ANNEXJTO OPINION No. 14.

I.—DocuMENTS TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS :

Extvacts jrom the following Conventions and}Regulations concerning
the navigation of the Danube.

Treaty of Paris (March 30th, 1856).

Public Act relating to the Navigation of the mouths of the
Danube (November 2nd, 1865).

Protocols of Conferences held at Paris in 1866 between the
representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia,
Russia and Turkey, concerning the affairs of the Danubian Prin-
cipalities and the navigation of the Danube.

Protocol No. 3 (March 28th).
» » 6 (April 24th).
» » 7 (May 2nd).
” » 8(.,, Ith).
M »» to (June 4th).

Treaty of London (March 13th, 1871).
Treaty of Berlin (July 13th, 1878).
Additional Act to the Public Act of November 2nd, 1865, relating
to the Navigation of the mouths of the Danube (May 28th, 1881).
Treaty of London (March roth, 1883).
Treaty of Versailles (June 26th, 1919).
Articles 331-338 and 346-349. |

Navigation and Police Regulations applicable to that part of the
Danube situated between the Iron Gates and Braila.

Letter from the Foreign Office to the Secretary-General (Septem-
ber 6th, 1924).
Appendix: British Memorial.

Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and
Transit. Minutes of the seventh session, held at Geneva, Novem-
ber 26th-29th, 1924.

Memorials transmitted in 1924 and 1925 by the representatives’

and experts of the British, French, Italian and Roumanian Govern-
ments [to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Special Committee. Minutes of the Ist session, held at Geneva,
February 18th-rgth, 1925. |

Special Committee. Verbatim record of the 2nd session, held at
Geneva, March 30th—April 2nd, 1925.

Letter from M. Carlo Rossetti, Italian delegate on the Danube
Commission, to M. Burckhardt, President of the Special Committee
(May 21st, 1925; with 5 annexes), ‘
OPINION No. Ï4.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 136

Letters from M. Contzesco, Roumanian delegate on the European
Commission of the Danube, to M. Burckhardt, President of the
Special Committee (June, 1925).

Report of the Special Committee (July 2nd, 1925 ; with 5 annexes),

Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and
Transit. Minutes of the 8th session, held at Geneva, July 24th-30th, 1925.

Letter from the President of the Special Committee to the Presi-
dent of the Advisory and Technical Committee, transmitting
Committee’s report (September 17th, 1925).

Letter from the President of the Special Committee to the Presi-
dent of the Advisory and Technical Committee, transmitting the
agreement concluded between the representatives of the Governments
on the European Commission of the Danube, together with the
Protocol signed by the same representatives (September 25th, 1926).

Declaration made by M. Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube,
at the meeting held at Geneva, September 17th-18th, 1926, between
the members of the Special Committee and the four delegates to
the European Commission. .

Agreement of September 18th, 1926, between the French, British,
Italian and Roumanian Governments.

Letter from the President of the Advisory and Technical Com-
mittee for Communications and Transit to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations, dated September 25th, 1926.

Report relating to the jurisdiction of the European Commission
of the Danube, presented by M. Guerrero, and adopted on Decem-
ber gth, 1926, by the Council.

Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations, 43rd Session,
4th meeting, Thursday, December gth, 1926.

Letter from the President of the Special Committee to the
President of the Advisory and Technical Committee (February 24th, 1927).

Two maps of areas under the Port Captains.

Series of maps of the Danube submitted at the request of the
Italian Government (this series is identical with that which has
been transmitted by the British Government ; see below).

IE— DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED IN THE NAME OF THE INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS
OR FILED BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES : :

À.

International agreements and regulations.

Articles 108-116 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 1815
(in English).

Articles 15-20 of the Treaty of Paris, 1856 (in English).
Public Act of Galatz of November 2nd, 1865 (in English).
Articles 52-57 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (in English).

Roumanian Regulations concerning the policing of the ports and
shores of the Danube, March 24th, 1879 (résumé of—).

Additional Act. to the Public Act of Galatz, May 28th, 1881
(in English).
OPINION No. I4.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 137

Treaty of London, 1883 (in English).
Notice to Navigators (No. 1025—-Galatz, May 18th/30th, 1893).

Notice to Navigators No. 4 (in English), November toth, 1911,
brought up to date 1912, European Commission of the Danube.

Regulations of Navigation and Police applicable to the: Lower
Danube, November roth, 1911 (brought up to date 1923).

Extract from the Convention instituting the}Definitive Statute of
the Danube, 1921 (in English).

B.—Extracts from protocols and minutes of Conferences and International
Commissions.

Protocols of the London Conferences : February-March, 1883.

Extract from the Protocol of the meeting of the European
Commission of the Danube, August 26th/September 7th, 1887.

Minutes of the deliberations of the Executive Committee concerning
the drafting of the third memorandum on the works for the improve-
ment of the course of the Lower Danube, April 13th, 1888.

Extracts from the minutes of the Commission on the international
régime of ports, waterways and railways of the Peace Conference,
1910.

International {Conference for the institution of the Definitive
Statute of the Danube, Protocols Nos. 1 to 29, and 30 to 68
(1920-1921).

Minutes of the International Commission] of the Danube;
seventh plenary session, held at Bratislava; minutes of Novem-
ber 14th and r6th, 1922.

Report relating to Navigation on the Danube, presented to the
Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and
Transit of the League of Nations (C. 444 (a) 164 M. a. 1925
Vin). ‘

Sentence pronounced by the European Commission of the Danube,
dated October 12th, 1926. ‘

C.— Diplomatic correspondence.

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to that Commission (No. 71—June 13th, 1870).

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
Commissioner (June 15th, 1879).

Extract from the confidential letter from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube (No. 18646—-November 1st/r3th, 1880).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Minister for {Foreign Affairs (No. 41—1881).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Com-
mission to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (No. 46—1881).

Confidential and personal report of the Roumanian Chargé
d'affaires at Constantinople to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
(No. 359—May 18th/3o0th, 1881).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (June}28th, 1881).
OPINION No. I14.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 138

Letter from the Inspector of Navigation of the European
Commission at Toultcha to the European Commission of the
Danube at Galatz (No. 865—September ist, 1881).

Letter of April 28th, 1882, from the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the French Minister at Bucharest.

Letter of June 12th, 1882, from the Austro-Hungarian Minister
for Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador at Vienna.

Letter of June rath, 1882, from the French Minister at Bucharest’
to the French Minister for Foreign} Affairs.

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Com-
mission of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Ne. 54-1883).

Earl Granville to H.E. Prince Ghica (March roth, 1883—2 English).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 7051—
May 2nd/rath, 1883).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 7088—
May 12th/24th, 1883).

Letter from Prince Ghica to Lord Granville, dated June 14th,
1883, and observations of the Roumanian Government relating to
the Treaty of London.

Letters of November 7th and 22nd, 1883, and of March 15th,
1884, from the French delegate at Galatz to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Letter of. April 22nd, 1884, from the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the French delegate at Galatz.

Letters of April 24th, May 2nd, May 5th and November 2oth,
1884, from the French delegate at Galatz to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Letter from the Consul of Norway and Sweden at Galatz to the
European Commission of the Danube (No. 32—April 22nd, 1887).

. Letter from the European Commission of the Danube to the
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube
(No. 1908— August 1st/13th, 1887).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 14—April 8th/
‘20th, 1888).

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 155—
April 13th/25th, 1888). : ;

Letter from the European ‘Commission of the Danube to the
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube
(No. 2040—December 31st, 1888). |

Report by M. Balaceanu, Roumanian delegate, to the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs (No. 19--March 18th/3oth, 1892).
OPINION No. I4.—-EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 139:

Letter from the European Commission of the Danube to
MM. Gsiller, Austro-Hungarian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube, and G. Cogordan, Minister Plenipotentiary, French
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 432—
March 2oth, 1892).

Letter from the European Commission of the Danube to the
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube
(No. 936—-June, 1892}.

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 15404—
August 4th, 1892).

Letter from the resident-engineer of the European Commission
of the Danube to that Commission (No. 319—September 15th,
1892).

Letter from the European Commission of the Danube to the
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube
(No. 1674-September 21st, 1892).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 144—
November roth/22nd, 1892).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1893).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 7—
April 21st, 1893).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 16—
May 8th, 1893).

Cipher telegram from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the
Roumanian delegate on the European Commission of the Danube
(No. 10161—May tIoth/23rd, 1893). .

Cipher telegram from the Roumanian delegate on the European
Commission of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(No. 21—-May 12th, 1893).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (May roth,
1893).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 23—
May 25th, 1893).

Letter from the Inspector of Navigation at Toultcha to the
European Commission of the Danube (No. 1317—June Ist, 1893).

Telegram from the Roumanian delegate on the European Com-
mission of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(No. 106-—September Ist, 1893).

Letter from the same to the European Commission of the
Danube (No. 115—September 2nd, 1893). .

Letter from the same to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(No. 126—September 27th, 1893).
OPINION No. I4.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE I40

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 24,
603/93—-January 22nd, 1894).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ (No. 19—Feb-
ruary 3rd, 1894).

Letter from M. Lahovary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
M. Olanesco, Minister for Public Works (No. 6382—March 2oth, 1894).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 7182—
April oth, 1804).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Com-
mission of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1895).

Telegram from the Commander of the Roumanian Fleet to the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (No. 13—May 6th, 1895).

Letter from the Roumanian delegate on the European Commission
of the Danube to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (May 6th, 1895).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (May 4th/16th,

1895).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 8823—
May 12th, 1895).

Letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
delegate on the European Commission of the Danube (No. 5736—
April 17th, 1906). ;

Letter from the French delegate to the President of the European
Commission of the Danube at Galatz (July ist, 19217).

Letter from the President of the Special Committee to the Presi-
dent of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications
* and Transit (February 24th, 1927). :

D.—Maps.

Detailed plans of Galatz and Braila.
Map of the Maritime Danube.
Map of the course of the Danube from Braila to the sea.

Plans of the ports of Braila and Galatz and of their areas of
expansion.

Delta of the Danube.

Mouths of the Danube: Tan—Ada—Si.

Map of Roumania and of neighbouring countries (Galatz sector).
Map of Roumania and of neighbouring countries (Odessa sector).

Map of the Danube and its arms (6 sections).

18
OPINION No. I4.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE I4I

III.—DocuMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE:

Protocols of the European Commission of the Danube (18536—1915 ;
1919—-1926). -

(The following protocols have been placed before the Court:
1865 Protocol No. 149 (Final), November 2nd.

1879 ». » 333, June 13th,
” 2 336, ” 28th.
188x » » 381, May roth.
” ” 384, 22 28th.
1892 » » 308, November 21st.
1893 » » 514 May 2oth.
1905 7 » 700, October 25th.
5 » 702, November 1st.
3 ” 704; ” 7th.
1908 » » 749, May 4th.
IQII » » 806, November roth.
1913 » » 845, May 30th.
1919 5 » 2 October 16th.
” ” 5, 53 17th.
1920 » » 890, May 18th.
” yy 900, » 27th.
” » 909, November 15th.
1921 ” » 929, October 24th.
» » 940, November gth.
1922 » » 955, May 24th.
» » 964 October 25th.
» ” 965, ” 26th.
” » 966, ” 27th.
jh » 968, 5 28th.
1923 ” » 977, May toth.
” » 985, October 29th.
» > 987; » 30th.
‘ ” ” 989, . oy 30th.
1924 » ,, 1006, May 18th.
» , 1017, October 7th.
» », 1021, ” 17th.
1023, 18th.
33 a? 3
1925 ” » 1025, May 13th.
” ” 1026, ” 8
, , 1035, October 21st.
1926 1057, May 1oth.)

a” #1

Map of the Danube and its arms (six sections).

IV.—CoLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS PREPARED BY THE REGISTRY :
(a) Treaties, Acts and Regulations.

Treaty of Peace between Prussia and France (May 30th, 1814).
(Text published according to the Official Gazette of July roth of
same year. Paris, F. Leprieur, 1815.)

Act of the Congress of Vienna (June oth, 1815). (Nouveau
Recueil de Traités, de Martens, vol. II, 1887, pp. 379 et seq.)
OPINION No. I4.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 142

Draft of the peace preliminaries of February st, 1856
(D. Sturdza: La question des Portes-de- Fer et des Catavactes du Danube,

pp. 63 ei seq.). .

Treaty of Paris (March 30th, 1856). (Noweau Recueil de Traités,
de Martens, vol. XV, pp. 770 ef seq.)

| Navigation Act of the Danube (November 7th, 1857). Minisierul
Afacerilor Siraine. Cestiunea Dunareai. Acte si Documente.

Public Act relative to the Navigation of the mouths of the
Danube (November 2nd, 1865). (Protocols of the European Com-
mission of the Danube, 1865-1866, vol. V.)

Regulations of Navigation and Police applicable to the Lower
Danube (Annex to the Public Act of November 2nd, 1865).

Austria, Russia and the United Principalities. Provisions relating
to the navigation of the Pruth (December 15th, 1866). (Nouveau
Recueil de Traités, de Martens, vol. XX, pp. 296 et seq.)

Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Russia. Regulations of Navigation
and Police applicable to the Pruth (February 8th-oth (January 27th-
28th), 1871). (Nouveau Recueil de Traités, de Martens, vol. I, and
Series; pp. 485 ef seq.)

Treaty amending the Treaty of Paris of March 3oth, 1856
(London, March 13th, 1871). (British White Papers, C. 314. 1871
(Reprinted in 1914).)

Treaty of San Stefano (February 19th (March 3rd), 1878). (Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale: Documents diplomatiques ; Affaires d'Orient;
Congrès de Berlin, 1878, pp. 12 et seg.)

Treaty of Berlin (July 13th, 1878). (Nouveau Recueil de Traités,
de Martens, vol. III, 2nd Series, pp. 449 ef seq.)

Roumanian Regulations for Ports and Quays of March 24th,
1879. (Collection of Treaties and Conventions’ concluded by
Austria with foreign Powers from 1763. New series, vol. XI,
Vienna, 1864, pp. 92 ef seq.)

Regulations fixing the procedure of the European Commission of
the Danube (November toth, 1879). (Annex to Protocol No. 337 of
the European Commission of the Danube.)

Special Instructions for the Inspector of Navigation of the Lower
Danube, with amendments to May 2ist, 1891. (Annex to Protocol
No. 845 (May 30th, 1913) of the European Commission of the
Danube.)

Regulations of Navigation and Police applicable to the Danube
between Galatz and its mouths (May roth, 188z). (Annex to Proto-
col No. 381 of the European Commission of the Danube.)

Treaty of London (March roth, 1883). (Protocols of the Confe-
rence held in London concerning the navigation of the Danube,
February. 8th—March roth, 1883. Harrison & Sons, 1883.)

Additional Act to the Public Act of November 2nd, 1865,
relating to the navigation of the mouths of the Danube (May
28th, 1881). (Annex. to Protocol No. 384 of the European Com-
mission - of the Danube.)
OPINION No. 14.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 143

Regulations for Navigation, River Police and Superintendence,
applicable to that part of the Danube between the Iron Gates
and Braila (Annex to the Treaty of London of March i1oth, 1883).
(Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1883.)

Regulations of Navigation and Police applicable to the Lower
Danube (November 1oth, 1971). (Annex to Protocol No. 806 of the
European Commission of the Danube.)

Extract from the Treaty of Versailles (June 28th, 1919). (Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale, 1919.)

Extract from the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (September roth,
1919). (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1979.)

Extract from the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27th, 1919).
(Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1910.)

Extract from the Treaty of Trianon (June 4th, 1920). (Paris,
Imprimerie Nationale, 1920.)

Extract .from the Treaty of Paris relating to Bessarabia
(October 28th, 1920). (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1920.)

Resolutions adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations
on December oth, 1920 (Organization of Communications and
Transit).

Rules for the organization of general conferences and of the
C.C. T. (League of Nations, Doc. C. 15. M. 10. 1921. VIII).

Convention on the régime of navigable waterways of international
concern (Barcelona, April zoth, 1921). (League of Nations, Doc.
C. 479. M. 327. r92t. VIII.)

Statute relating to the régime of navigable waterways of inter-
national concern (Barcelona, April 2oth, 1921). (League of Nations,
Doc. C. 479. M. 327. 1921. VIII.)

Convention instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube :
(Paris, July 23rd, 1921). (League of Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. XXVI (1924), pp. 174-198.)

Convention and Statute on the international régime of maritime
ports (Geneva, December oth, 1923). (League of Nations, Doc.
C. 823. M. 321. VIII. 1923.)

(b) Protocols and Minutes of Conferences and of International Commissions.

1. Protocols of Conferences held at Vienna (1855) between the
plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia and
Turkey :

Protocol No. 4 (March 21st, 1855).
» » S{  ,, 23rd, ,, ).

2. Protocols of the Congress of Paris (February 25th—<April 16th,
1856) :
Protocol No. I (February 25th, 1856).
II ( » 28th, ,, ).
III-VI (March 1st-8th, 1856).
VII-IX ( roth-14th, 1856).
” » À (|, 18th, 1856).
XI-XV ( , 18th-26th, 1856).
XVI (March 27th, 1856).
XVII (March 28th, 1856).
XVIII (March 29th, 1856).

” »

a”
OPINION No. I4.—-EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE I44

3.

Protocols of the Conferences held at Paris, from May 22nd to
August 19th, 1858, for the organization of Moldavia and
Wallachia :

Protocol No. 18 (August 16th, 1858).
” ” 19 ( ” toth, ” ).

. Protocols of the River Commission. of the Danube (1856-1859) :

Protocol No. 1 (November 29th, 1856).
2 (December 3rd, 1856).
” » 31 (August r5th, 17th and 29th, 1857).

. Protocols of the Conferences held at Paris, in 1866, between the

representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Prussia, Russia and Turkey, relating to the Danubian Princi-
palities and to the navigation of the Danube:

Protocol No. 3 (March 28th, 1866).
6 (April 24th,' , ).
7 (May 2nd, » )
8 ( r7th, » )

EE

. Protocols of the Conference of London (January 7th—March 14th,

1871), for the revision of the stipulations of the Treaty of
March 30th, 1856, concerning the neutralization of the Black Sea :
Protocol No. 3 (February 3rd, 1871). .

” EE 4 ( a 7th, ” ).
» » 5 (March 13th, , }.
” ” 6 ( 2” 14th, » ) .

« Protocols of the Conference of Berlin ( Junme— July 13th, 1878):

9 (June 29th, 1878).

10 (July ist, 1878).

I ( , and, ,,).

12 ( ,, 4th, ,,).

» » 13-15 (July 5th-8th, 1878).

16 (July oth, 1878)

» » 17 ( ,, woth, ).
18 ( 11th, ,, ).

») 5 19 ( ” rath, ).
20 { 13th, }

Protocol No.

. Protocols .of Conferences held in London, February 8th—

March roth, 1883, regarding the navigation of the Danube:

‘Protocol No. 1 (February 8th, 1883).

roth,

NS

13th, )

2oth, )

, 24th, }.
March ist, , ).
7th, }

roth, )

00 AM DW
NN

” ”

Protocols of the International Conference for the framing of the
Definitive Statute of the Danube (Paris, August 2nd—-November
16th, 1920, and April 5th—July 21st, 1921):
Protocol No. 1 {August 2nd, 1920).

“ys 2” 2 ( 53 4th, ” ).

»  » 3 , 5th, 4, )
OPINION No. 14.—EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 145

Protocol No. 4 (September 6th, 1920).
” 2” 6 ( 3 16th, ” ).
FE ” 8 ( ” 22nd, a )
» ” 9 ( tae 24th, LE] ).
» » 10 { 3oth, 5)
” » +1 (October ist, nw
” LE 12 ( 6th, a }
, » 27 {November 12th, »)
» , 31 ( April 8th, 1921).

3 :, 32 ( 52 rrth, > ).
” ” 33 ( ” 13th, ” ).
EE) ” 34 (° » 15th, LE ).
” LE 35 ( 53 18th, EE ).
LE ” 36 ( 2 2oth, ” ).
LE) ” 38 ( 25th, ” ).
” ” 48 (Ma Toth, ” ).
” ” 49 ( ” 2ist, ” ).
LE 5 53 ( 28th, a ).
5 » 38 (J une 6th, ,, ).
EE ” 62 ( ” 15th, ” ).
» 5» 93 ( ,, «7th, ,, ).
5) ” 65 ( 5, 22nd, ” ).
LE 33 66 ( 3 23rd, ” ).
” ” 67 ( 25th, 5) ).
- » 68 (July 21st, I92I—with annexes).

(c) Diplomatic Correspondence.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna to the Austro- .
Hungarian Chargé d’affaires at Bucharest (April xrith, 1882).
(Sturdza, XXIV—5, pp. 202-203.)

The French Minister at Bucharest to the Roumanian Foreign
Minister (April 17th, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—6, pp. 204-212.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bucharest to the Roumanian
Envoy in Paris (May 12th, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—15, pp. 229-236.)

The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to his delegate on
the European Commission of the Danube (Mav 15th, 1882). (Sturdza,
XXIV—18, pp. 250-251.) .

The British Minister for Foreign Affairs to Viscount Lyons,
in Paris (October 28th, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—z22, pp. 261-262.)

Verbal Note of the French Government (November 4th, 1882.
(Tbidem.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bucharest to the Roumanian
Envoy in Vienna (November 17th, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—22,
Pp. 265.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bucharest to the Roumanian
Envoys in London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Berlin, Saint-Petersburg
and Constantinople (December oth, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—25,
PP. 275-276.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Bucharest to the Roumanian
representatives abroad (December roth, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—z26,
pp. 277-283.)
OPINION No. I4.—-EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE DANUBE 146

The Minister for Foreign Affairs in London to the representatives
of Great Britain (December 11th, 1882). (Sturdza, XXIV—-28,
pp. 285-286.)

The British Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British represent-
ative in Vienna (January roth, 1883). (Sturdza, XXIV—63,
P. 645.)

The British Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British representative
at Sofia (January 24th, 1883). (Sturdza, XXIV—65, p. 347.)

The Roumanian Minister in London to the British Minister for
Foreign Affairs (February 2th, 1883). (Sturdza, XXIV—74,
Pp. 367.)

The Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Roumanian
Envoy in London (May 24th, 1883). (Sturdza, XXIV—32,
p. 416 a—416 m.)


ANNEX.

I.—PapERS AND DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

1.—Caphandaris-Molloff Agreement, signed. at Geneva December gth, 1927
(Doc. C. 641. 1927. II) (in French and English). Annex: Provisional certi-
ficate of the Bulgarian 6 % Loan of 1923 and provisional bond of the said loan.

2.—Plan of payments to be effected by Bulgaria and Greece (December 8th,
1922), and explanatory note concerning the said Plan (Doc. F. 428, and
Addendum to F. 428).

3.--Letter dated August 7th, 1931, from the Bulgarian Government (Doc.
C.. 477. 1931.. 1) (in French and English).

4.—Letter dated September 2nd, 1931, from the Greek Government (Doc.
C. 530. 1931. I) (én French and English). Annex: Observations by the Greek
Government.

5.—Letter dated September 3rd, 1931, from the Bulgarian Government
(Doc. C. 540. 1931. 1). (im French and English). Annex’: Memorandum by the
Bulgarian Government concerning the interpretation of the Caphandaris-
Molloff Agreement. . 1

6.—Letter dated September 5th, 1931, from the Greek Government (Doc.
C. 543. 1931. I) (in French and English). Annex: Supplementary Memoran-
dum by the Greek. Government.

7.—Minutes of the meeting of the Council | on September 7th, 1931 (Doc.
€./64th Session/P.-V. 3. I) (in French and. English).

8.—Letter dated September 8th, 1931, from the Greek Government (Doc.
C. 553. 1931. I) (in French and English). .

9.—Letter dated September 11th, 1931, from the Greek Government (Doc.
C. 559. 1931. I) (in French and. English).
10.—Notes dated September -14th, 1931, by the Bulgarian Government
{Doc. C. 565.1931. I). (in French and English), Annexes: Lo
I.—-Telegram from the Bulgarian Finance Minister to the B.I.S. (July 14th,
1931), and telegram in reply from the B.I.S. (July 16th, 1931).

Il.—Letter from the Greek Finance Minister to the President’ of the
Mixed Commission (August 1st, 1931).
III.—Letter from the President of the Mixed Commission to the Greek
Finance Minister (August 3rd, 1931).
IV.—Greek Memorial submitted to the Committee of Experts in London.
V.—Decision by the Committee of Experts in London (extract).
11.—Letter dated September 15th, 1931, from the Greek Government
{Doc. C. 576. 1931. I). .
12.—Letter dated September 17th, 1931, from the Bulgarian Government
{Doc. C. 581. 1931. I) (in French and English). . .
13.—Letter dated September 18th, 1931, from the Greek Government
(Doc. C. 590. 1931. I) (én French and English)...
14.—Letter dated September’ 19th, 1931, from the Greek Government
(Doc. C. 595. 1931. I) (in French and English). Annex: Reply by the
Greek Delegation to M. Malinoff’s letter. oe
15.—Letter dated September 21st, 1931, from the Bulgarian Government
(Doc. C. 614 1931. J).
. 16:—-Extract from the Minutes of the 65th Session of the Council of. the
League of Nations (meeting on Saturday, September 1gth, 1931, No. 2906).

25
INTERPRETATION OF GRECO-BULGARIAN AGREEMENT (1927) 90

The following documents were also before the Court:

(a) President Hoover’s proposal, dated June 2oth, 1931 (text extracted
from the Publications of the Department of State. Press Releases.
Saturday, June 27th, 1931).

(6) Report by the International Committee of Experts, signed in London
on August rith and 13th, 1931 (British State Papers, Miscellaneous.
No. 19 (1931), Cmd. 3947).

(c) Circular concerning valuations and payments in respect of property
to be liquidated in pursuance of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention for
Reciprocal Emigration (Minutes of the Mixed Emigration Commission,
x7oth meeting, held on January 29th, 1924).

(@) Extract from the Minutes of the Council L. N. (meetings of Septem-
ber 1oth, 1931, No. 2903, and January 28th, 1932, No. 2998).

(e) Convention of Neuilly of November 27th, 1919 (Publications of the
Court, Series C., No. 18—I, pp. 369-373).

(f) Regulation for reciprocal and voluntary emigration, dated March 6th, 1922
(Publications of the Court, Series C., No. 18—I, pp. 374-402).

II.—PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT :

1.—Letter dated September 4th, 1929, from the Bulgarian Finance Minister
to the President of the Mixed Commission.

2.—Minutes of the 62nd meeting of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Emi-
gration Commission, held on September 24th, 1921.

3.—Idem, 126th meeting, held on December 4th, 31922; with two annexes.

4.—Letter dated October 6th, 1922, from the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs to the Mixed Commission.

5.—Minutes of the 127th meeting of the Mixed Commission, held on
December 6th and 8th, 1922.

6.—Letter dated February 11th, 1924, from the Mixed Emigration Com-
mission to the Secretary of the Inter-Allied Commission in Bulgaria.

7.—Letter dated January 16th, 1930, from the President of the Mixed
Emigration Commission to the President of the Financial Committee.

8.—Extract from the Minutes of the meeting held on March 8th, 1920,
by the Council L. N.

g.—Agreement concerning the regulation of Bulgarian reparations concluded.
at The Hague on January zoth, 1930.

III.—PapERS AND DOCUMENTS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT :

A.—During the written procedure :

1.—Trust Agreement, dated March 5th, 1931.

2.—Memorandum dated June 26th, 1931, delivered by the Greek Govern-
ment to the United States Minister at Athens.

3.—Declarations of M. Vénizélos, Prime Minister of Greece, to Mr. Skinner, |
United States Minister at Athens (July ist, 1931).

4.—Letter from the Director-General of the Greek Foreign Office to the
Bulgarian Minister at Athens (July 7th, 1931).
5.—Telegram from the Bulgarian Finance Minister to the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements (July 14th, 1931).
6.—Letter from the B. I. S. to the Greek Finance Minister (July 15th,
1931).
26.
INTERPRETATION OF GRECO-BULGARIAN AGREEMENT (1927) OI

7.—Letter from the Greek Finance Minister to the B. I. S. (July 30th,
1931).

8.—Arrangement concluded between the Government of the Greek Republic
and the Royal Bulgarian Government concerning the application of
the Hoover proposal to Bulgarian reparations and execution of the Caphan-
daris-Molloff Agreement during the Hoover Year (July rst, 1931—June 30th,
1932}.

9.—Letter from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Bulgarian
Minister at Athens (November 11th, 1931). :

10.—Convention between Greece and Bulgaria concerning the reciprocal
and voluntary emigration of ethnical minorities, dated November 27th, 1919.

11.—Plan governing the payments to be effected by Bulgaria and Greece
in execution of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention concerning the reciprocal
and voluntary emigration of ethnical minorities, dated December 8th, 1922.

12.—Caphandaris-Molloff Agreement, dated December gth, 1927.
13.—Letter from Sir O. Niemayer, of the L. N. Financial Committee, to

M. A. Carapanos, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated September 1st,
1928.

B.—During the oral procedure :

1.—Letter dated Sofia, August oth, 1929, from the Finance Minister of
the Kingdom of Bulgaria to the President of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed
. Commission.

2.—Bearer bond (unnumbered), for rooo leva, Series B., of the Bulgarian
6% State Loan of 1923, with coupon sheet attached (each coupon being
perforated).

3.—Bearer bond (No. 182.539) for 500 drachmas, of the Greek Republic
6% Loan of 1923, with coupon sheet attached (each coupon being perfor-
ated).

27


OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. MOROZOV
{Traduction |

Jai voté contre la décision de donner suite à la demande d’avis con-
sultatif et j'ai aussi répondu par la négative à la question I et à la question
II visées dans le dispositif de l’avis de la Cour, dont je ne saurais en outre
appuyer les motifs.

Cette attitude tient essentiellement aux raisons suivantes.

1. J’estime que /a Cour est incompétente pour donner l'avis consultatif
que le Comité des demandes de réformation de jugements du Tribunal
administratif sollicite par requête présentée en application de l’article 11
du statut du Tribunal, ladite requête étant la première de ce genre, et
étant formulée près de dix-huit ans après que l’Assemblée générale a
amendé le statut du Tribunal par sa résolution 957 (X) du 8 novembre
1955.

A ce sujet, je peux seulement dire que, si la procédure instituée pour la
prétendue réformation des jugements du Tribunal était réellement judi-
ciaire, comme l’envisageait l’avis consultatif de la Cour du 13 juillet
1954, c’est l’organe de réformation et non la Cour internationale de
Justice qui serait en mesure de statuer valablement sur l’affaire qui con-
cerne le jugement n° 158 du Tribunal.

2. L'article 65, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour, dispose: «La Cour
peut donner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique, à la demande
de tout organe ou institution qui aura été autorisé par la Charte des
Nations Unies ou conformément à ses dispositions, à demander cet
avis».

IL est incontestable que le Statut n’oblige pas la Cour à donner automa-
tiquement suite à toute espèce de demande d'avis consultatif. La Cour ne
doit donner d’effet à une demande et rendre un avis qu’en stricte confor-
mité avec les dispositions de la Charte et du Statut de la Cour et, notam-
ment, des articles 34 et 65 du Statut et de l’article 96 de la Charte.

La présente demande d'avis consultatif enfreint les principes de la
Charte et le Statut de la Cour.

Il appartient à l'Assemblée générale d’adopter telle résolution qu’elle
juge bon et je ne me propose pas d’engager la Cour dans une revision de la
résolution 957 (X), car il ne s’agit nullement là d’une fonction de la Cour.

Il n’en est pas moins vrai que la compétence et les fonctions de la Cour
doivent être régies, non par telle ou telle résolution adoptée par l’Assemblée
générale, mais par la Charte des Nations Unies et par le Statut de la Cour,
qui fait partie intégrante de la Charte.

134
DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION (OP. DISS. MOROZOV) 297

3. Contrairement à la conclusion de la majorité de la Cour, la procé-
dure qu’on lui impose ici n’est pas judiciaire.

Selon moi, l’avis consultatif utilise un certain nombre d’arguments peu
convaincants pour justifier la procédure que l’on présente comme une
procédure judiciaire normale de réformation des jugements du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies; et des éléments très importants n’ont
pas été pris en considération.

Par exemple, l’avis retient comme argument principal que les jugements
du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies dans les affaires contentieu-
ses opposant des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies au Secrétaire général
peuvent être réformés par la Cour internationale de Justice, non pas sous
une forme qui continuerait, au moins dans une certaine mesure, la pro-
cédure contentieuse, mais sous la forme d’une procédure consultative. Ce
système insolite a été imaginé il y a dix-huit ans et il est tout à fait clair
qu'on pourrait y déceler une intention de cacher que des particuliers (des
fonctionnaires des Nations Unies) se sont vu attribuer le droit de former
recours contre un jugement et de devenir parties devant la Cour interna-
tionale de Justice, contrairement aux dispositions de l’article 34 du Statut,
aux termes duquel «seuls les Etats ont qualité pour se présenter devant la
Cour».

Cependant, rien ne peut dissimuler que, par le biais il est vrai d’une
procédure présentée comme consultative, des particuliers peuvent devenir
parties à l’instance qui se déroule devant la Cour. Ces personnes peuvent
engager la procédure d’appel contre le jugement du Tribunal administra-
tif, elles ont le droit de présenter à la Cour des exposés et des preuves de
toute nature ainsi que de prendre la parole devant la Cour si celle-ci
décide de tenir audience.

Les limitations de ce droit qui tiennent à l’intervention du Comité des
demandes de réformation et au caractère restrictif des motifs de contesta-
tion prévus (non-exercice de la juridiction ou erreur fondamentale dans la
procédure) n’y changent rien en principe. Elles ne font que porter atteinte
aux intérêts des fonctionnaires des Nations Unies: c’est un point sur
lequel je me propose de revenir.

Il est nécessaire ici de rappeler que la question de la compétence de la
Cour internationale de Justice a été réglée par la Conférence des Nations
Unies sur l’organisation internationale en des termes très clairs, que
traduit l’article 34 du Statut de la Cour. Il est bien connu qu’à l’époque la
délégation du Venezuela avait proposé de modifier le libellé de l’article 34
afin que non seulement les Etats, mais aussi les particuliers, puissent
être autorisés à se présenter devant la Cour quand, siégeant en instance
d’appel, elle connaîtrait de litiges jugés par les tribunaux administratifs
dépendant des Nations Unies, pour autant que les statuts de ces tribu-
naux admettent cette procédure d’appel.

Cette proposition a été rejetée par la Conférence (Conférence des Nations
Unies sur l’organisation internationale, documents, vol. 13, p. 483).

4. Cependant, comment la situation s’est-elle présentée à la session de
1955 de l’Assemblée générale, quand la procédure de réformation des

135
DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION (OP. DISS. MOROZOV) 298

jugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies a été adoptée, con-
trairement à la décision de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur l’orga-
nisation internationale?

Pour répondre à cette question, il y a lieu de prendre en considération
l'avis consultatif rendu par la Cour le 13 juillet 1954 et les travaux prépa-
ratoires qui ont précédé la revision de l’article 11 du statut du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies.

En 1954, la Cour a déclaré, en réponse à la question posée par l’As-
sembiée générale:

«Si l’Assemblée générale envisageait d’instituer, pour les différends
à venir, des dispositions prévoyant la revision des jugements du
Tribunal, la Courestime que l’Assemblée générale elle-même, étant
donné sa composition et ses fonctions, ne pourrait guère agir comme
un organe judiciaire examinant les arguments des parties, appréciant
les preuves produites par elles, établissant les faits, et disant le droit
qui s’y applique — alors surtout que l’une des parties aux différends
est l'Organisation des Nations Unies elle-même.» (Effet de jugements
du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies accordant indemnité, avis
consultatif du 13 juillet 1954, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 56.)

Or que s'est-il passé en 1955? L'Assemblée générale a créé, sur la base
prétendument de l’article 22 de la Charte, un organe subsidiaire, le
Comité des demandes de réformation de jugements du Tribunal ad-
ministratif, et l’a autorisé à demander des avis consultatifs à la Cour dans
les affaires où le Comité constate que la demande dont il est saisi repose
sur des bases sérieuses, qu’elle émane de particuliers, du Secrétaire général
des Nations Unies ou d’Etats Membres. Il est bien certain que, pour
prendre une telle décision, le Comité doit examiner au fond le jugement
du Tribunal administratif mis en cause.

Vu l’avis précité de la Cour, il apparaît que l’Assemblée générale a
créé un organe «subsidiaire» autorisé à exercer une fonction que l’As-
semblée, selon l’avis de la Cour, ne doit pas exercer elle-même.

Or l’article 22 de la Charte permet à l’Assemblée générale de «créer les
organes subsidiaires qu’elle juge nécessaires à l’exercice de ses fonctions»
(les italiques sont de nous).

Ainsi, d’après l’opinion susvisée, exprimée par la Cour en 1954, et que
je partage pleinement, le Comité créé en 1955 ne saurait être considéré
comme un organe des Nations Unies au sens des articles 7 et 22 de la
Charte et il n’a donc aucun droit de demander des avis consultatifs à la
Cour en application de l’article 96, paragraphe 2, du même instrument.

Une preuve supplémentaire de ce que ce Comité ne pouvait pas con-
sulter la Cour est qu’à part l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité
les organes des Nations Unies ne peuvent être autorisés à demander un

136

DEMANDE DE REFORMATION (OP. DISS. MOROZOV) 299

avis que «sur des questions juridiques qui se poseraient dans le cadre de
leur activité» (article 96, paragraphe 2, de la Charte). Or, le Comité, qui
n’est pas un organe permanent des Nations Unies, a sollicité un avis con-
sultatif sur une question qui s’inscrit non pas dans le cadre de sa propre
activité, mais dans le cadre de l’activité d’un autre organe, le Tribunal ad-
ministratif des Nations Unies.

5. L’avis consultatif donne à penser que l’activité en question pourrait
s'expliquer sur la base de l’article 101 de la Charte.

Je voudrais rappeler que selon cet article: «Le personnel est nommé
par le Secrétaire général conformément aux règles fixées par l’Assemblée
générale». Mais, comme la Cour l’a déclaré en 1954, la Charte «n'a pas
conféré de fonctions judiciaires à l’Assemblée générale» et, en créant le
Tribunal administratif, celle-ci «ne déléguait pas l'exercice de ses propres
fonctions» (C./.J. Recueil 1954, p. 61).

Ces observations de la Cour soulignent le caractère Judiciaire de l’ac-
tivité du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies et il y a lieu de les
interpréter en ce sens que toute procédure de réformation des décisions
judiciaires de ce Tribunal doit être elle-même judiciaire.

6. Dès le début, l'adoption de la procédure qui vient de recevoir la
caution d’une majorité des membres de la Cour a procédé de considéra-
tions tout à fait étrangères aux intérêts des fonctionnaires de l'Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies.

Le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le repré-
sentant du Comité du personnel des Nations Unies ont soulevé des ob-
jections contre la procédure de réformation proposée.

Les débats qui se sont déroulés à la Cinquième Commission et aux
séances plénières de l’Assemblée générale en 1955 ont fait apparaître
d’importances divergences de vues concernant la Charte ainsi que le
Statut de la Cour.

A la Cinquième Commission, 30 des 57 délégations n’ont pas voté en
faveur des amendements proposés à l’article 11 du statut du Tribunal. En
séance plénière, 26 délégations sur 59 n’ont pas approuvé ces amende-
ments.

Il n’est peut-être pas inutile, à ce stade, de mentionner aussi certaines
des conséquences importantes de la procédure que la Cour a approuvée.

Comme je l’ai déjà fait observer, cette procédure n’est pas judiciaire.
En plus de la démonstration faite plus haut à ce sujet, j'aimerais souligner
ce qui suit.

L’article 11, paragraphe 3, du statut du Tribunal administratif, autorise
le Secrétaire général à donner effet à l’avis de la Cour, ce qui signifie que
lorsque l’avis de la Cour est contraire au jugement du Tribunal, si le
Secrétaire général en reconnaît le bien-fondé, il peut en droit et en fait
tenir pour nul le jugement du Tribunal, bien que n’érant lui-même qu'une
des parties en cause.

7. L'avis consultatif cite l’avis rendu par la Cour dans Paffaire con-

137
DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION (OP. DISS. MOROZOV) 300

cernant l'Unesco; le Conseil d'administration de l'OIT ayant été autorisé
par la Conférence internationale du Travail à demander l’avis consultatif
de la Cour à propos de jugements rendus par le Tribunal administratif de
POIT, on a voulu justifier par analogie la procédure acceptée par la Cour
en la présente affaire. Or il convient de souligner que le Conseil d’ad-
ministration de l'OIT (tout comme les conseils d’administration de
certaines autres institutions spécialisées) est l’organe directeur de POIT,
tandis que le Comité des demandes de réformation n’est pas un organe
directeur de l'Organisation des Nations Unies; de plus sa composition
n’est nullement comparable à celle du Conseil d'administration de l’OIT.

Un autre point important est que le droit de demander la réformation
de jugements du Tribunal de l'OIT n’appartient pas à des particuliers ou à
un Etat quelconque, mais au Conseil d'administration lui-même.

Je n’ai pas l'intention d’analyser dans tous leurs détails les autres
différences qui existent entre les dispositions du statut du Tribunal ad-
ministratif de l'OIT relatives à la réformation de jugements de ce tribunal
et celles qui concernent le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies. Il y
a à ce sujet une divergence de vues bien connue; et si j’ai mentionné les
principales différences importantes entre les deux statuts, c'était seulement
pour montrer qu’il n’y a pas lieu de faire état d’une analogie quelconque,
comme dans le raisonnement que j’ai évoqué plus haut.

(Signé) Platon Morozov.

138


COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE
DU DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL

(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE/TCHAD)

ORDONNANCE DU 26 OCTOBRE 1990

1990

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA/CHAD)

ORDER OF 26 OCTOBER 1990
Mode officiel de citation :

Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad),
ordonnance du 26 octobre 1990, C.L.J. Recueil 1990, p. 149

Official citation :

Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad),
Order of 26 October 1990, I.C.J. Reports 1990, p. 149

N° de vente : 5 89
Sales number

149

| COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1990 ANNÉE 1990
26 octobre
Rôle général
n° 83 26 octobre 1990
AFFAIRE

DU DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL

(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE/TCHAD)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: M. Rupa, Président; M. MBAYE, Vice-Président, MM. LACHS,
-ELIAS, ODA, AGO, SCHWEBEL, sir Robert JENNINGS, MM. BED-
Jaout, NI, EVENSEN, TARASSOV, GUILLAUME, SHAHABUDDEEN,
PATHAK, juges; M. VALENCIA-OSPINA, Greffier.

La Cour internationale de Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante:

Vu les articles 40 et 48 du Statut de la Cour,
Vu les articles 38, 39, 44 et 46 du Réglement de la Cour; et

Considérant que, le 31 août 1990, le Gouvernement de la Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste a, conformément à l’article 40, para-
graphe 1, du Statut de la Cour, procédé à la notification au Greffe de la
Cour d’un accord intitulé « Accord-cadre sur le règlement pacifique du
différend territorial entre la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire
et socialiste et la République du Tchad», fait à Alger en langues arabe
et française le 31 août 1989, et dont une copie était annexée à la notifica-
tion;

4
150 DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL (ORDONNANCE 26 X 90)

Considérant que cet accord-cadre dispose, en son article premier,
que:

«les deux parties s’engagent à régler d’abord leur différend territo-
rial par tous les moyens politiques, y compris la conciliation, dans un
délai d’un an, cité comme référence, à moins que les chefs d’Etat en
décident autrement »

et, en son article 2, que:

«à défaut d’un règlement politique à leur différend territorial, les
deux parties s’engagent:

a) à soumettre le différend au jugement de la Cour internationale de
Justice.» ;

Considérant que, selon la notification,

«la question posée à la Cour peut être définie dans les termes
suivants:

«En vue de la poursuite de l’application de l’accord-cadre, et
compte tenu du différend territorial entre les Parties, statuer sur les
limites de leurs territoires respectifs conformément aux régles du
droit international applicables en la matière » ;

Considérant qu’il est indiqué, dans la notification, que M. Abdulati
Ibrahim El-Obeïidi a été désigné comme agent de la Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne en l’espèce;

Considérant que, le 31 août 1990, une copie certifiée conforme de la
notification et de son annexe a, conformément à l’article 39, paragraphe 1,
du Règlement de la Cour, été communiquée au Gouvernement du Tchad
par le Greffier adjoint;

Considérant que, le 1% septembre 1990, le Greffe de la Cour a reçu par
télécopie de l’ambassade de la République du Tchad à Bruxelles une
communication qui reproduisait le texte d’une requéte du Tchad intro-
ductive d’instance contre la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socia-
liste; que cette requête était fondée sur l’article 2 a) de l’accord-cadre et, à
titre subsidiaire, sur l’article 8 du traité franco-libyen d’amitié et de bon
voisinage du 10 août 1955;

Considérant que, par cette requéte, la République du Tchad
«prie respectueusement la Cour de déterminer le tracé de la frontière
entre la République du Tchad et la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne,

conformément aux principes et règles de droit international appli-
cables en la matière entre les Parties »;

Considérant qu’il est indiqué, dans la requête, que M. Abderah-
man Dadi a été désigné comme agent de la République du Tchad en

5
151 DIFFEREND TERRITORIAL (ORDONNANCE 26 X 90)

lespéce; considérant que M. Abdoulaye Lamana a ensuite été désigné
comme coagent;

Considérant que, le 3 septembre 1990, ’ambassadeur de la République
du Tchad aux Pays-Bas a déposé au Greffe de la Cour l’original de la
requéte;

Considérant que, le même jour le Greffier a, conformément à l’ar-
ticle 38, paragraphe 4, du Règlement de la Cour, transmis à la Jamahi-
riya arabe libyenne une copie certifiée conforme de la requête;

Considérant que, par lettre du 28 septembre 1990, reçue au Greffe par
télécopie le même jour et dont l’original a été reçu le 5 octobre 1990,
l’agent du Tchad a notamment fait savoir à la Cour que son gouvernement
constatait que «sa demande coïncide avec celle contenue dans la notifica-
tion que la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne lui a adressée le 31 août 1990» et
considérait que

«ces deux notifications concernent une affaire unique, dont la Cour
est saisie en application de l’accord d’Alger, qui constitue le compro-
mis, fondement principal de sa compétence en l’espèce »;

Considérant que le Greffier adjoint a transmis une copie de la lettre du
28 septembre 1990 à l’agent de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne;

Considérant que, au cours d’une réunion entre le Président de la Cour
et les représentants des Parties tenue le 24 octobre 1990, les agents des
Parties sont convenus qu’en l’espèce l’instance avait en fait été introduite
par deux notifications successives du compromis que constitue l’accord-
cadre du 31 août 1989, ja notification déposée par la Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne le 31 août 1990 et la communication faite par la République du
Tchad le 3 septembre 1990 lue à la lumière de la lettre de l’agent du Tchad
du 28 septembre 1990, et que la procédure en l’espèce devait être détermi-
née par la Cour sur cette base, conformément à l’article 46, paragraphe 2,
du Règlement de la Cour;

S'étant renseignée auprès des Parties sur les délais de présentation des
pièces de procédure;

Décide, comme prévu à l’article 46, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la
Cour, que chacune des Parties déposera un mémoire et un contre-
mémoire dans les mêmes délais;

Fixe au 26 août 1991 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt des
mémoires;

Réserve la suite de la procédure.

Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-six octobre mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix, en

6
152 DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL (ORDONNANCE 26 X 90)

trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les
autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste et au Gouvernement de la Répu-

blique du Tchad.
Le Président,
(Signé) José Maria RuDA.
Le Greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.


                                                                              482

           DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RANJEVA

[Translation]

   Arbitral jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction — The International Court of
Justice and its role as a catalyst for scientific development of international
law — Authority of jurisprudence — Solution of continuity and State succession
and continuity of the jurisdictional solution — Transposal of Mavrommatis
solution and reversal in case law — Consent to jurisdiction and status of the
Respondent — Non-fulfilment of conditions for filing Application — Difference
in treatment between Respondent and Applicant — Article 35 of the Statute :
right to institute contentious proceedings — Article 34 of the Statute : limitation
of access to States alone and definition of the legal status or position of States
in proceedings : Applicant or Respondent — Principle of sovereign equality of
parties to a dispute — No special treatment for Respondent — Consensual basis
of jurisdiction — Difference vis-à-vis system of statutorily conferred jurisdic-
tion — Jurisdiction ratione materiae — Argumentation strategies independent
of proceedings — Declaration of succession by FRY — Croatian objection to
claimed succession — Distinction between continuity of treaty obligations and
discontinuity of legal personality of SFRY/FRY — Effect of this distinction on
Article IX — Systemic links between 1948 Convention and United Nations sys-
tem — Legally established consent to jurisdiction by Serbia lacking — Histori-
cal circumstances of Mavrommatis case jurisprudence — Specifics of mecha-
nisms instituted by 1919 Peace Treaties — Law of resolving political crises.

   1. Rendering justice under the law in a judicial institution having uni-
versal jurisdiction is a particularly difficult exercise. The consistency of
justice over the course of time can bring surprises. An arbitral court, un-
constrained in its decisions, is responsible for its judgment only to the
parties which have consented to its jurisdiction. A court of law, on the
other hand, acts within the context of a concept of legal policy ; it has a
heritage to uphold embodied in its jurisprudence, which helps promote
legal certainty and the consistency of the law. As one of the principal
organs of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice enjoys
operational autonomy while sharing in the objectives of the Organiza-
tion, inter alia, through the practice of presenting an Annual Report on
the Court’s activities to the General Assembly. Moreover, the Court is
recognized as having a specific mission, and one which is willingly attrib-
uted to it : to be a catalyst for the scientific development of international
law. However, there are instances where, for scientific reasons or techni-
cal legal or judicial reasons, observers and commentators may note some
inconsistency vis-à-vis a previous decision without there actually having
been a reversal of any precedents. Reasons linked to various factors, par-
ticularly the conduct of the parties (subject-matter of claims, basic strat-
egy, argumentation strategy, etc.) in the corresponding proceedings, can

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)             483

lead to different solutions being devised. Such is the situation in the
present case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) vis-à-vis
the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 43) : transpos-
ing the solution chosen in the case concerning Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (ibid., hereinafter BHY) is
impossible from the legal standpoint because it challenges the whole
underlying logic of the basis of the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice : consent.

                                    * * *
   2. As far as the first preliminary objection relating to the Court’s juris-
diction to adjudicate Croatia’s claim is concerned, I regretfully cannot
accept the decision of the majority. I must emphasize, however, that this
does not mean that I believe that Serbia has any ground not to answer
for violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide under international law, in so far as such viola-
tions may be established. It is that the submission of the case to the Court
by Croatia was inappropriate.
   3. So far as the international legal status of Serbia in relation to the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is concerned, the Court
has adopted the solution of continuity in order to accept the continuity of
the Court’s solution in the BHY case. By basing itself upon the principle
of State succession in order to justify the continuity of the treaty obliga-
tion under the 1948 Convention, the Court has accepted the solution of
continuity, which means a break in the continuity of the legal personality
from the SFRY to Serbia. That choice, however, ignores the solution in
the BHY case, which, on the contrary, was based on the continuity of the
legal personality from the SFRY to Serbia. This contradiction prompted
the majority to rely, in error, on the jurisprudence of the Mavrommatis
case (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2), and thus ignore
the golden rule that the jurisprudence of the Court is based on consent.
   4. The present Judgment will elicit a wide range of comments : it con-
stitutes a reversal of case law regarding conditions of access to the Court.
Thus, as the Judgment recalls, it is at the date when an application is filed
that the jurisdictional capacity of the Court is assessed ; at that critical
date, all the conditions necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction must
be fulfilled in all respects. For the sake of the sound administration of
justice, the present Judgment, in referring to the jurisprudence of the
Mavrommatis case calls that firmly established rule into question. In
other words, failure to fulfil all the conditions of jurisdiction no longer
leads inevitably to the Court’s lack of jurisdiction. Such situations are not
unknown underforum prorogatum whereby a State accepts jurisdiction

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)              484

after an application has been submitted to the Court ; the absence of consent
constitutes a defect which can be overcome by potestative initiative,
that is to say, at the discretion of the respondent State. Considerations
concerning the sound administration of justice (explicit indication of con-
sent to jurisdiction by the party which had not initially indicated such consent
and procedural efficiency) explain why this open solution has been
upheld in forum prorogatum case law.

   5. However, in the present instance, the circumstances are entirely dif-
ferent, since what is missing is not the consent which can be confirmed in
a potestative manner, but the capacity itself of the State (that of Serbia in
this instance), not to access the Court as an applicant, but to be brought
before it as a respondent. On two occasions, the Court has refused to
grant the Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro (Yugoslavia) the
right to be a party to a dispute before the Court (see the cases concerning
Legality of Use of Force in 2004 (I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I, II, III),
pp. 279-1450) and the case concerning Application for Revision of the Judg-
ment of 11 July 1996 (I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 7)). Its admission to the
United Nations did not have a retroactive effect ; it could not rectify its
sui generis status following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and prior to its admission in 2000 as a new
State. In addition to judicial revisionism on the link between the status of
State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice and mem-
bership of the United Nations, the present Judgment calls into question
the very conditions in which the Court exercises its jurisdiction.

   6. Although strictly speaking we cannot talk about res judicata, the
present Judgment favours the continuity of the jurisprudence of the
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
case, which is supported by an extensive body of decisions on both pro-
cedural issues and the legal merits, in order to dismiss the solution
adopted in the Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996,
Preliminary Objections case in 2003 and the Legality of Use of Force
cases in 2004. As a result, there is a lack of consistency and clarity in the
work of the Court and a misunderstanding of the nature of the jurisdic-
tional function within the United Nations system. I must therefore regret-
fully express my dissent from the decision of the majority in the present
case.
   7. As far as the facts and the conduct of the legal actors in the present
proceedings are concerned, the Judgment should have emphasized the
specific elements which differentiate the present case from the case con-
cerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro). First, prior to its admission to the United Nations, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claimed unequivocally its continuity
from the SFRY, whereas it now objects to the Court’s jurisdiction on the

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)           485

ground that its admission as a new State had no retroactive effect. Leav-
ing aside any ethical or moral considerations, where two separate cases
are concerned, is there any obligation in law for a State to be consistent
in or faithful to its arguments ? Second, unlike Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 595) (hereinafter the Bosnia case), the Court
could not overlook or set aside the protest by Croatia in 1994 whereby it
challenged the claims to continuity made by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Indeed, in a letter dated 16 February 1994 addressed to the
Secretary-General by its Permanent Representative, Croatia stated that
it :
    “strongly objects to the pretention of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
    slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue the state, international,
    legal and political personality of the former Socialist Federal Repub-
    lic of Yugoslavia.
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
       [I]f the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . . . expressed its intention
    to be considered, in respect of its territory, a party, by virtue of suc-
    cession to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to treaties of
    the predecessor State, with effect from 27 April, . . . as a new
    State, . . . the Republic of Croatia would fully respect that notifica-
    tion of succession.” (Doc. S/1994/198, 19 February 1994.)

In 1996, in the Bosnia case, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not
raise as a preliminary objection the issue of the sui generis Member State
status that had been attributed to it. Lastly, does the link between its
status as a Member of the United Nations or as a State party to the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice and its access to the Court as a
respondent correspond to the pursuit of the sound administration of jus-
tice ?
   8. The Court’s decisions of 2003 and 2004 in the Legality of Use of
Force and Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 cases
constitute the expression of the most recent state of the law concerning the
relationship between the status of Member State of the United Nations
and access to the Court in the event of a dispute. They were not called
into question directly or indirectly by the latest judgment dating from
2007, when the final finding regarding the Court’s lack of jurisdiction was
supported unanimously by the Members of the Court ; but the difference
in their views, on the other hand, had to do with the area on which the
Court’s decision was made : a question more of appropriateness than of
legality. Unlike ad hoc arbitral courts, it is considered imperative for the
Court to abide by its own case law to assure certainty in legal relation-
ships between States. The issue in the present proceedings concerns the
distinction to be drawn between access as an applicant, which has been

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)             486

the subject of past decisions, and the bringing of a respondent before the
Court, on which no previous decisions have been rendered.
   9. The first aspect of this problem lies in the difference in treatment
which the present decision attributes to the Respondent vis-à-vis the
Applicant. A State may be brought before the Court, notwithstanding a
complete failure to fulfil the conditions for locus standi at the critical date
when the Application was filed. This difference in treatment affects the
principle of equality of the parties in regard to the rules of procedure and
the application of identical basic rules. As for the equality of the parties
in regard to the rules of procedure, they have the right to be judged in the
same conditions : that is to say, that they must fulfil the same conditions
of access to the Court (in this case, to be the Respondent) and must com-
ply with the same rules of procedure, irrespective of their status as appli-
cant or respondent. As far as equality in the application of identical basic
rules for the proceedings is concerned, the question is whether, under the
law respecting States before the International Court of Justice, the act of
refusing to be called as respondent following a unilateral application con-
stitutes an injustice.
   10. On closer examination, the difference in treatment between the
applicant and the respondent may lack any direct basis, inasmuch as it
concerns a general principle of procedural law. It is difficult not to link
the principle of the equality of rights and conditions of the applicant and
the respondent to the provisions of Article 34 of the Statute of the Court,
the terms of which must be considered in comparison with those of Arti-
cle 35. Article 34 stipulates, “Only States may be parties in cases before
the Court.” The provisions recalled in Articles 35 and 34 in the French
version of the Statute — which is the original text, as was noted in the
Judgment in the LaGrand case (“It might however be argued, having
regard to the fact that in 1920 the French text was the original version . . .”
(I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 502, para. 100)) — make a distinction between
“La Cour est ouverte aux Etats parties au présent Statut” (“The Court
shall be open to the States parties to the present Statute”) (Article 35)
and “Seuls les Etats ont qualité pour se présenter devant la Cour” (“Only
States may be parties in cases before the Court”) (Article 34). The differ-
ence between the Court being open and the right to be a party lies in the
fact that the first provision concerns the authorization or faculty to bring
a case before the Court or to initiate contentious proceedings, whereas
the second concerns the condition or capacity in which a State may be
involved in contentious proceedings. Article 35 only addresses the issue
of the access of a State to the forum of the Court : that is its capacity to
bring a case and act within specific proceedings. A State which comes
before the Court as an applicant must establish that it has a right, vis-à-
vis the respondent, with respect to its claim. Article 34, for its part,
addresses two issues : first, limiting access to the Court to States and
excluding other rights holders under international law which are not
States and, second, by use of the word “qualité” the Statute considers the
capacity or function of the rights holder accessing the Court : that is, the

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)            487

legal condition of States in proceedings as applicant or respondent as the
case may be. The combined interpretation of these two points leads to
compliance with the principle of the sovereign equality of States and a
differentiation of their legal circumstances depending on the capacity in
which they appear in the case, as respondent or applicant, such being the
function that entitles them to take part in the proceedings. The inescap-
able consequences of this are, first, equality of standing in respect of
access and, second, exclusion of any specific, different treatment that
would place the respondent at a disadvantage.
   11. The lack of any specific provisions concerning the respondent,
which would be the counterpart of Article 35, can be explained by the
consensual nature of the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction. In a system of
statutorily conferred jurisdiction, justice must be conducted in such a
way that all potential litigants can find a court to resolve their dispute ;
the statutes and functioning of the court régime provide for the right to
justice to be exercised. The dispute is put before the court with jurisdic-
tion at the applicant’s initiative, thereby making it necessary for his
adversary to take part in proceedings ; the legal bonds between the two
parties cannot then be set within a contractual or consensual framework.
In other words, in the framework of legal relationships within which the
powers and obligations of the parties to the case are defined, one of the
parties is obliged to appear before the court without any requirement for
his prior consent.
   12. On the other hand, in a system based on consent to jurisdiction,
such as that established under Article 36 of the Statute, a State is entitled
to refuse to be brought before the International Court of Justice without
its consent. This principle accounts for the importance of objections
regarding jurisdiction and admissibility in the conduct of proceedings. As
far as the law of procedure on merits is concerned, this principle explains
the lack of provisions on abuse of process and frivolity. Similarly, this is
why there is no counterpart to Article 35 of the Statute concerning the
respondent. Once the same conditions as those required of the applicant
have been fulfilled, it is for the participants to establish consent to juris-
diction, in particular the consent of the respondent. In view of the impor-
tance of the respondent’s consent for the connection between the parties
in dispute to be established, Article 34 and, in particular, its first para-
graph are linked to the issue of jurisdiction ratione personae, an interpre-
tation which we can note is borne out by the travaux préparatoires of the
Advisory Committee of Jurists (see B. Schenk von Stauffenberg, Statut et
Règlement de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale : éléments
d’interprétation, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Berlin, 1934, pp. 217 et seq.).
   13. Despite these considerations, the Judgment has chosen to interpret
the silence of previous decisions in a very specific way : to safeguard and
justify the case law of the Judgment of the 2007 case against critics.
Indeed the Judgment engages in a justification of the 2007 case law in a
surreal context : defending the implausible from the real facts. As the
judges present at the time of the 1996 Judgment and still sitting in 2007

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)             488

stated in their joint opinion, nothing can be deduced from the silence of
the 1996 Judgment on capacity to appear before the Court. The unease is
further heightened when, for lack of objective arguments, the Judgment
turns as a last resort to an ipse dixit justifying the possibility for the
Court to refrain from furnishing any explanation on a point which can be
raised ex officio, even if that point calls into question the very foundation
of contentious proceedings before the Court since it is preliminary to
even the preliminary proceedings ! This was an irrelevant and, in any
event, inconclusive debate on the issue addressed in the course of the
present case.
   14. One must wonder if the Judgment in the present case has not
arrived at the same conclusions as the arbitral tribunals of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in the
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of
Egypt (1985) and Asian Agricultural Products Limited (AAP) v. Sri
Lanka (1990) cases. The arbitral tribunals referred to the condition
linked to the consent of the two parties for putting the dispute before the
ICSID and interpreted their acceptance of ICSID dispute settlement
methods in broad terms. The arbitral tribunals did not have to be overly
strict because there was evidence of an incipient indication of consent ;
one cannot then talk of a simple logical legal conclusion.

   15. The consensual nature of the basis of jurisdiction means that juris-
diction must always be debated and established by means of a judicial
procedure. It cannot be solely “scientific”, that is, justified by logical con-
siderations. This is a precautionary principle. Jurisdiction must not be
established by attributing a greater meaning to the relevant elements of
fact and law than they possess.
   16. For these reasons, the Judgment is mistaken in the difference in
treatment it attributes to the conditions for a State to be a party before
the Court depending on whether that State is the applicant or the respon-
dent.

                                    * * *
   17. The jurisdiction ratione materiae raises the issue of the history of
the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the United
Nations and the consequences thereof on the sui generis position of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on the status of Serbia with respect
to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. In the circumstances of the
present case, unlike the solution chosen in the Bosnia case, the Judg-
ment’s approach is open to criticism because it lacks a basis in order to
be credible.
   18. Quite properly, the Judgment has sought to ensure consistency by
transposing vertically the solution from the precedent of the Bosnia pro-
ceedings on the merits. However, by avoiding a careful examination of
the particular or specific aspects of the present case, the Judgment is

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)          489

lacking in rigour, given the axiom that each case is unique in facts and in
law.
   19. To one preliminary question the Judgment brings no answer. Can
a party which has been a respondent in previous proceedings submit new
arguments contrary to those it has put forward in the past ? Examination
of the present case reveals that the dispute concerns the same question of
law : violation of the Genocide Convention. It also relates to similar
facts : the after-effects of the break-up of the SFRY. As for what is at
issue in the case, the Applicant’s claims seek the same redress as those
submitted in the Bosnia case. The dispute following the break-up of the
SFRY fed upon itself. In the circumstances of the present case, a joinder
of the proceedings under the terms of Article 47 of the Rules of Court
might have been an option for the Court, since it is not inconceivable
even without the consent of the parties. When the Croatian Application
was filed the Bosnia case was still pending and the Court would not have
been obliged to deliver largely identical judgments, when the context in
this instance is complex. The distinct and independent approaches to the
cases concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro) and Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), along with
the lack of a decision to join the proceedings, give the Parties to the sec-
ond case full control over their strategies of argumentation regarding
their own status. For its part, the Court can draw no advantage from the
decision in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Serbia and Montenegro) in adjudicating the case concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) as to the rights of the Parties
which can submit their own claims and support their own arguments of
fact and law. The Court must, in particular, provide substantive reasons
for its findings on the specific arguments advanced in the present case.

   20. Three acts punctuating the evolving understanding of the legal
status of Serbia from 1992 should have given rise to a more detailed
examination : first, the declaration of continuity made by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ; second, the Croat objection in 1994 to the
continuity claimed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ; and finally,
the admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United
Nations as a new Member State after the suspension of its participation
in the United Nations General Assembly. The combined effect of those
three acts has prompted the Court, since 1992, to talk of a sui generis
situation, more out of linguistic convenience than by reference to a pre-
established legal category. Consequently, there is reason to supplement
the Judgment’s analysis, even if it means arriving at different con-
clusions.
   21. The declaration of continuity made by the Federal Republic of

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)          490

Yugoslavia actually represents a notification of succession and falls within
the framework of the requirements of the Convention on Succession of
States in respect of Treaties ; it is binding upon it. This aspect is of no
interest in the present case. As for the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the erga omnes nature of the obli-
gations which it lays down is acknowledged as the consequence of the
basis of those provisions in customary law.
   22. The crux of the problem concerns the scope of Croatia’s 1994
objection to the continuity claimed by the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via on the fate of Article IX in the jurisdictional relationship between the
two Parties in dispute. The Court cannot regard these unilateral acts as
mere scraps of paper and must attribute legal consequences to them.

   23. In relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia the difficulty stems from the letter from the Permanent Representa-
tive of Croatia to the United Nations dated 16 February 1994. This
official document was mistakenly not taken into consideration in the
Judgment as a basis for the decision on the issue of State succession that
arose in the litigious relationship between the Parties. As stated in that
document,
    “if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
    expressed its intention to be considered, in respect of its territory, a
    party, by virtue of succession, to the Socialist Federal Republic of
    Yugoslavia, to treaties of the predecessor State, with effect from
    27 April 1992, the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
    (Serbia and Montenegro), as a new State, assumed responsibility for
    its international relations, the Republic of Croatia would fully respect
    that notification of succession” (doc. S/1994/198 (1994)).

   24. The subject-matter of the letter was a protest against the declara-
tion of 27 April 1992 by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It consti-
tuted an objection entering a reservation to the claim of continuity.
On closer analysis, various aspects must be emphasized : first, a rejection
of the continuity of the personality of the SFRY by the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia ; next an acceptance of the continuity of the treaty
obligations ratione loci : that is the applicability to the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of treaty obligations for which a
succession had taken place ; and, lastly, a formal notice to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to accept Croatia’s offer. The Croat letter
means that, having been informed of the declaration of succession of
April 1992, the Republic of Croatia considered that, with respect to
treaty ties between the Croats and the Serbs, the letter is binding upon
it vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the terms which
Croatia established therein : a continuity of treaty obligations
combined with a clause of territorial applicability. However, any
notion of the continuity of the personality of the State is ruled out, par-

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        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)          491

ticularly as far as the organic and institutional dimensions vis-à-vis the
United Nations are concerned.
   25. It is in this specific and unqualified context that the issue of the
fate of the dispute settlement clause in Article IX lies. An initial conclu-
sion cannot be avoided : the declaration in question is binding upon its
author and lays down the legal framework of its relationship with Serbia
within the context of the present case. Furthermore, as the dispute set-
tlement clause is severable from the system of obligations of the Geno-
cide Convention, it must be addressed independently inasmuch as there is
reason to apply specific rules to the indication of consent to jurisdiction,
which must be established explicitly and not implicitly, that is, based on
logical conclusions. In the present case, a doubt about continuity is jus-
tified given, on the one hand, the systemic ties which the Judgment itself
recalls between the 1948 Convention and participation in the United
Nations system — irrespective of the continuity of the substantive ties of
obligation under multilateral treaties — and, on the other hand, the
organic link between the Court and the United Nations system. In view
of the distinction drawn by Croatia in its 1994 letter in response to the
1992 declaration by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it is not dem-
onstrated that Croatia accepted the jurisdictional clause with respect to
the other Party or that it can be binding upon Croatia in the jurisdic-
tional context of the present case. This possibly surprising conclusion
must be drawn because of the consensual nature of the basis of jurisdic-
tion, since the International Court of Justice is not a court of statutorily
conferred jurisdiction, whose sphere of competence can be interpreted
broadly.
   26. For these reasons Article IX does not fall within the scope of suc-
cession in relations between Croatia and Serbia.

                                  * * *
   27. In the present case, the extension of the jurisprudence of the Mav-
rommatis case with respect to the Respondent is open to criticism since,
at the date when the Application was filed, the Respondent did not fulfil
the conditions required to appear before the Court. It is not unknown for
applications instituting proceedings to be validated after they have been
filed, as the Judgment rightly recalls : forum prorogatum, for example,
corresponds to just such a situation, serving as the underlying basis for
jurisdiction. This occurs when a State accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ
after the case has been brought. The reasons for this practice were
explained by the Court in the case concerning Certain Questions of
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).
   28. In the present instance the problem lies in the fact that at the date
of filing of the Application, the Respondent did not fulfil the conditions
required of a State in order to appear before the Court. The Judgment, in
transposing the infans conceptus pro nato habetur principle in the sense
that the proceedings are regarded as having been instituted according to

                                                                         83

        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)          492

the rules providing that the applicant fulfilled all of the conditions
required, has held that for reasons relating to the sound administration
of justice the subsequent admission of Serbia to the United Nations vali-
dated the circumstances and conditions of the filing of the Application.
Evidently, for reasons of procedural economy and with a not very for-
malistic view of the law of international disputes, nothing is said to stand
in the way of the fulfilment of the conditions for submitting a case to the
Court being assessed at the date when all of those conditions have been
met. In the present instance, the admission of Serbia and Montenegro to
the United Nations in 2000 represented the solution. The important thing
was not to oblige the Applicant to file a new Application once again in
the same case, with the same subject-matter, the same claim, the same
reason and against the same State. However, the Court’s finding on the
first preliminary objection can be criticized, even if we were to assume
that the Court had jurisdiction. For this reason, the Judgment relies on
the jurisprudence of the Mavrommatis case.
   29. The content of the Mavrommatis principle has been abundantly
discussed in the Judgment. However, the conclusion at which that deci-
sion arrived cannot be accepted owing to the lack of a rigorous analysis
of the Mavrommatis ruling and the subsequent judgments referred to.
   30. An analysis should have been made of the passage quoted in para-
graph 82 rather than a simple recollection of the finding of the Permanent
Court of International Justice. The overall procedural economy is justi-
fied by a number of points which are put forward :
— the condition that was missing, which concerned the incomplete
  nature of the international obligation under Article 11 of the Man-
  date for Palestine : it had been established but had not at that point
  entered into force. On reading the Judgment, nothing suggests that
  that obligation might have been of an irreversible nature ;
— the discretionary or potestative nature of the Applicant’s initiative to
  submit its Application again ;
— insufficient grounds for dismissing the initial Application.
   31. An analysis of the jurisprudence of the Mavrommatis case prompts
the following comments. First, the case was brought before the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice by way of a special agreement. Such a
consensual means of submitting a case presumes a lack of absolute
defects of a kind that would call into question the choice of court made
by common agreement. Second, the corrective initiative lay within the
powers of the Applicant. This aspect was repeated in the subsequent deci-
sions mentioned in the present Judgment. Thus in the Certain German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case (Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6,
1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6), the Judgment talks of unilateral action
on the part of the applicant Party. Lastly, the defect marring the regu-
larity of the submission of the case to the Court lay within the exclusive
responsibility of the party concerned, that is, the Applicant.
   32. A conclusion can be drawn : the conditions indicated by the Mav-

                                                                         84

        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)            493

rommatis Judgment do not exist in the present case. First, the question
does not concern the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court, but an
issue preliminary to jurisdiction : the right or obligation to be able to be
brought before the Court as a respondent. This is a preliminary point of
law. Indeed, if the condition governing appearance before the Court is
not fulfilled, there is ultimately no dispute capable of judicial resolution.
Second, the defect noted when the Application was filed concerned the
status of the Respondent in the proceedings, a matter beyond the power
of the Applicant. Lastly, the initiative to fulfil the missing condition lies
outside the powers of the Applicant ; control over that which is prelimi-
nary to the preliminary issue of jurisdiction comes under a different order
of authority, one which is beyond both the Court and the parties. For
these reasons, transposing the principles of the jurisprudence in the Mav-
rommatis case constitutes an error of fact and of law.
   33. Finally, it is not without interest to recall the reasons of judicial
and jurisprudential policy underlying the Mavrommatis Judgment.
   34. Particular attention must be paid to the limitation of the obliga-
tion of declaration to the Applicant. It is on the basis of the travaux
préparatoires of 1920 and the jurisprudence of the S.S. “Wimbledon”
case (Judgments, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1) that we can envisage
the limitation of the provisions of the first paragraph to the Applicant,
without there being corresponding rules for the Respondent. How, in the
absence of a valid dispute settlement clause, can a State be brought
before the Court on the sole basis that the Applicant fulfils all the con-
ditions laid down by the Statute ? The interpretation of the provisions of
Article 35 in terms of limiting the conditions of access to applicant States
parties flows from the overall structure of the Versailles Peace Treaties.
The travaux préparatoires amply demonstrated that paragraphs 1 and 2
viewed as a whole were aimed specifically at the former Central Powers,
the defeated States, which could not, particularly in 1919-1920, seek to
claim equal rights with the victors. To restate the remarks made by Sir
Cecil Hurst and the commentary by von Stauffenberg, as well as the
travaux préparatoires of the Statute, within the general context of the
1919 Peace Treaties, two considerations must be emphasized. First, there
was greater likelihood of the defeated States (Germany and the other
Central Powers) appearing before the Court as respondents. Second,
within the context of those treaties, it was difficult to confer upon the
defeated States a right to claim equal rights with the victors ; so far as the
defeated States were concerned, it was not absurd to regard the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice as possessing something similar to
statutorily conferred jurisdiction within the system of the 1919 Peace
Treaties. In the context of the United Nations Charter, the fundamental
principle of the sovereign equality of States renders any departure from
such equality contrary to the principles of the new world order. One
might thus wonder if, from the perspective of a solution to a crisis falling
under Chapter VII of the Charter, Serbia has been treated as a defeated
State, comparable to Germany in 1919. The Court should have resolved

                                                                           85

        APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION (DISS. OP. RANJEVA)            494

this question of law. These considerations explain the limits of a very nar-
row interpretation of Article 35 with a view to its general application.
  35. As far as the S.S. “Wimbledon” case is concerned, it will be
recalled that it was brought before the Permanent Court of International
Justice pursuant to Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany,
which had yet to become a Member of the League of Nations at that
point, was the Respondent. A declaration was not considered necessary
for two reasons : (1) the special reservation in Article 35, paragraph 2,
specifically concerns the provisions of the Peace Treaty (see the drafting
history of the article) ; (2) the article only mentions applicant parties,
whereas Germany was the Respondent, a possibility which had not been
foreseen at Versailles.
  36. The link between the Versailles Peace Treaties of 1919 and the
mechanism established by the provisions of Articles 34 and 35 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, carried over in
the Statute of the present Court, reveals the political dimension of the
project : the judicial rights of defeated States are not treated on a basis of
equality with those of other States.

                                           (Signed) Raymond RANJEVA.

                                                                           86


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA

(NICARAGUA y. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER OF 18 NOVEMBER 1987

1987

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DES ACTIVITES MILITAIRES
ET PARAMILITAIRES AU NICARAGUA
ET CONTRE CELUI-CI

(NICARAGUA c. ETATS-UNIS D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 18 NOVEMBRE 1987
Official citation:

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Order of 18 November 1987,
1. CJ. Reports 1987, p. 188.

Mode officiel de citation :

Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci
(Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), ordonnance du 18 novembre 1987,
C.LJ. Recueil 1987, p. 188.

Sales number 5 39
N° de vente :

1987
18 November
General List
No. 70

188

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
YEAR 1987

18 November 1987

CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA

(NICARAGUA vy. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

ORDER

Present: President NAGENDRA SINGH; Vice-President MBAYE; Judges
LacHs, RUDA, ELIAS, ODA, AGO, SETTE-CAMARA, SCHWEBEL,
Sir Robert JENNINGS, BEDJAOUI, Ni, EVENSEN, TARASSOV,
GUILLAUME; Judge ad hoc CoLLIARD; Registrar VALENCIA-
OSPINA.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to Article 44
of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Judgment delivered by the Court on 27 June 1986
by which it found (inter alia) that the United States of America was under
an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all
injury caused to Nicaragua by certain breaches of obligations under
customary international law and treaty-law committed by the United
States of America,

Whereas by the said Judgment the Court decided that the form and
amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, would

4
189  MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (ORDER 18 XI 87)

be settled by the Court, and reserved, for that purpose, the subsequent
procedure in the case;

Makes the following Order:

Whereas by a letter dated 7 September 1987 the Agent of Nicaragua,
referring to the said Judgment and to the communication from the
United States dated 18 January 1985, quoted in paragraph 10 of that
Judgment, to the effect that the United States intended not to participate
in any further proceedings in connection with the case, stated that
Nicaragua considered that the case still remained within Article 53 of the
Statute of the Court, and that that Article was still in operation;

Whereas in the said letter it was further stated that no agreement had
been reached between the Parties as to the form and amount of the repara-
tion, and that Nicaragua wished to take the opportunity afforded it by the
Court to satisfy the Court that the nature and amount of the reparation it
claims was well founded in fact and law, and that Nicaragua requested the
Court to make the necessary orders for the conduct of the case;

Whereas a copy of the letter of 7 September 1987 was forthwith
transmitted to the Government of the United States of America, and both
Parties were informed that the President of the Court would hold a
meeting, on a date to be announced, in accordance with Article 31 of the
Rules of Court, for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the Parties
on the procedure to be followed;

Whereas by a letter dated 13 November 1987 the Deputy-Agent of the
United States informed the Registrar that the United States remained
of the view that the Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the dis-
pute and that the Nicaraguan Application was inadmissible, and that
accordingly the United States would not be represented at the said meet-
ing; and whereas the meeting was held, after due notice to the Parties, on
17 November 1987, and was attended by the Agent of Nicaragua, but no
representative of the United States was present;

Having ascertained the views of the Government of Nicaragua and
having afforded the Government of the United States of America an
opportunity of stating its views,

THE COURT

Fixes as follows the time-limits for written proceedings on the question
of the form and amount of reparation to be made in this case:

29 March 1988 as the time-limit for the Memorial of the Republic of
Nicaragua; ;

29 July 1988 as the time-limit for the Counter-Memorial of the
United States of America;

And reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.
190 = MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (ORDER 18 XI 87)

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of November, one
thousand nine hundred and eighty-seven, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Government of the
United States of America, respectively.

(Signed) NAGENDRA SINGH,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.