b'Rights-of-Way Across National Forests\nT h e A ct o f June 4, 1897, does not grant a right o f access to ow ners o f land surrounded\nby national forests, other than actual settlers, and the Secretary o f A griculture has\ndiscretionary authority to deny such access unless a right otherw ise exists.\nT h e com m on law doctrine o f easem ent by necessity does not apply to land ow ned by the\nfederal governm ent, but a right o f access may be implied from the term s of a federal\nland grant in some circum stances. N o statutes currently modify any such implied right\nfound to exist.\nAbsent a prior existing access right, the Secretary o f A griculture may deny \xe2\x80\x9cadequate\naccess\xe2\x80\x9d to land within a national forest w ilderness area, but must offer a land exchange\nas indemnity.\n\nJune 23, 1980\nT\n\nhe\n\nSecretary\n\nof\n\nA\n\ng r ic u l t u r e\n\nThis replies to your letter of September 18,\n1979, requesting my opinion on several questions concerning access\nrights of private owners of land located within the boundaries of the\nnational forests. Your letter poses the following questions:\n(1) Whether the Organic Act of June 4, 1897,1 grants to private\nlandowners,2 other than actual settlers, a right of ingress to and egress\nfrom their properties located within the exterior boundaries of the\nnational forests, or whether you may deny such access;\n(2) W hether private landowners with property located within the\nexterior boundaries of the national forests have a right-of-way across\nnational forest lands by implied easement or easement by necessity\nenforceable against the federal government; and, if so, whether this\nright-of-way is limited to those instances in which the United States by\nits conveyance created a situation in which nonfederal lands are sur\xc2\xad\nrounded by public lands;\n(3) Whether, if a right-of-way exists across national forests, it has\nbeen modified by:\nM y D e a r M r. S e c r e ta r y :\n\n(a) The Organic Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 478;\n(b) The Wilderness Act, \xc2\xa7 5(a), 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1134(a);\n(c) The Act of October 13, 1964, 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 532-538;\n1A c t o f J u n e 4. 1897, c h . 2. \xc2\xa7 1. 30 S tat. 36 (c o d ifie d at 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 478).\n- A s used in th is o p in io n , th e te rm \xe2\x80\x9c p riv a te la n d o w n e rs " re fe rs to all n o n fe d e ra l la n d o w n e rs unless\no th e r w is e in d icated .\n\n30\n\n\x0c(d) The Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, \xc2\xa7 3, 16 U.S.C.\n\xc2\xa7 1132 note; or\n(e) Any other statute; and\n(4)\nWhether \xc2\xa7 5(a) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1134(a), au\xc2\xad\nthorizes you to deny access and offer as indemnity an exchange of\nnational forest land for private land, or whether the private landowner\nmay insist on a right of access.\nI conclude, first, that the Organic Act of June 4, 1897, does not grant\na right of access to owners of land surrounded by national forests, other\nthan actual settlers, and that you have discretionary authority to deny\nsuch access, provided that a right of access does not otherwise exist. Of\ncourse, access cannot be denied arbitrarily.\nSecond, in my opinion, the common law doctrine of easement by\nnecessity does not apply to land owned by the federal government. A\nright of access may be implied from the terms of a federal land grant\nonly if Congress intended to grant the right. This intent may be show\nfrom the circumstances surrounding the grant, including the purpose\nfor which it was made.\nThird, none of the statutes you have asked us to consider, nor any\nothers that we have found, would modify such a right in any case in\nwhich it is found to exist.\nFourth, I conclude that, absent a prior existing access right, you may\ndeny \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d under the Wilderness Act, but you must offer a\nland exchange as indemnity.\nI.\n\nYour first question is whether Congress has given private inholders 3\na statutory right of ingress and egress with respect to their property,\nincluding a right to build roads. Congress clearly has the power to\ngrant such statutory rights.4 The question is whether it has done so.\nYour department concludes that the Organic Act of June 4, 1897,\ngrants a right of access, including a right to build roads, to all owners\n3 A n \xe2\x80\x9c in h o ld e r" is a la n d o w n e r w h o se p ro p e rty is c o m p le te ly s u rro u n d e d b y p r o p e r ty o w n e d b y\nth e U n ited S tates. A g ain , as used in th is o p in io n th e te rm \xe2\x80\x9c p riv a te inholder*\xe2\x80\x99 re fe rs to all n o n fe d e ra l\nin h o ld ers.\n4 T h e p o w e r to c o n tro l p u b lic lan d s is g ra n te d to C o n g re s s by th e C o n stitu tio n :\nT h e C o n g re s s shall h a v e P o w e r to D isp o se o f an d m ake all n ee d fu l R u les an d\nR e g u la tio n s re s p e c tin g th e T e r r ito r y o r o th e r p ro p e rty b e lo n g in g to th e U n ite d\nS ta l e s .. . .\nU .S. C o n st.. A rt. IV , \xc2\xa7 3, cl. 2. T h is c o m p re h e n s iv e co n g re s s io n a l a u th o rity o v e r p u b lic lan d s in c lu d e s\nth e p o w e r to p re s c rib e th e tim es, c o n d itio n s , an d m o d e o f tra n sfe r (U n ite d S ta tes v. G ratiot. 39 U .S . (14\nP et.) 526, 537-38 (1840)); to d e c la re th e e ffec t o f title e m a n a tin g fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s ( B a g n ell v.\nBroderick, 38 U .S. (13 P e t.) 436, 4 5 0 (1839)); a n d to p re v e n t u n la w fu l o c c u p a tio n o f p u b lic p r o p e r ly\n(C a m fie ld v. U nited Stoles. 167 U .S. 518, 525 (1897)). In K leppe v. N e w M exico. 426 U .S. 529, 539\n(1976), th e C o u rt sta te d : \xe2\x80\x9c (W jh ile th e fu rth e st re a c h e s o f p o w e r g ra n te d b y th e P r o p e r ty C la u se h a v e\nn o t yet been d efin ite ly re so lv e d , w e h a v e re p e a te d ly o b s e rv e d th a t th e p o w e r o v e r p u b lic la n d s th u s\ne n tru ste d to C o n g re s s is w ith o u t lim ita tio n ."\n\n31\n\n\x0cof land surrounded by national forest reserves. Section 478, the codifi\xc2\xad\ncation of \xc2\xa7 1 of the Act, provides:\nNothing in sections 473 to 478, 479 to 482 and 551 of this\ntitle shall be construed as prohibiting the egress or ingress\nof actual settlers residing within the boundaries of na\xc2\xad\ntional forests, or from crossing the same to and from their\nproperty or homes; and such wagon roads and other im\xc2\xad\nprovements may be constructed thereon as may be neces\xc2\xad\nsary to reach their homes and to utilize their property\nunder such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by\nthe Secretary of Agriculture. Nor shall anything in such\nsections prohibit any person from entering upon such na\xc2\xad\ntional forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including\nthat of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral\nresources thereof. Such persons must comply with the\nrules and regulations covering such national forests.\nIn 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was asked by the Secretary of\nAgriculture for his opinion on the meaning of this statute. See 42 Op.\nA tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen. 127 (1962). Prior to 1962, your department interpreted the\nfirst sentence of \xc2\xa7 478 as granting a right of access to all owners of land\nsurrounded by a national forest. It reasoned that the term \xe2\x80\x9cingress and\negress\xe2\x80\x9d included the construction of wagon roads, and that the term\n\xe2\x80\x9cactual settlers\xe2\x80\x9d included any person or corporation owning property\nwithin the boundaries of national forests. As a result, private landown\xc2\xad\ners, including lumber corporations, were considered to have a statutory\nright to build logging roads. Id. at 130. Attorney General Kennedy\nopined that the term \xe2\x80\x9cactual settlers\xe2\x80\x9d includes original settlers who\nreside on the land, and excludes corporations and other business enti\xc2\xad\nties.5 He further concluded that the Secretary of Agriculture has discre\xc2\xad\ntionary authority to impose a reciprocity requirement on requests by\ninholders, other than actual settlers, to use existing roads or to build\nnew roads within national forests. Id. at 142-45.\nYou have advised us that, notwithstanding the 1962 opinion, your\ndepartment has continued to maintain that \xc2\xa7 478 creates a right of\naccess for all private inholders. This interpretation, you have informed\nus, has been based upon the second sentence of \xc2\xa7 478, which was not\ndirectly addressed in the 1962 opinion. My review of the reasoning set\nforth in that earlier opinion, as well as my analysis of \xc2\xa7 478 and its\nlegislative history, convinces me that no such access right exists.\nThe 1962 opinion analyzed \xc2\xa7 478 by dividing it into the following\nthree categories: (1) ingress and egress of actual settlers; (2) construc\xc2\xad\n5\nB etw e en th e e x tre m e s o f th e o rig in a l s e ttle r a n d c o r p o ra tio n s o r b usiness e n titie s a re in te rm e d ia ry\nty p e s o f p ro p e rty o w n e rs su c h as h e irs o r assigns o f an a c tu a l s e ttle r. T h e 1962 o p in io n d id n o t\nc o n s id e r w h e th e r th o se in te rm e d ia ry p ro p e r ty o w n e rs a re \xe2\x80\x9c a c tu a l s e ttle rs \xe2\x80\x9d w ith in th e m e an in g o f th e\nA c t. 42 O p . A tt\xe2\x80\x99y G en . 127, 138 (1962).\n\n32\n\n\x0ction of wagon roads and other improvements by actual settlers; and (3)\nentry upon the national forest for all proper and lawful purposes by any\nperson. Id. at 127, 138-39. We are concerned here only with the third\ncategory because you inquire as to the rights of landowners other than\nactual settlers. In this category, \xe2\x80\x9centry upon\xe2\x80\x9d may be subdivided into\nentry by mere ingress and egress, in particular the use of existing roads,\nand entry requiring construction of roads. Section 478 provides that\nany entry upon the forest reserve by any person is subject to the rules\nand regulations covering such national forests. The question now pre\xc2\xad\nsented, therefore, is whether the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s regulations may, in appro\xc2\xad\npriate cases, include denial of the requested entry.\nTo determine correctly the scope of rights protected by the 1897\nAct, it is necessary to study carefully the language of the Act itself, and\nits legislative history. As the legislative history is fully summarized in\nthe 1962 opinion, I note only the aspects particularly relevant here. At\nthe outset, it is helpful to review the sequence of events which led to\nthe passage of the Act. During the 1800\xe2\x80\x99s the public entered freely\nupon federal land, and Congress, although it did not provide specific\nlegal authority for most uses of the public domain, made no serious\nattempt to halt such uses. See generally G. Robinson, The Forest Serv\xc2\xad\nice 2-5 (1978); Clawson & Held, The Federal Lands 46 (1957). This\ntacit approval constituted an open invitation to the public to avail itself\nof the federal land without specific authorization. Most people assumed\nthat the United States was a temporary titleholder and that the land\nwould eventually pass into private ownership. See R. Robbins, Our\nLanded Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1970, 5-6 (1976). The\npublic land laws of the era, including preemption laws,6 homestead\nlaws,7 and mining laws,8 presumed unimpeded access to the public\ndomain.\nThis policy of unimpeded access was recognized by the Supreme\nCourt in Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890), a case in which the\nCourt considered the complaints of owners of alternate odd-numbered\nsections of land that sheepowners were damaging their land by driving\n6T h e A c t o f M ay 29, 1830, 4 S tal. 4 2 0 -2 1 , first g ra n te d p re e m p tio n rig h ts to settlers. U n d e r its\nterm s, an y p erso n w h o h ad se ttle d on th e p u b lic d o m a in an d h ad c u ltiv a te d a tra c t o f land w as\na u th o riz e d to p u rc h a s e an y n u m b e r o f a c re s up to a m axim um o f 160 a c re s u p o n p ay in g to th e U n ite d\nS ta te s a m inim um p ric e fo r Che land.\n7\nT h e first h o m e stead a c t w as passed in 1862. A c t o f M ay 20, 1862, 12 S ta t. 3 9 2 -9 3 . It p ro v id e d th a t\nc e rta in p erso n s c o u ld e n te r u n a p p ro p ria te d p u b lic lan d s an d , u p o n satisfy in g c e rta in c o n d itio n s, o b ta in\na G o v e rn m e n t p a te n t th e re fo r.\n8T h e M in in g L a w o f 1866 (A c t o f J u ly 26, 1866, c h . 262, 14 S tat. 251) o p e n e d m in eral d e p o sits o n\np u b lic lands to e x p lo ra tio n , claim , and o c c u p a tio n . T h e o n ly sp ecific re fe re n c e to rig h ts-o f-w ay\nap p e a re d in \xc2\xa7 8, w h ic h g ra n te d a rig h t-o f-w a y fo r th e c o n s tru c tio n o f h ig h w a y s o v e r p u b lic lan d s n ot\nre se rv e d fo r public uses. T h e M in eral L o c a tio n L a w o f 1872 (A c t o f M ay 10, 1872, c h . 752, 17 S tat.\n9 1 -9 6 ) d id not m e n tio n ac cess ac ro ss th e p u b lic d o m a in . F ro m th e o u tse t, h o w e v e r, fed era l m in in g\nla w s h av e b een c o n s tru e d as an in v itatio n to e n te r, d is c o v e r, an d lo c a te claim s u p o n p u b lic lands n ot\nw ith d ra w n o r reserv ed . See, e.g.. Union O il Co. v. S m ith , 249 U.S. 337, 3 4 6 -4 7 (1919); U n ite d S ta te s v.\nCarlile. 67 l.D . 417, 421 (1960). See generally J. L o n e rg a n , A ccess to In te rm in g led M in e ra l Deposits,\nM in in g C la im s a n d Private L a n d s Across S u rro u n d in g Public D om ain a n d N a tio n a l Forest L a n d s. 8 L an d\n& W a te r L. R ev. 124 (1973).\n\n33\n\n\x0csheep across it to reach the even-numbered sections of the public\ndomain. The Court denied plaintiffs\xe2\x80\x99 request for an injunction with the\nfollowing explanation:\nWe are of opinion that there is an implied license, grow\xc2\xad\ning out of the custom of nearly a hundred years, that the\npublic lands of the United States . . . shall be free to the\npeople who seek to use them where they are left open\nand unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this\nuse. . ..\nThe whole system of the control of the public lands of\nthe United States as it had been conducted by the G ov\xc2\xad\nernment, under acts of Congress, shows a liberality in\nregard to their use which has been uniform and\nremarkable.\n133 U.S. at 326-27. The Court refused to allow the complainants, under\nthe pretense of owning a small portion of a tract of land, to obtain\ncontrol over the entire tract and thereby deny defendants their privi\xc2\xad\nlege to use the public domain. 133 U.S. at 322. See also, Broder v. Water\nCo., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879) (Court noted conduct of government\nencouraging development of mines and construction of canals and\nditches on public domain); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1876) (Court\nnoted tacit consent to enter upon the public lands for the purposes of\nmining); Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507 (1874) (Court noted\n\xe2\x80\x9csilent acquiescence\xe2\x80\x9d to the general occupation of the public lands for\nmining).\nIn the late 19th century, efforts expanded to protect the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s\nnatural resources from the results of what were perceived as overly\ngenerous land-use policies. See Robbins, supra, at 301-24. In 1891, the\nCongress passed a law authorizing the President to reserve forest lands\nfrom the public domain. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, \xc2\xa724, 26 Stat.\n1103. One provision of this Act, \xc2\xa7 24, later known as the Forest Re\xc2\xad\nserve Act of 1891, was added as an amendment by the conference\ncommittee.9 The amended bill was considered in the closing days of the\nCongress on an oral presentation of its terms, no printed version being\navailable. It was approved with little debate.10 The status of these forest\n9 S e c tio n 24 p ro v id e d :\n[T ]h e P re sid e n t o f th e U n ite d S ta te s m a y , fro m tim e to tim e, set a p a rt an d re se rv e , in\na n y S ta te o r T e r rito r y h a v in g p u b lic land b e a rin g forests, a n y part- o f th e p u b lic lands\nw h o lly o r in p a rt c o v e re d w ith tim b e r o r u n d e rg ro w th , w h e th e r o f c o m m e rc ia l valu e\no r n o t, as p u b lic re s e rv a tio n s , an d th e P resid en t shall, by p u b lic p ro c la m a tio n , d e c la re\nth e esta b lish m e n t o f su ch re s e rv a tio n s an d th e lim its th e reo f.\nl0S o m e S e n a to rs ex p ressed c o n c e rn ab o u t not k n o w in g e x a c tly w h a t w as in .t h e r e p o rt, b u t th e\nm a jo rity felt th a t in th e c lo sin g d a y s o f th e session \xe2\x80\x9c th e re has g o t to be s o m e th in g ta k en fo r g ra n te d o r\nelse th e p u b lic b usiness c a n n o t g o fo rw a rd as it should.*\xe2\x80\x99 22 C o n g . R ec. 3 5 4 6 -4 7 (1891). T h e b rie f\nH o u se d e b a te a p p e a rs at 22 C o n g . R ec. 3 6 1 3 -1 6 (1891).\n\n34\n\n\x0creserves was not defined, nor were guidelines provided for the manage\xc2\xad\nment of the reserves.\nOn February 22, 1897, President Cleveland, pursuant to the 1891\nAct, issued proclamations placing approximately 20 million acres of\npublic land in forest reserves. Presidential Proclamations Nos. 19-31,\nFeb. 22, 1897, 29 Stat. 893-912. Within the boundaries of the reserves\nwere villages, patented mining claims, homestead claims of actual set\xc2\xad\ntlers and other developments. See 30 Cong. Rec. 901-02 (1897). Each of\nthe proclamations contained the following admonition: \xe2\x80\x9cWarning is\nhereby expressly given to all persons not to enter or make settlement\nupon the tract of land reserved by this proclamation.\xe2\x80\x9d See, e.g., 29 Stat.\n894 (1897). The proclamations also prohibited the general use of timber\non the reserves, and jeopardized other theretofore legitimate activities\nof persons living within or near the reserves.\nCongressmen from states affected by the proclamations expressed\noutrage at what they considered the President\xe2\x80\x99s hasty and ill-advised\naction. 30 Cong. Rec. 902 (1897). This reaction culminated in the\npassage of an amendment to the Sundry Civil Expense Appropriation\nAct, 30 Stat. 36 (1897). This amendment was designed to solve the\n\xe2\x80\x9cdifficulties surrounding these forest reservations\xe2\x80\x9d (id. at 900) and to\nprovide for \xe2\x80\x9cadministering the forest so reserved\xe2\x80\x9d (id. at 909).11 Senator\nCarter of Montana explained that the amendment was offered \xe2\x80\x9cnot for\nthe purpose of benefitting any particular individual or class of individ\xc2\xad\nuals, but for the purpose of permitting existing communities in the\nUnited States to enjoy the privileges which have ordinarily been ac\xc2\xad\ncorded to the pioneer settlers on the frontier everywhere.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 902.\nOther Senators also criticized the provision prohibiting entry or settle\xc2\xad\nment upon the reserves. Id. at 910-11. Senator Allison of Iowa stated:\n\xe2\x80\x9c[I]f segregations are made I think every interest existing at the time,\nhowever remote it may be, should be protected.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 911 (emphasis\nadded). The House debate on the amendment indicates that the con\xc2\xad\ngressmen also were concerned about preserving existing uses of the\nforest reserves. Id. at 1007-13 (remarks of Representatives Castle,\nKnowles, Lacy, and DeVries).12\nThe bill was referred to a conference committee, which reported the\nbill without changes in or comments upon the access section. Id. at\n1242-43. During the Senate debate on the conference report, some of\nthe same western Senators on whose behalf the amendment was intro\xc2\xad\nduced sought to change the clause \xe2\x80\x9cactual settlers residing within the\nboundaries of national forests\xe2\x80\x9d to \xe2\x80\x9cbona fide settlers or owners within a\nreservation.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 1278-81. Senator White explained that the provision\n\xe2\x80\x9c T h e a m e n d m e n t te m p o ra rily re s to re d th e w ith d ra w n lands to th e p u b lic d o m a in b y su sp e n d in g\nth e o p e ra tio n o f th e p re sid e n tia l p ro c la m a tio n s fo r a p p ro x im a te ly o n e year. 30 C o n g . R ec. 8 9 9 -9 0 0\n(1897). I t also clarifie d th e P re s id e n t\xe2\x80\x99s a u th o rity to re v o k e , m odify, o r su sp e n d s u c h p ro c la m a tio n s.\n,2 F o r a c o m p le te d iscu ssio n o f th is le g islativ e h isto ry , see 42 O p . A lt\xe2\x80\x99y G en . 127, 135-38 (1962).\n\n35\n\n\x0cas drafted did not adequately protect all persons who had acquired title\nin fee from the government. Id. at 1278. The amendment was defeated.\nId. at 1285. Opponents of the amendment emphasized that there was no\nintent to deprive any person of access to his property, and that \xe2\x80\x9cwhat\xc2\xad\never rights have been acquired as respects the public lands under the\npublic land laws are reserved and preserved.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 1283. It was noted\nthat entry upon the forests was subject to the rules and regulations of\nthe Secretary of Interior (who then had this administrative authority)\nand that such rules would not likely prevent access to a person\xe2\x80\x99s home.\nId. at 1280 (remarks of Senator Berry). Notwithstanding the concession\nthat the bill was \xe2\x80\x9cimperfect,\xe2\x80\x9d the conference report was agreed to. It\nwas pointed out that further amendment would cause substantial delay\nand that any evils could be corrected by subsequent legislation. Id. at\n1282\xe2\x80\x9483. The House adopted the conference report without debate on\nthis provision. Id. at 1397-401.\nThis legislative history demonstrates that the effect of the second\nsentence of \xc2\xa7 478 is to protect whatever rights and licenses with regard\nto the public domain existed prior to the reservation. We interpret the\nprovision as a congressional declaration that the establishment of forest\nreserves would not alter the long-standing policy of allowing\nunimpeded access to the public land or interfere with the rights of\npersons then using the land, not as an affirmative grant of a broad right\nof entry to all persons. The express language of the statute provides\nthat nothing in the act shall be construed to prohibit certain activities.\nThe language grants no rights not already in existence. See Robbins,\nsupra, at 323; John Ise, The United States Forest Policy 140 (1920).\nThe protection of \xe2\x80\x9clawful\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cproper\xe2\x80\x9d entry upon the reserves\ncannot be construed to limit congressional authority to regulate such\nentry. No vested right to use the public domain for a particular purpose\narises from the government\xe2\x80\x99s mere acquiescence in such use. In Light v.\nUnited States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), the Court wrote:\n[WJithout passing a statute, or taking any affirmative\naction on the subject, the United States suffered its public\ndomain to be used for such purposes. There thus grew up\na sort of implied license that these lands, thus left open,\nmight be used so long as the Government did not cancel\nits tacit consent. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 326. Its failure\nto object, however, did not confer any vested right on the\ncomplainant, nor did it deprive the United States of the\npower of recalling any implied license under which the\nland had been used for private purposes.\nId. at 535. See also The Yosemite Valley Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77\n(1872); Frisbie v. Whitney, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 187, 194 (1869).\nSection 478 clearly subjects entry upon the national forests to reason\xc2\xad\nable regulation by the Secretary. Prior to the enactment of the Federal\n36\n\n\x0cLand Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C.\n\xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 1701-1782, and its repeal of \xc2\xa7 2 of the Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C.\n\xc2\xa7 551, insofar as the latter section applied to the issuance of rights-ofway through public lands, the Secretary was required to read \xc2\xa7 478 and\n\xc2\xa7551 together. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 515 (1911).\nSection 551 provides that the Secretary shall \xe2\x80\x9cmake such rules and\nregulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of such\nreservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to pre\xc2\xad\nserve the forests thereon from destruction . . .\nThis section was held\nto confer upon the Secretary a \xe2\x80\x9cbroad scope of regulation\xe2\x80\x9d intended to\n\xe2\x80\x9cbe effective.\xe2\x80\x9d See 42 Op. A tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen. 127, 140, citing Chicago Mil. & St.\nP. Ry. v. United States, 218 F. 288, 298 (9th Cir. 1914), affd, 244 U.S.\n358 (1917); Shannon v. United States, 160 F. 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1908). In\nGrimaud, the Court stated that the Secretary \xe2\x80\x9cis required to make\nprovisions to protect the forest reserves from depredation and harmful\nuses.\xe2\x80\x9d 220 U.S. at 552. The Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s authority to grant rights-of-way\nacross national forest lands now is based on 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 532-538, and\nFLPMA, 43 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 1761-1771. Both statutes authorize the Secretary\nto protect the forest lands.13\nThis interpretation is consistent with the 1962 opinion of the A ttor\xc2\xad\nney G eneral.14 His review of the legislative history of \xc2\xa7478 disclosed a\nlegislative desire to protect explicitly only the rights of ingress and\negress of actual settlers. 42 Op. A tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen. 127, 138. He found that\nentry upon the national forests by all other persons is subject to your\nrules and regulations covering the forests and discussed the scope of\nyour regulatory authority as follows:\n,3 S ectio n 504 o f F L P M A . 43 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1764, d ire c ts ih e S e c re ta ry to issue re g u la tio n s w ith re s p e c t\nto th e te rm s an d c o n d itio n s o f th e rig h ts-o f-w a y . S e c tio n 505, 43 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1765, req u ires, in ter alia, th a t\ne a c h rig h t-o f-w a y p erm it c o n ta in te rm s an d c o n d itio n s w h ic h w ill " p r o te c t th e en v iro n m en t.* \' \xe2\x80\x9c p ro te c t\nF e d e ra l p r o p e rty ,\xe2\x80\x9c an d \xe2\x80\x9c o th e rw ise p ro te c t th e p u b lic in terest in th e lan d s tra v e rse d b y th e rig h ts-o fw a y o r a d ja c e n t thereto.** T h e A c t o f O c to b e r 13, 1964, 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 5 3 2 -5 3 8 , w h ic h g e n e ra lly\nc o n c e rn s th e c o n s tru c tio n an d m a in te n a n c e o f a sy stem o f ro a d s w ith in th e n atio n al fo rests, a u th o riz e s\nth e S e c re ta ry to g ra n t p erm a n e n t o r te m p o ra ry ea se m e n ts \xe2\x80\x9c u n d e r su ch re g u la tio n s as he m ay p r e \xc2\xad\nsc rib e ." 16 U .S.C . \xc2\xa7 533.\nu In 1964, in resp o n se to th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l\xe2\x80\x99s 1962 o p in io n . C o n g re s s passed le g islatio n .g iv in g\nth e S e c re ta ry th e a u th o rity to g ra n t p erm a n e n t o r te m p o ra ry ea se m e n ts o v e r la n d s m a n ag ed b y th e\nD e p a rtm e n t o f A g ric u ltu re . P ub. L. N o. 8 8 -657. \xc2\xa7 2 , 78 S tat. 1089 (1964). T h e c o m m itte e re p o rts o f\nb o th th e H o u se a n d th e S en ate in d ic a te th a t C o n g re s s u n d e rs to o d th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l\'s o p in io n to\nh o ld th a t \xc2\xa7 478 w as \xe2\x80\x9c n o t to be c o n s tru e d as a s ta tu to ry g u a ra n te e o f ac cess to p riv a te lan d s w ith in th e\nn atio n al fo re sts." S. R ep. N o. 1174, 88th C o n g ., 2d Sess. 4 (1964); H .R . R ep. N o . 1920. 88 th C o n g ., 2d\nSess. 4 (1964). In th e S en ate r e p o rt, th e c o m m itte e stated :\nIt sh o u ld b e ex p ressly n o te d th a t th is le g islatio n is in te n d e d n e ith e r to affirm n o r to\na b ro g a te th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l\xe2\x80\x99s in te rp re ta tio n o f th e ac t o f J u n e 4. 1897 (30 S tat. 36,\n16\nU .S .C . 478), w ith resp ect to th e act*s as s u ra n c e o r lack o f assu ran ce, c o n c e rn in g\na c cess to p riv a te lands ac ro s s n atio n al fo rest lands. H o w e v e r, th e p r e d ic ta b le efTect o f\nth is legislation w ill be to m inim ize th e lik elih o o d o f litig a tio n b e tw e e n th e U n ited\nS ta te s an d p riv a te la n d o w n e rs d e sig n e d to test a p p lic a tio n s o f th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l\xe2\x80\x99s\nin te rp re ta tio n o f th e ac t o f J u n e 4, 1897. T h is le g islatio n w ill p ro v id e to m o st o w n e rs\no f p riv a te land a s a tisfa c to ry a lte rn a tiv e to s ta tu to ry a s s u ra n c e o f a c c e s s to an d fro m\nth e ir lands. T h e c o m m itte e th e re fo re re c o m m e n d s e n a c tm e n t o f th e ac t as a m en d ed .\nA m e n d m e n ts w h ic h w o u ld h a v e c re a te d a s ta tu to r y rig h t o f a c cess w e re re je c te d b o th in c o m m itte e\n(S. R ep . N o. 1174, at 8) an d on th e S e n a te flo o r. 110 C o n g . R ec. 16.413-15 (1964).\n\n37\n\n\x0cAs the Supreme Court pointed out in United States v.\nGrimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-17, it is your function to\ndetermine what private use of the national forests in any\ngiven case is consistent with the purposes sought to be\nattained by the statute. The imposition of harsh and oner\xc2\xad\nous requirements not related to the benefit received or to\nyour general responsibility to preserve and manage the\nnational forests, might well constitute an abuse of\ndiscretion.\n42 Op. A tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen. at 147.\nYour department argues that it has a long-standing policy that the\nSecretary is without discretion to deny access under \xc2\xa7 478, and that a\nchange in this policy would have a drastic effect on the well-established\nexpectations of landowners within the national forests. It is a familiar\nprinciple that interpretations made contemporaneously with the enact\xc2\xad\nment of a statute and consistently followed for a long period are\nentitled to great weight, particularly if they have been relied on by the\npublic. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1969); Alaska S.S. Co.\nv. United States, 290 U.S. 256, 262 (1933); Norwegian Nitrogen Products\nCo. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). Correspondingly, when\nan agency\xe2\x80\x99s interpretation has been neither consistent nor long-standing,\nthe weight given it diminishes accordingly. See Southeastern Community\nCollege v. Davis, 422 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1979); United Housing Founda\xc2\xad\ntion, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 n.25 (1975). Prior to 1962,\nyour department relied on the first sentence of \xc2\xa7 478 to find the same\nrights you now find in the second sentence. This 1962 revision of the\ndepartment\xe2\x80\x99s interpretation occurred almost 70 years after enactment of\nthe statute.15\nIn any case, to the extent that my judgment is governed by the\ncustomary rules of statutory construction, I am guided by the overrid\xc2\xad\ning rule that the statute, and not the agency\xe2\x80\x99s interpretation, is conclu\xc2\xad\nsive. See, e.g., VolksWagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390\nU.S. 261, 272 (1968). Additionally, I am persuaded by the legislative\nhistory and by the common sense rule that legislative history disclosing\nCongress\xe2\x80\x99 intent is entitled to more weight than a conflicting adminis\xc2\xad\ntrative interpretation and must control. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products\nCo. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); Sutherland, Statutes and\nStatutory Construction \xc2\xa749.04 (1973 & Supp. 1975).\nIn sum, I conclude that \xc2\xa7 478 does not grant access rights to private\ninholders other than actual settlers. In my opinion, absent a right of\naccess otherwise granted to the landowner by Congress, you may deny\nrequested access if such denial will protect the public interest in the\n14 In S oriano v. U nited States. 494 F .2 d 681, 683 (9 th C ir. 1974), th e c o u r t d e c lin e d to g iv e sp ecial\nd e fe re n c e to a re g u la tio n p ro m u lg a te d m o re th a n 100 y ea rs a fte r e n a c tm e n t o f th e statu te.\n\n38\n\n\x0cland to be traversed. Because you may not arbitrarily deny access to\nprivate landowners, I do not foresee that this interpretation will have a\ndrastic effect on their expectations.\nII.\n\nYour second question is whether an inholder has an easement by\nnecessity or other implied easement across national forest land. The\nconclusion in Part I (that \xc2\xa7 478 does not grant a right of access to\nprivate property across national forest reserves, and that, absent an\naccess right otherwise guaranteed to a landowner by Congress, \xc2\xa7 478\nallows denial of access) renders apparent the importance of this\nquestion.\nIn the 1962 opinion, the Attorney General stated that whether an\neasement by necessity lies against the government is a complex and\ncontroversial question. While he concluded that it need not be decided\nat that time, the Attorney General nonetheless offered his view that\nsuch an easement does not exist over public lands. 42 Op. A tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen.\n127, 148. It is also my view that the common law doctrine of easement\nby necessity does not apply to congressional disposition of the public\ndomain. This does not mean, however, that access cannot otherwise be\nimplied. In my opinion, access may be implied if it is necessary to\neffectuate the purpose for which the land was granted.\nThe doctrine of easement by necessity is a common law property\nconcept that was recently described by the Supreme Court as follows:\n\xe2\x80\x9cWhere a private landowner conveys to another individual a portion of\nhis lands in a certain area and retains the rest, it is presumed at common\nlaw that the grantor has reserved an easement to pass over the granted\nproperty if such passage is necessary to reach the retained property.\xe2\x80\x9d\nLeo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 679 (1979).16 Authoritative\ntreatises on property law identify three basic prerequisites to the cre\xc2\xad\nation of an easement by necessity.17 First, the titles to the two tracts in\nquestion at some time must have been held by one person. This is the\nunity-of-title requirement. Second, the unity of title must have been\nsevered by a conveyance of one of the tracts. Third, the easement must\nbe necessary in order for the owner of the dominant tenement to use\nhis land. This necessity must exist both at the time of the severance of\ntitle and at the time of application for the exercise of the easement.18\n16 In L eo Sheep, th e C o u rt c o n s id e re d th e q u estio n w h e th e r th e U n ite d S ta te s h ad re s e rv e d an\nea sem en t to pass o v e r lan d s w h ic h h ad passed fro m fed eral o w n e rs h ip . Y o u r in q u iry , c o n v e rs e ly , is\nw h e th e r th e U nited S tates g ra n te d an e a sem en t to a fed era l land g ra n te e to pass o v e r re ta in e d la n d s to\nre a c h th e c o n v e y e d p r o p e rty . T h e L eo S heep ca se is discu ssed in fra at p ag es 19-20, n o te 28.\n17 S ee generally 3 P o w e ll on R eal P r o p e rty \xc2\xa7 4 1 0 (1979); 2 T h o m p s o n o n R ea l P r o p e r ty \xc2\xa7 363, at\n4 2 4 -2 7 (1961 & S u p p . 1978); 3 T iffa n y , L a w o f R eal P ro p e r ty \xc2\xa7 7 9 3 (3 d ed . 1939 S u p p . 1979);\nC o m m e n t, E asem ents B y W ay o f N ecessity Across F ederal L ands, 35 W ash. L . R ev . 105, 107 (1960).\n18 C o u rts h a v e e m p h a siz e d v a rio u s fa c to rs in ap p ly in g th is d o c trin e . T h e R e s ta te m e n t o f P r o p e r ty\n\xc2\xa7 4 7 6 , lists so m e o f th e se facto rs:\nContinued\n\n39\n\n\x0cSee 3 Powell on Real Property \xc2\xa7410, at 34-59 to 34-60 (1979);\nSimonton, Ways By Necessity, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 573-79 (1925).\nWhether this doctrine applies to the government has not been resolved.\nCourts and commentators have differed.19\nTo determine whether the doctrine applies to property of the federal\ngovernment, it is necessary to determine what law controls. Here fed\xc2\xad\neral law must control. The Constitution vests in Congress alone author\xc2\xad\nity to dispose of and make needful rules concerning the public domain.\nU.S. Const., Art. IV, \xc2\xa7 3, cl. 2. As I have noted earlier in this opinion,\nthis power is vested in Congress \xe2\x80\x9cwithout limitation.\xe2\x80\x9d United States v.\nGratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New\nMexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976); United States v. San Francisco, 310\nU.S. 16, 29-30 (1940). The construction of grants by the United States\nhas been held to be a federal, not a state, question. United States v.\nOregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935), Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669\n(1891).20 With regard to implying an easement across land which the\nUnited States still holds in trust for the public, therefore, federal law\nmust control. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,\n404 (1917).21 Federal property can be made subject to state law only\nwhen congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous. See EPA v.\nCalifornia ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211\n(1976); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976).\n(a) w h e th e r (he c la im a n t is th e c o n v e y o r o r th e c o n v e y e e ; .\n(b) th e te rm s o f th e c o n v e y a n c e :\n(c) th e c o n s id e ra tio n g iv e n fo r it:\n(d ) w h e th e r th e claim is m a d e ag a in st a s im u lta n e o u s c o n v e y e e ;\n(e) th e ex ten t o f th e necessity ;\n( 0 w h e th e r r e c ip ro c a l b en e fits resu lt to th e c o n v e y o r o r c o n v e y e e ;\n(g) th e m a n n e r o f use o f th e land b e fo re c o n v e y a n c e :\n(h) th e ex ten t to w h ic h p rio r use w as k n o w n .\n19See. e.g.. U nited S ta tes v. D u n n . 478 F .2 d 443 (9 th C ir. 1973) (h o ld in g , w ith o n e ju d g e d issen tin g ,\nth a t th e d o c tr in e is ap p lic a b le ); S u n S tuds. Inc.. 83 I.D . 518 (1976) (h o ld in g th a t th e d o c tr in e is n o t\na p p lic a b le ). S o m e c o m m e n ta to rs s ta te th a t w a y s o f n e c e ssity d o n o t a rise ag a in st th e s o v ereig n . 2 G .\nT h o m p s o n , C o m m e n ta rie s o n th e L a w o f R eal P r o p e rty \xc2\xa7 362, at 417 (1961); Jo n e s o n E a se m e n ts\n\xc2\xa7 3 0 1 , at 247 (1898). O th e rs c o n c lu d e th a t th e d o c trin e sh o u ld be a p p lic a b le . 3 P o w e ll o n R eal\nP r o p e rty \xc2\xa7 4 1 0 at 34-73 to 3 4 -7 4 (1979); 3 T iffan y , L a w o f R eal P r o p e r ty \xc2\xa7 793 (3d ed . 1939).\n20 W h e n , h o w e v e r, th e la n d h as passed fro m fed era l o w n e rs h ip , it b e c o m e s su b je c t to th e la w s o f\nth e s ta te in w h ic h it is lo c a te d . S ee O regon e x rel. S ta te L a n d Bd. v. C orvallis S a n d <& G ravel Co.. 429\nU .S. 363, 372 (1977). It fo llo w s, th e re fo re , th a t w h e re title to b o th a d o m in a n t a n d se rv ie n t te n em en t\nh as p assed fro m fed era l o w n e rs h ip , th e q u e stio n w h e th e r th e u n ity -o f-title re q u ire m e n t is satisfied by\np rio r g o v e rn m e n t o w n e rs h ip is a q u e stio n o f s ta te law . S ta te c o u r ts h a v e re a c h e d d iffe rin g o p in io n s o n\nth is q u e stio n . C o u rts in C a lifo rn ia , F lo rid a , In d ia n a, O k la h o m a , T e n n e sse e , an d T e x a s h a v e c o n c lu d e d\nth a t u n ity o f title c a n n o t be b ased on p rio r g o v e rn m e n t o w n e rs h ip . B u lly H ill Copper M in in g &\nS m e ltin g Co. v. Bruson. 4 C al. A p p . 180, 87 P. 237, 238 (1906); G uess v. Azar. 57 So. 2d 443, 444 (F la.\n1952); C o n tin en ta l E nterprises Inc. v. Cain, 296 N .E .2 d 170, 171 (In d . 1973); D u d ley v. Meggs, 153 P.\n1121, 1122 (O k la. 1915); Pearne v. C oal C reek M in. & M fg. Co.. 9 0 T e n n . 619, 6 2 7 -2 8 , 18 S .W . 4 0 2 -0 4\n(1891); S ta te v. B lack Bros.. 116 T e x . 615, 6 2 9 -3 0 , 297 S .W . 213, 2 1 8 -1 9 (1927). C o u r ts in A rk an sas,\nM issouri a n d M o n ta n a h a v e re a c h e d th e o p p o s ite c o n c lu s io n . A rka n sa s S ta te H ig h w a y C o m m \'n v.\nM arshall. 485 S .W .2d 740, 743 (A rk . 1972); S n y d e r v. Warford, 11 M o . 513, 514 (1848); Violet v.\nM artin. 62 M o n t. 335, 205 P. 221, 223 (1922).\n21 T h e ru le s a d o p tin g s ta te law to d e te rm in e w h a t rip a ria n rig h ts p ass in a fe d e ra l g r a n t a r e n ot\na p p lic a b le to th e q u e s tio n o f w a y s a c ro s s fed era l land. U tah Power & L ig h t Co. v. U n ited States. 243\nU .S. 389, 411 (1917). See O regon e x rel. S ta te L a n d Bd. v. Corvallis S a n d <\xc2\xa3 G rave! Co.. 429 U .S . 363,\n372 (1977); U nited S ta tes v. Oregon. 295 U .S. 1, 27 (1935); H a rd in v. Jordan. 140 U .S. 371 (1891).\n\n40\n\n\x0cTo determine what rights have passed under federal law, it is neces\xc2\xad\nsary to interpret the statute disposing of the land.22 It is a recognized\nprinciple that all federal grants must be construed in favor of the\ngovernment \xe2\x80\x9clest they be enlarged to include more than what was\nexpressly included.\xe2\x80\x9d United States v. Grant River Dam Authority, 363\nU.S. 229, 235 (1960); United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 353 U.S. 112, 116\n(1957).23 In Pearsall v. Great No. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 664 (1895), the\nCourt wrote: \xe2\x80\x9cNothing is to be taken as conceded . . . but what is\ngiven in unmistakeable terms, or by an implication equally clear. . . .\xe2\x80\x9d\nThese general rules must not be applied to defeat the intent of Con\xc2\xad\ngress, however. The Supreme Court has stated that public grants are\n\xe2\x80\x9cnot to be construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to\nwithhold what is given either expressly or by necessary or fair\nimplication. . . .\xe2\x80\x9d United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 150 U.S.\n1, 14 (1893). In all cases, the intent of Congress must control. Id. See\nalso Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Kansas Pac. Ry., 97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878).\nThese rules dictate that if it is clear that Congress intended to grant\naccess, such access must be acknowledged, its scope consistent with the\npurposes for which the grant was made.24 An implied easement defined\nby the actual intent of Congress must be distinguished from an ease\xc2\xad\nment by necessity, which relies on a presumed intent of the parties.\nThere are no clear uniform rules for determining the scope of an\neasement by necessity. In some cases, it has been held that the scope\nincludes whatever access is necessary for any reasonable, beneficial use\nof the dominant tenement, not merely the use for which the grant was\nmade. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Yarian, 219 Ind. 477, 39 N.E.2d\n604, 606 (1942); Soltis v. Miller, 444 Pa. 357, 283 A.2d 369, 370-71\n(1971); Meyers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71, 78 (1881); Whittier v. Winkley, 62\nN.H. 338, 339-40 (1882); Jones on Easements \xc2\xa7 323 (1898). Since the\ncommon law doctrine is based on the presumed intent of the parties, its\noperation may have the effect of disregarding or possibly frustrating the\nintention of the grantor, absent express language in the conveyance\ndenying an easement. 2 G. Thompson, Law of Real Property \xc2\xa7 362\n(1961), citing Lord v. Sanchez, 136 Cal. App. 2d 704 289 P.2d 41 (1955);\nMoore v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 299 Ind. 309, 95 N.E.2d 210\n(1950). Thus, if the doctrine were allowed to operate where the G ov\xc2\xad\nernment is the grantor, the actual intent of Congress would, at the least,\n23 W e n o te th a t y o u r d e p a rtm e n t, w ith o u l re a c h in g th e ea sem en t-b y -n e cessity issue, h as c o n c lu d e d\nth a t an ex a m in atio n o f th e g ra n tin g s ta tu te is essential to d e te rm in in g a c cess rig h ts. S ee M e m o ra n d u m :\nA c c e ss to S ta te an d P riv a te In h o ld in g s in N a tio n a l F o re s ts at 18, U .S. D e p t, o f A g ric u ltu r e (O c t. 31,\n1979).\n23 S ee also C a m fie ld v. U nited States, 167 U .S. 518, 52 4 -2 6 (1897); U n ited S ta te s v. C larke, 529 F .2 d\n984, 986 (9 th C ir. 1976).\n2*See C u rtin v. Benson. 222 U .S. 78, 86 (1911). In U nited States v. 9.947.71 Acres. 220 F. S u p p . 328,\n331 (D . N ev . 1963), th e c o u rt re c o g n iz e d an im plied a c cess rig h t fo r m in in g p u rp o s e s w h e re a m in in g\nclaim o w n e r had to c ro s s p u b lic d o m a in to reac h his claim . C f A rizona v. C alifornia, 373 U .S. 546,\n5 9 9 -6 0 0 (1963); W inters v. U nited States, 207 U .S. 564, 575-77 (1908). T h e se ca ses re c o g n iz e an im p lied\nrese rv a tio n o f w a te r rig h ts fo r Indian reserv atio n s.\n\n41\n\n\x0cbecome irrelevant, and, in some cases, would be thwarted. Plainly, the\napplication of the common law doctrine would be inconsistent with the\nestablished principles that the intent of Congress in disposing of federal\nland must control, and that rights in government land cannot be pre\xc2\xad\nsumed to pass by implication.25\nThe doctrine of easements by necessity was developed to settle\ndisputes between private parties, not disputes involving the federal\ngovernm ent.26 The federal government has at one time held title to\nover three-fourths of the territory of the United States; it today retains\ntitle to approximately one-third of the nation\xe2\x80\x99s land. One-Third of the\nNation\xe2\x80\x99s Land: A Report to the President and to Congress by the\nPublic Land Law Review Comm\xe2\x80\x99n, at 8 (1970). It holds property as\nsovereign, as well as proprietor, and exercises power beyond that\nwhich is available to a private party. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.\n529, 539 (1976); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (191 1).\nThroughout its history, statutes have been enacted allowing access\nacross its land.27 It holds land in trust for all the people and in dispos\xc2\xad\ning of it is concerned with the public interest. Utah Power & Light Co.\nv. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Causey v. United States, 240\nU.S. 399, 402 (1916). In Causey, the Court wrote that \xe2\x80\x9cthe Government\nin disposing of its public lands does not assume the attitude of mere\nseller of real estate at its market value.\xe2\x80\x9d Id.\nFor these reasons, other doctrines applicable to private landowners\nhave been held inapplicable to the sovereign. In Jourdan v. Barrett, 45\nU.S. (4 How.) 169, 184-85 (1846), the Supreme Court held that no\nprescriptive rights may be obtained against the sovereign, and in Field\nv. Seabury, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 323, 332-33 (1856), the Court held that\ngovernment patents may not be collaterally attacked as can grants from\na private party. In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), the\n25 It is n o te w o n h y th a t sin ce th e A tto rn e y G e n e ra l o p in e d in 1962 th a t th e d o c tr in e o f ea se m e n ts by\nn ec essity w as n o t e n fo rc e a b le ac ro s s fed era l land, C o n g re s s has n o t m o d ified th e rule. A lth o u g h this\ng e n e ra lly is n o t s tro n g e v id e n c e w h e n th e re is no in d ic a tio n th a t C o n g re s s w as a w a re o f th e ru lin g\n(Z u b e r v. A llen, 396 U .S. 168, 194 (1969)), it is m o re p e rs u a s iv e w h e n , as h e re , co n g re s s io n a l ac tio n\nd ire c tly re su lte d from th e o p in io n . S e e n.14, supra. S ee generally B ean v. L ed m a r. 368 U .S. 403, 4 1 2 -1 3\n(1962); U nited S ta tes v. M idw est O il Co.. 236 U .S. 459, 481 (1915).\n26T h e d o c trin e has b een tra c e d to e a rly E n g lish o rig in s. S im o n to n , W ays o f N ecessity, 25 C o lu m . L.\nR ev . 571, 57 2 -7 8 (1925). It u su ally has b een p re d ic a te d on p u b lic p o lic y fa v o rin g lan d u tiliz atio n an d a\np re s u m p tio n o f in ten t. 3 P o w e ll on R ea l P ro p e rty \xc2\xa7 4 1 0 at 3 4 -5 9 to 3 4 -6 0 (1979).\n21\nSee. e.g.. A c t o f M a rc h 3, 1875, ch . 252, \xc2\xa7 1, 18 S tat. 482 (re p e a le d 1976) (rig h t o f w ay fo r\nra ilro ad s); A c t o f M a rc h 3, 1891, c h . 561, \xc2\xa7 18 (re p e a le d 1976) ( rig h t o f w a y fo r irrig a tio n d itc h e s an d\nc a n als); A c t o f Ja n . 21, 1895, ch. 37, \xc2\xa7 I (re p e a le d 1976) (rig h t o f w a y fo r tra m ro d s , ca n als, and\nrese rv o irs); A c t o f J u ly 26, 1866, c h . 262, \xc2\xa7 8, 14 S tat. 253 (re p e a le d 1976) (rig h t o f w ay fo r h ig h w ay s).\nT h e s e s ta tu te s w e re re p e a le d by th e F e d e ra l L a n d P o lic y an d M an a g e m e n t A c t o f 1976 ( F L P M A ) ,\nP u b . L. N o . 9 4 -5 7 9 , \xc2\xa7 \xc2\xa7 5 0 1 -5 1 1 , 90 S tat. 2776-82 (co d ifie d at 43 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 \xc2\xa7 1 7 6 1 -1 7 7 1 ). F L P M A\np ro v id e s, w ith c e rta in e x c e p tio n s, th a t rig h ts o f w a y a c ro s s g o v e rn m e n t lan d c a n o n ly b e o b ta in e d as\np ro v id e d in th a t A c t. 43 U .S .C J770. G e n e ra l a n d c o m p re h e n s iv e le g islatio n , p re sc rib in g a c o u rs e o f\nc o n d u c t to be p u rs u e d a n d th e p a rtie s an d th in g s a ffec ted , an d s p ecifically d e s c rib in g lim itatio n s an d\ne x c e p tio n s , is in d ic a tiv e o f a le g isla tiv e in ten t th a t th e s ta tu te sh o u ld to ta lly s u p e rs e d e an d re p la c e th e\nc o m m o n la w d e a lin g w ith th e s u b je c t m a tte r. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson. 343 U .S. 779, 7 8 7 -8 8 (1952);\nS n e e l v. R uppert, 541 P .2 d 1042 (W y o . 1978); J. S u th e rla n d , S ta tu te s an d S ta tu to ry C o n s tru c tio n\n\xc2\xa7 50.05 (1973 & S u p p . 1978).\n\n42\n\n\x0cCourt refused to hold that the federal government had forfeited by\nlaches or estoppel its interest in littoral property, stating: \xe2\x80\x9cThe Govern\xc2\xad\nment, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the\npeople, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court\nrules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned\npieces of property. . .\nId. at 40.\nThese same reasons lead me to conclude, as did the Court in Leo\nSheep, that the doctrine of easements by necessity as applicable to\nfederal lands is \xe2\x80\x9csomewhat strained, and ultimately of little signifi\xc2\xad\ncance\xe2\x80\x9d and that the \xe2\x80\x9cpertinent inquiry . . . is the intent of Congress.\xe2\x80\x9d 28\nA grantee is entitled instead to reasonable access across government\nland to use his property, for the purposes for which the land grant was\nmade, if such an access right either expressly or impliedly arises from\nthe act authorizing the land grant.29\nTo interpret correctly congressional intent underlying a statutory\nland grant, it is necessary to look at the condition of the country when\nthe grant was made, as well as the declared purpose of the grant. Leo\nSheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979); Winona & St. Paul\nR.R. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885); Platt v. Union Pacif. R.R., 99\nU.S. 48, 64 (1878). In Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 (9th\nCir. 1965), for example, the court looked to the purpose of the grant\nand concluded that the scope of the implied access was not broad\nenough to include the type of entry sought. The plaintiff oil company\nwas a lessee of a religious mission which had received a land patent to\nfacilitate and encourage its activities among the Indians. The land in\nquestion was surrounded by the Hopi Reservation, which the United\nStates held in trust for the Indians. The issue on appeal was whether\n28In L eo Sheep Co. v. U nited States. 440 U .S. 668 (1979), th e C o u rt, in h o ld in g th a t th e fed eral\ng o v e rn m e n t d o e s not h a v e a re s e rv e d e a sem en t by n ec essity ac ro s s th e lan d o f its g ra n te e o r its\ng r a n te e \'s su ccesso r, w ro te :\nF irst o f all, w h a te v e r rig h t o f p assag e a p riv a te la n d o w n e r m ig h t h av e , it is n o t at all\nc le a r th a t it w o u ld in c lu d e th e rig h t to c o n s tru c t a ro a d fo r p u b lic a c cess to a\nre c re a tio n a l a rea . M o re im p o rta n tly , th e ea sem en t is n o t a c tu a lly a m a tte r o f n ec essity\nin th is ca se b e c a u se th e G o v e rn m e n t has th e p o w e r o f em in en t d o m a in . J u ris d ic tio n s\nh av e g e n e ra lly seen em in en t d o m a in an d e a sem en ts by n ec essity as a lte rn a tiv e w a y s to\ne ffect th e sam e results. . . . [S Jtate c o u rts h a v e held th a t th e \xe2\x80\x9ce a sem en t b y n e c e ssity \xe2\x80\x9d\nd o c trin e is not av a ilab le to th e so v ereig n .\nId. at 679-81 (fo o tn o te s o m itte d ). O f c o u rs e , th e o p in io n in L eo Sheep is n o t a lo n e d is p o s itiv e o f th e\nq u estio n you h a v e asked. It in v o lv e d a claim by th e g o v e rn m e n t g ra n to r, n o t th e p riv a te g ra n te e , o f an\ne a sem en t by n ecessity. T h e C o u rt th e re d id rely su b stan tially on th e p o w e r o f em in en t d o m a in , an d\nw as c a re fu l n o t to d e c id e th e b ro a d e r q u e s tio n o f th e av ailab ility o f th e ea se m e n t-b y -n e c e ssity d o c trin e\ng en e ra lly . In an e a rlie r ca se refu sin g to find a re se rv e d w a y o f n ec essity fo r a p u b lic ea se m e n t ac ro ss\np riv a te la n d , a d is tric t c o u r t s tated m o re b ro a d ly : \xe2\x80\x98i t is, in m y ju d g m e n t, v e ry d o u b tfu l w h e th e r th e\nd o c trin e o f w ay s o f n ec essity has a n y a p p lic a tio n to g ra n ts fr o m th e g e n e ra I G o v e rn m e n t u n d e r th e\np u b lic land la w s ." U nited S ta tes v. R indge, 208 F. 611, 618 (S .D . C al. 1913). S ee also. S u n S tu d s Inc., 83\nI.D . 518 (1976). B u t see, B ydlon v. U nited States. 175 F . S u p p . 891 (C t. C l. 1959); M a c k ie v. U n ited\nStates. 195 F . S upp. 306 (D . M inn. 1961).\n29 O f c o u rs e , ev e n w ith o u t su c h an e n title m e n t, a la n d o w n e r m ay ap p ly fo r an ea se m e n t p erm it\nu n d e r p ro c e d u re s esta b lish ed p u rsu a n t to o th e r statu tes. S ee F L P M A , 43 U .S .C 1761-1771; A c t o f\nO c to b e r 13, 1964, 16 U .S .C . 532 et seq. It c a n n o t b e assum ed th a t C o n g re s s , o r fed era l r e g u la to ry\na u th o ritie s , w ill e x e c u te th e ir p o w e r in su ch a w a y as to b rin g ab o u t in ju stice . S e e U n ited S ta te s v.\nC alifornia, 332 U .S. 19, 40 (1947).\n\n43\n\n\x0cthe oil company was entitled to move heavy equipment across the\nreservation to drill for oil on the leased property. In ruling that access\nwas limited to the scope of the grant, the court stated:\nCertainly it cannot be said either that public policy de\xc2\xad\nmands or that the Indians\xe2\x80\x99 trustee impliedly intended a\ngrant of a way of access across Indian lands greater in\nscope than was required for mission purposes and whose\ngreater scope was necessary only in order to permit the\ngranted lands to be used in a fashion adverse to the\ninterests of the Indians.30\nAlthough some courts that have dealt with this issue have written in\nterms of easements by necessity, most of them in effect have looked at\nthe grant in question and limited access according to the purpose of the\ngrant. The Superior Oil case was relied on by the Tenth Circuit in\nKinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978), which held:\nAn easement by necessity for some purposes could possibly\nhave arisen when the United States granted the patent to\nplaintiffs\xe2\x80\x99 predecessor in interest. . . . While nothing ordi\xc2\xad\nnarily passes by implication in a patent, Walton v. United\nStates, 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.), an implied easement may\narise within the scope o f the patent.\nId. at 161 (emphasis added).\nSimilar statements appear in Utah v. Andrus, (unreported) C 79-0037\n(D. Utah Oct. 1, 1979), in which Utah claimed an easement by neces\xc2\xad\nsity for access to its school grant lands. Relying on United States v.\nDunn, 478 F.2d 443, 444 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973), the district court con\xc2\xad\ncluded: \xe2\x80\x9cAlthough this common law presumption might not ordinarily\napply in the context of a Federal land grant, the liberal rules of\nconstruction applied to school trust land allowed for the consideration\nof this common law principle and justify its application here.\xe2\x80\x9d 31 The\n30T h e c o u r t, in e ffec t, c re a te d a h y b rid d o c trin e , a p p ly in g p rin c ip le s o f b o th w a y s o f n ec essity an d\nw a y s c r e a te d b y th e a c tu a l in ten t o f th e g ra n to r:\nA p p e lla n t\'s p o sitio n is sim p ly th a t sin ce th e p a te n t fo r th e M ission w as in u n re s tric te d\nfee sim p le it c a rrie d w ith it by im p lic a tio n a w a y o f n e c e ssity o v e r lan d s o f th e U n ited\nS ta te s fo r all p u rp o s e s to w h ic h th e c o n v e y e d land m ig h t la w fu lly b e put.\nS u c h is n o t th e law . T h e s c o p e a n d e x te n t o f th e rig h t o f a c c e s s d e p e n d s n o t u p o n th e\ns ta te o f title o f th e d o m in a n t e s ta te , n o r th e e x iste n c e o r la c k o f lim itatio n s in th e g ra n t\no f th a t esta te, b u t u p o n w h a t m ust, u n d e r th e c irc u m s ta n c e s , b e a ttrib u te d to th e\ng r a n to r e ith e r by im p lic a tio n o f in te n t o r by o p e ra tio n o f la w fo u n d e d in a pu b lic\np o lic y fa v o rin g land u tiliz atio n .\nS u p erio r O il Co. v. U nited Stales, 353 F .2 d 34, 36 -3 7 (9 th C ir. 1965).\n31\nS lip O p . at 8. In U nited S ta te s v. D u n n , 478 F .2 d 443 (9 th C ir. 1973), th e U n ite d S ta te s s o u g h t an\nin ju n c tio n to p re v e n t D u n n , w h o h e ld title as a g ra n te e o f a ra ilro a d , fro m c o n s tr u c tin g an ac c e ss ro a d\nfo r c o m m e rc ia l a n d re sid e n tia l d e v e lo p m e n t o f his la n d . T h e d is tric t c o u r t g ra n te d p a rtia l su m m a ry\nju d g m e n t, h o ld in g d e fe n d a n ts tre sp a ss e rs a n d th e g o v e rn m e n t e n title d to im m e d ia te possession. T h e\nN in th C irc u it re v e rs e d , h o ld in g th a t s u m m a ry ju d g m e n t w a s p re c lu d e d b e c a u se d e fe n d a n ts raised th e\nfa c tu a l issue w h e th e r th e y h a d an e a se m e n t by n ec essity . Id. at 446. T h e D u n n c o u r t \'s o n ly d iscu ssio n\no f th e a p p lic a tio n o f th e d o c trin e , h o w e v e r, a p p e a re d in a f o o tn o te re sp o n se to th e d issen tin g ju d g e . In\nth e d isse n t. J u d g e W rig h t s ta te d sim p ly th a t h e " w o u ld h o ld th a t u n d e r th e facts o f th is ca se th e\nC ontinued\n\n44\n\n\x0ccourt went on to hold that this right is not absolute, however. It\nreasoned:\nUnder the Constitution Congress has the authority and\nresponsibility to manage Federal land. U.S. Const, art. IV,\n\xc2\xa7 3, cl. 2. . . . There is nothing in the school land grant\nprogram that would indicate that when Congress devel\xc2\xad\noped the school land grant scheme it intended to abrogate\nits right to control activity on Federal land. Further, it is\nconsistent with common law property principles to find\nthat the United States, as the holder of the servient tene\xc2\xad\nment, has the right to limit the location and use of Utah\xe2\x80\x99s\neasement of access to that which is necessary for the\nstate\xe2\x80\x99s reasonable enjoyment of its right. . . . Thus, the\ncourt holds that, although the State of Utah or its lessee\nmust be allowed access to section 36, the United States\nmay regulate the manner of access under statutes such as\nFLPMA.\nSlip Op. at 21.\nCases like Superior Oil, Kinscherff, and Utah v. Andrus lend support\nto my conclusions with respect to implied rights to access across\nfederal land. While the common law easement by necessity does not\nrun against the United States, a right to access may nonetheless be\nimplied by reference to particular grants. And, to the extent that such\nimplied rights exist, your broad authority\xe2\x80\x94delegated to you by Con\xc2\xad\ngress\xe2\x80\x94to manage forest reserves empowers you to regulate their exer\xc2\xad\ncise. See United States v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315, 322-23 (D. Minn.\n1952), affd, 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953);\nPerko v. Northwest Paper Co., 133 F. Supp. 560, 569 (D. Minn. 1955).\nDetermining what implied rights exist in the numerous federal land\ngrants is beyond the scope of this opinion. As set forth above, this\ndetermination depends on when the grant was made and for what\npurpose. Mindful of the goal of giving effect to legislative intent, you\nmust look to the rules the Supreme Court has adopted for interpretation\nof federal land grants. As discussed previously, land grants generally\nare to be strictly construed. This rule must be balanced against the\nconflicting rule that in some situations, certain types of land grants may\ndeserve a more liberal construction because of the circumstances sur\xc2\xad\nrounding passage of the statutes in question. See generally Leo Sheep Co.\nv. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1979) (railroad land grants);\nd o c trin e o f ea se m e n t b y n ec essity is n o t b in d in g o n th e U n ite d S tates. . .\nId. at 446. T h e m a jo rity\nresp o n d ed ;\nS in ce th e G o v e rn m e n t d id n o t, in o u r ju d g m e n t, raise th e p o in t u p o n w h ic h J u d g e\nW rig h t bases his d issen t, w e h a v e n o t d iscu ssed it in th e o p in io n , b u t n e v e rth e le ss d id\ng iv e it c o n s id e ra tio n a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t it la ck ed m erit.\nId. at 444 n.2. I d o not find th is ca se p ersu asiv e a u th o rity fo r a p p lic a tio n o f th e d o c trin e .\n\n45\n\n\x0cWyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 508 (1921) (state school land\ngrants). Absent express language to the contrary, however, a grant\nshould not be construed to include broad rights to use retained govern\xc2\xad\nment property, particularly in the case of gratuitous grants. See United\nStates v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112 (1957); Camfield v. United\nStates, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Wisconsin Central R.R. v. United States, 164\nU.S. 190 (1896); 30 Op. A tt\xe2\x80\x99y Gen. 263, 264 (1941).\nOnce the right, if any, is found to exist, you should consider how\nthat right reasonably should be regulated to protect the public\xe2\x80\x99s interest\nin federal property. It is beyond dispute that such rights are subject to\nreasonable regulation without a resulting inverse condemnation. See\ngenerally Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (restric\xc2\xad\ntion of access by erection of fence enclosing extended portion of high\xc2\xad\nway held not a taking); 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain \xc2\xa7 5.72[1] (1978).\nNonetheless, fewer restrictions properly may be imposed on well\nestablished, developed uses than on unexercised rights. See Penn Central\nTransp. Corp. v. City o f New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Euclid v. Amber\nRealty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Frustration and appropriation are\nessentially different things. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,\n363 U.S. 229, 236 (1960), citing Omnia Co. v. United States, 261, 502,\n513 (1923).\nIII.\n\nYour third question is whether any act of Congress has modified any\nimplied rights that may accompany federal grants. Of particular con\xc2\xad\ncern are the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa71131-1136, and various\nwilderness study acts.32 See, e.g., Montana Wilderness Study Act of\n1977, Pub. L. No. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243; Sheep Mtn. and Snow Mtn.\nWilderness Areas, et al., Pub. L. No. 94-557, \xc2\xa7 3, 90 Stat. 2635 (1976).\nThese wilderness study acts require you to exercise your discretion so\nas to preserve the wilderness character of the land.33 If a request for a\nparticular mode of access would destroy that wilderness character,\ntherefore, you must deny the request. These acts also provide, how\xc2\xad\never, that their mandates are subject to \xe2\x80\x9cexisting private rights.\xe2\x80\x9d 34 See,\ne.g., Montana Wilderness Study Act, \xc2\xa7 3(a), 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1132 note. You\nmust determine, therefore, what implied access rights are guaranteed in\na particular grant, and allow the exercise of those rights. The wilder\xc2\xad\n32 T h e im p a c t o f th e W ild e rn e ss A c t is d iscu ssed in P a rt IV .\n33 S ee P arker v. U ntied States. 448 F .2 d 793 (1 0 th C ir. 1971), cert, d en ied sub. nom ., K a ib a b In d u stries\nv. Parker, 405 U .S. 989 (1972) (h e ld S e c r e ta r y \xe2\x80\x99s d is c re tio n to e n te r in to th e tim b e r h a rv e s tin g c o n tr a c t\nfo r p u b lic land is lim ited by 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1132(b)).\n34 In a d d itio n to \xe2\x80\x9c ex istin g p r iv a te rights,*\' th e W ild e rn e ss A c t p e rm its in g re ss to a n d e g re s s fro m\nm in in g lo c a tio n s until D e c e m b e r 31, 1983. 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1133(d)(3). S u c h in g re ss an d eg re s s is s u b je c t to\nre a so n a b le re g u la tio n b y th e S e c re ta ry o f A g ric u ltu re , c o n s is te n t w ith use o f th e lan d fo r m in eral\ne x p lo ra tio n , lo c a tio n , d e v e lo p m e n t, p ro d u c tio n , a n d re la te d p u rp o ses.\n\n46\n\n\x0cness study acts thus do not modify any implied rights that may accom\xc2\xad\npany federal grants.\nNor do I find that the other statutes you cite modify such implied\nrights. The Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7478, discussed at length in\nPart I of this opinion, preserves access rights existing at the time of\ncreation of a forest reserve. The Act of October 13, 1964, 16 U.S.C.\n532-538, which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to grant ease\xc2\xad\nments for road rights-of-way over lands administered by the Forest\nService,35 was passed in reaction to Attorney General Kennedy\xe2\x80\x99s 1962\ninterpretation of 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7478, which, as discussed earlier, allowed\nthe imposition of a reciprocity requirement with respect to rights-ofway. By empowering the Secretary of Agriculture to grant permanent\neasements, the Congress hoped to provide an alternative to statutory\nassurance of access to and from private inholdings.36 Thus, the statute\ndoes not substantively modify implied rights of access. It does, along\nwith FLPMA, allow the imposition of certain procedural requirements,\nsuch as application for a permit prior to road construction. We have\nfound no other statute that substantively modifies implied access rights.\nIV.\n\nYour final question concerns \xc2\xa7 5(a) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.\n1134(a). Your department has concluded that this provision guarantees\na private owner \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d to an inholding unless the land\xc2\xad\nowner voluntarily chooses a land exchange. Pursuant to this interpreta\xc2\xad\ntion, regulations have been promulgated providing that access \xe2\x80\x9cshall be\ngiven.\xe2\x80\x9d 37 The Department of the Interior has taken the position that\n\xc2\xa7 5(a) grants the Secretary of the Interior (and, by analogy, the Secre\xc2\xad\ntary of Agriculture) the authority to deny access to a landowner, and\n3516 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 533. S ee p. 10 & n o te 13 supra. T h is s ta tu te w as n ot re p e a le d b y F L P M A . W ith\nresp ect to th e S e c re ta ry o f A g ric u ltu r e \xe2\x80\x99s a u th o rity u n d e r \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 5 3 2-538, F L P M A p ro v id e d :\n[N ]o th in g in th is s u b c h a p te r shall b e c o n s tru e d as affe c tin g o r m o d ify in g th e p ro v isio n s\no f sectio n s 532 to 538 o f title 16 an d in th e e v e n t o f c o n flic t w ith , o r in c o n sisten cy\nb e tw e e n , th is s u b c h a p te r a n d sectio n s 532 to 538 o f title 16, th e la tte r shall p rev ail:\nProvided fu rth e r. T h a t n o th in g in th is A c t sh o u ld be c o n s tru e d as m a k in g it m a n d a to ry ,\nth a t, w ith resp ect to fo rest ro ad s, th e S e c re ta ry o f A g ric u ltu re lim it rig h ts-o f-w a y\ng ra n ts o r th e ir te rm s o f y ea rs o r re q u ire d is c lo su re p u rs u a n t to se c tio n 1761(b) o f this\ntitle o r im p o se an y o th e r c o n d itio n c o n te m p la te d by this A c t th a t is c o n tr a r y to p re se n t\np ra c tic e s o f th a t S e c re ta ry u n d e r s e c tio n s 532 to 538 o f title 16.\n43 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1770(a).\n36 S. R ep. N o . 1174, 88th C o n g ., 2d Sess. 4 (1964). See n o te 10 supra.\n3736 C .F .R . \xc2\xa7 293.12. T h is re g u la tio n p ro v id e s in p art:\nS ta te s o r p erso n s, a n d th e ir s u c c e sso rs in in te re st, w h o o w n la n d c o m p le te ly s u r \xc2\xad\nro u n d e d by N atio n al F o re s t W ild ern ess shall be g iv e n su c h rig h ts as m ay b e n e c e ssa ry\nto a ssu re a d e q u a te a c cess to th e land. \xe2\x80\x9c A d e q u a te a c c e s s \xe2\x80\x9d is d e fin e d as th e c o m b in a tio n\no f ro u te s a n d m o d e s o f tra v e l w h ic h w ill, as d e te rm in e d by th e F o re s t S e rv ic e , ca u se\nth e least la stin g im p a c t o n th e p rim itiv e c h a ra c te r o f th e land a n d at th e sam e tim e w ill\ns e rv e th e re a so n a b le p u rp o s e s fo r w h ic h th e S ta te a n d p riv a te la n d is h e ld o r used.\nT h is re g u la tio n is c o n s is te n t w ith y o u r d e p a rtm e n t\xe2\x80\x99s in te rp re ta tio n o f 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 4 7 8 . S e e 36 C .F .R .\n\xc2\xa7 212.8(b).\n\n47\n\n\x0coffer land exchange as indemnity.38 The Interior Department\xe2\x80\x99s interpre\xc2\xad\ntation, contrary to yours, under appropriate circumstances would allow\ndenial of \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d to private holdings as well as to stateowned inholdings.\nSome initial observations about the Wilderness Act are in order. The\npurpose of the Wilderness Act is to \xe2\x80\x9csecure for the American people of\npresent and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of\nwilderness.\xe2\x80\x9d 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1131(a). \xe2\x80\x9cWilderness\xe2\x80\x9d is defined as an area of\n\xe2\x80\x9cundeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influ\xc2\xad\nence, without permanent improvements or human habitation.\xe2\x80\x9d 16\nU.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1131(c). Section 4(c) of the Act prohibits, with limited excep\xc2\xad\ntions, use of motor vehicles or other mechanical transportation. 16\nU.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1133(c). It also prohibits permanent roads within any wilder\xc2\xad\nness area, except as specifically provided in the Act, and subject to\n\xe2\x80\x9cexisting private rights.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. The Act directs you to administer wilder\xc2\xad\nness areas within your jurisdiction so as to preserve their wilderness\ncharacter. 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1133(b). The phrase \xe2\x80\x9cexisting private rights\xe2\x80\x9d in\n\xc2\xa7 4(c), 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1133(c), is not defined in the Act or in its legislative\nhistory, but, in my opinion, includes existing easements, which are wellrecognized rights in property.39 Thus, in spite of the A ct\xe2\x80\x99s general\nprohibitions, if a private inholder has an implied right to a particular\ntype of access, that right is preserved.\nThe Wilderness Act was developed over a 15-year period, with\nalmost unprecedented citizen participation. See S. Rep. No. 109, 88th\nCong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). The first major wilderness bill was introduced\nin the 85th Congress. S. 1176, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). In 1961, the\nSenate passed a wilderness bill, S. 174, but the House failed to pass it.\n38 S u p p le m e n ta l M e m o ra n d u m In S u p p o rt o f P la in tifT s M o tio n fo r P e rm a n e n t In ju n c tio n , at 14-19,\nU n ited S ta tes v. C otter Corp., N o. C 7 9 -0 3 0 7 (D . U ta h O c t. 1, 1979). T h e c u r r e n t reg u la tio n o f th e\nIn te r io r D e p a r tm e n t\xe2\x80\x99s F ish a n d W ild life S e rv ic e , 50 C .F .R . 35.13, a lth o u g h s o m e w h a t am b ig u o u s,\nre s tric ts a c cess to m eans an d ro u te s w h ic h w ill \xe2\x80\x9c p re s e rv e th e w ild e rn e s s c h a ra c te r o f th e a re a .\xe2\x80\x9d T h e\nre g u la tio n p ro v id e s:\nR ig h ts o f S ta te s o r p e rs o n s an d th e ir su c c e s s o rs in in te re st, w h o se lan d is su rro u n d e d\nby a w ild e rn e s s u n it, w ill be re c o g n iz e d to a ssu re a d e q u a te a c cess to th a t land.\nA d e q u a te a c c e s s is d e fin e d as th e c o m b in a tio n o f m o d e s a n d ro u te s o f tra v e l w h ic h\nw ill best p r e s e r v e th e w ild e rn e s s c h a ra c te r o f th e la n d sc a p e . M o d es o f tra v e l d e s ig \xc2\xad\nn ated shall be re a so n a b le a n d c o n s is te n t w ith a c c e p te d , c o n v e n tio n a l, c o n te m p o ra ry\nm o d e s o f tra v e l in said v ic in ity . U se w ill b e c o n s is te n t w ith re a so n a b le p u rp o se s fo r\nw h ic h s u c h la n d is h eld . T h e D ir e c to r w ill issue s u c h p e rm its as a re n e c e ssa ry fo r\nac cess, d e sig n a tin g th e m e an s an d ro u te s o f tra v e l fo r in g re ss an d d e g re s s (sic) so as to\np re s e rv e th e w ild e rn e s s c h a ra c te r o f th e a rea .\n395ee, e.g.. U nited S ta te s v. Welch, 217 U .S . 333, 339 (1910); M yers v. U n ited States, 378 F .2 d 696,\n703 (C t. C l. 1967). It lo g ic a lly c o u ld b e a rg u e d th a t th e p h ra s e \xe2\x80\x9c ex istin g p riv a te r ig h ts \'\' in c lu d e s an d\np re s e rv e s o n ly th o s e rig h ts w h ic h h a d b ee n e x e rc ise d at th e tim e th e W ild e rn e ss A c t w as p assed . L ittle\ns u p p o rt exists, h o w e v e r, for th is a rg u m e n t th a t C o n g re s s in te n d e d to ex tin g u ish u n ex e rc ised ac cess\nrig h ts, le a v in g th e la n d o w n e r w ith o n ly th e rig h t to a c cess o r e x c h a n g e u n d e r \xc2\xa7 5(a). W h e n p ro v id in g\nfo r p r e s e rv a tio n o n ly o f e s ta b lis h e d uses, C o n g re s s c le a rly so in d ic a te d . S ee 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1133(d)(1)\n(p e rm ittin g esta b lish e d uses o f a irc ra ft a n d m o to rb o a ts ). In S. R ep . N o . 109, 88 th C o n g ., 1st Sess. 2\n(1963), th e c o m m itte e s ta te d th a t u n d e r th e W ild e rn e s s P re s e rv a tio n S y stem , \xe2\x80\x9c e x istin g p r iv a te rig h ts\na n d esta b lish ed u ses" a re p e rm itte d to c o n tin u e . (E m p h a s is a d d e d .) A w a y o f a c c e s s to w h ic h a p erso n\nis e n title d b y ex p ress o r im p lie d g ra n t p re d a tin g th e W ild ern ess A c t is a rig h t w h ic h ex isted p r io r to\nth e e ffe c tiv e d a te o f th e A c t, w h e th e r e x e rc is e d o r u n ex e rc ised .\n\n48\n\n\x0cIn 1963, S. 4 was introduced in the 86th Congress. It was identical to\nS. 174, with one exception not relevant here. It passed the Senate by a\nlarge margin (110 Cong. Rec. 17,458 (1964)), but was amended in the\nHouse (110 Cong. Rec. 17,461 (1964)). A conference committee was\nconvened and adopted with few amendments the House version of the\nbill, H.R. 9070. See H.R. Rep. No. 1829, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).\nThe conference bill was approved by both Houses (110 Cong. Rec.\n20,603, 20,632 (1964)) and signed by the President on September 3,\n1964.\nSection 5(a) of the Act deals with state and private property com\xc2\xad\npletely surrounded by wilderness areas. It provides:\nIn any case where State-owned or privately owned land\nis completely surrounded by national forest lands within\nareas designated by this chapter as wilderness, such State\nor private owner shall be given such rights as may be\nnecessary to assure adequate access to such State-owned\nor privately owned land by such State or private owner\nand their successors in interest, or the State-owned land\nor privately owned land shall be exchanged for federally\nowned land in the same State of approximately equal\nvalue under authorities available to the Secretary of Agri\xc2\xad\nculture: Provided, however, that the United States shall\nnot transfer to a State or private owner any mineral\ninterests unless the State or private owner relinquishes or\ncauses to be relinquished to the United States the mineral\ninterest in the surrounded land.\nSince the enactment of the Wilderness Act, your department has inter\xc2\xad\npreted this language to preserve the statutory right of access you found\nin 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 478.40 Because, in my opinion, \xc2\xa7478 does not grant a\nright of access to inholders other than actual settlers, the question\npresented here is whether \xc2\xa7 5(a) grants to inholders a broad right of\n\xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d beyond any existing private rights. I believe it does\nnot.\nThe term \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d is not defined in the Act, but the legisla\xc2\xad\ntive history makes clear that the term includes access not consistent\nwith wilderness uses.41 For example, in both the Senate and House\n40S ee n o te 37 supra.\n41\nO th e r sectio n s a p p ly to uses c o n s is te n t w ith w ild e rn e ss p re s e rv a tio n . In \xc2\xa7 5(b), 16 U .S .C .\n\xc2\xa7 1134(b), C o n g re s s p ro v id e d th a t w h e re v alid m in in g claim s o r o th e r v a lid o c c u p a n c ie s a r e s u r\xc2\xad\nro u n d e d b y a n atio n al fo rest w ild e rn e ss a rea , th e S e c re ta ry o f A g ric u ltu r e sh all, b y re aso n ab le\nre g u la tio n s co n siste n t w ith th e p re s e rv a tio n o f th e a re a as w ild e rn ess, p e rm it in g re ss to a n d eg ress\nfro m su ch s u rro u n d e d a re a s by m eans w h ic h h a v e been o r a re b e in g c u s to m a rily e n jo y e d w ith re s p e c t\nto sim ilarly s itu a te d area s. Cf. 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1133(d) (p ro v id e s fo r re g u la tio n o f in g re ss a n d e g ress\nco n siste n t w ith use o f land fo r m in eral e x p lo ra tio n a n d d e v e lo p m e n t). S e c tio n 5(b) d id n o t a p p e a r in\ne ith e r S. 174 o r S. 4. It d id a p p e a r in se v e ra l e a rly H o u se v ersio n s o f th e bill, a n d th e se v ersio n s\nex p ressly in c lu d e d \xe2\x80\x9c p riv a te ly o w n e d la n d s" in a d d itio n to v alid m in in g claim s a n d o th e r valid\nC ontinued\n\n49\n\n\x0cdebates, repeated references were made to road construction for motor\xc2\xad\nized vehicles. See, e.g., 107 Cong. Rec. 18,105 (1961); 109 Cong. Rec.\n5,925-26 (1963). Accordingly, your regulation defining \xe2\x80\x9cadequate\naccess\xe2\x80\x9d does not limit access to established uses or to means consistent\nwith wilderness uses. It includes access which \xe2\x80\x9cwill serve the reason\xc2\xad\nable purposes for which the state and private land is held or used.\xe2\x80\x9d 42\nWhat constitutes adequate access will depend on the facts and circum\xc2\xad\nstances o f each case, and is a determination left to your discretion.\nThe Act requires that the state or private inholder be given such\nrights as are necessary to assure adequate access, or that the land be\nexchanged for federally owned land of approximately equal value. The\nlanguage of \xc2\xa7 5(a) indicates that a landowner has a right to access or\nexchange. If he is offered either,, he has been accorded all the rights\ngranted by the statute. If you offer land exchange, the landowner has\nno right of access under \xc2\xa7 5(a). This interpretation is supported by the\nlegislative history of the section.43\nThe language of \xc2\xa7 5(a) first appeared in an amendment to S. 174, 87th\nCong., 1st Sess. (1961). Senator Bennett of Utah proposed the amend\xc2\xad\nment in response to concerns of the Western Association of State Land\nCommissioners, and, accordingly, the amendment pertained only to\nstate-owned land. 107 Cong. Rec. 18,092 (1961).44 The Senator identi\xc2\xad\nfied a series of \xe2\x80\x9cloopholes\xe2\x80\x9d in the bill. He described the 13th loophole\nas follows: \xe2\x80\x9cNo provision is made in S. 174 to preserve the right of\no c c u p a n c ie s. T h is re fe re n c e to p riv a le ly o w n e d lan d s w as d e le te d in la te r v e rs io n s o f th e b ill, su c h as\nH .R . 9070. T h e re p o ris d o n o t e x p lain this d e le tio n . It m ay h a v e o c c u rr e d b e c a u se o f th e d ecisio n\nd u rin g th e sam e session to in c lu d e p riv a te ly o w n e d land in \xc2\xa7 5(a).\nT h e final p a ra g ra p h o f \xc2\xa7 5 , 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1134(c), a u th o riz e s y o u to a c q u ire s ta te o r p riv a te ly o w n e d\nland o n ly if e ith e r th e o w n e r c o n c u rs o r C o n g re s s s p ecifically a u th o riz e s th e a c q u isitio n .\n42 S e e 36 C .F .R . \xc2\xa7 293.12, n o te 27 supra.\n43 Y o u r d e p a rtm e n t relies o n th e le g isla tiv e h is to ry o f su b se q u en t le g islatio n to s u p p o rt its c o n te n \xc2\xad\ntio n th a t \xc2\xa7 5(a) g ra n ts a rig h t to a d e q u a te ac c e ss to in h o ld e rs. In a re p o rt filed in c o n ju n c tio n w ith th e\nIn d ia n P eak s W ild ern ess A re a , et a l, 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1132 n o te , th e H o u se C o m m itte e n o te d th a t \xc2\xa7 5 o f\nth e W ild e rn e s s A c t re q u ire s th e S e c re ta ry to g iv e p riv a te la n d o w n e rs a d e q u a te ac cess. H .R . R ep . N o .\n1460, 9 5 th C o n g ., 2d Sess. 9 -1 0 (1978). T h e re p o rt d o e s n o t d iscu ss th e e x c h a n g e o p tio n .\nT h is le g is la tiv e o b s e rv a tio n is n o t a p a rt o f th e le g isla tiv e h is to ry o f th e W ild e rn e ss A c t. It is th e\nin te n t o f th e C o n g re s s th a t e n a c te d a la w th a t c o n tr o ls in te rp re ta tio n o f th a t law . U n ited A irlines, Inc.\nv. M cM a n n . 434 U .S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977); T eam sters v. U nited S ta tes, 431 U .S . 324, 354 n.39 (1977).\nW h a te v e r e v id e n c e is p ro v id e d b y th e re p o rt on th e su b se q u en t le g islatio n is o v e r c o m e b y c o n flic tin g\nev id e n c e . See Southeastern C o m m u n ity C ollege v. Davis, 442 U .S . 397, 4 1 1 -1 2 (1979); Oscar M a yer &\nCo. v. Evans, 441 U .S. 750, 758 (1979).\n44 T h e re so lu tio n passed b y th e W e ste rn S ta te L a n d C o m m issio n e rs s u g g e s te d th a t th e bill be\na m e n d e d to c o n ta in th e fo llo w in g p ro v isio n :\nW h e n e v e r an a re a in c lu d in g S ta te -o w n e d land is in c o rp o ra te d in th e w ild e rn e s s sy stem ,\np ro v is io n shall b e m a d e fo r a c cess to su ch land a d e q u a te fo r th e re a so n a b le ex e rc ise o f\nits rig h ts th e re in b y th e S ta te a n d th o s e claim in g u n d e r it . . . . P r o v id e d , h o w e v e r,\nth a t, if th e re c o m m e n d a tio n b y w h ic h an a re a in c lu d in g S ta te -o w n e d la n d is in c o r p o \xc2\xad\nra te d in th e w ild e rn e s s sy stem shall fail to p ro v id e fo r a c c e s s to th e S ta te -o w n e d land\nth e re in , th e n th e o w n in g S ta te m ay, at its e le c tio n , use th e in c lu d e d S ta te lan d as b ase\nin m a k in g in d e m n ity se le c tio n o f la n d s, in c lu d in g th e m in eral rig h ts th e re in as p ro v id e d\nin a p p lic a b le U .S. s ta tu te s.\n107 C o n g . R e c . 18,103 (1961). T h e re s o lu tio n illu stra te s th a t th e C o m m issio n ers also b e lie v e d ac cess\nc o u ld b e d e n ie d . T h e in d e m n ity s ta tu te s to w h ic h th e re so lu tio n refers, 43 U .S .C . 851, 852, a llo w states\nto m a k e in d e m n ity s e le c tio n s w h e n e v e r sc h o o l s e c tio n s a re lost b e c a u se o f o th e r re s e rv a tio n s o r g ra n ts\no f th e land.\n\n50\n\n\x0caccess to State school sections or other lands. This should certainly be\ndone or alternatively, the States should be permitted to choose Federal\nlands in another location in lieu of the land isolated within wilderness\nareas.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. The choice referred to by Senator Bennett was the choice of\nlands if access were denied, not the choice of either access or exchange.\nHe stated that the purpose of his amendment was to \xe2\x80\x9cgive the States\naccess to State lands within wilderness areas established under the bill,\nor indemnify the States for loss of such access.\xe2\x80\x9d 107 Cong. Rec. 18,103\n(1961). He did not indicate that a state could choose between access\nand indemnity. His amendment provided in part:\nIn any case where State-owned land is completely sur\xc2\xad\nrounded by lands incorporated into the wilderness system\nsuch State shall be given (1) such rights as may be neces\xc2\xad\nsary to assure adequate access to such State-owned land\nby such State and its successors in interest, or (2) land in\nthe same State, not exceeding the value of the surrounded\nland, in exchange for the surrounded land. Exchanges of\nland under the provisions of this subsection shall be ac\xc2\xad\ncomplished in the manner provided for the exchange of\nlands in national forests.\n107 Cong. Rec. 18,103 (1961). In urging support of his amendment,\nSenator Bennett explained:45\n[T]he Western Association of State Land Commissioners\nunanimously adopted a resolution calling for indemnifica\xc2\xad\ntion to the States which will lose access to State lands in\nwilderness areas established under S. 174. Where State\nschool sections or other State lands are isolated by wilder\xc2\xad\nness areas, the State should be given an opportunity, if\naccess is denied, to make in lieu selections of Federal lands\nin other areas.\nId. (emphasis added).46 These statements demonstrate that Senator\nBennett believed that access not consistent with wilderness preservation\ncould be denied, and wanted to give states an alternative in such\ncircumstances.\nThe Senator later explained that his amendment was designed to\ncorrect problems states had experienced with land exchanges in the\npast. 107 Cong. Rec. 18,105 (1961). He wanted to ensure that if the\nstate land was \xe2\x80\x9clocked up,\xe2\x80\x9d the state clearly would be entitled to an\nexchange. He further explained:\n45 A u th o rity to e x c h a n g e land is p ro v id e d by 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 \xc2\xa7 4 8 5 , 486 (o rig in a lly e n a c te d as A c t o f\nM ar. 20, 1922, c h . 105, 42 S tat. 465) an d 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 516 (o rig in a lly e n a c te d as A c t o f M ar. 3, 1925,\nch . 473, 43 S tat. 1215).\n46 H is b e lie f th a t a c cess to sta te -o w n e d lan d s m a y be d e n ie d e n tire ly m a y resu lt in p a rt fro m th e\nla n g u a g e o f \xc2\xa7 4 (c ) , 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1133(c), w h ic h s p ecifically p ro te c te d o n ly ex istin g priva te rig h ts. H e\nm a d e n o s ta te m e n ts re ly in g on th is la n g u ag e, h o w e v e r.\n\n51\n\n\x0cThe first choice, providing that the State shall have adequate\naccess, would in fact defeat the value o f the wilderness bill,\nassuming there were a very valuable mineral in a State\nschool section, and the State were to decide that it was\nworth money to drive a road through the wilderness to\nget to it. This would change the situation with respect to\nexisting law, because we would be imposing particular\nrestrictions, in spirit at least, with respect to access to the\nland.\nId. (emphasis added).\nBecause of misunderstandings regarding the effect of the proposed\namendment on mineral lands, Senator Bennett withdrew the amend\xc2\xad\nment to allow time to confer with other Senators from western states.\nHe re-offered the amendment the following day, with minor changes\nnot relevant here. 107 Cong. Rec. 18,384 (1961). Senator Church, who\nearlier had expressed reservations about the amendment, now voiced\nhis support. In his brief remarks, he stated:\nI think the amendment is fair to the States involved. If\nthey need rights of access, they should have them; if they\nwant to relinquish the land, they ought to have the right\nto acquire other land of comparable value.\nId. Although we can infer from these remarks an understanding that\nthe section gives states the option of choosing access or exchange, the\nstatement does admit of other interpretations. In light of the evidence\nto the contrary, the resolution of this question cannot be rested on the\nremarks of one senator during debate on the Senate floor, where \xe2\x80\x9cthe\nchoice of words . . . is not always accurate or exact.\xe2\x80\x9d In re Carlson,\n292 F. Supp. 778, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1968), citing United States v. Internat\'l\nUnion UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585-86 (1957). If the Congress had\nintended to grant landowners a right to adequate access, it could have\ndone so expressly. Resolving the doubt in favor of the grantee of such a\nright would violate the well-established rule that any doubts as to\ncongressional grants of property interests must be resolved in favor of\nthe government. Andrus v. Charleston Stone Prod. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617\n(1978); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957).\nThe Senate agreed to Senator Bennett\xe2\x80\x99s amendment to S. 174, but\nS. 174 did not pass the House during the 87th Congress. A House\nversion of the bill did include a similar provision, also applicable only\nto state-owned land. The House report on this bill indicated that the\nsection required only that a state be given either access or exchange; it\ndid not indicate that the state could choose between them, or that\nadequate access otherwise was guaranteed. It stated:\nIf surrounded land is owned by a State, the State would\nbe given either right of access or opportunity of exchange.\n52\n\n\x0c. . . Ingress and egress would be provided for all valid\noccupancies.\nH.R. Rep. No. 2521, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1962) (emphasis added).\nVariations of Senator Bennett\xe2\x80\x99s amendment appeared in both the\nSenate and House versions of the wilderness legislation in the 88th\nCongress. S. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. \xc2\xa7 3(j) (1963); H.R. 9070, 88th\nCong., 2d Sess. \xc2\xa7 6(a) (1964). The Senate committee report on S. 4\nindicates that the understanding that states could be denied access and\noffered a land exchange as indemnity remained unchanged:\nSection 3(j) provides that where State inholdings exist\nin wilderness areas, the State shall be afforded access, or\nshall be given Federal lands in exchange of equal value.\nThe amendment is an attempt to clarify the intention of\nthe Senate in regard to section 3(j), which was originally\nproposed, withdrawn, revised, again proposed and\nadopted during floor consideration of S. 174 in 1962 [sic].\nThe amended section represents a more deliberate and\ncareful drafting and consideration.\nS. Rep. No. 109, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 21 (1963).\nThe House modified this section to include \xe2\x80\x9cprivately owned land\xe2\x80\x9d\nin the first paragraph regarding \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access,\xe2\x80\x9d rather than in the\nsecond paragraph regarding \xe2\x80\x9cingress and egress.\xe2\x80\x9d This modification is\nnot explained in the House report. See H.R. Rep. No. 1538, 88th Cong.,\n2d Sess. 13 (1963). The change was discussed in both the Senate and\nHouse hearings, however. The sentiment expressed was that private\nowners should have the same rights as the States. National Wilderness\nPreservation Act: Hearings on H.R. 9070, H.R. 9162, S. 4 and Related\nBills, Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands o f the House Comm, on\nInterior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1369-72 (1963). Both\npublic witnesses and congressmen stated that ingress and egress was\nuncertain under both 16 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7478 and the wilderness acts, and that\nthe same provision for exchange should be made for private owners as\nwas made for States. Id. There is no indication that this addition of\nprivately owned lands modified the purpose of the section as identified\nby Senator Bennett.\nIn sum, if uses are well-established prior to wilderness designation,\nthey may be permitted to continue.47 In addition, all existing private\n47\nS ectio n 4(d)(1) o f th e A c t, 16 U .S .C . \xc2\xa7 1133(d)(1), p ro v id e s th a t th e \xe2\x80\x9c use o f a irc ra ft o r m o to r \xc2\xad\nb o ats, w h e re th e se uses h av e a lre a d y b e c o m e esta b lish e d , m ay be p e rm itte d to c o n tin u e su b je c t to su ch\nre stric tio n s as th e S e c re ta ry o f A g ric u ltu re d ee m s d e s ira b le .\xe2\x80\x9d T h e c o m m itte e re p o rts rev ea l an in ten t\nth a t o th e r w ell-estab lish ed uses also be p e rm itte d to c o n tin u e . See. e.g.. S. R ep . N o . 109, 88 th C o n g .,\n1st Sess. 2, 10 (1963). See also 109 C o n g . R ec. 5926 (1963) ( S e n a to r C h u r c h , a sp o n so r o f th e bill,\nex p ressed th e v ie w th a t o w n e rs o f ra n c h e s be a llo w e d to c o n tin u e \xe2\x80\x9c th e c u s to m a ry u sag e o f th e ir\np r o p e rty fo r in g re ss an d e g ress a c c o r d in g to th e c u s to m a ry w a y s \xe2\x80\x9d ).\n\n53\n\n\x0crights of access are preserved. Even if the landowner has no prior\nexisting right to access not consistent with wilderness uses, the Wilder\xc2\xad\nness Act requires that \xe2\x80\x9cadequate access\xe2\x80\x9d be given or that an offer be\nmade to the landowner to exchange the land for federal land of ap\xc2\xad\nproximately equal value. As a result of \xc2\xa7 5(a), therefore, the inholder\nactually may possess more access \xe2\x80\x9crights\xe2\x80\x9d than were possessed prior to\nwilderness designation. If the landowner rejects an offer of land ex\xc2\xad\nchange, he may retain title to the inholding and exercise access rights\nconsistent with wilderness uses, or he may consent to acquisition of his\nland by the federal government.\nThese responses to the questions you have asked should provide\nsatisfactory guidance in your performance of your federal land manage\xc2\xad\nment responsibilities.\nSincerely,\nB e n ja m in\n\n54\n\nR.\n\nC iv ile tti\n\n\x0c'