    OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE SKOTNIKOV

 raduction]

 1. Selon moi, la Cour aurait dû, compte tenu des circonstances pour le
oins singulières de l’espèce, user de son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour
 bstenir d’exercer sa compétence consultative. Jusqu’alors, elle n’avait
mais eu à connaître d’une question qui, posée par un organe des
ations Unies, appelât une réponse dépendant entièrement de l’interpré-
 ion d’une décision prise par un autre organe des Nations Unies. Ce qui
  tingue encore davantage la présente espèce, c’est le fait que l’organe en
 estion n’est autre que le Conseil de sécurité, agissant en vertu du cha-
 re VII de la Charte des Nations Unies. Pour répondre à la question de
Assemblée générale, la Cour devait en effet déterminer si la déclaration
 ilatérale d’indépendance constituait ou non une violation du régime
abli au Kosovo par le Conseil de sécurité au travers de sa résolution
 44 (1999).
 2. La Cour a, par le passé, jugé important de souligner qu’elle donnait
 n avis juridique sur des décisions adoptées par l’organe requérant pour
 e celui-ci puisse en tirer profit. Dans l’avis consultatif sur la Namibie,
 e a ainsi précisé :
   « [il] s’agit d’une requête présentée par un organe des Nations Unies
   [le Conseil de sécurité], à propos de ses propres décisions, en vue
   d’obtenir de la Cour un avis juridique sur les conséquences et les inci-
   dences de ces décisions. C’est cet objectif que souligne le préambule
   de la résolution sollicitant l’avis, où le Conseil de sécurité indique
   « qu’un avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice serait
   utile au Conseil de sécurité pour continuer à examiner la question de
   Namibie et pour la réalisation des objectifs recherchés par le
   Conseil ». » (Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence
   continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonob-
   stant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, avis consultatif,
   C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 24, par. 32 ; les italiques sont de moi.)
De toute évidence, la situation en la présente espèce est totalement dif-
 ente.
3. Dans son avis sur les Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un
ur, la Cour a une nouvelle fois affirmé que « les avis consultatifs ser-
ai]ent à fournir aux organes qui les sollicitent les éléments de caractère
 idique qui leur sont nécessaires dans le cadre de leurs activités »
 onséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire pales-
 ien occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 162, par. 60).
 , en la présente espèce, l’Assemblée générale n’est pas un organe qui
 isse tirer utilement profit des « éléments de caractère juridique » que

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urnira la Cour. En effet, lorsque l’avis lui sera communiqué, elle sera,
   vertu de l’article 12 de la Charte des Nations Unies, dans l’impossi-
 ité de faire une quelconque recommandation concernant l’objet de la
 ésente demande, à moins d’y être invitée par le Conseil de sécurité.
 4. Le Conseil de sécurité lui-même s’est abstenu de se prononcer sur la
 nformité de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance à sa résolu-
 n 1244, bien qu’il eût pu le faire en adoptant une nouvelle résolution
   en autorisant une déclaration de son président. Il n’a pas non plus
  licité l’avis de la Cour sur le point de savoir si l’adoption de la déclara-
 n unilatérale d’indépendance était compatible avec les termes de sa
  olution 1244. Telle est la position actuelle du Conseil de sécurité sur
  question qui fait l’objet de la demande d’avis consultatif soumise à
 Cour par l’Assemblée générale.
 5. Les Membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ont conféré à
Assemblée générale, au Conseil de sécurité et à la Cour internationale
  Justice des responsabilités distinctes, en fixant des limites à la compé-
nce de chacun de ces organes principaux. La Cour — à la fois en tant
 ’organe principal de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et en tant qu’ins-
nce judiciaire — doit veiller scrupuleusement à ne pas perturber l’équi-
 re entre ces trois organes principaux, tel qu’il a été établi par la Charte
 par son Statut. En n’apportant pas la réponse qui convenait à la ques-
 n de l’opportunité de donner suite à la demande objet de la présente
 océdure, elle a manqué à cette obligation.
 6. La majorité, pour tenter de justifier sa position, se réfère à « une ten-
 nce croissante à voir l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité exa-
 ner parallèlement une même question relative au maintien de la paix et
   la sécurité internationales » (avis consultatif, par. 41), tendance qui
 ait été relevée par la Cour dans son avis consultatif sur les Conséquen-
s juridiques de l’édification d’un mur. Or, la présente espèce ne s’inscrit
ut simplement pas dans cette tendance. Certes, l’Assemblée générale a,
 e aussi, adopté des résolutions relatives à la situation au Kosovo (ibid.,
 r. 38), mais, ainsi qu’il ressort clairement de l’avis consultatif, aucune
  ces résolutions ne se rapporte au régime établi par la résolution 1244
   à la question sur laquelle l’Assemblée générale demandait un avis. En
alité, tout repose sur l’interprétation de la résolution 1244 du Conseil
  sécurité.
 La majorité cite également l’avis consultatif sur la Namibie, ainsi que
   avis consultatifs sur Certaines dépenses des Nations Unies et sur les
  nditions de l’admission d’un Etat comme Membre des Nations Unies
oir paragraphes 46 et 47 de l’avis consultatif). Pourtant, aucune de ces
 océdures ne s’apparente, de près ou de loin, à la présente espèce. S’agis-
nt de la Namibie, l’organe dont émanait la demande était le Conseil de
curité (voir paragraphe 2 ci-dessus). Dans l’avis sur Certaines dépenses,
 Cour ne cite un certain nombre de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité
 e pour relever l’existence indéniable d’un « dossier contenant [nombre]
examens, de confirmations, d’approbations et de ratifications par le
onseil de sécurité et l’Assemblée générale de l’action du Secrétaire géné-

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  » (Certaines dépenses des Nations Unies (article 17, paragraphe 2, de
 Charte), avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 176) et, dans l’avis sur
   Conditions de l’admission, il n’est question d’aucune résolution du
onseil de sécurité. Dans la procédure consultative sur Certaines dé-
nses comme dans celle sur les Conditions de l’admission, la Cour avait
 ur tâche d’interpréter la Charte des Nations Unies et, dans les deux
s, l’Assemblée générale, organe dont émanait la demande d’avis, allait
 e en mesure d’utiliser les « éléments de caractère juridique » fournis par
 Cour. La majorité se réfère en outre aux affaires contentieuses relatives
des Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de Mont-
al de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie. Dans ces af-
 res, toutefois, la Cour n’a interprété aucune résolution du Conseil
  sécurité. Elle a dit seulement que la Libye, les Etats-Unis d’Amérique
 le Royaume-Uni, en tant que Membres de l’Organisation des Nations
nies, étaient tenus d’accepter et d’appliquer les décisions du Conseil de
curité conformément à l’article 25 de la Charte des Nations Unies (voir
 ffaire relative à des Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la
nvention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Locker-
    (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), mesures
nservatoires, ordonnance du 14 avril 1992, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 126,
 r. 42 ; et l’affaire relative à des Questions d’interprétation et d’applica-
 n de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de
  ckerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), mesures conser-
toires, ordonnance du 14 avril 1992, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 15, par. 39).
 L’incapacité de la majorité à trouver une jurisprudence tant soit peu
rtinente se comprend parfaitement puisque la présente espèce, comme
 l’ai indiqué au paragraphe 1, est sans précédent.
 7. Le fait que la Cour n’ait pas exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire
 ur s’abstenir de répondre à la question posée par l’Assemblée générale
   malheureusement fort préjudiciable à l’intégrité de sa fonction judi-
  ire et à son rôle en tant qu’organe principal de l’Organisation des
ations Unies.
 8. En particulier, et compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce, toute
 erprétation donnée par la Cour de la résolution 1244 ne pouvait être
 n moins qu’autorisée.
 On se rappellera le prononcé de la Cour permanente de Justice inter-
 tionale selon lequel, « suivant une doctrine constante, le droit d’inter-
éter authentiquement une règle juridique appartient à celui-là seul qui a
 pouvoir de la modifier ou de la supprimer » (Jaworzina, avis consulta-
   1923, C.P.J.I. série B no 8, p. 37). Il s’ensuit bien évidemment que

   « seul le Conseil de sécurité, ou un organe autorisé par lui à le faire,
   peut donner une interprétation véritablement authentique [d’une
   résolution du Conseil de sécurité]. » (Michael C. Wood, « The Inter-
   pretation of Security Council Resolutions », Max Planck Yearbook
   of United Nations Law, vol. 2, 1998, p. 82.)

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 est non moins évident que
     « [l]a CIJ et d’autres juridictions internationales (y compris celles
     pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda) peuvent être amenées à inter-
     préter des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité pour donner effet aux
     décisions de cet organe » (Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
     Law, vol. 2, 1998, p. 85).
 En la présente espèce, cependant, l’interprétation par la Cour de la
  olution 1244 ne vise pas à donner effet à une quelconque décision du
onseil de sécurité. Celui-ci n’a pris aucune décision au sujet de la décla-
  ion unilatérale d’indépendance. Il n’a pas même pris acte de l’adoption
  la déclaration. Les termes de la résolution 1244 sont demeurés inchan-
 s après cette adoption (voir paragraphes 91 et 92 de l’avis consultatif).
 9. Il convient de garder à l’esprit que les résolutions du Conseil de
curité sont des décisions politiques. Par conséquent, apprécier la confor-
 té d’un fait donné — en l’espèce l’adoption de la déclaration unilaté-
  e d’indépendance — à une résolution du Conseil est essentiellement un
 te de nature politique. Cela signifie que, quand bien même une conclu-
  n formulée par la Cour à cet égard serait juste sur le strict plan du
 oit (ce qui n’est pas le cas en l’espèce), elle pourrait néanmoins être
  onée du point de vue politique, qui est celui du Conseil de sécurité. En
  prononçant sur la compatibilité de la déclaration unilatérale d’indé-
 ndance avec la résolution 1244 — décision déterminante pour le régime
abli au Kosovo par le Conseil de sécurité — sans que le Conseil le lui
   demandé, la Cour se substitue à lui.
 10. A certains égards, la situation devant laquelle la Cour s’est trouvée
 ns la présente procédure rappelle celle à laquelle elle avait dû faire face
  sujet de la qualité de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de
 République fédérale de Yougoslavie (RFY) avant que cet Etat ne soit
 mis à l’Organisation en 2000. Or, lorsqu’elle a, en 1993 et 1996, statué
   l’affaire Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie dans le cadre de procé-
 res incidentes, la Cour s’est abstenue d’interpréter les résolutions perti-
 ntes de l’Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité pour déterminer
  a RFY était ou non Membre de l’Organisation et, ipso facto, partie au
atut de la Cour. Elle s’est contentée d’observer que la solution adoptée
   sein de l’Organisation sur la question de la continuité de la qualité de
 embre de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie (RFSY)
  e laiss[ait] pas de susciter des difficultés juridiques » (affaire relative à
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
  génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), mesures conservatoires,
donnance du 8 avril 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 14, par. 18). Elle n’a
 s abordé cette question dans son arrêt de 1996 relatif aux exceptions
 éliminaires (affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la pré-
ntion et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. You-
 slavie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II)). De
ute évidence, elle n’était pas autorisée à se prononcer sur la question de
 qualité de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de la RFY, et

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e ne l’a pas fait, alors même qu’il s’agissait d’une question de jus standi.
  n’est qu’après que le Conseil de sécurité et l’Assemblée générale eurent
 rifié la situation en admettant la RFY à l’Organisation en tant que
 uveau Membre que la Cour, en 2004, dans les affaires relatives à la
céité de l’emploi de la force, est parvenue à la conclusion que celle-ci
était pas membre de l’Organisation ni partie au Statut avant son admis-
 n en 2000. La Cour a précisé ce qui suit :
   « l’importance de cette évolution survenue en 2000 tient au fait
   qu’elle a clarifié la situation juridique, jusque-là indéterminée, quant
   au statut de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie vis-à-vis de
   l’Organisation des Nations Unies. C’est en ce sens que la situation
   qui se présente aujourd’hui à la Cour concernant la Serbie-et-
   Monténégro est manifestement différente de celle devant laquelle elle
   se trouvait en 1999. Si la Cour avait alors eu à se prononcer défini-
   tivement sur le statut du demandeur à l’égard de l’Organisation des
   Nations Unies, cette tâche aurait été compliquée par les incertitudes
   entourant la situation juridique, s’agissant de ce statut. Cependant,
   la Cour se trouvant aujourd’hui à même d’apprécier l’ensemble de la
   situation juridique, et compte tenu des conséquences juridiques du
   nouvel état de fait existant depuis le 1er novembre 2000, la Cour est
   amenée à conclure que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’était pas membre
   de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, ni en cette qualité partie au
   Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, au moment où elle
   a déposé sa requête introduisant la présente instance devant la
   Cour, le 29 avril 1999. » (Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-
   Monténégro c. Belgique), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
   Recueil 2004 (I), p. 310-311, par. 79.)
 11. Si la Cour avait statué sur cette question en 1993, 1996 ou 1999,
 squ’elle a examiné la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
 ns les affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force, elle aurait à
 fois mis en péril l’intégrité de sa fonction judiciaire et compromis son
 e en tant qu’organe principal de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
 Et c’est précisément ce qui est en jeu en la présente espèce. C’est pour-
 oi la décision de la Cour de répondre à la question qui lui était adres-
e est aussi erronée que regrettable.
 12. Bien qu’avec réticence, je vais maintenant devoir donner mon opi-
on sur la tentative de la majorité d’interpréter la résolution 1244 du
onseil de sécurité relativement à la déclaration unilatérale d’indépen-
 nce. En formant cette interprétation, la majorité est malheureusement
 rvenue à certaines conclusions qui, tout simplement, ne sauraient être
rrectes.
 13. L’une de ces conclusions est que la résolution 1244, dont l’objectif
 mordial était de parvenir à une « solution politique de la crise au
osovo » (paragraphe 1 du dispositif de la résolution), n’a pas créé
obligations contraignantes pour les dirigeants albanais du Kosovo (voir
 ragraphes 117 et 118 de l’avis consultatif). Or, le Conseil de sécurité ne

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urait être accusé d’une telle omission, qui aurait rendu inopérant tout le
ocessus engagé par la résolution 1244. Au moment de l’adoption de
 te dernière, le représentant permanent du Royaume-Uni a d’ailleurs
oncé cette évidence :
  « [c]ette résolution s’applique également et intégralement aux Alba-
  nais du Kosovo et exige d’eux qu’ils jouent pleinement leur rôle pour
  rétablir une vie normale au Kosovo et créer des institutions démo-
  cratiques et autonomes. Le peuple albanais du Kosovo et ses diri-
  geants doivent se montrer à la hauteur du défi de la paix en acceptant
  les obligations de la résolution, notamment pour ce qui est de démi-
  litariser l’Armée de libération du Kosovo (ALK) et les autres grou-
  pes armés. » (Déclaration du représentant permanent du Royaume-
  Uni ; Nations Unies, doc. S/PV.4011, 10 juin 1999, p. 18 ; les italiques
  sont de moi).
14. Non moins saisissante est la conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle il
 uvait être mis fin à « un processus politique visant à déterminer le sta-
   futur du Kosovo, en tenant compte des accords de Rambouillet », tel
 e celui que prévoit la résolution 1244 (paragraphe 11 e) du dispositif),
r un acte unilatéral des dirigeants albanais du Kosovo (voir paragra-
 es 117 et 118 de l’avis consultatif). Autrement dit, le Conseil de sécurité
rait, selon la majorité, ouvert une immense brèche dans le régime qu’il
 tabli par la résolution 1244 en admettant l’éventualité d’un « règlement
 litique » unilatéral de la question du statut final. Cette approche, si elle
ait effectivement été suivie par le Conseil de sécurité, aurait privé de
ns toute négociation sur le statut final. Telle n’était bien évidemment
s l’intention du Conseil lorsqu’il a adopté et mis en œuvre la résolu-
 n 1244. A cet égard, il est utile de rappeler que le paragraphe 11 e) du
 positif de la résolution 1244 fait référence aux accords de Rambouillet,
 i prévoient que,
  « [t]rois ans après l’entrée en vigueur du présent accord, une réunion
  internationale sera convoquée en vue de définir un mécanisme pour
  un règlement définitif pour le Kosovo, sur la base de la volonté du
  peuple, de l’avis des autorités compétentes, des efforts accomplis par
  chacune des Parties [Belgrade et Pristina] dans la mise en œuvre du
  présent accord, et de l’acte final de Helsinki... » (Nations Unies,
  doc. S/1999/648, 7 juin 1999, p. 85).
ême avec beaucoup d’imagination, cette déclaration de principe on ne
ut plus claire que le Conseil de sécurité a faite sienne dans sa résolu-
 n 1244 ne saurait être considérée comme prévoyant l’hypothèse d’un
èglement unilatéral ».
La pratique ultérieure du Conseil de sécurité à l’égard de la résolu-
 n 1244 n’est pas moins claire. Lorsque le processus visant à déterminer
statut final du Kosovo a été ouvert en 2005, les membres du Conseil de
curité ont joint à la lettre adressée au Secrétaire général par le président
 Conseil, « à titre de référence », les principes directeurs devant régir le

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 tut futur du Kosovo établis par le groupe de contact (composé de
Allemagne, des Etats-Unis, de la France, de l’Italie, de la Russie et du
oyaume-Uni). Dans ces principes directeurs, il était indiqué sans équi-
 que que « [t]oute solution unilatérale [ou] résultant de l’emploi de la
rce sera[it] inacceptable » et que « le Conseil de sécurité devra[it]
 prouver la décision finale sur le statut du Kosovo » (principes direc-
urs annexés à la lettre datée du 10 novembre 2005, adressée au Secré-
 re général par le président du Conseil de sécurité, Nations Unies,
 c. S/2005/709 ; les italiques sont de moi).
 15. Enfin, la majorité reconnaît aux auteurs de la déclaration unilaté-
 e d’indépendance le droit d’avoir pu se soustraire au cadre constitu-
 nnel créé en vertu de la résolution 1244 simplement en prétendant agir
  dehors de ce cadre :
   « la Cour considère que les auteurs de cette déclaration n’ont pas agi,
   et n’ont pas entendu agir, en qualité d’institution née de cet ordre
   juridique [instauré aux fins de la phase intérimaire] et habilitée à
   exercer ses fonctions dans ce cadre, mais qu’ils ont décidé d’adopter
   une mesure [la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance] dont l’impor-
   tance et les effets iraient au-delà » (avis consultatif, par. 105).
alheureusement, la majorité ne précise pas en quoi consiste la diffé-
nce entre agir en dehors de l’ordre juridique et le violer.
 16. La lecture de la résolution 1244 faite par la majorité ne tient pas.
e surcroît, par le sort qu’elle a fait à une décision du Conseil de sécurité
 optée en vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, la Cour
 manqué aux « responsabilités qui lui incombent, en vertu de ladite
harte et du Statut de la Cour, dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécu-
é » internationales (Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Bel-
que), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil
 99 (I), p. 132, par. 18).
 17. La façon dont la Cour interprète le droit international général est
alement problématique. Dans l’avis consultatif, il est indiqué que « le
oit international général ne comporte aucune interdiction applicable
s déclarations d’indépendance » (par. 84). Cette assertion est trompeuse
 risque d’avoir un effet séditieux. En réalité, le droit international géné-
  ne traite tout simplement pas de l’adoption des déclarations d’indé-
ndance parce que
   « les déclarations d’indépendance ne donnent pas lieu à la « créa-
   tion » ou à la constitution d’Etats en droit international. Ce ne sont
   pas de telles déclarations qui remplissent les conditions factuelles, en
   droit international, de l’accès à la qualité d’Etat ou de la reconnais-
   sance. En droit international, de telles déclarations ne sont pas le
   fondement juridique de la qualité d’Etat ou de la reconnaissance. »
   (CR 2009/31, p. 46 (Fife, Norvège).)
 Les déclarations d’indépendance ne peuvent devenir pertinentes du
 int de vue du droit international général que lorsqu’elles sont exami-

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 es conjointement avec la prétention à la qualité d’Etat et à l’indépen-
 nce qui les sous-tend. Or, la question posée par l’Assemblée générale
ait « circonscrite et précise » (avis consultatif, par. 51). « En particulier,
 Cour n’[était] pas priée de dire si le Kosovo a ou non accédé à la qua-
é d’Etat. » (Ibid., par. 51.) Par conséquent, il était tout simplement
 possible d’apporter une réponse à la question de la licéité de la déclara-
 n unilatérale d’indépendance du point de vue du droit international
 néral. Le seul droit applicable aux fins de répondre à la question de
Assemblée générale est la lex specialis créée par la résolution 1244 du
onseil de sécurité.
 18. En conclusion, il faut ajouter que l’objet et la portée de l’avis
 nsultatif sont tout aussi circonscrits et précis que la question à laquelle
 ui-ci répond. L’avis ne traite pas des conséquences juridiques de la
 claration unilatérale d’indépendance. La Cour ne s’y prononce pas sur
 statut final du Kosovo. Elle indique clairement qu’elle
   « n’estime pas nécessaire, pour répondre à la question de l’Assemblée
   générale, d’examiner le point de savoir si la déclaration d’indépen-
   dance a ou non conduit à la création d’un Etat, ou de se prononcer
   sur la valeur des actes de reconnaissance » (ibid., par. 51).
  Cour relève par ailleurs que
   « les controverses relatives à la portée du droit à l’autodétermination
   ou à l’existence d’un droit de « sécession-remède » se rapportent ... à
   la question du droit de se séparer d’un Etat [et que] cette question
   sort du cadre de celle qui a été posée par l’Assemblée générale »
   (ibid., par. 83).
 Dans son avis consultatif, la Cour ne conteste nullement que la résolu-
  n 1244 reste en vigueur dans son intégralité (voir paragraphes 91 et 92
   l’avis consultatif). Cela signifie que le « processus politique visant à
 terminer le statut futur du Kosovo » prévu dans cette résolution (par. 11
 ) n’a pas été mené à son terme et qu’un règlement final de ce statut
  te encore à approuver par le Conseil de sécurité.

                                            (Signé) Leonid SKOTNIKOV.

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248

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO
[Translation.]

Whilst regretting that my opinion differs from that of the Court,
I give an affirmative answer to both questions for the following
reasons :

I.—It is useless to recall here in detail the evolution of law
which tends to carry to its ultimate consequence the execution
of any sort of obligation; the nature of the undertakings must
be examined in order to accept incomplete or imperfect solutions
such as that of damages, in the sole case of de facto or de jure
impossibility.

Once the respect of the human person has been reserved—nemo
ad factum precise cogi potest—the execution of the obligations
to “perform” is therefore pursued until a remedy is found for
a mere declaration of will which the debtor persists in refusing
to make without reason. As regards the pactum de compromittendo,
international law has made certain progress in developing the
formulas regulating passage from arbitration im potentia to arbi-
tration im actu, particularly in respect of the appointment of
arbitrators by the act of a third party.

This is to be explained by the absence of a complete judicial
organization which, in domestic law, prevents too frequent reference
to private judges. But for the same reason, viewed from a dif-
ferent angle, the task of filling the gaps in a treaty is in general
rendered very difficult, in the international field, in the absence
of a person who can assume this delicate rôle of appointing substi-
tute arbitrators.

At any rate, the means permitting international engagements
to be vite adimplett may more easily be found if a clear distinction
is made between the question of the legitimacy of a substitution
of the will and that of the organ entrusted with such action.

2.—Confronted with the fact that it is almost impossible to
provide adequate rules covering an almost infinite number of
concrete cases, it is sufficient that the author of a law or treaty
should set up machinery which can function normally, and the
juridical system will provide for the adaptation required in each
case, without requiring a revision of the acts. On the contrary,
conventions will often be shown to be useless if, by excessive
attachment to the letter of the texts and by resorting to vague
penalties especially when it is known that there is an intention
to evade the agreements, the defects attributed to the under-
takings are allowed to prevail.

31
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 249

The specific performance of preliminary contracts does not affect
the sovereignty even of the State which rightfully alienated it to
the extent necessary to permit a replacement of its own choice—
que ab initio erant voluntatis ex post facto funt necessitatis.

It is also of little importance that international obligations
cannot in general be the object of direct penalties, if the execution
of some of them can be pursued up to a certain point ; there should
thus be no hesitation about pursuing the useful results of an arbi-
tration clause, by abandoning the problems raised by the execution
of the decisions at the moment when these are handed down by
the arbitrators. This will be a subsequent stage which is easier
to regulate, for the law would already be declared.

3.—In the present case, the careful and prolonged negotiations
which preceded the drafting of the treaties concerned rule out the
possibility of faults and errors having been committed by the
parties themselves; on the other hand, they derive therefrom
a certain character of compromise often leading to formulas which
are not completely satisfactory to the two parties.

These considerations, however, could not justify the conclusion
that a renunciation for resistance in respect of the appointment
of a third member, a more serious question than the replacement of
the representative of one party, was successfully overcome. Indeed,
the choice of a third member, failing previous agreement, will no
longer be subject to control by the parties, and this affects both
the party which in good faith tried to find an impartial arbitrator and
the party which frustrated such appointment ; whereas, in the nomi-
nation of a national commissioner, where each party enjoys com-
plete liberty to make the designation, the intervention which is exer-
cised as a penalty from the outside would affect only the guilty party.
The normal interest in having a member freely chosen may yield
to the design of frustrating the constitution of the arbitral organ.

4.—It must therefore be admitted that instead of accepting
risks, the parties, whilst providing for disputes, did not contemplate
such unusual eventualities as the denial that the disputes them-
selves existed, or the radical refusal to. appoint national commis-
sioners. There is nothing in the preparatory work of the treaties
to show that the parties contemplated the eventuality of all
disputes remaining without a solution, practically facilitating
the non-performance of the treaties themselves.

At any rate, this failure to provide for every case would not be
irreparable, in view of the juridical principles recalled above
which can overcome undue resistance, as was shown in the Opinion
of the Court which removed the first of the said obstacles. Even
the absence of a clause providing for the substitution of a national
member, as may be found in some treaties, would not lead to such
an irreparable result.

32
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 250

5.—It may be observed that a high authority of the United
Nations has been exceptionally invested with broad powers,
which go beyond the functions attributed to him by the Charter.
Indeed, the Secretary-General has been entrusted with a number
of very delicate tasks which all tend to one main end—to ensure
the peaceful settlement of any dispute which may arise between
the parties.

In this way a strict interpretation limited to an examination
of one text only and which takes as its data a partial intention of
the parties, cannot, in my view, prevail, especially if it confirms
the complete breakdown of the whole machinery for solving the
disputes, although.it be recognized in theory that a responsibility
arises from the fact that an international obligation has been
violated.

On the contrary, I believe that the treaties should be interpreted
as a-whole, having regard to the purposes embodied therein. No
effort must be spared to ensure the most perfect execution of
obligations, in spite of imperfections and disadvantages exclusively
due to the obstruction of the party which was under the obligation
to carry out the undertaking.

6.—But the request for an opinion does not contemplate the
maximum result in the application of these principles, as would
be the case, for example, if it attempted to provide for the appoint-
ment of the national commissioners themselves on the basis of an
argument derived a fortiori from the nature and extent of the powers
conferred upon the Secretary-General.

Question III hardly refers to the nomination of the representative
of a recalcitrant State in conjunction with that of the third member,
and the Court must simply confine itself to the problem of the
nomination of a third member independently of the nomination of
the other arbitrators.

In order to determine whether the nomination of the third
member must necessarily follow the designation of the other
members, it must first be admitted that the texts of the relevant
clauses are completely neutral and provide for several solutions.
They are therefore not sufficiently clear to justify the rejection of
any process of interpretation other than the one which confines
itself to the letter of the texts.

To be sure, the current practice is to appoint the third member
after the other members have been appointed, or at the same time,
but this empirical observation by no means justifies our reading
into these texts a condition which does not exist.

7,—What is most interesting, however, is the nature of the
functions attributed to the third arbitrator in each particular case.

International practice makes a clear instinction between two
principal categories of such functions.

33
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 251

In a certain number of cases the third member appears on the
scene only when a divergence of views arises between the other
commissioners, and his function in principle is to give the casting
vote ; he may in exceptional circumstances be authorized to adopt
an intermediary solution or even an entirely new one. This position
is exclusively subsidiary and conditional.

In other cases the nomination of a third member takes place
beforehand, and he is even entrusted with the task of presiding
over the work of the commission. He plays a principal rôle which,
however, decreases when the other members agree, even though
he be permitted to give his personal views in any case.

8.—There happens to be a decisive element in the three treaties
which points clearly to the system which has been preferred.

Indeed, these instruments provide for the constitution of two
commissions : one a so-called “conciliation” commission for econo-
mic questions, and the other, which has no name, for disputes in
general.

The first of these is composed of an equal number of represent-
atives of the parties concerned, although the precise number of the
members is not laid down ; nevertheless, if agreement has not been
reached within three months of the dispute having been referred
to the commission, the addition of a third member, appointed by
the Secretary-General, may be required. This is a perfect model
for the réle of the third arbitrator who can only intervene after the
efforts of the other members have failed (Treaties with Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania, Articles 35, 31 and 32 respectively).

In the other commission the régime of the coincidence of two
opinions is also preferred; but, in this case, the very designa-
tion of the third member by the Secretary-General depends not
upon a time-limit extending from the date when a certain case was
referred, but merely upon disagreement between the parties upon
the appointment of a national of a third State, after a lapse of one
month (the above cited treaties, Articles 40, 36 and 38).

This comparison, within the same treaty, brings out a distinc-
tion which is further emphasized by the creation of a third commis-
sion, provided for only in the treaty with Romania (Article 33).
For instance, for the determination of the prices of goods delivered
as reparations, a third system has been adopted submitting the
controversy to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions at Bucharest. In
case of disagreement, the Secretary-General shall appoint a single
“arbitrator’’ whose decision shali be binding on the parties. Obvi-
ously, this arbitrator is not bound by any of the solutions previously
put forward.

g.—In the present case, it seems therefore arbitrary again to call
upon the Secretary-General to intervene in another circumstance
which the text has not indicated as a condition : the appointment

34
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 252

and also perhaps the acceptation of other members. Nor has the
sequence of voting at the time of the decision any relation to that
of the appointment of the members of the organ, as they must all
perform their functions simultaneously.

In the desire to meet a hypothetical intention of the parties, one
runs the risk of losing sight of the main aspect of the question, that
of the réle of the third arbitrator considered from the angle of a
familiar distinction in international law. Even this preoccupation
does not give assurance of a perfect interpretation and, at the same
time, by an inversion of the order followed in the Request for
Opinion, may compel an answer to a question which in the end
must be set aside: Question IV.

10.—Undoubtedly the appointment of this third member would
be useless if ultimately the commission were unable to function.
For that reason, the General Assembly has put Question IV.

Before answering this question, one must, however, underline
another aspect of the function of the commissioners : those that are
to be appointed by the parties have quite openly been considered
as their ‘‘representatives”. This will make it easier for the States
having designated them to replace them.

On the other hand, the position of the third member becomes
more important, as he will in fact become the only true arbitrator,
with the single reservation that he will not be in a position to adopt
another solution than those proposed by the other members. He
will crystallize the majority responsible for the decisions. He will
be the one to define it so that this majority will coincide with the
simple juxtaposition of two votes on the same side.

Obviously, if the two representatives of the parties agree, it
is useless for the third member to give a verdict. But in this case
there would be no dispute, the latter having been settled by the
agreement of those who would then be really agents for the Govern-
ments reaching a compromise.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that the concept of minor-
ity ceases to have any value by eradicating the relative character
which may be attributed to it and to the corresponding concept
of majority, the latter being transformed into unanimity.

11.—-One finds in the records of international law a series of
cases in which an arbitration organ saw its initial composition
disturbed by the disappearance of one member, either by accidental
circumstances or because of the action of that member or of the
State which had appointed him, action taken either openly or
indirectly.

The practice of keeping in function such a tribunal is justified by
the desire not to put wrongful conduct at an advantage. The same
solution must prevail, therefore, in the case of absence of a member
ab initio, particularly if his absence is not due to circumstances

35
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 253

beyond the control of the party which should have appointed him.

In the first case, the majority is also formed by the remaining
members. There is no opposition left, as the organ comprises three
members. One is not confronted either by a situation different
from the one envisaged by the parties, or even by a revision of the
treaty with a view to obtain an abstention from the remaining
judges and thereby the closure of the tribunal. In fact, it is only
the natural consequence of a specific sanction required by the
nature of the obligation disregarded by one of the parties.

There is no essential difference between the two cases. If one
does not wish to see form overrule substance, one is compelled to
adopt the same solution br eadem ratio, 1b1 idem jus.

An excessive respect for mere formulæ should not result in the
extension of a mere concept such as, for instance, the one of the
“fundamental procedural order” which has sometimes been put
forward to give exceptional importance to the time of the constitu-
tion of an organ, to the detriment of social exigencies and for the
exclusive benefit of those who are forgetful of their promises,
whether they be individuals or States.

12.—The most critical moment for a deliberative organ is not
the time of its organization, but the time when, fulfilling its purpose,
it makes a decision which alone will carry legal effect in casu.

The organ which loses a member without being able to replace
him remains, from another angle, in a more serious position than
the one which started its work with an incomplete bench, but
in the hope or, at least, with the possibility that a change in
the attitude of the defaulting State before the end of its work would
permit its completion. It is impossible ever to foresee with certainty
the maintenance or the abandonment of a diplomatic position.

Excessive liking for abstractions should therefore not lead to
the rejection of the extension of a reasonable solution accepted
without reservations in international law, such as that of the func-
tioning of an incomplete tribunal, not only in an analogous case,
but also in a case where this application would be justified for
major reasons.

It is true that the work of these commissions might not bring
complete results because decisions will not be made in case of
disagreement between the two. members. But the same result
would occur if one member had disappeared during the term of
office of the tribunal.

The commission would at least fulfil part of its purpose in deciding
cases where agreement was complete. This would give some satisfac-
tion to the principle of effectivity.

36
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AZEVEDO 254

13.—It is also necessary to remember the distinction between
the notion of composition of an organ and of quorum permitting
its operation.

Although consisting of fifteen members, the International Court
of Justice could not, for instance, start functioning before some of
the judges have been elected (Statute, Article 12, paragraph 3),
or before all have accepted their. election ?

14.—It may be observed that the member most qualified to
express the views of the recalcitrant State might, in voting, modify
the opinion of the third member. That is an indisputable disadvant-
age, but it is quite as serious as some others which continually
occur in cases of wrongful admission by a party and which, for
example, lead to the absence of any definite expression of the
questions to be decided, to the absence of rules of procedure and
of substance, and even to the insufficiency of evidence.

All this, however, constitutes a large part, if not the main part,
of the sanction imposed upon the defaulting State. It acts as an
injunction. to bring about its consent. The same can be said of the
kind of “‘veto”’ which the party represented on the commission
will have in practice. This “veto” results exclusively from the
default of the other party which has an easy means of suppressing
it at any time by filling the empty seat.

15.—None of these obstacles has been sufficient to set aside
procedure by default in similar circumstances in international
law.

Absence of means of defence and absence of counsel is far more
serious than the absence of participation in the judgment of a
national member, to whom even the Statute of the International
Court of Justice has attributed a purely optional character. All
these consequences, however, are also accepted as a new sanction
against the party which does not appear in Court.

In my opinion, the absence of the “representative” of one of
the parties is no reason for suspecting the third member, whose
function is not in any way changed thereby. Whether he acts with
one or two members, he remains free to have the last word.

In case of default, Article 53 of the Statute contents itself with
a recommendation to the International Court to exercise a certain
ex officio control, which it has already had occasion to exert. There is
nothing to prevent organs functioning in an incomplete way from
taking their guidance from the same principle when they are about
to make their decisions. They have every reason to do so.

(Signed) Pu. AZEVEDO.

37


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA SOUVERAINETE
SUR PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN

(INDONESIE/MALAISIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 19 OCTOBRE 2000

2000

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY
OVER PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN

(INDONESIA/MALAYSIA)

ORDER OF 19 OCTOBER 2000

Mode officiel de citation:

Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan
(Indonésiel Mulaisie), ordonnance du 19 octobre 2000,
C.J. Recueil 2000, p. 173

Official citation:

Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesial Malaysia}, Order of 19 October 2000,
LC J. Reports 2000, p. 173

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 800

ISBN 92-1-070877-6

19 OCTOBRE 2000

ORDONNANCE

SOUVERAINETE SUR PULAU LIGITAN
ET PULAU SIPADAN

(INDONESIE/MALAISIE)

SOVEREIGNTY OVER PULAU LIGITAN
AND PULAU SIPADAN

(INDONESIA/MALAYSIA)

19 OCTOBER 2000

ORDER
173

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 2000 2000
19 October
General List
19 October 2000 No. 102

CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER
PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN

(INDONESIA/MALAYSIA)

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 44 and 46, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Special Agreement between the two Parties,
which was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 3! May 1997 and entered into
force on 14 May 1998,

Having regard to the Order of 11 May 2000, whereby the President of
the Court, taking account of the agreement of the Parties, extended until
2 August 2000 the time-limit for the filing of a Counter-Memorial by
each of the Parties,

Having regard to the Counter-Memorials of the Parties, which were
filed within the time-limit thus extended;

Whereas in Article 3, paragraph 2 (c), of the Special Agreement the
Parties have agreed that the written pleadings in the case should include,
in addition to the Memorials and Counter-Memorials, “a Reply pre-
sented by each of the Parties not later than 4 months after the date on
which each has received the certified copy of the Counter-Memorial of
the other Party”;

Whereas the Co-Agents of the two Parties addressed to the Court a
joint letter dated 14 October 2000, which inter alia stated the following:

“By this letter. the undersigned wish to inform you that both

4

PULAU LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (ORDER 19 X 00) 174

Parties intend to file Replies in accordance with Article 3, para-
graph 2 fc), of their Special Agreement signed on 31 May 1997. The
provisions of the Special Agreement envisage that Replies will be
filed not later than 4 months after the date on which each has
received the certified copy of the other’s Counter-Memorial that is to
say, not later than 2 December 2000.

However, the Parties respectfully request the Court to extend this
time-limit by three months, to 2 March 2001. In all other respects,
the Special Agreement remains unchanged”,

Taking into account the agreement between the Parties,

Fixes 2 March 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of a Reply by each
of the Parties; and

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this nineteenth day of October, two thou-
sand, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia, respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.


548

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BUERGENTHAL

Inadmissibility of Germany's third submission — Late filing of request for
provisional measures unjustified — Denial of hearing due to Germany's negli-
gence — Holding third submission admissible incompatible with procedural fair-
ness and sound administration of justice — Court's admissibility decision not
properly motivated — Order requested by Germany identical to Breard Order —
German knowledge that Breard Order deemed non-binding by United States —
German litigation strategy — Procedural misconduct prejudicial to United
States.

1. Since I find myself in disagreement with the Court’s ruling that Ger-
many’s third submission is admissible, I regret that I must dissent from
that part of the Court’s Judgment.

2. In the submission, which I consider to be inadmissible, Germany
requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

“that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final
decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated
its international obligation to comply with the Order on provisional
measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from
any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute
while judicial proceedings are pending”.

3. Germany filed its Application in this case, together with its request
for provisional measures, at 7.30 p.m. The Hague time on 2 March 1999,
some 27 hours before the scheduled execution of Walter LaGrand. On
3 March 1999, at 9.00 a.m. The Hague time, the Vice-President of the
Court! met with the representatives of Germany and the United States to
discuss the subsequent course of the proceedings. At this meeting Ger-
many’s representative asked the Court to indicate the requested provi-
sional measures proprio motu pursuant to Article 75 of the Rules of
Court and without holding any hearing on the subject. Responding to
this request, the representative of the United States explained, inter alia:

“that the United States would have strong objections to any pro-
cedure such as that proposed only that very morning by the repre-

' The President of the Court, Judge S. Schwebel of the United States, relinquished the
presidency in this case pursuant to Article 32 of the Rules of Court.

86
549 LAGRAND (DISS. OP, BUERGENTHAL)

sentative of Germany which would result in the Court making an
Order proprio motu without having first duly heard the two Parties” *.

4. Article 74, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court specifies that “[a]
request for the indication of provisional measures shall have priority over
all other cases”, and paragraph 3 of that Article provides in part that
“(t]he Court, or the President if the Court is not sitting, shall fix a date
for a hearing which will afford the parties an opportunity of being rep-
resented at it”.

Under Article 75, paragraph |, of the Rules:

“The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of pro-
visional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any
or all of the parties.”

5. On 3 March 1999, at 7.15 p.m. The Hague time, the Court issued
the Order for provisional measures requested by Germany. It did so with-
out the prior hearing provided for in Article 74, paragraph 3, of the
Rules, without an exchange of pleadings, and having before it only Ger-
many’s Application and request for provisional measures, which set out
Germany’s allegations in justification of its request.

6. In issuing the requested Order, the Court explained its decision to
proceed in this ex parte fashion in the following terms:

“Whereas, the sound administration of justice requires that
a request for the indication of provisional measures founded on
Article 73? of the Rules of Court be submitted in good time;

Whereas, Germany emphasizes that it did not become fully aware
of the facts of the case until 24 February 1999 and that since then it
has pursued its action at diplomatic level;

Whereas, under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
the latter ‘may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether
the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional
measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all
of the parties’: whereas a provision of this kind has substantially

2 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of
3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 13, para. 12.

+ Article 73 of the Rules of Court, which Germany had also invoked, reads as
follows:

“1. A written request for the indication of provisional measures may be made by a
party at any time during the course of the proceedings in the case in connection with
which the request is made.

2. The request shall specify the reasons therefor, the possible consequences if it is
not granted, and the measures requested. A certified copy shall forthwith be trans-
mitted by the Registrar to the other party.”

87
550 LAGRAND (DISS. OP, BUERGENTHAL)

featured in the Rules of Court since 1936, and whereas, if the Court
has not, to date, made use of the power conferred upon it by this
provision, the latter appears nonetheless to be clearly established;
whereas the Court may make use of this power, irrespective of
whether or not it has been seised by the parties of a request for
the indication of provisional measures; whereas in such a case it
may, in the event of extreme urgency, proceed without holding oral
hearings; and whereas it is for the Court to decide in each case if,
in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, it should
make use of the said power”.

7. The Court issued its Order only four hours before the scheduled
execution of Walter LaGrand, which was to take place in the State of
Arizona. The United States authorities were thus left with very little time
to assess and act upon the Order with the deliberateness its gravity
required under American law and constitutional practice applicable to
federal-state relations as well as under international law. It is to be
observed, however, that the Court was presented by Germany with
claims regarding a set of facts that called for immediate action to save the
life of a human being who had allegedly been deprived of his rights under
international law. In light of these circumstances, it is difficult to fault the
Court for issuing the Order in the manner it did. But there is no excuse
for Germany’s conduct in waiting until the last minute to seek the Order.
This is so particularly since it is now clear that the grounds Germany
alleged in justification of its late filing do not withstand scrutiny. The late
filing, as will be shown below, had serious negative consequences for the
position of the United States in defending its rights before this Court. In
my opinion, these circumstances now require the Court to hold the third
submission inadmissible.

8. Germany sought to excuse its last minute request for provisional
measures on the ground that it did not know until 23 or 24 Febru-
ary 1999 that the authorities of the State of Arizona had been aware at
least as far back as 1982 or 1984 that the LaGrand brothers were Ger-
man nationals. In issuing its Order, the Court attached considerable
importance to this claim. This is readily apparent from the specific refer-
ence the Court makes to Germany’s claim in setting out the reasons moti-
vating its decision and from the context within which the reference
appears in its Order (see paragraph 6, above).

9. Even assuming that Germany’s late filing could be justified on the

ground advanced by it — something that is open to some doubt — the
record now before the Court indicates that the information Germany

4 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of
3 March 1999, L C.J. Reports 1999 (1), p. 14, paras. 19-21.

88
551 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

claimed it did not have was in fact available to Germany at least since
1993.

10. Germany learned in 1992 that the LaGrands had been arrested in
1982 and that they had been tried and convicted in Arizona in 1984.
According to Germany, its involvement in this case begins with a prison
visit to the brothers on 8 December 1992. It explained this involvement to
the Court in the following words:

“In the following [after December 1992], Germany helped the
brothers’ attorneys to investigate the brothers’ childhood in Ger-
many, both by financial and logistical support, and to raise this issue
and the omission of consular advice in Court proceedings.” (Empha-
sis added.)

Among the court proceedings instituted by the LaGrands’ lawyers in co-
ordination with German consular officials was an appeal to the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, filed on 8 March 1993.
“In these proceedings”, according to Germany, “the attorneys raised for
the first time the lack of consular advice and the violation of Art. 36 of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”® In support of their
claim, the attorneys provided the United States District Court on the
same date with the presentence reports prepared in 1984 by the probation
officials of Pima County, Arizona, in connection with the sentencing of
the LaGrand brothers’. Each of these presentence reports stated very
clearly that the LaGrands were German citizens®. The reports had been
provided to the defence attorneys of the LaGrands a decade before and
they formally acknowledged receipt of these reports in open court on
12 December 1984°.

11. In other words, the information contained in the presentence
reports, including the fact that the Arizona authorities knew as far back
as the early 1980s that the LaGrands were German nationals, was known
to the attorneys of the LaGrands by 1984, if not earlier. These attorneys
filed the presentence reports with the United States District Court for
Arizona in March 1993 in connection with their habeas corpus motion on
behalf of the LaGrands. As of that date, these reports were available to
Germany which, as we have seen, emphasized to this Court that it
“helped the brothers’ attorneys ... to raise . . . the omission of consular
advice” and “the violation of Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention on Con-

> Memorial of Germany, Vol. I, p. 11, para. 2.06.

6 Jbid., p. 12. para. 2.07.

7 See Memorial of Germany, Vol. III, Ann. 46, p. 853, at p. 1009.

8 See Presentence Reports on Karl and Walter LaGrand, dated 2 April 1984, Memorial
of Germany, Vol. II, Ann. 2, pp. 261 and 276.

3 See Memorial of Germany, Vol. II, Ann. 8, pp. 461-462.

89
552 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

sular Relations” in the proceedings they instituted in 1993 (see para-
graph 10 above).

12. The foregoing facts raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of
Germany’s contention in this Court that the late filing (on 2 March 1999)
of its request for provisional measures was attributable to the fact that it
discovered only on 23 February 1999 that the Arizona authorities knew
as far back as 1984 that the LaGrands were German nationals. Even
assuming that Germany did not actually know these facts, it certainly
had no excuse for not knowing them, given its insistent claim in this
Court of its close involvement in the LaGrand case after 1992 and its
collaboration with the LaGrands’ attorneys after that date, particularly
in assisting them in raising issues relating to the Vienna Convention.

13. In its oral argument, Germany responded in the following terms to
the contention of the United States that the 1984 presentence reports pro-
vided the answer to the question concerning the date when the Arizona
authorities learned that the LaGrands were German citizens:

“the only question that makes sense at all in this context is whether
German officials did or did not have easy access to the Presentence
Reports in 1992 or thereafter. Although we do not attribute any
conclusive weight to this issue, we can provide you with a clear
answer. We have filed with the Court a Memorandum regarding the
Presentence Reports issue in the LaGrand matter, drafted by the
Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona at the request of
the German Consulate General in Los Angeles. Let me summarize
what this Memorandum says: According to a local rule of the Pima
County Superior Court, the Presentence Reports concerning Karl
and Walter LaGrand were filed under seal and kept confidential
even after sentencing. When the Federal Public Defender tried to
locate this report in June of this year [2000], they could not be
found. In the words of the Public Defender:

‘The exhibits clerk at the superior court advised that the clerk
did not have pre-sentence reports information on either LaGrand,
and they had no idea where the pre-sentence reports were filed. It
appears that the pre-sentence reports are not even in the superior
court file.’

Mr. President, if not even the competent US authority managed to
retrieve the reports, does it make sense to say, as the Counter-
Memorial [of the United States] does, that it is ‘hard to understand
how these reports were not already familiar to German consular
officers’? Can one really accuse a foreign consulate of negligence

90
553 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

when it failed to get hold of documents which could not even be
traced by the competent local authorities?” '°

14. The answer to the question counsel for Germany asked in the last
sentence of the preceding paragraph is a resounding “yes”. As we have
seen, the presentence reports were in the possession of the LaGrands’
attorneys and transmitted by them to the United States District Court in
1993. Moreover, even assuming that these reports were confidential or
under seal after the conviction in 1984 of the LaGrands, they became a
matter of public record when provided to the United States District
Court. Since the reports were thus available to Germany by 1993, it is
quite irrelevant that the Public Defender, quoted above by Germany, was
unable allegedly to find them in the year 2000.

15. [t is noteworthy, too, that between 1992, when Germany learned
of the detention, trial and sentencing of the LaGrands, and the beginning
of 1999, when Germany claimed that it found out for the first time that
the Arizona authorities had known since the early 1980s that the
LaGrands were German citizens, Germany never asked the United
States Department of State to investigate the case of the LaGrands.
Moreover, in 1998 the Department of State expressly invited all embas-
sies in Washington “to bring possible failures of consular notification to
its attention, so that it could investigate and take any appropriate
action” !!, Such an investigation, had it been requested by Germany con-
sistent with the practice routinely followed in these types of cases, would
have determined the date as of which the LaGrands’ German nationality
was known to the Arizona authorities. This information was in fact con-
tained in the report prepared by the State Department following its own
investigation of the case in 1999-2000 !.

16. Germany’s lack of diligence in ascertaining the facts it advanced to
justify its late filing deprived the United States of an opportunity to be
heard on Germany’s request for provisional measures. What is more, it
left the Court little choice but to accept on face value Germany’s claim
of its lack of knowledge, since the absence of a hearing prevented the
United States from rebutting Germany’s contention in this regard. Ger-
many’s conduct raises issues analogous to those the Court addressed in
the case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium),

19 CR 2000/26, p. 38.

11 Counter-Memorial of the United States. p. 51, para. 61.

“Karl and Walter LaGrand. Report of Investigation into Consular Notification
Issues”, United States Department of State, 17 February 2000, Counter-Memorial of the
United States, Exhibit 1. pp. 7-8.

91
554 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

where Yugoslavia attempted to invoke a new basis of jurisdiction at a
very late stage of the proceedings. In that case, the Court ruled as
follows:

“Whereas the invocation by a party of a new basis of Jurisdiction
in the second round of oral argument on a request for the indication
of provisional measures has never before occurred in the Court’s
practice; whereas such action at this late stage, when it is not
accepted by the other party, seriously jeopardizes the principle of
procedural fairness and the sound administration of justice; and
whereas in consequence the Court cannot, for the purpose of decid-
ing whether it may or may not indicate provisional measures in the
present case, take into consideration the new title of jurisdiction
which Yugoslavia sought to invoke on 12 May 1999,”13

17. Germany's justification for its late filing, which the informa-
tion now before the Court has shown to have been based on spurious
claims, had the effect of obtaining a ruling from the Court that “seriously
jeopardize[d] the principle of procedural fairness and the sound admini-
stration of justice”. This result, as we have seen, was brought about
because of Germany’s lack of diligence. It alone justifies holding the
submission inadmissible on the grounds invoked by the Court in Yugo-
Slavia v. Belgium, above.

18. In addressing the issue of the admissibility of Germany’s third
submission, the Court makes the following finding (para. 57):

“The Court recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the
manner in which these proceedings were filed and for their timing.
The Court recalls, however, that notwithstanding its awareness of
the consequences of Germany’s filing at such a late date, it neverthe-
less considered it appropriate to enter the Order of 3 March 1999,
given that an irreparable prejudice appeared to be imminent. In
view of these considerations, the Court considers that Germany is
now entitled to challenge the alleged failure of the United States
to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Germany’s third submission is admissible.”

19. [have no disagreement with the Court’s view that given the immi-
nence of “an irreparable harm” in the instant case it was “appropriate”
to enter the Order of 3 March 1999 on the facts then known to the Court.
But it does not follow therefrom, contrary to what the Court says, that
“in view of these considerations, the Court considers that Germany is

'3 Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, LC.J. Reports 1999 (1), p. 139,
para. 44.

92
555 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

now entitled to challenge the alleged failure of the United States to
comply with the Order”. The fact that it was appropriate for the Court
to issue the Order does not compel the admissibility of Germany’s
third submission once it is apparent that Germany’s justification for its
late filing is shown not to withstand scrutiny. It is to be regretted that
the Court fails to address this issue since it bears directly on the admis-
sibility of Germany’s third submission.

20. Germany’s negligence had other detrimental consequences for the
United States, as far as concerns the Order of 3 March 1999. In its
request for provisional measures, Germany asked the Court for an Order
that tracked verbatim the language of the Court’s Order of 9 April 1998
in the Breard case". When the Breard Order was before the United
States Supreme Court, the Solicitor General of the United States
explained why the Government believed that the Order was not binding.
He made three points in this regard. He submitted, first, that “there is
substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether an ICJ order indi-
cating provisional measures is binding. See Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 903, Reporter’s Note 6, at
pp. 369-370 (1986). The better reasoned position is that such an order
is not binding” '> The Solicitor General then attempted to show, by ana-
lysing Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, why that was the better
reasoned view. The Solicitor General’s second argument in support
of the non-binding character of the Court’s Article 41 orders was that:

“the ICJ itself has never concluded that provisional measures are
binding on the parties to a dispute. That court has indicated provi-
sional measures in seven other cases of which we are aware; in most
of those cases, the order indicating provisional measures was not
regarded as binding by the respondent.” !*

Finally, the Solicitor General argued that, even assuming that “parties to
a case before the ICJ are required to heed an order of that court indicat-
ing provisional measures”, the Order in the Breard case was not worded
in mandatory terms!’. Consistent with the view of the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court of the United States denied the stay of execution in

'4 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations { Paraguay v. United States of America),
Provisional Measures, Order of 9 April 1998, I C.J. Reports 1998, p. 258, para. 41 (D.

5 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore,
Memorial of Germany, Vol. 11, Ann. 34, p. 737.

16 Thid.. p. 738.

17 Jbid., p. 739.

93
556 LAGRAND (DISS. OP. BUERGENTHAL)

the Breard case called for by the Order of the International Court of Jus-
tice in that case!®.

21. Germany was aware of the position of the United States Govern-
ment regarding the non-binding character of orders of this Court indi-
cating provisional measures in general and with its interpretation of the
Order in the Breard case in particular. Nevertheless, Germany asked the
Court less than a year later for an Order worded in precisely the same
language, instead of seeking an order that provided the authorities of the
United States with some legal basis for reassessing their position on the
binding nature of these orders. This failure by Germany would have been
less serious an omission had there been a hearing in the instant case in
which the United States could have explained its position to the Court.
But because of Germany’s late filing, as we have seen, no hearing could
be held.

22. It is difficult to understand, therefore, what Germany sought to
achieve with its 2 March 1999 request for provisional measures. It cer-
tainly could not have been surprised that the United States would adopt
the same position with regard to the requested order as it did in relation
to the Breard Order of 9 April 1998. There was nothing in the order Ger-
many requested on 2 March 1999 that would have provided the authori-
ties of the United States with a legal basis justifying the Solicitor General
to reverse his official position adopted less than a year earlier. In the
absence of such a justification, it would have been unprecedented for him
not to adhere to his earlier view. Moreover, and that is even more impor-
tant, the Court itself had not in the meantime clarified its position on
the subject. Consequently, when Germany asked the Court to proceed
proprio motu and without a hearing, and sought an order identical to that
the Court issued in the Breard case, Germany breached an obligation of
elementary fairness it owed the United States in the circumstances of this
case. It is true, of course, that a party in proceedings before this Court, as
before any other court, must bear the consequences of having assumed,
erroneously in retrospect, that a given order is non-binding and being
held responsible for the resulting violation. But this fact does not relieve
Germany of responsibility for having engaged in a litigation strategy
prejudicial to the United States.

23. To summarize, the claim advanced by Germany to justify its late
filing has been shown to be without merit. In fact, it is now clear that
Germany had no good reason for not bringing its request for provisional
measures to the Court at least a year or two earlier, if not much earlier.
Its late filing did nevertheless have the consequence of preventing the

'8 Breard v. Greene, Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998), 37 Inter-
national Legal Materials (1998), p. 829.

94
$57 LAGRAND (DISS. OP, BUERGENTHAL)

United States from being heard in a timely fashion on the German
request for provisional measures. The absence of a hearing also deprived
the United States of the opportunity to address the question of the bind-
ing character of the Court’s orders and their effect on the laws of the
United States. What is more, Germany sought an order from this Court
that it had every reason to anticipate the United States would consider to
be non-binding and hence not requiring enforcement — a litigation
strategy that is very difficult to understand unless that was its very
purpose.

24. Accordingly, I consider that the manner in which Germany pro-
ceeded in obtaining the Court’s Order of 3 March 1999 amounted to pro-
cedural misconduct prejudicial to the interests of the United States as a
party to the instant proceedings. Such misconduct provides the requisite
justification — it compels it, in my opinion — for declaring Germany’s
third submission inadmissible.

(Signed) Thomas BUERGENTHAL.

95


                         COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                             RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                      AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                   OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER UN ACCÈS
                         À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                               (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                       ORDONNANCE DU 21 SEPTEMBRE 2016

                                2016
                         INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                           REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                        ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                   OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS
                        TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                               (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                          ORDER OF 21 SEPTEMBER 2016

4 CIJ1102.indb 1                                          10/02/17 09:59

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                               Obligation de négocier un accès à l’océan Pacifique
                              (Bolivie c. Chili), ordonnance du 21 septembre 2016,
                                           C.I.J. Recueil 2016, p. 252

                                               Official citation :
                              Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean
                               (Bolivia v. Chile), Order of 21 September 2016,
                                          I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 252

                                                                               1102
                                                                No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                               Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157297-1

4 CIJ1102.indb 2                                                                      10/02/17 09:59

                                                21 SEPTEMBRE 2016

                                                  ORDONNANCE

                   OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER UN ACCÈS
                         À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                           (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                   OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS
                        TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
                           (BOLIVIA v. CHILE)

                                                21 SEPTEMBER 2016

                                                     ORDER

4 CIJ1102.indb 3                                                    10/02/17 09:59

                    252

                                   COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

         2016
                                                   ANNÉE 2016
     21 septembre
     Rôle général                                21 septembre 2016
        no 153

                          OBLIGATION DE NÉGOCIER UN ACCÈS
                                À L’OCÉAN PACIFIQUE
                                               (BOLIVIE c. CHILI)

                                                 ORDONNANCE

                    Présents : M. Abraham, président ; M. Yusuf, vice‑président ;
                                MM. Owada, Tomka, Bennouna, Cançado Trindade,
                                Greenwood, Mmes Xue, Donoghue, M. Gaja, Mme Sebutinde,
                                MM. Bhandari, Robinson, Gevorgian, juges ; M. Couvreur,
                                greffier.

                        La Cour internationale de Justice,
                       Ainsi composée,
                       Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
                       Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44, 45, para-
                    graphe 2, 48 et 49 de son Règlement,
                       Vu l’ordonnance en date du 24 septembre 2015, par laquelle la Cour a
                    fixé au 25 juillet 2016 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du
                    contre‑mémoire de la République du Chili,
                       Vu le contre-mémoire dûment déposé par la République du Chili dans
                    le délai ainsi fixé ;
                       Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion que le président de la Cour a
                    tenue avec les agents des Parties le 13 septembre 2016, l’agent de la Boli-
                    vie a prié la Cour d’autoriser la présentation d’une réplique par le deman-
                    deur et d’une duplique par le défendeur ; et que l’agent de la Bolivie a
                    sollicité un délai d’au moins six mois, à compter de la date de l’ordon-
                    nance de la Cour, pour la préparation de la réplique ; considérant que, au

                    4

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                    253 	 obligation de négocier un accès (ordonnance 21 IX 16)

                    cours de la même réunion, l’agent du Chili a déclaré que la demande de la
                    Bolivie tendant à ce que soit organisé un second tour de procédure
                    écrite agréait à son gouvernement ; et que l’agent du Chili a exprimé l’avis
                    que les Parties devraient chacune disposer d’un délai de six mois pour la
                    préparation de leur pièce respective ;
                      Compte tenu de l’accord des Parties,
                      Autorise la présentation d’une réplique de la Bolivie et d’une duplique
                    du Chili ;
                      Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt de ces
                    pièces de procédure :
                        Pour la réplique de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie, le 21 mars 2017 ;
                        Pour la duplique de la République du Chili, le 21 septembre 2017 ;
                        Réserve la suite de la procédure.

                       Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
                    la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt et un septembre deux mille seize, en trois
                    exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres
                    seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de l’Etat plurinational
                    de Bolivie et au Gouvernement de la République du Chili.

                                                                            Le président,
                                                                  (Signé) Ronny Abraham.
                                                                               Le greffier,
                                                                 (Signé) Philippe Couvreur.

                    5

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