                             INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                              REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                           ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                      APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
                       CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
                       OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
                    AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                      ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                          OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                           (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

                                ORDER OF 28 JUNE 2021

                                    2021
                             COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                         AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                     APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION
                  INTERNATIONALE POUR LA RÉPRESSION
                    DU FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME
                 ET DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE
                SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES
                       DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE
                          (UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)

                             ORDONNANCE DU 28 JUIN 2021

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                                                  Official citation:
                          Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
                         of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention
                              on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
                              (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Order of 28 June 2021,
                                            I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 196

                                             Mode officiel de citation :
                           Application de la convention internationale pour la répression
                          du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale
                           sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
                          (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), ordonnance du 28 juin 2021,
                                             C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 196

                                                                                1224
                                                                     Sales number
                    ISSN 0074-4441                                   No de vente:
                    ISBN 978-92-1-003886-7

                                     © 2022 ICJ/CIJ, United Nations/Nations Unies
                                         All rights reserved/Tous droits réservés

                                          Printed in France/Imprimé en France

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                                                      28 JUNE 2021

                                                           ORDER

                      APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
                       CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
                       OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
                    AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                      ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                          OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                       (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

                         APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION
                      INTERNATIONALE POUR LA RÉPRESSION
                        DU FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME
                     ET DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE
                    SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES
                           DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE
                       (UKRAINE c. FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE)

                                                     28 JUIN 2021

                                                    ORDONNANCE

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                    196

                                   INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

        2021
                                                    YEAR 2021
       28 June
     General List                                   28 June 2021
      No. 166

                      APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
                       CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
                        OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
                    AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                       ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                           OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                                   (UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

                                                      ORDER

                        The President of the International Court of Justice,
                       Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44,
                    paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Rules of Court,
                       Having regard to the Order dated 8 November 2019, whereby the
                    Court fixed 8 December 2020 as the time‑limit for the filing of the Counter‑
                    Memorial of the Russian Federation, as well as to the Orders dated
                    13 July 2020 and 20 January 2021, whereby the Court, at the request of
                    the Respondent, extended that time‑limit first until 8 April 2021 and then
                    until 8 July 2021;
                       Whereas, by a letter dated 17 June 2021, the Agent of the Russian
                    Federation, Mr. Grigory Lukiyantsev, requested the Court to further extend
                    by one month the time‑limit for the filing of the Counter‑Memorial,
                    explaining that two key individuals involved in the preparation of that
                    pleading had been diagnosed with COVID‑19 and were temporarily
                    prevented from working because of the severe effects of the virus; and

                    4

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                    197 	     application of the icsft and cerd (ord. 28 VI 21)

                    whereas, upon receipt of this letter, the Registrar transmitted a copy there
                    of to the Agent of Ukraine, in accordance with Article 44, paragraph 3,
                    of the Rules of Court;
                       Whereas, by a letter dated 23 June 2021, the Agent of Ukraine,
                    Mr. Yevhenii Yenin, stated that, in light of the circumstances mentioned
                    in the letter of the Agent of the Russian Federation, his Government did
                    not object to a further one‑month extension of the time‑limit for the filing
                    of the Counter‑Memorial;
                     Taking into account the views of the Parties,
                     Extends to 9 August 2021 the time‑limit for the filing of the Counter‑
                    Memorial of the Russian Federation; and
                     Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                      Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
                    the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-eighth day of June, two thou-
                    sand and twenty‑one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the
                    archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of
                    Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation, respectively.

                                                               (Signed) Joan E. Donoghue,
                                                                            President.
                                                                (Signed) Philippe Gautier,
                                                                             Registrar.

                    5

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                    ISBN 978-92-1-003886-7

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49

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI.
[Translation.]

I cannot accept the first part of the Judgment, because I do not
agree with the juridical foundation given by it to Albania’s respons-
ibility.

I, like the Court, cannot admit the first argument of the
United Kingdom : that Albania had direct knowledge of the exist-
ence of the minefield, if it is not first established that she had
knowledge of the minelaying. I agree with the Court’s reasons
for rejecting the second argument, that Albania laid the minefield,
and for considering that the indirect evidence produced by the
United Kingdom Government is not decisive proof either that
mines were laid by Yugoslav vessels in Saranda Bay, or of collu-
sion between the two Governments.

In finding that Albania was responsible, the Court accepted the
United Kingdom’s third argument, to the effect that the mines
cannot have been laid without the Albanian Government having
knowledge ; if that be admitted, then, as Albania did not give notice
of the existence of the minefield and did not warn the British
warships that were approaching, her responsibility is involved.

This conclusion does not seem sound, for the same reasons that
prevented the Court from admitting collusion : such an exception-
ally grave charge against a State, as the Court has rightly said,
would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here.

To reply to the question whether Albania really knew of the mine-
laying, the manner in which the events occurred must be considered.

The secret operation could have been seen by the inhabitants
of Saranda ; but the town is rather far from the spot in question,
and it would be difficult to admit that the operation could have
been noticed and recognized as such, if it had been carried out
during the night, and if the most elementary precautions had been
taken. It could have been seen by the coastguard. Very natur-
ally no evidence was produced on this subject. The experts
of the Parties appeared to be in agreement on the general condi-
tions under which the operation could have been seen and heard ;
but they did not agree in determining with some accuracy the
influence of the conditions under which the operation must have
taken place, having regard to the probable place and date (night
of October 21st-22nd, 1946). An Albanian expert declared that the

49
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 50

author might be certain of not being noticed, still less identified.
In particular, if there was no look-out post at Denta Point, this
would render the secret minelaying operation not only practicable,
but safer and more easy. The Court’s Experts, after going to
the spot, stated that the vessels and, under certain conditions, the
operation itself, must have been seen, especially from Denta Point,
if a normal watch was kept over territorial waters.

But was the operation really seen ?

The possibilities of observing minelaying from the Albanian
coast are shown in the Judgment. But while supervision of
this sector seems relatively easy and not beyond the means at
Albania’s disposal, the evidence of the three Albanian witnesses
showed how insufficient it was. The coastal defences had just
been reorganized at the time of the incident, May 15th, but they
were manifestly inefficient. During the critical period, immediately
after and before October 22nd, the commander of the coastal
defence was absent; the harbour-master, who replaced him,
judging from his evidence, seemed not to be particularly efficient.
He was instructed only to watch; but his posts could not even
watch at all effectively. It was said that, during the night, this
imperfect watch was further reduced, and that there was no post
at Denia point.

Whatever be the importance that it is desired to give to this
evidence, it does not seem to be definitely proved that the local
authorities had knowledge of the operation ; and further, it would
be difficult to show how far they would have been able to inform
their Government and to stop the British warships in sufficient
time.

This hypothesis was also put forward by United Kingdom
Counsel under a different form: it does not matter whether the
local authorities knew; it might be arranged that nothing
should be seen. What is important is that the Albanian Govern-
ment knew.

But if the Albanian Government knew—and according to this
conception it must be supposed that it knew beforehand—that
was not knowledge, but collusion. In short, it seems difficult to
assert that Albania knew 7” abstracto; if she knew, she knew in a
concrete manner : when, under what conditions, and no doubt by
whom the mines had been laid. She therefore knew, for instance,
that the minelaying had been done during the night of
October 21st-22nd, with Yugoslavian material ; we are now faced
once again with the hypothesis of collusion, and it has not been
suggested that the operation was carried out in collaboration with
another party possessing governmental means of performing it
effectively.

50
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 51

If the Court considers that it is not proved that the minefield
was laid by the two Yugoslav vessels, it would also seem difficult
to admit, as judicially proved, Albania’s knowledge of the mines
laid by an unknown party. To declare Albania responsible for
the operation or for its result, on the basis of abstract and, so to
speak, immaterial knowledge, would be in reality to base that
responsibility on a presumption derived from the mere fact that
Albania is the territorial Power and has sovereignty over the place
where the unlawful act occurred.

If the two United Kingdom contentions (collusion and knowledge)
cannot be held to be proved, the only ground on which Albania
could be considered responsible would seem to be the fact that she
did not use the due diligence required by international law, to
prevent and repress the unlawful act of October 22nd, 1946.

But two preliminary objections would have to be examined.

(a) United Kingdom Counsel admitted that if Albania did not
know of the minefield she cannot be held responsible. Can the
Court take a different view on this subject ? It is not a matter of a
petitum of the Parties, beyond which the Court has no jurisdiction,
but of an interpretation, or a conception of a rule of international
law. Here the Court is not limited by the views of the Parties, as
was recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case of the Free Zones (P.C.I.J., Series A./B, No. 46, p. 138) :

“From a general point of view, it cannot lightly be admitted that
_ the Court, whose function it is to declare the law, can be called
upon to choose between two or more constructions determined
beforehand by the Parties, none of which may correspond to the
opinion at which it may arrive. Unless otherwise expressly provid-
ed, it must be presumed that the Court enjoys the freedom which
normally appertains to it, and that it is able, if such is its opinion,
not only to accept one or other of the two propositions, but also
to reject them both.’’

If therefore a judge was convinced that Albania must be held
responsible for other reasons than those given by the opposite Party,
the opinion expressed by the United Kingdom Counsel should not
stop him.

(b) In virtue of the Agreement of November 22nd, 1945, respons-
ibility for Medri route 18/32 and 18/34 was, by the unanimous
decision of the four Great Powers on the Medzon Board, entrusted
to Greece. Itis true that, as a United Kingdom expert remarked,
the Channel had been swept, checked and declared safe for naviga-
tion, and that Greece’s responsibility was more or less nominal.
Still, Greece was responsible for the maintenance of a certain
state of things entrusted to her, and it is well-known that she

SI
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 52

immediately consented that the British Navy should take the
necessary measures in the Channel that had been handed over to
Greece.

But this aspect of the affair concerns only Greece, on the one
hand, and the United Kingdom, if not the four Great Powers or the
Medzon Board as such, on the other hand. For Albania, the
Agreement of 1945 was à res inter alios acta ; and it seems certain,
from the whole of the Albanian statements, that Albania never
recognized the decision placing on Greece the responsibility for the
Albanian sector of Medri Route 18/32 and 18/34. We must
therefore reckon that there were two distinct responsibilities : that
of Greece, purely the result of a treaty, for the Medri channel, a
matter completely foreign to Albania; and that of Albania, a
responsibility under ordinary international law, as territorial
Power. It is only this latter responsibility that the Court is called
upon to consider.

The Special Agreement does not limit the Court to considering and
determining whether Albania laid the mines, or helped to lay them,
or knew they had been laid in sufficient time to warn the British
ships. The Court is asked to say whether Albania is responsible
in international law. The Court’s.task is to consider every ground
of responsibility recognized by international law, and corresponding
to the circumstances of the case.

In international law, every State is responsible for an unlawful
act, if it has committed that act, or has failed to take the necessary
steps to prevent an unlawful act, or has omitted to take the necessary
steps to detect and punish the authors of an unlawful act. Each
of these omissions involves a State’s, responsibility in international
law, just like the commission of the act itself. This general prin-
ciple is naturally capable of applications that differ according
to the infinite variety of facts accompanying the act contrary to
international law; but doctrine and jurisprudence recognize it,
and it may be well to refer on this subject to the opinion of the
Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of
Nations in connexion with another Corfu Case, a quarter of a
century ago:

“The responsibility of a State is only involved by the com-
mission in its territory of a political crime against the persons
of foreigners, if the State has neglected to take all reasonable
measures for the prevention of the crime and the pursuit, arrest,
and bringing to justice of the criminal.’’

The Albanian Government asserts that : ‘A government cannot
be held responsible for damage caused by mines merely because
the mines were found in its territorial waters. To involve the
responsibility of the State, it must be proved either that the State
caused the mines to be laid, or that it knowingly allowed them to
be laid. The State cannot be held responsible for everything that

52
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 53

happens inits territorial waters.... It is not responsible for watching
over the safety of that navigation” (in its territorial waters).

It is true, as the Court rightly said in speaking of knowledge,
that the responsibility of a State cannot be held to be involved
solely because of the supervision it exercises over its territority,
including its territorial waters, and independently of other circum-
stances. On the other hand, it would be too easy to say that a
State cannot be held responsible for any occurrence on its territory,
or that a State cannot guarantee that an act contrary to inter-
national law will never happen on its territory. To allege such a
responsibility would be absurd ; international law has never been
held to impose such a burden on States. It is equally clear that
there can be no question of a breach of a rule or of a principle of
international law, save in so far as that rule or that principle
exists. But in this case, such rules and principles do exist. Three
passages, which seem to formulate existing international law
exactly, may be quoted on this subject.

M. Max Huber, former President of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, in the Arbitral Award in the Palmas case,
1928, said :

“Territorial sovereignty .... involves the exclusive right to
display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a
duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights
of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviol-
ability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each
State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without
manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding
to circumstances, the State cannot fulfil this duty. Territorial
sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e., to excluding
the activities of other States; for it serves to divide between
nations the space upon which human activities are employed,
in order to assure them at all points the minimum of protection
of which international law is the guardian.’’

M. D. Anzilotti, former President of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, said in his Course of International Law
(Pp. 490) :

“The duty of a State cannot consist and does not consist in
the exclusion of the possibility of the committing of acts that
harm or offend foreign States by persons subject to its authority ;
a State can only be bound to take suitable measures to prevent
these acts happening or, when they do happen, to take criminal
proceedings against the guilty: such is the duty of a State and
only within these limits is an unlawful international act possible.’’

Lastly, in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case (P.C.I.J.,
Series A., No. 10, p. 88), Mr. J. B. Moore, former Judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, said :

53
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 54

“It is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence
to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts
against another nation or its people.” (United States v. Arjona,
1887, 120, U.S. 479.)

Each particular case must be considered and judged with regard
for the circumstances peculiar to it. The zone of Albanian
territorial waters in question extends from the point where the
Albanian-Greek frontier reaches the Strait, up to a point somewhat
to the north of Cape Kiephali, where that part of the sea recognized.
as dangerous ends, and the mine-free space of the Strait of
Otranto begins. Throughout the length of the North Corfu
Channel, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Kiephali to Cape
S. Katerina, there is no free sea, the maritime frontier between
Albania and Greece following the median line of the Strait. The
navigable channel, starting from the South, goes very close to the
Greek coast ; it then occupies the whole width of the Strait for a few
kilometres, and finally follows the Albanian coast very closely, as
far as Cape Kiephali. That part of the navigable channel that
follows the Albanian coast for less than fifteen kilometres was the
theatre of events that gave rise to the present case.

The Judgment has sufficiently shown what was the attitude
of the Albanian Government in regard to the right of passage of
foreign warships through Albanian waters during the period
between May 15th and October 22nd, 1946, and even after. The
Judgment refers to the Albanian Government’s wish to keep a
jealous watch over its territorial waters. In fact, from May 15th
onwards-it is clear that the Albanian Government was determined
to refuse a free passage to foreign ships and boats through that part
of the Medri route 18/32 and 18/34 that was in Albanian waters.
In that way, it rendered any. supervision that the Greek vessels
might have desired to exercise in the name of the International
Mine Clearance Organization impossible. The reasons for this
attitude were given by Albania in her diplomatic notes and in her
Counter-Memoriai and Rejoinder, and during the arguments. They
were: the vulnerable frontier with Greece ; the territorial claims
of that country ; the “‘state of war’ of which the Representative
of Greece spoke at the Security Council ; the “‘piratical incursions”
ot Greek boats, eight of which were mentioned in the note of
May 2ist, 1946, not to mention the other “innumerable piratical
incursions’ and a number of cases in which foreign vessels entered
Albanian waters on patrol, without showing their flag and without
permission ; passages of British warships ; removal of property
and of Albanian citizens; infiltration of hostile elements; the
Bay and the Port of Saranda seem to play an important part in
the Albanian Government’s anxieties. The result was, in the
opinion of that Government, the “exceptional circumstances in
the North Corfu Channel” stressed in the Counter-Memorial. “The

54
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 55

question of free passage is, for Albania, necessarily connected with
the problem of the country’s security.”

The Albanian note of December 21st, 1946, expressly set out
another aspect of the problem. The Albanian Government
“desires to declare that it respects the principles of international
law concerning maritime navigation .... ships have the right of
innocent passage in straits which form an international highway of
communication. But this principle of innocent passage, so far
as it can be applied to the present case, was flagrantly violated by
the ships of His Majesty, on the occasion of their passage through
the northern part of the Corfu Channel. It is evident that there
was no innocent passage when British ships were sailing demon-
stratively very close to the Albanian coast.’ And further on:
“Tf Great Britain really wishes to apply the principle of innocent
passage and to provide for the safety of commercial shipping, she
should undertake the sweeping of the middle of the North Corfu
Channel, which is the safest for shipping, in such a way that
navigation through the Channel would be more in accordance
with the principle of innocent passage mentioned in the United
Kingdom note.”

It seems certain—and this is confirmed in the Rejoinder—that
from the month of May, 1946, Albania considered this part of the
swept area a critical place and wished to move the sector towards
the West. In this way, according to Albania’s view, the channel
coming from the South should bend north-westward somewhat
to the south of St. George’s Monastery, and not at Denta Point,
as it does at present, and would pass at an equal distance from
either coast ; in this case, it would be moved about two kilo-
metres.

It would be natural that this attitude of the Albanian Govern-
ment should lead it to take special measures of vigilance in the
sector mentioned above during the period in question (May—
October, 1946) ; and the Albanian delegate at the Security Council
spoke of these. None the less, the Albanian Counter-Memorial
and Rejoinder took great pains to show that Albania was not in
a position to keep an effective watch over her coast-line and terri-
torial waters : that she had no means of knowing what happened
there and, in particular, could learn nothing of the minelaying
operation, however close to the coast it may have been. The
Albanian Government resisted the idea that she had been watchful
in the way her representative at the Security Council stated during
the discussion of the matter; and the Counter-Memorial insists
upon this. The Albanian witnesses depicted the coastal defence
organization and the watch over the territorial sea as absolutely
inadequate.

What then does the situation in the Saranda sector appear to
have been? It would seem that in the organization of the watch
over the coast and the territorial waters, there was nothing

55
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 56

that corresponded to the protests and energetic reaction against
the passage of foreign vessels through Albanian waters ; nothing
that could be considered as measures of appropriate protection
against alleged danger of incursions, infiltrations, and abductions,
by which the Albanian Government endeavoured to justify its
attitude towards foreign shipping. This contradiction was charac-
teristic of the Albanian Government’s attitude throughout the
proceedings. Her attitude shows another contradiction: it is
not possible to proclaim one’s rights as a territorial Power, to
exalt and exaggerate them in such a way as to refuse to allow
other States to use one’s territorial waters, and at the same time
to neglect the organization of one’s public order and security
services intended to guarantee to States allowed to use the navig-
able channel that minimum of security to which they are entitled
according to the most modest international standard. The
“exceptional circumstances’ relied on by Albania ought to have
guided her conduct and dictated to her her duties, which would
not have exceeded her capacities, however limited.

Still more, if Albania had decided to set international action
in motion in this sector of her territorial waters, an action whose
purpose might be perfectly legitimate (shifting of the navigable
channel), she ought, especially at that moment, to have made
certain that effective surveillance would enable her to avoid any
additional complications.

After the explosions of October 22nd, and even after the notifica-
tion of October 26th, Albania evidently omitted to open an enquiry
to discover the facts ; nor did she propose that the Medzon Board
or the United Kingdom should take part in any investigation of the
causes of the explosion ; she did not protest against the laying of
the minefield in her territorial waters, which was truly a serious
violation of her territorial sovereignty; she seemed to remain
indifferent to the grave breach of international law committed on
her territory, arid to the dangers to which shipping quite close to
her coast was exposed ; nothing is known of an enquiry for the
pursuit and bringing to justice of the authors of the act which also
constitutes a crime from the viewpoint of domestic law. Such an
attitude on the part of the Albanian Government has been held to
be an indirect proof of Albania’s knowledge of the minelaying ;
it would seem more reasonable to hold that it can and must be
considered as an independent ground for her responsibility.

For these reasons, but for these only, Albania might be con-

sidered responsible under international law for the explosions that
occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in her territorial waters.

56
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE WINIARSKI 57

*
* *

I would add that I cannot agree with the Court’s decision on
the question of its jurisdiction to assess the amount of compens-
ation due to the United Kingdom. When they signed the Special
Agreement, the Parties put an end to the proceedings instituted
by the unilateral application ; this was in accordance with the
wish constantly expressed on the Albanian side. The Special
Agreement is therefore a new instrument and, as regards the
submissions of the Parties, to be treated as independent of, the
Application, and intended to replace it. There is no request for
the Court to assess the amount of compensation in the Special
Agreement ; yet such a request has become almost a clause de
style, in special agreements of this nature, and I have not been
convinced by the interpretation adopted in favour of jurisdiction
on this point.

(Signed) B. WINIARSKI.

57


37

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ODA
[Traduction]

1. Jai voté pour l’avis consultatif, mais seulement après avoir quelque
peu hésité, et j’estime qu’il est de mon devoir de juge de m’en expliquer. Je
suis, en effet, convaincu qu’un aspect important du différend existant
entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis aurait dû être mis
plus clairement en évidence à la fois dans la requête soumise par l’Assem-
blée générale et dans l’argumentation de la Cour.

2. Il importe de noter dès le départ qu’il n’existe guère de divergences
de vues entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis en ce qui
concerne les dispositions pertinentes de fond de l’accord de siège de 1947,
à savoir les sections 11 à 13. Bien que, dans la présente controverse, la
première référence expresse aux sections 11, 12 et 13 remonte, du moins à
la connaissance de la Cour, à la déclaration faite par le porte-parole du
Secrétaire général le 22 octobre 1987 (conférence de presse quotidienne de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies), il est raisonnablement permis de
penser que non seulement l'Organisation des Nations Unies mais aussi les
Etats-Unis ont toujours eu ces dispositions à l’esprit lorsqu'ils ont consi-
déré les conséquences que pouvait avoir pour les intérêts de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies la proposition de loi visant à rendre illégaux l’éta-
blissement ou le maintien d’un bureau de l'Organisation de libération de
la Palestine dans les limites de la juridiction des Etats-Unis.

3. Dès janvier 1987, le secrétaire d’Etat Shultz, dans la lettre qu’il a
adressée le 29 janvier 1987 au sénateur Dole ainsi que dans une lettre du
même jour à M. Kemp, membre de la chambre des représentants, a fait
connaître son interprétation de l’accord de siège dans les termes suivants:

«Les Etats-Unis ont fait clairement savoir que les membres du per-
sonnel de la mission d’observation de l’'OLP ne sont présents aux
Etats-Unis qu’en qualité de « personnes invitées » par l'Organisation
des Nations Unies, au sens de l’accord de siège. Donc, nous avons
l'obligation d’autoriser les membres du personnel de la mission d’ob-
servation de l’OLP à entrer et à demeurer aux Etats-Unis pour s’ac-
quitter de leurs fonctions officielles au Siège de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies...» (Congressional Record, vol. 133, n° 78, p. S6449.)

Dans une lettre qu’il a adressée le 13 octobre 1987 au représentant perma-
nent des Etats-Unis, le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies, se référant à la position du secrétaire d’Etat (citée ci-dessus), lui a
nettement fait savoir que la «législation [envisagée est] contraire aux obli-
gations qui découlent de l'accord de siège». Dans une lettre, datée du
27 octobre 1987, le représentant permanent des Etats-Unis auprès de
l'Organisätion des Nations Unies a répondu en ces termes au Secrétaire
général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies:

29
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (OP. IND. ODA) 38

«Le gouvernement s’est fermement opposé à la fermeture de la
mission d’observation de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine
auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Je tiens à vous assurer
que le gouvernement demeure hostile à ce projet de loi...»

Dans une lettre du 7 décembre 1987 adressée au représentant permanent
des Etats-Unis, le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
a réaffirmé la position de l’Organisation et a noté qu’elle «coïncidait »
avec la position adoptée par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis dans la
lettre du secrétaire d’Etat du 29 janvier 1988.

4. Le 14 octobre 1987, quand l’observateur de l’OLP a porté la question
à l’attention du comité des relations avec le pays hôte de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies, le représentant des Etats-Unis a immédiatement réagi
dans les termes suivants:

«de l’avis de l’exécutif, la fermeture de la mission de l’OLP ne serait
pas conforme aux obligations du pays hôte en vertu de l’accord de
siège» (A/42/26, Rapport du comité des relations avec le pays hôte,
p. 12).

D’après le rapport du comité, il n’a été fait mention d’aucune disposition
particulière de l’accord de siège qui aurait pu être mise en cause. Cepen-
dant, on peut raisonnablement penser que, dans sa réponse, le représen-
tant des Etats-Unis avait à l’esprit les sections 11, 12 et 13 de Paccord.

5. Dans sa résolution 42/210 B du 17 décembre 1987, l’Assemblée
générale a exprimé l’avis non seulement que

«la mesure envisagée [aux] Etats-Unis d’ Amérique … pourrait empé-
cher le maintien des installations de la mission ... d’observation de
[POLP] … lesquelles lui permettent de s’acquitter de ses fonctions
officielles »,

mais aussi que la mission d’observation de l’OLP était couverte par les
dispositions de l’accord de siège et elle a prié les Etats-Unis

« de respecter les obligations que lui impose l’accord relatif au siège
et. de s’abstenir de prendre toute mesure qui empécherait la mission
… d'observation de [’OLP] de s’acquitter de ses fonctions offi-
cielles ».

Lorsque le projet concernant cette résolution a été examiné à la Sixième
Commission, le représentant des Etats-Unis s’est exprimé comme suit le
25 novembre 1987:

«le secrétaire d’Etat des Etats-Unis a déclaré que la fermeture de
cette mission constituerait une violation des obligations des Etats-
Unis en vertu de l’accord de siège » (A/C.6/42/SR.58, p. 2).

Dès janvier 1988, le représentant permanent par intérim des Etats-Unis,

30
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (OP. IND. ODA) 39

dans la lettre qu’il a adressée le 5 du même mois au Secrétaire général de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies, n’a pas hésité à déclarer que les disposi-
tions concernant la mission d'observation de l’'OLP «si elles étaient appli-
quées ... seraient contraires à nos obligations juridiques internationales
découlant de l’accord de siège avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies».

6. Il était donc tout à fait clair qu’en ce qui concerne «l'interprétation
ou l'application» des sections 11 à 13 de l’accord il n’y avait aucune diver-
gence de vues, les deux parties reconnaissant que la fermeture par la
contrainte du bureau de l’OLP serait contraire aux obligations internatio-
nales que les Etats-Unis assumaient en vertu de l’accord. Les positions des
Etats-Unis et de l’Organisation des Nations Unies n’ont divergé que
lorsque le Congrès a finalement adopté, les 15 et 16 décembre 1987, la loi
contre le terrorisme, qui constituait le titre X de la loi d’ouverture de cré-
dits pour les affaires étrangéres, exercices budgétaires 1988 et 1989, que le
président des Etats-Unis a promulguée, avec les autres titres de cette loi, le
22 décembre 1987. Je dois 4 nouveau faire observer que la divergence de
vues entre l’Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis ne portait
pas sur la question de savoir si la fermeture par la contrainte du bureau
violerait ou non l’accord de siège, mais plutôt sur la question de savoir
quelle mesure prise dans le cadre du système juridique interne des Etats-
Unis équivaudrait à la fermeture par la contrainte du bureau de ?OLP à
New York, mesure que les deux parties considéraient comme une viola-
tion de l’accord. Cette divergence de vues semble être apparue vers la fin
de 1987 ou au début de 1988.

7. Lorsque le projet (qui devait devenir la résolution 42/210 B de l’As-
semblée générale) a été mis aux voix à la Sixième Commission le 11 dé-
cembre 1987, le représentant des Etats-Unis a indiqué pourquoi il n’avait
pas participé au vote, en précisant que le vote sur la résolution était «su-
perflu et inopportun puisqu'il porte sur une question que le Gouverne-
ment des Etats-Unis est encore en train d’étudier» (A/C.6/42/SR.62,
p. 4). Lorsque le projet proposé par la Sixième Commission a été adopté
en séance plénière par l’Assemblée générale, le 17 décembre 1987, et est
devenu la résolution 42/210B, le représentant des Etats-Unis, qui une
nouvelle fois n’a pas participé au vote, a exposé encore la position des
Etats-Unis (A/42/PV.98, p. 8). Par ailleurs, dans une lettre qu’il a adressée
le 7 décembre 1987 au représentant permanent des Etats-Unis, le Secré-
taire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies a demandé confirmation

«que même si la loi envisagée est adoptée, les arrangements actuel-
lement en vigueur en ce qui concerne la mission d’observation de
VOLP ne seront ni restreints ni autrement affectés ».

Le Secrétaire général a déclaré:

« Faute d’une telle assurance, il s’avérerait qu’un différend existe
entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis quant à l’in-
terprétation ou à l'application de l’accord de siège »

et a précisé qu’à défaut de cette assurance il se «verrait dans l’obligation

31
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (OP. IND. ODA) 40

d’entamer la procédure de règlement des différends prévue à la section 21
de l'accord». Cette position a été réaffirmée par le Secrétaire général de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans une lettre datée du 14 janvier 1988,
adressée au représentant permanent des Etats-Unis.

8. L'Organisation des Nations Unies a déclaré que des négociations —
préalable indispensable pour qu’un différend puisse être soumis à un ar-
bitrage obligatoire en vertu de la section 21 de l’accord de siège — avaient
débuté le 7 janvier 1988, mais leur objet reste mal connu. Ce qui est clair,
c’est que le Secrétaire général a estimé qu’il n’avait pas reçu l’assurance,
qu’il avait demandée, au cours d’une réunion tenue le 12 janvier 1988,
que les arrangements en vigueur concernant la mission d’observation
de l'OLP seraient maintenus. On est doublement fondé à en déduire qu’il
n’y a pas eu de négociations sur «l'interprétation ou l'application » des sec-
tions 11, 12 et 13 mais de simples consultations au cours desquelles l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies semble avoir cherché à plusieurs reprises à
obtenir des Etats-Unis l’assurance que, compte tenu de la concordance de
vues des parties concernant ces sections, le bureau de l’OLP ne serait pas
fermé en dépit de la promulgation de la loi contre le terrorisme. Par ailleurs,
la position adoptée par les Etats-Unis lors de ces consultations était que

«la loi en question n’avait pas encore été appliquée et que l’exécutif
continuait d'évaluer la situation en vue d’une éventuelle non-appli-
cation de cette loi» (exposé écrit du Secrétaire général de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies).

Ainsi, au cours d’une série de consultations, les Etats-Unis ont estimé que
la situation qui existait alors ne relevait pas de la section 21 de l’accord;
l'Organisation des Nations Unies, pour sa part, a maintenu que la pro-
cédure de règlement des différends prévue à la section 21 devait être
appliquée. Les discussions ont porté sur l’applicabilité et, partant, sur
Papplication de la section 21, autrement dit de la clause compromis-
soire elle-méme.

9. En conséquence, il n’y a jamais eu de différend manifeste entre l’Or-
ganisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis sur le point de savoir com-
ment les sections 11 à 13 de l’accord devaient être «interprétées ou appli-
quées ». Certes, il n’est pas exclu que les Etats-Unis soutiennent plus tard
que la fermeture par la contrainte du bureau de la mission d’observation de
VPOLP ne serait pas contraire aux dispositions de l’accord, mais il n’en de-
meure pas moins que l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis
se sont presque accordés à reconnaître que sa fermeture par la contrainte
constituerait une violation de ces dispositions. Or «l’ Attorney General des
Etats-Unis a jugé qu’il est tenu par la loi de 1987 contre le terrorisme de
fermer le bureau » de la mission d’observation de l’OLP (lettre du 11 mars
1988 adressée par le représentant permanent par intérim des Etats-Unis
au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies). La véritable
question qui se posait à l’Organisation avait trait à la structure constitu-
tionnelle des Etats-Unis qui permettait manifestement de donner effet a
une loi interne en violation des droits d’une autre partie 4 un traité conclu

32
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (OP. IND. ODA) 41

par les Etats-Unis, et cela « quelles que soient les obligations que les Etats-
Unis pourraient avoir au titre de l'accord» (lettre précitée) ou «quelles
que puissent être les obligations juridiques internationales des Etats-
Unis en vertu de l’accord de siège» (exposé écrit des Etats-Unis), ou
indépendamment de «interprétation ou l’application de l’accord»;
les Etats-Unis faisaient apparemment valoir que «le Congrès a le pou-
voir d’abroger les traités et de ne pas tenir compte du droit international
aux fins du droit interne» ou que, en l’occurrence, «le Congrès a décidé,
indépendamment du droit international, d’interdire la présence de tous
les bureaux de l’'OLP aux Etats-Unis, y compris la présence de la mission
d'observation de l’OLP auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies»
(conférence de presse du département d’Etat du 11 mars 1988).

10. Je ne veux pas dire que, dans la présente affaire, la Cour a été priée
d’examiner cette question, qui constitue un aspect fondamental du main-
tien de la suprématie du droit international dans le cadre de son applica-
tion interne. Cependant, il faut bien voir qu’en posant la question dont
nous sommes actuellement saisis et qui procède de l’idée que «la sec-
tion 21 de l’accord [de siège] constitue la seule voie de recours existant sur
le plan juridique pour régler ce différend » (résolution 42/230 de l’Assem-
blée générale du 23 mars 1988 (les italiques sont de moi)), l’Assemblée
générale a remis à plus tard les véritables questions qui se sont posées à
l'Organisation des Nations Unies et qui, j'en suis certain, ne pourront en
définitive être réglées par la simple soumission à l’arbitrage d’un différend
limité à l’interprétation ou à l'application des sections 11 à 13 de l’accord
de siège; en effet, les véritables questions que soulève le différend ne por-
tent pas sur l'interprétation ou l'application de l’accord de siège, mais sur
le point de savoir si, sur le plan de l’exécution, la primauté devra être ac-
cordée à l’interprétation ou à l’application incontestée de cet accord ou à
la loi contre le terrorisme telle que l’a interprétée l’ Attorney General des
Etats-Unis. Ce qui me gêne, c’est que la question que la Cour a dû exa-
miner n’est pas celle à laquelle il aurait été le plus utile qu’elle réponde
pour tenir compte des profondes inquiétudes exprimées par l’Assemblée
générale. Il se trouve que la Cour a affirmé la prééminence, dans les cir-
constances de l'affaire, du droit international mais n’a ni entendu ni exa-
miné d’argument circonstancié sur ce point crucial.

(Signé) Shigeru Opa.

33


250

              SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ROBINSON

   1. An interesting and not esoteric question has been raised in this case.
It was not necessary for the Court to pronounce on it in explicit terms.
However, the question may have implications for the functioning of what
the Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(hereinafter “the UNCLOS” or “the Convention”) calls “a legal order for
the seas and oceans” 1, the establishment of which was the primary goal of
the Convention.
   2. Nicaragua argued that there is a “convergence in maritime delimita-
tion methodology” 2 in respect of the territorial sea, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (hereinafter the “EEZ”) and the continental shelf. In eﬀect,
Nicaragua espouses an approach whereby the principles set out in Arti-
cles 74 and 83 of the Convention, for the delimitation of the EEZ and
continental shelf would apply equally to delimitation of the territorial sea
under Article 15 of the Convention. Indeed, Costa Rica argued that the
eﬀect of Nicaragua’s submission on this point is that delimitation of the
territorial sea under Article 15 of the Convention “must be undertaken in
such a manner as not to prevent or undermine the achievement of an
equitable solution to the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf
under Articles 74 and 83” 3. I understand Nicaragua’s submission to
mean that the law under the UNCLOS calls for a convergence in mari-
time delimitation methodology.

   3. This opinion argues that there is no such convergence for the three
zones, although, it is possible for States by agreement to use a single
methodology for all three zones. The opinion maintains that a proper
interpretation of the Convention shows that it calls for a dichotomous
approach, whereby the territorial sea is delimited on the basis of the
median line/special circumstances approach and the EEZ and continental
shelf are delimited on the basis of any method that would result in an
equitable solution.
   4. The decision to convene the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea was, in part, a response to the claims of many coun-
tries, in particular developing countries from Latin America, Asia and
Africa, to an extensive zone of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. The
precise nature of this zone, which came to be called the exclusive eco-

  1   Preamble, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.
  2   CR 2017/11 (Lowe), p. 12, para. 15.
  3   CR 2017/07 (Ugalde), p. 23, para. 16.

115

251 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

nomic zone, (although in Latin America it was originally called the patri-
monial sea) was among the most diﬃcult issues faced by the Conference,
and the issue of delimitation of the EEZ between neighbouring States was
perhaps the most intractable problem in the Conference. In 1980, six years
after the Conference commenced and just two years before it concluded,
no agreement had been reached on the delimitation of the EEZ and con-
tinental shelf. There was however, at that time, broad agreement on the
régime for the delimitation of the territorial sea, which generally followed
Article 12 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone.
   5. It will be recalled that the equidistance/special circumstances rule 4
in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
which was employed for the delimitation of the territorial sea, also applied
to the delimitation of the continental shelf under the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf. However, UNCLOS’ drafting history 5 shows that,
owing to the potential for natural geographical overlap between the con-
tinental shelf and the newly created EEZ, the provisions for delimitation
of the continental shelf moved closer to those for the delimitation of the
EEZ, the two sets of provisions becoming congruent with each other to
the extent that Articles 74 and 83 have identical formulations. No doubt
this congruence is one explanation for the practice that has developed of
a single maritime boundary being used to delimit these two zones.
   6. During the Conference, States exhibited a preference for equity to
play a greater role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries as one
moved further seaward. An explanation for this preference is that the
potential distorting eﬀects of the equidistance line are more magniﬁed in
the more distant EEZ and continental shelf than in the territorial sea. In
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 6, the Court said that the distorting
eﬀect of equidistance lines are “comparatively small within the limits of
territorial waters, but produce their maximum eﬀect in the localities
where the continental shelf areas lie further out”. 7
   7. During the Conference, some countries favoured the use of the
median line in the delimitation of the EEZ; others, taking their cue from
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, favoured the use of equitable prin-
ciples. Obviously any framework for delimitation of the EEZ had to take
account of the diﬀerences between the legal régime of the territorial sea

   4  See Article 6 (1) of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and Article 12 (1)
of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
    5 See generally, Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Conven-

tion on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II, Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 1985,
pp. 132-143, pp. 796-821 and pp. 948-962; Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. XIII, (Summary Records, Plenary, General Committee,
First and Third Committees, as well as Documents of the Conference, Ninth Session),
A/CONF.62/SR.126, 126th Plenary Meeting (1980).
    6 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Repu-

blic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3.
    7 Ibid., p. 37, para. 59.

116

252 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

and that of the EEZ, described in Article 55 of the Convention as “an
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea”. For some States, includ-
ing the strongest supporters of an extensive maritime zone of jurisdiction
for the coastal State, the rights of the coastal State in that zone should be
emphasized, while for others, the high seas freedoms of all States in the
zone should receive maximum protection. Articles 56 and 58 of the
Convention reﬂect the compromise that was reached between both groups
of States.

   8. This tug between States was reﬂected in a proposal by Venezuela in
1980 that the concept of equity should govern delimitation in the territo-
rial sea, EEZ and continental shelf 8. In the result, that approach was not
accepted. Article 15 of the Convention reads as follows:

         “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each
      other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between
      them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
      line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the
      baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the
      two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however,
      where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special cir-
      cumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way
      which is at variance therewith.”
  Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention read as follows:
         “The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf]
      between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be eﬀected by
      agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Arti-
      cle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
      achieve an equitable solution.”
   9. The main diﬀerence between the legal régime of the territorial sea
and that of the EEZ is that whereas, in accordance with Article 2 (1) of
the Convention “[t]he sovereignty of a coastal State extends . . . to . . . the
‘territorial sea’”, in the EEZ the coastal State only has, in accordance
with Article 56 (1), sovereign rights and jurisdiction in respect of certain
functions. Moreover, Article 56 (2) provides that a coastal State in carry-
ing out its functions in the EEZ, “shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the pro-
visions of this Convention”.
   10. In the territorial sea, therefore, the rights of the coastal State, based
as they are on that State’s sovereignty, are clearly diﬀerent from the sov-
  8 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. XIII
(Summary Records, Plenary, General Committee, First and Third Committees, as well
as Documents of the Conference, Ninth Session), A/CONF.62/SR.126, 126th Plenary
Meeting (1980), paras. 137 (statements by Venezuela) and 88 (statement by Argentina).

117

253 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

ereign but functional rights and jurisdiction that the coastal State enjoys
in the EEZ. The rights of the coastal State receive their greatest recogni-
tion and deference in the territorial sea. This diﬀerence between the ter-
ritorial sea and the EEZ is reﬂected in the drafting of Article 15 on the
one hand, and that of Articles 74 and 83 on the other. While Article 15
prescribes a speciﬁc methodology of delimitation, the median line/special
circumstances method, Articles 74 and 83 do not prescribe a particular
method, but point to the achievement of an equitable solution as the goal
of the delimitation. Over the years the equidistance/relevant circum-
stances method, which has evolved through this Court’s judicial interpre-
tation of Articles 74 and 83, has become applicable for delimitation of the
EEZ and continental shelf. In any event, as a practical matter, delimita-
tion — whether of the territorial sea or the EEZ and continental shelf —
begins with a provisional median/equidistance line. The diﬀerent methods
of delimiting the various zones derive from the diﬀerences in their legal
régimes. Another distinction between the two régimes is that Articles 74
and 83 have an explicit reference not only to the dispute settlement pro-
cedures in Part XV of the Convention, but also directs the parties in the
interim period, pending agreement on delimitation, to conduct themselves
in a manner that would not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a ﬁnal
agreement. This indicates a greater sensitivity to the potential for disputes
on a provision which does not identify a speciﬁc method, but places its
focus on the search for an equitable solution.

   11. The ﬁrst rule of interpretation is that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose” 9. A plain reading of the relevant articles shows that Article 15
sets out more deﬁnitive and objective criteria for the delimitation of the
territorial sea than do Articles 74 and 83 for the delimitation of the EEZ
and continental shelf. Article 15 requires that if States cannot agree on
the delimitation of their territorial sea, absent special circumstances, “nei-
ther of the two States is entitled . . . to extend its territorial sea beyond the
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the
two States is measured” 10. Thus, a departure from the median line is
envisaged only in situations where “special circumstances” exist. Arti-
cle 15, by prescribing the method for delimitation, identiﬁes the median
line as the speciﬁc basis for delimitation of the territorial sea. In Guyana/
Suriname 11, the Tribunal aﬃrmed the primacy of the median line in the

   9 Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.
   10  Article 15, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.
   11 Award in the Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between

Guyana and Suriname, Award of 17 September 2007, United Nations, Reports of Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXX (Part One), p. 93, para. 296.

118

254 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

delimitation of the territorial sea. On the other hand, Articles 74 and 83
are wholly result-oriented; no speciﬁc method is identiﬁed, although in
practice, the judicially developed equidistance line/relevant circumstances
approach prevails. After the Black Sea case 12 (described in more detail in
paragraph 16), one must add to that approach, the element of dispropor-
tionality.

   12. The explicit reference to the median line as a method to delimit the
territorial sea in Article 15 can be contrasted with the silence of Arti-
cles 74 and 83 on the method of delimitation. Absent special circum-
stances, the elements of predictability and certainty resulting from the
requirement to employ the more objective criterion of the median line in
the territorial sea are not present in the delimitation of the EEZ and con-
tinental shelf, which may be seen as oﬀering greater ﬂexibility in method-
ology, the aim of which is to ﬁnd an equitable solution.
   13. Given the diﬀerences between the legal régime of the territorial sea
and that of the EEZ and continental shelf, an interpretation of the Con-
vention, as requiring a single method for delimiting all three zones would
indeed be diﬃcult to understand. This is so because a single method may
not reﬂect, or reﬂect suﬃciently, the varying rights of the coastal State in
the territorial sea on the one hand, and in the EEZ and continental shelf
on the other.

 14. The Court also commented on this diﬀerence in the Nicaragua v.
Honduras 13 case when it stated that,
         “The methods governing territorial sea delimitations have needed
      to be, and are, more clearly articulated in international law than those
      used for the other, more functional maritime areas. Article 15 of
      UNCLOS, like Article 12, paragraph 1, of the 1958 Convention on
      the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone before it, refers speciﬁcally
      and expressly to the equidistance/special circumstances approach for
      delimiting the territorial sea.” (Emphasis added.)

This unequivocal statement of what the Court obviously sees as an
imperative requirement to have more clearly articulated delimitation meth-
ods for the territorial sea than in the EEZ and continental shelf is a telling
judicial comment supporting the need for a dichotomous approach. The
dictum means that there is something in the territorial sea, or more speciﬁ-
cally, in the nature of the territorial sea that calls for greater clarity in the
methods for delimiting that zone — that “something” is the territorial

   12 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61.
   13 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean

Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 740, para. 269.

119

255 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

rights enjoyed by the coastal State in the territorial sea. The basis of that
analysis by the Court must be the marked diﬀerence in the legal régime of
the various zones. For it is this diﬀerence that will generally call for diﬀer-
ent methodologies if the basic law governing the zones is not to be contro-
verted. Thus, the provisional median line in the territorial sea has a diﬀerent
value from the provisional median line in the EEZ and continental shelf,
and while special circumstances and relevant circumstances are both modi-
ﬁers, they too, will have diﬀerent values. This was one of the reasons why
the Arbitral Tribunal in Bangladesh/Myanmar 14 in delimiting the territorial
sea gave full eﬀect to St. Martin’s Island, a Bangladeshi island, even though
it is located on Myanmar’s side of the equidistance line, but gave it no
eﬀect in the EEZ and continental shelf. Another example comes from the
instant case in which the Court refused to modify the median line on
account of the Santa Elena peninsula, giving it full eﬀect in the territorial
sea. But the peninsula was given half-eﬀect in the EEZ and continen-
tal shelf.

   15. However, since under Articles 74 and 83 it is open to States to
choose any method for delimitation (in order to arrive at an equitable
solution) and under Article 15, States may agree not to use the median
line, it is possible for States under UNCLOS to agree to utilize a uniform
methodology for delimiting the three zones. In Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire 15, a
Special Chamber of the ITLOS, although acknowledging that diﬀerent
rules apply to the delimitation of the territorial sea and the EEZ, having
heard the submissions of the parties, determined that there was an implicit
agreement that a single methodology should be used for the various
zones.
   16. The Court’s case law as well as the decisions of arbitral tribunals
have consistently followed a dichotomous approach to the delimitation of
the territorial sea and the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf.
When the ICJ cases are carefully examined, it will be found that the Court
has never applied a single delimitation methodology for all three zones.
(I do not consider Nicaragua v. Honduras 16 to be a case in which the
Court applied a single methodology, since the Court used the angle-
bisector method for drawing of the single maritime boundary and the equi-
distance method to delimit the overlapping territorial seas generated by
   14 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay
of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 47, para. 152; p. 86,
paras. 316-319.
   15 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte

d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, judgment of
23 September 2017, p. 78, paras. 259-260.
   16 Supra note 13, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 746, para. 286; p. 752, paras. 304-305.

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256 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

some islands situated in the territorial sea.) Cameroon v. Nigeria 17 does
not indicate otherwise. It will be recalled that, in Cameroon v. Nigeria,
this Court had said,
         “The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the appli-
       cable criteria, principles and rules of delimitation are when a line
       covering several zones of coincident jurisdictions is to be determined.
       They are expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant cir-
       cumstances method. This method, which is very similar to the equi-
       distance/special circumstances method applicable in delimitation of
       the territorial sea, involves ﬁrst drawing an equidistance line, then
       considering whether there are factors calling for an adjustment or
       shifting of that line in order to achieve an ‘equitable result’.” 18

Three comments are appropriate. First, it follows from the position
that I have taken, in particular on the question of diﬀering values (see
paragraph 14) that I would have some diﬃculty with the last sentence in
that dictum, if by it the Court meant that in substance the equitable prin-
ciples/relevant circumstances method is similar to the equidistance/special
circumstances method. For there are clearly substantial diﬀerences
between the two methods. One such a diﬀerence may be found at the end
of the third sentence in the reference to adjustments of the equidistance
line in order to achieve an equitable result, a goal that has no application
to the median line/special circumstances method. If however, the Court was
merely referring to a procedural similarity between the two methods —
that is, in both cases one begins with a provisional median/equidistance
line, followed by consideration as to whether it should be adjusted —
I would have less diﬃculty with that analysis. Second, this was not a case
where the Court delimited all three maritime zones, as the Court was
not called upon to delimit the territorial sea in light of its ﬁnding that
that zone had already been delimited by previous agreements 19. Third,
at the time of this decision in Cameroon v. Nigeria, the Court had not
yet developed the three-stage approach in Black Sea. In the Black Sea
case 20 the Court outlined the three-stage methodology for the delimita-
tion of the EEZ and continental shelf. In the ﬁrst stage, a provisional
equidistance line is drawn; in the second stage, an examination is carried
out to determine whether there are any relevant circumstances requiring
an adjustment or shifting of that line; in the third stage, a check is carried
out to ensure that there is no disproportionality between the relevant
coasts and relevant areas to be delimited.

  17  Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303.
   18 Ibid., p. 441, para. 288.
   19 Ibid., p. 440, para. 285; p. 431, para. 268.
   20 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61.

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257 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

   17. The Black Sea approach, in particular, the third stage in which the
Court checks that there is no disproportionality, conﬁrms the diﬀerence
alluded to before, between the median line/special circumstances approach
under Article 15 and the equitable solution approach of Articles 74 and
83. The addition of the disproportionality test at the third stage in the
delimitation ensures that the focus of a delimitation under Articles 74 and
83 remains the achievement of “an equitable solution”. Under Article 15,
disproportionality, itself an element of equitableness, plays no role in the
delimitation of the territorial sea. Therefore, Cameroon v. Nigeria, is not
an authority for the proposition that the Court’s case law supports a uni-
form methodology for delimiting all three maritime zones.

  18. Another case that might appear to show the Court’s use of a uni-
form methodology for delimiting the three maritime zones is Peru v.
Chile 21. However, examination of that case shows that there is no basis
for that conclusion. It will be recalled that in Peru v. Chile the Court had
found that the Parties had agreed on their maritime boundary up to
80 nautical miles and therefore, began the delimitation at that endpoint 22.
The question of delimitation of the territorial sea, therefore, did not arise.
Since the Court did not delimit all three maritime zones, that case can
hardly provide support for the proposition that the Court favours a single
method of delimitation for all three zones.

   19. Therefore, Articles 15, 74 and 83 properly interpreted, as well as
the case law of the Court, do not support the proposition that there is a
“convergence in maritime delimitation methodology” 23 for the delimita-
tion of the territorial sea, EEZ and the continental shelf. A case such as
Croatia v. Slovenia 24, which posits that there is such a convergence, must
be treated cautiously 25. In light of the fact that in that case the delimita-
tion of all three zones did not arise, the following statement at para-
graph 1000 is diﬃcult to understand:
          “In relation to the delimitation both of the territorial sea and of
        the maritime zones beyond the territorial sea, international law thus
        calls for the application of an equidistance line, unless another line is
        required by special circumstances. That is reﬂected in the practice of
        the ICJ, which has applied the ‘equidistance/special circumstances’

   21 Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 3.
   22 Ibid., p. 65, para. 177; p. 66, para. 183.
   23 CR 2017/11 (Lowe), p. 12, para. 15.
   24 Arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, signed on 4 November 2009
(Croatia v. Slovenia), PCA Case No. 2012-04, Final Award of 29 June 2017.
   25 For discussion of this case, see Massimo Lando, “The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitral

Award of 29 June 2017: Is there a Common Method for Delimiting all Maritime Zones
under International Law?”, Rivista Di Diritto Internazionale, Vol. 100 (4), p. 1184.

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258 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

       approach in the drawing of single maritime boundaries without dis-
       tinguishing between its application to the territorial sea and its appli-
       cation beyond the territorial sea.” 26

In support of its ﬁnding that the Court’s practice favours a single meth-
odology for delimitation of the territorial sea and the maritime zones
beyond it, the Tribunal cites Cameroon v. Nigeria and Peru v. Chile.
However, as the analysis in paragraphs 16 to 18 of this opinion shows,
this is not the case.

   20. In the instant case, the Court drew a single maritime boundary, but
was explicit in applying the median line/special circumstances approach
in respect of the territorial sea, and the Black Sea three-stage approach,
incorporating the equidistance line/relevant circumstances and dispropor-
tionality tests, for the EEZ and continental shelf.

   21. Moreover, in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, recourse may be had to the travaux préparatoires
for the purpose of conﬁrming the meaning resulting from the general rule
of interpretation. In that regard, reference has already been made to the
Venezuelan proposal in 1980 that the concept of equity should apply to
delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf. The
rejection of that proposal supports the conclusion that unless the parties
have agreed otherwise, for the purposes of delimitation, the territorial sea
is treated diﬀerently from the EEZ and continental shelf, that is, there is
no convergence in maritime delimitation methodology in respect of the
three zones intended by the drafters of the Convention.

   22. The Venezuelan proposal is also relevant for another reason. In
order to substantiate its proposition of a convergence in maritime delimi-
tation methodology, Nicaragua attempted to show that Article 15 of
UNCLOS was simply transposed from the 1958 Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, thereby suggesting that the topic of the
territorial sea was somewhat uncontroversial. However, during the ninth
session of the Third Conference, Venezuela indicated that it could not
accept the wording of Article 15 because, in its view, the concept of equity
should inﬂuence the delimitation of all maritime spaces; for that reason it
proposed that Article 15 should be brought into line with Articles 74
and 83, which at that time included references to equitable considerations.
The introduction of the Venezuelan proposal shows that, at that time,
some countries had diﬃculties with the régime for delimitation of the ter-
ritorial sea; in particular, they did not accept the absence of a reference to
equitable principles in Article 15.

  26   Supra note 24, p. 311, para. 1000.

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259 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

  23. I turn now to address an argument that may be said to favour
Nicaragua’s approach.
  24. Over the years, State practice in maritime delimitation has shown a
marked preference for a single maritime boundary delimiting the various
maritime areas. The Court itself has on some occasions been requested to
draw a single maritime boundary for the EEZ and the continental shelf as
well as the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf.

   25. Nicaragua interprets this practice as supporting its theory of
convergence in maritime delimitation methodologies. In the oral proceed-
ings it made several submissions in support of this proposition; for exam-
ple, it submitted that “UNCLOS Articles 15, 74 and 83 apply to the
drawing of diﬀerent segments of one continuous line” 27. It also submitted
that when the Court is asked to draw a territorial sea boundary, it is “a
reasonable presumption that it will draw it so that the part in the territo-
rial sea joins up with the part beyond the territorial sea” 28.
   26. A single delimitation line does not necessarily mean a single delim-
itation method, as the instant case and several others have shown. The
point is that even when a single delimitation line is employed, the segment
of the line delimiting the territorial sea will have an entirely diﬀerent legal
signiﬁcance from the segment of the line reﬂecting delimiting the EEZ
and continental shelf. For those segments would have been arrived at on
entirely diﬀerent legal bases: the ﬁrst on the basis of a median line, that
because it relates to an area where the rights of the coastal State are ter-
ritorial, remains virtually unassailable, and the second on the basis of a
median line, which because it relates to an area in which the rights of the
coastal State are only functional, is more susceptible to adjustment in the
search for an equitable solution. The best explanation for the advent of
the single delimitation line as an emerging practice in delimitation agree-
ments between States is the element of simplicity and convenience that it
oﬀers. Thus, the question whether this practice in any way supports the
claims for a single delimitation methodology must be answered in the
negative.
   27. The Court has employed the single line approach, but has always
distinguished between delimitation methods for the territorial sea on the
one hand, and those for the EEZ and continental shelf on the other 29. It
follows from the position I have taken in paragraphs 16 to 18 that I do
not treat as true examples of a uniform approach, Cameroon v. Nigeria
and Peru v. Chile, since in those cases the Court did not have to delimit
all three maritime areas.

  27  CR 2017/11 (Lowe), p. 12, para. 16.
  28  Ibid., p. 13, para. 16.
   29 See for example, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar

and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 94-110,
paras. 178-223.

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260 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

   28. In Nicaragua v. Honduras, despite the exceptional circumstances of
the case, the Court was careful to stress that the median line remains “the
general rule” 30. In Qatar v. Bahrain, where the Court was asked to deter-
mine the course of a single maritime boundary for the territorial sea, EEZ
and continental shelf, it stated that delimitation of the EEZ and the con-
tinental shelf “does not present comparable problems [to delimitation of
the territorial sea] since the rights of the coastal State in the area con-
cerned, [territorial sea] are not functional but territorial, and entail sover-
eignty over the sea-bed and the super adjacent waters and air column” 31.

   29. No development after 1982 has changed the marked distinction
made by the Convention and aﬃrmed by the Court between delimitation
of the territorial sea on the one hand, and that of the EEZ and continen-
tal shelf on the other. At the First United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the United
Kingdom’s Representative said, in respect of the territorial sea: “for rea-
sons of equity . . . special circumstances may exist which could make it
diﬃcult to accept the true median line as the actual line of delimitation” 32.
However, as is patent, that comment was made long before the adoption
of the Convention in 1982, which eﬀected a bifurcation between the
delimitation of the territorial sea on the one hand, and delimitation of the
continental shelf and EEZ on the other. Today, as a result of the
UNCLOS, it will not avail a disgruntled State (party to the Convention)
to aver that the delimitation of its territorial sea has not produced an
equitable solution, if that term is used synonymously with “equitable
solution” in Article 74 and 83 of UNCLOS.
   30. Today there is certainly less leeway for departing from the median
line in the territorial sea on the basis of special circumstances than there
is for departing from the equidistance line in the EEZ and continental
shelf on the basis of relevant circumstances in the search for an equitable
solution. The special circumstances must indeed be very special to war-
rant adjustment to or departure from the median line in the territorial
sea; for example, in the Nicaragua v. Honduras case, due to geomorpho-
logical conditions at the mouth of the River Coco, it was not possible to
identify suitable base points for the drawing of the median line and the
Court therefore used the angle-bisector method 33.

   31. Prior to 1982, in view of the similarity in the provisions for delimi-
tation relating to the territorial sea and the continental shelf, it may have
been correct to speak of a unity of delimitation methods for both zones.

  30  Supra note 13, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 745, para. 281.
  31  Supra note 29, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 94, para. 174.
   32 Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II, Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 1985, p. 135,
para. 15.2.
   33 Supra note 13, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 742-743, paras. 277-280.

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261 maritime delimitation and land boundary (sep. op. robinson)

However, today it is not correct to say that equity or equitable principles
apply to the territorial sea, if those terms are used synonymously with the
term “equitable solution” in Articles 74 and 83. Such a conclusion is con-
tradicted by the plain reading of the relevant articles, and the drafting
history of the Conference, in which — after eight years of negotiations
that expressly considered the use of the median line or equitable princi-
ples for the delimitation of the EEZ — 158 countries decided on a formu-
lation for the EEZ that focused on an equitable solution. The phrase
“equitable solution” has therefore become a term of art and its usage
should be conﬁned to the situations covered by Articles 74 and 83.

                                Conclusions

  I. Properly interpreted, Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS call for
     a dichotomous approach in the delimitation methodology for the ter-
     ritorial sea on the one hand, and the EEZ and continental shelf on
     the other.
 II. However, it is possible under the Convention for States to agree to
     utilize a uniform method.
III. It is the diﬀerence in the legal régime for the territorial sea on the one
     hand and the EEZ and continental shelf on the other, that explains
     why the Convention calls for a dichotomous approach in maritime
     delimitation methodology.
IV. Diﬀerent values are attached to the various elements relevant to the
     delimitation in the various zones. Thus, the provisional median line
     in the territorial sea has a diﬀerent value from the provisional equi-
     distance line in the EEZ and continental shelf and similarly, special
     circumstances in the territorial sea will have a diﬀerent value from
     relevant circumstances in the EEZ and continental shelf. If one were
     to apply the territorial sea-median line/special circumstances method
     to the EEZ and continental shelf, one would have to do so fully sen-
     sitive to the fact that the provisional equidistance line in the EEZ and
     continental shelf will be more susceptible to adjustment than the pro-
     visional median line in the territorial sea.

V. The Court has used the dichotomous approach consistently in its
    work, and generally, so have arbitral tribunals.
VI. The three-stage approach set out in the Black Sea case is a major
    development in the Court’s case law, but it has in no way aﬀected the
    dichotomous approach employed by the Court. In fact, it has served
    to conﬁrm that approach.

                                          (Signed) Patrick L. Robinson.

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