217

JOINT SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES FORSTER,
BENGZON, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
NAGENDRA SINGH AND RUDA

1. What has made it possible for us to concur in the reasoning of the
Court and to subscribe to its decision is that, while the Judgment declares
the Icelandic extension of its fisheries jurisdiction non-opposable to the
Applicant’s historic rights, it does not declare, as requested by the
Applicant, that such an extension is without foundation in international
law and invalid erga omnes. In refraining from pronouncing upon that
part of the Applicant’s first submission in which it requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that the Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972 have
“no basis in international law”, and in reaching instead a decision of non-
opposability to the Federal Republic of Germany of the Icelandic regula-
tions, the Judgment is based on legal grounds which are specifically con-
fined to the circumstances and special characteristics of the present case
and is not based on the Applicant’s main legal contention, namely, that a
customary rule of international law exists today imposing a general
prohibition on extensions by States of their exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
beyond 12 nautical miles from their baselines.

2. In our view, to reach the conclusion that there is at present a general
rule of customary law establishing for coastal States an obligatory
maximum fishery limit of 12 miles would not have been well founded.
There is not today an international usage to that effect sufficiently wide-
spread and uniform as to constitute, within the meaning of Article 38,
paragraph 1 (6), of the Court’s Statute, “‘evidence of a general practice
accepted as law”.

3. It is an indisputable fact that it has not been possible for States, de-
spite the efforts made at successive codification conferences on the law of
the sea, to reach an agreement on a rule of conventional law fixing the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea nor the maximum distance sea-
ward beyond which States are not allowed to extend unilaterally their
fisheries jurisdiction. The deliberations of the 1958 Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea revealed this failure which has been recorded in its
resolution VIII of 27 April 1958. The General Assembly of the United
Nations consequently laid down that these two subjects would constitute
the agenda for the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea, which also
failed to reach agreement on a text. The establishment of a rule on these
two questions thus remains among the topics on the agenda of the current
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

46
218 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

4, The law with respect to free-swimming fishery resources has evolved
with complete independence from the question of the continental shelf:
the two subjects, divorced at the 1958 Conference, have remained sepa-
rate. It follows that while the provisions of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion (or the principles it established as customary law) cannot afford per
se a legal basis to a claim with respect to free-swimming fish in the waters
above the shelf, these provisions cannot either be applied a contrario in
order to rule as unlawful a claim to exclusive fisheries in the superjacent
waters. In order to prove the lack of relationship between the two ques-
tions it is sufficient to recall that the Applicant itself has claimed since
1964 exclusive rights over free-swimming fishery resources in waters
beyond and adjacent to its own territorial sea, that is to say in waters
which, under the terms of Article | of the Continental Shelf Convention,
are superjacent to part of its continental shelf.

5. It has also been contended that a [2-mile maximum fishery limit
results by implication from the fact that Article 24 of the Territorial Sea
Convention establishes a maximum 12-mile limit for the contiguous zone.
However, the contiguous zone is also entirely unrelated to fishery ques-
tions: fishing does not find a place among the purposes of the zone
referred to in that Article. It does not seem possible therefore to infer
from this provision a restriction with respect to fishery limits. Moreover,
when the contiguous zone concept and its limits were adopted at the
Geneva Conference no-one understood at the time that by agreeing to
this comparatively secondary provision, the Conference was deciding by
implication the two basic questions which had been left in suspense and
had in the end to be referred to a second Conference: the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea and the maximum fishery jurisdiction of the
coastal State. The Conference recorded in its resolution No. VIEL that
these two questions had remained unsettled. In the face of that decision,
it does not seem plausible to contend now that the Conference in adopting
Article 24 on the Contiguous Zone implied, even inadvertently, a maxi-
mum limit for fishery jurisdiction or for the territorial sea.

6. No maximum rule on fishery limits, having the force of international!
custom, appears to have as yet emerged to be finally established. The
Applicant has however contended that such a rule did crystallize around
the proposal which failed to be adopted by one vote at the 1960 Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. It is true that a general practice has
developed around that proposal and has in fact amended the 1958 Con-
vention praeter legem: an exclusive fishery zone beyond the territorial sea
has become an established feature of contemporary international law. It
is also true that the joint formula voted at that Conference provided for a
6 -- 6 formula, i.e., for an exclusive 12-mile fishery zone. Et is however

47
219 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

necessary to make a distinction between the two meanings which may be
ascribed to that reference to 12 miles:

(a) the 12-mile extension has now obtained recognition to the point
that even distant-water fishing States no longer object to a coastal
State extending its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction zone to 12 miles;
or, on the other hand,

(b) the 12-mile rule has come to mean that States cannot validly extend
their exclusive fishery zones beyond that limit.

7. In our view, the concept of the fishery zone and the 12-mile limit
became established with the meaning indicated in 6 (a) above when, in
the middle sixties, distant-water fishing States ceased to challenge the
exclusive fishery zone of 12 miles established by a number of coastal
States. It is for this reason that it may be said, as the Judgment does, that
the 12-mile limit ‘“‘appears now to be generally accepted”.

8. However, to recognize the possibility that States might claim without
risk of challenge or objection an exclusive fisheries zone of 12 miles
cannot by any sense of logic necessarily lead to the conclusion contended
for by the Applicant, namely, that such a figure constitutes in the present
state of maritime international law an obligatory maximum limit and that
a State going beyond such a limit commits an unlawful act, which is
invalid erga omnes. This contention of the Applicant is an answer to a
different question, which must be examined separately.

9. That question is as follows: is there an existing rule of customary law
which forbids States to extend their fisheries jurisdiction beyond 12
miles? In order to reply in the affirmative to this question, it would be
necessary to be satisfied that such a rule meets the conditions required for
the birth of an international custom.

10. [tis a fact that a continually increasing number of States have made
claims to extend and have effectively extended their fisheries jurisdiction
beyond 12 miles. While such a trend was initiated in Latin America, it has
been lately followed not only in that part of the world, but in other
regions as well. A number of countries in Africa and Asia have also
adopted a similar action. The total number adopting that position may
now be estimated to be between 30 to 35 coastal States, depending on the
interpretation to be given to certain national laws or decrees.

11. While those claims have generally given rise to protests or objec-
tions by a number of important maritime and distant-water fishing
States, and in this respect they cannot be described as being “generally
accepted”, a majority of States have not filed similar protests, and quite a
number have, on the contrary, made public pronouncements or formal
proposals which would appear to be inconsistent with the making of such
protests.

48
220 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

12. In this respect, attention must be drawn to declarations made, or
proposals filed by a number of States in relation to or in preparation for
the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. It is true that, as the Court’s
Judgment indicates, the proposals and preparatory documents made in
the aforesaid context are de lege ferenda. However, it is not possible in our
view to brush aside entirely these pronouncements of States and consider
them devoid of all legal significance. If the law relating to fisheries con-
stituted a subject on which there were clear indications of what precisely
is the rule of international law in existence, it may then have been pos-
sible to disregard altogether the legal significance of certain proposals,
declarations or statements which advocate changes or improvements in a
system of law which is considered to be unjust or inadequate. But this is
not the situation. There is at the moment great uncertainty as to the
existing customary law on account of the conflicting and discordant
practice of States. Once the uncertainty of such a practice is admitted, the
impact of the aforesaid official pronouncements, declarations and propo-
sals must undoubtedly have an unsettling effect on the crystallization of
a still evolving customary law on the subject. Furthermore, the law on
fishery limits has always been and must by its very essence be a compromise
between the claims and counter-claims of coastal and distant-water
fishing States. On a subject where practice is contradictory and lacks
precision, is it possible and reasonable to discard entirely as irrelevant
the evidence of what States are prepared to claim and to acquiesce in, as
gathered from the positions taken by them in view of or in preparation for
a conference for the codification and progressive development of the law
on the subject?

13. The least that can be said, therefore, is that such declarations and
statements and the written proposals submitted by representatives of
States are of significance to determine the views of those States as to the
law on fisheries jurisdictionrand their opinio iuris on a subject regu-
lated by customary law. A number of pronouncements of States in the
aforesaid circumstances reveals that while the fundamental principle of
freedom of fishing in the high seas is not challenged as such, a large
number of coastal States contest or deny that such a principle applies
automatically and without exception to adjacent waters in ail parts of the
world as soon as the 12-mile limit is reached. Such an attitude is not only
based on the clear consideration that two conferences have failed to
agree on a maximum limit but also because of additional factors which
have emerged in the intervening period between the Second and Third
United Nations Conferences. For example, it is contended that the 12-
mile fishery limit ensures, in fact, a clear privilege and a distinct ad-
vantage to the few States equipped to undertake distant-water fishing,
thus widening the gulf between developed and developing States: a
second fact is that technological advances and the pressure on food
supplies resulting from the population explosion have caused a serious
danger of depletion of living resources in the vicinity of the coasts of

49
221 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

many countries. In this respect, economic studies on fisheries have shown
that the principle of open and unrestricted access to coastal waters
inevitably results in physical and economic waste, since there is no in-
centive for restraint in the interest of future returns: anything left in
adjacent waters for tomorrow may be taken by others today. While the
better-equipped States can freely move their fleets to other grounds as
soon as the fishing operations become uneconomical, the coastal States,
with less mobile fleets, maintain the greatest interest in ensuring that the
resources near their own coasts are not depleted.

14, While granting that proposals and preparatory documents are de
lege ferenda and made with the purpose of reaching future agreements on
the basis of concessions and compromise, the following inferences could,
however, be legitimately drawn from their existence:

(a) States submitting proposals for a 200-mile economic zone, for in-
stance, which includes control and regulation of fishery resources in
that area, would be in a somewhat inconsistent position if they op-
posed or protested against claims of other States for a similar ex-
tension. Such would be the case, in particular, of those States that
have, in the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African
Unity, voted in favour of the declaration on the Issues of the Law of
the Sea, Article 6 of which says:

“., that the African States recognize the right of each coastal State
to establish an exclusive economic zone beyond their territorial seas
whose limits shall not exceed 200 nautical miles, measured from the
baselines establishing their territorial sea”.

Another instance is that of the People’s Republic of China. In the
joint communiqué of establishment of diplomatic relations with
Peru of 2 November 1971, the People’s Republic of China re-
cognized ‘the sovereignty of Peru over the maritime zone adjacent
to her coasts within the limits of 200 nautical miles”. The same re-
cognition was expressed in a similar communiqué with Argentina
on 16 February 1972.

(6) it would not seem justified to count States which have agreed to or
made such declarations and proposals as figuring in the group of
States concurring in the establishment of an alleged practice in
favour of a 12-mile maximum obligatory limit.

15. If, to the 30 to 35 States which have already extended their fishertes
jurisdiction beyond 12 miles, there is added the further number of 20 to 25
States which have taken the attitudes described in the preceding para-
graph, the conclusion would be that, today, more than haif the maritime

50
222 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

States are on record as not supporting in fact and by their conduct the
alleged maximum obligatory 12-mile rule. In these circumstances, the
limited State practice confined to some 24 maritime countries cited by
the Applicant in favour of such a rule cannot be considered to meet the
requirement of generality demanded by Article 38 of the Court’s Statute.

16. Another essential requirement for the practice of States to acquire
the status of customary law is that such State practice must be common,
consistent and concordant. Thus contradiction in the practice of States or
inconsistent conduct, particularly emanating from these very States
which are said to be following or establishing the custom, would prevent
the emergence of a rule of customary law.

17. Certain States, whose conduct is invoked as showing the existence
of the 12-mile maximum rule, have not hesitated to protect their own
fishing interests beyond that limit, when they felt that it was required for
the benefit of their nationals by the existence of important fisheries in
waters adjacent to their coasts. Various methods have been utilized to
achieve that result, but the variety of methods should not obscure the
essential fact. It could be observed for instance, that the United States
and the USSR have lately carried out this form of protection not uni-
laterally but through bilateral agreements inter se and with other States !.
However, these Powers began by adopting unilateral measures which
created for the States whose nationals were fishing in adjacent waters the
need to enter into fishery agreements if they wished that their nationals
could continue their fishing activities in those grounds. Once the need for
an agreement was thus created, it was not difficult for these Powers,
because of their possibilities in offering various countervailing advan-
tages, to reach agreements which assured them of a preferential or even
an exclusive position in those fishing grounds in which they had special
interests in areas adjacent to their shores well beyond the 12 miles. This

1 International Convention (with annex and Protocol) for the High Seas Fisheries
of the North Pacific Ocean signed on 9 May 1952 by the United States of America,
Canada and Japan (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 205, p. 65); Convention con-
cerning the High Seas Fisheries of the North-West Pacific Ocean signed on 14 May
1956 by Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (AJIL, 1959, p. 763);
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Fishery Problems in the
North-Eastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off the Coast of the United States of America,
signed on 13 February 1967 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 688, p. 157); Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas in
the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, signed on 25 November 1967 (United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 701, p. 162); Agreements effected by Exchange of Notes
signed on 23 December 1968 between the United States and Japan on Certain Fisheries
off D United States Coast and Salmon Fisheries (TZAS of the United States, No.
6600).

3]
223 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

demonstrates the fact that even for States which cannot claim a special
dependence on their fisheries for their livelihood or economic develop-
ment, 12 miles may not be sufficient. It would not seem fair or equitable
to postulate on the basis of such divergent conduct a rule of law which
would deny the power to protect much more vital fishing interests to
countries lacking the same possibilities of offering attractive terms by way
of compensation for abstaining from fishing in their adjacent waters.

18. The practice of France offers another interesting example with
respect to the question of uniformity of custom. France extended its
fishing limits, in 1972, to 80 miles in the French Guiana. Law No. 72-620
of 5 July 1972 established this zone of 80 miles ‘with a view to ensure the
conservation of biological resources”. However, Article 2 laid down:

“Tn that part of the zone defined in Article ] which extends beyond
territorial waters, measures shall be taken as needed, in accordance
with conditions laid down by decree, for the purpose of limiting the
fishing of the various species of marine animal. The application of
these measures to the vessels of foreign States shall be carried out
with due regard for the geographical situation of those States and the
fishing habits of their nationals.

In the same part of the zone, fishing by the vessels of States not
authorizing fishing by French vessels in comparable circumstances
may be prohibited by decree.”

Thus France is reserving its right to forbid foreign vessels to fish in the
zone between the 12 and 80-mile limit off Guiana, if French vessels are
not authorized to fish in zones beyond 12 miles off the coast adjacent to
another country. It is hardly possible to count France among the States
whose practice invariably supports an alleged 12-mile maximum limit,
when it is reserving the right to forbid foreign fishing outside 12 miles off
the shore of the French Guiana, under certain conditions.

19. Likewise, archipelago States which have claimed or established
fishery limits according to the geographical characteristics of their ter-
ritories could hardly be counted as States accepting the existence of a
maximum 12-mile obligatory limit. The same observation could be made
in regard to States which have fixed an exclusive fishing zone far beyond
the 12-mile limit off their coasts by establishing ‘fisheries closing lines” in
certain bays.

20. Consequently, it is not possible to find today in the practice of
52
224 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (JOINT SEP. OP.)

States what the Court described in the Asylum case as ‘‘a constant and
uniform usage, accepted as law” (J.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 277). The alleged
12-mile limit maximum obligatory rule does not fulfil ‘‘an indispensable
requirement”, namely, ‘‘that within the period in question, short though
it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform”’
(North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 43).

21. It could therefore be concluded that there is at present a situation
of uncertainty as to the existence of a customary rule prescribing a maxi-
mum limit of a State’s fisheries jurisdiction. No firm rule could be deduced
from State practice as being sufficiently general and uniform to be accept-
ed as a rule of customary law fixing the maximum extent of the coastal
State’s jurisdiction with regard to fisheries. This does not mean that there
is a complete “lacuna” in the law which would authorize any claim or
make it impossible to decide concrete disputes. In the present case, for
instance, we have been able to concur in a Judgment based on two
concepts which we fully support: the preferential rights of the coastal
State and the rights of a State where a part of its population and industry
have a long established economic dependence on the same fishery
resources.

22. Admittedly, this situation of legal uncertainty is unsatisfactory and
conducive to international friction and disputes. It is to be hoped however
that the law on the subject may be clarified as a result of the efforts
directed to its codification and progressive development which are now
being made at the Caracas conference.

(Signed) I. FORSTER.

(Signed) C. BENGZON.

(Signed) E. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA.
(Signed) NAGENDRA SINGH.
(Signed) J. M. RuDA.

53


124

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ
[Translation]

Nature of the dispute

The case now before the Court has given rise to long discussions,
both in the written proceedings and in the oral arguments. All the
legal questions relating to jurisdiction involved in the dispute have
not, however, in my opinion, been fully brought out.

There are four important questions which have to be considered
by the Court :

(1) What is the scope of the Declaration by which Iran accepted
the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court,
or rather, how is this Declaration to be construed ?

(2) Is the nationalization by Iran of the oil industry, which
directly affected the Anglo-[ranian Oil Company, a measure solely
within the reserved domain of Iran, and thus outside the jurisdiction
of the Court ?

(3) What is the nature of the United Kingdom Government’s
intervention in this case ?

{4) What is the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court ? Is the Court competent to deal with questions other
than those expressly specified in the said article ?

I shall follow the scheme of my previous individual and dissenting
opinions, and consider the questions indicated above from the point
of view of the law, after which I shall apply the law to the facts of
the present dispute.

One preliminary observation of cardinal importance must be
made in this connection. As a result of the profound and sudden
transformations which have recently occurred in the life of peoples,
it is necessary to consider in respect of the above questions, first
the way they have been settled until recent times, that is to say,
in accordance with classical international law, and secondly, how
they are settled to-day, that is to say, in accordance with the new
international law.

There is a fundamental difference between the two. Classical inter-
national law was static, it scarcely altered at all, because the life of
peoples was subject to few changes ; moreover, it was based on the
individualistic regime. The new international law is dynamic ; it 1s
subject to constant and rapid transformations in accordance with
the new conditions of international life which it must ever reflect.
This law, therefore, has not the character of quasi-immutability ; it
is constantly being created. Moreover, it is based upon the regime

35
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 125

of interdependence which has arisen and which has brought into being
the law of social interdependence, the outcome of the revitalized juri-
dical conscience, which accords an important place to the general
interest. This is social justice. This law is not, therefore, mere specu-
lation ; nor is it the ideal law of the future, but it is a reality ; it is
in conformity with the spirit of the Charter as it appears from the
Preamble and from Chapter E thereof.

The Court must not apply classical international law, but rather
the law which it considers exists at the time the judgment is deli-
vered, having due regard to the modifications it may have undergone
following the changes in the life of peoples ; in other words, the Court
must apply the new international law.

II

Scope of the Declaration by which Iran accepted the provisions of
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court

It was this question which gave rise to the most lengthy argu-
ment. The Parties resorted to arguments of all kinds, especially to
arguments based on the rules of grammar. The question whether
Iran’s Declaration of adherence was unilateral or bilateral in char-
acter was also argued. I shall not dwell long upon this latter point ;
the Declaration is a multilateral act of a special character ; it is the
basis of a treaty made by Iran with the States which had already
adhered and with those which would subsequently adhere to the
provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.

The Iranian Declaration of adherence should not be construed by
the methods hitherto employed for the interpretation of unilateral
instruments, conventions and legal texts, but by methods more in
accordance with the new conditions of international life.

The traditional methods of interpretation may be summarized
by the following points :

(1) It is considered that the texts have an everlasting and
fixed character as long as they have not been expressly abrogated.

(2) Strict respect for the letter of the legal or conventional
texts.

(3) Examination of these texts, considered by themselves
without regard to their relations with the institution or convention
as a whole.

(4) Recourse to travaux préparatoires in case of doubt as to
the scope of these texts.

(5) Use, in reasoning, of out-and-out logic, almost as in the
case of problems of mathematics or philosophy.

(6) Application of legal concepts or doctrines of the law of
nations as traditionally conceived.

36
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 126

(7} Application of the decisions of the present International
Court, or of the earlier Court, in similar cases which arise, without
regard to the question whether the law so laid down must be
modified by reason of the new conditions of international life.

(8) Disregard for the social or international consequences
which may result from the construction applied.

Some form of reaction is necessary against these postulates
because they have had their day.

In the first place the legal or conventional texts must be modified
and even regarded as abrogated if the new conditions of inter-
national life or of States which participated in the establishment
of those texts, have undergone profound change.

Then it is necessary to avoid slavish adherence to the literal
meaning of legal or conventional texts ; those who drafted them
did not do so with a grammar and a dictionary in front of them ;
very often, they used vague or inadequate expressions. The
important point is, therefore, to have regard above all to the spirit
of such documents, to the intention of the parties in the case
of a treaty, as they emerge from the institution or convention as a
whole, and indeed from the new requirements of international life.

Recourse should only be had to travaux préparatoires when it
is necessary to discover the will of the parties with regard to
matters which affect their interests alone. A legal institution, a
convention, once established, acquires a life of its own and evolves
not in accordance with the ideas or the will of those who drafted
its provisions, but in accordance with the changing conditions
of the life of peoples.

A single example will suffice to show the correctness of this
assertion. Let us assume that in a commercial convention there
is a stipulation that all questions relating to maritime trade are
to be governed by the principles of international law-in force.
These principles may have been followed by the parties for a
century, perhaps, without any disputes arising between them ;
but one of the parties may, at the present time, by reason of
the changes which have recently taken place in such matters,
come to Court to claim that the century-old practice hitherto
followed should be changed on the ground that it must be held
that the will of the parties is no longer the same as it was at the
time when the convention was signed. This is in many ways
similar to the rebus sic stantibus clause which is so well known
in the law of nations.

It is, moreover, to be observed that out-and-out reliance upon
the rules of logic is not the best method of interpretation of legal
or conventional texts, for international life is not based on logic ;
States follow, above all, their own interests and feelings in their
relations with one another. Reason, pushed to extremes, may
easily result in absurdity.

37
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 127

It is also necessary to bear in mind the fact that certain
fundamental legal conceptions have changed and that certain
institutions and certain problems are not everywhere understood
in the same way: democracy is differently understood in Europe
and in America, and in the countries of the Eastern group and
those of the Western group in Europe ; the institution of asylum
is not understood in the same way and is not governed by the
same rules in Europe and in Latin America ; the Polar question,
particularly in the Antarctic, is not looked at in the same way
in America as on other continents, and so forth.

Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the conse-
quences of the interpretation decided upon in order to avoid
anomalies.

Applying the foregoing considerations to the determination of
the scope of Iran’s adherence to the provisions of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, this adherence must be inter-
preted as giving the Court jurisdiction to deal with the present
case. The scope of this adherence is not to be restricted by giving
too great an importance to certain grammatical or secondary
considerations. Justice must not be based upon subéletres but upon
realities.

I shall not dwell on this point, because I think it is necessary to
consider other elements, perhaps more important than the will of
the Parties, in order to decide as to the Court’s jurisdiction, as will
subsequently be seen.

III

Iyan's nationalization of the oil industry and the ‘‘reserved
domain" of that State

The Iranian Government, in its “Observations préliminaires”,
filed on February 4th, 1952, expressly asserted that the nationali-
zation of the oil industry which it had put into effect was a measure
exclusively within its reserved domain and that the Court therefore
had no jurisdiction to deal with this case.

It is necessary in the first place briefly to examine the nature of
the reserved domain, its origin and its present state.

This domain was established by classical international law as a
natural consequence of the 2ndividualistic regime and of the absolute
sovereignty of States upon which this law was founded.

This reserved domain covered a very wide ficld. In particular,
States could, without regard to the will or the interests of other
States, do.the following :

(a) Every State could set up the internal political organization
which it considered the most suitable without being accountable
to anybody.

38
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 128

(b) It could enact such laws as it considered necessary, even if
these were contrary to international law, and its courts were required
to apply only these laws.

(c) It could freely determine who were its nationals.

(ad) It could, in entire freedom, determine the civil rights of its
nationals and those of foreigners residing on its territory, often
differentiating in important respects between these two categories.

(e} Foreigners were in all respects subject to the authority of the
State in which they resided and had no redress even if they were
prejudiced as the result of the action of that State.

{f) Each State could, by virtue of what was called its domaine
éminent, make such use as it desired of the natural resources of its
territory, which might or might not be the subject of exploitation
concessions to private persons and which might be reclaimed by
the State if it so desired.

(g) It could freely exercise its sovereign rights over the whole
extent of its territory, free from any obligation towards other
States or towards the international community. It could, in parti-
cular, take or refrain from taking the measures necessary to ensure
internal order, carry out surveillance of its coasts, facilitate naviga-
tion, etc.

(h) Each State could, as it pleased, conclude treaties with other
States without any means existing for their modification or abroga-
tion.

From the middle of the rgth century, as the result of the appear-
ance of important factors which had not previously existed, the
traditional individualistic regime of the absolute sovereignty of
States began to give place to a new regime, that of interdependence,
which gave rise, as I have said, to the law of social interdependence.
This resulted in the beginning of the total or partial internation-
alization of all the matters referred to above as within the reserved
domain. It is now admitted that a State which, in the exercise of
its sovereignty, causes damage to another State, must indemnify
that other State. Moreover, the concept of abus du droit, of which I
shall have more to say later, is beginning to be introduced into
international law. As a result of these various factors, the reserved
domain of States has been modified and considerably reduced ;
in many cases it is possible to present a claim against a State
relating to matters which it alleges to be within its reserved domain.

I shall merely give one example: although it is true that every
State may establish the internal organization which it chooses, this
organization must nevertheless be such that the State can fulfil its
international obligations ; if the State does not do so, it cannot be
admitted as a Member of the United Nations or it may be expelled

39
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ I29

from the United Nations (Articles 4 and 6 of the Charter) and, in
any event, if by reason of defects in its internal organization it
causes injury to another State, it is under an obligation to com-
pensate that State.

IV

Nature of the intervention by the United Kingdom Government in
the present case.

This point is of cardinal importance.

The United Kingdom Government applied to the Court on
May 26th, 1951, in order to protect the interests of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, an English company, on the ground that
Iran, by nationalizing the oil industry, had violated the rights of
that Company, rights derived, in particular, from the Concession
Agreement of 1933 concluded between the Company and Iran.

The United Kingdom Government is therefore not appearing in
this case in defence of its own interests, but to protect the interests
of its nationals, which is a very different matter.

In accordance with the international law in force, a State may
formulate a claim against another State in three cases :

(a) When one of its rights has been violated by that State.

(0) To protect the rights of its nationals if these rights have been
disregarded or violated by that State.

(c} To defend the rights of a State which has entrusted it with
this defence because it cannot directly undertake its own defence,
for instance, if it has broken off diplomatic relations with the State
which has violated its rights.

The position of the claimant State is quite different in each of the
three cases.

In the first case, that is to say, where the State is acting in defence
of its own interests, attention must be confined to the agreements
which have been concluded between the two States.

In the second case, the claimant State acts in virtue of a right
conferred by the law of nations and universally recognized in
practice, the right of diplomatic protection of its nationals. In
accordance with this law, the action of the claimant State cannot
be met by any of the arguments that could be raised against it if
it were acting on its own behalf: the only objections which can be
raised to such a claim are those which are based upon international
law or which result from the nature of the right which the claimant
relies on.

No difficulty arises in respect of the third case. The State against
which the claim is made can, as against a State acting on behalf of
the claimant State, rely only upon conventions or agreements
concluded between the last-named State and itself.

It must be pointed out as regards diplomatic protection that,
according to the new international law, it may assume three different

40
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 130

forms which depend upon the organ before which that protection is
exercised : (a) direct protection or claim against a State ; (6) protec-
tion before the Security Council of the United Nations ; (c) protec-
tion before the International Court of Justice.

These three aspects of diplomatic protection will disappear or
will undergo changes when the new international law clearly estab-
lishes the international rights of the individual, i.e. those rights
which he will be entitled to invoke directly against a State without
resorting to the diplomatic protection of the country of which he is
a national.

V

What is the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court ? Is the Court competent to deal with matters other than those
specifically indicated in that Article ?

These questions, in my opinion, constitute the crucial point of the
present case.

The arguments which we have heard proceeded from the basis,
which was regarded as indisputable, that the Court’s jurisdiction
is determined solely by Article 36, paragraphs x and 2, of its Statute
and that it is consequently derived almost entirely from the consent
of the Parties. This explains the long arguments as to the scope of
Iran’s adherence to the provisions of that Article.

This view is incorrect.

It should be pointed out, in the first place, that Articles 36
and 38 of the Statute of the Court, in Chapter II relating to the
competence of the Court, are very defective. Article 38, which
reproduces Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, has long been the subject of strong criticism,
of which no account was taken at the San Francisco Conference
when that Article was revised. It is therefore for the International
Court of Justice to determine its true scope. The same must be
said of Article 36.

That article, Article 36, refers to disputes which may arise
between States ; these relate to rights flowing from agreements
concluded between these States or from rules established by
international law with regard to given questions (land domain,
maritime domain, etc.). What are involved therefore are disputes
ordinarily relating to instruments to which two or more States
are parties.

But in addition to such rights there are others, directly established
by international law, which have not been sufficiently brought out
in the present case to determine the Court’s jurisdiction. These
rights do not result from the will of States or from other juridical
acts, but from the revitalized conscience of the people which
takes account of the general interest. These rights do not create

4I
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 131

direct obligations between States ; their existence may not give
rise to discussion but must be protected in the event of their
violation.

Among these rights, it is necessary to mention in particular
those which are said to be fundamental rights of States (the
right to independence, to sovereignty, to equality, etc.), as well
as certain other rights conferred by the law of nations, such as
that of the protection of nationals, the right to be indemnified
for injuries, and so forth.

Article 36 of the Statute of the Court does not refer to the
rights falling within this second category, for they do not give
rise to disputes and, perhaps for this reason, no thought was
given to them. But Article 36 does not exclude them from the
Court’s jurisdiction ; if this had been the intention, it would
have been stated expressly.

How then is this gap to be filled, or in short, how is the Court’s
jurisdiction with regard to this second category of rights to be
determined ? In order to do this, it is necessary to have recourse
to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, of which the
Statute of the Court forms an integral part (Article 92 of the
Charter), and to the general principles of the law of nations. It
is moreover necessary to have regard to the international conse-
quences which might result from a restrictive interpretation of
Article 36.

The Charter seeks to add to the prestige of the law of nations,
as appears from the Preamble, paragraph 3, from Article 1,
paragraph 1, of Chapter I, from Article 2, paragraph 3, as well
as from Article 13 (a) and from Articles 36 and 38. International
law and the International Court of Justice are, at the present
time, closely linked together: it is impossible to conceive of an
international Court which does not apply the law of nations,
or of this law without a Court to apply it.

In accordance with the spirit of the Charter, and with the
general principles of international law, all the rights o1 States
must be fully recognized and protected and the conflicts to which
they may give rise must be settled by peaceful means.

There is a fundamental difference between classical international
law and the new international law with regard to the means
available to States to assert the two categories of rights indicated
above.

Under classical international law, disputes between States
arising from conventions or facts giving rise to legal relations,
or from rules established by the law of nations on given matters,
had to be settled by means freely chosen by the parties; but
if the parties could not agree as to these means, the dispute
remained unresolved and consequently the stronger State could
to some extent impose its will upon the weaker.

42
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 132

The same is true with regard to the exercise of a right expressly
recognized by the law of nations, that is to say those rights which
fall within the second category referred to above. Here again, if
some peaceful settlement is not reached, a strong State can impose
its will upon a weak State ; and if the latter be the claimant, its
right remains of no practical value.

In the new international law the matter is wholly different. In
accordance with this law, and in particular with the spirit of the
Charter, all disputes between States must be resolved by peaceful
means, and all the rights recognized by the law of nations must be
respected and must have a sanction.

To this end, the Charter created an international organization
comprising, among other organs, the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice.

If the Statute of the Court were intended to limit the powers of
the Court solely to the solution of disputes relating to rights of the
first category referred to above, it would, as I have said, have
expressly so provided. The Court then would be, in effect, a mere
international court of arbitration. It would have been better, in
these circumstances, to have confirmed the Permanent Court of
Arbitration set up in 1899, which has the advantage of being
composed of judges selected in each case by the parties themselves.
But the present Court is, according to its Statute, a Court of jusitce
and, as such, and by virtue of the dynamism of international life,
it has a double task: to declare the law and develop the law. Its
first task includes the settlement of disputes between States as well
as the protection of the rights of those States as recognized by the
law of nations. As regards the Court’s second task, namely, the
development of law, it consists of deciding the existing law, modify-
ing it and even creating new precepts, should this be necessary.
This second mission is justified by the great dynamism of inter-
national life. The Third Session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations has recognized the Court’s rights to develop inter-
national law in its Resolution No. 171. The Institute of Inter-
national Law has on its side in the recently held Session at Siena
expressly recognized this right of the Court. In creating a commis-
sion, the Institute unanimously adopted the following Resolution :
[Translation] “The Institute of International Law, keenly aware
of the growing importance of the International Court of Justice
and of its rôle in the development of international law...” In
discharging this task the Court must not proceed in an arbitrary
manner, but must seek inspiration in the great principles of the
new international law.

With regard to the protection of these rights, it is unnecessary
to ascertain whether the complainant or the State against which
the claim is made has or has not accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court, or whether it is or is not a Member of the United Nations.
Every State in the world is to-day a member of the international

43
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 133

community, or rather, of the international society ; all are subject
to the law of nations and have the rights and obligations laid down
by that law. It is impossible to suppose that a State not a Member
of the United Nations, or one which has not accepted the juris-
diction of the Court, should be able to violate the rights of other
States and that it should not be possible to bring it before the Court ;
or, conversely, that a State which is a Member of the United
Nations should be able so to act with regard to a non-member
State.

The Court, in its Advisory Opinion of April 11th, 1949, on
“Reparations for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United
Nations” expressly adopted the above-mentioned point of view.
It held that ‘‘in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involv-
ing the responsibility of a State which zs not a member, the United
Nations, as an Organization, has the capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government
with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage
caused to the United Nations”.

It must be noted that in that Opinion, the Court actually created
the law.

The State responsible may therefore be brought before the Court
without its being necessary to inquire whether it has or has not
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or whether it has adhered to
the provisions of Article 36 (2) of its Statute.

If the United, Nations brought before the Court.a claim against
a State on the grounds above referred to, could it be possible for
the Court to reject the claim brought by this Organization, on the
basis of Article 34 (1) of the Statute, which provides that : “only
States may be parties in cases before the Court’’, and on the ground
that the United Nations are not a State ? This would be nonsense.

It should be pointed out too, with regard to rights of the second
category above referred to, that the new international law has
reinforced and amplified the rights which already existed and it
has recognized or conferred others which are of great importance
and which have no existence in classical international law. I shall
mention but three, because they are closely linked with the sub-
stance of the present dispute: that of the protection of nationals,
which is reinforced, that resulting from a dental of justice and that
resulting from an abus du droit. This last concept, which is relatively
new in municipal law (it finds a place in the Civil Codes of Germany
and Switzerland) is finding its way into international law and
the Court will have to give it formal recognition at the appropriate
time.

Efforts are moreover being made at the present time to establish
a universal declaration of the rights of the individual, and in order
to give these rights protection on an international level, it is sought
to create a special Court. It is clear that it will be enough for the

44
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 134

State concerned to present itself before that Court or, failing that,
before the International Court of Justice for it to obtain satis-
faction.

Lastly, if the Court should hold that it lacks jurisdiction when-
ever rights of the second category of which I have spoken are
concerned, very important cases might occur in which such a hold-
ing of lack of jurisdiction would cause disappointment and would
considerably damage the prestige of this tribunal.

In conclusion, the Court should interpret and even develop
Article 36 of its Statute in the sense indicated above.

In conclusion, I shall merely indicate briefly certain other obser-
vations with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose
of completing what may be called a general theory of the Court’s
competence.

(1) The Court is competent to give an opinion on all questions
submitted to it by the Security Council or the Assembly of the
United Nations. Its jurisdiction results from the fact that the Court
is one of the organs of the United Nations (Article 7 of the Charter).

(2) Many international relations have at the present time a poli-
tical as well as a juridical aspect ; this was recognized by the Court
in its Advisory Opinion of May 28th, 1948. In such cases, the Court
must consider both these aspects of cases submitted to it.

(3) It may happen that a dispute has entirely separate juridical
and political aspects. In such a case, the Court is competent to deal
with the juridical aspect and the Security Council is competent to
deal with the political aspect.

(4) If a case submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to
world peace, the Security Council may seise itself of the case and
put an end to the Court’s jurisdiction. The competence of the
Council results from the nature of the international organization
established by the Charter, and from the powers of the Council.

VI

Conclusions

The following conclusions result from the legal considerations
which I have set out, in the case now before the Court :

(1) The Court has jurisdiction to deal with the claim presented
against Iran by the United Kingdom by reason of the Iranian
Declaration of adherence to the provisions of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court. ‘

(2) The Court has jurisdiction, in particular, because the United
Kingdom is not acting in the present case in defence of its own
interests, but to protect the interests of one of its nationals, the
Anglo-franian Oil Company.

45
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALVAREZ 135

Since the United Kingdom is exercising this right of protection,
it cannot be met with arguments as to the scope of the Iranian
Declaration of adherence to the provisions of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, because what is involved is
not a dispute between these two countries, but the exercise of a
right recognized by the law of nations.

(3) In view of the nature of the reserved domain at the present
day, the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be limited by the Iranian conten-
tions with regard to this domain.

(4) The Court has a very wide jurisdiction for the protection of
rights directly conferred upon States by international law (those
relating to the protection of nationals, to reparation for injury
unjustly suffered, to denials of justice, to abus du droit, etc.). Its
jurisdiction in this connection cannot be limited by the non-
adherence of the State against whom the claim is made to the provi-
sions of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.

The exercise of some of these rights may constitute the merits of
the dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran.

(Signed) A. ALVAREZ.


104 ARRÊT N° I3. — USINE DE CHORZOW (FOND)

ANNEXE A L’ARRET N° 13

I. — PIÈCES TRANSMISES PAR L’AGENT DU GOUVERNEMENT ALLEMAND :
Contrat entre le chancelier du Reich et la Bayerische, 2 mai 1916
(en allemand). ‘

Deuxième contrat complémentaire entre les mêmes Parties, 21 octobre
1916 (en allemand).

Quatrième contrat complémentaire entre les mêmes Parties, 22 décem-
bre 1916 (en allemand).

Cinquième contrat complémentaire entre les mêmes Parties, 20 mars
1917 (en allemand).

Septième contrat complémentaire entre les mêmes Parties, 13 novembre
1918 (en allemand).

Requête de la Bayerische contre le Fisc allemand, 14 mai 1919
(en allemand).

Lettre de MM. Lybrand, Ross Bros. et Montgomery à la direction
de la Bayerische (avec expertise).

Certificat notariel du DT Hermann Münch, 19 juin 1928.
Certificat notariel du DT Robert Henoch, 19 juin 1928.

Glossen zur Stickstoff-Industrie, conférence du Dt N. Caro, 24 janvier
1927 (en allemand).

Plan général de l’usine de Piesteritz.

Plan des Reichsstickstoffwerke, Piesteritz.

Vue panoramique des Bayerische Stickstoffwerke 4 Piesteritz.

Plan général des Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke à Chorzéw.

Plan des Reichsstickstoffwerke à Chorzéw.

Vue panoramique des usines de Chorzéw.

Glossen zur Stichstoff-Industrie, extrait de la Chemische Industrie, n° 14,
du 9 avril 1927 (en allemand).

Lettre de l’Oberschlesische au D! Ernst Wolff, Berlin, 19 juin 1928
(en allemand).

Lettre de la Bayerische au DT Ernst Wolff, Berlin, 19 juin 1928
(en allemand). ‘

Bilans annuels de la Stickstoff Treuhand Gesellschaft, 31 mars 1921 —
31 mars 1928 (en allemand).

II. — PIECES TRANSMISES PAR L’AGENT DU GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS :
Requête introduite au nom du Fisc polonais contre l’Oberschlesische
devant le Tribunal de Katowice.

Lettre de la Bayerische à la Section des usines de l’État, direction des
usines de Chorzéw, Berlin, 24 juillet 1917.

Discours du député Mayer au Reichstag, 2 novémbre 1916.

Lettre du commandant général, 6mM€ Corps d’Armée, au Reichsstick-
stoffwerke, Chorzdw, 20 octobre 1916.

Lettre à la Direction des chemins de fer, Katowice, 22 juin 1917.

Lettre du ministère de la Guerre à la Kriegsamistelle, Breslau,
25 mai 1918.
105

ARRÊT N° 13. — USINE DE CHORZOW (FOND)

Lettre de l’Oberschlesische à la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.,
Trostberg, 14 octobre 1920.

Description des installations de l'usine à Chorzéw.
Extrait de la Gewerbeordnung für das Deuische Reich, Berlin, 1912.

Tableau des propres frais de l’usine de Chorzôw pour la production
d’un kilo d’azote.

Relevé des matériaux emmagasinés, etc., repris, le 3 juillet 1922,
dans l'usine de Chorzéw.

Requéte introduite devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polo-
nais par la Bayerische contre l'État polonais, 25 mars 1925.

Note verbale du Gouvernement allemand à la Légation polonaise,
Berlin, 11 mai 1927.

Jugement du Tribunal de Katowice en l'affaire du Fisc polonais
contre l’Oberschlesische, 12 novembre 1927.

Lettre de l'avocat DT Ernst Wolff au Tribunal arbitral mixte ger-
mano-polonais, 6 janvier 1928.

Lettre du ministre d'Allemagne à Varsovie à M. Jackowski, 24 octobre
1927. |

Lettre du ministre d'Allemagne; à Varsovielà M. Jackowski, 20 octobre
1927.


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER
INDIAN TERRITORY
(PORTUGAL v. INDIA)

ORDER OF JANUARY 17th, 1959

1959

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DU
DROIT DE PASSAGE
SUR TERRITOIRE INDIEN
(PORTUGAL c. INDE)

ORDONNANCE DU 17 JANVIER 1959
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
Order of January 17th, 1959: I.C.]. Reports 1959, p. 3.”

La présente ordonnance doit étre citée comme suit:

« Affaire du droit de passage sur territoire indien,
Ordonnance du 17 janvier 1959: C. I. J. Recueil 1959, p. 3. »

Sales number 9 0 3
N° de vente:

1959
January 17th
General List :

No. 32

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1959

January 17th, 1959

CASE CONCERNING
RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER

INDIAN TERRITORY
(PORTUGAL v. INDIA)

ORDER

The President of the International Court of Justice,

having regard to Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and to
Article 37 of the Rules of Court;

having regard to the Order of November 6th, 1958, whereby the
time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of the Government of
India was postponed to January 26th, 1959;

Whereas, by a letter dated January 13th, 1959, the Agent for the
Government of India requested an extension until February 5th,
1959, for the filing of the Rejoinder;

Whereas, by a letter dated January 16th, 1959, the Agent for the
Government of Portugal stated that his Government made no
objection to this extension;

Decides to extend the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of
the Government of India to February 5th, 1959.

4
4 RIGHT OF PASSAGE OVER INDIAN TERRITORY (ORDER I7 I 59)

Done in English and in French, the English text being authori-
tative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this seventeenth day of
January, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine, in three copies,
one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the
others transmitted to the Government of the Portuguese Republic
and the Government of the Republic of India, respectively.

(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President.

(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.


436

DECLARATION OF JUDGE SHI

I am in agreement with the majority of the Court that, in the present
case, no basis of prima facie jurisdiction can be found for the indication
of provisional measures requested by the Applicant.

Nevertheless I am of the opinion that, being confronted with the
urgent situation of a human tragedy involving loss of life and suffering
which arises from the use of force in and against Yugoslavia, the Court
ought to have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and
security in so far as its judicial functions permit.

The Court would have been fully justified in point of law if, immedi-
ately upon receipt of the request by the Applicant for the indication of
provisional measures, and regardless of what might be its conclusion on
prima facie jurisdiction pending the final decision, it had issued a general
statement appealing to the Parties to act in compliance with their obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations and all other rules of inter-
national law relevant to the situation, including international humanitar-
ian law, and at least not to aggravate or extend their dispute. In my view,
nothing in the Statute or the Rules of Court prohibits the Court from so
acting. According to the Charter, the Court is after all the principal judi-
cial organ of the United Nations, with its Statute as an integral part of
the Charter; and by virtue of the purposes and principles of the Charter,
including Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the Court has been
assigned a role within the general framework of the United Nations for
the maintenance of international peace and security. There is no doubt
that to issue such a general statement of appeal is within the implied
powers of the Court in the exercise of its judicial functions. Now that the
Court has made its final decision on the request by the Applicant, it has
failed to take an opportunity to make its due contribution to the main-
tenance of international peace and security when that is most needed.

Moreover, in his letter addressed to the President and the Members of
the Court, the Agent of Yugoslavia stated:

“Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection I kindly ask the Court to decide
on the submitted Requests proprio motu or to fix a date for a hearing
at earliest possible time.”
437 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (DECL. SHI)

In the recent LaGrand case, the Court, at the request of the applicant
State and despite the objection of the respondent State, decided to make
use of its above-mentioned power under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court without hearing the respondent State in either written or
oral form (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Order of
3 March 1999, LC.J. Reports 1999, pp. 13 and 14, paras. 12 and 21). By
contrast, in the present case the Court failed to take any positive action
in response to the similar request made by the Agent of Yugoslavia in a
situation far more urgent even than that in the former case.

It is for these reasons that I felt compelled to vote against the operative
paragraph 38 (1) of the present Order.

(Signed) Sut Jiuyong.

19


482

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M™ LE JUGE HIGGINS

[Traduction]

Radiation du rôle pour des motifs autres que le désistement — Pouvoirs inhé-
rents de la Cour — Pouvoirs inhérents ne se limitant pas à deux exemples exis-
tants — Motifs pour lesquels la présente affaire aurait dû être rayée du rôle —
Inopportunité de statuer dans l'arrêt sur application du paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 35 du Statut.

1. Dans son arrêt, la Cour conclut que les observations de la Serbie-
et-Monténégro n’ont pas eu pour effet juridique un désistement d’ins-
tance au sens des dispositions du Règlement (par. 31). J’en suis d’accord.
Il ne fait aucun doute que le demandeur a refusé de se «désister» et que
le «désistement», tel que prévu dans le Règlement, dépend de la volonté
des Parties.

2. La Cour relève ensuite que:

«Avant l’adoption du paragraphe 5 de l’article 38 dudit Règle-
ment, dans un certain nombre d’affaires dans lesquelles la requête
n’indiquait aucun titre de compétence existant, mais invitait simple-
ment l’Etat désigné comme défendeur à accepter la compétence de la
Cour aux fins de l’espèce, la Cour, par voie d’ordonnance, a rayé les
affaires en question de son rôle. Par ordonnances du 2 juin 1999,
elle a rayé du rôle deux affaires relatives à la Licéité de l'emploi
de la force, portées devant elle par la Serbie-et-Monténégro contre
l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, au motif qu’elle «n’a[vait]
manifestement pas compétence» (C.IJ. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 773
et 925).» (Arrêt, par. 32.)

3. Puis la Cour constate que «[I]a présente espèce ne relève toutefois ni
de l’une ni de l’autre de ces catégories». Il semble donc que la Cour
estime qu’il s’agit d’une liste limitative de cas (autres que le désistement)
dans lesquels une affaire peut être rayée du rôle et laisse entendre qu’elle
ne pouvait pas rayer la présente affaire du rôle puisque les faits ne cor-
respondent pas aux deux exemples existants.

4. Une affaire peut être rayée du rôle par le seul fait du demandeur,
une ordonnance pouvant alors être rendue à cette fin (Dénonciation du
traité sino-belge du 2 novembre 1865, ordonnance du 25 mai 1929,
C.P.J.I. série À n° 18; Statut juridique du territoire du sud-est du Groën-
land, ordonnance du 11 mai 1933, C.P.J.I. série AIB n° 55, p. 157; Pro-
tection des ressortissants et protégés français en Egypte, ordonnance du
29 mars 1950, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 59; Société Electricité de Beyrouth,
ordonnance du 29 juillet 1954, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 107; Incident aérien
du 27 juillet 1955 (Royaume-Uni c. Bulgarie), ordonnance du 3 août 1959,

57
LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 483

C.L.J. Recueil 1959, p. 264; Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955 (Etats-Unis
d'Amérique c. Bulgarie), ordonnance du 30 mai 1960, C.I.J. Recueil 1960,
p. 146; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, ordon-
nance du 10 avril 1961, C.J. Recueil 1961, p. 9; Procès de prisonniers de
guerre pakistanais, ordonnance du 15 décembre 1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973,
p. 347; Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua
c. Costa Rica), ordonnance du 19 août 1987, C.I.J. Recueil 1987, p. 182;
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci ( Nica-
ragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), ordonnance du 26 septembre 1991,
CIJ. Recueil 1991, p. 47; Actions armées frontalières et transfronta-
lières (Nicaragua c. Honduras), ordonnance du 27 mai 1992,
CILJ. Recueil 1992, p. 222; Passage par le Grand-Belt ( Finlande c. Dane-
mark), ordonnance du 10 septembre 1992, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 348;
Délimitation maritime entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal, ordonnance
du 8 novembre 1995, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 423; Convention de Vienne
sur les relations consulaires (Paraguay c. Etats-Unis d’ Amérique), ordon-
nance du 10 novembre 1998, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 426; Activités armées
sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo
c. Burundi), ordonnance du 30 janvier 2001, C.J. Recueil 2001, p. 3;
Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo ( République démocratique du
Congo c. Rwanda), C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 6).

5. Il existe une pratique comparable et analogue en ce qui concerne le
désistement par accord entre les parties, la radiation du rôle s’effectuant
par voie d’ordonnance. Parmi les nombreux exemples de tels cas, on peut
citer: Délimitation des eaux territoriales entre l’île de Castellorizo et les
côtes d’Anatolie, ordonnance du 26 janvier 1933, C.P.J.I. série AIB n° 51,
p. 4; Compagnie du port, des quais et des entrepôts de Beyrouth et Société
Radio-Orient, ordonnance du 31 août 1960, C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 186;
Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), ordonnance
du 13 septembre 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 322; Questions d’interpré-
tation et d'application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de
l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-
Uni), ordonnance du 10 septembre 2003, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 149;
Questions d'interprétation et d'application de la convention de Montréal
de 1971 résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’ Amérique), ordonnance du 10 septembre 2003,
CI.J. Recueil 2003, p. 152.

6. La Cour a également refusé d’examiner plus avant certaines affaires
dans des cas autres que le désistement, au sens des dispositions du Règle-
ment. C’est ainsi que la Cour permanente a mis fin à une procédure en
indication de mesures conservatoires en l’affaire de l’ Administration du
prince von Pless, au motif que la demande formulée par l’Allemagne dans
sa requête était devenue sans objet (ordonnance du 11 mai 1933, C. P.J.I.
série AIB n° 54, p. 150). Et la Cour a refusé de poursuivre l’examen de
l'affaire du Cameroun septentrional pour ce qu’elle estimait être des rai-
sons tenant à sa fonction judiciaire (exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
CIJ. Recueil 1963, p. 29). Dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, la

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LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 484

Cour n’a pas considéré comme un obstacle pour elle le fait que l’Australie
et la Nouvelle-Zélande, une fois que la France eut annoncé qu’elle met-
tait fin à ses essais, ne s’étaient pas désistées des instances en application
de l’article 74 du Règlement de 1972. La Cour a dit que «cela n[e IJ’empé-
chfait] pas ... d’arriver à sa propre conclusion sur la question» (Essais
nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.IJ. Recueil 1974, p. 270,
par. 54; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.ILJ.
Recueil 1974, p. 476, par. 57) et a estimé que «l’objet de la demande
a[vait] été atteint d’une autre manière» — c’est-à-dire autrement que par
la voie contentieuse (Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.L.J.
Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 55; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande
c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 476, par. 58).
7. Dans un dictum pertinent, la Cour a dit qu’elle ne voyait

«pas de raison de laisser se poursuivre une procédure qu’elle sait
condamnée à rester stérile. Si le règlement judiciaire peut ouvrir la
voie de l’harmonie internationale lorsqu’il existe un conflit, il n’est
pas moins vrai que la vaine poursuite d’un procès compromet cette
harmonie.» (Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt,
C.LJ. Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 58; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-
Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 477, par. 61.)

Tant en l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional que dans celles des Essais
nucléaires, la Cour a décidé de ne pas poursuivre son examen et n’a pas
rendu formellement d’ordonnance.

8. Par ordonnances rendues le 2 juin 1999 (Licéité de l'emploi de la
force (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 916; Licéité de
l'emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 761), la Cour a
rayé les affaires en question du rôle après les audiences consacrées aux
mesures conservatoires au motif qu’elle n’avait manifestement pas com-
pétence. Et, comme le reconnaît le présent arrêt en son paragraphe 32,
avant l’adoption du paragraphe 5 de l’article 38 du Règlement, des af-
faires furent rayées du rôle au motif que la requête était une simple
invitation adressée au défendeur.

9. Il s’agit là de mesures prises par la Cour dans l’exercice de ses pou-
voirs inhérents. Les précédents en matière de radiation du rôle cités par la
Cour — lorsque aucun titre de compétence existant n’était indiqué au
départ ou lorsque la Cour n’avait manifestement pas compétence — ne
constituent pas deux catégories exclusives auxquelles la Cour doit se rap-
porter si elle souhaite exercer ses pouvoirs inhérents en l’absence d’un
désistement. Rien dans la jurisprudence ne permet de le soutenir. On voit
mal d’ailleurs quelle pourrait être la source juridique d’un droit permet-
tant de rayer une affaire du rôle à la seule condition qu’il soit limité à ces
deux exemples.

10. Les pouvoirs inhérents de la Cour découlent de son caractère judi-
ciaire et du fait qu’elle doit disposer de moyens pour réglementer

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LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 485

des questions liées à l’administration de la justice, dont tous les aspects
peuvent ne pas être prévus par le Règlement. C’est sur ce fondement que
la Cour permanente a permis le dépôt d’exceptions préliminaires d’incom-
pétence avant même que le Règlement ne prévoie cette possibilité. La
Cour a dit qu’elle était «libre d’adopter la règle qu’elle considère comme
la plus appropriée à la bonne administration de la justice» (Concessions
Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt n° 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A n° 2, p. 16).
Le pouvoir qu’a la Cour de déterminer les remèdes pour toute violation
d’un traité, dans une affaire où sa compétence est fondée uniquement sur
ce traité, a été considéré comme relevant des pouvoirs inhérents de
la Cour en l'affaire du Détroit de Corfou (fixation du montant des répa-
rations, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 244) et en l'affaire LaGrand ( Alle-
magne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (mémoire de la République fédérale
d'Allemagne, vol. I, 16 septembre 1999, par. 3.60).

11. La Cour n’a que très rarement à exercer ses pouvoirs inhérents: la
question peut se poser in limine litis, ou lorsqu'elle décide de ne pas exer-
cer sa compétence, ou encore pour des raisons liées au déroulement ou au
fond d’une affaire. Les juges qui ont rédigé une opinion dissidente com-
mune dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires ne contestaient pas l’exis-
tence de ces pouvoirs inhérents. Ils ont affirmé que ceux-ci ne pouvaient
être utilisés que «dans des cas tout à fait exceptionnels et lorsque les
considérations les plus impérieuses touchant à ce qui est approprié à la
fonction judiciaire l’exige[aielnt» (Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 322, par. 22, opinion dissidente commune).
Ces juges tenaient particulièrement, et on le conçoit sans peine, à ce que
le pouvoir de statuer d’office ne soit pas exercé sans donner au deman-
deur la possibilité de présenter des conclusions en sens contraire, ce qui
aurait été incompatible avec une bonne administration de la justice. En la
présente affaire, la question de savoir s’il y avait lieu de rayer l’affaire du
rôle a été pleinement débattue devant la Cour.

12. La vraie question n’est donc pas de savoir si le demandeur s’est
«désisté» ou non de l’affaire ni si les circonstances de l’espèce sont exac-
tement identiques aux rares cas dans lesquels la Cour, de sa propre ini-
tiative, a rayé une affaire du rôle (cas qui, d’ailleurs, étaient sans doute
«nouveaux» à l’époque et n’entraient dans aucune des catégories établies
auparavant). La question est de savoir si les circonstances sont telles qu’il
est raisonnable, nécessaire et indiqué que la Cour raye l’affaire du rôle
dans l’exercice de son pouvoir inhérent en vue de préserver l’intégrité de
la procédure judiciaire.

Je pense qu’il faut répondre à cette question par l’affirmative.

13. En matière de désistement, le point de départ est le paragraphe 2
de l’article 38 du Règlement de la Cour, aux termes duquel le demandeur
«indique autant que possible les moyens de droit sur lesquels [il] prétend
fonder la compétence de la Cour». La Cour peut, dans certaines circon-
stances, permettre l’élargissement de ces chefs de compétence et il peut
arriver aussi qu’un demandeur préfère par la suite se fonder sur un
moyen particulier plutôt que sur un autre. Néanmoins, le paragraphe 2

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LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 486

de l’article 38 a beau offrir une grande latitude, l’obligation qu’il énonce
est une obligation continue. Un demandeur qui, le lundi, énonce deux
terrains de compétence pour l'affaire sur laquelle il demande à la Cour de
statuer et qui, le jeudi, informe la Cour qu’il n’entend finalement plus
invoquer ces moyens, ne saurait être considéré, le samedi, comme s’étant
conformé au paragraphe 2 de l’article 38. Il s’est exclu lui-même du cadre
légitime du paragraphe 2 de l’article 38 et le fait qu’il refuse dans le même
temps de se désister de l’affaire en application de l’article 88 ou 89 du
Règlement n’a, à cet égard, aucune pertinence.

14, La position du demandeur qui renonce aux terrains de compétence
annoncés, sans en proposer d’autres ainsi que l’exige le Règlement, n’est
pas davantage pertinente du fait qu’il prie la Cour de «statuer sur sa
compétence» en tenant compte de l’évolution de la situation (arrêt,
par. 28). Une telle demande sort complètement des prévisions du Règle-
ment. Pourtant, c’est bien ce qui s’est produit en l’espèce. Le 24 avril 1999,
l'ancienne République fédérale de Yougoslavie a déposé sa requête intro-
ductive d’instance contre plusieurs Etats en invoquant, pour fonder la
compétence de la Cour, le paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut de la
Cour ainsi que l’article IX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide. Le 20 décembre 2002, la Serbie-et-Mon-
ténégro a affirmé formellement qu’elle n’était pas partie au Statut de la
Cour avant le 1°” novembre 2000 et que, au moment du dépôt de sa
requête initiale, elle n’était pas liée par la convention sur le génocide.

15. S’étant ainsi placée dans une situation incompatible avec le para-
graphe 2 de l’article 38 du Règlement, la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas
fait savoir à la Cour qu’elle se désistait de l’affaire en application de
Particle 89 du Règlement, mais l’a plutôt priée de «statuer sur sa compé-
tence». En réalité, elle ne pouvait adresser une telle demande à la Cour et
ces seuls faits auraient suffi, selon moi, pour que la Cour use de ses pou-
voirs inhérents en vue d’assurer le bon exercice de sa fonction judiciaire et
raye les affaires du rôle.

16. En fait, le caractère désordonné de la ligne de conduite suivie par
la Serbie-et-Monténégro s’est accentué. En réponse aux prétentions ini-
tiales avancées quant au fond à l’encontre des différents Etats défendeurs,
dans les huit affaires dont la Cour a permis l’examen au-delà des pre-
mières audiences consacrées aux mesures conservatoires, des exceptions
préliminaires ont été déposées. Pendant les trois années qui suivirent,
aucune réponse n’y fut donnée — et d’ailleurs, lorsque le demandeur
présenta finalement de très brèves observations, il ne chercha même pas
à réfuter les arguments de fond contenus dans les exceptions prélimi-
naires des défendeurs, ni du reste, à y répondre. Au lieu de cela, le
demandeur a renoncé aux chefs de compétence invoqués auparavant et
s’est contenté de suggérer que «la Cour statue». Cette façon incohérente
de procéder n’est pas, à mes yeux, compatible avec une procédure judi-
ciaire régulière, qui vise à traiter toutes les parties concernées de façon
équitable, et elle constituait un autre motif pour lequel il eût été indiqué
que la Cour raye les affaires du rôle.

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LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 487

17. Cette regrettable série d’événements rentre dans le cadre des
circonstances décrites par la Cour en l’affaire du Cameroun septen-
trional:

«If y a des limitations inhérentes à l’exercice de la fonction judi-
ciaire dont la Cour, en tant que tribunal, doit toujours tenir compte.
Il peut ainsi y avoir incompatibilité entre, d’un côté, les désirs d’un
demandeur ou même des deux parties à une instance et, de l’autre, le
devoir de la Cour de conserver son caractère judiciaire. C’est à la
Cour elle-même et non pas aux parties qu’il appartient de veiller à
l'intégrité de la fonction judiciaire de la Cour.» (Exceptions prélimi-
naires, arrêt, C.J. Recueil 1963, p. 29.)

x * +

18. Au paragraphe 39 de son arrét, la Cour dit qu’elle «ne peut refuser
de connaitre d’une affaire simplement du fait des motivations alléguées
de l’une des parties, ou en raison des conséquences que son arrêt pourrait
avoir dans une autre instance». Les sept juges qui ont émis une déclara-
tion commune ont fait, au paragraphe 12 de celle-ci, quelques observa-
tions sur ce point. A ce propos, d’autres observations s’imposent sur
l'attention considérable qui a été portée par la Cour au paragraphe 2 de
Particle 35 du Statut. Bien entendu, cette disposition n’avait jamais été
invoquée par le demandeur au cours de la période pendant laquelle il s’en
tenait 4 ses deux terrains de compétence initiaux. La demande irréguliére
adressée à la Cour par le demandeur le 20 décembre 2002 tendait à ce que
celle-ci «[statue] sur sa compétence à la lumière de l’argumentation expo-
sée dans les présentes observations écrites». Ces observations écrites ne
renvoyaient nulle part au paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 comme chef subsi-
diaire de compétence — et pourtant, allant au-delà de ce qu’avait demandé
la Serbie-et-Monténégro en l’espèce, la Cour a consacré quelque vingt-
trois paragraphes à l’énoncé des motifs l’amenant à conclure que le para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut ne pouvait constituer un chef subsidiaire
de compétence en vertu duquel la Serbie-et-Monténégro aurait pu accé-
der à la Cour en application de la convention sur le génocide. Cette ana-
lyse était manifestement inutile en l’espèce. Elle ne peut présenter d’inté-
rêt, et c’est le seul cas possible, qu’à l’égard d’une autre affaire pendante.
Je pense que la Cour n’aurait jamais dû se placer sur ce terrain en la pré-
sente affaire.

x * +

19. Etant convaincue qu'il ne fallait pas choisir de trancher le diffé-
rend sur la base de motifs ratione personae (pour les raisons données
dans la déclaration commune émise par sept juges), il n’est pas dans mon
intention ici de présenter mes propres vues sur les arguments avancés par

la Cour pour étayer ses conclusions sur cette base. Je me contenterai de
dire que, si la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale, adoptée le

62
LICEITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. HIGGINS) 488

1% novembre 2000, par laquelle la République fédérale de Yougoslavie a
été admise comme nouvel Etat, clarifie forcément la situation juridique à
partir de ce moment, on est toujours en droit de se demander si, «la Cour
se trouvant aujourd’hui à même d’apprécier l’ensemble de la situation
juridique», l’«évolution survenue en 2000 ... a clarifié la situation juri-
dique, jusque-la indéterminée, quant au statut de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie vis-a-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies» à l’époque
qui nous intéresse (arrét, par. 78).

20. Le juge Lachs a dit en 1992 que, s’il est vrai que les divers organes
principaux de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ont chacun leur propre
rôle à jouer à l’égard d’une situation ou d’un différend, ils doivent agir

«dans l’harmonie — bien que pas, évidemment, de concert — et
[qu’il importe] que chacun d’entre eux s’acquitte de ses fonctions
concernant une situation ou un différend dont divers aspects figurent
à l’ordre du jour de chacun d’entre eux sans porter préjudice à l’exer-
cice des pouvoirs de l’autre» (Questions d'interprétation et d’applica-
tion de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l'incident
aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni),
mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 14 avril 1992,
C.LJ. Recueil 1992, p. 27, opinion individuelle de M. le juge Lachs).

La Cour, en prétendant éclaircir à posteriori la situation qui existait
entre 1992 et 2000, alors même que l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de
sécurité avaient estimé, lors de toutes les délibérations, que les objectifs
des Nations Unies étaient mieux servis par le flou juridique, semble avoir
fait fi de cette sage parole.

(Signé) Rosalyn Hiccins.

63


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STATES OF THE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
NOTWITHSTANDING SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 276 (1970)

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

ORDER OF 29 JANUARY 1971

1971

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE
LA PRÉSENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE DU 29 JANVIER 1971
Official citation:

Læai Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Rese-
tien 276 (1970), Order of 29 January 1971, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 12.

Mode officiel de citation:

Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de I’ Afrique

du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276

(1978) du Conseil de sécurité, ordonnance du 29 janvier 1971, C.I.J. Re-
cueil 1971, p. 12.

Node vente: SOD

12

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1971 1971
29 janvier
: . Rôle général
29 janvier 1971 n° 53

CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES POUR LES ÉTATS DE
LA PRÉSENCE CONTINUE DE L’AFRIQUE DU SUD
EN NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970)

DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

(REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF)

ORDONNANCE

Présents: Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN, Président; M. AMMOUN,
Vice-Président; sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, MM. PADILLA NERVO,
FORSTER, Gros, BENGZON, PETREN, LACHS, ONYEAMA, DILLARD,
IGNACIO-PINTO, DE Castro, Morozov, JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
juges; M. AQUARONE, Greffier.

LA Cour,

Ainsi composée,

Après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

Vu les articles 31 et 68 du Statut de la Cour et l’article 83 du Règlement,

Vu la résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies en date du 29 juillet 1970 demandant à la Cour internationale de
Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur la question suivante:

« Quelles sont les conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la
présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la
résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité? »,
NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) (ORDONNANCE 29 I 71) 13

Vu les exposés écrits présentés par les gouvernements des Etats sui-
vants: Afrique du Sud, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande, France,
Hongrie, Inde, Nigéria, Pakistan, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie,
Yougoslavie, et par le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies,

Rend l'ordonnance suivante:

Considérant que, par lettre du secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères au
Greffier en date du 13 novembre 1970, le Gouvernement sud-africain
a présenté une demande tendant à la désignation d’un juge ad hoc pour
siéger en l'affaire aux termes de l’article 31, paragraphe 2, du Statut de
la Cour;

Considérant que, conformément aux termes de l’article 46 du Statut
de la Cour, la Cour a décidé d'entendre à huis clos les observations
du Gouvernement sud-africain sur sa demande concernant son droit de
désigner un juge ad hoc;

Ayant entendu les observations du Gouvernement sud-africain au
cours d’une audience tenue à huis clos le 27 janvier 1971, audience dont
la date avait été notifiée par le Greffier aux Etats ayant signalé leur
intention de présenter un exposé oral conformément à l’article 66,
paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour:

La Cour

Décide par dix voix contre cing de rejeter la demande.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au palais
de ja Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-neuf janvier mil neuf cent soixante et
onze en huit exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé aux archives de la
Cour, un autre sera transmis au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies et les autres seront transmis aux gouvernements des
Etats suivants: Afrique du Sud, Etats-Unis d’Amérique, Finlande, Inde,
Nigéria, Pays-Bas.

Le Président,
(Signé) ZAFRULLA KHAN.

Le Greffier,
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.

Sir Gerald FirzMaurice, MM. Gros et PETREN, juges, font la déclara-
tion commune suivante:

Nous ne pouvons nous rallier à la décision de rejet contenue dans
l'ordonnance, pour des raisons que nous nous réservons d'exposer

5
NAMIBIE (SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) (ORDONNANCE 29 I 71) 14

ultérieurement, parce que, sous certains de ses aspects, la question
présente touche au fond de la demande d’avis consultatif.

MM. ONYEAMA et DILLARD, juges, font la déclaration commune
suivante:

Nous ne pouvons nous rallier à la décision de la Cour. Tout en n’esti-
mant pas que la République sud-africaine ait établi son droit de désigner
un juge ad hoc en vertu de l’article 83 du Règlement de la Cour, nous
sommes convaincus que le pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré à la Cour
en vertu de l’article 68 de son Statut lui permet d'approuver une telle
désignation et qu’il aurait été approprié d’exercer ce pouvoir discrétion-
naire vu l'intérêt particulier de la République sud-africaine dans la
question dont la Cour est saisie.

(Paraphé) Z.K.
(Paraphé) S.A.


24.

25.

188

ANNEX.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT.

I.—DocuMENTS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.
A.—In the course of the written proceedings :

Letters from the Greek Minister for For. Aff. to the Belgian Minister in
Athens, dated September 21st and October 31st, 1933.

Letter from the Société commerciale de Belgique to the Greek Ministers
of Communications and Finance, dated December 30th, 1933.

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the Greek Foreign Minister,
dated April 30th, 1934.

Minutes of the meeting of the Arbitration Commission, July 11th, 1934.
Letter from the Greek Ministry of Communications to the Company,
dated September 11th, 1934. .

Special Agreement for Arbitration of August 30th, 1934.

Arbitral Award of January 3rd, 1936.

Arbitral Award of July 25th, 1936.

Letter from the Company to the Greek Ministers of Finance and Commu-
nications, dated August 3rd, 1936.

Emergency Law sub No. 361—1936.

Letter from the Company to the Greek Minister of Finance, dated
September 19th, 1936.

Letter from the Greek Ministry of Finance to the Société nationale de
Crédit à l'Industrie, Brussels, dated September 29th, 1936.

Letter from the Company to the Greek Minister of Finance, dated Sep-
tember 15th, 1936.

Note verbale from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the Greek Ministry
for For. Aff., dated December 11th, 1936.

Letter from the delegates of the Company to the Greek Minister of
Finance, dated December 21st, 1936.

Note from the Greek Government to the delegates of the Company,
dated December 31st, 1936.

Letter from the delegates of the Company to the Greek Minister of
Finance, dated January 5th, 1937.

Letter from the Company to the Greek Minister of Finance, dated
May 21st, 1937.

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the President of the
Council of Ministers of Greece, dated June 14th, 1937.

Letter from the Greek Ministry for For. Aff. to the Belgian Minister in
Athens, dated June 28th, 1937.

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the President of the
Council of Ministers of Greece, dated July 12th, 1937.

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the President of the
Council of Ministers of Greece, dated August oth, 1937.

Letter from the Société nationale de Crédit à l'Industrie, Brussels, to
the Greek Ministry of Finance, dated October 2oth, 1936.

Note verbale from the Greek Ministry for For. Aff. to the Belgian Minister
in Athens, dated September 6th, 1937.

Noie verbale from the Greek Ministry for For. Aff. to the Belgian Minister
in Athens, dated September 6th, 1937.

32
WI ay

A./B. 78.—‘SOCIETE COMMERCIALE DE BELGIQUE” 189

Note verbale from the Belgian Minister in Athens to the Greek Ministry
for For. Aff., dated December 22nd, 1937.

Note verbale from the Greek Ministry for For. Aff. to the Belgian Minister
in Athens, dated February 17th, 1938.

Extract from the report of the Third Expert, July 11th, 1936 (Compen-
sation claimed by the Government—Damages for failure to carry out
programme completely).

Extract from the report of the Third Expert, July 11th, 1936 (Compen-
sation claimed by the Government—Damages for delay).

Opinion of the Third Expert, March 2oth, 1936, concerning penalties
imposed on the Company for delay in delivery of rolling-stock.

Note handed by the Belgian Minister in Athens to the Greek Minister
for For. Aff., February 21st, 1927.

Some characteristics of the conventions concluded by the Greek Govern-
ment between 1924 and 1926 for the carrying out and financing of
public works.

Extract from the report of the Third Expert, July 11th, 1936 (Compen-
sation claimed by the Company—-Opinion on the merits).

Extract from the Messager d'Athènes of October 6th, 1938: ‘A country
at work.”

Extracts from the account of the work of the International Financial
Commission for the year 1937.

Messager d'Athènes of November 7th, 8th and oth, 1937.—Extracts from
the speech of M. Metaxas at Patras.

Extract from the Messager d'Athènes, August 3rd, 1938: “The work of
August 4th, illustrated by figures.”

Messager d'Athènes of August 4th, 1938.—Extract from the message of
the head of the Government to the Hellenic people.

B.—In the course of the oval proceedings :

Convention of August 27th, 1925, between the Greek Government and
the Société commerciale de Belgique, and Additional Agreements.

II.—DocuMENTS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.
A.— In the course of the written proceedings :

Railway map of the Kingdom of Greece showing the lines covered by
the Convention of August 27th, 1925.

Extracts from the Convention of August 27th, 1925, concerning the cost
of the work to be carried out by the Company.

Extracts from conventions and agreements as regards the nature of the
gold loan.

Agreement concluded between the Greek Government and bond-bearers of
its external debt (Sept. 1932—in English, with French translation).

Agreement of. November 1933 (in English, with French translation).
Agreement of August 1936 (in English, with French translation).
Holding of the Bank of Greece in gold and foreign currency.

Report of the Financial Committee to the Council of the League of
Nations, June 30th, 1933 (doc. of the L. N. C. 387. M. 194—1933. II. A).

B.—In the course of the oval proceedings :

Communication from the Council of Foreign Bondholders and from the
League Loans Committee, published in the London Press on March 2nd,
1939 (in English and French).

Budget of the Greek State (years 1936-1937, 1937-1938, 1938-1939).

33
A./B. 78.—"SOCIÉTÉ COMMERCIALE DE BELGIQUE” 190

Remittances from Greek emigrants abroad (years 1930, 1932, 1936, 1937,
1938).

Service of the Foreign Public Debt (years 1936-1937, 1937-1938, 1938-
1939). . ;
Extraordinary expenditure on national defence (apart from ordinary
expenditure) (years 1935-1936 to 1939-1940).

Percentage of consumption of cereals covered by home produce (years
1936-1938).

Sums paid for imported cereals (years 1936, 1937).

Holdings of the Bank of Greece in gold and foreign currency (years
1933-1938).

Bank of Greece: statistics of the holdings of the Bank and of currency
circulation (years 1936-1938).

Deficit in the balance of payments (years 1936-1938).

Index of economic activity (years 1928, 1932-1938).

Index of quotations on the Athens stock-market (years 1928-1938).

Cost of living index for forty-four towns of Greece (years 1931-1939).

34


71 ICAO COUNCIL (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN)

President Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA KHAN makes the following decla-
ration:

I much regret | am unable to agree that Article 84 of the Convention
read with Articles 5 (4), 15 and 18 of the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences provides a right of appeal against a decision of the Council of
ICAO rejecting a preliminary objection to its competence-to handle an
application or complaint. It seems to me that the considerations that
have impelled the Court to arrive at the opposite conclusion do not
carry the matter any further than the desirability of a provision to that
effect. However strong that desirability may be it cannot serve as a sub-
stitute for the lack of such a provision in the Convention read with the
relevant rules. The entire scheme of the Rules excludes the possibility of
an appeal against a decision of the Council rejecting a preliminary objec-
tion against its competence. The remedy for the correction of this situa-
tion, if a correction should be desired, would be by way of amendment of
the Convention and the Rules, and not by reading into them a meaning
which they are not capable of bearing.

Nor am I able to agree that Section | of Article II of the Transit
Agreement contemplates only cases of injustice or hardship occasioned
by action which is lawful but is prejudicial, and that to the extent to
which a complaint under that Section alleges unlawful action as the cause
of the injustice or hardship complained of, it becomes assimilable to the
case of an application for the purposes of appealability to the Court.

In view, however, of the finding of the Court that the Council of
ICAO has jurisdiction to entertain the Application and Complaint laid
before it by the Government of Pakistan on 3 March 1971, a finding with
which I am in entire agreement, my dissent on the question of the admissi-
bility of India’s appeal assumes a purely academic aspect.

A large part of the submission of India’s counsel to the Court was
devoted to the exposition of irregularities of procedure alleged to have
been committed by the Council of ICAO in dealing with India’s Prelim-
inary Objection to its assumption of jurisdiction in respect of Pakistan’s
Application and Complaint. The purpose of this exposition was to
persuade the Court to hold that the proceedings before the Council were
vitiated by these alleged irregularities and that the decision of the Council
on India’s Preliminary Objection was thus rendered void and of no effect
and should consequently be set aside.

These alleged irregularities fall broadly into two categories; those
relating to the ‘‘manner and method” of arriving at the decision appealed
against, and those resulting from failure to comply with the requirements
laid down in Article 15 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences.

As regards the first category, India’s objections and suggestions were
thoroughly debated in the Council (Memorial of India, Annex E, (e),
Discussion, paras. 50-84) and the rulings of the President were upheld by

29
72 ICAO COUNCIL (DECL. ZAFRULLA KHAN)

the Council. Nothing urged by India’s counsel in his submissions to the
Court in this context has served to raise any doubt in my mind concerning
the correctness and propriety of the President's rulings and of the pro-
cedure followed by the Council.

As regards the second category, the brief answer to India’s objections
is that Article 15 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences has no
relevance to a decision on a preliminary objection. The subject of Pre-
liminary Objection and Action Thereon is dealt with in Article 5 of the
Rules. This Article is comprised in Chapter III of the Rules, which deals
with Action upon Receipt of Applications. The Article is self-contained
and comprehensive. The procedure for dealing with a preliminary ob-
jection is prescribed in paragraph (4) of Article 5 which runs as follows:
“If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing the
parties, shall decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further
steps are taken under these Rules.” This is exactly what the Council did.

Article 15 of the Rules is contained in Chapter IV which prescribes
the procedure to be followed in respect of “Proceedings”, which start
after a preliminary objection has been disposed of and which relate to the
merits of the case. Article 15 which is headed “Decision” obviously has
reference to a decision on the merits, and does not relate back to a
decision on a preliminary objection disposing of the question as a pre-
liminary issue before the commencement of proceedings on the merits.

The record of the discussion before the Council does not show that
India urged compliance by the Council with the requirements of Article
15. Even before the Court some of the alleged irregularities were men-
tioned for the first time in the oral submissions of counsel and the list
was expanded in reply. Be that as it may, it is clear that Article 15 of the
Rules has no application to a decision on a preliminary objection. The
Council rightly proceeded on that assumption and not a single member
gave expression to a difference of view.

Judge LACHS makes the following declaration:

Feeling as I do that there are certain observations which should be
made on some aspects of the Judgment, } avail myself of the right
conferred by Article 57 of the Statute of the Court and append hereunder
the following declaration.

]
While I fully agree with the findings of the Court concerning its com-

petence to entertain the appeal, I wish to comment further on the inter-
pretation of Article 84 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil

30