1173

               SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE XUE

   1. Much to my regret, I wish at this preliminary stage to place on
record my reservation to the Court’s interpretation, albeit not yet deﬁni-
tive, of Article 4 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (hereinafter “the Convention”).

  2. Article 4 of the Convention provides that “States Parties shall carry
out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with
the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and
that of non-interference in the domestic aﬀairs of other States”.

   3. The Parties give diﬀering interpretations to this Article. Notwith-
standing such diﬀerence, the Court notes that in order to found its juris-
diction ratione materiae, prima facie, to entertain the case pursuant to
Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Convention, it must ascertain whether the
acts alleged by Equatorial Guinea against France appear to fall within
the provisions of that instrument. Regarding the meaning of Article 4, the
Court in paragraph 49 of the Order states the following :
        “49. The purpose of Article 4 of the Convention is to ensure that
     the States parties to the Convention perform their obligations in
     accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integ-
     rity of States and non-intervention in the domestic aﬀairs of other
     States. The provision does not appear to create new rules concerning
     the immunities of holders of high-ranking oﬃce in the State or incor-
     porate rules of customary international law concerning those immu-
     nities. Accordingly, any dispute which might arise with regard to ‘the
     interpretation or application’ of Article 4 of the Convention could
     relate only to the manner in which the States parties perform their
     obligations under that Convention. It appears to the Court, however,
     that the alleged dispute does not relate to the manner in which France
     performed its obligations under Articles 6, 12, 14 and 18 of the Con-
     vention, invoked by Equatorial Guinea. The alleged dispute, rather,
     appears to concern a distinct issue, namely whether the Vice-President
     of Equatorial Guinea enjoys immunity ratione personae under cus-
     tomary international law and, if so, whether France has violated that
     immunity by instituting proceedings against him.”
   4. This interpretation, in my view, begs a number of questions. First,
the intention of the States parties, as reﬂected in the travaux préparatoires
of Article 4, not to create new rules of immunities of customary interna-
tional law in the Convention cannot be interpreted to mean that the exist-

29

1174     immunities and criminal proceedings (sep. op. xue)

ing rules on the same subject-matter are precluded in the application of
the Convention. On the contrary, as a guideline, Article 4 provides a legal
framework within which the other provisions are to be implemented.
What is governed under the principle of sovereign equality of States
under general international law should remain intact and applicable,
when circumstances of a case so require. Rules of jurisdictional immunity
of State and its property and jurisdictional immunity of high-ranking
oﬃcials in foreign courts are, among others, two relevant régimes
that directly derive from that principle.

   5. Secondly, the question of jurisdictional immunity ratione personae
bears on “the manner” in which a State party performs its obligations
under the Convention. It is no less relevant to the principle of sovereign
equality than an operation being conducted in a foreign territory. In the
present case, Mr. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue is a foreign national
holding high-ranking oﬃce in his country. Although all the acts alleged
by Equatorial Guinea were carried out in the French territory and under
the French internal law, the essence of the dispute between the Parties is
the applicability of the Convention.
   6. Thirdly, whether an incumbent President or a Vice-President of a
State enjoys jurisdictional immunity in foreign courts under customary
international law is not a “distinct issue” that does not fall within the
provisions of the Convention. In implementing its obligations under Arti-
cle 6 (criminalization of laundering of the proceeds of crime), Article 12
(measures to enable conﬁscation and seizure), Article 14 (disposal of con-
ﬁscated proceeds of crime or property), and Article 18 (mutual legal assis-
tance), a State party may have to act diﬀerently if rules of jurisdictional
immunities apply. The dispute in the present case appears to concern that
very question.

  7. Given the above considerations, I maintain the view that the Court
has, prima facie, jurisdiction under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Con-
vention.

                                                (Signed) Xue Hanqin.

30


22 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JUDGMENT)

to the other Party, even if Iceland has chosen not to appoint an Agent,
file a Counter-Memorial or submit preliminary objections to the Court’s
jurisdiction; and Article 53 of the Statute both entitles the Court and, in
the present proceedings, requires it to pronounce upon the question of its
jurisdiction. This it has now done with binding force.

46. For these reasons,
THE Court,
by fourteen votes to one,

finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland on 14 April 1972 and to deal with the merits of the dispute.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this second day of February, one thou-
sand nine hundred and seventy-three, in three copies, of which one will
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and to the Government of the Republic of Iceland, respectively.

(Signed) ZAFRULLA KHAN,
President.

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.

President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN makes the following dec-
laration:

I am in entire agreement with the Judgment of the Court. I consider it
needful, however, to append the following brief declaration.

The sole question before the Court in this phase of these proceedings
is whether, in view of the compromissory clause in the Exchange of Notes
of 11 March 1961 between the Government of the United Kingdom and
the Government of Iceland, read with Article 36 (J) of its Statute, the

23
23 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN)

Court is competent to pronounce upon the validity of the unilateral ex-
tension by Iceland of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50
nautical miles from the baselines agreed to by the parties in 1961. All
considerations tending to support or to discount the validity of Iceland’s
action are, at this stage, utterly irrelevant. To call any such consideration
into aid for the purpose of determining the scope of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, would not only beg the question but would put the proverbial cart
before the horse with a vengeance and is to be strongly deprecated.

Judge Sir Gerald FirzMAuRIcE appends a separate opinion to the
Judgment of the Court.

Judge PADILLA NERVO appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of
the Court.

({nitialled) Z.K.
(Initialled) S.A.

24


143

DECLARATION OF JUDGE HERCZEGH
[Translation]

I voted against paragraphs 2 (a) and (b), and 3 of the operative part,
for reasons similar to those which were the subject-matter of the declara-
tion which I appended to the Judgment delivered today in the case con-
cerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom).

I therefore request the reader to refer to the text of that declaration.

(Signed) Géza HERCZEGH.

32


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
v. YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO))

ORDER OF 16 APRIL 1993

1993

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À L’APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION POUR LA PREVENTION
ET LA REPRESSION DU CRIME DE GENOCIDE

(BOSNIE-HERZEGOVINE | __
c. YOUGOSLAVIE (SERBIE ET MONTENEGRO))

ORDONNANCE DU 16 AVRIL 1993
Official citation:

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Order of 16 April 1993,
1.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 29

Mode officiel de citation :

Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression
du crime de génocide, ordonnance du 16 avril 1993,
C.J. Recueil 1993, p. 29

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N° de vente : 63 2
ISBN 92-1-070690-0

29

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1993 YEAR 1993
16 April
General List
No. 91 16 April 1993

CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
y. YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO))

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
Having regard to Articles 31 and 44 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
20 March 1993 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, instituting
proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations by
Yugoslavia of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide,

Having regard to the Order made by the Court on 8 April 1993, by
which the Court indicated provisional measures pending the final deci-
sion in the case;

Taking into account the agreement of the Parties, expressed at a meet-
ing between the President and the Agents of the Parties held on 8 April
1993, that time-limits of six months each should be fixed for the Memorial
and Counter-Memorial,

Fixes as follows the time-limits for the written proceedings in the case:
30 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (ORDER 16 IV 93)

15 October 1993 for the Memorial of the Government of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

15 April 1994 for the Counter-Memorial of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixteenth day of April, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-three, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Govern-
ment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
respectively.

(Signed) R. Y. JENNINGS,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2001
2001
12 avril
Rôle général
n°121
12 avril 2001

AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU MANDAT D'ARRÊT
; . DU 11 AVRIL 2000
(REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. BELGIQUE)

ORDONNANCE
Le président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

Vu l'article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les paragraphes 3 et 4 de l'article 44 de son
Réglement,

Vu l'ordonnance du 14 mars 2001, par laquelle la Cour a reporté, respectivement, au
17 avril 2001 et au 31 juillet 2001, les dates d'expiration des délais pour le dépôt du
mémoire de la République démocratique du Congo et du contre-mémoire du Royaume de
Belgique;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du 10 avril 2001 et parvenue au Greffe le 11 avril
2001 par télécopie, l'agent de la République démocratique du Congo a prié la Cour de
reporter de trente jours la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire, et a indiqué
les raisons à l'appui de cette demande; et considérant que, dès réception de cette lettre, le
greffier, se référant au paragraphe 3 de l'article 44 du Règlement, en a fait tenir copie à
l'agent de la Belgique;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du 12 avril 2001 et parvenue au Greffe le même
jour par télécopie, l'agent de la Belgique a indiqué que son gouvernement ne s'opposait pas
à la prorogation de délai sollicitée par la République démocratique du Congo et a demandé
que la date d'expiration du délai fixé pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire soit reportée au 17
septembre 2001;

Compte tenu des raisons invoquées par la République démocratique du Congo et de
l'accord des Parties,

Reporte au 17 mai 2001 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire de la
République démocratique du Congo;
-2-

Reporte au 17 septembre 2001 la date d'expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-
mémoire du Royaume de Belgique;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en frangais et en anglais, le texte frangais faisant foi, au Palais de la Paix, a
La Haye, le douze avril deux mille un, en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la
République démocratique du Congo et au Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique.

Le président,
(Signé) Gilbert Guillaume.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe Couvreur.