200

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ODA
[Traduction]

1. Je suis d’accord avec l’avis de la Cour selon lequel

«la section 22 de l’article VI de la convention sur les privilèges et
immunités des Nations Unies est applicable au cas de M. Dumitru
Mazilu en sa qualité de rapporteur spécial de la Sous-Commission
de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des
minorités » (par. 61).

Je me demande toutefois si, en se bornant à donner cette réponse, la Cour
a bien répondu à ce qui était la préoccupation du Conseil économique et
social lorsqu'il a formulé la résolution 1989/75 dans laquelle il a de-
mandé à la Cour, «à titre prioritaire », d'émettre un avis

«sur la question juridique de l’applicabilité de la section 22 de l’ar-
ticle VI de la convention … au cas de M. Dumitru Mazilu en sa qua-
lité de rapporteur spécial de la Sous-Commission » (les italiques sont
de moi).

A mon sens, la question aurait été formulée en termes plus restrictifs si le
Conseil avait souhaité seulement recevoir une réponse par oui ou par non.
La façon dont elle a été effectivement libellée appelait, me semble-t-il, cer-
taines prises de position sur les modalités de l’application de la section 22
de la convention au cas de M. Mazilu.

2. Comme cela est dit dans le préambule de sa résolution, le Conseil
économique et social a fait cette demande après avoir

«examiné la résolution 1988/37 de la Sous-Commission de la lutte
contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des minorités,
en date du 1* septembre 1988, et la résolution 1989/37 de la Commis-
sion des droits de l’homme, en date du 6 mars 1989».

La genèse de la demande d’avis consultatif adressée à la Cour par le
Conseil pourrait être reconstituée d’une façon un peu différente de celle
que la Cour a adoptée, car à mon avis on aurait pu mettre davantage en
relief certains faits qui se rapportent plus directement au motif de la
demande.

3. M. Mazilu, qui était alors un des membres de la Sous-Commission
dont le mandat allait venir à expiration le 31 décembre 1987, avait été prié

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 201

par la Sous-Commission d’établir un rapport sur les droits de l’homme et
la jeunesse (résolution 1985/12 du 29 août 1985). Des informations à cet
effet lui avaient été régulièrement envoyées par le centre des Nations
Unies pour les droits de l’homme à Genève. Cependant, lorsque la ses-
sion de 1987 de la Sous-Commission s’est ouverte à Genève le 10 août
1987, M. Mazilu n’avait pas remis de rapport et n’était pas présent à la
réunion. Le 12 août 1987, la Sous-Commission a été informée que le
Secrétariat venait de recevoir de la mission permanente de la Roumanie
à Genève une lettre l’avisant que M. Mazilu avait eu une crise cardiaque
en juin et que, étant encore hospitalisé il ne pourrait se rendre à Genève.
Un télégramme portant le nom «D. Mazilu», reçu par le Secrétariat le
18 août 1987, annonçait de même qu’il était impossible à l'intéressé d’assis-
ter à la session suite à une maladie cardiaque. Le 4 septembre 1987, la Sous-
Commission a décidé de reporter à sa session de 1988 l’examen du point
de son ordre du jour dans le cadre duquel le rapport demandé à M. Mazilu
devait être examiné.

4. Par la suite, le Secrétaire général adjoint aux droits de l’homme, à
Genève, a tenté, par une lettre du 3 novembre et un télégramme du 17 dé-
cembre 1987, d’entrer en contact avec M. Mazilu et de lui venir en aide
dans l’établissement de son rapport, notamment en prenant des disposi-
tions pour qu’il puisse se rendre à Genève. Le centre a reçu de M. Mazilu
deux lettres portant le cachet postal du 25 et du 29 décembre 1987 dans
lesquelles M. Mazilu disait qu’il n’avait pas reçu les communications pré-
cédentes du centre, y compris l'invitation à la session de 1987, et qu’il ne
pouvait pas obtenir de son gouvernement l’autorisation de se rendre à la
session à Genève. Dans aucune de ces deux lettres M. Mazilu n’a fait allu-
sion à une maladie. Le 19 janvier 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint aux
droits de l’homme a tenté d’entrer en contact avec M. Mazilu par l’inter-
médiaire du centre d’information des Nations Unies à Bucarest et il a
adressé une invitation officielle demandant à M. Mazilu de venir au
centre, à Genève, pour des consultations pendant la période de deux
semaines commençant le 15 février 1988.

5. Dans une lettre non datée adressée au Secrétaire général adjoint,
remise au directeur par intérim du centre d’information des Nations
Unies à Bucarest le 15 janvier 1988, et reçue à Genève le 1° février 1988,
M. Mazilu a déclaré qu’il avait été mis dans l’impossibilité d’avoir des
contacts avec le centre pour les droits de l’homme à Genève, et qu’il avait
«beaucoup souffert de cette situation intenable ». I] avait été hospitalisé
deux fois et contraint, à partir du 1° décembre 1987, de se démettre de son
poste au ministère des affaires étrangères. Il indiquait ensuite que, bien
qu’il fût disposé à se rendre à Genève pour des consultations, les autorités
roumaines avaient refusé de lui délivrer une autorisation de voyage. Il
ajoutait qu’il était « prêt à se rendre au centre le 14 février de cette année».
Dans une série de six lettres datées des 5 avril, 19 avril (deux lettres por-
tant cette date), 8 mai (deux lettres portant cette date) et 17 mai 1988,
M. Mazilu a donné de nouveaux détails sur sa situation personnelle: dans
la première, il a déclaré avoir opposé un refus à une commission spéciale

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 202

du ministère des affaires étrangères qui lui avait demandé d’envoyer un
télégramme au Secrétaire général adjoint pour lui dire qu’il n’était pas en
mesure d’établir son rapport et pour lui suggérer de confier cette tâche à
un autre expert. Il s’est plaint constamment de ce que, sous des formes
diverses, de fortes pressions avaient été exercées sur lui-même et sur sa
famille. .

6. Par une lettre du 6 mai 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint aux droits
de l’homme a demandé au représentant permanent de la Roumanie
à Genève de bien vouloir prêter son concours pour faire en sorte que
M. Mazilu reçoive tous les renseignements pertinents dont il avait besoin
pour achever son rapport. Le même jour, le Secrétaire général adjoint a
suggéré à M. Mazilu de venir à Genève du 30 mai au 10 juin 1988. Par une
lettre du 15 juin 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint a informé le représen-
tant permanent de la Roumanie qu’il avait décidé, à titre de mesure excep-
tionnelle, d’autoriser un fonctionnaire du centre pour les droits de
l’homme à se rendre à Bucarest pour aider M. Mazilu à établir son rap-
port, à condition que M. Mazilu soit mis en mesure de se rendre à Genève
pour présenter son rapport à la Sous-Commission et participer aux débats
qui suivraient. Dans une lettre du 27 juin 1988, le représentant permanent
de la Roumanie, sans répondre directement sur ce point, s’est simplement
référé à une offre d’établir un rapport sur les droits de l’homme et la
jeunesse, qui avait été faite le 29 mars 1988 au président de la Sous-
Commission par un nouveau membre roumain de celle-ci dont le mandat
commençait en 1988, offre que la mission roumaine avait transmise au
centre le 8 avril 1988. Le 1° juillet 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint a
rappelé au représentant permanent de la Roumanie sa décision précé-
dente aux termes de laquelle M. Mazilu aurait dû faire un bref séjour
à Genève.

7. M. Mazilu, qui n’était plus membre de la Sous-Commission mais
demeurait chargé d’établir un rapport sur les droits de l’homme et la
jeunesse, était de nouveau absent lorsque la session de 1988 de la Sous-
Commission s’est ouverte à Genève le 8 août 1988. Conformément à une
décision prise le 9 août 1988 lors d’une réunion consacrée à l’organisation
des travaux de la Sous-Commission, une invitation spéciale à se rendre à
Genève pour présenter son rapport a été télégraphiée à M. Mazilu. Le
télégramme ne lui a pas été remis et le centre d’information des Nations
Unies à Bucarest n’a pu savoir où se trouvait M. Mazilu. Le 15 août 1988,
la Sous-Commission a adopté la décision 1988/102 par laquelle elle priait
le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de prendre contact avec le Gou-
vernement roumain. Le 17 août 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint a in-
formé la Sous-Commission que, lors de ces contacts, le chargé d’affaires
de la mission permanente de la Roumanie à New York avait déclaré que
M. Mazilu était malade et avait pris sa retraite du ministère des affaires
étrangères, ce qui l’avait empêché de poursuivre son étude en vue du rap-
port. Le chargé d’affaires avait par ailleurs clairement indiqué que toute
intervention du Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et toute
forme d’enquête à Bucarest seraient considérées par son gouvernement

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 203

comme une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de la Roumanie. La
Roumanie estimait que le cas de M. Mazilu était une affaire interne entre
un citoyen et son propre gouvernement et, pour cette raison, aucune visite
à M. Mazilu ne serait autorisée.

x.

8. C’est dans ces circonstances que, le 1** septembre 1988, la Sous-
Commission a adopté la résolution 1988/37, demandant au Secrétaire gé-
néral « d’invoquer [auprès du Gouvernement roumain] l’applicabilité de
la convention» et d’inviter ce gouvernement «à coopérer pleinement à
l'application de la ... résolution en faisant en sorte que le rapport de
M. Mazilu soit achevé et présenté à la Sous-Commission à la date la plus
rapprochée possible». La Sous-Commission priait en outre le Secrétaire
général « au cas où le Gouvernement roumain ne souscrirait pas à l’appli-
cabilité des dispositions de ladite convention dans le cas présent », «de
porter cette divergence de vues entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et
la Roumanie à l’attention immédiate de la Commission des droits de
l’homme à sa … session [de 1989]». La Sous-Commission a aussi prié la
Commission des droits de l’homme, «dans cette dernière hypothèse »,
«de demander instamment au Conseil économique et social de solliciter
de la Cour internationale de Justice ... un avis consultatif sur l’applicabi-
lité des dispositions pertinentes de la convention ... [à ce] cas».

9. Conformément à cette résolution de la Sous-Commission, le Secré-
taire général a adressé, le 26 octobre 1988, au représentant permanent de
la Roumanie à New York, une note verbale dans laquelle, se référant à
l'avis juridique donné par le conseiller juridique de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies le 23 août 1988, il invoquait la convention sur les privilèges
et immunités des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne M. Mazilu et deman-
dait au Gouvernement roumain d’accorder toutes les facilités nécessaires
à M. Mazilu afin de lui permettre d’achever la tâche qui lui avait été
confiée. Cette communication étant restée sans réponse, le Secrétaire gé-
néral adjoint aux droits de l’homme a adressé, le 19 novembre 1988, une
lettre de rappel au représentant permanent de la Roumanie à Genève.

10. Le 6 janvier 1989, le représentant permanent de la Roumanie à
New York a remis au conseiller juridique de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies un aide-mémoire dans lequel le Gouvernement roumain définissait
sa position. La Roumanie exposait que, du fait de sa maladie et de sa mise
à la retraite, M. Mazilu n’était pas en mesure d’élaborer le rapport et que le
problème de l’application de la convention ne se posait pas dans son cas.

*

11. Le 6 mars 1989, la Commission des droits de l’homme a adopté la
résolution 1989/37 par laquelle la commission, «/n/Jotant que le Gouver-
nement roumain ne souscrit pas à l’applicabilité des dispositions de la
convention … dans le cas de M. Mazilu », a recommandé au Conseil éco-

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 204

nomique et social d'adopter un projet de résolution dont le texte était
joint. Le 24 mai 1989, ce texte est devenu la résolution 1989/75 du Conseil
(qui est citée partiellement au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus), sans changement
de fond autre que l’addition des mots «à titre prioritaire ».

* *

12. De ces trois résolutions (celles de la Sous-Commission, de la Com-
mission et du Conseil) il ressort clairement que la Sous-Commission de la
lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des minorités
considérait que la convention sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Organi-
sation des Nations Unies était applicable au cas de M. Mazilu, que la
Commission des droits de l’homme considérait que la Roumanie «ne
souscri[vai]t pas à l’applicabilité des dispositions de la convention», et
que le Conseil économique et social avait conclu qu’« une divergence de
vues s’[était] élevée entre l’Organisation des Nations Unies et le Gouver-
nement roumain quant à l’applicabilité de la convention ... au cas de
M. Dumitru Mazilu, en sa qualité de rapporteur spécial de la Sous-Com-
mission». Quelle était donc la «divergence de vues [qui s’était] élevée
entre l’Organisation des Nations Unies et ... [la Roumanie] quant a l’appli-
cabilité de la convention au cas de M. Dumitru Mazilu en sa qualite de
rapporteur spécial» ?

*

13. Il faut tout d’abord se demander si un rapporteur spécial de la
Sous-Commission de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la
protection des minorités entre ou non dans la catégorie des « experts en
missions pour l’Organisation des Nations Unies » visée à la section 22 de
l’article VI de la convention. L’Organisation des Nations Unies a affirmé
que oui mais la Roumanie a exprimé, dans son aide-mémoire du 6 janvier
1989, le point de vue que «la convention ne comporte pas une assimi-
lation des rapporteurs, dont les activités ne sont qu’occasionnelles, aux
experts en missions pour les Nations Unies». La Cour a conclu qu’une
personne exerçant cette fonction relève effectivement de la catégorie des
«experts en missions » (par. 55).

*

14. Deuxièmement, pour répondre à la question de l’applicabilité de
la section 22 de la convention au cas de M. Mazilu en sa qualité de rap-
porteur spécial de la Sous-Commission, la Cour devait déterminer si
M. Mazilu était ou non rapporteur spécial à l’époque de l’adoption de la
résolution du Conseil par laquelle la Cour a été priée de donner un avis
(c’est-à-dire le 24 mai 1989) et s’il l’est encore. A cet égard, il aurait aussi
été utile de se demander si sa mission a été considérée comme achevée par
l'organe qui la lui avait confiée. Hormis l’exposé de la genèse de la de-
mande d’avis consultatif et des faits ultérieurs (par. 9-26), l’avis de la Cour

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 205

ne fait guère référence à la position de la Roumanie sur cet aspect de la
question, si ce n’est en relevant son allégation selon laquelle M. Mazilu
était dans l’incapacité de «remplir son mandat de rapporteur spécial»
(par. 58).

15. Dans son aide-mémoire du 6 janvier 1989, la Roumanie a déclaré
que:

«En 1987, M. Mazilu est tombé gravement malade, [souffrant d’June
sérieuse maladie de cœur et a été hospitalisé à maintes reprises,
durant plusieurs mois. En novembre 1987, il a personnellement
soumis une demande de mise à la retraite pour incapacité de travail,
à cause de cette maladie, tout en fournissant des certificats médicaux
appropriés. Conformément à la loi roumaine, il a été examiné par

-une commission de médecins qui a décidé sa mise à la retraite pour
cause de maladie, pour une durée initiale d’une année.
frlécemment, à la fin d’une première année de retraite [pour raison]
médicale, il a fait l’objet d’un nouvel examen devant une commission
similaire de médecins qui a décidé de prolonger sa retraite pour cause
de maladie.»

Bien qu'il ne soit pas allé jusqu’à le dire expressément, le Gouvernement
roumain a sans doute considéré que M. Mazilu n’était plus rapporteur
spécial vers la fin de 1987. On peut estimer que cette prise de position a été
confirmée par la transmission, le 8 avril 1988, par la mission permanente
de Roumanie, d’une proposition faite par un membre roumain nouvelle-
ment élu d’entreprendre l'établissement du rapport (voir par. 5 ci-dessus). La
position de la Roumanie a été réaffirmée dans son exposé écrit présenté
à la Cour le 24 juillet 1989 dans lequel il était dit que:

«Pendant le mois de mai 1987 [M. Mazilu] est tombé gravement
malade, raison qui a conduit, sur sa demande, à sa mise à la retraite
pour incapacité de travail, à partir du 1% décembre 1987. En 1988,
une commission médicale a, conformément aux lois roumaines en
vigueur, réexaminé l’état de santé de M. Dumitru Mazilu et a décidé
de prolonger pour une nouvelle année sa mise à la retraite pour inca-
pacité de travail.

Au moment de sa retraite, il n’avait même pas commencé à rédiger le
rapport en question. » (Exposé écrit de la Roumanie, p. 7.)

16. L'Organisation des Nations Unies a adopté une position différente.

Le 1° juillet 1988, le Secrétaire général adjoint aux droits de l’homme a

rappelé, dans une lettre adressée au représentant permanent de la Rou-

manie (faisant référence à l'offre d’assistance faite par le nouveau
membre roumain), que:

«M. Mazilu tient son mandat [d'établir le rapport sur le sujet]
d’une décision de la Sous-Commission énoncée dans sa résolu-

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 206

tion 1985/12, et seule la Sous-Commission, ou un organe de niveau
plus élevé, serait habilitée à modifier cette désignation. »

17. Ici, la question essentielle examinée par la Cour était de savoir si
M. Mazilu, malgré sa volonté de conserver son statut de rapporteur spécial
de la Sous-Commission, avait perdu ce statut par suite d’une décision prise
par le Gouvernement roumain — ou, en d’autres termes, si le Gouverne-
ment roumain avait pu le priver du statut de rapporteur spécial de la Sous-
Commission pour une quelconque raison. Je partage le point de vue de la
Cour selon lequel «M. Mazilu continue à avoir la qualité de rapporteur
spécial» — conclusion qu’elle formule tout à la fin de son avis, au para-
graphe 60.

*

18. Troisièmement, si la Cour n’a pas été invitée à donner un avis gé-
néral sur la gamme des privilèges et immunités dont jouit un rapporteur
spécial de la Sous-Commission ou un expert en mission pour l'Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies — en d’autres termes, à dire quel type de privilèges
il a le droit de recevoir, ni à préciser quand, où et si il a le droit de bénéfi-
cier d’immunités judiciaires devant les tribunaux ou d’autres immunités
ailleurs, dans son pays ou à l’étranger —, la question posée par le Conseil
économique et social exige, dans une certaine mesure, que soient exami-
nées les conséquences matérielles du droit qu’a M. Mazilu de bénéficier
des dispositions de la section 22 de l’article VI de la convention.

19. Le Gouvernement roumain a fait allusion à ces questions dans son
aide-mémoire du 6 janvier 1989, et sa position à cet égard ne peut être
mieux exprimée que par l’extrait suivant de son exposé écrit:

«Même si on reconnaît partiellement aux rapporteurs le statut des
experts des Nations Unies ... la section 22 ... de la convention [fait]
ressortir clairement qu’un expert ne jouit pas de priviléges et immu-
nités n’importe où et n’importe quand, mais uniquement dans le pays
où il est envoyé en mission, et seulement pendant la durée de celle-ci,
de même que dans les pays de transit, lors des voyages requis par la
mission. De même, les privilèges et les immunités ne peuvent courir
que du moment du départ de l’expert en voyage pour accomplir la
mission. Pour autant que le voyage de l’expert aux fins d'accomplir la
mission pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies n’ait pas commencé,
et cela pour des raisons qui n’ont aucun lien avec son activité d’ex-
pert, il n’y a nul fondement juridique pour prétendre [a] des privi-
lèges et immunités conformément à la convention, sans égard au fait
qu’il se trouve dans son pays de résidence où dans un autre pays, dans
une qualité autre que celle d’expert.

Dans le pays dont il possède la citoyenneté, dans le pays où il a sa
résidence permanente, ou dans d’autres pays où il pourrait se trouver
en dehors de la mission respective, l'expert ne jouit de privilèges et
immunités qu’en ce qui concerne le contenu de l’activité déployée au

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 207

cours de sa mission (y compris ses paroles et écrits). » (Exposé écrit
de la Roumanie, p. 6.)

20. L'Organisation des Nations Unies a pris une tout autre position,
comme cela ressort de la note verbale du 26 octobre 1988 adressée par le
Secrétaire général au représentant permanent de la Roumanie, dans la-
quelle le Secrétaire général affirmait que, en vertu de la section 22 de la
convention, M. Mazilu aurait dû avoir

«la possibilité ... d’établir des contacts personnels avec le Secrétaire
général adjoint aux droits de l’homme afin que le centre pour les
droits de l’homme puisse lui accorder l’assistance dont il aurafit]
besoin».

Dans son exposé écrit présenté à la Cour le 31 juillet 1989, le Secrétaire
général s’est référé à sa note verbale du 26 octobre 1988

«dans laquelle il invoquait la convention générale dans le cas de
M. Mazilu et priait le Gouvernement roumain d’accorder à celui
ci les facilités nécessaires, notamment pour effectuer un voyage a
Genève afin qu’il puisse achever la tâche qui lui avait été confiée »
(exposé écrit du Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nation
Unies, par. 24).

21. Dans son avis consultatif, la Cour a déclaré, en termes généraux, que:

«la section 22 entend assurer dans l'intérêt de l'Organisation l’indé-
pendance de ces experts en leur accordant les privilèges etimmunités
nécessaires à cet effet. Ces privilèges et immunités tendent dans cer-
tains cas à faciliter le voyage des experts et leur séjour à l'étranger,
par exemple en ce qui concerne la saisie ou la fouille des bagages
personnels. Mais, dans d’autres cas, ils ont un caractère beaucoup
plus général, en particulier pour ce qui est des communications avec
l'Organisation des Nations Unies ou de Pinviolabilité des papiers et
documents. Dans ces conditions, la section 22 est applicable à tout
expert en mission, qu’il soit ou non en déplacement. » (Par. 50.)

«Les privilèges et immunités accordés par les articles ... et VI le
sont en vue d’assurer l’indépendance des fonctionnaires internatio-
naux et des experts dans l’intérêt de l'Organisation. Cette indépen-
dance doit être respectée par tous les Etats, y compris par l’Etat de la
nationalité et celui de la résidence. » (Par. 51.)

Ces affirmations sont justes, mais elles ne semblent pas s’attacher suffi-
samment aux aspects essentiels du cas concret de M. Mazilu, notamment
au fait qu’il lui a été impossible de recevoir de la documentation du centre
des Nations Unies pour les droits de l’homme à Genève, d’entrer en rela-
tion avec ce centre, ou d’être joint par lui, et qu’il a été empêché par son
gouvernement de se rendre à Genève aux fins de consultations avec le
centre ou pour présenter un rapport à la Sous-Commission. La confirma-
tion que M. Mazilu possède un statut général qui lui confère des privilèges
et immunités n’épuise pas, à mon avis, la question portée devant la Cour.

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PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 208

22. On peut soutenir qu’il a simplement été demandé à la Cour de
donner son avis «sur la question juridique de l’applicabilité de la sec-
tion 22 de l’article VI de la convention » (les italiques sont de moi), sans
envisager la question de son application. Je sais que l’exposé écrit du
Secrétaire général, visé dans l’avis de la Cour, précise que:

«la demande adressée à la Cour concerne ... non les conséquences de
[’lapplicabilité [de la section 22 de la convention], c’est-à-dire la na-
ture des privilèges et immunités dont M. Mazilu pourrait bénéficier
en conséquence de son statut et la question de savoir s’il a été porté
atteinte à ces privilèges et immunités» (exposé écrit du Secrétaire
général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, par. 2),

et je n’ignore pas que le conseiller juridique, en tant que représentant du
Secrétaire général, a affirmé au cours de la procédure orale que:

«[le] Conseil [économique et social] ... a simplement posé une ques-
tion juridique préliminaire à la Cour, qui semble destinée à préciser
tout au plus la situation de M. Mazilu vis-à-vis de la convention, mais
sans résoudre l’ensemble du litige qui oppose manifestement l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies et le Gouvernement roumain».

Théoriquement, cela pourrait justifier que l’on se borne à une simple affir-
mation que la section 22 de l’article VI est applicable à M. Mazilu en sa
qualité de rapporteur spécial relevant de la catégorie des «experts en mis-
sions pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies», mais il n’est pas possible,
à mon avis, de déterminer l’applicabilité d’une disposition à un cas concret
sans se référer de façon adéquate à la manière dont elle peut s’appliquer.
A cet égard, la Cour énonce simplement, en termes très généraux, que:

«[les rapporteurs et rapporteurs spéciaux] jouissent..., conformé-
ment à la section 22, des privilèges et immunités nécessaires pour
exercer leurs fonctions, et en particulier pour établir tous contacts
utiles à la préparation, à la rédaction et à la présentation de leur rap-
port à la Sous-Commission » (par. 55).

23. Amon avis, la Cour n’aurait pas dû négliger de relater et de traiter
expressément la façon dont M. Mazilu, en Roumanie, a été privé de tout
contact avec le centre des Nations Unies pour les droits de l’homme à
Genève et empêché de se rendre à Genève pour exécuter la mission
dont il avait été chargé par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, parce qu’il
s’agit là d’aspects essentiels du cas de M. Mazilu, que la Cour a été priée
d'examiner.

* *

24, En conclusion, j’estime que, eu égard à la nécessité que la « partici-
pation de la Cour ... à l’action de l’Organisation» (C.1J. Recueil 1950,
p. 71) soit aussi utile que possible, le dernier paragraphe de l’avis aurait pu
étre un peu plus développé, sans aborder des points de fait litigieux. Au

35
PRIVILÈGES ET IMMUNITÉS (OP. IND. ODA) 209

lieu de donner une simple réponse affirmative, il aurait dû énoncer de
manière plus explicite: premièrement, qu’un rapporteur spécial de la
Sous-Commission de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la
protection des minorités entre dans la catégorie des «experts en missions
pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies»; deuxiémement, que M. Mazilu
était, au moment de la demande d’avis du Conseil économique et social,
un rapporteur spécial de la Sous-Commission et qu’il exerce encore cette
fonction et, enfin, que M. Mazilu a le droit, dans l’intérét de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies, de recevoir de toutes les parties à la convention
sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies, y compris de l’Etat dont
il a la nationalité, toutes les facilités qui sont en leur pouvoir, pour remplir
sa mission. Sila Cour s’était prononcée dans ce sens, elle aurait utilement
appelé l'attention sur la nécessité de permettre à M. Mazilu de communi-
quer librement avec le centre des Nations Unies pour les droits de
l’homme et d’avoir accès à celui-ci.

{Signé) Shigeru ODA.

36


74

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. VALTICOS

1. Tout en reconnaissant pleinement les qualités de l’arrêt qui pré-
cède et sur lesquelles je reviendrai, je ne suis pas en mesure de m’y asso-
cier.

2. En effet, je ne considére pas que la Cour soit compétente pour
examiner le différend entre le Qatar et Bahrein et, du reste, la Cour elle-
même n’avait pas, dans son précédent arrêt du 1° juillet 1994, déclaré
qu’elle était, mais avait demandé aux Parties de lui fournir des éléments
complémentaires qui, en réalité, ne lui ont été fournis qu’incomplétement
et par une seule des deux Parties.

3. Pour être plus précis, rappelons que la Cour avait, dans Varrét
précité du 1% juillet 1994, estimé qu’il y avait eu des accords internatio-
naux créant des droits et des obligations pour Bahrein et Qatar. Plus pré-
cisément, elle a considéré que ces deux Etats ont pris l’engagement de
soumettre à la Cour l’ensemble du différend qui les oppose, selon la
formule «bahreinite». Elle n’a pas pour autant conclu que ces accords
entre les deux Etats équivalaient à un compromis suffisant pour que
laffaire puisse être portée directement et telle quelle devant la Cour.

4. En effet, cet accord entre les deux Etats devait encore être complété
par un accord sur l’objet précis du recours à la Cour, ainsi que par une
démarche des deux Parties, conjointe ou individuelle (mais, comme je
lPindiquerai plus bas, doublement individuelle), comme la Cour l’a elle-
même précisé dans son arrêt du 1° juillet 1994.

5. Si ces mesures complémentaires n’avaient pas été jugées nécessaires,
la Cour n'aurait pas, par cet arrêt, demandé «aux Parties » (aux deux Par-
ties donc) de lui soumettre « l'ensemble du différend». Or, à cet égard, les
mesures complémentaires jugées nécessaires par la Cour n’ont été prises
que partiellement, puisqu’une seule des Parties (Qatar) a adressé une
liste de points 4 la Cour et, si elle a bien mentionné cette fois-ci Zubarah
avec les autres questions faisant l’objet du différend, ce fut par une for-
mule qui n’a pas rencontré l’accord de l’autre Partie. En effet, Qatar a
marqué qu’il souhaitait que la question soit définie simplement par le
terme «Zubarah», avec l’indication selon laquelle il «considère que
Bahrein définit sa revendication concernant Zubarah comme une reven-
dication de souveraineté». De son côté, Bahreïn rejette cette formule en
expliquant qu’il avait demandé que le terme de «souveraineté» figurât
dans le libellé même de la question.

6. Or cette différence, peut-on se demander, subsiste-t-elle toujours, à
partir du moment où, vers la fin de son plus récent arrêt — «in cauda
suave» pourrait-on dire — la Cour estime maintenant qu’en réalité, dès
lors que la question de Zubarah et celle des îles Hawar lui sont soumises,

72
75 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. VALTICOS)

des revendications de souveraineté peuvent être présentées par l’une ou
l'autre Partie et que dès lors elle est saisie de l’ensemble du différend?

7. Est-il cependant vraiment possible de raisonner ainsi — ce qui
résoudrait, il est vrai, le problème — lorsque l’une des Parties (Qatar)
n’accepte pas, quant à elle, cette définition large de l’objet du différend et
se borne à prendre note de la demande plus générale de l’autre? Peut-on
vraiment écarter cette divergence des Parties quant à la définition de
l’objet du différend, divergence que les Etats concernés ont estimée suf-
fisamment importante pour empêcher leur accord sur ce point? Car en
réalité cette divergence est bien substantielle: en effet, la seule indication
d’après laquelle il serait entendu pour l’une des Parties (Qatar) que
l'autre (Bahreïn) accorde une plus large portée à la formulation d’une
question ne signifie pas qu'elle est d'accord pour que cette question soit
soumise à la compétence de la Cour. Au contraire, cette Partie se réserve
ainsi la possibilité de contester, le moment venu, que la Cour puisse exa-
miner la question ainsi formulée. Dans ces conditions, et compte tenu de
la position de Qatar, il ne me semble pas possible de considérer vraiment
qu'il y a eu accord des deux Parties pour que la question de la souverai-
neté sur Zubarah lui soit soumise.

8. Certes, au cours des longues discussions entre les deux Etats, il avait
été question de Zubarah (tout court) mais la portée de cette question
— et plus spécialement le fait de savoir si elle couvrait la souveraineté —
n’avait jamais fait l’objet d’un accord.

9. On doit donc bien constater que, faute d’un accord sur ce point, la
souveraineté sur Zubarah peut difficilement étre considérée comme sou-
mise à la Cour, étant donné la position expresse adoptée par Qatar.

10. Il est donc évident qu'il n’y a pas plein accord des deux Etats
quant à l’objet du différend qui les oppose et que la Cour ne dispose pas,
comme elle avait demandé aux Parties de lui soumettre, d’une définition
de «lensemble du différend» qui soit formulée par elles (arrét du
1% juillet 1994, par. 41, point 3).

11. Du reste, en demandant que les Parties lui soumettent l’ensemble
du différend, la Cour (par. 41, point 4) avait précisé que celles-ci devraient
«agir conjointement ou individuellement à cette fin».

12. Nous touchons ici la question de la saisine qui, en cette affaire, n’a
soulevé que trop de confusion. Déjà, lors des précédents travaux de la
Cour, il avait été largement question de la signification du terme arabe
«al-tarafan », qui avait été utilisé dans le procès-verbal de Doha et du
point de savoir si ce terme se référait aux deux Parties prises ensemble ou
bien séparément. Ces discussions n’ont pas abouti, de sorte qu’il serait
aventureux de fonder la validité de la saisine de la Cour sur une traduc-
tion contestée ou sur des déductions aventureuses. La compétence, qui
comprend la saisine de la Cour, ne peut être fondée sur le doute.

13. Du moment, cependant, que cette question est traitée dans le pré-
sent arrêt, on ne saurait passer sous silence les raisons qui, à mon sens,
font pour le moins douter que le terme «al-tarafan » utilisé pour se réfé-
rer aux conditions dans lesquelles la Cour serait saisie de la présente

73
76 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. VALTICOS)

affaire puisse être pris pour signifiant l’une ou l’autre Partie. En effet, lors
des discussions de Doha, un premier projet, établi par Oman, prévoyait
qu’aprés un certain délai «chacune des deux Parties» pourrait soumettre
la question a la Cour. Ce texte fut remplacé, 4 la demande de Bahrein,
par la formule selon laquelle «les deux Parties» (en arabe « al-tarafan »)
pourraient saisir la Cour. Ce changement n’aurait pas eu de sens s’il vou-
lait dire la même chose que le projet initial. Dans l’atmosphère bousculée
de la réunion, alors surtout préoccupée par les graves problèmes de l’Iraq
et du Koweit, on n’aurait pas modifié le texte précédent pour un texte
avec la méme signification. Le nouveau texte devait certainement vouloir
dire autre chose et ce ne pouvait être que ce seraient «les deux Parties à
la fois» (ou «ensemble») qui pourraient recourir à la Cour. Cette déduc-
tion me paraît d’une logique à la fois élémentaire et décisive. La Cour a
d’ailleurs admis qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un texte «explicite». Comment la
compétence peut-elle alors être fondée sur le doute ou en tout cas une
interprétation incertaine?

14. Pour ma part, il ne me paraît pas possible de partager le point de
vue selon lequel l’amendement adopté à Doha aurait été, en définitive,
dépourvu de signification. En effet, et en vertu d’un principe d’interpré-
tation bien connu, les changements apportés à un texte ne sauraient être
dénués de sens. Ce qui devrait être décisif, en occurrence, ce sont, non
les suppositions sur la manière dont les divers intéressés auraient compris
cet amendement, mais essentiellement le texte même de l’amendement,
Vintention qui l’a inspiré et une interprétation ainsi fondée sur ses termes
mêmes et sur les conditions de son adoption.

15. Revenant maintenant à l’arrêt de la Cour du 1° juillet 1994, il faut
souligner qu’en décidant que «les Parties [devraient] agir conjointement
ou individuellement » (point 4) en vue «de soumettre à la Cour l’ensemble
du différend» (point 3), la Cour visait manifestement, dans une éventua-
lité comme dans l’autre, à une action de la part des deux Parties que cette
action fût conjointe, ou qu’il s’agît de deux actions individuelles. La
demande adressée ainsi par la Cour aux deux Parties n’était du reste
qu’une suite logique du principe selon lequel la Cour ne peut être
saisie que par les deux Parties à un différend, à moins d’un compromis
spécifiant le contraire, ce qui est difficile à admettre sur la seule base du
procès-verbal contesté de Doha. En effet, même si l’on considère ce pro-
cès-verbal comme un engagement international, ce texte ne précisait pas
quels étaient les points litigieux et ne pouvait donc pas se suffire à [ui-
même, ni être considéré comme autorisant chacune des Parties à en saisir
la Cour. Encore fallait-il qu’il y eût accord sur la portée du litige pour
pouvoir en saisir la Cour.

16. Il est du reste significatif qu’après l’accord de Doha les deux Etats
concernés ont à plusieurs reprises essayé de négocier un accord spécial, et
ont donc bien considéré que le texte de Doha ne pouvait se suffire à lui-
même.

17. Enfin, l’accord des Parties de procéder selon la formule «bahreï-
nite» suppose bien une opération combinée avec une saisine, de pré-

74
77 DELIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. VALTICOS)

férence simultanée, mais en tout cas double et parallèle, des deux
Etats.

18. Du reste, toute cette discussion relative à la saisine et à la question
de savoir comment et par qui elle peut être effectuée perd de sa signifi-
cation dans la situation actuelle, puisque les Parties ne sont pas d’accord
sur l’objet du différend et qu’on ne saurait considérer la Cour comme
compétente à défaut d’un tel accord, qui n’a jamais existé.

19. Il resterait encore une dernière question à examiner: celle du poids
qu’il convient d’attribuer au refus énergique formulé actuellement par
Bahreïn de voir l’affaire portée devant la Cour, alors que celle-ci a consi-
déré que le procès-verbal de Doha constitue un accord international
créant des droits et des obligations pour les Parties. L'engagement entre
deux Etats de saisir la Cour peut-il constituer le fondement d’une instance
devant la Cour alors qu'il n’y a pas eu accord complet quant à l’objet du
différend? Une négociation et une action complémentaires des Etats
concernés ne sont-elles pas encore nécessaires avant que la Cour ne se
considère comme compétente et valablement saisie? C’est dans ce sens, et
pas autrement, que peut s'expliquer l’arrêt du 1° juillet 1994, dans lequel
la Cour a demandé aux Parties une action complémentaire et des éléments
qu’elle n’a, depuis, pas obtenus, ou du moins pas pleinement obtenus.

20. On se trouve ainsi dans une situation dans laquelle il n’y a ni
plein accord des Parties sur l’objet du litige, ni acte par lequel les deux
Parties, agissant «conjointement ou individuellement» comme l’avait
demandé la Cour, soumettent à celle-ci l’ensemble du différend qui les
oppose.

21. Dans l’arrêt en question du 1% juillet 1994, la Cour, tout en esti-
mant que les deux Etats concernés «ont pris l'engagement de [lui] sou-
mettre l’ensemble du différend qui les oppose», ne s’était pas prononcée
sur sa compétence. Elle souhaitait, comme on vient de le dire, «donner
aux Parties l’occasion de lui soumettre l’ensemble du différend». Les
Parties n’ont pas saisi cette occasion. Elles n’ont pas réussi à s’entendre
sur les questions (notamment sur l’une d’elles) à porter devant la Cour.
Contrairement à ce que celle-ci avait demandé, il n’y a pas eu soumission,
soit conjointe, soit individuelle — mais dans ce dernier cas de la part de
l’une comme de l’autre Partie — de l’ensemble du différend à la Cour. Un
seul des Etats a procédé à une telle communication, alors que l’autre, en
désaccord avec la formulation proposée par son adversaire, s'oppose for-
mellement à ce que l’affaire soit portée devant la Cour. L’accord de
Doha, ce semblant d'harmonie juridique, reste donc inachevé.

22. Dans ces conditions, j'estime que la Cour aurait dû conclure
qu’elle n’a pas compétence pour connaître de la requête de l’Etat de
Qatar et que cette requête n’est pas recevable.

23. Il y a du reste, d’après moi, une raison plus générale pour laquelle
l'arrêt ci-dessus peut être discuté. C’est que, avec une habileté incontes-
table, la Cour a contourné l’obstacle que constitue l’absence de réel
consentement des Parties. Elle a, ainsi, donné sans doute une chance à
la prévention d’un conflit qui risquerait d’éclater dans une région déjà

75
78 DÉLIMITATION ET QUESTIONS (OP. DISS. VALTICOS)

très sensible. Sur la question même de sa compétence, elle a abouti à une
conclusion qui, dans l’ensemble, satisfait Qatar et, en fait, devrait satisfaire
aussi Bahreïn (du moins pour ce qui est de l’objet du litige), puisqu'elle
accepte que sa compétence couvre la souveraineté sur Zubarah.

24. Ces avantages incontestables suffisent-ils pour compenser ce que je
considère la faiblesse que, sur le plan juridique, constituent l’absence de
consentement effectif d’une des Parties et l’insuffisance de la saisine? Le
souci très légitime de prévenir un conflit peut-il amener la Cour à se mon-
trer moins exigeante sur le principe consensuel qui est à la base de sa
compétence et de la confiance que lui accorde la communauté internatio-
nale?

25. Personnellement, je ne me sens pas en mesure de m’associer à une
conclusion qui me paraît aller au-delà de la compétence de la Cour.

(Signé) Nicolas VALTICOS.

76


41

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CORDOVA

Iam in disagreement with the majority of the Court both with
its reasoning as well as to its conclusion with regard to the First
Preliminary Objection of the United States. The United States
claims that, since the dispute in this case arose prior to August 26th,
1946, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate the
claim of the Swiss Government. I agree with such contention.

The United States Declaration of Acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court limits the submission to its competence
to the “legal disputes hereafter arising’, that is to say, after the
date of the Declaration, August 26th, 1946. The paramount
questions to decide this First Preliminary Objection, therefore,
are the definition of the international legal dispute which has
been brought by Switzerland before the Court as well as the date
of its inception.

The majority of the Court, it seems to me, based its decision
on this Objection on the assumption that the legal dispute between
the Parties is constituted by the different attitudes taken by them
on the question of the restoration of the assets to the Interhandel
by the United States. With this most essential finding of the Court I
cannot concur, and, from this difference of points of view derive
the difference in the conclusions reached by the majority and by me.
If the real dispute before the Court is limited to the restoration of
the vested assets of Interhandel then, of course, the conclusion that
it arose after August 26th, 1946, is right and right is also the deci-
sion to reject the first objection; but [ am bound to differ with the
majority because in my way of thinking the legal dispute, the real
difference between governments, lies in their opposite views with
regard to the legal character of Interhandel, enemy or neutral.

The Parties in this suit are in complete agreement in regard to the
law which should be applied in the case. In particular, they agree
on the positive and the negative aspects of the principle of inter-
national law which permits a belligerent State to seize and vest
enemy property lying within its territory on the one hand, and, on
the other, prohibits the same State to take property belonging
either to a neutral country or to its subjects. The whole diplomatic
discussion of the two Governments and the pleadings of their
Agents show the agreement on this principle, which moreover is
also incorporated in the law of the United States, the Trading
with the Enemy Act of October 6th, 1917. This law empowers
the United States Government to seize and appropriate the assets
of nationals of an enemy country but, at the same time, excludes

39
42 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

from such action the property of nationals of a neutral State,
making it possible for neutral property wrongfully seized to be
returned to its owners. There is complete agreement of the
Parties with regard to both the applicable law and the inevitable
consequence of the application of such law, the legal vesting of
the assets of Interhandel by the United States or its return to
the Swiss company.

The United States Government seized the property of Inter-
handel, constituted mainly, and among other assets, by 90 per cent
of the stock of the General Aniline and Film Corporation, organized
and doing business in the United States. In vesting these assets,
the United States relied on its contention that Interhandel was,
in fact, German owned, serving only as a cloak for the Frankfurt
firm, I.G. Farben. The Swiss Government, after having made
investigations, reached the conclusion that that was not the case;
that Interhandel, at the time of the seizure of its shares in the
General Aniline and Film Corporation, February 16th and
April 24th, 1942, was not any more controlled by German interests,
having as far back as June 1940 broken all its financial and
administrative connections with the German company.

This basic legal dispute between the Parties, the juridical
character of Interhandel, develops itself into some other differences
as, for example, the return of the shares, or that related to the
different procedures to solve such dispute as with regard to the
obligation of the United States to abide by the decision of the
Swiss Authority of Review or the obligation of the same Govern-
ment to take part in conciliatory proceedings or to arbitrate the
dispute. All of these secondary differences are based either on the
Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946, or on the Treaty of Ar-
bitration and Conciliation of February 16th, 1931. In my opinion,
all these differences are phases only of one and the same legal
dispute—the neutral or enemy character of Interhandel. Should
both Governments have been in agreement with regard to the
character of Interhandel, either as belligerent or as neutral, this
case would have never come before the Court, nor before the local
tribunals of the United States. The claim would have never existed.

If the Swiss Government would have presented its claim before
the Court based only on the refusal by the United States to abide
by the decision of the Washington Accord or to arbitrate the dispute
in compliance with the Treaty of 1931, I might have been inclined
to believe that the dispute would have been upon the non-com-
pliance of such Accord or of such Treaty; but having presented its
claim on the basis of the application of the international law
principle of the respect due by belligerents for neutral property,
I believe that the subsidiary Swiss submissions constitute only a
means to arrive at the same conclusion sought by the plaintiff,
the recognition that Interhandel was a neutral company and, as

40
43 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

a corollary, that it has a right to the return of the assets. In
other words, the return or restoration of the assets to Interhandel
is nothing else but a practical consequence of the solution of the
real and only legal dispute of the Parties—the character of the
Swiss company—but not the basic dispute itself. The return of
the shares and other assets, in itself, is not perhaps even a legal
dispute.

Once the determination of the legal dispute has thus been made,
it is necessary to fix the time when it really arose. Only then will
we be in a position to analyse the first Preliminary Objection in
the light of these two basic questions.

The United States Government vested Interhandel’s property on
February 16th and April 24th, 1942. This action was taken, as I
have said, on the basis of the assumed enemy character of Inter-
handel by the United States authorities in spite of its apparent
Swiss nationality. So it was notified to the Swiss Diplomatic Agent
in Washington in a Memorandum of February 16th, 1942 (Exhibit ro
of the Preliminary Objections of the United States). This Memoran-
dum also stated that such action did not mean, in any way, the in-
tention to take over any bona fide Swiss property, a statement which
evidently meant that the vested shares and other assets of In-
terhandel were not considered bona fide property of the Swiss
corporation. This is the first document in our record to show
that one Party stated its position to the other with regard to the
character of Interhandel as an enemy-controlled company. The
Swiss Government did not immediately question such enemy
character, nor, therefore, the right of the United States to vest its
property. It decided first to make some investigations in order to
find out what was the real situation between Interhandel and the
German company, Farben Industries of Frankfurt. According to
the allegations in the case, the two investigations conducted by the
competent Swiss authority showed that Interhandel and Farben
Industries had broken completely their relations since 1940, that
is, even before the United States came into the World War; the
Swiss Government communicated these findings to the American
authorities, expressing the hope that ‘a settlement will be reached
with regard to the Interhandel’s property in the United States”,
the assets and stock that had been vested in 1942. This petition
was made known to the United States Government in the Me-
morandum dated June 4th, 1947 (Exhibit 16, Preliminary Object-
zons). In other words, the Swiss Government would never have
claimed the restoration of the assets had it not come to the con-
clusion that Interhandel was a bona fide neutral Swiss company, nor
the United States would have ever vested such assets, had it not
believed the Interhandel was in reality an enemy-owned firm.

4ï
44 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

There are many other communications between the two Govern-
ments regarding different aspects and shades of the negotiations
relating to the character of Interhandel, but all of them were
connected with the provisional blocking in Switzerland by the Swiss
Government of the Interhandel properties; the Memorandum dated
June 4th, 1947, seems to be the first document on record in which
the opposed views of the Swiss Government to the thesis of the
United States are stated with regard to Interhandel’s character
of enemy owned company im connection with the return of the vested
property by the United States. I would have therefore accepted the
date of June 4th, 1947, as the date when the dispute between the
two Governments with regard to the enemy or neutral character of
Interhandel arose in connection with the vesting of the assets of
the General Aniline and Film Corporation, had it not been for the
expressions used by the Department of State in its Memorandum
of June 18th, 1947, wherein in answer to the already mentioned Aide
Mémoire of June 4th, 1947, of the Swiss Government, the United
States said (Exhibit 17 to the Preliminary Objections):

“During the course of the negotiations leading to the Accord of
May 25, 1946, the United States representatives made clear that a
decision on the Interhandel case can have no effect of any settlement
of or decision on the vesting action by the Alien Property Custodian
of February 1942 of the stock of the General Aniline and Film Cor-
poration. The Umited States Government has not changed its views
in this matter.”

That is to say, the United States Government affirms that before
May 25th, 1946, the date of the Washington Accord, it had already
discussed and rejected the contention of the Swiss Government
that the findings of the Swiss authorities under the Washington
Accord, with regard to the character of Interhandel as neutral or
enemy, should have the “effect of any settlement of or decision”
on the question of the vesting of its assets and shares. Since this
most important assertion has been left completely unanswered by
the plaintiff Government, I feel justified in my belief that the dispute
upon the legal character of Interhandel in relation with the vesting
of the shares and assets by the United States arose even prior to
the date of the Washington Accord, May 25th, 1946.

I conclude, therefore, that the dispute arose before the date of
the Declaration of the United States, August 26th, 1946, and that
the First Preliminary Objection should have been upheld by the
Court.

I agree with the Court’s decision to retain the Third Preliminary
Objection, but, in my opinion, the reasoning of the majority,
based mainly on the necessity to avoid the danger of two proceedings
being followed—local as well as international—does not cover all
the issues presented by Switzerland. I believe that the Court

42
45 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

should have founded its application of the principle of exhaustion
of local remedies on a much broader basis.

The Court is justified in concluding that the local courts of the
United States are dealing with exactly the legal suit which the
Court would have to decide if it had to consider the merits of the
case before the local remedies would have been exhausted; its
finding that Interhandel should first exhaust ail local remedies
pending in the United States before this Court would be able to
consider and adjudicate the same issues is, of course, entirely
correct. But, besides the question of the existence of two parallel
procedures, there are some other reasons which, in my opinion, the
Court should have taken also into consideration in applying the
principle to both the principal as well as to the subsidiary or alter-
native submissions of Switzerland.

The argument related to the parallel procedures which the princi-
ple of exhaustion of local remedies tries to avoid can successfully be
opposed to the main as well as to the subsidiary submission related
to the non-compliance by the United States of the decision of the
Swiss Authority of Review and to its refusal to arbitrate the dispute.
It cannot be opposed nevertheless against the contention put
forward by Switzerland that the Court should decide that the
United States are bound to enter into proceedings of conciliation
in compliance with the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation of
1931. Conciliation being a procedure in the nature of an extra-
judicial settlement by the parties and not ending in a binding
decision certainly cannot be considered as a parallel international
procedure to that followed before the local courts of the United
States.

To apply the principle of exhaustion of local remedies to the claim
of Switzerland with regard to conciliation, it is necessary to resort
to other reasons which also underlie it. The principle, as I have
said, is based and justified on grounds perhaps more important
than the mere possible avoidance of conflicting procedures and
decisions. The main reason for its existence lies in the indispensable
necessity to harmonize the international and the national juris-
dictions—assuring in this way the respect due to the sovereign
jurisdiction of States—by which nationals and foreigners have to
abide and to the diplomatic protection of the Governments to
which only foreigners are entitled. This harmony, this respect for
the sovereignty of States is brought about by giving priority to the
jurisdiction of the local courts of the State in cases of foreigners
claiming against an act of its executive or legislative authorities.
This priority, in turn, is assured only by means of the adherence
to the principle of exhaustion of local remedies.

The right of the State, in the present instance Switzerland, to
protect its national Interhandel, for an alleged wrongful act of a
foreign government, that of the United States, does not legally

43
46 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

arise until the judicial authorities of the latter decide irrevocably
upon such wrongful act through a decision of its judicial authorities.
Before the tribunals of the respondent State have handed down
its final decision, the State may not be considered liable internation-
ally because and for the simple and good reason that the damage
has not as yet been consummated. This principle informs all systems
of law—civil as well as criminal, local as well as international.

A State may not even exercise its diplomatic protection, and
much less resort to any kind of international procedure of redress
until its subject has previously exhausted the legal remedies offered
him by the State of whose action he complains.

In the present case it cannot be affirmed that the damage to
Interhandel has been caused by the vesting of its property by the
local authorities of the United States until such vesting has been
definitely consummated, that is, until the judicial authorities of the
Unites States will have definitely confirmed such action by a judg-
ment which will have the force of res judicata. Then, and only then,
will Interhandel and the Swiss Government be entitled to resort to
this International Court or any other competent international
proceedings seeking redress for the supposed violation of the law
of nations which the local authorities will not be any more in a
position to grant. That is why the well-settled principle of inter-
national procedure of the exhaustion of local remedies is based on
the fundamental idea that a claim is not ripe, that there is no
international claim, until the damaged foreigner has complied with
such principle.

In the present case it seems that there was a mistake with regard
to the exhaustion of local remedies since the United States Govern-
ment itself expressed its opinion that such exhaustion had already
been effected. On this false impression, it seems, the Swiss Govern-
ment presented before the Court its Application instituting pro-
ceedings against the United States. But once this wrong belief
had been dispelled, the juridical situation—as far as I can under-
stand it—was that such Application had been wrongfully brought
before the Court. In other words, it seems to me that the finding
of the Court should have been, that the different claims of the
Swiss Government before the Court, the restoration of the vested
assets, the obligation of the United States to comply with the
decision of the Swiss Authority of Review and the duty of the
respondent Government to arbitrate or conciliate the dispute, could
not be entertained by the Court not only because of the pending
proceedings in the United States but because of the more general
reason that an international claim does not yet exist in any of
its different possible faces, restoration of property, submission to

44
45

47 INTERHANDEL (SEPAR. OPIN. OF JUDGE CORDOVA)

arbitration or conciliation, or compliance with the terms of the
Washington Accord, until the tribunals of the United States hand

down their last and final decision on the suit brought before them
by Interhandel.

(Signed) R. CORDOVA.


52

SEPARATE OPINION OF SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE

Although I am in full agreement with the operational part of
the Judgment of the Court, and with its reasoning and language,
there are certain matters which I should like to develop futher, and
others—not mentioned in the Judgment—which seem to me to
require a brief discussion.

Since I have no intention of going over the whole ground again,
I shall set out my points seriatim, in order of convenience, and
without attempting to establish any particular connecting links
between them.

The pre-1g04 position

The Judgment states that the Court is not called upon to go
into the situation as it existed previous to the treaty settlement
of 1904; and this is true inasmuch as the rights of the Parties depend
on, or flow from, that settlement, or events subsequent to it. There
is however one fact, not referred to in the Judgment, which could
have been of decisive importance in this case, namely that, previous
to the boundary settlements of the period 1904-1908, the Temple
of Preah Vihear was situated in territory that was, at that time,
under Siamese sovereignty, because a treaty of 15 July 1867
between France (acting on behalf of Cambodia) and Siam (as Thai-
land was then called) had established a frontier line running wall
south of the Dangrek range of mountains, across the Cambodian
plain. Since the effect of the 1904 treaty settlement was to shift
the frontier to the north, and to place it along the general line of
the Dangrek range, it follows that, by this settlement, Thailand
was giving up territory. As a consequence, there arises a presump-
tion im favorem ejus qui dat that Thailand did not relinquish any
territory she cannot be proved to have relinquished. This means that
in any conflict between a more northerly and a more southerly
frontier line in the region of Preah Vihear, the latter line must be
held to prevail, unless the former can be established. I agree with
the Court that the former (i.e. the more northerly) line can be,
and is, established, for the reasons given in the Judgment; but the
foregoing considerations require to be stated in order that the
significance of the conclusion may be fully apparent.

The matter is brought into relief in another way. Throughout
these proceedings Thailand has contended that, there never having
been (as she maintains) any effective delimitation of the frontier
in the eastern sector of the Dangrek range, as required by Article 3

50
53 JUDGM. 15 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

of the Treaty of 1904, the result (by virtue of Article I) is automati-
cally to cause the frontier to run along the line of the watershed
as ascertained by scientific survey. An interpretation even more
favourable to Thailand would however be that, in the absence of
the delimitation required by Article 3, in completion of Article x,
the latter provision could not have taken any practical effect, so
that no new frontier line under the Treaty of 1904 would have
come into existence at all, and the frontier would have remained
as it was immediately previous to 1904, with the Temple area in
Thailand. Since both these interpretations are favourable to Thai-
land, and either would have been decisive if the Court had not
held that Thailand had in any event, subsequently, and inde-
pendently, accepted a frontier placing the Temple in Cambodia,
it was not necessary to choose between them.

There is another aspect of the pre-1904 situation which is mate-
rial, namely the considerable evidence in the record of the unsettled
state of the frontiers between Siam and French Indo-China (of
which Cambodia was then part), which had existed for a long time
and was the cause of disturbed relations between France and Siam.
This is mentioned towards the end of the Judgment. It is however
a point that has to be borne constantly in mind from the start, in
assessing what the Parties were really intending to achieve by the
frontier settlements of the period 1904-1908, and as indicative of
their desire to achieve a settlement that would be definite and
durable.

Considerations of a topographical,
historical and cultural character

The Court has dismissed these in a sentence, as not being legally
decisive. I agree that they are not; but I think it desirable to say
why, since these considerations occupied a prominent place in
the arguments of the Parties. Such matters may have some legal
relevance in a case about territorial sovereignty which turns on
the weight of factual evidence that each party can adduce in
support of its claim, and not on any more concrete and positive
element, such as a treaty. In the present case it is accepted, and
indeed contended by both Parties, that their rights derive from the
treaty settlement of 1904, and on the subsequent events relative to
or affecting that settlement. In consequence, extraneous factors
which might have weighed with them in making that settlement,
and more particularly in determining how the line of the frontier
was to run, can only have an incidental relevance in determining
where today, as a matter of law, it does run.

Moreover, for these factors to have any serious influence, it
would at least be necessary that they should all point in the same

51
54 JUDGM. 15 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

direction, and furnish unambiguous indications. This is not the
case here. As the Judgment of the Court points out, no certain
deduction can be drawn from the desire of the Parties for natural
and visible frontiers—the Dangreks in themselves furnished that,
and would, in a general way, have done so, whether the line along
the Dangreks was a crest, a watershed or an escarpment line. Equally,
it is difficult to draw any certain deduction from the siting of the
Temple. It overlooks the Cambodian plain: but it faces in the direc-
tion of Thailand. Its main access is from the latter direction;
but there is also access from the Cambodian side—and this access,
because steep and hard, must—precisely for that reason—have
been contrived deliberately and of set purpose, contra naturam
as it were, since it involved a climb of several hundred metres.
Yet difficulty of access is not—or was not—all on one side: there
is much evidence in the documentation of the case that the thickness
of the jungle on the northern (Thai) side of the Temple had the
consequence that visits had to be specially prepared, by the clear-
ing of paths and the blazing of trails. This particular difficulty
was much less prominent on the Cambodian side: but what re-
mains certain is that if, though for different reasons and in differ-
ent ways, access was not easy from either side, it was feasible
from both, and was also achieved from both, at varying times
and in varying degrees.

As to the Khmer origins of the Temple—this factor (put forward
by Cambodia) operates in an equally neutral way, since it seems
to be admitted that there are and were, in these regions, populations of
Khmer race on both sides of the frontier.

The proceedings of the Mixed Commission
under the Treaty of 1904

Although I do not dissent from what the Judgment says under
this head, I think many of the facts are so conjectural that it
is exceedingly difficult to draw any sure conclusions from them.
Various inferences may be more or less reasonable and warranted,
but when all is said and done the only certain thing is that the
Annex I map was produced in Paris by French topographical
officers in November 1907, and was never, as such, seen (much
less approved or adopted) by the Mixed Commission, which indeed
appears to have ceased to function entirely after about February
of that year—or at any rate it did not, after January, hold any
meeting of which there is any record. Whether the map was based
on any instructions that the Commission had given, or on rough
sketches approved by it, must, in the absence of any evidence,
remain a matter of surmise. It seems to me therefore that Thailand
succeeds on this part of the case, about which it is hardly
necessary to say more than that, however respectable the

52
55 JUDGM. I5 Vi 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

provenance of the map was, it must be held to have been a purely
unilateral production, not in any way binding on Thailand at the
moment of its communication to her, and subject entirely, at that
time, to her acceptance or rejection, either in whole or in part.

Thailand’s acceptance by conduct of the Annex I line

Had the matter ended with the production of the map; or if
the map had never been officially communicated to Thailand;
or had been communicated in such a way, or in such circumstances,
that no adverse conclusion could be drawn from her failure to react;
or had been communicated but rejected, either as a whole, or in
relation to Preah Vihear; then Thailand would, in my opinion,
have been entitled to a finding in her favour, since I personally
consider that there is little reasonable doubt that, in this particular
region, the true line of the watershed runs, and ran in 1904, along
the line of the escarpment. (Moreover, I could not myself regard
the deviation from the line of the watershed at Preah Vihear as
being covered by any discretionary powers of adaptation which
the Mixed Commission might have possessed; but this matter is
not in any event material, since it was not the Mixed Commission
as such which made or approved the map.)

The crucial issue in this case is therefore whether Thailand, by
her conduct in 1908, and thereafter, in fact accepted the Annex I
map line as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation
provided for by the Treaty of 1904, knowing how it had been pro-
duced; or, more simply, whether Thailand just accepted the line
as being the frontier line, accepting also the risk of its possible
inaccuracy.

The Judgment of the Court answers these questions in the affir-
mative, on grounds in which I fully concur. In doing so, I am not
unmindful of the fact that acceptance by conduct alone, of an obliga-
tion in the nature of a treaty obligation, is not lightly to be pre-
sumed; especially where a frontier is in question; and even more
so where the frontier line thus said to be accepted involves a
departure from the delimitary criterion indicated by the relevant
treaty. But if the plea of error or misapprehension is excluded, as
I think it has to be (see below), I can place no other interpretation
on Thailand’s conduct, considered as a whole, than that she ac-
cepted this particular line as representing the frontier in this region.
Moreover, even negative conduct—that is to say failure to act,
react or speak, in circumstances where failure so to do must imply
acquiescence or acceptance—is, in my opinion, quite sufficient for
this purpose, if the facts are clear.

I would only add to the views expressed in the Judgment, that
53
56 JUDGM. I5 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

I cannot accept the plea so eloquently urged on behalf of Thailand
that any adherence to the Annex I line would have involved a
departure from a solemn treaty obligation. This surely begs the
question; for as the Judgment says, it is always open to govern-
ments, in their bilateral relations, to agree on a departure of this
kind, provided they do so knowingly, or (as I think was Thailand’s
case here) in circumstances in which they must be held to have
accepted, and as it were discounted in advance, the risks or conse-
quences of lack, or possible lack, of knowledge. In the present case,
the conduct of each Party, over what was an important matter of
common concern to both, was, in my opinion, evidence of, or
amounted to, a mutual agreement to accept a certain line as the
frontier line. What seems to me therefore really to have occurred
was not in the legal ‘sense a departure from the treaty provision
concerned, but the mutual acceptance of a certain result as being
its actual outcome, irrespective of the precise conformity of that
outcome with the treaty criterion.

I think it desirable here to mention a point of detail, but one
nevertheless liable to give rise to some confusion. Another of the
maps communicated to the Siamese authorities covered the Pnom
Padang range of mountains which prolongs the Dangrek range
eastwards to the river Mekong, and showed a frontier line apparently
running along the crest of the Pnom Padang. This was because the
Treaty of 1904, while prescribing a watershed line for the Dangreks,
prescribed a crest line for the Pnom Padang, and the actual delimi-
tation was carried out by the Mixed Commission set up under that
Treaty. The subsequent boundary Treaty of March 1907, however,
prescribed a watershed line for the Pnom Padang as well as for the
Dangreks. But already in the meantime, the first (1904) Mixed Com-
mission had (see minutes of its meeting of 18 January 1907) adopted
the crest line (though the Commission seems in this region to have
regarded the crest and watershed lines as coinciding). As far as I
can understand the matter, the result was that although it was
strictly part of the task of the second (1907) Mixed Commission
to delimit the frontier along the Dangrek and Pnom Padang ranges,
it only delimited the western Dangrek sector (the eastern sector
being the task of the first Commission), and did not delimit the
Pnom Padang at all. The crest line delimitation carried out by the
first Commission in the Pnom Padang region therefore stood.
There seems thus to have been a tacit understanding between the
Governments that the relevant provisions of the 1907 Treaty would
to this extent be ignored, since a delimitation, even though not the
one provided for in this latter Treaty, had already been carried out.
Here again, therefore, the Governments accepted the map line as
being the line of the frontier, even though it did not correspond

54
57 JUDGM. I5 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

with the latest treaty provision on the subject. This is a minor
matter, but it illustrates very aptly how the Governments did not
consider themselves as necessarily tied down to the treaty criteria
in what they finally accepted as the frontier line.

The question of error

The Court has dealt very fully with this matter, but it is so
central to the whole issue in this case that I desire to make some
additional remarks about it.

In the interests of the stability of contracts, the principle of
error as vitiating consent is usually applied somewhat strictly; and
I consider that this approach is also the correct one in international
law, in the interests of the stability of treaties, and of frontier
lines established by treaty or other forms of agreement. That there
was (as I think) an error in the map by ,eference to the true water-
shed line does not necessarily mean that Thailand was herself
under any misapprehension, nor that, if she was, she can, in law,
now plead the fact. The Siamese authorities, in 1908 and thereafter,
cannot possibly have failed to realize that the Annex I map showed
Preah Vihear as being in Cambodia, since it so clearly did; and for
the reasons given in the Judgment of the Court, the fact that, at
this time, the Siamese authorities may have attached no importance
to the Temple, or may have failed to realize the importance it
would eventually assume for them, is legally quite irrelevant. This
could never, per se, be a legal ground for claiming frontier rectifi-
cation.

The sole remaining question therefore is whether the Siamese
authorities, if (as the Judgment holds) they accepted that Preah
Vihear should be attributed to Cambodia (as part of French Indo-
China), did so in the mistaken belief—and (as Thailand alleges)
only on the basis of such a belief—that the line on the map corre-
sponded to the watershed line.

Even if the Siamese authorities of that date were under such
a misapprehension, there are, in my opinion, two decisive reasons
why Thailand cannot now rely on or plead the fact. The first arises
as follows.

It was the Siamese Government itself which, with the assent,
and actually at the suggestion of the Siamese members of the
Mixed Commission, formally requested that the work of preparing
the maps of the frontier areas should be carried out by the French
topographical officers. It was the same in connection with the work
of the second Mixed Commission under the Treaty of 1907. In the

55
58 JUDGM, I5 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

eastern Dangrek sector moreover, the Siamese authorities did not
even cause the French officers doing the survey work to be accom-
panied by a Siamese officer, as they could have done, and as was
in fact done in other cases (and it was actually a French officer of
Cambodian race who did the survey work in the eastern Dangrek
sector, as the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission perfectly
well knew). The despatch from the Siamese Minister in Paris —
enclosing the series of maps, of which the Annex I map was one, also
stated in the clearest possible terms that they were the maps pro-
duced by the French officers in response to “the Siamese Commis-
sioners” request. The maps were then communicated to the Siamese
members of the Mixed Commission, who of course equally knew
this, and further would have known how far, if at all, the maps
were based on work done or approved, or on instructions given by,
the Commission itself.

It is apparent, therefore, that no one on the Siamese side could
have been under any misapprehension as to the provenance of
these maps. Furthermore, is is evident that the Siamese authorities
deliberately left the whole thing to the French elements involved,
and thus accepted the risk that the maps might prove inaccurate
in some respects. Consequently, it was for them to verify the
results, if they wished to do so, in whatever way was most appro-
priate in the circumstances, e.g. by consulting neutral experts.
If they did not (for whatever reasons) wish to do this, then they
had to abide by these results. The formal request for extra copies
for the use of the provincial Governors shows that, in any event,
the case was not one of a mere passive reception of these maps by
the Siamese authorities.

The explanation of all this, there can be no reasonable doubt, is
that, in effect, everyone on the Siamese side relied on the skill
and good faith of the French topographical officers producing the
maps. There can equally be no doubt that the latter acted in com-
plete good faith, used all their skill, and fully believed that the
watershed in the Preah Vihear region ran as indicated by the An-
nex I line. One may sympathize with Siam’s lack of topographical
and cartographical expertise at this time, but one is dealing with
sovereign independent States to whom certain rules of law apply;
and it remains the fact that, in the absence of any question of
lack of good faith, the legal effect of reliance on the skill of an
expert is that one must abide by the results—in short, a principle
akin to that of caveat emptor is relevant. This is so in all walks
of life. A man who consults a lawyer, doctor, architect, or other
expert, is held (in the absence of fraud or negligence—not here
in question) to accept the possibility that the expert may be
mistaken in the advice he gives, or less than perfect in the work
he does. Like all human beings, he is fallible. Except in cases in
which the doctrine of “absolute” risk or liability prevails, the law

56
59  JUDGM. 15 VI 62 (SEP. OP, SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

as a general rule affords no remedy against errors made in good
faith and without negligence by duly qualified experts. The dangers
of giving expert advice could not otherwise be accepted. The
French officers in this case were of course fallible. They for instance
{and both Parties were agreed about this) made an error over the
course of the O’Tasem stream, which must have affected the whole
question of how the watershed line ran in the Preah Vihear region.
The authorities of French Indo-China were unaware of this error.
They accepted the map as correct. Equally, the Siamese authorities,
knowing the character and provenance of the map, being in a posi-
tion to consult their Commissioners who had received it, or experts
of their own choice, made no objection, and raised no query, in
relation to a line which was clearly intended to represent and con-
stitute the line of the frontier in this region, and which anyone
looking at it must have seen at once placed Preah Vihear on the
Cambodian side of the line. Today Thailand says the map was
erroneous and that she was under a misapprehension about it.
But the Siamese authorities of that date plainly accepted the risk
that just such an error as this might in time be discovered: and
whoever does that, must be held thereby also, and in advance, to
have accepted such errors as do in fact eventually come to light.

The other decisive reason why it is not possible to receive Thai-
land’s plea that she mistakenly believed the Annex I line to corre-
spond to the line of the watershed, and that she only on that basis
accepted the siting of Preah Vihear in Cambodia, is, as the Judg-
ment of the Court points out, that this plea is totally inconsistent
with her attitude over her “acts on the ground’’, which she puts
forward as evidence that she considered herself to have sovereignty
over Preah Vihear and had never accepted the Annex I line; for if
this was so, she must have regarded the map line as erroneous, and
the map as showing Preah Vihear in Cambodia for that reason only.
It does not make any difference that the Court has found that
Thailand’s acts on the ground did not in fact suffice to demonstrate
her non-acceptance of the map line. The inconsistency with the
plea of mistaken belief lies in the very contention that they did.

Thailand’s “acts on the ground”

If Thailand’s attitude respecting her acts on the ground debars
her from pleading error over the watershed question, she remains
fully entitled to put them forward as evidence of a belief on her
part that she had sovereignty over Preah Vihear, and did not accept

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60 JUDGM. 15 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

the Annex I line in that region. But like the Court, I do not find
these acts really convincing in that sense. Thailand has, I know,
produced an impressive volume of evidence of local administrative
activity relative to Preah Vihear; but it is not clear to me just
what legal value can be attached to it. I have already drawn
attention to the fact that previous to the 1904 treaty settlement,
the Preah Vihear region (not in isolation of course, but as part of
the eastern Dangrek sector) was, and had since 1867 been, under
Siamese sovereignty, because the frontier at that time ran south
of the whole Dangrek range. In view of this, it was perhaps to be
expected (and would not in itself signify greatly) that in this rather
remote region, and because of the difficulties of communication
with Bangkok which must then have existed, the local officials
and authorities of Khukhan province should, for a time, have
continued, at and near Preah Vihear, to perform those acts and
carry out those activities which they had been accustomed to per-
form and carry out for some time past. If this was the position, no
very positive inference can be drawn from it. It is true that the
Siamese authorities did take steps to make the frontier changes
known locally; but, in this region, realization of them may have been
slow to come through. There may for a time have been an element
of fluidity in the local situation; but the real attitude of Siam as a
State must, for the reasons given in the Judgment of the Court,
be taken to be that evinced in the course of, and following upon,
the visit of Prince Damrong in 1930—by far the most significant
incident in this part of the case. To me it seems to have constituted
a tacit recognition of Cambodian sovereignty over Preah Vihear,
and the existence of possible reasons why Siam did not protest
cannot, in law, alter the fact.

T also could not help being struck by the evidence of one of Thai-
land’s own expert witnesses—a patently honest and reliable one,
it seemed to me—to the effect that, in the course of a visit to this
region in July 1961, during which he spent eleven days in carrying
out a survey of the Temple area, he saw no sign of the inhabitants,
rice cultivations, or forestry or other activities, that figure so
prominently in the evidence furnished by Thailand respecting the
period following on the treaty settlements of 1904-1908. This
witness, when cross-examined on behalf of Cambodia, was asked
whether he saw any people living between Preah Vihear and the
nearest village on the Thai side—a distance of 10-15 kilometres—
and he answered “No, there is [sc. he saw] nobody living there”.
When asked whether he saw any people on Mount Preah Vihear
itself, he said that, apart from the Thai police post, and one guard
at the Temple, he saw “occasionally a few visitors ... or tourists’.
When asked whether he saw any people cultivating rice, he said

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61 JUDGM. I5 VI 62 (SEP. OP. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)

“No. This area is covered by jungle forests and there is no rice
cultivation”. Asked whether he saw any woodcutters or foresters
about, he replied “During the eleven days I stayed there I did not
see anybody’. In re-examination on behalf of Thailand, no questions
were put to the witness on these points.

It is obviously not permissible from this evidence, particularly
on the basis of so short a stay, to draw any definite conclusion as to
the situation existing at the earlier period. But even in eleven
days it is possible to see if, in a restricted area, there are any habi-
tations, cultivations, forestry work in progress, and so on. It seems
therefore reasonable to infer—taking the scale of Siamese activity
in this area, in the period following on the treaty settlement, to
have been as indicated in the evidence furnished by Thailand—
that it must since have undergone a notable diminution.

The Treaties of 1925 and 1937

These Treaties, the bearing and effect of which was much discus-
sed in the written and oral proceedings, have, in my opinion, only
a limited, though weighty significance in this case, namely as indi-
cative of the importance the Parties attached to having stable and
durable frontiers. This was shown by the fact that frontier revision
was, in terms, excluded from the revisionary processes which were
otherwise one of the main objects of these Treaties. The Court
has made this fact the basis of a finding, with which I fully agree,
that it is reasonable to assume from this feature of the Treaties
that, by the boundary settlements of the period 1904-1908, the
Parties were equally seeking stability and durability, and that this
factor should therefore prevail in resolving any doubts in favour
of, or against, a part of the frontier the validity of which is now
called in question.

It is a general principle of law, which has been applied in many
contexts, that a party’s attitude, state of mind or intentions at a
later date can be regarded as good evidence—in relation to the
same or a closely connected matter—of his attitude, state of mind
or intentions at an earlier date also; provided of course that there
is no direct evidence rebutting the presumption thus raised.
Similarly—and very important in cases affecting territorial sover-
eignty—the existence of a state of fact, or of a situation, at a later
date, may furnish good presumptive evidence of its existence at
an earlier date also, even where the later situation or state of affairs
has in other respects to be excluded from consideration (Judge
Huber in the Island of Palmas case, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, Vol. II, at p. 866; and see also the separate Opinion of

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Judge Basdevant in the Minguters and Ecrehos case, I.C.]. Reports
1953, at p. 76 ff.).

Cambodia however claimed another effect for the Treaties of
1925 and 1937, namely that by confirming the frontiers as already
established, they imparted a new and independent treaty basis
to the Annex I line, thereby validating it, even if it was not valid
before. I do not think this contention well-founded. Such a con-
firmation of the existing frontiers no doubt implied that frontiers
did exist, and possibly also that they existed and were complete
at all points of contact between the two countries; but this could
not, by itself, say anything at all as to what these frontiers were,
or how exactly they ran. A confirmation only confirms what is;
it cannot per se alter, add to, or detract from the latter, which must
be ascertained ab extra—in this case by reference to the previous
treaty settlements and the events relevant to them. The confirma-
tion was evidence of the importance the Parties attached to the
frontiers, but otherwise it left matters as they were, whatever they
were.

The principle of preclusion and estoppel

The Court has applied this principle in the present case to the
effect that even if there could be any doubt as to whether Thailand did
originally accept the Annex I map and line, so as to become bound
by it, she is precluded by her subsequent conduct from now assert-
ing her non-acceptance. With this conclusion I agree (it being postu-
lated, for reasons already given, that no error or misapprehension
can be pleaded). But the Court only glances at the matter, which
needs a good deal of development.

The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field
of international law to the common-law rule of estoppel, though
perhaps not applied under such strict limiting conditions (and it
1s certainly applied as a rule of substance and not merely as one
of evidence or procedure). It is quite distinct theoretically from the
notion of acquiescence. But acquiescence can operate as a preclu-
sion or estoppel in certain cases, for instance where silence, on an
occasion where there was a duty or need to speak or act, implies
agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can be regarded as a represen-
tation to that effect (see the cases, and the quotation from an
Opinion of the British Law Officers, cited in Dr. D. W. Bowett’s
article, “Estoppel before international tribunals and its relation to
acquiescence’, in the British Year Book of International Law for
1957, at pp. 197-201; and see also Lord McNair’s Law of Treaties,
1961, p. 488). On that basis, it must be held in the present case that
Thailand’s silence, in circumstances in which silence meant ac-
quiescence, or acted as a representation o: acceptance of the map

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line, operates to preclude or estop her from denying such acceptance,
or operates as a waiver of her original right to reject the map line
or its direction at Preah Vihear.

However, in those cases where it can be shown that a party has,
by conduct or otherwise, undertaken, or become bound by, an
obligation, it is strictly not necessary or appropriate to invoke
any rule of preclusion or estoppel, although the language of that
rule is, in practice, often employed to describe the situation. Thus
it may be said that A, having accepted a certain obligation, or
having become bound by a certain instrument, cannot now be
heard to deny the fact, to “blow hot and cold”. True enough, A
cannot be heard to deny it; but what this really means is simply
that A is bound, and, being bound, cannot escape from the obliga-
tion merely by denying its existence. In other words, if the denial
can be shown to be false, there is no room or need for any plea of
preclusion or estoppel. Such a plea is essentially a means of excluding
a denial that might be correct—-irrespective of its correctness.
It prevents the assertion of what might in fact be true. Its use must
in consequence be subject to certain limitations. The real field of
operation, therefore, of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, stricto
sensu, in the present context, is where it is possible that the party
concerned did not give the undertaking or accept the obligation
in question (or there is room for doubt whether it did), but where
that party’s subsequent conduct has been such, and has had
such consequences, that it cannot be allowed to deny the existence
of an undertaking, or that it is bound.

The essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion
or estoppel, as strictly to be understood, is that the party invoking
the rule must have ‘‘relied upon” the statements or conduct of the
other party, either to its own detriment or to the other’s advantage.
The often invoked necessity for a consequent “change of position”
on the part of the party invoking preclusion or estoppel is implied
in this. A frequent source of misapprehension in this connection is
the assumption that change of position means that the party in-
voking preclusion or estoppel must have been led to change its own
position, by action it has itself taken consequent on the statements
or conduct of the other party. It certainly includes that: but what
it really means is that these statements, or this conduct, must have
brought about a change in the relative positions of the parties,
worsening that of the one, or improving that of the other, or both.

The same requirement, that a change or alteration in the relative
positions of the parties should have been caused, covers also certain

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other notions usually closely associated with the principle of pre-
clusion or estoppel, such as for instance that the one party must have
“relied” on the statements or conduct of the other; or that the
latter must, by the same means, have “held itself out” as adopting
a certain attitude; or must have made a “representation” of some
kind. These factors are no doubt normally present; but the essen-
tial question is and remains whether the statements or conduct of
the party impugned produced a change in relative positions, to its
advantage or the other’s detriment. If so, that party cannot be
heard to deny what it said or did.

Applying this test to the circumstances of the present case, there
can be little doubt that’ Cambodia’s legal position was weakened
by the fact that (although a striking assertion of her sovereignty
had been manifested on the occasion of Prince Damrong’s visit in
1930) it was not until 1949 that any protest on the diplomatic level
was made about local acts of Thailand in violation, or at any rate
in implied denial, of that sovereignty. But France (exercising the
protectorate) was entitled to assume from the conduct of the
central Siamese authorities that the latter accepted the frontier as
mapped at Preah Vihear. On that basis, but on that basis only,
France could safely ignore the activities of local Siamese authorities,
and (the war period being ruled out, as I think it must be in this
case) confine her diplomatic action, as she seems to have done, to
cases clearly involving the central Siamese authorities.

Similarly, it was only on the basis of a justifiable assumption of
Thailand’s acceptance of the frontier line as mapped that a com-
paratively low level of administrative activity on the part of France
and Cambodia at Preah Vihear would have been compatible with
the upkeep of sovereignty. It is an established principle of inter-
national law that, especially in wild or remote regions, compara-
tively few acts are necessary for that purpose where the title does
not primarily depend on the character or number of those acts
themselves, but derives from a known and independent source,
such as a treaty settlement. On the basis therefore of the acceptance
of the map line by Thailand, as part of the treaty settlement, there
would, in the upkeep of Cambodian title, have been no need (in
respect of such a locality as that of the Temple area) to perform any
but the most minimal and routine acts of administration. Clearly,
if Thailand could now be heard to deny this acceptance, the whole
legal foundation on which the relative inactivity of France and
Cambodia in this region was fully explicable would be destroyed.

In addition to the foregoing considerations, it may be useful to
recall a deliberately non-technical statement of the matter given

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by a former Judge of the Court (writing in another capacity), as
follows:

“A State cannot be allowed to avail itself of the advantages
of the treaty when it suits it to do so and repudiate it when its
performance becomes onerous. It is of little consequence whether
that rule is based on what in English law is known as the principle
of estoppel or the more generally conceived requirement of good
faith. The former is probably not more than one of the aspects of
the latter.” (Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Document A/CN.4/63 of 24 March 1953, p. 157.)

The question of interpretation —watershed clause versus map line

The Court has dealt fully with this matter, although indicating
in effect that, given the main basis of the Judgment, it does not
strictly arise, because the Parties themselves resolved any possible
conflict when they accepted the map line as being the outcome of
the work of delimitation even if it might not in all respects follow
the watershed line. I think the Court was nevertheless right to
consider how any conflict should, as a matter of ordinary treaty
interpretation, be resolved, for the following reason.

It would have been open to Thailand in the present proceedings to
have adopted a different course from the one she in fact followed.
Instead of denying, she might have admitted acceptance of the
map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and
also that the map became part of the treaty settlement. Having
admitted that, however, it would still have been open to Thailand
to contend that, precisely because the map had become part of the
settlement, any conflict arising between it and a clause of the Treaty
must fall to be resolved by the ordinary processes of treaty inter-
pretation, and that Thailand must be entitled to the benefit of those
processes, just as would be the case if an inconsistency were discover-
ed between two provisions of the Treaty itself. On that basis, even
if Thailand admitted her acceptance of the map, it was open to
her to argue that in a conflict between a treaty clause that says
“watershed” and a map that says something different, the former
must prevail. It was therefore necessary for the Court to deal with
the matter on that basis.

There is of course no general rule whatever requiring that a
conflict of this kind should be resolved in favour of the map line,
and there have been plenty of cases (some of which were cited before
the Court) where it has not been, even though the map was one of
the instruments forming part of the whole treaty settlement (as
here), and not a mere published sheet or atlas page—in which case
it would, in itself, have no binding character for the parties. The
question is one that must always depend on the interpretation of

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the treaty settlement, considered as a whole, in the light of the
circumstances in which it was arrived at. So considered in the
present case, I agree with the Court that, in this particular instance,
the question of interpretation must be resolved in favour of the
map line.

The course of the watershed line

According to the basis adopted for the Judgment of the Court
(with which basis I agree), it becomes unnecessary to consider how
the watershed line really runs at Preah Vihear. I nevertheless desire
to say that the expert evidence on this subject, written and oral,
convinced me personally that the watershed line runs (and ran also
in the period 1904-1908) as contended for by Thailand.

(Signed) G. G. FITZMAURICE.

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