable the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea
to be held and to succeed in codifying a new legal order for the sea
and its resources” (‘La troisième Conférence sur le droit de la mer”,
Annuaire français de droit international, 1971, p. 828).

In the expectation of the opening of the new era which is so much
hoped for, | am honoured at finding myself in agreement with certain
Members of the Court like Judges Gros, Petrén and Onyeama for whom
the golden rule for the Court is that, in such a case, it should confine
itself strictly within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on it.

Judge NAGENDRA SINGH makes the following declaration:

There are certain valid reasons which weigh with me to the extent that
they enable me to support the Judgment of the Court in this case and

40


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

DEMANDE EN INTERPRETATION
DE L’ARRET DU 11 JUIN 1998 EN L’AFFAIRE
DE LA FRONTIERE TERRESTRE ET MARITIME
ENTRE LE CAMEROUN ET LE NIGERIA
(CAMEROUN c. NIGERIA),
EXCEPTIONS PRELIMINAIRES

(NIGERIA c. CAMEROUN)

ARRET DU 25 MARS 1999

1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE
JUDGMENT OF 11 JUNE 1998 IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE LAND AND MARITIME
BOUNDARY BETWEEN CAMEROON AND
NIGERIA (CAMEROON v. NIGERIA),
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

(NIGERIA r. CAMEROON)

JUDGMENT OF 25 MARCH 1999
Mode officiel de citation:

Demande en interprétation de l'arrêt du 11 juin 1998 en l'affaire de la

Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Came-

roun c. Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires { Nigéria c. Cameroun), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 31

Official citation:

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case

concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and

Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v.
Cameroon), Judgment, C.J. Reports 1999, p. 31

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 723

ISBN 92-1-070792-3

25 MARS 1999

ARRET

DEMANDE EN INTERPRETATION DE L’ARRET
DU 1] JUIN 1998 EN L'AFFAIRE DE LA FRONTIÈRE
TERRESTRE ET MARITIME ENTRE LE CAMEROUN

ET LE NIGERIA (CAMEROUN c. NIGERIA),
EXCEPTIONS PRELIMINAIRES

(NIGERIA c. CAMEROUN)

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF I! JUNE 1998 IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY
BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA
(CAMEROON v. NIGERIA), PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

(NIGERIA v. CAMEROON)

25 MARCH 1999

JUDGMENT
31

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1999 1999
25 March
General List
25 March 1999 No. 101

REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE
JUDGMENT OF 11 JUNE 1998 IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE LAND AND MARITIME
BOUNDARY BETWEEN CAMEROON AND
NIGERIA (CAMEROON vy. NIGERIA),
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

(NIGERIA vy. CAMEROON)

Article 60 of the Statute — Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a request
for interpretation of a judgment on preliminary objections — Request can relate
only to the operative part of the judgment and to reasons inseparable therefrom.

Admissibility of the request for interpretation:

Need to avoid impairing the finality of the judgment to be interpreted or
delaying implementation thereof — Primacy of the principle of res judicata.

Judgment of 11 June 1998 — Rejection of Nigeria's sixth preliminary objec-
tion — Question of the conditions for admissibility of an application at the time
of its introduction, and the question of the admissibility of the presentation of
additional facts and legal grounds — Principle that the freedom to present addi-
tional facts and legal considerations not included in the application is subject to
the limitation that the dispute must not be transformed — Finding that Cam-
eroon had not so transformed the dispute — Additional “incidents” and addi-
tional “facts” — Principle of audi alteram partem.

Submissions of the request already considered and rejected in the Judgment of
11 June 1998 — Submissions seeking to remove from the Court's consideration
elements of fact and law the presentation of which has already been authorized
by that Judgment, or which have not yet been put forward.

Costs — Articles 64 of the Statute and 97 of the Rules — General rule that
each party shall bear its own costs.
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 32

JUDGMENT

Present: President SCHWEBEL; Vice-President WEERAMANTRY; Judges Opa,
BEDJAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA, HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER,
KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN, HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOIJMANS;
Judges ad hoc MBAYE, AnBoLa; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

In the case concerning the request for interpretation of the Judgment of
11 June 1998,

between

the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim, SAN, OFR, Honourable Attorney-
General of the Federation and Minister of Justice,

as Agent,
and

the Republic of Cameroon,
represented by

H.E. Mr. Laurent Esso, Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals,

as Agent;

Mr. Maurice Kamto, Professor at the University of Yaoundé IT, Member of
the Paris Bar,

Mr. Peter Ntamark, Professor of Law at the Faculty of Laws and Political
Science, University of Yaoundé I], Barrister-at-Law, member of the Inner
Temple,

as Co-Agents;

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre and at
the Institut d’études politiques, Paris,

as Deputy-Agent,

THE Court,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 28 October 1998, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
(hereinafter called “Nigeria”) filed in the Registry of the Court an Application
instituting proceedings dated 21 October 1998, whereby, referring to Article 98
of the Rules of Court, it requested the Court to interpret the Judgment
delivered by the Court on 11 June 1998 in the case concerning the Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria),
Preliminary Objections.
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 33

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
forthwith communicated to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon
(hereinafter called “Cameroon”) by the Deputy-Registrar. At the same time,
the Parties were informed that the senior judge, acting pursuant to Articles 13,
paragraph 3, and 98, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, had fixed 3 December
1998 as the time-limit for Cameroon to submit its written observations on
Nigeria’s request for interpretation.

3. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute, all States entitled to
appear before the Court were informed of the Application.

4. On 13 November 1998, within the time-limit fixed, the Government of
Cameroon filed in the Registry its written observations on the Nigerian request.

5. In light of the dossier thus submitted to it, the Court, considering that it
had sufficient information on the positions of the Parties, did not deem it
necessary to invite them “to furnish further written or oral explanations”, as
Article 98, paragraph 4, of the Rules allows it to do.

6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
the Parties, each of them availed itself of the right conferred by Article 31, para-
graph 3. of the Statute to proceed to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case:
Nigeria chose Mr. Bola Ajibola and Cameroon Mr. Kéba Mbaye.

%

7. In the course of the proceedings the Parties presented the following sub-
missions :

On behalf of Nigeria:
in the Application:

“On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Nigeria requests the
Court to adjudge and declare that the Court’s Judgment of 11 June 1998 is
to be interpreted as meaning that:

so far as concerns the international responsibility which Nigeria is said
to bear for certain alleged incidents:

fa) the dispute before the Court does not include any alleged incidents
other than (at most) those specified in Cameroon’s Application of
29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994;

(b} Cameroon’s freedom to present additional facts and legal consid-
erations relates (at most) only to those specified in Cameroon’s
Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of
6 June 1994; and

(c} the question whether facts alleged by Cameroon are established or
not relates (at most) only to those specified in Cameroon’s Applica-
tion of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of 6 June 1994.”

On behalf of Cameroon:
in the written observations:
“On these grounds,

Having regard to the request for interpretation submitted by the Federal
Republic of Nigeria dated 21 October 1998, the Republic of Cameroon
makes the following submissions:
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 34

1. The Republic of Cameroon leaves it to the Court to decide whether it
has jurisdiction to rule on a request for interpretation of a decision handed
down following incidental proceedings and, in particular, with regard to a
judgment concerning the preliminary objections raised by the defending
Party;

2. The Republic of Cameroon requests the Court:

— Primarily:

To declare the request by the Federal Republic of Nigeria inadmissible;
to adjudge and declare that there is no reason to interpret the Judgment of
11 June 1998;

— Alternatively:

To adjudge and declare that the Republic of Cameroon is entitled to
rely on all facts, irrespective of their date, that go to establish the continu-
ing violation by Nigeria of its international obligations; that the Republic
of Cameroon may also rely on such facts to enable an assessment to be
made of the damage it has suffered and the adequate reparation that is due
to it.”

x * x

8. The Court will first address the question of its jurisdiction over the
request for interpretation submitted by Nigeria. Nigeria states that, in the
case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria, Cameroon alleged that Nigeria bore international responsi-
bility “for certain incidents said to have occurred at various places at
Bakassi and Lake Chad and along the length of the frontier between
those two regions”. Cameroon is also said to have “made allegations
involving a number of such incidents in its Application of 29 March
1994, its Additional Application of 6 June 1994, its Observations of
30 April 1996... and during the oral hearings held from 2 to 11 March
1998”. According to Nigeria, Cameroon had “also said that [it] would be
able to provide information as to other incidents on some unspecified
future occasion”. Nigeria contends that the Court’s Judgment of 11 June
1998 does not specify “which of these alleged incidents are to be consid-
ered further as part of the merits of the case”. Thus Nigeria maintains
that the Judgment “is unclear [as to] whether Cameroon was entitled at
various times, after the submission of its Amended Application, to bring
before the Court new incidents”.

Nigeria further emphasizes “the inadmissibility of treating as part of
the dispute brought before the Court by the Applications of March
and June 1994 alleged incidents occurring subsequently to June 1994”.
Cameroon, it is said, is entitled in this case to submit, in due course, only
“additional facts in amplification of incidents previously adverted to”: it
was not entitled to submit “entirely new and discrete incidents which are
made the subject of new claims of responsibility”. The Judgment of
11 June 1998 was accordingly to be interpreted as meaning “that so far as
concerns the international responsibility [of] Nigeria . . . the dispute

7
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 35

before the Court does not include any alleged incidents other than (at
most) those specified in [the] Application ... and Additional Application”.

9. For its part, Cameroon recalls in its written observations on
Nigeria’s request for interpretation that, in its Judgment of 11 June 1998,
the Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections of lack of jurisdic-
tion and inadmissibility raised by Nigeria and stated that, in the circum-
stances of the case, the eighth objection was not of an exclusively pre-
liminary character; in that Judgment, the Court further recognized that it
had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and found that the Appli-
cation filed by the Republic of Cameroon on 29 March 1994, as amended
by the Additional Application of 6 June 1994, was admissible. Cameroon
declares that the Parties “do not have to ‘apply’ such a judgment; they
only have to take note of it”. While leaving the question to the apprecia-
tion of the Court, it states that “there are very serious doubts about the
possibility of bringing a request for interpretation of a judgment concern-
ing preliminary objections”.

%

10. Article 60 of the Statute provides: “The judgment is final and
without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the
judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party.”
This provision is supplemented by Article 98 of the Rules of Court,
paragraph | of which provides: “In the event of dispute as to the mean-
ing or scope of a judgment any party may make a request for its interpre-
tation...”

By virtue of the second sentence of Article 60, the Court has jurisdic-
tion to entertain requests for interpretation of any judgment rendered by
it. This provision makes no distinction as to the type of judgment con-
cerned. It follows, therefore, that a judgment on preliminary objections,
just as well as a judgment on the merits, can be the object of a request for
interpretation. However,

“the second sentence of Article 60 was inserted in order, if necessary,
to enable the Court to make quite clear the points which had been
settled with binding force in a judgment, . . . a request which has not
that object does not come within the terms of this provision” (Inter-
pretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow), Judg-
ment No. 11, 1927, P.C.LJ., Series A, No. 13, p. 11).

In consequence, any request for interpretation must relate to the opera-
tive part of the judgment and cannot concern the reasons for the judg-
ment except in so far as these are inseparable from the operative part.
11. In the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria, Nigeria had put forward a sixth preliminary
objection “to the effect that there is no basis for a judicial determination

8
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 36

that Nigeria bears international responsibility for alleged frontier incur-
sions”. In its Judgment of 11 June, the Court summarized Nigeria’s posi-
tion on this point:

“Nigeria contends that the submissions of Cameroon do not meet
the standards required by Article 38 of the Rules of Court and
general principles of law regarding the adequate presentation of
facts... [W]hat Cameroon has presented to the Court does not give
Nigeria the knowledge which it needs . . . Similarly, in Nigeria’s
view, the material submitted is so sparse that it does not enable the
Court to carry out fair and effective judicial determination . .. While
Nigeria acknowledge[d] that a State has some latitude in expand-
ing later what it ha[d] said in its Application and in its Memorial,
Cameroon [was] said to be essentially restricted in its elaboration
to the case as presented in its Application.” (LC. J. Reports 1998,
p. 317, para. 96.)

In the operative part of its Judgment of 1! June 1998, the Court
“fr ejects the sixth preliminary objection”. The reasons for this are set
out in paragraphs 98 to 101 of the Judgment. These deal in detail with
Cameroon’s rights as regards the presentation of “facts and legal consid-
erations” that it might wish to put forward in support of its submissions
seeking a ruling against Nigeria (ibid., p. 318, para. 99). These reasons
are inseparable from the operative part of the Judgment and in this
regard the request therefore meets the conditions laid down by Article 60
of the Statute in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to entertain a
request for interpretation of a judgment.

* *

12. The Court will now examine the admissibility of the request of
Nigeria. The question of the admissibility of requests for interpretation
of the Court’s judgments needs particular attention because of the need
to avoid impairing the finality, and delaying the implementation, of these
judgments. It is not without reason that Article 60 of the Statute lays
down, in the first place, that judgments are “final and without appeal”.
Thereafter, the Article provides that in the case of a “dispute as to the
meaning or scope of the judgment”, it shall be construed by the Court
upon the request of any party. The language and structure of Article 60
reflect the primacy of the principle of res judicata. That principle must be
maintained. The Court adheres to what it has previously held, namely
that

“[tlhe real purpose of the request must be to obtain an interpretation
of the judgment. This signifies that its object must be solely to obtain
clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has
decided with binding force, and not to obtain an answer to questions
not so decided. Any other construction of Article 60 of the Statute

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REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 37

would nullify the provision of the article that the judgment is final
and without appeal.” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1950, p. 402.)

In its Judgment on the Application for Revision and Interpretation of the
Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) { Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya), the Court similarly held that

“[it is however a condition of admissibility of a request for interpre-
tation . .. that the real purpose of the request be to obtain an inter-
pretation — a clarification of that meaning and scope (1. C.J. Reports
1985, p. 223, para. 56)”.

13. In the present case, the Court would initially recall what were
Cameroon’s submissions with regard to the alleged frontier incidents in
the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria. In its Application as amended by its Additional Applica-
tion, Cameroon complained in 1994 “of grave and repeated incursions of
Nigerian groups and armed forces into Cameroonian territory all along
the frontier between the two countries”. It further requested the Court to
adjudge that the “internationally unlawful acts” alleged to have occurred
in the Bakassi and Lake Chad regions involve the responsibility of
Nigeria.

In its Memorial of 16 March 1995, Cameroon developed these submis-
sions by emphasizing that, as a result of the “internationally unlawful
acts” set out in pages 561 to 648 of the Memorial, Nigeria had incurred
international responsibility. This document dealt not only with incidents
in the Bakassi and Lake Chad regions, but also with those in other
frontier areas and in particular at Tipsan. Then, in its observations
of 30 April 1996, Cameroon confirmed its previous submissions and in
Annex I to those observations listed incidents relating to 42 localities
situated along the length of the frontier. Some of the incidents mentioned
in Cameroon's Memorial and observations had occurred after the date of
the Additional Application.

14. To these submissions, Nigeria raised its sixth objection to admis-
sibility. It argued that Cameroon’s initial Application as amended
restricted itself to vague allegations as to “the dates, circumstances and
precise locations of the alleged incursions and incidents”. It added that
this Application “made no claim as to Nigeria’s international responsi-
bility in relation to acts occurring outside Bakassi and Lake Chad”. It
considered that Cameroon must “essentially confine itself to the facts...
presented in its Application”. From this it concluded that any subsequent
attempt to enlarge the scope of the case was inadmissible and that “addi-
tions” presented subsequently with a view to establishing Nigeria’s respon-
sibility must be disregarded.

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REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 38

15. By its Judgment of 11 June 1998, the Court rejected Nigeria’s sixth
preliminary objection. The Court explained that “[tlhe decision on
Nigeria’s sixth preliminary objection hinges upon the question of whether
the requirements which an application must meet and which are set out in
Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court are met” (C.J. Reports
1998, p. 318, para. 98). The Court added that the term “succinct” used in
Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules (“[the Application] shall also specify
the precise nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the
facts and grounds on which the claim is based”) does not mean “com-
plete” and does not preclude later additions to the statement of the facts
and grounds on which the claim is based. The Court also found that the
latitude of an applicant State, in developing what it has said in its appli-
cation, is not strictly limited, as suggested by Nigeria. The Court under-
lined, inter alia, that that conclusion cannot be drawn from the Court’s
pronouncement on the importance of the point of time of the submission
of the application as the critical date for the determination of its admis-
sibility as “these pronouncements do not refer to the content of applica-
tions (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, L C.J
Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 44; and Questions of Interpretation and Appli-
cation of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 130,
para. 43)” (ibid., p. 318, para. 99). The Court wishes to reiterate that the
question of the conditions for the admissibility of an application at the
time of its introduction, and the question of the admissibility of the
presentation of additional facts and legal grounds, are two different things.
The Court indicated, in its Judgment of 11 June 1998, that the limit of the
freedom to present additional facts and legal considerations is that there
must be no transformation of the dispute brought before the Court by
the application into another dispute which is different in character.
Whether that is the case ultimately has to be decided by the Court in each
individual case in which the question arises. With regard to Nigeria’s
sixth preliminary objection, the Judgment of 1] June 1998 has concluded
that “[i]n this case, Cameroon has not so transformed the dispute” (ibid.,
p. 319, para. 100) and that Cameroon’s Application met the requirements
of Article 38 of the Rules. Thus, the Court made no distinction between
“incidents” and “facts”; it found that additional incidents constitute
additional facts, and that their introduction in proceedings before the
Court is governed by the same rules. In this respect, there is no need for
the Court to stress that it has and will strictly apply the principle of audi
alteram partem.

16. It follows from the foregoing that the Court has already clearly
dealt with and rejected, in its Judgment of 11 June 1998, the first of the
three submissions presented by Nigeria at the end of its request for inter-
pretation, namely that:

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REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 39

“{a) the dispute before the Court does not include any alleged inci-
dents other than (at most) those specified in Cameroon’s
Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional Application of
6 June 1994”,

The Court would therefore be unable to entertain this first submission
without calling into question the effect of the Judgment concerned as res
judicata. The two other submissions, namely that:

“(b) Cameroon’s freedom to present additional facts and legal
considerations relates (at most) only to those specified in
Cameroon’s Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional
Application of 6 June 1994”,

and that:

“{c) the question whether facts alleged by Cameroon are estab-
lished or not relates (at most) only to those specified in
Cameroon’s Application of 29 March 1994 and Additional
Application of 6 June 1994”,

endeavour to remove from the Court’s consideration elements of law and
fact which it has, in its Judgment of 11 June 1998, already authorized
Cameroon to present, or which Cameroon has not yet put forward. In
either case, the Court would be unable to entertain these submissions.

It follows from the foregoing that Nigeria’s request for interpretation
is inadmissible.

17. In view of the conclusions it has reached above, there is no need
for the Court to examine whether there is, between the Parties, a “dispute
as to the meaning or scope of the judgment” of 11 June 1998, as contem-
plated by Article 60 of the Statute.

18. In its written observations, Cameroon seeks not only to have the
Court declare Nigeria’s request for interpretation inadmissible, it also
requests that, in conformity with Article 97 of the Rules, Nigeria be
charged with the additional costs caused to Cameroon by Nigeria’s
request.

Article 64 of the Statute provides that “[u]nless otherwise decided by
the Court, each party shall bear its own costs”. This provision is given
effect by Article 97 of the Rules of Court. While anticipating the possi-

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REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 40

bility of exceptions, in circumstances which it does not specify, Article 64
confirms the

“basic principle regarding the question of costs in contentious pro-
ceedings before international tribunals, to the effect that each party
shall bear its own” (Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, LCI.
Reports 1973, p. 212, para. 98).

The Court sees no reason to depart in the present case from the general
rule set forth in Article 64 of the Statute.

19. For these reasons,
THE Court,
(1) By thirteen votes to three,

Declares inadmissible the request for interpretation of the Judgment of
11 June 1998 in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections, presented by Nigeria on 28 October 1998;

IN FAVOUR: President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva,
Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans; Judge ad hoc Mbaye;

AGAINST: Vice-President Weeramantry; Judge Koroma; Judge ad hoc Ajibola.

(2) Unanimously,

Rejects Cameroon’s request that Nigeria bear the additional costs
caused to Cameroon by the above-mentioned request for interpretation.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fifth day of March, one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to
the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government
of the Republic of Cameroon respectively.

(Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL,
President.
(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

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REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION (JUDGMENT) 41

Vice-President WEERAMANTRY, Judge KOROMA, and Judge ad hoc
AJIBOLA append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) SMS.
(Initialled) E.V.O.

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