                                                                                258

                DÉCLARATION COMMUNE
   DE MM. LES JUGES CANÇADO TRINDADE ET ROBINSON

[Traduction]

   1. En plus de nos opinions individuelles respectives, nous estimons
devoir présenter cette déclaration commune compte tenu de l’importance
que nous attachons au contenu normatif des résolutions de l’Assemblée
générale des Nations Unies s’appliquant à la question traitée dans le pré-
sent avis consultatif. La Cour aurait dû attacher plus d’importance à la
valeur de résolutions essentielles telle que les résolutions 1188 (XII) du
11 décembre 1957, 1514 (XV) du 14 décembre 1960, 2621 (XXV) du
12 octobre 1970 et 2625 (XXV) du 24 octobre 1970. En négligeant ces
résolutions, la Cour a aﬀaibli leur valeur dans le développement, en droit
international général, du droit fondamental à l’autodétermination.

   2. Les résolutions adoptées par l’Assemblée générale avant 1960 1
témoignent d’un engagement ferme en faveur des droits humains fonda-
mentaux : elles aﬃrment la dignité et la valeur de la personne humaine
ainsi que le respect du principe de l’égalité des droits. Ces résolutions ont
jeté les fondations nécessaires à l’élaboration du droit des peuples à dis-
poser d’eux-mêmes, droit qui a trouvé sa formulation déﬁnitive dans la
résolution historique 1514 (XV) de l’Assemblée générale en date du
14 décembre 1960 (ci-après la « déclaration de 1960 »). La déclaration de
1960 a marqué une étape essentielle pour l’humanité dans l’évolution du
droit international s’agissant du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes.
Si l’on veut bien se souvenir qu’en 1960, un tiers au moins de la popula-
tion mondiale vivait encore sous domination coloniale, la déclaration doit

   1 Voir, par exemple, résolution 9 (I) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 9 février 1946,
Populations qui ne s’administrent pas elles-mêmes ; résolution 566 (VI) de l’Assemblée
générale en date du 18 janvier 1952, Participation des territoires non autonomes aux
Travaux du Comité des renseignements relatifs aux territoires non autonomes ; résolu-
tion 545 (VI) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 5 février 1952, Insertion dans le Pacte
ou les Pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme d’un article sur le droit des
peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, se référant à la résolution 421 (V) de l’Assemblée géné-
rale en date du 4 décembre 1950 ; résolution 637 (VII) de l’Assemblée générale en date
du 16 décembre 1952, Droit des peuples et des nations à disposer d’eux-mêmes ; résolu-
tion 738 (VIII) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 28 novembre 1953, Le droit des peuples
et des nations à disposer d’eux-mêmes ; résolution 1188 (XII) de l’Assemblée générale en
date du 11 décembre 1957, Recommandations concernant le respect, sur le plan interna-
tional, du droit des peuples et des nations à disposer d’eux-mêmes ; résolution 1466 (XIV)
de l’Assemblée générale en date du 12 décembre 1959, Participation des territoires non
autonomes aux travaux de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées.

                                                                                167

                     séparation des chagos (décl. comm.)                              259

être considérée comme une gigantesque avancée sur la voie de la libéra-
tion et de la justice. Soutenue par la création, le 27 novembre 1961, du
comité spécial chargé de surveiller son application 2, la déclaration de
1960 témoigne de la volonté manifeste de l’Assemblée générale de réaliser,
en droit international, le droit à l’autodétermination. En eﬀet, elle consti-
tuait l’aﬃrmation de ce droit en tant que norme universellement appli-
cable à laquelle il était, par conséquent, impossible de déroger.

   3. L’Assemblée générale a joué un rôle très actif pour garantir l’achè-
vement du processus de décolonisation à travers le monde, grâce notam-
ment à l’adoption de plusieurs résolutions réaﬃrmant les dispositions de
la déclaration de 1960 et surveillant son application au ﬁl des années 3.
   4. La déclaration de 1960 a cristallisé le droit des peuples à disposer
d’eux-mêmes en droit international général. Son importance cruciale a été
par la suite conﬁrmée par la Cour dans son avis consultatif de 1975 sur le
Sahara occidental, dans lequel elle déclarait en particulier qu’elle « a été la
base du processus de décolonisation qui s’est traduit, depuis 1960, par la
création de nombreux Etats, aujourd’hui Membres des Nations Unies » 4.
   5. La déclaration sur les relations amicales 5, adoptée en 1970 (ci-après
la « déclaration de 1970 »), a réaﬃrmé les éléments constitutifs du droit
des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, plus particulièrement l’obligation de
respecter l’intégrité territoriale des territoires non autonomes ainsi que,
élément majeur, la volonté librement exprimée des peuples intéressés de
mettre rapidement ﬁn au colonialisme. La déclaration de 1970 constitue
un nouvel exemple de la grande valeur des résolutions de l’Assemblée
générale pour ancrer solidement le droit à l’autodétermination dans le
droit international général.
   6. En insistant, année après année, sur l’importance du droit fonda-
mental des peuples à obtenir leur liberté et leur indépendance en tant que
norme majeure du droit international, l’Assemblée générale est parvenue,
grâce à ses résolutions et à leur application, à mener presque entièrement
à bien le processus de décolonisation à travers le monde. Le présent avis
consultatif doit être replacé dans cette perspective historique.

   2  Résolution 1654 (XVI) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 27 novembre 1961, La
situation en ce qui concerne l’application de la Déclaration sur l’octroi de l’indépendance
aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux.
    3 Voir, par exemple, résolution 1654 (XVI) de l’Assemblée générale en date du

27 novembre 1961, La situation en ce qui concerne l’application de la Déclaration sur
l’octroi de l’indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux ; résolution 1956 (XVIII) de
l’Assemblée générale en date du 11 décembre 1963, La situation en ce qui concerne l’appli-
cation de la Déclaration sur l’octroi de l’indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux ;
résolution 2189 (XXI) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 13 décembre 1966, Application
de la Déclaration sur l’octroi de l’indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux.
    4 Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 32, par. 57.
    5 Résolution 2625 (XXV) de l’Assemblée générale en date du 24 octobre 1970, Décla-

ration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la
coopération entre les Etats conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies.

                                                                                168

                 séparation des chagos (décl. comm.)                   260

  7. Compte tenu de la pertinence des résolutions de l’Assemblée géné-
rale pour les questions soulevées devant la Cour, il aurait fallu accorder
une plus grande importance à leur valeur. On ne peut mettre en cause la
valeur normative de ces résolutions en la matière : elles sont la preuve du
développement continu de l’opinio juris communis en droit international
coutumier.
  8. Dans le présent avis consultatif, la Cour aurait dû examiner avec
plus de soin l’importance des résolutions de l’Assemblée générale dans la
consolidation du droit à l’autodétermination et, compte tenu de la perti-
nence du jus cogens pour les questions soulevées dans la procédure, elle
aurait également dû se prononcer sur le caractère impératif (jus cogens)
de ce droit.

                       (Signé) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.
                               (Signé) Patrick L. Robinson.

                                                                       169


COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE

SÉRIE A/B

ARRETS, ORDONNANCES ET AVIS CONSULTATIFS

FASCICULE N° 66

AFFAIRE PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY
(EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE)

ORDONNANCE DU 23 MAI 1936

1936

ORDER OF MAY 23rd, 1936

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

SERIES A./B.

JUDGMENTS, ORDERS AND ADVISORY OPINIONS

FASCICULE No. 66

THE PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTION)

SOCIETE D’EDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF’S

LEYDE LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

ORDER MADE ON MAY 23rd, 1936. 1936.
— May 23rd.
—— General List :
Nos. 65 and 66.

JUDICIAL YEAR 1936.

[Translation.|

THE PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTION)

Present : Sir Cecrt Hurst, President ; M. GUERRERO, Vice-Presi-
dent ; Baron RoLIN-JAEQUEMYNS, Count ROSTWOROWSKI,
MM. FROMAGEOT, DE BUSTAMANTE, ALTAMIRA, ANZILOTTI,
Urrutia, NEGULESCO, Jhr. VAN Eysinca, M. NAGAOKA,
judges; MM. DE ToMCcsANYI and Zoriti¢, Judges ad
hoc.

The Permanent Court of International Justice,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

having regard to Articles 40 and 48 of the Statute,
having regard to Article 62 of the Rules of Court,

Makes the following Order:

AS REGARDS THE POSITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS :

Whereas the Royal Hungarian Government, by means of an
Application dated December Ist, 1935, presented to and filed
with the Registry of the Court on December 6th, 1935, has
instituted proceedings before the Permanent Court of Inter-
national. Justice against the Royal Yugoslav Government in
regard to three judgments rendered on July 22nd, 1935, by the
Hungaro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbitral Tribunal under Nos. 740,

750 and 747;
4
A./B. 66.—PAJzZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE 5

Whereas the Hungarian Government, in its Application, relies
in this case, firstly upon Article X of Agreement II for the
“settlement of questions relating to the agrarian reforms and
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals’, signed at Paris on April 28th,
1930, inter alia by Hungary and Yugoslavia, which Article is
as follows:

“Article X.—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, of
the one part, and Hungary, of the other part, agree to recog-
nize, without any special agreement, a right of appeal to the
Permanent Court of International Justice from all judgments
on questions of jurisdiction or merits which may be given hence-
forth by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals in all proceedings other
than those referred to in Article I of the present Agreement.

The right of appeal may be exercised by written application
by either of the two Governments between which the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, within three months from the
notification to its Agent of the judgment of the said Tribunal.”

Whereas the Hungarian Government, in support of its Applic-
ation, adduces, secondly, Article XVII of Agreement II and
Article 22 of Agreement III of Paris, which are as follows:

Agreement IIT, ‘Article XVII.—In the event of any differ-
ence as to the interpretation or application of the present
Agreement and failing agreement between the Parties interested
on the choice of a single arbitrator, any State interested shall
be entitled to address itself, by written application, to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, and shall not be
barred by any decision of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal under
Article I of the present Agreement.”

Agreement III. “Article 22.—In the event of any difference
as to the interpretation or application of the present Agree-
ment, and failing agreement between the Parties interested on
the choice of a single arbitrator, any State interested shall be
entitled to address itself, by written application, to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice.”

Whereas the Hungarian Government, in its Application,
adduces, lastly and in the alternative, the declarations made
by Hungary and Yugoslavia accepting the Optional Clause of
Article 36 of the Court’s Statute ;

Whereas, in regard thereto, while Hungary, on May 3oth,
1934, renewed her acceptance of this clause for a period of five
years as from August 13th, 1934, Yugoslavia, on May 16th,
1930, only accepted the clause for a period of five years as
from November 24th, 1930; whereas, since this acceptance has
not been renewed, Yugoslavia had ceased to be bound by the
Optional Clause on December 6th, 1935, the date on which the
Application of the Hungarian Government was filed; and

5
A./B. 66.—PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE 6

whereas this is a point on which the Parties are in agree-
ment ;

Whereas the time-limits for the presentation of the docu-
ments of the written proceedings, after successive extensions,
were so fixed that the time allowed to the Hungarian Govern-
ment for the presentation of its Memorial expired on January 2oth,
1936, and the time allowed to the Yugoslav Government for
the presentation of its Counter-Memorial expired on March 5th,
1936 ;

Whereas the Hungarian Government, in the Memorial filed
by it within the time-limit thus fixed, prays the Court:

“A. 1. To admit the appeal;

2. To adjudge and declare, as a matter of law, after admit-
ting the appeal, preferably by way of revising the three
judgments in question, that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims of the
Hungarian nationals, stating fully the reasons on which
the judgment is based and requiring the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal to conform to such statement of reasons;

B. Alternatively or cumulatively, as the Court may see fit:

1. To adjudge and declare, generally, how Agreements II
and III of Paris are to be interpreted and applied, and
to redress the situation created by the Yugoslav Govern-
ment’s attitude, since that Government, either under its
domestic legislation as portrayed in Article 11, paragraph 3,
of its law of June 26th, 1931, or under an erroneous
interpretation of that legislation by the administrative
authorities—though alleged by it to be authorized by
and in conformity with Agreements II and II of Paris—
at present refuses to recognize in respect of all Hunga-
rian nationals its obligation to pay the sums due to
them in accordance with the national treatment applic-
able to them under its domestic legislation in respect of
their lands expropriated in the course of its agrarian
reform—extending to them an entirely new and unfore-
seen treatment discriminatory in character and not pro-
vided for in Agreements II and III of Paris—instead of
only proceeding in this way in the case of Hungarian
nationals who submitted claims in respect of the same
lands before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and who have
had their claims recognized by judgments of the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal against the Agrarian Fund, as laid
down in. Agreements II and III of Paris;

2. To order the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in particular:

(a) in its attitude and proceedings, strictly to conform to the
interpretation and application of Agreements II and III,

6
A./B. 66.-—PAJZS, CSÂKY, ESTERHAZY CASE 7

so laid down as correct, and to respect the rights of
which the existence was assumed by those Agreements ;

(8) to make good the damage and refund the costs and
expenses occasioned to Hungarian nationals by its pre-
sent attitude and proceedings which are unwarranted by
Agreements II and III of Paris;

C. To adjudge and declare that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
is also under an obligation to indemnify the Government
of the Kingdom of Hungary for all costs and expenses
incurred by the latter in obtaining redress for its nation-
als for whose situation the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in
spite of warning, is responsible, including the cost and
expenses of the present proceedings before the Court” ;

Whereas, within the time-limit fixed for the presentation of
its Counter-Memorial, the Yugoslav Government filed a docu-
ment entitled: ‘“Counter-Memorial of the Yugoslav Government
including the formal submission of an objection presented to.
the Court in the proceeding instituted by the Hungarian
Government as an appeal from the three judgments Nos. 747,
749 and 750, rendered by the Hungaro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbi-
tral Tribunal”, and praying the Court:

“1. To adjudge and declare, before entering upon the merits,
that the appeal of the Royal Hungarian Government against
the three judgments of the Hungaro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbi-
tral Tribunal cannot be entertained and is contrary to Arti-
cle X of Agreement II of Paris;

2. To adjudge and declare, before entering upon the merits,
that the request of the Royal Hungarian Government for
a general interpretation by the Court of Agreements II and
IIT of Paris cannot be entertained because the essential
conditions laid down by Article XVII of Agreement II and
Article 22 of Agreement III have not been fulfilled ;

3. Alternatively, to adjudge and declare that the appeal of the
Hungarian Government under Article X of Agreement II
is ill-founded, and to confirm the three judgments of the
Hungaro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbitral Tribunal ;

4. Alternatively, to adjudge and declare that the three judg-
ments of the Hungaro-Yugoslav Mixed Arbitral Tribunal are in
accordance with the true interpretation of the Paris Agreements ;

5. To order the Royal Hungarian Government to refund to
the Royal Yugoslav Government all costs and expenses
incurred in the present proceedings” ;

Whereas, in an Order made on March roth, 19364, under
Article 38 of the Rules then in force, the Court—holding the
first two submissions of the Yugoslav Government to be in
the nature of preliminary objections—fixed April 3rd, 1936,
as the date by which the Hungarian Government might pre-
sent a written Statement of its observations and submissions

1 The text of this Order will be published subsequently. [Note by the Registrar.]
7
A./B. 66.—PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE 8

in regard to these objections ; whereas, by the date thus fixed,
the Hungarian Government filed a Statement praying the
Court :

“To overrule the preliminary objections of the respondent
State ;

To declare itself to have jurisdiction ;
To order the continuance of the proceedings on the merits’ ;

Whereas the two Parties concerned have availed themselves
of their right under Article 31 of the Statute each to nomin-
ate a judge to sit in the case;

Whereas, at public hearings held by the Court on April 2gth
and 30th and May Ist, 4th, 5th and 6th, 1936, M. Stoykovitch,
the Agent finally appointed by the Yugoslav Government, and
M. Gajzago, the Agent appointed by the Hungarian Govern-
ment, respectively presented the oral observations of the Parties
upon the objections above mentioned; whereas the Agent for
the Hungarian Government in his oral statements maintained
the submissions on the objections made in the Hungarian
written Statement and the submissions on the merits made
in the Hungarian Memorial; whereas, for his part, the Agent
for the Yugoslav Government also maintained as they stood
the two submissions made by the Yugoslav Government as
preliminary objections in its Counter-Memorial, including the
formal submission of an objection on the proceeding instituted
by the Hungarian Government ;

Whereas, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court must
under Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Rules in force, either
give its decision on the objection or join the objection to the
merits ;

AS REGARDS THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION :

Whereas it appears from the written statements and verbal
explanations of the Parties that the Court is confronted with
the two following objections :

(1) that the appeal of the Hungarian Government based on
Article X of Agreement II of Paris cannot be entertained
because, contrary to the contentions of the Hungarian Govern-
ment, the cases forming the subject of the judgments appealed
against are not, as required by Article X, cases other than
those referred to in Article I of that Agreement and because
the said judgments are not judgments on questions of juris-
diction or merits within the meaning of Article X ;

‘ (2) that the request of the Hungarian Government based
on Article XVII of Agreement II and Article 22 of Agree-
ment III cannot be entertained because that Government has
lodged an application with the Court without its first having

8
A./B. 66.—PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE 9

been established that the Parties concerned have failed to
agree on the choice of a single arbitrator ;

Whereas the questions raised by the first of these objections
and those arising out of the appeal as set forth in the Hun-
garian Government’s submissions on the merits are too intim-
ately related and too closely interconnected for the Court
to be able to adjudicate upon the former without prejudging
the latter ; ‘

Whereas the purpose of the second objection of the Yugoslav
Government is to frustrate a request which is presented
“alternatively or cumulatively as the Court may see fit” to
the “‘appeal’’ based on Article X of Agreement II to which
the first objection relates; whereas, in so far as this request
is in the nature of an alternative, the objection in respect of
it can likewise only be dealt with in the alternative ;

Whereas the further proceedings on the merits, by enabling
the Court to obtain a clear understanding of the relation in
which the appeal under Article X of Agreement II stands to
the request for the interpretation of Agreements II and III
under Articles XVII and 22 of these Agreements, and of the
meaning and scope to be attached to the submissions presented
“alternatively or cumulatively as the Court may see fit”, will
place the Court in a better position to adjudicate with a full
knowledge of the facts upon the second objection of the Yugo-
slav Government ;

Whereas both objections should therefore be joined to the
merits, so that the Court will give its decision upon them and,
if need be, upon the merits in one and the same judgment ;

AS REGARDS THE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS :

Whereas, under Article 62, paragraph 5, of the Rules in
force, if the Court joins the objection to the merits, it must
once more fix time-limits for the further proceedings ;

Whereas, upon the presentation of the objection of the Yugo-
slav Government, the Court suspended the proceedings on the
merits; whereas however the document filed by the Yugoslav
Government within the time-limit fixed for the presentation of
its Counter-Memorial in itself constituted, according both to its
title and contents, a Counter-Memorial on the merits ;

Whereas, in these circumstances and in accordance with the
Order of March roth, 1936, it now only rests with the Court
to fix the time-limits for the presentation of the Reply and
Rejoinder on the merits ;
A./B. 66.—PAJZS, CSAKY, ESTERHAZY CASE Io
THE COURT

(x) joins the objections lodged by the Yugoslav Government
to the merits in the proceedings instituted by the Applica-
tion of the Hungarian Government filed with the Regis-
try on December 6th, 1935, and will adjudicate upon these
objections and, if need be, upon the merits in one and
the same judgment ;

(2) fixes as follows the further time-limits for the filing of
the documents of the written proceedings :

(a) for the Reply by the Hungarian Government :

July 3rd, 1936;
(b) for the Rejoinder by the Yugoslav Government :
August r4th, 1936.

Done at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-third day
of May, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, in three copies, one
of which shall be placed in the Archives of the Court and the
others shall be transmitted to the Royal Hungarian Govern-
ment and to the Royal Yugoslav Government respectively.

(Signed) CECIL J. B. Hurst,

President.

(Signed) À. HAMMARSKJOLD,

Registrar.

Io


                      470

                                DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BHANDARI

                         1. On a close and careful examination of the pleadings, documents
                      and submissions, I came to the conclusion that, in the facts and circum-
                      stances of this case, the Court should not have indicated provisional
                      measures.
                         2. The case of Qatar is based on the UAE’s declaration of 5 June 2017,
                       which is reproduced in relevant part as under:
                              “UAE affirms its complete commitment and support to the Gulf
                           Cooperation Council and to the security and stability of the
                           GCC States. Within this framework, and based on the insistence of
                           the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability
                           of the region and its failure to honour international commitments and
                           agreements, it has been decided to take the following measures that
                           are necessary for safeguarding the interests of the GCC States in gen-
                           eral and those of the brotherly Qatari people in particular:

                           (1) In support of the statements issued by the sisterly Kingdom of
                               Bahrain and sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United
                               Arab Emirates severs all relations with the State of Qatar, includ-
                               ing breaking off diplomatic relations, and gives Qatari diplomats
                               48 hours to leave UAE.
                           (2) Preventing Qatari nationals from entering the UAE or crossing
                               its points of entry, giving Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE
                               14 days to leave the country for precautionary security reasons.
                               The UAE nationals are likewise banned from traveling to or stay-
                               ing in Qatar or transiting through its territories.

                           (3) Closure of UAE airspace and seaports for all Qataris in 24 hours
                               and banning all Qatari means of transportation, coming to or
                               leaving the UAE, from crossing, entering or leaving the UAE
                               territories, and taking all legal measures in collaboration with
                               friendly countries and international companies with regards to
                               Qataris using the UAE airspace and territorial waters, from and
                               to Qatar, for national security considerations.

                             The UAE is taking these decisive measures as a result of the Qatari
                           authorities’ failure to abide by the Riyadh Agreement on returning
                           GCC diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in

                      68

7 Ord 1145.indb 132                                                                                11/06/19 14:31

                      471 	            application of the cerd (diss. op. bhandari)

                               2014, and Qatar’s continued support, funding and hosting of terror
                               groups, primarily Islamic Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours
                               to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda across its direct
                               and indirect media.” 1

                         3. The UAE made unqualified statements that the declaration of
                      5 June 2017 has not been implemented or given effect to 2. Conversely,
                      Qatar could not produce sufficiently cogent evidence, in writing or orally,
                      to demonstrate that the declaration of 5 June 2017 has been implemented.
                      Furthermore, on 5 July 2018, after the closure of the oral proceedings, the
                      UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an unqualified undertaking. The
                      relevant portion of this undertaking states that:

                               “[s]ince its announcement on June 5, 2017, pursuant to which the
                               United Arab Emirates (UAE) took certain measures against Qatar
                               for national security reasons, the UAE has instituted a requirement
                               for all Qatari citizens overseas to obtain prior permission for entry
                               into the UAE. Permission may be granted for a limited-duration
                               period, at the discretion of the UAE Government.

                                  The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Coopera-
                               tion wishes to confirm that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE
                               need not apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE.
                               However, all Qatari citizens resident in the UAE are encouraged to
                               obtain prior permission for re-entry into UAE territory.”

                         4. In view of the UAE’s explanation that the declaration of 5 June
                      2017 has not been implemented, and of the unilateral undertaking of
                      5 July 2018, the risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Qatar is not
                      apparent. Unilateral undertakings before the Court can create obligations
                      under international law, as the Court confirmed in Nuclear Tests (Austra-
                      lia v. France) 3, Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) 4, and Maritime
                      Dispute (Peru v. Chile) 5. Such undertakings can also have an impact on
                      provisional measures proceedings, if made in the context of such proceed-
                      ings, as it emerges from the jurisprudence of the Court and of the Inter-
                      national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

                           1
                           Qatar’s Application instituting proceedings, p. 22, para. 22.
                           2
                           CR 2018/13, p. 63, para. 25 (Shaw); ibid., p. 64, para. 26 (Shaw); CR 2018/15, p. 39,
                      para. 12 (Shaw).
                         3 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 267, para. 43.
                         4 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 472,

                      para. 46.
                         5 Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 34, para. 78.

                      69

7 Ord 1145.indb 134                                                                                11/06/19 14:31

                      472 	          application of the cerd (diss. op. bhandari)

                         5. In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
                      (Belgium v. Senegal), the Co‑Agent of Senegal made a solemn declara-
                      tion under which: “Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal
                      while the present case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the
                      intention to allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case
                      is pending before the Court” 6.

                         The Court held that, “taking note of the assurances given by Sene-
                      gal . . . the risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium
                      is not apparent on the date of this Order” 7. In Questions relating to the
                      Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v.
                      Australia), the Attorney General of Australia made a written undertak-
                      ing, under which the documents seized from Timor-Leste’s legal counsel
                      would “not be used by any part of the Australian Government for any
                      purpose other than national security purposes” 8. The Court held that,
                      “[g]iven that, in certain circumstances involving national security, the
                      Government of Australia envisages the possibility of making use of the
                      seized material . . . there remains a risk of disclosure of this potentially
                      highly prejudicial information” 9.

                        6. In Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor
                      (Malaysia v. Singapore), heard by ITLOS under Article 290 of the United
                      Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 10, the Agent of Singapore
                      made a “commitment”, according to which:

                           “[i]f . . . Malaysia believes that Singapore had missed some point or
                           misinterpreted some data and can point to a specific and unlawful
                           adverse effect that would be avoided by suspending some part of the
                           present works, Singapore would carefully study Malaysia’s evidence.
                           If the evidence were to prove compelling, Singapore would seriously
                           re-examine its works and consider taking such steps as are necessary
                           and proper, including a suspension, . . . to deal with the adverse effect
                           in question.” 11

                          6 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),

                      Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 154, para. 68.
                          7 Ibid., p. 155, para. 72.
                          8 Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data

                      (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports
                      2014, p. 156, para. 38.
                          9 Ibid., p. 158, para. 46.
                          10 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1833, p. 3.
                          11 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia

                      v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 24,
                      para. 85.

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                      473 	              application of the cerd (diss. op. bhandari)

                      ITLOS placed on record the commitment made by Singapore 12. How-
                      ever, it seems that ITLOS did not consider that such a commitment was
                      sufficient to remove the risk of irreparable prejudice, since it unanimously
                      prescribed provisional measures 13.
                        7. The jurisprudence suggests that, in order to remove the risk of irrep-
                      arable prejudice, an undertaking or commitment must be unqualified.
                      Australia’s solemn undertaking was insufficient because it stated that the
                      documents allegedly belonging to Timor‑Leste could be used if national
                      security so required. Similarly, Singapore’s commitment appears to have
                      been insufficient because it was worded in vague terms, as it stated that
                      Singapore “would carefully study” available evidence, and only “[i]f the
                      evidence were to prove compelling”, Singapore pledged that it “would
                      seriously re‑examine its works”. By contrast, the undertaking of the
                      Co‑Agent of Senegal was unqualified, as it did not list any circumstances
                      under which Mr. Habré would have been allowed to leave Senegal.

                         8. In the present case, the unqualified undertaking included in the
                      statement of the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 5 July 2018 does
                      not seem to have been qualified by any exceptions. In this sense, it is
                      similar to the undertaking in Questions relating to the Obligation to Pros-
                      ecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), and different from the undertak-
                      ings in Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents
                      and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia) and Land Reclamation by Singapore
                      in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore). Qataris
                      already residing in the UAE “need not apply for permission to continue
                      residence in the UAE”, while only being encouraged to “obtain prior per-
                      mission for re-entry into UAE territory”. Based on this wording, it would
                      appear that Qataris residing in the UAE, but currently located outside the
                      UAE, can re-enter the UAE without hindrance. Qataris residing overseas
                      are required “to obtain prior permission for entry into the UAE”. The
                      granting of right to entry and right of abode to any foreign citizen is a
                      prerogative falling within the reserved domain of the UAE. Consequently,
                      that “permission may be granted . . . at the discretion of the UAE Gov-
                      ernment” could not be seen as an exception to the undertaking that resid-
                      ing Qataris may continue legally to reside in the UAE, and that
                      non-residing Qataris need to obtain permission to enter the UAE. In the
                      light of this undertaking, it is my view that there is no irreparable preju-
                      dice in the circumstances of this case.

                        9. The existence of urgency in a request for provisional measures is
                      fundamentally fact‑dependent. The unqualified undertaking by the UAE,

                           12   ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 25, para. 88.
                           13   Ibid., pp. 26-28, para. 106.

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                      which I believe to have removed the risk of irreparable prejudice in the
                      circumstances, has an impact on urgency. If there is no irreparable preju-
                      dice, there can be no urgency, since urgency is to be understood as an
                      attribute of irreparable prejudice. In the most recent orders on provi-
                      sional measures, the Court has consistently stated that urgency is a “real
                      and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights
                      in dispute before the Court gives its final decision” 14. In its orders on
                      provisional measures, the Court itself examines these two requirements
                      together. Without irreparable prejudice, there can be no urgency.

                        10. For these reasons, it is my view that, in the facts and circumstances
                      of the present case, the Court ought not to have exercised its power to
                      indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute.

                      (Signed) Dalveer Bhandari.

                         14 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),

                      Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 152, para. 62; Certain
                      Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Provi-
                      sional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 21, para. 64; Ques-
                      tions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste
                      v. Australia), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 March 2014, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 154,
                      para. 32; Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Provisional
                      Measures, Order of 7 December 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II), p. 1168, para. 83; Appli-
                      cation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
                      and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
                      nation (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017,
                      I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 136, para. 89; Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), Provisional Measures,
                      Order of 18 May 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 243, para. 50.

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