INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)

ORDER OF 18 AUGUST 1972

1972

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA COMPETENCE
EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET
D'IRLANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

ORDONNANCE DU 18 AOÛT 1972
Official citation:

Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland),
Order of 18 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 181.

Mode officiel de citation:

Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Royaume-Uni
c. Islande), ordonnance du 18 août 1972, C.IJ.
Recueil 1972, p. 181.

Sales number 3 69
No de vente:

18 AUGUST 1972
ORDER

FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE

(UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND v. ICELAND)

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA COMPETENCE EN
MATIERE DE PECHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET
D'IRLANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

18 AOÛT 1972
ORDONNANCE
181

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1972 1972

18 août
Rôle général
n° 55

18 août 1972

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À LA COMPÉTENCE
EN MATIÈRE DE PÊCHERIES

(ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET
D'IRLANDE DU NORD c. ISLANDE)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président; M. AMMOUN,
Vice-Président; sit Gerald FITZMAURICE, MM. PADILLA NERVO,
FORSTER, GROS, BENGZON, PETREN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINTO, DE CASTRO, MOROZOV, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
juges; M. AQUARONE, Greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,

Aprés délibéré en chambre du conseil,
Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour,

Vu l’article 37 du Règlement de la Cour,

Rend l’ordonnance suivante:

Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 14 avril 1972, par
laquelle le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a
introduit une instance contre la République d’Islande au sujet d’un

4
COMPETENCE PECHERIES (ORDONNANCE 18 VIII 72) 182

différend portant sur l’extension, annoncée par le Gouvernement islan-
dais, de sa compétence en matière de pêcheries autour de IIslande;

Considérant que le dépôt de la requête a été immédiatement notifié
au Gouvernement islandais et qu’il lui a été transmis copie de la requête
par courrier aérien;

Vu la lettre du ministre des Affaires étrangères d’Islande datée du
29 mai 1972 et reçue au Greffe le 31 mai 1972, le télégramme dudit
ministre daté du 28 juillet 1972 et reçu au Greffe le 29 juillet 1972, son
télégramme du 11 août 1972 reçu au Greffe le même jour, répété et
confirmé par sa lettre du 11 août 1972, toutes communications où il
est affirmé que la Cour ne peut trouver dans son Statut aucun fondement
pour l’exercice de sa compétence en l’affaire;

Vu le refus du Gouvernement islandais de désigner un agent, énoncé
dans sa lettre du 29 mai 1972, et le fait que le Gouvernement islandais,
qui avait été avisé par télégramme et par lettre du 19 juillet 1972 que la
Cour ouvrirait la procédure orale le 1°" août 1972 en vue de donner aux
Parties l’occasion de formuler leurs observations sur la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires, ne s’est pas fait représenter à
l’audience tenue à cette date;

Vu l'ordonnance du 17 août 1972, par laquelle, statuant sur la demande
présentée par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni le 19 juillet 1972, la
Cour a indiqué des mesures conservatoires en l'affaire, ce qui ne préjuge
en rien la compétence de la Cour pour connaître du fond du différend;

Considérant que, dans ces conditions, il est nécessaire de régler en
premier lieu la question de la compétence de la Cour,

La Cour

Décide, par neuf voix contre six, que les premières pièces écrites
porteront sur la question de la compétence de Ja Cour pour connaitre du
différend;

Fixe comme suit la date d’expiration des délais pour la procédure
écrite:

Pour le dépôt du mémoire du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, le
13 octobre 1972,

Pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire du Gouvernement islandais, le
8 décembre 1972;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le dix-huit août mil neuf cent soixante-douze, en trois
exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et dont les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement du Royaume-

5
COMPETENCE PÊCHERIES (ORDONNANCE 18 VIII 72) 183

Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et au Gouvernement dela
République d'Islande.

Le Président de la Cour,
(Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN.

Le Greffier de la Cour,
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

MM. BENGZON et JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, juges, joignent à l’ordonnance
l'exposé commun de leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphée) Z. K.
(Paraphé) S. A.


                            COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                               RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                        AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                     IMMUNITÉS ET PROCÉDURES PÉNALES
                          (GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE c. FRANCE)

                          ORDONNANCE DU 1er JUILLET 2016

                                   2016
                            INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                             REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                          ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                   IMMUNITIES AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
                          (EQUATORIAL GUINEA v. FRANCE)

                                ORDER OF 1 JULY 2016

5 CIJ1100.indb 1                                             14/02/17 10:04

                                           Mode officiel de citation :
                         Immunités et procédures pénales (Guinée équatoriale c. France),
                           ordonnance du 1er juillet 2016, C.I.J. Recueil 2016, p. 246

                                                Official citation :
                       Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France),
                                Order of 1 July 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 246

                                                                                1100
                                                                 No de vente:
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                Sales number
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157295-7

5 CIJ1100.indb 2                                                                            14/02/17 10:04

                                                  1er JUILLET 2016

                                                  ORDONNANCE

                     IMMUNITÉS ET PROCÉDURES PÉNALES
                      (GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE c. FRANCE)

                   IMMUNITIES AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
                      (EQUATORIAL GUINEA v. FRANCE)

                                                   1 JULY 2016

                                                       ORDER

5 CIJ1100.indb 3                                                     14/02/17 10:04

                      246

                                     COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                                       ANNÉE 2016
          2016
        1er juillet
     Rôle général                                      1er juillet 2016
       no 163

                           IMMUNITÉS ET PROCÉDURES PÉNALES
                                      (GUINÉE ÉQUATORIALE c. FRANCE)

                                                     ORDONNANCE

                      Présents : M. Yusuf, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire ;
                                  M. Abraham, président de la Cour ; MM. Owada, Tomka,
                                  Cançado Trindade, Greenwood, Mmes Xue, Donoghue,
                                  M. Gaja, Mme Sebutinde, MM. Bhandari, Robinson,
                                  Crawford, Gevorgian, juges ; M. Couvreur, greffier.

                          La Cour internationale de Justice,
                         Ainsi composée,
                         Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,
                         Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 32, 44, 45, para-
                      graphe 1, 48 et 49 de son Règlement,
                         Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 13 juin 2016, par
                      laquelle la République de Guinée équatoriale a introduit une instance
                      contre la République française au sujet d’un différend ayant trait à « l’im-
                      munité de juridiction pénale du second vice‑président de la République de
                      Guinée équatoriale chargé de la défense et de la sécurité de l’Etat [M. Teo-
                      doro Nguema Obiang Mangue], ainsi qu[’au] statut juridique de l’im-
                      meuble qui abrite l’ambassade de Guinée équatoriale en France, tant
                      comme locaux de la mission diplomatique que comme propriété de
                      l’Etat » ;
                         Considérant que, le jour même du dépôt de la requête, un exemplaire
                      signé de celle-ci a été transmis à la France ;
                         Considérant que la Guinée équatoriale a désigné comme agent

                      4

5 CIJ1100.indb 22                                                                                14/02/17 10:04

                    247 	 immunités et procédures pénales (ordonnance 1 VII 16)

                    S. Exc. M. Carmelo Nvono Nca ; et que la France a désigné comme agent
                    M. François Alabrune ;
                       Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion que le vice-président de la
                    Cour a tenue avec les agents des Parties le 29 juin 2016, l’agent de la Gui-
                    née équatoriale a indiqué que son gouvernement souhaitait pouvoir dis-
                    poser d’un délai de six mois à compter de la présente ordonnance pour la
                    préparation de son mémoire ; et que l’agent de la France a indiqué qu’une
                    période de six mois conviendrait à son gouvernement pour la préparation
                    de son contre-mémoire ;
                       Compte tenu de l’accord des Parties,

                      Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt des
                    pièces de la procédure écrite :
                      Pour le mémoire de la République de Guinée équatoriale, le 3 janvier
                    2017 ;
                      Pour le contre-mémoire de la République française, le 3 juillet 2017 ;
                        Réserve la suite de la procédure.

                       Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au Palais de
                    la Paix, à La Haye, le premier juillet deux mille seize, en trois exemplaires,
                    dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront trans-
                    mis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République de Guinée équa-
                    toriale et au Gouvernement de la République française.

                                                                       Le vice-président,
                                                            (Signé) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.
                                                                            Le greffier,
                                                               (Signé) Philippe Couvreur.

                    5

5 CIJ1100.indb 24                                                                                14/02/17 10:04


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A CERTAINS
EMPRUNTS NORVEGIENS
(FRANCE c. NORVEGE)

ARRET DU 6 JUILLET 1957

1957

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE OF CERTAIN NORWEGIAN
LOANS
(FRANCE v. NORWAY)

JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957
Le présent arrêt doit être cité comme suit :

« Affaire relative à certains emprunts norvégiens,
Arrêt du 6 juillet 1957: C. I. J. Recueil 1957, p. 9.»

This Judgment should be cited as follows:

“Case of Certain Norwegian Loans,
Judgment of July 6th, 1957: I.C.]. Reporis 1957, p. 9.”

N° de vente: 163
Sales number

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1957
July 6th
General List

YEAR 1957 No. 29

July 6th, 1957

CASE OF CERTAIN NORWEGIAN
LOANS

(FRANCE v. NORWAY)

International loans, question of gold clause.— Obligations of borrowing
State.— Preliminary Objections.— Municipal law, international law.—
Second Hague Convention, 1907.— Compulsory jurisdiction.— Declara-
tions under Article 36, paragraph 2, of Statute ; reservation of national
jurisdiction as understood by declarant Siate.— Effect of condition of
reciprocity.— Competence of Court.

JUDGMENT

Present: President HACKWORTH; Vice-President BADAwI; Judges

GUERRERO, BASDEVANT, WINIARSKI, ZORICIC, KLAESTAD,
READ, ARMAND-UGON, KoJEVNIKOV, Sir Muhammad
ZAFRULLA KHAN, Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT, MORENO
QUINTANA, CORDOVA, WELLINGTON Koo; Registrar
LOPEZ OLIVAN.

4
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) Io

In the case of Certain Norwegian Loans,

between

the French Republic,
represented by:

M. André Gros, Professor of the Faculties of Law, Legal Adviser
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

as Agent,

assisted by:

M. Paul Reuter, Professor of the Faculty of Law of Paris, Assis-
tant Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel,

Me. Marcel Poignard, of the Paris Bar, former Batonnier,

as Advocate,

and by:

M. Claude Chayet, Legal Adviser in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs,
M. Robert Monod, Administrateur civil in the Ministry of Finance,

M. J. J. de Bresson, Procureur de la République, detached to the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Me. Henri Monneray, of the Bar of the Paris Court of Appeal,

as Expert Advisers,

and

the Kingdom of Norway,
represented by:

M. Sven Arntzen, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Norway,
as Agent and Advocate,

M. Lars J. Jorstad, Ambassador of Norway at The Hague,
as Agent,

assisted by:

M. Maurice Bourquin, Professor at the University of Geneva and
at the Graduate Institute of International Studies,

M. Jens Evensen, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Norway,

as Advocates,

M. Frede Castberg, Rector of the University of Oslo,

M. Johannes Andenaes, Professor at the University of Oslo,
M. Bredo Stabell, Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
M. Pierre Lalive, Professor at the University of Geneva,

as Expert Advisers,
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) II

and by

M. Einar Lôchen, Chief of Division in the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs,
as Secretary,

THE CourT,
composed as above,

delivers the following Judgment:

In a letter of July 6th, 1955, filed in the Registry on the
same day, the Ambassador of France to the Netherlands forwarded
a letter from the Agent of the Government of the French Republic
dated July 5th, 1955, transmitting an Application instituting
Proceedings in a dispute with the Government of the Kingdom of
Norway concerning the payment of various Norwegian Loans
issued in France. At the same time, the Ambassador of France
notified to the Registry the appointment of Professor Gros as Agent
of the French Government in the case.

The Application thus filed in the Registry on July 6th, 1955,
expressly refers to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court and to the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice by the Kingdom of Norway on
November 16th, 1946, and by the French Republic on March rst,
1949. It refers to and enumerates certain loans floated by the
Kingdom of Norway, by the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of
Norway and by the Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank;
it relies upon the fact that bonds of these loans are in the hands
of French holders; it alleges that the said loans contain a gold clause;
and it is designed to request the Court to determine the manner in
which the borrower should discharge the substance of his debt.

Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Applica-
tion was communicated to the Government of the Kingdom of
Norway and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same Article, other
Members of the United Nations as well as non-member States
entitled to appear before the Court were notified of it.

By Order of September 19th, 1955, the President, taking account
of an agreement between the Parties, fixed the time-limits for the
filing of the Memorial and Counter-Memorial. On the date of the
expiry of the second of these time-limits, the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway filed a document setting out certain prelim-
inary objections designed, on various grounds stated therein, to ob-
tain a finding from the Court that the Application was inadmissible.

By Order of April 24th, 1956, the Court, noting that the proceedings
on the merits were suspended by virtue of the provisions of Arti-
cle 62, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, fixed June 4th, 1956, as
the time-limit for the presentation by the Government of the French

6
NORWEGIAN LOANS {JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 12

Republic of a written statement of its Observations and Submissions
in regard to the Preliminary Objections. In notifying the Agents
of this decision, the Registrar informed them that it was the
Court’s intention to open the oral hearings on June 25th, 1956.

On May 15th, 1956, the Agent of the Government of the King-
dom of Norway acquainted the Court with the desire of his Govern-
ment that, because of unforeseen circumstances, the oral proceed-
ings should be postponed until the autumn. Consequently the Court,
after ascertaining the views of the Parties and having decided to
postpone the opening of the oral proceedings, by Order of May 2gth,
1956, extended to August 31st, 1956, the time-limit for the filing,
by the French Government, of its Observations and Submissions
on the Preliminary Objections raised by the Norwegian Government.

Within this time-limit, the French.Government presented its
Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections.
Whilst stating the grounds on which it requested the Court nct to
uphold the Objections, it asked the Court to join the Preliminary
Objections to the Merits.

The Court decided, on September 21st, 1956, to open the oral
hearings on the Preliminary Objections on October 15th, 1956, and
the Agents of the Parties were advised of this decision on the same
date. In a letter of the same date, which was handed to the Registrar
on September 22nd, the Agent of the Government of the Kingdom
of Norway, noting that, in its Observations on the Preliminary
Objections, the Government of the French Republic had asked that
it might please the Court to join the Objections to the merits,
stated that his Government, whilst maintaining in their entirety
the Objections which it had raised, did not consider that it should
object to the joinder of these Objections to the merits.

By Order of September 28th, 1956, the Court, considering that
there was no objection to taking into account the understanding
thus reached, joined the Objections to the merits and, after ascer-
taining the views of the Parties, fixed time-limits for the filing of
the further pleadings, the last of these time-limits expiring on
April 25th, 1957. The Parties having respectively filed their Counter-
Memorial, Reply and Rejoinder within the time-limits so fixed, the
case was ready for hearing on the last-named date.

In the course of hearings held on May 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th,
20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 28th, 1957, the Court heard
the oral arguments and replies of M. André Gros and Me. Marcel
Poignard, on behalf of the Government of the French Republic,
and of M. Sven Arntzen, M. Maurice Bourquin and M. Jens Even-
sen, on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Norway.

During the written and oral proceedings, the following Sub-
missions were presented by the Parties:
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 13

On behalf of the French Government, in the Application:

“May it please the Court:

To take note that for the purpose of all notifications and communi-
cations relating to the present case, the Agent of the Government
of the French Republic selects for his address for service the French
Embassy at The Hague; .

To notify the present Application, in accordance with Article 40,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, to the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway;

To adjudge and declare, whether the Government of the Kingdom
of Norway appears or not, and after such time-limits as the Court
may fix in the absence of an agreement between the Parties:

That the international loans issued by the Kingdom of Norway in
1896 (3% gold), 1900 (33% gold), 1902 (34% gold), 1903 (3% gold),
1904 (3$% gold), 1905 (33% gold), the international loans issued by
the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway, 3$% gold 1885-1896,
1902, 1905, 1907, 1900 and 4% gold 1900, the international loan
issued by the Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank 3$% gold
in 1904, stipulate in gold the amount of the borrower’s obligation
for the service of coupons and the redemption of bonds;

And that the borrower can only discharge the substance of his
debt by the payment of the gold value of the coupons on the date
of payment and of the gold value of the redeemed bonds on the
date of repayment.”

On behalf of the French Government, in the Memorial:

“The Government of the French Republic therefore maintains
the submissions filed in its Application of July 6th, 1955, and
requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

That the international loans issued by the Kingdom of Norway in
1896 (3% gold), 1900 (33% gold), 1902 (34% gold), 1903 (3% gold),
1904 (34% gold), 1905 (34% gold), the international loans issued by
the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway, 34% gold 1885-1898.
1902, 1905, 1907, 1909 and 4% gold 1900, the international loan
issued by the Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank 34% gold
in 1904, stipulate in gold the amount of the borrower’s obligation
for the service of coupons and the redemption of bonds;

And that the borrower must discharge the substance of his debt
by the payment of the gold value of the coupons on the date of
payment and of the gold value of the redeemed bonds on the date
of repayment.”

On behalf of the Norwegian Government, in the Preliminary
Objections:

“Whereas:

1. The subject of the dispute, as defined in the Application of the
French Government of July 6th, 1935, is within the domain of
municipal law and not of international law, whereas the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court inrelation to the Parties involved isrestrictec.
by their Declarations of November 16th, 1946, and March Ist, 1049.
to disputes concerning international law;

&
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) I4

2. The ‘facts’ or ‘situations’ in respect of which the dispute
has arisen are prior to the Declaration by which the French Govern-
ment accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, this dispute
is therefore excluded from the undertaking given by France and, by
virtue of reciprocity, from the undertaking given by Norway v1s-d-
vis France;

3. Asregards that part of the claim which relates to the bond certi-
ficates issued by the Mortgage Bank of Norway and by the Norwegian
Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank, these two Banks have a
legal personality distinct from that of the Norwegian State; proceed-
ings can therefore not be instituted against the latter in its capacity
as the borrower; whereas, moreover, the jurisdiction of the Court
is limited to disputes between States;

4. The holders of bond certificates on whose behalf the French
Government considers itself entitled to institute international
proceedings have not previously exhausted the local remedies,

May it please the Court
to adjudge and declare that the claim put forward by the Applica-
tion of the French Government of July 6th, 1955, is not admissible.”

On behalf of the French Government, in the Observations and
Submissions on the Preliminary Objections:
“For these reasons, and subject to the subsequent presentation
of any evidence or argument,
May it please the Court
to join to the merits the ‘Preliminary Objections’ raised by the
Royal Norwegian Government.”
On behalf of the Norwegian Government, in the Counter-Memorial:

“On the Preliminary Objections :

Having regard to the fact that the Norwegian Government
maintains Preliminary Objections Nos. 1, 3 and 4 raised in the docu-
ment submitted to the Court on April 2oth, 1956,

May it please the Court

to adjudge and declare that the claim submitted by the Appli-
cation of the French Government of July 6th, 1955, is not admissible.

On the Merits:

Having regard to the fact that the claim of the French Govern-
ment is unfounded,

May it please the Court
to dismiss the claim of the French Government.”
On behalf of the French Government, in the Reply:
“On the question of admissibility:

May it please the Court

to place on record the abandonment by the Royal Government
of Norway of its second Preliminary Objection,

, 9
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 15

to dismiss the Preliminary Objections of the Royal Government
of Norway Nos. 1, 3 and 4,

to adjudge and declare that the claim put forward in the Appli-
cation of the French Government of July 6th, 1955, is admissible.

On the Merits:

May it please the Court

to uphold the submissions of the Government of the French
Republic set out in its Application of July 6th, 1955.”

On behalf of the Norwegian Government, in the Rejoinder:

“The Norwegian Government maintains the Submissions of its
Counter-Memorial of December zoth, 1956.”

On behalf of the French Government, Submissions stated at the
hearing of May 15th, 1057, and filed on the same day:

“The Government of the French Republic requests the Court to
adjudge and declare:

On Jurisdiction:

That the claim of the Government of the French Republic, which
has adopted the cause of its nationals who are holders of bond
certificates of the Norwegian loans in question, constitutes a case
of the recovery of contract debts within the meaning of Article 1
of the Second Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907 ; that this claim,
not having been settled by diplomatic means, has given rise to a
legal dispute of an international character between the two States;

That the two States, by their acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, have recognized
the competence of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;

That the recovery of a debt due under an international loan,
claimed from the Government of the debtor State by the Govern-
ment which has adopted the cause of its nationals who are holders
of bond certificates, raises an issue which, within the meaning of
Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (0) and (c), falls within the
competence of the Court by virtue of the acceptance of both Parties;

That the dispute may be brought before the Court without the
need for the exhaustion of local remedies since it has not been shown
that such remedies could be effectual.

On the Merits:

That the loans which constitute the subject-matter of the Appli-
cation of the Government of the French Republic are international
loans and that it follows from the nature of the bearer bonds that
in respect of all foreign holders the substance of the debt is the same
and that payments to foreign holders of an identical certificate
must be made without any discrimination ;

10
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 16

That the said loans contain an undertaking to pay in gold value
interest and amounts due on redemption of the bonds;

That undertakings as to the amount of a debt contracted by a
State with foreign nationals, containing express conditions as to
performance, cannot be unilaterally modified by that State without
negotiation with the holders, with the State which has adopted the
cause of its nationals, or without arbitration as to the financial
capacity of the debtor State to fulfil its obligations ;

That in these circumstances, and without passing upon the
financial adjustment of payments which the Government of the
French Republic has declared itself ready to study with the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Norway, the claim of the Government of
the French Republic should be held to be well-founded;

That the Kingdom of Norway having expressly promised and
guaranteed payment in gold value of the sums due in performance
of its obligations under the various loans in issue, the debtor cannot
validly discharge this obligation except by payments as they fall
due in gold value.”

On behalf of the Norwegian Government, Submissions stated at
the hearing of May 23rd, 1957, and filed on the same day:

“On the Preliminary Objections:
Whereas:

1. The subject of the dispute, as defined in the Application, is
within the domain of municipal law and not of international law,
whereas the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the
Parties involved is restricted, by their Declarations of Novem-
ber 16th, 1946, and March Ist, 1949, to disputes concerning inter-
national law;

2. As regards that part of the claim which relates to the bond
certificatesissued by the Mortgage Bank of Norway and the Norwegian
Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank, these two Banks have
a legal personality distinct from that of the Norwegian State;
proceedings can therefore not be institued against the latter in its
capacity as the borrower; whereas moreover the jurisdiction of the
Court is limited to disputes between States;

3. The holders of bond certificates for whose protection the French
Government considers itself entitled to institute international
proceedings have not previously exhausted the local remedies,

May it please the Court,

rejecting all submissions to the contrary,
to adjudge and declare that the claim put forward by the Applica-
tion of the French Government of July 6th, 1955, is not admissible.

On the Merits:
Whereas the claim of the French Government is unfounded,

II
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 17

May it please the Court,

rejecting all submissions to the contrary,
to dismiss the claim of the French Government.”

Certain objections having been raised by the Agent of the Nor-
wegian Government to the tenor and admissibility of the Sub-
missions fled by the Agent of the French Government on May 15th,
1957, the Agent of the French Government made certain altera-
tions in them at the hearing of May 25th, 1957, and filed them on
the same day in the following form:

“The Government of the French Republic requests the Court to
adjudge and declare:

On Jurisdiction:

x. That the claim of the Government of the French Republic,
which has adopted the cause of its nationals who are holders of
bond certificates of the Norwegian loans in question, constitutes
a case of the recovery of contract debts within the meaning of
Article z of the Second Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907;
that this claim, not having been settled by diplomatic means, has
given rise to a legal dispute of an international character between

‘the two States;

2. That the two States, by their acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, have recognized
the competence of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;

3. That the recovery of the debts due under the loans in question,
claimed from the Government of the Norwegian State by the French
Government which has adopted the cause of its nationals who are
holders of bond certificates, raises an issue which, within the
meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs {b) and (c), falls
within the competence of the Court by virtue of the acceptance of
both Parties;

4. That the dispute may be brought before the Court without the
need for the exhaustion of local remedies since it has not been
shown that such remedies could be effectual.

On the Merits:

1. That the loans which constitute the subject-matter of the
Application of the Government of the French Republic are inter-
national loans and that it follows from the nature of the bearer bonds
that in respect of all foreign holders the substance of the debt is the
same and that payments to foreign holders of an identical certificate
must be made without any discrimination;

2. That the said loans contain an undertaking to pay in gold
value interest and amounts due on redemption of the bonds;

3. That undertakings as to the amount of the debts contracted
under the said loans by the Norwegian State with French nationals,

I2
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY Oth, 1957) 18

containing express conditions as to performance, cannot be unila-
terally modified by that State without negotiation with the holders,
with the French State which has adopted the cause of its nationals,
or without arbitration as to the financial capacity of the debtor
State to fulfil its obligations;

4. That in these circumstances, and without passing upon the
financial adjustment of payments which the Government of the
French Republic has declared itself ready to study with the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Norway, the claim of the Government of
the French Republic should be held to be well-founded;

5. That the Kingdom of Norway having expressly promised
and guaranteed payment in gold value of the sums due in perfor-
mance of its obligations under the various loans in issue, the debtor
cannot validly discharge this obligation except by payments as they
fall due in gold value.”

On behalf of the Norwegian Government, the Agent of that Govern-
ment declared at the hearing of May 28th, 1957, that he maintained
in their entirety his Submissions as formulated on May 23rd, 1957.

The Submissions of the Parties, in the form in which they were
given or confirmed at the hearings of May 25th and May 28th,
1957, respectively, constitute their Final Submissions.

*
* *

The facts which led the French Government to institute the
present proceedings before the Court are as follows :

Between 1896 and 1905, the Norwegian Government floated six
public loans on the French market and on other foreign markets.
From 1885 to 1909, various loans were floated on foreign markets,
including the French market, by the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom
of Norway, an establishment created by the State and whose capital
belongs to the State. Finally, in 1904, the Norwegian Small Holding
and Workers’ Housing Bank floated a loan on the French market and
on other foreign markets. The French Government contends that
the bonds contain a gold clause which varies in form from bond
to bond, but which that Government regards as sufficient in the
case of each bond, this being disputed by the Norwegian Govern-
ment.

Following upon the opening of hostilities in Europe, the conver-
tibility of notes of the Bank of Norway was suspended on
August 5th, 1914, this measure being later confirmed by Royal
Decree of August 18th, 1914. During the ensuing period, the
Bank of Norway was authorized to resume the convertibility
of notes into gold (1916) and to suspend it anew (1920). This latter
measure was in turn abrogated (1928) and notes of the Bank of
Norway again became convertible. However, in 1931 the obligation
of the Bank to convert notes was once more suspended; this
measure is still in force.

13
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 19

During these years of instability, a law concerning pecuniary
obligations whose payment was expressed in gold was promulgated
on December 15th, 1923. This law which, in accordance with its
second Article, came into force at once, provides in Article 1:

“Where a debtor has lawfully agreed to pay in gold a pecuniary
debt in kroner and where the creditor refuses to accept payment
in Bank of Norway notes on the basis of their nominal gold value,
the debtor may request a postponement of payment for such period
as the Bank is exempted from its obligation to redeem its notes in
accordance with their nominal value. Where a creditor withdraws
his refusal he shall be entitled to require such payment only after
the giving of three months’ notice. During the period of post-
ponement interest shall be paid at the rate of four per cent per annum.
Interest shall be paid in banknotes in accordance with their nominal
value.

Prior notice of waiver of the right to request postponement may
be given only by the State, municipalities, the Bank of Norway
and the Banks which are fully guaranteed by the State (the Mort-
gage Bank, the Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank and the
Fishery Bank). ”

The first representations made by the French Government to
the Government of Norway were in the form of a Note dated
June 16th, 1925, from the French Legation at Oslo to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Norway. This Note referred to the loans
floated by the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway, which
the French Government regarded as subject to a gold clause, and
to the above-mentioned Norwegian law of December 15th, 1923.
It contained a brief reference to the contradiction which it believed
to exist between that law and the obligations which had been
assumed, contended ‘that it would not seem that a unilateral
decision can be relied upon as against foreign creditors’, and
requested that the “Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs should give
its consideration and assistance for the purpose of securing prompt
recognition by the Norwegian Government and by the Mortgage
Bank of Norway of the rights claimed by the French holders of
bonds of the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway, the bond-
holders’ claims appearing to the Government of the Republic
to be fully justified’.

On December gth, 1925, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway transmitted to the French Legation a copy of a letter
from the Board of Directors of the Mortgage Bank to the Ministry
of Finance and declared that the Ministry of Finance shared the
view of the Board of Directors of the Mortgage Bank. In this
letter the Board disputed the assertions concerning the gold clause
and added that ‘‘the question has in any case been settled by the
law of December 15th, 1923”.

Protracted diplomatic correspondence ensued in which the two
Governments maintained their points of view. The representations

14
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 20

of the French Government now related to all the Norwegian loans,
both the State loans and the loans of the two Banks. Various
proposals were put forward, designed to submit the problem to a
mixed Commission of Economic and Financial Experts, to arbi-
tration, or to the International Court of Justice; the matter was
also brought to the attention of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development. The Norwegian Government was not
prepared to agree to these proposals. It maintained throughout
that the claims of the bondholders were within the jurisdiction of
the Norwegian courts, that the latter were competent to deal with
them, and that these claims involved solely the interpretation and
application of Norwegian law. The French bondholders, for their
part, refrained from submitting their cases to the Norwegian courts.
The French Government did not accept the views of the Norwegian
Government. By a Note of January 27th, 1955, it proposed to the
Norwegian Government that the dispute should be referred to an
international tribunal in order to determine, on the basis of the
general principles of international law, whether the clause which, it
contended, was contained in the bonds in question (the gold clause)
had to be respected. On February 2nd, 1955, the Norwegian Govern-
ment declined this proposal, maintaining that the normal and
proper procedure would be for the bondholders to start pro-
ceedings against the respective Norwegian debtors in the Norwegian
courts. It added that it could see no reason for making an exception
in the present case to the rule of international law under which
international proceedings can only be instituted after the exhaustion
of local remedies. It was as a result of this refusal that the French
Government referred the matter to the Court by an Application
on July 6th, 1955.

*
* *

In its Application, the French Government requests the Court
to adjudge and declare that the international loans issued by the
Kingdom of Norway, by the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of
Norway and by the Small Holding and Workers’ Housing Bank,
which are listed in the Application, stipulate in gold the amount
of the borrower’s obligation for the service of coupons and the
redemption of bonds; and that the borrower can only discharge
the substance of his debt by the payment of the gold value of the
coupons on the date of payment and of the gold value of the
redeemed bonds on the date of repayment.

The claim in the Application has been maintained in the Memorial
and in the Reply which, with regard to the merits, requests the
Court to “uphold the Submissions of the Government of the French
Republic set out in its Application of July 6th, 1955”.

The Application expressly refers to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court and to the acceptance of the compulsory

15
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 21

jurisdiction of the Court by Norway on November 16th, 1946,
and by France on March Ist, 1940. The Norwegian Declaration reads:

“T declare on behalf of the Norwegian Government that Norway
recognizes as compulsory #pso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is to
say, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the Court, for a period of ten years as from 3rd October

1946.”
The French Declaration reads:

“On behalf of the Government of the French Republic, and subject
to ratification, I declare that I recognize as compulsory 7pso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other State
accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of reciprocity,
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity
with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the said Court, for all
disputes which may arise in respect of facts or situations subsequent
to the ratification of the present declaration, with the exception of
those with regard to which the parties may have agreed or may agree
to have recourse to another method of peaceful settlement.

This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood
by the Government of the French Republic.

The present declaration has been made for five years from the
date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification. It shall continue
in force thereafter until notice to the contrary is given by the French
Government.”

On April 2oth, 1956, the Norwegian Government filed four
Preliminary -Objections. The first Objection consisted of two parts.
In the first part the Norwegian Government maintained that the
subject of the dispute was within the exclusive domain of the
municipal law of Norway, and that it did not fall within any
of the categories of disputes enumerated in Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute, by reference to which both Parties had
by their Declarations accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court. In the second part of that Objection the Norwegian
Government relied upon the reservation in the French Declara-
tion with regard to differences relating to matters which are
essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the
French Government. It challenged the jurisdiction of the Court
on both grounds.

The second Objection was based on the fact that the French
Declaration limited its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court to “all disputes which may arise in respect of facts
or situations subsequent to the ratification” of the Declaration.
It was contended that the dispute before the Court arose in respect
of facts or situations prior to March Ist, 1949, and that, by virtue

16
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 22

of the condition of reciprocity, it was excluded from the under-
taking subscribed to by the Parties.

The third Objection was designed to obtain a finding that the
Application was inadmissible as regards that part of the claim which
relates to the bonds of the two Norwegian Banks on the ground
that they possess a legal personality distinct from that of the
Norwegian State. |

Lastly, the fourth Objection sought a finding of the Court that
the Application of the French Government was inadmissible on the
ground that the French holders of the Norwegian bonds had not
previously exhausted the local remedies.

The French Government in its Observations and Submissions
requested the Court to join the Preliminary Objections raised by
the Norwegian Government to the merits. The latter Government
did not oppose this request. Accordingly, the Court, taking into
account this understanding between the Parties, by Order of
September 28th, 1956, joined the Objections to the merits “in
order that it may adjudicate in one and the same judgment upon
these Objections and, if need be, on the merits”.

In the Counter-Memorial, the Norwegian Government declared
its “immediate and unconditional abandonment of its second
Objection”. Accordingly, in the Counter-Memorial, the Reply, and
the Rejoinder, as well as in the oral proceedings, both Parties
discussed Objections 1, 3 and 4, and the merits.

*
* ES

The Court will at the outset direct its attention to the Preliminary
Objections of the Norwegian Government. The first of these
Objections relates directly to the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudi-
cate upon the dispute submitted to it by the French Application.
It is this Objection that the Court will examine first.

As previously stated, this Objection, as presented by the Norwegian
Government, has two aspects. In the first place, it is contended that
the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with inter-
national law such disputes as are submitted to it, can be seised,
by means of a unilateral Application, only of legal disputes falling
within one of the four categories enumerated in paragraph 2 of
Article 36 of the Statute and relating to international law. It is urged
that the Application of the French Government asks the Court
to interpret loan contracts which, in the view of the Norwegian
Government, are governed by municipal law and not by interna-
tional law.

After presenting the first ground of its first Preliminary Objection
on the basis that the loan contracts are governed by municipal
law, the Norwegian Government continues in its Preliminary
Objections:

17
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 23

“There can be no possible doubt on this point. If, however, there
should still be some doubt, the Norwegian Government would rely
upon the reservations made by the French Government in its
Declaration of March 1st, 1949. By virtue of the principle of reci-
procity, which is embodied in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court and which has been clearly expressed in the Norwegian
Declaration of November 16th, 1946, the Norwegian Government
cannot be bound, vis-à-vis the French Government, by undertakings
which are either broader or stricter than those given by the latter
Government.”

It is this second ground of the first Preliminary Objection which
the Court will proceed to consider.

It will be recalled that the French Declaration accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court contains the following reser-
vation:

“This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood
by the Government of the French Republic.”

In the Preliminary Objections filed by the Norwegian Govern-
ment it is stated:

“The Norwegian Government did not insert any such reservation
in its own Declaration. But it has the right to rely upon the restric-
tions placed by France upon her own undertakings.

Convinced that the dispute which has been brought before the
Court by the Application of July 6th, 1955, is within the domestic
jurisdiction, the Norwegian Government considers itself fully
entitled to rely on this right. Accordingly, it requests the Court to
decline, on grounds that it lacks jurisdiction, the function which
the French Government would have it assume.”

In considering this ground of the Objection the Court notes
in the first place that the present case has been brought before
it on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute and
of the corresponding Declarations of acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction; that in the present case the jurisdiction of the Court
depends upon the Declarations made by the Parties in accordance
with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute on condition of reci-
procity ; and that, since two unilateral declarations are involved, such
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which
the Declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between
the two Declarations shows that the French Declaration accepts the
Court’s jurisdiction within narrower limits than the Norwegian
Declaration; consequently, the common will of the Parties, which
is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, exists within these narrower
limits indicated by the French reservation. Following in this
connection the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (Phosphates in Morocco case, Judgment of June 14th,

18
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 24

1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No, 74, p. 22; Electricity Company
of Sofia and Bulgaria case, Judgment of April 4th, 1939, P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 77, p. 81) the Court has reaffirmed this method
of defining the limits of its jurisdiction. Thus the judgment of the
Court in the Anglo-Ivanian Oil Company case states:

“As the Iranian Declaration is more limited in scope than the
United Kingdom Declaration, it is the Iranian Declaration on
which the Court must base itself.” (2.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 103.)

France has limited her acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court by excluding beforehand disputes “relating to matters
which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood
by the Government of the French Republic”. In accordance with
the condition of reciprocity to which acceptance of the compulsory’
jurisdiction is made subject in both Declarations and which is
provided for in Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway,
equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood by Norway to be
essentially within its national jurisdiction.

In its Observations and Submissions on the Preliminary Objections
raised by the Norwegian Government, the French Government points
to what it regards as a contradiction in the attitude of Norway:

“Between France and Norway, there exists a treaty which
makes the payment of any contractual debt a question of inter-
national law. In this connection the two States cannot therefore
speak of domestic jurisdiction.”’

The treaty here referred to is the Second Hague Convention of
1907 respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the
recovery of contract debts. The French Government invokes it
principally against the first ground of the first Objection and as
such it does not fall for consideration here; but the passage
quoted from the Observations and Submissions purports to show
also that the second ground of the first Objection is not valid since
both Parties are signatories of the Second Hague Convention of
1907. This calls for but brief observations by the Court.

The purpose of the Convention in question is that indicated in its
title, that is to say “the Limitation of the Employment of Force for
the Recovery of Contract Debts’. The aim of this Convention is
not to introduce compulsory arbitration in the limited field to
which it relates. The only obligation imposed by the Convention
is that an intervening Power must not have recourse to force
before it has tried arbitration. The Court can find no reason why
the fact that the two Parties are signatories of the Second Hague
Convention of 1907 should deprive Norway of the right to invoke
the reservation in the French Declaration.

The French Government also referred to the Franco-Norwegian
Arbitration Convention of 1904 and to the General Act of Geneva

19
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 25

of September 26th, 1928, to which both France and Norway are
parties, as showing that the two Governments have agreed to
submit their disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement in cer-
tain circumstances which it is unnecessary here to relate.

These engagements were referred to in the Observations and
Submissions of the French Government on the Preliminary Objec-
tions and subsequently and more explicitly in the oral presentations
of the French Agent. Neither of these references, however, can be
regarded as sufficient to justify the view that the Application of
the French Government was, so far as the question of jurisdiction
is concerned, based upon the Convention or the General Act. If the
French Government had intended to proceed upon that basis it
would expressly have so stated.

As already shown, the Application of the French Government is
based clearly and precisely on the Norwegian and French Decla-
rations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. In these
circumstances the Court would not be justified in seeking a basis
for its jurisdiction different from that which the French Govern-
ment itself set out in its Application and by reference to which
the case has been presented by both Parties to the Court.

From one point of view it might be said that the second ground
of the first Objection, namely the ground based on the reservation
in the French Declaration, is merely subsidiary in character. It is
true that the first ground of the first Preliminary Objection relies
upon the proposition that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the
dispute falls to be dealt with under the municipal law of Norway.
But Norway has also relied upon the second ground of its first
Preliminary Objection, Norway requests the Court “‘to decline,
on grounds that it lacks jurisdiction, the function which the
French Government would have it assume”. It is clear that
this request is based on both grounds, the character of the dispute
and the French reservation. In the opinion of the Court, the
second ground cannot be regarded as subsidiary, in the sense that
Norway would invoke the French reservation only in the event
of the first ground of its Objection being held to be legally
unfounded. The Court’s competence is challenged on both grounds
and the Court is free to base its decision on the ground which in its
judgment is more direct and conclusive.

Not only did the Norwegian Government invoke the French
reservation, but it maintained this second ground of its first
Objection throughout and at no time did it abandon it.

The Submissions in the Counter-Memorial, maintained in the
Rejoinder, are formulated as follows:

“Having regard to the fact that the Norwegian Government
maintains Preliminary Objections Nos. 1, 3 and 4 raised in the
document submitted to the Court on April 2oth, 1956, May it please

20
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 26

the Court to adjudge and declare that the claim submitted by the
Application of the French Government of July 6th, 1955, is not
admissible.”

Since the Preliminary Objections under the head “First Objec-
tion” relied upon both grounds—the character of the dispute and
the French reservation—it was not necessary, in order to maintain
the two grounds, to specify that both were involved. What has
just been said also applies to the Final Submissions of the Norwegian
Government.

In the course of his oral presentations Counsel for the Norwegian
Government stated :

“... the Court has jurisdiction only in so far as undertakings prior
to the origin of disputes have conferred upon it the power of
adjudicating on such disputes as might arise between France and
Norway.

What are these undertakings?

They are the undertakings resulting from the Declarations made
by the two Governments on the basis of Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court.

That is the only basis on which the other Party can rely to show
that its Application falls within the limits of the jurisdictional
competence of the Court. In so far as the undertakings given by the
two Parties are in concordance—to the extent of their reciprocity—
it is clear that Norway is bound in relation to France. But she has
no other obligation toward France. The Court may therefore
adjudicate in this dispute only if it is included within these limits.”

From the reply of the French Agent to this argument it appears
that in his view the second ground of the first Objection was fully
maintained by Norway. Later, in his oral rejoinder, the Agent for
the Norwegian Government declared:

“We maintain our positions in their entirety both as regards the
merits and as regards the Preliminary Objections.”

The Court cannot infer from the attitude of the Parties that the
second ground of the first Objection was regarded by them as
unimportant and still less that it was abandoned by the Norwegian
Government. Abandonment cannot be presumed or inferred;
it must be declared expressly, as was done when Norway declared
its abandonment of its second Preliminary Objection.

The Court does not consider that it should examine whether
the French reservation is consistent with the undertaking of a legal
obligation and is compatible with Article 36, paragraph 6, of the
Statute which provides:

2I
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 27

“In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.”

The validity of the reservation has not been questioned by the
Parties. It is clear that France fully maintains its Declaration,
including the reservation, and that Norway relies upon the reser-
vation.

In consequence the Court has before it a provision which both
Parties to the dispute regard as constituting an expression of their
common will relating to the competence of the Court. The Court
does not therefore consider that it is called upon to enter into an
examination of the reservation in the light of considerations which
are not presented by the issues in the proceedings. The Court,
without prejudging the question, gives effect to the reservation
as it stands and as the Parties recognize it.

The Court considers that the Norwegian Government is entitled,
by virtue of the condition of reciprocity, to invoke the reservation
contained in the French Declaration of March Ist, 1949; that this
reservation excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court the dispute
which has been referred to it by the Application of the French
Government; that consequently the Court is without jurisdiction
to entertain the Application.

In view of the foregoing it is not necessary for the Court to
examine the first ground of the first Objection, or to deal with
Objections 3 and 4 presented by the Norwegian Government,
or with the Submissions of the Parties other than those upon which
it is adjudicating in accordance with the reasons stated above.

For these reasons,
THE COURT,

by twelve votes to three,

finds that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute
which has been brought before it by the Application of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic of July 6th, 1955.
NORWEGIAN LOANS (JUDGMENT OF JULY 6th, 1957) 28

Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this sixth day of July, one thousand
nine hundred and fifty-seven, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court and the others will be trans-
mitted to the Government of the French Republic and to the
Government of the Kingdom of Norway, respectively.

(Signed} GREEN H. HACKWORTH,
President:

(Signed) J. LOPEZ OLIVAN,
Registrar.

Judge MorENo QUINTANA, after voting for the Judgment, made
the following declaration: |

The reason why I consider that the Court is without juris-
diction in this case is different from that given in the Judgment.
I base myself, not on the second ground of the first Objection
put forward by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway
but on the first ground of that Objection. State loans, as
being acts of sovereignty, are governed by municipal law.

Vice-President Bapawi and Judge Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT,
availing themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57
of the Statute, append to the Judgment of the Court statements of
their individual opinions.

Judges GUERRERO, BASDEVANT and READ, availing themselves
of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append
to the Judgment of the Court statements of their dissenting

opinions.

(Initialled) G.H.H.
(Initralled) J. L. O.

23


340

DISSENTING OPINION
BY MM. DE BUSTAMANTE, ALTAMIRA, SCHUCKING
AND JONKHEER VAN EYSINGA.

[Translation. |

The undersigned are unable to concur in the judgment of
the Court in regard to points 1 to 5 of the application insti-
tuting proceedings. They confine themselves to attaching to
the judgment this dissenting opinion in regard to the first
point. |

The sedes materre of the question whether the Governor
of the Memel Territory has the right to dismiss the President of
the Directorate is to be found in paragraph 2 of Article 17
of the Statute of the autonomous unit of Memel, which runs
as follows :

“The President shall be appointed by the Governor and
shall hold office so long as he possesses the confidence of
the Chamber of Representatives. The President shall
appoint the other members of the Directorate. The
Directorate must enjoy the confidence of the Chamber of
Representatives and shall resign if the Chamber refuses
it its confidence. If, for any reason, the Governor appoints
a President of the Directorate when the Chamber of
Representatives is not in session, it shall be convened so
as to meet within four weeks after the appointment
to hear a statement from the Directorate and vote on
the question of confidence.”

The autonomy which the authors of the Convention of
Paris of May 8th, 1924, intended to confer on the Memel
Territory is given very definite form in this provision. For
once the President of the Directorate has been appointed
by the Governor, the continuance in office of the President
and of the other members of the Directorate is solely depend-
ent on the confidence of the Chamber of Representatives.
So long as the President possesses this confidence he remains
in office; as soon as he loses it, the Directorate will have to
resign. If the Chamber is not in session when a new Presi-
dent is appointed by the Governor, it is to meet within a
short space of time to vote on the question of confidence.

50
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 341

The apparent intention of these provisions is to make the
continuance in office of the President of the Directorate
appointed by the Governor—to speak only of the latter, since
he alone is mentioned in point 1—dependent solely on the
confidence of the representatives of the citizens of the auto-
nomous unit of Memel. This holds good when the Chamber,
under Article 12 of the Statute, is dissolved by the Governor
in agreement with the Directorate, i.e. it holds good after an
appeal to the electorate; in this case the new Chamber
of Representatives decides the fate of the President and of
the whole Directorate. It is not merely a question of par-
liamentary control over the activities of the President so long
as the latter keeps within the limits of his constitutional
duties; it is an organic rule to the effect that no authority
other than the Chamber of Representatives can remove the
President. What the authors of the Constitution of Memel
meant to introduce for the very purpose of maintaining the
autonomy of Memel, is parliamentary government in its most
pronounced form, and it is difficult to point to another con-
‘stitution in which the parliamentary character of the executive
authority has been so carefully laid down in express terms as
in the Statute of the autonomous unit of Memel, which is
simply a constitution in treaty form. Of course it is also
the first duty of the President of the Directorate himself
scrupulously to observe the Statute; but in virtue of the
very clear terms of Article 17 of the Statute, the only author-
ity which can compel him to leave office is the Parliament
in which the authors of the Statute reposed complete con-
fidence in this respect. The right of the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives to decide when the President of the Directorate is
to leave office is so clearly stated in the Statute that, under
the terms of Article 7 of the Statute itself, any power of
dismissal on the part of the Governor, a power of which
moreover no trace is to be found in the Statute, is excluded.
For the same reason it seems arbitrary to endeavour to
read Article 17 of the Statute as implying a right on the part
of the Governor to dismiss the President of the Directorate.
It should be observed that the Statute is confined to
indicating the main constructive lines of the autonomous
unit of Memel. In this connection it was necessary to

7 SI
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 342

indicate in what manner the period of office of a President was
to be brought to an end against his will, The possibility of
a President himself placing his resignation in the hands of the
Governor, should he be compelled for reasons of health,
domestic or other reasons, to do so, is an aspect of the mat-
ter which the Statute only hints at in the third sentence of
the second paragraph of Article 17 (‘‘for any reason”); more-
over, this aspect is immaterial in the present case.

It follows from the foregoing that Article 17 of the Statute,
the text of which is clear, by itself affords sufficient ground
for a negative answer to the first question, namely, whether the
Governor of the Memel Territory has the right to dismiss
the President of the Directorate. By conferring on the
Chamber of Representatives the right to terminate the
political career of a President of the Directorate against his
will, the Article excludes any right of dismissal on the part
of the Governor.

The history of Article 17 of the Statute only tends to
confirm this view.

The genesis of the Article reveals the existence of two tend-
encies. The Conference of Ambassadors, and later the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations, wished to make the autonomy of
the Memel Territory much greater than the Lithuanian Govern-
ment, which represented the other tendency. The latter wished
to reserve to the Governor control over the legislation of
the Diet of Memel, a control which would apparently have
covered not only the legality of such legislation—as provided
in Article 16 of the Statute—but also its expediency. Fur-
thermore, the Lithuanian Government wished the Governor to
be the head of the executive authority of the autonomous
territory ; this would have placed in the hands of the Lithua-
nian Government a general control over the executive authority
as well as general control over legislation. A Directorate
enjoying the confidence of the Diet and solely responsible
to it was to be chosen by the Governor, merely to assist
him in the exercise of the executive power (Lithuanian Yellow
Book, I, p. 120). The foregoing are merely some points from
the ‘‘Considévations générales lithuaniennes sur le futur Statut
de Memel’ of March 26th, 1923; they will however suffice to

52
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 343

show that Memel’s autonomy, if the views held by the Lithua-
nian Government had prevailed, would have been very
restricted.

The Conference of Ambassadors had quite a different con-
ception of the autonomy of Memel. As regards more par-
ticularly the executive authority, its intention was completely
to exclude the Lithuanian Government from any part therein.
The executive authority was to be exercised by a Direc-
torate, the President of which was to be appointed by the
Parliament and would choose the other members; the Direc-
torate was to be responsible to this Parliament (Yellow
Book, I, p. 123, Art. 14). Far from having any intention
of placing the executive authority in the hands of an official
of the Lithuanian Government, the Conference of Ambassadors
had in view a definitely parliamentary executive authority.

The Lithuanian delegation at Paris accepted the views of
the Conference of Ambassadors save on one point. They
proposed to transfer the appointment of the President of
the Directorate from the autonomous Parliament to the
President of the Republic of Lithuania (Yellow Book, I,
p. 139, Art. 19); it should be observed that the Lithuanian
delegation did not add to the important right of appointing
the President of the Directorate, which would thus pass to
Lithuania, the right of dismissing him.

In its new draft of July 13th, 1923, the Conference of
Ambassadors acceded to the desire expressed by Lithuania
with regard to the appointment of the President of the Direc-
torate by the President of the Republic (Yellow Book, I,
p. 213, Art. 18); but, on the other hand, it thought it essen-
tial, in view precisely of this appointment of the President
of the Directorate by the President of the Republic, more
effectively to safeguard the Memel and parliamentary char-
acter of the Directorate. To this end, Article 18 of the
draft of the Conference of Ambassadors of July 13th, 1923,
states first, that the Directorate should consist of Memel
citizens, and, secondly, this Article replaces the words ‘The
Directorate is responsible to the Chamber’ by the two fol-
lowing sentences: “The Directorate shall enjoy the confidence
-of the Chamber. The members of the Directorate collec-
tively and individually shall resign if the Chamber refuses

53
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 344

them its confidence.” The meaning of these two amend-
ments is clear: they bring out the parliamentary and Memel
character of the executive authority; it in no way follows
that because the power to appoint the President of the
Directorate was given, not to the Memel Parliament, but to
the Lithuanian Government, the continuance in office of the Pre-
sident of the Directorate, although appointed by an act of the
Governor, should henceforward depend upon this Lithuanian
official. The parliamentary system still required that the
Memel Parliament alone should be able to terminate
the appointment of a President.of the Directorate. But the
formula providing for responsibility to Parliament which,
‘combined with the right to dissolve Parliament, has brought
about parliamentary government in many countries, has not,
in other countries, had this result. Accordingly, recourse was
often had to a more definite formula when, after the great
war, new constitutions were established providing for a par-
liamentary system. This was the formula, now almost com-
mon form after the great war, which the Conference of
Ambassadors substituted for the formula expressing the idea
of responsibility to Parliament. |

The Lithuanian delegation accepted the new Article 18
proposed by the Conference of Ambassadors; but, since no
agreement could be reached on several other points, the
Conference of Ambassadors later addressed itself to the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations under Article XI of the Covenant.

By a Resolution of December 16th, 1923, the Council
decided to appoint a commission of three persons to prepare
a new draft convention (Yellow Book, II, p. 44). In its
report (Yellow Book, II, pp. 86-87), the Commission, presided
over by Mr. Norman Davis, repeats a declaration made by
him at a meeting which the Commission had held with the
Lithuanian delegation. This declaration has an important
bearing upon the autonomy of the Memel Territory. The
Commission there states that during its visit to Memel it
was strongly impressed by the keen desire for autonomy
shown by both the Lithuanian and the Memel elements of
the Territory. It was to satisfy this keen desire for auto-
nomy that the Commission tried “‘to arrange for the fullest
possible autonomy for the district under the sovereignty of

34
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 345

the Lithuanian Republic’. This attempt was facilitated by
the fact that the Lithuanian Government contended ‘that the
larger part of the population of the Memel Territory was of
Lithuanian origin and sympathy and sincerely loyal to the
Lithuanian Republic’. The Commission felt that this fact fur-
ther simplified the problem, as the Lithuanian Government would
have no reason to fear or distrust an autonomous régime
based on universal suffrage.

This declaration, which was repeated in the report of the
Norman Davis Commission, shows that the latter certainly
did not intend to formulate a less extensive autonomy than
had been provided for in the last draft of the Conference of
Ambassadors and that, perhaps, its proposals went even
farther. Indeed, a comparison between the last draft of
the Conference of Ambassadors and that of the Norman
Davis Commission shows that Article 17 of the latter, the
text of which is identical with Article 17 of the final Statute, -
strengthens in two other directions the parliamentary char-
acter of the Directorate. In the first place, Article 17 pro-
vides that should the Governor appoint a President of the
Directorate when the Chamber is not in session, the latter
shall be convened so as to meet within four weeks after
the appointment of the President to pass or refuse a vote of
confidence in the new President of the Directorate. The
meaning of this addition is clear: the Chamber must be
able at any moment to exercise its control over the
continuance in office of the President.

In the second place, the text of the Norman Davis Com-
mission aimed at safeguarding the Chamber’s right to deter-
mine the political fate of a President of the Directorate from
another danger which was not perhaps altogether theoretical.
Suppose the President of the Directorate appointed by the Gov-
ernor enjoyed the confidence of the Chamber; under the pro-
vision which replaced the formula of responsibility, he would
not be bound to resign, but he might at amy moment cease
to please the Governor. What then? The Norman Davis
Commission thought it worth while expressly to state that
in this case too the fate of the President of the Directorate
depended solely upon the Chamber; the President of the

55
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 346

Directorate “shall hold office so long as he possesses the
confidence of the Chamber of Representatives’. By this
addition, which is very exceptional in constitutions, the depend-
ence of the political fate of the President of the Directorate
upon the will of Parliament and upon that will alone finds
a two-fold support in the wording of the Statute: the Direc-
torate must resign as soon as the Chamber refuses it its
confidence ; but, on the other hand, as long as he possesses
that confidence, the President is entitled to remain in office.

From the foregoing observations, it follows that the history
of Article 17 of the Statute simply confirms the truth which
emerges from the very text of that Article itself, namely,
that the Governor is not entitled to dismiss the President of
the Directorate.

*
* *

The right of the Governor to dismiss the President of the
Directorate has been claimed in virtue of the sovereignty
acquired by Lithuania over the Memel Territory under Article 2
of the Convention of Paris of May 8th, 1924 It is argued
that this sovereignty includes a right of ‘control’ over acts
of the Directorate which might be contrary, inter alia, to
the Statute of Memel, and that this “control” in turn
includes the right of the Governor to dismiss the President
of the Directorate.

In this connection, the undersigned make the following
observations.

It is true that the autonomous unit of Memel is under the
sovereignty of Lithuania, to whom the Principal Allied Powers
transferred, subject to the conditions laid down in the Conven-
tion of Paris, all the rights and titles ceded to them by
Germany as regards the Memel Territory, in virtue of Article 09 :
of the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 1 and 2 of the Convention
of Paris). But what does this sovereignty of Lithuania over
the autonomous unit of Memel mean? If we disregard
non-treaty international law and treaties binding Lithuania
with the exception of the Paris Convention, this sovereignty
is simply the residue left to the exclusive jurisdiction of

56
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 347

Lithuania by the Convention of Paris. And as the Statute
annexed to the Convention reserves—in terms which, as
stated above, are as precise as possible—to the Memel Chamber
of Representatives, and not to the Governor, the right
to dismiss the President of the Directorate, Lithuania’s sover-
eignty over the autonomous unit of Memel does not include
the right to dismiss the President of the Directorate. In
view of the extensive character of the Memel autonomy,
Lithuania’s sovereignty over this Territory implies a very
limited group of rights which, under the very terms of Articles 1
and 2 of the Convention and Article 17 of. the Statute,
does not include the right to dismiss the President of the
Directorate. It does not seem to us possible to deduce from
the notion of the sovereignty attributed to Lithuania a right
on the part of the Governor to dismiss the President of the
Directorate—a right which is not only not mentioned in the
Statute but which, as stated above, is ruled out by the very
definite wording of the Statute.

The Statute gives Lithuania, in certain very definite cases,
a right to ‘‘control’’ acts which exceed the competence of
the authorities of the Territory or which are incompatible
with the provisions of Article 6 or with Lithuania’s inter-
national obligations. In this connection, Article 16 of the
Statute gives the Governor a right to veto laws passed by the
Chamber of Representatives, if these laws exceed the com-
petence of the authorities of the Territory, as laid down by
the Statute, or if they are incompatible with the provisions
of Article 6, or with the international obligations of Lithuania.
It was not thought necessary that the Statute should supple-
ment this right to veto laws already passed, by giving Lithu-
ania a right to legislate in the place of the Chamber of
Representatives, should the latter fail in its duty to pass a
law prescribed by a convention upon a matter within the
competence of the local authorities of the Territory (see Art. 4
of the Statute). Nor was it thought necessary that the Statute
should give Lithuania a right of “‘control’’ over the executive
authorities ; in this connection, the authors of the Statute had
apparently every confidence in the control which the Chamber
of Representatives was to exercise over the Directorate under
Article 17 of the Statute.

57
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION 348

As regards the Governor’s right to dismiss the President of
the Directorate, considered as a means of “‘control’’ over the
executive authority, it may be wondered, apart from the fact
that this right is contrary to the Statute, why this is the
only right which is claimed. In the first place, the very
grave step of dismissing the President of the Directorate
offers less guarantee of legality than that afforded by the
administrative courts usually found in subdivisions of any
given country (provinces, communes, etc.); and, secondly,
the right of veto, or annulment, may operate equally well
in the executive as in the legislative sphere. If therefore
it is true, on the one hand, that there exist, besides the
alleged right of the Governor to dismiss the President of
the Directorate, many other means of realizing ‘control’
by the Governor over the executive authority, and that, on
the other, neither this right of dismissal by the Governor nor
these other means are provided for in the Statute, it seems
to us arbitrary to single out this one means, viz. the dismissal
of the President of the Directorate by the Governor, without
even showing that this is the only way to achieve effective
“control”.

(Signed) ANTONIO S. DE BUSTAMANTE.
{ ,, ) RAFAEL ALTAMIRA.

( ,, ) WALTHER SCHUCKING.

( ) v. EYsINGA.

39

58


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

APPLICABILITY OF THE OBLIGATION |
TO ARBITRATE UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS
AGREEMENT OF 26 JUNE 1947

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

ORDER OF 9 MARCH 1988

1988

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

APPLICABILITE DE L’OBLIGATION D’ARBITRAGE
EN VERTU DE LA SECTION 21 DE L’ACCORD
DU 26 JUIN 1947 RELATIF AU SIEGE
DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE DU 9 MARS 1988
Official citation :

Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate
under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement
of 26 June 1947, Order of 9 March 1988, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 3.

Mode officiel de citation :

Applicabilité de l'obligation d'arbitrage en vertu de la section 21 de l'accord
du 26 juin 1947 relatif au siège de l'Organisation des Nations Unies,
ordonnance du 9 mars 1988, C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 3.

Sales number 5 4 1
N° de vente :

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1988 1988
9 mars
Rôle général

9 mars 1988 n° 77

APPLICABILITÉ DE L’OBLIGATION D’ARBITRAGE
EN VERTU DE LA SECTION 21 DE L’ACCORD-
DU 26 JUIN 1947 RELATIF AU SIEGE
DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. Rupa, Président; M. MBAYE, Vice-Président; MM. LAcus,
NAGENDRA SINGH, ELIAS, ODA, AGO, SCHWEBEL, sir Robert
JENNINGS, MM. BEDJAOUI, NI, EVENSEN, TARASSOV, GUILLAUME,
SHAHABUDDEEN, juges; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA, Greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu les articles 41, 48, 65, 66 et 68 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 73,
103, 104 et 105 de son Règlement,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante:

Considérant que, le 2 mars 1988, l’Assemblée générale des Nations
Unies a adopté la résolution 42/229 B par laquelle elle prie la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur la question suivante:

«Etant donné les faits consignés dans les rapports du Secrétaire
général [A/42/915 et Add.1], les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, en tant que
partie à l’accord entre l’Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-
Unis d’Amérique relatif au siège de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies [résolution 169 (IDj], sont-ils tenus de recourir à larbitrage
conformément à la section 21 de l’accord?»
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (ORDONNANCE 9 III 88) 4

Considérant que, le même jour, le conseiller juridique de lOrganisa-
tion des Nations Unies a transmis à la Cour par télécopie les versions
anglaise et française de la résolution susmentionnée, reçues au Greffe
le 3 mars 1988;

Considérant que, par lettre datée du 2 mars 1988, reçue au Greffe par
télécopie le 4 mars 1988 et par la poste le 7 mars 1988, le Secrétaire général
a transmis à la Cour la requête pour avis consultatif et des copies certifiées
conformes des versions anglaise et française de ladite résolution, et qu’il a
indiqué dans cette lettre que, conformément à l’article 65 du Statut, tout
document pertinent pouvant servir à élucider la question serait transmis
à la Cour dès que possible;

Considérant qu’il ressort des rapports du Secrétaire général visés dans
ladite résolution (dont les textes ont été fournis à la Cour) que la procé-
dure de règlement des différends définie à la section 21 de l'accord de
siège mentionné dans la résolution a été formellement invoquée par le
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à propos d’un
différend allégué relatif à la loi des Etats-Unis de 1987 contre le terro-
risme (titre X du Foreign Relations Authorization Act pour les exercices
1988 et 1989) et à son application à la mission permanente d’observa-
tion de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine auprès de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies;

Considérant qu’il ressort en outre desdits rapports que ladite loi
a été signée et promulguée par le président des Etats-Unis le 22 décembre
1987 et qu’elle prendra effet, selon ses propres termes, quatre-vingt-dix
jours après sa promulgation;

Considérant que le préambule de la résolution 42/229 B précise notam-
ment qu’«étant donné des contraintes de temps il faut appliquer immé-
diatement la procédure de règlement des différends conformément à la
section 21 de l’accord », qu’il convient de tenir compte «des dispositions
du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, en particulier des articles 41
et 68», et que la décision de demander un avis consultatif a été prise «en
tenant compte des contraintes de temps »;

Considérant que la résolution 42/229B, si elle comporte dans son
préambule une référence aux articles 41 et 68 du Statut, ne contient pas de
demande formelle en indication de mesures conservatoires;

Considérant qu'il n’y a pas lieu pour la Cour, dans les circonstances de
l’espèce, de rechercher si des mesures conservatoires peuvent ou non être
indiquées à l’occasion d’une procédure pour avis consultatif;

Considérant que la Cour prend note que l’Assemblée générale, à la
séance au cours de laquelle elle a adopté la résolution 42/229B par
laquelle elle demande un avis consultatif à la Cour, a aussi adopté la réso-
lution 42/229 A par laquelle elle

« demande au pays hôte de respecter les obligations qu’il a contrac-
tées au titre de l’accord et de donner l’assurance qu’il ne sera pris
aucune mesure qui porte atteinte aux arrangements actuellement en

5
ACCORD RELATIF AU SIÈGE (ORDONNANCE 9 III 88) 5

vigueur en ce qui concerne les fonctions officielles de la mission per-
manente d’observation de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine
auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à New York»;

Considérant, à la lumière des indications fournies par l’Assemblée
générale dans la résolution, que la Cour estime qu’une prompte réponse
à la requête serait souhaitable, ainsi qu’il est prévu à l’article 103 du
Règlement de la Cour, et qu’en conséquence la Cour devrait prendre
toutes mesures utiles pour accélérer la procédure;

La Cour,

à l'unanimité,

1. Prie le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de
fournir les documents visés à l’article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut à une
date aussi rapprochée que possible;

2. Décide que l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique sont jugés, conformément à l’article 66, paragraphe 2, du
Statut, susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question sou-
mise à la Cour pour avis consultatif et fixe au 25 mars 1988 la date d’expi-
ration du délai pendant lequel la Cour sera disposée à recevoir d’eux des
exposés écrits sur la question;

3. Décide en outre que les autres Etats parties au Statut de la Cour qui
en auront exprimé le désir pourront soumettre à la Cour un exposé écrit
sur la question, le 25 mars 1988 au plus tard;

4. Décide de tenir des audiences, qui s’ouvriront le 11 avril 1988 et au
cours desquelles des observations sur les exposés écrits pourront être
faites devant la Cour par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique et les Etats qui auront déposé des exposés écrits;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le neuf mars mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-huit.

Le Président,
(Signé) José Maria RUDA.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

M. SCHWEBEL, juge, joint à l'ordonnance l’exposé de son opinion in-
dividuelle.

(Paraphé) J.M.R.
(Paraphé) E.V.O.