                     224

                             DECLARATION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

                        1. In concurring with the adoption of the present Order (of 11 April
                     2016) of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Armed
                     Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
                     Congo v. Uganda), in which the Court discloses its prudence as to the
                     length of the requested extension of time, I feel obliged, at the same time,
                     to lay on the records, in this declaration, my concern at the continuing
                     prolongation of the proceedings as to reparations in the cas d’espèce.
                        2. Looking back in time, it took almost a decade, since the Court’s
                     Judgment of 19 December 2005 (on the merits) in the present case, for the
                     Contending Parties to come to the conclusion, in their inter‑ministerial
                     meeting held in Pretoria, on 17‑19 March 2015, that they had not suc-
                     ceeded to reach a consensus in their negotiations. The aforementioned
                     Judgment of 19 December 2005 — over a decade ago — set forth the duty
                     of the Contending Parties to provide reparations for damages.
                        3. In effect, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda have
                     both shown their awareness that the proceedings in the present case have
                     consumed far too long a time. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
                     did so, when asking the Court (Application of 8 May 2015) “to reopen
                     proceedings” for determination of the reparations due. In its
                     Order of 1 July 2015, the ICJ decided to resume the proceedings on repara-
                     tions.
                        4. In my declaration appended to that Order, I pondered that the les-
                     son to be learned was that “the Court should not have left the question of
                     reparations, as it did in its Judgment of 19 December 2005, open to nego-
                     tiations between the parties without a time‑limit, without a reasonable
                     time” (I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 586, para. 4). After all, I added, the
                     members of the segments of the population victimized in the present case
                     have kept on waiting, for more than one decade, for “the reparations due
                     to them for the damages they suffered” (ibid.).
                        5. Yet, shortly afterwards, upon a new request of the Democratic
                     Republic of the Congo (not objected to by Uganda), the ICJ issued a new
                     Order in the cas d’espèce, of 10 December 2015, this time granting a fur-
                     ther extension of the time‑limit for the filing of the Memorials (on repara-
                     tions) of the two Contending Parties 1. And now, once again, in the more
                     recent correspondence presented to the Court, the Democratic Republic

                       1 The time‑limit was extended by the Court from 6 January 2016 to 28 April 2016.

                     The Democratic Republic of the Congo had asked for an extension until “late April or
                     mid‑May 2016”.

                     6

6 CIJ1095.indb 224                                                                                14/02/17 09:58

                     225 	            armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                     of the Congo requests (letter of 31 March 2016) another extension of
                     time 2, given the large scale of the damages and the complexity of the
                     fact‑finding.
                        6. In its letter of response (of 6 April 2016), Uganda, for its part, states
                     that it is prepared to agree with a much shorter extension of time 3. The
                     Court, in the Order it has just adopted today, has found an intermediary
                     solution, in between the time‑extension requested by the Democratic
                     Republic of the Congo and the one agreed upon by Uganda. In the reso-
                     lutory point of the present Order of the ICJ, it extends to 28 September
                     2016 the time‑limit for the filing by the two Parties of their respective
                     Memorials on reparations.
                        7. It is understandable that both Contending Parties seek to prepare
                     and substantiate their arguments as to reparations, and this is commend-
                     able, but this should not entail further prorogations or delays in the pro-
                     ceedings. Tempus fugit. In their more recent correspondence addressed to
                     the Court, the Contending Parties have shown their awareness of this.
                     Thus, in its letter of 31 March 2016, the Democratic Republic of the
                     Congo stated that it felt obliged to request this new extension of time‑limit
                     “with reluctance” (p. 1), given the “unprecedented complexity” of this
                     dispute (a five‑year conflict), in which “for the first time in its history the
                     Court will be faced with the question of reparation for war damages on
                     such an unusual scale” (p. 1).

                       8. Yet, other contemporary international tribunals have for some time
                     been constructing their case law on this matter 4; a study of it could prove
                     useful to the Contending Parties in the cas d’espèce, as well as to the ICJ

                         2   Now an additional extension of ten months.
                         3   Namely, an extension of three months.
                           4 Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, Oxford

                     University Press, 2011, pp. 151‑191 ; A. A. Cançado Trindade, Evolution du droit interna‑
                     tional au droit des gens — L’accès des particuliers à la justice internationale : le regard d’un
                     juge, Paris, Pedone, 2008, pp. 132‑146 and 151‑184 ; A. A. Cançado Trindade, El Ejercicio
                     de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
                     Humanos, 3rd ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2013, pp. 59‑74 and 336‑342 ;
                     A. A. Cançado Trindade, El Derecho de Acceso a la Justicia en Su Amplia Dimensión, 2nd ed.,
                     Santiago de Chile, Ed. Librotecnia, 2012, pp. 367‑396 and 423‑559 ; A. A. Cançado
                      Trindade, Los Tribunales Internacionales Contemporáneos y la Humanización del Derecho
                       Internacional, Buenos Aires, Ed. Ad-Hoc, 2013, pp. 113‑129; A. A. Cançado Trindade,
                       State Responsibility in Cases of Massacres: Contemporary Advances in International Justice,
                       Utrecht, Universiteit Utrecht, 2011, pp. 1‑71. And cf. also: [Various Authors], Réparer
                       les violations graves et massives des droits de l’homme : La Cour Interaméricaine, pionnière
                       et modèle? (eds. E. Lambert Abdelgawad and K. Martin‑Chenut), Paris, Ed. Société de
                     législation comparée, 2010, pp. 17‑334; I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes under
                      International Law, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 1‑253; [Various Authors], Reparations for
                      Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (eds. C. Ferstman, M. Goetz
                      and A. Stephens), Leiden, Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 7‑566; L. Moffett, Justice for Victims before
                      the International Criminal Court, London/N.Y., Routledge, 2014, pp. 1‑289; J.‑B. Jean-
                     gène Vilmer, Réparer l’irréparable — Les réparations aux victimes devant la Cour pénale
                     internationale, Paris, PUF, 2009, pp. 1‑182.

                     7

6 CIJ1095.indb 226                                                                                14/02/17 09:58

                     226 	           armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                     itself. In any case, as to the time‑length, in their latest arguments before
                     the ICJ, the Contending Parties disclosed their awareness of the need to
                     avoid further delays in the present proceedings on reparations. Thus, still
                     in its letter of 31 March 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
                     announced that “this request for postponement will be the last of the
                     kind” (p. 2).
                        9. For its part, in its letter of 6 April 2016, Uganda considered the
                     time‑extension requested “excessive” and “disproportionate” (pp. 1‑2): as
                     considerable time has already lapsed (since the 2005 Judgment on the
                     merits), this case being “the second oldest on the Court’s docket”, it pro-
                     ceeded, the applicant State “has already had considerable time to collect
                     evidence relating to its reparations claim” (p. 1). Uganda added that this
                     matter should be now “resolved on a timely basis” (p. 2).

                        10. Over a decade ago, in delivering its Judgment of 19 December 2005
                     on the merits in the present case, the ICJ was aware that the particulariza-
                     tion of the damages inflicted by the Parties was, at that stage, of course
                     not sufficient: such account of damages had been addressed by the Demo-
                     cratic Republic of the Congo mainly in its Reply of 29 May 2002, and by
                     Uganda in its Counter‑Memorial of 21 April 2001, but in rather general
                     terms, and not set out in great detail. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court
                     made it clear that, in order to decide on reparations, though it was not
                     necessary to embark on findings of fact with regard to each individual
                     incident (paras. 205 and 237), the whole matter had to be addressed in
                     greater detail at the following stage of reparations (para. 345 (6) and (14)),
                     when it would need to be particularized.

                       11. The complexity of the case is widely known. Yet, as years go by,
                     the history of the conflict at issue is gradually being written 5. The needed
                     particularization of the damages is possible, in particular for the purpose
                     of collective reparations to the victims, and it should not entail further
                     delays in the proceedings. After more than a decade, the time has now
                     come for a prompt determination of the reparations for damages inflicted
                     upon the numerous victims.
                       12. According to a célèbre maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. This
                     point was the object of meditation already in Seneca’s Moral Letters to
                     Lucilius (circa 62‑64 ad). In the search for the realization of justice, undue
                     delays are indeed to be avoided. The victims (in armed conflicts) of grave

                         5 Cf., inter alia, e.g., N. Nzereka Mughendi, Guerres récurrentes en République démo‑

                     cratique du Congo — Entre fatalité et responsabilité, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010, pp. 15‑199 ;
                     P. Mbeko and H. Ngbanda‑Nzambo, Stratégie du chaos et du mensonge — Poker menteur
                     en Afrique des Grands Lacs, Québec, Edit. de l’Erablière, 2014, pp. 9‑643 ; Lwamba Katansi,
                     Crimes et châtiments dans la région des Grands Lacs, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2007, Chap. 7,
                     pp. 41‑72 ; G. Prunier, Africa’s World War — Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making
                     of a Continental Catastrophe, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 113‑368 and 396‑468 ;
                     Th. Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, London/N.Y., Zed Books, 2008
                     (reimpr.), pp. 1‑233.

                     8

6 CIJ1095.indb 228                                                                                14/02/17 09:58

                     227 	         armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                     breaches of the international law of human rights and of international
                     humanitarian law have a right to reparations — most likely collective
                     reparations, and in their distinct forms — within a reasonable time.

                        13. The more time passes, the more difficult fact‑finding and investiga-
                     tions in loco become. I have addressed this point, among others, in my
                     recent and extensive dissenting opinion (paras. 149‑179, 195, 287, 321,
                     497‑499, 533‑535 and 538‑539 in the case of the Application of the Conven‑
                     tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croa‑
                     tia v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015). Furthermore, as a life time
                     is rather brief, and passes fast, many victims of those grave violations
                     cross the final threshold of their lives without finding justice, or else hav-
                     ing lost any hope in it.

                        14. Ancient Stoic thinking was already conscious of the perennial mys-
                     tery surrounding human existence, that of the passing of time. Stoicism,
                     in its perennial wisdom, recommended (as in, e.g., Seneca’s De Brevitate
                     Vitae, circa 40 ad) to keep always in mind all times — past, present and
                     future — jointly: time past, by means of remembrance; time present, so as
                     to make the best use of it (in search of justice); and time future, so as to
                     anticipate and prevent all one can, thus seeking to make life longer.

                        15. The duty of reparation is firmly‑rooted in the history of the law of
                     nations. The acknowledgment of such duty goes back to its origins, to the
                     perennial lessons of the “founding fathers” of international law. In this
                     connection, four years ago, in my lengthy separate opinion in the case of
                     Ahmadou Sadio Diallo ((Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
                     Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I)), I deemed it fit
                     to recall the lessons and writings of the “founding fathers” that expressly
                     referred to it (ibid., pp. 351‑352, para. 12 and pp. 353‑354, paras. 15‑19),
                     in the light of the principle neminem laedere.

                         16. I thus recalled the relevant passages in the classic works of, e.g.,
                     Francisco de Vitoria (Second Relectio de Indis, 1538‑1539); Hugo Grotius
                     (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625, Book II, Chap. 17); Samuel Pufendorf (Ele‑
                     mentorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis — Libri Duo, 1672; and On the
                     Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, 1673); Christian Wolff
                     (Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, 1764; and Principes du
                     droit de la nature et des gens, 1758); among others, such as the pertinent
                     considerations also of Alberico Gentili (De Jure Belli, 1598);
                     Francisco Suárez (De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, 1612); Cornelius van
                      Bynkershoek (De Foro Legatorum, 1721; and Quaestiones Juris Publici —
                      Libri Duo, 1737).
                         17. There is nothing new under the sun. The more we do research on
                      the classics of international law (largely forgotten in our hectic days), the
                      more we find reflections on the victims’ right to reparations for injuries —
                      also present in the writings of, e.g., Juan de la Peña (De Bello contra Insu‑

                     9

6 CIJ1095.indb 230                                                                                14/02/17 09:58

                     228 	            armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                     lanos, 1545); Bartolomé de Las Casas (De Regia Potestate, 1571);
                     Juan Roa Dávila (De Regnorum Justitia, 1591); Juan Zapata y Sandoval
                     (De Justitia Distributiva et Acceptione Personarum ei Opposita Discepta‑
                     tio, 1609).

                       18. In sum, since the origins of the law of nations, there was acknowl-
                     edgment of the duty to provide redress to those who suffered damages
                     caused by wrongful acts, in distinct circumstances. The realm of the
                     evolving jus gentium, the law of nations, was conceived as encompassing
                     the international community of (emerging) States, as well as all peoples,
                     groups and individuals: jus gentium was regarded as co-extensive with
                     humanity.
                       19. The duty of reparation for injuries was clearly seen as a response to
                     an international need 6, in conformity with the recta ratio — whether the
                     beneficiaries were (emerging) States, peoples, groups or individuals. The
                     recta ratio provided the basis for the regulation of human relations with
                     the due respect for each other’s rights 7. As I have pondered in my earlier
                     declaration appended to the Court’s previous Order of 1 July 2015 in the
                     present case and I here reiterate in the ICJ’s new Order just adopted
                     today (11 April 2016),

                              “Reparations, in cases involving grave breaches of the international
                           law of human rights and of international humanitarian law (. . .) are
                           to be resolved by the Court itself, within a reasonable time, bearing
                           in mind not State susceptibilities, but rather the suffering of human
                           beings, — the surviving victims, and their close relatives, — prolonged
                           in time, and the need to alleviate it. The aforementioned breaches and
                           prompt compliance with the duty of reparation for damages, are not
                           be separated in time: they form an indissoluble whole.” (I.C.J. Reports
                           2015 (II), p. 587, para. 7.)

                        6 J. Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law — Francisco de Vitoria and

                     His Law of Nations, Oxford/London, Clarendon Press/H. Milford, 1934, pp. 140, 150, 163,
                     165, 172, 210‑211 and 282‑283; and cf. also, Association Internationale Vitoria‑Suarez,
                     Vitoria et Suarez: Contribution des théologiens au droit international moderne, Paris,
                     Pedone, 1939, pp. 73‑74, and cf. pp. 169‑170; A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Prefacio”, in
                     Escuela Ibérica de la Paz (1511‑1694) — La Conciencia Crítica de la Conquista y Coloniza‑
                     ción de América (eds. P. Calafate and R. E. Mandado Gutiérrez), Santander, Ed. Univer-
                     sidad de Cantabria, 2014, pp. 40‑109.
                        7 The right reason lies at the basis of the law of nations, being the spirit of justice in

                     the line of natural law thinking; this trend of international legal thinking has always much
                     valued the realization of justice, pursuant to a “superior value of justice”. P. Foriers, L’or‑
                     ganisation de la paix chez Grotius et l’école de droit naturel [1961], Paris, J. Vrin, 1987,
                     pp. 293, 333, 373 and 375 [reed. of study originally published in : Recueil de la Société
                     Jean Bodin pour l’histoire comparative des institutions, Vol. 15‑Part II, Brussels, Libr. Ency-
                     clopédique, 1961].

                     10

6 CIJ1095.indb 232                                                                                14/02/17 09:58

                     229 	         armed activities (decl. cançado trindade)

                        20. In the present case, the ultimate beneficiaries of reparations for
                     damages resulting from grave breaches of the international law of human
                     rights and international humanitarian law (as determined by the ICJ) are
                     the human beings victimized. They are the titulaires of the right to repara-
                     tions, as subjects of the law of nations, as conceived and sustained, in
                     historical perspective, by the “founding fathers” of international law.
                     This is deeply‑rooted in the historical trajectory of our discipline. As titu‑
                     laires of that right, they have, in the cas d’espèce, been waiting for repara-
                     tions for far too long a time; many of them have already passed away.
                     Justitia longa, vita brevis.

                     (Signed) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.

                     11

6 CIJ1095.indb 234                                                                                14/02/17 09:58


1927.
Le 18 juin.
Dossier E. c. IX.

ORDONNANCE
RENDUE A LA DATE DU 18 JUIN 1927.

DOUZIÈME SESSION (ORDINAIRE)

Présents:

MM. Huser, Président,
LopDER, ancien Président,

Lord FINLAY,

MM. NYHOLM,
Moore,
DE BUSTAMANTE,
ALTAMIRA,
ODA,
ANZILOTTI,
PEssôa,
YOVANOVITCH, Juge suppléant.

Juges.

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA DÉNONCIATION DU TRAITÉ
SINO-BELGE DU 2 NOVEMBRE 1865

La Cour,

composée ainsi qu’il est dit ci-dessus,
apres délibéré en Chambre du Conseil,
rend l’Ordonnance suivante :

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour ;

Vu la Requête introductive d’instance datée du 25 novembre
1926, déposée au Greffe de la Cour le 26 novembre 1926 au nom
du Gouvernement belge et saisissant la Cour d’une affaire relative
à la dénonciation par le Gouvernement chinois du Traité conclu
le 2 novembre 1865 entre la Belgique et la Chine ;
13

Vu les Ordonnances rendues par le Président en ladite affaire
le 8 janvier et le 15 février 1927 ;

Attendu que, par une décision du 14 décembre 1926, le Président
de la Cour avait, en vertu des pouvoirs que lui confère l’article 33
du Règlement de la Cour, fixé comme suit les délais pour la présen-
tation des pièces de procédure en l'affaire :

pour le Mémoire, par la Partie demanderesse,

le mercredi 5 janvier 1927 :
pour le Contre-Mémoire, par la Partie défenderesse,

le mercredi 16 mars 1927;
pour la Réplique, par la Partie demanderesse,

le mercredi 6 avril 1927;
pour la Duplique, par la Partie défenderesse,

le mercredi 8 juin 1927;

Attendu que, par une communication du 17 janvier 1927,
adressée au Greffier de la Cour, le Gouvernement belge lui avait fait
connaître que, les Gouvernements belge et chinois ayant décidé .
d’un commun accord de rouvrir les négociations ayant pour objet
la conclusion d’un traité qui abrogerait le Traité de 1865, le Gouver-
nement belge, désireux de faciliter ces négociations, serait heureux,
pour répondre à un vœu du Gouvernement chinois, de voir prolon-
ger le délai imparti au Gouvernement chinois 5 pour la présentation
de son Mémoire ;

Que, d’autre part, par une décision du 20 janvier, portée à la
connaissance des Parties en date du même jour, le Président de la
Cour, saisi de cette demande et tenant compte de ce qu’elle
semblait destinée à répondre à un vœu du Gouvernement chinois,
lequel ne s’était, en tout cas, pas opposé à la prorogation demandée,
avait modifié comme suit les délais fixés le 14 décembre 1926,
savoir :

pour le Contre-Mémoire, par la Partie défenderesse,
le mercredi 25 mai 1927;
pour la Réplique, par la Partie demanderesse,
le mercredi 15 juin 1927;
‘pour la Duplique, par la Partie défenderesse,
le mercredi 17 août 1927 ;

Attendu que, par une nouvelle communication du 2 mai 1927,
adressée au Greffier de la Cour, le Gouvernement belge — les négo-
I4

ciations concernant la conclusion d’un nouveau traiténe paraissant
pas devoir aboutir à un résultat définitif avant la date fixée en der-
nier lieu pour le dépôt du Contre-Mémoire du Gouvernement chi-
nois, et pour donner suite à une promesse faite par lui au Gouver-
nement chinois lors de l'ouverture des négociations susvisées —
avait demandé une nouvelle prolongation des différents délais ;

Que, d'autre part, par une décision du 10 mai 1927, portée le
même jour à la connaissance des Parties, le Président, faisant droit
à cette demande, avait accordé la prolongation jusqu'au 18 juin
du délai pour le dépôt du Contre-Mémoire du Gouvernement chi-
nois, tout en réservant à la Cour elle-même, lorsqu'elle se réunirait,
de fixer les délais pour le dépôt des Réplique et Duplique respective-
ment ; |

Considérant que, par une lettre au Greffier de la Cour, datée du
14 juin 1927, le Gouvernement belge a, enfin, invoquant les motifs
déja exposés dans sa communication susvisée du 2 mai 1927, saisi
la Cour d’une demande ultérieure de prolongation des délais de
procédure en l’affaire dont il s’agit, sans, toutefois, proposer de dates
pour l’expiration des délais en question ; |

Considérant que, dans les conditions indiquées dans la décision
présidentielle du 20 janvier r927, il y a lieu de donner suite à cette
demande :

La Cour,

Décide, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 33 de son
Règlement, de fixer comme suit les délais ultérieurs de la procédure
en l’affaire entre la Belgique et la Chine relative à l’abrogation
par la Chine du Traité sino-belge du 2 novembre 1865, savoir :

pour le Contre-Mémoire, par la Partie défenderesse,
le mercredi 15 février 1928 ;

pour la Réplique, par la Partie demanderesse,
le dimanche rer avril 1928 ;

pour la Duplique, par la Partie défenderesse,
| le mardi 15 mai 1928.
35
~ Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le dix-huit juin mil neuf cent
vingt-sept, en quatre exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment au Gouvernement de Chine, au Gouvernement de Belgique
et au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations.

Le Président de la Cour:
(Signé) Max HUBER.

Le Greffier de la Cour:
(Signé) À. HAMMARSKJOLD.


634

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

I would like to explain my support for the judgment of the Court on
two points, namely, treaty succession and forum prorogatum.

TREATY SUCCESSION

The course taken by the Court in its judgment makes it unnecessary to
consider whether Bosnia and Herzegovina was a party to the Genocide
Convention as from the date of its independence. However, as this point
was closely argued and is the subject of some attention, I propose to say
a word on it.

I think that the more general arguments as to succession to treaties
may be put aside in favour of an approach based on the special charac-
teristics of the Genocide Convention. In the case of the Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, the Court likewise considered that the “solution of [the] problems”
which arose there “must be found in the special characteristics of the
Genocide Convention” (C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23). The fact that the
Genocide Convention provided for the possibility of cessation or denun-
ciation did not affect its special character as found by the Court. It
observed:

“The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of
the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime
under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existence
of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is con-
trary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations
(Resolution 96 (1) of the General Assembly, December 11th, 1946).
The first consequence arising from this conception is that the prin-
ciples underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized
by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conven-
tional obligation. A second consequence is the universal character
both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation
required ‘in order to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge’ (Preamble to the Corivention). The Genocide Convention
was therefore intended by the General Assembly and by the con-
tracting parties to be definitely universal in scope.” (Ibid. )

Thus, the universality of the Convention attached both to the prin-
ciples underlying the Convention and to “the co-operation required ‘in

43
635 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’”. Obviously,
universality as regards co-operation could not be achieved without
universality of participation. The Court recognized this when it noted
“the clearly universal character of the United Nations under whose
auspices the Convention was concluded, and the very wide degree of par-
ticipation envisaged by Article XI of the Convention” (C.J. Reports
1951, p. 21). In a famous passage, it said:

“The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The
Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that
might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on
the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human
groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary
principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting States
do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and
all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high
purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention. Conse-
quently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual
advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a
perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals
which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common
will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions.”
(Ibid., p. 23.)

It added:

“The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that
it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which
adopted it that as many States as possible should participate.” (Jbid.,
p. 24.)

If the arguments of Yugoslavia are correct, they lead in one way or
another, so far as a successor State such as Bosnia and Herzegovina is
concerned, to the introduction of an inescapable time-gap in the protec-
tion which the Genocide Convention previously afforded to all of the
“human groups” comprised in the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. There could be many long and single days during such a
time-gap when, for all practical purposes, that protection is no longer
heard of. It is difficult to appreciate how the inevitability of such a break
in protection could be consistent with a Convention the object of which
was “on the one hand . . . to safeguard the very existence of certain
human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elemen-
tary principles of morality”. |

I think that the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention
required parties to observe it in such a way as to avoid the creation of
such a break in the protection which it afforded. The Convention could
not be read as meaning that a party, which was bound under the Conven-
tion to apply its jurisdictional provisions for the protection of the “human

44
636 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

groups” inhabiting a given area, was allowed to regard itself as liberated
from those provisions in relation to a successor State by reason of the
fact that that particular area was now comprised within the territory of
the successor State; such a party would continue to be bound by those
provisions in relation to other parties in respect of the same “human
groups” while being inconsistently free in relation to the successor State
within whose territory breaches of the Convention are allegedly being
perpetrated by it.

To effectuate its object and purpose, the Convention would fall to be
construed as implying the expression of a unilateral undertaking by each
party to the Convention to treat successor States as continuing as from
independence any status which the predecessor State had as a party to
the Convention. The necessary consensual bond is completed when the
successor State decides to avail itself of the undertaking by regarding
itself as a party to the treaty. It is not in dispute that, one way or another,
Yugoslavia is a party to the Convention. Yugoslavia has therefore to be
regarded as bound by a unilateral undertaking to treat Bosnia and Herze-
govina (being a successor State) as having been a party to the Convention
as from the date of its independence.

It may be said that this approach presents existing parties with prob-
lems of retroactivity and uncertainty of status of successor States in so far
as the precise position taken by the latter may not emerge until some time
after the dates of their independence. The answer is, I think, provided by
recourse to the jurisprudence of the Court in the Right of Passage over
Indian Territory case: the problems in question would be the result of the
scheme of the Genocide Convention which parties to the Convention
accepted when they accepted the Convention. Since Yugoslavia considers
itself a party to the Convention, it is bound by the scheme. Consequently,
it has to regard Bosnia and Herzegovina as a party to the Convention as
from the date of its independence irrespective of possible difficulties.

The foregoing conclusion is reinforced by the following consideration.
The Court would be correct in accepting the generally prevailing view
that even Yugoslavia is not a continuation of the international personal-
ity of the previous Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but is a new
State and therefore itself a successor State. If, as no one disputes, Yugo-
slavia is correct in regarding itself as having always been a party to the
Convention, this by parity of reasoning applies equally to the case of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*

Touching on the wider problem concerning State succession to human
rights treaties, J am not persuaded, for present purposes, to draw too
sharp a distinction between the Genocide Convention (and in particular

45
637 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

its jurisdictional provisions) considered as a measure intended to prevent
and punish conduct detrimental to the integrity of certain “human
groups” and human rights treaties stricto sensu: basically they are all
concerned with the rights of the human being — in the case of the Geno-
cide Convention, with some of the most important human rights of all.
The origins of the Convention lay in “the intention of the United Nations
to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime under international law’
involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups”; con-
sequently, the “object” of the Convention was to “safeguard the very
existence of certain human groups”. That object could not be achieved
unless it included the safeguarding of the right to life in certain circum-
stances, ultimately through the jurisdictional provisions of the Conven-
tion. One writer, not unreasonably, described the Convention as “the first
human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations” (Matthew
Lippman, “The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, Boston University International
Law Journal, 1985, Vol. 3, p. 1).

But to say that a treaty is a human rights treaty, while providing a
possible foundation, does not necessarily indicate a precise juridical
mechanism for treating it as being automatically succeeded to by a suc-
cessor State consistently with the consensual character of treaty relation-
ships. It is possible that such a juridical mechanism is furnished by draw-
ing on the above-mentioned argument and proposing more generally that
the effectuation of the object and purpose of such treaties, inclusive of
the desideratum of avoiding operational gaps, will support a construction
being placed upon them to the effect that they constitute the expression
of a unilateral undertaking by existing parties to treat successor States as
parties with effect from the date of emergence into independence. As
suggested above, the consensual bond is completed when the successor
State avails itself of the undertaking by deciding to regard itself as a
party to the treaty.

This could provide an answer to the question whether there is auto-
matic succession in the case of human rights treaties in general. However,
I do not propose to express a definite opinion at this point on this com-
plex and much disputed question. The construction referred to suffices, in
my view, to answer the question in the case of the Genocide Convention
in the light of the specific features of this particular instrument.

ForuM PROROGATUM

The Court has correctly held that, in the circumstances of the case, this
doctrine does not enable jurisdiction to be founded on bases additional to
that provided by Article IX of the Genocide Convention. As to jurisdic-
tion under that provision, I agree with the Court in taking the position,

46
638 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

as J think it has, that the question of the applicability of the doctrine need
not be considered. Counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted —
rightly, I think — that the question which arose in the case of that provi-
sion was not one of ferum prorogatum, but one as to whether Yugoslavia
had acquiesced in the view that that provision was applicable. There is a
distinction between acceptance of the jurisdiction provided for by the
jurisdictional provision of a treaty on the basis that the provision itself
does not apply and acceptance of the proposition that the jurisdictional
provision itself applies. In the first case, the acceptance is the only basis
of jurisdiction; in the second case, it is not, being merely an admission
that the treaty applies. The latter is how I understood the position taken
by counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina (see CR 96/8, pp. 75-76, 79-80,
81-82, and CR 96/11, p. 52).

Moreover, I agree with what I understood to be also the position taken
by counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say, that the doctrine
of forum prorogatum does not come into play where the same jurisdiction
exists under an applicable title of jurisdiction; ex hypothesi, the doctrine
may be imported only where the jurisdiction in question does not other-
wise exist (CR 96/8, p. 82). In this case, the Court having found that
Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies as a treaty provision
between the parties, there is neither need nor basis for having recourse to
the doctrine in question in order to attract the jurisdiction provided
for under that provision.

The positions so taken by counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina accord
with the fact that, in paragraph 34 of its Order of 13 September 1993, the
Court did not understand that a question of forum prorogatum had been
raised in respect of Article IX of the Convention; that understanding is
retained in paragraph 40 of today’s Judgment. The Court’s understand-
ing is consistent with the course of the arguments during both of the two
previous phases of the case, namely, those of 1-2 April 1993 and those of
25-26 August 1993. (For the stage at which — towards the end of the
second phase of the case — and for the circumstances in which the
question of forum prorogatum was first raised, see Z.C.J. Reports 1993,
pp. 416-420, separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht.)

By way of comparison, it may be observed that in the Corfu Channel
case the plea of forum prorogatum was raised, without loss of time, by the
United Kingdom both in its written observations and in its oral argu-
ments (see .C.J. Reports 1947-1948, pp. 26ff.; and ..C.J. Pleadings,
Corfu Channel, Vol. Il, pp. 15-18, particularly para. 9 (g) at p. 18, and
Vol. II, pp. 36, 56 ff., 66 and 69). In the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co., the initiative was likewise taken, and taken immediately, by the
United Kingdom, even though its contentions were not upheld (see Z C.J.
Reports 1952, pp. 112-114, and C.J. Pleadings, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.,
pp. 517-518, 540, 544, 553-556, 594, 626, 630 ff.). Immediacy of response
is important in appraising the understanding of the parties; forum pro-

47
639 APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (SEP. OP. SHAHABUDDEEN)

rogatum rests ultimately on the same consensual foundations which
underpin the jurisdiction of the Court.

These considerations support what I believe to be the position taken by
the Court, that is to say, that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not relying —
and correctly, I think — on forum prorogatum in relation to Article IX of
the Genocide Convention.

(Signed) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

48