60

SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT SETTE-CAMARA

While voting in favour of the Judgment, I feel that there are some points
of the reasoning with which I do not entirely agree. That is why I find
myself bound to append this separate opinion to the Judgment.

In order to arrive at the proper delimitation of the relevant area we
should start from the definition of the relevant coasts. And in the present
case this is particularly important because we are faced with a case of
States with opposite coastlines and coastlines with an unprecedented dis-
proportion in lengths. It is of paramount importance that the coasts of each
Party which are relevant to the case be defined in an unambiguous way.
And that of course would be a part of the process for establishing the
relevant area. The definition of the relevant coastlines is moreover of
extreme importance because the Judgment has considered the dispropor-
tion in the comparable lengths of coasts as a very important special
circumstance, indeed a determinant for the correction of the equidistance
line which constituted the first step in the process of delimitation. But it is
beyond doubt that the segments of coastlines between Delimara Point and
Ras il-Wardija on the Maltese side, and between Ras Ajdir, on the boun-
dary between Libya and Tunisia, and Ras Zarruq on the Libyan side
emerge as the relevant coasts.

Again, I fully agree with the Judgment in rejecting the geomorphological
argument advanced by Libya. To the reasoning of the Judgment on this
point I would add the following : the Court has been very careful in the
recognition of natural boundaries of continental shelf areas constituted by
natural features. The treatment of the Norwegian Trough by the United
Kingdom and Norway in the Agreement of 10 March 1965 completely
disregarded it in spite of its marked characteristics ; the findings of the
Court of Arbitration-in the Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977, when
referring to the Hurd Deep — another marked feature —, stated that the
location of features of this kind is a matter of chance — “a fact of nature” —,
“and there is no intrinsic reason why a boundary along that axis should be
the boundary .. .” (Decision of 30 June 1977, para. 108). And again the
Court’s 1982 Judgment in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) case rejects the Tunisian attempt at presenting the Zira and
Zuwarah Ridges as a potential boundary line. The Court found :

“As for the features relied on by Tunisia, the Court, while not
accepting that the relative size and importance of these features can be
reduced to such insubstantial proportions as counsel for Libya sug-

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61 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

gest, is unable to find that any of them involve such a marked dis-
ruption or discontinuance of the sea-bed as to constitute an indis-
putable indication of the limits of two separate continental shelves, or
two separate natural prolongations.” (C.J. Reports 1982, p. 57, para.
66.)

In the present case both Parties have resorted to the practice of States to
support their arguments. Libya produced a two-volume Annex to its
Counter-Memorial, reproducing Delimitation Agreements, mainly based
on the United States Department of State’s Limits in the Seas. Malta
submitted, as Annex 4 to the Maltese Reply, a learned expert opinion on
State practice by Dr. J. R. V. Prescott. The main controversy between the
Parties centred on the use of the equidistance method in maritime boun-
dary agreements.

I believe that it is otiose to embark on such a controversy. Since 1969 it
has been well established that equidistance is one method among others,
and that there is no question of attributing to it a primacy or the character
of a primary test. But, on the other hand, it would be futile to try to prove
that it has been progressively discarded by the practice of States. As
recently as the Tunisia/ Libya case in 1982, the Court invoked equidistance
to justify the veering of the delimitation line at the point of change of di-
rection of the Tunisian coastline. The Court found (Judgment, para.
126) :

“The major change in direction undergone by the coast of Tunisia
seems to the Court to go some way, though not the whole way, towards
transforming the relationship of Libya and Tunisia from that of
adjacent States to that of opposite States, and thus to produce a
situation in which the position of an equidistance line becomes a
factor to be given more weight in the balancing of equitable consi-
derations than would otherwise be the case.” (Z.C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 88.)

A simple perusal of the series Limits in the Seas will show beyond any
doubt that equidistance has always been, and continues to be, found a
useful technical method for delimitation, even though the work of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has led to the
suppression of any mention of it in Article 83 of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea. One should note that, in spite of this fact, equidistance
has not been altogether expelled from that Convention. According to its
Article 4 thereof equidistance is still the official criterion for establishing
the outer limit of the territorial sea.

Regarding natural boundaries, the Timor Trough seems to be the only
indisputable example of a geomorphological phenomenon governing a line
of delimitation. The Timor Trough is described by The Geographer,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State of the
United States in Limits in the Seas, No. 87, page 3, as follows :

“Two major submarine morphologic provinces may be distin-

52
62 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

guished : the Timor trough in the northwest and the Sahul shelf in the
southeast. The Timor trough is an elongated basin oriented approxi-
mately northeast-southwest ; the maximum depth is approximately
3,200 meters.”

In the other cases mentioned by Libya, namely the 5 February 1974
Agreement between Japan and Korea, and the 29 January 1974 Agreement
between France and Spain, the existence of marked morphological fea-
tures led to the establishment of joint development zone limits, and did not
really determine the course of the boundary.

But it is important to observe that it is one thing for any State to be free
to conclude with another State a delimitation agreement that would take
into account geomorphological features of whatever dimension ; for a
tribunal to feel obliged to decide on the basis of any accidental feature of
the sea-bed is quite another.

When we resort to maps, we should not merely search for natural
boundaries in the dark blue depths of depressions and troughs or in the
pale shallownesses of ridges and plateaus.

Beyond all this we have to resort to law and it is law that will have the
final word.

*
* *

The Judgment has correctly recognized that in the present case the Court
cannot rely on any provision of treaty-law as a source of the law to be
applied. Libya, unlike Malta, is not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Law of the Sea. There is no previous agreement on delimitation of
maritime boundaries in force between the Parties. On the other hand, the
1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea is not yet in force,
and will not be for a considerable time, if the present pace of ratifications is
maintained. Therefore provisions of treaty-law, particularly those of the
two above-mentioned Conventions, may be invoked only in so far as they
constitute the expression of customary international law.

The Judgment did not find it necessary to evoke the history of the
evolution of the concept of continental shelf. The Court itself has done so
extensively in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (see I.C.J. Reports
1969, p. 32, para. 42) and in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) case (see I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 43, para. 47). And in both
these Judgments it was emphasized that even today some of the main
elements of the doctrine of the continental shelf can be traced back to
Proclamation 2667 made by the President of the United States on
28 September 1945.

The 1969 Judgment of the Court certainly continues to be a milestone in
the evolution of the concept of the continental shelf. In the Judgment of
12 October 1984 given by the Chamber of the Court in the case concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, between
Canada and the United States, the importance of the 1969 Judgment was
emphasized in strong terms :

53
63 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

“That Judgment, while well known to have attributed more marked
importance to the link between the legal institution of the continental
shelf and the physical fact of the natural prolongation than has
subsequently been given to it, is nonetheless the judicial decision
which has made the greatest contribution to the formation of cus-
tomary law in this field. From this point of view, its achievements
remain unchallenged.” (1. C.J. Reports 1984, p. 293, para. 91.)

A few of the 1969 dicta constitute basic formulations of the principles
and rules governing the whole of the field of the law of the continental
shelf, that must be kept in mind whenever we deal with this problem. The
overriding dictum is contained in operative paragraph 101 (C) (1) of the
Judgment which reads :

“delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circum-
stances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all
those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolon-
gation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroach-
ment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other”
(CJ. Reports 1969, p. 53).

The Judgment contains a recognition moreover that such a natural
prolongation is a fact of nature, so that geography cannot be ignored when
trying to identify the continental shelf of a given country. Indeed it says in
paragraph 95 :

“The institution of the continental shelf has arisen out of the
recognition of a physical fact ; and the link between this fact and the
law, without which that institution would never have existed, remains
an important element for the application of its legal régime.” (Ibid,

p. 51.)

And more : “The appurtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of
whose coastlines it lies, is therefore a fact...” (Ibid)

The source of the concept of the continental shelf as the natural pro-
longation of the landmass arises from the basic principle that the land
dominates the sea. The Court put it in the following terms :

“What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes
to the coastal State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that
the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of
the territory over which the coastal State already has dominion, — in
the sense that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or
continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea.” (bid,
p. 31, para. 43.)

The Judgment also considered it
“the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,

54
64 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

though quite independent of it, — namely that the rights of the coastal
State in respect of the area of continental shelf . . . exist ipso facto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension
of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the
seabed and exploiting its natural resources” (1.C.J. Reports 1969,
p. 22, para. 19).

Another important point of the 1969 Judgment is that there is no rule of
international law imposing the equidistance method as obligatory, failing
the agreement of the Parties (see ibid., p. 41, para. 69).

The Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977 coincides on most points with the
1969 Judgment on the establishment of the principles and rules governing
the question of delimitation of the continental shelf. The importance of the
relationship between the physical fact of natural prolongation and the
legal concept of continental shelf, the nature of the rights of the coastal
State over the shelf, and the relevance of the configuration of the coasts to
the identification of the natural prolongation, are likewise emphasized in
the arbitral decision.

The 1982 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case con-
firmed the basic findings of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and
added some important dicta on relevant aspects of continental shelf
delimitation.

For instance, the importance of the configuration of the coasts is
emphasized in paragraph 74 of the 1982 Judgment.

The 1982 Judgment is especially meaningful for the present case because
of the controversy between the Parties relating to Libya’s fidelity to the
basic principle of natural prolongation and Malta’s reliance on the “dis-
tance principle” as it appears in Article 76 of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea. On this point the Court said :

“According to the first part of paragraph | the natural prolongation
of the land territory is the main criterion. In the second part of the
paragraph, the distance of 200 nautical miles is in certain circum-
stances the basis of the title of a coastal State.” (1. C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 48, para. 47.)

And

“In so far however as the paragraph provides that in certain cir-
cumstances the distance from the baseline, measured on the surface of
the sea, is the basis for the title of the coastal State, it departs from the
principle that natural prolongation i is the sole basis of the title.” ([bid.,
para. 48.)

But the same paragraph 48 concluded that the distance principle is a
mere “trend”. It reads :

“Both Parties rely on the principle of natural prolongation : they

55
65 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

have not advanced any argument based on the ‘trend’ towards the
distance principle. The definition in Article 76, paragraph 1, therefore
affords no criterion for delimitation in the present case.” (1.CJ.
Reports 1982, pp. 48-49.)

So, in the present case, the argument of Malta, according to the juris-
prudence of the Court, is based on a “trend” that cannot yet be considered
as a rule of customary international law.

Consistently with the 1969 Judgment, the 1982 Judgment discards
equidistance as a mandatory rule:

“While ... there is no mandatory rule of customary international
law requiring delimitation to be on an equidistance basis, it should be
recognized that it is the virtue — though it may also be the weakness —
of the equidistance method to take full account of almost all varia-
tions in the relevant coastlines.” (bid. p. 88, para. 126.)

But one of the highlights of the 1982 Judgment deals with the specificity
of each case of dispute over continental shelf delimitation, where it
states :

“Clearly each continental shelf case in dispute should be considered
and judged on its own merits, having regard to its peculiar circum-
stances ; therefore, no attempt should be made here to overconcep-
tualize the application of the principles and rules relating to the
continental shelf.” (bid, p. 92, para. 132.)

And the Judgment proclaims :

“the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable prin-
ciples, and taking account of all relevant circumstances” (ibid., para.
133 A. (1)).

The Judgment accepted the reality of the “widening of the concept [of
continental shelf] for legal purposes” :

“at a very early stage in the development of the continental shelf as a
concept of law, it acquired a more extensive connotation, so as even-
tually to embrace any sea-bed area possessing a particular relation-
ship with the coastline of a neighbouring State, whether or not such
area presented the specific characteristics which a geographer would
recognize as those of what he would classify as ‘continental shelf’ ”
(ibid. p. 45, para. 41).

The Judgment dated 12 October 1984 of the Chamber of the Court,
constituted by the Order of 20 January 1982 in the Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area case, contributes substan-
tially to consolidating the basic findings of the jurisprudence of the Court
on the question of delimitation of continental shelf, and to clarifying
additional points.

Regarding the problem of natural submarine frontiers the Chamber

56
66 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

concurred with the previous Judgments in giving them a limited weight.
Indeed, in paragraph 46 we read :

“Even the most accentuated of these features, namely the North-
east Channel, does not have the characteristics of a real trough
marking the dividing-line between two geomorphologically distinct
units. It is quite simply a natural feature of the area. It might also be
recalled that the presence of much more conspicuous accidents, such
as the Hurd deep and Hurd Deep Fault Zone in the continental shelf
which was the subject of the Anglo-French arbitration, did not pre-
vent the Court of Arbitration from concluding that those faults did
not interrupt the geological continuity of that shelf and did not
constitute factors to be used to determine the method of delimita-
tion.” (LC.J. Reports 1984, p. 274, para. 46.)

And more in paragraph 56 :

“It must, however, be emphasized that a delimitation, whether of a
maritime boundary or of a land boundary, is a legal-political opera-
tion, and that it is not the case that where a natural boundary is
discernible, the political delimitation necessarily has to follow the
same line.” (Ibid, p. 277.)

The Chamber did not fail to emphasize the limited reach of customary
international law in the actual process of delimitation. In paragraph 81 of
the Judgment it found :

“In a matter of this kind, international law — and in this respect the
Chamber has logically to refer primarily to customary international
law — can of its nature only provide a few basic legal principles, which
lay down guidelines to be followed with a view to an essential objec-
tive.” (Ibid, p. 290.)

And it concluded in paragraph 82 :

“The same may not, however, be true of international treaty law.
There is, for instance, nothing to prevent the parties to a convention —
whether bilateral or multilateral — from extending the rules contained
in that convention to aspects which it is less likely that customary
international law might govern.” (Ibid.)

On the role and nature of the equidistance principle the Chamber
followed in the footsteps of the 1969 and 1982 Judgments. In paragraph
107 the Chamber stated clearly :

“It will not be disputed that this method has rendered undeniable
service in many concrete situations, and is a practical method whose
use under certain conditions should be contemplated and made man-
datory by a convention like that of 1958. Nevertheless this concept, as
manifested in decided cases, has not thereby become a rule of general
international law, a norm logically flowing from a legally binding

57
67 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

principle of customary international law, neither has it been adopted
into customary law simply as a method to be given priority or pre-
ference.” (.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 297.)

One of the most important passages of the Judgment of the Chamber is
the one where, drawing upon the Judgment in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, the Chamber enunciated what could be considered the “basic
norm”, which is contained in paragraph 112 and reads :

“(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States.
Such delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agree-
ment, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the
genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such
agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by
recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence.

(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application
of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of
ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and
other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.” (Jbid., pp. 299-
300.)

I have tried to draw up a marginalia of the important findings of the
Court in its three relevant Judgments, as well as the 1977 Decision of the
Anglo-French Court of Arbitration, as an important background for con-
sideration of the more recent achievements in the field of treaty-law
through the almost ten years of labour of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, of which the 1982 Montego Bay
Convention is the result.

The two Parties in the present case have diverged in their pursuit of the
basic legal support for their claims. Libya attached itself to the principle of
natural prolongation, attributing special importance to the physical
aspects of natural prolongation, to develop its claim of the existence of two
natural frontiers in the area, namely the “Rift Zone” in the northwest and
the line of Escarpments (Sicily-Malta Escarpment and Medina Escarp-
ment, separated by the Heron Valley) in the east. The “Rift Zone”,
extending from the Egadi Valley to the Heron Valley, over more than 300
nautical miles, is a fundamental discontinuity according to Libya and
constitutes a natural frontier.

Malta denies any importance to the same morphological features,
affirming the continuity, “simplicity” and “normality” of the area to be

58
68 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

delimited. Moreover, Malta alleges the progressive erosion, in the course of
the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, of
the hitherto undisputed principle of natural prolongation, and has main-
tained that the fundamental principle of the law of the continental shelf is,
since the 1982 Convention, the “principle of distance” as envisaged in
paragraph 1 of Article 76 of the Convention.

In view of the argument of Malta the Court was bound to examine the
“new trends” of international law in the law of the sea, as reflected in the
Montego Bay Convention, although the Special Agreement between Libya
and Malta does not contain any specific proviso attributing to the Court
such a task, as was the case with the Tunisia/Libya Special Agreement.

At the outset one should enquire what is the present status of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Of course it is a Convention signed by a
large number of States, ratified by a few, and not yet in force. The required
number of ratifications for its coming into force (60 ratifications) is far
from being attained : at present only 14 States have ratified it. Therefore
the Convention can be taken into consideration only in so far as it contains
principles of customary international law. Apart from that the Convention
is irrelevant to this case.

But since the Judgment, particularly in paragraphs 39, 42 and 43, has
attributed to the so-called “distance principle” the status of a rule of
customary international law in the form it takes in Article 76, paragraph 1,
of the Convention, I feel it would be appropriate to analyse its meaning
and importance.

My first observation is that Article 76 relates to the definition of the
continental shelf and of its outward limits, and not to delimitation, which
is dealt with in Article 83. Paragraph 10 of Article 76 contains an express
proviso according to which :

“The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question
of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts.”

In fact, paragraph 1 of Article 76 by no means discards the principle of
natural prolongation as a corollary of the rule that the land dominates the
sea. Indeed Article 76, paragraph 1, reads :

“The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory...” (Emphasis
added.)

The principle of natural prolongation therefore has not been aban-
doned ; it is supplemented by the second part of the paragraph which took
care of the situation of States possessing a continental margin with an outer
edge not extending to the distance of 200 nautical miles.

The history of this provision is well known and does not require to be

59
69 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

recapitulated. Throughout the greater part of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea two important disputes took place : the
equidistance versus equitable principles controversy, and — most impor-
tant — the struggle against the growing tendency of many countries
towards the establishment of 200 miles as the breadth of the territorial sea.
The fears of a number of countries, rightly concerned about the threat to
the preservation of the sacrosanct principle of the freedom of the high seas
constituted by any generalization of the trend towards the 200-mile ter-
ritorial sea, led to a painstaking and intricate exercise of diplomacy, from
which emerged a consensus on the recognition of the 200 miles exclusive
economic zone and the 200 miles proviso of Article 76, paragraph 1. The
dispute between the “territorialists” and the “patrimonialists” is probably
at the root of the magic number of 200 miles. It was negotiated to counter
the 200 miles territorial sea, renunciation of which by the interested
countries will follow from the signing of the Convention and by the
forthcoming ratification of its provisions.

Now, the problem before us is : does the distance criterion of Article 76,
paragraph 1, of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea constitute
customary international law, in the sense that 200 nautical miles from the
baselines, from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, will be
the minimum breadth of the continental shelf, while the maximum breadth
of the same continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles, according
to paragraph 5 of the same Article ?

In spite of all the speculations backing the theory of instantaneous
formation of customary international law by the procedure of consensus, I
find it difficult to accept at this time the distance provisions of Article 76,
paragraphs 1 and 5, as rules of customary international law. The only rule
of customary international law retained by this Article is, I submit, still the
old rule of natural prolongation. Anything further lacks evidence of opinio
juris sive necessitatis and of usus. To the best of my knowledge, there is not
one single convention between States — aside the Montego Bay Conven-
tion — embodying the rule of minimum 200 miles and maximum 350 miles.
Neither is there any decision of an international tribunal subscribing to
these distance criteria. In support of the distance principle political and
diplomatic convenience can be invoked — but this is hardly opinio juris sive
necessitatis.

On the other hand, it has been suggested that the magic criterion of
200 miles tends to lead to a merger of the two concepts — continental shelf
and exclusive economic zone. I have my doubts on this point. There are
substantial differences in the jurisdiction of the coastal State in the two
cases. Part V of the 1982 Convention, which deals with the exclusive
economic zone, does not contain one word that would give the rights of the

60
70 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

coastal State an ab initio and ipso facto character, as is clearly established in
paragraph 3 of Article 77 concerning the continental shelf. It is true that
the Convention does not require an express claim or proclamation of the
coastal State to establish the existence of the exclusive economic zone. But
so far the practice of States has been that an express claim is necessary for
the existence of the exclusive economic zone. Moreover, according to
Article 57 of the Convention, the breadth of the exclusive economic zone
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles. In the case of the exclusive
economic zone 200 nautical miles is the maximum breadth and in the case
of the continental shelf it is the minimum breadth. The maximum breadth
of the latter, according to paragraph 5 of Article 76, will be 350 miles or
100 miles from the 2,500-metre isobath. So the two boundaries of maritime
spaces, although possibly coinciding, delimit different things.

What does not seem clear to me is what the distance principle of Article
76 has to do with the present delimitation. The Maltese group of islands lies
about 180 nautical miles off the coast of Libya ; so, unless one accepts the
argument of Libya of the fundamental discontinuity and natural boun-
daries, what exists between the two coasts is one single continental shelf of
less than 200 nautical miles to be divided by agreement between the
Parties, according to principles and rules to be established by the Court in
its Judgment.

As to the exclusive economic zone, neither Party has so far made any
official claim. Malta has unilaterally established a 25-mile fishing zone to
protect its traditional fisheries, especially the kannizzati, the latter being
the source of 40 per cent of the Maltese catch. Although the kannizzati —
made of bundles of palm leaves under which certain species gather in
search of shade and are then caught — are very similar to the Tunisian
historic fisheries, which involved a substantial part of the argument of the
Parties in 1982, in the present case nobody has questioned the right of
Malta to establish its 25-mile fishery zone. Since, furthermore, it is located
to the north of what the Judgment treats as the maximum northward
adjustment of the median line (para. 72), I think we should not lose any
time in discussing it.

To sum up, Article 76 of the Convention retained natural prolongation
as a source of entitlement and as a rule of customary international law. The
so-called “distance principle” could hardly be considered a rule of cus-
tomary international law at the present time.

Moreover, the concept of continental shelf, since its inception in the
Truman Proclamation, has related to a submarine area — the natural
prolongation of the territory of a State into and under the sea. There is
nothing in the Montego Bay Convention that can be said to change this
fact. It is true that the physical fact of the geological “species of platform”
has been progressively replaced by the juridical concept of the continental
shelf. I admit that in the light of the 1982 Convention the distance of
200 miles may be measured on the surface of the waters. But I doubt

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71 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

whether the “new trends” have in any way changed the nature of the
continental shelf as a submarine area.

We have before us a case of delimitation of continental shelf with States
having opposite coasts lying less than 200 miles apart. The natural pro-
longations of the coasts meet and overlap. The Court resorts to equidis-
tance because equidistance is a method — among others — which recom-
mends itself in cases like this — not on account of the so-called “distance
principle”. In a second stage the Court corrects the equidistance line to
take account of special circumstances and to achieve an equitable result.
That is a normal procedure according to customary international law. I do
not see any need to resort to paragraph 1 of Article 76 in fine of the
Montego Bay Convention, and to introduce into the Judgment an unwar-
ranted and premature discussion on the nature of its new approach to the
definition of the continental shelf.

As regards the exclusive economic zone, I do not see why the Judgment
devotes a considerable part of the reasoning to it (paras. 31-34).

The exclusive economic zone is a creation of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and of the Montego Bay Convention.
Some believe that within the economy of the Convention the concepts of
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone tend to merge and become
the same thing. I disagree with that view. In fact the rights and jurisdiction
of the States over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone
overlap to a considerable degree ; but they differ in many ways. For
instance, Article 56 of the Convention deals with the “duties” of the coastal
State in relation to the exclusive economic zone and there is no similar
proviso regarding the continental shelf. Another striking difference in the
two régimes is the one concerning Article 82 of the Convention, under
which the coastal State exploring non-living resources of the continental
shelf beyond 200 miles shall make payments and contributions to the
Authority, which shall distribute them “on the basis of equitable sharing
criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States,
particularly the least developed and the land-locked among them”.
Nothing of that kind exists concerning the exclusive economic zone.

Now, I repeat, in the present case, neither Party has claimed an exclusive
economic zone, and an offer of Libya to negotiate the limits of the latter
together with those of the continental shelf was rejected by Malta, and
therefore nothing of the kind was included in the Special Agreement. So, I
submit that the excursus of the Judgment on the exclusive economic zone
was unnecessary and does not contribute to the clarity of the reason-

ing.

*
* *

Already in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the Court dealt with the

62
72 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

problem of proportionality in two different contexts : according to para-
graph 101 (C), which deals with the principles and rules of international
law applicable to delimitation proper, resort to the concept of proportion-
ality is ancillary and relates only to marginal “areas that overlap”, which
are to be divided between the Parties in agreed proportions or, “failing
agreement, equally, unless they decide on a régime of joint jurisdiction,
user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them”. But the
dispositif deals with proportionality in another context, namely that of
subparagraph (D), which enumerates the factors to be taken into account
in the course of the negotiations of the Parties, and lists under (3)

“the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a
delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought
to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast measured
in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this
purpose of the effects, actual and prospective, of any other continen-
tal shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same region”
(LCF. Reports 1969, p. 54).

The Court, though rejecting the concept of proportionality raised by the
Federal Republic of Germany as corresponding to “a just and equitable
share” of the continental shelf, could not discard it, and that is why it
emerges in the dispositif as a criterion for the division of the areas which
overlap, and as a “factor” to be taken into consideration by the Parties in
the “course of negotiations”. One should observe the difference : in the
former context there is no definition of proportionality between the areas
to be divided, so much so that paragraph 101 (C) (2) stipulates that failing
agreement between the Parties the areas should be equally divided. Con-
versely the wording of paragraph 101 (D) (3) spells out the meaning of
proportionality, that is to say, a balance between the extent of the conti-
nental shelf areas and the length of coast, measured in the general direction
of the coastline. But again, I repeat, in this case proportionality was
resorted to as “a factor to be taken into account” by the Parties “in the
course of negotiations”. And this, with the goal referred to in paragraph 92
of the 1969 Judgment, namely that delimitation be carried out in such a
way as to be recognized as equitable.

The 1977 Decision in the Anglo-French Arbitration contests the general
application of the criterion of a reasonable degree of proportionality, as
put forward by the 1969 Judgment. In paragraph 99 it implies that the
criterion was intended to be applied in the specific situation of three
adjoining States situated on a concave coast and nothing else. And in
paragraph 101 the Court of Arbitration stated :

“In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle of
proportionality which is the relevant criterion or factor . . . Propor-
tionality, therefore is to be used as a criterion or factor relevant in

63
73 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations, not as a
general principle providing an independent source of rights to areas of
continental shelf.”

The Court of Abitration shunned the idea of embarking on “nice cal-
culations” between the extent of the coasts of the State and the area of
continental shelf appertaining to it. Proportionality is, on the contrary,
recognized as a criterion for remedying distortions due to particular geo-
graphical features. Proportionality is an instrument for correcting dispro-
portionality.

Paragraph 98 of the 1969 Judgment (Z.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52) seems to
understand the element of proportionality in a much broader sense than
the one suggested by Libya in 1982. Indeed it stresses the need to measure
the coastlines

“according to their general direction in order to establish the neces-
sary balance between States with straight, and those with markedly
concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their
truer proportions”.

In favour of its own position Libya quoted in 1982 the following passage of
the Decision in the Anglo-French Arbitration :

“Nor is it a question of simply assigning to them areas of the shelf in
proportion to the length of their coastlines ; for to do this would be to
substitute for the delimitation of boundaries a distributive apportion-
ment of shares. Futhermore, the fundamental principle that the con-
tinental shelf appertains to a coastal State as being the natural pro-
longation of its territory places definite limits on recourse to the factor
of proportionality.” (Para. 101.)

But the fact is that in the present case the flagrant disproportion in the
lengths of coasts is such that the correction of any line according to a
reasonable ratio is indispensable for achieving an equitable result.

The argument of Libya repeatedly makes reference to consideration of
proportionality in relation to the landmass of the territory of each of the
Parties. I think the Judgment is right in recognizing that these territorial
dimensions are not to be taken into consideration ; it is the coastal length
that matters. >

In the Arbitral Award of 14 February 1985, the Arbitration Tribunal for
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau
found in paragraph 119:

“As to proportionality in relation to the landmass of each State, the
Tribunal considers that this is not a relevant circumstance in the
present case. The rights over the sea to which a State may lay claim are
related, not to the extent of its territory behind its coasts, but with

64
74 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

those coasts, and the way in which they bound that territory. A State
of limited area may claim much more extensive marine territories than
a State of large area : everything depends on their respective coastal
fronts, and on their presentation.” /Translation.]

The striking difference in the lengths of the relevant coasts, without
precedent in the practice of States — at least in the degree present here —,
could not be ignored by the Court. But the Judgment, following in the steps
of the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration, took into account dispropor-
tionality rather than proportionality ; and this flagrant disproportionality
was recognized as an important special circumstance for the correction of
the equidistance line. The principle of proportionality itself was retained
only for its normal a posteriori use to test the equity of the final result.

I cannot subscribe to the way in which the northern extreme parameter,
for the establishment of the corrected equidistance line, is arrived at. The
consideration of the general geographical context proposed by para-
graph 69, so as to come to the conclusion that although the delimitation
relates only to the continental shelf appertaining to two States it is at the
same time a delimitation between a portion of the southern littoral and a
portion of the northern littoral of the Central Mediterranean, seems to me
a far-fetched exercise. We are dealing with the delimitation of continental
shelf between two States, and under the terms of the Special Agreement we
have no jurisdiction to deal with delimitation of “portions” of littorals of
continents. Moreover, parts of the coast of Sicily relevant for this exercise
have already been used in the “provisional” median line in the channel
between Malta and Sicily. Of course all this is only the first step towards
establishing the extreme limit northwards of the shifting of the equidis-
tance line, which is dealt with in paragraph 72 of the Judgment. There,
resorting to a hypothetical situation tantamount to ignoring the existence
of Malta, the Court established a notional median line between Libya and
Sicily. That line is to provide the maximum northwards adjustment of the
Libya-Malta median line, estimated by the Judgment to be 24’ of latitude.
Between the two lines the Court has reached the solution of the line of
34° 30’ N, resulting from a correction of 18’ which it considers equi-
table.

Though accepting the decision of the Court J have doubts concerning the
intricate method of reasoning. Malta exists and is before us as a Party in the
case. It cannot be ignored even ex hypothesi. For so far as its coasts extend,
they interrupt any possible relationship between the coasts of Libya and
Italy. In opposite States it is the confrontation of coasts that plays the
paramount role in the delimitation process, and there is no such confron-
tation between Libya and Sicily as long as the Maltese coasts are inter-

65
75 CONTINENTAL SHELF (SEP. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

posed between them. I have reservations in relation to the imaginary
refashioning of geography implied by paragraph 72 of the Judgment. It
would be much simpler to attribute partial effect to the coasts of Malta, to
be balanced up with similar partial effect to be given to the dispropor-
tionality in the lengths of the relevant coasts, so as to reach an equitable
result.

However, my reservations relate only to some aspects of the reasoning. I
am convinced that the equitable solution, which is the final goal of the

delimitation procedure according to Article 83 of the Montego Bay Con-
vention, is fully achieved by the present Judgment.

(Signed) José SETTE-CAMARA.

66


                         OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE ABRAHAM

      1. J’adhère à la plupart des conclusions auxquelles est parvenue la Cour dans le présent arrêt.

       2. Je suis d’avis que, comme la Cour le constate au paragraphe 89 de l’arrêt, la Somalie n’a
pas acquiescé à la frontière maritime revendiquée par le Kenya, le long du parallèle, et qu’il n’existe
pas, par suite, de frontière déjà convenue entre les Parties. En conséquence, j’ai voté en faveur du
point 1 du dispositif, qui affirme l’absence d’accord tacite entre les Parties à cet égard.

       3. Puisque c’est donc à la Cour qu’il appartenait de procéder elle-même à la délimitation des
espaces maritimes relevant respectivement de la Somalie et du Kenya, elle s’y est employée, à mon
avis correctement sur la plupart des points.

      4. Je n’ai rien à objecter à la manière dont la Cour a fixé le point de départ de la frontière
maritime (aux paragraphes 93 à 98). Je n’ai pas non plus de désaccord quant à la section de l’arrêt
consacrée à la délimitation de la mer territoriale (paragraphes 99 à 118). J’approuve le tracé de la
ligne médiane dont les coordonnées sont indiquées au paragraphe 117 et qui est représentée sur le
croquis no 5. En conséquence, j’ai voté en faveur des points 2 et 3 du dispositif.

       5. En ce qui concerne la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental
en deçà des 200 milles marins, j’approuve pleinement la Cour d’avoir appliqué la méthode dite
«en trois étapes», désormais bien établie en jurisprudence, réaffirmant à cette occasion que si ladite
méthode n’est pas obligatoire, elle est néanmoins de règle sauf s’il existe des facteurs spécifiques
rendant son application inappropriée dans un cas déterminé  de tels facteurs n’existant pas en
l’espèce.

      6. Quant à la manière dont la Cour applique au cas d’espèce la méthode en trois étapes, je n’ai
aucune critique à émettre en ce qui concerne la première et la troisième étapes. La construction de la
ligne d’équidistance provisoire (paragraphes 142 à 146) n’encourt aucun reproche à mes yeux, et
j’approuve les coordonnées de cette ligne telles qu’indiquées au paragraphe 146 et son tracé
représenté sur le croquis no 9. J’admets aussi que la ligne de délimitation retenue par la Cour, après
ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire, n’est pas invalidée par le test final visant à vérifier
l’absence de disproportion, en ce qu’elle n’entraîne pas de «disproportion marquée» entre le rapport
des longueurs des côtes pertinentes respectives des Parties et le rapport des espaces attribués à
chacune d’elles dans la zone pertinente.

       7. Mon désaccord porte sur la deuxième étape du processus, celle dont l’objet est de rechercher
s’il existe des facteurs exigeant un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire, et, si la réponse
est affirmative, de procéder à l’ajustement approprié compte tenu des circonstances pertinentes
(paragraphes 147 à 174). C’est en raison de mon désaccord sur le choix, comme frontière maritime,
de la «ligne ajustée» telle qu’elle est figurée sur le croquis no 11, que j’ai dû, à regret, voter contre le
point 4 du dispositif, qui décide du tracé de la frontière maritime unique en deçà des 200 milles
marins, et, par voie de conséquence, contre le point 5, qui prolonge cette frontière au-delà des
200 milles marins, le long de la même ligne géodésique, pour délimiter le plateau continental.

       8. Avant d’expliquer les raisons de mon désaccord, j’indiquerai brièvement que la manière
dont l’arrêt traite les questions spécifiques de droit et de fait qui se rapportent à la détermination de
la frontière entre les Parties sur le plateau continental au-delà des 200 milles marins n’appelle aucune

                                                   -2-

objection de ma part, et que j’approuve également le rejet par la Cour (ainsi que les motifs sur
lesquels ce rejet est fondé) des conclusions de la Somalie tendant à ce que la Cour déclare que la
responsabilité internationale du Kenya est engagée du fait de la violation par ce dernier de certaines
obligations internationales (raison pour laquelle j’ai voté en faveur du point 6 du dispositif).

       9. Ainsi donc, mon seul désaccord avec l’arrêt  mais il porte sur une question
substantielle  concerne l’examen par la Cour des circonstances justifiant  ou non  l’ajustement
de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire, examen qui occupe les paragraphes 147 à 174 et constitue la
deuxième étape de la méthode traditionnelle.

       10. La Cour a estimé qu’un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance provisoire par un
déplacement de cette ligne vers le nord  donc au bénéfice du Kenya  était justifié par la concavité
de l’ensemble du littoral de l’Afrique de l’Est, de la Somalie jusqu’à la Tanzanie. Du fait de cette
concavité, le Kenya, situé au centre de ce littoral, serait désavantagé si une ligne d’équidistance stricte
était utilisée pour établir les frontières maritimes. Plus précisément, si des lignes d’équidistance
étaient retenues comme frontières maritimes entre le Kenya et la Somalie d’une part, entre le Kenya
et la Tanzanie d’autre part, il en résulterait un effet d’amputation au détriment du Kenya. Le
croquis no 10 est destiné à illustrer cette situation, en montrant que «[l]a ligne d’équidistance
provisoire tracée entre la Somalie et le Kenya rétrécit progressivement la projection côtière de ce
dernier, réduisant ainsi grandement ses droits maritimes en deçà de 200 milles marins»
(paragraphe 169), et ce même si l’on ne tient pas compte de la frontière convenue par voie de traité
entre le Kenya et la Tanzanie suivant le parallèle de latitude.

      11. Je ne suis pas convaincu.

        J’observe d’abord que la Cour, pour déceler une concavité provoquant un effet d’amputation
justifiant un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance, est obligée de s’éloigner significativement des
côtes pertinentes, en adoptant une approche que l’on pourrait qualifier de «macrogéographique»,
c’est-à-dire en examinant la concavité du littoral «dans un contexte géographique plus large» que
celui des Etats en cause (paragraphe 164). Or, dans l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime
entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), la Cour
s’est exprimée dans les termes suivants, qui sont à mes yeux on ne peut plus clairs :

             «La Cour ne conteste pas que la concavité des côtes puisse constituer une
      circonstance pertinente pour la délimitation, ainsi qu’elle l’a estimé dans les affaires du
      Plateau continental de la mer du Nord ou comme l’a estimé le tribunal arbitral dans
      l’affaire de la Délimitation de la frontière maritime Guinée/Guinée-Bissau, que le
      Cameroun invoque. La Cour rappelle néanmoins qu’il ne peut en aller ainsi que lorsque
      cette concavité existe dans le secteur à délimiter.» (Arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 445,
      par. 297.)

      Il est difficile, dans la présente affaire, de prétendre que la concavité du littoral existe «dans le
secteur à délimiter». Si l’on considère les côtes pertinentes de la Somalie et du Kenya, telles qu’elles
apparaissent, par exemple, sur le croquis no 8 qui suit le paragraphe 141 de l’arrêt, elles ne font
apparaître aucune concavité particulière, ce que d’ailleurs l’arrêt reconnaît.

       Pour tenter de parer l’objection tirée du précédent Cameroun c. Nigéria, qu’il mentionne
(quoiqu’il n’en fasse qu’une citation incomplète), l’arrêt souligne «le contexte particulier de cette
affaire» (paragraphe 164), mais l’explication qu’il fournit à cet égard n’est guère convaincante.

                                                  -3-

       12. J’admets qu’il est raisonnable, dans certaines affaires, de tenir compte non seulement de
la configuration des côtes des deux Etats parties à l’instance, mais aussi de celle des côtes d’un Etat
tiers (ou de plusieurs Etats tiers) lorsqu’il est manifeste que ces côtes peuvent avoir, par les
projections qu’elles génèrent, des effets importants sur l’équité de la délimitation à opérer entre les
deux Etats directement concernés. Tel est le cas lorsque trois Etats limitrophes bordent un littoral
concave, le pays situé au centre, pris en étau entre les deux autres, se trouvant privé d’une grande
partie de ses espaces maritimes par l’application stricte de la méthode de l’équidistance. En pareille
hypothèse, même si l’affaire soumise à la décision judiciaire ou arbitrale n’oppose que deux des trois
Etats en cause, il serait difficile au juge ou à l’arbitre de ne pas tenir compte de la configuration des
côtes du troisième Etat. La Cour a raison, à cet égard, de citer les précédents constitués par les
affaires Bangladesh/Myanmar et Bangladesh c. Inde, jugées respectivement par le Tribunal
international du droit de la mer et un tribunal arbitral (paragraphe 166 de l’arrêt).

       13. Mais même si l’on accepte de s’éloigner des côtes directement pertinentes pour prendre
une vue générale de la région, en englobant d’un même regard l’ensemble du littoral allant de la
Somalie au nord à la Tanzanie, voire au Mozambique, au sud, il saute aux yeux que la situation du
Kenya, qui est plus ou moins au centre de cet ensemble, ne présente aucune analogie avec celle du
Bangladesh enclavé entre l’Inde et le Myanmar au fond d’un golfe profondément incurvé, ou avec
celle des côtes allemandes situées entre les côtes danoises et les côtes néerlandaises, telles que la
Cour les a considérées ensemble dans l’affaire du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord.

       Dans la présente affaire, aucune concavité significative n’apparaît dans la configuration des
côtes somaliennes au nord du Kenya, ni dans la manière dont les côtes somaliennes et kényanes se
prolongent dans une direction générale qui est à peu près la même. Ce sont les côtes de la Tanzanie,
et elles seules, situées au sud, qui sont marquées par une certaine concavité.

       14. Il est vrai que ce n’est pas la concavité des côtes en elle-même qui constitue le motif
déterminant de l’ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance auquel procède la Cour, mais l’effet
d’«amputation» qui en résulterait au détriment du Kenya. Mais la jurisprudence est claire et constante
en ce sens qu’un effet d’amputation ne suffit pas par lui-même à justifier le déplacement de la ligne
d’équidistance provisoire ; cela se comprend aisément, dès lors que toute délimitation entre deux
Etats dont les projections maritimes se chevauchent crée inévitablement un effet d’amputation au
détriment de l’un d’entre eux, et le plus souvent des deux à la fois.

        C’est seulement lorsque l’effet d’amputation est «grave» ou «important» qu’il y a lieu de le
corriger  ou de l’atténuer  par un ajustement de la ligne d’équidistance, comme cela résulte de
la jurisprudence citée à bon droit par la Cour au paragraphe 170 de l’arrêt.

       15. Je doute fort que le critère de «gravité» soit satisfait en l’espèce. Le croquis no 10, qui
montre ce que seraient les espaces maritimes dévolus au Kenya si ses frontières maritimes étaient
fixées, au nord comme au sud, selon la méthode de l’équidistance, ne fait apparaître selon moi aucune
amputation suffisamment grave pour justifier un ajustement de l’ampleur de celui que retient la Cour,
qui aboutit à déplacer vers le nord la ligne d’équidistance entre la Somalie et le Kenya à proportion
d’environ un tiers de la distance qui sépare cette ligne du parallèle revendiqué par le Kenya, sans
fondement juridique valide, comme frontière agréée. En outre, il est flagrant que l’effet d’amputation
que subit le Kenya résulte pour l’essentiel de la configuration de ses côtes rapportées à celles de la
Tanzanie au sud, et en particulier de la présence de l’île tanzanienne de Pemba que mentionne la
Cour au paragraphe 168 de l’arrêt. La Somalie se trouve ainsi privée d’une partie de ses droits
maritimes pour une cause qui ne devrait être normalement pertinente que dans le contexte de la
délimitation de la frontière maritime entre deux autres Etats.

                                               -4-

      Les circonstances de la cause ne justifiaient pas, selon moi, l’ajustement auquel la Cour a
procédé, si même un quelconque déplacement de la ligne d’équidistance était justifié, et je ne peux
pas donner mon adhésion à la solution qu’elle a adoptée.

                                                         (Signé)   Ronny ABRAHAM.

                                          ___________


220

DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT RANJEVA
[Translation ]

Violation of freedom of commerce and non-violation of freedom of commerce
between the territories of the two Parties — Court’s discretionary power and
structure of its reasoning — Piercing the veil of the dispute — Constituent ele-
ments of the claim: subject-matter and “cause”, Article 38, paragraph 2, of the
Rules — Jura novit curia — Importance of notion of “cause” of claim.

1. I agree with the following findings in the Judgment:

— the absence of legal justification for the destruction of the platforms
on the basis of Article XX, paragraph (1) (d);

— the violation of freedom of commerce as a result of the destruction of
the platforms;

— dismissal of the Applicant’s claim for reparation;

— dismissal of the counter-claims.

The question whether freedom of commerce in general on the part of one
of the contracting parties can legitimately be dissociated from that of
freedom of commerce between the territories of the parties to the 1955
Treaty is debatable.

2. The Court’s freedom to determine the order in which questions of
law raised in the dispute should be addressed is a discretionary one; that
does not imply that the Court is entitled to determine in an arbitrary
manner how its reasoning should be structured. The choice of method of
reasoning depends directly on the general scheme of the dispute: its sub-
ject-matter, the parties’ claims, their arguments, their overall forensic
strategy. It is problematic in practice to rely dogmatically on the dictates
of legal or judicial logic, which can be seen on closer examination to be
more matters of formal logic. Hence, the way in which a case is to be
approached remains unique, and specific to each dispute.

3. In the present case, the Court has not allowed itself to be obstructed
by obstacles of a formalistic or formal nature. The terms in which the
problem was posed have in fact been distorted by peripheral issues, on
which the Parties focused to an unreasonable extent. The result has been
a certain artificiality in the subject-matter of the dispute, in the claims
presented by the Parties and in their overall forensic strategy, which has
at times smacked of sophistry. In the face of these diversionary tactics,
the Court has “pierced the veil” of the dispute, relying directly on acts,
conduct and statements contemporaneous with the events having given
rise thereto. It has taken the view that it should begin by addressing
the issue of the lawfulness of use of force in light of the provisions of
Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty.

63
OIL PLATFORMS (DECL. RANJEVA) 221

4. In thus going directly to the real heart of the dispute, the Court has
complied with its obligation to analyse the facts in a transparent manner
and to make a true interpretation of substantive law. That presupposes
strict respect for the law applicable, here in the first instance conventional
law deriving from the 1955 Treaty and then, by way of interpretive
framework to the treaty instrument, international law, that is to say law
deriving from the United Nations Charter and international customary
law. Piercing the veil of the dispute is a necessary condition, or at least a
helpful contribution, in terms of providing a sounder basis for the settle-
ment of international disputes.

5. I would have preferred to adopt a different procedural approach
from that of the Court in this dispute in order to arrive at the same
solutions. Inasmuch as this approach departs from the traditional
ones, it does not justify an opinion. It is based on an analysis of the sub-
stance of the claim or matter in dispute. It consists of two essential ele-
ments: the subject-matter (quid) and the “cause” (cur); those elements
are essential in order to determine and characterize the substance of a
dispute, even though it may be difficult precisely to define their respective
content.

6. Defining the “cause” of a claim — the underlying reason therefor —
is a controversial issue in doctrine because of the notion’s malleable char-
acter and metaphysical connotations. Article 40 of the Statute confines
itself to requiring that the elements to be indicated in the application
instituting proceedings shall include the subject-matter of the claim.
However, in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules there is a fleeting ref-
erence to the notion of “cause”: the application “shall also specify the
precise nature of the claim, together with a succinct statement of the facts
and grounds on which the claim is based” (emphasis added). Under the
Rules, the applicant is required to set out the factual and legal bases of its
claim. This drafting device simply transposes the problem without resolv-
ing it. Thus the issue of “cause” is bound up with that of the compatibil-
ity of the consensual basis of the Court’s jurisdiction with the principle
jura novit curia. It would be inappropriate here to enlarge upon the doc-
trinal controversy regarding the difficulty of distinguishing between sub-
ject-matter and “cause” and determining the latter’s constituent elements,
as these are issues not directly dealt with in the Judgment.

7. The notion of “cause” poses a dual difficulty: that of the extent of
the Court’s power to determine the rule of law to be applied to the dis-
pute submitted to it, and that of how it determines the rules and methods
which appear to it to be the most appropriate. Irrespective of forensic
strategy and pleading techniques, the Court must not debar itself from
ascertaining the true intention of each Party. In paragraphs 32 and 37,
the Judgment was at pains to note the position of the respondent Party,
which effectively left it to the Court to determine how it should address
the connection between Article X, paragraph 1, the basis of its jurisdic-
tion, and Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), which is the underlying “cause”
in terms of the applicable law as well as of the claim. I can only regret

64
OIL PLATFORMS (DECL. RANJEVA) 222
that the Court failed to take the opportunity to find a practical, empirical
solution to a delicate problem and to provide a more convincing justifica-
tion for the order in which it decided to address the issues.

(Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.

65


                                                                                394

                     OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE GEVORGIAN

                 [Traduction]

                     Première exception préliminaire de la France — Article 4 de la convention de
                 Palerme — Immunités incluses dans l’égalité souveraine — Conséquences de
                 l’interprétation que fait la Cour de l’article 4 — Absence de compétence ratione
                 materiae de la Cour — Caractère limité du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 de la
                 convention de Palerme — Consentement de l’Etat — Risques de l’élargissement de
                 la compétence de la Cour — Respect impératif des immunités par les Etats parties
                 dans le cadre de l’application de la convention de Palerme.

                    1. Je me suis prononcé en faveur de la première exception préliminaire
                 de la France, qui affirme que la Cour n’est pas compétente en vertu de la
                 convention de Palerme. Dans la présente opinion individuelle, je souhaite
                 préciser ma position concernant certains éléments du raisonnement qui
                 sous-tend la conclusion de la Cour.
                    2. Le différend dont la Cour était saisie portait sur diverses questions
                 qui sont définies aux paragraphes 67 à 73 de l’arrêt. Ma principale préoc-
                 cupation a trait aux conséquences de l’interprétation de l’article 4
                 de la convention de Palerme que la Cour a faite et qui appuie sa conclu-
                 sion sur l’absence de compétence ratione materiae pour connaître des
                 violations des immunités des Etats et de leurs agents que la France aurait
                  commises.
                    3. La disposition en question se lit comme suit :
                         « 1. Les Etats Parties exécutent leurs obligations au titre de la pré-
                      sente Convention d’une manière compatible avec les principes de
                      l’égalité souveraine et de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats et avec
                      celui de la non-  intervention dans les affaires intérieures d’autres
                      Etats.
                         2. Aucune disposition de la présente Convention n’habilite un
                      Etat Partie à exercer sur le territoire d’un autre Etat une compétence
                      et des fonctions qui sont exclusivement réservées aux autorités de cet
                      autre Etat par son droit interne. »
                 Selon la Guinée équatoriale, cette disposition a une portée générale et
                 doit être interprétée à la lumière des dispositions de fond de la convention
                 de Palerme. La référence à l’égalité souveraine figurant au paragraphe 1
                 vise à couvrir la protection des immunités ; en conséquence, une fois qu’il
                 a été démontré que les actes de la France ont été accomplis en application
                 de l’une quelconque des dispositions de fond de la convention de Palerme,
                 la Cour est compétente ratione materiae. La France conteste cette inter-
                 prétation et considère l’article 4 comme une « directive interprétative »
                 générale qui n’incorpore aucun des principes susmentionnés dans le
                 champ de la convention.

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                           immunités et procédures pénales (op. ind. gevorgian)                       395

                    4. La compétence de la Cour en vertu de la convention de Palerme est
                 fondée sur le paragraphe 2 de l’article 35, qui renvoie aux « différends
                 concernant l’interprétation ou l’application » de la convention. Cette dis-
                 position, comme toute autre clause compromissoire, se limite à la subs-
                 tance du traité. Comme la Cour l’a affirmé lors de la deuxième phase des
                 affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, « les clauses juridictionnelles sont …, par
                 leur nature et par leur effet, des dispositions de procédure et non de
                 fond… La clause juridictionnelle ne détermine pas si une partie a des
                 droits de fond, mais seulement si, à supposer qu’elle les ait, elle peut les
                 faire valoir devant un tribunal. » 1 Dans la présente affaire, la question
                 centrale est celle de savoir si la clause juridictionnelle consacrée au para-
                 graphe 2 de l’article 35 autorise la Guinée équatoriale à invoquer les
                 immunités des Etats et de leurs agents devant la Cour. Selon l’arrêt,
                      « l’aspect du différend opposant les Parties au sujet de l’immunité
                      invoquée en faveur du vice-président équato-guinéen et de l’immu-
                      nité de toute mesure de contrainte invoquée en faveur de l’immeuble
                      sis au 42 avenue Foch à Paris en tant que bien d’Etat ne concerne
                      pas l’interprétation ou l’application de la convention de Palerme.
                      Dès lors, la Cour n’a pas compétence pour connaître de cet aspect du
                      différend » 2.
                    5. La Cour fonde cette conclusion sur la constatation que « les règles
                 du droit international coutumier relatives aux immunités des Etats et de
                 leurs agents ne sont pas incorporées dans l’article 4 » 3. Tout en relevant à
                 juste titre que les immunités découlent du principe de l’égalité souveraine
                 mentionné à l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme 4, elle explique que
                 cette disposition
                      « ne fait nullement référence aux règles du droit international coutu-
                      mier, en ce compris celles de l’immunité de l’Etat, qui découlent de
                      l’égalité souveraine, mais au principe même de c elle-ci... Lu dans son
                      sens ordinaire, le paragraphe 1 de l’article 4 n’impose pas aux Etats
                      parties, par sa référence à l’égalité souveraine, l’obligation de se com-
                      porter d’une manière compatible avec les nombreuses règles de droit
                      international qui protègent la souveraineté en général, ainsi qu’avec
                      toutes les conditions dont ces règles sont assorties. » 5
                   6. A la lumière de cette conclusion, il est affirmé dans l’arrêt que « point
                 n’est besoin pour la Cour de déterminer plus avant le champ ou le contenu
                 des obligations des Etats parties au titre de l’article 4 de la convention de
                 Palerme » 6.
                    1 Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud ; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud), deuxième

                 phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 39, par. 64-65.
                    2 Arrêt, par. 102.
                    3 Ibid.
                    4 Ibid., par. 93.
                    5 Ibid., par. 93.
                    6 Ibid., par. 119.

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                            immunités et procédures pénales (op. ind. gevorgian)                      396

                    7. Selon moi, la référence à l’égalité souveraine faite à l’article 4 de la
                 convention de Palerme était destinée à inclure la protection des immuni-
                 tés des Etats et de leurs agents, mais n’entre pas dans le champ des dispo-
                 sitions couvertes par la clause compromissoire. C’est ce que reflète le
                 présent arrêt, où la Cour rappelle que « les règles relatives à l’immunité de
                 l’Etat procèdent du principe de l’égalité souveraine des Etats » 7.
                    8. Cela étant, il faut reconnaître que la portée de la clause compromis-
                 soire n’est pas aussi large que le prétend la Guinée équatoriale. Compte
                 tenu du caractère général des principes de « l’égalité souveraine, de l’inté-
                 grité territoriale et de la non-intervention » mentionnés à l’article 4 de la
                 convention de Palerme, l’incorporation de toutes les règles coutumières
                 comprises dans ces principes peut avoir pour effet de porter atteinte au
                 principe du consentement à la compétence de la Cour énoncé au para-
                 graphe 2 de l’article 35 dudit instrument.
                    9. En particulier, les demandeurs pourraient invoquer la compétence
                 ratione materiae de la Cour en liant artificiellement un différend concer-
                 nant un point accessoire du droit international aux dispositions de fond
                 de la convention de Palerme. Partant, tout différend indirectement lié à
                 l’une quelconque des dispositions de fond de la convention de Palerme
                 serait un différend « ayant trait » à celle-ci. En conséquence, dès lors que
                 l’application de l’une de ses dispositions serait en jeu, la Cour serait com-
                 pétente pour les nombreuses branches du droit international qui
                 contiennent des règles reflétant les principes de l’égalité souveraine, de
                 l’intégrité territoriale et de la non‑intervention. La compétence de la Cour
                 serait ainsi élargie à des questions pour lesquelles les Etats parties n’ont
                 pas donné leur consentement en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35.
                    10. L’arrêt de la Cour ne saurait en aucun cas être interprété comme
                 portant atteinte aux obligations en matière d’immunités qui s’imposent
                 aux Etats parties à la convention de Palerme lorsqu’ils s’acquittent des
                 obligations découlant de c elle-ci. Cela est réaffirmé au paragraphe 102 de
                 l’arrêt, où il est dit que la conclusion de la Cour relative à la compétence
                 « est sans préjudice de l’applicabilité de ces règles » 8. Comme l’a rappelé la
                 Cour, il existe une
                         « différence fondamentale entre, d’une part, l’existence et la force
                         contraignante d’obligations résultant du droit international et,
                         d’autre part, l’existence d’une cour ou d’un tribunal compétent pour
                         résoudre des différends relatifs au respect de ces obligations. Le fait
                         qu’une telle cour ou un tel tribunal n’existe pas ne signifie pas que les
                         obligations n’existent pas. Elles conservent leur validité et leur force
                         juridique. » 9

                     7Arrêt, par. 93.
                     8Ibid., par. 102.
                    9 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide

                 (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-
                                                   Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 104,
                 par. 148.

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                          immunités et procédures pénales (op. ind. gevorgian)                   397

                 En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la question des immunités des
                 agents des Etats, il est, a constaté la Cour,
                      « clairement établi en droit international que, de même que les agents
                      diplomatiques et consulaires, certaines personnes occupant un rang
                      élevé dans l’Etat, telles que le chef de l’Etat, le chef du gouvernement
                      ou le ministre des affaires étrangères, jouissent dans les autres Etats
                      d’immunités de juridiction, tant civiles que pénales » 10.
                 Le respect de cette obligation n’ayant pas de rapport avec le défaut de
                 compétence de la Cour pour ce qui est de l’article 4 de la convention de
                 Palerme, il conserve donc une importance primordiale dans les relations
                 entre les Etats parties à cette convention.

                 (Signé) Kirill Gevorgian.

                    10 Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique),

                 arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 20‑21, par. 51. (Les italiques sont de moi.)

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