INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE
AERIAL INCIDENT OF
JULY .27th, 1955

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BULGARIA)

ORDER OF JANUARY 27th, 1958

1958

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A
L’INCIDENT AERIEN DU
27 JUILLET 1955

(ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE c. BULGARIE)

ORDONNANCE DU 27 JANVIER 1958
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955
(United States of America v. Bulgaria),
Order of January 27th, 1958: I.C.J. Reports 1958, p. ro.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:
« Affaire relative à l'incident aërien du 27 juillet 1955
(États-Unis d'Amérique c. Bulgarie),
Ordonnance du 27 janvier 1958: C.I. J. Recueil 1958, p. ro.»

Sales number 17 9
N° de vente :

Io

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1958
January 27th
General List :

No: 36 YEAR 1958

January 27th, 1958

CASE CONCERNING THE
AERIAL INCIDENT OF
JULY 27th, 1955

(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BULGARIA)

ORDER

The Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Acting
President in this case,

having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court,
having regard to Article 37 of the Rules of Court;

Having regard to the Order of November 26th, 1957, whereby
the Court fixed June 2nd, 1958, as the time-limit for the filing of
the Memorial of the Government of the United States of America,
and reserved for a subsequent Order the fixing of a time-limit
for the filing by the Respondent of its Counter-Memorial;

After ascertaining the views of the Respondent,

Fixes December 9th, 1958, as the time-limit for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial of the Goverriment of the People’s Republic of
Bulgaria;

Reserves the rest of the procedure for further decision.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of
January, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight, in three

4
II AERIAL INCIDENT (U.S.A. v. BULGARIA) (ORDER 27 1 58)

copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and
the others transmitted to the Government of the United States of
America and to the Government of the People’s Republic of
Bulgaria, respectively.

(Signed) A. BADAWI,
Vice-President.

(Signed) J. Lopez OLIVAN,
Registrar.


147

      DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC VINUESA

   Partial agreement with certain of Court’s considerations and findings — The
dispute does not concern a confrontation between environmental protection of
shared natural resources and the right of sustainable development — Objective
and purpose of the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay — Requirements for the
indication of provisional measures — Rights claimed to be preserved —
Urgency — Imminent threat of irreparable damage — Precautionary prin-
ciple — The Court’s power to indicate other provisional measures than the ones
requested by the Parties — Need to guarantee commitments affirmed before the
Court.

   I regret to fully disagree with the decision of the majority of the Court
in the operative part of the present Order. Even if the majority of the
Court was not persuaded to indicate the provisional measures as requested
by the Republic of Argentina, the “circumstances, as they now present
themselves to the Court” (Order, para. 87), and as argued by both
Parties, are such that the Court should have considered the indication of
alternative provisional measures in order to preserve the rights of each
Party until final judgment.

  However, I partially agree with several of the considerations and find-
ings of the majority of the Court, as follows :

   I do agree with the majority of the Court on the existence of prima
facie jurisdiction under Article 60 of the 1975 Statute.
   I do agree with the majority of the Court that the decision given in no
way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with
the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves.
   I do agree with the majority’s finding that the evidence presented by
Argentina at this stage is not sufficient to prove that the authorization
and subsequent construction of the plants, in themselves, and just in
themselves, have already caused irreparable harm to the environment.
   However, I strongly disagree with the Court’s finding that the con-
struction of the plants constitutes a neutral or innocent step without legal
consequences that shall not affect the future preservation of the environ-
ment. As things stand today, and taking into account the evidence pro-
vided by both Parties, the uncertainty of a risk of an imminent threat of
irreparable harm is inexorably linked to the present and continuing con-
struction of the mills.

  I do agree with the majority of the Court when it “recognizes the con-

38

148                   PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

cerns expressed by Argentina for the need to protect its natural environ-
ment and, in particular, the quality of the water of the River Uruguay”
(Order, para. 72).
   I do agree with the majority of the Court when it recalls that the Court
has had occasion in the past to stress the great significance it attaches to
respect for the environment, and when it refers in this respect to the rele-
vant paragraphs of the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 241-242,
para. 29) and the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun-
gary/Slovakia) case (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140).
   I do agree with the majority of the Court that, in proceeding with the
authorization and construction of the mills, Uruguay necessarily bears all
risks relating to any finding on the merits that the Court might later
make.
   I do agree with the majority of the Court that the construction of the
mills at the current site cannot be deemed to create a fait accompli.
   I do agree with the majority of the Court that it is not disputed
between the Parties that the 1975 Statute establishes a joint machinery
for the use and conservation of the River Uruguay and that the pro-
cedural mechanism provided for in the Statute constitutes a very impor-
tant part of the treaty régime.
   I do agree with the finding by the majority of the Court that the Parties
are required to fulfil their obligations under international law, stressing
the necessity for Argentina and Uruguay to implement in good faith the
consultation and co-operation procedures provided for by the 1975
Statute, and that CARU constitutes the envisaged forum for that pur-
pose.
   I do agree with the intention expressed by the majority of the Court to
encourage both Parties to refrain from any actions which might render
more difficult the resolution of the present dispute.
   I do agree with the majority of the Court on the legal effects attributed
to the commitments, made by the Agent of Uruguay before the Court, to
comply in full with the 1975 Statute.
   I do agree with the finding of the majority of the Court that the deci-
sion leaves unaffected the right of Argentina to submit in the future a
new request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 75,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court.

                                   *   *
   To my regret, I could not agree with the assessment by the majority of
the Court that the present case highlights the importance of the need to
ensure environmental protection of shared natural resources while allow-
ing sustainable economic development.
   Neither of the two Parties has addressed the present dispute as a con-
frontation between environmental protection rights, on the one hand,
and the right of States to pursue sustainable development, on the other

39

149                    PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

hand. As a matter of fact, such a confrontation does not exist even in
abstract terms.
  To my understanding, and taking into account what both Parties have
argued at the stage of provisional measures, there is no doubt that the
present dispute concerns the scope of rights and duties established by the
1975 Statute of the River Uruguay, which is binding upon Argentina and
Uruguay since its entry into force on 18 September 1976.

  Uruguay has not denied the duty of the Parties to protect the environ-
ment of the River Uruguay, and Argentina, for its part, has not denied
the right of the Parties to sustainable development.
  Both Parties agreed on the need for the 1975 Statute to be fully
applied, but differed on the scope of the respective rights and duties with
regard to the implementation of
      “the joint machinery necessary for the optimum and rational utiliza-
      tion of the River Uruguay, in strict observance of the rights and
      obligations arising from treaties and other international agreements
      in force for each of the Parties” (Article 1 of the Statute).

   It is important to take into account that the Preamble of the 1975
Statute of the River Uruguay proclaimed that the Governments of Uru-
guay and Argentina were “motivated by the fraternal spirit inspiring the
Treaty concerning the Río de la Plata and the Corresponding Maritime
Boundary signed in Montevideo on 19 November 1973”.
   Under Article 1 of the 1975 Statute, the Parties also recognized that
this Statute was the result of the implementation of Article 7 of the
Treaty concerning the Boundary of the River Uruguay, signed in Monte-
video on 7 April 1961. The latter provision established the main objec-
tives and purposes of the 1975 Statute, which are no other than the joint
regulation of a régime for the navigation of the river, the conservation of
its living resources and the avoidance of pollution of the river waters.
   All the above considerations are vital for the application of the 1975
Statute in deciding the merits of the present dispute, as well as in deter-
mining the possibility for the Court to indicate provisional measures in
order to preserve the respective rights of the Parties.

                                      *
  Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides that :
         “The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
      circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to
      be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”
  It follows from this provision that, once the Court has satisfied itself of
the existence of its prima facie jurisdiction, it has to consider the viability

40

150                   PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

of the alleged rights that need to be preserved, pending a final decision on
the merits, and determine whether provisional measures are necessary to
prevent irreparable harm to the rights that are in dispute, and that there
is a degree of urgency in indicating them. I will address these matters in
turn.

                                     *
   With regard to the rights claimed, it should be recalled that the pro-
visional measures requested by Argentina were intended to preserve
its rights under the 1975 Statute from alleged violations by Uruguay of
procedural and substantive obligations imposed on it by the Statute.

   The so-called procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute alleged
by Argentina to have been violated by Uruguay concerned the non-
implementation by Uruguay of the joint machinery that is required by
Chapter II (Arts. 7 to 12) when one party plans to carry out works
(the pulp mills) which are liable to affect navigation, the régime of the
river or the quality of its waters.
   What Argentina calls the substantive obligations under the 1975
Statute concerned the obligation not to allow any construction before
the requirements of the 1975 Statute have been met, and the obligation
not to cause environmental pollution or consequential economic or social
harm.
   Within the 1975 Statute, the relationship of obligations of a procedural
and of a substantive character is essential in the implementation of the
precautionary principle. Indeed, as clearly stated by Article 1, the joint
mechanism envisaged by the 1975 Statute is the necessary venue to obtain
an optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay. As explained
above, the main objectives and purposes of the 1975 Statute were pre-
determined by Article 7 of the 1961 Montevideo Treaty, which conditioned
the establishment of the future Statute to regulate the navigation of the
river, the achievement of agreements on fisheries and the achievement of
agreements to avoid water pollution. The Statute is a clear example of the
new boundary river régimes that have developed a detailed procedure of
co-operation among riparian States, in order to implement substantial
rights and obligations for the use and conservation of a shared natural
resource. The 1975 Statute constitutes the institutional expression of a
community of interests in which substantive norms and principles are
interwoven with procedural norms. Procedures and substantive rules are
melded in the accomplishment of the objective and purpose of the 1975
Statute.

   A clear distinction must be made between requests for provisional
measures which aim at preserving an alleged right, and those which, in a
sense, aim at repairing an alleged violation of a treaty obligation. In the
latter case, there is no chance to repair an alleged breach through the

41

151                    PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

indication of a provisional measure without prejudging the merits. It is
obvious that such a question remains to be solved at that later stage.

   However, that does not apply for the actual and future implementation
of a joint mechanism pre-established by Chapter II of the 1975 Statute.
In this regard, the indication of provisional measures would be appro-
priate to preserve the said procedural right, as well as the substantive
right that is intrinsically associated with it under the Statute, pending a
final solution on the merits.

                                      *
   Turning now to the question of urgency, the Court, in previous cases,
has determined that it is only empowered to indicate provisional meas-
ures if there is an urgent need to prevent irreparable harm to rights that
are the subject of the dispute, before the Court has had the opportunity
to render its decision (see Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports
1991, p. 17, para. 23 ; Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic
of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measure, Order of 17 June 2003,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 107, para. 22).
   In the present proceedings, the precedent of the Passage through the
Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) case has been invoked to allege that the
Court should deny the indication of provisional measures, given the
absence of urgency. It is true that, in that case, the Court found that the
circumstances were not such as to require the exercise of its power under
Article 41. The Court considered that if the construction works contem-
plated by Denmark on the East Channel Bridge, which, it was claimed,
would obstruct Finland’s right of passage, had been expected to be car-
ried out prior to the decision of the Court on the merits, this might have
justified the indication of provisional measures. However, the Court,
placing on record the assurances given by Denmark that no physical
obstruction of the East Channel would occur before the end of 1994, and
considering that the proceedings on the merits in the case would, in the
normal course, be completed before that time, found that it had not been
shown that the claimed right of passage would have been infringed by
those construction works during the pendency of the proceedings (Pas-
sage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Meas-
ures, Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 18, paras. 26-27).
   To my understanding, the simple and straightforward application
of this same criterion should have led the Court to conclude that the
requisite of “urgency” is fulfilled in the present case and that the Court
should proceed to indicate provisional measures.
   It is a fact that, at the very least, the construction and operation of the
Orion project, as confirmed by Uruguay, is expected to be carried out by
the middle of 2007, obviously prior to any decision of this Court on the
merits. Inasmuch as there are no assurances by Uruguay that the mills

42

152                   PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

will not be in operation before the completion of the proceedings on the
merits in the present case, it follows that the rights the preservation of
which is requested by Argentina will be infringed by the construction
works and by the operation of the mills during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings.

                                     *
  With regard to the imminent threat of irreparable damage as a require-
ment for the indication of provisional measures, the majority of the
Court considered that
      “Argentina has not provided evidence at present that suggests that
      any pollution resulting from the commissioning of the mills would
      be of a character to cause irreparable damage to the River Uruguay”
      (Order, para. 75).
   However, as stated above, I consider that the authorization and the
construction of the mills, or future authorizations and constructions of
other plants on the River Uruguay, are neither neutral nor innocent
steps. The constructions are meant to have a direct effect, which is the
final implementation and full operation of the mills.

   In the present case, the majority of the Court has also found that
Argentina has not produced evidence to prove that the future operation
of the mills will cause irreparable harm to the environment. I completely
disagree. To reach such a conclusion, the majority of the Court should
have made explicit reference in the Order to how it evaluated the docu-
mentation produced by the Parties. What Argentina has to prove, and
what it has proved, is that the work authorizations and the actual execu-
tion of the works have generated a reasonable basis of uncertainty on the
probable negative effects to the environment of the works. This would be
no more than a direct application of the precautionary principle, which
indisputably is at the core of environmental law. In my opinion, the pre-
cautionary principle is not an abstraction or an academic component of
desirable soft law, but a rule of law within general international law as it
stands today.

   However, there is no need, in the present case, to enquire further into
the existence of a general rule of law embodying the precautionary prin-
ciple, since the said principle has, on a treaty-law basis, already been
incorporated by Uruguay and Argentina in the 1975 Statute for the pur-
poses of protecting the environment of the River Uruguay. As clearly
stated by Article 1, the objective and purpose of the 1975 Statute was
“to establish a joint machinery necessary for the optimum and rational
utilization of the River Uruguay”. The necessary participation of the
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) in the
process of assessing environmental impacts on the River Uruguay, as a

43

153                   PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

recognized shared natural resource, within a pre-established binding joint
machinery, constitutes the essential legal and binding guarantee for the
proper implementation of the said precautionary principle.
  The existence of a reasonable uncertainty as to a risk of irreparable
harm to the river environment has been recognized by Uruguay when, at
the hearings on provisional measures, it affirmed that there was no final
environmental assessment in relation to the operation of the mills and
that no authorization had yet been issued for the construction of the
CMB plant.

                                    *   *
   The Republic of Argentina has requested two different sets of provi-
sional measures. The first set refers, in general terms, to suspension of the
construction of the works until a final decision has been reached by the
Court. The second set of provisional measures refers in general terms to
the full and adequate implementation of rights and obligations under the
1975 Statute.
   The majority of the Court has found that, in the present circumstances,
there is no need for the Court to indicate the provisional measures
requested by Argentina. In the motivation of its decision, the Court
found that the construction of the works at the current site could not be
deemed to create a fait accompli. It further considered that Uruguay
bears all the risks of any subsequent finding on the merits whereby it
would be found that the construction of the works breached a legal right
of Argentina, and that such works could not be continued or that the
mills would have to be modified or dismantled. In addition, in consider-
ing the present circumstances of the case, the Court took particular note
of the commitments undertaken by Uruguay at the closing session of the
hearings on provisional measures. I believe, however, that the Court
should have proceeded to guarantee those unilateral commitments by
indicating provisional measures alternative to the ones requested by
Argentina.
   There is no doubt that the Court has the power to indicate provisional
measures other than those requested by the parties (see Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co., Interim Protection, Order of 5 July 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951,
pp. 93-94 ; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Interim
Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, pp. 17-18 ;
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Interim
Protection, Order of 17 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, pp. 35-36 ;
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June
1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 106 ; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.
France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973,
p. 142 ; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United
States of America v. Iran), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December
1979, I.C.J. Reports 1979, p. 21 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Provi-

44

154                    PULP MILLS (DISS. OP. VINUESA)

sional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 187 ;
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Provisional Measures,
Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 12-13 ; Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 24).

   As recalled above, in the present case, Uruguay has unilaterally recog-
nized its obligations under the 1975 Statute and assured the Court that it
will abide by them. I consider that this unilateral commitment should
have been complemented by the indication by the majority of the Court
of provisional measures aimed at preserving the procedural and substan-
tial rights of both Parties to full implementation of the joint machinery
provided for under Chapter II of the 1975 Statute. For that purpose, the
majority of the Court should have indicated, as a provisional measure,
the temporary suspension of the construction of the mills until Uruguay
notifies the Court of its fulfilment of the above-mentioned Statute obli-
gations. In the event that Argentina might have failed to fulfil its own
identical obligations under the 1975 Statute, Uruguay would always
have the possibility to ask the Court to set aside the indicated temporary
suspension.
   In addition, the majority of the Court should have encouraged the
Parties, in the spirit of their historical and fraternal relationship, to make
an effort to try to solve the present dispute in accordance with the 1975
Statute, pending the final decision on the merits, as it did in the Passage
through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) (Provisional Measures,
Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 20, para. 35).

   Finally, the majority of the Court should have recognized that it is
clearly in the interest of both Parties that their respective rights and obli-
gations be determined definitively as early as possible ; it would therefore
have been appropriate for the majority of the Court, with the co-opera-
tion of the Parties, to ensure that the decision on the merits be reached
with all possible expedition, as it also did in the Passage through the
Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) (Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July
1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 20, para. 36).

                                        (Signed) Raúl Emilio VINUESA.

45


146

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. PAPAZOFF

Ne pouvant me rallier à l’arrêt reconnaissant la compétence
de la Cour en vertu des déclarations par lesquelles la Belgique
et la Bulgarie ont accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour,
j'estime devoir exposer brièvement mon opinion dissidente.

Conformément à l’article 36, alinéa 2, du Statut de la Cour,
la Belgique et la Bulgarie se sont engagées à reconnaître la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour, aux conditions prévues dans
leurs déclarations d'adhésion.

La déclaration de la Bulgarie, ratifiée le 12 août 1927, est la
suivante: « Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume de Bulga-
rie, je déclare reconnaître comme obligatoire de plein droit et
sans convention spéciale, vis-à-vis de tout autre Membre ou
État acceptant la même obligation, la juridiction de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale, purement et simplement. »

La déclaration de la Belgique est ainsi conçue : « Au nom du
Gouvernement belge, je déclare reconnaître comme obligatoire
de plein droit et sans convention spéciale, vis-à-vis de tout
autre Membre ou État acceptant la même obligation, la juri-
diction de la Cour, conformément à l’article 36, alinéa 2, du
Statut de la Cour, pour une durée de quinze années, sur ‘tous
les différends qui s’éléveraient après la ratification de la présente
déclaration au sujet. de situations ou de faits postérieurs à
cette ratification, sauf les cas où les Parties auraient convenu
ou conviendraient d’avoir recours à un autre mode de règle-
ment pacifique. »

Cette déclaration a été ratifiée et est entrée en vigueur le
IO mars 1926.

La déclaration bulgare ne pose qu'une seule condition, celle

de réciprocité.
+ Mais il est reconnu que la limitation contenue dans la décla-
ration belge fait droit entre les Parties, aussi bien par Veffet
de la condition de réciprocité inscrite au paragraphe 2 de
Varticle 36 du Statut de la Cour, que par sa répétition dans
la déclaration bulgare.”

Ii s’agit donc de déterminer le sens et la portée de la limi-
tation contenue dans la déclaration du Gouvernement belge.
Cette limitation pose deux conditions: 1° il faut que le diffé-
rend se soit élevé aprés la ratification de la déclaration ; 2° il
faut en second lieu que le différend se soit élevé au sujet de
situations ou de faits postérieurs a cette ratification.

La déclaration belge ayant été ratifiée le ro mars 1926, c’est
cette date, qu’on peut désigner sous le terme de « date cri-
tique », qu’il faut prendre en considération.

86
147 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. PAPAZOFF

Telle qu’elle est rédigée, la déclaration belge a pour but
d’exclure toute possibilité d’un effet rétroactif. La juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour n'est acceptée que pour l’avenir, En
aucun cas on ne peut revenir sur le passé. C’est pourquoi il
ne suffit pas que le différend se soit élevé après la ratification
de la déclaration. [1 faut encore qu’il ne se soit point élevé au
sujet de situations ou de faits antérieurs à cette ratification.
Dans le cas actuel, les deux Parties sont d'accord pour recon-
naître que le différend s’est élevé après la date critique — c’est-
à-dire après le ro mars 1926.

Mais le Gouvernement bulgare, qui a soulevé l'exception
d’incompétence vatione temporis, soutient que la seconde condi-
tion fait défaut, le différend actuel s'étant élevé au sujet de
situations ou de faits antérieurs au 10 mars 1926. Cette objec-
tion est, à mon avis, pleinement établie par les données de la
procédure écrite. En effet, la lettre du ministre de Belgique du
24 juin 1937, par laquelle il exprime l'intention de porter la
cause devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale,
contient le passage suivant: « Aprés la constatation des faits
antérieurs, l’étude attentive de l’arrêt rendu le 27 mars dernier
par la Cour d’appel de Sofia a convaincu le Gouvernement belge
que la décision judiciaire intervenue méconnaissait, en ordre
principal sur deux points de première importance, les droits de
la société tels qu'ils ont été définis par le Tribunal arbitral
mixte belgo-bulgare, constitué en exécution du Traité de
Neuilly — dans ses sentences du 5 juillet 1923 et du 27 mai
1925 —, dont il incombait au Gouvernement bulgare d’assurer
la stricte application en vertu d’un engagement international
exprès, en l'espèce l’article 188 du Traité de Neuilly susdit. »
Cette lettre fait ressortir que le différend provient de la situa-
tion que les sentences du Tribunal arbitral mixte belgo-bulgare
du 5 juillet 1923 et du 27 mai 1925 ont établie.

Le Mémoire belge fait apparaître non moins clairement que
le différend actuel s’est élevé au sujet de la situation créée par
ces sentences. En effet, il est dit à la page 12 de ce Mémoire:
« Devant les contestations qui s’élevaient au sujet de la mise
à exécution de la formule contenue dans les arrêts rendus par
le Tribunal arbitral mixte », etc.; à la page 14: « les experts
qui sont les auteurs de la formule litigieuse » ; à la page 22:
« le Gouvernement belge retient comme fausse application du
jugement du Tribunal arbitral mixte », etc. ; et à la page 33:
« Les Hautes Juridictions bulgares bouleversent dans ses fonde-
ments toute l’économie du système élaboré par le Tribunal
arbitral mixte. » — |

Ce « système élaboré », c’est bien la « situation » créée par
les sentences du Tribunal arbitral mixte de 1923 et 1925 et au
sujet de laquelle a surgi le différend. Sans la « formule » établie

87
148 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. PAPAZOFF

par le Tribunal arbitral mixte, il n’y aurait pu y avoir de
différend.

A mon avis, il y a un lien nécessaire de causalité entre cette
« situation » et le différend qui s’est élevé en 1937. La com-
pagnie n'aurait pu prétendre qu’une atteinte a été portée à
ses droits, si la situation créée par les sentences arbitrales de
1923 et 1925 n'existait pas. Or, cette situation est antérieure
au ro mars 1926. Et il me paraît que cela suffit. Selon mon
opinion, il n’est point nécessaire qu’elle soit elle-même généra-
trice du différend, et qu’elle soit elle-même objet d’une contes-
tation.

Car une pareille condition ne figure pas dans le texte de la
déclaration belge. Ce qui est exigé, c’est que le différend s'élève,
c'est-à-dire qu’il naisse après la ratification de la déclaration.
D'autre part, afin que la déclaration n’ait aucun effet rétroactif,
ce différend ne doit avoir aucun lien avec des situations ou des
faits antérieurs. Cette condition est exprimée par les mots
« au sujet de ». Ce qui importe, c’est de ne pas revenir sur le
passé, sous quelque forme que ce soit, la déclaration d’adhésion
ne devant avoir d’effet que pour l'avenir.

Je trouve une confirmation de cette interprétation des termes
«au sujet de» dans la constatation que, lorsqu'on a voulu
tenir compte de la naissance des différends par rapport aux
faits antérieurs, cela a été dit expressément. En effet, dans les nom-
breux traités de conciliation, de règlement judiciaire et d’arbi-
trage qui ont été conclus entre la Belgique et divers États, deux
formules différentes ont été employées pour établir la clause de
non-rétroactivité. Ainsi, dans les traités conclus entre la Bel-
gique et l'Allemagne, la Turquie, la Roumanie, sont exclus « les
différends nés de faits qui sont antérieurs au présent Traité et
qui appartiennent au passé. ».

Par contre, les traités conclus par la Belgique avec la Suède,
la Suisse, la Finlande, le Portugal, la Pologne et le Danemark
contiennent les mêmes expressions que celles employées dans la
déclaration de la Belgique portant acceptation de la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour, et précisent que le traité ne s’appli-
quera qu'aux litiges qui viendraient à s'élever, après l’échange
des ratifications, au sujet de situations ou de faits postérieurs
à cette date. Ici, il n’est plus question de différends « nés » de
faits antérieurs. Et nulle part l'expression « différend né d’une
situation antérieure » n’a été employée.

Le fait que le présent litige se reporte à une date antérieure
au Io mars 1926 ressort également des conclusions du Mémoire
belge, lequel, énumérant les dommages subis par la Compagnie
d’Electricité, expose : « En effet, comme suite aux décisions judi-
ciaires intervenues, la société a été tenue d'effectuer des verse-
ments à la Municipalité de Sofia ou au fisc bulgare: a) du
chef de restitution de l’accise prétendument perçue dans des

88
149 A/B 77 (COMPAGNIE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ). — OP. PAPAZOFF

conditions illicites de 1925 à 1937 », etc. Il s'agirait donc d’un
litige portant sur des sommes perçues dès 1925.

Par les considérations exposées, j'arrive à la conclusion que
le différend actuel s’est bien élevé après la date critique, 10 mars
1926, mais au sujet d’une situation antérieure créée par les
sentences du Tribunal arbitral mixte rendues en 1923 et 1925.

Par conséquent, j'estime que ce différend, en raison de la
limitation rvatione temporis contenue dans la déclaration belge,
échappe à la juridiction de la Cour.

(Signé) PAPAZOFF.

89


                                                21 JANUARY 2022

                                                    ORDER

APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
             OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

                    (ARMENIA v. AZERBAIJAN)

                          ___________

APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR L’ÉLIMINATION
       DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE

                   (ARMÉNIE c. AZERBAÏDJAN)

                                                21 JANVIER 2022

                                                 ORDONNANCE

                          COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                            ANNÉE 2022
                                                                                2022
                                                                                21 janvier
                                                                                Rôle général
                                                                                no 180
                                           21 janvier 2022

   APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR L’ÉLIMINATION
          DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE

                                (ARMÉNIE c. AZERBAÏDJAN)

                                           ORDONNANCE

Présents : MME DONOGHUE, présidente ; M. GEVORGIAN, vice-président ; MM. TOMKA,
           ABRAHAM, BENNOUNA, YUSUF, MMES XUE, SEBUTINDE, MM. BHANDARI, ROBINSON,
           SALAM, IWASAWA, NOLTE, MME CHARLESWORTH, juges ; M. GAUTIER, greffier.

      La Cour internationale de Justice,

      Ainsi composée,

      Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

     Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et les articles 31, 44, 45, paragraphe 1, et 48 de son
Règlement,

      Vu la requête déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 16 septembre 2021, par laquelle la République
d’Arménie a introduit une instance contre la République d’Azerbaïdjan à raison de violations
alléguées de la convention internationale du 21 décembre 1965 sur l’élimination de toutes les formes
de discrimination raciale,

       Vu la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par la République
d’Arménie le 16 septembre 2021 et l’ordonnance du 7 décembre 2021 par laquelle la Cour a indiqué
certaines mesures conservatoires ;

                                                 -2-

      Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion que la présidente de la Cour a tenue avec les agents
des Parties par liaison vidéo le 13 janvier 2022, en application de l’article 31 du Règlement, l’agent
de l’Arménie a indiqué que les Parties étaient convenues de solliciter des délais de 12 mois,
respectivement aux fins de l’élaboration d’un mémoire par le demandeur et d’un contre-mémoire par
le défendeur ; et considérant que l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan a confirmé l’accord entre les Parties
tendant à solliciter des délais de 12 mois aux fins de la présentation des premières pièces de la
procédure écrite ;

      Compte tenu de l’accord entre les Parties,

       Fixe comme suit les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt des pièces de la procédure
écrite :

      Pour le mémoire de la République d’Arménie, le 23 janvier 2023 ;

      Pour le contre-mémoire de la République d’Azerbaïdjan, le 23 janvier 2024 ;

      Réserve la suite de la procédure.

       Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le
vingt et un janvier deux mille vingt-deux, en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives
de la Cour et les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la République d’Arménie
et au Gouvernement de la République d’Azerbaïdjan.

                                                                       La présidente,
                                                            (Signé) Joan E. DONOGHUE.

                                                                          Le greffier,
                                                            (Signé)   Philippe GAUTIER.

                                            ___________


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE LA DELIMITATION MARITIME
ENTRE LA GUINEE-BISSAU ET LE SENEGAL

(GUINEE-BISSAU c. SENEGAL)

ORDONNANCE DU 8 NOVEMBRE 1995

1995

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION
BETWEEN GUINEA-BISSAU AND SENEGAL

(GUINEA-BISSAU v. SENEGAL)

ORDER OF 8 NOVEMBER 1995
Mode officiel de citation:

Délimitation maritime entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal,
ordonnance du 8 novembre 1995, CIJ. Recueil 1995, p. 423

Official citation:

Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal,
Order of 8 November 1995, LC.J. Reports 1995, p. 423

N° de vente:
ISSN 0074-4441 Sales number 667
ISBN 92-1-070731-1

423

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1995

8 November 1995

CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION
BETWEEN GUINEA-BISSAU AND SENEGAL

(GUINEA-BISSAU v. SENEGAL)

ORDER

Present: President BEDJAOUI; Vice-President SCHWEBEL; Judges ODA,
GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN, WEERAMANTRY,  RANJEVA,
HERCZEGH, SHI, FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESHCHETIN,
FERRARI BRAVO, HIGGINS; Registrar VALENCIA-OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Ar-
ticle 89 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
12 March 1991 by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau instituting proceedings
against the Republic of Senegal in respect of a dispute concerning the
maritime delimitation between the two States;

Whereas this Application was immediately communicated to the Sene-
galese Government, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Court and whereas the Members of the United Nations, and also any
other States entitled to appear before the Court, were notified pursuant
to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute;

Whereas in that Application Guinea-Bissau, referring to the proceed-
ings pending before the Court in the case concerning the Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), stated that “when those first

4
MARITIME DELIMITATION (ORDER 8 XI 95) 424

proceedings are concluded, and whatever the outcome, the delimitation
of all the maritime territories will still not have been effected”; whereas in
that Application Guinea-Bissau founded the jurisdiction of the Court on
the declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court made by the two States pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute, while recognizing that if, when the above-mentioned proceedings
were concluded, the Court were to find the Award of 31 July 1989 to be
inexistent or null and void, the dispute now submitted to it “would, in
every respect, be the one that was the subject of [the] Arbitration Agree-
ment [of] 12 March 1985” and that “[iJn that case, because of the reser-
vations made by Senegal, its declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction
of the Court... would not apply” and that the Application would then
be submitted to the Court on the basis of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the
Rules; and whereas at the end of its Application Guinea-Bissau asked the
Court to adjudge and declare:

“What should be, on the basis of the international law of the
sea and of all the relevant elements of the case, including the future
decision of the Court in the case concerning the arbitral “award”
of 31 July 1989, the line (to be drawn on a map) delimiting all the
maritime territories appertaining respectively to Guinea-Bissau and
Senegal”;

Whereas the two Parties each appointed an Agent, Guinea-Bissau by a
letter dated 12 March 1991 from its Ambassador to the Netherlands,
with which the Application was enclosed, and Senegal by a letter dated
29 March 1991 from its Ambassador to the Netherlands, in which a com-
munication from the Senegalese Minister for Foreign Affairs was tran-
scribed; and whereas in that communication it was indicated, inter alia,
that the fact, for Senegal, of its having appointed an Agent “[did] not
imply acceptance on its part of the new proceedings set in motion by
Guinea-Bissau”, Senegal expressing “here and now every reservation as
to the admissibility of this fresh claim, and possibly as to the Court’s
jurisdiction” ;

Whereas at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the
representatives of the Parties on 5 April 1991, the latter agreed that no
measure should be taken in the case until the Court had delivered its deci-
sion in the case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989; whereas
the Court delivered its Judgment in that case on 12 November 1991 and
whereas, among other things, it indicated in paragraph 68 of that Judg-
ment that it considered it

“highly desirable that the elements of the dispute that were not
settled by the Arbitrai Award of 31 July 1989 be resolved as soon as
possible, as both Parties desire” (1 C.J. Reports 1991, p. 75);

and whereas at a meeting held by the President with the representatives
of the Parties on 28 February 1992, the latter requested that no time-limit

5
MARITIME DELIMITATION (ORDER 8 XI 95) 425

be fixed for the initial pleadings in the case, pending the outcome of nego-
tiations on the question of maritime delimitation, which were to continue
for six months in the first instance;

Whereas at a meeting held by the President with the representatives of
the Parties on 6 October 1992, the latter stated that some progress had
been made towards an agreement and that the two Parties jointly
requested that a further period of three months, with a possible further
extension of three months, be allowed for continuation of the negotia-
tions;

Whereas after several exchanges of letters between the Registry and the
Parties, and the granting to the latter of further extensions, the President
received their representatives on 10 March 1994 and whereas on that
occasion the representatives handed the President the text of an agree-
ment entitled “Accord de gestion et de coopération entre le Gouvernement
de la République de Guinée-Bissau et le Gouvernement de la République
du Sénégal”, done at Dakar on 14 October 1993 and signed by the two
Heads of State; whereas this agreement provided, inter alia, for the joint
exploitation, by the two Parties, of a “maritime zone situated between
the 268° and 220° azimuths drawn from Cape Roxo” (Art. 1), and the
establishment of an “International Agency for the exploitation of the
zone” (Art. 4), and whereas that agreement stated that it would enter into
force “upon conclusion of the agreement concerning the establishment
and functioning of the International Agency and with the exchange of the
instruments of ratification of both agreements by both States” (Art. 7);
and whereas in letters dated 16 March 1994, addressed to the Presidents
of both States, the President of the Court expressed his satisfaction and
informed them that the case would be removed from the list, in accord-
ance with the terms of the Rules of Court, as soon as the Parties had
notified him of their decision to discontinue the proceedings;

Whereas at a meeting held by the President with the representatives of
the Parties on 1 November 1995, the latter furnished him with an addi-
tional copy of the above-mentioned agreement as well as the text of a
“Protocole d’accord ayant trait à l’organisation et au fonctionnement de
Pagence de gestion et de coopération entre la République du Sénégal et la
République de Guinée-Bissau instituée par accord du 14 octobre 1993”,
done at Bissau on 12 June 1995 and signed by the two Heads of State;
and whereas the representatives at the same time notified him of the deci-
sions of their Governments to discontinue the proceedings and whereas
the President asked them to confirm that decision in writing to the Court
in whatever manner they deemed most appropriate;

Whereas by a letter of 2 November 1995, received in the Registry the
same day, the Agent of Guinea-Bissau, referring to Article 89 of the
Rules of Court, confirmed that his Government, by virtue of the agree-
ment reached by the two Parties on the disputed zone, had decided to
discontinue the proceedings instituted by its Application dated 12 March
1991;
MARITIME DELIMITATION (ORDER 8 XI 95) 426

Whereas a copy of that letter was communicated to the Agent of
Senegal directly by the Agent of Guinea-Bissau and after receipt of that
letter by the Registrar; and whereas by a letter dated 6 November 1995,
which arrived in the Registry the same day by facsimile, the Agent of
Senegal confirmed that his Government “agreed to the discontinuance of
proceedings”,

Places on record the discontinuance by the Republic of Guinea-Bissau
of the proceedings instituted by the Application filed on 12 March 1991;
and

Orders that the case be removed from the list.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of November, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-five, in three copies, one of which will be placed
in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Government of the
Republic of Senegal, respectively.

(Signed) Mohammed BEDJAOUI,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.