33

DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA.
[ Translation. |

I regret that I disagree both with the conclusions and the
reasoning’ of the present judgment, and I feel it my duty to
state, very briefly, the essential points upon which my dissent
is based.

1.—The doctrine of the Court, which has been enunciated
in Judgments Nos. 2 and 5 and is repeated in the present
judgment, is that it has jurisdiction to entertain questions
concerning the interpretation and application of Protocol XII
of Lausanne in so far as such questions originate in, or are in
their turn dependent on, a question of the interpretation or
application of Article 11 of the Mandate for Palestine in
connection with a concession covered by the guarantees
afforded in the Protocol itself, which question therefore falls
within the scope of the international obligations accepted in
this respect by the Mandatory.

This necessary connection between the Mandate and the
Protocol, is the condition upon which the coming into play of
Article 26 of the former instrument, which confers jurisdiction
on the Court, is dependent, and it arises whenever there is
incompatibility between the obligations contained in the
Protocol and the use made by the Mandatory of the powers
bestowed upon him by Article xz of the Mandate in the
sphere of economic policy to which the concessions contemplated
by the Protocol belong, and whenever, as a consequence of this
incompatibility, the reservation expressly made in Article II
in regard to these obligations is disregarded.

It is clear that, according to the article referred to, disregard
of international obligations may occur when the power
exercised by the Mandatory is that of providing for public
ownership as well as when it is that relating to public control,
that is to say, both when the Administration declares a
thing or a right forming part of a previously granted and
valid concession to be public property, and in so doing means itself
to undertake exploitation, and when it grants this thing or
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 34.

right to a person other than the original concessionnaire, in a
manner involving the exercise of public control. The wording
of the second sentence of Article 11, paragraph 1, is very
clear as regards ‘this point. According to this sentence, the
“reservation concerning international obligations’ covers both
public ownership and control. It is no less clear that
the sentence makes a definite distinction between two different
powers: that of providing for ownership and that of providing
for public control. Again, if the word “ownership” is here
intended to convey—and it cannot well be otherwise—the idea
of public or State (administration) ownership, it is obvious
that “control” can only contemplate the only other form of
ownership possible in connection with the development of the
natural resources of the country or of works and services of
public utility, that is to say, private ownership, which is
economically necessary to the existence of a private enterprise.
The degree or extent to which the administration may
intervene in an enterprise of this second category, in preference
to itself undertaking exploitation, is, in principle, a matter
of no, or secondary, importance in characterizing the system.
But one thing is certain, and that is that there is a limit
to such interference which cannot be overstepped without
destroying the very system established by the first paragraph
of Article 11, and this limit is the border line which divides
public ownership from private ownership in regard to the:
exploitation of resources, etc. Were it possible for the inter-
ference of the administration in a private enterprise of the
kind contemplated in Article 1x1, when it uses the words
“public control”, to become in a particular case indistinguish-
able from or so closely akin to “public ownership’ that it
would be difficult to separate the two powers, it would be
impossible to understand why a distinction has been made in
the article. between the two kinds of power. This conclusion
would have still more weight if it were sought to interpret
the expression “public control’ in the Mandate as meaning
only that form of intervention in which the action taken by
the administration is indistinguishable from public ownership,
or borrows from the latter most of its characteristic powers.
It is therefore clear that the expression “public control”
in Article 11 must cover many, if not all—a point which the
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 35

Court does not seem to: accept—the possible degrees of inter-
ference by the administration in a private undertaking, but
always excepting a degree of control which would obliterate
the difference as regards “public ownership”. Thus, even
taking a. very strict interpretation, it would be at all events
very difficult to limit the meaning of public control to such
forms of intervention on the part of the administration as
‘would, for instance, result. in the complete or almost com-
plete nationalization or municipalization of a private concern.
Even admitting that control may assume some of these
extreme forms without ceasing to be “control” “and becoming
something more, it is certain that it may also assume other
forms of intervention on the part of the administration, or,
in other words, the reservation by the administration of
certain rights of intervention in the operation of the private
concern. |
The foregoing reasoning, which is based on legal conceptions,
is borne out by the logical interpretation of Article rz. In
the expression of an idea, two things are never contrasted
unless it is considered that they really possess characteristics
‘sufficiently different, and even perhaps contradictory, to enable
them to be regarded as logically suitable to be contrasted ;
and when the expression has a legal significance, the need
for the observance of this rule is greater than ever. It
might even be said that Article Ir only recognizes two ways
of exercising the powers granted to the Administration and
that, consequently—when the method chosen is not that of
‘public ownership—, the only form of concession which is
permissible in Palestine for the exploitation of the natural.
resources of the country or the carrying out of public works,
‘services or utilities, is that which takes the form of public
control. In that case it would be still less possible to hold
that this control would only be exercised in one particular way.

2.—Strictly speaking I might have spared myself the greater
‘part of the foregoing observations, seeing that the hypothesis
therein considered of a conception of public control entirely
or partially obliterating the fundamental difference between

5
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 36

exploitation by the administration, or public exploitation, and
private exploitation does not appear in the doctrine estab-
lished and explained in Judgments Nos. 2 and 5.

All that I find in regard to this point in those judgments—
and this might therefore seem to compel the Court not to
deviate from them—is the following:

Firstly, that public control according to the meaning
of this expression in the English text of the Mandate (selected
by the Court for reasons which it is unnecessary to repeat
here) does not cover the actual act of granting an undertaking
or concession of public utility to an individual or company
(i.e. the contract by which the administration leaves economic
development to a private person instead of keeping it in
its own hands), but only “the various methods whereby the
‘public administration may take over or dictate the policy of”
undertakings of the kind under consideration, which methods
may “accompany” the grant of the concession.

Secondly, that this somewhat wide sense of public control
has not been determined by any concrete definition (save
that which I will consider shortly) nor by any enumeration
of the methods covered by it. It remains open therefore to
all possible interpretations as to the extent and as to the
form in which the taking over. or supervision by the adminis-
_ tration may take place. One single observation in this
respect has been made by the Court in Judgment No. 2,
because it particularly concerned the case of Mr. Rutenberg’s
concessions which were then under discussion. The observa-
tion in question is that concerning the connection between
the government control stipulated in these concessions and
their recognition as public utility undertakings. It seems
almost useless to recall—because it is so well known—that
recognition or a declaration of the character as a public service
of a private enterprise of a very general nature concerned,
for instance with the construction of communications (roads,
railways, etc.) and the supply of water, is not necessarily
accompanied by very pronounced forms of advice or of
supervision over its management on the part of the adminis-
tration. In many systems of legislation, it is rather a form
designed to facilitate certain works of the undertaking or the
fulfilment of certain necessary conditions such as the expro-
priation of land, the- creation of servitude, etc.
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 37

‘Thirdly, and this might also be regarded as a definition
of the characteristic methods of public control in the sense
of the Mandate, Judgments Nos. 2 and 5—and especially
No. 2 which, as is generally known, relates to the jurisdiction
—also establish two circumstances: that the High Commis-
sioner for Palestine had to intervene in order to approve
the statutes of the company to be formed by Mr. Rutenberg
to operate his concessions, and that the Jewish Agency men-
tioned in the Mandate also played a part therein. The latter
circumstance the judgment appears to regard—to use the
language of the judgment—as a manifestation “of a pro-
gramme of economic policy’ which is referred to several
times in the Mandate and is characteristic of that instrument
from this point of view. And it is because it found that
these two circumstances were present in the Rutenberg con-
cessions of 1921 that the Court in 1924, held that there was
in them an exercise of public control. It could certainly
.not follow from this that, apart from these methods of public
control, there were no others which would also be covered
by the general formula then adopted. by the Court. It is,
however, unnecessary, from the point of view of my main
argument, to proceed further with the consideration of this
question, since the observations I have just made seem to
me sufficient. But I think it necessary to point out, as
regards the part played by the Jewish Agency in the eco-
nomic policy of Palestine, that this very fact has the effect
of excluding any action on the part of the public administration
which would destroy the interests and character of that
Organization. The recognition of that Organization as a true
public body, with the rights conferred on it by Article 4 of
the Mandate, implies that it must be accorded privileged or
exceptional treatment which would disappear if the control
exercised by the Administration were so extensive as. to result
in the substitution of the Administration itself for the Jewish
Agency. In order to effect this substitution, the Administration
might certainly base itself upon public ownership without having
recourse to public control. |

3.—The doctrine in regard to public control which I have
just indicated as flowing from Judgments Nos. 2 and 5 is not
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 38

substantially changed in the present judgment. The concep-
tion of control still means “a situation which, although it
does not take the legal form of ownership, enables the public
authorities to exercise certain powers normally inherent in
ownership’, or certain measures which may accompany the
grant of the concession and give it the character of public
control. At the same time this conception also covers, in the
present judgment, the ‘programme of economic policy”
referred to in Article xx and several other articles of the
Mandate. It should, however, be observed that the “certain
powers” as also the “‘measures’’ alluded to, still cover a wide
field which is only limited by an exception in regard to ‘the
right reserved in certain circumstances to the authorities in
respect of concessionary undertakings’, with which I will deal
later on. The general nature of the terms used only serves
to emphasize the great variety of forms which these “powers’’
and “measures” may assume in practice ; and this is doubtless
what the judgment means to convey when it says that ‘the
question whether, in a given case, there has been an exercise
of the full power to provide for public control is essentially
a question that can only be decided for each particular case
as tt arises’,

It would indeed be impossible to construe this sentence
in any other way than as the recognition of the existence
of many circumstances, other than those which in 1924 were
found to exist in the Rutenberg concessions and which would
be peculiar to each case. It would, in my opinion,’ be just as
difficult to make a general assumption, covering all possible
contingencies, to the effect that ‘the right reserved in certain
circumstances to the authorities in respect of concessionary
undertakings, either by means of administrative regulations
or by clauses inserted in the concessionary contracts, to exer-
cise powers ‘of advice and supervision, does not come within
the conception of “public control’ as used in Article tr”.
We will not pause to consider the fact that the insertion
of these powers of advice and supervision in concession-
ary contracts is by no means essential, since it is a pure
formality, as is shown by, amongst other things, the fact
that in the case of the Rutenberg concessions of 1921, the
powers of “public control” were set out in the actual contracts.
DISSENTING OPINION BY M.. ALTAMIRA 39

As regards the scope of the powers of ‘advice and super-
vision”, it will suffice to recall the great variety of forms,
which ‘these two powers” of the public administration
may take in a private undertaking, and likewise the’ variety
of forms which they actually take in modern administrative
law,. in order to arrive at the conclusion that, even only
taking into account the definitions—very few in number—
accepted by the judgment as regards “certain powers norm-
ally inherent in ownership’, the provisions of administrative
law and of concessionary contracts, in all countries, create, and
that very often, powers of advice and supervision of the same
kind as those granted in the Rutenberg concessions of. 1921.
The line of demarcation between power of advice and super-
vision constituting “‘public control’? and that which does not
do so (since such a line seems desirable), does not allow of
a general affirmation which at all events would discard from
the conception of “control” the greater proportion of the
forms which advice and supervision may take and which are
usual in modern concessions, but in a varying degree,
and which reserve to the Administration powers normally
inherent in ownership. The distinction between the circum-
stances contemplated in the first of the quotations from
the judgment, given at the beginning of this reasoning,
and those contemplated in the second quotation, does not
therefore correspond to a situation of fact separating two
different domains in the relations between the Adminis-
tration and private enterprises from the standpoint of the
freedom of action of the latter or the intervention of the
former.

After all, of all the forms and degrees which the public
control mentioned in Article 11 may assume, the only ones
which are of importance in each given case for the solution of
the question of the Court’s jurisdiction now under considera-
tion, are those which would be incompatible with the rights
of a previous concession, which must be maintained and pro-
tected in accordance with the obligations established by Pro-
tocol XII and reserved by Article 11 of the Mandate. For this
fundamental reason, it was possible to say that a series of acts
tending to set aside, and render impossible to carry out,
certain concessions, in order to give free play to the Zionist
‘DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 40

economic policy of the Mandate, may constitute a method of exer-
cising public control. In my opinion this is certainly the case.

4.—In any case it is an accepted fact that, according
to Article 11, the Administration must employ the powers
which were conferred upon it in such a way as not to con-
travene the obligations which the Mandatory has accepted as
regards the maintenance and respect of formerly valid conces-
sions. This undertaking cannot, in my opinion, be under-
stood as meaning that it does not contemplate all the acts
which might endanger the respect or the maintenance of the
concessions indicated above. It cannot therefore end in the
accomplishment of a single and formal act, representing the
initial stages of respect and maintenance, but on the other
hand it must include all the elements which would be neces-
sary for the effacement of any form of contradiction between
the application of a measure of public control relating to a
concession of that kind and the respect and maintenance of
another concession granted under the Protocol. That would
be the case in the event of the signature of a contract for
readaptation followed by acts which rendered the adaptation
itself ineffective. It goes without saying that the consequences
would be all the more harsh in the case where the con-
tract for readaptation had annulled the former concession
which had been the subject of such readaptation; because
if by that fact the original concession totally disappeared
while the one which had been substituted for it had been
rendered incapable of execution, what then would remain of
‘ the rights of the concessionnaire ? It becomes clear that under
any other assumption the guarantees provided for under the
Protocol and affirmed under Article 1x of the Mandate would
be entirely illusory.

It is thus obvious that every time we find ourselves con-
fronted with such contradiction, we are entitled to say that
the matter comes under the operation of Article 11 and con-
sequently of Article 26 of the Mandate.

5.—In the case under consideration, this contradiction
appears to have arisen with regard to the facts, the nature
and interpretation of which are the subject of the dispute
submitted to the Court by the Application of May 28th, 1927.
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA . AT

Substantially, the grounds for the dispute are to be found
in certain difficulties which the Palestine Administration and
the Colonial Office had made to the carrying out in a
reasonable time of certain conditions without which the con-
cession granted to M. Mavrommatis as a readaptation of his
former concession would be practically cancelled. The words
“delays’ and “hostility” employed in the conclusions of the
Case of the Greek Government serve to show the nature of
the alleged difficulties. |

Whatever the nature of these acts may be, whether positive
or negative, the Greek Government claims that they were due
to the fact of the existence of a concession granted by the
Administration to Mr. Rutenberg which the latter claimed
covered one of the elements considered by M. Mavrommatis
to be essential for his concession. The fact that this allegation
affected in a certain respect and to a certain degree the
delays and the other acts of the authorities alleged by the
Greek Government, is in my opinion clearly established. I
am led to believe this is owing to two circumstances amongst
others. The first amongst them is the suggestion made by
the Colonial Office to Sir H. Greenwood on July gth, 1926,
to confer with Mr. Rutenberg with regard to the opposition
set up by the latter with regard to the readaptation
M. Mavrommatis had obtained on February 25th of the same
year. This suggestion would certainly not have been made
if the Colonial Office had not then thought that there was
something more or less well founded in Mr. Rutenberg’s
opposition. Many of the acts of the Administration during
the year 1926 may be explained on the assumption of this
opinion. The second circumstance which goes to confirm
what would otherwise be simple conjecture in what I have
just stated is to be found in the explanation given by Coun-
sel for the British Government in his reply made at the
public hearing on September roth last with regard to the
delay by the authorities in deciding whether there had really
been a contradiction, as alleged by Mr. Rutenberg, between
his concession and that of M. Mavrommatis as far as concerns
the use of the El-Audja source. It is impossible to judge
now of the weight or of the justification of the grounds
upon which, according to this explanation, the delays of the
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 42

authorities rested, because this question appertains to the
merits of the case and not to the question of the jurisdiction
of the Court to adjudicate upon those merits. But the fact
of the existence of these grounds suffices for the question
which the Court is now called upon to determine.

The essential facts for the purpose of reaching a decision
are the following:

(rt) The concession upon which Mr. Rutenberg’s opposition
was founded had been granted to him by the Administration
in the exercise of its public control. As regards the original
form of the concession of September 12th, 1927, the Court has
already in its previous judgments stated its opinion. As
regards the confirmation of the concession on March 5th,
1926 (clause 3 [A]), it is sufficient to say that it brought
about no change and is confined to guaranteeing its main-
tenance. Moreover, the Court has recognized that this con-
firmation, which may certainly be defined as a final grant, is
an act undertaken by virtue of the full powers provided for
under Article rz of the Mandate. It is thus in the same
situation as the other concession of Mr. Rutenberg, which was
the subject of dispute settled by Judgments Nos. 2 and 5.

(2) In 1924 the concession of September 12th, 1921, called
“El-Audja Concession”, was not in contradiction with any of
the previous valid concessions of M. Mavrommatis. Nor could
there in 1926, it seems, have existed any contradiction with
the readapted concessions of M. Mavrommatis, unless the
El-Audja concession were to be interpreted as à monopoly
over the waters of that source considered as having been
necessarily granted to Mr. Rutenberg for the purpose of gener-
ating the supply of electrical energy and thus preventing
the use by M. Mavrommatis of these same waters which were
considered technically to be necessary for the sufficient supply
of the town of Jerusalem and consequently for the carrying
out of the concession itself. This eventuality was not provided
for in the Rutenberg concession of March 5th, 1926, because
that concession, although subsequent to M. Mavrommatis’
readapted concessions (of February 25th), only referred in clause 3
to one of the latter such as it was granted in 1914 by the
Municipality of Jerusalem for the supply of electricity and
electric tramways, a concession which did not refer to the
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 43

waters of El-Audja, and the Rutenberg concession of Sep-
tember 12th, 1921, and was confined to guaranteeing them
both against the possible and inconsistent application to
them of the concession granted to the Palestine Electric
Corporation. Nothing was thus said with regard to the water
concession of Jerusalem granted to M. Mavrommatis, although
on March 5th the possibility might have been foreseen of a
conflict between the El-Audja concession of Mr. Rutenberg
and this concession of M. Mavrommatis, owing to the fact
that under clause 6 of the contract of February 25th (a
clause which is a typical clause of readaptation, namely, of
bringing an undertaking into conformity with the new eco-
nomic conditions of the country) ‘a source or sources” was
mentioned capable of providing not less than 6,000 cubic
_ metres of water per day and up to a maximum of I1,000,
and that technical opinions had already been given that this
condition could not be fulfilled unless the El-Audja waters
were utilized. The fact that at the time of the grant of an
electricity concession a water concession, the property of
Mr. Rutenberg, had been reserved, would have made possible
without any hardship a reservation also of the concession for
the supply of water newly granted to M. Mavrommatis. |
(3) Although it may be admitted that in form there was
no express incompatibility in the terms of the two concessions
of Rutenberg and the two concessions of Mavrommatis,
Mr. Rutenberg endeavoured to question the matter. All his
opposition during 1926, all his attempts to approach M. Mavrom-
matis in order to get rid of him in the Jerusalem under-
takings, all his threats with regard to M. Mavrommatis
and even to the British authorities, were based on the claim
that his concession of September 21st, 1921, finally granted
on March 5th, 1926, conferred upon him a monopoly over the
El-Audja waters and on that ground he could prevent the
carrying out of the Mavrommatis concession which depended
upon the approval of the plans in which the El-Audja waters
were included as indispensable.
. We are therefore confronted with a concession—-that of
Mr. Rutenberg—granted, as has already been stated, in the
exercise of public control and which had become incompatible
with another concession—that of M. Mavrommatis—which
; 6
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 44

belongs to the type of concessions coming under the guaran-
tee of international obligations provided for under Article rr
of the Mandate. The fact, recognized some months later by.
the authorities, that Mr. Rutenberg’s allegation was ill-
founded in law, does not deprive that allegation of being
in. the nature of an obstacle which had effectively been in the
way of M. Mavrommatis’ concession during a certain time,
a time sufficient to produce the disastrous economic conse-
quences of which the Greek Government complains. If Mr. Ruten-
berg’s allegation had been well-founded, it would have pro-
duced exactly the same result with this difference: that
these results would not have come to an end at a certain date
in the way in which they have done in the present case. But
it must again be repeated that the time during which oppo-
sition was made was sufficient to bring about the vexatious
consequences for the Mavrommatis concession which constitute
the subject matter of the discussion between the Parties.

The difference between an allegation founded in law, and
another which is not, but which has the same effect, is not
sufficient in a case such as the present one to destroy, in
the facts which have taken place, the characteristics necessary
for founding the jurisdiction of the Court, that is to say, in
order to consider them as being included in the category of
facts which, being in themselves a direct exercise of pub-
lic control by the Administration or resulting from such a
previous exercise, lead in practice to incompatibility with
the obligations concerning the respect and maintenance of
the concessions guaranteed under Protocol XII. A mere external
form should not be sufficient. It does not appear to be
in conformity with juridical common sense to consider that
the only method of acting in a manner contrary to and of
infringing the respect and maintenance of a concession is the
existence, in another concession granted in the exercise of
public control, of a clause which directly contravenes the
rights of the earlier one or which would give to the conces-
sionnaire of the second the possibility of contravening the
other. In the 1924 case it was the existence in the Rutenberg
concessions of Article 29, the application of which led to the
failure in respect for and maintenance of the concessions. of
M. Mavrommatis. It should be recalied that Mr. Rutenberg
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA 45

did not make use of this article in xQ21-1924. However,
the mere existence of that article and the effect which it
seemed to produce on the attitude of the Palestine and British
authorities with regard to the rights of M. Mavrommatis is
sufficient for the Court for the purpose of determining that,
in the practical case under consideration, there was a valid
reason for ruling that it had jurisdiction.

The identity between this situation in 1924 and that existing
in the present case seems to me to be so strong that it would be
impossible in my opinion to justify a decision to the contrary:

As concerns the significance to be attached to the acts
now imputed to the Palestine and British authorities in.con-
nection with the interests represented by the Mavrommatis
concession, regard must also be had to the well known fact
that law is not an abstract and merely speculative science.
On the contrary, it is a practical force which reacts on human
life, and generally with a view to the achievement of practical
aims. These aims, in the case of rights over property, assume
an essentially economic character. If these aims are affected
by facts which result in an irreparable injury, those facts will
not disappear simply through the intervention of a tardy decla-
ration to the effect that they are, it is claimed, not legally
justified. That is exactly what the Greek Government says in
the present case and what the British Government denies. The
Court cannot give a decision at the present stage of the
proceedings, as this question—in regard to which moreover I
make all necessary reservations—belongs to the merits of the case.
But it is precisely for this reason and because of the conditions in
regard to the existence of public control and the conflict between
one concession which falls within the scope of that conception
and another which is covered by the international obligations
accepted by the Mandatory, that it appears to me to be established
that the Court should reserve the case for decision on the merits.

I do not wish to terminate without explaining that in ail
the foregoing, I only have in mind the Court’s right to declare
itself to have jurisdiction. It is by reason of my respect
for this right, which I consider made out in the present case,
that I have dissented from the judgment. I do not intend
my opinion to have the slightest bearing upon the opinion
the Court might adopt (or that I might adopt myself) in
DISSENTING OPINION BY M. ALTAMIRA | 46

regard to the merits of the case, that is to say, the question
whether there has really been a violation of international obliga-
tions as regards the responsibility of the British authorities,
if the Court were to hear that question, nor to prejudge
the solution of that question in any way in so far as I
myself am concerned. Just as Judgment No. 2 did not and
could not decide this question in the case of the application
of 1924, I think that a decision in favour of jurisdiction in
the case now before the Court would also be incapable of
deciding in advance the case on the merits, just as, moreover,
a decision against jurisdiction, such as the present judgment,
could in no case be supported upon an opinion to the effect
that, contrary. to the contention of the Greek Government,
there has been no violation by the British Government of its
international obligations.

6.—Having regard to the reasons for my opinion, based
on the questions raised by Article 11 of the Mandate, I do not
think it necessary to consider the other question whether
the case, indicated in Judgment No. 5 (page 26) in regard to
the possibility of deciding disputes concerning the application
of Articles 4 and 5 of Protocol XII without the necessity
for a fresh agreement between the Parties, has or has not
arisen. I will confine myself to saying that, in my opinion,
it would have been possible to argue this point, if it had
been thought advisable to do so.


276

      OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE RANJEVA

                        OBLIGATION DE PRÉVENTION

   Obligation de prévention — Obligation erga omnes fondée sur la solidarité
internationale — Obligation permanente de vigilance et de coopération pesant
sur tous les Etats parties — Responsabilité internationale des Etats pour omis-
sion — Action diplomatique concertée.

   1. En droit, la responsabilité internationale pour omission est admise
pour la sauvegarde d’intérêts fondamentaux de la communauté interna-
tionale. La stipulation de l’obligation de prévention s’inscrit dans une
approche des relations juridiques internationales fondée sur la solidarité
internationale, voire mondiale. Cette dimension offre alors à l’interpréta-
tion des relations juridiques une nouvelle dimension des relations juri-
diques internationales. Au paragraphe 430, l’arrêt décrit le contenu de
l’obligation de prévention en termes d’obligation de moyen et non de
résultat au sens propre dans la mesure où aucune garantie de succès ne
peut être assurée. Si l’Etat partie a le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’agir dans
le sens qu’il estime le plus opportun, la question se pose de savoir si
celui-ci est libre d’agir ou de ne pas agir face à l’obligation de prévention
que prescrit la convention de 1948 contrairement aux règles du droit
international général classique. Exceptionnellement, un Etat partie est
tenu d’agir et, dans ce cas, une inertie ou une indifférence constitue une
violation de l’obligation de prévention du génocide. Le silence de la
Convention sur les conditions qu’elle fixe pour l’exécution de cette obli-
gation confère à l’Etat partie la compétence pour apprécier de manière
discrétionnaire les conséquences qu’il entend tirer des faits constitutifs du
différend. Mais la question est de savoir si l’abstention peut être une
option licite au regard du droit conventionnel en question.
   2. La convention de 1948 crée à la charge des Etats parties l’obligation
de prévenir le crime de génocide (cf. arrêt, par. 166). Une telle stipulation
conventionnelle a représenté, en son temps, une mise à jour des prescrip-
tions du droit international positif aux exigences de la morale universelle.
Le caractère universel de la vocation juridictionnelle justifiait ce rappel :
la conscience universelle a été interpellée directement par les problèmes
de violations de la convention de 1948 alors que la plupart des grands
acteurs de la vie internationale étaient présents sur le champ de la catas-
trophe. Par ailleurs, une dimension de l’obligation semble avoir été
oubliée : le caractère permanent de cette obligation à la différence de celle
de punir ; la vigilance, exercée avec discernement, doit être constante avec
un degré plus intense d’intérêt sinon de curiosité en période de crises poli-
tiques ou humanitaires. La Cour devait rappeler, dans le cadre de la pré-

237

277     APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (OP. IND. RANJEVA)

sente affaire, que l’obligation de prévention pèse sur tous les Etats parties
à la Convention. Cependant, le contenu de cette obligation doit être
interprété in concreto en fonction de la situation particulière de chaque
intéressé. La restriction de l’examen de la Cour aux obligations juridiques
des seuls Etats parties à la présente instance ne saurait être interprétée
comme une relativisation ou une extranéisation de l’obligation de préve-
nir le crime de génocide qu’a contractée la communauté internationale.
   3. Le rappel des travaux préparatoires à l’adoption de la convention
de 1948 (arrêt, par. 164) montre que les participants ont plus porté leur
intérêt sur l’obligation de punir que sur celle de prévenir le crime de géno-
cide. Les circonstances historiques et politiques qui ont immédiatement
précédé et suivi la seconde guerre mondiale expliquent cette information.
Au regard de l’économie générale des instruments internationaux de
l’immédiat après-guerre, l’obligation de prévenir relevait essentiellement
de la déclaration des droits et des devoirs de l’Etat (A/RES/177 et
A/RES/178 (II)). Le présent arrêt met un terme aux éventuelles querelles
plus idéologiques que juridiques : l’obligation de prévenir relève de l’ordre
normatif de droit positif (arrêt, par. 165). Le principe affirmé, la concré-
tisation de son contenu n’en est pas pour autant aisée. L’embarras qui
empreint la description au paragraphe 430 de l’arrêt illustre les difficultés
rencontrées lorsqu’il s’agit d’en fixer les contours.
   4. L’arrêt examine les manquements à l’obligation de prévenir le crime
de génocide par rapport à la « due diligence » en termes de comporte-
ments et d’actes imputables à un Etat en particulier ; mutatis mutandis, la
Cour a adopté une analyse des manquements allégués en termes analy-
tiques de comportement individuel. Dans une perspective de responsabilité
conventionnelle dans les relations bilatérales, une telle démarche se justi-
fie aisément. A l’analyse, on est amené à se demander si cette approche
est suffisante pour couvrir l’ensemble des relations d’obligations dans la
convention de 1948 lorsqu’il s’agit de vigilance dans une perspective mul-
tilatérale et de surcroît face au crime international absolu qu’est le géno-
cide. Pour satisfaire à la solidarité internationale qui est à la base de
l’obligation de prévenir le génocide, il est difficile de considérer le rayon-
nement du lien conventionnel de cet instrument comme une juxtaposition
de relations bilatérales entre les Etats parties ; la Convention manquerait
son but si elle ne donnait pas naissance à un groupement auquel ferait
défaut l’unité conceptuelle en matière normative. Ainsi, peut être expli-
quée la qualification des obligations consacrées par la présente Conven-
tion comme des obligations erga omnes valables « même en dehors de
tout lien conventionnel » (Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951,
p. 23). La force obligatoire de l’obligation découle non pas de l’engage-
ment particulier de l’Etat, mais de la valeur que le droit attribue à cette
obligation.
   5. La convention de 1948 marque, sans aucun doute, un progrès du
droit dans une double direction. En premier lieu, elle stipule l’engage-
ment de prévenir le crime de génocide lorsqu’elle précise le cadre de l’ac-

238

278     APPLICATION DE CONVENTION GÉNOCIDE (OP. IND. RANJEVA)

tion discrétionnaire de l’Etat en donnant à l’article II la qualification
juridique des faits constitutifs de génocide. En second lieu, elle crée une
obligation de résultats dans l’article V lorsqu’elle impose des mesures
législatives nécessaires pour l’application de la Convention. Mais le pre-
mier engagement fait problème dans la mesure où l’existence de certains
des faits qui sont énoncés à l’article II crée une obligation de faire. De
même, une tentative de qualification des faits au regard de cet article est
délicate à mettre en œuvre dans la mesure où elle comporte une appré-
ciation subjective et péjorative sur le comportement de l’Etat à qui sont
attribués les faits alors que la problématique du génocide s’inscrit dans
un cadre de coopération multilatérale. La tentation est en effet grande de
valider, sans discernement, les présupposés ethniques de la base de cons-
titution d’un Etat. Une conséquence en droit s’impose : les Etats ne
peuvent dès lors s’abstenir de rechercher des renseignements et des infor-
mations de nature à éclairer leur décision lorsque sont en cause de tels
faits. Cette conclusion est incontournable pour des raisons pratiques.
L’engagement de l’Etat partie est sanctionné par la responsabilité
conventionnelle en ce sens que chaque Etat a dû prévoir à quoi il
s’engageait ainsi que les conséquences juridiques qu’il devrait assumer en
cas de défaillance. Il ne faut pas permettre que ces prévisions puissent être
déjouées par une qualification subjective et artificielle de tiers par rapport
aux faits visés au même article II, alors que tous les Etats contractants
font partie d’un même ensemble conventionnel.
   6. Pour ces raisons, il faut cependant accepter en toute humilité les dif-
ficultés rencontrées par le juge pour contrôler la réalité de la menace ou
du risque de génocide lorsqu’il s’agit d’appréciation. Mais, toujours est-il
que cette appréciation relève de la compétence de chaque Etat partie.
Par-delà le rappel de l’obligation de droit international général qui pro-
hibe l’immixtion dans les affaires intérieures d’un Etat, l’évaluation des
risques de génocide, dans le contentieux devant la Cour internationale de
Justice, relève essentiellement de l’appréciation qui ressort de l’action
diplomatique de plus en plus concertée. C’est dans ce sens que s’ins-
crivent les prescriptions de l’article VIII et la démarche diplomatique
comme illustration du contenu de l’obligation de prévention. Un
contrôle judiciaire de la qualification des faits risque d’amener le juge à
substituer son analyse à celle des autorités des Etats responsables des
relations internationales.

                                            (Signé) Raymond RANJEVA.

239


86

DÉCLARATION DE M. REZEK

1. Tout en croyant que le traité de 1977 n’est plus en vigueur, je suis
en mesure d'accepter les conclusions de la majorité des membres de la
Cour pour ce qui est de l'essentiel, à savoir les conséquences pratiques
du présent arrêt, le programme de mesures qu’il invite les Etats en litige à
mettre en œuvre.

Mon opposition à la majorité se fonde plutôt sur des convictions théo-
riques ayant trait à la nature du traité de 1977 et aux effets, sur un enga-
gement bilatéral en cours d’exécution (ne déployant pas encore les effets
territoriaux qu'il était censé produire un jour), de Villicéité conjuguée que
représente l'existence, de la part des deux Etats en cause, d’attitudes
signifiant la disparition de animus contrahendi qui les aurait réunis
naguère.

2. Un engagement du type du traité bilatéral de 1977 ne saurait faire
l’objet d’une dénonciation ordinaire en cours d’exécution; mais la notifi-
cation hongroise du 19 mai 1992 n’a pas été une dénonciation ordinaire.
Elle est survenue après que les deux Parties eurent manqué à leurs enga-
gements réciproques, la Hongrie par l'abandon de travaux à sa charge, la
Tchécoslovaquie par adoption de la variante C. Je conçois la note du
19 mai 1992 comme étant l’acte formel de terminaison d’un traité que,
pour des raisons différentes et à plus d’une reprise auparavant, chacune
des Parties avait déjà répudié. Je vois donc dans l’espèce une hypothèse
hétérodoxe d’abrogation.

3. A mon avis, la règle pacta sunt servanda signifie que le traité crée
des droits réciproques entre les parties sur la base d’une conjonction
d'intérêts, d'une intégration de volontés souveraines qui probablement
continueront de coïncider au cours du temps. Lorsque des deux côtés du
processus conventionnel on se trouve dans la situation où on manque de
rigueur dans l’exécution de ce qu’a été convenu, l'engagement s’affaiblit
et devient vulnérable à la répudiation formelle d’une des parties, sans
égard à la question de savoir quelle a été celle des parties qui la première
a été amenée à négliger ses devoirs, et il importe peu que les parties aient
manqué de rigueur de différentes manières. Les traités tirent leur force de
la volonté des Etats qui les concluent. Ils ne possèdent pas une valeur
objective qui les sacralise indépendamment de cette communion d’inten-
tions.

4. J’estime que le traité de 1977 ne subsiste plus, abrogé qu'il a été par
l'attitude des deux parties. De cette conclusion, toutefois, je tire des
conséquences proches de celles que la majorité dégage de la survivance du
traité. Il y a, en premier lieu, des faits accomplis, et accomplis de bonne
foi. Il y a, aussi et surtout, le principe même de la bonne foi, qui doit

83
87 PROJET GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS (DÉCL. REZEK)
orienter en l'espèce l’accomplissement des devoirs réciproques, reliquats

d’un traité inappliqué par la faute commune des parties.

(Signé) Francisco REZEK.

84


1353

JOINT DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT RANJEVA,
JUDGES GUILLAUME, HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS,
AL-KHASAWNEH, BUERGENTHAL AND ELARABY

[English Original Text]

Various objections to the jurisdiction of the Court — Freedom of choice of
the Court — Guiding criteria: consistency; certitude; implications for the other
pending cases — Judgment of the Court inappropriately based on its lack of
jurisdiction ratione personae — Judgment incompatible with previous decisions
of the Court.

1. We have voted in favour of the dispositif of the Judgment because,
at the end of the day, we each agree that this case cannot, as a matter of
law, proceed to the merits. Nevertheless, we profoundly disagree with the
reasoning upon which the Judgment rests, in particular the ground upon
which the Court has found it has no jurisdiction.

2. It is not unusual that, in a case, the Court has the possibility of
determining its jurisdiction on more than one ground (Right of Passage
over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J Reports
1957, pp. 129-134; Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp. 132-134; Land and Maritime Bound-
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I. C.J Reports 1998, pp. 284-289; Aerial Incident
of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I CJ.
Reports 2000, pp. 19-24). Submissions may have been made to the Court
that it lacks jurisdiction by reference to more than one of the common
bases of jurisdiction (that is to say, ratione personae, ratione materiae,
ratione temporis). If the Court finds that, on two or more grounds, its
jurisdiction is not well founded, it may choose the most appropriate
ground on which to base its decision of lack of competence. The Court
does not necessarily first have to dispose of the conditions laid down in
Article 35 of the Statute, dealing only later with the conditions laid down
in Articles 36 and 37.

3. The choice of the Court has to be exercised in a manner that reflects
its judicial function. That being so, there are three criteria that must
guide the Court in selecting between possible options. First, in exercising
its choice, it must ensure consistency with its own past case law in order
to provide predictability. Consistency is the essence of judicial reasoning.
This is especially true in different phases of the same case or with regard
to closely related cases. Second, the principle of certitude will lead the
Court to choose the ground which is most secure in law and to avoid a
ground which is less safe and, indeed, perhaps doubtful. Third, as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the Court will, in making

50
1354 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

its selection among possible grounds, be mindful of the possible implica-
tions and consequences for the other pending cases.

4. In the earlier phase of the present case — as in other cases relating
to events after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia — the Court had chosen to base itself on jurisdictional considera-
tions ratione temporis and ratione materiae.

5. In this respect it should first be recalled that when the Court gave an
Order of 2 June 1999, in response to a request by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia for the indication of provisional measures, in which it found
that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction to rule on Yugoslavia’s Applica-
tion, it did so on quite different grounds from the one on which the Court
has based itself in the present decision.

6. In the Orders concerning Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal
and the United Kingdom, the Court observed that Yugoslavia’s declara-
tion accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, had been filed with the United Nations
Secretary-General on 26 April 1999 (three days before the institution of
proceedings). In that declaration, Yugoslavia recognized, on condition
of reciprocity, “the jurisdiction of the said Court in all disputes arising
or which may arise after the signature of the present Declaration,
with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature”.

The Court found that the Application was directed, in essence, against
the bombing of Yugoslav territory by several members of NATO. It
observed that the bombings began on 24 March 1999. Accordingly, it
considered that the disputes before it had arisen some time prior to
25 April 1999. The Court further recalled its established jurisprudence
whereby any limitation ratione temporis attached by one of the parties to
its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction “holds good as
between the Parties” and concluded from this that the declaration of
Yugoslavia, taken in conjunction with those made by the Parties which
had also accepted the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute, did not constitute a basis on which its jurisdiction could
prima facie be founded (see, for example, case concerning Legality of Use
of Force ( Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Order of 2 June 1999, I C.J.
Reports 1999 (IT), pp. 835-836, para. 25). The Court, thus lacking prima
facie jurisdiction ratione temporis, concluded that it did not need to
examine whether Yugoslavia was or was not a Member of the United
Nations and a party to the Statute in 1999, or whether on such basis it
had jurisdiction ratione personae.

7. In all the Orders, the Court next noted that Yugoslavia and certain
of the respondent States were parties to the United Nations Genocide
Convention without reservation. It recalled the definition of genocide as
stated in the Convention and observed that, according to that definition,

51
1355 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

“[the] essential characteristic [of genocide] is the intended destruction of
‘a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’” (Z C.J. Reports 1999 (II),
p. 838, para. 35). In the Court’s view, it did not appear “at the
present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which form the sub-
ject of the Yugoslav Application ‘indeed entail the element of intent,
towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above’” (ibid. ,
p. 838, para. 35).

8. Based on different reasoning, the Court has now confirmed that
it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claims presented by Serbia and
Montenegro. It began by finding that Serbia and Montenegro, on
29 April 1999, was not a Member of the United Nations and not a party
to the Statute. It concluded therefrom that the Court was not open to
Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

Moreover, the Court considered that Article 35, paragraph 2, of the
Statute enabled States not parties to the Statute to appear before the
Court only by virtue of treaties concluded prior to the entry into force of
the Statute. It observed that the Genocide Convention entered into force
at a later date, on 12 January 1951. It thus concluded that Article 35,
paragraph 2, did not grant Serbia and Montenegro access to the Court
under Article IX of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court was not
called upon to decide “whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a
party to the Genocide Convention” when the Applications were filed. In
any event, the Court was, once again, not open to Serbia and Monte-
negro.

In sum, and contrary to its position in 1999, the Court has thus pre-
ferred to rule on its jurisdiction ratione personae, without even examining
the questions of jurisdiction ratione temporis and ratione materiae on
which it had previously pronounced prima facie.

9. This change of position is all the more surprising as the reasoning
now adopted by the Court is at odds with judgments or orders previously
rendered by the Court.

10. We would first observe that the question whether Yugoslavia was
a Member of the United Nations and as such a party to the Statute
between 1992 and 2000, remained a subject of debate during that period.
The Court declined to settle the issue, both in 1993 (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Pro-
visional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 18) and in 1999 when
issuing its Order on provisional measures (Legality of Use of Force
( Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order of 2 June 1999, I. C.J. Reports 1999 (I),
p. 136, para. 33). It then confined itself to stating that the solution
adopted in this respect by Security Council resolution 757 (1992) and
General Assembly resolution 47/1 was “not free from legal difficulties”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and

52
1356 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14,
para. 18).

Subsequent to the admission of Serbia and Montenegro to the United
Nations on 1 November 2000, the Court had to consider the question
whether that admission clarified the previous position. The Court then
found, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003, that

“resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’s right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a
dispute before the Court under the conditions laid down by the Stat-
ute” (Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections ( Yugoslavia v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina), I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 70).

The Court added that

“General Assembly resolution 55/12 of 1 November 2000 cannot
have changed retroactively the sui generis position which the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia found itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations
over the period 1992 to 2000, or its position in relation to the Statute
of the Court” (ibid., para. 71).

The Court thus previously found in 2003 that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia could appear before the Court between 1992 and 2000 and that this
position was not changed by its admission to the United Nations in 2002.

11. Further, the interpretation given in the present Judgment of
Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute also appears to us to be at odds
with the position previously adopted by the Court in its Order of 8 April
1993, where it considered that

“proceedings may validly be instituted by a State against a State
which is a party to such a special provision in a treaty in force, but
is not party to the Statute, and independently of the conditions laid
down by the Security Council in its resolution 9 of 1946” (Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993,
C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19).

It is moreover astonishing that the Court found it necessary to rule on
the scope of Article 35, paragraph 2, whereas the Applicant did not
invoke this text.

12. Turning to the second criterion that the Court should apply in
selecting between alternative grounds for its decision — that of certi-
tude — we also find this not to be reflected in the ground chosen by the
Court today. Nothing has occurred, in the series of cases concerning
Kosovo, since the Court’s last judgment in 2003, to suggest that the

53
1357 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JOINT DECL.)

grounds previously chosen have now lost legal credibility. Further, the
grounds today selected by the Court are less certain than others open to
it. The Court has determined that the admission of the Applicant to the
United Nations in November 2000 “did not have, and could not have
had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared” (para. 76). The Court
has also stated that “the significance of this new development in 2000 is
that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation concerning the
status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-a-vis the United Nations”
(para. 77). Without specifying whether this “clarification” refers to the
period 1992-2000, the Court asserts that it has now become “clear that
the sui generis position of the Applicant could not have amounted to its
membership in the Organization”. We find this proposition far from self-
evident and we cannot trace the steps of the reasoning. Such grounds
seem to us to be less legally compelling and therefore less certain, and
more open to different points of view, than the grounds relied upon by
the Court thus far and which are now set aside by the Court.

13. We have referred also to the care that the Court must have, in
selecting one among several possible grounds for a decision on jurisdic-
tion, for the implications and possible consequences for other cases. In
that sense, we believe that paragraph 40 of the Judgment does not
adequately reflect the proper role of the Court as a judicial institution.
The Judgment thus goes back on decisions previously adopted by the
Court, whereas it was free to choose the ground upon which to base them
and was under no obligation to rule in the present case on its jurisdiction
ratione personae. Moreover, this approach appears to leave some doubt
as to whether Yugoslavia was a party, between 1992 and 2000, to the
United Nations Genocide Convention. Such an approach could call into
question the solutions adopted by the Court with respect to its jurisdic-
tion in the case brought by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and
Montenegro for the application of the Genocide Convention. We regret
that the Court has decided to take such a direction.

(Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signed) Rosalyn HIGGINS.
(Signed) Pieter KOOTIMANS.
(Signed) Awn Shawkat AL-KHASAWNEH.
(Signed) Thomas BUERGENTHAL.
(Signed) Nabil ELARABY.

54


67

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. NAGAOKA

L'interprétation selon laquelle la Partie II de la Constitution
de Dantzig, en se servant de l'expression « loi », vise une loi
adoptée conformément à l’article 43 de ladite Constitution,
n'est pas convaincante. I] faut, en effet, admettre qu'une loi,
telle que celles qui sont visées dans cette partie de la
Constitution, ne peut pas toujours entrer elle-même dans tous
les détails; c’est pourquoi il est d’ailleurs généralement
reconnu qu'une loi pénale peut s’en remettre à un règlement
d'administration publique du soin de déterminer ces détails.

On doit également admettre qu’une loi pénale peut laisser
— et que les lois pénales laissent, en fait, souvent — au
juge le soin de fixer les modalités de son application. Dès
lors, et afin de constater s'il y a incompatibilité entre les
deux décrets du 29 août 1935, promulgués comme des décrets
ayant force de loi, et la Constitution de Dantzig, il s’agit
d'examiner si les décrets-lois laissent au juge une latitude trop
large, lui permettant de rendre en toute liberté des arrêts
selon sa discrétion, même en méconnaissance des dispositions
de la Constitution. Il est difficile d'accepter que le résultat
de cet examen puisse être affirmatif. Les deux décrets-lois
dont il s’agit imposent au juge l'obligation de se conformer,
en rendant des arrêts en vertu de ces décrets, à deux condi-
tions qui limitent considérablement sa liberté d'appréciation.
Les individus, en essayant d’éluder les prescriptions d’une loi
pénale, tâchent de mettre à profit les lacunes ou imper-
fections qu'elle peut présenter. Or, si la loi était appliquée
par analogie dans les conditions prévues par les décrets-lois,
ces individus devraient se rendre compte à l'avance du carac-
tère punissable de leurs actes.

D'autre part, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la Consti-
tution de la Ville libre de Dantzig a été élaborée d'accord
avec le Haut-Commissaire de la Société des Nations et ne
peut être modifiée qu’avec l’autorisation de la Société. I] s’ensuit
que la Ville libre ne posséde pas le droit de supprimer ou
d’amender une disposition quelconque de la Constitution par
sa seule volonté. La Constitution en vigueur a Dantzig est
donc toujours la Constitution telle qu’elle a été approuvée
par la Société des Nations. C’est la une obligation inter-
nationale à laquelle le Sénat de la Ville libre ne peut pas
se dérober; et les magistrats de Dantzig se font un devoir
de respecter strictement les prescriptions de la Constitution,
laquelle prime toutes les autres lois.

30
68 A/B 65 (DÉCRETS-LOIS DANTZ.). — OP. IND. NAGAOKA

Jusqu'à présent, la Société des Nations a considéré que
les mesures prévues dans la législation dantzikoise fournissent
la garantie nécessaire pour assurer le respect de la Constitu-
tion. Si la Société arrivait à la conclusion que ces mesures
ne sont pas suffisantes, il lui appartiendrait de demander à
la Ville libre, en vertu du Traité de Versailles, les garanties
nouvelles que la Société jugerait indispensables pour lui per-
mettre d'accomplir la mission dont elle est chargée.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, j'estime que les décrets-lois du
29 août 1935 dont il s’agit sont compatibles avec la Consti-
tution ou, plus exactement, qu'ils ne touchent d'aucune façon
aux dispositions de celle-ci, bien qu’ils confèrent au juge des
pouvoirs plus larges que ceux qu'il possédait antérieurement ;
j'estime, d'autre part, que, lorsqu'un arrêt aura été rendu par
application des dispositions des décrets-lois, la question pourra
se poser de savoir si cet arrêt est ou non conforme à la
Constitution.

(Signé) H. NAGAOKA.

31


                          INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                            REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                         ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                     QUESTION OF THE DELIMITATION
                       OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
                   BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA
                       BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES
                      FROM THE NICARAGUAN COAST
                            (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)

                             ORDER OF 28 APRIL 2016

                                 2016
                          COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                              RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                       AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                      QUESTION DE LA DÉLIMITATION
                        DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
                   ENTRE LE NICARAGUA ET LA COLOMBIE
                      AU‑DELÀ DE 200 MILLES MARINS
                      DE LA CÔTE NICARAGUAYENNE
                            (NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)

                          ORDONNANCE DU 28 AVRIL 2016

4 CIJ1096.indb 1                                           23/02/17 08:47

                                                 Official citation :
                     Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua
                      and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast
                               (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Order of 28 April 2016,
                                           I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 231

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                       Question de la délimitation du plateau continental entre le Nicaragua
                      et la Colombie au-delà de 200 milles marins de la côte nicaraguayenne
                             (Nicaragua c. Colombie), ordonnance du 28 avril 2016,
                                            C.I.J. Recueil 2016, p. 231

                                                                                1096
                                                                 Sales number
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                No de vente:
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157291-9

4 CIJ1096.indb 2                                                                               23/02/17 08:47

                                                   28 APRIL 2016

                                                     ORDER

                     QUESTION OF THE DELIMITATION
                       OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
                   BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA
                       BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES
                      FROM THE NICARAGUAN COAST
                        (NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)

                       QUESTION DE LA DÉLIMITATION
                        DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
                   ENTRE LE NICARAGUA ET LA COLOMBIE
                      AU-DELÀ DE 200 MILLES MARINS
                       DE LA CÔTE NICARAGUAYENNE
                        (NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)

                                                  28 AVRIL 2016

                                                  ORDONNANCE

4 CIJ1096.indb 3                                                   23/02/17 08:47

                                                                                231

                                   COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                                    ANNÉE 2016
                                                                                2016
                                                     28 avril 2016                                       28 avril
                                                                                Rôle général
                                                                                no 154
                         QUESTION DE LA DÉLIMITATION
                          DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
                      ENTRE LE NICARAGUA ET LA COLOMBIE
                         AU‑DELÀ DE 200 MILLES MARINS
                         DE LA CÔTE NICARAGUAYENNE
                                         (NICARAGUA c. COLOMBIE)

                                                  ORDONNANCE

                      Le président de la Cour,
                      Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 44 et 79, paragraphe 9,
                    de son Règlement,
                       Vu la requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 16 septembre 2013, par
                    laquelle la République du Nicaragua a introduit une instance contre la
                    République de Colombie concernant un différend relatif à « la délimita‑
                    tion entre, d’une part, le plateau continental du Nicaragua s’étendant
                    au‑delà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est
                    mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale du Nicaragua et, d’autre part, le
                    plateau continental de la Colombie »,
                       Vu la première demande formulée par le Nicaragua dans sa requête,
                    par laquelle la Cour a été priée de déterminer « [l]e tracé précis de la fron‑
                    tière maritime entre les portions de plateau continental relevant du Nica‑
                    ragua et de la Colombie au‑delà des limites établies par la Cour dans son
                    arrêt du 19 novembre 2012 », et sa deuxième demande, par laquelle la
                    Cour a été priée de déterminer « [l]es principes et les règles de droit inter‑
                    national régissant les droits et obligations des deux Etats concernant la
                    zone de plateau continental où leurs revendications se chevauchent et
                    l’utilisation des ressources qui s’y trouvent, et ce, dans l’attente de la déli‑

                                                                                4

4 CIJ1096.indb 13                                                                                23/02/17 08:47

                       délimitation du plateau continental (ordonnance 28 IV 16) 232

                    mitation de leur frontière maritime au‑delà de 200 milles marins de la
                    côte nicaraguayenne »,
                       Vu l’ordonnance en date du 9 décembre 2013, par laquelle la Cour a
                    fixé au 9 décembre 2014 et au 9 décembre 2015 les dates d’expiration des
                    délais pour le dépôt, respectivement, du mémoire de la République du
                    Nicaragua et du contre‑mémoire de la République de Colombie,
                      Vu les exceptions préliminaires d’incompétence de la Cour et d’irrece‑
                    vabilité de la requête qui ont été soulevées par le Gouvernement de la
                    République de Colombie le 14 août 2014 ;
                      Considérant que le dépôt des exceptions préliminaires de la République
                    de Colombie a eu pour effet, en vertu de l’article 79, paragraphe 5, du
                    Règlement de la Cour, de suspendre la procédure sur le fond ;
                      Considérant que la Cour, par son arrêt en date du 17 mars 2016, a
                    déclaré qu’elle avait compétence, sur la base de l’article XXXI du pacte
                    de Bogotá, pour connaître de la première demande formulée par le Nica‑
                    ragua dans sa requête, et que cette demande était recevable ;
                      Considérant que, par lettre en date du 1er avril 2016, les deux Parties
                    ont été informées par le greffier que le président de la Cour tiendrait une
                    réunion le 21 avril 2016, conformément à l’article 31 du Règlement de la
                    Cour, afin de s’enquérir de leurs vues sur la suite de la procédure ;
                       Considérant que, par lettre en date du 20 avril 2016, l’agent de la Répu‑
                    blique de Colombie a informé le greffier que ni le coagent ni lui‑même ne
                    seraient en mesure d’assister à la réunion convoquée par le président ; qu’il a
                    cependant précisé, au sujet de la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du
                    contre‑mémoire de la Colombie, que son gouvernement « se fond[ait] sur
                    l’esprit de l’ordonnance rendue par la Cour le 9 décembre 2013 … prévoyant
                    que la Colombie disposer[ait] de douze mois à compter de la date du dépôt
                    du mémoire du Nicaragua pour exercer son droit de faire valoir ses
                    moyens » ;
                      Considérant que, au cours de la réunion que le président a tenue le
                    21 avril 2016 avec l’agent du Nicaragua, celui‑ci a sollicité un délai sup‑
                    plémentaire de quatre à cinq mois pour le dépôt du mémoire, le Nicara‑
                    gua ayant déjà commencé l’élaboration de ladite pièce avant la suspension
                    de la procédure sur le fond ; que l’agent du Nicaragua a indiqué n’avoir
                    pas d’objection à ce que la Colombie dispose d’un délai de douze mois, à
                    compter de la date du dépôt du mémoire, pour l’élaboration de son
                    contre‑mémoire ;
                       Considérant que le demandeur et le défendeur se sont initialement vu
                    accorder un délai de douze mois pour l’élaboration du mémoire et du
                    contre‑mémoire, respectivement ; que le demandeur a déjà bénéficié d’une
                    partie de ce délai avant la suspension de la procédure sur le fond ; que,
                    dans les circonstances de l’espèce et compte tenu des vues des Parties, il
                    convient d’accorder à chacune d’elles un délai qui tienne compte de cette
                    situation particulière,

                                                                                5

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                       délimitation du plateau continental (ordonnance 28 IV 16) 233

                      Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt des
                    pièces de la procédure écrite :
                      Pour le mémoire de la République du Nicaragua, le 28 septembre 2016 ;
                      Pour le contre‑mémoire de la République de Colombie, le 28 septembre
                    2017 ;
                      Réserve la suite de la procédure.

                      Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
                    Paix, à La Haye, le vingt‑huit avril deux mille seize, en trois exemplaires,
                    dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres seront trans‑
                    mis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua et
                    au Gouvernement de la République de Colombie.

                                                                           Le président,
                                                                  (Signé) Ronny Abraham.
                                                                              Le greffier,
                                                                 (Signé) Philippe Couvreur.

                                                                                6

4 CIJ1096.indb 17                                                                                23/02/17 08:47


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

AERIAL INCIDENT OF MARCH 10th, 1953

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

ORDER OF MARCH 14th, 1956

1956

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

INCIDENT AERIEN DU 10 MARS 1953
(ETATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE Cc. TCHECOSLOVAQUIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 14 MARS 1956
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Aerial incident of March roth, 1953,
Order of March r4th, 1956: I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 6.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit :

« Incident aérien du 10 mars 1953,
Ordonnance du 14 mars 1956: C.I. J. Recueil 1956, p. 6. »

Sales number 1 4 4
N° de vente:

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1950
March 14th YEAR 1956
General List :

No. 25 March 14th, 1956

AERIAL INCIDENT OF MARCH 10th, 1953

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

ORDER

Present : Vice-President Bapawi, Acting President ; President
HACKWORTH ; Judges BASDEVANT, WINIARSKI, KLAESTAD,
Reap, Hsu Mo, ARMAND-UGoN, KOJEVNIKOV, Sir
Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT,
MORENO QUINTANA, CORDOVA; Registrar LOPEZ OLIVAN.

The International Court of Justice,
composed as above,

after deliberation,
having regard to Articles 36 and 48 of the Statute of the Court ;

Makes the following Order :

Whereas on March 2gth, 1955, the Ambassador of the United
States of America to the Netherlands filed in the Registry an Appli-
cation dated March 22nd, 1955, and signed by the Agent of the
Government of the United States of America instituting proceed-
ings before the Court against the Government of the Czechoslovak
Republic on account of “certain wrongful acts committed by MIG-
type aircraft from Czechoslovakia within the United States zone of
occupation in Germany on March 10, 1953”

4
7 AERIAL INCIDENT OF MARCH 10th, 1953 (ORDER OF 14 III 56)

Whereas the Application was duly communicated by the Registry
on March 2gth, 1955, to the Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic
to the Netherlands ;

Whereas the Application was also duly communicated by the
Registry to the Members of the United Nations, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the other States
entitled to appear before the Court ;

Whereas the Application contains the following paragraphs :

“The United States Government, in filing this application with
the Court, submits to the Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of
this case. The Czechoslovak Government appears not to have filed
any declaration with the Court thus far, although it was invited
to do so by the United States Government in the note annexed
hereto. The Czechoslovak Government, however, is qualified to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and may
upon notification of this application by the Registrar, in accordance
with the Rules of the Court, take the necessary steps to enable
the Court’s jurisdiction over both parties to the dispute to be
confirmed.

The United States Government thus founds the jurisdiction of
this Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 36 (1) of
the Statute.”

Whereas the note annexed to the Application, which was addressed
on August 18th, 1954, by the Government of the United States of
America to the Czechoslovak Government, ends with the following
passage :

“Since it appears that the Czechoslovak Government has thus far
not filed with that Court any declaration of acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of that Court, the United States Government
invites the Czechoslovak Government to file an appropriate decla-
ration with that Court or to enter into a Special Agreement by
which the Court may, in accordance with its Statute and Rules,
proceed to a determination of the issues of fact and law which have
been set forth herein ; and the Czechoslovak Government is requested
to inform the United States Government in the reply to the present
note of its intentions with respect to such a declaration or Special
Agreement.”

Whereas in a letter dated May 6th, 1955, from the Minister of the
Czechoslovak Republic in the Netherlands to the Registry it was
stated that :

“As the Czechoslovak Government has already stated in its
Notes to the Embassy of the United States of America in Prague
of March r1th and 30th, 1953, the aerial incident of March roth,
1953, occurred above Czechoslovak territory as the result of a
violation of the Czechoslovak air space by American military air-
craft, and all responsibility therefor lies solely upon the Government
of the United States of America.
& AERIAL INCIDENT OF MARCH Toth, 1953 (ORDER OF I4 III 56)

The Czechoslovak Government would observe that the claims
-put forward by the Government of the United States in this connec-
tion against Czechoslovakia are without point and that the Appli-
cation purporting to bring this matter before the International
Court of Justice is totally unfounded. The Czechoslovak Government
can see no reason why this case should be considered by the Inter-
national Court of Justice and regards the Application of the United
States instituting such proceedings before. the International Court
of Justice as unacceptable.”

Whereas a certified true copy of the above-mentioned letter was
communicated to the Agent of the Government of the United States
of America on May 7th, 1955 ;

Whereas the said letter of May 6th, 1955, does not constitute on
the part of the Government of Czechoslovakia either the appropriate
déclaration or consent to conclude a Special Agreement ;

Whereas, in these circumstances, the Court finds that it has not
before it any acceptance by the Government of the Czechoslovak
Republic of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal witn the dispute
which is the subject of the Application submitted to it by the
Government of the United States of America and that therefore it
can take no further steps upon this Application ;

THE Court

orders that the case shall be removed from the list.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fourteenth day of March, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-six, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted.
to the Government of the United States of America and to the
Government. of the Czechoslovak Republic, respectively.

(Signed) A. BADAWI,

Vice-President.

(Signed) J. Lopez OLIVAN,
Registrar.

6