452

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE RUDA

1. I have voted in favour of subparagraphs 1 fa), 1 (c) and 2 of the
operative provisions of the Judgment, but since I have voted against
subparagraph 1 (5) and do not concur in some important points with the
reasoning of the Court, I am bound to append this separate opinion. This
opinion will refer to three subjects : the 1956 Treaty of Friendship as a
basis of the jurisdiction of the Court, Proviso c of the 1946 United States
Declaration, and the conduct of the States as a basis of the jurisdiction of
the Court.

I. THE 1956 TREATY AS THE BASIS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

2. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction under the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation of 1956 between the United States and
Nicaragua to entertain the claims referred to in the Nicaraguan Applica-
tion, to the extent that they constitute a dispute as to the interpretation or
application of several articles of the Treaty.

The 1956 Treaty provides in Article XXIV :

“1. Each Party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such repre-
sentations as the other Party may make with respect to any matter
affecting the operation of the present Treaty.

2. Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or
application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplo-
macy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless
the Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.”

3. It is true, as the Court says, in paragraph 81 of the Judgment that

“the intention of the Parties in accepting such clauses is clearly to
provide for such a right of unilateral recourse to the Court in the
absence of agreement to employ some other pacific means of settle-
ment”.

But from this point onwards, I regret to part company with the reasoning
of the Court.

4. The compromissory clause of the 1956 Treaty is common to many
treaties of “establishment”. Its structure is simple. Two conditions must be
fulfilled in order to open the way to recourse to the Court. One, that there
should be a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation and

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453 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. RUDA)

application of the Treaty and second that such a “dispute has not been
adjusted by diplomacy”.

5. There is no doubt that a dispute exists between Nicaragua and the
United States as to the facts asserted by Nicaragua in its Application ; but
even if this dispute, which is very doubtful, could be covered by the terms
of the Treaty, this does not mean that Nicaragua could take action on it as a
dispute over the interpretation and application of the Treaty, after the
institution of the proceedings. Nicaragua has to follow the procedure laid
down in the Treaty, which is simple and clear, before coming before the
Court.

6. It is not sufficient to invoke the Treaty, alleging before the Court
violations of its provisions, in the course of the proceedings, at the time of
submitting the Memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility. These allega-
tions must have been the subject of negotiations prior to the institution of
proceedings. How can there be a dispute as to the interpretation and
application of the Treaty, if no démarche has been presented to the other
party ?

7. To invoke the 1956 Treaty as a title of jurisdiction, it is essential that
diplomatic negotiations should have taken place prior to coming before the
Court, because, first, that is what is set out in clear terms in Article XXIV of
the Treaty and second, because it is impossible to know the existence and
scope of a dispute without one party submitting a claim against the other,
stating the facts and specifying the provisions of the Treaty alleged to have
been violated. It is the essence and therefore the indissoluble attributes of
the concept of dispute that negotiations between the interested States
should precede the institution of proceedings before the Court, because
negotiations or the adjustment by diplomacy fixes the points of fact and
law over which the parties disagree. But, in this particular case, apart from
this reasoning, the Treaty itself clearly provides that prior efforts should be
made to adjust the dispute by diplomacy.

8. No evidence has been submitted by the Applicant that it had made
any representation, approach, claim or démarche with regard to the Res-
pondent before filing its Memorial, where the Treaty of 1956 has been
invoked. No dispute has been proved to exist, prior to the institution of the
proceedings, as to the interpretation and application of the Treaty.

9. For these reasons, I part company with my colleagues on the finding
of the Court, that on the “basis alone” (para. 111) of the Treaty of 1956, the
Court is competent. The Court states in paragraph 83 that :

“In the view of the Court, it does not necessarily follow that,
because a State has not expressly referred in negotiations with another
State to a particular treaty as having been violated by conduct of that
other State, it is debarred from invoking a compromissory clause in
that treaty.”

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10. I take the opposite view from the Court. I think that a State is
debarred from judicially invoking the compromissory clause of a treaty, if
the procedure provided for in this clause is not followed. This procedure is
not a mere formality, it has a reason from the juridical point of view : it is
during the negotiations that the dispute is established and its scope
defined. A procedure, incorporated in a legal instrument, must be com-
plied with, except in circumstances when the impossibility of following the
procedure could frustrate the purposes of the instrument, as was the case in
the Judgment on the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
I.C.JT. Reports 1980, page 3. It should be remembered that on this occasion,
the Court considered, as a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction, a similar
article in the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights between the United States and Iran, in regard to a claim concerning
two private individuals, said to be held in the American Embassy. The
Court stated :

“As previously pointed out, when the United States filed its Appli-
cation on 29 November 1979, its attempts to negotiate with Iran in
regard to the overrunning of its Embassy and detention of its nation-
als as hostages had reached a deadlock, owing to the refusal of the
Iranian Government to enter into any discussion of the matter. In
consequence, there existed at that date not only a dispute but, beyond
any doubt, a ‘dispute ... not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy’
within the meaning of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty ;
and this dispute comprised, infer alia, the matters that are the subject
of the United States claims under that Treaty.” (Z.C.J. Reports 1980,
p. 27, para. 51.)

11. The Court invoked paragraph 2 as a basis of its jurisdiction because
there was an impossibility to negotiate under the Treaty.

12. The circumstances in the present case are just the opposite ; both
countries have Embassies in their respective capitals, the Secretary of State
has visited Managua and negotiations are going on between the Parties. In
this case, it is possible to apply the provisions of Article XXIV, para-
graph 2. Therefore, there is no factual impediment to the application of the
compromissory clause of the Treaty of 1956, and the way seems open to
negotiations under this instrument, but negotiations have not taken place
until today.

II. Proviso € oF THE UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF 1946

13. The United States Declaration of 14 August 1946 accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36. paragraph 2, of the
Statute excludes, inter alia, from such jurisdiction :

“(c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties
to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case

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455 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. RUDA)

before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially
agrees to that jurisdiction”.

14. Much doctrinal controversy arose in the 1940s as to the meaning of
this proviso, but this is the first time that it has been invoked by the United
States to bar the jurisdiction of the Court.

15. The textual interpretation of the proviso is not easy. I agreed with
those who consider that the phrase “affected by the decision” qualifies
“parties” and not “treaty” and therefore it is not necessary for all the
parties to a multilateral treaty to be present before the Court for it to
declare itself competent, in a case when the United States is party to a
dispute, under the treaty.

16. The problem of interpretation of this proviso arises from the mean-
ing to be attached to the phrase “parties ... affected by the decision”.

17. The history of the proviso is well known and it is not of much help to
find the intention of its authors, but that is the only source of interpretation
available. My reading of this legislative history leads me to the conclusion
that the objective was to ensure that the United States would not be forced,
because of its acceptance of the Optional Clause, to be involved in a case
before the Court when not all the parties to the dispute are before it : the
United States does not wish, because of its acceptance of the Optional
Clause, to be bound by a judgment of the Court vis-a-vis States that have
accepted the Clause, when other States which have not accepted the
Optional Clause, would not be bound by the same judgment.

18. This interpretation derives from the following part of Mr. Dulles’
Memorandum submitted to a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate :

“Since the Court uses the singular ‘any other State’, it might be
desirable to make clear that there is no compulsory obligation to
submit to the Court merely because one of several parties to such
dispute is similarly bound, the others not having bound themselves to
become parties before the Court and, consequently, not being subject
to the Charter provision (Art. 94) requiring Members to comply with
decisions of the Court in cases to which they are a party.” (Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res.
196, 79th Cong., 2nd sess, p. 44.)

19. And from the following part of the report of the Committee on
Foreign Relations :

“If the United States would prefer to deny jurisdiction without
special agreement, in disputes among several States, some of which

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have not declared to be bound, Article 36 (3) permits it to make its
declaration conditional as to the reciprocity of several or certain
States.

Mr. Dulles’ objection might possibly be provided by another sub-
section, in the first proviso...” (S. Rept. 1835, 79th Cong., 2nd sess,

pp. 6, 7.)

20. On the floor of the Senate the following exchange took place
between Mr. Vandenberg from Michigan and Mr. Thomas from Utah :

“Mr. Vandenberg. Mr. Dulles . .. has raised the question whether
the language of the resolution might not involve us in accepting
jurisdiction in a multilateral dispute in which some one or more
nations had not accepted jurisdiction. It is my understanding that it is
the opinion of the Senator from Utah that if we confronted such a
situation we would not be bound to submit to compulsory jurisdiction
in a multilateral case if all of the other nations involved in the mul-
tilateral situation had not themselves accepted compulsory jurisdic-
tion. Is that so?

Mr. Thomas. That is surely my understanding. J think reciprocity is
complete. All parties to the case must stand on exactly the same
foundation except that we have waived a right.” (Congressional
Record, 1 August 1946, p. 10618.)

21. Therefore, the phrase “parties. . . affected by the decision” seems to
mean, in the context of proviso c, that, I repeat, the United States will
accept the jurisdiction of the Court in a dispute arising under a multilateral
treaty, when all other parties to the treaty involved in the dispute have
previously accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the
United States wishes to avoid a situation under a multilateral treaty, in
which it would be obliged to apply the treaty in a certain way because of the
Court’s decision and the other parties to the treaty would remain juridi-
cally free to apply it in another form, because of the effects of Article 59 of
the Statute.

22. The proviso could only be invoked if the United States is defendant
in a case, because as Applicant it would not, logically, submit the Appli-
cation until it was sure that all the other parties to the dispute were in a
condition to be bound by the decision of the Court. Moreover, I do not
interpret the proviso as meaning that it includes the defence of the interests
of third parties ; from the debates in the Senate it is clear that the intention
was to preserve the interests of the United States, i.e., to ensure that third
States would also be bound by the decision of the Court. On the other
hand, it does not seem logical that a State submitting a declaration
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but excluding certain
matters affecting its own interests from that jurisdiction, should act on
behalf of third States. The other States also have the same opportunity as
the United States, and they are the sole sovereign judges of their own

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interests ; furthermore, it is open to these States to apply to intervene
under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute, if they think their interests are
affected.

23. In the present proceedings, there is a dispute under several multi-
lateral treaties and the United States is defendant against the claims
submitted by Nicaragua. But the United States alleges that there is a
situation where the decision of the Court will affect El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica, and that, consequently, proviso c is applicable here.

24. However, that is not my understanding of the case. It is true that
there is a complex and generalized conflict among Central American
countries, but not the whole conflict, with all its economic, social, political
and security aspects, is submitted to the Court, only the claims of Nica-
ragua against the United States. Nicaragua has not presented any claims
against Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

25. In my analysis there are two disputes : the first, Nicaragua v. United
States, and the second, involving the grievances of El Salvador, Honduras
and Costa Rica ! against Nicaragua. A decision of the Court in the first

' As for the grievances of El Salvador against Nicaragua I would refer, for instance, to
the statement made by President Magana to the ABC, Madrid, on 22 December 1983,
when, replying to a question on how and where the guerrillas obtained their supplies, he
said :

“Be sure of this, from Nicaragua and only from Nicaragua. In the past two weeks
we have detected 62 incursions by aircraft which parachuted equipment, weapons
and ammunitions into the Morazan area...”

and he added :

“While Nicaragua draws the world’s attention by claiming for the past two
years that it is about to be invaded, they have not ceased for one moment to invade
our country. There is only one point of departure for the armed subversion :
Nicaragua.” (United States Counter-Memorial, Ann. 51.)

See also the statements of a similar tenor by President Duarte on 4 June 1984 and 27 July
1984 (United States Counter-Memorial, Anns. 52 and 53). See also the Declaration of
Intervention filed on 15 August 1984.

As for the grievances of Costa Rica, I would refer to the notes presented to Nicaragua,
reproduced in documents of the Organization of American States where it is said, for
example, on 10 September 1983 : :

“The Government of Costa Rica condemns and repudiates with profound
indignation the attack on Costa Rican territory, on Members of the armed forces of
Costa Rica and the country installations ...” (United States Counter-Memorial,
Anns. 63 and 64.)

With reference to the grievances of Honduras I would refer to the diplomatic notes,
reproduced in documents of the Organization of American States, where it is said, for
example, on 1] July 1983:

“Tt has been confirmed that they were caused [the deaths of two US journalists,
injuries to a Honduran citizen and damages to a truck] by the explosion of antitank
and antipersonnel mines placed by the Sandinista forces on the Honduran high-
way...” (United States Counter-Memorial, Anns. 59, 60, 61 and 62.)

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458 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. RUDA)

dispute will not affect the reciprocal rights, duties and obligations of these
Central American countries. Whatever conduct, if any, that the Court
would impose on the United States, such a decision would not debar the
rights of these three countries vis-a-vis Nicaragua.

26. For this reason, I think that the present situation is not the one
provided for in proviso c, where a situation is foreseen, in which the United
States, as a defendant, would be obliged to follow a certain course of action
and the other parties to the dispute would be free. Here, if the Court
imposes, in a decision, a certain conduct on the United States vis-a-vis
Nicaragua for alleged violations of several multilateral treaties, there is no
possibility of other States being affected, because there are no other parties
to this dispute. Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica ask, on the contrary,
that Nicaragua should stop illegal actions of a similar character against
them. Nicaragua is placed in a defensive position, but the rights of Hon-
duras, El Salvador and Costa Rica cannot be affected by the Court’s
decision. Although I recognize that both disputes are part of a generalized
conflict, they are clearly distinguished from the juridical point of view,
because in one Nicaragua is in the position of Applicant and in the other
the claims are made against it.

27. Iam, therefore, of the opinion that proviso c is not applicable in the
case before the Court and, consequently, it should be rejected. Since my
understanding of the juridical situation is different from that of the Court,
and I reach a different conclusion, I part company from the Judg-
ment where the Court finds that the bar raised by the United States does
not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusive preliminary
character.

IT. THE CONDUCT OF STATES AS A BASIS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
CouRT

28. I fully agree with the finding of the Court, in paragraph 42 of the
Judgment, “that the interpretation whereby the provisions of Article 36,
paragraph 5, cover the case of Nicaragua has been confirmed by the
subsequent conduct of the parties to the treaty in question, the Statute of
the Court” ; and this is precisely the reason why I have voted in favour of
the decision that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Application
filed by Nicaragua on 9 April 1984. But I disagree with the reasoning of the
Court and the corresponding finding in paragraphs 42 and 47.

“... It should therefore be observed that the conduct of Nicaragua in
relation to the publications in question also supports a finding of
jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute indepen-
dently of the interpretation and effect of paragraph 5 of that Article.”
(Para. 42.)

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459 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. RUDA)

“,.. [The Court] considers therefore that, having regard to the origin
and generality of the statements to the effect that Nicaragua was
bound by its 1929 Declaration, it is right to conclude that the constant
acquiescence of that State in those affirmations constitutes a valid
mode of manifestation of its intent to recognize the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute,
and that accordingly Nicaragua is, vis-a-vis the United States, a State
accepting ‘the same obligation’ under that Article.” (Para. 47.)

29. My disagreement is based on my reading of the Statute of the Court,
where it is provided that the only condition necessary to make operative a
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute, is, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the same
Article, the deposit of the declaration with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. The consent of a State to be bound by the international
obligations assumed under a treaty, should be given in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the treaty. The conduct of a State is an important
element in the interpretation of a convention, including the Statute, which
the Court has taken into account in previous paragraphs, but it is a totally
different matter to regard this conduct as constituting acceptance of the
international obligations set out in a treaty, without following the proce-
dure laid down precisely for the entry into force of these obligations.

30. I agree with the Court that the situation of Nicaragua is wholly
unique, among the States bound by the Optional Clause, but this unique-
ness does not justify taking the conduct of this State as a basis for con-
sidering Nicaragua as accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Statute, independently of
Article 36, paragraph 5, for the reasons I have just explained.

31. Moreover, I disagree with the Court’s affirmation that the reports of
the Secretary-General, as depositary of the declarations, and that the
International Court of Justice Yearbooks have affirmed that Nicaragua
had accomplished the formality of deposit, if I have correctly interpreted
the Court’s statement in paragraph 46.

32. In the publication of the Secretary-General concerning Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Nicaragua’s acceptance is
included under subtitle (b) :

“Declarations made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, which are deemed to be
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice.” (Emphasis added ; Multilateral Treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General. Status as at 31 December 1982, p. 24.)

33. In the International Court of Justice Yearbook 1946-1947, Nicara-
gua’s declaration is included among “Communications and declarations of
States which are still bound by their adherence to the Optional Clause of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice” (p. 207) and
the country is included in the

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460 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. RUDA)

“List of States which have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice or which are still bound by their
acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (Article 36 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice).” (P. 221.)

34. The same title is reproduced in the Yearbook 1947-1948 (p. 133). The
parenthesis is deleted in the Yearbook 1955-1956 (p. 188). The last Year-
book 1982-1983 includes Nicaragua in a list of “Declarations recognizing
as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court” ; it is stated, before the texts
of the Declarations :

“In view of the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, the present section also contains
the texts of Declarations made under the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice which have not lapsed or been with-
drawn. There are now eight such declarations.” (Emphasis added in
the original text, p. 56.)

35. In my reading of these official publications, what Nicaragua has
acquiesced in is to be considered bound by the Optional Clause, in accor-
dance with the interpretation and application given by these organs of the
United Nations to Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Court, and
not to be bound directly under Article 36, paragraph 2, as has been found
by the Court.

(Signed) J. M. Rupa.

72


                                                                                733

                                DÉCLARATION DE Mme LA JUGE XUE

                 [Traduction]

                    1. J’ai voté en faveur de l’arrêt car je souscris à la décision de la Cour
                 consistant à se déclarer incompétente en la présente espèce. Ce nonob
                 stant, je tiens à formuler deux observations.
                    2. La première a trait à l’approche que la Cour a suivie. Dans son
                 arrêt, celle‑ci a conclu que les éléments de preuve qui lui avaient été pré-
                 sentés ne permettaient pas de démontrer que, au moment où les
                 Iles Marshall avaient introduit l’instance devant elle, il existait entre les
                 Parties un différend relatif à l’objet de la requête ; en conséquence, il
                 n’était pas satisfait à la condition pour qu’elle ait compétence. La Cour
                 est parvenue à cette conclusion essentiellement au motif que, quelles que
                 soient les circonstances, les Iles Marshall n’avaient jamais — par leurs
                 déclarations ou leur comportement — livré au Pakistan quelque élément
                 précis qui lui aurait permis d’avoir connaissance de ce qu’elles nourris-
                 saient à son encontre un grief d’ordre juridique pour manquement à son
                 obligation internationale de négocier au sujet du désarmement nucléaire.
                    3. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, un différend doit en principe exis-
                 ter à la date du dépôt de la requête (Violations alléguées de droits souve‑
                 rains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua
                 c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2016 (I),
                 p. 27, par. 52 ; Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination
                 de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de
                 Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 85,
                 par. 30 ; Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de
                 Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya
                 arabe libyenne c. Royaume‑Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
                 C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 25‑26, par. 43‑45 ; Questions d’interprétation et
                 d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident
                 aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique),
                 exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 130‑131, par. 42‑44).
                 L’existence d’un différend demande à être établie objectivement par la
                 Cour, sur la base des positions et du comportement des parties (Violations
                 alléguées de droits souverains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des
                 Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
                 Recueil 2016 (I), p. 26-27, par. 50 ; Questions concernant l’oblig      ation
                 de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal), arrêt, C.I.J.
                 Recueil 2012 (II), p. 442, par. 46 ; Application de la convention inter
                 nationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
                 (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
                 C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 84, par. 30 ; Essais nucléaires (Australie
                 c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 55 ; Essais nucléaires
                 (Nouvelle‑Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 476, par. 58 ;

                                                                                185

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                              armes nucléaires et désarmement (décl. xue)                  734

                 Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la
                 Roumanie, première phase, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 74).
                 Lorsque le titre de compétence est constitué par les déclarations d’accep-
                 tation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour que les parties ont faites en
                 vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut, ni la notification préalable
                 ni l’envoi d’une note diplomatique officielle énonçant la réclamation
                 d’une partie à l’encontre de l’autre ne sont considérés comme une condi-
                 tion obligatoire. La détermination de l’existence d’un différend est une
                 question de fond, et non de forme (Violations alléguées de droits souve‑
                 rains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colom‑
                 bie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2016 (I), p. 26-27,
                 par. 50 ; Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de
                 toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Rus‑
                 sie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 84, par. 30),
                 la Cour devant s’employer à établir si les vues des parties divergeaient au
                 sujet des questions juridiques en cause.
                    4. En la présente espèce, la Cour a dûment suivi cette jurisprudence.
                 Etant donné qu’elle n’a pas examiné les autres exceptions soulevées par le
                 défendeur, mais a rejeté la requête en s’appuyant uniquement sur sa
                 conclusion quant à l’existence d’un différend, il n’est toutefois pas exclu
                 que l’opportunité de cette approche formelle et restrictive suscite certaines
                 questions. Compte tenu de la pratique antérieure de la Cour — qui a
                 consisté à faire preuve de souplesse à l’égard des carences procédurales
                 (voir Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
                 crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
                 C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 438, par. 81 ; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au
                 Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), compé‑
                 tence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 428‑429, par. 83 ; Came‑
                 roun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume‑Uni), exceptions préliminaires,
                 arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 28 ; Certains intérêts allemands en Haute‑
                 Silésie polonaise, compétence, arrêt n° 6, 1925, C.P.J.I. série A no 6, p. 14 ;
                 Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A
                 no 2, p. 34) —, il est en effet permis de se demander si l’inexistence d’un
                 différend entre les Parties au moment du dépôt de la requête pouvait en
                 soi constituer une base solide pour écarter l’affaire ; le différend s’étant
                 désormais bel et bien cristallisé, il serait aisé pour les Iles Marshall de se
                 présenter de nouveau devant la Cour en introduisant une nouvelle requête
                 ayant le même objet. Pour des raisons d’économie judiciaire, le réalisme
                 et la souplesse pouvaient donc sembler être de mise dans les présentes
                 circonstances.
                    5. Si j’ai souscrit à la décision de la Cour, c’est pour trois raisons. Pre-
                 mièrement, je suis d’avis que la démonstration, par le demandeur, de ce
                 qu’un différend existait entre les Parties avant l’introduction de l’instance
                 doit satisfaire à un critère de preuve minimal. Or, les éléments présentés
                 par les Iles Marshall à cet égard étaient nettement insuffisants. Hormis les
                 deux déclarations qu’il a faites lors de conférences internationales pour
                 exhorter les puissances nucléaires à engager immédiatement des négocia-

                                                                                186

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                              armes nucléaires et désarmement (décl. xue)                  735

                 tions sur le désarmement nucléaire — que les autres Etats seraient fondés
                 à considérer comme des déclarations politiques —, le demandeur n’a
                 fourni aucun élément attestant que des contacts bilatéraux de quelque
                 sorte que ce soit auraient eu lieu entre les Parties avant la saisine de la
                 Cour. Il s’est en revanche abondamment appuyé sur les positions expri-
                 mées par ces dernières en cours d’instance pour montrer que la réclama-
                 tion de l’une se heurtait à l’opposition manifeste de l’autre. Or, ainsi que
                 la Cour l’a souligné, si pareille argumentation était jugée recevable, la
                 condition de l’existence d’un différend se trouverait en pratique privée de
                 tout sens et de toute valeur. Chose selon moi plus fondamentale encore,
                 cela ébranlerait la confiance des Etats qui acceptent la juridiction obliga-
                 toire de la Cour.
                    6. Deuxièmement, même si une notification préalable ou des échanges
                 diplomatiques ne sont pas requis en tant que condition de l’existence d’un
                 différend, il convient de décourager les actions en justice « par surprise ».
                 Tout moyen de règlement pacifique des différends, y compris la voie judi-
                 ciaire, vise au règlement du différend en cause. A cet égard, le fait d’expri-
                 mer clairement une réclamation juridique contre la partie responsable,
                 chaque fois que les circonstances le permettent, faciliterait le processus de
                 négociation et de règlement. En tant que victimes du développement des
                 armes nucléaires, les Iles Marshall ont certes toutes les raisons de repro-
                 cher aux Etats qui en sont dotés de ne pas mener des efforts conjoints en
                 poursuivant des négociations sur la cessation de la course aux armements
                 et le désarmement nucléaire. Cette légitimité ne saurait cependant pré
                 valoir sur les conditions juridiques régissant l’exercice de la compétence
                 de la Cour.
                    7. Bien que la notion de différend n’ait jamais été formellement définie
                 et que le critère permettant de déterminer l’existence d’un différend soit
                 généralement peu strict, l’Etat contre lequel une instance est introduite
                 devrait au moins avoir préalablement connaissance de ce qu’un différend
                 d’ordre juridique, qui pourrait être soumis à la juridiction obligatoire de
                 la Cour en vue de son règlement, l’oppose à un autre Etat. La Cour peut
                 prendre en compte le comportement des parties postérieur au dépôt de la
                 requête en tant qu’élément de preuve supplémentaire pour s’assurer de sa
                 compétence et de la recevabilité de la requête, mais la souplesse, en
                 matière judiciaire, doit être exercée dans des limites raisonnables.
                    8. Troisièmement, la compétence de la Cour repose sur le consente-
                 ment mutuel et la réciprocité. Selon moi, la présente affaire différait par
                 nature de celles dans lesquelles la Cour avait opté pour une approche plus
                 souple à l’égard de certaines carences procédurales. Les déclarations que
                 les Iles Marshall ont faites dans le cadre de certaines conférences interna-
                 tionales ne suffisent pas, en tant que telles, à démontrer que, dans les
                 relations bilatérales de cet Etat, un différend l’opposait à chacune des
                 puissances nucléaires. De fait, le demandeur ne pouvait estimer qu’il
                 s’agissait là d’un problème bilatéral. Quoique ayant été elles‑mêmes vic-
                 times des armes nucléaires, les Iles Marshall n’ont pas introduit la pré-
                 sente instance simplement pour protéger leurs propres intérêts ; leur

                                                                                187

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                              armes nucléaires et désarmement (décl. xue)                   736

                  argumentation sert en effet davantage ceux de la communauté internatio-
                 nale. Or, bien qu’elle ait, dans le cadre de l’affaire de la Barcelona Trac‑
                 tion (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (nouvelle
                 requête : 1962) (Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J.
                 Recueil 1970, p. 32, par. 33), reconnu l’existence d’obligations erga omnes,
                 la Cour ne s’est pas penchée sur la question de la qualité pour agir
                 dans ce domaine, question qui reste à approfondir en droit international.
                     9. Cela m’amène à la seconde observation que je tiens à formuler au
                  sujet de l’arrêt. Je déplore grandement que la Cour n’ait pas examiné
                 certaines autres exceptions soulevées par le défendeur. Dans ses écritures
                  et plaidoiries, le Pakistan soutenait que la requête des Iles Marshall était
                  irrecevable
                      « [du] fait que [celles‑ci] ne met[taient] pas en cause certains protago-
                      nistes essentiels, dans une affaire concernant un traité multilatéral
                      qui li[ait] [l]es Etats dotés de l’arme nucléaire et d’autres Etats, mais
                      auquel le Pakistan, lui, n’[était] pas partie, ou encore [d]u fait que la
                      voie judiciaire [était], par nature, impropre à résoudre les questions
                      relatives au désarmement nucléaire impliquant de multiples Etats,
                      a fortiori par une prescription spécifique ou toute autre prescrip-
                      tion visant un seul d’entre eux » (contre‑mémoire du Pakistan,
                      par. 1.12).
                    10. Selon lui, la règle de l’Or monétaire empêchait la Cour de statuer
                 sur les demandes des Iles Marshall en l’absence des Etats parties au traité
                 sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (le « TNP ») et d’autres Etats
                 concernés (ibid., par. 7.33). Le défendeur affirmait par ailleurs que la voie
                 judiciaire était, par nature, impropre à résoudre les questions relatives au
                 désarmement nucléaire impliquant de multiples Etats (ibid., par. 1.12), et
                 que la Cour aurait « exerc[é] en vain » sa compétence contentieuse en l’es-
                 pèce (ibid., par. 8.105).
                    11. A mon sens, la Cour aurait dû examiner ces exceptions dès la phase
                 préliminaire, puisque ses conclusions à cet égard auraient eu un effet
                 direct sur sa compétence et sur la recevabilité de la requête. Si elle avait
                 procédé ainsi, elle aurait en effet été mieux à même de démontrer que,
                 pour ce qui concerne les questions de compétence et de recevabilité, la
                 requête des Iles Marshall n’était pas seulement défectueuse sur un point
                 de procédure.
                    12. Dans son avis consultatif sur la Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi
                 d’armes nucléaires, la Cour, après avoir examiné quel était alors le statut
                 des armes nucléaires en droit international, avait précisé que, pour
                 atteindre l’objectif fixé de longue date du désarmement nucléaire complet,
                 tous les Etats parties au TNP avaient l’obligation de négocier de bonne
                 foi en ce sens. Elle avait également souligné que, « [d]e fait, toute recherche
                 réaliste d’un désarmement général et complet, en particulier nucléaire,
                 nécessit[ait] la coopération de tous les Etats » (Licéité de la menace ou de
                 l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 264,
                 par. 100 ; les italiques sont de moi).

                                                                                188

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                              armes nucléaires et désarmement (décl. xue)                    737

                   13. La Cour s’était également référée à la résolution 984 (1995) en
                 date du 11 avril 1995, dans laquelle le Conseil de sécurité avait réaffirmé
                 qu’il était « nécessaire que tous les Etats parties au traité sur la non‑
                 prolifération des armes nucléaires s’acquittent pleinement de toutes leurs
                 obligations » et exhorté
                      « tous les Etats à poursuivre de bonne foi, comme il [était] stipulé à
                      l’article VI du traité sur la non‑prolifération des armes nucléaires,
                      des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives au désarmement
                      nucléaire et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un
                      contrôle international strict et efficace, qui demeur[ait] un objectif
                      universel » (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (I), p. 265, par. 103 ; les italiques sont
                      de moi).
                    14. Dans son avis consultatif, la Cour avait notamment souligné que
                 l’obligation découlant de l’article VI du TNP était une double obligation,
                 ajoutant ce qui suit :
                         « La portée juridique de l’obligation considérée dépasse celle d’une
                      simple obligation de comportement ; l’obligation en cause ici est celle
                      de parvenir à un résultat précis — le désarmement nucléaire dans
                      tous ses aspects — par l’adoption d’un comportement déterminé, à
                      savoir la poursuite de bonne foi de négociations en la matière. »
                      (Ibid., p. 264, par. 99.)
                    15. Vingt ans se sont écoulés depuis que la Cour a prononcé ce dictum
                 solennel. Ainsi qu’elle l’a précisé, tous les Etats doivent coopérer pour
                 réaliser cet objectif. A l’évidence, l’on a assisté en la matière à un manque-
                 ment collectif, mais la question qui se posait en la présente espèce était de
                 savoir si celui‑ci pouvait prendre la forme d’une série de différends bilaté-
                 raux, examinés séparément.
                    16. Il n’est guère douteux que certains Etats dotés d’armes nucléaires,
                 d’une part, et les Etats qui en sont dépourvus, d’autre part, ont des vues
                 divergentes au sujet de la cessation de la course aux armes nucléaires et du
                 processus de négociation sur le désarmement nucléaire. Pareil désaccord
                 peut‑il pour autant être qualifié de différend au sens des articles 36 et 38 du
                 Statut ? Autrement dit, un tel différend, à supposer qu’il ait existé au
                 moment du dépôt de la requête ou qu’il se soit cristallisé par la suite, peut‑il
                 être tranché par la Cour dans le cadre d’une procédure contentieuse ? La
                 question qui se posait en la présente espèce n’était pas, semble‑t‑il, celle
                 d’une carence procédurale à laquelle il aurait pu être remédié en cours
                 d’instance, comme cela avait été le cas dans les affaires antérieures. Je crains
                 que la Cour ait un peu trop mis l’accent sur la manière dont un différend
                 peut se matérialiser, sans tenir suffisamment compte de la nature de celui
                 qui, selon les Iles Marshall, les opposait au Pakistan.

                 (Signé) Xue Hanqin.

                                                                                189

6 CIJ1106.indb 139                                                                                13/11/17 09:02


533 NUCLEAR TESTS (ORDER 20 XII 74)

on which the Order is based: because Fiji, which is not a party to the 1928
Act and to the optional clause system, has failed to invoke in its applica-
tion any title of jurisdiction in relation to France.

In my view, in order to be entitled to intervene under Article 62 of the
Statute for the purpose of asserting a right as against the respondent a
State must be in a position in which it could itself bring the respondent
before the Court.

When Article 62 of the Statute was drafted, its authors were proceeding
on the assumption that the intervening State would have its own title of
jurisdiction in relation to the respondent, since the draft Statute then
provided for general compulsory jurisdiction. When that system was
replaced by the optional clause, Article 62 remained untouched, but it
must be interpreted and applied as still subject to that condition. Other-
wise, unreasonable consequences would result, in conflict with basic
principles such as those of the equality of parties before the Court and
the strict reciprocity of rights and obligations among the States which
accept its jurisdiction. A State which cannot be brought before the Court
as a respondent by another State can neither become an applicant vis-à-vis
that State nor an intervener against that same State, entitled to make
independent submissions in support of an interest of its own. In my view
the provision in Article 69, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court requiring
“a statement of law and of fact justifying intervention” must in circum-
stances like those in the present case be interpreted as including the
requirement of establishing an independent jurisdictional link between
intervener and respondent.

Judge ad hoc Sir Garfield BARWICK makes the following declaration:

I have voted in favour of the Order made in respect of the Application
by Fiji to intervene in these proceedings not because of the Order made
by the Court in the cases Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France
but solely for the reasons expressed by Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga and
Judge Onyeama in their declarations concerning the Fiji Order, with
which I entirely agree.

(Initialled) M.L.
(Initialled) S.A.


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

ANGLO-IRANIAN
OIL Co. CASE

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION

OF INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION
(UNITED KINGDOM / IRAN)

ORDER OF JULY 5th, 1951

1951

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE |
DE L’ANGLO-IRANTAN OIL Co.

DEMANDE EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES
(ROYAUME-UNI / IRAN)

ORDONNANCE DU 5 JUILLET 1951

SOCIÉTÉ D’EDITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFFS

LEYDE LEYDEN
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
This Order should be cited as follows:

“Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Order of July 5th, 1951:
ILC. J. Reports 1951, p. 89.”

La présente ordonnance doit être citée comme suit :

«Affaire de l'Anglo-Tranian Où Co., Ordonnance du
5 juillet 1951: C. I. J. Recueil 1951, p. 89.»

N° de vente: 62
Sales number

1951
July 5th
seneral List:
No. 16

89
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1951

July 5th, 1951

ANGLO-IRANIAN
OIL Co. CASE

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION
OF INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

(UNITED KINGDOM / IRAN)

ORDER

Present: President BaSDEVANT; Vice-President GUERRERO;
judges ALVAREZ, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI, ZoRICIC,
DE VisscHER, Sir Arnold McNair, KLAESTAD, BADAWI
PasHA, Reap, Hsu Mo; Registrar HAMBRO.

THE COURT,

composed as above,

after deliberation,

having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,
having regard to Article 61 of the Rules of Court,

In the proceedings instituted before the Court by the Application
dated May 26th, 1951, by the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, against the Iranian Empire
in the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,

Makes the following Order:

Having regard to the Request dated June 22nd, 1951, submitted
to the Court and filed in the Registry on that day whereby the
United Kingdom Government— invoking Article 41 of the Statute
and Article 61 of the Rules, and referring to the Application of
May 26th, in which the United Kingdom Government had reserved

4
go

ORDER OF 5 VII 51 (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CO.)

the right to request the Court to indicate such interim measures—
requested the Court to indicate that pending the final Judgment
of the Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case :

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(1)

The Imperial Government of Iran should permit the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, Limited, its servants and agents, to search
for and extract petroleum and to transport, refine or treat in
any other manner and render suitable for commerce and to sell
or export the petroleum obtained by it, and generally, to continue
to carry on the operations which it was carrying on prior to
the 1st May, 1951, free from interference calculated to impede
or endanger the operations of the Company, by the Imperial
Government of Iran, their servants or agents, or any Board,
Commission, Committee, or other body nominated by them.

The Imperial Government of Iran should not by any executive
or legislative act or judicial process hinder or prevent or attempt
to hinder or prevent the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,
its servants or agents, in or from continuing to carry on its
operations as aforesaid.

The Imperial Government of Iran should not by any executive
or legislative act or judicial process sequester or seize or attempt
to sequester or seize or otherwise interfere with any property
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, including (but
without prejudice to a decision on the merits of the case) any
property which the Imperial Government of Iran have already
purported to nationalize or otherwise to expropriate.

The Imperial Government of Iran should not by any executive
or legislative act or judicial process sequester or seize or attempt
to sequester or seize any monies earned by the Angio-Iranian
Oil Company, Limited, or otherwise in the possession or power
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, including (but
without prejudice to a decision on the merits of the case) any
monies which the Imperial Government of Iran have purported
to nationalize or otherwise to expropriate or any monies earned
by means of property which they have purported so to nationalize,
or otherwise to expropriate.

The Imperial Government of Iran should not by any executive
or legislative act or judicial process require or attempt to require
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, to dispose of the
monies referred to in sub-paragraph (d) above otherwise than
in accordance with the terms of the Convention of 1933 or of
any measure to be indicated by the Court.

The Imperial Government of Iran should ensure that no other
steps of any kind are taken capable of prejudicing the right
of the Government of the United Kingdom to have a decision
of the Court in its favour on the merits of the case executed,
should the Court render such a decision.

The Imperial Government of Iran and the Government of the
United Kingdom should ensure that no step of any kind is taken
91 ORDER OF 5 VII 51 (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CO.)

capable of aggravating or extending the dispute submitted to
the Court, and in particular, the Imperial Government of Iran
should abstain from all propaganda calculated to inflame opinion
in Iran against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, and
the United Kingdom.

Whereas, on the day on which the Request for the indication
of interim measures was filed, it was transmitted to the Iranian
Government and the submissions made therein were communicated
by telegraph to the said Government ;

Whereas the Registry, referring to Article 41, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations
of the said Request, and, in accordance with Article 40, paragraph 3,
of the Statute communicated it to the Members of the United
Nations through the Secretary-General, and to the other States
entitled to appear before the Court ;

Having regard to the message transmitted by telegraph by the
President of the Court on June 23rd to the Prime Minister and to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Iran, which was in the following
terms :

“Court being due to meet to consider Request for indication
interim measures of protection filed June 22nd by United Kingdom
Agent, it is my duty, in accordance with Article 61 of the Rules,
to take such measures as appear necessary to me to enable the
Court to give an effective decision. For this purpose I have honour
suggest to Your Excellencies that Imperial Government issue
appropriate instructions to avoid all measures which might render
impossible or difficult the execution of any judgment which the
Court might subsequently give and to ensure that no action is
taken which might aggravate the dispute submitted to Court.
Any measures taken by Imperial Iranian Government for this
purpose would in no way prejudice such representations as that
Government may deem it appropriate to make to Court either in
proceedings on Request for interim measures in which both Parties
will have right to be heard at hearing on June 30th or subsequently
in proceedings on Application filed May 26th by the United King-

om.

Having regard to the reply to this message, transmitted by
telegraph on June 2gth to the Iranian Legation at The Hague, and,
on the same day, delivered to the President of the Court by the
Iranian Minister at The Hague, filed and communicated to the
Agent for the United Kingdom Government ;

Having regard to the final text of the said reply, consisting of
a message signed ““B. Kazemi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Tran”, followed by a statement together with three annexes
delivered to the President of the Court on June 30th by the Iranian
Minister at The Hague, which was also communicated to the
Agent for the United Kingdom Government ;

6
92 ORDER OF 5 VII 5I (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CO.)

Whereas the said reply stated :

“In view of the foregoing considerations the Iranian Government
hopes that the Court will declare that the case is not within its
jurisdiction because of the legal incompetence of the complainant
and because of the fact that exercise of the right of sovereignty
is not subject to complaint. Under these circumstances the request
for interim measures of protection would naturally be rejected.”

Whereas on June 23rd, the day following the filing of the Request
for the indication of interim measures of protection, the United
Kingdom Government, through its duly authorized Agent, and the
Iranian Government, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, were
informed that the Court would hold a hearing on June 30th,
for the purpose of giving the Parties an opportunity of presenting
their observations on the subject of the Request ;

Whereas, upon the opening of the hearing fixed for this purpose,
the President of the Court took note of the presence in Court of
Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign
Office, and of the Right Honourable Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., M.P.,
Attorney-General ; Professor H. Lauterpacht, K.C., Professor of
International Law at Cambridge University ; Mr. A. K. Rothnie,
Eastern Department, Foreign Office ; and Messrs. H. A. P. Fisher
and D. H. N. Johnson, Counsel ;

Whereas the Iranian Government was not represented at this
hearing ;

Having heard Sir Frank Soskice on behalf of the United Kingdom
Government, on the Request for the indication of interim measures
of protection ;

Whereas the submissions in the request of the United Kingdom
Government, quoted above, were maintained in the course of the
hearing ;

Whereas in its message of June 2gth, 1951, the Iranian Govern-
ment stated that it rejected the’ Request for the indication of
interim measures of protection presented by the United Kingdom
Government on the grounds principally of the want of competence
on the part of the United Kingdom Government to refer to the
Court a dispute which had arisen between the Iranian Government
and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, and of the fact that
this dispute pertaining to the exercise of the sovereign rights of
Iran was exclusively within the national jurisdiction of that State
and thus not subject to the methods of settlement specified in the
Charter ;

Whereas it appears from the Application by which the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom instituted proceedings, that that
Government has adopted the cause of a British company and is
proceeding in virtue of the right of diplomatic protection ;

Whereas the complaint made in the Application is one of an
alleged violation of international law by the breach of the agree-

7
93 ORDER OF 5 VII 51 (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CO.)

ment for a concession of April 29th, 1933, and by a denial of justice
which, according to the Government of the United Kingdom, would
follow from the refusal of the Iranian Government to accept
arbitration in accordance with that agreement, and whereas it
cannot be accepted a priori that a claim based on such a complaint
falls completely outside the scope of international jurisdiction ;

Whereas the considerations stated in the preceding paragraph
suffice to empower the Court to entertain the Request for interim
measures of protection ;

Whereas the indication of such measures in no way prejudges
the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits
of the case and leaves unaffected the right of the Respondent to
submit arguments against such jurisdiction ;

Whereas the object of interim measures of protection provided
for in the Statute is to preserve the respective rights of the Parties
pending the decision of the Court, and whereas from the general
terms of Article 41 of the Statute and from the power recognized
by Article 61, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Court, to indicate
interim measures of protection proprio motu, it follows that the
Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights
which may be subsequently adjudged by the Court to belong
either to the Applicant or to the Respondent ;

Whereas the existing state of affairs justifies the indication of
interim measures of protection ;

For these reasons,
THE CouRT

Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted
on May 26th, 1951, by the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the Imperial Govern-
ment of Iran, the following provisional measures which will apply
on the basis of reciprocal observance :

1. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom
Government should each ensure that no action is taken which might
prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying
out of any decision on the merits which the Court may subsequently
render ;

2. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom
Government should each ensure that no action of any kind is taken
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the
Court ;

3. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom
Government should each ensure that no measure of any kind
should be taken designed to hinder the carrying on of the industrial

8
94 ORDER OF 5 VII 5I (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL Co.)

and commercial operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
Limited, as they were carried on prior to May Ist, 1951 ;

4. That the Company’s operations in Iran should continue under
the direction of its management as it was constituted prior to
May ist, 1951, subject to such modifications as may be brought
about by agreement with the Board of Supervision referred to in

paragraph 5;

5. That, in order to ensure the full effect of the preceding pro-
visions, which in any case retain their own authority, there should
be established by agreement between the Iranian Government and
the United Kingdom Government a Board to be known as the
Board of Supervision composed of two Members appointed by
each of the said Governments and a fifth Member, who should be
a national of a third State and should be chosen by agreement
between these Governments, or, in default of such agreement, and
upon the joint request of the Parties, by the President of the Court.

The Board will have the duty of ensuring that the Company’s
operations are carried on in accordance with the provisions above
set forth. It will, inter alia, have the duty of auditing the revenue
and expenses and of ensuring that all revenue in excess of the sums
required to be paid in the course of the normal carrying on of the
operations and the other normal expenses incurred by the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, Limited, are paid into accounts at banks
to be selected by the Board on the undertaking of such banks not
to dispose of such funds except in accordance with the decisions
of the Court or the agreement of the Parties.

Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of July, one thousand
nine hundred and fifty-one, in four copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted
to the Imperial Government of Iran, to the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to
the Security Council.

(Signed) BASDEVANT,
President.

( Signed ) E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.
95 ORDER OF 5 VII 51 (ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CO.)

Judges WINISRSKI and BADAWI Pasua, declaring that they are
unable to concur in the Order of the Court, have appended to the
Order the joint statement of their dissenting opinion.

(Initialled) J. B.
(Initialled) E. H.

10


INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING THE
AERIAL INCIDENT OF 3 JULY 1988

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN y. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA)

ORDER OF 22 FEBRUARY 1996

1996

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE L’INCIDENT AERIEN
DU 3 JUILLET 1988

(REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE DU 22 FEVRIER 1996
Official citation:
Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran
v. United States of America), Order of 22 February 1996,
I C.J. Reports 1996, p. 9

Mode officiel de citation:

Incident aérien du 3 juillet 1988 ( République islamique d'Iran
c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique ), ordonnance du 22 février 1996,
C.I.J. Recueil 1996, p. 9

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N° de vente: 674
ISBN 92-1-070737-0

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1996

22 février 1996

AFFAIRE DE L’INCIDENT AERIEN
DU 3 JUILLET 1988

(RÉPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN c. ÉTATS-UNIS
D’AMERIQUE)

ORDONNANCE

Le Président de la Cour internationale de Justice,

Vu l’article 48 du Statut de la Cour et l’article 88 de son Règlement,

Vu la requête enregistrée au Greffe de la Cour le 17 mai 1989 par
laquelle la République islamique d’Iran a introduit une instance contre
les Etats-Unis d'Amérique au sujet d’un différend concernant l’inter-
prétation et l’application de la convention de 1944 relative à Paviation
civile internationale et de la convention de 1971 pour la répression d’actes
illicites dirigés contre la sécurité de l'aviation civile, différend qui a
découlé de la destruction, le 3 juillet 1988, d’un avion iranien et de la
mort de ses deux cent quatre-vingt-dix passagers et membres d'équipage,

Vu les notifications adressées, respectivement, à l'Organisation de
Yaviation civile internationale, conformément au paragraphe 3 de Par-
ticle 34 du Statut, et aux parties aux conventions sus-indiquées, confor-
mément au paragraphe | de l’article 63 du Statut,

Vu l'ordonnance du 13 décembre 1989 par laquelle la Cour a fixé au
12 juin 1990 Ia date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire de la
République islamique d’Iran et au 10 décembre 1990 la date d'expiration
du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

Vu Pordonnance du 12 juin 1990 par laquelle le Président de la Cour a
reporté au 24 juillet 1990 et au 4 mars 1991 les dates d’expiration des
délais pour le dépôt, respectivement, du mémoire et du contre-mémoire,

4

1996
22 février
Rôle général
n° 79
INCIDENT AERIEN DU 3 VII 88 (ORDONNANCE 22 II 96) 10

Vu le mémoire déposé par la République islamique d’Iran et les excep-
tions préliminaires à la compétence de la Cour présentées par les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique dans les délais ainsi prorogés,

Vu l’ordonnance du 9 avril 1991 par laquelle la Cour a fixé au 9 dé-
cembre 1991 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel la République
islamique d’Iran pourrait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses obser-
vations et conclusions sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

Vu les ordonnances du 18 décembre 1991 et du 5 juin 1992 par les-
quelles le Président de la Cour a reporté successivement au 9 juin et au
9 septembre 1992 la date d'expiration du délai dans lequel la République
islamique d’Iran pourrait présenter un tel exposé écrit,

Vu l'exposé écrit contenant les observations et conclusions de la Répu-
blique islamique d’Iran sur les exceptions préliminaires, déposé dans le
délai ainsi proroge,

Vu les observations écrites présentées par l'Organisation de l’aviation
civile internationale le 4 décembre 1992, dans le délai fixé à cet effet par
le Président de la Cour conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 69 du
Règlement,

Vu la lettre du 8 août 1994 par laquelle les agents des deux Parties ont
conjointement informé la Cour que leurs gouvernements avaient «entamé
des négociations qui pourraient aboutir à un règlement total et définitif
de [PJaffaire» et l’ont priée de «renvoyler] sine die l'ouverture de la pro-
cédure orale», dont elle avait fixé la date au 12 septembre 1994;

Considérant que, par une lettre datée du 22 février 1996 et déposée au
Greffe le même jour, les agents des deux Parties ont conjointement notifié
à la Cour que leurs gouvernements sont convenus de se désister de l’ins-
tance parce qu’ils sont parvenus

«à un arrangement amiable complet et définitif pour ce qui est de
tous les différends, divergences de vues, demandes, demandes recon-
ventionnelles et questions que suscite ou peut susciter, directement
ou indirectement, la présente instance, ou qui sont directement ou
indirectement liés ou associés à celle-ci»,

Prend acte du désistement, par accord des Parties, de l’instance intro-
duite le 17 mai 1989 par la République islamique d’Jran contre les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique;

Prescrit que l'affaire soit rayée du rôle.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de
la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt-deux février mil neuf cent quatre-vingt-seize,
en trois exemplaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et

5
INCIDENT AERIEN DU 3 VII 88 (ORDONNANCE 22 IT 96) 11

les autres seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique islamique d’Iran et au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d’Amé-
rique.
Le Président,
(Signé) Mohammed BEDJAoUI.
Le Greffier,
{ Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.