                      515

                                DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN

                         Disagreement with the Court’s finding that the Court has jurisdiction —
                      The Court has not established that Venezuela has provided unequivocal consent to
                      the Court’s jurisdiction — The Secretary‑General’s choice of means of settlement
                      under Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement is not legally binding upon the
                      Parties — The Court’s textual analysis of Article IV (2) does not establish that
                      the Secretary-General’s choice is binding — The object and purpose of the Geneva
                      Agreement is best understood as facilitating an agreed resolution of the dispute —
                      The Court ignores language in the Geneva Agreement which contradicts
                      its conclusion — The documents referred to by the Court do not support the
                      view that the Secretary‑General’s choice of the means of settlement is legally
                      binding — Other reasons given by the Court for finding the required consent are
                      unconvincing.

                         1. I have joined the Court’s unanimous finding that it lacks jurisdiction
                      to entertain the claims of the Co‑operative Republic of Guyana (herein
                      after “Guyana”) which arise from events that occurred after the signature
                      of the Geneva Agreement. However, I disagree with the Court’s conclu-
                      sion that it has jurisdiction to entertain Guyana’s Application in so far as
                      it concerns the validity of the Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 and “the
                      related question of the definitive settlement of the land boundary dispute”
                      between the Parties. In this opinion, I shall set forth the reasons for my
                      disagreement with the Court’s approach.

                         2. In my view, the Court’s Judgment in this case undermines the fun-
                      damental principle of consent of the parties to its jurisdiction and is
                      inconsistent with both the Court’s Statute and its jurisprudence. In its
                      prior judgments, the Court has established not only that the consent of
                      the parties is required for it to exercise jurisdiction, as is provided in its
                      Statute, but also that such consent must be “certain”, “unequivocal” and
                      “indisputable” 1. The Court in its Judgment ignores this high threshold
                      for finding consent, reaching the unprecedented decision to exercise juris-
                      diction on the basis of a treaty that does not even mention the Court, let
                      alone contain a compromissory clause. This is especially problematic
                      because one of the Parties has consistently refused to bring the present
                      dispute before the Court, as was most recently demonstrated by its deci-
                      sion not to participate in the proceedings, though it presented a Memo-
                      randum with serious legal arguments that, in my view, did not receive due

                         1 See Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France),

                      Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 204, para. 62.

                      64

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                      516 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                      consideration from the Court. Moreover, in the context of this dispute,
                      the Court should have taken into account that the case involves
                      national interests of the highest order such as rights to large amounts of
                      territory.
                         3. A key basis for the Court’s flawed approach to the issue of consent
                      is its finding that Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Geneva Agreement gives
                      the Secretary- General of the United Nations the authority to issue a
                      legally binding decision on the means of settlement to be employed by the
                      Parties. In my view, this interpretation is not supported by the text of the
                      Geneva Agreement or the Agreement’s object and purpose. The Geneva
                      Agreement was meant to assist the Parties in achieving an agreed resolu-
                      tion of their dispute, and not to subject the Parties to a particular form of
                      dispute settlement against their will.

                           I. The Allegedly Binding Nature of the Secretary-General’s
                                               Choice of the Court

                        4. In paragraph 74 of the Judgment, the Court concludes that “the
                      Parties conferred on the Secretary‑General the authority to choose, by a
                      decision which is binding on them, the means to be used for the settle-
                      ment of their controversy” 2. This conclusion, in my view, is contrary to
                      the text of the Geneva Agreement, which contains no indication whatso-
                      ever that the Secretary‑General has the authority to make legally binding
                      decisions. In this respect, moreover, the Court misinterprets the Geneva
                      Agreement’s object and purpose, ignoring key elements of the preamble
                      and Article IV (2) which make absolutely clear that the true purpose of
                      the Agreement is to facilitate “an agreed settlement” 3 to the Parties’ dis-
                      pute. The factors relied upon by the Court in support of its interpretation
                      of the Geneva Agreement to me are not persuasive for the following rea-
                      sons.

                                              1. Text of the Geneva Agreement
                         5. In paragraph 72 of the Judgment, the Court analyses the provision
                      in Article IV (2) that the Parties “shall refer the decision as to the means
                      of settlement . . . to the Secretary-General” and makes a finding that the
                      term “shall” “should be interpreted as imposing an obligation on States
                      parties”; that the term “refer” “conveys the idea of entrusting a matter to
                      a third party”; and that the term “decision” “is not synonymous with

                           2
                           See paragraph 74 of the present Judgment.
                           3
                           See Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Finan-
                      cing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
                      Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                      I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 599, para. 109.

                      65

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                      ‘recommendation’ and suggests the binding character of the action taken
                      by the Secretary-General as to his choice of the means of settlement”. On
                      this basis, the Court arrives at the conclusion that “the Parties made a
                      legal commitment to comply with the decision of the third party on whom
                      they conferred such authority” 4. I cannot agree with this interpretation,
                      as the terms “shall” and “decision” do not necessarily indicate the cre-
                      ation of a legal obligation.

                          6. While the Court has previously found that the word “shall” imposes
                       an obligation on State parties in the context of Article 4 (1) of the
                       United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (also
                       known as the “Palermo Convention”) 5, the Court in the present case pro-
                       vides no reason to consider that this word should be given an identical
                       construction in Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement. In fact, the Court
                       has found, in other cases, that treaty provisions containing the word
                       “shall” do not impose binding legal obligations upon the parties 6. More-
                       over, the term “shall refer” does not necessarily indicate that the Parties
                       entrusted a third party with the authority to make a legally binding deci-
                       sion.
                          7. While the Court now assumes that the word “decision” is “not syn-
                       onymous with ‘recommendation’”, the Court itself has made clear, in past
                       cases, that the term “decision” can in fact mean “recommendation”, and
                       therefore does not necessarily indicate a legal obligation of compliance.
                       The Court observed with regard to “decisions” of the General Assembly
                       under Article 18 of the United Nations Charter that “[t]hese ‘decisions’. . .
                       include certain recommendations” in addition to decisions with disposi-
                       tive force and effect 7. The Court thus acknowledged that the reference to
                      “decisions” in Article 18 did not exclusively refer to legally binding
                      decisions.
                          8. In sum, I am of the view that the Court’s textual analysis of Arti-
                       cle IV (2) does not establish that the Secretary-General’s choice as to the
                       means of settlement is legally binding upon the Parties.

                                      2. Object and Purpose of the Geneva Agreement
                         9. The Court also purports to rely on the object and purpose of the
                      Geneva Agreement, which it characterizes in paragraph 73 of the
                      Judgment as “ensur[ing] a definitive resolution of the controversy between

                           4
                           See paragraph 72 of the present Judgment.
                           5
                           Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary
                      Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 321, para. 92.
                         6 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary

                      Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 812‑814, paras. 24‑28.
                         7 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advi-

                      sory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 163.

                      66

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                      518 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                      the Parties” 8. This interpretation of the Agreement’s object and purpose,
                      in my view, is flawed, as it ignores several relevant portions of the Agree-
                      ment’s preamble and text.
                         10. First, the Court omits any discussion of the fourth paragraph of
                      the Geneva Agreement’s preamble, which provides that any outstanding
                      controversy between the parties should “be amicably resolved in a man-
                      ner acceptable to both parties”. This statement should not be taken to be
                      a mere platitude. The Court recently observed, in Ukraine v. Russia, that
                      “references to the ‘amicable solution’” of a dispute in Articles 12 and 13
                      of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
                      Discrimination (CERD) indicate that “the objective of the CERD Com-
                      mittee procedure is for the States concerned to reach an agreed settlement
                      of their dispute” 9. There is even greater reason to find that the objective
                      of the Geneva Agreement is to reach an agreed settlement of the dispute,
                      by a solution “acceptable to both parties”.

                         11. Thus, I am of the view that the Geneva Agreement’s true object and
                      purpose is to assist the Parties in reaching an agreed resolution of the pres-
                      ent dispute. If the object and purpose of the Geneva Agreement is so
                      framed, the Secretary‑General’s role could be conceived of as similar to
                      that of a conciliator entrusted with helping the Parties reach an agreed
                      solution to the dispute rather than imposing a means of settlement on them.
                         12. A second significant flaw with the Court’s approach to the object
                      and purpose of the Geneva Agreement, in my view, is that it gives
                      inadequate consideration to the second sentence of Article IV (2). That
                       sentence provides:
                                    “If the means so chosen do not lead to a solution of the controversy,
                               the said organ or, as the case may be, the Secretary-General of the
                               United Nations shall choose another of the means stipulated in
                               Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, and so on until
                                the controversy has been resolved or until all the means of peaceful
                                settlement there contemplated have been exhausted.” (Emphasis added.)

                         13. This provision requires the Secretary-General to continue choosing
                      from the means of settlement listed in Article 33 until one of two possible
                      outcomes is reached: either (1) the controversy between the Parties is
                      resolved, or (2) all the means of peaceful settlement contemplated in Arti-
                      cle 33 have been exhausted. So, Article IV (2) contains no presumption
                      that the controversy between the Parties will definitively be resolved.

                           8
                           See paragraph 73 of the present Judgment.
                           9
                           Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
                      Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
                      Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                      I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 599, para. 109; emphasis added.

                      67

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                         14. This provision in Article IV (2), in my view, strongly indicates that
                      the Parties, in concluding the Geneva Agreement, did not intend to sub-
                      ject themselves to a binding method of dispute resolution that would
                      guarantee a definitive resolution of the controversy. If this had been their
                      intent, they could have left out the final portion of Article IV (2), instead
                      ending that provision with the phrase “and so on until the controversy
                      has been resolved”. Article IV (2) is better interpreted as requiring agree-
                      ment by the Parties before the Secretary‑General’s choice of the means of
                      settlement may be implemented. Such an interpretation would explain
                      how the Secretary‑General’s choice of a binding means such as judicial
                      settlement could leave the controversy unresolved, namely by allowing
                      for the possibility that the Parties would fail to agree on the implementa-
                      tion of the Secretary-General’s choice. Therefore, in my view, the final
                      sentence of Article IV (2) provides additional evidence that the Geneva
                      Agreement aims to facilitate an agreed resolution of the controversy, and
                      not a resolution that is imposed upon the Parties by any third party.

                         15. In paragraph 86 of the Judgment, the Court provides an uncon-
                      vincing alternative explanation for the language at the end of Arti-
                      cle IV (2). It suggests that this language could account for a judicial
                      decision which only partially addresses the Parties’ dispute, but it admits
                      that such a scenario would be contrary to what it considers the object and
                      purpose of the Geneva Agreement 10. In other words, rather than acknowl-
                      edging that the text of Article IV (2) is inconsistent with its interpretation
                      of the Agreement’s object and purpose, the Court contends that the Par-
                      ties chose to include language in Article IV (2) that would only come into
                      play if the purpose of the Agreement were defeated.

                         16. In my view, this is a strained and implausible interpretation of
                      Article IV (2). If the Parties had truly envisaged that the mechanism
                      established by the Geneva Agreement would ensure a definitive resolution
                      of the controversy, there would have been no reason for them to include
                      language contemplating the Agreement’s failure to achieve such a resolu-
                      tion. The Agreement’s object and purpose consists of facilitating an
                      agreed solution to the controversy.

                                                         3. Additional Factors
                      A. Documents relied upon by the Court
                         17. The Court cites a number of documents promulgated after the con-
                      clusion of the Geneva Agreement in order to prove that the Parties (and
                      Venezuela in particular) agreed with its interpretation of Article IV (2). In
                      my view, none of these documents contains any acknowledgment that the
                      Secretary-
                                General’s choice of means was meant to be legally binding

                           10   See paragraph 86 of the present Judgment.

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                      520 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                      upon the Parties. Rather than supporting the Court’s position, the docu-
                      ments cited in the Judgment only further indicate that there has been no
                      “unequivocal” and “indisputable” expression of consent to the Court’s
                      jurisdiction, as required by the Court’s jurisprudence.

                         18. The Court first cites in paragraph 75 an excerpt from a document
                      explaining Venezuela’s motives for ratifying the Protocol of Port of
                      Spain, which imposed a 12‑year moratorium on the operation of Arti-
                      cle IV of the Geneva Agreement. In this document, it is stated that
                                “the possibility existed that . . . an issue of such vital importance . . .
                                as the determination of the means of dispute settlement, would have
                                left the hands of the two directly interested Parties, to be decided by
                                an international institution chosen by them, or failing that, by the
                                Secretary-General of the United Nations” 11.
                         19. Nothing in this statement indicates that Venezuela considered Arti-
                      cle IV (2) to confer binding decision-making authority upon the Secretary-
                      General. At most, it reflects Venezuela’s understanding that, if
                      Article IV (2) were to be implemented, the choice of the means of settle-
                      ment would no longer be the object of direct negotiations between the
                      Parties. Indeed, the same document cited by the Court elsewhere states
                      that an “essential advantage” of the Protocol of Port of Spain is the fact
                      that it “[a]voids our border dispute with Guyana from leaving (in a very
                      short period, possibly three months) direct negotiations between the inter-
                      ested Parties to passing into the hands of third parties” 12. Indeed, once
                      the Parties referred the choice of means of settlement to the Secretary‑
                      General, they were no longer engaging in direct negotiations, but rather
                      other forms of peaceful dispute settlement (such as good offices). This
                      does not mean, however, that the Secretary-General had the authority to
                      issue binding decisions.

                         20. The Court also cites, in paragraph 77, a statement made before the
                      Venezuelan National Congress on 17 March 1966 by the then-Minister
                      for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Mr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges on the
                      occasion of the Geneva Agreement’s ratification. The Minister is quoted
                      as stating that “[t]he only role entrusted to the Secretary-     General of
                      the United Nations [was] to indicate to the parties the means of peaceful
                      settlement of disputes . . . provided in Article 33” 13.
                         21. The Minister’s statement does not support the argument that the
                      Parties are bound by the Secretary-General’s choice. If anything, this
                      statement suggests that the Secretary-General was not viewed as capable
                      of issuing binding decisions. The Court does not “indicate” solutions to a
                      dispute, but issues a definitive ruling. It is a conciliator or mediator who

                           11 Paragraph 75 of the present Judgment.
                           12 Memorial of Guyana, Ann. 47, para. 8 (b); emphasis added.
                           13 Paragraph 77 of the present Judgment.

                      69

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                      521 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                      indicates solutions to a dispute, with the ultimate decision being left to
                      the parties.
                         22. The Court cites in paragraph 87 a joint statement issued by the
                      Venezuelan and United Kingdom Ministers for Foreign Affairs, along
                      with the Prime Minister of British Guiana. That statement, issued con-
                      temporaneously with the signing of the Geneva Agreement, states that
                      “an agreement was reached whose stipulations will enable a definitive
                      solution” to the controversy between the Parties 14. Importantly, this joint
                      statement does not state that the Geneva Agreement will “ensure” or
                      “guarantee” a definitive solution of the controversy. Rather, use of the
                      term “enable” indicates an understanding on the part of the Parties that
                      the Geneva Agreement made a definitive solution possible. This again is
                      consistent with an interpretation of the Agreement’s object and purpose
                      as facilitating an agreed solution to the controversy, rather than
                      “ensur[ing] a definitive resolution” thereof.

                        23. In sum, I do not consider that any of the documents relied upon by
                      the Court establish that the Parties understood the Secretary-General’s
                      choice of means of settlement to be binding.

                      B. Factors omitted by the Court
                         24. In my view, the Court gives inadequate attention to the fact that,
                      prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement, Venezuela had mani-
                      fested on several occasions its unwillingness to have issues related to its
                      territory decided by third parties without its clear consent. In this respect,
                      it should be noted that Venezuela had concluded, in 1939, a bilateral
                      treaty with Colombia providing, in general, for submission of disputes to
                      conciliation or judicial settlement. However, Article II of that treaty
                      expressly excluded any disputes relating to the territorial integrity of the
                      parties from being submitted to third‑party settlement 15. A similar
                      1940 bilateral treaty between Venezuela and Brazil required, at Article IV,
                      that the parties attempt to conclude a special agreement before any dis-
                      putes could be submitted to judicial settlement 16. These treaties reflect
                      Venezuela’s unwillingness, prior to 1966, to subject itself to judicial settle-
                      ment without its express consent, particularly with regard to territorial
                      disputes, and should have been taken into account by the Court.

                           14
                           Paragraph 87 of the present Judgment.
                           15
                           Treaty of non-aggression, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, signed at
                      Bogotá on 17 December 1939, United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1257, Part
                      Two, p. 463, Art. II.
                        16 Treaty for the pacific settlement of disputes, signed at Caracas on 30 March 1940,

                      UNTS, Vol. 51, Part Two, p. 308, Art. IV.

                      70

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                      522 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                           II. Other Arguments concerning the Parties’ Alleged Consent
                                       to Judicial Settlement by the Court

                         25. Apart from the supposedly binding nature of the Secretary-
                      General’s decision‑making authority, the Court rests on two other argu-
                      ments in attempting to demonstrate the Parties’ consent to the Court’s
                      jurisdiction. First, it states in paragraph 82 that, by including a renvoi to
                      Article 33 of the United Nations Charter (which in turn refers to judicial
                      settlement) in Article IV (2), the Parties “accepted the possibility of the
                      controversy being settled by that means” 17. It adds that if the Parties had
                      wished to exclude judicial settlement, they could have done so during
                      their negotiations 18. However, there is a significant difference between the
                      Parties “accept[ing] the possibility” of recourse to judicial settlement and
                      their unequivocal consent in advance to such settlement. Moreover, by
                      the Court’s own logic, if the Parties had wished to provide consent in
                      advance to judicial settlement by the Court, without the need for further
                      agreement between them, they could have included an express statement
                      to this effect in Article IV (2). However, they chose not to do so.

                         26. Secondly, the Court suggests in paragraph 114 that Article IV (2)’s
                      reference to the decision of the Secretary-General would be deprived of
                      effet utile if that decision were subject to the further consent by the Par-
                      ties for its implementation. However, this argument does not account for
                      the possibility that the Secretary‑General could have a non‑binding role
                      in the dispute settlement process, akin to that of a conciliator. While it is
                      true that the Secretary-General’s role only comes into play when the Par-
                      ties have otherwise failed to agree on a means of settlement, this does not
                      mean that his intervention in a non‑legally binding capacity would neces-
                      sarily be unhelpful. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter makes clear
                      that negotiation is a form of dispute settlement separate from conciliation
                      or mediation, indicating that there is distinct value to the latter proce-
                      dures even if the third party in question is not empowered to issue bind-
                      ing decisions.

                                                           III. Conclusion

                        27. Given the foregoing, I am of the view that the Geneva Agreement
                      contains no certain, unequivocal indication of the Parties’ consent to the
                      Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore the Court has erred in finding that it
                      has jurisdiction to entertain Guyana’s Application.

                       28. The dangers of the Court’s approach are well illustrated by its ulti-
                      mate conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction over the question con-

                           17   See paragraph 82 of the present Judgment.
                           18   Ibid.

                      71

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                      523 	 arbitral award of 3 october 1899 (diss. op. gevorgian)

                      cerning the “definitive settlement of the land boundary dispute” between
                      Guyana and Venezuela 19. This would be a decision of potentially enor-
                      mous significance for the Parties, and thus the fact that the Court bases
                      its finding of jurisdiction to make this decision upon an instrument that
                      contains no compromissory clause and does not even mention the Court
                      is cause for concern.
                         29. Rather than basing itself upon an unequivocal, indisputable indica-
                      tion of Venezuela’s consent, as its jurisprudence requires, the Court goes
                      looking for reasons to exercise jurisdiction, relying in particular on the
                      presumed intentions of the Parties and upon a series of statements that
                      are, at best, of ambiguous meaning. The Court ignores language in the
                      text of the Geneva Agreement that squarely contradicts its position and is
                      unable to point to any express statement evidencing either consent to this
                      Court’s jurisdiction or an acknowledgment that the Secretary‑General’s
                      choice of the means of settlement is legally binding. In my view, this
                      approach is wrong and undermines the fundamental principle of consent
                      by the parties to the jurisdiction of the Court.

                      (Signed) Kirill Gevorgian.

                           19   See paragraph 138 (1) of the present Judgment.

                      72

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614

              SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TOMKA

  Jurisdiction ratione materiae of Court under ICSFT — Criminal law nature of
ICSFT — Ukraine’s claims related to support in internal armed conflict — Rights
Ukraine seeks to protect implausible at provisional measures stage — Court should
have analysed whether Ukraine’s claims within scope of ICSFT — Supply of arms
outside scope of “funds” — Ukraine’s claims outside Court’s jurisdiction.

   Jurisdiction ratione materiae of Court under the CERD — Court should have
analysed Ukraine’s claims in detail — No absolute right under CERD to
native-language education — Alleged discrimination in equality before law within
scope of CERD — Some but not all of Ukraine’s claims within scope of Court’s
jurisdiction under CERD — Court has jurisdiction over those claims.

   Procedural preconditions to jurisdiction under CERD — Recourse to negotiation
and CERD procedures not overly burdensome relative to Court — Logical reading
of text of Article 22 requires preconditions to be cumulative — Precondition to
engage CERD procedures supported by context — Departure from practice not to
consider travaux préparatoires — Travaux confirm preconditions are
cumulative — Requiring recourse to Committee procedures however excessively
formalistic in circumstances of present case.

  State responsibility — Requirement of breach of international obligation for
State responsibility.

   1. The way in which the Court has dealt with the preliminary objec-
tions of the Russian Federation as regards its jurisdiction ratione
materiae and determined that it has jurisdiction under both of the Con-
ventions relied on by Ukraine calls for some comments. I will start with
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (hereinafter the “ICSFT”).

      I. The International Convention for the Suppression of
                    the Financing of Terrorism

   2. The ICSFT is a typical criminal law convention. It precisely deﬁnes,
in Article 2, the oﬀence of the ﬁnancing of terrorism by describing both
its objective element (the act itself or actus reus) and its subjective element
(mens rea). States parties to the Convention have the obligation — as is
typical for criminal law conventions — to establish as criminal oﬀences

60

615        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

under their domestic law the oﬀences deﬁned in Article 2 and to provide
for appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of the
oﬀences. States parties have the obligation — again typical for criminal
law conventions — to establish as may be necessary their jurisdiction over
the oﬀences deﬁned in the Convention. The Convention also creates an
obligation for the States parties to co-operate in the prevention of the
oﬀences. That obligation of co-operation is further speciﬁed in the Con-
vention (Art. 18). The object of the Convention is clearly spelled out in its
preamble, which provides that States have agreed on this Convention,
      “[b]eing convinced of the urgent need to enhance international coop-
      eration among States in devising and adopting eﬀective measures for
      the prevention of the ﬁnancing of terrorism, as well as for its suppres-
      sion through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators”.
The Convention has to be viewed and interpreted in light of its object and
purpose, taking into account its nature as a criminal law convention.
   3. According to Ukraine, this Convention is applicable to acts involv-
ing the use of arms and armed force in the eastern part of Ukraine, which
have occurred in what can be characterized as an internal armed conﬂict.
The Memorial of Ukraine refers in particular to actions by the so-called
Donetsk People’s Republic (“DPR”) and Luhansk People’s Repub-
lic (“LPR”) opposing the eﬀorts of the Government of Ukraine, also
involving the use of force, to reinstate its full control over the region.

  4. It is to be recalled that, in its Order on provisional measures of
19 April 2017, the Court declined the request of Ukraine based on the
ICSFT. The Court did not consider that the rights for which Ukraine
sought protection were at least plausible, not having been convinced that
there were “suﬃcient reasons for considering that the other elements set
out in Article 2, paragraph 1, such as the elements of intention or knowl-
edge . . . [were] present” (Application of the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April
2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, pp. 131-132, para. 75). As the Court noted,
“[a]t th[at] stage of the proceedings, Ukraine ha[d] not put before the
Court evidence which aﬀords a suﬃcient basis to ﬁnd it plausible that
these elements [speciﬁed in Article 2] [were] present” (ibid.).

   5. This conclusion of the Court has led Ukraine to “repackage” its
original claims, as presented in its Application instituting proceedings
(Judgment, para. 18) into a new version as formulated in its Memorial
(ibid., para. 19), while in substance they remain more or less the same. It
is apparent from the Memorial of Ukraine that it continues to charge the
Russian Federation of committing acts which, in its view, are contrary to
the ICSFT. Chapter 2, consisting of some forty pages, of that written
pleading is entitled “Russian Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine”. Its

61

616        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

purpose is to describe “the myriad ways in which the Russian Federation,
acting through numerous state oﬃcials, not only tolerated but fostered
and supported the funding of illegal armed groups in Ukraine, including
by providing weapons used for the acts of terrorism recounted in Chap-
ter 1” (Memorial of Ukraine, p. 80, para. 132). Ukraine submits that
“Russian ﬁnancing of terrorism in Ukraine” consisted of “massive” sup-
ply of weapons and ammunition to “illegal armed groups in Ukraine”
(ibid., pp. 81-85, paras. 133-136), the supply or “transfer” of the Russian
Buk anti-aircraft missile used to destroy ﬂight MH17 (ibid., pp. 86-98,
paras. 137-154), the supply of multiple launch rocket systems, which were
used to shell Ukrainian civilians, to the DPR and LPR (ibid., pp. 98-104,
paras. 155-161), the provision of explosives used to bomb Ukrainian
cities (ibid., pp. 104-108, paras. 162-168), “comprehensive training on
Russian territory” of the DPR, LPR and other armed groups
(ibid., pp. 109-113, paras. 169-173) and Russian fundraising for illegal
armed groups in Ukraine (ibid., pp. 113-119, paras. 174-180).

  6. On the one hand, the Court recalls that, as it stated in its Judgment
on the preliminary objection in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States of America) (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 809-810),

      “in order to determine the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae under
      a compromissory clause concerning disputes relating to the interpre-
      tation or application of a treaty, it is necessary to ascertain whether
      the acts of which the applicant complains ‘fall within the provisions’
      of the treaty containing the clause” (Judgment, para. 57).
On the other hand, the Court ultimately fails to ascertain whether the
above-mentioned acts, described in Chapter 2 of Ukraine’s Memorial, fall
within the provisions of the ICSFT. Instead, the Court focuses its atten-
tion on the deﬁnition of perpetrators of oﬀences of ﬁnancing acts of ter-
rorism. Not surprisingly, the ICSFT, as a criminal law convention, uses
in Article 2 the expression “any person”. This is typical language used in
many criminal codes and statutes to describe a perpetrator. The Court
leaves the other element of the oﬀences (mens rea), speciﬁcally, either the
intention of a perpetrator that the funds should be used or his knowledge
that they are to be used to commit an act of terrorism, for the merits
stage of the proceedings (ibid., para. 63).
   7. The Court has also refrained from determining the scope of the term
“funds” used in the Convention, in particular whether it includes the pro-
visions of weapons by a State, despite the fact that it is determining its
jurisdiction ratione materiae (ibid., para. 56). As the Court acknowledges
“[t]his may require the interpretation of the provisions that deﬁne the
scope of the treaty” (ibid., para. 57). One such provision is Article 1, para-
graph 1, of the ICSFT, which deﬁnes the term “funds” for the purposes
of that Convention. The Court accepts that the scope of this term
“relate[s] to the scope of the ICSFT” (ibid., para. 62) but rather surpris-

62

617      application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

ingly takes the view that it “need not be addressed at the present stage of
the proceedings” (Judgment, para. 62). According to the Court, the inter-
pretation of the deﬁnition of “funds” “could be relevant as appropriate at
the stage of an examination of the merits” (ibid.).

   8. I am not convinced that this is the right approach. The ascertain-
ment of the scope of the term “funds” is a distinctly legal issue which is a
matter of interpretation of the Convention. The scope of that term
“relate[s] to the scope of the ICSFT” (ibid.) and thus has a direct bearing
on the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae. Determining the
scope of jurisdiction ratione materiae more precisely at this jurisdictional
stage of the proceedings would have assisted in clarifying which of the
claims presented by Ukraine, if any, fall within the Court’s jurisdiction
and could be further argued at the merits stage. This issue has been left
open despite the fact that the legal deﬁnition of the term “funds” for the
purposes of the ICSFT is not closely intertwined with the merits. Thus,
the principal task of the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings has not
been fully realized. Moreover, it is useful to recall the past jurisprudence
of the Court. In 1972, the Court stated that it “must . . . always be satis-
ﬁed that it has jurisdiction, and must if necessary go into that matter
proprio motu” (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council
(India v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52, para. 13).
Although this statement was made by the Court in response to India’s
argument that Pakistan could not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction as it
did not raise it as a “preliminary” objection, the Court resorted to that
jurisprudence some thirty-ﬁve years later when it asserted that its
1996 Judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility in the Genocide case
dealt implicitly with an issue that neither party raised before it in 1996
during the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, but which was relevant
for the Court’s jurisdiction (Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 91,
para. 118).
   9. On the basis of the extremely cursory treatment of the Russian Fed-
eration’s objection, without really applying the Oil Platforms test and
without considering whether various acts of the Russian Federation of
which the Applicant complains in Chapter 2 of the Memorial fall within
the provisions of Articles 8, 9, 10, 12 and 18 identiﬁed by Ukraine as rel-
evant for its claims in its submissions (Memorial of Ukraine, pp. 362-363,
para. 653), the Court “concludes that the objection raised by the Russian
Federation to its jurisdiction ratione materiae under the ICSFT cannot be
upheld” (Judgment, para. 64).

  10. Despite the above comments on the treatment by the Court of the
preliminary objections raised by the Russian Federation against the
Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of Article 24 of the ICSFT, I agree with
the Court’s view that “[t]he ﬁnancing by a State of acts of terrorism is not

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618        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

addressed by the ICSFT” and that such activity “lies outside the scope of
the Convention” (Judgment, paras. 59, 60 and 61). The Court’s conclu-
sion on its jurisdiction under the ICSFT should be read in light of this
view, which is expressed repeatedly in its Judgment.
   11. The acts of which Ukraine complains of in Chapter 2 of its Memo-
rial (pp. 80-119), describing them as “Russian Financing of Terrorism in
Ukraine”, referred to already in paragraph 5 of this opinion, are the acts
of the Russian Federation, to a great extent consisting of providing weap-
ons to the DPR and the LPR. Even if proven, they, in my view, do not
fall within the scope of the ICSFT. This has led me to respectfully dis-
agree with the conclusion of the majority.

       II. The International Convention on the Elimination of
                 All Forms of Racial Discrimination

  12. This brings me to the Court’s treatment of the jurisdictional
objections of the Russian Federation as to Ukraine’s claims under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (hereinafter “the CERD”).

  13. The Court’s determination of its jurisdiction ratione materiae under
the CERD is not much more detailed. In fact it consists of just three
paragraphs. In the ﬁrst one (Judgment, para. 94), the Court says what it
does not need to do at this stage of the proceedings. In the next para-
graph (ibid., para. 95), the Court recalls that at the jurisdictional stage of
the proceedings it “only needs to ascertain whether the measures of which
Ukraine complains fall within the provisions of the Convention”. And in
the ﬁnal paragraph of its “analysis”, the Court simply considers that
      “taking into account the broadly formulated rights and obligations
      contained in the Convention . . . and the non-exhaustive list of rights
      in Article 5, . . . the measures of which Ukraine complains . . . are
      capable of having an adverse eﬀect on the enjoyment of certain rights
      protected under CERD” (ibid., para. 96).
It concludes that “[t]hese measures thus fall within the provisions of the
Convention” (ibid.). The Court simply asserts this conclusion without
reasonably and suﬃciently demonstrating it.
   14. Again, there is no speciﬁc analysis of the preliminary objections of
the Russian Federation, presented on almost forty pages (Prelimi-
nary Objections submitted by the Russian Federation, Vol. I, pp. 139-182,
paras. 294-359). By way of example, the Respondent argues that “Arti-
cle 5 (e) (v) of CERD does not include, as Ukraine alleges, an absolute
right to education ‘in native language’” (ibid., p. 158, para. 329). The
Court provides no answer to this argument, which concerns the scope of
the CERD, rather leaving the issue open for the merits.

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619        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

   15. However, certain of the claims of Ukraine, like the claim that the
Respondent “fail[s] to guarantee the right of members of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities to equality before the law, notably in
the enjoyment of . . . the right to equal treatment before the tribunals and
all other organs administering justice” (Memorial of Ukraine, p. 363,
para. 653 (i)), fall within the scope of the CERD. Whether the Respon-
dent has failed to comply with this obligation still remains to be proven
by the Applicant, while the Respondent will have full opportunity to
rebut these allegations. This, however, is a matter properly for the merits.
Since at least some of the claims of Ukraine fall within the scope of the
CERD, although I am not satisﬁed that the Court refrained to specify
which ones, I have in the end voted with the majority.

   16. Moreover, I am not convinced by the Court’s treatment of the
question of the procedural preconditions for seising it contained in Arti-
cle 22 of the CERD. When interpreting the nature of these preconditions,
the Court concludes that they are alternative. Accordingly, prior to seis-
ing the Court with a dispute under the CERD, either, at least, a good-
faith attempt of negotiations on the issues falling within the subject-matter
of the Convention must have been made, or the dispute must have been
referred to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(hereinafter “the Committee”) without that dispute having been settled.
   17. The main basis for this conclusion by the Court is its view that

      “should negotiation and the CERD Committee procedure be consid-
      ered cumulative, States would have to try to negotiate an agreed solu-
      tion to their dispute and, after negotiation has not been successful,
      take the matter before the [CERD] Committee for further negotia-
      tion, again in order to reach an agreed solution” (Judgment,
      para. 110).

According to the Court “the context of Article 22 of CERD does not sup-
port this interpretation” (ibid.).
   18. However, the relevant provisions for the procedure before the
Committee are contained in Articles 11 to 13 of the Convention. Nowhere
is the condition of prior negotiations before referring the matter to the
Committee stipulated in those three Articles. Under Article 11, para-
graph 1, of the Convention “[i]f a State Party considers that another State
Party is not giving eﬀect to the provisions of this Convention, it may
bring the matter to the attention of the Committee”. The Committee then
transfers the communication to the State party concerned. Under para-
graph 2 of the same Article, if the matter is not adjusted within six
months, either by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure, either
State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee. As
is clear from the provisions of Article 11, negotiations are an element of

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620       application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

the process instituted before the Committee, not a precondition for seis-
ing it of the matter.

   19. It follows from the above that, once a State brings a matter to the
attention of the Committee under Article 11, it demonstrates its willingness
to enter into negotiations with the other State party within the context of
the procedures in the Committee. If that negotiation or the continuation of
the procedures do not lead to the settlement of a dispute, either party may
bring it to the Court, as both negotiations and conciliation procedures
under Articles 11-13 of the CERD will have been tried to no result.
   20. The Court believes that such expressions as “without delay”
(Art. 2, para. 1) or “speedily” (preamble) support its interpretation as
these provisions “show the States parties’ aim to eradicate all forms of
racial discrimination eﬀectively and promptly” (Judgment, para. 111).
And the Court adds that “the achievement of such aims could be ren-
dered more diﬃcult if the procedural preconditions under Article 22 were
cumulative”.

   21. This view can underestimate the usefulness of other means of
peaceful settlement of disputes and the role of other bodies and, on the
other hand, unrealistically estimate that the Court can resolve a dispute
“speedily”. The present dispute was brought before the Court on 16 Jan-
uary 2017 and, taking into account the current docket of the Court, the
Court’s Judgment on the merits most likely will not be rendered earlier
than sometime in 2023.
   22. In my view, Article 22 should be interpreted to the eﬀect that the
conditions provided therein are cumulative. Under Article 22, a dispute
which is to be referred to the Court must be one that “is not settled by
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Conven-
tion”. Ukraine focuses heavily on the ordinary meaning of the word “or”
to support its position that the preconditions are alternative. However, it
is not the ordinary meaning of “or” which the Court must determine ; it
is the ordinary meaning of the phrase “which is not settled by negotiation
or by the procedures . . .”. This phrase admits two meanings. First, it
could refer to a dispute which is not settled by negotiation and which is
not settled by the procedures, as the Russian Federation argues. Second,
it could refer to a dispute which is not settled by negotiation or is not
settled by the procedures before the Committee, as Ukraine maintains.
Which of these interpretations is correct depends on the reading to be
given to “not” and “or” together in this phrase.

   23. A logical reading of the text of Article 22 favours the interpretation
that the conditions are cumulative. The words “not” and “or” are logical
connectors, so it is reasonable to apply propositional logic to the interpre-
tation of the phrase in which they are used. According to the ﬁrst De Mor-

66

621        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

gan’s law of formal propositional logic “the negation of a disjunction is
equal to the conjunction of the negation of the alternates — that is not
(p or q) equals not p and not q, or symbolically ~(pq) Ł ~p·~q” 1. This is
consistent with the semantic context of Article 22. A dispute can be
settled either by direct negotiation between the parties or by the pro-
cedures referred to in Articles 11-13 of the CERD, but not by both simul-
taneously. Accordingly, with respect to a dispute that is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, the “or” must be disjunctive. The negation of
this disjunction should accordingly be read to refer to disputes settled
neither by negotiation nor by the CERD procedure. Only when negotia-
tion and the procedures have not led to the resolution of a dispute, is the
condition met in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of
Article 22.

   24. When the context is taken into account, a cumulative reading that
requires recourse to the inter-State dispute settlement procedures of the
Committee should also be preferred in order to preserve the eﬀectiveness
of Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD and the Conciliation Commissions fore-
seen thereunder. According to the rule codiﬁed in Article 31, paragraph 2,
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the context to be con-
sidered comprises the full text of the CERD, including its preamble. The
particular context for the interpretation of Article 22 of the CERD
includes the Conciliation Commission process established in Articles 12
to 13.
   25. It would undermine the procedures in the Committee to interpret
recourse to them as optional before seisin of the Court. The principle of
eﬀectiveness “has an important role in the law of treaties and in the juris-
prudence of this Court” (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Juris-
diction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 455, para. 52).
The necessity of a cumulative reading to preserve the eﬀectiveness of
Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD is reﬂected in the diﬀerence between the pro-
cedures in the Committee and the Court. From the perspective of a claiming
State, there are several reasons to prefer the Court. First, the procedures
in the Committee produce a report containing ﬁndings of fact and recom-
mendations (Art. 13, para. 1), while a judgment of the Court has binding
eﬀect in accordance with Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations and Article 59 of the Statute. Additionally, there is no
possibility for interim relief during the procedures in the Committee,
while the Court has the power to indicate binding provisional measures
under Article 41 of its Statute.

   1 “Augustus De Morgan”, Britannica Academic, Encyclopædia Britannica, 26 October

2016, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Augustus-De-Morgan/29609. Accessed
3 October 2019.

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622       application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

  26. This preference is borne out in the practice of States. States do not
resort to the inter-State procedures before the Committee unless there is
no access to the Court. The only exception is the case between Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates, Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which is also pend-
ing before the Court. In view of the above, the context strongly favours
the interpretation of the procedural preconditions of Article 22 of the
CERD as cumulative. To hold otherwise is tantamount to holding that
States anticipated Articles 11 to 13 of the CERD to serve as a residual
mechanism against States which make reservations to Article 22, thus not
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. However, nothing suggests that
this was the intention of States when they negotiated the text of the future
Convention.

   27. Indeed, the travaux préparatoires of the CERD indicate the oppo-
site, and conﬁrm the interpretation that the preconditions are cumulative.
The Court, in a departure from its recent practice — even in paragraph 59
of the Judgment as regards the ICSFT — declines to look at the CERD
travaux. Although “[t]he Court notes that both Parties rely on the
travaux préparatoires of CERD in support of their respective arguments”,
in its view “there is no need for [the Court] to examine the travaux prépara-
toires” (Judgment, para. 112). This is rather a “spectacular” turn-around,
as just eight years ago, when the Court interpreted the same provision,
Article 22 of the CERD, the travaux were not ignored. There, also after
noting that “both Parties have made extensive arguments relating to the
travaux préparatoires, citing them in support of their respective interpre-
tations” of Article 22 and after mentioning, by example, four other cases
when it resorted to the travaux préparatoires, the Court came to the con-
clusion that “in this case . . . an examination of the travaux préparatoires
is warranted” (Application of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federa-
tion), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 128,
para. 142 ; emphasis added). As consistency is a virtue in judicial approach
and reasoning, I see no reason for the Court to change its approach.

   28. The draft of the Convention submitted by the Economic and Social
Council to the General Assembly on the basis of the report of the Com-
mission on Human Rights contained neither institutional provisions
establishing the Committee nor a provision on dispute resolution (Draft
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, UN doc. E/RES/1015 B (XXXVII)). Instead, these provisions
were added to the text during negotiations in the Third Committee (Report
of the Third Committee : Draft International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN doc. A/6181). In addi-
tion to the draft text, the Council submitted to the Assembly a working
paper prepared by the Secretary-General containing draft ﬁnal clauses,

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623        application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

including a dispute resolution clause (UN doc. E/CN.4/L.679 ; see also
UN doc. A/6181, para. 4 (d)). In that paper, the Secretary-General pro-
vided four examples of compromissory clauses based on previous multi-
lateral treaties (UN doc. E/CN.4/L.679, pp. 15-16). The Third Committee
discussed the question of a compromissory clause at its 1367th Meeting
on 7 December 1965 (see UN doc. A/C.3/SR.1367). As a basis for discus-
sion, the oﬃcers of the Committee suggested a similar text :

         “Any dispute between two or more Contracting States over the
      interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled
      by negotiation, shall at the request of any of the parties to the dispute
      be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision,
      unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement.”
      (UN doc. A/C.3/L.1237, p. 4; see also UN doc. A/6181, para. 197.)

  29. The addition of words “or by the procedures expressly provided
for in this Convention” after “negotiation” was jointly proposed as an
amendment      by    Ghana,     Mauritania    and     the   Philippines
(UN doc. A/C.3/L.1313 ; see also UN doc. A/6181, para. 199). This pro-
posed amendment was adopted unanimously by the Third Committee
(UN doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, para. 41). During the discussion, only Ghana
provided views on the amendment. Its delegate
      “said that [it] was self-explanatory. Provision had been made in the
      draft Convention for machinery which should be used in the settle-
      ment of disputes before recourse was had to the International Court
      of Justice. The amendment simply referred to the procedures provided
      for in the Convention.” (UN doc. A/C.3/SR.1367, para. 29; emphasis
      added.)
The amendment was not further discussed prior to the adoption of the
Convention by the plenary of the General Assembly at its 1406th Meet-
ing on 21 December 1965 (UN doc. A/PV.1406).
   30. I admit that in the case at hand, in view of the very strenuous rela-
tionship between the two Parties in the period from 2014 to 2017, there
was no chance of settling their dispute even if it had been referred to the
Committee. It would have been a futile exercise. For that reason, while
maintaining my interpretation of Article 22 of the Convention, I did not
vote against the Court’s jurisdiction under the CERD. To insist, in the
circumstances of the present case, on the prior referral of the dispute to
the Committee would have been an exercise in excessive formalism. Even
if the Application was premature, this defect could have been remedied
by the Applicant and it would make no sense to require Ukraine to
institute fresh proceedings (cf. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6,
p. 14 ; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,

69

624       application of the icsft and cerd (sep. op. tomka)

Series A, No. 2, p. 34 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 428-429, para. 83).

            III. Breaches of an “International Obligation”

   31. A ﬁnal point on precision in drafting merits mention. The Court
occasionally refers to “breaches of the Convention”, “breaches of Arti-
cles” or “violat[ions] of a number of provisions of the ICSFT and CERD”
(e.g. Judgment, paras. 30, 79, 90 and 93). It is rather regrettable that the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations does not pay suﬃcient
attention to the precision of the language it uses. Under international law,
for an act of a State to be wrongful, such act, consisting of an action or
omission, must both be attributable to the State and constitute a breach
of an international obligation of the State (Article 3 of ARSIWA). The
International Law Commission intentionally chose this language because
it is “long established” (Yearbook of the International Law Commis-
sion (YILC), 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 35, Commentary to Article 2,
para. 7). As the Commission correctly stated in its Commentary to then
Article 3 of the Draft Articles adopted in the ﬁrst reading, it is “more
appropriate to refer . . . to ‘breach of an international obligation’ rather
than ‘breach of a rule’ or of a ‘norm of international law’” (YILC, 1973,
Vol. II, p. 184, Commentary to Article 3, paragraph 15; emphasis in the
original). As the Commission explained, that expression is

      “the most accurate. A rule is the objective expression of the law; an
      obligation is a subjective legal phenomenon and it is by reference to
      that phenomenon that the conduct of a subject of international law
      is judged, whether it is in compliance with the obligation or whether
      it is in breach of it.” (Ibid.)
And as the Commission observed, the phrase “breach of an international
obligation” corresponds to the language of Article 36, paragraph 2 (c),
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (YILC, 2001, Vol. II,
Part Two, p. 35, Commentary to Article 2, paragraph 7). The Court could
have been inspired by the language of its own basic instrument.

                                                 (Signed) Peter Tomka.

70


142

      OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE BENNOUNA

   Relations entre l’instance principale et la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires — Sauvegarde des droits et maintien du statu quo — Violation
des droits et risque de dommage irréparable — Accord des Parties sur l’examen
par la Cour prima facie de l’existence des droits en cause — Circonstances auto-
risant la Cour à se prononcer prima facie sur l’existence des droits en cause —
La Cour a éludé la discussion sur les droits.

   1. Si j’ai voté en faveur du dispositif de l’ordonnance rendue par la
Cour, je ne peux pas me rallier, cependant, à l’enchaînement du raison-
nement qui a permis d’y parvenir. Je regrette en particulier que la Cour
n’ait pas saisi l’occasion qui lui était offerte, dans cette affaire, pour cla-
rifier les relations entre l’instance principale, dont elle était saisie, et la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires.
   Que cette relation soit inévitable, ceci a été clairement affirmé par la
Cour dans l’affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-
Unis à Téhéran :
      « considérant en outre qu’une demande en indication de mesures
      conservatoires a nécessairement, par sa nature même, un lien avec la
      substance de l’affaire puisque, comme l’article 41 l’indique expressé-
      ment, son objet est de protéger le droit de chacun ; et qu’en la pré-
      sente espèce le but de la demande des Etats-Unis ne paraît pas être
      d’obtenir un jugement provisionnel ou définitif, sur le fond des récla-
      mations mais de protéger pendente lite la substance des droits invo-
      qués » (Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhé-
      ran (Etats-Unis c. Iran), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
      15 décembre 1979, C.I.J. Recueil 1979, p. 16, par. 28).
   2. La jurisprudence a précisé que cette protection des droits de chacun
se faisait au travers de mesures conservatoires adoptées en urgence et des-
tinées à empêcher qu’un dommage irréparable ne vienne annihiler les
droits en cause qui ont été bafoués. Il s’agit certes de maintenir le statu
quo et de faire en sorte qu’on n’assiste pas, selon la terminologie de la
Cour, à « l’aggravation ou à l’extension du différend ». Encore faut-il se
demander s’il s’agit du maintien du statu quo au moment de la saisine de
la Cour ou de la restauration de celui qui existait avant l’action préten-
dument illégale du défendeur 1.
   1 Même dans ce cas, l’objet de la mesure provisoire demeure la sauvegarde du droit qui

est l’objet du litige devant la Cour, car, à ce stade, il n’est pas question de réparer le dom-
mage. Ainsi que l’avait souligné E. Dumbauld : « interim protection looks to the future »
(Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies, 1932, p. 164).

33

143            USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER (OP. IND. BENNOUNA)

   3. Dans ce dernier cas, la violation des droits protégés porte en elle-
même le risque d’un dommage irréparable et la Cour peut décider à titre
provisoire, comme elle l’a fait dans l’affaire du Personnel diplomatique et
consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran, précitée, de mesures conservatoires
de la situation existant avant l’action prétendument illégale. C’est ainsi
que la Cour s’est prononcée prima facie en faveur de l’existence des droits
invoqués dont la violation représente par elle-même un dommage irrépa-
rable. En d’autres termes, les droits invoqués par les Etats-Unis dans
l’affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhé-
ran sont présumés et la Cour pouvait d’autant plus aisément parvenir à
cette conclusion prima facie que l’Iran ne s’est pas présenté devant elle et
n’a pas eu l’occasion de contester réellement les droits en question. Il est
plus simple, en effet, pour la Cour, en application de l’article 53 du Sta-
tut, d’adjuger à la partie demanderesse ses conclusions, notamment quant
à la présomption en faveur des droits invoqués.
   4. De même, la Cour peut éviter de s’engager dans la discussion sur
l’existence prima facie des droits à protéger, lorsque ce n’est pas leur exis-
tence même qui est en cause mais leur portée.
   Ainsi dans l’affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt :

      « la Cour observe qu’il n’est pas contesté qu’il existe, pour la Fin-
      lande, un droit de passage par le Grand-Belt, le différend qui oppose
      les Parties ayant trait à la nature et à l’étendue de ce droit, et notam-
      ment à son applicabilité à certains navires de forage et plates-formes
      pétrolières » (Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Danemark),
      mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 29 juillet 1991, C.I.J. Recueil
      1991, p. 17, par. 22).

   D’autre part, dans l’affaire des Essais nucléaires, les juges se sont divi-
sés sur la situation juridique existante qui doit être préservée pendente
lite, notamment sur le contenu du droit de procéder à des essais nu-
cléaires (Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), mesures conser-
vatoires, ordonnance du 22 juin 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 135 ; voir
notamment les opinions dissidentes des juges Forster et Petrén).
   Le problème qui nous concerne dans la requête en mesures conserva-
toires introduite par l’Argentine contre l’Uruguay est plus complexe,
puisque les deux Parties ont engagé un véritable débat devant la Cour sur
l’existence même du droit invoqué par l’Argentine à ce que l’autorisation
de construire les usines de pâte à papier ne soit donnée, ni que le lance-
ment des travaux ne soit effectué, sans l’accord préalable des deux pays.
   5. La Cour ne devait-elle pas saisir cette occasion et se demander si,
dans certaines circonstances, elle n’est pas tenue d’examiner prima facie
l’existence du droit en cause ? D’autant plus que cette question a divisé
jusqu’à présent les juges et la doctrine (voir l’opinion individuelle du juge
Shahabuddeen jointe à l’ordonnance précitée de la Cour du 29 juillet
1991 dans l’affaire du Passage par le Grand-Belt (Finlande c. Dane-
mark), C.I.J. Recueil 1991, notamment p. 29 et suiv.).

34

144            USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER (OP. IND. BENNOUNA)

   6. Je pense que la Cour pouvait s’engager dans cette voie, en prenant
toutes les précautions indispensables pour ne pas être taxée d’avoir, ce
faisant, préjugé du fond de l’affaire. L’Argentine, au demeurant, n’a pas
demandé à la Cour de décider définitivement sur une partie de ses deman-
des ; elle lui a proposé seulement de geler la situation en attendant l’arrêt
au fond (dans l’affaire de l’Usine de Chorzów, la Cour a considéré que
      « la demande du Gouvernement allemand ne peut être considérée
      comme visant l’indication des mesures conservatoires, mais comme
      tendant à obtenir un jugement provisionnel adjugeant une partie des
      conclusions de la susdite requête » (ordonnance du 21 novembre
      1927, C.P.J.I. série A no 12, p. 10)).
   7. D’ailleurs les Parties elles-mêmes étaient d’accord pour que la Cour
se prononçât prima facie sur l’existence du droit revendiqué, à savoir le
droit à ce que les ouvrages ne soient pas construits sans leur accord com-
mun préalable, droit dit procédural. En effet, l’Argentine a tout d’abord
énuméré, parmi les droits qu’elle cherche à sauvegarder, dans sa demande
du 4 mai 2006 en indication de mesures conservatoires :
      « le droit à ce que l’Uruguay n’autorise ni n’entreprenne la construc-
      tion d’ouvrages susceptibles de causer des préjudices sensibles au
      fleuve Uruguay — bien juridique dont l’intégrité doit être préser-
      vée — ou à l’Argentine ».
   8. La question de savoir qui, en dernière analyse, autorise cette cons-
truction, en cas de divergences entre les Parties sur les « préjudices sen-
sibles », restait cependant posée.
   Dans ses plaidoiries, l’Argentine devait préciser son interprétation du
statut :
         « [S]i l’Argentine a fait des objections à un projet soumis à ces
      conditions énoncées par le statut — comme elle l’a fait en l’espèce à
      de multiples reprises — l’Uruguay ne peut construire aucun
      ouvrage... L’Argentine a un droit indéniable à ce qu’il soit interdit à
      l’Uruguay de réaliser tout ouvrage. L’article 9 [du statut] établit une
      obligation de « non construction ». C’est aussi simple que cela. »
      (CR 2006/46, p. 31, par. 12 (Sands).)
   9. En quelque sorte, l’Argentine estime que si les Parties divergent sur
le point de savoir si un projet est susceptible de causer des préjudices sen-
sibles au fleuve Uruguay, il s’ensuit une obligation pour l’Uruguay de ne
pas l’autoriser et un droit pour l’Argentine qu’il ne le soit pas. Celle-ci en
conclut que
      « la poursuite de la construction ... cause un préjudice irréparable
      non seulement aux droits de l’Argentine mais également ... au bon
      fonctionnement de la Cour qui joue un rôle très important dans le
      système établi par le statut » (CR 2006/46, p. 32, par. 14 (Sands)).

35

145            USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER (OP. IND. BENNOUNA)

  10. L’Uruguay, de son côté, admet que là se situe le centre du débat
entre les Parties sur l’indication des mesures conservatoires :
         « Le débat de ces derniers jours a été clarificateur parce qu’il a mis
      à nu le vrai objet, ou plutôt le cœur même du différend qui oppose
      les parties. Le cœur du différend est justement représenté par la ques-
      tion de savoir si, oui ou non, un droit de veto subsiste d’après le sta-
      tut qui nous intéresse : tout se résume en fin de compte à cela.
         Or il va de soi qu’un tel différend fondamental ne saurait être
      tranché par la Cour à ce stade de la procédure. Il n’en reste pas
      moins que votre Cour est bien obligée d’en connaître sommairement
      maintenant parce que — il faut le dire — elle ne pourrait pas accor-
      der les mesures conservatoires demandées qu’à condition de recon-
      naître, tout au moins prima facie, que le statut confère effectivement
      aux parties un droit de veto. Si par contre la Cour devait constater
      qu’il y a des raisons sérieuses pour en douter, alors l’octroi des me-
      sures conservatoires ne se justifierait pas... » (CR 2006/49, p. 19-20,
      par. 8-9 (Condorelli).)
   11. Dans ces conditions, la Cour devait se poser la question de l’exis-
tence de ce droit prima facie. Il est vrai cependant qu’il n’est pas appro-
prié de la trancher, même prima facie, lorsque le doute subsiste, du fait de
la complexité, de l’ambiguïté, ou du silence éventuels des documents en
cause (en particulier le statut de 1975 du fleuve Uruguay) qui ne permet-
traient pas d’arbitrer à ce stade entre les interprétations divergentes des
Parties. Dans cette hypothèse, le renvoi de toute la discussion à la phase
du fond s’imposerait. Et c’est précisément la situation dans laquelle la
Cour s’est trouvée face à la demande de l’Argentine de se voir reconnaître
un droit à ce que les travaux soient autorisés d’un commun accord. Une
fois l’appréciation faite des droits en présence, le risque d’un préjudice
irréparable et l’indication ou non de mesures conservatoires devraient en
découler. Il manque donc, à notre sens, un chaînon dans le raisonnement
de la Cour, celui relatif à l’existence ou non prima facie du droit invoqué.

   12. En effet, ce chaînon du raisonnement est important, comme l’ont
perçu les Parties elles-mêmes, puisqu’il détermine la réponse qui sera
apportée à la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, tout au
moins dans la partie relative à la suspension des travaux. S’il est établi
prima facie que l’Uruguay ne peut les entreprendre sans que l’Argentine
y ait consenti, alors il convient d’urgence de préserver ce droit de l’Argen-
tine par le retrait des autorisations qui ont été données et le gel de la
situation sur le terrain. Par contre, si de prime abord, le statut de 1975,
interprété correctement, selon les méthodes admises en la matière, et
d’éventuels accords subséquents, ne permettent pas de répondre positive-
ment à la question, alors le débat sera reporté à la discussion au fond de
l’affaire.
   13. La Cour a choisi d’éluder cette discussion (alors que les deux
Parties s’y étaient engagées), en se contentant d’affirmer que même si le

36

146              USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER (OP. IND. BENNOUNA)

droit invoqué par l’Argentine avait été violé, cela ne signifie pas qu’il ne
sera pas toujours possible d’y remédier au stade du fond (paragraphes 70
et 71 de l’ordonnance), autrement dit, il ne s’agirait pas d’un préjudice
irréparable. Mais ce n’est là qu’une pétition de principe de la Cour, car si
la fonction des mesures conservatoires est de préserver les droits en pré-
sence, la Cour devrait veiller à ce que ceux-ci ne soient pas purement et
simplement annihilés. Or que devient le droit éventuel de l’Argentine de
consentir aux travaux si ceux-ci, une fois autorisés sans son accord, pou-
vaient se poursuivre jusqu’à leur terme, alors que la Cour était saisie 2 ? Le
droit aurait bel et bien disparu et on ne voit pas quelle mesure de répara-
tion pourrait le ressusciter. Certes, la construction de ces usines colossales
de pâte à papier n’est pas un « fait accompli », comme l’a souligné la
Cour, mais que sait-on des effets qu’elle pourrait avoir à court et à
moyen terme sur le site considéré, promis à une vocation touristique du
côté argentin ?
   14. La Cour n’a pas osé lever le voile qui, dans sa jurisprudence,
recouvre pudiquement les droits en cause à cette phase de la procédure.
On peut estimer qu’elle le fait implicitement, sans le dire ; mais, comme en
toutes choses, sa fonction ne pourrait que gagner à être expressément cla-
rifiée.
   15. Est-ce que cela signifie qu’il y a un risque d’un glissement du débat
à ce niveau vers des questions qui devraient être traitées au stade du
fond ? Je ne le pense pas. Les Parties n’ont-elles pas dans cette affaire
débattu du droit en litige et demandé à la Cour de se prononcer à son
sujet prima facie, tout en restant dans les limites du temps qui leur était
imparti et sans jamais aborder réellement le fond ? Et encore une fois, il
s’agit d’une question de dosage, de degré dans le traitement des pro-
blèmes et non de leur nature, tant il est vrai qu’on ne peut séparer tota-
lement l’instance en indication de mesures conservatoires de l’instance au
fond, les droits en cause formant le lien indissoluble entre elles. La diffé-
rence est que d’un côté on veut les préserver à titre provisoire et que, de
l’autre, on vise le règlement définitif des différends nés à leur sujet.

  16. C’est pour cela que je regrette cette occasion manquée par la Cour
de clarifier cet aspect des mesures conservatoires. Il n’en demeure pas
moins qu’ayant considéré que les éléments mis à la disposition de la Cour
ne lui permettaient pas de se prononcer, prima facie, au sujet du droit
invoqué par l’Argentine et, partageant le reste du raisonnement de la
Cour, j’ai voté en faveur de l’ordonnance.

                                                (Signé) Mohamed BENNOUNA.

   2 Karin Oellers-Frahm a souligné, dans son commentaire de l’article 41 du Statut :

« what is to be preserved is the subject-matter of the right, the factual use of the right
which would be impossible if the subject-matter were irreparably destroyed » (The Statute
of the International Court of Justice, dir. publ. A. Zimmermann et al., 2006, p. 931).

37


67

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GUERRERO
{Translation ]

I regret to find myself in disagreement with the operative part
of the Judgment and with a few of the considerations on which it
is founded.

On the other hand, I share the view of the Court when it
recognizes that, in the present case, the jurisdiction of the Court
depends upon the Declarations made by the Parties in accordance
with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

This view does not seem to me to conflict with the principle
that the problem of the Court’s jurisdiction is reduced to deter-
mining the extent of the obligations assumed by the Parties and
to verifying their conformity with the provisions of the Statute
which the Court is obliged to observe and respect for which it
must ensure.

The consideration of the Court is therefore directed to the
instrument by virtue of which it is seised, that is to say, the special

agreement or the jurisdictional clause.

In the jurisprudence of the Court, there are to be found very
definite indications for the signatories of these instruments. I
shall mention only the Order of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice made on August rgth, 1929, in the case of the
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the district of Gex.

The representatives of France and Switzerland, Parties to this
dispute, were in agreement on communication by the Court un-
officially to the Agents of both Parties of any indications which
might appear desirable as to the result of the Court’s deliberation.

After stating in the Order that the spirit and letter of its Statute
did not allow the Court to act in accordance with the agreement
between the Parties and that the Court could not, on the proposal
of the Parties, depart from the terms of the Statute, the Order
of August 19th, 1929, stated:

“Nevertheless, it is important to set forth clearly that special
agreements whereby international disputes are submitted to the
Court should henceforth be formulated with due regard to the forms
in which the Court is to express its opinion according to the precise
terms of the constitutional provisions governing its activity, in
order that the Court may be able to deal with such disputes in the
ordinary course and without resorting, as in the present case, to a
construction which must be regarded as strictly exceptional.”
(Order of August roth, 1929. Case of the Free Zones, p. 13, Series A,
No. 22.)

What is said with regard to special agreements applies equally
to the conditions in which States formulate their jurisdictional
clauses. In the latter, as in the former, the consensus of the Parties

62
NORWEGIAN LOANS (DISS. OPIN. JUDGE GUERRERO) 68

is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Court. It is
further necessary to ascertain whether that consensus is compatible
with the provisions of the Statute and whether it can be applied
without the Court’s being obliged to depart from those provisions.

It should be pointed out that, in the case of the Free Zones,
the Court decided ex officio on the incompatibility of the Franco-
Swiss Agreement with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
It did not wait for the question of incompatibility to be raised
by the Parties.

It is highly probable that it would have been the same in the
present case if the Court had not considered that it should not
“examine whether the French reservation is consistent with the
undertaking of a legal obligation and is compatible with Article 36,
paragraph 6, of the Statute’.

One of the aspects of the problem raised by the second part
of the first Objection put forward by the Norwegian Government
was the question whether that Government is entitled to rely on
the restrictions placed by France on the obligation assumed on
March rst, 1949, and whether Norway, equally with France, was
entitled to except from compulsory jurisdiction disputes under-
stood by Norway to be essentially within its national jurisdiction.

This aspect of the problem was examined in to-day’s Judgment.

I shall endeavour to consider briefly the other aspect of the
problem which the Court did not think it necessary to examine,
namely, that of the compatibility of the French reservation with
the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

The French Government’s Declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court contains the following reservation:

“This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood
by the Government of the French Republic.”

The great defect of this reservation is that it does not conform
either to the spirit of the Statute of the Court or to the provisions
of paragraphs 2 and 6 of Article 36.

It is obvious that the purpose of paragraph 2 is to establish the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court between States which accede
to the optional clause. By the fact that France reserves her right
to determine herself the limit between her own national jurisdiction
and the jurisdiction of the Court, France renders void her main
undertaking, for the latter ceases to be compulsory if it is France
and not the Court that holds the power to determine the limit
between their respective jurisdictions.

The reservation conflicts also with paragraph 6 of Article 36,
which is in the following terms:

63
NORWEGIAN LOANS (DISS. OPIN. JUDGE GUERRERO) 69

“In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.”

This principle is common to all arbitral and judicial tribunals of
an international character.

The Court would perhaps be the only tribunal that would be
compelled to refuse to deal with a dispute submitted to it whenever
a State invoked the reservation in question to claim the right to
determine that limit.

Without going in detail into the questions raised by the French
reservation, I wish, nevertheless, to point out that it is an obstacle
to the exercise of the judicial function attributed to the Court and
that it seriously affects the efficacity of the optional clause.

These considerations are, in my view, sufficient to prove the
urgent necessity for a judicial decision on the validity of reserva-
tions which go beyond what is permitted by Article 36 of the
Statute.

Although Article 36 has been construed as meaning that a
declaration of accession to the optional clause may contain reser-
vations, it is certain that it was never the intention of the authors
of the Statute that such reservations should serve to enable a
State to evade the undertakings involved in the declaration pro-
vided for by Article 36, paragraph 2, or unilaterally to arrogate
to itself rights which the Statute confers solely on the Court.

Such reservations must be regarded as devoid of all legal validity.
It has rightly been said already that it is not possible to establish a
system of law if each State reserves to itself the power to decide
itself what the law is.

It is clear, moreover, that the new practices introduced in
August 1946 are contrary to the spirit and to the purpose of the
Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations 1.

The problem to be solved is, however, a simple one. It is, in
fact, the problem whether the unilateral will of one State or the
common will of the Parties before the Court can have priority over
the collective will expressed in an instrument as important as the
Statute of the Court.

It may not be inappropriate to recall that when Article 36 of the
Statute was construed as meaning that it gave the right to accede
to the optional clause with reservations, this was under the favour-
able influence of the attitude which the Members of the League of
Nations had adopted in regard to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Their declarations of acceptance were accompanied only by reser-
vations that came within the framework of Article 36 of the Statute.
The anxiety of the Members of the League of Nations was that the

1 American Bar Association Journal, March 1947, No. 3, p. 249, and May 1947,
No. 5, p. 432.

64
NORWEGIAN LOANS (DISS. OPIN. JUDGE GUERRERO) 70

movement towards the final establishment of international com-
pulsory jurisdiction, which was developing so well before the Second
World War, should not be impeded in any way whatsoever.

It was only in the early days of the United Nations that the
situation changed completely, when one of its Members declared,
on August 14th, 1946, that it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court, provided that its Declaration should not apply, inter
alia, to disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within its own domestic jurisdiction, as determined by itself.

Six other States have up to the present followed the example set
on August 14th, 1946. Should this practice gain other followers, the
optional clause will cease to be an instrument capable of bringing
about compulsory jurisdiction between States.

The validity of these new reservations has, df course, not yet
been examined by any international organ of the United Nations.
There is, in fact, no other procedure to be followed in regard to
declarations of accession to paragraph 2 of Article 36 than that
which is provided for in paragraph 4 of the same Article. The
Declarations are deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, who transmits copies of them to the Parties to the
Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.

What it will be found difficult to understand is what reason the
Court could have had for not dealing with the question when it was
seised of the Franco-Norwegian dispute, in the course of which the
Parties invoked the terms of their respective declarations of acces-
sion to the optional clause.

*
* *

As regards the operative part of the Judgment, I shall confine
myself to saying that I cannot agree that the Court is without
jurisdiction when its lack of jurisdiction is founded on the terms
of a unilateral instrument which I consider to be contrary to the
spirit and to the letter of the Statute and which, in my view, is,
for that reason, null and void.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,