INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECE v. UNITED KINGDOM)
MERITS: OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE

JUDGMENT OF MAY 19th, 1953

1953

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE AMBATIELOS

(GRECE c. ROYAUME-UNI)
FOND: OBLIGATION D’ARBITRAGE

ARRET DU 19 MAI 1953

SOCIETE D’EDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF'S

LEYDE | | LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF 1 PUBLISHING COMPANY
This Judgment should be cited as follows:

“Ambatielos case (merits: obligation to arbitrate), Judgment of
May roth, 1953: 1.C.]. Reports 1953, p. 10.”

Le présent arrêt soit être cité comme suit:

«Affaire Ambatielos (fond: obligation d'arbitrage), Arvét du
19 mat 1953: C. I. J. Recueil 1953, p. Io.»

Sales number 10 4
No de vente:

1953

May

yeneral List:

No.

1gth

15

Io

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1953

May roth, 1953

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECE v. UNITED KINGDOM)
MERITS: OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE

Question of obligation to accept arbitvation.— Declaration of July 16th,
1926.— Judgment of the Court of July rst, 1952.—Relation between
the Declaration of 1926 and the Treaty of November roth, 1886.—
Respective jurisdictions of the Court and of a Commission of Avbi-
tyation.—Merits of claim within exclusive competence of Commission
of Arbitration.—Expression “based on’ Treaty means depending
for support on Treaty; Commission of Arbitration to decide whether
claim is actually supportable under Tvreaty.—Most-favoured-nation
clause.—‘Free access to the Courts of Justice’’.—Existence of dif-
ference within meaning of Declaration of 1926.— Non-exhaustion of
local remedies.— Delay in presentation of case to Court.

JUDGMENT

Present : Vice-President GUERRERO, Acting President ; President

Sir Arnold McNair; Judges ALVAREZ, BASDEVANT,
HaACKWORTH, WINIARSKI, KLAESTAD, BADAWI, READ,
Hsu Mo, Levi CARNEIRO, Sir Benegal Rau, ARMAND-
Ucon; M. Sprropoutos, Judge ad hoc; Registrar
HAMBRO.
II AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

In the Ambatielos case,
between
the Kingdom of Greece,

represented by :

M. N. G. Lély, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes in the
Netherlands,

as Agent,
assisted by :

M. E. Verghis, Chargé d’affaires ad interim of Greece in the
Netherlands,

as Assistant Agent,

and by:

M. Henri Rolin, Professor of International Law at Brussels
University, former President of the Belgian Senate,

the Right Honourable Sir Frank Soskice, Q.C., M.P., former
Attorney-General of the United Kingdom,

Mr. C. J. Colombos, Q.C., LL.D., Member of the English Bar,
as Counsel,

and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

represented by :
Mr. W. V. J. Evans, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office,

as Agent,

assisted by :

Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, C.M.G., Second Legal Adviser to the
Foreign Office,

as Assistant Agent and Counsel,

and by:
Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett, D.S.C., Member of the English Bar,
Mr. D. H. N. Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office,

as Counsel,
12 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

THE Cour,
composed as above,

delivers the following Judgment :

By its Judgment of July 1st, 1952, the Court, adjudicating upon
the Preliminary Objection raised by the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Application
of the Royal Hellenic Government, found that it had jurisdiction
to decide whether the United Kingdom was under an obligation
to submit to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration annexed
to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of July 16th, 1926,
between Great Britain and Greece, the difference as to the validity
of the Ambatielos claim, in so far as that claim was based on the
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of November roth, 1886,
between the same contracting parties. The Court, in its Judgment,
reserved the fixing of time-limits for the filing of a Reply by the
Hellenic Government and a Rejoinder by the United Kingdom
Government for a subsequent Order.

This Order was made on July 18th, 1952. The Reply and
Rejoinder were filed within the prescribed time-limits, namely,
October 3rd, 1952, and January 6th, 1953, and on the latter date
the issue defined by the Court in its Judgment of July Ist, 1952,
was ready for hearing.

The Court, which was presided over by the Vice-President, in ac-
cordance with Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Rules, and which in-
cluded on the Bench Professor Jean Spiropoulos, appointed by the
Hellenic Government to sit as judge ad hoc, held public sittings on
March 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 30th, 1953, at which it
heard, on behalf of the Hellenic Government, M. Henri Rolin and
Sir Frank Soskice, Counsel, and on behalf of the United Kingdom
Government, Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Assistant Agent and Coun-
sel, Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett, Counsel, and Mr. W. V. J. Evans, Agent.

The Hellenic Government presented the following Submissions
in the Reply:

“May it please the Court :

x. To hold that the Ambatielos claim, based upon the provisions
of the Treaty of 1886, does not prima facie appear to be unconnected
with those provisions.

2. AS a consequence, to decide that the United Kingdom is
under an obligation to submit to arbitration, in accordance with
the Declaration of 1926, the difference as to the validity of the
Ambatielos elaim.

3. To declare that the Court will assume the functions of the
arbitral tribunal in this case in the event of the Parties accepting
its jurisdiction in their final submissions.
13 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

4. To fix time-limits for the filing by the Parties of the Reply
and Rejoinder upon the merits of the dispute.”

The Government of the United Kingdom presented the following
Submission in the Rejoinder :

“The United Kingdom Government accordingly submits that
the-Court should hold and declare that the United Kingdom is
not under any obligation to submit to arbitration, in accordance
with the Declaration of 1926, the difference between the Parties
as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim.”

During the hearings, the Hellenic Government confirmed the
Submissions contained in the Reply, and the Government of the
United Kingdom formulated the following Submissions :

“1. That the United Kingdom Government is under no obliga-
tion to submit to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration
of 1926, the difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim,
unless this claim is based on the Treaty of 1886.

2. That the Hellenic Government’s contention that the Amba-
tielos claim is based on the Treaty of 1886, within the meaning
of the Declaration of 1926, because it is a claim formulated on
the basis of the Treaty of 1886 and not obviously unrelated to
that Treaty, is ill-founded.

3. That, even if the above. Hellenic contention be correct in
law, the Court should still not order arbitration in respect of the
Ambatielos claim, because the Ambatielos claim is in fact
obviously unrelated to the Treaty of 1886.

4. That the Ambatielos claim is not a claim based on the Treaty
of 1886, unless it is a claim the substantive foundation of which
lies in the Treaty of 1886.

5. That, having regard to (4) above, the Ambatielos claim is
not a claim the substantive foundation of which lies in the Treaty
of 1886, for one or other or all of the following reasons :

(a} the Ambatielos claim does not come within the scope of the
Treaty ;

(b) even if all the facts alleged by the Hellenic Government were
true, no violation of the Treaty would have occurred ;

(c) local remedies were not exhausted ;

(d) the Ambatielos claim—in so far as it has any validity at all,
which the United Kingdom Government denies—is based on
the general principles of international law and these principles
are not incorporated in the Treaty of 1886.

6. That if, contrary to (4) and (5) above, the Ambatielos claim
be held to be based on the Treaty of 1886, the United Kingdom
Government is not obliged to submit to arbitration the difference
as to the validity of the claim for one or other or all of the following
reasons :
14 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

{a) non-exhaustion of local remedies ;

(b) undue delay in preferring the claim on its present alleged
basis ;

(c) undue delay and abuse of the process of the Court in that,
although reference of the dispute to the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court has been continuously possible since the
roth December 1926, no such reference took place until the
oth April 1951.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom Government prays the Court

To adjudge and declare

That the United Kingdom Government is not obliged to submit
to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration of 1926, the
difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim.”

On. April oth, 1951, the Hellenic Government, in instituting
proceedings against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland with regard to a claim on behalf of Mr. Amba-
tielos, asked the Court to adjudge and declare: “that the arbitral
procedure referred to in the Final Protocol of the Treaty of 1886
must receive application in the present case”. In the subsequent
proceedings the Hellenic Government requested the Court itself
to adjudicate upon the validity of the Ambatielos claim.

By its Judgment of July ist, 1952, the Court held that it had
no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the Ambatielos claim.
It found at the same time that it had jurisdiction to decide
whether the United Kingdom is under an obligation to submit
to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration of 1926, the
difference as to the validity of the Ambatielos claim, in so far
as this claim is based on the Treaty of 1886.

The question now before the Court is whether the United
Kingdom Government is under an obligation to accept arbitration
of the difference between that Government and the Hellenic
Government concerning the validity of the Ambatielos claim as
presented by the Hellenic Government, in so far as this claim
is based on the Treaty of 1886.

This case, quite unlike the case of the Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, decided by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1924, derives its distinctive character from the fact
that the Court is called upon to decide, not its own jurisdiction
over any particular dispute, but whether a dispute should be
referred to another tribunal for arbitration.

Both Greece and the United Kingdom have rested their case
on the Declaration of 1926 and the Judgment of the Court of
July ist, 1952.

The Declaration of 1926 reads as follows:

“It is well understood that the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion between Great Britain and Greece of to-day’s date does not
prejudice claims on behalf of private persons based on the provi-
sions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886, and that
15 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

any differences which may arise between our two Governments
as to the validity of such claims shall, at the request of either
Government, be referred to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of the Protocol of November roth, 1886, annexed to
the said Treaty.”

The Protocol of 1886 referred to in the Declaration of 1926
contains, inter alia, the following provision :

“Any controversies which may arise respecting the interpreta-
tion or the execution of the present Treaty, or the consequences of
any violation thereof, shall be submitted, when the means of
settling them directly by amicable agreement are exhausted, to
the decision of Commissions of Arbitration, and the result of such
arbitration shall be binding upon both Governments.”

The Declaration of 1926 was agreed upon for the purpose of safe-
guarding the interests of the Parties with respect to claims on
behalf of private persons based on the Treaty of 1886, for which,
on the termination of that Treaty, and with it the Protocol, there
would have been no remedy in the event of the failure of the two
Governments to arrive at amicable settlements by direct means.
While the controversies for which arbitration was provided in the
Protocol were relatively more general in scope, those provided for
in the Declaration are limited to claims on behalf of private persons
based on the Treaty of 1886. But in both cases the Parties were
prompted by the same motives and adopted the same method of
arbitration.

The operative part of the Court’s Judgment of July ist, 1952, is
in the following terms :

“that it [the Court] is without jurisdiction to decide on the merits
of the Ambatielos claim ;

that it has jurisdiction to decide whether the United Kingdom
-is under an obligation to submit to arbitration, in accordance with
the Declaration of 1926, the difference as to the validity of the
Ambatielos claim, in so far as this claim is based on the Treaty
of 1886”.

By that decision, the Court laid down two rulings. The first,
negative in character, was that the merits of the Ambatielos claim
are outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The second ruling, positive
in character, assigned to the Court a limited jurisdiction in the
Ambatielos case, namely, to decide whether the United Kingdom
is obliged to accept arbitration, as requested by Greece. This
limited jurisdiction of the Court is to be clearly distinguished from
the jurisdiction of the Commission of Arbitration. In order to
remove any possible doubt as to the respective spheres of action of
the Court and of the Commission of Arbitration, the Court stated in
its Judgment :

“The Court would decide whether there is a difference between
the Parties within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926. Should
16 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

the Court find that there is such a difference, the Commission of
Arbitration would decide on the merits of the difference.”

The Court must refrain from pronouncing final judgment upon
any question of fact or law falling within ‘“‘the merits of the differ-
ence’ or ‘‘the validity of the claim”. If the Court were to undertake
to decide such questions, it would encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the Commission of Arbitration. The task of the Court will have
been completed when it has decided whether the difference between
Greece and the United Kingdom with regard to the validity of the
Ambatielos claim is or is not a difference as to the validity of a
claim on behalf of a private person based on the provisions of the
Treaty of 1886 and whether, in consequence, there is an obligation
binding the United Kingdom to accept arbitration.

The words “‘in so far as this claim is based on the Treaty of 1886”,
used in the operative part of the Court’s Judgment of July Ist, 1952,
must be understood in the sense in which they were used. They are
intended to indicate the character which the Ambatielos claim must
possess in order that it may be the subject of arbitration in accord-
ance with the Declaration of 1926. They do not mean that the
Ambatielos claim must be found by the Court to be validly based
on the Treaty of 1886. If such a meaning had been intended by the
Court, it would not have decided that it was without jurisdiction
to pass on the merits of the claim.

The question whether there is a difference within the meaning of
the Declaration of 1926 depends upon whether the claim as formul-
ated by the Hellenic Government contains the elements required
for arbitration as agreed upon by the Parties in that Declaration.

The Hellenic Government states in its first submission that the
Ambatielos claim does not prima facie appear to be unconnected with
the provisions of the Treaty of 1886. The Court understands that
this submissicn is intended as a reason for the principal submission
of the Hellenic Government that the United Kingdom is under an
obligation to accept arbitration. But the Court considers that the
reason stated in such a negative form is not sufficient.

The United Kingdom Government, on its part, contends that
the Ambatielos claim is not a claim the substantive foundation of
which lies in the Treaty of 1886. It maintains that, before the Court
can decide upon arbitration, it is necessary to determine, by way
of interpreting the Declaration of 1926 and as a substantive issue,
whether the claim is actually or genuinely based on the Treaty of
1886, in the sense that the facts alleged by the Hellenic Govern-
ment, if true, would constitute a violation of that Treaty.

The Court cannot accept this contention. It would necessarily
lead to passing on a point which constitutes one of the principal
elements of the Ambatielos claim and consequently to the substitu-
tion of the Court for the Commission of Arbitration. The Court

ro
17 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

cannot substitute itself for the Commission of Arbitration. The
question of violation or non-violation of the Treaty of 1886 goes
to the very roots of the Ambatielos claim. To decide whether the
facts alleged by the Hellenic Government, if true, would constitute
an actual violation of the Treaty of 1886 would be to pass upon
“the validity of the claim” and ‘‘the merits of the difference”, which
are reserved exclusively for the Commission of Arbitration, and
concerning which this Court, according to its own earlier Judgment,
is without jurisdiction. It cannot be assumed that the Declaration
of 1926 contemplates that the verification of the allegations of fact
of the Hellenic Government should be the duty of the Commission
of Arbitration, while the determination of the question whether
the facts alleged constitute a violation of the Treaty of 1886 should
form the task of another tribunal. Such a division of functions would
imply a division of the merits of the claim, which is authorized
neither by the Declaration nor by the previous Judgment of this
Court.

The Declaration of 1926 was, as previously stated, agreed upon to
ensure that the method of arbitration provided for in the Protocol
of 1886 should be employed for the settlement of a limited category
of differences concerning the Treaty of 1886, namely, differences as
to the validity of claims on behalf of private persons based on that
Treaty. At the time of the’signature of the Declaration, it could
hardly have entered the minds of the Parties that before arbitration
should be in order; the Party requested to accept that procedure
might insist that the question whether a claim was genuinely based
on the Treaty of 1886 should first be examined and definitively
settled by that Party itself or by an organ other than the Commis-
sion of Arbitration. It must have been their intention that the
genuineness of the treaty basis of any claim, if contested, should be
authoritatively decided by the Commission of Arbitration, to-
gether with any other questions relating to the merits of the claim,
just as, before 1926, any question as to whether a certain contro-
versy was concerned with the interpretation or execution of the
Treaty of 1886 would have been settled by such a commission.
If the Ambatielos claim had been referred to arbitration, it would
have been for the Commission to decide whether the claim had a
legal basis in respect of the Treaty of 1886. In the absence of any
manifestation of a common intention of the Parties to the contrary,
the Commission of Arbitration cannot be deprived of a part of its
competence and no other body can be invested with the authority
to determine definitively the validity of the treaty basis of the
Ambatielos claim.

For the purpose of determining the obligation of the United
Kingdom to accept arbitration, the words ‘‘claims .... based on
the provisions of the .... Treaty of 1886” cannot be understood as
meaning claims actually supportable under that Treaty. In the
context in which the words occur, they can only mean claims

II
18 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

depending fot support on the provisions of the Treaty of 1886,
so that the claims will eventually stand or fall according as the
provisions of the Treaty are construed in one way or another.
The fact that a claim purporting to be based on the Treaty may
eventually be found by the Commission of Arbitration to be
unsupportable under the Treaty, does not of itself remove the
claim from the category of claims which, for the purpose of arbi-
tration, should be regarded as falling within the terms of the
Declaration of 1926.

In order to decide, in these proceedings, that the Hellenic
Government’s claim on behalf of Mr. Ambatielos is “based on”
the Treaty of 1886 within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926,
it is not necessary for the Court to find—and indeed the Court is
without jurisdiction to do so—that the Hellenic Government’s
interpretation of the Treaty is the correct one. The Court must
determine, however, whether the arguments advanced by the
Helenic Government in respect of the treaty provisions on which
the Ambatielos claim is said to be based, are of a sufficiently
plausible character to warrant a conclusion that the claim is based
on the Treaty. It is not enough for the claimant Government to
establish a remote connection between the facts of the claim and
the Treaty of 1886. On the other hand, it is not necessary for that
Government to show, for present purposes, that an alleged treaty
violation has an unassailable legal basis. The validity of the argu-
ments presented by the Hellenic Government, as well as the validity
of those presented by the United Kingdom Government, would
be determined by the Commission of Arbitration in passing upon
the merits of the difference. If the interpretation given by the
Hellenic Government to any of the provisions relied upon appears
to be one of the possible interpretations that may be placed upon
it, though not necessarily the correct one, then the Ambatielos
claim must be considered, for the purposes of the present pro-
ceedings, to be a claim based on the Treaty of 1886.

In other words, if it is made to appear that the Hellenic Govern-
ment is relying upon an arguable construction of the Treaty, that
is to say, a construction which can be defended, whether or not it
ultimately prevails, then there are reasonable grounds for concluding
that its claim is based on the Treaty. This view seems to have been
in the mind of Counsel for the United Kingdom when he said:

“*.... we are not, of course, suggesting that the Court must decide
whether the claim is valid or not, that is to say, well-founded on
the Treaty, for that would be a matter of the ultimate merits....
We do not suggest that the Court must consider whether the claim
is ‘bien fondée’, but what we say is that it must at least consider
whether the claim is ‘fondée’....””

12
19 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

The Court will use its power of appreciation to resolve the legal
problem presented by the Parties, namely, whether the difference
between them is of such a character as to come under the Declara-
tion of 1926 ; but it cannot carry its power of appreciation to the
extent of deciding the merits of the difference. In the opinion of the
Court, this course of action would be in consonance with the inten-
tion of the Parties that all differences which might arise concerning
the validity of claims on behalf of private persons based on the
Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886 should be referred to
arbitration.

The Court is not departing from the principle, which is well-
established in international law and accepted by its own juris-
prudence as well as that of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, to the effect that a State may not be compelled to submit
its disputes to arbitration without its consent ; but it observes
that, in this case, the question is whether the consent given by
the Parties in signing the Declaration of 1926 to arbitrate a certain
category of disputes, does or does not extend to the Ambatielos

claim.

*
* *

The articles of the Treaty of 1886 invoked by the Hellenic Gov-
ernment are as follows :

“Article I

There shall be between the dominions and possessions of the
two High Contracting Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce
and navigation. The subjects of each of the two Parties shall have
liberty freely to come, with their ships and cargoes, to all places,
ports and rivers in the dominions and possessions of the other
to which native subjects generally are or may be permitted to
come, and shall enjoy respectively the same rights, privileges,
liberties, favours, immunities and exemptions in matters of com-
merce and navigation which are or may be enjoyed by native
subjects without having to pay any tax or impost greater than
those paid by the same, and they shall be subject to the laws
and regulations in force.

Article X

The Contracting Parties agree that, in all matters relating to
commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour or immunity
whatever which either Contracting Party has actually granted
or may hereafter grant to the subjects or citizens of any other
State shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the
subjects or citizens of the other Contracting Party ; it being their
intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall
be placed, in all respects, by the other on the footing of the most

favoured nation.
13
20 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF I9 V 53)

Article XII

The subjects of each of the Contracting Parties who shall conform
themselves to the laws of the country:

1. Shall have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel,
or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the
other Contracting Party.

2. They shall be permitted to hire or possess the houses, manu-
factories, warehouses, shops, and premises. which may be
necessary for them.

3. They may carry on their commerce either in person or by
any agents whom they may think fit to employ.

4. They shall not be subject in respect of their persons or
property, or in respect of passports, nor in respect of their
commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local,
or to imposts or obligations of any kind whatever other or
greater than those which are or may be imposed upon native
subjects.

Article XV

The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses and shops of the
subjects of each of the Contracting Parties in the dominions and
possessions of the other, and all premises appertaining thereto
destined for purposes of residence or commerce shall be respected.

It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a search of, or a
domiciliary visit to, such dwellings and premises, or to examine
and inspect books, papers, or accounts, except under the condi-
tions and with the form prescribed by the laws for subjects of the
country.

The subjects of each of the two Contracting Parties in the
dominions and possessions of the other shall have free access to
the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their
rights, without other conditions, restrictions, or taxes beyond
those imposed on native subjects, and shall, like them, be at liberty
to employ, in all causes, their advocates, attorneys or agents,
from among the persons admitted to the exercise of those profes-
sions according to the laws of the country.” ,

The Hellenic Government, relying upon the most-favoured-
nation clause contained in Article X, invokes Article 16 of the
Treaty of Peace and Commerce between the United Kingdom and
Denmark of February 13th, 1660-1661, which the Hellenic Govern-
ment has quoted in English as follows :

‘Each Party shall in all causes and controversies now depending,
or hereafter to commence, cause justice and right to be speedily
administered to the subjects and people of the other Party, accord-
ing to the laws and statutes of each country without tedious and
unnecessary delays and charges.”

The Hellenic Government has invoked similar provisions of
other treaties concluded between the United Kingdom and third
States, that is to say:

14
21 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

—Article 24 of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce with Denmark
of July rith, 1670, providing that the Parties ‘shall cause justice
and equity to be administered to the subjects and people of each
other” :

— Article 8 of the Treaties of Peace and Commerce with Sweden
of April 11th, 1654, and of October 21st, 1661, providing that
“In case the people and subjects on either part .... or those who
act on their behalf before any Court of Judicature for the recovery
of their debts, or for other lawful occasions, shall stand in need of
the Magistrate’s help, the same shall be readily, and according to the
equity of their cause, in friendly manner granted them...” ;

—Article 10 of the Treaty of Commerce with Bolivia, of August Ist,
1911, reserving the right to exercise diplomatic intervention in
any case in which there may be evidence of ‘‘denial of justice” or
“violation of the principles of international law”.

The United Kingdom Government, in the first place, questions
the correctness of the English translations from the original Latin of
certain of these provisions ; and in the second place, it contends
that Article X of the Treaty of 1886, dealing with matters of
commerce and navigation, cannot be invoked to claim the benefits
of provisions in other treaties concerning judicial proceedings,
which, in the Treaty of 1886, form the subject of a separate article.
The United Kingdom also advances a number of other arguments
designed to show that the facts alleged by the Hellenic Government,
if true, would amount to a denial of justice, and that an allegation
of denial of justice must be based on general principles of inter-
national law and cannot be premised on Article X of the Treaty
of 1886 dealing with commerce and navigation.

On the other hand, the Hellenic Government has contended that
a litigation arising out of a commercial contract may be considered
as a matter relating to commerce and thus falling within the term
“all matters relating to commerce and navigation” to which the
most-favoured-nation clause in Article X of the Treaty of 1886
applies. The undertaking by the United Kingdom vis-a-vis third
States that the courts shall administer “justice and right” or
‘justice and equity” in any litigation is regarded by the Hellenic
Government as a “favour’’ which inures to the benefit of Greek
nationals under the most-favoured-nation clause of Article X.

With regard to the Anglo-Bolivian Treaty of 1911, the Hellenic
Government argues that it imposes upon the United Kingdom, as
well as upon Bolivia, the obligation to apply the principles of inter-
national law in the treatment of the nationals of the other con-
tracting party.

15
22 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

Article XV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of 1886 provides for “‘free
access to the Courts of Justice’. The United Kingdom Government
insists on a limited interpretation of the term ‘‘free access” and
maintains that Mr. Ambatielos must be considered as having been
fully accorded this right when he was permitted to appear in the
English courts for the prosecution and defence of his rights on an
equal footing with British subjects.

The Hellenic Government, on the other hand, relies on a differ-
ent interpretation of the term ‘‘free access” to the Courts of
Justice and argues that the right of “‘free access’’ should be under-
stood to include the prosecution of rights by the foreign litigant
in the local courts free from restrictions imposed by the executive
authorities. According to the contention of the Hellenic Govern-
ment, Mr. Ambatielos did not enjoy ‘‘free access” to the courts,
because of the “‘withholding” by the executive branch of the United
Kingdom Government of evidence considered to be vital to his case.

Having regard to the contentions of the Parties with respect to
the scope and effect of the most-favoured-nation clause in Article X
of the Treaty of 1886, as well as the divergence of views concerning
the meaning of the expression “free access to the Courts of Justice”
contained in Article XV, paragraph 3, of that Treaty ; and bearing
in mind especially the interpretations of these provisions contended
fot by the Hellenic Government, the Court must conclude that
this is a case in which the Hellenic Government is presenting a
claim on behalf of a private person ‘‘based on the provisions of
the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886”, and that the differ-
ence between the Parties is the kind of difference which, according
to the Declaration of 1926, should be submitted to arbitration.

Accordingly, the Court must hold that the United Kingdom is
under an obligation to co-operate with Greece in constituting a
Commission of Arbitration, in accordance with the Protocol of
1886, as provided in the Declaration of 1926.

*
* *

There remain for consideration contentions advanced by the
United Kingdom Government that, even assuming the facts alleged
by the Hellenic Government to be true, the United Kingdom still is
not obliged to submit to arbitration the difference as to the validity
of the Ambatielos claim, for the following additional reasons :

(1) That Mr. Ambatielos did not exhaust local remedies ;

(2) That there was undue delay in preferring the claim on its
present alleged basis ;

(3) That there were undue delay and abuse of the process of the
Court in that, although ‘reference of the dispute to the

16
23 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has been continuously
possible since the roth December 1926, no such reference took
place until the gth April 1051.

With regard to the first two arguments, the Court need only
observe that they are arguments in defence directed to the admis-
sibility of the Ambatielos claim and are not in any way related to
the question whether the claim is based on the Treaty of 1886.
The points raised in these arguments are entirely outside the terms
of the Declaration of 1926, which it is the Court’s present task to
interpret. For these reasons, the Court expresses no view concerning
the validity or the legal effect of these arguments.

These considerations also apply to the point of delay contained
in the third argument. As regards the point of abuse of the process
of the Court raised in that argument, the Court does not consider
that the Hellenic Government did anything improper in instituting
proceedings against the United Kingdom on April oth, 1951, in
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Statute and Rules
of Court.

The Court does not consider it necessary to pass on Submissions 3
and 4 of the Hellenic Government.

For these reasons,
THE CouRT,

by ten votes to four,

finds that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to submit
to arbitration, in accordance with the Declaration of 1926, the
difference as to the validity, under the Treaty of 1886, of the Amba-
tielos claim.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of May, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, in three copies, one of
which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
will be transmitted to the Royal Hellenic Government and to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,

Vice-President.

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,

Registrar.

17
24 AMBATIELOS CASE (JUDGMENT OF 19 V 53)

Sir Arnold McNair, President, Judges BASDEVANT, KLAESTAD
and Reap, availing themselves of the right conferred on them
by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the Judgment the joint
statement of their dissenting opinion.

(Initialled) J. G. G.
(Initialled) E. H.

18


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING BORDER AND
TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

ORDER OF 14 DECEMBER 1989

1989

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A DES ACTIONS ARMEES
FRONTALIERES ET TRANSFRONTALIERES

(NICARAGUA c. HONDURAS)

ORDONNANCE DU 14 DECEMBRE 1989
Official citation:

Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Order of 14 December 1989, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 174.

Mode officiel de citation:

Actions armées frontaliéres et transfrontaliéres (Nicaragua c. Honduras),
ordonnance du 14 décembre 1989, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 174.

Sales number 57 2
N° de vente :

174

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1989 YEAR 1989
14 December
General List
No. 74 14 December 1989

CASE CONCERNING BORDER AND
TRANSBORDER ARMED ACTIONS

(NICARAGUA v. HONDURAS)

ORDER

Present: President Rupa; Judges Opa, AGO, SCHWEBEL, Sir Robert
JENNINGS, BEDJAOUI, EVENSEN, TARASSOV, GUILLAUME,
SHAHABUDDEEN, PATHAK; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Makes the following Order:

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44
of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Order of 21 April 1989 by which time-limits for
the written proceedings on the merits were fixed as follows: 19 Septem-
ber 1989 for the Memorial of Nicaragua and 19 February 1990 for the
Counter-Memorial of Honduras,

Having regard to the Order of 31 August 1989 by which the President of
the Court, at the request of Nicaragua, extended to 8 December 1989
the time-limit for the Memorial of Nicaragua on the merits; and
_ Whereas the Memorial of Nicaragua was duly filed within the time-
limit as so extended;

Whereas when the Order of 31 August 1989 was adopted the question
of extension of the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial
of Honduras was reserved;

4
175 ARMED ACTIONS (ORDER 14 XII 89)

Whereas by a letter dated 13 December 1989 and received in the Regis-
try the same day, the Agent of Nicaragua transmitted to the Court a copy
of an agreement in Spanish reached by the Presidents of the Central
American countries on 12 December 1989 in San Isidro de Coronado,
Costa Rica, and drew the attention of the Court in particular to para-
graph 13 of that agreement;

Whereas by a letter dated 13 December 1989 and received in the Regis-
try on 14 December 1989, the Agent of Honduras similarly informed the
Court of the agreement of 12 December 1989 and referred in particular to
paragraph 13 thereof;

Whereas that paragraph records the agreement of the President of
Nicaragua and the President of Honduras, in the context of arrangements
aimed at achieving an extra-judicial settlement of the dispute which is the
subject of the present proceedings, to instruct their Agents in the case to
communicate immediately, either jointly or separately, the agreement to
the Court, and to request the postponement of the date for the fixing of the
time-limit for the presentation of the Counter-Memorial of Honduras
until 11 June 1990;

Whereas that paragraph further provides that if no extra-judicial
settlement of the dispute has been reached by that date, either Party may
request that Honduras be granted six months for the filing of its
Counter-Memorial;

Taking into account the agreement of the Parties, in accordance with
Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court,

THE COURT,

Unanimously,

Decides that the time-limit for the filing by the Republic of Honduras
of a Counter-Memorial on the merits is extended from 19 February 1990
to a date to be fixed by an order to be made after 11 June 1990.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourteenth day of December, one thou-
sand nine hundred and eighty-nine, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Government of the
Republic of Honduras, respectively.

(Signed) José Maria RUDA,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.


             JOINT DECLARATION OF JUDGES
           AL-KHASAWNEH, SIMMA, BENNOUNA,
            CANÇADO TRINDADE AND YUSUF

 nglish Original Text]

Admissibility of an additional claim — Subject of the dispute — Legal secu-
y and good administration of justice — Continuity between the arrest and
 ention of Mr. Diallo in 1988-1989 and 1995-1996, and their connection with
  attempts to recover the debts.

1. With regret, we were obliged to vote against the first subparagraph
 the operative part of the Judgment, according to which “the claim of
e Republic of Guinea concerning the arrest and detention of
r. Diallo in 1988-1989 is inadmissible”. We are convinced that this
 im, albeit presented belatedly, during the proceedings, falls within
e subject of the dispute as indicated in the Application instituting pro-
edings, pursuant to Article 40 of the Statute of the Court. Our analy-
  is based on an approach which was set forth with clarity by the
rmanent Court of International Justice and has since been reiterated
any times by this Court : “The Court, whose jurisdiction is interna-
 nal, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of
 portance which they might possess in municipal law.” (Mavrommatis
 lestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2,
 34.)
2. It follows that, first of all, the claim relating to the events of 1988-
89 cannot be rejected solely because it was only presented by Guinea
r the first time in its Written Observations of 7 July 2003, in response to
e objections in respect of inadmissibility raised by the Democratic
 public of the Congo, and, subsequently, in more detail in its Reply of
 November 2008 (Judgment, paras. 31 and 32).

3. The question which then arises is not whether the Applicant may
 d to the facts at issue in the context of the subject of the dispute,
hich it described in its Application, since according to Article 38,
 ragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, the latter “shall also specify the pre-
 e nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts
 d grounds on which the claim is based”. At that stage, therefore, it is
 t a matter of being exhaustive as regards the facts concerned. It is
cepted, moreover, that the Parties may amend their submissions up to
e end of the oral proceedings, and Guinea was consequently able to
 er, in its final submissions, to “arbitrary arrests” in the plural, instead
 to the single arrest mentioned in the submissions in its Application. It
 true, however, that there are limits to “the liberty accorded to the

                                                                         60

 rties to amend their submissions up to the end of the oral proceed-
gs”, since “the Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought
 fore it by application to be transformed by amendments in the sub-
 ssions into another dispute which is different in character” (Société
ommerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78,
  173).
 4. In our opinion, what matters as regards the admissibility of a for-
ally new claim is that it should fall within the subject of the dispute
hich has been brought before the Court, while complying with the Stat-
e and the Rules of Court. Otherwise, “the subject of the dispute on
hich [the Court] would ultimately have to pass [judgment] would be
cessarily distinct from the subject of the dispute originally submitted to
 n the Application” (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aus-
  lia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 266,
 ra. 68). And such a situation would necessarily be incompatible with
e requirements of “legal security and the good administration of jus-
 e” (ibid., p. 267, para. 69).
 5. The Court accepts that the evaluation of additional claims essen-
 lly involves asking whether these would have the effect of “transform-
 g] the subject of the dispute originally brought before it under the
 ms of the Application”, referring to the case concerning Territorial
 d Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
an Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II),
  695, para. 108). But it does not apply that test, as such, in order to
 termine the admissibility of Guinea’s claim in respect of the events of
 88-1989. The Court indeed loses sight of this in the course of its argu-
ent, which it bases solely on the two criteria that have emerged from
e jurisprudence specifically for assessing the connection between a new
  im and the subject of the dispute : either that it is implicit in the Appli-
tion, or that it arises directly out of it. These criteria are intended to
ake it possible to answer the central question, namely whether the
 ditional claim falls within the subject of the dispute which has been
ought before the Court, or whether it introduces a new dispute.
nfortunately, the Court does not answer that question, since it has
 osen to embark on a purely formal analysis of the claim in respect of
e events of 1988-1989, referring in turn to the two criteria mentioned
 ove. It thus concludes that those events are not implicit in the Appli-
tion because they concern “arrest and detention measures, taken at a
 ferent time and in different circumstances”, and that “the legal bases
r [the] arrests . . . were completely different” (Judgment, para. 43).
  is formal line of argument is used again by the Court in order to con-
ude that it sees no possibility of finding that the new claim arises
  ectly out of the question which is the subject-matter of the Applica-
 n (ibid., para. 46).

6. We observe that, in the light of this reasoning, the majority has been
ntent to draw a simple comparison between the formal circumstances

                                                                           61

  the arrests and detention of Mr. Diallo, and between the legal bases
r them which have been alleged by the DRC, without concern for the
al continuity between the events of 1988-1989 and those of 1995-1996,
 d without qualifying the matters of form in municipal law, as advo-
 ted by the jurisprudence of the Court.
 7. In terms of substance, however, the arbitrary arrests which
 r. Diallo suffered in 1988-1989 and 1995-1996 reflect the continuity of
e action taken against him by the Democratic Republic of the Congo
henever he brought more pressure to bear on the authorities in order to
cover the debts owed by that State and Congolese companies to his two
 mpanies (of which he had become the sole associé). On 25 Janu-
y 1988, Mr. Diallo was arrested and imprisoned for a year, on the
 der of the Prime Minister of the DRC, after he had tried in vain to
cover the debts owed by the Congolese State to the Africom-Zaire com-
 ny in the “listing paper” affair, even though the Finance Minister had
 knowledged the debts in question. The accusation of fraud against
 r. Diallo was not made in any judicial context, but simply formulated
  the government authorities of the DRC. The same Prime Minister of
e DRC who ordered Mr. Diallo’s arrest for fraud had written to the
 nance Minister on 14 January 1988 asking him not to settle the debts
wed to Africom-Zaire. In 1996, Mr. Diallo was once again arrested and
en expelled, after he had sought implementation of the judgment given
 favour of the Africontainers-Zaire company. For the DRC authorities,
 was obviously a matter of removing Mr. Diallo from Congolese terri-
ry once and for all, so that he could no longer pursue the debts owed to
   companies by the State and Congolese companies.

 8. Furthermore, the Court itself correctly pointed out that :
   “the DRC has never been able to provide grounds which might con-
   stitute a convincing basis for Mr. Diallo’s expulsion. Allegations of
   ‘corruption’ and other offences have been made against Mr. Diallo,
   but no concrete evidence has been presented to the Court to support
   these claims. These accusations did not give rise to any proceedings
   before the courts or, a fortiori, to any conviction. Furthermore, it is
   difficult not to discern a link between Mr. Diallo’s expulsion and the
   fact that he had attempted to recover debts which he believed were
   owed to his companies by, amongst others, the Zairean State or
   companies in which the State holds a substantial portion of the capi-
   tal, bringing cases for this purpose before the civil courts.” (Judg-
   ment, para. 82.)

9. We can only regret that the majority failed to apply this analysis to
e question of admissibility. That would necessarily have resulted in a
 ar finding that the arrest in 1988-1989 formed a continuity with that of
95-1996, since it took place for the same reasons, and that it was of the

                                                                       62

me arbitrary character. The only difference is that in 1995-1996, it was
cided to expel Mr. Diallo from the DRC, whereas previously, in 1988-
89, he was detained for almost a year !

10. Therefore, in our opinion, the events of 1988-1989 are quite clearly
nnected with the subject of the dispute as set forth in Guinea’s Appli-
tion dated 23 December 1998 :
      “Mr. Diallo Ahmadou Sadio, a businessman of Guinean nation-
   ality, was unjustly imprisoned by the authorities of the Democratic
   Republic of the Congo, after being resident in that State for
   thirty-two (32) years, despoiled of his sizable investments, businesses,
   movable and immovable property and bank accounts, and then expelled
   from the country.
      This expulsion came at a time when Mr. Diallo Ahmadou Sadio
   was taking proceedings to recover substantial debts owed to his
   businesses by the State and by the oil companies established on its
   territory and of which the said State is a shareholder.
      After vain attempts to arrive at an out-of-court settlement, the
   State of Guinea is filing an Application with the International Court
   of Justice with a view to obtaining a finding that the Democratic
   Republic of the Congo is guilty of serious violations of international
   law committed upon the person of a Guinean national.”
11. Hence, whether they are regarded as implicit in that Application or
 sing out of its subject-matter, the events of 1988-1989 are connected
th the subject of the dispute described in the Application, since they
volve an unjust arrest of Mr. Diallo linked to the spoliation of his
sets by the DRC.
12. We therefore cannot understand how the majority has declared
uinea’s claim in respect of those events to be inadmissible, taking a for-
alistic approach which is inappropriate to a long and costly interna-
 nal dispute, Guinea having brought this case before the Court nearly
  years ago. It would appear that the Democratic Republic of the
ongo was informed at quite an early stage of the addition by Guinea of
e facts relating to 1988-1989 and that it had the opportunity to contest
em, as indeed it did not refrain from doing during the oral argument
 R 2010/3, pp. 16-17, paras. 11-13 (Kalala)). The Court thus had evi-
nce before it allowing it to pronounce on all the violations of interna-
 nal law committed by the DRC upon the person of Mr. Diallo. If
e Court had done so, it would genuinely have met the requirements
  “legal security and the good administration of justice”. Those req-
 ements must take account, in this case originally based on the exer-
 e of diplomatic protection, the scope of which includes “internationally
 aranteed human rights” (case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
 epublic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary
bjections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 599, para. 39), of
e individual rights of Mr. Diallo, who has on two occasions been a victim

                                                                        63

 arbitrary measures by the authorities of the host State, and for the
me reasons.

                     (Signed) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
                             (Signed) Bruno SIMMA.
                         (Signed) Mohamed BENNOUNA.
                  (Signed) Antônio Augusto CANÇADO TRINDADE.
                       (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed YUSUF.

                                                                  64


140

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. SHAHABUDDEEN
[Traduction]

L’ordonnance de la Cour se fonde uniquement sur la résolution 748
(1992) du Conseil de sécurité. Tel est aussi le motif de mon accord avec
elle. Sans cette résolution, j'aurais estimé que la Libye avait plaidé une
cause défendable en faveur de l'indication de mesures conservatoires. La
résolution dispense maintenant d'approfondir les éléments juridiques de
la demande présentée par la Libye à cet effet. Toutefois, compte tenu du
tour donné aux événements par la résolution, je voudrais dire quelque
chose sur: i) le fondement juridique de l’ordonnance de la Cour; ii) la
possibilité d’un procès impartial si les deux accusés sont livrés au défen-
deur; et iii) certaines implications de l’ordonnance de la Cour.

i) LE FONDEMENT JURIDIQUE DE L’ORDONNANCE DE LA COUR

Quelle qu’ait pu être la situation antérieure, la résolution 748 (1992) du
Conseil de sécurité ne laisse à la Cour aucune autre conclusion possible
que celle à laquelle elle a abouti. Cela ne résulte pas d’une autorité supé-
rieure qui s'impose — il n’y en a pas — mais du fait qu’en déterminant le
droit applicable la Cour doit tenir compte de la résolution dans la mesure
où celle-ci affecte la faculté de faire respecter les droits dont la Libye a
voulu obtenir la protection en demandant des mesures conservatoires. La
validité de la résolution, bien que contestée par la Libye, doit être présu-
mée à ce stade (voir le principe général dans Conséquences juridiques pour
les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest
africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, C.L.J.
Recueil 1971, p. 22, par. 20). L'article 25 de la Charte des Nations Unies
oblige la Libye à se conformer à la décision énoncée dans la résolution
(ibid., p. 52-53). En vertu de l’article 103 de la Charte, cette obligation
prévaut sur toute obligation conventionnelle en conflit dont la Libye
pourrait être tenue (Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), C:I.J. Recueil 1984,
p. 440, par. 107). Les obligations issues de traités peuvent étre supplantées
par une décision du Conseil de sécurité qui impose des sanctions
(Paul Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 1989, p. 113, par. 228, et
sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court
of Justice, 1986, vol. 2, p. 431). Par conséquent, 4 supposer que la Libye ait
les droits qu’elle invoque, ces droits ne peuvent, à première vue, pas rece-
voir exécution tant que la résolution reste en vigueur.

Plusieurs décisions démontrent, d’une manière ou d’une autre, que le
simple fait que la question litigieuse soit aussi examinée par un autre

30
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 141

organe de l'Organisation des Nations Unies n’empêche pas la Cour d’agir
(voir, entre autres, Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis
à Téhéran, C.L.J. Recueil 1980, p. 22, par. 40; Activités militaires et paramili-
taires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
mesures conservatoires, C.LJ. Recueil 1984, p. 185-186, et, même affaire,
compétence et recevabilité, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 433-436). En l'espèce, il se
trouve que la décision qu’il est demandé à la Cour de prononcer entrerait
directement en conflit avec une décision du Conseil de sécurité. Cet
aspect de l’affaire ne peut être méconnu. Il ne constitue pourtant pas le
motif juridique de l’ordonnance de ce jour. Celle-ci ne résulte d’aucun
conflit entre la compétence du Conseil de sécurité et celle de la Cour, mais
d’un conflit entre les obligations qu’impose à la Libye la décision du
Conseil de sécurité et toutes obligations dont elle pourrait être tenue en
vertu de la convention de Montréal. La Charte dit que les premières
doivent prévaloir.

J'ai envisagé la question de savoir si des mesures conservatoires
auraient pu être indiquées dans la mesure où il était allégué que le défen-
deur avait menacé le demandeur d’employer la force, ce que n’autorise
pas la résolution 748 (1992). Toutefois, me semble-t-il, quelle qu’ait été la
situation antérieure, la conclusion que le juge doit tirer de la façon dont les
choses se présentent maintenant est que le défendeur, qui a pris l'initiative
de la résolution et l’a appuyée, est prêt à suivre la ligne de conduite tracée
par elle et donc à ne pas recourir à la force sans y être autorisé par le
Conseil de sécurité. La résolution du Conseil de sécurité constitue donc
un obstacle sur ce point, tant en droit qu’en fait.

ii) LA POSSIBILITÉ D’UN PROCES IMPARTIAL
SI LES DEUX ACCUSES SONT LIVRES AU DEFENDEUR

La réclamation des Etats-Unis tendant a obtenir que les deux Libyens
accusés leur soient livrés part en grande partie du principe qu’un procès
impartial ne serait pas possible en Libye. Cependant, le dossier soumis à
la Cour amène à se demander si les Etats-Unis n’ont pas préjugé l’affaire.
Leur demande tendant à ce que la Libye verse « des indemnités appro-
priées ... promptement et sans aucune réserve » présuppose que les Etats-
Unis ont établi que les accusés sont coupables, car la responsabilité de
l'Etat libyen dépend de la culpabilité des accusés. Mon raisonnement est
exposé dans une opinion individuelle que je joins à l’ordonnance rendue
aujourd’hui par la Cour en l'instance parallèle introduite par la Libye
contre le Royaume-Uni.

iii) LES IMPLICATIONS DE L’ORDONNANCE DE LA COUR

Puisque l’impossibilité d’agir, en droit interne, ne peut pas consti-
tuer un moyen de défense pour l’inexécution d’une obligation interna-

31
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. SHAHABUDDEEN) 142

tionale, il se peut qu’un Etat, s’il veut s’exécuter dans une affaire de ce
genre, constate qu’afin de ne pas enfreindre son ordre juridique
interne il doit non seulement légiférer de la manière ordinaire, mais
prendre quelques mesures appropriées de revision constitutionnelle et
cela sans tarder. En l’espèce, la Libye a contesté que l’objectif déclaré
de garantir un procès impartial sera atteint si (après avoir pris toutes
les mesures nécessaires) elle se conforme à la résolution du Conseil de
sécurité.

La question qui surgit maintenant du fait de la contestation par la
Libye de la validité de la résolution 748 (1992) est celle de savoir si
une décision du Conseil de sécurité peut l’emporter sur les droits
qu'ont juridiquement les Etats et, en ce cas, s’il existe quelque restric-
tion au pouvoir du Conseil de sécurité d'appliquer à une situation une
qualification qui permette d’adopter une décision entraînant de telles
conséquences. Les pouvoirs d’appréciation du Conseil ont-ils des
limites? Etant donné l’équilibre de forces sur lequel repose la structure
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans l’ordre international en
mutation, peut-on concevoir qu’il y ait un point au-delà duquel l’on
peut légitimement s’interroger, en droit, sur la compétence du Conseil
de sécurité de produire de tels effets prééminents? S’il y a de telles
limites, quelles sont-elles? Quel organe, sinon le Conseil de sécurité,
est-il compétent pour dire en quoi elles consistent ?

S’il faut répondre à toutes ces questions délicates et complexes par
la négative, la situation risque d’être étrange. Elle ne serait pas pour
autant nécessairement indéfendable en droit. Quant à savoir jusqu’à
quel point la Cour peut pénétrer dans ce domaine, c’est là une autre
affaire. Il s’agit pourtant de questions importantes, même si elles ne
peuvent pas être examinées maintenant.

(Signé) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

32


22

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. MOROZOV
[Traduction]

1. J’ai voté pour le dispositif de la décision parce que, de mon point de
vue, la Cour ne peut connaître d’une requête à fin d’intervention fondée sur
l’article 62 du Statut que si un lien juridictionnel (au sens des articles 36 et
37 du Statut) existe entre l’Etat demandant à intervenir et les Etats parties
à l’affaire.

2. L’article 62, qui fait partie du chapitre III du Statut, intitulé « Pro-
cédure », ne contient aucune disposition qui permette de considérer cet
article comme abrogeant les dispositions relatives à la « Compétence de la
Cour » qui figurent sous ce titre au chapitre II du Statut. De plus, l’arti-
cle 62, paragraphe 2, qui donne à la Cour le droit de décider, ne saurait être
considéré comme une sorte de /ex specialis écartant l'application des
prescriptions générales en matière de compétence et autorisant la Cour à
admettre l’intervention malgré les dispositions fondamentales des ar-
ticles 36 et 37 du Statut. Tout ce que prévoit en réalité ce paragraphe, c’est
que la Cour, sous réserve des exigences de son Statut, y compris les
articles 36 et 37, peut admettre ou refuser la demande. Par conséquent,
quand bien même il existerait un lien de juridiction, la Cour pourrait
encore, pour une raison valable, rejeter la demande. Mais s’il n’y a pas de
lien de juridiction, la Cour n’a pas le choix : elle doit la rejeter.

3. C’est la première fois, dans l’administration de la justice internatio-
nale, et plus spécialement dans l’expérience de la Cour internationale de
Justice, que la Cour est amenée à se prononcer sur une demande fondée sur
l’article 62. Il est donc inévitable que l’effet de la décision dépasse de
beaucoup le cadre de la requête maltaise et puisse être considéré comme un
précédent susceptible, d’après moi, d’être invoqué pour justifier une pra-
tique inconciliable avec le Statut et de nature, en outre, à porter atteinte
au principe suprême du consentement des Etats.

4. Comme on le sait, Malte reconnaît qu’il n’existe pas de lien juridic-
tionnel entre elle et la Libye ou la Tunisie. Ces deux Etats ont plaidé
l’incompétence de la Cour et déclaré que seul l’article 36 du Statut pourrait
servir de fondement à sa juridiction.

5. Pour finir, je voudrais rappeler le texte de l’article 36, paragraphe 6,
du Statut, qui dispose : « En cas de contestation sur le point de savoir si la
Cour est compétente, la Cour décide. » Selon moi, chaque fois qu’une
requête à fin d'intervention fondée sur l’article 62 du Statut est présentée, la
question de la compétence doit, par principe, être examinée en premier lieu,
en particulier quand, comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, les deux Partiesinitiales
(la Libye et la Tunisie) soulèvent l’incompétence.

(Signé) Platon MOROZOV.

23


37

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BROMS

Having joined the other Members of the Court in adopting the present
Order I want to explain the factual background to the adoption of the
Order. In doing this I do realize that at this stage any comment must relate
solely to the request for the provisional measures while the merits of the
case will only be discussed when the final decision of the Court will be
made. Needless to say the Parties at the hearing did refer to some of the
merits in order to justify their views on the provisional measures. This
turned out to be necessary in order to estimate whether the claimant had a
prima facie case.

At the time the Application for the provisional measures was made by
Finland the normal prerequisites seemed to exist for the granting of the
request. The jurisdiction of the Court did not present any problems; the
claim obviously included legal problems to be judged by the Court, and
was one which on its face had reasonable chances of succeeding. The
claimant also could prove that without provisional measures irreparable
prejudice could be caused to the right of free passage of drill ships and
oil rigs allegedly based on several international treaties and international
custom. There also seemed to be the required urgency, which has often
played a decisive role in the Court’s decision-making on applications
for provisional measures. The final construction tenders for the East
Channel Bridge have an acceptance deadline of 18 August 1991 and
there was a danger that tenders for Finnish oil rigs and drill ships would
diminish due to the fear of the potential buyers that the construction
work would be prevented in the near future due to the impossibility of
making use of the right of free passage through the Great Belt.

At the hearing the Danish Government made a statement that, accord-
ing to the schedule for construction of the East Channel Bridge, “no
physical hindrance for the passage through the Great Belt will occur
before the end of 1994” (Danish Written Observations, para. 140 (2);
Public Sitting of 2 July 1991 (morning), CR 91/11, p. 11 (Lehmann)). To this it
was added that by that time the case would have been finally decided by
the Court. Having said this the Agent for Denmark suggested that no
indication for provisional measures was required (ibid.). He went on
to explain that the construction of the East Channel Bridge will not
present any practical hindrance for the passage of mobile offshore
drilling units through the Danish Straits and the navigation may con-
tinue through the Strait as before (see para. 25 of the Order).

29
38 PASSAGE THROUGH THE GREAT BELT (SEP. OP. BROMS)

Thus according to the Agent of Denmark, there is no urgency. Another
thing changing the original situation was that later during the delibera-
tions of the case the Court decided to make the final decision of the case
expeditiously, probably during the spring of 1992 or at the latest in the fall
of 1992. When this decision is combined with the Danish assurances as to
the continuation of the right of free passage, the issue of urgency must be
seen in another light. Finnish ships, including the oil rigs and drill ships,
are now guaranteed the right of transit at least until the end of 1994 and the
Court will decide the case as expeditiously as possible — certainly before
the above date. Thus, as a result of the above explained events the material
grounds for the acceptance of the Application have changed. With these
changes the prerequisites for the adoption of the Application diminished
without any fault of the claimant. The remaining alternative was the
present Order.

The present Order confirms the above-mentioned Danish assurances
given to the Court. What is most important, however, is the provision
included in paragraph 32, whereby the Court underlines the well-estab-
lished legal norm that a State engaged in a dispute before the Court with
another State cannot improve its legal position vis-a-vis that other State by
any action taken pendente lite, and no such action “can have any effect
whatever as regards the legal situation which the Court is called upon to
define” (Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland,
P.C.LJ., Series A’B, No. 48, p. 287). This concerns naturally both Parties
but, taking into account the circumstances of the present case, this prin-
ciple is especially important as a guarantee to Finland against any
detrimental change which might be undertaken by the territorial power
of the Great Belt.

The Order also decides another important legal issue which was taken
up at the hearing by the counsel, Professor Bowett, speaking for the Gov-
ernment of Denmark. He suggested that in the event a restitution in kind
should prove excessively onerous for Denmark, a monetary compensa-
tion of damages would suffice as a payment to Finland, should Finland’s
claim eventually be accepted by the Court (Public Sitting of 5 July 1991,
CR 91/14, p. 45). But this is not what the claimant has been seeking. The
claimant is seeking restitution in kind. Therefore, the opinion of the Court
which denies the validity of the Danish theory is correct, and an important
interpretation.

Finally, I also regard the contents of paragraphs 33 and 34 to be most
important, especially in light of paragraph 35, where the Court welcomes
the Parties to enter into negotiations to solve their dispute. The principle
of equal treatment of the Parties has been quite correctly adopted in para-
graphs 33 and 34. Both Parties are requested to consider alternative solu-
tions to settle the dispute. With the help of their combined technical

30
39 PASSAGE THROUGH THE GREAT BELT (SEP. OP. BROMS)

expertise, the future negotiations which the Court recommends to both
Parties might turn out to be decisive in finding a mutually acceptable
solution.

I have not been able to avoid the impression that the dispute is one
which could also possibly be solved by the use of negotiations between the
two Governments. By doing this they would only be acting in the best Nor-
dic spirit of comity and co-operation to make the utmost effort to find a
solution which would satisfy both sides.

After all, the main dispute should be brought to its realistic measure-
ments. It is not easy to understand how the building of an opening to the
East Channel Bridge by means of a swing bridge, or possibly by another
technical solution, could cause more expense to Denmark than a rela-
tively small fraction of the total construction costs, which are said to be
more than 4 billion dollars. Neither should such a modification cause any
real delay to the construction work presuming that the necessary decision
is reached in the foreseeable future. As the Order of the Court itself sug-
gests negotiations to the Parties, the acceptance of negotiations can no
longer be said to lead to any loss of face on either side. To the contrary, the
Court would appreciate such an effort by the Parties. Needless to say,
even if the Parties could not solve their dispute through direct negotia-
tions, the results of such negotiations, and in particular the technical solu-
tions which may be explored, would be helpful to the Court which, for
natural reasons, is composed of legal, and not technical, representatives.

As the Court now has decided to deal expeditiously with the case this
solution is in the interest of both Parties. The uncertainty of the situation
should not be allowed to continue any longer than is absolutely necessary.
Now that the Court has adopted the above Order it is to be hoped that with
the co-operation of the two Agents the merits of the case will, indeed, be
decided at the latest by the end of 1992. That way any possible damage to
either Party would be minimized.

(Signed) Bengt BROMS.

31


152

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ARMAND-UGON

Tout en souscrivant à l’arrêt de la Cour, je crois devoir énoncer
les motifs qui m’y conduisent par un autre raisonnement,

1° La première exception préliminaire à la requête du Gouverne-
ment israélien soulevée par le Gouvernement bulgare se fonde sur
l’alinéa 5 de l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour. Il s’agit de savoir
si cet alinéa s'applique à la déclaration signée le 12 août 1927 par
le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Royaume de Bulgarie. C’est
donc l'interprétation de cette disposition qui se pose à la Cour. Son
texte est le suivant:

« Les déclarations faites en application de l’article 36 du Statut
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale pour une durée
qui n'est pas encore expirée seront considérées, dans les rapports
entre parties au présent Statut, comme comportant acceptation
de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice
pour la durée restant à courir d’après ces déclarations et confor-
mément. à leurs termes. »

La déclaration bulgare antérieurement mentionnée est ainsi
libellée:

« Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume de Bulgarie, je déclare
reconnaître comme obligatoire de plein droit et sans convention
spéciale, vis-à-vis de tout autre membre ou État acceptant la
même obligation, la juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, purement et simplement. »

2° La Cour, dans son avis consultatif sur la Compétence de l’As-
semblée générale pour l'admission d’un État aux Nations Unies, a
établi et rappelé certaines règles applicables à l'interprétation de la
Charte, valables aussi pour l'interprétation du Statut de la Cour
qui en est l’annexe:

«Le premier devoir [disait la Cour] d’un tribunal appelé à
interpréter et à appliquer les dispositions d’un traité, est de
s’efforcer de donner effet, selon leur sèns naturel et ordinaire, à
ces dispositions prises dans leur contexte. Si les mots pertinents,
lorsqu'on leur attribue leur signification naturelle et ordinaire,
ont un sens dans leur contexte, l'examen doit s'arrêter là. En
revanche, si les mots, lorsqu'on leur attribue leur signification
naturelle et ordinaire, sont équivoques et conduisent à des résultats
déraisonnables, c’est alors et alors seulement que la Cour doit
rechercher par d’autres méthodes d'interprétation ce que les parties
avaient en réalité dans l'esprit. » (C. I. J. Recueil 1950, p. 8.)

29
I53 INCIDENT AÉRIEN (OPIN. INDIV. DE M. ARMAND-UGON)

On doit donc rechercher d’abord dans le texte de l'alinéa 5 les
éléments pour son interprétation, et c’est seulement si ceux-ci sont
insuffisants qu’on pourra se fonder sur des éléments extérieurs au
texte. La compétence pour interpréter doit s’en tenir au texte
quand celui-ci est clair.

3° L’alinéa 5 doit être interprété restrictivement.

En premier lieu, parce que cette disposition établit une exception
à la modalité d'acceptation de la clause facultative, laquelle norma-
lement se fait par le moyen d’une déclaration unilatérale, comme
lPindique l’alinéa 2 de l’article 36 du Statut.

Le système de l'acceptation de la clause facultative est dominé
et régi par un principe adopté par le présent Statut, comme il avait
déjà été admis par l’ancien Statut. Ce principe est qu’une telle
acceptation est toujours facultative et particulière, et non pas obli-
gatoire et générale, c'est-à-dire que la juridiction de la Cour ne
peut en aucun cas être imposée à un État par d’autres États.
L’adhésion à la clause facultative par un gouvernement est une
décision politique.

L’alinéa 5 prévoit un régime d’acceptation de la juridiction de
la Cour collectif et automatique pour certains États liés au Statut
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

Ce paragraphe est donc une dérogation au droit commun en
matière d'acceptation de la clause facultative, car il considère cer-
tains États ayant fait certaines déclarations en application de
l’article 36 de l’ancien Statut comme acceptant la juridiction de la
nouvelle Cour sur la base de leurs déclarations antérieures. Ces
États se trouvent ainsi liés à la juridiction de la Cour internationale
de Justice sans avoir fait de déclaration volontaire et unilatérale.
La reconnaissance de la juridiction de la Cour, qui ressort de l’ali-
néa 5, doit se maintenir dans ses termes exprès, sans pouvoir
s'étendre par voie d'interprétation à d’autres cas non compris
dans cette norme.

D'autre part, le paragraphe en question revêt la forme d’une
fiction légale — solution plus ou moins empirique et de pure tech-
nique juridique; elle a été construite en vue de sauvegarder certains
intérêts nettement déterminés. Quand le droit s'exprime par un tel
procédé, son interprétation ne doit pas dépasser les limites imposées
par la formule légale; elle doit être contenue dans la lettre de son
texte: toute proposition d'interprétation extensive doit être ici
rejetée.

4° Une saine interprétation de l'alinéa 5 doit tenir compte, en
tout premier lieu et essentiellement, de son texte précis, afin de
dégager son contenu.

Il est bien connu que les déclarations d'acceptation de la clause
facultive de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale et de la
Cour internationale de Justice peuvent être de deux sortes: décla-

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154 INCIDENT AERIEN (OPIN. INDIV. DE M. ARMAND-UGON)

rations d'acceptation sans durée déterminée ou sans terme, dont
les effets sont immédiats et pour toujours, et déclarations d’accep-
tation avec durée déterminée ou avec terme, qui ne produisent
d'effets que pour la durée qui leur a été fixée par le gouvernement
déclarant. Ces différentes modalités d'acceptation de la clause
facultative étaient naturellement présentes à l'esprit des rédacteurs
de l'alinéa 5. Le texte de cet alinéa mentionne seulement les décla-
rations qui sont « pour une durée qui n’est pas encore expirée » et
qui comportent l'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice « pour une durée restant à courir d’après ces
déclarations ». Ces deux phrases visent clairement des déclarations
avec une durée déterminée et se réfèrent à des actes juridiques
avec un terme extinctif. Elles n’auraient pas de sens raisonnable si
on voulait les appliquer à des déclarations faites « sans limitation
de durée » et n'ayant pas en conséquence de «durée restant à
courir ». La légère différence de rédaction entre le texte anglais et
le texte français de l’alinéa 5 de l’article 36 n’invalide pas cette
interprétation du texte, dans les deux langues; il est évident que
les seules déclarations visées par l’alinéa sont les déclarations avec
délai déterminé.

L’alinéa en question ne prévoit donc pas les déclarations faites
sans délai, c'est-à-dire sans un espace de temps à courir. Affirmer
qu’une obligation a « une durée restant 4 courir » suppose nécessai-
rement une échéance à l'obligation.

La mention que l'alinéa 5 fait des déclarations au délai déterminé
emporte l'exclusion des autres déclarations sans délai.

Dans la sauvegarde qu'il organisait de certaines déclarations
visant la juridiction de la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale, l'alinéa 5 n'a pas compris la déclaration du Royaume de
Bulgarie, signée le 12 août 10921, laquelle acceptait la juridiction
de cette Cour « purement et simplement » et sans délai, comme le
permettait l'alinéa 3 de l’article 36 de l’ancien Statut.

La rédaction très soigneuse de l’alinéa 5, en faisant des distinctions
entre les diverses catégories de déclarations alors existantes, évitait
aux États qui avaient fait des déclarations sans délai leur soumission
permanente à la juridiction de la Cour internationale de Justice.

C’est le cas d’appliquer la vieille règle: bene indicat qui bene
distingutt.

L’acceptation de la thèse donnant plein effet à l’alinéa 5 pour
toutes les déclarations, sans aucune distinction entre celles qui sont
sans délai et celles qui sont avec délai, conduirait à lier la Bulgarie
à Ja clause facultative définitivement et pour tous les différends
rentrant dans cet engagement et sans limitation de temps. Telle

3T
155 INCIDENT AÉRIEN (OPIN. INDIV. DE M. ARMAND-UGON)

n'a pu être la volonté qu'a voulu exprimer cet alinéa, et lui attribuer
ce sens dépasserait son texte limitatif. La fiction légale de cette
disposition ne peut prétendre à une telle ampleur qui déborderait
évidemment le contenu de son texte formel. Imposer à la Bulgarie
un tel engagement juridictionnel qui l’affecterait à perpétuité néces-
siterait une règle ne laissant aucun doute sur ce point. Or le texte
de l’alinéa 5 ne se prête pas à de si graves conséquences ; il faut donc
le rétablir dans son sens littéral, sans qu'aucune considération
étrangère à son texte puisse prévaloir. JI faut appliquer la disposi-
tion légale dont la formule est claire, sans en rien retrancher ni
sans rien y ajouter.

Il faut remarquer que le but pratique cherché par l'alinéa 5 de
l’article 36 n'était autre que celui de faciliter l'exercice immédiat
de la juridiction obligatoire de la nouvelle Cour, ce qui s’assurait
largement avec les déclarations avec délai déterminé. Il n’est donc
pas autorisé de faire de l'interprétation extensive là où rien ne
l'exige. Les conséquences claires et précises d’un texte ne sont
autres que celles que ce texte a voulu; lui en attribuer d’autres
suppose une modification abusive du texte.

La présente argumentation n’a pas été discutée pendant les plai-
doiries, mais rien ne fait obstacle à son admission, selon le principe
bien connu et appliqué par la jurisprudence internationale en ma-
tière procédurale que le tribunal peut chercher d'office et choisir la
base juridique pour appuyer sa décision sur les conclusions finales
des parties — tura novit curia.

*
* *

En conséquence, la déclaration bulgare ne peut être considérée
comme visée par l'alinéa 5.

J'aurais désiré que la Cour eût fondé uniquement son arrêt sur
les motifs qui viennent d’être exposés sommairement. Elle a préféré
une autre énonciation, sans cependant avoir rejeté l'interprétation
exposée dans la présente note.

(Signé) ARMAND-UGON.

32