Warren E. Burger: We will hear arguments next in City of Los Angeles against Lyons. Mr. Merkin, I think you may proceed whenever you're ready.
Frederick N. Merkin: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: This case concerns the important constitutional questions of: Under what circumstances may an individual seek protection from the federal district court against local law enforcement agencies relative to the force techniques that the officers of those agencies may in the future apply against such individual? The case also concerns the circumstances where, if the court is going to entertain such a plea, the federal judiciary may assume control over the force techniques utilized by local law enforcement agencies. I think at the outset it's important to acknowledge what is almost obvious, namely that the situations faced by police officers on the streets are often difficult ones, and sometimes situations that most of us are unable easily to relate to. Secondly, from the governmental standpoint the issues are also quite complex and difficult and often deal, when you're speaking of use of force, with the kinds of questions that are often faced, for example, in deciding upon military tactics. These are very difficult of resolution. Now, there are really two decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that are at issue here, and the city of course submits that they were erroneously reasoned. But before going to the defects, the most important and significant defects in the reasoning of those two opinions, it may be helpful to have some background in this matter, in particular with reference to recent developments which may or may not affect the justiciability of the case. As you probably know, the city believes that the case is not moot and needs to be resolved. But, beginning with the beginning, about five and a half years ago the Respondent Mr. Lyons filed an action in federal district court seeking both a declaration and an injunction against the Los Angeles police department to limit the use of the unconscious-rendering control holds to situations where an officer is faced with deadly force. We submit that that's the effective prohibition of such holds. And his primary theory and the theory that developed was that the control holds shock the conscience. And the Respondent's position is that the control holds shock the conscience intrinsically, having little to do, if anything, with the training of the officers, but they're intrinsically of the kind that shock the conscience. Now, the control holds of which we speak are neck restraints that are really of two different fundamental varieties. The first are techniques that officers apply with their arm on both sides of the neck, to put pressure on the carotid arteries which transmit oxygenated blood to the brain. The second family are techniques known as arm restraints, which rely pressure of the forearm against the front of the neck and the tracheal tube. The purpose of both of those techniques is to assume control of the individual, and in the vast majority... and the record demonstrates this... people submit. They do have the potential, as the record reflects and the district court found, of rendering people unconscious if necessary, whereupon they can be turned onto their belly, which is the typical approach, and handcuffed such that that person is now in control. Now, these are techniques that officers are trained in, but they're relatively infrequently applied. We're speaking of thousands upon thousands of encounters between police officers and citizens, and in a large city such as Los Angeles we're speaking of a tremendous number of arrests.
Harry A. Blackmun: You speak of training. Isn't training an issue in the case?
Frederick N. Merkin: The case need not be decided on training, this case need not. The district court certainly had that issue before it, but the fundamental error here is legal. More specifically, Mr. Justice Blackmun, it has to do with the legal standards that were demanded of the district court upon review in the Lyons II decision, as we call it, the review of the preliminary injunction. We submit that the Court of Appeals failed to look for the application of the appropriate legal standards, and those legal standards of which I speak and they are really quite related. One is the standard that derives from principles of federalism and equity, which says that the federal courts should only assume control over the activities, let's say, of a police department in the most extraordinary circumstances. Secondly, to have a constitutional violation here the court had to find that the tactic shocked the conscience. That too requires in effect the most extraordinary type of conducts. Indeed, I believe in a concurring opinion you wrote, Mr. Justice Blackmun, outrageous conduct is what triggers the constitutional violation.
Harry A. Blackmun: Well, you had a number of deaths here, didn't you?
Frederick N. Merkin: There are deaths in the record, yes.
Byron R. White: A number of them, aren't there?
Frederick N. Merkin: There are indeed.
Thurgood Marshall: 16.
Frederick N. Merkin: There are at least, yes.
Harry A. Blackmun: Let me ask another question. There's been a six-month moratorium?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes.
Harry A. Blackmun: It expires in ten days.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's right.
Harry A. Blackmun: What's the city going to do then?
Frederick N. Merkin: I don't know, and I don't know that the city knows.
Harry A. Blackmun: You're representing them. You don't know?
Frederick N. Merkin: I don't know, and part of the reason for that is that the city submits that this is the kind of thing that is subject to reasonable debate, indeed there's a debate going on, not just within city government but to some extent nationwide; and that these decisions, especially in this particular situation, are such that there may be tentative decisions such as we have already now from the city of Los Angeles, that are subject to change and modification.
William H. Rehnquist: Mr. Merkin, can you tell us at least who will probably make that decision--
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes.
William H. Rehnquist: --about which Mr. Justice Blackmun inquired?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes, and I can tell you a little bit about how and on what basis that decision will be made, I believe. The controlling authority over the Los Angeles police department is a five-member board of police commissioners, who are civilians appointed by the mayor and confirmed by a 15-member city council. That board, if it has all five at the session that takes up the issue, will decide by majority vote what policy to follow.
Sandra Day O'Connor: Is the commission holding off until this Court rules, in effect?
Frederick N. Merkin: No. I have no indication that that is their desire. My most recent information is as follows. I did recently file a memorandum indicating that they were going to take up the matter one week from today. My most recent information is it will probably be later this month, but I do not have a specific date.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: But in any events I gather there'll be no outstanding restraint which would prevent the restoration of the practice if the commission decides to restore it?
Frederick N. Merkin: That is correct, and the commission and the city government as a whole believes that these tactics. They may or may not be good tactics. Reasonable people, reasonable chiefs of police, reasonable experts, can differs and so long as that's the case we're not in the extreme situation where reasonable people, reasonable people who are informed and have reflected on the subject, are going to concur that these tactics are not civilized, they're barbaric, and they cannot be tolerated in this society.
Sandra Day O'Connor: What is the policy that you would have this Court hold the city is free to adopt if it wants to with regard to the use of these holds?
Frederick N. Merkin: I think the policy is derived from two different notions. The first is the standard that is referred to, the shock the conscience standard--
Sandra Day O'Connor: No, no. What is the policy that you want this Court to in effect say the city is free to adopt if it wants to? When could the city use the holds and under what circumstances, in your view?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Returning to the description of the control holds themselves, the latitude that I think, Justice O'Connor, that we speak of is to use the holds in circumstances such as they were most recently used before. Now, that is one possibility, but the city government has yet to decide that, if it chooses to use the holds, whether it will want that extent of latitude. It may, for example, compromise and may prescribe the holds are to be used in some circumstances but perhaps not in others. But I think they want... the city government wants the full constitutional latitude.
Thurgood Marshall: Would it be all right if the rule said that they should only use it unless the application of such force is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to the opinion? Would that be all right?
Frederick N. Merkin: That is a reasonable approach, but it's not--
Thurgood Marshall: Well, isn't that what the court said?
Frederick N. Merkin: --That is what the court said, but the court--
Thurgood Marshall: That's what the court said, didn't it?
Frederick N. Merkin: --The district court did make that determination, yes.
Thurgood Marshall: Well, what's wrong with it?
Frederick N. Merkin: There are two problems.
Thurgood Marshall: You just said it was all right.
Frederick N. Merkin: There are two problems wrong with that, Mr. Justice Marshall. The first is the notion of what is a threat of serious bodily harm is ambiguous. And the policy that was followed by city government up to that point was broader. There were circumstances--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Excuse me, Mr. Merkin. Isn't the answer that you should give Justice O'Connor that what you want is the same latitude that the city had before with respect to the use of these holds?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Yes.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Everything that you used to be able to do, you want still to do.
Frederick N. Merkin: Constitutionally, yes.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: And you want us to say that you're free to do it, isn't that right?
Frederick N. Merkin: Well, that the policy that was followed, yes.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: You want us to say that constitutionally you're completely free to follow the practice you followed before you were enjoined?
Frederick N. Merkin: That is correct, yes.
Warren E. Burger: Subject to being sued by people who are injured.
Frederick N. Merkin: Subject to being sued and defending those suits in, for example, a damages action brought under the Monell decision.
Thurgood Marshall: Well, what recourse does a man have whom you kill? What recourse does the man that you kill have?
Frederick N. Merkin: Well, the individual, the deceased him or herself does not have any personal recourse, of course. They are very unfortunate situations when people die. But when it's a remote consequence... if we were to... if the Court were to formulate a rule that a person fearful of a remote consequence can get an injunction, then so many of us who fly airplanes, for example, do all kinds of things, walk just the streets--
Warren E. Burger: Well, isn't the answer to the question that the decedents' representatives would have the same right as though a police car had negligently run them down on the street and killed them in the our suit of someone else? Do you consider murder and negligence on the same level?
Frederick N. Merkin: --No, we do not.
John Paul Stevens: Thank you. May I ask you a question about the posture of what we're asked to review. You pointed out that you're interested primarily in the standard of review. What's before us, as I understand it, is a preliminary injunction--
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes.
John Paul Stevens: --which has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. And there were findings made by the district court which were also affirmed. Do you question any of the findings?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes.
John Paul Stevens: You're asking us to say some of the findings are clearly erroneous? For example, the district judge found that the use of the bar arm and the carotid artery holds engender a high risk of irreparable injury or death as presently used. Do we accept that as true or do we have to look at the record and decide it's not true? You will have an opportunity to prove this at the full trial, as I understand.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's quite correct. Mr. Justice Stevens, I think you could make two determinations of clearly erroneous findings, but you need not do that. You need not, to support the reversal of the Ninth Circuit, make those determinations or even quibble with the facts. What you can do is say that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law should have been looking for some particular things. For example, one thing it should have looked for was a finding that there was a clearly superior alternative; moreover, that this clearly superior alternative... and there had to be some gross disparity between the alternative and the technique before the officer... was--
John Paul Stevens: The thing that puzzles me is, you brought the case up by appeal, rather than taking advantage of the normal opportunity of a trial litigant to adduce additional evidence at the trial court level and straighten out all these factual matters. As we get the case, the standard of review for us, I understand, is whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge, having made these findings, to say we'll have a preliminary injunction subject to further review, and you develop evidence that shows that he went too far.
Frederick N. Merkin: --Mr. Justice Stevens, to that I would say there are really two issues we brought to the Court. The standard is one, but the other is standing. This trial would be of gargantuan proportion, and the review by the Ninth Circuit and then ultimately perhaps by this Court might be years in the coming.
John Paul Stevens: You're saying that no one would have standing to challenge this practice, is that right?
Frederick N. Merkin: By declaratory or injunctive relief, no. But there are other remedies, not only that the Respondent in this case has--
John Paul Stevens: No one could challenge it. You just have to wait until people get hurt and then they can sue for damage, is that your view?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Because it is remote. If it were not a remote consequence.
John Paul Stevens: Well, there are 16 cases. How many would it have to be before you could have injunctive relief?
Frederick N. Merkin: I can't give you a mathematical formula, Mr. Justice Stevens. But I think we can distinguish between... when a person has reason to be anxious walking down the street in some town or city, there you're really fearful of your encounters with the police, and we must apply an external standard: Is a person being reasonable in such fear? There there's a serious problem indeed in that community. But when you're talking about a remote consequence... now, there are 16 deaths that have been ascribed to the control holds out of literally thousands of applications of the control holds. Now, the city is--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Does that figure appear in the record, Mr. Merkin? The 16 deaths constitute what proportion of the total number of holds, do we know?
Frederick N. Merkin: --We know by extrapolation. There is in the record the following calculation, that in one 18-month period the control holds were applied 935 times and that the Respondent contends that 3 people died. We calculated that that's, I think, a percentage of 0.31 percent of the individuals die maximum.
John Paul Stevens: Mrs. Merkin, if you're talking about standing, you don't have to get killed to have standing. If you have the hold applied to you and you find it objectionable and if it is an invalid police procedure, don't you have a right to sue about it? Isn't the proper number to look at the 935 who were subjected to the hold? And all of them claim it was an improper procedure. At least they theoretically might so claim. And you say none of them would have standing unless they get killed? I thought you said they could sue for damages. But none of them's going to have a suit for equitable relief?
Frederick N. Merkin: You cannot sue for equitable relief in circumstances where the threat of injury is so remote.
John Paul Stevens: But there's some injury to everybody who's subjected to it, isn't there? Maybe it's not enough to get all that excited about. But you're talking about standing. Is there any injury whatsoever?
Frederick N. Merkin: There is a possibility of injury indeed, okay. But--
John Paul Stevens: But only 935 people have been hurt, so we don't think there's a sufficient probability to justify anybody having standing to litigate, to challenge the practice? Are you serious?
Frederick N. Merkin: --We're talking about the Constitution.
Thurgood Marshall: Yes.
Frederick N. Merkin: And the Constitution talks about... truly, it speaks relatively, I think, in this area, the compared to what.
Thurgood Marshall: The Constitution speaks of "individual rights", "individual".
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes, Mr. Justice Marshall.
Thurgood Marshall: So each one of those 900 would have a constitutional right, wouldn't they?
Frederick N. Merkin: But see, I think standing... and the Court's decisions seem to suggest this, Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens, require that the threat to the individual be quite meaningful. And it's going to be... the individual's going to be fearful rationally--
Thurgood Marshall: Well, when the police puts his arm around my neck, can I object then?
Frederick N. Merkin: --You can object, certainly.
William H. Rehnquist: Mr. Merkin, there was a motion in this case to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted or dismiss on the grounds of mootness, and as I read the Respondent's brief they assert not that the case is actually moot in the technical sense, because of course I guess there's an action for damages pending, but that the need for the preliminary injunction has disappeared in view of the department's change of policy, and therefore that we should simply vacate the preliminary injunction and presumably let the case proceed in the district court. Your response in your reply brief is an argument that the case isn't moot in the technical sense. But I didn't understand the Respondent to contend that it was moot in the technical sense. I thought they were simply saying that the need for injunctive relief had disappeared. Do you disagree? I take it you disagree with that, but could you say why?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. One of the points we did make in response was we're speaking of the question of whether or not there's a case or controversy. And while it's true that the recent city policy conforms to more or less what the Respondent is asking for, that may change and it may change quickly. It could change this month, it may not. It may change in three months, it may change before the matter comes to trial. It may not. We're speaking of a very fluid situation at this moment. But in any event, one of the fundamental problems is that we're speaking of whether or not there's a case or controversy to begin with, and the sooner that that kind of issue is resolved the better it is for the judicial system to dispose of cases that are advisory in nature.
Byron R. White: Mr. Merkin, the policy of using these control holds is based... is expressed in the regulations or the training manual, isn't it?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes.
Byron R. White: And they are authorized only in order to overcome resistance?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes, generally.
Byron R. White: Well, that's the policy. That's the policy.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's not the full panoply of the policy. It's a little more specific than that.
Byron R. White: Well, is an officer free to... according to the policy, is an officer free to apply a control hold to a person he's arresting for a traffic offense who is entirely peaceful?
Frederick N. Merkin: Of course not.
Byron R. White: Would that violate... that would violate the regulations?
Frederick N. Merkin: It would be out of policy indeed, Mr. Justice White, and probably... it could be unconstitutional.
Byron R. White: Would a person to whom the control hold is erroneously applied, erroneously in terms of what he's told to do, would a person who is subjected to that kind of control hold have a cause of action under California law?
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes. If the amount of force that was applied was not reasonable and necessary, then there is an action under California law. The penal code sets that standard for California peace officers.
Byron R. White: Well now, do you think the injunction forbids the use of the control holds at all? Is that what it does?
Frederick N. Merkin: No, it does not.
Byron R. White: What does it do? It says, just please obey the regulation?
Frederick N. Merkin: No.
Byron R. White: What does it say?
Frederick N. Merkin: It rewrites the regulation. It says that you've allowed too great a latitude in when these holds can be applied and we want to limit it to really serious threats to an officer. The immediate response to that is, when an officer is faced generally with a serious threat... and that's where the definition of serious bodily harm comes in... then--
Byron R. White: The training bulletin says: "Control holds should be used only when necessary to stop a suspect's resistance. " Now, the injunction thought that that was too lenient a standard?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Apparently so. But there are circumstances where an officer has yet to be in a situation where he or she is faced with a very serious threat to his or her well-being, which might require the pulling of a baton if the officer has a baton or the pulling of the revolver where there's a threat to the officer's life, but it may escalate very quickly. And one thing that's very important is for an officer to take control of a situation to prevent the escalation. We're speaking of a grappling physical encounter between two individuals, and the sooner that the officer has control of the other person's body and his or her weapon, for example the revolver, in a position of safety, the better.
Thurgood Marshall: Doesn't the gun sort of get control?
Frederick N. Merkin: Excuse me, Mr. Justice Marshall?
Thurgood Marshall: Doesn't a loaded gun usually get control?
Frederick N. Merkin: It usually does, when people are acting rationally.
Thurgood Marshall: Why do you have to choke him to death?
Frederick N. Merkin: Well, you don't have to choke people to death. And I think that we do, as I say, take issue with the general conclusion that all of these deaths have been caused by the control hold system. This is an incredibly complex medical phenomenon that does require further study and will be studied. The process of review in the city of Los Angeles is not an episodic thing.
Byron R. White: If you're looking at the city policy or what the rules are, the governing rule about the control holds, a person is not going to have a control hold applied to him unless he resists.
Frederick N. Merkin: Almost always--
Byron R. White: Isn't that what the training manual says?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Yes, that's the policy.
Byron R. White: And so you have to count... as far as the city's liability is concerned or as far as the validity of the policy is concerned, the control hold is only applied, supposedly, if there's been resistance to the arrest.
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes, but there's one additional predicate I would add here, that it's only where the officer has tried lower force techniques and they failed, or at the time it just didn't seem reasonable to try to twist the arm or bend the wrist to cause pain. What they do teach the officers is to escalate and de-escalate the level of force to no higher level than necessary to control somebody.
Byron R. White: Well, again... again, my question still stands. As far as the policy is concerned, control holds are authorized only when there's resistance, when it's necessary to use force.
Frederick N. Merkin: When it's necessary to use force, that is correct. That is the policy. And it's not to use them at the officer's complete discretion.
Byron R. White: Well, if the person to be arrested or confronted is entirely peaceful, there would never be an occasion to use a control hold, as far as the policy is concerned.
Frederick N. Merkin: That is correct, and that is Respondent's... Respondent's charge here is that when he had his encounter with the officer department the control hold was put on for no reason whatsoever, that he did nothing to prompt it.
Byron R. White: That's a violation of the regulation, or it's a violation of his duty.
Frederick N. Merkin: Exactly. It's a violation of a number of things. And if the case ever does go to trial, of course we would have to determine if that actually happened.
Byron R. White: Well, in terms of standing, in terms of showing some future risk to himself, he would have to show that, not only that he is liable to be stopped for a traffic incident again, but another policeman is likely to disobey his orders.
Frederick N. Merkin: There are two cases he's bringing, in a sense. There's the primary case and then there's the hidden case. The primary case is, you have to be fearful that the hold would be applied according to policy, and that's his Monell theory.
Byron R. White: Well, I know. But if it's applied according to policy, the predicate for that is that he resists.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's correct.
Byron R. White: That he resists, and in short that he is committing an illegal act himself.
Frederick N. Merkin: Yes. And the other, the hidden case that he has in a sense is that the control hold is applied without provocation. And that is an entirely different case, and whatever the probabilities may be with regard to the policy, they've got to be, hopefully, incredibly remote with regard to out of policy application of the control holds. So we're speaking of, once again, on both issues, very remote possibilities of injury to the individual.
Byron R. White: To the same person.
Frederick N. Merkin: To the same person.
Byron R. White: There was no class certification here?
Frederick N. Merkin: There was no class certification. I would like to reserve my time for rebuttal, please.
Warren E. Burger: Mr. Mitchell.
Michael R. Mitchell: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: This case should be dismissed because my client no longer needs the injunction that was granted. The city has now complied with the terms of that injunction and my client--
Byron R. White: But it would like to cease complying.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Pardon?
Byron R. White: It would like to cease complying. I take it if it ceased... it revoked or suspended the rule only under the force of the injunction.
Michael R. Mitchell: No, that's not correct, Justice White. There was another death in April of 1982 and a firestorm of public criticism that, along with this lawsuit... I believe this lawsuit did have some impact... resulted in the moratorium.
Byron R. White: Well, when did the moratorium occur, before or after the entry of the preliminary injunction?
Michael R. Mitchell: After entry of the preliminary, by a year and a half. So for a year and a half--
John Paul Stevens: It had been stayed, hadn't it? The injunction had been stayed?
Michael R. Mitchell: --The injunction has always been stayed. There has never been a--
John Paul Stevens: So it was a voluntary decision, then?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Correct.
Warren E. Burger: Mr. Mitchell, from my point of view the threshold question here is the standing to bring this case. Let me give you a hypothetical to see if it will shed any light on it. There is a good deal of debate in police circles and public circles about the hot pursuit by police cars, and sometimes that spills over into the speed of fire engines. But confining our hypothetical to the hot pursuit, where police will pursue a bank robber or whatever, and frequently injure other people, citizens, or kill them, do you think a citizen who is fearful of that has standing to go into the courts and stop the practice of hot pursuit?
Michael R. Mitchell: Well, Your Honor, it's a complex question. What you need to know, of course, is whether or not that citizen, I believe, has a justifiable fear of real immediate injury.
Warren E. Burger: Let's assume, then, that on one occasion a police car in hot pursuit collided with his car and did very substantial damage and injured him. Now, with that addition, does he have standing?
Michael R. Mitchell: Well, it's certainly not--
Warren E. Burger: Other than for damages? Damages, clearly he has a claim. Does he have standing for equitable, injunctive relief to change the practice of the police or the fire department?
Michael R. Mitchell: --No, Your Honor, he would not, because that policy would not be that police cars collide broadside with citizens' cars. The policy is that you chase people that you need to chase. In this instance we have a policy, a direct policy, that you choke people who do not threaten serious bodily harm. That's like saying you take your car and run it into a citizen's car.
Byron R. White: But the rule is, as I understand it, the rule is that you are not supposed to apply these control holds, you're not supposed to choke them, unless it's necessary to overcome resistance.
Michael R. Mitchell: Your Honor, if you'll look at the record, the city training officer says that, Mr. Speer... his deposition is at page--
Byron R. White: Well, is the policy written or isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: --It's written several different ways, Your Honor. Yes, it is.
Byron R. White: Where is it in the record?
Michael R. Mitchell: At number 74, page 21, 30, and 91 in the official record, and the training bulletin... the training bulletin, at the city's petition for cert, 41A in the appendix. It says "subdue any resistance".
Byron R. White: You say that 41A, is that policy the city policy or isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: Well, it's not the city policy today.
Byron R. White: Well, I know, but was it? That is the policy? That's an adequate description of the policy?
Michael R. Mitchell: To subdue any resistance or if an officer felt a bodily attack was going to be made upon him. That was the city policy as best I understand it.
Byron R. White: So if a person... if an officer simply applies the control hold for no reason whatsoever, he's disobeying his instructions.
Michael R. Mitchell: Absolutely. But in the case of Adolph Lyons, of course, presumably the officer felt that something was about to happen. Presumably he felt that there was about to be a bodily attack. We don't really know, since we have nothing from the officers in the case. But consider the position of Adolph Lyons. As a black male in the city of Los Angeles, if you take the statistics... and let me point you in the record to the statistics. The only ones that we have are in the city cert petition at page 11. It shows application of a total of 113... 1,013 strangle holds, with a total of six deaths in the period. Which means that approximately one out of every 200 times that the strangle holds are applied, a death will result. Now, I submit to you that that, plus the fact that they are quite obviously having a disparate impact on the black male population of Los Angeles... you are 12 times more likely to be strangled if you are black, to die of strangulation, if you are a black male than if you are white. And 12 of the 16 deaths have been black males. There are 200,000, approximately 200,000, black males in the city, and they're killing approximately 2 per year with strangle holds. We've got 12 in 6-1/2 years. If you take those statistics, it's a simple calculation to show that your chances as a black male of being strangled are one in 500 versus one in 6,000 for anybody else in the city. So Adolph Lyons, who suffered almost death... he was almost death number 17 in this case. He defecated and urinated, he lost consciousness. He suffered--
Thurgood Marshall: It was a traffic violation, wasn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Yes, it was, for a traffic violation. He suffered this conduct and is terrified that he'll suffer it again. He has one chance in 500 of being stopped and choked by the LAPD, and if he is one chance in 200, because one out of every 200 times they choke, of dying. It is not reasonable to expect the black population, black male population of Los Angeles, to suffer that continuing threat.
Sandra Day O'Connor: Mr. Mitchell, was it the position of the Respondent for purposes of getting the preliminary injunction that the Los Angeles city police routinely use these choke holds for routine traffic stops?
Michael R. Mitchell: No, it was not, Your Honor, not that they did that routinely. And we haven't developed all the facts yet. There's a massive amount of work to be done before we get to the trial. Whether they do it routinely in traffic stops or not, we don't know.
Sandra Day O'Connor: And in any event, Mr. Lyons would continue to have his damages action, would he not?
Michael R. Mitchell: If he lives, if he lives. And I submit that the risk that he might die far outweighs the possibility that he might be satisfied with any damage action. What the LAPD is requiring Mr. Lyons to do every day is to play a game of roulette that's a very unusual one. It's one where the LAPD says, our policy is you've got to choose a number with this roulette wheel with 100,000 places as your chances of dying, and we're going to spin this wheel and if that ball should fall in your slot you die. Now, that kind of policy is different from one where it says, you put down your money, we'll spin the wheel and if the ball falls in your slot you lose your money, because the next day you can go back into court and say, that policy is a taking without due process and it's unconstitutional. It's not true when they take your life.
Warren E. Burger: Was there any evidence in the record, Mr. Mitchell, about the conduct of these various people that had the fatal consequences? That is, were they intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, or how did they react to the police encounter? What does the record show about that?
Michael R. Mitchell: Your Honor, the record shows that apparently several of them were under the influence of various drugs, and that may have well contributed to their deaths, because when you're under the influence of narcotic-type drugs, including alcohol, you're insensitive to paint and so when a police officer puts a choke hold on you and seeks to obtain your compliance by causing you paint like that bar arm control, you don't feel it. And if you don't feel it, he can continue to give pressure before you stop, and you die by virtue of that insensitivity to pain. So those are especially people who you want to avoid choking. The district court made that finding, in fact, that those people are ones who are very, very delicate. Now, the cases that the Court seems to rely on in terms of judging whether Mr. Lyons has standing do not involve the threat of death, and that's what distinguishes them. A threat, an immediate threat, is comprised of at least four elements: First of all, you've got to know you're threatened. There's got to be some real probability that you're going to be subject to... the threat's going to be carried out. And there's a consequence to the threat as well as an immediacy of the threat. Now, the consequence is what in many cases, it seems to met is implicitly assumed but never expressed. The threat of death as a consequence is much different than the threat that bail will be too high, as in O'Shea, or that you'll be treated discriminatorily by a judge. The fact that the Philadelphia police department doesn't have a disciplinary process that adequately disciplines police officers, as in Rizzo, doesn't involve a threat of death, a direct threat that we can calculate, as we can in this situation. I don't think anyone in this room would like to trade places with Adolph Lyons and have that chance that they're going to die. You can avoid deciding the case, however, and you have in the past on many occasions avoided addressing complex and very important constitutional questions, on the grounds that my client no longer needs the injunction, with the assurance that the city cannot return to its former policy.
John Paul Stevens: How can you say that? Excuse me. How can you say that when they've said ten days from now they may return to their policy?
Michael R. Mitchell: Because I have seen... and it's not in the record... the massive outrage and outcry of that community. I just simply believe it's politically impossible for the city to do that.
Byron R. White: You would not object, then, to vacating the injunction? It's been stayed.
Michael R. Mitchell: That's correct.
Byron R. White: But I don't know when the stay expires. When we get through with this case, I suppose. But you would not object to our vacating the injunction?
Michael R. Mitchell: Not in the least.
Byron R. White: Well, how would we... on what basis would we vacate the injunction, that the case is just not ripe? You can't say it's moot, can you?
Michael R. Mitchell: I can say it's moot, Your Honor, because my client walks the streets of Los Angeles these days with none of that fear that he had before. He doesn't have the standing to have the injunction any longer.
Byron R. White: Well, I don't know how we can do that, how we have all that knowledge of what the reality is in Los Angeles.
Michael R. Mitchell: He has no controversy any more. He wants to settle.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Well, I don't quite understand. Would we vacate the injunction and dismiss the proceeding, or direct the district court to dismiss the suit?
Michael R. Mitchell: Well, there are several counts down there for damages that remain. The damage claims would remain.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Oh, then as far as you would go would be vacate the injunction, but otherwise let the lawsuit proceed, is that it?
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, Your Honor.
Thurgood Marshall: Does your client agree with you?
Michael R. Mitchell: Your Honor?
Thurgood Marshall: Does your client agree with you?
Michael R. Mitchell: That it should be dismissed at this point?
Thurgood Marshall: Yes.
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, Your Honor, he does.
Thurgood Marshall: When did he tell you that?
Michael R. Mitchell: After the moratorium was imposed. I must in all candor--
Thurgood Marshall: What's his position right now? I mean, I'm just wondering about you standing up there giving away half of your case.
Michael R. Mitchell: --I haven't spoken to him this morning, Your Honor, but I don't think that his position has changed. In all candor, should that moratorium be lifted on November the 12th, we'll be right back in the district court and we'll want that injunction that day.
William H. Rehnquist: Well, isn't that itself more or less a confession that the Kamenish doctrine really doesn't apply to you and that there is a real prospect that the moratorium could shift, and if it does you'll be back in district court right away?
Michael R. Mitchell: Justice Rehnquist, there's chances that they could do hundreds and hundreds of different things. I can't speculate as to what the police commission is going to do. But I don't think this Court, not this Court, should concern itself with a case like this where it's involving--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Under your suggested disposition, if we vacate it and you go back to trial, I gather all of the issues, constitutional and everything else, would have to be resolved in any event by the district court in the first instance, would they not? Wouldn't you in the damages aspect of the suit raise all these constitutional questions, the validity of the choke holds and the rest of it?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Your Honor, the way the complaint is drafted, those are not raised with respect to the primary count, count one. We would in fact have to prove, I suppose, that it was a taking of my client's right to liberty without due process.
Byron R. White: In this specific instance.
Michael R. Mitchell: In this specific instance.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Is this a 1983 suit? What is it?
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, it's a 1983 suit.
Thurgood Marshall: I guess it's your position that all that's gone on in the past in this case is just wasted effort?
Michael R. Mitchell: No, Your Honor, I don't take that position at all.
Thurgood Marshall: I don't see what else you can say. You've gone through all of this for how many years? How many years has this case been pending?
Michael R. Mitchell: Since 1977, Your Honor.
Thurgood Marshall: And all of that's just going to be washed down the drain?
Michael R. Mitchell: Your Honor, I think this case--
Thurgood Marshall: You say you'll start again after the moratorium's lifted?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Your Honor, if it's lifted we will.
Thurgood Marshall: Didn't you just say that?
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, we will.
Thurgood Marshall: So you wasted your time and you've wasted other people's time all along.
Michael R. Mitchell: No, Your Honor. I think this case--
Thurgood Marshall: Well, I object to you wasting mine. More than that, if I understand your speech about the fear that your client suffers as he wanders around Los Angeles, that you're going to let him suffer that fear during the period between the lifting of the moratorium and the time you can get back and get another injunctions which may well take a couple of months.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Well, Your Honor--
John Paul Stevens: I don't suppose... you don't know for sure what the judge will do, if you have to prove your case all over again.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Your Honor, my understanding is that on the 9th of November the police commission must make a decision as to whether the moratorium is lifted or not.
John Paul Stevens: Supposing they say, we're going to lift it. You say, well, we don't care. That's somewhat inconsistent with the argument you made a little while ago.
Michael R. Mitchell: No, Your Honor. I misspoke if I said that. I'll be in court on November the 10th, the day after November the 9th, to get a preliminary injunction.
John Paul Stevens: Yes, but you may not get it, and you're saying you don't care if we lift the one that's now protecting your client.
Michael R. Mitchell: This one has never been in effect.
John Paul Stevens: Well, because it's been stayed. But you say you don't even ask us to lift the stay. You just say, well, just dismiss the injunction, I'm confident I can get it again if I need it. It's a strange posture for representing a client. Well, isn't it essential to your posture, the statement that you really don't think the political authorities in Los Angeles will ever reinstitute this procedure?
Michael R. Mitchell: Indeed.
William H. Rehnquist: So you'll be back in the district court if you have to bet but you think the chances are 99 out of 100 that you won't have to be?
Michael R. Mitchell: Precisely.
Byron R. White: That also is very relevant to your standing, too, isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: Standing to be here today?
Byron R. White: To ask for an injunction. You say that you don't need any protection, that the threat to you is nonexistent in the future. So you don't need an injunction.
Michael R. Mitchell: Because the city has changed its policy.
Byron R. White: Yes.
Michael R. Mitchell: And now it only chokes when it should.
Byron R. White: It not only has changed its policy, but you say you have no fear with respect to its present policy.
Michael R. Mitchell: Correct.
Byron R. White: So you don't need an injunction.
Michael R. Mitchell: Absolutely.
Warren E. Burger: When will you get to trial on your case in the ordinary course of events down there?
Michael R. Mitchell: With that calendar, probably not until next summer, late spring.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: It's going to be a protracted trial, I gather?
Michael R. Mitchell: I'm sorry?
William J. Brennan, Jr.: It's going to be a long trial?
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, Your Honor, I expect it will be.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: The city indicates it'll go on for a very long time. Will the only issue that remains be the damages issue if we do as you suggest?
Michael R. Mitchell: Yes, Your Honor, assuming the moratorium is not lifted, absolutely. The question of federalism, it seems to me in this case, that has been raised by the city is not a real question any longer. The city claimed that this injunction, if issued, would completely... cause them to completely revamp all their training procedures, spend a great deal of money. And now the city on its own in May of '82 has done precisely what the injunction required, did it with great ease. But I don't think that the way they raised the question addresses the issue of federalism that concerns Adolph Lyons, which is that the Constitution is the principle of federalism that he was seeking to be protected by. He wanted to be protected from deprivation of his life without due process of law. That's the principle of federalism that he was concerned with, and there's no other principle of federalism, it seems to me, that in any way makes a local police department immune from this federal protection for the citizen. The city would have this Court institute a policy that, no matter what policy the city had, the federal judiciary would be powerless to enjoin the policy. If Adolph Lyons does not have standing to challenge this policy, there's absolutely no one in the city of Los Angeles who did, and he's the man, he's one of the men, who was almost killed by it. So if you do not dismiss as improvidently granted, vacating the injunction--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Mr. Mitchell, am I right, the only judgment before us is the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the preliminary injunction, isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Yes.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: And there was another judgment, was there not, that's not here at this time?
Michael R. Mitchell: Justice Brennan, there was a Lyons I, if you like--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Yes.
Michael R. Mitchell: --where the court did reinstitute the lawsuit. It had been dismissed because of the standing problem. So there are two judgments.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: But the only one before us now is the affirmance by the Ninth Circuit of the preliminary injunction, isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: No, Your Honor, I think they're both before you now. Those were issues presented in the petition for cert.--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Well, what do we do with the other one under your submission?
Michael R. Mitchell: --Well, if you dismiss as improvidently granted and vacate the injunction, you needn't do anything else.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Well, we're not dismissing as improvidently granted if we vacate the injunction.
Michael R. Mitchell: I beg your pardon?
William J. Brennan, Jr.: We're not dismissing as improvidently granted if we vacate the injunction, are we? No, you're taking action on the merits then.
Michael R. Mitchell: Indeed. You could order it remanded for vacation of the injunction.
Warren E. Burger: Mr. Mitchell, if every policeman on the beat had carried out the instructions in the manual that Justice White read earlier in the argument, would there be any problem, that is, that it's used only when it's necessary to subdue violence?
Michael R. Mitchell: That wasn't the words I heard Justice White read.
Warren E. Burger: Well, that's the essence of it, isn't it?
Michael R. Mitchell: The essence is to subdue any resistance. That's what the bulletin says. And that means subdue all resistance, Your Honor.
Byron R. White: Well, it says "necessary to subdue resistance", "necessary". Not just when it's applied for the purpose of.
Michael R. Mitchell: Mr. Justice White, a police officer may subjectively feel that it's necessary for him to choke a black man on the streets of Los Angeles because--
Byron R. White: That isn't what the bulletin says. It says "necessary" and it doesn't say if the officer feels it's necessary.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Well, combined with the--
Byron R. White: It may be objectively. It may be an objective test.
Michael R. Mitchell: --I don't think it is, Your Honor. I think the other statements in the record--
Byron R. White: You'll find out in your trial. You'll find out in your damage suit.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Well, I don't think you should leave people to a damage remedy in a situation like this, not with this overwhelming threat. So if you do not dismiss--
Byron R. White: Well, this overwhelming threat that you say you don't need any protection against any more.
Michael R. Mitchell: --Well, it's gone, and hopefully it'll be gone forever. Thank you.
Warren E. Burger: Do you have anything further, Mr. Merkin?
Warren E. Burger: Excuse me, Mr. Merkin. Will you tell me what do you think is before us? You brought the case here. What judgment is here?
Frederick N. Merkin: The one you stated, Mr. Justice Brennan. The judgment that comes from the court of appeals in affirming a preliminary injunction, but there are decisions of this Court--
William J. Brennan, Jr.: Not no. What other judgment is before us?
Frederick N. Merkin: --No other judgments.
William J. Brennan, Jr.: That's the only one.
Frederick N. Merkin: Only judgment, yes.
Warren E. Burger: And that is stayed by the courts.
Frederick N. Merkin: And that is stayed.
Byron R. White: But there's a special standing issue even in that judgment.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's right. It's inherent in it, and this Court has ruled in the past that decisions,... the term "early in the proceedings" upon which this Court has a rule, can be raised at a later point. It's inherent and indeed, the court could raise it on its motion if it so desired because it's a case of controversey under Article III which is at issue-- There are just two points I would like to address on rebuttal. The first is to clarify a point relative to what the city wants. The city wants flexibility. It's not clear that the city ever will go back to the control holds... wants the flexibility to do so should it make that determination. The second issue goes to whether the respondent believes the case is moot. If the respondent believes that the need for a declaration or injunctive relief is moot, respondent would move to dismiss all aspects of the case other than damages. And counsel for the respondent said, apparently, that only the damages issue remains. I think what the respondent is trying to do, however, is to have the spectra of federal judicial control there overseeing the police department's decisions on this matter. And if they're not satisfactory to the respondent, then the respondent will be in court perhaps--
Thurgood Marshall: Respondent could have said that when you filed your petition for certiorari. And we wouldn't be here. We wouldn't have all this problem. Right?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Well, I--
Thurgood Marshall: Couldn't respondent have said we don't care about the injunction, and let it go.
Frederick N. Merkin: --Respondent could have said that, yes.
Thurgood Marshall: You wouldn't be up here, would you?
Frederick N. Merkin: That's right.
William H. Rehnquist: I think in fairness to respondent, though, the moratorium hadn't taken place at the time you filed your petition, had it?
Frederick N. Merkin: I don't believe so. I believe, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, we filed our petition in December of 1981. The moratorium followed roughly six months thereafter. And debriefing was well underway at the time on May 12th, that the police commission instituted the moratorium. It was shortly thereafter that respondent moved to have the writ dismissed as having been improvidently granted.
Byron R. White: And we didn't take action on that motion.
Frederick N. Merkin: That's right. And I believe correctly so.
John Paul Stevens: Mr. Merkin, do you think we could safely assume, in view of what's been said in court today, that if we were to dismiss the write as improperly granted, that your opponent means what he says and he would just go in and move to dismiss the injunction before the district court? You don't believe him, I take it.
Frederick N. Merkin: I don't think that's a fair assumption. For example,--
John Paul Stevens: He's, in effect, represented to the Court that he's prepared to do that, as I understand what he said. And it seems sort of silly to be deciding the kind of a case in which obviously, there's some difference of opinion if no matter what we do he's going to say let's vacate the injunction and then you'd probably be happy, wouldn't you?
Frederick N. Merkin: --Mr. Justice Stevens, I think he's saying vacate... he's not concerned about the preliminary injunction, but his primary causes for declaratory injunctive relief I think he still wishes to pursue. Because otherwise, he would dismiss all injunctive, all equitable aspect of the case.
John Paul Stevens: It would seem to me that a couple of good lawyers would be able to settle this case and save the damage issue without requiring this Court to do very much about it.
Frederick N. Merkin: Well, there is a problem that the city faces with respect to the doctrines enunciated by the Ninth Circuit. Whatever control hold policy the city chooses is immediately challengeable in district court, and not just the control hold policy; any use of force policy.
Warren E. Burger: That narrows your complaint down to the standing issue, then, doesn't it?
Frederick N. Merkin: Well, that--
John Paul Stevens: You'd like an advisory opinion on the standing issue is what I understand.
Frederick N. Merkin: --I don't believe it's advisory.
Warren E. Burger: Maybe you'll get a different panel in the Ninth Circuit next time. [Laughter]
Frederick N. Merkin: Perhaps. But that's basically all I have. Thank you.
Warren E. Burger: Thank you, gentlemen, the case is submitted.


Earl Warren: Number 10, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania versus Steve Nelson. Mr. Truscott.
Frank F. Truscott: If the Court pleases, this case comes before Your Honors on a certiorari to the Supreme Court, court of last appellate resort of Pennsylvania. Now, we think that sole question involved is whether or not the Smith Act, the Federal Smith Act of 1940 is codified in the Federal Criminal Code of 1948, supercedes, nullifies state Sedition Act of Pennsylvania of 1919 is codified in the Criminal Code of Pennsylvania of 1939. On October 17th, 1950, the grand jury of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania found a true bill and indicted, one, Steve Nelson, alias Louis Evans, alias Hugo, alias Steve Mesarosh. The motion was filed towards the indictment. A hearing was heard on it. The motion was dismissed. The case came on for trial in December 4th, 1951. The trial continued until January the 30th, 1952 on a verdict of guilty and all 12 counts of the indictment was rendered. The motion for a new trial and the motion in arrest of judgment was filed, was heard by the court in bank. The trial judge and the judge of Court of Allegheny County and the judge was imported from Westmoreland County to sit and to hear the motion. The motions were dismissed. Sentence was pronounced on the defendant, 20 years of imprisonment, cost $10,000 bond. An appeal was taken to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which is our court of intermediate appeals, hearing appeals and all crimes with murder with some civil jurisdiction. That court in the unanimous per curiam opinion affirmed the conviction in the lower court. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania under a statute, which gives them the right, really not a right as a matter of grace and where an unusual extraordinary question or constitutional questions is involved, an allocatur maybe granted to our Superior Court and that was done in this case. Before the hearing, the Court decided to find opinion written by Justice Jones. The lower court, the Superior Court should be reversed and that the indictment should be quashed. A short concurring opinion was written by three justices, Chief Justice Stern, Justice Allen Stearne and Justice Chidsey. The very vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Justice Bell. Justice Musmanno did not sit because he was interested in the prosecution of the trial below. Justice Arnold did not sit because he was a member of the Superior Court and the matter was passed upon in that Court. Now, my reason for stating that I think the sole question involved is whether or not the Pennsylvania Sedition Act is superseded by the Smith Act is because the majority opinion in the Supreme Court states after reviewing what Justice Jones' concedes might be errors of the trial. He says but with all -- with any and all of that, we need not now be concerned. The appellant's principal and cogent contention is that the supreme -- that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act is suspended by operation of law upon the enactment by Congress by Title 1 of the Act of June the 28th, 1940 known as the Smith Act which defines sedition against the United States and prescribed punishments therefore. If the Pennsylvania Act was so suspended, then the defendant's conviction cannot be sustained accordingly. We have met at the outside -- outset with this question which was presented timely in the trial court reserves upon the Superior Court and has been stressed upon us. And our opinion, the contention is well-founded. Consequently, the indictment should imply.
Speaker: What happened that we should reverse this case?
Frank F. Truscott: I think it depends on, Your Honor, how you reversed it and what's you say in the reversal, of course, but that it probably goes back to the Supreme Court for the decision upon the merits of the case as of that time. Now, the other three justices who filed this short concurring opinion, they said on the -- they said in the court's -- short concurring opinion, “We think this is a national question.” And they ended their opinion by saying, “We assume that the question involved being obviously one of national importance will be finally determined -- be determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” So that indicates that they also thought that there was a sole question and even the dissenting opinion thought it was the sole question because Justice Bells starts out his opinion with -- Congress has never once said the Pennsylvania laws of any state or any state law on sedition is suspended or invalidated. The Supreme Court of the United States has never said so. If there could be any doubt on the question and in my opinion, there is none, it should certainly not be resolved in favor of freeing one of the top leaders in the Communist Party in America who has been convicted of plotting the destruction of our country. So as I say practically, all parties agreed even the respondent in his brief feels that that is the question. I think it is also important that we should have before us just what is said in the indictment. I'm quoting from page 6 of my brief on the statement of facts, “Indictment charged and really is that the defendant, Steve Nelson, encouraged person as to engage in conduct with a view to overthrowing and destroying by force the government of Pennsylvania and of the United States. That he published and distributed printed matter in encouraging persons to engage in conduct with a view to overthrowing and destroying by force, the government of Pennsylvania and of the United States.” Indictment further charge specifically with respect to some of the matters that had been printed by and distributed by, setting forth in haec verba what was contained in the material. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise by peaceful development, but can arise only as a result of smashing the bourgeois state machine and bourgeois army. This Soviet Organization alone is capable of smashing and finally destroying the bourgeois and bureaucratic and the judicial process and this can be done only by revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of the bourgeois society and bourgeois democracy. It can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic machine and the bourgeois police. The society organization and the State alone is capable of immediately and effectively smashing and finally destroying the old, the bourgeois bureaucratic and the judicial apparatus. The bourgeois state can only be put an end to by a revolution. The replacement of the bourgeois by proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against existing social and political order of things. The Communist openly declared that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions that the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and deliberation of the working class in (Inaudible) capitalism cannot be affected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change in the capital system by a revolution. The proletariat revolution is -- is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and substitution for it of a new one. Now, there were many others. These are just examples of what were the allegations of the indictment with respect to the specific printed material that was distributed or discharged, distributed, that the respondent distributed. As I say this title of the case tool about two months, 2700 pages of testimony were taken which has been reduced in our printed record to about 1400. It detailed many of the activities of the respondent, the idea of showing the intent to which these things were distributed.But as I say, I don't think that we are concerned here with that because I think all parties have agreed that the only question is whether there is one of supersession, which was submitted to be answered by this Court. Now, I think probably because there has been a great deal said both in the opinion of the Learned Justice below and in the brief of the respondent in this case about whether or not a State can pass the Sedition Act proscribing the advocacy of the overthrow of the government of the United States only as distinguished in the State of Pennsylvania although Your Honors will note that in the excerpts that I read from the indictment that Pennsylvania as well as the United States were part of the objects of the advocacy of overthrow by force and violence in this case. And since the order of the court below was the quashing of the indictment as distinguished from a motion and arrest of judgment where all of the case comes into effect, we probably maybe dealing with the sole question of these averments of the indictment which do specifically aver the overthrow of Pennsylvania, the Government of Pennsylvania as well as that of the United States. But be that as it may, we are confronted to some extent as to whether or not a State can proscribe against Acts of Sedition such as our -- instigated here. Can a State make it a crime to commit acts in its territory, which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States? Now, Your Honors, it had recently a number of these cases before you. There's hardly as single case in which some justice is now sitting upon this bench has not made some reference in an opinion that could be quoted back with respect to this situation that we have facing us here today. But I want to refer, Your Honors, to three important cases that I think that are all controlling in this situation. And the first one is the case of Gitlow against New York. There, there was a statute somewhat the same as the statute involved in this case with the distinction that there, there was to be an overthrowing or overturning of the organized government by force and violence. Here, it was the overthrowing of Pennsylvania and the government of the United States. The Gitlow case, after conviction and appeals, finally reach this Court. Justice Sanford said in his opinion, “And the State may penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the representative and the constitutional form of government of the United States and the several States by violence or other unlawful meanings.” In short, this freedom (does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self-preservation which so long as human governments endure, they cannot be denied). Now, there was a similar statute in California. That statute made as to felony for anybody to become a member of an organization which advocated unlawful acts of force and violence as a means of accomplishing in -- a change in industrial ownership or any political change. This Court said in that case that a state in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances and amicable to the public welfare pending to incite the crime, disturb the public peace or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means is not open to question. Now, in those two cases, there has been some aspersion cast upon them in the -- and particularly in the opinion of the Learned Justice below to the effect that there was not at the time that they were decided any federal Act in effect and that is true. The Sedition Act of 1918 had been repealed in 1921. But with respect to those two cases, the utterances were charged to have been made on November the 28th, 1919 and July the 5th, 1919. And at the time that they were charged to have been made, the Sedition Act was still in effect and I submit that if the state law had been nullified, this Court would not have confirmed the convictions in those cases. But there is a case that was decided by this Court and which there can be absolutely no question about a federal Act being in full force in effect at the time that the conviction was held and at the time that the appeal was heard in this Court. In that case is Gilbert against Minnesota. In Gilbert against Minnesota, there was a Minnesota statute making it as a misdemeanor to advocate that citizens of the State should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on a war. At the time that Gilbert was convicted, the Federal Espionage Act was in full force in effect. It was argued in the lower court. It was argued impractically to every court and it was presented in this Court that the Federal Espionage Act which prohibited the same Acts of the Minnesota Act prohibited superseded and preempted and occupied the field so that the Minnesota Act did not have any force or -- or effect. This Court held, the statute indeed maybe supported as a simple exertion of the police power to preserve the peace of the State. It's simply a local police major aimed to suppress a species of seditious speech which the legislature of the State has found objectionable. On such occasions, feeling usually runs high and is impetuous. There is a prompting to violence and when violence has once yielded too, the Board can be quelled. Tragedies maybe enacted to produce such a result or the danger of it is a proper exercise of the power of the State. Now, I'm not going to bore Your Honors with any more quotations from your cases. Chief Justice Jones and Chief Justice Hughes said in the De Jonge against Oregon that the States were entitled to protect themselves. And in Stromberg against California, he said there was absolutely no question of what the States could do and pass such Acts. Now, these particular Sedition Act of Pennsylvania, I should like to call also Your Honors attention, has been constitutional by our Supreme Court in three different cases, the Widowich case, the Zima case, and the Lazar case. And in two of those cases, they are brought to the attention of this Court and one, a writ of certiorari was denied and in another, the appeal was dismissed. There had been similar statutes. In other States, that had been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of those States. One of the cases is State against (Inaudible) of New Jersey and the other is the recent case in the State of New Hampshire of Nelson against Wyman. Now, having demonstrated I believe that by the decisions of this Court and several decisions of our state courts that the State has the power to enact a Sedition Act of this common. I should now like to submit to Your Honors that in this instant case, there was no intention on the part of Congress by the passage of the Smith Act, the superseded or preemptive field in which the Sedition Acts operate on the part of States. First of all, these Sedition Acts in the states and territories are penal laws. They are laws for the punishment of conduct or an act in those particular territories. This is not the case like the Cloverleaf case with the -- with the regulation with respect to Butter. It's not a case like the Allen-Bradley Local of Labor Relations. It's not a case of regulations with respect to platforms on the rear part of railroads. There is no Act such as the Taft-Hartley Act involved of the Labor Relations Act or the Interstate Commerce Act involved. These are penal laws of the state and of the territory has by the duly elected representatives of the people of those States. They have no regulations of any kind, no registration mandates, nothing that could conflict. They are merely a part of the criminal justice of each state and each territory where they had been passed. I think the brief of the Solicitor General of the Government covers that subject very well. He says, “These are ordinarily -- ordinary criminal statutes which proscribe completely substantive evils, certain types of conduct and create a substantive crime independently of any administrative or statutory regulation. In this respect, they are like statutes punishing murder, robbery or kidnapping which are crimes against those state and nation where every elements giving rise to federal jurisdiction of prison. Statutes of the type and issues do not contemplate any scheme of regulation. They do not establish any administrative agency with power to issue rules, orders or regulations. They are not registration statutes with the tenant administrative requirement. There is, therefore, no possibility of conflict between the requirements of federal and state administrative regulations coming from this statute. The state sedition laws are ordinarily -- ordinary penal laws which have as their object of protection of the established government of the State. Now, very early, there was a case of Cohens against West Virginia in which Congress passed an Act permitting lottery tickets particularly here in the District of Columbia to finance certain situations. The man was arrested in Virginia because the Virginia law prohibited to the lottery -- the lotteries. Chief Justice Marshall said that to interfere with the penal laws of the State where they are not leveled against the legitimate powers of union that have for their sole object, the internal government and countries of very serious nature. It must be taken deliberately and the intention would be clearly and unequivocally expressed. An Act such as that under consideration ought not we think to be so considered is to imply this intention unless its provisions were such as to render the construction inevitable. And then there was a very fine dissertation on crime by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Malinski against New York, in which Justice Frankfurter says, that as far as the criminal justice is concerned, it was with the States. It was reserved to the States. And only so much of it was given to the Federal Government as it was necessary for it to efficaciously carry on its work as a government. And that remain so until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. And after the passage of that, it still remained that the enforcement of the criminal law was predominantly with the States. There were some restrictions in the making and the enforcement placed upon it by the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, this is apart from permitting Congress to use criminal sanctions as a means for carrying into execution powers granted it, the Constitution left the domain of the criminal justice to the States. And again, Rochin against California in 342 U.S., he says, “In our federal system, the administration of the criminal justice is predominantly committed to the care of the States. The power to define crimes belongs to Congress only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited grant of legislative powers.” Broadly speaking, crimes in the United States or what the laws of the individual States make them subject to the limitations of Article I Section 10, Clause 1 of the original Constitution prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. I think one way that we can arrive and most surely at the intention of Congress in this case is to look at the legislative history of a case. Look at the hearings and let me say in passing that in all -- our investigation shows that there are 42 States, Alaska and Hawaii that have Acts similar to this Act that's involved in this case in Pennsylvania. Now, they're not all known as Sedition Acts. But the majority of them by a good bit are known as Sedition Acts. There are some that are known as Syndicalism acts and some that are known as Anarchy acts.But in all, there are 42 States in Hawaii and Alaska. In the subcommittee hearings in Congress, there's a great awareness that shown of the state sedition acts. In fact, one of the witnesses in the subcommittee hearing testified that the Smith Act was modeled after the New York State Act and he mentioned that the Gitlow case had been passed upon by this Court and that the New York State Act had been held constitutional. In the debates, reference was frequently made to the state sedition acts. They knew that they were in existence. And when the sponsor was interrogated on the floor of Congress concerning the discrepancy between the penalty and some of the state acts and they proposed for that, they answer to the interrogation by saying, “This bill has nothing whatever to do with the state acts.” That's the 84th Congressional Record on page 10,452. Then, there had been committees of Congress that had been appointed that reported with respect to certain activities of individuals and they noted in a report filed in March of 1950 and in a report filed in August of 1950 that the Sedition acts were in full force in effect and they spoke about the activity of the state legislatures with respect to these Acts. It would have been a great surprise to them. Congress had it been brought to their attention that for 10 years these Acts that they were reporting on had been nullified by an Act which they passed back in the year of 1940, the Smith Act. And then there's the title of the Act itself. Now, as a part of the Federal Criminal Code, this Title 18, Section 32 and 31, “Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.” Certainly, that language is a specific statement to the effect that the state laws are at least not to be nullified by influence. Nothing in this title is to take away or impair. Now, in our Supreme Court, quash the indictment in this case by a decision of one judge half-heartedly joined in by three because they showed some misgiving saying that it ought to be decided by this Court. And one judge very vigorously dissented and there had been three court -- three judges in lower court in an appellate capacity and seven judges on our Superior Court, all 11 of those judges held that there was no supersession in this case. And as I say only one and three half-heartedly joining in needless to say the Justice Department, that I happened to heeded that time, was somewhat shocked. It was enacted by our own legislature with one justice, three joining in, nullifying our own Act. And I decided immediately that a petition for a rehearing should be filed and I did. And I attached to that a letter that I had received from the author of this Act, Mr. Representative Smith himself, and so it is a part of the record in this case. And Justice Bell has included it in his opinion when the petition for the rehearing denied. Honorable Frank Truscott, Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
Felix Frankfurter: What is that you're reading?
Frank F. Truscott: I'm reading the letter that the sponsor, that the author of this bill wrote to me which I attached to the petition for a rehearing in our Supreme Court. And it's a part of the opinion -- the dissenting opinion in this case. Honorable Frank Truscott, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, “Dear Mr. Attorney General. As I am the author of the Federal Act in question, known as the Smith Act, I am deeply disturbed by the implications of this decision. May I say that when I read this opinion, it was the first intimation, I have ever had either in the preparation of the Act in the hearings before the Judiciary Committee in the debates, in the House or any subsequent development that Congress ever had the famous notion of nullifying the concurrent jurisdiction of the respecting -- respective sovereign states to pursue also their own prosecution for subversive activities. It would be a severe handicap to the successful stamping out subversive activities if no state authority were permitted to assist in the elimination of this evil or to protect its own sovereignty. The whole tenor and purpose of the Smith Act was to eliminate subversive activities, not to a system, which letter might well be the effect of the decision in the case of Commonwealth against Nelson. I hope you will not think me presumptuous in taking this matter up with you, but you can readily understand how deeply disturbed I am about it. Sincerely yours, Howard W.Smith.” I have only to point out in connection with that, that this is not an ex post facto letter. This is a letter, which says that, it's the first intimation I have, ever had. Now, he's a former judge, highly respected judge, he represents the Eighth District and has for a long time, a grand public servant and I think one of our most highly thought of Congressman, writes that letter that this is the first intimation that he ever had that that Act might be superseded. Now, there are other States that have this problem. Ohio, it has an Act, which has a Commission to ascertain who is advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. One man defied the Commission and he cited the case of Commonwealth against Nelson, decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and said the Act it didn't -- nullified because the Smith Act that preempted the field, that the higher court in Ohio, followed the dissenting opinion of Justice Bell in this case and said they would not follow Justice Jones' opinion or the concurring opinion. Then, as the State of New Hampshire, Attorney General of New Hampshire some time here, so I'll only spend just one minute on that. But the Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire said, when a declaratory judgment, petition was filed to declare the -- their Act which is very similar to the Pennsylvania Act, void the enactment by Congress of the Smith Act, which defines and penalizes sedition and subversive activities against the governments of the United States, the States or any of their subdivisions, does not preclude state legislation on the same subject matter. Insofar as Pennsylvania against Nelson, a 104 A.2d 133, gives support to the proposition that it does, we do not adopt it. Two States have found for the opposite from what the learned opinion of Justice Jones, the -- the opposite conclusion that Justice Jones comes to. Now, just one -- two brief words about the opinion in the court below. It is -- it is seems to be what is bolstered by four main propositions. One is Section 4 Article IV of the Constitution. The other is the Hines-Davidowitz case which was decided by this Court not too long ago. The Gilbert-Gitlow and Whitney cases, which are distinguished a double jeopardy because after the conviction in this case, it is the truth. In fact, the man was prosecuted in the Federal District Court and they are likewise convicted. And also Justice Jones feels that they would be a tremendous hampering of the federal authorities. Now, as to Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution, it reads as follows, the United States shall not -- shall guarantee that every State in this union or republican form of government shall protect each of them against the invasion and on application of the legislature or the executive when the legislature cannot be convened against domestic violence. Learned Justice below says, federal preemption could hardly be more clearly indicated. Well, of course, as the famous case Luther against Borden holds, there is no invasion in -- threatened in this case. The United States shall guarantee a republican form of government shall protect each of them against invasion. There's no question about invasion and about and on application of the legislature or the executive against domestic violence. Well, it seems to me that it's a foregone conclusion if the legislature or the executive has to make an application to the Federal Government for assistance where there's domestic violence, certainly, it must be assumed that they're authorized to cope with it, themselves, until it gets out of hand. And I think that the Learned Justice below went quite for our appeal when he thought that that length, of some credence to the fact that the appeal had been preempted. Now, the Hines-Davidowitz case, that was the case that came up from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania too, that's relied on very heavily in the court below and it's relied upon by my friend most heavily, he says that there are two cases that governed this. Number one is the Hines against Davidowitz. But Hines against Davidowitz was an entirely different proposition. Hines against Davidowitz was enact that we had in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that compelled the registration of aliens. And there was a Federal Act that compelled the registration of aliens, and as this Court said, here is an all embracing far reaching integrated system for the registration of aliens. And it has an international application. We think that that is purely a national subject, a subject which Congress should be allowed alone to deal with and therefore, we feel that the field has been preempted. Now, with respect to that, Hines against Davidowitz has been absolutely limited to the facts and narrowed down Justice Frankfurter said in the case, which I've quoted on page 48 of my brief. In the Hines case, a federal system that the alien registration was held to supersede a state system of -- of registration, but there, we were dealing with the problem which had an impact on the general field of foreign relations. Here, we are dealing with the letter type of problem, which is the historic problem of whether or not the States can legislate with respect to public safety and order and the use of their streets and highways. And then it was distinguished by his Honor Justice -- Mr. Justice Douglas, in the Allen-Bradley Local case and said that they are the international relations aspect of the case, limited that case, (Inaudible) They should -- no one should think that the States had lost their right of police power in matters where there was not that implication. Now, I see have a bit few minutes left of my time. I've awarded 15 minutes of my time to my colleague to respond and answer after the respondent's attorney spoken. I just want to say that the four votings of the court below that enforcement by the States of their Sedition acts would interfere with the federal enforcement. It seemed to be absolutely unfounded. Two people in the United States have probably know more about that than any two other individuals or the Solicitor General and the Attorney General. And they both, one says unmistakably in his brief, that for 15 years, the State have operated alongside of the Federal Government in the enforcement of these Acts and that there's been no difficulty and that they've gone down through the stress of time of two wars. And that they have had no -- no difficulty at all and they think that the States should cooperate with the Federal Government. And he says that the assumption in the court below is absolutely unfounded. I just want to say one more word, we have the city police, we have the bureau police, and we have the township police, we have the sheriff, we have the right of any city executive to call upon the governor from Malaysia. We have all of the facilities for the enforcement.If there is a crime being hatched where there might be a great destruction of property, a great loss of life, the police are present to detect it. With our national government, we have no such facility. The FBI which is very efficient says itself, that's it's only an information gathering agency. It isn't spread through out the entire 48 States of the union. If Congress ever intended to take away from the States their right of self-preservation, certainly, they would have set up some kind of machinery to cope with the situation that they did not do. Now, with respect to the element of punishment on this case, it can be much more serious in some cases than it can in others. We are highly industrialized community to hatch out and -- and encourage people to overthrow the government of Pennsylvania or the United States by force and violence in the plans that we have in the Pittsburg area and the Philadelphia area, known as the Arsenal of Democracy might be far more serious than if it took place somewhere in the Black Hills of North Dakota. Therefore, a sentence in Pennsylvania were the seriousness of the crime could be felt and where effect of it would be a far more serious than with the elsewhere might call for a more serious sense. And certainly, there should be no uniformity in a matter of this kind.