55

           DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

   Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies not only to disputes as to the
interpretation or application of the Convention but also to disputes as to the ful-
filment of the Convention — Article IX envisions that disputes relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide be submitted to the Court — Reservations
to a clause concerning dispute settlement are contrary to the object and purpose
of the treaty if the provision is the raison d’être of the treaty — The object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention is the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide, and this encompasses holding a State responsible for vio-
lating its obligations under the Convention — The DRC’s failure to object to
Rwanda’s reservation is not sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the
issue of Rwanda’s reservation — Human rights treaties like the Genocide Con-
vention are based not on reciprocity between States but instead serve to protect
individuals and the international community at large — Principle of good faith
and Rwanda’s prior statements in support of human rights — Principle of good
faith and Rwanda’s prior efforts to establish International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda — Forum prorogatum — Court should have seized opportunity
to examine thoroughly whether reservation violated object and purpose of
Convention.

   1. Among the bases of jurisdiction invoked by the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (DRC) in instituting legal proceedings against Rwanda
before the Court is Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, to which both States are
parties, the DRC having acceded on 31 May 1962 and Rwanda on
16 April 1975. Article IX of the Convention stipulates that :
        “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
     tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
     those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
     of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
     International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
     the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)
  2. Article VIII provides that :
       “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
     the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
     United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
     suppression of acts of genocide . . .” (Emphasis added.)

  3. According to Article III :
       “The following acts shall be punishable :

53

56                ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

     (a) Genocide ;
     (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide ;
     (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide ;
     (d) Attempt to commit genocide ;
     (e) Complicity in genocide.”
   4. Thus, Article IX envisions that disputes between Contracting
Parties relating to a violation of the Convention and disputes relating to
the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, including
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute.
   5. As stated earlier, both the DRC and Rwanda are parties to the
Genocide Convention. In its accession instrument Rwanda entered a
reservation that : “The Rwandese Republic does not consider itself as
bound by Article IX of the Convention.” Thus, Rwanda argued, the juris-
diction of the Court under the Genocide Convention was excluded by the
reservation entered by it to Article IX.
   6. However, Rwanda’s reservation, in my view, has to be considered in
light of the object and purpose of the Convention. Under Article I of the
Convention,
       “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com-
     mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under internatio-
     nal law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” (Emphasis
     added.)
Article I thus imposes an obligation on States to prevent and punish the
crime of genocide.
   7. In its Application, the DRC contends that Rwanda has violated
Articles II and III of the Convention.
   8. Article II defines genocide to be :
     “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
     whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
     such :
     (a) Killing members of the group ;
     (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
          group ;
     (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
          to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ;
     (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;
     (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
Article III has been quoted earlier.
  9. Specifically, the DRC claims that Rwandan forces, directly or
through their Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD/Goma)
agents, committed acts of genocide against 3,500,000 Congolese, by

54

57                ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

carrying out large-scale massacres, assassinations and other murders
targeting well-identified groups (Warega, Bemba, Bashi, Bahemba . . .)
in Rwandan-occupied territories of the DRC.

   10. It is in the light of these tragic events that the DRC decided to
exercise its right under Article IX of the Convention, alleging that Rwanda
had violated its obligations under the Convention and bears responsi-
bility for those violations. Rwanda, for its part, denied the Court’s juris-
diction on the grounds that : it was not bound by the Article as it had
entered a reservation to it ; and the Court therefore lacked competence to
adjudicate on the matter.
   11. While a reservation to a treaty clause concerning dispute settle-
ment or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty is not, in
itself, incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, it is incom-
patible if the provision to which the reservation relates constitutes the
raison d’être of the treaty (“Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties”,
International Law Commission, Fifty-seventh Session, A/CN.4/558/
Add.2, Ann., p. 31, para. 3.1.13 (14 June 2005)).
   12. The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is the preven-
tion and punishment of the crime of genocide, and this encompasses
holding a State responsible whenever it is found to be in breach of its
obligations under the Convention. As explained below, Article IX is the
only provision of the Convention addressing the question of State respon-
sibility and it provides :
        “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
     tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including
     those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
     of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the
     International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
     the dispute.” (Emphasis added.)
The Article thus contemplates that disputes concerning acts of genocide,
or the responsibility of a State or Government for such acts, will be
referred to the Court for judicial scrutiny, and that a State accused of
breaching its obligations under the Convention should account to the
Court for its conduct.
   13. An analysis of the structure of the Genocide Convention reinforces
this conclusion. The title itself of the Convention — Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide — clearly frames
it in terms of both prevention and punishment of genocide (see, for
example, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 24 (deducing the object and purpose of a Convention
from its title)). Having conclusively established that the acts listed in
Article III are punishable, the Genocide Convention then sets up two types
of punishment mechanisms : the first is aimed at persons and the second
at State actors. In keeping with this dichotomy, Articles IV, V, VI
and VII treat the punishment of persons responsible for genocide or any

55

58                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

of the other acts listed in Article III. Unlike Articles IV, V, VI and VII,
however, Article IX focuses on disputes at the level of State actors.
Indeed, given the nature of the crime, it is difficult to imagine how geno-
cide could be committed without some form of State complicity or
involvement. Article IX is thus crucial to fulfilling the object and purpose
of the Convention since it is the only avenue for adjudicating the respon-
sibilities of States. Denying the Court this function, as Rwanda purports
to do by its reservation, not only prevents the Court from interpreting or
applying the Convention but also — and this in my view is the critical
point in the present case before the Court — from enquiring into disputes
between Contracting Parties relating to the responsibility of a State for
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, and is
thus not conducive to the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the
Convention, namely, the prevention and punishment of genocide. As the
Court stated in the Legality of Use of Force cases :

     “Article IX of the Convention accordingly appears to constitute a
     basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the
     extent that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘the interpre-
     tation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convention, including dis-
     putes ‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any
     of the other acts enumerated in article III’ of the said Convention”
     (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
     1999 (I), p. 137, para. 37 ; emphasis added).
   14. In considering Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Geno-
cide Convention, the Court observed that the Convention does not pro-
hibit reservations and that the DRC had put forward no objection to
Rwanda’s reservation when it was made. This finding notwithstanding,
the fact that a State does not object to such a reservation at the time it is
made is not, in my view, of dispositive significance, given that States
are often remiss in fulfilling their duties of objecting to reservations
which they consider invalid. Moreover, the failure of a State to object
should not be regarded as determinative in the context of human rights
treaties like the Genocide Convention that are not based on reciprocity
between States but instead serve to protect individuals and the inter-
national community at large.

 15. As the Human Rights Committee stated in its General Com-
ment 24, human rights treaties
     “are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They
     concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of
     inter-State reciprocity has no place, save perhaps in the limited con-
     text of reservations to declarations on the Committee’s competence
     under article 41. And because the operation of the classic rules on
     reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not

56

59                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

     seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. The
     absence of protest by States cannot imply that a reservation is either
     compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the
     Covenant.” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24
     (CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6), 4 November 1994, para. 17.)

The Committee concluded that the pattern of objections to reservations
is so unclear that it is unsafe to assume that a non-objecting State “thinks
that a particular reservation is acceptable” (ibid., para. 17). Although
the Human Rights Committee was speaking about the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the same holds true for the Geno-
cide Convention. Because, as the Court itself has stated, the Genocide
Convention, like other human rights treaties, is not based on reciprocity
between States, the fact that the DRC did not object to Rwanda’s reser-
vation at the time it was made has no bearing on the Court’s ability to
consider it. Hence, the DRC’s failure to object should not have been
deemed sufficient to prevent the Court from examining the issue of
Rwanda’s reservation on this occasion.

   16. While the question of reservations to Article IX of the Genocide
Convention came up in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force —
(Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 772, para. 32) and (Yugoslavia v. United
States of America) (Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999 (II),
I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 924, para. 24) — the Court in those cases did not
examine the issue whether the reservations to Article IX by Spain and the
United States prevented the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the
Convention, because that precise issue was not raised by Yugoslavia.
Since Yugoslavia neither explicitly raised the issue nor alluded to it in
its arguments, the Court concisely concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
under Article IX. Be that as it may, the Court did however confirm that
disputes relating to “the interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the
Convention included disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State
for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III”,
even though in those cases the acts complained of by Yugoslavia
were incapable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention. In the present case, the fact that the issue of the reservation
was addressed by both Parties entitled the Court to examine Rwanda’s
reservation in the light of the purpose and object of the Convention.

  17. Moreover, in considering this issue the Court should have taken
due account of the principle of good faith as it relates to the effect of the
Statement made by Rwanda, in the person of its Minister of Justice,
before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights :
       “Rwanda is one of the countries that has ratified the greatest
     number of international human rights instruments. In 2004 alone,

57

60                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

     our Government ratified ten of them, including those concerning the
     rights of women, the prevention and repression of corruption, the
     prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and the environment.
     The few instruments not yet ratified will shortly be ratified and past
     reservations not yet withdrawn will shortly be withdrawn.” (Sixty-
     first Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.)

Among the few instruments to which Rwanda had entered reservations,
reservations that were “shortly [to] be withdrawn”, was the Genocide
Convention.
  18. The Court made clear in the Nuclear Tests cases that :

        “Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties
     is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an inter-
     national obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus
     interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and
     place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obliga-
     tion thus created be respected.” (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
     Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46 ; Nuclear Tests
     (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 473,
     para. 49.)
It would not be appropriate to regard Rwanda’s declaration concerning
its reservation to the “most important” human rights and humanitarian
treaty as nothing more than political posturing devoid of legal effect.

  19. This is all the more so given the principles underlying the Con-
vention, as well as the gravity of the present case, in which 3,500,000
Congolese citizens are alleged to have been massacred on grounds of
ethnicity.
  20. As the Court stated in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case :
        “By [its] very nature [the outlawing of genocide, aggression,
     slavery and racial discrimination is] the concern of all States. In
     view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held
     to have a legal interest in their protection ; they are obligations erga
     omnes.” (Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32 ;
     emphasis added.)

  21. Thirty years later, the Court confirmed its understanding of the
object and purpose of the Convention and concluded :
       “It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Con-
     vention are rights and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that
     the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime
     of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention.” (Applica-

58

61                 ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

     tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
     Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-
     liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616,
     para. 31 ; emphasis added.)
Hence, in my judgment, a State which denies the Court’s jurisdiction to
enquire into allegations alleging violation of the Convention would not
be lending the co-operation required to “liberate mankind from [the] . . .
odious scourge” of genocide or to fulfil the object and purpose of the
Convention. Denying recourse to the Court essentially precludes judicial
scrutiny into the responsibility of a State in a dispute relating to the vio-
lation of the Convention.
   22. This point is of particular cogency in this case concerning Rwanda,
a State where genocide took place and which justifiably called on the
United Nations Security Council to set up an international criminal tri-
bunal to try those who committed the crime against a section of its popu-
lation. It will thus not be in keeping with the spirit and objective of the
Convention to refuse to allow judicial consideration of the allegation of
genocide perpetrated in another country because Rwanda itself or its
agents are alleged to be responsible. While this is not to claim that the
seriousness of an obligation, the jus cogens status of a norm or the erga
omnes nature of an obligation per se confers jurisdiction on the Court, as
was recognized in the Judgment, it is nevertheless my opinion that it is
incumbent on Rwanda in this case, as a State party to the Genocide Con-
vention — and which itself was a victim of genocide and rightly referred
the matter to the competent organ of the United Nations — to allow
scrutiny of the allegation that it had breached its obligations under the
Genocide Convention.

  23. In its letter to the Secretary-General of 28 December 1994 regard-
ing this issue, Rwanda rightly stressed the gravity of the genocide which
had been committed on its territory and requested the “[s]etting up as
soon as possible [of] an international tribunal to try the criminals”. In the
request, Rwanda stated as follows :
       “There is evident reluctance by the international community . . .
     to expose and punish the criminals . . . still at large. This is tanta-
     mount to diluting the question of genocide that was committed in
     Rwanda.” (Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the Permanent
     Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the
     President of the Security Council, United Nations doc. S/1994/1115
     (29 September 1994).)
Parallel reasoning would suggest that Rwanda’s unwillingness to allow
the Court to scrutinize its alleged genocidal conduct in this case not only
has the same effect of diluting the question of genocide, a result which
Rwanda rightly criticized and sought to prevent, but in fact has an even
more drastic effect : denial of the question of genocide. In this connec-

59

62                ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

tion, it is worth stressing that all human lives — be they Rwandan, Con-
golese, or of any other nationality — are precious ; offering redress to
some while denying it to others is neither in conformity with the Conven-
tion nor with justice ; nor does it further the purposes and principles of
the United Nations Charter in respect of the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. The spirit of the Convention as well as the letter of the Convention
must be respected at all times.
   24. The allegation involving the commission of genocide is far too
serious a matter to be allowed to escape judicial scrutiny by means of a
procedural device. The nature of the Convention and gravity of the
allegation dictate that, wherever possible, it must be subject to judicial
scrutiny. Inasmuch as Rwanda was able to call on the international com-
munity to hold to account those alleged to have committed genocide in
Rwanda itself, it cannot justifiably shield itself from enquiry in respect
of the very kinds of acts for which it succeeded in obtaining scrutiny by a
competent organ. In other words, it is neither morally right nor just
for a State to shield itself from judicial scrutiny under Article IX of the
Convention in respect of acts alleged to have taken place in the territory
of a neighbouring State when those acts constitute the very same
conduct as that in response to which the State successfully urged the
establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.

   25. It is indeed a principle of law that the jurisdictional basis of the
Court is consensual. In paragraph 21 of the Judgment the Court recalls
that such consent may take various forms. Among these is forum proro-
gatum, which was explained not long ago by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in
his separate opinion in the Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) case as follows :

     “the possibility that if State A commences proceedings against State B
     on a non-existent or defective jurisdictional basis, State B can
     remedy the situation by conduct amounting to an acceptance
     of the jurisdiction of the Court” (Provisional Measures, Order of
     13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 416, para. 24, separate
     opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).

While I do not accept the substance of the DRC’s argument on this issue,
I do believe that the gravity of the matter and the nature of the allegation
before the Court are such that the Court should have been allowed to
adjudicate the case. There is no impediment in law preventing Rwanda
from expressing its consent and thereby entitling the Court to examine
the alleged breaches of Rwanda’s obligations under the Genocide Con-
vention.

60

63                ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

   26. As can be seen from the foregoing, this opinion has, to a great
extent, drawn on the jurisprudence of the Court on the subject of the
Genocide Convention to show why the Court should have been able to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court has over the years taken cognizance of
the importance of the Genocide Convention, has acknowledged the denial
of humanity that genocide — described as the “crime of all crimes” —
represents, and has responded appropriately, declaring “the principles
underlying the Convention” to be “principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 616,
para. 31). In reaching such profound conclusions, the Court, in my view,
was reflecting the gravity of the crime of genocide and the seriousness
with which it, the international community and mankind as a whole take
the Convention. While not denying the right of the States parties to the
Convention to enter reservations to Article IX, the Court, through its
jurisprudence, has stressed the unique nature of the Convention and the
necessity for States to respect their obligations under it. The Court’s pro-
nouncements fostered high hopes and expectations that the object and
purpose of the Convention would be fulfilled. This case presented an
opportunity for the Court to apply the Convention and its principles.
   27. It is thus this profound respect for the Court’s earlier affirmations
of the principle underlying the Convention, its object and purpose,
together with the seriousness of the matter before it, which leads me to
regret the Court’s conclusion that it is not entitled to take on the present
case. In my view, had the Court also, besides the Genocide Convention,
taken a different, but no less valid, view of the other instruments relied
upon including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women and the Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, it could
have reached a different conclusion with respect to its jurisdiction. My
regret that the Court was not able to do so explains my vote.

   28. I have read with considerable interest the joint separate opinion
of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma. They have
succinctly reflected the essence of the judicial concern underlying this
opinion, namely, that it is a very grave matter for a State to shield itself
from international judicial scrutiny for

     “any claim that might be made against it concerning genocide. A
     State so doing shows the world scant confidence that it would never,
     ever, commit genocide, one of the greatest crimes known” (para. 25).

That concern could not have been more aptly stated. I also agree with the
joint opinion to the effect that in matters relating to the compatibility of

61

64                ARMED ACTIVITIES (DISS. OP. KOROMA)

a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty, the reserving State
or States do not have the final word.
  29. On the other hand, while not disagreeing with the view of the
authors of the joint opinion that Article IX of the Genocide Convention
creates no monitoring function involving the review of periodic reports
by human rights treaty bodies on States’ behaviour, I wish to reiterate
that Article IX does provide for the Court to adjudicate :

       “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the inter-
     pretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
     including those relating to the responsibility of a State” (emphasis
     added).
The Article, in my view, therefore provides a basis for the Court, inter
alia, to enquire into State responsibility for genocide.

                                        (Signed) Abdul G. KOROMA.

62


142

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KOROMA

I have voted in favour of most of the operative part of the Judgment,
principally because I concur with the Court’s finding, in response to the
questions submitted to it in the Special Agreement, that Hungary was not
entitled to suspend and subsequently to abandon in 1989 the works on
the Nagymaros Project and on the part of the Gabéikovo Project on the
Danube river for which it was responsible under the 1977 Treaty, that the
Treaty continues to be in force and consequently governs the relationship
between the Parties.

In making such a finding the Court not only reached the right decision
in my view, but reached a decision which is in accordance with the 1977
Treaty, and is consistent with the jurisprudence of the Court as well as
the general principles of international law. Foremost among these prin-
ciples is that of pacta sunt servanda which forms an integral part of inter-
national law. Any finding to the contrary would have been tantamount to
denying respect for obligations arising from treaties, and would also have
undermined one of the fundamental principles and objectives of the
United Nations Charter calling upon States “to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties

. can be maintained”, and “to achieve international co-operation in
solving problems of an economic, social . . . character”.

When Czechoslovakia (later Slovakia) and Hungary agreed by means
of the 1977 Treaty to construct the Gabtikovo-Nagymaros barrage sys-
tem of locks on the Bratislava-Budapest sector of the river for the devel-
opment and broad utilization of its water resources, particularly for the
production of energy, and for purposes connected with transport, agri-
culture and other sectors of the national economy, this could be seen as a
practical realization of such objectives, since the Danube has always
played a vital part in the commercial and economic life of its riparian
States, underlined and reinforced by their interdependence.

Prior to the adoption of the Treaty and the commencement of the
Project itself, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary had recognized that
whatever measures were taken to modify the flow of the river, such as
those contemplated by the Project, they would have environmental effects,
some adverse. Experience had shown that activities carried on upstream
tended to produce effects downstream, thus making international co-op-
eration all the more essential. With a view to preventing, avoiding and
mitigating such impacts, extensive studies on the environment were under-
taken by the Parties prior to the conclusion of the Treaty. The Treaty
itself, in its Articles 15, 19 and 20, imposed strict obligations regarding

139
143 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

the protection of the environment which were to be met and complied
with by the contracting parties in the construction and operation of the
Project.

When in 1989 Hungary, concerned about the effects of the Project on
its natural environment, suspended and later abandoned works for which
it was responsible under the 1977 Treaty this was tantamount to a viola-
tion not only of the Treaty itself but of the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda.

Hungary invoked the principle of necessity as a legal justification for
its termination of the Treaty. It stated, inter alia, that the construction of
the Project would have significantly changed that historic part of the
Danube with which the Project was concerned; that as a result of opera-
tion in peak mode and the resulting changes in water level, the flora and
fauna on the banks of the river would have been damaged and water
quality impaired. It was also Hungary’s contention that the completion
of the Project would have had a number of other adverse effects, in that
the living conditions for the biota of the banks would have been drasti-
cally changed by peak-mode operation, the soil structure ruined and its
yield diminished. It further stated that the construction might have
resulted in the waterlogging of several thousand hectares of soil and that
the groundwater in the area might have become over-salinized. As far as
the drinking water of Budapest was concerned, Hungary contended that
the Project would have necessitated further dredging; this would have
damaged the existing filter layer allowing pollutants to enter nearby
water supplies.

On the other hand, the PHARE Report on the construction of the
reservoir at Cunovo and the effect this would have on the water quality
offered a different view. The Report was commissioned by the European
Communities with the co-operation of, first, the Government of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and, later, the Slovak Republic. It
was described as presenting a reliable integrated modelling system for
analysing the environmental impact of alternative management régimes
in the Danubian lowland area and for predicting changes in water quality
as well as conditions in the river, the reservoir, the soil and agriculture.

As to the effects of the construction of the dam on the ecology of
the area, the Report reached the conclusion that whether the post-dam
scenarios represented an improvement or otherwise would depend on the
ecological objectives in the area, as most fundamental changes in eco-
systems depended on the discharge system and occurred slowly over
many years or decades, and, no matter what effects might have been felt
in the ecosystem thus far, they could not be considered as irreversible.

With regard to water quality, the Report stated that groundwater
quality in many places changed slowly over a number of years. With this
in mind, comprehensive modelling, some of which entailed modelling
impacts for periods of up to 100 years, was undertaken and the conclu-

140
144 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

sion reached that no problems were predicted in relation to groundwater
quality.

The Court in its Judgment, quite rightly in my view, acknowledges
Hungary’s genuine concerns about the effect of the Project on its natural
environment. However, after careful consideration of the conflicting evi-
dence, it reached the conclusion that it was not necessary to determine
which of these points of view was scientifically better founded in order to
answer the question put to it in the Special Agreement. Hungary had not
established to the satisfaction of the Court that the construction of the
Project would have led to the consequences it alleged. Further, even
though such damages might occur, they did not appear imminent in
terms of the law, and could otherwise have been prevented or redressed.
The Court, moreover, stated that such uncertainties as might have existed
and had raised environmental concerns in Hungary could otherwise have
been addressed without having to resort to unilateral suspension and ter-
mination of the Treaty. In effect, the evidence was not of such a nature as
to entitle Hungary to unilaterally suspend and later terminate the Treaty
on grounds of ecological necessity. In the Court’s view, to allow that
would not only destabilize the security of treaty relations but would also
severely undermine the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Thus it is not as if the Court did not take into consideration the
scientific evidence presented by Hungary in particular regarding the effects
on its environment of the Project, but the Court reached the conclusion
that such evidence was not sufficient to allow Hungary unilaterally to
suspend or terminate the Treaty. This finding, in my view, is not only of
significance to Slovakia and Hungary — the Parties to the dispute — but
it also represents a significant statement by the Court rejecting the argu-
ment that obligations assumed under a validly concluded treaty can no
longer be observed because they have proved inconvenient or as a result
of the emergence of a new wave of legal norms, irrespective of their legal
character or quality. Accordingly, not for the first time and in spite of
numerous breaches over the years, the Court has in this case upheld and
reaffirmed the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties and must be performed in good faith (Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).

Nor can this finding of the Court be regarded as a mechanical applica-
tion of the principle of pacta sunt servanda or the invocation of the
maxim summun jus summa injuria but it ought rather to be seen as a re-
affirmation of the principle that a validly concluded treaty can be sus-
pended or terminated only with the consent of all the parties concerned.
Moreover, the Parties to this dispute can also draw comfort from the
Court’s finding in upholding the continued validity of the Treaty and
enjoining them to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty so as to achieve
its aims and objectives.

141
145 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

I also concur with the Court’s findings that Czechoslovakia was
entitled to proceed, in November 1991, to Variant C in so far as it then
confined itself to undertaking works which did not predetermine its final
decision. On the other hand, I cannot concur with the Court’s finding
that Czechoslovakia was not entitled to put Variant C into operation
from October 1992. The Court reached this latter conclusion after hold-
ing that Hungary’s suspension and abandonment of the works for which
it was responsible under the 1977 Treaty was unlawful, and after acknow-
ledging the serious problems with which Czechoslovakia was confronted
as a result of Hungary’s decision to abandon the greater part of the con-
struction of the System of Locks for which it was responsible under the
Treaty. The Court likewise recognized that huge investments had been
made, that the construction at Gabéëikovo was all but finished, the bypass
canal completed, and that Hungary itself, in 1991, had duly fulfilled its
obligations under the Treaty in this respect by completing work on the
tailrace canal. The Court also recognized that not using the system would
not only have led to considerable financial losses of some $2.5 billion but
would have resulted in serious consequences for the natural environment.

It is against this background that the Court also reaffirmed the prin-
ciple of international law that, subject to the appropriate limitations, a
State party to a treaty, when confronted with a refusal by the other party
to perform its part of an agreed project, is free to act on its own territory
and within its own jurisdiction so as to realize the original object and
purpose of the treaty, thereby limiting for itself the damage sustained
and, ultimately, the compensatory damages to be paid by the other party.

As the Judgment recalled, Article 1 of the 1977 Treaty stipulated that
the Gabüikovo-Nagymaros Project was to comprise a “joint investment”
and to constitute a “single and operational system of locks”, consisting of
two sections, Gabëikovo and Nagymaros. According to Article 5, para-
graph 5, of the Treaty, each of the contracting parties had specific
responsibilities regarding the construction and operation of the System of
Locks. Czechoslovakia was to be responsible for, inter alia:

“(1) the Dunakiliti-Hruëov head-water installations on the left
bank, in Czechoslovak territory;

(2) the head-water canal of the by-pass canal, in Czechoslovak
territory;

(3) the Gabéikovo series of locks, in Czechoslovak territory;

(4) the flood-control works of the Nagymaros head-water instal-
lations, in Czechoslovak territory, with the exception of the
lower Ipel district;

(5) restoration of vegetation in Czechoslovak territory.”

142
146 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

Hungary was to be responsible for, inter alia:

“(1) the Dunakiliti-HruSov head-water installations on the right
bank, in Czechoslovak territory, including the connecting weir
and the diversionary weir;

(2) the Dunakiliti-Hruëov head-water installations on the right
bank, in Hungarian territory;

(3) the Dunakiliti dam, in Hungarian territory;

(4) the tail-water canal of the by-pass canal, in Czechoslovak ter-
ritory;

(5) deepening of the bed of the Danube below Palkovitovo, in
Hungarian and Czechoslovak territory;

(6) improvement of the old bed of the Danube, in Hungarian and
Czechoslovak territory;

(7) operational equipment of the Gabtikovo system of locks (trans-
port equipment, maintenance machinery), in Czechoslovak ter-
ritory ;

(8) the flood-control works of the Nagymaros head-water instal-
lations in the lower Ipel district, in Czechoslovak territory;

(9) the flood-control works of the Nagymaros head-water instal-
lations, in Hungarian territory;

(10) the Nagymaros series of locks, in Hungarian territory;

(11) deepening of the tail-water bed below the Nagymaros system
of locks, in Hungarian territory;

(12) operational equipment of the Nagymaros system of locks
(transport equipment, maintenance machinery), in Hungarian
territory;

(13) restoration of vegetation in Hungarian territory.”

In accordance with the Treaty and the concept of joint investment,
some of those structures, such as the Dunakiliti weir, the bypass canal,
the Gabtikovo dam and the Nagymaros dam were to become joint prop-
erty, irrespective of the territory on which they were located.

As noted in the Judgment, by the spring of 1989 the work on Gab-
tikovo was well advanced: the Dunakiliti dam was 90 per cent complete,
the Gabëikovo dam was 85 per cent complete, the bypass canal was
between 60 per cent complete (downstream of Gabëikovo) and 95 per
cent complete (upstream of Gabëikovo}, and the dykes of the Dunakiliti-
HruSov reservoir were between 70 and 98 per cent complete. This was not
the case in the Nagymaros sector where, although the dykes had been
built, the only structure relating to the dam itself was the coffer-dam
which was to facilitate its construction.

When Hungary, on 13 May 1989, decided to suspend works on the
Nagymaros part of the Project because of alleged ecological hazards and
later extended this to the Gab¢ikovo section, thereby preventing the
scheduled damming of the Danube in 1989, this had a considerable,

143
147 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

negative impact on the Project — which was envisaged as an integrated
project and depended on the actual construction of the planned installa-
tions at Nagymaros and Gabëikovo. Hungary’s contribution was there-
fore considered indispensable, as some of the key structures were under
its control and situated on its territory.

Following prolonged and fruitless negotiations with Hungary regard-
ing the performance of their obligations under the Treaty, Czechoslo-
vakia proceeded, in November 1991, to what came to be known as the
“provisional solution”, or Variant C. This was put into operation
from October 1992 with the damming up of the Danube at river kilo-
metre 1851.7 on Czechoslovak territory with resulting consequences on
water and the navigation channel. It entailed the diversion of the Danube
some 10 kilometres upstream of Dunakiliti on Czechoslovak territory. In
its final stage it included the construction at Cunovo of an overflow dam
and a levee linking that dam to the south bank of the bypass canal. The
corresponding reservoir was designed to have a smaller surface area and
provided approximately 30 per cent less than the storage initially contem-
plated. Provision was made for ancillary works, namely: an intake struc-
ture to supply the Mosoni Danube; a weir to enable, inter alia, flood
water to be directed along the old bed of the Danube; an auxiliary ship-
lock; and two hydroelectric plants (one capable of an annual production
of 4 GWh on the Mosoni Danube, and the other with a production of
174 GWh on the old course of the Danube). The supply of the water to
the side-arms of the Danube on the Czechoslovak bank was to be secured
by means of two intake structures on the bypass canal at Dobrohoët and
Gabtikovo. Not all problems were solved: a solution was to be found for
the Hungarian bank, and the question of lowering the bed of the Danube
at the confluence of the bypass canal and the old bed of the river
remained.

In justification of the action, Slovakia contended that this solution was
as close to the original project as possible and that Czechoslovakia’s deci-
sion to proceed with it was justified by Hungary’s decision to suspend
and subsequently abandon the construction works at Dunakiliti, which
had made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to attain the object and pur-
pose contemplated by the 1977 Treaty. Slovakia further explained that
Variant C represented the only possibility remaining to it of fulfilling the
purposes of the 1977 Treaty, including the continuing obligation to
implement the Treaty in good faith. It further submitted that Variant C
for the greater part was no more than what had already been agreed to
by Hungary, and that only those modifications were made which had
become necessary by virtue of Hungary’s decision not to implement its
obligations under the Treaty.

In spite of what appeared to me not only a cogent and reasonable
explanation for its action but also an eminently legal justification for

144
148 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

Variant C, the Court found that, though there was a strong factual simi-
larity between Variant C and the original Project in its upstream compo-
nent (the Gabéikovo System of Locks), the difference from a legal point
of view was striking. It observed that the basic characteristics of the 1977
Treaty provided for a “joint investment”, “joint ownership” of the most
important construction of the Gab¢ikovo-Nagymaros Project and for the
operation of this “joint property” as a “co-ordinated single unit”. The
Court reasoned that all this could not be carried out by unilateral action
such as that involving Variant C and that, despite its physical similarity
with the original Project, it differed sharply in its legal characteristics.
The Court also found that, in operating Variant C, Slovakia essentially
appropriated for its own use and benefit between 80 and 90 per cent of
the waters of the Danube before returning them to the main bed of the
river downstream of Gabéëikovo. This act, in the Court’s view, deprived
Hungary of its right to an equitable share of the natural resources of the
river, this being not only a shared international watercourse but an inter-
national boundary river.

In the light of these findings, the Court concluded that Czechoslovakia,
by putting into operation Variant C, did not apply the Treaty, but, on the
contrary, violated certain of its express provisions and in so doing com-
mitted an internationally wrongful act. In its reasoning, the Court stated
that it had placed emphasis on the “putting into operation” of Variant C,
the unlawfulness residing in the damming of the Danube.

This finding by the Court calls for comment. In the first place, it is to
be recalled that the Court found that Hungary’s suspension and uni-
lateral termination of the Treaty was unlawful. Secondly, the Court held
that a State party confronted, as Czechoslovakia was, with a refusal by
the other party to perform its part of an agreed project is entitled to act
on its own territory and within its own jurisdiction so as to realize the
object and purpose of the treaty. This notwithstanding, the Court took
exception to the fact that Variant C did not meet the requirements of
Articles 1, 8, 9 and 10 of the 1977 Treaty regarding a “single and opera-
tional system of locks”, “joint ownership” and “use and benefits of the
system of locks in equal measure”. In its view, “by definition all this
could not be carried out by unilateral measure”. This stricture of Variant
C is not, in my respectful opinion, warranted. The unilateral suspension
and termination of the Treaty and the works for which Hungary was
responsible under it had amounted not only to a repudiation of the
Treaty; it frustrated the realization of the Project as a single and opera-
tional system of works, jointly owned and used for the benefit of the con-
tracting parties in equal measure. As a result of Hungary’s acts, the
objective of the original Project could only have been achieved by Slo-
vakia alone operating it; according to the material before the Court,
Variant C constituted the minimum modification of the original Project
necessary to enable the aim and objective of the original Project to be

145
149 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

realized. It should be recalled that but for the suspension and abandon-
ment of the works, there would have been no Variant C, and without
Variant C, the objective of the act of Hungary which the Court has quali-
fied as unlawful would have been realized thus defeating the object and
purpose of the Treaty. In my view Variant C was therefore a genuine
application of the Treaty and it was indispensable for the realization of
its object and purpose. If it had not proceeded to its construction,
according to the material before the Court, Czechoslovakia would have
been stranded with a largely finished but inoperative system, which had
been very expensive both in terms of cost of construction and in terms of
acquiring the necessary land. The environmental benefits in terms of
flood control, which was a primary object and purpose of the Treaty,
would not have been attained. Additionally, the unfinished state of the
constructions would have exposed them to further deterioration through
continued inoperation. |

Variant C was also held to be unlawful by the Court because, in its
opinion, Czechoslovakia, by diverting the waters of the Danube to oper-
ate Variant C, unilaterally assumed control of a shared resource and
thereby deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable share of the natural
resources of the river — with the continuing effects of the diversion of
these waters upon the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkéz —
and failed to respect the degree of proportionality required by interna-
tional law.

The implication of the Court’s finding that the principle of equitable
utilization was violated by the diversion of the river is not free from
deubt. That principle, which is now set out in the Convention on the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, is not new.

While it is acknowledged that the waters of rivers must not be used in
such a way as to cause injury to other States and in the absence of any
settled rules an equitable solution must be sought (case of the Diversion
of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, 1937, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 70),
this rule applies where a treaty is absent. In the case under consideration
Article 14, paragraph 2, of the 1977 Treaty provides that the contracting
parties may, without giving prior notice, both withdraw from the Hun-
garian-Czechoslovak section of the Danube, and subsequently make use
of the quantities of water specified in the water balance of the approved
Joint Contractual Plan. Thus, the withdrawal of excess quantities of
water from the Hungarian-Czechoslovak section of the Danube to oper-
ate the Gabéikovo section of the system was contemplated with compen-
sation to the other party in the form of an increased share of electric
power. In other words, Hungary had agreed within the context of the
Project to the diversion of the Danube (and, in the Joint Contractual
Plan, to a provisional measure of withdrawal of water from the Danube).
Accordingly, it would appear that the normal entitlement of the Parties

146
150 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

to an equitable and reasonable share of the water of the Danube under
general international law was duly modified by the 1977 Treaty which
considered the Project as a lex specialis. Slovakia was thus entitled to
divert enough water to operate Variant C, and more especially so if, with-
out such diversion, Variant C could not have been put into productive
use. It is difficult to appreciate the Court’s finding that this action was
unlawful in the absence of an explanation as to how Variant C should
have been put into operation. On the contrary, the Court would appear
to be saying by implication that, if Variant C had been operated on the
basis of a 50-50 sharing of the waters of the Danube, it would have been
lawful. However, the Court has not established that a 50-50 ratio of use
would have been sufficient to operate Variant C optimally. Nor could the
Court say that the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty had been
infringed or that the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty had been
defeated by the diversion. In the case concerning the Diversion of Water
from the Meuse, the Court found that, in the absence of a provision
requiring the consent of Belgium, “the Netherlands are entitled . . . to
dispose of the waters of the Meuse at Maestricht” provided that the treaty
obligations incumbent on it were not ignored (Judgment, 1937, P.C.LJ.,
Series A/B, No. 70, p. 30). Applying this test in the circumstances which
arose, Variant C can be said to have been permitted by the 1977 Treaty
as a reasonable method of implementing it. Consequently Variant C did
not violate the rights of Hungary and was consonant with the objectives
of the Treaty régime.

Moreover the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization has to
be applied with all the relevant factors and circumstances pertaining to
the international watercourse in question as well as to the needs and uses
of the watercourse States concerned. Whether the use of the waters of a
watercourse by a watercourse State is reasonable or equitable and there-
fore lawful must be determined in the light of all the circumstances. To
the extent that the 1977 Treaty was designed to provide for the operation
of the Project, Variant C is to be regarded as a genuine attempt to
achieve that objective.

One consequence of this finding by the Court is its prescription that
unless the Parties otherwise agree, Hungary shall compensate Slovakia
for the damage sustained by Czechoslovakia and by Slovakia on account
of the wrongful suspension and abandonment by Hungary of the works
for which it was responsible; and Slovakia shall compensate Hungary for
the damage it has sustained on account of the putting into operation of
the “provisional solution” by Czechoslovakia and its maintenance in
service by Slovakia.

While this finding would appear to aim at encouraging the Parties to
negotiate an agreement so as realize the aims and objectives of the
Treaty, albeit in a modified form, it appears to suggest that the Court
considered the wrongful conduct of the Parties to be equivalent. This
somehow emasculates the fact that the operation of Variant C would not

147
151 GABC{KOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

have been necessary if the works had not been suspended and terminated
in the first place. It was this original breach which triggered the whole
chain of events. At least a distinction should have been drawn between
the consequences of the “wrongful conduct” of each Party, hence my
unwillingness to concur with the finding. While Article 38, paragraph 2,
of its Statute allows the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, this
can only be done with the agreement of the parties to a dispute.

The Judgment also alluded to “the continuing effects of the diversion
of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetk6z”. It is
not clear whether by this the Court had reached the conclusion that sig-
nificant harm had been caused to the ecology of the area by the operation
of Variant C.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I take the view that the
operation of Variant C should have been considered as a genuine attempt
by an injured party to secure the achievement of the agreed objectives of
the 1977 Treaty, in ways not only consistent with that Treaty but with
international law and equity.

In his separate opinion in the case concerning the Diversion of Water
from the Meuse, Judge Hudson stated that

“[W]hat are widely known as principles of equity have long been
considered to constitute a part of international law, and as such they
have often been applied by international tribunals, . . .” (Judgment,
1937, P.CLJ., Series A/B, No. 70, p. 76).

He went on to point out that

“It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where
two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one
party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that
obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar
non-performance of that obligation by the other party. The principle
finds expression in the so-called maxims of equity which exercised
great influence in the creative period of the development of the
Anglo-American law. Some of these maxims are . . .; ‘He who seeks
equity must do equity.’ It is in line with such maxims that ‘a court of
equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the
subject-matter of the litigation has been improper’ (13 Halsbury's
Laws of England (2nd ed., 1934), p. 87). A very similar principle was
received into Roman Law. The obligations of a vendor and a vendee
being concurrent, ‘neither could compel the other to perform unless
he had done, or tendered, his own part’ (Buckland, Text Book of
Roman Law (2nd ed., 1932), p. 493).” (Zhid., p. 77.)

Judge Hudson took the view that:

“The general principle is one of which an international tribunal
should make a very sparing application. It is certainly not to be

148
152 GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (SEP. OP. KOROMA)

thought that a complete fulfilment of all its obligations under a
treaty must be proved as a condition precedent to a State’s appear-
ing before an international tribunal to seek an interpretation of that
treaty. Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the limi-
tations which are necessary, a tribunal bound by international law
ought not to shrink from applying a principle of such obvious fair-
ness.” (P.C.LJ., Series A/B, No. 70, p. 77.)

Judge Hudson continued,

“Yet, in a particular case in which it is asked to enforce the obliga-
tion to make reparation, a court of international law cannot ignore
special circumstances which may call for the consideration of equi-
table principles.” (/bid., p. 78.)

It is my view that this case, because of the circumstances surrounding it,
is one which calls for the application of the principles of equity.

The importance of the River Danube for both Hungary and Slovakia
cannot be overstated. Both countries, by means of the 1977 Treaty, had
agreed to co-operate in the exploitation of its resources for their mutual
benefit. That Treaty, in spite of the period in which it was concluded,
would seem to have incorporated most of the environmental imperatives
of today, including the precautionary principle, the principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization and the no-harm rule. None of these principles
was proved to have been violated to an extent sufficient to have war-
ranted the unilateral termination of the Treaty. The Court has gone a
long way, rightly in my view, in upholding the principle of the sanctity of
treaties. Justice would have been enhanced had the Court taken account
of special circumstances as mentioned above.

(Signed) Abdul G. Koroma.

149


                     172

                          OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE BENNOUNA

                        Evolution de la règle coutumière de l’immunité — Mutation du concept de sou‑
                     veraineté — Lien entre le droit de la responsabilité internationale et le droit de
                     l’immunité de juridiction — Droit d’accès à la justice — Circonstances exception‑
                     nelles permettant la levée de l’immunité — Unité du droit international — Concep‑
                     tion mécaniste de l’œuvre judiciaire.

                        1. Tout en me ralliant au dispositif de l’arrêt de la Cour qui a conclu à
                     la violation par l’Italie, dans le différend qui l’oppose à l’Allemagne, de
                     l’immunité de juridiction de celle-ci (arrêt, par. 139, point 1)), je ne peux
                     cependant faire mienne l’approche adoptée par la Cour ni accepter la
                     logique de son raisonnement.
                        2. On sait que la portée du principe de l’immunité de juridiction des
                     Etats a divisé et continue de diviser les Etats, même si l’on assiste à une
                     tendance au rapprochement, dans le contexte de la mondialisation.
                        3. En effet, partant d’une conception absolue de la souveraineté, les
                     Etats en avaient déduit une conception tout aussi absolue de l’immunité,
                     consistant en ce que l’un d’entre eux puisse se soustraire en toutes circons-
                     tances à la compétence des tribunaux de l’autre.
                        4. Mais la mutation sensible du concept de souveraineté, sous l’effet de
                     la diversification des acteurs internationaux et des avancées du droit
                     international, a conduit de nombreux Etats à adapter et à relativiser leurs
                     positions en ce qui concerne l’immunité de juridiction, en la limitant
                     essentiellement aux actes de souveraineté (jure imperii) par opposition
                     aux actes d’ordre privé et commercial (jure gestionis). Cependant, la ligne
                     de séparation entre ces deux catégories d’actes n’est pas toujours facile à
                     tracer. Quant aux législations nationales, peu nombreuses, elles sont loin
                     d’être homogènes, comme le rappelle d’ailleurs la Cour (ibid., par. 71), et
                     il en est de même de la jurisprudence des tribunaux des différents Etats, ce
                     qui fait que le droit de l’immunité juridictionnelle donne l’impression
                     d’un pavillon qui recouvre toutes sortes de marchandises.
                        5. De fait, des législations sont adoptées par les Etats autorisant leurs
                     tribunaux à connaître de certaines activités des Etats étrangers, sans s’ap-
                     puyer pour cela sur le droit international en matière d’immunités. C’est
                     ainsi qu’en 1996 les Etats-Unis ont amendé leur propre législation pour
                     que leurs tribunaux puissent connaître de recours en responsabilité civile
                     contre des Etats étrangers que le Gouvernement américain viendrait à
                     désigner « soutien[s] du terrorisme » (Etats-Unis d’Amérique : Foreign
                     Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (loi de 1976 sur l’immunité des Etats
                     étrangers), 28 USC, art. 1605A). En conséquence, la doctrine s’est inter-
                     rogée sur la limite du pouvoir des Etats de légiférer en la matière, en
                     relation avec la règle coutumière de l’immunité.

                     77

6 CIJ1031.indb 150                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     173 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                        6. Cette situation est encore plus complexe si l’on considère l’introduc-
                     tion, d’abord dans la convention européenne de 1972 sur l’immunité des
                     Etats (art. 11), puis dans la convention des Nations Unies de 2004 sur
                     l’immunité juridictionnelle des Etats et de leurs biens (art. 12), de l’excep-
                     tion dite territoriale ou délictuelle (« tort exception »), sans distinction
                     entre les actes jure imperii et les actes jure gestionis. Cette exception devrait
                     s’appliquer, en effet, aux atteintes aux personnes et aux biens, sur le terri-
                     toire de l’Etat du for, sans prendre en compte la finalité ou l’objet de
                     l’activité en question.
                        7. Par ailleurs, la responsabilité de l’Etat est désormais indissociable de
                     l’exercice par celui-ci de son pouvoir souverain. Il est responsable tout
                     d’abord à l’égard de sa propre population, qu’il a le devoir de protéger,
                     mais aussi du fait d’actes qui lui sont attribuables commis en dehors de
                     son territoire et portant préjudice à la population d’un autre pays.
                        8. Ce caractère indissociable de la responsabilité et de l’exercice de la
                     souveraineté fait que c’est en assumant, s’il y a lieu, la première que l’Etat
                     peut justifier sa revendication de l’immunité devant les tribunaux étran-
                     gers au titre du principe de l’égalité souveraine. Autrement dit, l’octroi
                     par ceux-ci de l’immunité ne peut, en aucun cas, signifier une exonération
                     de la responsabilité de l’Etat concerné, elle ne peut que différer l’apprécia-
                     tion de celle-ci devant d’autres instances diplomatiques ou judiciaires.
                     L’égalité souveraine n’a de sens que si elle s’accompagne d’une égalité
                     dans le respect de la légalité internationale.
                        9. Il convient de souligner que, lorsqu’elle se pose dans le cas de crimes
                     internationaux, comme dans le présent litige, la question de l’immunité de
                     juridiction soulève des problèmes éthiques et juridiques essentiels pour la
                     communauté internationale dans son ensemble, problèmes qu’on ne peut
                     écarter en se cantonnant dans la qualification de l’immunité comme une
                     simple question de procédure.
                        10. L’Allemagne reconnaît d’ailleurs, comme le relève la Cour, « les
                     souffrances indicibles infligées aux hommes et aux femmes d’Italie, en
                     particulier lors des massacres, ainsi qu’aux anciens internés militaires ita-
                     liens », lesquels constituent des actes illicites qui engagent sa responsabi-
                     lité (arrêt, par. 52). Mais la Cour se contente de considérer comme
                     « surprenant — et regrettable — que l’Allemagne ait refusé d’accorder
                     réparation à un groupe de victimes au motif que celles-ci auraient eu droit
                     à un statut que, à l’époque pertinente, elle a refusé de leur reconnaître »
                     (ibid., par. 99).
                        11. A mon avis, la Cour ne pouvait en rester là, que ce soit au niveau
                     des principes ou des conséquences qu’il convient d’en tirer dans le cas
                     considéré. Au niveau des principes, tout d’abord, la Cour avait déjà clai-
                     rement affirmé que « l’Etat qui demande à une juridiction étrangère de ne
                     pas poursuivre, pour des raisons d’immunité, une procédure judiciaire
                     engagée à l’encontre de ses organes assume la responsabilité pour tout
                     acte internationalement illicite commis par de tels organes dans ce
                     contexte » (Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière
                     pénale (Djibouti c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 244, par. 196).

                     78

6 CIJ1031.indb 152                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     174 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                     En l’occurrence, l’Allemagne revendique l’immunité en tant qu’Etat pour
                     des actes criminels commis par ses organes et qui lui sont attribuables ;
                     elle doit en assumer la responsabilité.
                        12. La résolution de l’Institut de droit international, adoptée à la ses-
                     sion de Naples en 2009, sur « l’immunité de juridiction de l’Etat et de ses
                     agents en cas de crimes internationaux », contient précisément un
                     article II, intitulé « Principes », qui replace les immunités dans leur
                     contexte (paragraphe premier), consistant non à contourner les règles du
                     droit international, mais à permettre aux tribunaux de prendre en compte
                     l’égalité souveraine des Etats dans l’exercice de leurs propres compétences
                     respectives :
                             « 1. Les immunités sont accordées en vue d’assurer conformément
                          au droit international une répartition et un exercice ordonnés de la
                          compétence juridictionnelle dans les litiges impliquant des Etats, de
                          respecter l’égalité souveraine de ceux-ci et de permettre aux per-
                          sonnes qui agissent en leur nom de remplir effectivement leurs fonc-
                          tions. » (Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, vol. 73, session
                          de Naples (Italie), 2009.)
                        13. Il aurait donc été nécessaire pour la Cour de souligner, dans cette
                     affaire, que l’Allemagne, qui reconnaît l’illicéité des actes commis contre
                     le groupe de victimes en question, en particulier les anciens internés mili-
                     taires, dont M. Luigi Ferrini, doit en assumer, en principe, la responsabi-
                     lité, et que c’est à cette condition qu’elle devrait bénéficier de l’immunité
                     devant les tribunaux de l’Etat du for.
                        14. En outre, du point de vue des conséquences à tirer du principe de
                     responsabilité, la Cour considère que
                          « les demandes résultant du traitement des internés militaires ita-
                          liens…, ainsi que d’autres réclamations de nationaux italiens qui
                          resteraient à régler — qui ont été à l’origine des procédures

                          italiennes — pourraient faire l’objet de nouvelles négociations

                          impliquant les deux Etats en vue de parvenir à une solution »

                          (arrêt, par. 104).
                     A mon avis, plus qu’une simple possibilité ouverte à l’Allemagne de négo-
                     cier, il s’agit pour elle d’assumer sa responsabilité internationale, en
                     concertation avec l’Italie, afin de compléter les mesures qu’elle a prises
                     depuis la seconde guerre mondiale pour couvrir les catégories de victimes
                     qui en ont été exclues.
                        15. Ainsi, ce n’est que dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, lorsque
                     l’Etat présumé auteur des faits illicites rejette toute mise en cause de sa
                     responsabilité, sous quelque forme que ce soit, qu’il pourrait perdre le
                     bénéfice de l’immunité devant les tribunaux de l’Etat du for. Le droit des
                     personnes concernées d’avoir accès à la justice de leur pays s’imposerait
                     alors, faute pour l’Etat en cause de se soumettre aux principes fondamen-
                     taux du droit dont il se réclame lui-même par ailleurs.

                     79

6 CIJ1031.indb 154                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     175 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                        16. De telles circonstances exceptionnelles ne peuvent être ignorées, à
                     mon avis, ni par le juge national ni par le juge international et, si c’était le
                     cas, cela ouvrirait la voie à des abus qui sont susceptibles de saper les
                     fondements mêmes de la légalité internationale.
                        17. La vigilance du juge devrait être toujours à l’affût pour faire préva-
                     loir en dernier ressort le droit et la justice, ainsi que l’a rappelé Rosalyn
                     Higgins :
                             « Une exception [l’immunité souveraine] aux règles normales en
                          matière de compétence ne doit être admise que lorsque le droit inter-
                          national l’exige, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’elle est conforme à la justice et à la
                          protection équitable des parties. Elle ne doit pas être admise « de plein
                          droit ». » (« Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immu-
                          nity », Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 29, 1982, p. 271.)
                        18. On se serait attendu à ce que la Cour internationale de Justice suive
                     cette approche, qui a permis, au cours des dernières décennies, de faire
                     évoluer le régime juridique de l’immunité de juridiction, de manière à
                     tenir la balance égale entre les souverainetés étatiques et les considéra-
                     tions de justice et d’équité qui opèrent au sein de celles-ci. Le concept
                     westphalien de la souveraineté s’éloigne ainsi progressivement, au fur et à
                     mesure que l’on situe la personne humaine au centre du système juridique
                     international.
                        19. Cette évolution se reflète en partie dans les travaux de codification
                     de la Commission du droit international sur le sujet et dans la conven
                     tion des Nations Unies sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des Etats et de
                     leurs biens (adoptée par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le
                     2 décembre 2004, résolution 59/38) ; mais cela ne veut pas dire que cette
                     évolution a été figée une fois pour toutes. C’est pour cela qu’il revient à la
                     Cour, à l’occasion des cas dont elle est saisie, de revisiter les concepts et
                     les normes qui sont débattus devant elle et d’indiquer, s’il y a lieu, les
                     nouvelles tendances qui se dessinent dans leur interprétation et la déter-
                     mination de leur portée.
                        20. La Cour reconnaît certes que l’octroi de l’immunité de juridiction à
                     un Etat n’affecte pas sa responsabilité internationale (arrêt, par. 100),
                     mais elle n’en tire aucune conséquence concrète. Ainsi, elle aurait pu
                     ajouter qu’un Etat qui refuse a priori la mise en cause de sa responsabilité
                     perd, par là même, le droit d’invoquer son immunité de juridiction.

                        21. Lorsque le droit à l’immunité est revendiqué, il s’accompagne d’un
                     devoir, celui pour l’Etat de faire face à ses responsabilités internationales
                     par les moyens appropriés. Et je conçois qu’en matière de conflit armé ces
                     moyens passent par la négociation interétatique, mais encore faut-il que
                     celle-ci puisse avoir lieu en prenant en compte l’ensemble des situations
                     en cause.
                        22. Certaines circonstances particulières caractérisent la présente
                     affaire : l’Allemagne admet sa responsabilité pour les actes illicites en
                     cause devant les tribunaux italiens, actes qui se sont déroulés, en partie ou

                     80

6 CIJ1031.indb 156                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     176 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                     en totalité, sur le territoire italien ; elle revendique cependant l’immunité
                     de juridiction et engage une action contre l’Italie devant cette Cour pour
                     violation des obligations de celle-ci en la matière ; enfin, les personnes
                     concernées ont engagé, en vain, différents recours.
                        23. Or, il ne suffit pas de constater que ces personnes n’ont pu obtenir
                     aucune satisfaction ni devant les juridictions allemandes ni devant la
                     Cour européenne des droits de l’homme pour en tirer des conséquences
                     quant à l’absence d’une obligation de réparation de l’Allemagne à leur
                     égard. Une telle obligation est la conséquence des actes illicites internatio-
                     naux reconnus par l’Allemagne et devrait trouver un moyen de règlement
                     dans le cadre interétatique. Il s’agit donc d’une question qui est toujours
                     en suspens entre les deux pays.
                        24. Quant à l’exigence de circonstances exceptionnelles pour lever l’im-
                     munité, elle prive de toute portée l’argument consistant à considérer ce
                     type de dérogation comme complètement irréaliste, dans la mesure où il
                     reviendrait à ouvrir la boîte de Pandore des recours individuels, en répa-
                     ration, de la part de toutes les victimes des conflits armés.
                        25. A mon avis, si l’Allemagne en vient à fermer toutes les portes à ce
                     règlement, ce que rien ne laisse présager, la question de la levée de son
                     immunité devant les tribunaux étrangers pour les mêmes actes illicites
                     pourrait se poser, de nouveau, légitimement. En effet, lorsque cette Cour
                     a conclu à la violation par l’Italie de son obligation de respecter l’immu-
                     nité juridictionnelle de l’Allemagne, elle n’a entendu d’aucune manière
                     faire obstacle à la mise en œuvre d’une autre norme fondamentale du
                     droit international relative à la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait interna-
                     tionalement illicite.
                        26. Ainsi, j’ai voté en faveur du dispositif de l’arrêt, en considération
                     de la nature de cette affaire qui date de la seconde guerre mondiale, des
                     efforts consentis par l’Allemagne depuis la fin de ce conflit et de sa volonté
                     d’assumer ses propres responsabilités à cet égard, qui font que les circons-
                     tances exceptionnelles que j’ai évoquées et qui permettent de lever l’im-
                     munité ne me semblent pas réunies.
                        27. La Cour ne peut rejeter l’argument dit du « dernier recours »,
                     comme elle le fait au paragraphe 103 de l’arrêt, en s’abritant derrière l’ab-
                     sence de pratique ou de jurisprudence étatiques le justifiant. En effet, la
                     Cour, dont la fonction est « de régler conformément au droit internatio-
                     nal les différends qui lui sont soumis » (article 38 du Statut), doit appli-
                     quer et interpréter la norme en cause dans son contexte juridique, à savoir
                     en tenant compte des autres règles de droit qui lient les Parties. Dès lors,
                     on ne voit pas comment on peut appliquer et interpréter le droit de l’im-
                     munité de l’Etat sans prendre en compte l’impact du droit de la respon
                     sabilité internationale. Surtout si, devant les tribunaux internes, il est
                     apparu, in limine litis, que l’Etat auteur de l’acte illicite a fermé toutes les
                     portes à la réparation.
                        28. C’est en prenant en compte l’ensemble de ces composantes, dans
                     leur complémentarité, que la Cour peut contribuer à la garantie de l’unité
                     du droit international au service de la justice internationale. Cette

                     81

6 CIJ1031.indb 158                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     177 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                     éminente fonction ne peut se satisfaire d’une approche formaliste étroite,
                     consistant à analyser l’immunité en elle-même, stricto sensu, sans souci
                     des victimes des crimes internationaux qui demandent que justice leur
                     soit rendue. On peut considérer, pour reprendre l’expression de Vaughan
                     Lowe (« The Politics of Law-making : Are the Method and Character of
                     Norm Creation Changing ? », dans M. Byers, The Role of Law in Interna
                     tional Politics : Essays in International Relations and International Law,
                     Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 212‑221), qu’une « interstitial norm »
                     devrait permettre d’établir le lien entre le droit des immunités et le droit
                     de la responsabilité internationale. Il s’agirait d’invoquer, pour cela, des
                     principes généraux du droit, ainsi que l’a fait la Cour dans l’affaire du
                     Détroit de Corfou lorsqu’elle s’est référée aux « considérations élémen-
                     taires d’humanité » en tant que lien entre les droits de l’homme et le droit
                     international humanitaire (Détroit de Corfou (Royaume-Uni c. Albanie),
                     fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 22).
                        29. La Cour s’est fondée sur une conception mécaniste de l’œuvre judi-
                     ciaire consistant, pour le juge national, à se prononcer à titre liminaire sur
                     l’immunité, sans prendre en compte les « circonstances particulières de
                     chaque affaire » (arrêt, par. 106). Or, il s’agit là d’une vue de l’esprit car,
                     dans la pratique, il arrive souvent que, pour se prononcer sur la question
                     de l’immunité et sur les exceptions invoquées par le demandeur pour la
                     levée de celle-ci, le juge soit amené à examiner le fond de l’affaire. C’est
                     ainsi, par exemple, que, lorsque cette Cour considère qu’une exception
                     d’incompétence n’a pas « un caractère exclusivement préliminaire », elle
                     décide de ne la trancher qu’une fois qu’elle a analysé les données au fond
                     de l’affaire dont elle est saisie.
                        30. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue, enfin, que l’Italie a toujours la possi-
                     bilité de prendre fait et cause pour ses ressortissants, en exerçant la pro-
                     tection diplomatique en leur faveur ; cette institution représentant le
                     dernier rempart ou l’ultima ratio pour la sauvegarde des droits de l’homme
                     internationalement garantis, ainsi que la Cour l’a reconnu dans l’affaire
                     Ahmadou Sadio Diallo ((République de Guinée c. République démocratique
                     du Congo), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 599,
                     par. 39).
                        31. Je regrette, finalement, que le raisonnement de la Cour n’a pas été
                     bâti à partir des caractéristiques du droit international contemporain où
                     l’immunité, en tant qu’élément d’un mécanisme de répartition des compé-
                     tences, ne pourrait se justifier lorsqu’elle aboutirait à faire obstacle aux
                     exigences de la justice due aux victimes. C’est pour cela que l’immunité
                     n’est pas un droit subjectif, au sens strict, à la disposition de l’Etat, mais
                     une possibilité pour celui-ci de ne pas être jugé par les tribunaux étran-
                     gers, en fonction des circonstances propres à l’espèce considérée.
                        32. Le pouvoir d’appréciation des tribunaux internes pour interpréter
                     et appliquer le droit relatif à l’immunité demeure entier, contrairement à
                     ce que laisse entendre la Cour dans son arrêt (arrêt, par. 106). Si cette
                     appréciation est faite à titre liminaire, elle n’empêche pas les tribunaux
                     nationaux d’analyser l’ensemble des données de l’affaire dont ils sont sai-

                     82

6 CIJ1031.indb 160                                                                                22/11/13 12:25

                     178 	immunités juridictionnelles de l’état (op. ind. bennouna)

                     sis, lorsque cela s’avère nécessaire pour apprécier si les circonstances de
                     celle-ci autorisent ou non l’octroi à l’Etat de l’immunité.
                        33. Reste bien sûr à se demander si une politique étatique systématique
                     fondée sur la commission de crimes internationaux, comme le génocide
                     ou le crime contre l’humanité, pourrait être couverte par l’immunité dans
                     le cadre des actes de souveraineté (jure imperii). Cette question en amène
                     une autre, à savoir quelle autorité serait à même de distinguer entre ce qui
                     relève des fonctions étatiques habituelles et celles qui doivent être quali-
                     fiées de crimes internationaux, afin d’exclure les secondes du bénéfice de
                     l’immunité. Par contre si, comme c’est le cas dans cette affaire, l’activité
                     criminelle attribuable à l’Etat est bien établie et reconnue, nous retrou-
                     vons la nécessité, pour ce dernier, d’ouvrir à un moment ou à un autre les
                     canaux appropriés pour la réparation afin d’éviter d’être jugé, en fin de
                     compte, par des tribunaux étrangers.
                        34. Cette affaire démontre, à l’évidence, à quel point le système immu-
                     nitaire du corpus étatique et la prise en compte par celui-ci de ses propres
                     manquements à la légalité internationale sont étroitement liés. La Cour,
                     dans son analyse du droit international coutumier, se devait de relever
                     cette tendance et de prévoir ses retombées sur le plan de l’élaboration du
                     droit international. Ce n’est pas parce que les affaires portées devant les
                     juridictions nationales et reflétant cette tendance sont limitées que celle-ci
                     doit être ignorée par la Cour.
                        35. La prééminence bien affirmée de la justice et de la règle de droit au
                     niveau international, qu’il s’agisse de justice pénale ou de justice civile, a
                     également pour fonction de dissuader les dirigeants, agissant au nom de
                     leur pays, de se livrer à la violation des normes de droit impératif relatives
                     à la prévention et à la commission des crimes internationaux. Il faut éviter
                     que cette fonction dissuasive ne soit altérée sous l’effet d’une approche
                     passéiste de l’immunité de l’Etat et de ses représentants.

                                                               (Signé) Mohamed Bennouna.

                     83

6 CIJ1031.indb 162                                                                                22/11/13 12:25


                             DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN

        Disagreement with the Court’s finding that Colombia has infringed upon Nicaragua’s EEZ
rights by issuing fishing permits  Conclusion that related incidents at sea imply an authorization
to fish in Nicaragua’s EEZ is not fully convincing  Doubts over whether there is sufficient evidence
that resolutions by DIMAR and the Archipelago’s Governor constitute fishing permits.

       1. I am not fully convinced by the finding of the Court that, “by authorizing fishing activities
in the Republic of Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone, the Republic of Colombia has violated the
Republic of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in this maritime zone” (paragraph 3 of the
dispositif). The following paragraphs address why I believe Nicaragua has failed to substantiate this
claim.

       2. In my view, Nicaragua did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that Colombia issued
permits to Colombian and foreign-flagged vessels authorizing them to fish in areas appertaining to
Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone (hereinafter “EEZ”). In particular, I am not convinced by the
majority’s assessment of the available evidence relating to the alleged incidents at sea, which were
relied upon to justify the conclusion in paragraph 3 of the dispositif. The Court has consistently
emphasized in its jurisprudence that it

       “will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case and also
       materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer contemporaneous evidence from
       persons with direct knowledge. It will give particular attention to reliable evidence
       acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented by the person
       making them” 1.

In addition, the Court has consistently held that the value of government reports

       “depends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of evidence (for instance
       partisan, or neutral), (2) the process by which it has been generated (for instance an
       anonymous press report or the product of a careful court or court-like process), and (3)
       the quality or character of the item (such as statements against interest, and agreed or
       uncontested facts)” 2.

       3. The main evidentiary source for the incidents alleged by Nicaragua are the “Daily Navy
Reports”, as well as a letter from the Nicaraguan Naval Force, all of which seem to have been
prepared specifically for the purpose of the current proceedings and emanate from a single, partisan
source. Accordingly, they can only be awarded limited probative value. Admittedly, some incidents
are also supported by additional audio recordings. However, for a number of such recordings, there
is no way to assess the date and location of their creation, nor are the recordings always clear about
the precise circumstances of the exchange.

       1 See e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment

of 9 February 2022, para. 121, quoting Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 60; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, paras. 64-65.
        2 See e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment

of 9 February 2022, para. 122; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 76, para. 190.

                                                        -2-

       4. Moreover, even if conclusively proven, I remain unconvinced that said incidents at sea
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Colombia has authorized unlawful fishing activities in
Nicaragua’s EEZ. While Colombian ships did indeed in some instances accompany Colombian and
foreign-flagged vessels engaged in unauthorized fishing in the Luna Verde area, this cannot be
equated with the authorization of such fishing. There can be no requirement for Colombia’s naval
frigates to dissociate themselves from private fishing activities in Nicaragua’s EEZ 3. These incidents
cannot be relied on to remedy, by way of inference, the additional evidentiary defects in relation to
the resolutions issued by the General Maritime Directorate of the Ministry of National Defence of
Colombia (hereinafter “DIMAR”) and the Governor of the Department of the Archipelago of San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina (hereinafter “Governor of the Archipelago”).

      5. In this regard, I am not certain the relevant resolutions adopted by DIMAR and the Governor
of the Archipelago constitute fishing permits in the first place. In particular, it remains unclear
whether DIMAR is an authority that is competent to issue such permits, as opposed to a body in
charge of merely prescribing technical arrangements. It is the responsibility of Nicaragua, as the
Party alleging the fact, to discharge the burden of proof in line with the principle of onus probandi
incumbit actoris, and demonstrate that these authorities are in fact competent to issue fishing
permits 4. However, Nicaragua has not responded to Colombia’s argument that DIMAR has no such
powers and provided no convincing evidence to the contrary 5.

       6. In addition, even when assuming that DIMAR and the Governor of the Archipelago are
competent authorities, and that said resolution actually constitutes fishing permits, I remain
unconvinced that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that any authorization granted by these
permits extends to areas appertaining to Nicaragua’s EEZ. The only reference to the areas of
Luna Verde or La Esquina appears in the preambular section of two “permits”, and not in their
operative parts. These operative parts define the authorized fishing grounds as “the area of the
Department of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina” and include no reference to Luna Verde
or La Esquina 6. In its response to Nicaragua’s allegations, Colombia specifically highlighted these
facts. However, Nicaragua again chose not to address this issue in the oral hearings.

        7. In light of these considerations, I have difficulties supporting the conclusion expressed in
paragraph 3 of the dispositif that Colombia has violated Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction
in its exclusive economic zone by authorizing fishing in this maritime zone. For this reason, I also
voted against paragraph 4 of the dispositif, which orders Colombia to cease conduct that was found
to be unlawful in the two preceding paragraphs. However, I disagree with paragraph 4 only in so far
as it relates to paragraph 3. In contrast, I support the finding that Colombia must cease to interfere
with fishing and marine scientific research activities of Nicaraguan-flagged or Nicaraguan-licensed
vessels as expressed in paragraph 4 of the dispositif.

                                                              (Signed)          Kirill GEVORGIAN.

                                                    ___________

      3 Judgment, para. 117.

      4 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 162.

      5 CR 2021/15, p. 22 (Bundy).

      6 MN, Ann. 11, p. 175; RN, Ann. 14, p. 313.


59

DECLARATION OF JUDGE EL-KHANI
[Translation]

I have voted for the Judgment in the hope that it would be possible for it
to be adopted by the unanimous votes of the Members of the Court, or if
not, by the greatest possible majority. This Judgment will, I trust, assist the
Parties in reaching the equitable agreement which is desired.

However, I should have thought that a reasonable degree of propor-
tionality, taking into account the lengths of the coasts of the two Parties,
would have produced a line lying further north. Such a line, dividing
equally the area in dispute between the two States, would have better
met the requirements of proportionality and been in conformity with
equity.

(Signed) Abdallah Et-KHANI.

50