56

ANNEXE

DOCUMENTS SOUMIS A LA COUR

I. — Prices DÉPOSÉES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT ESTONIEN.

Exceptions préliminaires.

10.

TI.

12.

13.

I4.

15.

16.

17.
18.

56

. Riigi Teataja, lisa 1923, n
. Certificat du ministère des Affaires économiques d’Estonie du 10 septembre

A, — Procédure écrite :

. Statuts de la Première Société des Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie

(rédaction de 1898).

. Décret impérial du 21 novembre 1897 concédant à la Première Société des

Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie la construction et l'exploitation du
chemin de fer secondaire à voie étroite de Sventziany à Ponévège.

x

. Décret impérial du 27 juin 1894 concédant à la Première Société des

Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie la construction et l'exploitation du
chemin de fer secondaire de Sventziany.

. Traité de paix entre la Russie et l'Estonie du 2 février 1920 (extrait).
. Règlement provisoire adopté par le Gouvernement de la République esto-

nienne le 7 avril 1920 concernant l'administration des sociétés et compa-
gnies par actions et associations approuvées par le Gouvernement russe.

. Ordonnance adoptée le 1e octobre 1921 par le Gouvernement. de la Répu-

blique estonienne concernant la mainlevée de la curatelle des biens de
sociétés et compagnies par actions.

. Ordonnance du 27 mai 1922 plaçant sous curatelle la Première Société des

Chémins de fer secondaires en Russie.
9 115, p. 1605.

1937. .

Procès-verbal de la seconde assemblée extraordinaire des actionnaires dé
la Première Société des Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie, tenue à
Tallinn le 2 novembre 1923.

Statuts de la société par actions « Première Société des Chemins de fer
secondaires en Russie » (Esimene Juurdeveo Raudteede Selis Venemaal)
(rédaction de 1923).

Loi adoptée par l’Assemblée d'État d’Estonie le 4 août 1923 sur le rachat
des chemins de fer de la Première Société des Chemins de fer secondaires
en Russie.

Loi adoptée par l'Assemblée d’État d’Estonie le 18 décembre 1925, modi-
fiant la loi sur le rachat des chemins de fer de la Première Société des
Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie.

Proposition du ministre des Voies de communication, approuvée par le
chef d’État le 18 juin 1926.

Note de la Direction générale des Chemins de fer de Lettonie, Riga,
29 septembre 1937, n° 004.

Note du secrétaire d’État d’Estonie du 9 octobre 1931.

Note du ministère des Affaires économiques d’Estonie du 18 août 1932.
Lettre du ministére des Communications de Lithuanie du 25 octobre 1933.
57

19.

20.

30.

31.

LS)

A/B 76. — CHEMIN DE FER PANEVEZYS-SALDUTISKIS

Avis du Conseil d'État de Lithnanie du 25 janvier 1933 sur les bases
juridiques de la prétention de la société par actions Esimene Juurdeveo
Raudteede Selts Venemaal sur la ligne Panevezys-Saldutiskis.

Conditions de l'émission par la Première Société des Chemins de fer
secondaires en Russie d'obligations pour la construction du chemin de fer
Ponévège-Sventziany.

. Arrêt du Tribunal suprême de Lithuanie du 16/26 mars 1934 dans l'affaire

Jeglinas c/ la Première Société.

. Note du ministre d’Estonie à Kaunas du 3 décembre 1936.

. Note du ministre des Aff. étr. de Lithuanie du 30 décembre 1936.

. Note du ministre d’Estonie à Kaunas du 1¢ février 1937.

. Note du ministre des Aff. étr. de Lithuanie du 5 mai 1937.

. Décret soviétique du 28 juin 1918 concernant la nationalisation des entre-

prises les plus importantes.

. Décret soviétique du 4 septembre 1918 sur la liquidation des chemins de

fer privés.

. Extrait du commentaire de l’article 406 des Lois civiles dans Worms et

Eliachévitch, Lois civiles, II, Moscou, 1913, 167-185.

. Arrêts de la Cour de cassation relatifs à l’article 406 des Lois civiles.

Arrêts de la Cour de cassation relatifs à la compétence des tribunaux dans
les affaires contre |) Administration.
Affaire Jeglinas c/ la Premiére Société des Chemins de fer secondaires en
Russie.

B. — Procédure orale :

. Articles additionnels au Traité de Tartu du 2 février 1920. Traduction

française certifiée conforme.

. Recueil des traités, accords et conventions conclus par la R. S. F. S. R.

avec les États étrangers. (Edition du Commissariat du Peuple aux Aff. étr.;
fasc. I-V, 1922-1923.)

Suite de la procédure.

D

A. — Procédure écrite :

. Loi latvienne du 20 avril 1921 sur les sociétés par actions et par parts.

. Arrêt de la Cour d’appel britannique du 6 mai 1929 dans l'affaire Hoff

Trading Company v. Union Insurance Society and others.

. Procès-verbal de l'assemblée générale extraordinaire des actionnaires de la

Première Société des Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie du 10 mars 1924.

. Règlement du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple du 4 mars 1919 sur la

liquidation des engagements des entreprises d'État.

. Arrêt de la Cour d'appel de Paris (1ère Chambre) du 15 juin 1937, affaire

Nobel c/ Lessner et autres.

. Arrêt de la Section d’appel du Tribunal mixte de Tanger du 21 mai 1937,

affaire Stella et Johanna Preyer c/ Baron de Nolde.

. Traité de paix entre l’Estonie et la Russie signé à Tartu le 2 février 1920

(art. XI).

. Lettre du professeur Piip, ancien membre de la délégation estonienne à la

Conférence de paix entre l’Estonie et la Russie, ancien ministre des Aff.
étr. d’Estonie, du 2 avril 1938.

. Loi estonienne du 17 mars 1928 sur la restitution des actions remises au

Gouvernement estonien en vertu du Traité de paix entre l’Estonie et la :
Russie (extrait).

. Certificat de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie d’ Estonie du 3r mars

1938.

+ Procès-verbal de la Commission de l'ingénieur en chef Sabalauskas (1927).
58

Les]

A/B 76. — CHEMIN DE FER PANEVEZYS-SALDUT ISKIS

B. — Procédure ovale :

. Lettre adressée, en date du 21 décembre 1938, par la légation d’Estonie

en Lithuanie au Conseil d'administration de l’Esimene Juurdeveo Raud-
teede Selts Venemaal (avec deux annexes).

. Remarques du Gouvernement estonien relatives a l’exploitation du chemin

de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis et aux dépenses engagées pour sa réorganisa-
tion aprés la.grande guerre et la révolution.

. a) Certificat de dépôt de 10.120 actions de la Première Société émis par

la Swiss Bank Corporation à Londres le 22 juin 1925.

) Pouvoir de ladite banque de la même date.

c) Pouvoir de ladite banque du 3 décembre 1926. afférent à 9.959 actions
de la Première Société en dépôt à cette banque.

a) Certificat de la Lloyd’s Bank à Londres en date du 2 décembre 1926,
relatif au dépôt de. 8.200 actions de la Première Société.

e) Certificat de la même banque de la même date relatif au dépôt de
3.500 actions de la Premièré Société.

. Carte indiquant d’une manière schématique la situation des lignes de voies

ferrées ayant appartenu à la Première Société des Chemins de fer secon-
daires en Russie.

IT. — PIÈCES DEPOSEES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMENT LITHUANIEN.

‘Exceptions préliminaires.

A. — Pyocédure écrite :

. Décret soviétique du 10 décembre 1921, publié le 28 décembre 1921, sur

les entreprises devenues la propriété de l'État (extrait).

. Décret soviétique du 4 mars 1919 sur la liquidation des devoirs incom-

bant aux entreprises de l'État (extrait).

. Requête du Conseil d'administration de la Première Société des Chemins

de fer secondaires, du 5 mars 1925.

. Mémorandum remis par la Première Société des Chemins de fer secon-

daires le 14 novembre 1931 (extrait).

. Requête du Conseil d'administration de la Première Société des Chemins

de fer secondaires, du 14 novembre 1931.

: Requête du Conseil d'administration de la Première Société des Chemins

de fer secondaires, du 20 mai 1932.

. Requête du Conseil d'administration de la Première Société des Chemins

de fer secondaires, du 15 septembre 1933 (extrait).

. Lettre du ministère des Communications de Lithuanie, du 25 octobre 1933.
. Articles 406 et 408 des lois civiles en vigueur en Lithuanie.
. Interprétation de l’article 406 (extraits du commentaire des lois civiles

rédigé par A. Worms et V. Eljachevitsch, 1913).

. Articles premier et 2 du Code de procédure civile en vigueur en Lithuanie.
. Interprétation des articles premier et 2 du Code de procédure civile en

vigueur en Lithuanie (extraits du commentaire des lois de procédure civile
rédigé par V. Isatchenko).

. Arrêt n° 162, de 1887, du Sénat russe (extrait).

B. — Procédure orale:

— Texte officiel du Traité de paix de Tartu du 2 février 1920.

58
59

A/B 76. — CHEMIN DE FER PANEVEZYS-SALDUTISKIS

Suite de la procédure.

A. — Procédure écrite :

. Procès-verbal de l’assemblée extraordinaire des actionnaires de la Première

Société des Chemins de fer secondaires en Russie tenue le 23 novembre
1922.

. Extraits, en traduction française, du jugement dans l'affaire Trading

Company L. and J. Hoff v. Union Insurance Society of Canton Lid. and
C. I. de Rougemont.

: Requête de M. Wolkenstein au procureur du Tribunal de Tallinn-Hapsal.

. Décret du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple du 15/28 juin 1918.
. Décret du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple sur la liquidation des

chemins de fer.

. Note du Commissariat du Peuple des Aff. étr. du 14 novembre 1938.

. Calcul des capitaux investis dans le chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis

de 1919 à 1926.

. Relevé des capitaux investis dans le chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis

de 1927 à 1937.

. Liste des locomotives en service sur le chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldu-

tiskis.

. Liste des wagons en service sur le chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis.
. Renseignements sur les transports de service sur le chemin de fer Panevezys-

Saldutiskis et sur le chemin de fer à voie normale destinés à ce chemin
de fer.

. Renseignements sur les recettes provenant du transport de la poste sur le

chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis jusqu’au 1€! janvier 1938.

. Relevé des recettes et dépenses pour la période de 1919 à 1937 sur le

chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis.

. Lloyd’s List Law Reports ; vol. 32, n° 9, fasc. du 3 janvier 1920.

B. — Procédure orale:

— Extrait du procès-verbal de la séance de la Commission des jurisconsultes

59

des ministères (de la République de Lithuanie) du 19 novembre 1925.


61

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. REZEK

1. Puisque l'Etat défendeur, en contestant ainsi tant la compétence de
la Cour que la recevabilité de la requête, a mis l’accent sur la force obli-
gatoire et la primauté des résolutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil
de sécurité à la lumière des articles 25 et 103 de la Charte des Nations
Unies, je suis d’avis que l’arrêt auquel je souscris rendrait plus complète-
ment compte de l’argumentation des Parties s’il consacrait quelques
lignes au thème de la compétence de la Cour par rapport à celle des or-
ganes politiques de l'Organisation.

2. L'article 103 de la Charte est une règle de solution de conflit entre
traités: il présuppose avant tout l'existence d’une opposition entre la
Charte des Nations Unies et un autre engagement conventionnel. Ii
résout le conflit en faveur de la Charte, sans égard à la chronologie des
textes. Mais il n’entend pas opérer au détriment du droit international
coutumier et moins encore au préjudice des principes généraux du droit
des gens. Et c’est bien la Charte des Nations Unies (non une résolution
du Conseil de sécurité, une recommandation de l’Assemblée générale ou
un arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice) qui bénéficie de la primauté
établie dans cette norme: c’est la Charte avec tout le poids de ses prin-
cipes, de son système et de la répartition de compétences qu'elle réalise.

3. D’autre part, la Cour est l'interprète définitif de la Charte des
Nations Unies. C’est à la Cour qu’il appartient de procéder à la détermi-
nation du sens de chacune de ses prescriptions et de l’ensemble du texte,
et il s’agit là d’une responsabilité qui devient particulièrement grave lors-
que la Cour est confrontée à la mise en question de décisions de l’un des
deux organes politiques principaux de l'Organisation. Veiller à assurer la
primauté de la Charte dans son sens précis et complet est parmi les tâches
incombant a la Cour une des plus éminentes et la Cour, de plein droit et
par devoir, fait en sorte qu'il en soit ainsi chaque fois que l’occasion se
présente, même si cela peut en théorie conduire à la critique d’un autre
organe des Nations Unies, ou plutôt au désaveu de l’exégèse de la Charte
que fait cet organe.

Lors de l’affaire du Timor oriental, M. Skubiszewski a eu l’occasion de
rappeler:

«La Cour est compétente, ainsi que le montrent plusieurs arrêts et
avis consultatifs, pour interpréter et appliquer les résolutions de
l'Organisation. Elle est compétente pour se prononcer sur leur léga-
lité, et notamment sur la question de savoir si elles sont intra vires.

56
62 CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. REZEK)

Cette compétence découle de la fonction de la Cour en tant qu’organe
judiciaire principal de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Les déci-
sions de l'Organisation (au sens large que cette notion a en vertu des
dispositions de la Charte relatives au vote) peuvent être examinées
par la Cour du point de vue de leur légalité, de leur validité et de leur
effet. Les conclusions de la Cour sur ces questions mettent en cause
les intérêts de tous les Etats Membres, ou du moins de ceux qui sont
visés par les résolutions en question. Mais ces conclusions restent
dans les limites fixées par la règle énoncée dans l’affaire de Or
monétaire. En évaluant les diverses résolutions de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies concernant le Timor oriental par rapport aux droits
et aux devoirs de l'Australie, la Cour ne contreviendrait pas à la
règle du fondement consensuel de sa compétence.» (C.IJ. Recueil
1995, p. 251.)

Dans le passé, des juges aussi pondérés que sir Gerald Fitzmaurice ont
fait état de cette compétence, et l’autorité de la doctrine allait dans le
même sens. I y a bien longtemps que M. Oliver Lissitzyn proposait:

«Si l'Organisation veut s’affirmer, il faut que le pouvoir de donner
des interprétations contraignantes de la Charte, du moins dans les
matiéres intéressant directement les droits et obligations des Etats,
réside quelque part, de préférence entre les mains d’un organe judi-
ciaire. Les objectifs et politiques à long terme énoncés dans la Charte
doivent être protégés contre les éventuels égarements temporaires
des organes politiques. Le pouvoir sans le droit, c’est le despotisme. »
(O. J. Lissitzyn, The International Court of Justice, 1951, p. 96-97.
[Traduction du Greffe. ])

La thèse suivant laquelle le contrôle judiciaire de l’interprétation de la
Charte à laquelle a procédé un organe politique ne peut se faire que dans
l’exercice de la compétence consultative est totalement dénuée de fonde-
ment scientifique. Il est seulement vrai qu'aucun Etat n’est autorisé par le
système à consulter la Cour sur une question constitutionnelle des Nations
Unies ni à soulever une telle question par le biais d’une action directe
contre l'Organisation ou contre un organe comme le Conseil de sécurité.
Mais la question constitutionnelle — ayant trait, par exemple, à un cas
d’excès de pouvoir — peut parfaitement se poser dans le contexte du
contentieux entre Etats. Il est fort naturel, dans un tel cadre, que la
requête soit dirigée contre l’Etat qui, pour une raison quelconque, aurait
pris à sa charge d’exécuter l’acte du Conseil, bien que cet acte fut contesté
au regard de la Charte ou de n’importe quelle norme du droit internatio-
nal général. Le sujet passif de l’action n’est point donc le législateur, mais
Pexécuteur immédiat de la loi, tel que cela se produit d’ordinaire, devant
les juridictions internes, dans le cadre d’une procédure d’habeas corpus et
dans le contexte d’actions civiles pour la protection de droits autres que
la liberté individuelle.

4, La Cour jouit d’une pleine compétence pour l'interprétation et

57
63 CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971 (OP. IND. REZEK)

l’application du droit dans une affaire contentieuse, même quand l’exer-
cice de cette compétence peut entraîner l'examen critique d’une décision
d’un autre organe des Nations Unies. Elle ne représente pas directement
les Etats Membres de l'Organisation (on l’a rappelé devant la Cour, et on
a voulu en tirer comme conséquence l’incompétence de la Cour pour pro-
céder à l’examen des résolutions du Conseil), mais c’est justement son
imperméabilité à l’injonction politique qui fait de la Cour l'interprète par
excellence du droit et le for naturel de la revision, au nom du droit, des
actes des organes politiques, tel qu’il est de rigueur dans les régimes
démocratiques. Ce serait bien une source d’étonnement si le Conseil de
sécurité des Nations Unies devait jouir d’un pouvoir absolu et incontes-
table à Pégard de la règle de droit, privilège dont ne jouissent pas, en
droit interne, les organes politiques de la plupart des fondateurs et des
autres membres de l'Organisation, à commencer par l'Etat défendeur.

C’est aux Etats Membres des Nations Unies, au sein de l’Assemblée
générale et du Conseil de sécurité, qu’appartient le pouvoir de légiférer,
de changer s’ils le veulent les règles qui président au fonctionnement de
lOrganisation. Dans l’exercice de la fonction législative, ils peuvent déci-
der, par exemple, que l’Organisation peut se passer d’un organe judi-
ciaire, ou que celui-ci, contrairement aux modèles nationaux, n’est pas
l'interprète ultime de l’ordre juridique de l'Organisation, lorsque se pose
la question de la validité d’une décision d’un autre organe du système. A
ce que l’on sait, ils n’ont jamais songé à agir ainsi, et je pense que la Cour
ne devrait pas être timide dans l’affirmation d’une prérogative qui lui
revient de par la volonté présumée des Nations Unies.

(Signé) Francisco REZEK.

58


301

DISSENTING OPINION
OF PRESIDENT SIR ROBERT JENNINGS

I very much regret that I am unable to agree with the decision of the
Court rejecting Australia’s preliminary objection based on the circum-
stance that New Zealand and the United Kingdom are not also parties to
the proceedings (see (1) (g) of para. 72 of the Judgment). My difficulties
with this part of the Judgment may be stated very briefly.

This preliminary objection raises an important issue concerning the
consensual basis of the Court’s jurisdiction where the legal interests of
third States are involved in a case. Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Sta-
tute, which allow for intervention, show that the parties to a case may have
their claims adjudicated by the Court, even when the legal interests of
third States may be affected by the Court’s decision. There is, however, a
limit to the exercise of jurisdiction in a case affecting the legal interests of a
third State, and that limit is where, according to the well-known formula
of the case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary
Question), the third State’s “legal interests would not only be affected by a
decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision”
(LCJ. Reports 1954, p. 32).

That the legal interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom
will form the very subject-matter of any decision in Nauru’s case against
Australia is surely manifest. The Mandate for Nauru was in 1920 con-
ferred upon “His Britannic Majesty” ; the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947
designated

“The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (hereinafter called ‘the Administering Authority’) as
the joint Authority which will exercise the administration of the
Territory”;

New Zealand and the United Kingdom were two of the three members of
the British Phosphate Commissioners; and they were both joint parties to
the Canberra Agreement of 1967. This is to mention only the salient
instances of the inextricable involvement of the legal interests of those two
States in this matter.

Moreover, one must contemplate the situation that must arise if, on the
merits, there should be any question of assessing the reparation that might
be due from Australia (see para. 48 of the Judgment). If the obligations
from which the liability arises are held to be solidary (joint and several) so
that Australia is liable for the whole, or whether, alternatively, Australia is
held liable only for some proportion of the whole sum, it is clear in either

65
302 PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU (DISS. OP. JENNINGS)

case that the Court will unavoidably and simultaneously be making a
decision in respect of the legal interests of those two other States.

For these reasons it seems to me that the Australian preliminary objec-
tion in this matter is well founded, and that the Court is without jurisdic-
tion in this case.

(Signed) R. Y. JENNINGS.

66


                     445

                             DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC VUKAS

                       As I shared the Court’s conclusion in its Judgment of 18 Novem-
                     ber 2008, I attached only a separate opinion in order to make clear my
                     personal reasoning that led me to support the conclusions of the Court.
                     However, in respect of the present Judgment, I have delivered a dissent-
                     ing opinion as I am against the Court’s rejection of Croatia’s claim con-
                     cerning the violations of the Convention on the Prevention and
                     Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the Republic of Serbia against
                     members of the Croat ethnic group on the territory of the Republic of
                     Croatia.

                                          I. Jurisdiction and Admissibility

                        1. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court rejected two of Serbia’s prelimi-
                     nary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, it concluded
                     that Serbia’s preliminary objections ratione temporis did not possess, in
                     the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character. These
                     preliminary objections concerned the inadmissibility of the claims of the
                     Republic of Croatia, based on acts or omissions which took place before
                     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came into being (Application of the
                     Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
                     (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008,
                     p. 419, para. 21 (point 2)). Therefore, the Court reserved the decision
                     thereon to the present phase of proceedings (ibid., p. 460, para. 130 and
                     p. 466, para. 146 (point 4)).
                        2. For the determination of the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of
                     Serbia, at that time the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (FRY), what is
                     very important is the declaration made by the FRY on 27 April 1992 (the
                     date on which the FRY was proclaimed a State) which stated that :
                              “The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, inter-
                           national legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal Repub-
                           lic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments that the
                           Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally.”
                           (United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. II, quoted in ibid., p. 446,
                           para. 98.)
                        The correct interpretation of the above statement concerning the con-
                     tinuation of the “international legal and political personality” of the
                     SFRY, means that the FRY succeeded also as to the responsibility for
                     acts committed by the SFRY. It follows from that general principle that

                     446

7 CIJ1077.indb 888                                                                                18/04/16 08:54

                     446 	 application of genocide convention (diss. op. vukas)

                     the FRY also succeeded to the responsibility already incurred by the
                     SFRY for the alleged violations of the Genocide Convention before
                     27 April 1992.
                        In addition to this legal explanation of the responsibility of the FRY, it
                     is useful to recall that the real leaders of the SFRY, in its last years, were
                     the persons that formally proclaimed the establishment of the FRY on
                     27 April 1992.

                             II. Consideration of the Merits of the Principal Claim

                       3. On the basis of the analysis of the arguments/documents submitted
                     by the Parties,
                            “the Court considers it established that a large number of killings were
                            carried out by the JNA and Serb forces during the conflict in several
                            localities in Eastern Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and
                            Dalmatia. Furthermore, the evidence presented shows that a large
                            majority of the victims were members of the protected group, which
                            suggests that they may have been systematically targeted . . . The
                            Court thus finds that it has been proved by conclusive evidence that
                            killings of members of the protected group . . . were committed, and
                            that the actus reus of genocide specified in Article II (a) of the
                           Convention has therefore been established.” (Judgment, para. 295.)

                     Furthermore, the Court considers that
                           “during the conflict in a number of localities in Eastern Slavonia,
                           Western Slavonia, and Dalmatia, the JNA and Serb forces injured
                           members of the protected group . . . and perpetrated acts of ill‑treat-
                           ment, torture, sexual violence and rape. These acts caused such bod-
                           ily or mental harm as to contribute to the physical or biological
                           destruction of the protected group. The Court considers that the
                           actus reus of genocide within the meaning of Article II (b) of the
                           Convention has accordingly been established.” (Ibid., para. 360.)

                     Summing up the two above‑mentioned conclusions, the Court found that
                     in the mentioned localities in Croatia the JNA and Serb forces perpe-
                     trated against members of the protected group acts falling within sub-
                     paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article II of the Convention, and that the
                     actus reus of genocide has been established (ibid., para. 401).
                        4. However, in respect of its final conclusion concerning the relation of
                     the acts committed against the Croat population in the mentioned areas
                     and the Convention, the Court decided
                           “to compare the size of the targeted part of the protected group with
                           the number of Croat victims, in order to determine whether the JNA

                     447

7 CIJ1077.indb 890                                                                                18/04/16 08:54

                     447 	 application of genocide convention (diss. op. vukas)

                           and Serb forces availed themselves of opportunities to destroy that
                           part of the group. In this connection, Croatia put forward a figure of
                           12,500 Croat deaths, which is contested by Serbia. The Court notes
                           that, even assuming that this figure is correct — an issue on which it
                           will make no ruling — the number of victims alleged by Croatia is
                           small in relation to the size of the targeted part of the group.

                               The Court concludes from the foregoing that Croatia has failed to
                           show that the perpetrators of the acts which form the subject of the
                           principal claim availed themselves of opportunities to destroy a sub-
                           stantial part of the protected group.
                           �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
                               Thus, in the opinion of the Court, Croatia has not established that
                           the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the pattern of
                           conduct it relied upon was the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
                           the Croat group. The acts constituting the actus reus of genocide
                           within the meaning of Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were
                           not committed with the specific intent required for them to be char-
                           acterized as acts of genocide.” (Judgment, paras. 437 and 440.)
                        5. However, the quoted conclusion of the Court has not taken into
                     account two important elements related to the acts committed against the
                     Croat group. The first has already been mentioned in its own text : it has
                     not taken into account the number of Croatian victims of acts specified in
                     Article II (b) of the Convention. The second is the fact that the promi-
                     nence of the victims within a national group cannot be interpreted in a
                     restricted manner as in the Court’s text (ibid., para. 437). Namely, “prom-
                     inent”, “significant” or “substantial” can have various meanings. Accord-
                     ing to the latest, and one of the best books on the Convention on
                     Genocide, published in 2014 by C. Tams, L. Berster and B. Schiffbauer,
                     “substantial” can mean “a number of circumstantial aspects like the stra-
                     tegic importance of the group‑members’ area of settlement” 1. This inter-
                     pretation is especially important in respect of the acts of the JNA and
                     Serb forces in Croatia. Namely, the geographical map of Croatia (repro-
                     duced in the main Judgment) confirms that almost all the genocide acts
                     mentioned in the documents and statements of Croatia were committed
                     in two regions most important for the establishment of a Greater Serbia :
                     the Eastern Slavonia border of Croatia with Serbia, and in Lika and Dal-
                     matia. The first area was most important in preventing the extension of
                     the Republic of Serbia to the eastern area of the Republic of Croatia, and
                     the second was dangerous for the existence of the so‑called “Repub-
                     lika Srpska Krajina”. For that reason, as I mentioned in the course of the
                     deliberations of the Court, I cannot agree with the conclusion that “Cro-

                        1 Christian J. Tams, Lars Berster and Björn Schiffbauer, Convention on the Prevention

                     and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide : A Commentary, C. H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2014,
                     p. 149, para. 133.

                     448

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                     448 	 application of genocide convention (diss. op. vukas)

                     atia has failed to show that the perpetrators of the acts which form the
                     subject of the principal claim availed themselves of opportunities to
                     destroy a substantial part of the protected group” (Judgment, para. 437)
                     and that “Croatia has failed to substantiate its allegation that genocide
                     was committed” (ibid., para. 441).

                       6. In conformity with my conviction concerning the commission of
                     genocide on the territory of the Republic of Croatia against members of
                     the Croat ethnic group, I am of the opinion that the Court had to confirm
                     Croatia’s claims related to the commission of that crime. The Application
                     of Croatia requested the Respondent to take immediate and effective
                     measures against everybody who was included in the commission of acts
                     of genocide. Extremely important is also the requirement of the Republic
                     of Croatia that Serbia should provide to the Applicant all information
                     within its possession or control as to the whereabouts of Croatian citizens
                     who are missing as a result of the genocide acts for which it is responsible.

                       It would also be correct to make reparation to Croatia and its citizens
                     for the damages caused by the Respondent as well as returning to the
                     Applicant all remaining items of cultural property within the jurisdiction
                     of the Respondent, which were seized in the genocide acts for which it is
                     responsible (ibid., para. 51).

                            III. Consideration of the Merits of the Counter-Claim

                        7. Establishing its independence, Croatia has tried — individually and
                     with international support — to unite its entire population, which has
                     been a difficult and important historical task. However, part of its popu-
                     lation of Serb nationality did not accept the independence of Croatia and
                     gradually established its own quasi State — the Republika Srpska Krajina
                     (RSK) inside Croatia !

                        For five years the Government of the Republic of Croatia tried to pre-
                     vent the establishment of Krajina as a part of the Belgrade Republic of
                     Serbia. As all the peaceful efforts of Croatia were rejected by Krajina, the
                     leaders of the Republic of Croatia decided at the beginning of August 1995
                     to use force in order to eliminate the Republic of Serb Krajina from the
                     natural and peaceful development of the Republic of Croatia. As the
                     RSK had not enough support from Belgrade, in five days the Croatian
                     forces eliminated the Krajina armed forces from Croatia. As in all armed
                     conflicts, there were victims on both sides. Not only among the members
                     of the armies, but also on the side of the civilian population.

                       Many civilians left Croatia, but they are now returning to their homes.
                     The Government of the Republic of Croatia does everything possible in

                     449

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                     449 	 application of genocide convention (diss. op. vukas)

                     the present difficult economic situation to enable the Serbs from Croatia
                     to return to their cities, villages and homes.

                                                                 (Signed) Budislav Vukas.

                     450

7 CIJ1077.indb 896                                                                               18/04/16 08:54


                    458

                                     Declaration of Judge Keith

                      1. I agree with the conclusions the Court reaches, essentially for the
                    reasons it gives. This declaration addresses one aspect of those reasons.

                       2. For nearly 90 years, the International Court of Justice and its prede-
                    cessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have had the power
                    to permit a State, not a party to the main proceeding before it, to inter-
                    vene in the proceeding if the State persuades the Court that it has “an
                    interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the
                    case” (Article 62 of the Statute). If permission is granted, the intervening
                    State is supplied with copies of the pleadings and may submit a written
                    statement to the Court and its observations in the oral proceedings, with
                    respect to the subject‑matter of the intervention (Rules of Court, Arti-
                    cle 85). Of the 15 requests that have been made in 12 cases since 1923, two
                    have been granted, one without objection and the other in part only.
                       3. Until today, the Court has not attempted to provide a definition or
                    an elaboration of the expression “an interest of a legal nature” as it appears
                    in Article 62 of the Statute. Rather, having considered the evidence and
                    submissions presented to it by the requesting State and the parties to the
                    main proceeding, it has determined whether “in concreto and in relation to
                    all the circumstances of a particular case” the requesting State has demon-
                    strated what it asserts including showing that its interest may be affected
                    (Land, Island and Maritime Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application
                    for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 117‑118,
                    para. 61).
                       4. There are, I think, good reasons for the Court’s practice to date of
                    keeping closely to the statutory test laid down in Article 62 and not
                    attempting to elaborate on a single phrase within that test. I begin with the
                    nature of the power which the Court exercises under Article 62. It is of
                    a preliminary, procedural, interlocutory character. In terms of its legal
                    or binding effect, it does no more than to allow (or not) the requesting
                    State to participate in the process. It involves the Court in making a future‑
                    looking, speculative assessment about the possible impact of the decision
                    in the main proceeding on the interest asserted by the requesting State.
                    That assessment is whether the decision “may”, not “will” or “is likely” to
                    affect that interest.

                       5. The principal features of the power of the Court to make its decision
                    in the main proceeding differ sharply from those of the Article 62 power.
                    The parties have much more extensive opportunities, in written and oral

                    42

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                    459 	      territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                    proceedings, to make their case and answer the case against them. They
                    must have given their consent in one form or other to the Court having
                    jurisdiction over the case. The Court makes a final decision on the merits
                    which is binding on the parties and without appeal. In the course of making
                    that decision, the Court determines the existence or not of rights under
                    law and whether those rights have been breached. That process of fact
                    finding will in general be backward looking. The party asserting a fact in
                    support of its case usually has the burden of establishing it on the balance
                    of probabilities — a standard which is plainly more demanding than that
                    stated in Article 62.
                       6. It is true that one of the differences in the elements to be found in
                    the two functions is that between a (legal) right and an interest of a legal
                    nature, but the two preceding paragraphs suggest that that difference has
                    a very small role. The problematic character of that difference is to be
                    seen in the definition which the Court gives to “an interest of a legal
                    nature” and the consequences it draws from the difference. The Court
                    defines today “an interest of a legal nature”, as opposed to an “estab-
                    lished right”, as “a real and concrete claim . . . based on law” (Judgment
                    on Application by Costa Rica, para. 26 ; Judgment on Application by
                    Honduras, para. 37). If the claim is based on law and is real and concrete,
                    is it not a claim of a right (or a liberty or a power) recognized by the law?
                    Is the Court drawing a real distinction?

                       7. The Court draws two consequences from its definition : an estab-
                    lished right has greater protection and the requirement of proof is not as
                    demanding in the case of an interest of a legal nature. But those conse-
                    quences are a result of the full range of contrasting features of the two
                    powers set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 above. They do not arise simply and
                    solely from any difference between an established right and an interest of
                    a legal nature.

                       8. The elusive character of the difference is further demonstrated by
                    the practice of States requesting permission to intervene. They do not
                    appear to find assistance in any such distinction. To take the two cases
                    being decided today, Costa Rica, at the outset of its Application, stated
                    that its “interests of a legal nature which could be affected by a decision
                    in this case are the sovereign rights and jurisdiction afforded to Costa Rica
                    under international law and claimed pursuant to its constitution” (empha-
                    sis added). It said essentially the same at the end of the proceedings in
                    answering a question from a judge. Similarly, as the Court records in the
                    Honduras case, that State, to demonstrate that it has an interest of a legal
                    nature, contends that it is entitled to claim sovereign rights and jurisdic-
                    tion over a certain maritime area (Judgment, paras. 16 and 18).

                      9. That close linking of interests of a legal nature to rights under inter-
                    national law has appeared from the outset to the present day :

                    43

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                    460 	       territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                    — In the S.S. “Wimbledon” case, Poland referred to “violations of the
                      rights and material advantages guaranteed to Poland by Article 380
                      of The Treaty of Versailles” ; it changed its request to one under Arti-
                      cle 63 and the Court accepted it (S.S. “Wimbledon”, Judgments, 1923,
                      P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1 (Question of Intervention by Poland), p. 13).

                    — In the Nuclear Tests cases, Fiji in its request having referred to the
                      claims made by Australia and New Zealand — respectively, that the
                      testing was not consistent with applicable rules of international law or
                      constituted a violation of New Zealand rights under international
                      law — contended that “[I]t will be evident from the facts set out above
                      that Fiji is affected by French conduct at least as much as [Australia]
                      New Zealand and that similar legal considerations affect its position.”
                      (I.C.J. Pleadings, Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Applica-
                      tion for Permission to Intervene Submitted by the Government of
                      Fiji, p. 91.) The Court did not rule on the substance of this request
                      (Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application for Permission to
                      Intervene, Order of 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 536.

                    — While Malta in the Tunisia/Libya case used the terms of Article 62 in
                      its request it at once defined its “interest of a legal nature” as rights
                      under the law :
                             “There can be no doubt that Malta’s interest in her continental
                          shelf boundaries is of a legal character since the continental shelf
                          rights of States are derived from law, as are also the principles and
                          rules on the basis of which such areas are to be defined and delimited.
                          In other words these rights are created and protected by law, and
                          the question of the proper spatial extent of the regions over which
                          they can be exercised by any given State is also a matter of law.”
                          (I.C.J. Pleadings, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jama‑
                          hiriya), Application for Permission to Intervene by the Government
                          of the Republic of Malta, p. 258, para. 7.)
                    — Italy in its request in the Libya/Malta case under the heading l’intérêt
                      d’ordre juridique similarly referred to its rights and legal title, as it saw
                      them, in areas of continental shelf off its coast, the relevant areas
                      being within 400 nautical miles of the relevant coasts (I.C.J. Plead‑
                      ings, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Vol. II,
                      Application for Permission to Intervene, pp. 422‑424, paras. 6‑13).

                    — Nicaragua in the El Salvador/Honduras case stated two objects for its
                      intervention :
                             “First, generally to protect the legal rights of the Republic of Nica
                          ragua in the Gulf of Fonseca and the adjacent maritime areas by all
                          legal means available.

                    44

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                    461 	       territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                             Secondly, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
                          Court of the nature of the legal rights of Nicaragua which are in
                          issue in the dispute. This form of intervention would have the con-
                          servative purpose of seeking to ensure that the determinations of the
                          Chamber did not trench upon the legal rights and interests of the
                          Republic of Nicaragua, and Nicaragua intends to subject itself to
                          the binding effect of the decision to be given.” (Land, Island and
                          Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras : Nicaragua inter‑
                          vening), Application for Permission to Intervene by the Government
                          of Nicaragua, p. 4, paras. 5‑6.)
                    — In Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, again under a heading
                      using the terms of Article 62, recalled what the Court had said in its
                      judgment on preliminary objections in that case and continued by ref-
                      erence to the law :
                             “In fact, Equatorial Guinea has claimed an exclusive economic
                          zone and territorial sea under its own domestic law, in terms which
                          it believes consistent with its entitlements under international law.
                          The maritime area thus claimed would produce a boundary in the
                          north‑east corner of the Gulf of Guinea, based upon median line
                          principles, which would be both an exclusive economic zone bound-
                          ary and — in some circumstances — a territorial sea boundary with
                          Cameroon for a limited distance.” (Land and Maritime Boundary
                          between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial
                          Guinea intervening), Application for Permission to Intervene by the
                          Government of Equatorial Guinea, pp. 6‑8.)
                         It further developed this position by reference to the detail of its
                         national law and said this :
                          “in accordance with its national law, Equatorial Guinea claims the
                          sovereign rights and jurisdiction which pertain to it under interna-
                          tional law up to the median line between Equatorial Guinea and
                          Nigeria on the one hand, and between Equatorial Guinea and Cam-
                          eroon on the other hand. It is these legal rights and interests which
                          Equatorial Guinea seeks to protect.” (Ibid., p. 8.)
                    — In the Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with
                      Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the
                      Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Australia, also under a
                      heading based on Article 62, began with two New Zealand claims :

                            “If, as New Zealand claims, the rights . . . are of an erga omnes
                          character in the sense described above, it necessarily follows that the
                          New Zealand claim against France puts in issue the rights of all
                          States, including Australia. Assuming that France is subject to the
                          corresponding erga omnes obligations invoked by New Zealand (a
                          matter which will fall to be determined by the Court at the merits

                    45

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                    462 	        territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                           stage of the proceedings), Australia, in common with New Zealand
                           and all other States, has — in the words of the Court in the Barcelona
                           Traction case — a ‘legal interest’ in their observance by France.

                              As indicated above, New Zealand argues that these obligations
                           ‘by their very nature, are owed to the whole of the international
                           community, and it makes no sense to conceive of them as sets of
                           obligations owed, on a bilateral basis, to each member of that com-
                           munity’. If so, it must follow that a decision by the Court on the
                           merits of the New Zealand claim would not be a decision as to bilat-
                           eral rights and obligations of France and New Zealand, capable of
                           being considered in isolation from identical bilateral rights and obli-
                           gations existing between France and every other member of the
                           international community.” (Request for an Examination of the Situ‑
                           ation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of
                           20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France)
                           Case, Application for Permission to Intervene under the Terms of
                           Article 62 of the Statute submitted by the Government of Australia,
                           p. 9, paras. 18‑19.)
                         Again the basis for the intervention is rights which Australia claims.
                         Its reference to “legal interest” from Barcelona Traction may be
                         noted — a reference relating to the capacity of a State to bring a claim
                         rather than to the substantive character of the right or interest, a mat-
                         ter apparently distinct from the “interest of a legal nature” to be
                         assessed in determining a request for intervention.

                         The Solomon Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Mar-
                         shall Islands and Samoa made requests in similar terms, invoking Arti-
                         cle 63 as well as Article 62. On the latter, they comment that “disputes
                         about obligations owed erga omnes have an inherent unity . . .” (Request
                         for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63
                         of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests
                         (New Zealand v. France) Case : Application for Permission to Inter-
                         vene under Article 62 — Declaration of Intervention under Article 63
                         Submitted by the Government of Solomon Islands, p. 6, para. 19 ;
                         Application for Permission to Intervene under Article 62 — Declara-
                         tion of Intervention under Article 63 Submitted by the Government of
                         the Federated States of Micronesia, p. 6, para. 19 ; Application for
                         Permission to Intervene under Article 62 — Declaration of Interven-
                         tion under Article 63 Submitted by the Government of the Marshall
                         Islands, p. 6, para. 19 ; Application for Permission to Intervene under
                         Article 62 — Declaration of Intervention under Article 63 Submitted
                         by the Government of Samoa, p. 6, para. 19).
                         The Court did not rule on the five requests made in this case (Request
                         for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63

                    46

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                    463 	       territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                      of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests
                      (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of 22 September 1995,
                      I.C.J. Reports 1995, pp. 306‑307, para. 67).
                    — In Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan the Philippines
                      stated the following objects for its request :
                          “(a) First, to preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights
                               of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines arising
                               from its claim to dominion and sovereignty over the territory
                               of North Borneo, to the extent that these rights are affected, or
                               may be affected, by a determination of the Court of the ques-
                               tion of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan.

                            (b) Second, to intervene in the proceedings in order to inform the
                                Honourable Court of the nature and extent of the historical
                                and legal rights of the Republic of the Philippines which may
                                be affected by the Court’s decision.” (Sovereignty over Pulau
                                Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application
                                for Permission to Intervene by the Government of the Philip-
                                pines, p. 4, para. 5.)
                       10. I now turn to the Court’s decisions on intervention under Article 62,
                    beginning with one of the two cases in which the application was granted.
                    In that case, Nicaragua was successful in respect of the legal régime of the
                    waters of the Gulf of Fonseca. Honduras was not opposed to that part of
                    its request, saying that a special legal régime was called for in terms of the
                    community of interest of the coastal states ; the Chamber of the Court,
                    noting that El Salvador had claimed by the time of the proceedings that
                    the waters were subject to a condominium of the three coastal states,
                    allowed the request for intervention in that respect (Land, Island and
                    Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application for
                    Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 120‑122,

                    paras. 69‑72). It did not however allow the Application in respect of mari-
                    time delimitation within the Gulf and outside it (ibid., pp. 123‑128,
                    paras. 74‑84). Those refusals are the significant findings for the purpose
                    of the present cases. Along with the other two failed delimitation inter-
                    vention requests (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
                    Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981,
                    p. 20, para. 37 ; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta),
                    Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
                    pp. 26‑28, paras. 42‑43, 47), those refusals may be related to two common
                    features of the Court’s decisions in maritime delimitation cases. One was
                    recalled by the Chamber in its decision on Nicaragua’s request (Land,
                    Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Applica‑
                    tion for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 124,
                    para. 77) : delimitations between two States, I would add by treaty as well
                    as by third‑party decision, often take account of the coasts of one or

                    47

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                    464 	       territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                     more States. The second feature is that the Court in drawing delimitation
                     lines takes care to ensure that they stop short of the rights or interests of
                     third States (e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
                     Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 93‑94, para. 133 ; Continental Shelf
                     (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
                     pp. 25‑28, paras. 21‑22 ; Maritime D  elimitation and Territorial Questions
                     between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment,
                     I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 115‑117, paras. 250‑252 ; Land and Maritime
                     Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equato‑
                    rial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 448,
                    paras. 306‑307 ; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
                    Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
                    I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 756‑759, paras. 312‑319 ; Maritime Delimita‑
                    tion in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
                    2009, p. 131, para. 219). As this practice suggests, the parties do appear
                    to provide the Court with the necessary information about the interests of
                    third States. That information has sometimes indeed been invoked in
                    support of an objection to jurisdiction or admissibility based on the

                    Monetary Gold principle ; see the submissions of Nigeria in Cameroon v.
                     Nigeria (I.C.J. Pleadings, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cam
                     eroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea inter
                     vening), Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
                     paras. 4.1‑4.11, 8.11‑8.17) and of Nicaragua in El Salvador/Honduras
                     (I.C.J. Pleadings, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salva‑
                     dor/Honduras : Nicaragua intervening), Vol. III, pp. 737‑738, paras. 9‑12 ;
                     ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 3‑27).

                       11. The one successful application for intervention in respect of mari-
                    time delimitation was that by Equatorial Guinea in Land and Maritime
                    Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Applica‑
                    tion for Permission to Intervene, Order of 21 October 1999, I.C.J. Reports
                    1999 (II), p. 1029. Several features of that decision lessen its significance
                    for today’s cases : the Court in its jurisdictional judgment had suggested,
                    when rejecting a Monetary Gold argument, that certain third States may
                    wish to intervene (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
                    and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
                    I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 323‑324, paras. 115‑116) ; only one of them,
                    Equatorial Guinea, in fact applied to intervene ; that application was not
                    opposed and was accepted by way of an order, not a judgment, of the
                    Court ; and the Court, in the judgment in the main proceeding, said that
                    in fixing the maritime boundary it must ensure that it did not adopt any
                    position which might affect the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao
                    Tome and Principe (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
                    Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria : Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment,
                    I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 421, para. 238). The latter State had not applied to
                    intervene and obtained exactly the same protection as the State that did

                    48

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                    465 	      territorial and maritime dispute (decl. keith)

                    apply ; and the Court refers to the “rights” and not to the “interests” of
                    the two States (I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 421, para. 238).

                       12. In summary, I have three difficulties with the Court’s elaboration of
                    the distinction between “the rights in the case at hand” and “an interest of
                    a legal nature”. Those terms or concepts are being taken out of context.
                    The definition given to the second is problematic. And, to the extent that
                    it exists, the distinction does not appear to be useful in practice.

                                                                  (Signed) Kenneth Keith.

                    49

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5 File :

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

To the Permanent Court of International Justice.

In execution of the Resolution of the Council of the:
League of Nations adopted on May 12th, 1922, of which
a certified true copy is annexed heréto, and by virtue of
the authorisation given by this Resolution,

The Secretary General of the League of Nations has the
honour to present to the Permanent Court of International
Justice the request of the Council that the Court will,
in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant of the
League, give an advisory opinion upon the following
question : | |

,»Was the Workers Delegate for the Netherlands ‘at

the Third Session of the International Labour Conference

_ nominated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
3 of Article 389 of the Treaty of Versailles ?”

Documents äre attachéd hereto setting out the. facts out
of which the present request for the Court’s opinion has arisen,
and showing the circumstances in which, and the manner by
which: the. Delegate in question was nominated, and the
doubts which have been raised as to whether this nomination
was in accordance with the terms of the Treaty.

‘They. consist of a letter from the Director of the
International Labour Office, dated March i7th, 1922,
communicating the request of the competent organs of
the Labour Organisation that the Council would take the
opinion of the Court, and of the fifteen annexes referred
to in the letter.

(signed) ERIC DRUMMOND,
Secretary General of the League of Nations.

Geneva, May 22nd, 1022.

F. a. III
7...
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
= Resolution adopted by the Council, May 12th, 1922.

The Council of the League of Nations, having considered
the letter of March 17th, 1922, from the Director. of the
International Labour Office to the Secretary General, by
which the Council is informed of the unanimous desire of
the Third International Labour Conference and of the
Governing Body of the International Labour Office that
the Council will request the opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice upon the question formulated
in the letter,

RESOLVES:

1. The Council requests the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, in conformity with Article 14 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, to give an advisory
opinion upon the question “whether the Workers’ Delegate for
the Netherlands at the Third Session of the International La-
bour Conference was nominated in accordance with the provi-
sions of Paragraph 3 of Article 389 of the Treaty of Versailles”.

2. The Secretary General is authorised to present this
request to the Court, together with the letter from the
Director of the International Labour Office and the docu-
ments concerning the matter, to give all necessary assistance
in the examination of the question and to arrange to be
represented before the Court, if necessary.

3.°The International Labour Office is requested to afford
the Court all assistance which it may require in the conside-
ration of the question hereby submitted.

Certified true copy,

(signed) VAN HAMEL,
Director Legal Section.