88

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. MORENO QUINTANA

J'exprime mon grand regret de ne pouvoir joindre dans cette
affaire mon opinion à celle de la majorité de mes collègues de la
Cour qui, sur son fond, ont admis, voire même d’une manière
limitée et imparfaite, l'existence d’un droit de passage au profit
du Portugal sur le territoire indien. Il découle de l’opinion de la
majorité une prémisse juridique que je ne puis accepter. Telie, la
continuité théorique d’une situation de fait, laquelle a été disconti-
nuée — à mon sens — par les événements de 1954 dans les enclaves.
Car celle-ci implique, par définition, la reconnaissance de la prescrip-
tion comme mode d'acquisition de la souveraineté territoriale, ins-
titution de droit privé que j'estime étrangère à la technique du
droit international. En plus, la décision de la majorité se place
uniquement à une date qui ne lui permet pas de résoudre le pro-
blème qui lui est posé dans son entier.

Mon opinion dissidente s'appuie sur les considérations de fait et
de droit que je signale à continuation.

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* *

Par requéte du 22 décembre 1955, le Gouvernement du Portugal
introduit une instance contre celui de l’Inde par laquelle il demande
a la Cour la reconnaissance d’un droit de passage pour le transit
des personnes et des biens, y compris des forces armées « entre son
territoire de Damao (Damao du Littoral), ses territoires enclavés
de Dadra et de Nagar-Aveli et entre ceux-ci », en vue d’assurer sans
restrictions ou difficultés « l’exercice effectif de la souveraineté por-
tugaise sur lesdits territoires ». Il lui demande aussi de déclarer que
l’Inde viole ses engagements internationaux quand elle empêche
l'exercice de ce droit et qu’elle doit mettre fin à cette situation de
fait. Le mémoire du demandeur amplifie cette requête et donne les
fondements de droit qu’il considère applicables en l’espèce.

Dans son contre-mémoire, le défendeur soutient que la réclama-
tion portugaise est vague et douteuse, que le droit de passage
revendiqué manque de base juridique, qu’aucune preuve d’un usage
local n’a été rapportée, et que, méme dans une situation affirmative,
lesdites base ou preuve seraient sans rapport et inapplicables aux
circonstances du cas. Le demandeur, à son tour, résume ses conclu-
sions dans sa réplique en manifestant qu’il ne discute pas la souve-
raineté de l’Inde sur son territoire, et qu’il demande simplement
que cet État n’entrave pas les communications avec ses enclaves.

Une preuve documentaire abondante qui remonte au XVIIIme
siècle a été fournie par chacune des Parties à l'appui de leurs

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89 DROIT DE PASSAGE (OP. DISS. M. MORENO QUINTANA)

prétentions respectives. C’est principalement par elle que le deman-
deur doit démontrer le bien- fondé du droit de passage qu’il réclame,
carilne peut pas discuter qu’en principe le transit des personnes et
des biens à travers le territoire d’un État relève de la compétence
nationale de celui-ci.

#
8 *%

I] s’agit tout principalement, et tout uniquement aussi, de savoir
si un droit de passage a existé en faveur du Portugal pour commu-
niquer de Damao avec ses enclaves et entre les enclaves elles-
mêmes. Car, dans laffirmative, l’Inde manquerait à ses obligations
internationales en empêchant le Portugal à exercer ce droit. Or
l'existence dans les rapports internationaux d’un droit est un fait
qui, lorsqu'il est contesté, doit être prouvé par la partie qui l’in-
voque. Ceci est un principe élémentaire de la procédure.

La tâche que l’on doit remplir dans l'espèce n’est cependant pas
si simple étant donné les fréquents changements apportés par le
demandeur dans ses conclusions et l'insécurité même qu’il démon-
tre au sujet du fondement de son droit à travers les différentes
phases de la procédure. Tantôt il demande, comme il le fait dans
sa requête, la reconnaissance ample d’un droit, tantôt il réduit
cette ampleur dans son mémoire, tantôt il limite — comme dans sa
réplique — l’exercice de ce droit à la réglementation du souverain
territorial et il admet que le passage des forces armées pourrait
être suspendu momentanément s’il pouvait constituer un élément
de trouble pour l’ordre interne de l’État de passage. Or, c’est juste-
ment dans la circonstance d’un renversement de la situation dans
les enclaves que les besoins du passage de troupes s’avéraient indis-
pensables pour rétablir la prétendue souveraineté portugaise.

Un droit de passage n’est pas une construction abstraite. Il ne
peut être défini d’une manière aussi instable et imprécise, et selon
des modalités juridiques qui s’opposent les unes aux autres, tel
que le fait le demandeur. Ce droit existe ou n’existe pas dans l’ordre
juridique. Son existence ne peut être soumise à des fluctuations, à
des nuances qu’imposeraient les circonstances. En particulier, la
question qui découle du transit de troupes encadrées dans leur
formation militaire est inséparable de l’immunité qui les accom-
pagne sur ou a travers un territoire étranger. Elles représentent
l'autorité même de l’État. Voilà pourquoi le droit international
coutumier leur attribue l’immunité nécessaire à l’exercice de leurs
fonctions. Cette immunité est, à mon avis, comme condition juri-
dique nécessaire, irrenonçable. En synthèse, un droit subordonné
chaque fois à l’appréciation de l’autorité du lieu de son exercice
n’a de tel que le nom. I] ne constitue pas une faculté juridique sinon
une tolérance du souverain territorial.

Dans l’ordre international, le moyen normal d'acquérir des droits
ou de contracter des obligations est. l’accord que l’on dénomme,

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90 DROIT DE PASSAGE (OP. DISS. M. MORENO QUINTANA)

dans le sens le plus large, éraité. Il se peut aussi que lesdits droits
ou obligations soient la conséquence d’une coutume établie entre
les parties avec la conviction qu’elles appliquent le droit. Et même
— l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour l’admet aussi à son alinéa 1,
lettre c) —, ces droits ou obligations peuvent découler d’un principe
général de droit reconnu comme tel par les nations civilisées. De
toute manière, quoique j’admette que ladite disposition établit
un ordre légal de prélation dans l’application des sources du droit
international, j'estime que la validité d’un principe général peut
suppléer à l'existence d’une coutume internationale, et l'existence
d’une telle coutume à celle d’un traité.

Le demandeur ne donne cependant pas une base fixe et concluante
à son droit quand il l’appuie tantôt sur un traité, sur une coutume,
sur un principe ou subsidiairement sur la doctrine. Chacune de ces
sources est — dans sa thèse — par elle-même un fondement suffi-
sant. I] fait aussi un mélange de ces sources quand il dit que le droit
qu'il réclame repose à la fois sur les trois principales sources indi-
quées et. il invoque même un titre historique que lui conférerait
une pratique deux fois séculaire. La position ne saurait être plus
éclectique. |

De toute manière, le titre principal du Portugal est le traité dit
de Punem conclu en 1779 avec le souverain mahratte, lequel
aurait fourni au demandeur le droit de passage qu’il réclame. Son
analyse en premier lieu est d’une importance capitale pour le juge
international toutefois qu’elle démontrera ou non l'exactitude de la
base de cette affaire. En effet, l’application de toute autre source
que le traité lui-même est logiquement soumise à la question de
savoir si le traité a opéré ou non un transfert de souveraineté en
faveur du Portugal sur les enclaves de Dadra et de Nagar-Aveli.
S'il n’en était pas ainsi, aucun droit de passage ne pourrait découler
du fait d’une usurpation territoriale. A l’audience du 2 octobre
dernier, le professeur Bourquin a reconnu expressément que le droit
de passage réclamé par le Portugal n’est qu'un corollaire de sa
souveraineté sur les enclaves.

Cette manière de procéder peut s'avérer utile, toutefois qu’elle
évite de marcher sur un terrain glissant. Je considère comme tel
celui qui a trait, en l’espèce, aux principes généraux de droit re-
connus par les nations civilisées et même à celui de la coutume
générale envisagée comme octroyant erga omnes un droit de passage
sur le territoire de tiers États reliant, dans l’ordre juridique inter-
national, les territoires enclavés à leur métropole. On écarte ainsi,
en même temps, la considération d’une théorie aussi discutée et
vulnérable que celle des soi-disant servitudes internationales.
Quoique le demandeur la renie — c’est une question de terminologie
juridique — il l’accepte implicitement quand il a recours aux
principes généraux du droit pour appuyer ses prétentions.

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*
* *

Selon le demandeur, l’article 17 du traité de Punem aurait établi
la souveraineté portugaise sur les enclaves de Dadra et de Nagar-
Aveli et prouvé l'intention des Parties de créer un droit de passage
entre Damao et lesdites enclaves. Un traité peut évidemment créer
une norme juridique comme celle d’un droit de passage, même
d’une manière implicite, mais c’est la proposition principale du
transfert de souveraineté qui doit être démontrée en l'espèce. Car
un droit de passage sur un territoire étranger pour communiquer
avec une enclave ne peut se baser que sur la qualité de souverain
territorial. Dans aucun des textes de ce traité qui ont été présentés
à la Cour il n’est question de la création de ce droit. Leur termino-
logie est ambiguë et ouvre la porte à tous les doutes. Elle ne traduit
nullement un acte si catégorique dans les rapports internationaux
comme celui du transfert de la souveraineté territoriale. Les res-
trictions à la souveraineté des États ne se présument pas, a déclaré
la Cour permanente dans l'affaire si connue du Lotus (voir Arréts,
etc., Série A, n° 10, p. 18).

On serait 4 méme de se demander si ledit accord constitue réelle-
ment un traité puisqu’il n’existe aucun document homologué
simultanément par les deux parties contractantes qui puisse être
considéré comme son texte authentique. Mais une analyse toute
superficielle qu’elle soit de la situation, démontre que l’échange de
documents — mahratte du 4 mai 1779 et portugais du 17 décembre
de la même année — constitue sans doute l'expression d’un accord
consensuel créateur de droits et d'obligations réciproques entre
deux sujets de droit reconnus comme tels dans les relations inter-
nationales. Son article 6 dit clairement qu’un traité bilatéral a été
conclu et la preuve documentaire fournie démontre aussi, à maintes
occasions, que l'intention des parties a été celle de conclure un
traité et qu’elles ont eu conscience de l’avoir fait ainsi. La forme
juridique a été celle de l'échange de notes. De son côté, la juris-
prudence de la Cour permanente l’a compris de cette manière dans
son avis consultatif sur le régime douanier austro-allemand (v.
Arrêts, etc., Série A/B, n° 41, p. 47).

Que dit cet accord? Je prendrai comme base le texte de la tra-
duction mahratte de la version originale portugaise présenté dans
l'espèce par le défendeur, lequel porte la signature du vice-roi por-
tugais José Pedro da Camara et figure à l’annexe F, n° 23. Dans son
article 17, qui est déterminant dans l'espèce, «l’État Firangee
(Etat portugais de l'Inde) entretient des sentiments d’amitié envers
le Pandit Pradhan (souverain mahratte); l’envoyé a transmis ces
assurances. En consequence, il est convenu que le Pandit Pradhan
affectera à Damao, à partir de l’année courante, un jagiy d’un
. revenu de 12 000 roupies à Prant Damao. En conséquence, un
sanad énumérant les villages sera octroyé à l’État Firangee par
accord séparé. » Ce texte est clair; si clair qu'il fait pleine lumière

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sur deux points importants discutés par les Parties: la nature de
l’acte conclu et celle de la concession octroyée. En premier lieu,
les termes «il est convenu » et «accord séparé » démontrent sans
aucun doute qu’il s’agit d’un traité dans le sens large que don-
nent a ce mot la jurisprudence et la doctrine internationales. En
deuxième lieu, le mot «7agir » qualifie son objet qui est déterminé
par les sentiments d’amitié que portent les Portugais à l’égard des
Mahrattes. De toute façon, comparé un texte à un autre, ils ne
divergent pas grandement au sujet de ce qui a été donné par les
Mahrattes aux Portugais: jagir selon ceux-là, contribuçao d'accord
avec ceux-ci. Nulle trace, dans aucun des deux textes, d’un transfert
de souveraineté.

Il a été prouvé que le mot mongol jagir, qui a son équivalent
mahratte dans celui de saranjam, signifie l’octroi d’un revenu
fiscal et non pas un transfert de souveraineté territoriale. Les Par-
ties ne sont cependant pas d'accord au sujet de la portée de cette
concession. Car, tandis que l’Inde soutient qu’elle est un acte
graciable et précaire, révocable au gré du donateur, le Portugal
affirme qu'il y avait aussi des savanjams héréditaires, perpétuels
et irrévocables, tels que ceux qui étaient garantis par un traité,
cas qui serait celui de l’espèce. Il n’appartient pas au juge interna-
tional de prendre position dans un tel débat qui n’a qu'un intérêt
historique. Mais il lui sied en tout cas de remarquer qu'aucun des
qualificatifs invoqués par le Portugal ne figure dans le texte dudit
article 17 du traité de Punem. Dans le doute, il doit s’en tenir à
l'interprétation la plus restrictive. La Cour permanente l’a établi
ainsi dans son arrêt sur les concessions Mavrommatis (v. Arréts,
etc., Série A, n° 2, p. 19). Et cette interprétation découle, en
l'espèce, de celle que donne le propre bénéficiaire de la concession.
Le traité de Punem exprime par conséquent de la part de l’Inde
une promesse de donner des sommes d'argent en fonction d’une
situation amicale et non pas une transférence de souveraineté sur
des villages qui n'étaient pas même identifiés.

Aucune référence non plus n’est faite au sujet de l’attribution
d’un droit de passage en faveur du Portugal pour percevoir son
jagir. I n’a pas paru utile aux parties d’en parler vu les sentiments
amicaux, l’aide et l'assistance militaire des Portugais qui consti-
tuaient la contre-partie de la concession octroyée par les Mahrattes.
On ne pouvait supposer que la perception du jagir fût entravée
par le souverain mahratte. En outre, les villages qui devaient servir
l’annualité prévue en faveur du Portugal n'étaient pas mentionnés
dans le traité; ils devaient l’être postérieurement en vertu d’un
sanad. Cet acte administratif du souverain mahratte pouvait en
décider et réglementer les conditions de l'attribution. Les premières
annualités ne furent pas perçues par les Portugais sur aucun village,
sinon qu’elles furent versées directement par les Mahrattes. On ne
peut concevoir, par conséquent, que ledit droit de passage eût été
envisagé par le traité de Punem. C'était une question à résoudre

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en tout cas postérieurement si elle s’avérait nécessaire. Et elle ne
l'était pas puisque le passage existait comme un complément néces-
saire de la perception du jagir sans qu’il constituât pour cela un
droit indépendant en faveur du Portugal. Mais en 1954, cette
situation avait changé. De l’amitié promise en 1779 par les Portu-
gais aux Mahrattes, on était passé à un régime d’hostilités froides
entre l’Inde et le Portugal. Les Indiens avaient fermé leur légation
à Lisbonne en vue de la négative portugaise à entamer des négo-
ciations pour le retrait de sa souveraineté sur certains territoires
de l’Inde. Par suite des circonstances, les droits et obligations
réciproques découlant du traité de Punem s’étaient éteints. Jamais,
dans un cas comme celui-ci, la règle rappelée par Emerich de Vattel
dans son bien connu traité, Omnis conventio intelligitur rebus sic
stantibus, ne pourrait être mieux appliquée. Le traité de Punem a
cessé d’exister, le versement de jagir n’a plus été réclamé par le
Portugal, le passage entre Damao, Dadra et Nagar-Aveli a perdu
sa raison d’être.

Deux accords conclus beaucoup plus tard que le traité de Punem
par les Portugais avec les Mahrattes, le 29 mai 1783 et le 22 juillet
1785, complétèrent le régime établi par le traité de Punem. En
vertu du premier, c’est la Pragana de Nagar-Aveli qui est affectée
au revenu fiscal promis. Par le deuxième, c’est le village de Dadra
qui est affecté au même revenu. Ce dernier accord établit dans
l'article rr des capitulations qui l’accompagnérent — dont l’authen-
ticité est mise en doute par l'Ind obligation du Portugal
d’étouffer les révoltes qui pourraient éclater dans la Pragana. L’on
peut en déduire que cette obligation, ni aucune autre de son genre,
n'aurait pas été spécialement insérée dans lesdites capitulations si
le Portugal avait reçu la Pragana en pleine souveraineté. Etouffer
des révoltes dans son propre territoire est, en effet, une fonction
implicite de la compétence territoriale.

Il a été d’autre part prétendu par le demandeur que, même si le
traité de Punem n’avait pas transmis aux Portugais la souveraineté
sur les enclaves, ceux-ci l’auraient obtenue en vertu d’un possessio
longt temporis. Je ne puis retenir cet argument car cette question
n’a pas été posée comme faisant partie de l’objet du différend.

*
* *

Les données historiques de cette affaire révélent que la possession
entière de Damao est au pouvoir du Portugal depuis le XVIme
siécle. Divers traités et accords postérieurs paraissent lui avoir
reconnu cette souveraineté qui n’est pas directement en question
dans l'espèce. Mais le fait est important pour apprécier l'étendue de
la coutume internationale qui aurait créé le droit de passage qu'il
réclame entre cette possession et les enclaves de Dadra et Nagar-
Aveli. La pratique de cette coutume s’avérerait deux fois séculaire.

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Trois périodes se détachent dans le cadre historique des rapports
du Portugal avec l'Inde pour examiner les caractéristiques du tran-
sit entre Damao et les enclaves. La première est la période mahratte,
qui s'étend de 1779 (date de la conclusion du traité de Punem) à
1818, quand la Grande-Bretagne annexa l'empire mahratte. Cette
période — selon le demandeur — est celle de formation de la règle
juridique coutumière. La deuxième période, qui est la plus longue
de toutes, va de 1818 à 1947, moment où l'Inde acquiert son indé-
pendance. Cette période, qui est la période britannique, serait une
période de confirmation par les successeurs des Mahrattes de la
règle formée antérieurement. La troisième période est celle de ’ Inde
indépendante, qui comprend de 1947 à 1954, année celle-ci dans
laquelle sont intervenus les événements qui discontinuérent le
transit des Portugais entre Damao et les enclaves. Cette dernière
période serait celle d'application de ladite règle. Chacune de ces
étapes historiques révèle en effet un caractère différent quant à
l'exercice dudit transit, lequel doit être analysé d’une manière
séparée pour en tirer les conséquences nécessaires.

L'étude de la période mahratte n’est pas très significative quant
à la reconnaissance d’un droit de passage en faveur des Portugais,
Il n’y a dans cette période aucun acte, aucun fait qui puisse faire
penser ainsi. Les Mahrattes ne s’opposérent pas au transit des fonc-
tionnaires, des individus et des marchandises du Portugal. Une
attitude contraire aurait été anormale puisqu'ils lui avaient cédé
les revenus des villages de Dadra et de Nagar-Aveli et il fallait bien
qu'ils donnassent aux Portugais les moyens de les percevoir. En
échange, ils ne leur donnèrent aucune autorisation pour le passage
de troupes. Il ne semble par conséquent pas que les Mahrattes
eussent abandonné leur souveraineté de jure ni de facto sur les
enclaves malgré qu'ils délivraient chaque fois les autorisations né-
cessaires pour que ce transit puisse s'exercer. Même, à trois reprises,
des saisies faites par les Mahrattes sur lesdits revenus semblent
démontrer qu'ils n'avaient pas entendu procéder de la sorte. En
synthèse, l’examen de cette période révèle que, chaque fois que le
transit se réalisa, ce fut avec la conformité des souverains mahrattes.
Tl n’a été fourni aucune preuve par le demandeur que son prétendu
droit de passage s’exerçât indépendamment de la volonté exprimée
en chaque circonstance par le souverain territorial.

Pendant la période britannique surgit, par tolérance envers un
pays lié par une alliance séculaire ou par ignorance de la véritable
situation juridique du Portugal, un usage assez continu du transit
entre Damao et les enclaves. Cependant, aucun indice ne peut être
rapporté dans le sens que la Grande-Bretagne ait reconnu le passage
qu'elle facilitait au Portugal comme s’il s “agissait d'un droit. Les
Britanniques ne paraissent pas avoir renoncé, pas plus que les
Mahrattes, à l'exercice des compétences qui incombent au souverain
territorial. Damao et les possessions côtières étaient entourées par
un cordon frontalier. Le Gouvernement britannique exigeait des

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passeports et des visas pour les fonctionnaires portugais d’origine
européenne qui traversaient le territoire indien d’une possession
portugaise à une autre. Rappelons qu’en vertu du traité conclu le
13 juin 1817 entre la Compagnie anglaise des Indes orientales et
l'empire mahratte, la souveraineté sur cette partie du territoire
indien passa à la Couronne britannique. Cette situation se maintint
jusqu’au 15 août 1947 quand fut reconnue par la Grande-Bretagne
l'indépendance de l’Inde. Les obligations du souverain territorial
passèrent au conquérant en application des règles qui visent la
succession des États. Aucun acte juridique du Gouvernement bri-
tannique n’a modifié le status juris établi par les souverains mahrat-
tes au-sujet des soi-disant enclaves. Ni le Portugal ne pouvait
réclamer plus de droits qu’il n’avait auparavant, ni la Grande-
Bretagne se les attribua. Dans de telles conditions, aucun usage en
matiére de transit durant cette période ne put se transformer en
une pratique susceptible d’engendrer une coutume internationale
opposable à n’importe quel successeur territorial.

Une fois devenue indépendante, l'Inde ne changea pas fondamen-
talement le système établi. N'oublions pas que l'Inde, comme suc-
cesseur territorial, ne l'était nullement d’une manière originaire
puisqu'il s’agissait d’un Etat qui recouvrait une indépendance qu’il
avait jadis eue. Sa situation juridique remontait d’un coup plus
d’un siècle dans l’histoire comme si rien, pendant l'occupation
britannique, ne s'était passé. Dadra et Nagar-Aveli apparaissent
comme des enclaves ouvertes en territoire indien. L’importation de
marchandises de Damao aux enclaves se réalisait comme si elle le
fut dans ce territoire. Aucune difficulté insurmontable ne s’éleva
jusqu’au 27 février 1950, date à laquelle le ministre indien à Lis-
bonne remit au Gouvernement portugais un aide-mémoire proposant
Vouverture de négociations pour fixer les conditions de la remise
des territoires portugais à l’Inde. Face à la négative du Portugal,
le Gouvernement indien communiqua le 26 mai 1953, à celui de
ce pays, la fin de sa mission diplomatique au Portugal. Dès lors
commença de la part du Gouvernement indien une série de restric-
tions qui entrava considérablement les communications entre Damao
et les enclaves. Celles-ci furent interrompues définitivement le
21 juillet 1954 comme conséquence des événements qui eurent lieu
dans les enclaves.

*
* *

Appuyer sans une preuve catégorique et concluante la demande
du Portugal en l’espéce, qui implique la survivance du système
colonial, c’est marcher 4 rebours dans le cadre de la Charte des
Nations Unies.

Juge de sa loi — la Charte des Nations Unies — et juge de son
temps, celui de l’indépendance de tous les peuples de la terre, la
Cour internationale de Justice ne peut pas tourner le dos à la réalité

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du monde. « Le droit international doit s’adapter aux nécessités
politiques » a dit la Cour permanente d’arbitrage dans sa sentence
sur les indemnisations à des particuliers russes (II XI 1912). Voilà
pourquoi cette Charte a mis en œuvre un dispositif juridique qui
vise l’indépendance des territoires non autonomes.

Ma conclusion est que — tel que le demande le Gouvernement de
l’Inde — il n’a jamais existé un droit de passage en faveur du Por-
tugal entre sa possession côtière de Damao et les enclaves de Dadra
et Nagar-Aveli, ni entre celles-ci. Le Gouvernement du Portugal
aurait dû être, en mon opinion, débouté de son action.

(Signé) Lucio M. MORENO QUINTANA.

94


                            INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                              REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
                           ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

                                APPLICATION
                     OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                     ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                         OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                          (QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

                               ORDER OF 25 JULY 2018

                                   2018
                            COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

                                RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
                         AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

                                 APPLICATION
                     DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE
                   SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES
                          DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE
                           (QATAR c. ÉMIRATS ARABES UNIS)

                           ORDONNANCE DU 25 JUILLET 2018

4 CIJ1146.indb 1                                             28/02/19 14:26

                                                 Official citation:
                                   Application of the International Convention
                            on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
                            (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 25 July 2018,
                                           I.C.J. Reports 2018, p. 495

                                            Mode officiel de citation :
                                    Application de la convention internationale
                          sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
                          (Qatar c. Emirats arabes unis), ordonnance du 25 juillet 2018,
                                            C.I.J. Recueil 2018, p. 495

                                                                                1146
                                                                 Sales number
                   ISSN 0074-4441                                No de vente:
                   ISBN 978-92-1-157345-9

4 CIJ1146.indb 2                                                                             28/02/19 14:26

                                                        25 JULY 2018

                                                          ORDER

                                APPLICATION
                     OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                     ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                         OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                      (QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

                                 APPLICATION
                     DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE
                   SUR L’ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES
                          DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE
                       (QATAR c. ÉMIRATS ARABES UNIS)

                                                  25 JUILLET 2018

                                                   ORDONNANCE

4 CIJ1146.indb 3                                                       28/02/19 14:26

                    495

                                   INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

                                                    YEAR 2018
        2018
       25 July
     General List                                   25 July 2018
      No. 172

                                    APPLICATION
                         OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
                          ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
                              OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
                                    (QATAR v. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

                                                      ORDER

                        The President of the International Court of Justice,
                       Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Arti-
                    cles 31, 44, 45, paragraph 1, and 48 of the Rules of Court,
                       Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court on
                    11 June 2018, whereby the State of Qatar instituted proceedings against
                    the United Arab Emirates with regard to alleged violations of the Inter-
                    national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
                    ination of 21 December 1965,
                       Having regard to the request for the indication of provisional measures
                    submitted by the State of Qatar on 11 June 2018 and to the Order by
                    which the Court indicated certain provisional measures on 23 July 2018;
                       Whereas, at a meeting held by the President of the Court with the
                    Agents of the Parties on 23 July 2018, pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules
                    of Court, the Agent of the State of Qatar indicated that his Government
                    considered that the Parties should be granted a period of nine months for
                    the preparation of the Memorial and Counter-Memorial, respectively;
                    and whereas the Agent of the United Arab Emirates indicated that,
                    although his Government would have preferred a period of ten months
                    for the preparation of its Counter-Memorial, it could accept the proposal
                    of the Applicant;

                    4

4 CIJ1146.indb 4                                                                                28/02/19 14:26

                   496 	           application of the cerd (order 25 VII 18)

                       Taking into account the views of the Parties,
                       Fixes the following time-limits for the filing of the written pleadings:

                     25 April 2019 for the Memorial of the State of Qatar;
                     27 January 2020 for the Counter-Memorial of the United Arab Emir-
                   ates; and
                       Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

                     Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
                   the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand
                   and eighteen, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
                   of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the State
                   of Qatar and the Government of the United Arab Emirates, respectively.

                                                         (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf,
                                                                         President.
                                                            (Signed) Philippe Couvreur,
                                                                          Registrar.

                   5

4 CIJ1146.indb 6                                                                                28/02/19 14:26


80

DECLARATION OF JUDGE MBAYE
[Translation]

The present case is a “first”. It marks the first time that a State, as an
applicant, invokes before the Court the nullity of an arbitral award on the
sole basis of declarations made by the Parties to the case under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court !. The Court was therefore con-
fronted with a serious question of jurisdiction. It situated the question
clearly and settled it prudently. The Court analysed in detail the declar-
ations deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
2 December 1985 by Senegal and on 7 August 1989 by Guinea-Bissau. It
then noted that, in the instant case, Guinea-Bissau had accepted its juris-
diction and Senegal had not contested it. And it is on the basis of these
“circumstances”, taken as a whole, that the Court considered its jurisdic-
tion to have been founded. This is a judicious attitude that in no way pre-
judges the Court’s future position. For, as pointed out by Eugène Borel
(“Les voies de recours contre les sentences arbitrales”, Collected Courses of
the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 52, 1935, p. 75), it does not
appear possible to consider that Article 36, paragraph 2, subpara-
graphs (a)and (b), “already provides a legal basis, sound and indisputable,
for the jurisdiction of the Court”. Many other authors have asked them-
selves whether it does and some have responded in the negative. I share
their view. I fail to see why the International Court of Justice should auto-
matically constitute itself as a cour de cassation for all States having made
declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, with respect to
all arbitral awards in cases to which those States are parties, even if the
Court were each time to take care not to act as a court of appeal or as one
revising the award. That the need to decide a “question of international
law” has been raised is surely not sufficient justification for such an
inroad into another means of settlement of disputes between States. To
deny this would be to embark on an adventure which would have disas-
trous consequences not confined to arbitral decisions. The Court has for-
tunately refused to take this path.

(Signed) Kéba MBAYE.

1 The Application of the Government of Honduras in the case concerning the Arbitral
Award Made by the King of Spain (1.C.J. Reports 1960, pp. 194 et seq.) had as its object to
enforce an arbitral award and Nicaragua (the defendant) had, in particular, pleaded the
nullity of the award. In that case the Washington Agreement concluded by the two
States on 21 July 1957 resolved any jurisdictional problem.

31


93

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SETTE-CAMARA

I regret that I have been unable to agree with the Court’s majority in
the present Judgment in its appraisal of the facts, in its reasoning and in
its conclusions, and therefore feel under the obligation to explain why I
see this case differently.

The disputed zone is the so-called Libya-Chad borderlands, bounded
to the north-east by the east-south-east line of the Anglo-French Conven-
tion of 8 September 1919, to the south by the 15° north latitude parallel,
to the west by the 24° E meridian and to the east by the 16° E meridian.
It covers an area of some 530,000 km? and encompasses the Borkou-
Ounianga, the Ennedi and the Tibesti, what Chad refers to as the BET
(excluding northern Kanem). The population of the area is under 100,000,
compared with Chad’s population of some 5.4 million, including the
BET. The area contains 2 per cent of Chadian local population and it is
a poor, bare and inhospitable region.

In spite of the desertic nature of this zone, that we shall for conven-
ience continue to call the borderlands, it was never a terra nullius, open to
occupation according to international law. The two Parties concur as to
that, and echo herein the analogous finding of the Court in the Western
Sahara case. The land was occupied by local indigenous tribes, confed-
erations of tribes, often organized under the Senoussi Order. Further-
more, it was under the distant and laxly exercised sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire, which marked its presence by delegation of authority
to local people.

That was the background of the dispute: the human presence prior to
its beginning was constituted by the indigenous peoples and the Sublime
Porte. Although the cabinets of the great European Powers were
engrossed with the task of carving up Africa for the sake of their colonial
designs, they did not go beyond their distribution of future spheres or
zones of influence, since the non-existence of areas of terra nullius
excluded the possibility of occupation, short of outright conquest by
armed forces.

The fact is, on the one hand, that it was not until the year following the
1912 Treaty of Ouchy, which put an end to the war between Italy and the
Ottoman Empire, that any French intrusion beyond the de facto bound-
ary line agreed upon with the Ottomans occurred. By 1913 France had
not completed its military action in the borderlands. And before 1919
there was nothing resembling a civil administration. As far as Tibesti is
concerned, it was not even militarily occupied until 1930. France had
abandoned the Tibesti in 1916. Anyway, even the French military pres-

91
94 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

ence from 1913 to 1919 did not extend north of the strict south-east
line.

On the other hand, Italy, in spite of its long-standing ambitions over
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania — the subject of secret arrangements with
France in 1900 and 1902 — did not possess any actual hold on any ter-
ritory in North Africa until 1911.

Therefore the sovereignty over the whole region appertained to the
Porte which, furthermore, claimed, as Tripolitanian hinterland, vast
expanses to the south covering most of what is today Chad. The hinter-
land doctrine was contested by the colonial Powers — which nevertheless
made use of it whenever it chimed with their interests (e.g., Algerian and
Egyptian hinterlands). But short of the hinterland, the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire over the present disputed area was beyond contention.
So historic title over the region belonged first to the indigenous peoples,
tribes, confederations of tribes, sometimes organized under the Senous-
siya, and eventually passed to the Ottoman Empire before the colonial
Powers set foot in the area.

But the European Powers did not wait long to implement their designs
on the African continent. The ambitious policies of France were to unite
the French territories of north, west and central Africa and to link the
Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea by a continuous belt of French-dominated
territories. France had already conquered Algeria through a long war
(1830-1871) and through the Treaty of Bardo of May 1881 had made
Tunisia a French protectorate. On its side Great Britain had occupied
Egypt in 1882, making it a protectorate, against the wishes of France,
traditionally interested in Egypt. The two colonial Powers were also dis-
puting the domination of the Sudanic countries extending as far as west
Africa.

In this scenario of colonial ambitions, frictions were bound to arise,
and they led to the Fashoda incident, which brought France and Great
Britain to the brink of war. To soften the shock of the confrontation of
their ambitions the Powers felt bound to negotiate conventional solu-
tions.

In 1910 France and the Ottoman Empire reached agreement on the
delimitation of the western frontier of Tripolitania, contiguous to Tuni-
sia, running south from Ras Ajdir on the Mediterranean coast to Ghad-
amès. The Convention “fixant la frontière entre la régence de Tunis et le
vilayet de Tripoli” was a very detailed delimitation agreement. It was
demarcated by the emplacement of 333 boundary pillars. The section of
the western frontier of Tripolitania, running from Ghadamés in the direc-
tion of Toummo, corresponds to the wavy dashed line considered to be
the south-western frontier of the Vilayet of Tripoli, which is represented
on the Livre jaune map, and referred to in the 1902 exchange of letters
between France and Italy (the Prinetti-Barrére Agreement). If one
appraises the frontier situation in 1902, it is surprising that Chad should

‘92
95 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

now try to upgrade a frontier line agreed upon by France and Italy.
Indeed the whole region comprised within the wavy dashed line was
under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. How could France, at the
time still hundreds of kilometres south of Tripolitania, and Italy, at the
other side of the Mediterranean, conclude a treaty that would establish a
frontier between them? A treaty inter alios acta? Moreover, the reference
in the 1902 exchange of letters to the frontier of Tripolitania is clearly to
a limit to future French expansion, not to any conventional frontier.

In fact, in the present case there were two key questions to be resolved:

1. Is there, or has there ever been, a conventional boundary between
Libya and Chad east of Toummo leading to the Sudanese frontier?

2. Are the Conventions listed in Annex I to the 1955 Libya-France
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness actually boundary treaties
to which the provisions of the Cairo Declaration of 1964 and Article 11
of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties apply, that is to say, do they ipso facto escape the application
of the tabula rasa general rule?

As to the first question, I am convinced that there is not, nor has there
ever been, a boundary line conventionally established marking the
southern frontier of Libya east of Toummo. Neither Party has produced
evidence of any treaty or agreement covering that part of the Libyan
frontier. The only attempt at drawing a frontier described in detail from
Toummo eastwards towards the Sudan was the 1935 Laval-Mussolini
Treaty. The fact that there was no prior boundary east of Toummo was
explicitly and clearly recognized by the French Government when it
presented its Exposé des motifs to the French Parliament in relation to
the ratification of the 1935 Treaty. That 1935 line could have been a real
frontier according to the principles of international law. But since the
treaty in question never entered into force for lack of ratification due to
the political evolution of events at the time, the line never became a con-
ventionally agreed frontier, although it still appears on many maps, some
relatively recent, and is resorted to by Chad itself as the southern limit of
the so-called “Aouzou strip”.

As to the second question, I am likewise convinced that the 1899 line
of the Additional Declaration tagged to Article 4 of the 1898 Franco-
British Convention was never considered as a boundary line. It was
aimed at dividing spheres of influence between the two big colonial
Powers, France and Great Britain. Furthermore, Lord Salisbury, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, recognized that
it was less than a division of spheres of influence. It was merely a line estab-
lishing the limits of the French expansion northwards and eastwards,

93
96 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

laboriously negotiated and agreed upon under the shadow of the Fashoda
incident. Therefore, according to him, it had a purely negative purpose,
and it would be difficult to consider it a boundary line — at that time or
now — because, as I submit, there is no question of any effectivités that
could modify the nature of the line so as to endow it with any such status.

As to the Convention of 8 September 1919, between France and
Great Britain, supplementary to the Declaration of 21 March 1899, it
deals mostly with the frontier between Chad and the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan, and not with the Libya-Chad boundary. Hence the fact that it is
known as the Wadai-Darfour Convention. It is therefore more related to
Article 2 of the 1899 Declaration than to its Article 3. Indeed, the Exposé
des motifs of the draft law submitting to the French Parliament the text of
the Agreement calls it Traité de délimitation entre le Ouadai et le Darfour.

The only proviso that bears any relation to Article 3 of the 1899 Dec-
laration is its final paragraph, which reads:

“It is understood that nothing in this Convention prejudices the
interpretation of the Declaration of the 21st March, 1899, according
to which the words in Article 3‘. . . shall run thence to the south-east
until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (21° 40
east of Paris) are accepted as meaning ‘. . . shall run thence in a
south-easterly direction until it meets the 24th degree of longitude
east of Greenwich at the intersection of that degree of longitude with
parallel 19° 30’ of latitude.” (Memorial of Libya, “International
Accords and Agreements Annex”, Vol. 2, No. 17, p. 165.)

The line of Article 3 of the 1899 Declaration, in following a strict
south-east direction — and that seems to have been the intention of the
negotiators in the light of the travaux préparatoires —, would intersect the
24° E meridian at 15° 35’ N of latitude, approximately where it meets the
Wadi Howa. The same line as depicted on the Livre jaune map would
meet the 24° E meridian at the latitude of 19° N. According to the 1919
Franco-British Convention, the intersection would occur at 19° 30’ N,
and Chad maintains that it was never a strict south-east line, but an east-
south-east line. So there would be a substantive modification in the course
of the line, which would have been pushed northwards some four degrees.

It is therefore not surprising that Italy protested against this Conven-
tion, negotiated and concluded without its knowledge, which would have
amputated some 180,000 km? of Libyan territory. Moreover, if the para-
graph opens with the statement that “nothing in this Convention preju-
dices the interpretation of the Declaration of the 21st March, 1899”, it is
obvious that the 1919 line has the same nature as the 1899 line, namely
both were intended to divide spheres of influence and by no means could
be interpreted as constituting international boundaries.

94
97 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

In the eyes of Chad, the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourli-
ness concluded by France and Libya on 10 August 1955, which it con-
sidered the most important and decisive document in the dossier, pro-
vided the evidence of the southern frontier of Libya east of Toummo.
The negotiations on the Treaty took place in two stages: in Paris from
4 to 6 January 1955 and in Tripoli from 9 July to 10 August of the same
year. Prime Minister Mendés-France and his Libyan counterpart, Mus-
tapha Ben Halim, participated in the Paris session and Ben Halim and
Ambassador Dejean participated in the second stage in Tripoli. The
perusal of the existing minutes of these encounters, which are far from
complete, reveal the adamant positions of the parties: France fighting for
the establishment of the frontier line and Libya insisting on the with-
drawal of the French forces from the Fezzan. Libya regarded that as hav-
ing constituted the main objective of the Treaty, described as an “evacu-
ation treaty”. At the end of the negotiations — and the minutes do not
explain how or with what arguments — the text of Article 3 of the Treaty
was approved, according to which the frontiers were those arising from
the international acts in force at the date of Libya’s independence, which
were listed in Annex I to the Treaty. The Annex, agreed upon by
exchange of letters, lists six international acts. During the oral proceed-
ings Chad reduced that list to three main instruments: the 1899 Addi-
tional Declaration, the 1902 Prinetti-Barrère Agreement and the 1919
Anglo-French Convention.

In spite of the Chadian arguments I still doubt whether any of these
three instruments can be considered a boundary treaty. The 1899 Decla-
ration, as has been said, divided the spheres of influence or, as Lord Salis-
bury, the chief British negotiator, contended, not even that. The objective
of the line was a negative one, namely to mark the limits of the French
expansion northwards and eastwards. The 1902 exchange of letters
between Prinetti and Barrère, a follow-up of the 1900 exchange of letters
between Visconti-Venosta and the same Barrère, had little to do with the
southern frontier problem. It dealt with reciprocal respect for French
interests in Morocco and future Italian ambitions in Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica. It includes, nevertheless, a reference to the frontier of Tripoli-
tania, appearing as a wavy dashed line on the Livre jaune map, but only
as a limit to French expansion northwards. As to the 8 September 1919
Convention between France and Great Britain, said to be “supplemen-
tary to the Declaration of 21 March 1899”, it should again be recalled
that its last proviso read: “nothing in this Convention prejudices the
interpretation of the Declaration of the 21st March, 1899”. But this text
is ambiguous: whose interpretation? Besides, the 1919 Convention in
adopting an east-south-east line changed considerably the terminal point
of the line. Furthermore, if “nothing . . . prejudices the interpretation of
the Declaration of the 21st March, 1899”, the consequence would be that
the 1919 line also divided spheres of influence and not frontiers.

95
98 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

On the other hand, the point whether the treaties listed in Annex |
were en vigueur also deserves examination. The 1902 Franco-ltalian
exchange of letters, for one, besides being alien to the frontier problem,
was a secret agreement whose survival after the League of Nations’ con-
demnation of secret treaties is, to say the least, doubtful. 1 have also
doubts whether originally secret agreements were ever accepted for
registration with the United Nations Secretariat.

My conclusion, therefore, is that none of the three treaties invoked by
Chad qualifies for international recognition as a frontier treaty or could
consequently benefit from the exceptional treatment enshrined in the
Cairo Declaration and in Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.

As to the 1955 Treaty, it had an agreed duration of 20 years, a dura-
tion which was explicitly established by the parties for each of the con-
cessions made to France. Now, Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides, inter alia, that the termination of a treaty
takes place in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. Therefore the
1955 Treaty lapsed in 1975. The Parties were discreet in discussing its
Article 11. But the Chadian Counter-Memorial dealt with it, accepting
the fact that the Treaty lapsed in 1975, though only to contend that the
provisions of Article 3 and Annex I survive the Treaty because the latter
contains boundary agreements and consequently benefits from the excep-
tion to the tabula rasa rule reserved for dispositive and territorial treaties.
But the character of those provisions cannot be taken for granted, and
their role in providing an internationally recognized frontier remains to
be proved.

It is important to recall that France made the ratification of the 1955
Treaty conditional on the conclusion of the 1956 Agreement on the rec-
tification of the Franco(Algerian}-Libyan frontier that would turn over
to France the oil field of Edjelé. Indeed the French Parliament approved
the Isorni Amendment, that added the following article to the proposed
law authorizing ratification: “Les instruments de ratification seront déposés
lorsque sera intervenu l'accord fixant la frontière entre le Royaume-Uni
de Libye et l'Algérie.” (Memorial of Libya, Vol. 1, p. 398.)

That is why the 1955 Treaty was not ratified before 1957. And once the
rectification of the Libyan-Algerian border had been settled, France did
not bother to register the 1955 Treaty with the United Nations Secre-
tariat until 1991].

I now turn to the question of effectivités, that is to say, to the peaceful
and continuous exercise of State power, to use the language of Max
Huber in the /s/and of Palmas arbitration. Until the Italo-Turkish war of
1911 and the Treaty of Ouchy of 1912 there is no doubt that the colonial
effectivités in the disputed area were exercised by the Ottoman Empire,
through a distant and lax system based on the delegation of its powers to
local administrations. It is contended in the dossier that there was a
shared sovereignty between the Ottomans and the loca! indigenous
peoples, especially those organized and directed by the Senoussiya. Chad

96
99 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

contests the validity of these effectivités, but the fact is that there was no
French presence in the area prior to the Treaty of Ouchy and the with-
drawal of the Ottomans. It was only afterwards, namely in 1913, that the
French incursions trespassed beyond the modus vivendi line established
with the Ottomans. In successive incursions the French occupied the key
points, attacked and destroyed zawiyas and tried to establish a domina-
tion of the borderlands, especially of the BET. But the resistance of the
local tribes, and particularly of the Senoussi, never allowed the establish-
ment of the exercise of peaceful and continuous State power by France. It
was always a military occupation, and authority was exercised by mili-
tary officers. Even after the independence of Chad, French military were
retained in the administration of local oases. Moreover, Chad did not
provide any documentary proof of the exercise of peaceful State power.
No documentation appears in the dossier, in contrast to the case con-
cerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute ( El Salvador/Hon-
duras: Nicaragua intervening) in which volumes of certified documenta-
tion were provided as evidence of the peaceful and continuous exercise of
State power.

The fact is that no concrete evidence of effectivités was presented in the
case-file, of either Ottoman, French or Italian effectivités and, of course,
still less of Senoussi effectivités. So 1 believe that any invocation of effec-
tivités should simply be disregarded. Chad’s suggestion that there existed
a sui generis type of effectivités, owing to the peculiar geographical cir-
cumstances of a desertic and inhospitable area, is not convincing. It does
not match up to the famous criteria on the role of effectivités enshrined in
the Frontier Dispute ( Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) case.

The Chadian Memorial quoted French documents which confirm that
the occupation of the BET was carried out for the enforcement of their
hold on the zones of influence, and not to effect an occupation such as
could underpin a peaceful and continuous exercise of State power. For
instance, in 1913 the French forces occupied Zouar and Bardai, the main
town of Tibesti. But they withdrew as early as 1916 and did not come
back until 1930. The “reconnaissance patrols”, tournées militaires,
sporadically conducted with long intervals, could not suffice to establish
the existence of any genuine effectivités.

Chad on various occasions invoked the Jef-Jef incident of 1938 and the
Aouzou-Moya incident of 1955 as evidence of French sovereignty in the
area. In fact, these were minor incidents whose importance was inflated
on purpose. In the first incident a few unarmed Italian workers drilling a
well were expelled by French troops. In the second a civilian Libyan
group accompanied by a few soldiers, escorting a United Nations statis-
tics specialist, were likewise forced to withdraw to the claimed French
frontier.

97
100 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

I believe that the reasons aligned by Libya to contend that effectivités
could not play a decisive role in this case were valid. The basic question
was a question of title, and the legal title has been shown to reside first
with the indigenous population, especially the Senoussi peoples, the Otto-
man Empire, and later Italy. This was the title that Libya inherited.
France never occupied the Libya-Chad borderlands (whether by peaceful
means or by conquest) until after 1929, by which time occupation by
force was unlawful under international law. In any event, the territories
in question were not terra nullius, so that the occupation by a French
military presence was, to use the words of Chief Justice Hughes of the
United States Supreme Court, “a mere usurpation”.

Moreover, one should recall that the 1955 Franco-Libyan Treaty,
which according to Chad was the rock on which the whole Chadian case
rested, disregards completely the question of effectivités, relying exclu-
sively on the conventions in force at the date of Libyan independence for
the purpose of defining the borderline east of Toummo.

J now turn to the so-called “Aouzou strip”. The Chadian Memorial
itself (Vol. I, p. 17) recognizes that the expression “Aouzou strip” is of
recent use, appearing at the end of the 1970s because of “usage journalis-
tique”. It encompasses the region that would have been “ceded” by
France to Italy under the terms of the Laval-Mussolini Treaty. It is
delimited by two lines: the 1935 Treaty line and the 1899 Franco-British
Convention line. It is curious that Chad should have invoked the line of
the 1935 Treaty, describing in full detail the southern limit of the “Aouzou
strip”. For the northern limit, it relied on the 1899 line as it appears on
the Livre jaune map. The “Aouzou strip”, including a small intrusion into
the territory of Niger, covers an area of 144,000 km? — 1,040 km long
and 140 km wide. The strip is divided into parts corresponding to the
Borkou, the Ennedi and the Tibesti; in other words, it is the BET.

The position of the French Government concerning the sovereignty
over the “bande d’Aouzou” is somewhat dubious. For instance, on
27 March 1985, the Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, said in an inter-
view:

“La bande d’Aouzou est hors du Tchad. Cela, tout le monde en
est d’accord. Méme le président Habré le reconnait. C’est une affaire
qui remonte à 1934.” (See Counter-Memorial of Libya, Vol. 1,
p. 312.)

Therefore, nobody less than the Minister of Defence of France con-
firmed the clear-cut statement of President Tombalbaye in his disputed
letter to the Libyan Head of State.

As has been said, the Parties disagreed on the nature of the task that
lay before the Court. Libya contended for a distribution of territories,

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101 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

having in mind the historic colonial titles. Chad maintained that the
southern frontier of Libya existed, and resulted from the international
instruments en vigueur at the time of Libya’s independence. Indeed,
according to Chad, the task of the Court was confined to the choice of
one of the two lines limiting the Aouzou strip, despite the fact that in the
Accord-Cadre there is not the slightest mention of the “Aouzou strip”.
Chad contended that whatever the task of the Court might be, it would
have to establish a frontier line.

Chad agreed that by virtue of the Treaty of Ouchy, confirmed by the
1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, Italy inherited all the sovereign rights of the
Ottoman Empire, yet Chad denied that the Porte had any sovereign
rights over the BET.

Libya appealed to considerations of equity if the Court had to estab-
lish ex novo a boundary line, urging it to produce a line which was prac-
tical, fair and sensible, taking into consideration the interests of the Par-
ties and the peoples of the region. Chad categorically rejected any resort
to considerations of equity, even infra legem.

The relationship between the two countries has been far from peaceful.
Early in 1963 the internal situation in Chad was conducive to a rebellion
that triggered the creation of the FROLINAT (Front de libération natio-
nale). In the same year a treaty of friendship between Chad and Libya
was concluded, dealing mainly with security of communications, but pro-
viding nothing on frontiers.

By 1955 the discovery of oil and the promulgation of the first Libyan
Petroleum Regulation opened the door to a brighter future for Libya. By
1971 Chad, alleging interference in internal questions, had broken off
relations with Libya, but relations were resumed in 1972 when a new
treaty of co-operation and mutual assistance was signed. Again there was
no mention of frontiers. It was around then that the episode of the Tom-
balbaye letter occurred. Following the 1972 Treaty other agreements
between Libya and Chad were concluded. In the 1974 Treaty the only
reference to frontiers was a condemnation of the arbitrarily established
colonial frontiers, obviously in contradiction to the 1964 Cairo Declara-
tion. A new treaty was signed in 1980 and again there was no mention of
the presence of Libyan troops on Chadian territory. Yet another treaty
was signed in 1981, ignoring the “invasion” by Libyan troops of the
“Aouzou strip”. (On the Chadian internal front, the Accord de Lagos sur
la réconciliation nationale au Tchad, concluded in Lagos on 13-18 August
1979, by all Chadian political parties, assisted by the representatives of
Cameroon, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Congo, Liberia, Benin,
Central Africa and the representative of the Organization of African
Unity, had not dealt at all with the occupation of the “Aouzou strip” by
Libyan troops. Its objective was a cease-fire and the creation of the
Gouvernement d'union nationale de transition (GUNT).) The complaints
presented by Chad to the United Nations Security Council produced no
solution but were apparently conducive to the conclusion of the Accord-

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102 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

Cadre of 31 August 1989, by virtue of which the present case came to
the Court.

I believe that the titles to the territory asserted by Libya are valid.
Neither France nor Chad could present any sounder titles than the three
layers of title enuring to Libya, namely those of the peoples inhabiting
the territory, tribes, confederations of tribes and the Senoussi Order, the
Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty over the area, passing to Italy in 1912 and
thence to Libya in 1951.

The argument of Chad that the claim of Libya would involve half of
Chadian territory was unimpressive. Not only does it beg the question
but it also works the other way around, since Chad’s claim involves a
substantial part of Libyan territory.

The claim of Libya represented on map 105 of the Libyan Memorial
was based on succession to Ottoman claims that went much farther to the
south.

The concluding paragraph of the Judgment, paragraph 76, invokes the
pacta sunt servanda rule to justify the line enshrined in the operative part,
which would result from the 1955 Treaty. Nobody would challenge this
fundamental rule of international law, what Hans Kelsen established
as the Grundnorm of international law. But it obviously applies only to
treaties in force, and Article 11 of the 1955 Treaty renders its validity after
the 20 years deadline, to say the least, debatable.

Paragraph 77, containing the dispositif, resorts to the line of the 1919
Franco-British Convention, the so-called “Wadai-Darfour Convention”
which, incidentally, dealt with the southern frontier of Libya with the
French territories, moving it northward. The 1899 strict south-east line
was indeed progressively moved northward: first with the Livre jaune
map, in a unilateral modification of the original line, without consulta-
tion with the British, something which, according to the handwritten note
of Lord Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, “did not matter much”. The fact is that the 1899 line,
following a strict south-east direction — and that seems to have been the
intention of the negotiators in the light of the travaux préparatoires —
would intersect the 24° E meridian at 15° 35’ N of latitude, approxi-
mately at the place where it meets the Wadi Howa. The same line, as
depicted on the Livre jaune map, would meet the 24° E meridian at the
latitude of 19° N. According to the Franco-British Convention, the inter-
section would occur at 19° 30’ N. Chad contended that it was not a strict
south-east line, but an east-south-east line. Therefore there is a substan-
tive modification in the course of the line, which has been pushed north-
ward some four degrees. And that is the line which the dispositif of the
Judgment takes as the basis for defining the boundary between the
Republic of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

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103 TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (DISS. OP. SETTE-CAMARA)

But one could not exclude a compromise solution which, regrettably,
neither the Parties nor the Court explored. There were two possibilities
for drawing a fair and equitable line: the first would have been the line of
United Nations map No. 241, which is close to the 1935 line but not iden-
tical to it. Given that Chad had not scrupled to use the 1935 line as the
southern limit of the “Aouzou strip”, I cannot see why it would have
objected to its use for a boundary ex novo.

The second solution would have been to revert to the 1899 strict south-
east line, which was at the origin of the dispute, and which continues to
appear on very recent maps, for instance, the 1988 OAU map attached to
its Sub-Committee’s report on the Libya-Chad dispute. This, in my view,
is the most obvious, and perhaps the most equitable, line.

Both those lines would have afforded the advantage of dividing the
Tibesti Massif between the two countries. And it is not necessary to
emphasize the importance of the Tibesti Massif for the possible defence
of one country or the other, as repeatedly asserted by both Parties.

(Signed) José SETTE-CAMARA.

101


               87

                              INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

   2005                                       YEAR 2005
  11 July
General List
 No. 129                                      11 July 2005

                            CASE CONCERNING CERTAIN
                             CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
                                   IN FRANCE
                             (REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. FRANCE)

                                                ORDER

                   The President of the International Court of Justice,
                  Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
               Article 44, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Rules of Court,
                  Having regard to the Order of 29 December 2004, whereby the Presi-
               dent of the Court extended to 11 July 2005 and 11 August 2006 respec-
               tively the time-limits for the filing of the Reply of the Republic of the
               Congo and the Rejoinder of the French Republic ;
                  Whereas, in a letter dated 6 July 2005 and received in the Registry by
               facsimile on 7 July 2005, the Agent of the Republic of the Congo referred
               to the current state of judicial proceedings in France and the Congo, and
               asked the Court, for the reasons explained in his letter, to extend by
               six months the time-limit for the filing of the Reply of the Republic of the
               Congo ; and whereas, on receipt of that letter, the Registrar transmitted a
               copy thereof to the Agent of the French Republic ;

                 Whereas, by a letter dated 11 July 2005 and received in the Registry on
               the same day by facsimile, the Agent of the French Republic indicated
               that her Government did not object to the further extension of time
               sought by the Republic of the Congo, provided that the time-limit fixed
               for the filing of the Rejoinder be extended likewise ;
                 Taking account of the reasons given by the Republic of the Congo and
               of the agreement of the Parties,

               4

88         CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (ORDER 11 VII 05)

  Extends to 11 January 2006 the time-limit for the filing of the Reply of
the Republic of the Congo ;
  Extends to 10 August 2007 the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder
of the French Republic ; and
  Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

   Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eleventh day of July, two thousand and
five, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the
Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Republic of
the Congo and the Government of the French Republic, respectively.

                                            (Signed) SHI Jiuyong,
                                                      President.
                                        (Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
                                                      Registrar.

5