b'History of Appointments to the Supreme Court\n[T h e m e m o ra n d u m w h ic h fo llo w s , p r e p a r e d b y th e O ffic e o f L e g a l C o u n s e l a t th e re q u e s t\no f th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l, s u r v e y s f o u r g e n e r a l a s p e c ts o f th e p ro c e s s o f a p p o in tin g\nJ u s tic e s o f th e S u p r e m e C o u r t: (1 ) th e q u a litie s P r e s id e n ts h a v e s o u g h t in S u p r e m e\nC o u r t n o m in e e s; (2 ) th e p ro c e s s o f r e c r u itin g a n d e v a lu a tin g p o te n tia l a p p o in te e s p r io r\nto n o m in a tio n ; (3 ) th e m a n n e r in w h ic h th e S e n a te fu lfills its re s p o n s ib ilitie s in th e\na p p o in tm e n t p ro c e s s ; a n d (4 ) th e r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e \'.\'io c e s s o f c h o o s in g a\nc a n d id a te a n d a s u c c e s s fu l c a n d i d a te \xe2\x80\x99s e v e n tu a l p e r f o r m a n c e o n th e C \'u r t. T h e m e m o \xc2\xad\nra n d u m p a y s s p e c ia l a tte n tio n to th e ro le s p la y e d in th e a p p o in tm e n t p r o c e s s b y th e\nA tto r n e y G e n e r a l a n d th e D e p a r tm e n t o f J u s tic e ]\n\nMarch 5, 1980\nM EM ORANDUM FOR T H E ATTORNEY G E N ER A L\nI. Introduction\nAspirants to the Supreme Court, unlike presidential, vice-presidential,\nand congressional candidates, are subject to no constitutional limitations\nregarding age, citizenship, or residency. No statute requires that Jus\xc2\xad\ntices even be lawyers, although every nominee so far has met this\ncriterion. Congress has considered bills to limit Supreme Court appoint\xc2\xad\nments either to persons under a particular age or to candidates with\nprior judicial experience; no such limitation has ever been enacted. The\nhistory of Supreme Court appointments is consequently a history of\npresidential discretion limited formally only by the Senate confirmation\nprocess, which also proceeds without direct constitutional guidance.\nIn response to your request, this Office has surveyed some of the vast\nliterature relevant to the history of Supreme Court appointments.1 We\nhave addressed four general questions: What qualities have Presidents\nsought in Supreme Court nominees? How are potential appointees re\xc2\xad\ncruited and evaluated prior to nomination? How does the Senate fulfill\nits responsibilities in the appointment process? Is there a predictable\nrelationship between the process of choosing a candidate and a success\xc2\xad\nful candidate\xe2\x80\x99s eventual performance on the Court? In surveying the\nhistory of nominations and appointments, we have paid special attention\n1\nSecondary sources are cited in footnotes by au th o r and page number; a bibliography indicating the\nfull citation for each source is appended to this m em orandum . W e found the most useful general\nreview o f the history o f Suprem e C ourt appointm ents to be H. A braham , Justices and Presidents: A\nPoliticalH isto ry o f A ppointm ents to the Suprem e C ourt (1974).\n\n457\n\n\x0cto the roles played in these processes by the Attorney General and the\nDepartment of Justice.\nNo one formula for choosing the \xe2\x80\x9cbest\xe2\x80\x9d Supreme Court Justice can\nbe deduced from a historical survey. Who are the best candidates with\nrespect to any particular vacancy will depend on a host of factors,\nincluding the President\xe2\x80\x99s political philosophy, his perceptions of the\nrole of the Court in American government, the crucial issues facing the\nnation at a given moment in history, and the Court\xe2\x80\x99s changing institu\xc2\xad\ntional needs. Neither can a Justice\xe2\x80\x99s post-appointment performance be\npredicted with entire confidence based on his pre-appointment career.\nThe uniqueness of the Court\xe2\x80\x99s institutional role, the wide range of vital\nquestions that the Justices adjudicate, and the need for each Justice to\ncollaborate with eight others in reaching what often are controversial\nresults, all necessarily affect any appointee\xe2\x80\x99s eventual record in the\ndecision of cases. The aim of this memorandum is consequently not to\nelaborate, in any definitive way, how a great Justice might now be\nchosen; its aim is to identify the range of issues of which the President\nat least ought to be aware in exercising his discretion, and which this\nDepartment should consider if it is to be helpful in the appointment\nprocess.\nII. The Presidents\xe2\x80\x99 Criteria\nUnder Article II, \xc2\xa7 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the President\n\xe2\x80\x9cshall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the\nSenate, shall appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court. . . .\xe2\x80\x9d All but\nfour Presidents\xe2\x80\x94the exceptions so far including President Carter\xe2\x80\x94have\nsuccessfully nominated at least one Supreme Court Justice. Presidents\nhave sometimes made their selection criteria explicit. George\nWashington, for example, insisted on support of the Constitution, distin\xc2\xad\nguished Revolutionary service, active political involvement, prior judi\xc2\xad\ncial experience, geographic \xe2\x80\x9csuitability,\xe2\x80\x9d and either a good general\nreputation or personal ties with the President himself.2 More often, the\ncriteria have been tacit and ad hoc. It is possible, however, based on\nthe history of, 104 successful Court appointments,3 to examine certain\nfactors that have weighed to some degree in all nominations.\nA. A bility and Character\n\nPresident Herbert Hoover asserted that his Supreme Court ap\xc2\xad\npointees were \xe2\x80\x9cchosen solely on the basis of character and mental\npower,\xe2\x80\x9d 4 and every President, in explaining his nominations publicly,\n2 A braham at 64.\n3 T h e 104 successful appointm ents include three successful \xe2\x80\x9c prom otions\xe2\x80\x99* o f A ssociate Justices to\nthe post o f C h ief Justice. T h e tola! num ber o f persons to have served so far in the C ourt is 101.\nA braham at 46-47.\n4 T e g e r at 46.\n\n458\n\n\x0chas cited ability and character among his criteria for selection. Some\nminimum of each is thus a sine qua non for a successful appointment.\nThe appropriate measure of \xe2\x80\x9cobjective\xe2\x80\x9d merit, however, especially re\xc2\xad\ngarding judicial ability, may vary with the needs of the country and of\nthe Court when a vacancy occurs. With respect to some appointments,\nthe Court\xe2\x80\x99s greatest need may be an exceptional intellectual leader, with\nor without extensive political or administrative experience. At other\ntimes, the Court may need a catalytic administrator or an effective\nadvocate more than it needs a truly brilliant thinker. An ideal candi\xc2\xad\ndate, of course, would be both intellectually gifted and politically\neffective; the balance of these talents is likely, however, to vary even\nwithin the pool of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s best candidates.\nBecause the number of capable individuals is much greater inevitably\nthan the number of places to be filled, few nominations have occurred\nin which a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s outstanding ability alone appears to have de\xc2\xad\ncided his nomination. There are, however, exceptions. Although Presi\xc2\xad\ndent Hoover wanted a \xe2\x80\x9cnon-controversial western Republican\xe2\x80\x9d to suc\xc2\xad\nceed Oliver Wendell Holmes,5 he was persuaded by a long list of labor\nand business leaders, scholars, and Senators that Chief Judge Benjamin\nN. Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals was the only fit\nsuccessor. The final straw breaking Hoover\xe2\x80\x99s resistance appears to have\nbeen the emphatic endorsement of Senator William E. Borah of Idaho,\nthe Republican chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who\nreportedly told Hoover, \xe2\x80\x9cCardozo belongs as much to Idaho as to New\nYork,\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9c[g]eography should no more bar the judge than the pres\xc2\xad\nence of two Virginians\xe2\x80\x94John Blair and Bushrod Washington\xe2\x80\x94should\nhave kept President Adams from naming John Marshall to be Chief\nJustice.\xe2\x80\x9d 6 When reminded that a Jewish Justice, Louis Brandeis, al\xc2\xad\nready sat on the Court, Borah said, \xe2\x80\x9cAnyone who raises the question of\nrace [sic] is unfit to advise you concerning so important a matter.\xe2\x80\x9d 7 A\nsimilar chorus of support induced President Roosevelt to appoint Felix\nFrankfurter as Cardozo\xe2\x80\x99s successor. Roosevelt, like Hoover, wanted a\nWesterner on the Court, although, had he found one to succeed\nCardozo, Frankfurter\xe2\x80\x94already a Roosevelt adviser\xe2\x80\x94likely would have\nreceived a subsequent Roosevelt nomination.\nNot only is objective merit rarely the decisive criterion, but some of\nthe nation\xe2\x80\x99s greatest Justices were apparently chosen without obvious\nprimary regard for their intellectual potential. Joseph Story, for exam\xc2\xad\nple, who probably ranks second only to John Marshall in his impact on\nAmerican law, was the fourth nomination submitted by President\nMadison for the seat after two confirmed appointees (Levi Lincoln and\nJohn Quincy Adams) had declined the position and a third nominee had\n* A braham at 191.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 A braham al 192.\n7 A braham al 192.\n\n459\n\n\x0cbeen rejected by the Senate. In the end, it is uncertain what led\nMadison to Story, although it is known that Story\xe2\x80\x99s uncle was a close\nfriend of the President.8\nConversely, some candidates whose pre-appointment careers prom\xc2\xad\nised considerable success based on objective merit performed with little\ndistinction once appointed. The clearest recent example is Charles Evan\nWhittaker, an outstanding commercial lawyer from Missouri, who had\nserved briefly on both the U.S. District Court and Court of Appeals,\nand who had won the strong support of Attorney General Brownell.\nPresident Eisenhower appointed W hittaker to the Supreme Court in\n1957; he resigned ^ years later with few significant Supreme Court\nopinions to his credit.9\nTo a President interested in demonstrated merit, prior judicial experi\xc2\xad\nence may appear a useful index. Fifty-eight of the 101 individuals to\nserve on the Supreme Court had served earlier on a state or on a lower\nfederal tribunal. This asset, in this century, appears to have appealed\nmore to Republican than to Democratic Presidents. Of the 23 individ\xc2\xad\nuals with prior judicial experience appointed to the Supreme Court\nsince 1900, only eight were appointed by Democrats, although, of the\n44 persons named to the Court in this century, Democrats have named\n18. The 43 persons to serve without prior judicial experience on the\nSupreme Court since its inception include John Marshall, Joseph Story,\nRoger Taney, Charles Evans Hughes, Louis Brandeis, Harlan Fiske\nStone (when appointed Associate Justice), Felix Frankfurter, William\nDouglas, Robert Jackson, and Earl W arren\xe2\x80\x94a list that clearly demon\xc2\xad\nstrates the absence of any necessary correlation between judicial experi\xc2\xad\nence and capacity for distinguished service.\nPresidents have not viewed judicial service as a prerequisite to nomi\xc2\xad\nnation. However, all but one of the 101 persons to sit on the Court\nreached the Court after careers in politics or public service of some\nsort.10 Although a record of judicial service may be helpful in facilitat\xc2\xad\ning an assessment of a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s performance as a legal thinker,\nPresidents appear historically to have been at least as concerned with a\nperson\xe2\x80\x99s demonstrated acquaintance with the nation\xe2\x80\x99s needs and public\nprocesses, and sustained prior exposure to the pressures of public life.\nSome history of functioning in a pressurized environment may help\nassure that a nominee\xe2\x80\x99s effectiveness and independence on the Court\n8 A braham at 79-81.\n9 A braham at 247-48.\n10 T h e one exception is G eo rg e Shiras, Jr.. a P ittsburgh co rp o rate law yer appointed to the C ourt in\n1892 by Benjamin H arrison. All five academ icians to reach the C ourt (four o f them appointed by\nF D R ) had considerable experience in public life in addition to their academ ic backgrounds. Fourteen\nA ttorneys G eneral have been nom inated to the C ourt. N ine w ere successfully appointed\xe2\x80\x94Taney,\nC lifford, M oody, M cK enna, M cR eynolds, Stone, Jackson, M urphy and C lark. T w o w ere rejected by\nthe Senate and tw o w ithdrew before confirm ation. O ne, Edw in M. Stanton, was confirm ed, but died\nbefore taking his seat. A braham at 52; Schm idhauser at 82-83.\n\n460\n\n\x0cwill not be overcome by public criticism or the magnitude of the issues\nthat the Court confronts.\nB. Political and L egal Philosophy\n\nBecause intellect is rarely the sole determinant of a Supreme Court\nnomination, and because most Presidents have attached great impor\xc2\xad\ntance to the Supreme Court\xe2\x80\x99s role in legitimating particular policies or\nnational goals, the acceptability of a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s personal philosophy is\noften another sine qua non for nomination. As with \xe2\x80\x9cmerit,\xe2\x80\x9d however,\nwhat constitutes an acceptable philosophy may depend on the times, on\nthe President\xe2\x80\x99s attitude towards the Court, and on a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s fitness\nin other respects. For example, political considerations, such as reward\xc2\xad\ning partisan activity or defusing potential political opposition, may\nargue in favor of a particular nomination, although the appointing\nPresident could have identified a more personally compatible choice. In\nthe case of Earl Warren, nominated by President Eisenhower for the\nChief Justiceship in 1953, the President was likely impressed by\nWarren\xe2\x80\x99s political and administrative experience and skill, his positions\non particular issues (such as the 1937 Court-packing bill and the 1952\nsteel seizure case), and his campaign service both to Eisenhower and to\nThomas E. Dewey before him. However, Warren was also obstructing\nthe takeover of California Republican politics by more partisan leader\xc2\xad\nship, including Vice-President Nixon. Perhaps, had it not been for this\nlast factor, Eisenhower would have turned to Governor Dewey or to\nChief Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court for the\nvacant post.11 In any event, Eisenhower did not know W arren\xe2\x80\x99s philos\xc2\xad\nophy well (he sent Attorney General Brownell to interview him before\nthe nomination), and disagreed with the philosophy eventually mani\xc2\xad\nfested in Warren\xe2\x80\x99s decisions.\nAt particular times in history, the importance of a single issue to the\nnation\xe2\x80\x99s welfare or to a President\xe2\x80\x99s program has seemed so great that a\ncandidate\xe2\x80\x99s position on that issue, rather than his philosophy as a whole,\nbecame the litmus test of his acceptability. Obvious examples include\nthe cause of Unionism under Lincoln, the constitutionality of green\xc2\xad\nbacks as legal tender under Grant, and the legitimacy of extensive\ngovernment regulation under Franklin Roosevelt. The single-issue test,\nhowever, hardly guarantees a particular justice\xe2\x80\x99s pattern of thought.\nFor example, the fervent antitrust position of Attorney General James\nClark McReynolds undoubtedly recommended the idea of his nomina\xc2\xad\ntion highly to President Wilson. However, once on the Court,\nMcReynolds proved to be an unabashed conservative, and virtually all\nof his other positions were opposed to Wilsonian prpgressivism.\n11 A braham at 235-37.\n\n461\n\n\x0cConsequently, those Presidents most deeply interested in appointing\npolitically compatible Justices have focused neither on single-issue posi\xc2\xad\ntions, nor on partisan identification, but on the overall pattern of a\ncandidate\xe2\x80\x99s values and opinions. As explained by Theodore Roosevelt\nto Senator Lodge, in a much-quoted 1906 letter discussing the potential\nappointment of Justice Lurton: \xe2\x80\x9c [T]he nominal politics of the man has\nnothing to do with his actions on the bench. His real politics are all\nimportant.\xe2\x80\x9d 12\nThe clearest recent expression of this approach to the selection of\nSupreme Court justices was offered by Presidential candidate Nixon, in\ndiscussing what he would do to replace Chief Justice Warren:\nThe President cannot and should not control the decisions\nof the Supreme Court. . . . There are two important\nthings I would consider in selecting a replacement to the\nCourt. First, since I believe in a strict interpretation of the\nSupreme Court\xe2\x80\x99s role, I would appoint a man of similar\nphilosophical persuasion. Second, recent Court decisions\nhave tended to weaken the peace forces as against the\ncriminal forces in this country. I would, therefore, want\nto select a man who was thoroughly experienced . . . in\nthe criminal laws and its [sic] problems.13\nNixon said he wanted:\nstrict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting\nand not making law. They would see themselves as care\xc2\xad\ntakers of the Constitution and . . . not super-legislators\nwith a free hand to impose their social and political view\xc2\xad\npoints on the American people.14\nWhen they are measured against these standards, there is no reason\nto think that, on balance, Nixon would be disappointed with his ap\xc2\xad\npointees\xe2\x80\x99 performances on the Court. The most obvious exception may\nbe Justice Blackmun\xe2\x80\x99s decision in the abortion cases, a decision no one\ncould likely have anticipated.15 Chief Justice Burger also has written or\njoined in strong pro-integration decisions.\nOne reason why a nominee\xe2\x80\x99s performance may eventually surprise\nthe President who appointed him is the potential confusion, in the\nrecruitment process, between a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s political and judicial phi\xc2\xad\nlosophies. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, wanted ardent New Deal\nsupporters on the Court. One such clear supporter was Felix Frank\xc2\xad\n12 Schubert at 40.\n, 3 A shby at 366, (quoting Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) at 130).\n14 id.16\nIt should also be noted that N ixon\'s ability to appoint a personally com patible Justice w as most\nsharply curtailed by the time he nom inated Justice Blackmun, because the failure o f the H aynsw orth\nand C arsw ell nom inations m ade it politically necessary to locate a noncontroversia) m oderate.\nA braham at 9.\n\n462\n\n\x0cfurter. The central theme, however, of Justice Frankfurter\xe2\x80\x99s judicial\nphilosophy proved to be judicial restraint. He believed that the consti\xc2\xad\ntutional distribution of powers among the branches of the federal\ngovenment and between the federal and state governments required the\nCourt to avoid decisions that he deemed merely the imposition of its\nown value choices on political authorities who were constitutionally\nempowered to decide the same value questions differently. This defer\xc2\xad\nence to the elected branches enabled Frankfurter, as a Justice, fully to\nsupport the New Deal legislative program. However, Frankfurter\xe2\x80\x99s\nrecord in interpreting the Bill of Rights would appear far less libertar\xc2\xad\nian than that of other FDR appointees, especially Douglas, Black, and\nMurphy, despite similar personal philosophies, because his judicial phi\xc2\xad\nlosophy was so much less expansive.\nIn this vein, it should especially be noted that shorthand labels for\ncandidates\xe2\x80\x99 philosophies can be misleading. President Nixon advocated\n\xe2\x80\x9cstrict constructionism,\xe2\x80\x9d but appointed at least one Justice, William\nRehnquist, whose clear views of the constitutionally mandated distribu\xc2\xad\ntion of powers, like most theories on the subject, is not compelled\neither by the language of the Constitution or by judicial precedent. For\nthis reason, Rehnquist, though politically conservative, has been viewed\nby some as a judicial activist.16 Conversely, Hugo Black, generally\nconsidered one of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s greatest liberal jurists, reached strongly\nlibertarian results through \xe2\x80\x9cstrict construction\xe2\x80\x9d of the First Amend\xc2\xad\nment. 17\nA President should also recognize, if his aim is to affect the general\ndirection of Court decisions, that his purpose can not always be best\naccomplished by an intellectually gifted person adhering unwaveringly\nto the President\xe2\x80\x99s or to any other doctrinaire point of view .18 Critical\nto any Justice\xe2\x80\x99s potential influence is his ability to function effectively\nin a collegial decisionmaking context. Because a Supreme Court Justice\nis wedded to his colleagues for life, a gift for diplomacy, including a\nwillingness to compromise when necessary, will make his presence\nmore tolerable and his eventual contributions more persuasive. The\nindicia of political acceptability cannot be viewed wholly apart from\nthe criteria of ability. A record of public or civic service; a strong,\nconfident, and tolerant personality; and a mature temperament joined\nwith legal ability and intellect mark not only the gifted potential judge,\nbut also the effective institutional advocate.\n\n16 See generally Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 H arv. L. Rev. 293 (1976).\n17 Rubin, Judicial Review in the United States, 40 La. L. Rev. 67, 77 (1979).\n18 F o r a highly elaborate, m athem atically based theory for guiding Presidents in the selection of\nJustices w ho will influence C ourt dispositions, see S. T eger, Presidential Strategy fo r the Appointm ent o f\nSupreme Court Justices (1976) (unpublished U. o f R ochester Ph.D . thesis. L ibrary o f Congress).\n\n463\n\n\x0cC. E nhancing the R epresentativeness o f the C ou rt\n\nIn narrowing the pool of potential nominees, Presidents have fre\xc2\xad\nquently considered what category of individuals might enhance public\nperceptions of the \xe2\x80\x9crepresentativeness\xe2\x80\x9d of the Court. The primary\nmeasure of representativeness, as pursued by the Presidents, has been\ngeographical. Although the Constitution does not require regional bal\xc2\xad\nance, a desire for it underlies, in part, the constitutional designation of\nthe President to nominate Supreme Court Justices. It is recorded that,\nduring the debate on this provision, James Madison urged the Constitu\xc2\xad\ntional Convention, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Executive magistrate would be considered as a\nnational officer, acting for and equally sympathizing with every part of\nthe United States.\xe2\x80\x9d 19 In a variety of constitutional provisions, the\nFramers clearly sought to avoid sectional domination of the Govern\xc2\xad\nment, and it might be argued that, in seeking geographical balance on\nthe Court, a President is respecting a value implicit in our constitutional\nsystem.\nGeographic balance was most clearly a presidential consideration\nwith respect to Supreme Court appointments through the late 19th\ncentury. In selecting the original members of the Court, George Wash\xc2\xad\nington chose representatives of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachu\xc2\xad\nsetts, Virginia, and South Carolina. As the country moved westward,\neach President, starting with Jefferson, began to seek seats first for\nJustices from states west of the Alleghenies, then from west of the\nMississippi, and finally, with Lincoln\xe2\x80\x99s appointment of Stephen J. Field\nof California, from the Far West. Andrew Jackson, who made seven\nnominations, tried scrupulously to have represented each circuit in the\nnation\xe2\x80\x99s growing judicial system. The balance of Northerners and\nSoutherners was also of obvious political significance, both before and\nafter the Civil War. Part of President Hayes\xe2\x80\x99 program of\npostreconstruction reconciliation was the appointment of a Southerner\n(although Northern-born), William Woods, to the Court in 1880. The\nsymbolism was consummated in 1887 by President Cleveland\xe2\x80\x99s appoint\xc2\xad\nment of Lucius Q. C. Lamar, the first \xe2\x80\x9creal\xe2\x80\x9d Southerner to reach the\nCourt since 1853, and a former member of both the Confederate Army\nand the government of the Confederacy.20\nIn this century, although remaining of some concern, the emphasis on\nregionalism has been less obvious. Some Presidents have more or less\ndisavowed its importance. Theodore Roosevelt wrote, \xe2\x80\x9cI have grown\nto feel, most emphatically, that the Supreme Court is a matter of too\ngreat importance to me to pay heed to where a man comes from.\xe2\x80\x9d 21\n19 Pad o v er at 405.\n20 A braham at 131.\n21 A braham at 146.\n\n464\n\n\x0cRoosevelt appointed, within a 4-year period, two Justices from Massa\xc2\xad\nchusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes and William H. Moody. A similar\n\xe2\x80\x9cimbalance\xe2\x80\x9d occurred under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, who\nappointed three New York Justices\xe2\x80\x94Chief Justice Hughes and Associ\xc2\xad\nate Justices Stone and Cardozo. This imbalance, lasting 8 years, oc\xc2\xad\ncurred notwithstanding Hoover\xe2\x80\x99s reluctance, before picking Cardozo,\nto choose another New Yorker for the Court.\nThe Supreme Court currently includes two Minnesotans (both ap\xc2\xad\npointed by Nixon), and one Justice each from New Jersey, Ohio,\nColorado, Maryland,22 Virginia, Arizona, and Illinois. The most recent\nNew Englander to serve on the Court was Chief Justice Stone, who\ndied in 1946. The most recent representative pf the Deep South was\nHugo Black, who died in 1971, although in selecting Justice Powell to\nsucceed Black, President Nixon emphasized Powell\xe2\x80\x99s southern origins.\nAlthough not explicitly contemplated during the constitutional de\xc2\xad\nbates, Presidents, for political reasons or otherwise, have also sought\n\xe2\x80\x9cbalance\xe2\x80\x9d with respect to other criteria as well: partisan affiliation,\nreligion, and, most recently, race. There continue to be strong pressures\nto appoint a woman Justice.\nIt is arguable that such considerations as race, religion, ethnicity, or\nsex are offensive criteria in the choice of Justices, because they distract\nfrom the idea of simply choosing the \xe2\x80\x9cbest\xe2\x80\x9d persons for the Court or\nfrom the constitutional grant of total discretion to the nominating\nPresident. It is also arguable, however, that diversity on the Court\nboosts public confidence in the legitimacy of the Court\xe2\x80\x99s decisions. In\naddition, presidential concerns for diversity may properly affirm egali\xc2\xad\ntarian ideals in the society at large and the value of diversity itself.\nAs the record now stands, of the 101 people to serve on the Court,\nall have been men, 100 have been white, 95 have been of Anglo-Saxon\ndescent, 95 have been native-born, and almost all have been Protes\xc2\xad\ntant.23 Roger Taney, a Catholic and the first non-Protestant appointed,\nserved from 1836 to 1864. Thereafter, one seat on the Court was held\nby a Catholic from 1894 to the present, except for a 7-year period\nbetween 1949 and 1956.24 Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish Justice, was\nappointed in 1916. At least one seat on the Court between 1916 and\n1969 was held by a Justice who was Jewish.25 Thus, except for a\npattern of regional diversity, the history of the Court reveals a largely\nhomogeneous membership when measured according to the most obvi\xc2\xad\nous criteria of social background.\n22 T hough appointed from N ew York, Justice M arshall w as b o m and started his legal c aree r in\nBaltimore. A shby at 320-26.\n23 A braham at 53.\n24 This g roup includes Justices E. D. W hite, M cK enna, Butler, M urphy, and Brennan. A braham at\n56-57.\n25 This group includes Justices C ardozo, Frankfurter, and G oldberg. A braham at 58.\n\n465\n\n\x0cD. O th er C riteria\n\nAbility, character, and philosophical or representative suitability\nhardly exhaust the list of criteria evident in the nominations made to\nthe Court thus far. Age and health, of course, have played major parts.\nThe appointment of a younger person to the Court may help assure a\nnew Justice\xe2\x80\x99s continued influence over a long period, or at least help\nassure the Court of the continued aid of a physically vigorous individ\xc2\xad\nual. In one case, perhaps, a President used old age as a criterion.\nWilliam Howard Taft\xe2\x80\x99s appointment in 1910 of the 66-year-old Edward\nD. White to be Chief Justice may have been motivated, in part, by\nTaft\xe2\x80\x99s desire to assure the subsequent occurrence of a vacancy that he\nhimself could assume after his Presidency.26\nOther considerations in the choice of nominees may include friend\xc2\xad\nship, the rewarding of political partisanship or of particular public\nservice, the effective elimination of a political opponent, placating po\xc2\xad\nlitical opposition or securing political support. None of these alone has\nlikely secured the position of a Supreme Court Justice; however, each\nhas been among the motivations underlying the selection of particular\nnominees from pools of otherwise qualified persons.\nThe presence of ulterior motives in the nominating process or a close\nassociation between a nominee and the appointing President of course\nneed not correlate with the candidate\xe2\x80\x99s unsuitability on other grounds.\nAmong the justices appointed by the Presidents of whom they were\nclose personal or political allies are Roger Taney (Jackson), Stephen\nField (Lincoln), Harlan Fiske Stone (Coolidge), and Felix Frankfurter\n(FDR), all of whom would have qualified under any set of criteria.\nHowever, although no clear formula exists for the selection of a great\nfuture Justice or one set formula to identify a fit nominee, the Presi\xc2\xad\ndent\xe2\x80\x99s thinking perhaps may usefully be guided by a set of general\nprinciples. With respect to criteria closely related to a person\xe2\x80\x99s likely\nperformance on the Court, some high degree of ability, character,\nhealth, and philosophical compatibility ought to be viewed as a set of\nthreshold requirements. Having identified a pool of qualified finalists,\nthe President could then\xe2\x80\x94without undermining public confidence in his\nchoice\xe2\x80\x94consider other criteria, e.g., geographic suitability, background\n(sex, race), or rewarding public service, that might legitimately play a\npart in his ultimate selection. To the extent his criteria might be consid\xc2\xad\nered personal or political favoritism, he should be all the more careful\nthat his choice be defensible when measured against other candidates\nand against criteria related to likely performance. Though no President\ncan guarantee greatness in his appointees, he can likely avoid serious\ndisappointment by soliciting a variety of suggestions for any vacancy,\nevaluating candidates across a wide range of criteria, and, in analyzing\n26 A braham at 159.\n\n466\n\n\x0chis personal preferences, bearing in mind the Court\xe2\x80\x99s needs and public\nperceptions of the Court.27\nIII. Identification and Evaluation of Nominees\nBecause presidential acquaintance and selection criteria rarely limit\nthe pool of eligible candidates for the Supreme Court to one, Presidents\nordinarily rely to some degree on the assistance and advice of others in\nchoosing their nominees. Analytically, such assistance may be viewed\nas coming in two stages: first, the identification of suitable candidates\nfor the Court; second, the more exacting evaluation of the serious\ncontenders.\nA. Identification o f Potential Nominees\n\nPotential sources of information concerning suitable candidates are\nalmost endless. Solicited or unsolicited suggestions may come from the\nPresident\xe2\x80\x99s advisers, both official and unofficial, as well as from Mem\xc2\xad\nbers of Congress, sitting members of the judiciary, legal scholars, state\nbar representatives, concerned private citizens and candidates them\xc2\xad\nselves.\nSome instances are known in which Congress pilayed a strong role,\ninvited or otherwise, in the candidate identification process. In perhaps\nthe most dramatic instance, Thomas Jefferson, in his search for a\nSupreme Court Justice to come from west of the Appalachians, asked\neach Member of Congress to suggest two names. He selected Thomas\nTodd of Kentucky, the one person named as first or second choice by\nevery Member of Congress from the new Seventh Circuit, which com\xc2\xad\nprised Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Later in the 19th century,\nCongress mounted notable, though uninvited campaigns for President\nLincoln\xe2\x80\x99s 1862 nomination of Samuel M iller28 and for President\nGrant\xe2\x80\x99s 1869 nomination of Edwin M. Stanton.29 Although these are\nexceptional examples of congressional activism, suggestions by individ\xc2\xad\nual Members of Congress, particularly from the leadership, are un\xc2\xad\ndoubtedly common.\nSuggestions from sitting judges or Justices may also be expected.\nIndeed, in one case, the entire incumbent Supreme Court wrote to the\nPresident to urge the nomination of a particular candidate: John Camp\xc2\xad\nbell of Alabama, who was nominated for the Court in 1853 by Presi\xc2\xad\n27 A President should also be aw are o f the extent to w hich an appointm ent may, as a m atter o f\npolitical fact, \xe2\x80\x9cchange the law.\'* T h e re are issues, such as federalism, affirm ative action, the death\npenalty, abortion rights, and school desegregation, on w hich law yers and political scientists perceive\nthe current C ourt in flux. T h e balance o f C o u rt opinion on issues in these areas may be affected by a\nnew Justice, although Presidents typically have not been successful in making new law through\nindividual appointm ents. This is attributable not only to the unpredictability o f an individual\'s view s\nand behavior, discussed above, but also to the Justices\' ordinary adherence to precedent, by w hich\nmost Justices consider them selves guided, if not bound.\n28 Schubert at 41-44.\n20 A braham at 118.\n\n467\n\n\x0cdent Pierce.30 Chief Justices may more routinely offer their views on\nnominations. The most active campaigner among Chief Justices was\nlikely William Howard Taft. Taft had appointed six men to the Court\nduring his tenure as President, and appears to have been principally\nresponsible for selecting three nominees, including himself as Chief\nJustice, for President Harding.31 More recently, Chief Justice Burger is\nknown at least to have supported the nominations of Associate Justices\nBlackmun and Powell.32\nWhere Presidents have turned to Cabinet officers for advice, it is\ncommon for the Attorney General to play a major role both in suggest\xc2\xad\ning and in evaluating nominees. George Washington initiated the prac\xc2\xad\ntice by asking Edmond Randolph to prepare a list of candidates for the\nbench.33 In recent decades, Attorneys General Cummings and Biddle\n(for FDR), Brownell (for Eisenhower), Robert Kennedy (for John\nKennedy), Mitchell (for Nixon), and Levi (for Ford) all performed\nsignificant \xe2\x80\x9cscreening\xe2\x80\x9d functions during the nominations process. How\xc2\xad\never, just as no legal provision limits presidential criteria for candidate\nselection, there are no formal limitations or requirements binding the\nPresident to any particular system of identifying Supreme Court candi\xc2\xad\ndates.34\nB. Evaluation o f Nominees (Herein, the Roles o f the Departm ent o f Justice\nand o f the American Bar Association)\n\nWhoever is responsible for identifying plausible candidates, the func\xc2\xad\ntion remains of evaluating the serious contenders according to the\nPresident\xe2\x80\x99s criteria. In 1789, when the Judiciary Act established a\nfederal bench comprising 19 judges, the evaluation process could rely\nwith some success on the personal knowledge of the President and of\nhis close advisers. Even for a nine-member Supreme Court, however,\nthis is no longer a wholly satisfactory option. The far greater pool of\navailable talent today and the intensity of public scrutiny to which\nnominees are currently subjected make it desirable to follow a more\nrigorous and dependable information-gathering process.\nA tradition is now well established of active Attorney General and\nDepartment of Justice participation in the process of evaluating Su\xc2\xad\npreme Court nominees. The exact pattern of participation has varied\nwith different Presidents. The Attorney General, with whatever De\xc2\xad\n30 A braham at 104.\n31 A braham at 21, 155.\n32 W oodw ard and A rm strong at 87, 160.\n33 R ogers at 38.\n34 F o r a time, in the early 19th century, the D epartm ent o f Stale w as assigned the function of\noffering the President recom m endations concerning all appointm ents. Even after A ttorney G eneral\nC ushing in 1853 reassumed the assignment for his office w ith respect to judicial appointm ents,\nA tto rn ey G eneral Bates, under Lincoln, was still able to com plain that the Secretary o f the T reasury\nhad been instrum ental in making many appointm ents \xe2\x80\x9cw ithout any reference to legal and judicial\nqualifications." R ogers at 39.\n\n468\n\n\x0cpartment assistance he seeks, may initiate a study of potential nominees.\nThe Department also plays a special role in marshalling the recommen\xc2\xad\ndations of private groups and individuals, most notably\xe2\x80\x94since the Ei\xc2\xad\nsenhower Administration\xe2\x80\x94of the American Bar Association (ABA)\nStanding Committee on Federal Judiciary (the ABA Committee).\nThe practice of soliciting formal ABA views on Supreme Court\nnominations began with President Eisenhower\xe2\x80\x99s 1956 nomination of\nJudge William J. Brennan, Jr. to replace Justice Minton. The President\nhad assigned to Attorney General Brownell and the Department of\nJustice the task of recommending a nominee to meet four specific\ncriteria: an exemplary personal and professional reputation for legal and\ncommunity leadership; good health; relative youth; and ABA \xe2\x80\x9crecogni\xc2\xad\ntion.\xe2\x80\x9d He also expressed a preference for giving most serious consider\xc2\xad\nation to the promotion of an outstanding lower court judge.35\nBrownell, to whom Judge Brennan was strongly recommended by New\njersey\xe2\x80\x99s Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the New Jersey Bar Association, the\nAmerican Judicature Society, and a host of other organizations,36 sub\xc2\xad\nmitted Brennan\xe2\x80\x99s name to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a fullfield investigation and to the ABA Committee for its assessment of\nprofessional qualifications. The results of the ABA and FBI investiga\xc2\xad\ntions were presented to the Attorney General for his consideration and\neventual review with the President.37\nFBI full-field checks on proposed nominees are routine. Since the\nBrennan appointment, however, the mode of ABA input has varied\nfrom nomination to nomination. Through the Johnson Administration,\nit was typical practice to afford the ABA a very brief investigation\nperiod prior to the announcement of a nomination. The resulting time\npressure apparently made it difficult for the ABA to rely successfully,\nin its view, on any precise system of ranking nominees. For example,\nwith Justice Goldberg\xe2\x80\x99s nomination in 1962, the Committee decided to\nabandon any statement seeming to rank or quantify the nominee\xe2\x80\x99s\nsuitability, and instead offered the statement that the nominee was\n\xe2\x80\x9chighly acceptable from the point of view of professional qualifica\xc2\xad\ntions.\xe2\x80\x9d 38\nFor undisclosed reasons, President Nixon abandoned the practice of\nconsulting the ABA prior to announcing his nominees, a decision that,\nwith respect to the President\xe2\x80\x99s attempts to find a successor to Justice\nFortas, seemingly contributed to controversial results both for the\nPresident and for the ABA. The ABA Committee, like the general\npublic, learned of the Nixon nominations only from the President\xe2\x80\x99s\nannouncements. With the invitation of the Senate Judiciary Committee,\n35 R ogers at 39-40; A braham at 235.\n36 A braham at 245.\n37 R ogers at 40.\n38 Walsh at 556.\n\n469\n\n\x0cthe ABA Committee first reviewed the qualifications of Judge Clement\nF. Haynsworth, Jr., the first Nixon nominee to the Fortas seat. The\nCommittee unanimously found Haynsworth \xe2\x80\x9chighly qualified\xe2\x80\x9d for the\npost, a conclusion that it later ratified only 8-4 after public disclosures\nduring the confirmation process indicated possible insensitivity on\nJudge Haynsworth\xe2\x80\x99s part to financial conflicts of interest.\nWhen the Senate defeated the Haynsworth nomination, President\nNixon, acting again on the recommendation of Attorney General\nMitchell, nominated Judge G. Harrold Carswell, a former U.S. district\njudge in the Northern District of Florida who had recently been ap\xc2\xad\npointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mitchell was\nreported to have said of Carswell, \xe2\x80\x9cHe is almost too good to be\ntrue.\xe2\x80\x9d 39 Sensitized by the Haynsworth debate and apparently hoping\nto avoid dissent on the degree of a nominee\xe2\x80\x99s suitability, the ABA\nCommittee, in assessing Carswell\xe2\x80\x99s background, reverted to a \xe2\x80\x9cqualified\xe2\x80\x9d/ \xe2\x80\x9cnot qualified\xe2\x80\x9d system of evaluation, and reported Carswell\n\xe2\x80\x9cqualified.\xe2\x80\x9d When Carswell, during the confirmation process, was at\xc2\xad\ntacked for mediocre judicial talent and hostility to civil rights, and\nultimately defeated, the prestige o f the ABA also suffered, although\nABA Committee Chairman Lawrence E. Walsh defended the Commit\xc2\xad\ntee\xe2\x80\x99s assessment in light of its investigation into Carswell\xe2\x80\x99s performance\non the Fifth Circuit.40\nPresident Nixon again did not consult the ABA Committee before\nannouncing his third nominee to the Fortas seat, Judge Harry A.\nBlackmun of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Chief\nJustice Burger supported Blackmun\xe2\x80\x99s nomination, and the candidate\nwas interviewed by Attorney General Mitchell and the Assistant A ttor\xc2\xad\nneys General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Tax\nDivision.41 The ABA Committee again conducted a post-announce\xc2\xad\nment evaluation. It adopted a \xe2\x80\x9cnot qualified\xe2\x80\x9d/ \xe2\x80\x9cnot opposed\xe2\x80\x9d/ \xe2\x80\x9cmeets\nhigh standards of integrity, judicial temperament, and professional com\xc2\xad\npetence\xe2\x80\x9d system of ranking, seeking to avoid the appearance of a\nplenary endorsement for a merely acceptable candidate and emphasiz\xc2\xad\ning the assertedly nonideological character of its endorsement for a\nhighly qualified candidate.42 The ABA Committee turned in its most\nextensive report ever on a Supreme Court nominee for Judge\nBlackmun, finding that he met \xe2\x80\x9chigh standards of integrity, judicial\ntemperament, and professional competence.\xe2\x80\x9d 43 The Senate unani\xc2\xad\nmously confirmed the Blackmun nomination on May 12, 1970.\nThese events, however, did not conclude the Nixon Administration\xe2\x80\x99s\nhistory o f difficulties with the ABA. In September, 1971, Justices Black\n38\n40\n41\n\xe2\x96\xa0\xc2\xab\n\xc2\xab\n\nA braham at 6.\nW alsh at 556-57.\nW o o d w ard and A rm strong at 86.\nW alsh at 560.\nW alsh at 560.\n\n470\n\n\x0cand Harlan resigned, leaving the President the task of replacing two of\nthe Court\xe2\x80\x99s most highly esteemed members. Attorney General Mitchell\nhad written in July, 1970, to ABA Committee Chairman Walsh that the\nAdministration would henceforth submit lists of Supreme Court candi\xc2\xad\ndates to the Committee for its evaluation prior to nomination, an\nannouncement that won high acclaim in light of the ABA\xe2\x80\x99s rigorous\nwork on the Blackmun nomination.44 The President\xe2\x80\x99s first suggested\ncandidate was Rep. Richard H. Poff of Virginia, who received the\nCommittee\xe2\x80\x99s highest recommendation, but the President withdrew his\nname from consideration when the press reported his past anti-civil\nrights statements.\nThe Administration\xe2\x80\x99s next submission was a list of six names, includ\xc2\xad\ning California Court of Appeals Judge Mildred Lillie, Arkansas munici\xc2\xad\npal bond lawyer Herschel H. Friday, D.C. Superior Court Judge Sylvia\nBacon, Sen. Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, and Judges Charles\nClark and Paul H. Roney of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth\nCircuit. The first two were the President\xe2\x80\x99s top choices\xe2\x80\x94Mr. Friday\nwas a close friend of Attorney General Mitchell and had been recom\xc2\xad\nmended by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun\xe2\x80\x94and the Com\xc2\xad\nmittee devoted almost all its investigative work to them.45 The A ttor\xc2\xad\nney General had recommended the submission of their names notwith\xc2\xad\nstanding reservations expressed by White House Counsel John Dean\nand Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist concerning their judicial\nexperience and lack of constitutional law background.46 The results\nwere a unanimous vote of \xe2\x80\x9cnot qualified\xe2\x80\x9d for Judge Lillie and a 6-6 tie\nbetween \xe2\x80\x9cnot qualified\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cnot opposed\xe2\x80\x9d for Mr. Friday. News of\nthe ABA actions reached the press within hours of its report to the\nAttorney General; the ABA urged the President to \xe2\x80\x9cadd some people\nwith stature\xe2\x80\x9d to his list.47 The Administration informed the ABA in a\nletter from the Attorney General to Chairman Walsh that it could no\nlonger rely on the confidentiality of the Committee, and would return\nto its practice of submitting nominations directly to the Senate.48\nAccording to two commentators, Attorney General Mitchell acted\nprior to the ABA Committee\xe2\x80\x99s formal vote to solicit the acceptance by\nanother candidate, former ABA president Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of his\nnomination to the Black seat.49 Mitchell and Deputy Attorney General\nKleindienst recommended to the President his eventual nominee for the\nHarlan seat, Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist.50 Subsequent to the\n44 A braham at 28.\n45 A braham at 10,\n46 W oodw ard and\n47 A braham at 10.\n49 A braham at 30.\n49 W oodw ard and\n50 W oodw ard and\n\n29.\nA rm strong at 159.\n\nA rm strong at 160.\nA rm strong at 161.\n\n471\n\n\x0cPresident\xe2\x80\x99s announcement of his choices, the ABA Committee voted\nunanimously that Powell met \xe2\x80\x9chigh standards of integrity, judicial tem\xc2\xad\nperament, and professional competence.\xe2\x80\x9d Eight members of the Com\xc2\xad\nmittee voted the same endorsement of Rehnquist, with four voting \xe2\x80\x9cnot\nopposed.\xe2\x80\x9d Powell was confirmed by the Senate almost immediately,\nand Rehnquist, within several weeks.\nIn contrast to this stormy history, the Department of Justice and the\nABA enjoyed a smooth relationship during the process of evaluating\ncandidates in 1975 to succeed Justice William O. Douglas. President\nFord and Attorney General Levi returned to the practice of submitting\nnames to the Committee for its evaluation prior to nomination. On the\nday of Douglas\xe2\x80\x99 retirement, Levi submitted a list of candidates to the\nABA Committee.51 The Committee unanimously gave Levi\xe2\x80\x99s first\nchoice, Judge John Paul Stevens of Chicago, its highest rating. Judge\nStevens was subsequently nominated and confirmed without difficulty.\nThese events underscore significant questions of how best to make\nuse of the assistance and resources of private parties in the evaluation of\nSupreme Court candidates and, at the same time, maintain the full\nscope of presidential discretion that the Constitution provides for the\nnomination of Supreme Court Justices. ABA assistance can undoubt\xc2\xad\nedly be helpful in the evaluation of Supreme Court candidates, al\xc2\xad\nthough how best to accomplish its role has itself been a subject of long\ndebate by the ABA Committee. The Committee describes its function\nas limited to an examination of \xe2\x80\x9cprofessional competence, judicial tem\xc2\xad\nperament, and integrity,\xe2\x80\x9d 52 about which it is undoubtedly able to\nexpress an educated point of view. As time permits, the Committee\xe2\x80\x99s\ninvestigation includes interviews with judges, scholars, lawyers, public\nofficials, and other parties likely to have information regarding a nomi\xc2\xad\nnee\xe2\x80\x99s qualifications, plus a review of the nominee\xe2\x80\x99s writings by teams of\nlaw school professors and practicing lawyers. The ABA Committee\xe2\x80\x99s\nconclusions based on this kind of thorough study may be a useful guide\nto the President or his advisers in applying the President\xe2\x80\x99s criteria\nduring the nomination process.\nHowever, extensive ABA input, especially before nomination, may\nlead to criticism that an organization that is not responsible to any\npublic political process is exercising undue influence in the presidential\nselection of nominees.53 The ABA Committee currently comprises 14\nmembers\xe2\x80\x94one member at-large and one practicing lawyer from each of\nthe geographic areas covered by the 11 judicial circuits, except for the\nFifth and Ninth, which areas\xe2\x80\x94because of their size\xe2\x80\x94have two mem\xc2\xad\nbers each. There can be no assurance, however, that it fully represents\nthe American public, or even the American bar, given that nearly half\nM A m erican Bar A ssociation at 2.\n52 A m erican Bar A ssociation at 2.\n53 A braham ait 23; G rossm an at 212-15; M urphy and P ritchett at 76-77; Schm idhauser at 28-33.\n\n472\n\n\x0cthe lawyers in the United States do not belong to the ABA. Neither is\nthere any government control over the exhaustiveness of its survey or\nthe objectivity of its evaluation. Though consultation with the ABA\nprior to nomination may confer advantages in the evaluation process, it\nmay risk the public\xe2\x80\x99s perception that the selection process for the least\npolitically accountable branch of government is itself being removed a\nstep from public accountability.54\nWhat is not open to question is that, whatever sources are consulted\nprior to nomination, the pre-nomination investigation of any nominee\nshould be deep, broad, and disinterested enough to assure an informed\nevaluation of the nominee\xe2\x80\x99s professional qualifications, temperament,\nhealth, and integrity. So long as the goals of the investigative process\nand the advisory roles of the participants are clearly defined, it should\nbe possible to avoid the difficulties encountered during the Nixon\nnominations and make the best possible use of information from all\nsources.\nIV. The Confirmation Process\nOnce the processes of candidate evaluation produce a nominee, the\nPresident submits his choice for the \xe2\x80\x9cadvice and consent\xe2\x80\x9d of the Senate.\nFor the first half of this century, it appeared that the Senate\xe2\x80\x99s role in\nmaterially influencing the selection of a Justice had ended; its confirma\xc2\xad\ntion of presidential nominees was virtually automatic.55 Though equal\nparticipation by the Senate and the President in choosing Justices may\nbe gone, however, the Senate has significantly reasserted its hand in the\nselection of Justices since 1968. Since the conditional resignation of\nEarl Warren from the Chief Justiceship, four presidential nominations\nfor the Chief or an Associate Justiceship have been withdrawn or were\ndefeated at least in part because of Senate action.56\nThe Senate\xe2\x80\x99s procedure following nomination is straightforward.\nExcept in the cases of two ex-Senators, the Senate has always referred\nSupreme Court nominations to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Since\n54\nIt has been debated since 1973 w h eth er the reporting and o th er \xe2\x80\x9csunshine\xe2\x80\x99* provisions o f the\nFederal A dvisory Com m ittee A ct, 5 U.S.C. A pp. \xc2\xa7 10, apply to the A B A C om m ittee in its role o f\nadvising this D epartm ent. T h e Office o f Legal Counsel concluded in 1973 that the A ct does c o v er the\nABA Com m ittee, although the practical effects o f such co v erag e on the operation o f the C om m ittee\nw ould be limited. This position was affirm ed in a February, 1974, letter from A ttorney G eneral Saxbe\nto the. A BA Com m ittee. A fter fu rth er correspondence. A ttorney G eneral Saxbe inform ed the C om m it\xc2\xad\ntee in O ctober, 1974, that O L C , under then Assistant A tto rn ey G eneral Scalia, had reexam ined the\nissue and found that the A ct did not c o v er the ABA Com m ittee.\n95 Prior to 1968, the Senate failed only once in this century to confirm a presidential nom ination to\nthe Suprem e C ourt: President H o o v er\xe2\x80\x99s 1930 nom ination o f Judge John J. P arker to be an A ssociate\nJustice. Sw indler at S36.\n56\nJustice Fortas w ith d rew his nom ination for the C h ief Justiceship in O ctober, 1968, after the\nSenate failed to end a filibuster preventing a vote on his elevation. His action elim inated the\nprospective vacancy to w hich President Johnson had nom inated Ju d g e H om er T h o rn b erry o f the\nFifth C ircuit. In 1969, the Senate defeated President N ixon\'s first nom inee to succeed Justice Fortas,\nJudge C lem ent F. H aynsw orth, Jr. In 1970, it defeated his second nominee. Judge G . H arrold\nCarsw ell. A braham at 266; Sw indler at 536.\n\n473\n\n\x0cPresident Coolidge\xe2\x80\x99s nomination in 1925 of Harlan Fiske Stone to an\nAssociate Justiceship, the committee has usually interviewed the nomi\xc2\xad\nnee in person.57 It is modern practice, since President Roosevelt\xe2\x80\x99s 1938\nnomination of Stanley Reed, for the committee to hold public hearings\non the nomination.58 If the committee recommends approval, as it\ninvariably has in recent decades, the nomination is sent to the floor for\ndebate and an eventual vote by the entire Senate. Confirmation requires\na majority vote.\nThe factors that may affect the results of a Senate confirmation vote\nare innumerable; long and complex explanations have been written\nconcerning the politics of the confirmation process. Although the his\xc2\xad\ntory is fascinating, this memo will only briefly consider the politics of\nconfirmation to underline the one relevant and perhaps obvious point\nthat Senators\xe2\x80\x99 opposition to a candidate may not relate in any way to\nthe President\xe2\x80\x99s criteria for choosing a suitable candidate for the Court.\nThis is understandable because Senators may well decide their votes\nbased on partisanship, individual animosity, opposition to a nomination\nby constituent or special interest groups, ideological differences, or\nintraparty politics.59\nOne commentator has usefully divided the reasons for Senate opposi\xc2\xad\ntion to a candidate into three categories: reasons related to the charac\xc2\xad\nter, ability, or integrity of the candidate; reasons related to partisanship\nor the candidate\xe2\x80\x99s ideology; and reasons related to a candidate\xe2\x80\x99s prior\nidentification with the unpopular side of a significant political contro\xc2\xad\nversy.60 The stronger the opposition to a candidate, the more likely the\nnominee is to face detractors on all of these grounds.\nRelatively few nominees have been credibly opposed on grounds of\noutright inability. Perhaps the nominee to fare worst in this respect was\nGeorge H. Williams, an undistinguished lawyer nominated unsuccess\xc2\xad\nfully by President Grant in 1873. Most recently, Judge Carswell was\nopposed in part because of alleged lack o f ability, although it would be\ndifficult to determine the relative importance to his defeat of the Sen\xc2\xad\nate\xe2\x80\x99s evaluation of his judicial performance and its reaction to his\nrecord of apparent insensitivity to civil rights.\nOpposition on ethical grounds was a factor in the defeat of both the\nnomination of Justice Fortas to be Chief Justice and the nomination of\nJudge Haynsworth to succeed Justice Fortas. The filibuster against\n57 S tone\'s nom ination was controversial chiefly because, having succeeded a H arding appointee,\nH arry M. D augherty, as A tto rn ey G eneral, he refused to d ro p a D epartm ent o f Justice case brought\nby D augherty, a figure in the T eapot D om e scandal, against S enator W heeler o f M ontana. Frank at\n491.\n58 T h e Judiciary C om m ittee decided to enci its p ractice o f conducting its nom ination debates\nentirely in executive session after the co n tro v ersy engendered by public revelation o f the past K u Klux\nK lan m em bership o f Justice H ugo Black, w hose nom ination it had approved by a vote o f 13-4 in 1937.\nA braham at 201; A shby at S3.\n59 See generally GofT; Sw indler.\n60 A shby at 29-31.\n\n474\n\n\x0cFortas may have succeeded chiefly because of opposition to his judicial\nphilosophy and opposition to President Johnson as a lameduck Presi\xc2\xad\ndent in 1968. However, Fortas was also opposed for accepting paid\nemployment by American University while on the Court and for main\xc2\xad\ntaining a close advisory relationship with President Johnson, which\nseemed to some an inappropriate breach of separation of powers.61\nWhen Fortas later resigned under charges of ethical insensitivity (he\nhad received and returned, while on the Court, fees from investor\nLouis Wolfson and the Wolfson family\xe2\x80\x99s foundation), President Nixon\xe2\x80\x99s\nfirst designated successor, Judge Haynsworth, faced opposition based\non his participation in lower court cases in which he arguably had or\ncreated a financial conflict of interest.62\nConsiderations of personal or judicial ideology were clearly grounds\nfor Senate opposition to the nominations of Justice Fortas and Judges\nHaynsworth and Carswell. Senators opposed Fortas\xe2\x80\x99 liberal stands on\ndesegregation, criminal procedure, and free speech. Civil rights and\nlabor groups attacked the allegedly hostile positions of Judge\nHaynsworth. Judge Carswell\xe2\x80\x99s opponents emphasized his statement in\nsupport of \xe2\x80\x9cthe principles of White Supremacy\xe2\x80\x9d during his 1948 cam\xc2\xad\npaign for the Georgia legislature.63\nPartisan opposition, whether or not \xe2\x80\x9cideological,\xe2\x80\x9d may also defeat a\ncandidate. Of the 14 presidents whose nominees were rejected or other\xc2\xad\nwise \xe2\x80\x9ckilled\xe2\x80\x9d by the Senate, six\xe2\x80\x94John Quincy Adams, Tyler, Polk,\nFillmore, Buchanan, and Andrew Johnson\xe2\x80\x94held office in the face of\noverwhelming congressional opposition. At the times they lost their\nrespective nomination fights, it is doubtful that they could have secured\nthe nomination of almost any individual to the Court.\nInterestingly, the most \xe2\x80\x9cvenerable\xe2\x80\x9d ground historically for Senate\nopposition to a nominee is the nominee\xe2\x80\x99s prior identification with the\nlosing side in a national controversy. The first rejected nomination was\nthat of John Rutledge for Chief Justice in 1795, based largely on his\nattack on the Jay Treaty, which the Federalists vigorously supported.\nNo one-issue debate has loomed as large in the defeat of any Supreme\nCourt nominee in this century.\nThe role of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice in\nthe appointment process has generally been to identify and evaluate\ncandidates according to the President\xe2\x80\x99s criteria. Department of Justice\nwitnesses, however, have occasionally played a role in confirmation\nhearings either to elaborate on the Administration\xe2\x80\x99s evaluation of a\n61 Ashby at 338-41.\n62 A braham at 4-5; A shby, at 387-88.\n93 Ideological opposition to a candidate may, o f course, backfire. T h e overall c areer record on civil\nrights and labor issues o f F o u rth C ircuit Judge John J. Parker, w hose Suprem e C ourt nom ination w as\ndefeated in 1930, w as undoubtedly m ore progressive o r liberal then the Suprem e C ourt voting record\no f President H oover\'s subsequent successful nominee, O w en J. R oberts, although P arker\xe2\x80\x99s nom ination\nw as defeated prim arily th ro u g h the pressure o f labor and civil rights groups. Schubert at 49-50.\n\n475\n\n\x0cnominee\xe2\x80\x99s record or to comment on legal issues raised by a particular\nappointment. Not including former Assistant Attorney General\nRehnquist\xe2\x80\x99s testimony at his own confirmation hearing, Department of\nJustice Representatives have testified with respect to only two of the\nnine persons nominated to the Supreme Court since 1968. Attorney\nGeneral Levi testified in support of the 1975 nomination of Judge John\nPaul Stevens. Nomination o f John Paul Stevens to be a Justice o f the\nSupreme Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 94th\nCong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975). During the hearings on Justice Fortas\xe2\x80\x99 nomi\xc2\xad\nnation to the Chief Justiceship, Attorney General Clark testified regard\xc2\xad\ning whether Chief Justice W arren\xe2\x80\x99s conditional resignation legally cre\xc2\xad\nated a vacancy on the Court, Nominations o f Abe Fortas and Homer\nThornberry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 90th\nCong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968), and Deputy Attorney General Warren Chris\xc2\xad\ntopher testified regarding a memorandum he had prepared at the re\xc2\xad\nquest of committee member Senator Hart concerning the meaning and\nimpact of the Supreme Court opinions of Justice Fortas. Id., at 315.64\nV. Conclusion: The Appointment Process and Post-Appointment\nPerformance\nUnsurprisingly, the measures of success on the Court vary as widely\nas the criteria for selection.65 In considering what process of candidate\nselection is most likely to yield a successful Justice, it must first be\nborne in mind that, like other virtues, judicial excellence is significantly\nin the eye of the beholder, varying with time and place.\nIf a President\xe2\x80\x99s measure of success is the predictability of his ap\xc2\xad\npointee\xe2\x80\x99s decisions, no selection process can guarantee a happy result.\nEven a President\xe2\x80\x99s intimate familiarity with the opinions of a nominee\ncannot assure that their views will coincide as the appointed Justice\ngrows in his position and faces novel questions unforeseen at the time\nof his appointment. There are notable examples of presidential dissatis\xc2\xad\nfaction with the performance of an appointee, e.g., Madison, with the\nFederalist Story; Teddy Roosevelt, with Holmes\xe2\x80\x99 vote in the Northern\n6* A D epartm ent o f Justice A tto rn ey , N orm an K nopf, testified under subpoena in a private capacity\nduring the hearings on Ju d g e C arsw ell concerning his experiences w ith Judge C arsw ell w hile a\nmem ber o f the Law Students Civil R ights R esearch Council, prior to his em ploym ent w ith the\nD epartm ent o f Justice. George Harrold Carswell: Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary,\n91st C ong., 2d Sess. 174 (1970).\n65 T w o com m entators have w ritten that success on the C ourt is:\nthe result o f several qualities in com bination: scholarship; legal learning and analytical\npow ers; craftsm anship and technique; w ide general know ledge and learning; character,\nmoral integrity and impartiality; diligence and industry; the ability to express oneself\nw ith clarity, logic and com pelling force; openness to change; courage to take unpopu\xc2\xad\nlar positions; dedication to the C o u rt as an institution and to the office o f Supreme\nC ourt Justice; ability to carry a pro p o rtio n ate share o f the C ourt\'s responsibility in\nopinion w riting; and finally, th e quality o f statesm anship.\nDennis, Overcoming Occupational Heredity at the Suprem e Court. 66 A.B.A. J. 41, 43 (1980) (quoting A.\nBlaustein and R. M ersky, The First O ne H undred Justices: Statistical Studies o f the Suprem e Court o f the\nUnited States (\\91%)).\n\n476\n\n\x0cSecurities case; Wilson, with the conservative McReynolds; and Eisen\xc2\xad\nhower, with W arren.66\nIt is likely that those Presidents who measured success more by the\ncraftsmanship of their appointees were better pleased than those count\xc2\xad\ning on predictable votes. The average Justice has been one who has\nreliably made substantial contributions to acceptable adjudications of\ndifficult issues over a significant period of time. Not every Justice, of\ncourse, possesses the creativity, intellect, political acumen, and perhaps\nlongevity, to achieve not only excellence, but \xe2\x80\x9cgreatness.\xe2\x80\x9d However,\nthose candidates with the potential to be truly exceptional and extraor\xc2\xad\ndinary rarely stand out clearly from the pool of excellent candidates,\nand a process seeking to identify the \xe2\x80\x9cpotentially great\xe2\x80\x9d might prove\nmore whimsical than practical. While the eminence of John Marshall or\nBrandeis was perhaps predictable, no prognosticator could confidently\nhave predicted the careers of Harlan Fiske Stone, Hugo Black, or Earl\nWarren. Whether a process aimed at finding \xe2\x80\x9cgreat\xe2\x80\x9d future jurists\nwould have focused on them originally cannot be known.\nHistory gives much reason for optimism that, whatever the Presi\xc2\xad\ndent\xe2\x80\x99s criteria, a potentially successful member of the Court meeting\nthose criteria can be found with proper care. A clear set of standards,\ninput from numerous sources, a broad-based search for candidates, and\ntime enough for a thorough evaluation are the elements necessary and\nsufficient to find the appropriate nominee.\nAPPENDIX\nDATA ON SUPREM E COURT APPOINTM ENTS\n1. Succession of the Justices of the Supreme Court\nof the United States\n2. Supreme Court Nominations Rejected or Refused\n3. Prior Judicial Experience of U.S. Supreme Court\nJustices and Their Subsequent Service\n4. Occupations of Supreme Court Designees at Time\nof Appointment\n5. Acknowledged Religion of the 100 Individual\nJustices of the Supreme Court (at time of appoint\xc2\xad\nment)\n6. The 31 States From Which the 103 Supreme\nCourt Appointments Were Made\n7. Occupational Backgrounds of Supreme Court\nNominees Since 1937\n66 A braham at 62-63.\n\n477\n\n\x0c\x0cTable 1\nT A B L E O F SUCCESSION O F TH E JU STICES O F TH E SUPREME C O U R T O F TH E U N ITE D S TA TES\nShowing Yean \xc2\xab f A d n t Srrvict on the Court\nJudiciary A il of I W\nJohn Jay P R O -1795\nJithn R u I M p\n\n179$\n\nOlr**r ElliworlH\n|79t\xc2\xbb.\xc2\xbb799\nJohn M in liill\n1K0|.\xc2\xbbR\xc2\xbb5\n\nJohn Ruttedpr\n17*9-17*1\n\nprovided Im a Chief imtrar and 5 AtmciaU Ju ttim\n\nWilliam Cuihina\n1719-IRIO\n\nJam n Irrdell\n1790- 17<M\n\nJamet Vihon\n17R9.1 **a\n\nAlfred Moorr\n\nButhrad Wathtnfton\nI79R.1RJ9\n\nThofflu JofcfKon\nI79|.|7<*J\nWilliam Patmon\n|79t.|ROh\n\nJohn blaa\n|7 * 9|7 %\n\nSamuel Oiaw\n|79*-|RII\n\nWilliam Johnwn\nIftfM IR U\n\nHrnry B. 1 mngMnn\nIROhlR.\'.l\n\nJ w p h Story\nIR I I 1 M 5\n\nC.jhnrl Duvil\nINI M \xc2\xab \xc2\xbb *\n\nSmith Thnmpvw\nl* M IK4I\nIWnry Baldwin\nIK10-IH44\nlam n M Waynr\nIN.UIRftT\n\nRnfrr | Taney\nIN 1ft |N*4\n\nSamuel Nchon\niM M r;\n\nLevi Wpndhurv\n|R4*n |RH\n\nfillip P Rirhftii\ni m Wiina i\n\nRnhert ( (.riei\nIR 4 t.lR \xe2\x80\x99 i)\n\nPeter V Dan\xc2\xbb1\nIH4I IMM)\n\nBeniamin R Curti*\nIK M IR 5 \xe2\x80\x99\nNathan Clifford\n\n1\nZ. 5\n3\ns\ni\na\n\nSalmon P Chav\niH M in\n\nS\n*\ns\n?\n\nSamuel F Millet\n|Bfi \xe2\x80\x99 Ht\'Ht\n\n\\\\\nM m non R V m \xc2\xab\nIR74-IRRR\n\n8 \xc2\xab\n;\n3 ;\n\ns\nI\xc2\xbb se\n\nWard Hunt\ni r ?m r m :\n\nSamuel Blatchford\nIH R JIR UI\n\nHorave C n y\n1RRM90.\'\n\nMelmllrW Fuller\nIRRR-1910\n\nWilham Stroma\n1*70 IRRU\n\nWilliam B Wood*\niNRtyiRR?\'\n\nM i\n\xe2\x80\xa2- s\n\nL w i i m O C Lamar\nIRRN IR41\n\n" c\nEdward 0 White\nJ IR94\n<1 1 9 | 0 -l\xc2\xbb:i\n\n<\n\nHowell E J k I w i\nIR9.1 |R\xc2\xabH\nRufus W Peikham\n|R<*S 191)9\n\nOti\xc2\xbbtr Wendrll H o in n\ni \xc2\xab * o :i9 i :\n\nEdward D Vhiic\nJIR94\n( J 1910-19:1\n\nWilliam H Moody\n|9Qf> 1910\nM o n o H Lurtm\n|909.|g<4\n\nWtdti V n Dt*afilrr\n1910-19.17\n\nJa m n C McRrynnMt\nI9 I4 I9 4 I\nWilliam H Taft\nI9.M-I9.M)\n\nHrnry B Brown\nIR90l90n\n\nlo v p h R Lamar\n|9|(v I9ir*\nLoun D Brandrn\nlvtn-1919\n\nBenjamin N Cardoro\nI 9 IM 9 J H\nF rln Frankfurt"\nI 9 i9 i\xc2\xab r ,j\n\n1910-1941\nHugo L BIk I\n|917. |\'IT (\n\nWilliam O Doufta*\n1919\n\nJ I9JS *\n( J 1941 |94A\n\nJamn F Byfnei\n1941.1942\nWiley R u tlrd^\n|V4.M*49\nSherman Hinton\n" |<*4U.|\xc2\xab<*\n\nF n d M V im m\nI94A -I9JJ\nKarl V a r m\n|9<M <*9\n\nW illim J Brennan\nI9*h\nArthur J ( \xc2\xab l d M f\n!% M % <\nAhr Fortas\nI9 M -I9 A 9\n\nWarrrn E Burfrr\n|9fi9\n1r a n E Powell. Jt\nl\xc2\xab 7 :\n\n|U70\n\n\'S ucceeded by Justice Jo h n Paul Stevens. December 19, 1975.\nFrom A braham at 292-93.\n\n\x0cFe b n w y. 1973\n\nTABLE O F SUCCESSION O F THF JUSTICES O F THE S UP tE M E COURT O F TH E UNITED S TA TE S\n\n1789\nIT9 0\n\nj c l >11\ni ii\'-J\nu!\n\n1800\n\n1\nt\ng\n\n| \'\n\nT t w m a To d d\n1807-1826\n\n.\n\ni\n\n=11\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c o E\n\nx\noJ\n<w\n\nRobert Tum ble\nJohn M k U t i)\n\n| 21\n\n1\n\n\xc2\xab !o\nSi\nar\n\nX\n\no\nJohn Catron\nIR t T -l f t M\n\nJohn M c K u ilty\n1 8 V 1852\n\n<\n\n8\ne\n\ni i i\ni l l\n21|\n5ii\n0\n\no !\n\n1 8 )0\n\n&\nO a n d Dana\nI8 6 M 8 7 7\n\nh |\n\n18*0\n\nStephen J Field\n1863-1897\n\n!\n\ni l l\nI-\n\nni *\n?\xc2\xab5\nStanley Matthew*\n1M I I 889\n\n1840\n\ni i\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c1\nNoah H S va y n r\n1*62 1*81\n\n1820\n\n1 8 )0\n\n6\n\xc2\xab5*\n5S\n\'S*\n\nJohn A Campbell\nIN V tlA M\n\ntlto\n\nJohn M Hartan\nl\xc2\xab-r? .| Q i i\n\n- Joaepto P. Bradley \xe2\x80\x94\n1870-1892\n\n1870\n\n5\n1880\n\n- ^\n*e\n\nO\n\n<\n\nD and J B i t x i\n1889-19)0\nC r a r p S h in e . Jr\n1892 1903\n\n1890\n\nioaeph McKenna\n1898-192)\n1900\nW ilK \xc2\xabn R. O n\n>903-1922\nChartei E Hughes\n1910-1916\n\n1910\nMahkm Pitney\n19121922\n\nJofin H Clarkr\n19(^-1 9 2 2\n1920\n\nGfOfft\n\nSwlhrrland 1922-19,18\n\nF d v i f d T Sanford\nI9 2 .V I9 J0\n\nH ir lt * F . Slone\nJ 192)\nC J 1941-1946\n\nPierce Bvftet\n1922-1939\n\n1930\nI9 .W 1 9 4 5\nStanley F Heed\nI9 JR I9 S 7\n\nFrank M urphy\n\nH ir n M H . Burton\nI9 4 J -I9 M I\n\n1940\n\nRobert H . Ja ct ton\n1 9 41-19)4\nTom C. C M\n1949-1967\n\nC h a rtn E Whittaker\n19)7-1062\n\nPoller Stewart\n1959\n\n1950\n\nJohn M Htrtan\n1955-1971\nl\xc2\xab6 0\n\nIt\n\nByron\nWhile\n|9f>2\nTh vrfo o d Manhall\n1967\nW m H . R rhn qim t\n197\xe2\x80\x99\n\n1970\n\n1980\n\n478\n\n\x0cT a b l e 2.\xe2\x80\x94 S u p r e m e C o u r t N o m i n a t i o n s R e j e c t e d o r R e f u s e d\n(In the following tabulation, details on the nominations to the Suprem e C ourt o f the United States\nw hich w ere declined by the nominees or acted on adversely by the Senate have been summarized.\nT he political com position o f the Senate at ihc time o f such action is show n by m ajor parlies only:\nF .\xe2\x80\x94 Federalist; A .-F.\xe2\x80\x94A nti-Federalist; D.R. \xe2\x80\x94 D em ocratic Republican: N.R. \xe2\x80\x94 National Republican;\nW .\xe2\x80\x94W hig; D .\xe2\x80\x94 D em ocratic; R. \xe2\x80\x94Republican.]\nPresident and\nSupreme Court\nnominee\nG eorge W ashington\nRobert H. Harrison\nWilliam P aterson1\nJohn Rutledge,\nC J .2\nWilliam Cushing,\nC.J.\nJohn Adams\nJohn Jay, C .J...........\nJames Madison\nLevi L in co ln ...........\nA lexander W olcott.\nJohn Q. A d am s.......\nJohn Q. Adams\nJohn J. C ritte n d e n ..\nA ndrew Jack\'son\nR oger B. T an ey n ....\nW illiam S m ith .........\nJohn Tyler\nJohn C. Spencer\nReuben H.\nW alw orth\nEdw ard K in g ..........\nJohn M. R e a d .........\nJames K. Polk\nG eorge W.\nW oodw ard\nM illard Fillm ore\nEdw ard A.\nBradford\nG eorge E. B a d g e r..\nWilliam C. M icou...\nJames Buchanan\nJerem iah S. B lack...\nA ndrew Johnson\nH enry S ta n b e ry ......\nUlysses S. G rant\nEbenezer R. H oar...\nEdw in M. S ta n to n ..\nG eorge H.\nWilliams, C.J.\nC aleb Cushing, C.J.\nR utherford B. Hayes\nStanley M atthew s4 .\nC hester A. A rth u r\nRoscoe C o n k lin g ....\nG ro v e r Cleveland\nWilliam B.\nH om blow er\nW heeler H.\nPeckham\nH erbert H oover\nJohn J. P ark er.........\n\nSenate\ncom position\n\nD ate o f\nnomination\n\nA ction on\nnomination\n\nN ature o f action\n\nF. 19; A.-F. 13.\n\nSept. 24. 1789.... Sept. 26, 1789....\nFeb. 27. 1793..... Feb. 23, 1793.....\nJuly I. 1795\n! D ec. 15. 1795\nNov. 5. 1795\nJan. 26. 1796...... Jan. 27, 1796..\n\nF. 19; D .R. 13.\n\nDec. 18. 1800...\n\nDec. 19. 1800.... C onfirm ed; declined.\n\nD .R. 28; F 6...\nD .R . 28; F. 6...\nD .R . 28; F. 6...\n\nJan. 2, 1811...\nFeb. 4, 1811...\nFeb. 21. 1811.\n\nJan. 13, 1811..\nFeb. 13, 1811.\nFeb. 22, 1811.\n\nC onfirm ed; declined.\nR ejected. 9-24.\nConfirm ed; declined.\n\nD .R. 28; N.R. 20..! D ec. 17, 1828...\n\nFeb. 12, 1829..\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c Postponed. \xe2\x80\x9c\n\nD. 20; W. 20 .\nD. 30; W. 18 .\n\nJan. 15. 1835..\nMar. 3, 1837..\n\nMar. 3, 1835.\nMar. 8, 1837.\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c Postponed.\xe2\x80\x9d 24-21.\nC onfirm ed; declined.\n\nW. 28; D. 25 .\nW. 28; D. 25 .\n\nJan. 9, 1844......\nMar. 13, 1844..\n\nW. 28; D. 25 .\n\nJune 5. 1844..\nDec. 4. 1844.\nFeb. 7, 1845..\n\nJan.\nJan.\nJan.\nJan.\nFeb.\n\n31, 1844..\n15. 1845..\n27, 1845..\n15, 1845..\n7, 1845...\n\nRejected, 21-26.\n"P ostponed.\xe2\x80\x9c\nW ithdraw n.\n\xe2\x80\x9c Postponed.**\nW ithdraw n.\nN u action.\n\nJan. 22, 1846..\n\nRejected, 20-29.\n\nF. 17; A .-F. 9...\nF. 17; A .-F. 13.\nF. 1^; A .-F. 13.\n\nW. 28; D. 25 .\n\nD. 31; W. 2 5 ......... Dec. 23. 1845 .\n\nC onfirm ed; declined.\nW ithdraw n.\nRejected. 10-14.\nConfirm ed; declined.\n\nNo action.\n\nD. 35; W. 2 4 ......... Aug. 16. 1852.\nD. 35; W. 2 4 ......... | Jan. 10. 1853....\nD. 35; W. 2 4 .........1 Feb. 24. 1853..\n\nFeb. 1 1. 1853.\n\n\xe2\x80\x9c Postponed."\nN o action.\n\nD. 36; R. 26.\n\nFeb. 5, 1861....\n\nFeb. 21. 1861.\n\nR ejected, 25-26.\n\nR. 36; D. 26 .\n\nA pr. 16, 1866..\n\nR. 56; D. 11 .\nR. 56; D. II .\n\nDec. 15. 1869...\nDec. 20. 1869...\n\nN o action.\n\nR. 49; D. 19.\n\nFeb. 3. 1870....... Rejected, 46-11.\nD ec. 20, 1869... C onfirm ed (d. D ec.\n24, 1869).\nW ithdraw n.\nDec. I. 1873 ...... Jan. 8. 1874....\n\nR. 49; D. 19.\n\nJan. 10. 1874...... Jan. 13, 1874..\n\nW ithdraw n.\n\nD. 42; R. 33.\n\nJan. 26, 1881......\n\nN o action.\n\nR. 37; D. 37 .\n\nFeb. 24, 1882.... Mar. 2, 1882...\n\nC onfirm ed; declined.\n\nD. 44; R. 38 .\n\nSept. 17. 1893.... Jan. 15, 1894...\n\nRejected, 24-30.\n\nD . 44; R. 38 .\n\nJan. 22, 1893...... Feb. 16, 1894..\n\nR ejected, 32-41.\n\nR. 56: D. 3 9 .......... Mar. 21, 1930.... M ay 5, 1930....... R ejected. 39-41\n\n479\n\n\x0cT a b l e 2.\xe2\x80\x94 S u p r e m e C o u r t N o m i n a t i o n s R e j e c t e d o r R e f u s e d \xe2\x80\x94\n\nContinued\n\n[In the follow ing tabulation, details on the nom inations to the Suprem e C ourt of the U nited States\nw hich w ere declined by the nominees o r acted on adversely by the Senate have been summarized.\nT he political com position o f the Senate at the time o f such action is show n by m ajor parties only:\nF .\xe2\x80\x94 Federalist: A .-F .\xe2\x80\x94 A nti-Federalist: D .R .\xe2\x80\x94 D em ocratic Republican; N .R .\xe2\x80\x94National Republican:\nW .\xe2\x80\x94 W hig; D .\xe2\x80\x94 D em ocratic; R .\xe2\x80\x94 Republican.]\nPresident and\nSuprem e C ourt\nnominee\n\nSenate\ncom position\n\nLyndon B. Johnson\nA be Fortas. C .J.........\nH om er\nT h o rn b erry r>\nR ichard M. Nixon\nC lem ent F.\nH aynsw orth, Jr.\nG . H arrold\nCarsw ell\n\nD ate o f\nnom ination\n\nA ction on\nnom ination\n\nO ct. 7. 1968\nO ct. 7. 1968\n\nN ature o f action\n\nW ithdraw n,\nW ithdraw n.\n\nD. 64; R. 36\nD. 64; R. 36\n\nJune 27. 1968\nJune 27, 1968\n\nD. 58; R. 42\n\nSept. 4, 1969...... Nov. 21, 1969... Rejected, 45-55.\n\nD. 58; R. 42\n\nJan. 19. 1970\n\nA pril 7, 1970\n\nR ejected, 45-51.\n\n1 Paterson\'s name w as inadvertently subm itted before his term as Senator had expired, he having\nbeen a mem ber o f the Senate w hich created the C ourt positions under the Judiciary A ct o f 1789, I\nStat. 73.\n2 Rutledge w as com m issioned, sw orn in and presided o v er the August, 1795. Term o f the C ourt.\n3 T he Senate rejected the nom ination as an attem pt to co n trol the C ourt through T aney\'s Cabinet\naffiliation. In the 1836 election, w ith six additional states voting, the D em ocrats won control o f the\nSenate. Taney was renom inated, this time for C h ief Justice, and w as confirm ed. 29-15.\n4 T h e nom ination, caught betw een D em ocratic co n tro l o f the Senate and Senator C onkling\xe2\x80\x99s fight\nw ith Hayes, was pigeonholed. In the new Senate. D em ocrats and R epublicans w ere evenly divided.\nG arfield prom ptly resubm itted M atthew s\' name, and he was confirm ed. 24-23.\n5 T he Senate never reached this nom ination, as it was tied to the effort to advance Fortas to C hief\nJustice.\nFrom Sw indler at 536.\n\nT a b l e 3.\xe2\x80\x94 P r i o r J u d i c i a l E x p e r i e n c e o f U .S . S u p r e m e C o u r t\nJ u s t ic e s a n d T h e ir S u b s e q u e n t S e r v ic e\n\nJu stice\n\nY ear N o m in ated\n\nJ a y \xe2\x80\x98 ......................... 1789 .........................\nJ. R u tled g e* * ....... \'1789 an d 1795.....\nC u s h in g ................. 1 7 8 9 .........................\n1789\n....................\n1 7 8 9 ................... .*...\n1 7 9 0 .........................\n1 7 9 1 .........................\n1793 .........................\n1 7 9 6 .........................\n1 7 9 6 .........................\nW a s h in g to n .......... 1 7 9 8 .........................\n1 7 9 9 .........................\n1 8 0 1 .........................\n1 8 0 4 .........................\nL iv in g s to n ............ 1 8 0 6 .........................\nT o d d ....................... 1 8 0 7 .........................\nS to r y ....................... 1 8 1 1 .........................\n1 8 1 1 .........................\nT h o m p s o n ............ 1823 .........................\nT rim b le .................. 1 8 2 6 .........................\n\nN u m b e r o f Y ears o f P rio r Ju d icial\nE x p erien ce\nF e d e ra l\n\nS tate\n\nT o ta l\n\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n9\n\n2\n6\n29\n0\n11\n\n2\n6\n29\n0\n11\n\n480\n\nVz\n\nVz\n\nl>/2\n0\n8\n5\n0\n1\n0\n6\n0\n6\n0\n6\n16\n2\n\n1 >/2\n0\n8\n5\n0\n1\n0\n6\n0\n6\n0\n6\n16\n11\n\nY ears o f\nS e rv ice on\nS u p re m e\nC o u rt\n\n6\n\xe2\x80\x9c2\n21\n9\n7\n9\n2\n13\n15\n4\n31\n5\n34 Vi\n30\n17\n20\n34\n24\n20\n2\n\n\x0cT able 3.\xe2\x80\x94P rior J udicial E x per ien ce of U.S. S uprem e C ourt\nJ ustices an d T heir S ubsequent S erv ice \xe2\x80\x94Continued\n\nJu stice\n\nY ear N o m inated\n\nN u m b er o f Y ears o f P rio r Judicial\nE x p erien ce\nF ed eral\n\n1 8 2 9 .........................\n1 8 3 0.........................\n1835 .........................\n1 8 3 6 .........................\n1836 .........................\n1837 .........................\n1837 .........................\n1 8 4 1 .........................\n1845 .........................\n1845 .........................\n18 4 6.........................\n1 8 5 1.........................\n1853 .........................\nC liffo rd .................. 1858 .........................\n1862 .........................\n1 8 6 2.........................\n1 8 6 2.........................\nF i e l d ..................... 1 8 6 3.........................\n1 8 6 4 .........................\n1 8 7 0 .........................\n1 8 7 0.........................\n1872 .........................\n1 8 7 4.........................\n1877 .........................\n1 8 8 0.........................\n1 8 8 1.........................\n1 8 8 1.........................\n1882 .........................\nL. Q. C. L am ar... 1888 .........................\n1 8 8 8..........................\n1 8 8 9.........................\n18 9 0.........................\n1892 .........................\n1 8 9 3.........................\nW hite*................... \xe2\x80\x98 1894 and 1910.....\n1 8 9 5.........................\n1898 .........................\n19 0 2.........................\n1 9 0 3.........................\n1 9 0 6.........................\n1 9 0 9........ ................\n\'1 9 1 0 an d 1930.....\n1 9 1 0.........................\n1 9 1 0.........................\n1 9 1 2.........................\n1 9 1 4.........................\n1 9 1 6 .........................\n1 9 1 6 .........................\nT a ft\xe2\x80\x99........................ 1 9 2 1 .........................\n1 9 2 2.........................\nB u tle r..................... 1 9 2 2.........................\n\n0\n0\n0\n0\n6\n0\n0\n4\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n12\n0\n0\n15\n0\n0\n6\n16\n0\n7\n0\n0\n5\n0\n4\n0\n16\n0 7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n2\n8\n0\n0\n\n481\n\nS tate\n\nT o ta l\n\n6\n0\n5\n0\n2\n10\n0\n0\n22\n6\n13\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n14\n6\n0\n11\n0\n8\n0\n1\n0\n4\n18\n0\n0\n0\n22\n0\n0\n0\nl\'/2\n9\n0\n20\n3\n0\n10\n0\n1\n2\n11\n0\n0\n0\n5\n0\n0\n\n6\n0\n5\n0\n8\n10\n0\n0\n22\n6\n13\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n14\n6\n0\n11\n0\n8\n0\n1\n12\n4\n18\n15\n0\n0\n28\n16\n0\n7\nP/2\n9\n5\n20\n7\n0\n26\n0\n8\n2\n11\n0\n0\n2\n13\n0\n0\n\nY ears o f\nS e rv ic e on\nS u p rem e\nC o u rt\n32\n14\n32\n28\n5\n28\n15\n19\n27\n6\n24\n6\n8\n23\n19\n28\n15\n34\'/2\n9\n10\n22\n10\n14\n34\n7\n8\n21\nII\n5\n22\n21\n16\n11\n\'2\n27\n14\n27\n1 30\n19\n4\n5\n17\n27\n6\n10\n27\n23\n6\n9\n16\n17\n\n\x0cT able 3.\xe2\x80\x94 P rior J ud icial E x per ien ce of U.S. S uprem e C ou rt\nJ ustices a n d T heir S ubsequent S erv ice \xe2\x80\x94Continued\n\nJu stic e\n\nY ear N o m in ated\n\n1923 .........................\n\'1923 and 1941.....\n1 9 3 0.........................\n1932 .........................\n1937 ........................\n1937 .........................\n1 9 3 9.........................\n1939 .........................\n1940 ......................\n1 9 4 1 .........................\n1941 ..........................\n1943 .........................\n1 9 4 5 .........................\n1946 .........................\n1949 ........................\n1 9 4 9 .........................\n1953 .........................\n1955 .........................\n1956\n1957 .........................\n1958\nW h ite ...................... 1 9 6 2 .........................\n1 9 6 2 .........................\n1 9 6 5 .........................\n1 9 6 7 .........................\n1 9 6 9 .........................\n1 9 7 0 .........................\n1971 .......................\n1 9 7 1 .........................\n1975 .......................\n\nN u m b e r o f Y ears o f P rio r Judicial\nE x p e rie n c e\nF ed eral\n\nS tate\n\nT o ta l\n\n14\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n4\n0\n5\n0\n8\n0\n1\n0\n3\n4\n0\n0\n0\n3 \'/2\n13\n11\n0\n0\n5\n\n0\n0\n0\n18\nl \xe2\x80\x98/2\n0\n0\n0\n7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n7\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n\n14\n0\n0\n18\nl \xe2\x80\x98/2\n0\n0\n0\n7\n0\n0\n4\n0\n5\n0\n8\n0\n1\n7\n3\n4\n0\n0\n0\n3\'/2\n13\n11\n0\n0\n5\n\nY ears o f\nS e rv ic e on\nS uprem e\nC o u rt\n\n7\n23\n15\n6\n34\n19\n23\n36\n9\n1\n13\n6\n13\n7\n18\n7\n16\n16\n5\n\n3\n4\n\n\xe2\x80\x98 In d ic a te s C h ie f Ju s tic e and d a te o f his a p p o in tm e n t o r p ro m o tio n .\n* R u tle d g e \'s n o m in atio n w as re je c te d by th e S en ate in D e c e m b e r 1795, b ut h e had\nse rv e d as C h ie f Ju s tic e u n d e r a recess a p p o in tm e n t fo r fo u r m onths.\n\xe2\x80\x9c A c tu a lly R u tle d g e n e v e r se rv e d as A sso ciate Ju stic e , a lth o u g h he d id p e rfo rm c irc u it\nd u ty b efo re his resig n atio n in 1791.\nn In d icates n o ju d ic ia l ex p e rie n c e w h e n a p p o in ted as Associate Ju stice.\nFrom A b ra h a m at 45-47.\n\n482\n\n\x0cT a b l e 4 .\xe2\x80\x94 O c c u p a t i o n s * o f S u p r e m e C o u r t D e s i g n e e s a t T i m e o f\nA pp o in t m e n t +\nF ed eral O ffice h o ld e r in E x ecu tiv e B r a n c h ......................................................................\nJu d g e o f In ferio r F ed eral C o u r t ...........................................................................................\nJu d g e o f S tate C o u r t.................................................................................................................\nP riv a te P ra c tic e o f L a w .............................................................................................:............\nU.S. S e n a to r..................................................................................................................................\nU.S. R e p re se n ta tiv e ............................................................... ....................................................\nS tate G o v e r n o r ............................................................................................................................\nP ro fesso r o f L a w ........................................................................................................................\nA ssociate Ju stice o f U.S. S u p re m e C o u rt " .....................................................................\nJu stice o f the P erm an en t C o u rt o f In tern atio n al J u s tic e ............................................\n\n22\n21\n21\n18\n8\n4\n3\n3\n2\n1\n\n\' M any o f the ap p o in tees had held a v ariety o f federal o r sta te offices, o r ev en b o th ,\np rio r to th eir selection.\n* In g en eral the ap p o in tm en ts from sta te office are c lu ste re d at th e beg in n in g o f the\nC o u rt\xe2\x80\x99s existence; th o se from federal office are m o re recen t.\n\xe2\x80\x9c Ju stices W hite and Stone, w h o w e re promoted to the C h ie f Ju sticesh ip in 1910 and\n1930, resp ectiv ely .\nD o es not in clu d e Ju stic e Jo h n Paul Stevens, a p p o in te d 1975, fo rm erly a ju d g e o f the\nU.S. C o u rt o f A p p eals for th e S ev en th C ircu it.\nFrom A b rah am at 53.\n\nT a b l e 5.\xe2\x80\x94 A c k n o w l e d g e d R e l i g i o n o f t h e 100 I n d i v i d u a l\nJ u s t i c e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ( a t t i m e o f a p p o i n t m e n t )*\nE p is c o p a lia n .............................................................................................................................................\n26\nU nspecified P ro te sta n t..........................................................................................................................\n24\nP re sb y te ria n ..............................................................................................................................................\n17\nR om an C a th o lic ......................................................................................................................................\n6\nU n ita ria n ....................................................................................................................................................\n6\nB a p tis t........................................................................................................................................................\n5\nJ e w is h .........................................................................................................................................................\n5\nM e th o d ist...................................................................................................................................................\n4\nC o n g re g a tio n a list...................................................................................................................................\n3\nD isciples o f C h r i s t .................................................................................................................................\n2\nL u th e ra n ....................................................................................................................................................\n1\nQ u a k e r........................................................................................................................................................ ............ 1\n100\n\xe2\x80\xa2D o e s not in clu d e Ju stice Jo h n P aul S tevens, ap p o in ted 1975.\n\nFrom A b rah am at 57.\n\n483\n\n\x0cT a b l e 6 .\xe2\x80\x94 T h e 31 S t a t e s f r o m W h i c h t h e 103 S u p r e m e C o u r t\nA pp o in t m e n t s W e r e M a d e\nN e w Y o r k ................................................\nO h io ............................................................\nM a s s a c h u s e tts .........................................\nV ir g in ia ..................:.................................\nT e n n e s s e e .................................................\nP e n n sy lv a n ia ...........................................\nK e n tu c k y ..........\nM a ry la n d ..........\nN e w J e r s e y ......\nS o u th C a ro lin a\nC o n n e c tic u t......\nG e o r g i a .............\nA la b a m a ............\nC a lif o r n ia .........\nIllin o is.................\nL o u is ia n a ..........\n\nM in n e so ta .................................................\n2\nN o rth C a ro lin a ......................................\n2\nIo w a ................................................................2\nM ic h ig a n .................................................. ....2\nN e w H a m p sh ire ..................................... ....1\nM a in e ......................................................... ....1\nM ississip p i....................................................1\nK a n s a s ....................................................... ....1\nW y o m in g .................................................. ....1\nU ta h ................................................................1\nT e x a s ......................................................... ....1\nIn d ia n a ...........................................................I\nM isso u ri.........................................................1\nC o l o r a d o .................................................. ....1\nA riz o n a ..........................................................1\n\n15\n9\n8\n7\n6\n6\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 J o h n Paul S tev ens, w h o receiv ed the 104th successful p resid en tial ap p o in tm en t to the\nC o u rt, w as from Illinois, th u s raising th at S ta te \xe2\x80\x99s total to four.\nFrom A b rah am at 56.\n\n484\n\n\x0cT\n\nable\n\n7.\xe2\x80\x94 O c c u p a t i o n a l\nN\n\nN o m in ee\n\nBackgrounds\n\no m in e e s\n\nS\n\nin c e\n\nof\n\nS\n\nu prem e\n\nC\n\no urt\n\n1937\n\nL ast o ccu p a tio n befo re\nap p o in tm en t\n\nM a jo r o ccu p a tio n\n\nD o u g la s ..........................\n\nS ecurities and E x ch an g e\nC om m ission\n\nL aw and teaching.\n\nR e e d .................................\nJ a c k s o n ...........................\nS to n e ................................\nB y rn es..............................\nM u rp h y ...........................\nR u tle d g e .........................\nB u rto n ..............................\nV in s o n ............................\nM in to n ............................\nC la r k ................................\n\nS o licito r G e n e ra l.................\nA tto rn e y G e n e r a l................\nS u p rem e C o u rt J u s t ic e .....\nU .S. S e n a to r .........................\nA tto rn e y G e n e ra l................\nA p p e lla te c o u r t ...................\nU.S. S e n a to r .........................\nS e c re ta ry o f T re a s u r y .......\nA p p ellate c o u r t ...................\nA tto rn e y G e n e ra )................\n\nE x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.\nE x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.\nE x e c u tiv e b ra n c h and p riv a te p ractice.\nPolitics.\nPolitics.\nL aw sc h o o l d ean an d in stru cto r.\nP o litic s an d p riv a te practice.\nPolitics.\nP olitics.\nE x e c u tiv e b ra n c h an d p riv a te p ractice.\n\nH a rla n ..............................\nB re n n a n ..........................\nS te w a r t...........................\nW h itta k e r .......................\nW h ite ...............................\n\nP riv a te\nP riv a te\nP riv a te\nP riv a te\nP riv a te\n\nM a rsh all..........................\nT h o rn b e rry ....................\nB u rg e r..............................\nH a y n s w o rth ..................\nC a rs w e ll.........................\nB la c k m u n ......................\nP o w e l l ............................\nR e h n q u is t.......................\n\nP riv a te practice.\nP riv a te p ra c tic e w ith som e ex p erien ce\nin ex ecu tiv e b ran ch .\nN A A C P a tto rn e y and F e d eral bench.\nPolitics.\nP riv a te p ractice.\nP riv a te practice.\nP riv a te practice.\nP riv a te practice.\nP riv a te practice.\nP riv a te practice.\n\nA p p ellate c o u r t ...................\nS tate c o u r t .............................\nA p p e lla te c o u r t ...................\nA p p e lla te c o u r t ...................\nA ssistant A tto rn e y\nG en eral\nG o ld b e r g ........................ S e c re ta ry o f L a b o r ............\nF o r t a s .............................. P riv a te p ra c tic e ...................\n\npractice.\np ra c tic e an d S tate ju d g e .\npractice.\npractice.\npractice.\n\nS o licito r G e n e r a l.................\nA p p e lla te c o u r t ...................\nA p p ellate c o u r t ...................\nA p p ellate c o u r t ...................\nA p p ellate c o u r t ...................\nA p p e lla te c o u r t ...................\nP riv a te p r a c tic e ...................\nA ssistant A tto rn e y\nG en eral\nS te v e n s ........................... A p p e lla te c o u r t ................... P riv a te practice.\n\nAdapted from A sh b y at 453.\n\n485\n\n\x0cBIBLIOGRAPHY\nH. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appoint\xc2\xad\nments to the Supreme Court (1974).\nH. Abraham and E. Goldberg, A N ote on the Appointment o f Justices o f\nthe Supreme Court o f the United States, 46 A.B.A. J. 147 (1960).\nAmerican Bar Association, The Standing Committee on Federal Judici\xc2\xad\nary: What It Is and How It Works (1977).\nJ.\n\nAshby, \xe2\x80\x9cSupreme Court Appointments Since 1937\xe2\x80\x9d\n(unpublished Notre Dame Ph.D. thesis, Library of Congress).\n\n(1972)\n\nE. Dennis, Overcoming Occupational H eredity at the Supreme Court, 66\nA.B.A. J. 41 (1980).\nJ. Frank, The Appointm ent o f Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles\nand Politics, 1941 Wise. L. Rev. 172, 343, 461 (1941).\nJ. Goff, The Rejection o f United States Supreme Court Appointments,\n5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 357 (1961).\nJ. Grossman, Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judi\xc2\xad\ncial Selection (1965).\nW. Murphy and C. Pritchett, Courts, Judges and Politics: An Introduc\xc2\xad\ntion to the Judicial Process (1961).\nS. Padover, To Secure These Blessings (1970).\nW. Rogers, Judicial Appointments in the Eisenhower Administration, 41 J.\nAm. Jud. Soc. 38 (1957).\nA.. Rubin, Judicial Review in the United States, 40 La. L. Rev. 67 (1979).\nJ. Schmidhauser, Judges and Justices: The Federal Appellate Judiciary\n(1979).\nG. Schubert, Constitutional Politics: The Political Behavior of Supreme\nCourt Justices and The Constitutional Policies They Make (1960).\nD. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 Harv. L. Rev.\n293 (1976).\nW. Swindler, The Politics o f \xe2\x80\x9cAdvice an d Consent, \xe2\x80\x9d 56 A.B.A. J. 533\n(1970).\nS. Teger, \xe2\x80\x9cPresidential Strategy for the Appointment of Supreme Court\nJustices\xe2\x80\x9d (1976) (unpublished U. of Rochester Ph.D. thesis, Library\nof Congress).\nL. Walsh, Selection o f Supreme Court Justices, 56 A.B.A. J. 555 (1970).\nB. W oodward and S. Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme\nCourt (1979).\nB. Wukasch, The A be Fortas Controversy: A Research N ote on the Sen\xc2\xad\nate\'s R ole in Judicial Selection, 24 W. Pol. Q. 24 (1971).\n486\n\n\x0c'