Twenty-five years have elapsed since the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, and during that short span of time the scientific and technological revolution has acquired greater momentum, colonized peoples have achieved their independence, trade and communications have increased and international organizations have been successively embracing all the possible fields of cooperation among States. International policy has changed in character, and new diplomatic techniques have emerged in international organization. By looking back to the League of Nations, wherein the major part of United Nations activities finds some antecedent, we can gauge the distance covered by the international community in fifty years.
2.	There can be no accurate evaluation of the United Nations by comparing it with an ideal world in which its problems would invariably be solved rapidly and wisely; but it can be assessed in realistic terms by comparing it with its predecessor. Viewed from this perspective, the United Nations stands up well against the most critical analysis, in both its political and its technical aspects.
3.	Now that the United Nations has reached its twenty-fifth year it is appropriate to take stock of the situation. Hence it is to be hoped that at the current session, apart from thoughtful speeches, measures will be adopted for the administrative review of the Organization. The United Nations has reached a stage where, instead of proliferating by addition, there is need for it to look into itself, to its structures, machinery and operative practices, so that it may grow in depth and density.
4.	In this year in which the United Nations celebrated its first twenty-fifth anniversary, it is particularly gratifying to my Government to have you, Mr. President, occupying the highest post in the General Assembly. It is with much feeling that I recall your association, Ambassador Hambro, with Dr. Jose Gustavo Guerrero, at the time when Dr. Guerrero was President of the International Court of Justice. You, Ambassador Hambro, are for ever linked by strong ties to El Salvador, and it was for this reason that my Government was among the first to sponsor your candidacy for the Presidency of the General Assembly. As a learned commentator of the Charter, as a veteran diplomat at innumerable conferences, you represent the ideals and the experience of the diplomatic community of the international organizations
5.	The matters that are before the United Nations, some old and others more recent, are so numerous that without minimizing the importance of any and subject to their discussion in the different committees, I shall confine my remarks to the following major issues: peace and security, maritime law, the Second Development Decade, the principle of universality and the review of the Charter.
6.	In the current year the major tension spots and even those of open warfare have been somewhat on the decrease. Hence, it is to be hoped that intelligent and realistic efforts may lead towards negotiation which will replace confrontations from positions of strength.
7.	In the Near East, where until a few days ago the horizon looked bleak and forbidding, there has been a promising opening which must be preserved and, as far as possible, extended. My Government conveys its best wishes to the friendly Governments of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel for their determination to initiate and to keep the dialog open. Long and thorny is the path that these countries will have to tread. But it is precisely because of the difficulties that those Governments will have to overcome, that they deserve the commendation of the international community and should be given encouragement to persevere in the stand they have taken. The appeal addressed by the Secretary General to all the Members of the Security Council in July 1969  to exert all their influence in the United Nations in order to make the ceasefire effective was especially timely and has yielded, through a patient exercise of persuasion by friendly Governments, the initiation of a dialog within the framework of the United Nations. For our Organization it is decisive that those efforts be conceived and developed within the framework of its action machinery and under its aegis.
8.	In other regions as well, the violent antagonisms of the year 1969 have gone into a period of recession and dialog has yielded its first fruits. For instance, we hope that in Central America reason will prevail over passion and that the geography, the history and the principles of coexistence and the peaceful settlement of disputes will again become the guiding beacons of the subregional policy. In this connexion, my Government maintains a clearly defined and unalterable position to which it has remained faithful in the most tragic moments of its history and to which it is prepared to adjust its international conduct, that is to say, the line of reasonable and rational cooperation, of the defense of fundamental human rights, of the observance of the principles of international law construed as a system the components of which condition and interact among each other, and of compliance with formally contracted obligations.
9.	Among the numerous and complex disarmament problems, the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons has become a topical subject. To this end it is appropriate to recall the existence of a convention that enjoys great authority: the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. The scope and meaning of that Protocol were discussed in the First Committee at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. On that occasion my Government, through its Permanent Representative, established its position concerning the scope and meaning of the aforementioned Protocol. The report of the fourteen experts  mentioned by the SecretaryGeneral, on the scientific evaluation of the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their effects on the physical and biological environment is a valuable element for the orientation of United Nations action in his field.
10.	As for the manner in which the prohibition of the use of defoliants and other gases which are clearly banned in the Protocol can be made effective, my Government believes that General Assembly declarations which lack binding force are not the appropriate means to achieve that end. It is precisely because my Government wishes to have these ultramodern means of warfare banned that it considers that simple declarations of the Assembly are far too weak to achieve the aims pursued and believes that the United Nations should embark upon the slower but only sure and effective course of modifying the Geneva Protocol or of negotiating a new convention.
11.	Furthermore, my Government expressly stated in the First Committee and reiterates in this Assembly that it considers that the General Assembly of the United Nations lacks competence to interpret treaties and that for such purposes the United Nations has a competent body, the International Court of Justice; moreover, in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly may request an advisory opinion from the Court.
12.	As it has already stated, my Government seeks to ensure respect for the competence of the various bodies of the system as well as to ensure that the precedents have the necessary consistency to enable them to constitute a body of jurisprudence that interprets and develops the Charter.
13.	Of course, my Government is consistent with the doctrine it has upheld at other international conferences, that is, in drawing a very clear distinction between the two sources of international law, the law of treaties and customary law, and in denying that the contractual source, through the mere passage of time, may be regarded as the originator of custom. Acts of compliance with treaties cannot be regarded as generating custom. Therefore, my Government does not share in the thesis that treaties of European origin, conceived for European conditions, are a source of international custom, valid ergo ommes and hence binding on those who have not subscribed to such treaties. My Government has had occasion to expound in detail in the appropriate forums its position on this subject, and, if I now invoke the authority of the said Geneva Protocol and of other international conventions which my Government has not ratified, I do so by virtue of the value we attach to the contents of their provisions, independently of the binding force involved therein.
14.	Within the generally accepted principle that the seabed and ocean floor should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, a first step is being taken with the draft treaty  which would prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed. That draft, the coauthors of which are the United States and the Soviet Union, was the object of study by the General Assembly in 1969 and was referred back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The General Assembly will consider a new version of that draft treaty at the present session.
15.	My Government established its position concerning that draft treaty during the debate in the First Committee. That position is that, while we fully support the principle of the reservation of the seabed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes and while we are in favor of the prohibition of the emplacement on the seabed or ocean floor of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, my Government considers it undesirable and inadvisable to prejudge the solution of other problems of maritime law and to violate the interests and rights of coastal States as a result of an international agreement on the subject. El Salvador is not a party to the Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, signed in Geneva in April 1958. That Convention has received thirty-six ratifications in its twelve years of existence; hence it does not enjoy general acceptance. Therefore to embody its concepts in the draft treaty on the de-nuclearization of the seabed and ocean floor would be tantamount to presupposing that norms that reflect agreement of only a fraction of the international community have binding force.
16.	While my Government supports the substance and objectives of the Treaty it objects to the implication that it solves other natters which should be the object of direct negotiation through a conference on the sea. Prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor should be the object of formal international agreement, but it is not necessary rather it is prejudicial to the interests of many States for it to imply the acceptance of certain clauses in the Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. That prohibition can be agreed on through direct demarcation of the zone, independently of the fact that it encompasses a belt subject to national jurisdiction. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of the treaty, to distinguish between national and international zones. In this connexion, and omitting the implication of other conventions, the treaty could state purely and simply that the zone begins twelve miles from the coast.
17.	My Government follows with keen interest the work of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression and notes with satisfaction that some progress has been achieved, despite the antagonistic schools of thought that obey conflicting political interests. Two theories are in conflict: on the one hand, that of a general definition based on essential elements and, on the other, that of a definition through an enumerative indication of conceivable cases at the present time. The first, a more technical thesis from the academic standpoint, offers wide margins of interpretation and application; hence the reluctance of some countries to accept it. The second thesis, which meets a criterion of certainty and security, implies the risk of not going far enough as regards the enumeration of foreseeable cases. If to define is to indicate the limits, and hence the scope and meaning, of a concept, both theses correspond to what might be regarded in international law as an essentially political definition, yet in the light of the rules of logic it is the former that would carry the vote.
18.	The definition of aggression is not an isolated subject; rather it is linked to legitimate self-defense, which changes the juridical qualification of an act of force. The same act of force considered in its material elements may in given circumstances constitute aggression and in other circumstances constitute an act of legitimate self-defense. On the other hand, aggression must be envisaged not only from the point of view of the use of violence across frontiers but also from the point of view of the use of violence in violation of fundamental rights of another State, contrary to international law and the fundamental norms of friendship and cooperation among States. Moreover, the principles and norms the violation of which constitute aggression should be regarded as part of a system, and in this sense such a definition cannot be taken to mean the indication of limits for isolated cases; rather the definition must recognize the multilateral conditioning of the major international principles. For instance, the very lofty principle of sovereignty could not be invoked to flout and trample under foot the fundamental rights of another State.
19.	It is most regrettable that economic aggression should be absent from the immediate program of the aforesaid Special Committee, for in the contemporary world economic aggression in some cases has replaced armed aggression. Economic aggression, for as long as it continues with the tolerant acquiescence of the international organizations, will constitute a breach in the organized system of world coexistence and will also continue to play its nefarious role of poisoning international relations. When economic aggression shows characteristics of persistence and intensity, it acquires a new nature, for then the economic weapon is brandished with intentions that are on destructive as war weapons, and, its purposes and results being similar, they deserve the same legal qualifications.
20.	This type of problem should be studied by the Special Committee in order to properly comply with its mandate. The longer we take to arrive at conclusions, the greater the risks that this great task of coexistence symbolized by the United Nations will founder in abysmal depths, confusion and abuses.
21.	Since El Salvador is not a member of the Special Committee, we shall have an opportunity to submit to the Sixth Committee our remarks on this important subject when the report of the Special Committee is considered.
22.	Few subjects arouse so much interest as the strengthening of international security because beneficial consequences of every kind are derived from security, including the still remote possibility that the amounts invested in armaments may be transferred to development.
23.	International security is closely linked with the abolition of atomic weapons and the effective and just operation of the international bodies dealing with political cooperation and economic and social development. The United Nations has achieved some successes such as the treaties on the denuclearization of the Antarctic, of outer space [resolution 2222 (XXI)] and of Latin America. My Government is especially satisfied with the Treaty of Tlatelolco which eliminates atomic weapons from Latin American territories. The Treaty that is in the process of negotiation on the prohibition of the emplacement of atomic weapons on the seabed and ocean floor would considerably increase the important areas of the world in which such weapons are prohibited. But in other areas, and especially in the territories of the Great Powers and their military allies, atomic weapons are being accumulated in ever-growing quantities, and submarines loaded with hydrogen bombs sail the high sear, all over the world. Those weapons would suffice to annihilate the human species and to convert the earth into the most deserted of planets. Therefore the elimination of such weapons from certain areas is a limited relief, and viewed in a more general context does little to help man out of the dilemma or snare in which he has fallen through his increased mastery over nature. The same can be said of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII)] which limits the number of States possessing the bomb and certainly the risk of a catastrophe, but which allows States members of the atomic club to retain their capacity to decide whether man will survive or whether he will join the fossilized species which paleontologists from other galaxies may discover thousands of years hence.
24.	The item on international security should be maintained on the agenda of the General Assembly, but calls for more detailed treatment than it was given in 1969, when the General Assembly was faced with several draft declarations that were finally merged in resolution 2606 (XXIV), which confined itself to declaring good intentions. Among those intentions, at least one contains a challenge to this Assembly inasmuch as it expresses the hope that at the current session, in which the United Nations celebrates its first twenty- five years, some appropriate recommendations may be made to strengthen international security. In keeping with this purpose of the General Assembly, my Government hopes to submit to the appropriate body and at the appropriate time concrete proposals which will carry this item on to a more practical plane than declarations of good intentions whose immediate fate is to clutter up the archives of the Organization.
25.	Concerning maritime law and the seabed and ocean floor, El Salvador has been participating in the forty-two member Committee on the seabed.  Our contribution in that Committee was welcomed with goodwill by its members who entrusted the Permanent Representative of El Salvador with the post of Chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee. My Government expresses its thanks for this show of confidence and friendship.
26.	The General Assembly requested of the Committee on the seabed through resolution 2574 B (XXIV) that it speed up its study of a comprehensive and balanced declaration of principles which may be accepted by the international community. The Committee has worked untiringly to meet that request of the General Assembly, and although it has made considerable progress in the current year as a comparison between the synthesis included at the end of the second part of the report of the Legal SubCommittee in 1969 and the informal documents which were circulated in the latter part of the summer session held in Geneva will bear out there are still at least five major issues which while not insoluble, call for greater effort and more ingenuity to turn them into the common denominator that may be the object of a consensus. The Committee has accumulated a considerable wealth of experience in its two years of work and is better prepared than in the past to comply with its mandate. However, the subject it has to deal with is especially complex and is the object of varying and frequently of antagonistic interests requiring not a search for perfect solutions based on reason, but political solutions based on compromise.
27.	The task of the seabed Committee is among the most complex and important work now under way in the United Nations. If this were an academic exercise, the Committee would have long since produced a declaration of principles, but what is at stake are great political decisions and the interests of the maritime Powers and of countries having extensive coastlines and scant means to exploit the resources of the sea, of countries with advanced technology and developing countries, of regions having inland seas and regions facing wide expanses of the sea all extreme points in a broad spectrum of intermediate conditions and interests.
28.	There should be a single declaration of principles. It should be a guideline for the regime to be established and should be conceived in simple and abstract terms, but the regime should bear in mind the normative plurality in order that its norms may also take into account special facts and achieve international justice.
29.	My Government considers that details and qualifications create obstacles that stand in the way of agreement on principles bacause they introduce contents that some States are not in a position to accept. The road to agreement lies in simple, direct and abstract formulas. As soon as attempts are made to introduce specific elements we fall into discussions and disagreements. For the formulation of principles, abstraction and simplicity are the appropriate techniques. Of course if it were a question of agreeing on the regime of the seabed and the ocean floor, qualifications and specific formulas could not be avoided.
30.	The formulas to be embodied in the declaration should not prejudge, imply or presuppose controversial theses on the law of the sea. If through the declaration of principles attempts were made to draw advantages for the solution of other questions we would come to a dead-end street and implicitly we would be renouncing our wish to comply with the mandate given to the Committee. For instance, such formulas should not prejudge either in favor of or against the General Assembly moratorium or in favor or against either limitation of the zone or of the rights of the coastal States or of a provisional regime.
31.	But the declaration of principles must spell out certain fundamental questions relating exclusively to the use of the seabed and the ocean floor as for example, the principles which recognize that the seabed and ocean floor are the common heritage of mankind, that resources shall be exploited for the benefit of all peoples, and that an international organization shall administer the joint and common interests of peoples and, especially, will seek to ensure compliance with the regime to be established under the treaty.
32.	The determination of the nature of the principles of the declaration is of the highest importance. For the present it would appear that a common denominator could be found if the declaration were to be regarded as a guideline for the regime which would exclude the interpretation, unacceptable to many States, that it could be construed as being a provisional regime.
33.	The Secretary General undertook the consultations requested of him by the General Assembly [resolution 2574 A (XXIV)] on a possible conference on the sea, My Government responded to that consultation and stressed that a new conference on the sea should not be restrictive in character but rather that its objectives should be broad so as to allow for the study of the various pending matters relating to the law of the sea while updating others which, although there has been general agreement thereon, call for normative reforms.
34.	My Government is opposed to the convening of a conference with a restricted agenda, limited in advance, which would probably contain items that are of interest to the maritime Powers and the developed countries, while leaving aside those problems and subjects that are of interest to the developing countries. Thus the possibility of world understanding, of a systematic and joint treatment of the different subjects and of the sense of harmony and balance which should preside over those chapters of the international law of the sea, would be lost.
35.	Of course, a conference conceived in the terms advocated by my Government does not run the risk of foundering by reason of the imprecision and overabundance of items. Were it to be convened as a broad, comprehensive conference covering all matters relating to pending questions on the law of the sea and were it to be entrusted to a preparatory commission which would be in constant consultation with the States concerned, it would illicit proposals for items over a given period of time, but in the last analysis it would be a conference with a defined and limited agenda. In other words, the divergency with those who want a limited conference lies in the fact that they want the items to be defined in the letter convening the conference while my Government considers that the convening should be broad and that the items on the agenda should be determined in the course of the preparatory work. The conference would have to be carefully prepared and well thought out, there should be no improvisations and an opportunity should be given for a unified, balanced and harmonious treatment of all pending matters, whether they be new or old, with a view to completing or amending the most sensitive parts of contemporary maritime law.
36.	International law was conceived by Europeans for European conditions. As new circumstances arose, it was enriched by several Latin American doctrines; but the resistance opposed by European authors to the adoption of such doctrines, and the difficulties they encounter in some international courts are well known. Language is a barrier to the study of these old Latin American juridical doctrines by the recently emerged nations of Asia and Africa. My Government believes that countries in the process of development have a real interest in contributing to the progress of international law and that, just as they have opposed political colonialism, they would be prepared to close the way to intellectual colonialism. Of course, if this purpose is to become a reality it must find concrete expression in a clearly defined and consistent policy in all international forums.
37.	With reference to the Second United Nations Development Decade, the highly important role played by the United Nations since its establishment in regard to a world policy for development, so far as its strategy is concerned, is focused to a large degree on the Second Development Decade.
38.	The General Assembly will consider a draft declaration [A 17982, para. 16] on what could become a global strategy for development. The treatment of the problem in world dimensions implies, in itself, considerable progress, and, as such, is deserving of our commendation.
39.	The draft represents a compromise between the divergent interests of the developed and the developing countries and takes account of the policy that has been applied since the establishment of the United Nations and which experience has shown to be inadequate. There looms over the Second Decade, as there will loom over decades to come, a basic failing: we have been unable to persuade the developed countries that the economic progress of the developing world means their own progress and that, rather than in terms of political influence, development should be viewed in terms of mutual economic advantages, since developed countries make better customers than poor countries.
40.	It might be appropriate to point to a striking phenomenon in the world policy of recent years: the political unity and growing solidarity of interests of the developing countries in broad spheres and outside any ideological context.
41.	Development as a world plan should promote in the relatively less developed countries the formation of their own stocks of capital; it follows therefore that their best recourse lies in broad trade arrangements. The transfer of capital through loans and investments should be a supplementary element. So long as no satisfactory solutions to world trade are found there will be lacking an important generating nucleus for development, and some countries will get increasingly in debt and will end up reexporting in terms of amortization, interest and profits more capital than they receive.
42.	None of the United Nations services deals in a comprehensive manner with the transfer of science and technology and, therefore, this very important aspect of development is being serviced in a fragmentary and dispersed manner. In this connexion, Economic and Social Council resolution 1454 (XLVII), which contemplates the strengthening and coordination of current activities, has embarked upon the right course. Services connected with this subject could be coordinated, and work in this field could be carried out under a clearly defined and unified coordination policy; such coordination could lead to a merging of administrative activities. This is one of the decisive chapters for the Second Decade and calls for an emphatic, direct, overall approach.
43.	The Second Decade, as conceived, will not reverse the implacable trend resulting in the formation of two galaxies of developed and developing peoples respectively, which continue slowly to drift apart. In fifteen years, even if the greater part of the policy recommended in the proposed strategy is adopted, the gap between the two galaxies will have doubled.
44.	The 6 per cent yearly rate of growth, which it is to be hoped the developing countries will achieve in the first part of the Decade and of which it is said vaguely as though expressing a faint hope that there is a "possibility that a higher rate of growth may be achieved in the second half of the Decade", is perhaps realistic. But there is no reference in the draft to the ratio between the growth rate of that galaxy as compared to that of the galaxy of developed peoples.
45.	In the report of the Preparatory Committee, it is stated timorously that if an average rate of growth of 3.5 per cent in per capita income were maintained during the Decade it would be possible to achieve "at least a modest beginning towards narrowing the gap in living standards between developed and developing countries" [A 17982, para. 16(13)]. It might be questioned whether this modest growth in per capita income would truly begin to close that gap. Let us quote some figures. Let us suppose that certain countries have an annual per capita income of 300 and others 1,200. The 3,5 per cent for the 300 would result in a per capita income of 310.5 the first year. But if those who have 1,200 realize a 2 per cent growth in income let us not say 3.5 per cent as in the case of the former this would yield an increase 24 for the first year. From the first year the relative growth would not represent a modest reduction in the relative gap, but rather in increase. Let us assume an increase of 5 per cent in the per capita income of countries starting with 1,200, because even this insignificant sum which is negligible for the developed countries and, therefore, inadequate as a hypothesis, unless we choose to be absurd would give them an increase of 12, and it is obvious that 12 is higher than 10.5.
46.	In the second year, the country having 310.5 end a 3.5 per cent increase would increase by 10.86; but the one having 1,224 with a 2 per cent increase would increase its income by 24.48. If in the case of the latter we assume an increase of 1 per cent, which would be a ridiculous figure given the growth rate of the developed countries, and on the assumption that in the first year there was also a 1 per cent growth, the per capita income would rise by 12.12 and this figure is higher than 10.86.
47.	The purpose of the examples figures I have quoted is to show that we fail to understand how with the current strategy the Second Decade can constitute "a modest beginning towards narrowing the gap in living standards between developed and developing countries'", as asserted in the aforementioned document on development strategy.
48.	Among the complex arrangements for world trade under discussion, we find that of preferences scheme. As regards this question European preferences in favor of the African countries have brought to mind intra-continental preferences. But we should not add one distortion to another; and, before finally deciding on a scheme for world trade, we should work for the elimination of existing regional preferences and their replacement by general preferences accessible to countries from all areas of the world. Fortunately, the draft strategy favors generalized nonreciprocal non discriminatory preferences.
49.	I now come to the question of the universality of the United Nations. We find in the Charter the principle of universality, because the United Nations, by vocation and if it is to be effective, must be universal. The many stumbling blocks it had come across in its twenty-five years are due to the fact that this principle could not be made a reality. But this shortcoming cannot be imputed to the General Assembly, the Security Council or to certain Governments, since it stems from the very origins of the Organization itself. In fact, the United Nations was born when passions still raged at the end of the Second World War, which explains the content of Article 107, which speaks of enemy States.
50.	Universality is a principle, not a norm, and it follows that it inspires a policy but not an immediate and executive mandate implying the solution of specific political problems. There are serious political problems, especially as regards the division of national States as a result of civil strife or international wars, which cannot be solved by merely invoking the principle of universality. In such cases it is necessary to confront those problems and attempt to solve them in order to make universality a reality. The United Nations is not lagging behind in regard to the principle of universality because in twenty-five years it has not made that principle effective, but, rather, because of the lack of interest, imagination or realism with which it has dealt with certain problems and, what is ever more delicate, because of the practice that has been established of living in & status quo which, while being the case was out for the present, incubates greater problems for the near future. Universality must be lived, but without doing violence to the feelings and sentiments of peoples and without violating other principles, such as self-determination and the right to national independence understood not in isolation but as a system whose parts are interdependent and condition each other.
51.	Universality, apart from the chronically well known problems, has for some time been touching on the case of the so-called microStates. It is not easy ? to define a microState, although it might be a result
of a concurrence of factors, such as territory population, national product, capacity to contribute to the regular budget of the United Nations. If such restrictive criteria for admission to the United Nations were to be introduced, a precedent which could be easily invoked in the future would be created, and once such restrictions are introduced they would follow the trend of the taxation of national and international organizations' budgets in other words, they would only move upwards. Once the income is regulated, there is nothing to prevent its permanency being questioned. This is a delicate matter because the United Nations could well end up by becoming an exclusive club with access to membership conditioned by material and financial considerations having some precedent in the contemporary international community, namely the atomic club.
52.	Any definition of microState, however restrictive, could be applied to some of the present Members of the United Nations. Since no one is proposing, indeed, no one conceives, that a State Member of the United Nations may be deprived of its acquired rights, it could happen that one microState might be a full Member of the United Nations while other States whose conditions are similar would not be full Members, for reasons that could not be imputed to them, but merely because independence has come late to them in the process of decolonization.
53.	Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations makes no distinction between large, medium, small or minute States, but, rather, inspired by the principle of universality, it speaks of "peace-loving States" which, in the opinion of the Organization, are able to comply with the obligations they undertake. We mean all obligations, including financial obligations, provided they are willing to do so.
54.	When so much is being said of universality on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary, it would be inconsistent to reform the Charter in order to reduce the population scope of the Organization. I come now to the question of the review of the Charter of the United Nations. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary, the desirability of reviewing the Charter has been considered. The opinion is bruited about that the United Nations has only partially met the objectives which inspired its foundation twenty-five years ago. In the face of this judgment, the question arises whether the reason is some constitutional flaw that could be remedied by negotiating amendments to the Charter, or whether it is something deeper that touches the very core of international policy and expresses the will of states, who are less inclined than they were twenty-five years ago to rely on multilateral diplomacy.
55.	My Government considers that we cannot postpone consideration of the review of the Charter. This means that an opportunity should be given to assess the ideas and proposals of Member States through a kind of evaluation of the Charter, which regardless of the results may prove to be a healthy exercise.
56.	The ineffectiveness we have seen in the United Nations in its first twenty-five years probably cannot be overcome with a few mere amendments to the Charter, since the causes underlying its shortcomings run much deeper. As in the case of States, we find in international life that problems are solved not only through improved legislation but through a process of determination of the causes and the conditioning of social, political and economic factors. This, however, does not prevent its being desirable to have better laws, provided they are the best suited to the circumstances and not those suited to a Utopian world.
57.	Moreover, if the review of the Charter were to be considered, we would have a reference point and a nucleus around which we could study the major problems of the international community. Governments would bring their views and would benefit from the views of others. However, my Government is not unaware of the obstacles that stand in the way not only of a possible amendment to the Charter, but also of the possibility of beginning the consideration of such a topic. This shows the frail balance in which the international community has been placed by the Charter, a balance that has become crystallized and immobile in these twenty-five years, and which, if compared with those pioneer years of faith and confidence of the first Decade, has become even more precarious.
58.	My Government does not share the view that the General Assembly must annually produce an impressive number of resolutions on the most varied subjects, but, rather advocates the focusing of debate and resolutions on those subjects, measures and provisions that imply a constructive and profitable discussion of matters within its competence. Even in regard to those questions that are within its competence, my Government believes the time has come to adopt a criterion of restraint based on timeliness and priorities. The Organization's prestige and effectiveness so demand it, especially at this time when the Canadian delegation has most appropriately raised the question of the rationalization of procedures and organization of the General Assembly. But the need for rationalization goes beyond procedures and allocation of items and readjustment of the competence of committees, and must be extended to the very substance of items and subjects and the spirit presiding over our deliberations and recommendations.
59.	And yet, if there were no United Nations, we would immediately have to create some other international organization. While much criticism, I would go so far as to say, deserved criticism may be leveled against the United Nations, no one would think seriously of destroying it. Such criticism, after all, is no more than criticism of the States themselves, of the Members of the Organization, and reflects the ups and downs of the international community. Successes and failures in the United Nations increase the assets and liabilities of the Members, and criticism of the United Nations is to some extent criticism of the Member States, and hence to some extent self-criticism. When we ask something of the United Nations, we must stop to ponder on what we ourselves are prepared to give in order that our requests may be met.
60.	The Charter of the United Nations does not reflect the true balance between the achievement of peace and the realization of justice. Peace, both national and international, examined in terms of its conditions and content and viewed on the basis of a whole set of factors, is invariably linked to justice. However, only  when it reflects a superficial status quo, can it be regarded as a separate phenomenon divorced from the conditions and causes that engender it. It is dealt with as such in the Charter, since in the Charter justice holds a collateral, not to say marginal, position. "Justice" was included after a veritable fray lasting many hours at the twenty-fourth session about the slogan of the twenty-fifth anniversary but it invariably occupies a choice place in statements. When attempts are made in political forums to resolve certain conflicts, as soon as justice is invoked a sibylline climate cloaks the whole question that no one dares to openly avow, and a skeptical, comfortable, relaxed attitude is struck, much like that of a character depicting several situations, only instead of the question "what is truth?" being asked, "what is justice?" is what we hear.
61.	Were the Charter to be amended, then that would be the time to reorient the United Nations towards two equally valid and correlative goals: international peace and security.


Mr. President, this visit to the United Nations provides me with an opportunity to congratulate you on your well-deserved election by the General Assembly. It is a gesture of recognition of your personal qualifications and of the contribution which your country has made to international cooperation. Colombia is confident that under your expert guidance the General Assembly will successfully complete its work.
2.	This is the first time the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Government of Colombia attends this world Assembly. On 7 August last, President Misael Pastrana was constitutionally inaugurated. He was elected by the people of my country in the freest and most closely contested election campaign in the last years, in which a record number of ballots was cast and voters were able to decide the national destiny under the protection of the laws.
3.	The democratic character of this Government is fully in accord with the efforts of {he two national parties to maintain a coalition government and to continue to carry out the social programs, which are the irreversible goal of the new President of Colombia. He is determined to strengthen the achievements that have been gained within law and order, so as to apply an integral agrarian reform, an intensive and well balanced development of our territory and.a gradual and progressive rise in the standard of living of the underprivileged classes.
4.	The experience of the National Front, in existence for twelve years, has been one of the most significant developments in the history of Colombia. In its respect for human rights and constitutional guarantees, it has created an atmosphere favorable to understanding and agreement among all of our political groups. In a disturbed and confused world, shaken by protest and revolution. Colombia has achieved progress, through democratic channels and under the rule of law. We have full confidence in this national consensus and in the sprint of our nations.
5.	Furthermore, we have well-defined international purposes which support the principles of the United Nations. As a country we have an old and deep-rooted tradition of acting always with the strictest sense of justice and by closely observing the rules of human rights.
6.	The foreign policy of Colombia, since the earliest decades of the nineteenth century, the first years of our independence, has been oriented towards international cooperation. An evidence of this is the missions sent by the liberator and President of the Republic, Simon Bolivar, to various States in America and Europe, to explain the main principles of our new nation and to anticipate the Congress of 1826,  which adopted the first interAmerican Treaty of solidarity, mutual aid and reciprocal respect for sovereignty.
7.	That was the spirit with which we established our national boundaries. In the midst of a lack of knowledge of our geography, it was necessary to track down ancient titles to justify the legal demarcation line and to chase foot by foot the landmarks of a frontier extending over several thousand kilometers. In establishing its borders, Colombia scrupulously followed a juridical criterion and thus gave the supreme example of adherence to international law and to peaceful means. Any territorial disputes with our neighbors were settled in accordance with international law, with no thought of war, invasion or conquest.
8.	It is now many years since our last frontier treaty was signed. When that chapter of our diplomatic history was closed, we looked back with gratitude to the founders of the Republic of Colombia, for it was they who instilled in us the spirit of cooperation and friendship with our neighbors and with all States of our continent. It was they who proclaimed clearly the Colombian doctrine of judicially established frontiers, specifically those of uti possidetis juris of 1810, by which the nations that inherited the Spanish dominions were recognized as rightful owners of the territories of the various general captaincies and vice-royalties. It was this doctrine that very largely regulated the demarcation of frontiers in our hemisphere.
9.	Our national sovereignty is defined and limited by law. The ambition to which we have adhered through
the years has been the observance of international law, which is the supreme rule for justice among peoples. It is thus possible for us who are today members of the Colombian Government to state that we do not covet any territory other than that which has been assigned to us legitimately by border treaties and international agreements, as, for instance, those related to our continental shelf and our fishing zone J. Every inch of our land is acknowledged as ours by treaties which we finally succeeded in working out through friendly agreements. We should like to follow the same procedures with our neighbors regarding the delineation of the marine and submarine areas.
10.	In the first century of their existence the Latin American countries lived apart from international life, involved as they were in internal strife, and after the epic of liberation came the need for our countries of the Western Hemisphere to settle complicated differences over frontiers. Now, in the twentieth century, Latin America has an international personality and is proud to come to this Assembly of the United Nations with her theses on law, human dignity and economic justice among peoples.
11.	Latin America, in our opinion, has a lofty mission in world gatherings: to plead unceasingly for international cooperation, for the rule of law and justice and for better treatment for the developing peoples, as the basis for world balance. We are not satisfied with what has been done so far and we feel obliged to say so within this Organization, because of the grave situations which we see throughout the world.
12.	We have adhered to the ideals and methods of international cooperation both at the regional level and at the wider level of the United Nations, and now we find strong reasons to warn that the period of the isolation of peoples is over and that they are bound to join hands to undertake the works of peace, the very pressing task of preventing war and the equally urgent duty of extending economic and social justice throughout the world.
13.	No spot on earth is immune from attack. The Second World War was a clear demonstration of that fact, which is no longer disputed by anybody in this age of technology and science, when man has succeeded in his greatest adventure to travel to other spaces. Since then the destructive power of weapons has been perfected to the utmost, and our planet seems smaller than ever before, more densely populated and more exposed to the danger of universal devastation. At the same time, the needs of the underdeveloped peoples cannot wait. If the arms race is not stopped, we would face ominous harbingers and the not entirely unimaginable danger that what are now local wars may escalate into more general wars.
14.	The indispensable cooperation between peoples and States requires, of course, certain conditions without which it would be a vain purpose or an empty word. States must completely accept the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular to refrain from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State and always to act according to international law and to apply the procedures for the peaceful resolution of differences. Wherever illegal force is used there is a weakening of the noble concept of international cooperation so dear to all peoples of all nations.
15.	The dilemma of force versus law, of violence as a means to dominate other nations or against their self determination in choosing their national destinies and forms of government, which will best respond to their national criterion, whether social or political, is an accurate moral x-ray of the disquiet of our time and the summary of the past twenty--five years of history. After the Second World War ended, we did not see that era of peace and justice for which everyone yearned. We saw only a continuation of violence and the subordination of some States by others. It can be said that this Organization was born in the middle of a tremendous drama of mankind, when the war had not yet ended, and it was impossible to implant cooperation among all nations. We have yet to see the attainment of such aims as a just peace firmly established and peoples living together in freedom.
16.	Whereas technology and science reveal astonishing progress we have hardly advanced at all in the field of human relations. Yet we know where the essential values lie. There is no cooperation without respect for international law and respect too for self determination and the dignity of the individual. The United Nations is itself founded on the belief that all the Member States agree on certain fundamental principles.
17.	Let us recall Pascal's words: "Force without law is tyranny, and law without force is impotence."
18.	The United Nations should initiate without delay a process of honest self-criticism of its potentialities and achievements in collective security and the maintenance of peace. The twenty-five years during which the Charter of the Organization has been in force prove the ineffectiveness of the system adopted in San Francisco to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".
19.	There has been a glaring contradiction between the law and the harsh reality endured by people in some regions of the world where they suffer the bitter insecurity of poverty, where freedom is unknown, where war is the natural atmosphere in which generations are being raised. Nor have crises been lacking to show up the deficiencies of the system, because the organisms entrusted with the preservation of peace have been powerless to prevent such situations or have had insufficient authority to bring about an adequate solution. In the Middle East and in Asia there are wars, which public opinion is becoming accustomed to considering as an endemic state or a permanent situation, while acts of piracy provoke universal protest.
20.	We are witnesses to an undeniable deterioration of the peaceful procedures of international law, already fallen into disuse with the "cold war" episodes, the visible opposition between two blocs of countries separated by conflicting ideologies and situated in major zones of influence. The United Nations then lost a large part of its authority because of the unfortunate precedents created, and the Charter of the United Nations became an ineffective instrument. Although it is true that, after these twenty-five years of international tensions, we do perceive friendly contacts between States on both sides of the iron curtain.
21.	Certain other factors are not contemplated in the United Nations Charter. Such are the undeclared wars which erupt and are waged without formal announcements and which international organizations decide, with an excess of optimism, to consider that they do not exist. Then too there is the contemporary phenomenon of indirect aggression. This is perpetrated in various ways, sometimes, as war propaganda against another sovereign State, sometimes as instigations, so that improvised armies will disturb the internal peace and development of another country. Methods of creating violence have multiplied to such an extent throughout the world that the fundamental problem of the United Nations is, first of all, to restore confidence in its procedures among peoples.
22.	Yet the real and very grave problem of the vacuums in the collective security system is caused by the failure of a number of procedures which have been replaced by force of arms. The pyramid of armaments, which crushes humanity under its ruthless weight, has replaced collective security based on law and, unfortunately, what prevails now is the might of the strongest rather than the United Nations Charter. Let this be said clearly.
23.	The problem of collective security is a very serious one and should be examined without delay by the Member States of the United Nations, unless we wish to see the total collapse of a great ideal. We have reached the lowest point of incredulity in a system in which we all stand staring at' 'the balance of terror'', which looms over us like a menacing specter which we should like to be forever removed.
24.	Faced with the absence of a general system of collective security it becomes even more imperative for countries to improve regional agreements. In America at least and in our hemisphere we find a series of principles which cover legal equality among States, the obligation of nonintervention and solidarity against any kind of aggression and armed attack. These are the result of a lengthy evolution in our continental relations.
25.	Not only can we not refrain from applying these principles and methods of our regional system, but Colombia is furthermore determined to strengthen it, to extend it and endow it with the means to cope with the changing circumstances of the contemporary world, and to fulfill the guiding fundamental axiom of the Chapultepec Conference of 19452 which states that international law shall be the rule of conduct for all
States. In America we have outlawed war, as the antiwar treaty of nonaggression and conciliation of 1933 records, and we have established regional collective security by the interAmerican treaty of reciprocal assistance of 1947.
26.	Regional agreements are, at this juncture in the life of nations, the indispensable complement of the theoretical and furthermore inoperative worldwide collective security system. Colombia expounded this view at the San Francisco Conference, and we reiterate it, after decades of lack of action, unresolved crises and downright failures. We can now appreciate the historic significance of the debate at San Francisco. We did not want for warnings as to the general collective security system, entrusted as it was to a minority group of Great Powers in the Security Council, each of them having obtained the power to paralyse any decision of this body.
27.	It is quite true that the United Nations Charter was not drawn up in San Francisco in its entirety: it reached us with its essential, its most fundamental chapters dealing with the preservation of peace and with security already worked out. That explains why Colombia insisted so strenuously in 1945 to obtain confirmation of the regional agreements. It is a fact that certain great Powers had taken it upon themselves to assume responsibility for framing the future statute of the world Organization, as though called upon to do so, at the Conferences of Yalta in 1945 and Dumbarton Oaks in 1944. The countries that did not belong to that exclusive and powerful group had no choice but to agree to a whole series of rules to which no amendments of any kind were considered admissible,
28.	In San Francisco the tenacity of my country and of the American States, which backed up the ideas fervently and rightly championed by the chief of the Colombian delegation, our former President Alberto Lleras, did make it possible with regard to Article 52 on regional agreements to add paragraphs 2 and 4, and particularly paragraph 2, which invites States participating in such agreements to "make every possible effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council".
29. The experience of these twenty-five years has proved Colombia to have been right in firmly insisting on the need to preserve the integrity of such regional agreements as are compatible with the Charter of the United Nations and to make full use of them in the interests of peace and security. In several continents these agreements are clear guidelines for the security of numerous States in facing difficult circumstances, and at times when such situations are rendered desperate by aggression and intervention, which would otherwise have meant submission to the cumbersome machinery of the Security Council.
30.	Moreover, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the rights of Member States of the Organization, including naturally the American countries, to act individually and collectively in self defense ' 'until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". The chief of the delegation of Colombia at the San Francisco Conference explained the situation in the following words:
"If at any given time an armed attack should occur, that is to say, an act of aggression against a Member State of a regional group, then self-defense, either individual or collective, exercised as an inherent right, shall automatically operate within the terms stated by the Charter, until such time as the Security Council might impose the appropriate sanctions against the aggressor country.
"In the case of the American States, aggression against an American State constitutes aggression against all the American States, and in supporting the State attacked all States will be exercising their right of legitimate self-defense in order to repel the aggression. This is what is called the right of legitimate collective defense."
31.	One of the items on the agenda of the General Assembly is the "Need to consider suggestions regarding the review of the Charter of the United Nations". Colombia attaches particular importance to this problem, because we are convinced of the urgency of the task of aggiornamento of the Organization, which has become prematurely old in twenty-five years.
32.	The mere proliferation of new States calls for criteria to evaluate their capacity to assume responsibilities in this Organization. The "miniState" is a phenomenon which requires a certain amount of study if we wish to avoid excessive improvisation of judicial persons who aspire to act as sovereign entities. On the other hand, there are certain complex situations, the existing realities of which we should at least begin to consider, so that within a few decades we will not be accused of having established within the United Nations the image of an international community, arbitrarily cut up, without the participation of important States.
33.	In the world today, even the oldest and the most venerable institutions and beliefs of peoples have had to undergo revisions in keeping with the times. There is a concept of change that obliges every institution to take into account new social circumstances. Besides, unceasing evolution is a natural phenomenon in law. AngloSaxon jurists recognize it in their Common Law, and no code can be exempt from a day-to-day interpretation of jurisprudence.
34.	One could say a great deal perhaps even too much about the shortcomings of the United Nations Charter. It might not be amiss to specify the most conspicuous of them. We need, for example, first a reaffirmation of the principles of international law which concern good relations among States; secondly, an effective system to prevent war and to determine the aggressor; thirdly, a guarantee of the actual existence and defense of human rights; and, fourthly, the adoption of procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in order finally to abolish war.
35.	However, our immediate desires do not go so far and take into account reality. Indeed, Colombia's proposals are within the limited possibilities that we deem attainable at this time. We have preferred to postpone a discussion of subjects which, on account of their scope and many-sided implications, would require previous acceptance by the majority of this Assembly. We accept as a fact the much-discussed mechanism of the Security Council. At the same time, we observe, not without anguish, that the unchecked decaying of the procedures and institutions of the United Nations Charter becomes more notorious from year to year.
36.	We should like to find a way to achieve universality for the United Nations. This is a first purpose in response to the idea of a world system of peace and justice, as well as to the nature of certain problems which cannot be solved in the absence of the countries concerned. We need a procedure that will add both flexibility and effectiveness to the principle in the United Nations Charter, whereby it is provided that "membership in the United Nations is open to . . . peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the . . . Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations".
37.	In the field of collective security, the enunciation of initiatives is not an easy task without first altering the Security Council machinery, which is the engine of the system. We consider, however, that it would be useful to suggest a more categorical implementation of the regional agreements for the maintenance of peace. In most cases when disagreements between States arise, the problem for the United Nations is to prevent an immediate confrontation between the great Powers, and to this end regional agreements should be resorted to for the implementation of conciliatory action, as provided for in Article 33 of the Charter. This procedure would leave in the hands of the parties concerned in the conflict area a choice of the most suitable peaceful means to find a solution without having to fear intervention by the great Powers. We are seeking a stricter interpretation of Article 52 of the Charter in such a way that it would be essential for Member States of the United Nations before appealing to the Security Council, to work out a peaceful settlement of their local or regional disputes through any agreements previously subscribed to by them. This transfer of mandate from the Council to the regional organizations would make the former a supreme and second instance at which the dispute in question could be examined and settled.
38.	We wish to have the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter left unchanged, since those States which have the greatest responsibility for the maintenance of peace should not be deprived of their capacity to act on behalf of the United Nations and, on express recommendation of the Security Council at times of extremely serious threats to peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. This would not mean that the Council, as provided for in Article 53, might not make use of the regional agreements if it should deem this more appropriate.
39.	In the second place, we recommend more active participation by the International Court of Justice in the work of peace. It is undeniable that that high Court has been kept completely apart from the collective security system and its action has been confined to the arbitration of occasional disputes. In view of its vested authority and multinational character and in view also of the fact that it represents the different legal traditions of the Members of the United Nations, the Court could also pass judgment on the strictly legal aspects of international disputes by an emergency procedure open to all States without exception, whether or not they are Members of the United Nations.
40.	Our ideas for possible revision of parts of the Charter in certain specific aspects are submitted by Colombia to Governments represented at this Assembly for consideration, so that we may review with them all the factors of the problem and find the most adequate solutions in order to install new life into the United Nations.
41.	Colombia is particularly interested in the subject of the law of the sea. The General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2574 A (XXIV), should consider the desirability of convening a conference on such an important subject. We can state in advance that we are ready to participate actively in the necessary preparatory work.
42.	A great deal of progress has been made in establishing principles either unknown or ignored in 1945, when the President of the United States, Mr. Harry S. Truman, issued an important proclamation, which prompted similar proclamations by other States to claim jurisdiction in some cases, and in others to claim sovereignty of the State over the continental shelf, the criterion being based on different geographical and legal considerations. This was an era marked by anarchy in the development of the law of the sea.
43.	The American States were the first to establish adequate regional doctrines in this respect. The Inter American Council of Jurists declared, as early as 1956, among other postulates, that "the distance of three miles as the limit of territorial waters is insufficient, and does not constitute a general rule of international law". And it adds, consequently, that "the enlargement of the zone of the sea traditionally called 'territorial waters' is justifiable". The resolution adopted in Ciudad Trujillo that year, at the Inter-American Special Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters,  included the principle of the Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf which reads as follows:
"The seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal State, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super adjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that State and are subject to its jurisdiction and control."
In 1958 the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea  adopted four international conventions which refer to the main aspects of this question, namely, territorial waters and adjacent zones; the high seas, fishing and the conservation of the natural resources in the high seas; the continental shelf.
44.	At the Ciudad Trujillo Conference in 1956, Colombia expressly requested international cooperation in the solution of marine problems and announced that, in order to ease the way to unify points of view and eliminate divergences it would "abstain from adopting unilateral regulations". It would have been easy for Colombia to follow the example of other countries by formulating a unilateral statement as to its rights to the continental shelf or its adjacent zone, but Colombia preferred to await the outcome of the United Nations Conference held in 1958, and to incorporate its principles in the conventions which were adopted and signed there. We were consistent with our past attitude in determining territorial sovereignty, and abiding by the rules of the law were content simply to wait to cooperate with all nations in a general conference.
45.	There can be no mistake. International cooperation is the only way to avoid situations of insoluble difficulty, a searching for clear rules as to the extent of the rights of States. This indispensable cooperation has produced such lofty principles as those proclaimed by the International Convention on the Continental Shelf, which makes it clear that a coastal State exercises exclusive sovereign rights over the areas referred to in that instrument for the purposes of exploration and development of natural resources.
46.	Nevertheless, progress in the science of oceanography has left far behind certain rules of the Convention of the Continental Shelf, in which the right of sovereignty was envisaged as extending to 200 meters or, if possible, still further, without setting a limit to the exploitation or exploration of the natural resources of these zones. Furthermore, there is the Latin American consensus which grants the coastal State equally exclusive rights over the living resources of the part of the sea nearest its coast. There is an unequivocal need to complement this 1958 Convention with new and explicit provisions in the light of the most recent experience.
47.	Therefore, Colombia is in favor of the idea of convening a general conference of Member States of the United Nations to carry on the work discontinued since 1958. We desire this provided that, at the next meeting, due consideration will be given to all the various factors to which we have referred and which constitute an indivisible whole. On looking back upon the unilateral statements following President Truman's 1945 proclamation, we see them as completely outdated. International cooperation is opportune and, indeed, indispensable, so as to lead to the adoption of new rules that will take into account the needs of all countries.
48.	We shall therefore give preferential attention to the important proposal made in 1970 by the President of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon, on the possible exploration and exploitation of the ocean floor by a community of closely associated nations, in such a way as to respect the interests of the coastline State and to obtain a source of investments to assist the developing countries.
49.	In respect to the law of the sea, Colombia has adhered strictly to the principles of international law and will continue to do so. Were we to act otherwise, we would be breaking with our past tradition of asserting our sovereignty and claiming maritime rights of domain only in so far as we are authorized to do so by international conventions and public treaties.
50.	Colombia is not merely a country of mountains and wide open spaces, both veined by many rivers; Colombia is also a land with long coastlines washed by two oceans; it needs to delve into the riches of the seas to benefit its people. This represents nothing more than a consequence of obvious international principles.
51.	The twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations is celebrated amidst the distress of the peoples of a host of developing countries. It is a chapter in which we cannot conceal the gravity of the problems which confront us. They were not foreseen in all their vast dimensions at the San Francisco Conference, nor in the Bretton Woods Agreements.
52.	In the last few months numerous and very learned reports have examined the chief factors of the shortcomings in the aid to the developing countries. It is now a generally admitted and un-contradicted truth that the present world is divided into industrialized and poverty stricken zones. This great economic gap of our time widens every day with the existence of two price rates, one for industrial goods and another for the raw or semi-finished materials of the developing countries.
53.	A world divided into two very different zones, makes us think back to a description in the work Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations written in 1776 by the British economist Adam Smith. It shows the consequences of the discovery of the New World, which gave rise to an opening up of markets
"Signed at Washington, D.C. on 27 December 1945.
for the goods of Europe and progress in the arts and industry of that continent, in exchange for the precious metals of the New World, extracted in the midst of the rusticity and poverty of the inhabitants of that region. We see, then, that the gap in economic development goes back a long way.
54.	We would have to add other considerations. The areas most in need of development have been deprived of the immense capital invested in the sophisticated technology of the artifacts of death. While expenditures on intercontinental missiles increase constantly, the volume of aid to the developing countries has so steadily been declining that it is now at the 1961 level. The United Nations has doubtless made an effort to relieve the situation but it can hardly feel satisfied with the disappointing results of the first Development Decade, which ended in 1970.
55.	In his report to the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, Mr. Raul Prebisch stated:
"One of the main objectives of the United Nations Development Decade is the attainment of a minimum annual growth rate of 5 per cent in the income of the developing countries by 1970. This is certainly a rather modest target and not much higher than the average rate of 4.4 per cent registered in the 1950s. Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible for many of the developing countries to achieve and maintain this rate of growth unless the present Conference brings about a policy of international cooperation that would make it possible to eliminate the imbalance in trade."
56.	That rate of 5 per cent per annum really meant something much less in the average per capita earnings in the peripheral countries. Even though the goals were so modest they were not attained nor was implementation of the recommendations attained, such as the one that the industrialized nations set aside 1 per cent of the gross national product of each of them to aid the developing areas. The point we have reached has been graphically described in the Pearson report  with these figures: 34 per cent of the world population, composed of industrialized nations, received 87.5 per cent of the gross national product of all countries; 66 per cent of the world population, corresponding to the group of less developed countries, received barely 12.5 per cent of the above mentioned gross national product; 22 per cent of the world population live in the less developed countries, where per capita income was less than 1 per cent per annum; 48 per cent obtained from 1 to 2 per cent and only 30 per cent of the outside countries have exceeded 2 per cent.
57.	The foreign debt of the developing countries, created by large export credits and development aid, has rapidly increased to almost 50 billion dollars, while the servicing of these debts has increased at the rate of 17 percent per annum, according to the Pearson report, which was drawn up by a high ranking commission of experts of the World Bank. The first Development Decade does not offer much reason for enthusiasm in most countries.
58.	Given these figures we cannot fail to see that the Second Development Decade will be decisive for the fate of both the developed and the developing areas of the world, since neither can remain isolated from the other. Prosperity beside poverty is bound to provoke an upheaval. The effects are already perceptible in the outbreaks of nonconformity and violence in various parts of the world. The problem of trade in the developing countries is one which cannot be postponed. Possibly it is more important, in the long run, than the problem of aid itself. If the multilateral machinery for assistance is to be improved, there must be an effective increase in the contributions of capital.
59.	If the world maintains the present cleavage between rich and poor countries, and if, moreover, the exclusive commercial blocs favoring some countries and making outsiders of others are consolidated then the international situation cannot but show in the Second Development Decade a balance of frustration and disappointment far more alarming than that of the first.
60.	Colombia has come to this world Assembly to renew its great hope in the United Nations. Every human endeavor is subject to the storms of time. Nor should we forget that the effects of several centuries of enmity and misunderstanding among peoples cannot suddenly vanish like a midsummer night's dream. Despite the shortcomings we have pointed out, the United Nations is called upon to tackle a superhuman task.
61.	Progress cannot be measured in terms of months and years but in terms of decades and centuries. To arrive at the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in 1789, entire centuries of personal suffering had to be borne, and tyranny brought to the point of utter weariness. Democracy did not spring up overnight as though by magic. It was a progressive movement in the minds of people, while the ideas of Utopians and the thoughts of philosophers perforated like drops of water the wall of misunderstandings and the stony deafness of the leaders, until the time came when there was a great overthrow of the institutions.
62.	The United Nations is the creature of a Utopia of brotherhood and a philosophy of concord among peoples with respect for the rules of international law, which little by little are finding the arduous way to positive achievement. These mostly lie ahead. What we now perceive appears imperfect. But that which existed yesterday was even further removed from the ideal we cherished. Mankind in 1970 will, on looking back, become aware of the fact that we have laid the foundations for a future world organization, based on the active participation of all peoples in the management of the community of nations.
63.	Just now we find ourselves at a moment of evolution. The United Nations has seen that its structures need changing. This signifies an intellectual process of adaptation to changes in international ideas, whose aims are the abolition of racial discrimination, the suppression of social injustice, the strengthening of peaceful methods to solve controversies, and disarmament, as a prelude to security.
64.	Security, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes, were three intentions that won acclaim on the conclusion of the First World War. They were the signals of hope. Today we reiterate those purposes and add to them the clamors of a destitute mankind so that, through international cooperation, we may find effective means for harmonious development on all continents, together with social justice and respect for human rights. The United Nations is still a land of hope for a better world.