COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA LICEITE
DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(YOUGOSLAVIE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 2 JUIN 1999

1999

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER OF 2 JUNE 1999
Mode officiel de citation:

Licéité de l'emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Royaume-Uni),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999,
CLJ. Recueil 1999, p. 826

Official citation :

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom),
Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999,
LC J. Reports 1999, p. 826

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 735

ISBN 92-1-070803-2

2 JUIN 1999

ORDONNANCE

LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE
(YOUGOSLAVIE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE
(YUGOSLAVIA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

2 JUNE 1999

ORDER
826

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1999 1999
2 June
General List
2 June 1999 No. 113

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(YUGOSLAVIA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Present: Vice-President WEERAMANTRY, Acting President; President
SCHWEBEL; Judges ODA, BEDJAOUI, GUILLAUME, RANJEVA,
HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
HIGGINS, PARRA-ARANGUREN, KOOUMANS; Judge ad hoc
KRECA; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (hereinafter “ Yugoslavia”) filed in the Registry of the Court on
29 April 1999, instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter “the United Kingdom”)
“for violation of the obligation not to use force”,
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 827

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas in that Application Yugoslavia defines the subject of the
dispute as follows:

“The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by which it has violated
its international obligation banning the use of force against another
State, the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another
State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another State,
the obligation to protect the civilian population and civilian objects
in wartime, the obligation to protect the environment, the obligation
relating to free navigation on international rivers, the obligation
regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms, the obligation
not to use prohibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately
inflict conditions of life calculated to cause the physical destruction
of a national group”;

2. Whereas in the said Application Yugoslavia refers, as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1948 (hereinafter the “Genocide Con-
vention”);

3. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia states that the claims sub-
mitted by it to the Court are based upon the following facts:

“The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, together with the Governments of other Member
States of NATO, took part in the acts of use of force against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by taking part in bombing targets in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In bombing the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia military and civilian targets were attacked. Great
number of people were killed, including a great many civilians. Resi-
dential houses came under attack. Numerous dwellings were
destroyed. Enormous damage was caused to schools, hospitals, radio
and television stations, cultural and health institutions and to places
of worship. A large number of bridges, roads and railway lines were
destroyed. Attacks on oil refineries and chemical plants have had
serious environmental effects on cities, towns and villages in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The use of weapons containing
depleted uranium is having far-reaching consequences for human
life. The above-mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions
calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or
in part. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland is taking part in the training, arming, finan-

5
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 828

cing, equipping and supplying the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation

Army”;

and whereas it further states that the said claims are based on the follow-
ing legal grounds:

“The above acts of the British Government represent a gross vio-
lation of the obligation not to use force against another State. By
financing, arming, training and equipping the so-called ‘Kosovo Lib-
eration Army’, support is given to terrorist groups and the secession-
ist movement in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of
another State. In addition, the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1949 and of the Additional Protocol No. 1 of 1977 on the protec-
tion of civilians and civilian objects in time of war have been vio-
lated. The obligation to protect the environment has also been
breached. The destruction of bridges on the Danube is in contraven-
tion of the provisions of Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on free
navigation on the Danube. The provisions of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have also
been breached. Furthermore, the obligation contained in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
not to impose deliberately on a national group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about the physical destruction of the group has been
breached. Furthermore, the activities in which the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is taking part are contrary to
Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations”;

4. Whereas the claims of Yugoslavia are formulated as follows in the
Application:
“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests
the International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:

— by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use force against
another State;

— by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and
supplying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation
Army’, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another
State:
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 829

by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has acted against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects:

by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monu-
ments of culture, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any act of
hostility directed against historical monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute cultural or spiritual heritage
of people;

by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has acted against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use
prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to cause unneces-
sary suffering;

by taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical
plants, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to cause considerable environmental
damage;

by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted ura-
nium, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern [re-
land has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not to
cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;

by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, commu-
nications, health and cultural institutions, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has acted against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to respect
the right to life, the right to work, the right to information, the
right to health care as well as other basic human rights;

by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of
its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on international
rivers;

by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by
causing enormous environmental damage and by using depleted
uranium, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction, in whole or in part;
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 830

— the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is
responsible for the violation of the above international obliga-
tions;

— the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is
obliged to stop immediately the violation of the above obliga-
tions vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

— the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is
obliged to provide compensation for the damage done to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and juridical
persons” ;

and whereas, at the end of its Application, Yugoslavia reserves the right
to amend and supplement it;

5. Whereas on 29 April 1999, immediately after filing its Application,
Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provisional
measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court; and whereas that
request was accompanied by a volume of photographic annexes pro-
duced as “evidence”;

6. Whereas, in support of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia contends inter alia that, since the onset of the
bombing of its territory, and as a result thereof, about 1,000 civilians,
including 19 children, have been killed and more than 4,500 have sus-
tained serious injuries; that the lives of three million children are endan-
gered; that hundreds of thousands of citizens have been exposed to poi-
sonous gases; that about one million citizens are short of water supply;
that about 500,000 workers have become jobless; that two million citi-
zens have no means of livelihood and are unable to ensure minimum
means of sustenance; and that the road and railway network has suffered
extensive destruction; whereas, in its request for the indication of provi-
sional measures, Yugoslavia also lists the targets alleged to have come
under attack in the air strikes and describes in detail the damage alleged
to have been inflicted upon them (bridges, railway lines and stations,
roads and means of transport, airports, industry and trade, refineries and
warehouses storing liquid raw materials and chemicals, agriculture, hos-
pitals and health care centres, schools, public buildings and housing
facilities, infrastructure, telecommunications, cultural-historical monu-
ments and religious shrines); and whereas Yugoslavia concludes from
this that:

“The acts described above caused death, physical and mental
harm to the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; huge
devastation; heavy pollution of the environment, so that the Yugo-
slav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated
to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in
part”:
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 831

7. Whereas, at the end of its request for the indication of provisional
measures, Yugoslavia states that

“If the proposed measure were not to be adopted, there will be
new losses of human life, further physical and mental harm inflicted
on the population of the FR of Yugoslavia, further destruction of
civilian targets, heavy environmental pollution and further physical
destruction of the people of Yugoslavia”;

and whereas, while reserving the right to amend and supplement its
request, Yugoslavia requests the Court to indicate the following measure:

“The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall refrain from
any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”;

8. Whereas the request for the indication of provisional measures was
accompanied by a letter from the Agent of Yugoslavia, addressed to the
President and Members of the Court, which read as follows:

“T have the honour to bring to the attention of the Court the latest
bombing of the central area of the town of Surdulica on 27 April
1999 at noon resulting in losses of lives of civilians, most of whom
were children and women, and to remind of killings of peoples in
Kursumlija, Aleksinac and Cuprija, as well as bombing of a refugee
convoy and the Radio and Television of Serbia, just to mention
some of the well-known atrocities. Therefore, 1 would like to caution
the Court that there is a highest probability of further civilian and
military casualties.

Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection I kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requests proprio motu or to fix a date for a hearing
at earliest possible time”;

9. Whereas on 29 April 1999, the day on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar sent to the Government of the United Kingdom
signed copies of the Application and of the request, in accordance with
Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas he also sent to that Government copies of the docu-
ments accompanying the Application and the request for the indication
of provisional measures;

10. Whereas on 29 April 1999 the Registrar informed the Parties that
the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules
of Court, to hold hearings on 10 and 11 May 1999, where they would be

9
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 832

able to present their observations on the request for the indication of pro-
visional measures;

11. Whereas, pending the notification under Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, by transmittal of the
printed bilingual text of the Application to the Members of the United
Nations and other States entitled to appear before the Court, the Regis-
trar on 29 April 1999 informed those States of the filing of the Applica-
tion and of its subject-matter, and of the filing of the request for the
indication of provisional measures:

12. Whereas, since the Court includes upon the bench no judge of
Yugoslav nationality, the Yugoslav Government has availed itself of the
provisions of Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose Mr.
Milenko Kreéa to sit as judge ad hoc in the case: and whereas no objec-
tion to that choice was raised within the time-limit fixed for the purpose
pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court:

13. Whereas, at the public hearings held between 10 and 12 May 1999,
observations on the request for the indication of provisional measures
were presented by the following:

On behalf of Yugoslavia:

Mr. Rodoljub Etinski, Agent,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,

Mr. Paul J. I. M. de Waart,
Mr. Eric Suy,

Mr. Miodrag Mitic,

Mr. Olivier Corten;

On behalf of the United Kingdom:

Sir Franklin D. Berman, Agent,
The Rt. Hon. John Morris,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood;

14. Whereas, in this phase of the proceedings, the Parties presented the
following submissions:

On behalf of Yugoslavia:

“[T]he Court [is asked] to indicate the following provisional
measure:

[T]he United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland...
shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain from
any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia” ;

On behalf of the United Kingdom:

“The United Kingdom respectfully requests the Court summarily

10
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 833

to dismiss the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures
submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”

x * +

15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy,
the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life
and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia;

16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force
in Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises
very serious issues of international law;

17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the mainte-
nance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statute of the
Court;

18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, includ-
ing humanitarian law;

+ * x

19. Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have
jurisdiction over legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or
between other States to whom access to the Court has been granted;
whereas the Court has repeatedly stated “that one of the fundamental
principles of its Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction” (East Timor ( Por-
tugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1. C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101, para. 26); and
whereas the Court can therefore exercise jurisdiction only between States
parties to a dispute who not only have access to the Court but also have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for the
individual dispute concerned;

20. Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet 1t ought not to indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear,
prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might
be established;

* *

21. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to
found the jurisdiction of the Court upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the

11
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 834

Statute; whereas each of the two Parties has made a declaration recog-
nizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to that provi-
sion; whereas Yugoslavia’s declaration was deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on 26 April 1999, and that of the United
Kingdom on | January 1969;

22. Whereas Yugoslavia’s declaration is formulated as follows:

and

“T hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of recipro-
city, the jurisdiction of the said Court in all disputes arising or which
may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard
to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases
where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The
present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions
which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial
disputes.

The aforesaid obligation is accepted until such time as notice may
be given to terminate the acceptance”;

whereas the declaration of the United Kingdom reads as follows:

“I have the honour, by direction of Her Majesty’s Principal Sec-
retary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to declare
on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland that they accept as compulsory ipso
facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity,
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity
with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such
time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all
disputes arising after 24 October 1945, with regard to situations or
facts subsequent to the same date, other than:

(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom

(a) has agreed with the other Party or Parties thereto to settle
by some other method of peaceful settlement; or

(b) has already submitted to arbitration by agreement with
any State which had not at the time of submission accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice;

(ii) disputes with the government of any other country which is a
Member of the Commonwealth with regard to situations or
facts existing before | January 1969;

12
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 835

(iii) disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute;
or where the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction
on behalf of any other Party to the dispute was deposited or
ratified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the appli-
cation bringing the dispute before the Court.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom also reserves the
right at any time, by means of a notification addressed to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, and with effect as from the
moment of such notification, either to add to, amend or withdraw
any of the foregoing reservations, or any that may hereafter be
added.”;

23. Whereas the United Kingdom contends that the Court’s jurisdic-
tion cannot be founded upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Court in this case, in view of the reservations contained in its declara-
tion; and whereas it observes in particular that, under the terms of sub-
paragraph (iii) of the first paragraph of that declaration, it does not
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of

“(iii) disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice only in relation to or for the purposes of the dispute; or
where the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on
behalf of any other Party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less
than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court.”;

whereas the United Kingdom argues that Yugoslavia’s declaration “is in
substance an attempt to accept the jurisdiction of the Court solely for the
purpose of a single dispute”; and whereas the United Kingdom stresses
that, as Yugoslavia’s declaration was deposited only three days before
the date of the Application, “[iJt is self-evident . . . that it fails to meet the
twelve month requirement in the second clause of the United Kingdom
reservation”; and whereas the United Kingdom accordingly concludes
that Yugoslavia’s declaration “cannot provide even a prima facie basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction” ;
24. Whereas Yugoslavia submitted no argument on this point;

25. Whereas, given that Yugoslavia deposited its declaration of accept-
ance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with the Secretary-
General on 26 April 1999, and filed its Application instituting proceed-
ings with the Court on 29 April 1999, there can be no doubt that the
conditions for the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction provided for
in the second part of subparagraph (iii) of the first paragraph of the
United Kingdom’s declaration are satisfied in this case; whereas, as the

13
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 836

Court recalled in its Judgment of 4 December 1998 in the Fisheries Juris-
diction (Spain v. Canada) case,

“It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon
the limits it places upon its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Court: ‘[t]his jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which
it has been accepted’ (Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938,
P.C.LJ., Series AIB, No. 74, p. 23)? (1. C.J. Reports 1998, p. 453,
para. 44);

and whereas, as the Court noted in its Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the
case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), “[a]s early as 1952, it held in the case
concerning Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. that . . . ‘jurisdiction is conferred on
the Court only to the extent to which the [declarations made] coincide in
conferring it’ (C.J. Reports 1952, p. 103)” (LC J. Reports 1998, p. 298,
para. 43); and whereas the declarations made by the Parties under
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute manifestly cannot constitute a
basis of jurisdiction in the present case, even prima facie;

*

26. Whereas the United Kingdom, referring to resolution 777 (1992)
of the United Nations Security Council, dated 19 September 1992, and to
resolution 47/1 of the United Nations General Assembly, dated 22 Sep-
tember 1992, also contends that, since Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as
a Member of the United Nations or as a party to the Statute of the
Court, it could not establish a jurisdictional link with parties to the Stat-
ute by purporting to make a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2;

27. Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat, as
expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992 from the Legal Counsel of
the Organization (doc. A/47/485), and to the latter’s subsequent practice,
contends for its part that General Assembly resolution 47/1 “[neither] ter-
minate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organiza-
tion”, and that the said resolution did not take away from Yugoslavia
“Tits] right to participate in the work of organs other than Assembly
bodies” :

28. Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 25 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case;

*
* *

29. Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the second place,
to found the jurisdiction of the Court on Article [X of the Genocide Con-
vention, which provides:

14
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 837

“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute”;

and whereas in its Application Yugoslavia states that the subject of the
dispute concerns inter alia “acts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland by which it has violated its international obligation

. not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause the
physical destruction of a national group”; whereas, in describing the
facts on which the Application is based, Yugoslavia states: “The above-
mentioned acts are deliberately creating conditions calculated at the
physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part”; whereas, in
its statement of the legal grounds on which the Application is based,
Yugoslavia contends that “the obligation . . . not to impose deliberately
on a national group conditions of life calculated to bring about the physi-
cal destruction of the group has been breached”; and whereas one of the
claims on the merits set out in the Application is formulated as follows:

“by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by causing
enormous environmental damage and by using depleted
uranium, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction,
in whole or in part”;

30. Whereas Yugoslavia contends moreover that the sustained and
intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily
populated areas, constitutes “a serious violation of Article I] of the
Genocide Convention”; whereas it argues that “the pollution of soil, air
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the
environment with depleted uranium, inflicts conditions of life on the
Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical destruction”;
whereas it asserts that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such
that is targeted; and whereas it stresses that the use of certain weapons
whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already
known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country’s power
supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent
must be aware, “impl|y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
Yugoslav national group as such;

31. Whereas for its part the United Kingdom denies that Article IX of
the Genocide Convention could constitute a prima facie basis of jurisdic-
tion in this case, because it applies not to disputes in general, but only to
disputes regarding “the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the

15
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 838

Convention: and whereas the United Kingdom emphasizes that Yugo-
slavia has failed to adduce any specific evidence of violations of the Con-
vention and has not established the intent required thereunder;

32. Whereas it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and United King-
dom are parties to the Genocide Convention without reservation: and
whereas Article 1X of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the
extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to “the interpretation,
application or fulfilment” of the Convention, including disputes “relating
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in article III” of the said Convention;

33. Whereas, in order to determine, even prima facie, whether a dis-
pute within the meaning of Article IX of the Genocide Convention exists,
the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains
that the Convention applies, while the other denies it; and whereas in the
present case the Court must ascertain whether the breaches of the Con-
vention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions
of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one
which the Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae to entertain pursuant
to Article IX (cf. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States
of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (11),
p. 810, para. 16):

34. Whereas the definition of genocide set out in Article IE of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group:

(6b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d} Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”;

35. Whereas it appears to the Court, from this definition, “that [the]
essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of ‘a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group’” (Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provi-
sional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, LC.J. Reports 1993,
p. 345, para. 42); whereas the threat or use of force against a State can-
not in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article I]
of the Genocide Convention; and whereas, in the opinion of the Court, it
does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings
which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application “indeed entail the

16
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 839

element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision
quoted above” (Legulity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advi-
sory Opinion, LC.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 26);

36. Whereas the Court is therefore not in a position to find, at this
stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the
Respondent are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide
Convention; and whereas Article IX of the Convention, invoked by
Yugoslavia, cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court could prima facie be founded in this case;

* *

37. Whereas it follows from what has been said above that the Court
lacks prima facie jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia’s Application; and
whereas it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever
in order to protect the rights invoked therein;

38. Whereas, however, the findings reached by the Court in the present
proceedings in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court to deal with the merits of the case under Article IX of the Geno-
cide Convention, or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas they leave
unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugoslavia and the United
Kingdom to submit arguments in respect of those questions;

*
* *

39, Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question
of the acceptance by a State of the Court’s jurisdiction and the compat-
ibility of particular acts with international law; the former requires con-
sent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with
the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full
legal arguments by both parties;

40. Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the
Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them
that violate international law, including humanitarian law; whereas any
disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved
by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the
Charter, is left to the parties;

41. Whereas in this context the parties should take care not to aggra-
vate or extend the dispute;

42, Whereas, when such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special
responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter;

17
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 840

43. For these reasons,
THE Court,
(1) By twelve votes to three,

Rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submit-
ted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999;

IN FAVOUR: Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel: Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,

AGAINST: Judges Shi, Vereshchetin; Judge ad hoc Kreéa;
(2) By fourteen votes to one,

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

IN FAVOUR: Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; President
Schwebel: Judges Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi,
Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans; Judge ad hoc Kre¢éa;

AGAINST: Judge Oda.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of June, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in
the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of the
United Kingdom, respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Vice-President WEERAMANTRY, Acting President, and Judges Sut,
KoroMA and VERESHCHETIN append declarations to the Order of the
Court.

Judges Opa, HicGins, PARRA-ARANGUREN and KoolMANS append
separate opinions to the Order of the Court.

18
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (ORDER 2 VI 99) 841

Judge ad hoc KRECA appends a dissenting opinion to the Order of the
Court.

(Initialled) C.G.W.
(Initialled) E.V.O.


OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. STASSINOPOULOS

A mon vif regret je ne peux pas m’associer à l’ordonnance. Faisant
donc usage du droit que me confère l’article 57 du Statut, je me permets
d’indiquer les raisons de mon dissentiment.

La demande en indication de mesures conservatoires introduite par la
Grèce doit être envisagée, de prime abord, sous l’angle de deux principes
indiscutables du droit international de la mer.

Le premier principe est que l'Etat riverain exerce sur le plateau con-
tinental des droits souverains d’exploration et d’exploitation des res-
sources naturelles; ces droits sont exclusifs en ce sens que nul autre ne peut
exercer une activité de recherche, d’exploration ou d’exploitation sans
le consentement de cet Etat riverain. Ce principe, cristallisé par l’article 2
de la Convention de Genève de 1958 sur le plateau continental, fut
réaffirmé en des termes très clairs par la Cour dans son arrêt relatif au
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 22).

Le deuxième principe est que les îles possèdent leur plateau continental
au sens juridique de ce terme. Je me permets de rappeler ici la disposition
fondamentale de l’article premier de la Convention de Genève de 1958:

«Aux fins des présents articles, l'expression «plateau continental »
est utilisée pour désigner ... b) le lit de la mer et le sous-sol des
régions sous-marines analogues qui sont adjacentes aux côtes des
Îles:»

Le caractère normatif des articles 1 et 2 de cette convention a été à
maintes reprises confirmé par l’arrêt de la Cour susmentionné sur le
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (ibid., p. 22, 39 et 42).

A mon avis, il faut toujours avoir présents à l’esprit ces deux principes
qui constituent le droit en vigueur pour apprécier la demande visant à
Vindication de mesures conservatoires dans la présente affaire.

Or, l'exercice par la Grèce de ses droits souverains exclusifs sur son
plateau continental, tel qu’il est déterminé par les deux principes ci-dessus
mentionnés, a été immuable, imperturbable et continu de tout temps, et
depuis l’apparition dans le domaine du droit international de la notion
même du plateau continental. La Turquie n’a jamais protesté contre cet
exercice et n’a jamais revendiqué des droits quelconques sur le plateau
continental grec. Ce n’est qu’en 1973 qu’elle a soudainement publié dans
sa Gazette officielle une carte dans laquelle figurent des zones de la mer
Egée sur lesquelles la Turquie revendique des droits. Presque en même
temps cet Etat a octroyé des permis d'exploration sur ces mêmes zones
et commencé des travaux d’exploration. Cela signifie que la Turquie, au

36
36 MER ÉGÉE (OP. DISS. STASSINOPOULOS)

lieu d’attendre que la question soulevée par elle-même soit réglée par les
voies appropriées, conformément à l’article 33 de la Charte des Nations
Unies, a essayé de réaliser ses propres prétentions, par des actes matériels
entrepris sans aucun autre titre que ces prétentions. En droit, cette
manière d’agir constitue un exemple classique de ce qu’on appelle «voie
de fait» et ne suffit certainement pas pour que ces zones, appartenant
depuis toujours et incontestablement à la Grèce, soient qualifiées comme
des «zones litigieuses » ou «contestées ».

En 1976, les activités d’exploration entreprises par le navire turc
Sismik I sont fondées sur un programme très large qui s’est même élargi
après que la Cour a eu à s’occuper de la situation actuelle. En conséquence
de ces activités, la Grèce et la Turquie se sont trouvées devant une situa-
tion de préparatifs militaires d'envergure et l’aggravation de la situation
pourra amener à une menace réelle contre la paix.

Face à cette situation, qui ne fait que s’aggraver, la Grèce a introduit
devant la Cour une requête visant à la délimitation du plateau continental
de la mer Egée et une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
jusqu’à ce que cette haute juridiction internationale se prononce sur le
fond de l’affaire.

La demande de la Grèce est fondée sur l’article 33 de l’Acte général de
1928, ainsi que sur l’article 41 du Statut de la Cour. L’un et l’autre de ces
deux textes confèrent à la Cour le pouvoir d’indiquer des mesures
conservatoires. Mais ils se distinguent, notamment, par la densité des
pouvoirs conférés à cet effet à la Cour.

Le libellé de l’article 33, alinéa 1, de l’Acte général est plus impératif
pour la Cour:

«1. Dans tous les cas où le différend fait l’objet d’une procédure
arbitrale ou judiciaire, notamment si la question au sujet de laquelle
les parties sont divisées résulte d’actes déjà effectués ou sur le point
de l'être, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, statuant con-
formément à l’article 41 de son Statut, ou le tribunal arbitral,
indiquera, dans le plus bref délai possible, quelles mesures provisoires
doivent être prises. Les parties en litige seront tenues de s’y confor-
mer.»

Quant à l’article 41, alinéa 1, du Statut, celui-ci dispose que «la Cour
a le pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l’exigent,
quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à
titre provisoire» (les italiques sont de moi). A mon avis, dans la notion
des «circonstances » que la Cour devra prendre en considération, s’intègre
tout d’abord la nature des droits qu’il y a lieu de protéger. Et sur ce point,
les textes de l’article 33 de l’Acte général et de l’article 41 du Statut
s’identifient. Je veux dire par là que, lorsque la Cour se trouve en présence
d’une atteinte aux droits qui relèvent de la souveraineté d’un Etat, elle
est tenue de prendre en considération au plus haut degré cette circonstance
pour indiquer les mesures sollicitées.

37
37 MER ÉGÉE (OP. DISS. STASSINOPOULOS)

Cela dit, il y a lieu de rappeler que la Cour a indiqué des mesures
conservatoires dans bien des cas où les droits à protéger ne relevaient pas de
la souveraineté de l'Etat en cause. En revanche, j’ai l’impression que
c’est la première fois, dans la présente affaire, que la Cour refuse d’indiquer
des mesures conservatoires face à un litige impliquant des atteintes aux
droits souverains.

Dans sa jurisprudence, la Cour a précisé les conditions qui lui parais-
sent nécessaires pour l’indication de mesures conservatoires. Elles sont
ancrées autour des concepts: sauvegarde des droits des parties, préjudice
irréparable et aggravation et extension du différend.

Le concept de sauvegarde des droits des parties figure toujours dans
les ordonnances rendues par la Cour, que ces ordonnances indiquent ou
n’indiquent pas de mesures conservatoires. En revanche, le concept de
préjudice irréparable n’est pas toujours expressément mentionné dans
les considérants de la Cour. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, dans l’affaire de
l’Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (qui indiqua des mesures conservatoires) et dans
l'affaire de l’Interhandel (qui n’indiqua pas de mesures conservatoires).
J'ajoute que le concept de préjudice irréparable n’est pas pris par la Cour
dans un sens littéral. Le préjudice est considéré en fonction de la situation
dans laquelle il se produit.

Dans la présente affaire, il y a atteinte grave et irréparable aux droits
souverains en tant que tels; l’on sait, en effet, que l'Etat riverain possède,
selon la Cour, ces droits sur le plateau continental ipso facto et ab initio;
que l’article 2 de la Convention de Genève lorsqu'il parle d’exclusivité
consacre un droit absolu et que par conséquent toute atteinte à ce droit
absolu constitue un préjudice irréparable. Je considère également irré-
parable le préjudice causé par le recueil des renseignements sur les
ressources du plateau grec et la possibilité de les divulguer, ce qui ferait
un obstacle insurmontable à leur exploitation par la Grèce.

Par ailleurs, le fait matériel de l’exploration du plateau continental
par des explosions constitue une circonstance aggravante si l’on s’en
tient à l’évolution du droit international en la matière.

En effet, la troisième partie du «texte unique de négociation revisé»
de la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer
(A/CONF.62WP.8/Rev.1/Part ITI (6 mai 1976)), qui, d’après l’indication
du président de la Troisième Commission, a tenu compte «de toutes les
négociations précédentes, de toutes les propositions et de tous les amen-
dements qui avaient été soumis ainsi que des résultats obtenus au cours
de la présente session de la Conférence», contient dans son article 60,
paragraphe 2, alinéa b), une interdiction très nette de recherches et
d’explorations sur le plateau continental par l’utilisation d’explosifs.

Cette interdiction fait état d’un préjudice irréparable pour les res-
sources naturelles du plateau continental.

Mais elle concerne les cas où la recherche est effectuée avec l’autorisa-

38
38 MER ÉGÉE (OP. DISS. STASSINOPOULOS)

tion de l'Etat côtier. Comment pourrait-on préserver le plateau continen-
tal de toute aitération dans le cas d’une exploration illicite, comme dans
le cas en cause, constituant une véritable voie de fait? Et les actes visant
à la réalisation de la part de la Turquie de ses propres revendications sur
le plateau grec ne sont autre chose, comme je l’ai dit plus haut, que des
«voies de fait». Et je reviens instamment sur cette conception.

*

Je suis d’autre part en désaccord avec la partie de l’ordonnance qui a
trait à la résolution 395 (1976) du Conseil de sécurité.

La Cour est Porgane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies, l’un des
cing organes principaux de l’Organisation. Elle concourt, avec les
moyens mis à sa disposition par la Charte et par son Statut, au réglement
des différends juridiques entre Etats.

Dans l’affaire actuelle, nous sommes en présence d’un différend juri-
dique (délimitation du plateau continental) dont l’issue permettra aux
parties d'améliorer leurs relations.

L’aspect politique de l’affaire a été porté devant le Conseil de sécurité.
Cet organe a élaboré, en fonction d’éléments à sa disposition, une résolu-
tion.

De son côté, la Cour a été saisie d’un autre aspect fondamental de la
même question. Devant l’urgence de la situation et son aggravation, la
Cour aurait dû exercer la plénitude de ses pouvoirs. Il n’est point néces-
saire de mentionner ici la différence qui existe entre un différend ou une
situation porté à la fois devant le Conseil de sécurité et l’Assemblée
générale et entre deux recours, l’un porté devant les organes politiques
des Nations Unies, l’autre porté devant l’organe judiciaire de l’Organisa-
tion. Dans le premier cas, l’article 12 de ia Charte interdit en principe à
l’Assemblée générale de faire une recommandation, tant que le Conseil de
sécurité remplit à l’égard du différend ou de la situation les fonctions qui
lui sont conférées par la Charte. Mais rien, absolument rien n’empéche,
ni dans la Charte, ni dans le Statut, la Cour de statuer dans le domaine
qui lui est propre, au cas où un autre organe des Nations Unies s’occupe
des aspects politiques d’une affaire.

Face à une situation qui s’aggravait de jour en jour, l'indication aux
deux parties qu’elles doivent éviter tout acte qui pourrait aggraver et
étendre le différend aurait été justifiée dans le cadre des pouvoirs conférés
à la Cour par l’article 33 de l’Acte général et par l’article 41 de son Statut.
D'autre part, puisque la Cour a donné les solutions adoptées aux
paragraphes 34-41 de l'ordonnance, en concluant au paragraphe 42:

«qu’il n’est pas nécessaire pour la Cour de statuer sur la question de
savoir si l’article 41 du Statut lui confère le pouvoir d'indiquer des
mesures conservatoires dans le seul dessein de prévenir l’aggravation
ou l’extension d’un différend »,

39
39 MER ÉGÉE (OP. DISS. STASSINOPOULOS)

il fallait, à mon avis, étendre cette solution également à l’autre chef de la
demande, c’est-à-dire à la question du préjudice irréparable invoqué par
la demande, et ne pas se saisir quant à ce dernier. Au lieu de cela, la
Cour a dit qu’il n’y pas lieu d’indiquer les mesures sollicitées sur ie motif
qu’il n’existe pas un préjudice irréparable (par. 33). Pourtant, on ne doit
pas perdre de vue que l’activité du Sismik I et le préjudice irréparable
causé par elle se trouvent au cœur de l’affaire, et sont étroitement liés avec
la création de la situation qui aggrave et étend le différend. I va de soi
que ces deux éléments, étroitement liés comme je l’ai dit, ont été présentés
ensemble devant le Conseil de sécurité, puisque les explorations du
Sismik I étaient la cause de l’aggravation de la situation.

Or, à mon avis, la Cour devait décider de même pour les deux chefs de
la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires et ne pas examiner
séparément la question du préjudice irréparable, comme elle l’a fait, pour
aboutir à la conclusion contenue au paragraphe 33. Si la Cour avait
suivi ce procédé, la solution serait identique pour les deux chefs de la
demande, ce qui, à mon avis, correspondrait à la situation réelle et serait
une solution juste et calmante pour les deux parties.

QUESTION DE COMPÉTENCE

En ce qui concerne la compétence, je crois que, avant de procéder à
examen de la demande de mesures conservatoires, ainsi que de toute
demande, la Cour doit s’assurer, par un examen extrêmement sommaire,
de sa compétence prima facie, pour connaître du fond de l’affaire. Cette
régle ne se dégage pas seulement de la jurisprudence de la Cour; elle
constitue un principe général qui régit toutes les institutions analogues.

Je me rapporte a cet égard a la pratique des juridictions administratives
internes. Le recours pour excés de pouvoirs devant une juridiction ad-
ministrative n’a pas d’effet suspensif pour l’acte attaqué; cela signifie
que l’exécution de l’acte attaqué n’est pas empéchée du seul fait qu’un
recours ait été formé contre lui. Et c’est naturel, parce que le contraire
pourrait aboutir à nuire sérieusement au fonctionnement de l’administra-
tion et à paralyser son activité. Cependant, toujours dans les systèmes
juridiques internes, le législateur a prévu le cas extraordinaire où l’exécu-
tion de l’acte attaqué, qui aurait lieu en attendant que la juridiction
compétente se prononce sur sa validité, pourrait causer un préjudice
irréparable au requérant. Dans ce cas, le sursis à l'exécution de l’acte est
autorisé. L’on n’a jamais refusé ce sursis parce qu'il y avait des doutes sur
la compétence au fond.

La requête grecque est fondée sur l’article 17 de l’Acte général de 1928
et sur le communiqué conjoint gréco-turc du 31 mars 1975.

Pour ce qui est de l’Acte général, bien que la Cour, dans les affaires des
Essais nucléaires, ne se soit pas directement prononcée sur la thèse
française d’après laquelle cet acte était devenu caduc, elle a, néanmoins,

40
40 MER ÉGÉE (OP. DISS. STASSINOPOULOS)

considéré l’Acte général prima facie en vigueur pour les besoins de la
phase des mesures conservatoires. D'ailleurs l’activité récente du Secré-
taire général des Nations Unies, dépositaire de l’Acte général, prouve
qu’il est toujours en vigueur.

D'autre part, la Grèce fonde la compétence de la Cour sur le commu-
niqué du 31 mai 1975. Il s’agit là d’un engagement de la part des deux
parties. C’est un élément qui suffit également pour constater que la
compétence de la Cour existe au moins prima facie.

Enfin, la réserve b), mentionnée dans l’instrument d’adhésion de la
Grèce à l’Acte général (voir par. 19 de l’ordonnance), ne constitue point
un obstacle à la vigueur de l’ Acte général, pour les trois raisons suivantes:

a) comme il résulte de la lettre de M. Politis, versée au dossier, le but de
cette réserve était de tenir en dehors de l’application de l’Acte général
les différends qui pourraient être soulevés à propos des aspirations
éventuelles d’un autre Etat à une zone libre ou jouissant d’un régime
spécial dans le territoire de l’Etat grec;

b) à l’époque où cette réserve a été formulée, la notion du plateau
continental n’existait pas encore dans le domaine du droit internatio-
nal;

c) la lettre même du terme «statut territorial» exclut, à mon avis,
l'interprétation selon laquelle ce terme pourrait comprendre le plateau
continental.

Pour ces raisons, je suis d’avis que la compétence de la Cour pour juger
le fond de l’affaire existe au moins prima facie.

(Signé) Michel STASSINOPOULOS.

Al


                        INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                          REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                       ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                   CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT
                           BY NICARAGUA
                        IN THE BORDER AREA
                         (COSTA RICA v. NICARAGUA)

                           ORDER OF 18 JULY 2017

                               2017
                        COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                            RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                     AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                    CERTAINES ACTIVITÉS MENÉES
                         PAR LE NICARAGUA
                    DANS LA RÉGION FRONTALIÈRE
                         (COSTA RICA c. NICARAGUA)

                       ORDONNANCE DU 18 JUILLET 2017

2 CIJ1126.indb 1                                         20/04/18 08:35

                              Oﬃcial citation :
      Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area
            (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Order of 18 July 2017,
                         I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 285

                         Mode oﬃciel de citation :
    Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière
         (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), ordonnance du 18 juillet 2017,
                         C.I.J. Recueil 2017, p. 285

                                              Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441
ISBN 978-92-1-157324-4
                                              No de vente:    1126

                                                   18 JULY 2017

                                                     ORDER

                   CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT
                           BY NICARAGUA
                        IN THE BORDER AREA
                     (COSTA RICA v. NICARAGUA)

                    CERTAINES ACTIVITÉS MENÉES
                         PAR LE NICARAGUA
                    DANS LA RÉGION FRONTALIÈRE
                     (COSTA RICA c. NICARAGUA)

                                                 18 JUILLET 2017

                                                 ORDONNANCE

2 CIJ1126.indb 3                                                   20/04/18 08:35

               285

                              INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

   2017                                        YEAR 2017
  18 July
General List
 No. 150                                       18 July 2017

                       CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT
                               BY NICARAGUA
                            IN THE BORDER AREA
                                   (COSTA RICA v. NICARAGUA)

                                                 ORDER

                   The President of the International Court of Justice,
                  Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
               cles 45, paragraph 2, and 48 of the Rules of Court,
                  Having regard to the Judgment delivered on 16 December 2015 in the
               joined cases concerning Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the
               Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in
               Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), by which
               the Court found, inter alia, that the Republic of Nicaragua (hereinafter
               “Nicaragua”) has the obligation to compensate the Republic of Costa
               Rica (hereinafter “Costa Rica”) for material damages caused by Nicara-
               gua’s unlawful activities on Costa Rican territory (point 5 (a) of the
               operative part),
                  Having regard to the decision of the Court, set forth in the said Judg-
               ment, according to which, “failing agreement between the Parties on this
               matter within 12 months from the date of this Judgment, the question of
               compensation due to Costa Rica will, at the request of one of the Parties,
               be settled by the Court” (point 5 (b) of the operative part),
                  Having regard to the letter dated 16 January 2017, whereby the Co-
               Agent of Costa Rica indicated that “the Parties ha[d] not been able to
               agree on the compensation due to Costa Rica for material damages
               caused by Nicaragua’s unlawful activities” and requested the Court “to

               4

286                certain activities (order 18 VII 17)

settle the question of the compensation due to Costa Rica for material
damages caused by Nicaragua’s unlawful activities” as ascertained by the
Court in the case concerning Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua
in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)”,

   Having regard to paragraph 142 of the above-mentioned Judgment
according to which the Court will determine the amount of compensation
on the basis of further written pleadings limited to this issue,
   Having regard to the Order dated 2 February 2017, whereby the Court
ﬁxed 3 April 2017 and 2 June 2017, respectively, as the time-limits for the
ﬁling of a Memorial of Costa Rica and a Counter-Memorial of Nicara-
gua on the sole question of compensation due in the present case,

   Having regard to the Memorial and Counter-Memorial duly ﬁled
within the time-limits thus prescribed;
   Whereas, by a letter dated 20 June 2017, Costa Rica stated that, in its
Counter-Memorial, Nicaragua introduced evidence, and raised a number
of arguments, in particular in respect of Costa Rica’s expert evidence,
which Costa Rica “ha[d] not yet had the opportunity to address”; whereas,
in the same letter Costa Rica, inter alia, contested the methodology used
by Nicaragua for the assessment of environmental harm; whereas Costa
Rica thus requested the Court to be given an opportunity to respond by
way of a short reply;

  Whereas, by a letter dated 23 June 2017, Nicaragua objected to
Costa Rica’s request and asked the Court “to proceed and assess the rel-
evant material damage and the amount of compensation based on the
evidence that the Parties have provided in their Memorial and Counter-
Memorial”;
  Whereas the Court notes that the Parties hold diﬀerent views as to the
methodology for the assessment of environmental harm and ﬁnds it nec-
essary for them to address this issue in a brief second round of written
pleadings,
  Authorizes the submission of a Reply by Costa Rica and a Rejoinder
by Nicaragua on the sole question of the methodology adopted in the
expert reports presented by the Parties in the Memorial and Counter-
Memorial, respectively, on the question of compensation due in the pres-
ent case;
    Fixes the following time-limits for the ﬁling of those pleadings:

    8 August 2017 for the Reply of the Republic of Costa Rica;
    29 August 2017 for the Rejoinder of the Republic of Nicaragua;

5

287                certain activities (order 18 VII 17)

    Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

   Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of July, two thousand
and seventeen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Repub-
lic of Costa Rica and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua,
respectively.

                                           (Signed) Ronny Abraham,
                                                       President.
                                         (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                       Registrar.

6


28

INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER.
[Translation.]

The reply to be given to the question submitted to the
Court depends on the manner in which that question is
interpreted, and in particular on the meaning to be given
to the words “enable” and “‘special legal status”. The answer
will be in the affirmative if it is a question whether the spe-
cial legal status of the Free City of Danzig, as arising out
of the Treaty of Versailles, makes it possible for the Free
City to become a Member of the International Labour Organ-
ization; on the other hand, it would be in the negative if
the question related to a right for Danzig, without Poland’s
consent, to obtain admission to, and thereby to take part
in the work of, the Organization.

Both the International Labour Office and the two Govern-
ments concerned emphasized the fact, especially at the outset
of the arguments in Court, that there is in reality no dispute,
but only .a doubtful legal situation which they are desirous
of helping to clear up. The Court would therefore hardly
be responding to the intention which prompted the Governing
Body and the Council of the League of Nations to consult
it, if, starting from a particular hypothesis, it confined itself
merely to a reply in the negative or the affirmative. It is
rather for the Court to consider the different situations which
may arise within the legal framework established by the
Treaty of Versailles. For it is certain that the provisions of
this Treaty, on the one hand, and those of subsequent agree-
ments and decisions, on the other, are not all binding to the
same extent for those directly concerned; there will thus be
absolute incompatibilities and relative incompatibilities, accord-
ing to the legal situations envisaged.

In the present affair, the Court is all the more justified
in considering different possible situations in that its reply
will in any case be hypothetical, for it has not to decide the
preliminary and general question whether the Free City, apart
from its special status, fulfils the conditions necessary for ©
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 29

admission as a Member of the International Labour Organiz-
ation.

Being, by the terms of the request, obliged to deal with
only one aspect of the problem, the Court must, while keeping
within the request, throw light on all that side of the prob-
lem, without being held up by. an incompatibility between
the special status and Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles
if, without affecting the special status itself, this incom-
patibility might be overcome, either by an agreement between
the Parties concerned, or by a unilateral concession. And
thus—while remaining true to its traditional conception of
advisory opinions—the Court, by means of purely juridical
considerations, will best assist the Parties in finding a solution.

%
* *%

This having been said, there are above all three points
of a general nature to be considered.

: x. The special legal status of the Free City is based on
the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which, on the one hand,
provide for the protection of the Free City by the League of
Nations (Art. 102 and 103), and which, on the other hand,
lay down the rights of Poland in relation to Danzig, especially
as regards the conduct by the Polish Republic of the foreign
relations of the Free City (Art. 104 and Convention of Novem-
ber oth, 1920). The three Parties directly concerned in this
system are the Free City, the League of Nations and Poland.
The Treaty of Versailles, and therefore the system established
by that Treaty, is final and independent of the will of the
Parties. But, in so far as any one of them is to be considered
as holder of a right, he must be regarded as entitled to
waive that right in any particular case or series of cases,
unless such waiver should affect the system itself with a view
to which the right was created. In contradistinction to a :
statutory right, a contractual right cannot be presumed to be
binding on its holder.

2. Part XIII does not lay down that only States possessed
of complete sovereignty both in foreign relations and as regards
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 30

domestic legislation can be Members of the. Organization.
By the reference which it contains to the Covenant of the
League of Nations, Article 387 of the Treaty of. Versailles -
admits self-governing colonies or dominions, besides States
properly so-called. The International Labour. Organization
includes, or has included, communities whose mutual relations
are essentially different from their relations with third Powers.
Articles 405, paragraph 9, and 421, paragraph 2, contain
important exceptions to their main provisions in favour of
States which, although entirely independent in their foreign
relations, may, owing to their internal political structure, be
unable to apply throughout their territory conventions ratified
by them. If therefore Part XIII takes account of very differ-
ént situations arising from the internal structure of States or
-other communities Members of the Organization, as well as
from their relations of external dependence, it is not possible
prima facie to exclude the Free City from the International
Labour Organization owing to its special legal status. The
compatibility of that status with Part XIII is a question
which must be examined having regard to the special circum-
stances of the case, and the answer to which cannot be pre-
judged by the fact that, as regards foreign relations, the Free
City is not in a position to take independent action.

3. The relations of a Member of the International Labour
Organization with that Organization cannot be placed on the
same footing as relations arising from a treaty or multilateral
convention. By Article 387, every Member of the League
_of Nations is and must be a Member of the International
Labour Organization; the Preamble to Part XIII gives the
reason for this connection. The Covenant. of the League of
Nations and Part XIII do not merely belong to the same
Treaty, but are also organically connected. The adhesion
of the largest possible number of Members of the League of
Nations to conventions adopted by the Labour Conference is
beyond doubt one of the purposes of Part XIII, the realization
of which is the object of Articles 405, paragraphs 5 and 7,
and 416. The Free City is not a Member of the League of
Nations, but is protected by the League; it is further incor-
porated in the customs territory of Poland, a Member of the
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 31

League of Nations, which conducts the foreign relations of
Danzig. As, therefore, the Free City lies entirely within the
framework of the League of Nations, its admission to the
International Labour Organization and its adhesion to con-
‘ventions emanating therefrom cannot, in principle, be contrary
either to the interests of the League of Nations or to those
of a State Member of the League.

*
* *

' These general considerations, which dominate. the whole
problem submitted to the Court, must be taken into account
when the special legal status of the Free City and the provi-
sions of Part XIII are being compared for the purpose of
determining their absolute or relative compatibility or incom-
patibility.

The author of a separate opinion cannot make this detailed
comparison in a case in which he cannot refer to correspond-
ing statements and considerations in the Opinion of the Court
to which his separate opinion is attached. I thérefore limit
myself to indicating the principal points on which in my
view the Court should have given a decision.

The admission of the Free City to the International Labour
Organization—that is to say, the creation of conventional
relations between the Free City and the other Members of
the Organization—seems to be governed by the same rules
as the adhesion of the Free City to any convention, collect-
ive or otherwise. The fact that the adhesion of the Free
City necessarily depends on the intervention of Poland, and
that that State may possibly oppose it, does not exclude the
possibility of the Free City’s being a Member of the Interna-
- tional Labour Organization, any more than it excludes its
adhesion to the numerous international conventions to which
it has in fact become a Party through the intermediary of
Poland. This seems to decide indirectly in ‘the affirmative
another question connected with the special status, namely
whether Danzig possesses the character of a State neces-
sary for being a Member of the Organization.
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER | 37

The veto of the League of Nations, which may be inter-
posed under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention of Paris,
is only hypothetical, as is the refusal of Poland, and does
not in itself prevent the Free City from becoming a Member
of the International Labour Organization; leaving aside the
question whether this right of veto may really be applied
in any eventuality, it is only a condition belonging to this ~
special status. The same is true as regards any other possible
intervention by the League of Nations in virtue of its right of
protection.

The difficulty of the problem submitted to the Court lies
in the incompatibility which there may be between the special
legal status of the Free City and the rights and obligations
which would arise for it from its position as Member of the
Organization. -As it would be absurd to admit a community
which could not take part in the work, the question of admis- .
-sion is bound up with that of participation.

The fact that Poland might consent, in the name and on
behalf of the Free City, to ask those concerned for the admis-
sion of the latter may be understood in various ways and
must therefore be elucidated. If the consent resulted from
a decision given in virtue of the procedure laid down by
Article 39 of the Convention of Paris, it would leave intact
the right of Poland itself to proceed, on behalf of the Free
City, to any acts belonging to the conduct of foreign relations
which the latter might wish or be bound to perform in its
capacity as Member of the International Labour Organization.
If the right of Poland to refuse to act on behalf of the Free
City depends on the nature of the action requested—namely,
whether it is contrary or not to essential interests of the
Polish State—(High Commissioner’s decision of December 17th,
1921; decision of the Council of the League of Nations of
May 7th, 1922), Poland cannot in any case be obliged
to waivé her rights to conduct the foreign relations of the
Free City. It is important therefore to ascertain: (1) if and
to what extent participation in the International Labour
Organization comes within the field of foreign relations and
therefore of the rights of Poland; and (2) if and to what
extent the intervention of Poland, by virtue of this right,
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER _ 33

in the relations between the Free City and the Labour Organ-
ization would be contrary to the provisions of Part XIII.
In so far as there would be incompatibility, the admission of
the Free City would depend on Poland’s consent. But if
this consent is not contrary to the special status—and for
the reasons given above it is not so contrary—, that status
cannot be regarded as being such as not to enable the Free
City to become a Member of the International Labour Organ-
ization. The possibility still exists, although subject to cer-
tain conditions.

All these questions would not arise if the consent of Poland
meant the abandonment by her, as regards possible rela-
tions between the Free City and the International Labour
Organization, of her rights under Article 104 (6) of the
Treaty of Versailles. In that case—having been admitted
through the intervention and with the consent of Poland—
the Free City would be in the same position as Members who
conduct their foreign relations in entire independence.

Coming now to the principal points in regard to which an
incompatibility might exist, the following must be noted:

1.—Discussion in the Conference does not partake of the
nature of foreign relations which characterizes the negotiations
at a diplomatic conference; for, in view of the individual
vote of each delegate (Article 390, paragraph 1), it is not the
will of the States as persons in international law which is
—in law at any rate—thereby expressed. The legal conception
of foreign relations is connected with that of the individual
or collective will of States in their relations one with another.
The Conference would not therefore include a Danzig delegation |
under the leadership of the head of the Polish delegation,
and the abnormal situation, incompatible with the structure
of the Conference, which would be brought about if the
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 34

delegation of one Member was lead d by that of another, could
therefore not occur.

As however the purpose of discussion at the Conference is
in particular the conclusion of international conventions, it is
conceivable—although this extension of the notion may be
criticized—to consider the appointment of delegates as an act
of foreign policy. On this assumption, the appointment of
the Danzig delegates might be submitted for approval to the
Polish Government and would be forwarded by it; but once
it had been so forwarded, the independent situation of the
delegates, under Article 390, would be entirely in conformity
with the system of the International Labour Organization.

2.—Conventions drawn up by the Conference and ratified
by a Member create for the latter obligations - going beyond
those which he undertakes by the simple fact of his admis-
sion. The act of ratification therefore involves an act of foreign
policy and consequently belongs to the domain in which
Poland has the right to act for and on behalf of the Free
City. Here however the intervention of Poland is no more
an obstacle than it would be for the admission itself,-or than
it was in the past when any other convention was concluded
of which the ratification is left entirely to the discretion of
Members. The Organization has not to concern itself with the
conditions in which its Members exercise or do not exercise
their own rights. However, according to the interpretation
given, in the statements submitted to the Court on behalf
of the International Labour Office, to Article 405, paragraphs 5
and 7,.the Member is bound to ratify if the competent author-
ity—which is generally the legislative organ and which must
have the draft conventions submitted to it within a specified
time—has accepted a draft. In any case, whether it be a
procedure peculiar to Part XIII or the normal procedure for the
ratification of the convention, it is always an organ of the
Member which expresses the will involving ratification. As
this organ, whatever it be, is quite untrammelled in its
decision, it in any case lies with the Free City not
to approve a draft save under conditions which exclude any
conflict between its obligations towards Poland, on the one
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 35

hand, and the International Labour Organization, on the
other. This is therefore a point which can be settled between
Poland and the Free City.

In the oral arguments submitted on behalf of the Inter-
national Labour Office, it was mentioned that certain States
Members had agreed to come.to an understanding before
ratifying a draft convention, in order to follow a uniform line
of conduct in this domain. It therefore seems possible that
the attitude of Members towards draft conventions may be
determined by international undertakings other than those
arising from Part XIII.

3.—As regards the procedure by enquiry and judicial procedure
mentioned in Articles 411 and following, a distinction must be
made between disputes which might arise between Poland and
the Free City, on the one hand, and between the Free City
and other Members of the Organization, on the other.

As regards the first category, the conflict between the jurisdiction
referred to in Article 103 and that provided for by Part XIII
of the Treaty of Versailles must and can be given a legal
solution based on the relative values of the conflicting clauses
of this same Treaty. As regards the second category of dis-
putes, it is to be noted that the filing of a complaint or the
institution of proceedings against a State falls within the sphere
of foreign relations. But it is equally true that Members
have here a right belonging to them, and nothing prevents
the Free City from coming to an agreement with Poland as
to the conditions in which it would make use of that right;
this would permit Poland not to refuse her consent to the
admission, on that ground.

4.— The question of the economic measures (which cannot
be taken on the initiative of one Member of the Organiz-
ation) does not seem capable of giving rise to difficulties,
unless it be on account of the customs union between Poland
and the Free City. It would however hardly be possible for any
obstacle to exist on this ground as far as the Labour Organ-
ization- is concerned; for it is already recognized that a
State connected with another State by a customs union may
nevertheless be a Member of the Organization.
INDIVIDUAL OPINION BY M. HUBER 36

The points I have dealt with in no way claim to exhaust
the subject. But I think that guidance should be given
at least on these points, if the question put to the Court
is to receive an answer of such usefulness as those concerned
may well have expected. |

(Signed) Max Huser.