248

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AL-KHASAWNEH

Sovereignty over Zubarah and over the Hawars — Court declined to rule on:
uti possidetis juris, original title, und impact of effectivités — Preference for
comprehensive treatment of the arguments presented — Confinement by the
Court to the validity and binding force of the 1939 British decision — Too
restrictive Territorial claims open to judicial scrutiny — Absence of refer-
ence to substantive law in the part of the Judgment dealing with the Hawar
Islands.

No rigorous examination of the British decision in the Judgment — Qatari
claim of bias and prejudgment is not answered — Qatari consent to entrust the
British Government with resolving the dispute -~ Doubts as to the reality of the
consent — Consent artificially held to be freely given — Dubai/Sharjah arbitra-
tion fundamentally different.

Uti possidetis juris argument — Status of Qatar and Bahrain — "Protected
States” or “States in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government”
— Control of the British Government over the Sheikhdoms — No right of the
British Government to alienate parts of the Sheikhdoms’ territories without the
Rulers’ consent — No British territorial title to the Sheikhdoms — Uti possi-
detis juris is inapplicable — Intertemporal law — Originally seen as a Latin
American principle — Doubtful applicability of the principle in the Middle East.

Ascertaining the historic title — Necessary given the uncertainty of the other
grounds for determination of territorial title — Al-Khalifah Sheikhs exercised
influence over the affairs of the Qatari peninsula mainland — In precario pos-
sessionis — Claim of Qatari independence in 1868 — Not upheld — Ottoman
sovereignty on Qatar in 1872 — Qatari independence in 1913 under the Anglo-
Ottoman Convention — No indication of the spatial extent of the authority of
the Ruler — No firm evidence permits to conclude that the Hawars belonged to
Qatar — Relationship between geographic proximity, effectivités and title —
Evidence of Bahrain effectivités before 1913 — Recognition by the Ottomans
that the Ruler of Bahrain had ownership rights with respect to the islands —
Other effectivités shown until 1936 — Absence of effectivités adduced by Qatar.

1. Iam in substantive agreement with the majority view on the attribu-
tion of sovereignty over Zubarah to Qatar and over the Hawars to Bah-
rain, With respect to the Hawars, the Court came to its conclusion on the
basis that, whilst the British decision of 1939 was not an arbitration that
had attained a res judicata character, it was nevertheless a valid political
decision that binds the Parties.

2. Having reached this conclusion, the Court expressly declined (para-
graph 148 of the Judgment) to rule on:

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249 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

(a) The applicability of the principle uti possidetis juris;
(b) whether one or the other Party holds an original title; and

(c) the impact of the respective weight of effectivités which the Parties
claim to have carried out on the Hawar Islands.

3. It is of course not unusual for the Court, when faced with what
appears as alternative lines of reasoning to be satisfied, in finding its
own jurisdiction or in reaching a substantive conclusion, with only one
line of argumentation’. An analysis of the merits and demerits of
such an approach is beyond the scope of this separate opinion. Suffice
it to recall that I have had occasion in my dissenting opinion? in the
Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 ( Pakistan v. India) case to express a
preference for a more comprehensive treatment of the various arguments
presented by the Parties and a reluctance to yield too readily to formalism.
These are considerations that guide me also in dealing with the present
case.

4. In confining itself to the issue of the validity and binding force of
the British decision of 1939, the Court risks the not unreasonable criti-
cism of having been excessively restrictive, all the more so since the Bah-
raini formula of 1988 opened all territorial claims to judicial scrutiny and
did not confine itself to the legal status of the British decision. Moreover,
that decision was based on an assessment, by the British officials at the
time, of substantive law, regardless of whether one agrees with that
assessment or not. The absence therefore of any reference to substantive
law in the part of the Judgment dealing with the Hawars seems to me
unwarranted.

5. More importantly, to base the disposition of territorial title to the
Hawars solely on the validity of the British decision necessitates subject-
ing that decision to the most rigorous examination, which was not
adequately attempted in the Judgment. Thus for example the Qatari
claim that there was bias and prejudgment in violation of the rule which
prohibits bias in a decision-maker on the international plane goes un-
answered in the Judgment, although there is prima facie some evidence to
support that allegation. To cite only one example, what is one to make of
the undeniable fact that Weightman, then British Political Agent, was at
one and the same time laying the ground for an enquiry on title to the
Hawar Islands, and also participating in the description of the concession
area to be offered by Bahrain which included the Hawars (Reply of
Qatar, Vol. 3, p. 389), and indeed in advising the Ruler of Bahrain
against offering a concession that would grant the entire unallotted area

1 Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, LCJ. Reports 1957, p. 25: Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf, Judgment, C.J. Reports 1978, pp. 16-17: Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999
{Pakistan v. India), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 2000. pp. 23-24, para. 26.

© Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Judgment, LC.J. Reports
2000, dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh. p. 49. para. 6.

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250 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

except the Hawars and three miles of sea around them? (Reply of Qatar,
Vol. 3, p. 437.)

6. As far as Qatari consent to entrusting resolution of the dispute to
the British Government on the basis of “truth and equity” is concerned,
doubts also linger regarding the reality of that consent when set within
the context of overwhelming British control over the two sheikhdoms
and the realization on the part of the Ruler of Qatar that, faced with
what he must have seen as a fait accompli, he had no one else to turn to.
Under these circumstances, to construe his agreement to entrusting the
British Government with resolving the dispute as a freely-given consent
is possible only through a most nominal and highly artificial and dis-
connected interpretation of a series of events that started with the 1936
British provisional decision and ended in 1939 when the final decision
was made. It should be added here that while the conclusion of the
Arbitral Court in the Dubai/Sharjah Border case on the validity of the
British decisions of 1956 and 1957, as administrative decisions, might
recommend that conclusion as a model for the present case, that deci-
sion is fundamentally different from the present one in that, consent,
thought necessary by the Court of Arbitration, had been freely given
by the six Trucial States, together with an express undertaking by the
Rulers of Dubai and Sharjah not to “dispute or object to any decision
that may be decided by the Political Agent regarding the question of the
boundaries” between the sheikhdoms.

7. For these reasons the Judgment would have been based on firmer
ground had the Court laid the British decision of 1939 to rest and instead
embarked on an exploration of the, admittedly, much more arduous path
of ascertaining original title to the Hawars, which is what I shall endeav-
our to do in this separate opinion. But before that, I should comment
briefly on another argument advanced on Bahrain’s behalf in support of
its claim to the Hawar Islands, namely the applicability of the principle
uti possidetis juris.

8. Some remarks on the uti possidetis juris principle are appropriate
for two reasons: firstly, to those who doubt the reality of Qatari consent
to the British decision or find that consent vitiated, the decision becomes
nothing more than the uti possidetis juris principle in disguise. Hence an
enquiry into the impact of the principle assumes practical relevance.
Secondly, the implications of this principle, which seem to be passing
through a new phase of mutation, are profound. Generally speaking, to
yield too readily to its applicability would be inimical to other legally
protected rights, for example, the right of self-determination (although
there is no danger of this in the present case) as well as to the very func-
tion of international courts which is not to declare, in the interests of pre-
venting conflicts, pre-existing de facto territorial situations legal without
regard to title and other relevant criterion, but to uphold justice by cor-
recting illegalities where they occur.

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251 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

9. Both Bahrain and Qatar were classified under British law not as
colonies but as “protected States” or sometimes as “States in special
treaty relations with His Majesty’s Government”. Such a formal classifi-
cation notwithstanding, the British Government in fact exercised over-
whelming control over the two sheikhdoms, not only in the sphere of
international relations but also in domestic affairs. This control was
derived from the various treaties with the two sheikhdoms and in addi-
tion from “custom, suffrage and acquiescence”. However, regarding the
pertinent question of territorial title, the British Government did not
claim for themselves a right to alienate parts of the sheikhdoms’ territo-
ries without the rulers’ consent. This is clear from the DubailSharjah
arbitration*. Moreover, the British Government never acquired title in
the various sheikhdoms of the Gulf including Bahrain and Qatar, unlike
for example the Spanish Crown in Latin America, which had acquired
sovereignty and title to territory. This, in itself, should lead us to con-
clude that the principle uti possidetis juris is inapplicable in this case.

10. In addition, in the Eritreal Yemen Arbitral Award of 1998 the Tri-
bunal had occasion to consider the argument that the uti possidetis juris
principle applied and rejected that argument by one of the parties, noting
that:

“Added to these difficulties is the question of the intertemporal
law and the question whether this doctrine of uti possidetis juris, at
that time thought of as being essentially one applicable to Latin
America, could properly be applied to interpret a juridical question
arising in the Middle East shortly after the close of the First World
War.”

I find that line of reasoning both persuasive, and by analogy, applicable,
to the present situation, where the crystallization of the territorial claims
took place before the principle had started to lose its essentially Latin
American character and to assume a more international applicability,
although it is still very doubtful whether even now it has any applicability
in the Middle East.

11. I alluded earlier to the inherent difficulty of ascertaining historic or
even original title (para. 7 above} and I would recall in this context Jorge
Santayana’s famous words “[t}he future is relatively easy to predict. It
is the past that is well-nigh impossible to ascertain.” A measure of this
difficulty may be gleaned from Sir Robert Jennings’s classic work on
the acquisition of territory in international law. Commenting on the

+ DubailSharjah Border Arbitration, Award 1981, International Law Reports, Vol. 91,
p. 567.
+ Eritreal Yemen Arbitral Tribunal, Phase One, para. 99.

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252 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNER)

Minquiers and Ecrehos case he drew attention to the fact that

“There is something a little ironic in the frequent citation of the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case as an illustration of the importance of
historical consolidation; for this was the case where pleadings of un-
paralleled learning demonstrating the effect of titles established in
feudal times were almost brushed aside with the observation ‘what is
of decisive importance . . . is not indirect presumptions deduced
from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates
directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups’.”®
(Emphasis added.)

In the present case, while the events surrounding the ascertainment of
title did not take place in the Middle Ages, they go back to the eighteenth
century and indeed, if the Ottoman dimension of the two Sheikhdoms’
diplomatic history is to be fully taken into account as it should have
been, to 1517 when Ottoman sovereignty was extended to the whole of
Arabia regardless of the fact that, for the most part, particularly in the
Gulf region, it was a loose or nominal one.

12. Those difficulties were compounded in the present case by the fact
that, though the Court was inundated with a mass of information, some
of doubtful probative value and some of questionable relevance, on the
crucial question of Qatar’s territorial extent the indigenous sources are
more notable for their paucity of information than for their content.
Similarly the evidence on Bahraini effectivités is relatively modest. There
is no doubt that this is a reflection of the underdevelopment of the politi-
cal and economic situation in the two Sheikhdoms at the time. These
difficulties notwithstanding, the only way to dispose of the question of
sovereignty over the Hawars is to embark on an enquiry into the two
Sheikhdoms’ diplomatic history; especially in view of the fact that what
appeared at first glance as alternative lines of reasoning, i.e., the validity
of the British decision and the applicability of the uti possidetis juris prin-
ciple, have proved on closer examination to be uncertain grounds for the
determination of territorial title.

13. What emerges with relative clarity from the historical record is that
the Al-Khalifah Sheikhs exercised considerable influence over the affairs
of the Qatari peninsular mainland from some time in the second part of the
eighteenth century and up to 1868. Evidence also suggests that this influ-
ence was not absolute and was exercised more strongly over the settled
segments of the population on the coastal areas than over the nomadic
tribes. Even with regard to the former, this influence was intermittent and
occasioned violent opposition. Thus it is safe to say that while the Al-

> Minquiers and Ecrehos (FrancelUnited Kingdom), Judgment, C.J. Reports 1953,
p. 47.
6 R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, p. 27.

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253 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

Khalifah animus possidendi was strong, the actual corpus possessionis was
weak, resulting in a situation where their hold on the peninsula could be
interpreted, at best, as having been one of in precario possessionis.

14. In 1861 Mohammed bin Khalifah entered into a treaty of pro-
tection with the British in which he was styled “The Independent Ruler
of Bahrain”. In return for British protection, he agreed not to disturb
maritime peace. It is obvious that at that time the British authorities
considered the Qatari peninsula to be a dependency of the Ruler of
Bahrain.

15. All this was to change in 1868 when Mohammed bin Khalifah,
together with the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, led a punitive expedition against
the eastern coast of the peninsula in the course of which the towns of
Bida’a, Wakra and Doha were destroyed. Having breached his obliga-
tions not to disturb maritime peace, Mohammed Al-Khalifah was heavily
punished by the British, who deposed him and installed his brother Ali
Al-Khalifah. At the same time the British authorities entered into a sepa-
rate treaty with the sheikhs of Qatar, paramount among whom was
Mohammed Al-Thani, in accordance with which Mohammed bin Thani
was to retire to his abode in Doha and to continue certain payments to
Ali Al-Khalifah which were to be forwarded to the Wahabis as part of
the zakat (a religious tax) that was collected from the people and tribes of
Qatar.

16. It has been argued for Qatar that the events of 1868 marked the
independence of Qatar and the consolidation of Al-Thani rule over the
peninsula. This claim cannot in my view withstand the test of critical
examination. In the first place, the treaties were primarily concerned
with the maintenance of maritime peace and not with territorial title;
secondly, because Mohammed Al-Thani was required to retire to Doha
and its environs; and thirdly because the continued payment of sums
to Ali Al-Khalifah, stipulated in the treaty, confirms vestiges of Bahraini
authority over the peninsula.

17. But beyond these questions lies a more fundamental one. The
events of 1868 clearly confirm that the British authorities in the Gulf
thought it more expedient to deal with the sheikhs of Qatar directly. Can
this in itself create title? The answer must be in the negative, for the Brit-
ish position in the Gulf itself depended on de facto ascendancy and not
on any recognized title. Moreover the views of regional powers who had
or claimed sovereignty were completely opposed to the British position.
Thus Persia, which had a long-running claim to Bahrain, abandoned only
on the eve of the termination of Bahrain’s treaty relations with the
United Kingdom in 1971, never extended her territorial claim to Qatar.
Similarly, the Ottoman Empire, which undoubtedly had sovereignty over
Qatar and Bahrain — though, with regard to the latter such claims
remained nominal and were never pressed — could not have entertained
notions of Qatari dependence on Bahrain.

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254 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

18. Be that as it may, any theory of Qatari independence erga omnes
as of 1868 is gravely weakened by the fact that the Ottomans asserted
their sovereignty to the peninsula in 1872 and remained there until just
before the outbreak of the First World War. The fact that for most of
their stay in Qatar, Jasim bin Thani was kaimakam, i.e., district gover-
nor, does not alter this fact. The reasons for Ottoman resurgence in the
nineteenth century are beyond the scope of this opinion. Suffice it to say
that the Ottoman State’s fear for its Arab possessions from encroaching
European expansion was a primary motive’. To an over-burdened empire
the co-option of influential local leaders or families as middle-ranking
officials of the Imperial Ottoman Administration was a practical way of
dealing with the need to expand its control. This was a process that
was being repeated all over those parts of the Ottoman Empire where,
hitherto, the central administration was not directly felt.

19. The real date for Qatari independence is 1913, the date on which
the Anglo-Ottoman Convention was concluded (but not ratified).
Although the treaty was primarily concerned with the delimitation of
Qatar from Najd, i.e., central Arabia, it refers to the Qatari peninsula
continuing to be ruled by Al-Thani “as in the past”. However there is no
clear indication of the spatial extent of that authority, nor can the spatial
extent of that authority be ascertained from the 1914 Treaty of Aden
between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, which was ratified and
in fact made a renvoi to the relevant provisions of the 1913 Anglo-Otto-
man Convention. Were the Hawars intended to lie within the nascent
authority of the Al-Thanis? The provisions of the Convention are silent
and the words “as in the past” are not conducive to such an interpreta-
tion, for that authority, independently of Ottoman power, was restricted
to the environs of Doha and to the north of the peninsula around Zuba-
rah. Moreover, there is no express reference to the Hawars in the Con-
vention nor do we find any expression such as “the Qatari peninsula and
the islands immediately off its coast” from which a reasonably firm infer-
ence may be drawn. There is however a map which forms Annex V to the
Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 which may lend support to the
inclusion of the Hawars within the Qatari peninsula (this map is repro-
duced as map 46 in the Map Atlas of the Reply of Qatar), but even here
it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions. That map was primarily
concerned with delimiting the territories that were to remain under Otto-
man sovereignty after the conclusion of the Treaty of Aden. As far as
other territories are concerned the map seems to follow a geographic
rather than a political criterion.

7 Interestingly as it had been in 1517 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim (Yildrim) inter-
rupted his successful European campaigns and moved southwards to meet Portuguese
threats to the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

218
255 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

20. In the absence of clear guidance from the Anglo-Ottoman Conven-
tion, Qatar’s claim to the Hawars would rest on the strong presumption
that islands proximate to the mainland appertain to that mainland. This
presumption is however rebuttable. Geographic proximity cannot dis-
place a clearly established title. It would be crucial therefore to examine
the subtle interplay between the concept of geographic proximity on the
one hand and that of established title on the other; taking into account
the weight of effectivités which cannot in themselves displace title, but
come to the forefront when that title or its territorial expanse are not
clear. As the Court cogently put it:

“Finally, there are cases where the legal title is not capable of
showing exactly the territorial expanse to which it relates. The effec-
tivités can then play an essential role in showing how the title is
interpreted in practice.”*®

21. Bahrain has claimed to have demonstrated effectivités on the
Hawars for a period of almost a century and a half, including the claim
that the original Dawasir settlement on Hawars was effected through
grant by a Qadi of Zubarah (circa 1800) when that town was still under
Al-Khalifah rule. The evidence surrounding this particular effectivité is
however so clouded in uncertainty and hearsay that not much probative
value can be attached to it. What is more pertinent are the Bahraini effec-
tivités carried out in the period 1872-1913, 1.e., during the Ottoman pres-
ence in Qatar, for it is most unlikely that the Ottomans who were the
title-holders in Qatar would have acquiesced to such effectivités had they
not been carried out on territory to which their claims of sovereignty
were nominal. One may cite in this regard the 1909 Bahraini court deci-
sions relating to land rights and fishing traps in the Hawars, as well as the
arrest and compelled attendance in Bahraini courts of Hawar Island resi-
dents. As to external supporting evidence, one may also cite the use of the
same colour for the Hawars and Bahrain in a survey carried out in 1878
by Captain Izzet Bey, an officer of the Ottoman Army. Unlike the map
annexed to the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the Izzet Bey map
leaves no room for different interpretations.

22. These facts carry an important evidentiary value, for they confirm
that the Ottomans, the sovereigns of Qatar at that time, recognized that
the Ruler of Bahrain, although he had no title to the peninsular main-
land, nevertheless continued to have ownership rights over the islands on
the western coast of Qatar, a view not at all unreasonable in view of the
fact that for a seafaring people the links of these islands were perceived as

8 Frontier Dispute (Burkina FasolRepublic of Mali), LC.J. Reports 1986, p. 587,
para. 63.

219
256 DELIMITATION AND QUESTIONS (SEP. OP. AL-KHASAWNEH)

being greater with the main islands of Bahrain than with Doha, which is
separated from the Hawars by a daunting desert.

23. Additionally, until 1936, the date of the provisional British deci-
sion, Bahrain continued to show a number of other effectivités on the
Hawars. For example, the licensing of gypsum quarrying, which, in addi-
tion to being normally a governmental activity, also suggests the settled
nature of the presence on the Hawars of persons closely linked with Bah-
rain. To be sure such effectivités are not numerous and in some cases are
not free of controversy. However, by contrast Qatar could not demon-
strate any comparable effectivités, indeed any effectivités at all, over the
islands. In the period 1936-1939 there was a flurry of effectivités by Bah-
rain, but these should be discounted as no more than attempts to intro-
duce new evidence after the commencement of the dispute.

24. In conclusion, lack of clarity regarding Qatar’s original title to the
Hawar Islands gives to the effectivités, adduced by Bahrain in support of
its contention that it continued to have original title over the Hawars, a
crucial role notwithstanding their small number and modest status; for
under similar circumstances international law has been satisfied with little
evidence, undoubtedly as a reflection of the varying standards of time
and place. Following this line of reasoning, I concur with the majority
view.

(Signed) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.

220


366

              DECLARATION OF JUDGE SKOTNIKOV

  No jurisdiction — Respondent had no access to Court when proceedings insti-
tuted — Relevance of 2004 Legality of Use of Force cases — Issue of access to
Court not determined in 1996 Judgment — Res judicata not absolute and
exhaustive in incidental proceedings.

   No implied obligation in Genocide Convention for States not to commit geno-
cide — Such unstated obligation unnecessary to engage State responsibility for
genocide — State responsibility engaged when an individual, whose acts are
attributable to the State, commits crime of genocide — Court lacks criminal
jurisdiction necessary to establish whether individuals have committed geno-
cide — Determination by courts and tribunals with such criminal jurisdiction
may provide basis for State responsibility for genocide if they are consistent
with requirements of Genocide Convention — Judgments of ICTY in Krstić and
Blagojević not consistent as based on crime of “aiding and abetting” and involve
findings relating to state of mind of persons not before ICTY — Commission of
genocide at Srebrenica not sufficiently established.

  Duty to prevent interpreted too widely — Only applicable within territory
under a State’s jurisdiction or control — Duty to prevent one of result not
conduct.

                                 JURISDICTION

  In the 2004 Legality of Use of Force cases, the Court has acknowl-
edged a certain legal reality, which exists independently from the wishes
of the Court or the Parties and which cannot be any different in this case :
Serbia and Montenegro had not been a Member of the United Nations,
and consequently, was not a party to the Statute of the Court, before it
was admitted on 1 November 2000 to the United Nations as a new Mem-
ber under Article 4 of the United Nations Charter (see, for example,
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Prelimi-
nary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 314-315, para. 91).
On that basis, the Court has concluded that Serbia and Montenegro did
not have access to the Court at the time of institution of proceedings and
for that reason, the Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to entertain
these cases (ibid., pp. 327-328, paras. 127 and 129).
  However, what the Court’s reasoning in the present case means is that,
by application of the principle of res judicata in incidental proceedings,
the Court can create parallel realities : namely, in this case, unlike in the

327

367      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

Legality of Use of Force cases, the existence of access to the Court by the
Respondent by virtue of its finding on jurisdiction in the 1996 Judgment
on Preliminary Objections (Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 595).

  The notion that the issue of access by the Respondent to the Court
under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute must be considered as
having been dealt with in the 1996 Judgment, although it undoubtedly
was not, is a further blow to the reality which, according to the Judg-
ment, may be altered as “a matter of logical construction” if the integrity
of the principle of res judicata so requires :
      “the legal complications of the position of the Respondent in rela-
      tion to the United Nations were not specifically mentioned in the
      1996 Judgment. The Court stated . . . that ‘Yugoslavia was bound by
      the provisions of the [Genocide] Convention on the date of the filing
      of the Application in the present case’ (Application of the Conven-
      tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
      (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judg-
      ment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 610, para. 17), and found that ‘on
      the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and
      Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to adjudi-
      cate upon the dispute’ (ibid., p. 623, para. 47 (2) (a)). Since . . . the
      question of a State’s capacity to be a party to proceedings is a matter
      which precedes that of jurisdiction ratione materiae, and one which
      the Court must, if necessary, raise ex officio, . . . this finding must as
      a matter of construction be understood, by necessary implication, to
      mean that the Court at that time perceived the Respondent as being
      in a position to participate in cases before the Court. On that basis,
      it proceeded to make a finding on jurisdiction which would have the
      force of res judicata. The Court does not need, for the purpose of the
      present proceedings, to go behind that finding and consider on what
      basis the Court was able to satisfy itself on the point. Whether the
      Parties classify the matter as one of ‘access to the Court’ or of ‘juris-
      diction ratione personae’, the fact remains that the Court could not
      have proceeded to determine the merits unless the Respondent had
      had the capacity under the Statute to be a party to proceedings
      before the Court.” (Judgment, para. 132.)
         “That the FRY had the capacity to appear before the Court in
      accordance with the Statute was an element in the reasoning of the
      1996 Judgment which can — and indeed must — be read into the
      Judgment as a matter of logical construction.” (Ibid., para. 135.)
   It is obvious that the notion of an “unstated element of the reasoning”
is not compatible with Article 56 of the Statute, which provides that
“[t]he judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based”.

328

368      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

  It should also be noted that the part of the 1996 Judgment dealing with
jurisdiction ratione personae concerned only the question of whether the
Applicant and the Respondent were parties to the Genocide Convention,
and the assumption of that Judgment was that the Convention satisfies
the requirement of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and thus rep-
resents an independent and sufficient basis for the Respondent’s access to
the Court. This was in line with a provisional view which the Court had
taken in the 1993 Order indicating provisional measures :

      “proceedings may validly be instituted by a State against a State
      which is a party to such a special provision in a treaty in force, but
      is not party to the Statute, and independently of the conditions laid
      down by the Security Council in its resolution 9 of 1946” (Applica-
      tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
      Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993,
      I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19).
   That is why the Court did not address the uncertain and contradictory
issue of the Respondent’s access to the Court under Article 35, para-
graph 1, either in 1993 or in 1996. However, in the 2004 Legality of Use
of Force Judgments the Court addressed the issue of access under both
Article 35, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, and stated that the “treaty in
force” clause, contained in paragraph 2, concerns only the treaties which
were in force at the date of the entry into force of the Statute (Legality of
Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objec-
tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 323-324, para. 113).

  The idea that the parallel reality, created by the Court, is as solid as the
one existing independently from it, is expressed in the Judgment in no
ambiguous terms :
         “However fundamental the question of the capacity of States to
      be parties in cases before the Court may be, it remains a question to
      be determined by the Court, in accordance with Article 36, para-
      graph 6, of the Statute, and once a finding in favour of jurisdiction
      has been pronounced with the force of res judicata, it is not open to
      question or re-examination, except by way of revision under Arti-
      cle 61 of the Statute. There is thus, as a matter of law, no possibility
      that the Court might render ‘its final decision with respect to a party
      over which it cannot exercise its judicial function’, because the ques-
      tion whether a State is or is not a party subject to the jurisdiction of
      the Court is one which is reserved for the sole and authoritative deci-
      sion of the Court.” (Judgment, para. 138.)

   Then, the Court affirms that it cannot possibly be acting ultra vires in
establishing, by applying the principle of res judicata, its own parallel
reality :

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      “the operation of the ‘mandatory requirements of the Statute’ falls
      to be determined by the Court in each case before it ; and once the
      Court has determined, with the force of res judicata, that it has juris-
      diction, then for the purposes of that case no question of ultra vires
      action can arise, the Court having sole competence to determine
      such matters under the Statute” (Judgment, para. 139).
  The Court’s line of argument is based on the notion of a general find-
ing on jurisdiction reached in incidental proceedings being absolute and
exhaustive in nature (it goes without saying that the Court’s decisions on
specific preliminary objections have the full authority of res judicata).

  However, that clearly was not the view of the Court when it authorized
the Registrar to inform the Respondent that :
         “The Court moreover, as was in fact observed by Serbia and
      Montenegro in the ‘Initiative’ document, and as the Court has
      emphasized in the past, is entitled to consider jurisdictional issues
      proprio motu, and must ‘always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction’
      (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, I.C.J.
      Reports 1972, p. 52). It thus goes without saying that the Court will
      not give judgment on the merits of the present case unless it is sat-
      isfied that it has jurisdiction. Should Serbia and Montenegro wish to
      present further argument to the Court on jurisdictional questions
      during the oral proceedings on the merits, it will be free to do so.”
      (Letter of 12 June 2003.)
   The content of this letter was a clear indication to the Parties that no
final decision on jurisdiction had been taken, for it would have been
unthinkable for the Court to say to the Respondent that it was free to
present further argument to the Court on jurisdictional questions without
entertaining a possibility to consider them positively. It would have been
inconceivable for the Court to mention proprio motu action without
having considered the possibility of taking this action, and the further
possibility that the result of this action could be a negative finding on
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the invitation to Serbia and Montenegro to argue
jurisdictional questions in the merits phase would be totally without pur-
pose.
   The letter of June 2003 indicated the admissibility of the objections of
the Respondent to the application of Article 35 of the Statute. Indeed,
the objections to the Court’s jurisdiction were made as a part of the final
submissions and have been rejected by the Court in the dispositif of the
present Judgment.
   The Court’s position is based on the interpretation of the res judicata
principle in incidental proceedings as absolute and exhaustive. This inter-
pretation is a sharp departure from its previous more cautious and
nuanced position on this subject. It comes into conflict with the “non-
exhaustive character of preliminary objection proceedings” (by which

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“whether or not matters of jurisdiction have been raised at the stage
envisaged for preliminary objections, they may still be raised later, even
by the Court proprio motu” (Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of
the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. II, p. 876, II.229)). It limits the
right and the duty of the Court to act proprio motu to ensure that at all
stages of the proceedings jurisdiction indeed exists. Finally, as is the case
in this proceeding, it may bring the Court into conflict with legal facts
which are created by entities other than the Court and with its own find-
ings reached in a different case on the very same facts. There is also a
touch of the Court’s own infallibility in its reasoning which is difficult for
me to accept.
   For the reasons stated above, I could not support the conclusion of the
Court as contained in paragraph 1 of the operative clause of the Judg-
ment.

                                   MERITS

   Under Article IX of the Genocide Convention the Court is to settle
disputes between the Contracting Parties, “including those [disputes]
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the
other acts enumerated in Article III”. The underlying logic of the Judg-
ment is that no State can be held responsible for genocide or any of the
other acts enumerated in Article III unless the Genocide Convention
imposes on the Contracting Parties an obligation not to themselves com-
mit genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Conven-
tion.
   The Judgment states that “[s]ince Article IX is essentially a jurisdic-
tional provision, the Court considers that it should first ascertain whether
the substantive obligation on States not to commit genocide may flow
from the other provisions of the Convention” (Judgment, para. 166). The
Judgment recognizes that “such an obligation is not expressly imposed by
the actual terms of the Convention” (ibid.). Then, according to the logic
of the Judgment, this obligation must be implied in Article I : “the obliga-
tion to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the com-
mission of genocide” (ibid.). The Judgment also concludes that the obli-
gation of States to not commit genocide themselves is applicable to the
other acts enumerated in Article III (Judgment, para. 167).

   I do not find this construction sustainable for the following reasons.
   First, the very idea of an unstated obligation is objectionable in
general.
   Second, the “unstated obligation” in question does not fit into the
Convention. The Convention, in its substantive part, deals with the
criminal culpability of individuals. The Judgment addresses this fact and
attempts to reconcile it with the idea of a State’s obligation to not
commit the very criminal acts it undertakes to prevent and punish. This

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371      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

attempt, however, is not persuasive. Nor could it be, since it is simply not
what the Convention actually says.

   Third, the notion of a State’s obligation not to commit genocide, and
the other Article III acts, comes into conflict with the very foundations of
the Genocide Convention since there is no such thing under the Conven-
tion as genocide (or any of the other Article III acts) which is not a crime.
Yet, it is generally accepted that there is no such thing as State criminal
responsibility. The Court, the parties, the International Law Commission
(the ILC), are all in agreement that States do not commit crimes. Con-
sequently, what is achieved by introducing the concept of a State itself
committing genocide is decriminalization of genocide, which as a result is
transformed into an internationally wrongful act. This transformation is
as amazing as it is impossible under the Genocide Convention.

   The Court, while concluding that “the Contracting Parties to the Con-
vention are bound not to commit genocide” makes a clarification that the
Parties are under the obligation not to do so “through the actions of their
organs or persons or groups whose acts are attributable to them” (Judg-
ment, para. 167).
   The Court states that “if an organ of the State, or a person or group
whose acts are legally attributable to the State, commits any of the acts
proscribed by Article III of the Convention, the international responsi-
bility of that State is incurred” (Judgment, para. 179). This is absolutely
true. A State’s responsibility is engaged when a crime of genocide is com-
mitted by an individual whose acts are legally attributable to it. No
“unstated obligation” for States not to themselves commit genocide is
needed for this responsibility to be incurred through attribution.

   Therefore, I cannot accept the Court’s reasoning that, unless the Con-
vention is read as containing an obligation on State parties not to commit
genocide themselves, States would not be “forbidden to commit such acts
through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm
control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under
international law” (Judgment, para. 166). The ILC stated the obvious
when it said :

        “The State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full
      authority to act under international law. But to recognize this is not
      to deny the elementary fact that the State cannot act of itself. An ‘act
      of the State’ must involve some action or omission by a human being
      or group : ‘States can act only by and through their agents and rep-
      resentatives’.” (Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
      nationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p. 71.)

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   It would indeed be extraordinary to read the Genocide Convention as
allowing States “as such” to commit genocide, or any of the other Arti-
cle III acts, for their responsibility will be incurred when a crime of geno-
cide is committed by persons capable of engaging State responsibility.
Generally, as a matter of principle, wherever international law criminal-
izes an act, if that act is committed by an individual capable of engaging
State responsibility, the State can be held responsible. The fact that some
international conventions criminalizing certain acts contain “escape
clauses”, as in the cases of the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, excluding armed forces during
an armed conflict from the scope of these conventions 1, only confirms
this principle. This principle is definitely embodied in the Genocide Con-
vention, which first, specifically refers in Article IX to the responsibility
of a State for genocide, a crime committed according to its substantive
part by individuals, and second, reflects the absolute prohibition of geno-
cide under general international law 2. The artificial notion of a State’s
obligation under the Genocide Convention not to commit genocide does
nothing to reinforce this air-tight prohibition.

  There has been some measure of agreement between the Parties on this
point. According to the Respondent
      “for a State to be responsible under the Genocide Convention, the
      facts must first be established. As genocide is a crime, it can only be
      established in accordance with the rules of criminal law, under which
      the first requirement to be met is that of individual responsibility.
      The State can incur responsibility only when the existence of geno-
      cide has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. In addition,
      it must then be shown that the person who committed the genocide
      can engage the responsibility of the State . . .” (CR 2006/18, p. 20,
      para. 38.)
According to the Applicant
      “in the full meaning of the term, genocide is an international crime

  1 See the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted

by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1979, Art. 19, para. 2,
and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 April 2005, Art. 4, para. 2.
   2 The fact that Article IX is the subject of reservations by a number of States parties,

does not change in any way the absolute character of the prohibition of genocide as
reflected in the Genocide Convention. A reservation to Article IX does not absolve a State
from responsibility for genocide, it only prevents this Court from settling a dispute related
to this responsibility.

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      which not only engages the criminal responsibility of the individuals
      committing it but also that of the State to which the acts committed
      by individuals, acting de jure or de facto on its behalf, may be
      ascribed” (CR 2006/33, p. 31, para. 44).

   Should the Court have adopted the approach according to which State
responsibility is incurred when the crime of genocide or the other Arti-
cle III crimes are committed by individuals capable of engaging such
responsibility, it would have stayed on the firm ground of the Convention
and would have been perfectly able to make a determination required by
Article IX as to “the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III”.
   Article IX widens the scope of dispute settlement beyond the usual
“interpretation and application” (the addition of “fulfilment” is not par-
ticularly significant) to include the responsibility of a State for genocide
and the other Article III acts.

   However, nothing in Article IX suggests that the Court is empowered
to go beyond settling disputes relating to State responsibility and to actu-
ally conduct an enquiry and make a determination whether or not the
crime of genocide was committed.
   The Court simply cannot establish individual responsibility for the
crime of genocide by persons capable of engaging a State’s responsibility
since it lacks criminal jurisdiction.
   In particular, by reason of the lack of criminal jurisdiction, the Court
cannot establish the existence or absence of genocidal intent, since noth-
ing in the Genocide Convention indicates that it deals with genocidal
intent in any other sense than it being a requisite part, a mental element,
of the crime of genocide.
   What the Court can and must do is to make a finding as to whether it
has been sufficiently determined that genocide was committed.
   To make this determination, it would have been sufficient for the
Court in this case to rely on the findings of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY), to the extent they are in
conformity with the Genocide Convention, which is the sole basis for
jurisdiction in these proceedings.
   Instead, the Court adopted a position according to which it can itself
make a determination as to whether or not genocide was committed
without a distinct decision by a court or tribunal exercising criminal juris-
diction. The Judgment offers no explanation as to the legal basis of this
position. Rather the Court constructs for itself “the capacity” to do so
(Judgment, para. 181), which is nowhere to be found in the Genocide
Convention.
   The Court asserts that :
         “Any other interpretation could entail that there would be no
      legal recourse available under the Convention in some readily con-

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374      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

      ceivable circumstances : genocide has allegedly been committed
      within a State by its leaders but they have not been brought to trial
      because, for instance, they are still very much in control of the pow-
      ers of the State including the police, prosecution services and the
      courts and there is no international penal tribunal able to exercise
      jurisdiction over the alleged crimes ; or the responsible State may
      have acknowledged the breach.” (Judgment, para. 182.)

   However, reference to the absence of legal recourse under certain cir-
cumstances as an argument au contrario neither supports nor clarifies the
Court’s position. No recourse would be available, for example, when a
State in question has made a reservation to Article IX. As to the above
example about State leaders still in control of their country, on the con-
trary, legal recourse would remain available if the Court was properly
seised ; moreover, the Court, after establishing its jurisdiction on a
prima facie basis, can, if requested, indicate provisional measures of a
binding character. Furthermore, to deal immediately with these circum-
stances an action of the United Nations Security Council, under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter, would probably be required. As to
the possible unavailability of an international penal tribunal, the Security
Council can establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal, if the State in question
is not party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
opened for signature on 17 July 1998. And, of course, should a State
acknowledge its responsibility for genocide before this Court, questions
of establishing whether genocide was committed and whether a Respon-
dent is responsible for it simply would not arise, allowing the Court to
proceed straight to the issue of reparations.

   The proposition that the Court not only determines a State’s respon-
sibility for genocide, but also establishes whether genocide was commit-
ted or not, flows, of course, from the idea of a State’s obligation to not
commit genocide itself, which the Court infers from the Convention.
According to that construction, the Court simply determines the violation
of this “treaty obligation”. Therefore, following that logic, the lack of
criminal jurisdiction is not an impediment at all, since the Court does not
deal with genocide as a crime which, of course, is what it indisputably is
under the Genocide Convention. This approach is inconsistent with both
the Genocide Convention and the Court’s Statute.

   Having stated that it “must itself make its own determination of the
facts which are relevant to the law which the Applicant claims the
Respondent has breached”, the Court acknowledges that “[m]any of the
allegations before the Court have already been the subject of the
processes and decisions of the ICTY” (Judgment, para. 212) and con-
cludes that :

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375      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

      “it should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant findings
      of fact made by the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have been
      upset on appeal. For the same reasons, any evaluation by the Tri-
      bunal based on the facts as so found for instance about the existence
      of the required intent, is also entitled to due weight.” (Judgment,
      para. 223.)

   After having thus established in principle a possibility of arriving at
conclusions different to those of this criminal tribunal as to whether or
not genocide was committed, the Court proceeded to examine the allega-
tions which had already been considered and decided on by the ICTY,
thus putting itself potentially on a collision course with the Tribunal.
   This kind of collision of course has not occurred in practice. However,
this does not make the Court’s failure to strike a proper balance under
the Genocide Convention between the Court’s jurisdiction and that of a
criminal tribunal any lesser.
   At the same time, a clear distinction must be made between the Court
conducting its own investigation and coming up with legally binding
findings as to whether genocide was committed, which it cannot do, and
the Court applying the test of the Genocide Convention to the decisions
of the ICTY on genocide, which it must do, given that its jurisdiction is
based solely on the Genocide Convention and the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal is based on its Statute. That test is whether the decisions of the
ICTY are consistent with the Genocide Convention. Should a finding of
the ICTY fail that test, the Court must disregard this particular finding in
deciding the case before it.

   Unfortunately, the Court, while applying the test of Genocide Conven-
tion to the decisions of the ICTY, did not do it to the extent necessary.

  The Court concluded that acts of genocide were committed by “mem-
bers of the VRS [Army of the Republika Srpska] in and around Sre-
brenica from about 13 July 1995” (Judgment, para. 297). In reaching this
conclusion the Court relied on the findings of the ICTY in the Krstić and
Blagojević cases (Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Judgment of Appeals Chamber,
19 April 2004 (hereafter “Krstić”) and Blagojević and Jokić, IT-02-60-T,
Judgment of Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2005 (hereafter “Blagojević”)).

   These two individuals (only Krstić’s conviction is final) were convicted
of a crime established by the Tribunal’s Statute (Art. 7, para. 1), but not
recognized by the Genocide Convention, namely aiding and abetting
genocide. As found by the ICTY, neither Krstić nor Blagojević had geno-
cidal intent. (“There was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to
supply adequate proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal
intent” (Krstić, para. 134).) The Tribunal, basing itself on its Statute, has
held that persons furnishing aid and assistance can be convicted of aiding

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376      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

and abetting genocide without having genocidal intent. The Genocide
Convention, however, requires genocidal intent for every proscribed act
enumerated in it, which has been recognized by the ICTY itself (Krstić,
para. 142) and has not been disputed by the Parties.

   Consequently, these two — and so far the only — convictions of
charges related to genocide cannot be taken into account by the Court
since its jurisdiction is based solely on the Genocide Convention whereas
these convictions are not.

  Nevertheless, these two Judgments are relevant to the case before the
Court to the extent that they state that genocide occurred in Srebrenica.
Indeed, in the final analysis the whole case in the present Judgment is
made on the basis of this particular finding by the ICTY.

   The question is, however, whether or not this finding has been made
within the specific scope of the Genocide Convention.
   The way the ICTY has dealt, inter alia, with the issue of genocidal
intent suggests that the answer to this question is likely to be negative. In
the Blagojević case the Trial Chamber concluded that Bosnian Serb
forces had intended to destroy the Muslim population of Srebrenica
(Blagojević, para. 677). In the Krstić case the ICTY was slightly more
specific, referring to some members of the VRS Main Staff. The Appeals
Chamber decided that, in concluding that some (unnamed or unknown)
members of the VRS Main Staff intended to destroy the Bosnian Mus-
lims of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber “did not depart from the legal
requirements for genocide” (Krstić, para. 38).

   Tellingly, the Appeals Chamber did not say that the Trial Chamber
had not departed from the legal requirements of the Genocide Conven-
tion, for, inter alia, it is highly doubtful that, according to the Conven-
tion, genocidal intent, a mental element to be established in criminal
proceedings, can be established without trying (or at the very least iden-
tifying and presenting the necessary proof) a person or persons harbour-
ing it. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal itself has recognized that it is
necessary to have insight into the state of mind of alleged perpetrators in
order to draw the inference that those perpetrators had genocidal intent.

  In the Stakić case it stated :

         “Having heard all the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that it
      has not been provided with the necessary insight into the state of
      mind of alleged perpetrators acting on a higher level in the political
      structure than Dr. Stakić to enable it to draw the inference that
      those perpetrators had the specific genocidal intent.” (IT-97-24-T,
      Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 547.)

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   It is very difficult to reconcile this requirement of “necessary insight
into the state of mind of alleged perpetrators”, which is fully compatible
with the Genocide Convention, and the approach adopted by the ICTY
in the Krstić case :
         “The inference that a particular atrocity was motivated by geno-
      cidal intent may be drawn, moreover, even where the individuals to
      whom the intent is attributable are not precisely identified.” (Krstić,
      para. 34.)
Not only does this approach not appear to be in conformity with the
requirements of the Genocide Convention, it also raises questions related
to the fairness of criminal proceedings and the accuracy of their conclu-
sions. What if, for example, at a later stage, during a possible trial of so
far unnamed members of the VRS Main Staff, the Tribunal, after obtain-
ing the “necessary insight into the state of mind of alleged perpetrators”,
finds that these individuals did not possess genocidal intent ? Or, are these
individuals guilty even before they have been tried ? And, since they are
not, the question remains open as to whether the massacre in Srebrenica
can be qualified as genocide.

   The conclusion of the Court in these circumstances should have been
that the commission of genocide or of the other Article III acts in Sre-
brenica has not been sufficiently established.
   In spite of the difficulties I have with the Court’s interpretation of the
Genocide Convention, as outlined above, as well as, consequently, with
the wording of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the operative clause of the Judg-
ment, I have found myself in a position to vote for these paragraphs since
in substance they do contain the answer to the core question of this case :
the Respondent is not responsible for genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III. My vote in favour of these paragraphs does
not in any way compromise my position that it has not been sufficiently
established that the massacre in Srebrenica can be qualified as genocide.

  The additional difficulty I have is with the Court’s treatment of the
obligation to prevent under the Genocide Convention, which I find to be
extraordinarily expansive.
  The views of the Applicant presented on the subject of prevention were
quite reasonable :
         “This obligation is expressed in very general and, as it were, intro-
      ductory terms in Article I, which closely follows the wording of the
      title of the Convention. Later provisions, in Articles IV to VIII, add
      a whole series of specific details and clarifications essential to its
      implementation. However, these further provisions focus primarily
      on punishment, while rules on prevention are scantly developed.

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378      APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

         It is true, however, that no precise boundary can be established
      between prevention and punishment. First, it is well known that a
      well-organized system of enforcement, capable of imposing penalties
      proportionate to the seriousness of offences, plays a very important
      preventive role ; and secondly, effective prevention calls for the pun-
      ishment of any acts preparatory to genocide (such as conspiracy to
      commit genocide or attempted genocide, etc.), or again acts consti-
      tuting incitement to commit genocide. In other words, the punish-
      ment of most of the so-called ‘ancillary’ acts identified in Article III
      of the Convention . . . plays a definite, though obviously non-
      exhaustive, role in the area of prevention.” (CR 2006/11, p. 16,
      paras. 1-2.)

         “The lack of territorial limitations on the obligation to prevent
      and punish the crime of genocide, which [the Court] highlighted in
      1996, means therefore that a State party to the Convention must dis-
      charge this obligation even outside its sphere of territorial sover-
      eignty, when it exercises — whether legally or illegally — effective
      control over a territory outside its borders by assuming prerogatives
      of public authority in that territory.” (Ibid., p. 20, para. 12.)

The Respondent did not challenge this approach. On its part it was said
that “[p]reventive measures would be legislation directed against geno-
cide” (CR 2006/20, p. 21, para. 343). And that,
      “the Genocide Convention can only apply when the State concerned
      has territorial jurisdiction or control in the areas in which the
      breaches of the Convention are alleged to have occurred” (CR 2006/
      16, p. 15, para. 20).
  Accordingly, there was no dispute between the Parties about the inter-
pretation of the duty to prevent. However, the Court has chosen to come
up with an initiative on the subject stating that “the duty to prevent
places States under positive obligations, to do their best to ensure that
such acts do not occur” (Judgment, para. 432) and adding that,
      “a State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent even
      though it had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted,
      but failed to do so, that genocide was about to be committed or was
      under way ; . . . it is enough that the State was aware, or should
      normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of geno-
      cide would be committed” (Judgment, para. 432).

   The Court thus equates the notion of “due diligence” with the duty to
prevent under the Genocide Convention and applies it to the inter-
national arena where various States having varying capacities “to influence
effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing,

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379     APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DECL. SKOTNIKOV)

genocide” (Judgment, para. 430), each within its capacity “to influence”
must do their best to ensure that acts of genocide do not occur.

   This may be seen as a commendable appeal to the nations of the world
to do all they can to prevent genocide but it is not a proper interpretation
of the Convention according to customary international law, as reflected
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The content which the Court provides for the obligation to prevent
(rather than interpreting it) represents a political statement which is
clearly outside the specific scope of the Genocide Convention.

   What the Court should have said on the subject is, in my opinion, the
following : a State fails its duty to prevent under the Genocide Conven-
tion if genocide is committed within the territory where it exercises its
jurisdiction or which is under its control. Even if the perpetrators are not
its organs or persons capable of engaging its responsibility under custom-
ary international law, the failure is still there. Even if the State in ques-
tion takes the exhaustive measures required by the Convention, such as
enactment of relevant legislation, should genocide occur within the terri-
tory under its jurisdiction or control, it still fails its duty to prevent. The
duty to prevent is a duty of result and not one of conduct.

   Instead the Court has introduced a politically appealing, but legally
vague, indeed, hardly measurable at all in legal terms, concept of a duty
to prevent with the essential element of control being replaced with a
highly subjective notion of influence. I do not think that the Court’s
interpretation of the duty to prevent as a duty of conduct and not one of
result (Judgment, para. 430), which is a logical element of the above-
mentioned concept, is a service to the cause of preventing genocide.

   Consequently, I could not support the conclusion of the Court as con-
tained in paragraph 5 of the operative clause. In addition, my negative
vote on this paragraph also reflects my position, as outlined above, that it
has not been sufficiently established that the massacre in Srebrenica can
be qualified as genocide.
   For the latter reason, I could not support the finding of the Court con-
tained in paragraph 7 of the operative clause as to the Respondent’s non-
compliance with the provisional measures ordered by the Court on
8 April and 13 September 1993. However, I hold the view that the
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not act on these
Orders as they should have. Should they have done so, this could have
had an effect of averting many of the atrocities other than genocide. The
fact that these atrocities occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the
relevant period has not been denied by the Respondent.
   I supported the finding contained in paragraph 6 since the Respondent

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has failed to provide the Court with a clear-cut statement that it has done
all in its power to apprehend and transfer Ratko Mladić, indicted for
genocide and complicity in genocide, for trial by the ICTY.

  I agree with the Court’s decision in paragraph 8 of the operative clause
as to the Respondent’s obligation to co-operate with that Tribunal in
respect of individuals accused of genocide or any of the other acts pro-
scribed by Article III of the Convention.

                                          (Signed) Leonid SKOTNIKOV.

341


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF AN INFANT
(NETHERLANDS v. SWEDEN)

ORDER OF AUGUST 19th, 1957

1957

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE
A LA TUTELLE D’UNE MINEURE
(PAYS-BAS c. SUEDE)

ORDONNANCE DU 19 AOÛT 1957
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning the Guardianship of an infant,

Order of August roth, 1957: I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 102.”

La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

« Affaire relative à la tutelle d’une mineure,
Ordonnance du 19 août 1957: C.I. J. Recueil 1957, p. I02.»

Sales number 1 6 6
No de vente:

102

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1957
August 19th
General List :
No. 33 YEAR 1957

August 19th, 1957

CASE CONCERNING

THE GUARDIANSHIP OF AN INFANT
(NETHERLANDS v. SWEDEN)

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,
having regard to Articles 40 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,
having regard to Articles 32 and 37 of the Rules of Court;

Whereas by a letter dated July 9th, 1957, received in the Registry
on July roth, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
transmitted to the Registry an Application of the Government of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands of the same date instituting
proceedings before the Court against the Kingdom of Sweden in
the matter of the guardianship of an infant;

Whereas the Application refers to Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute and to the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court by the Kingdom of Sweden and by the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;

Whereas by the said letter dated July gth, 1957, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands notified the appointment
of Mr. W. Riphagen as Agent for the Government of the Nether-
lands;

Whereas the text of the Application and of the Ictter from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands was communicated,
on July roth, 1957, to the Swedish Ambassador to the Netherlands,
in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute and
Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court;

4
103 GUARDIANSHIP OF AN INFANT (ORDER OF Ig VIII 57)

Whereas in a letter dated July 18th, 1957, the Swedish Ambas-
sador to the Netherlands stated that the Application had been
received by his Government;

Whereas by a letter of July 2oth, 1957, the Swedish Minister of
Justice acting Minister for Foreign Affairs notified the appointment
of Mr. Sven Dahlman, Swedish Ambassador to the Netherlands,
as Agent for the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden;

After ascertaining the views of the Parties,
Fixes as follows the time-limits for the filing of the Pleadings:

for the Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands: November 30th, 1957;

for the Counter-Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom
of Sweden: March 31st, 1958;

And reserves the rest of the procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authori-
tative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of
August, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven, in three
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court
and the others transmitted to the Government of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and to the Government of the Kingdom of
Sweden, respectively.

(Signed) GREEN H. HACKWORTEH,

President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.


165

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. SHAHABUDDEEN
[Traduction]

L’ordonnance rendue aujourd’hui, qui est du même type que quelques
ordonnances rendues récemment, soulève des questions de droit qui sont
importantes quand bien même elles ne ressortent pas d’emblée du libellé
du document. L’une d’elles concerne le caractère juridique précis de l’or-
donnance. J’ai le sentiment qu’on pourrait sérieusement se demander ce
que la Cour a fait, en droit, en rendant cette ordonnance. Selon l’interpré-
tation qu’on en donne, je peux ou ne peux pas approuver l'ordonnance. Je
me vois donc obligé d’expliquer sur quoi je me fonde pour l’approuver, de
crainte que mon approbation ne soit prise comme un acquiescement à une
interprétation que je ne peux accepter.

Comme il est dit dans Pordonnance, El Salvador ne fait pas objection à
la désignation par le Honduras d’un certain juge ad hoc de remplacement.
Etant donné que la Cour elle-même ne conteste pas cette désignation et
qu’il n’y a pas de doute en la matière, aucune décision n’est requise en
vertu de l’article 35, paragraphe 4, du Règlement de la Cour. En consé-
quence, ce n’est pas en raison d’une éventuelle contestation ou d’un éven-
tuel doute que se pose la question de savoir si la Cour doit rendre formelle-
ment une ordonnance.

Il faut dès lors se demander: i) si une ordonnance est par ailleurs
requise et, dans l’affirmative, ii) si elle est requise pour qu’une personne
devienne juridiquement juge ad hoc de remplacement ou iii) si elle est
simplement requise à titre d'enregistrement du remplacement. Normale-
ment, je répondrais par la négative à la première question, ce qui me dis-
penserait d’aborder la deuxième et la troisième. En l’espèce, cependant,
je répondrai affirmativement à la première question, négativement à
la deuxième et affirmativement à la troisième, et cela pour les raisons
suivantes.

S’agissant de la première question, je relève que l’ordonnance de la
Cour du 8 mai 1987 (C.1.J. Recueil 1987, p. 12) mentionne expressément les
noms des deux juges ad hoc désignés pour faire partie de la Chambre spé-
ciale constituée par cette ordonnance; il semble découler logiquement du
libellé de ce texte que le décès de l’un d’eux et son remplacement par une
autre personne doivent être consignés dans une nouvelle ordonnance mo-
difiant dûment la précédente. C’est là, brièvement exposé, le motif pour
lequel j’approuve la décision de rendre une nouvelle ordonnance.

La deuxième et la troisième question obligent à rechercher le caractère
juridique précis de la nouvelle ordonnance. L'état actuel du droit étant
rarement, pour ne pas dire jamais, vérifiable sans recours au passé, il me
semble que l’on ne peut mener sensément cette recherche sans tenir
compte de l’évolution antérieure du droit. Le problème est d’autant plus

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 166

compliqué qu’il n’est pas courant que la Cour rende une ordonnance for-
melle visant spécifiquement la désignation de juges ad hoc(à distinguer de
la faculté d’en désigner); le fait qu’ils ont été désignés est en général sim-
plement relaté dans le cadre du rappel chronologique de la procédure qui
fait l’objet des paragraphes liminaires de l’ordonnance ou de la décision
que la Cour a par la suite l’occasion de rendre en l’espèce. On relève deux
exceptions, qui se rapportent respectivement à l'affaire du Différend fron-
talier (Burkina Faso/ République du Mali) (C_LJ. Recueil 1985, p. 7) et ala
présente affaire (C.I.J. Recueil 1987, p. 12). Dans ces deux affaires, l’or-
donnance de la Cour rend compte de l’élection de trois membres de la
Cour nommément désignés, auxquels s’ajoutent deux juges ad hoc nom-
mément désignés (qui avaient d’ailleurs été choisis avant l'élection des
autres juges), et qui forment ensemble une chambre de cinq juges. Il avait
été procédé différemment dans la première affaire ayant donné lieu à la
constitution d’une chambre spéciale, celle de la Délimitation de la frontière
maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/ Etats-Unis d’Amé-
rique) (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 8-9). Dans cette affaire, l'ordonnance de la
Cour avait constitué une chambre composée de cinq membres de la Cour
nommément désignés, élus par elle (y compris un membre de nationalité
américaine), et avait ensuite pris acte de ce que

« dans l’exercice des pouvoirs qu’il tient de l’article 31, paragraphe 4,
du Statut, le Président en exercice a prié M. Ruda [un des cinq juges
élus] de céder sa place, le moment venu, au juge ad hoc désigné par le
Gouvernement du Canada, et que M. Ruda s’est déclaré prêt à le
faire ».

La désignation à laquelle le Canada procéda ultérieurement ne donna pas
lieu à une ordonnance spécifique de la Cour; elle fut simplement relatée
comme un fait dans les considérants de l'ordonnance suivante, par la-
quelle la Cour fixa les délais pour le dépôt des pièces écrites (C.I.J. Recueil
1982, p. 16).

Il semble qu’une tendance à mentionner les noms des juges ad hoc dans
l'ordonnance par laquelle la Cour constitue une chambre spéciale se soit
manifestée en même temps qu’une tendance à abandonner la procédure
suivie dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, selon laquelle un membre de la
Cour, après avoir été élu à la Chambre, cède sa place, à la demande du
Président, à un juge ad hoc désigné ultérieurement par l'Etat intéressé.
Cette procédure de désistement s’imposait dans le cas de tous les juges
ad hoc, pour toutes les chambres. Elle est encore prescrite par le para-
graphe 4 de l’article 31 du Statut pour toutes les chambres et par le para-
graphe 2 de l’article 17 du Règlement de la Cour (modifié expressément
en 1978 à cet effet) pour les chambres spéciales en particulier. La tendance
qui s’est ensuite manifestée à s’écarter de cette procédure, telle qu’elle
avait été appliquée dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine, semble avoir été inex-
tricablement liée à l’application d’une autre disposition du paragraphe 2
de l’article 17 du Règlement de la Cour (d’abord introduite en tant que
paragraphe 1 de l’article 26 du Règlement de 1972) et en avoir été la consé-

8
DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 167

quence pratique. En substance, cette disposition visait à conférer aux par-
ties le droit de faire valoir leurs vues au sujet de l’élection par la Cour detel
ou tel de ses membres pour siéger dans une chambre spéciale. L'objectif
paraît avoir été « d’accorder aux parties une influence décisive sur la com-
position des chambres spéciales » (Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, « The
Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of Jus-
tice», American Journal of International Law, vol. 67, 1973, p. 2).

Sans examiner les conséquences juridiques de cette évolution, mais
tout en tenant compte de celle-ci, j’aborde maintenant le caractère juri-
dique de l’ordonnance rendue aujourd’hui: est-elle constitutive de la dési-
gnation d’un nouveau juge ad hoc par la Cour? Ou s’agit-il simplement de
l’enregistrement judiciaire officiel de la désignation par l'Etat intéressé
d’un nouveau juge ad hoc? En résumé, qui désigne un juge ad hoc? Est-ce
la Cour ou l'Etat intéressé ?

Je crois qu’on dit couramment qu’un juge ad hoc est désigné par l'Etat
intéressé. En revanche, on peut soutenir que, lorsqu’elle admet un juge
ad hoc sur le siège, la Cour exerce un pouvoir de désignation qui lui est
conféré par les paragraphes 2 à 6 de l’article 31 du Statut (voir
Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International
Courts and Tribunals, vol. IV, p. 374). Ce point de vue est respectable, et je
voudrais par conséquent examiner quelques-unes des considérations qui
pourraient être opposées à l’usage plus courant.

L'article 7 du Règlement de la Cour, relatif à l'admission d’un juge
ad hoc pour siéger à la Cour, semble viser la procédure prévue à l’article 20
du Statut, ainsi libellé :

«Tout membre de la Cour doit, avant d’entrer en fonction, en
séance publique, prendre l’engagement solennel d'exercer ses attri-
butions en pleine impartialité et en toute conscience. »

L'obligation de prendre cet engagement est imposée aux juges ad hoc par
le paragraphe 6 de l’article 31 du Statut. Il semble assez clair, cependant,
qu’elle vise non la désignation mais seulement la prise de fonctions. Il est
sous-entendu, dans le texte de l’article 20 du Statut, que l'intéressé est juge
avant même d’avoir pris ledit engagement. En conséquence, la procédure
d'admission semble laisser sans réponse la question de savoir par qui et à
compter de quand une personne est désignée comme juge ad hoc.

Aux termes du paragraphe 5 de l’article 35 du Règlement de la Cour:
« Un juge ad hoc qui a accepté d’être désigné mais n’est plus en mesure de
siéger peut être remplacé», ce qui ne semble pas nécessairement impli-
quer que cette « désignation » est faite pas la Cour. Dans les affaires de la
Namibie (C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 19, par. 10) et du Sahara occidental
(C.LJ. Recueil 1975, p. 15, par. 8), dans lesquelles la Cour a employé les
mots « désignation » et « désigner » à propos de juges ad hoc, il semble que
la question que la Cour cherchait à régler n’était pas de savoir si elle devait
désigner des juges ad hoc(ce qui aurait supposé qu’elle le pouvait), mais si
les conditions nécessaires étaient réunies pour que les Etats concernés
puissent en désigner. C’est ainsi, je crois, que sir Gerald Fitzmaurice a

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 168

interprété la situation dans l'affaire de la Namibie; il a déclaré dans son
opinion dissidente:

«La requête par laquelle l’ Afrique du Sud demandait à être auto-
risée à désigner un juge ad hoc dans la présente affaire a été rejetée
par la Cour, par l’ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971...» (C.LJ. Recueil
1971, p. 308, par. 17.)

Cette interprétation, selon laquelle la désignation est faite par l'Etat inté-
ressé, ne semble pas incompatible avec l’arrêt rendu par la Cour dans
l'affaire du Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte) (C.LJ.
Recueil 1984, p. 5), dont le paragraphe 3 est ainsi libellé:

«La Cour ne comptant sur le siège aucun juge de nationalité li-
byenne ou maltaise, chacune des Parties s’est prévalue du droit que
lui confère l’article 31, paragraphe 3, du Statut de procéder à la dési-
gnation [«to choose »] d’un juge ad hoc pour siéger en l’affaire.
Le 27 juillet 1982 la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne a désigné [« desig-
nated »] M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, et le 8 octobre 1982 les
Parties ont été informées, conformément à l’article 35, paragraphe 3,
du Règlement, que cette désignation [« appointment »] ne soulevait
pas d’objection; le 26 avril 1983 Malte a désigné [« designated »]
M. Jorge Castafieda, et le 30 mai 1983 les Parties ont été informées
que cette désignation [«appointment»] ne soulevait pas d’objec-
tion.»

Bien qu’il y ait deux thèses possibles, je préfère celle selon laquelle la noti-
fication que «cette désignation [«appointment »} ne soulevait pas d’ob-
jection» ne pouvait constituer un acte de désignation par la Cour elle-
même, mais présupposait au contraire l’existence d’une désignation faite
par une autre autorité. Dans le texte anglais du passage cité, les termes
« choosing», « designation» et «appointment» sont apparemment inter-
changeables et visent tous une désignation par l'Etat intéressé.

On peut considérer aussi la manière dont les termes en question ont été
utilisés dans le passé. Dans la deuxième partie du projet Root-Phillimore,
Particle 27 portait que: «Si ... la Cour ne renferme pas de juge de la
nationalité d’un des Etats parties en litige, cet Etat nommera ... un juge»
(Cour permanente de Justice internationale, Comité consultatif de
juristes, procès-verbaux des séances du comité, 16 juin-24 juillet 1920, avec
annexes, La Haye, 1920, p. 327). M. Hudson s’est exprimé de façon ana-
logue; il a utilisé indifféremment les mots «chosen» et «appoint»
(Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice,
1920-1942, New York, 1943, p. 181, 276, 361-364, et les références qui y
sont données). M. Fachiri a fait de méme (A. P. Fachiri, The Permanent
Court of International Justice, 2° éd., 1932, p. 59; voir aussi l’ouvrage plus
récent de Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court, 1965, vol. 1, p. 205-210). On ne peut s’attendre à une cohérence ab-
solue dans l’emploi de ces termes. Ainsi lit-on dans le compte rendu d’une

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 169

séance du comité de juristes des Nations Unies tenue à Washington en
1945 que «M. Hudson relève que dans le cas du paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 26 [du Statut] la Cour ne peut pas désigner de juges ad hoc». Cette
déclaration pourrait donner à penser que, quand un juge ad hoc peut être
désigné, c’est la Cour qui procède à cette désignation (Documents de la
conférence des Nations Unies sur l’organisation internationale, San Fran-
cisco, 1945, vol. XIV, p. 224). D’une façon générale, presque chaque fois
qu'on s’est référé à la question dans la correspondance et dans les débats,
c'était pour dire que les juges ad hoc sont désignés par les parties (voir par
exemple C.PJ.I. série D n° 2, p. 177, 215; C.P.J.I. série D, Troisième ad-
dendum au n° 2, p. 26, 31-33, 306, 386-394, 422, 478-491; affaire Losinger,
C.PJ.L. série C n° 78, p. 392-393; Société des Nations, Comité de juristes
chargé de l'étude du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,
procès-verbal, Genève, 1929, p. 53, intervention de M. Fromageot; et
«Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the
Permanent Court of International Justice», American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Supplement, vol. 39, 1945, p. 12, par. 41). La Cour perma-
nente de Justice internationale elle-même a parlé des juges ad hoc comme
étant désignés par les parties. Ainsi, dans l’affaire du Régime douanier
entre l'Allemagne et l'Autriche (C_P.J.I. série A/B n° 41, p. 90), la Cour a
officiellement décidé qu’il n’y avait « pas lieu, dans la présente affaire, à
la désignation de juges ad hoc soit par l’ Autriche, soit par la Tchécoslova-
quie » (voir aussi C.PJ.I. série C n° 53, p. 189). La Cour permanente a usé
de termes analogues dans l’affaire de la Compatibilité de certains décrets-
lois dantzikois avec la constitution de la Ville libre (C.P.J.I. série A/B n° 65,
p. 70-71. Voir aussi C.PJ.I. série E n° 4, p. 296).

Au cours des débats que la Cour permanente a consacrés en 1922 à l’éla-
boration de son premier Règlement, le Président Loder a déclaré «qu’un
texte seralit] préparé pour exprimer » que si un juge désigné aux termes de
Particle 31 du Statut tombe sous le coup des dispositions de l’article 17,

«en vertu du dernier alinéa de l’article 31 du Statut, la désignation
[d’un tel juge] peut, dans les circonstances indiquées, être déclarée
nulle par la Cour, auquel cas le droit pour les parties de nommer un
juge national sera périmé » (C.PJ.I. série D n° 2, p. 119).

incline à penser, comme M. Hudson, que le dernier membre de phrase
n’était pas une conséquence nécessaire de ce qui le précédait (Hudson,
op. cit., p. 364; .cf. Geneviève Guyomar, Commentaire du Règlement de la
Cour internationale de Justice, 1983, p. 212). Quant à ce qui précédait, il y a
lieu de relever que le texte suggéré, s’il a été rédigé, n’a jamais été pro-
mulgué. L’explication n’est pas claire, mais je ne serais pas surpris qu’elle
soit liée à un argument que l’on pourrait éventuellement faire valoir, à
savoir, que le paragraphe 2 de l’article 17 du Statut est formulé comme une
disposition visant à interdire à un membre en fonctions de la Cour de par-
ticiper au règlement d’une affaire dans certaines conditions, ce qui a pour
résultat, à proprement parler, qu’une décision de la Cour prise en confor-

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 170

mité du paragraphe 3 de l’article 17 du Statut est limitée à l’effet de cette
interdiction de participation et n’englobe pas des questions telles que la
validité de la qualité de membre elle-même. Quoi qu’il en soit, il ne semble
pas que le pouvoir de déclarer une désignation nulle implique que ce soit
la Cour qui est investie du pouvoir de désignation. En 1932, M. Fromageot
a exposé le problème en ces termes:

«Le droit pour une partie de désigner un juge ad hocne dépend pas
d’une autorisation de la Cour; mais la Cour doit pouvoir examiner si
les conditions posées à l’exercice de ce droit sont remplies; si elles ne
l’étaient pas, la Cour rendrait une ordonnance déclarant non justifiée
la désignation d’un juge ad hoc, mais non sans avoir entendu au préa-
lable les parties sur ce point.» (C.PJ.I. série D, Troisième addendum
au n° 2, p. 18, note de bas de page.)

Ainsi, une ordonnance de la Cour déclarant une désignation non justifiée
n’éte rien au fait que cette désignation est néanmoins faite par la partie
concernée et ne dépend pas d’une autorisation de la Cour. Il faut lire les
paragraphes 4 et 5 de l’article 35 du Règlement de la Cour dans l’optique
de la position prépondérante ainsi adoptée par le Statut.

La question se trouve compliquée par une modification apportée au
texte en 1945. L’article 31 du Statut de 1920, tel que modifié avec effet au
1* février 1936, semble avoir utilisé indifféremment dans le texte anglais
les mots «chosen », «selected » et «appointed » à propos des juges natio-
naux. En particulier, les personnes «chosen» pour siéger en qualité de
juges en vertu du deuxième alinéa de l’article 31 du Statut étaient à l’évi-
dence assimilées aux « judges specially appointed by the parties » tels que
visés au quatriéme alinéa du méme article. Le mot « appointed » ayant été
remplacé en 1945 par le mot «chosen », on pourrait considérer qu'il y ala
l'indication d’une modification de fond étayant la thèse inverse. Et je re-
connais la force de cet argument. Mais la structure du mécanisme est de-
meurée la même et aucune modification sur ce point n’a été apportée au
texte français, qui employait le mot « désignés » là où le texte anglais avait
employé le mot «appointed». Dans ces conditions, si les juges ad hoc
étaient regardés comme «appointed by the parties» («désignés par les
parties») et non par la Cour permanente, on voit difficilement comment
cette seule modification du libellé du texte anglais en 1945 pourrait impli-
quer que les juges ad hoc devaient désormais être désignés par la Cour. La
modification du texte anglais est peut-être attribuable à des considéra-
tions de style, comme l’a d’ailleurs suggéré M. Hudson (Manley O.
Hudson, «The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court», American
Journal of International Law, vol. 40, 1946, p. 29). Les comptes rendus
officiels de la sixième séance du comité consultatif de juristes de la
conférence de San Francisco, au cours de laquelle la modification a
été apportée, n’offrent aucune explication (Documents de la conférence
des Nations Unies sur l’organisation internationale, San Francisco, 1945,
t. XIX, p. 407).

On pourrait relever — sij’ose m’aventurer sur ce terrain — que les mots

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 171

employés dans le texte français (qui n’a pas été modifié sensiblement à cet
égard) étaient « désigner », « désignation » et « désignés ». Selon la défini-
tion qui en est donnée, le mot «désignation » signifie notamment l’«indi-
cation d’une personne déterminée pour occuper un poste ou remplir une
mission...» (Vocabulaire juridique, publié sous la direction de Gérard
Cornu, Presses universitaires de France, 1987, p. 260.) Dans la version
française du paragraphe 2 de l’article 31 du Statut actuel, les termes essen-
tiels sont les suivants : «toute autre partie peut désigner une personne de
son choix pour siéger en qualité de juge ». Le mot «désigner», rapproché
du mot « choix», peut impliquer plus qu’un simple choix: il semble viser
Pacte juridique complet qu’évoque le mot anglais «appoint». D’autre
part, même si le mot «appoint » («désigner») peut ne pas toujours signi-
fier «choose » («choisir »), il peut avoir et a parfois effectivement ce sens
(voir Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 6, p. 100-101, et State of New Jersey
v. Provenzano (1961) 169 A 2d 135, 34 N.J. 318). Il semble donc que le mot
anglais «choose» et le mot frangais «désigner» devaient tous deux
constituer, dans le contexte où ils étaient utilisés, l'équivalent juridique
du mot anglais «appoint».

Cela étant dit, on peut maintenant examiner plus en détail l’article 31
du Statut. Aux termes du paragraphe 2 de cet article «toute autre partie
peut désigner une personne de son choix pour siéger en qualité de juge».
Ce que ce libellé implique est précisé au paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 du
Statut, où il est dit que chacune des parties peut procéder « à la désigna-
tion d’un juge de la même manière qu’au paragraphe précédent». Il
semble que la personne désignée conformément au paragraphe 2 est
considérée comme un juge dès sa désignation. De même, le paragraphe 4
de l’article 31 parle des « juges spécialement désignés par les parties » (les
italiques sont de moi). Enfin, le paragraphe 6 de |’ article 31 est ainsi ré-
digé:

« Les juges désignés comme il est dit aux paragraphes 2, 3 et 4 du
présent article doivent satisfaire aux prescriptions des articles 2, 17,
paragraphe 2, 20 et 24 du présent Statut. Ils participent à la décision
dans des conditions de complète égalité avec leurs collègues.» (Les
italiques sont de moi.)

L'exercice du pouvoir de désignation semble être directement constitutif
du statut de juge ad hoc.

Le droit de désigner un juge ad hoc a des incidences sur la composition
de la Cour; par conséquent, il est directement régi par l’instrument consti-
tutif de la Cour, à savoir son Statut. L'article 31 du Statut est la disposition
qui traite du processus par lequel une personne est constituée juge ad hoc.
Cette disposition ne semble attribuer aucun rôle à la Cour, à un quel-
conque moment de ce processus, que ce soit directement ou indirectement
par le jeu des autres dispositions qui y sont mentionnées. Même interpré-
tées de façon très libérale, les limites du pouvoir réglementaire que l’ar-
ticle 30 du Statut donne à la Cour ne lui permettraient pas, par le biais de
l'élaboration des dispositions de son Règlement, de s’attribuer dans ce

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DIFFÉREND (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 172

processus un rôle qui ne lui est pas confié par le Statut. Le Statut paraît
s’en remettre à l’Etat concerné. Cette interprétation s’accorde avec le fait
que la notion de juges ad hoc faisant partie du siège de la Cour est en réa-
lité reprise partiellement de la pratique arbitrale.

En résumé, on voit mal quels sont les actes de la Cour dont on pourrait
dire qu’un juge ad hoc tire son autorité pour agir. Sans méconnaitre la
force des arguments en sens contraire, j’ai une préférence, tout bien consi-
déré, pour l’opinion selon laquelle la désignation d’un juge ad hoc est
constituée par l’acte que l'Etat concerné accomplit en le choisissant, le
rôle de la Cour se limitant à une fonction négative qui consiste à déter-
miner s’il existe un motif quelconque (ayant ou non trait à la validité de sa
nomination) pour l'empêcher de siéger en l'espèce. Si cette interprétation
est exacte, elle conduit à dire que l’ordonnance rendue aujourd’hui ne
constitue pas une désignation faite par la Cour, mais qu’elle est seulement
un acte formel par lequel la Cour enregistre une désignation faite par
l'Etat concerné. Je tiens donc à marquer que c’est en me fondant sur cette
interprétation que j’appuie l’ordonnance.

(Signé) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

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