b'Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens\xe2\x80\x99 Arrival in\nUnited States Territorial Waters\n\nU n d o c u m en ted alien s in te rd ic te d w ith in th e tw e lv e -m ile z o n e that c o m p ris e s the U n ited S ta te s \xe2\x80\x99s te rn to n a l sea are n o t e n title d to a h e a n n g u n d e r the e x c lu sio n p ro v is io n s o f the Im m ig ra tio n a n d N a \xc2\xad\ntio n a lity A ct\n\nT h e Im m ig ra tio n an d N a tu ra liz a tio n S e rv ic e had the a u th o rity to p ro m u lg ate a n in te rp re ta tiv e rule\nc o n stru in g th e "te rrito ria l w a te rs \xe2\x80\x9d o f th e U n ited S tales, as re fe rred to in sec tio n 287 o f th e IN A , to\ne x te n d for tw e lv e n au tical m iles\n\nO ctober 13, 1993\n\nM e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l\n\nThis memorandum responds to requests made by the Office o f the Associate\nAttorney General and the General Counsel\xe2\x80\x99s Office of the Immigration and Natu\xc2\xad\nralization Service (\xe2\x80\x9cINS\xe2\x80\x9d) for our views on the consequences under the Im m igra\xc2\xad\ntion and Nationality Act (\xe2\x80\x9cINA\xe2\x80\x9d) o f an undocumented alien\xe2\x80\x99s arrival in United\nStates territorial waters. 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 1101-1537. Specifically, we have been asked\nwhether undocumented aliens who have been interdicted within the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\nterritorial waters are entitled to an exclusion hearing under section 236 of the\nIN A ,1 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1226. W e have also been asked to review the IN S\xe2\x80\x99s enforcement\nauthority under INA section 287, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357, and to assess the INS\xe2\x80\x99s recent\ninterpretive regulation, 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(1) (1993), insofar as it purports to de\xc2\xad\nfine the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal boundaries\xe2\x80\x9d of the United States under INA section 287.\nWe understand that resolution o f these issues is of some urgency because the\nUnited States has been interdicting, within its territorial waters, vessels transport\xc2\xad\ning large numbers of undocumented aliens seeking admission into the United\nStates from various foreign countries. These activities have raised the question\nwhether the United States must provide exclusion proceedings for such aliens.\nAgencies represented on the W orking Group on Ocean Policy and the Law of the\nSea, in particular the State Department and the United States Coast Guard, have\nexpressed an interest in the issues. We have therefore invited, and received, the\nviews of the State Department and the Coast Guard.\n1\nS ee M em orandum for O ffice o f Legal Counsel, D epartm ent of Justice, from G rover Joseph R ees III\nG eneral Counsel, Im m igration and N aiurahzation Service, Re: Im m igration C onsequences oj A r r iv a l into\nthe Territorial Waters oj the U nited Suites (June 15, 1993) T og eth er w ith this cover m em orandum , the INS\nhas subm itted a M em orandum for M aureen W alker, Bureau o f O ceans and International E nvironm ental and\nScientific A ffairs, D epartm ent o f State, from the O ffice o f the G eneral C ounsel, Re- Inform ation R equest\nfr o m W orking G roup on Ocean P o h cv a n d Law oj the Sea (D ec 17, 1992) ( \xe2\x80\x9c 1NS/OGC M em orandum \xe2\x80\x99*) and\na draft m em orandum o f law (\xe2\x80\x9c INS Draft M em orandum ").\n\n77\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L eg a l Counsel\n\nI. B ackground\nThe background to these requests is as follows. Historically, the United States\nadhered to the rule that the territorial sea extends three nautical miles out.2 In\n1988, however, President Reagan, by proclam ation, extended the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\nterritorial sea to a distance of twelve nautical miles. See Proclamation No. 5928, 3\nC.F.R. 547 (1989), reprinted in 103 Stat. 2981 (1989), (\xe2\x80\x9cthe Proclamation\xe2\x80\x9d).3\nAlthough the Proclam ation by its term s purported not to extend or otherwise alter\nexisting Federal law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations de\xc2\xad\nrived therefrom , questions arose concerning the possible or alleged effects of the\nProclam ation on domestic law or law enforcem ent.4 Among these questions are\nthe two considered in this opinion, relating to the procedural rights under the INA\nof undocum ented aliens intercepted within twelve miles of the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\nshores, and to the authority of the IN S to board and search sea vessels suspected of\ntransporting undocum ented aliens if such vessels are found within that twelve mile\nzone.\nThe IN S \xe2\x80\x99s former General Counsel has taken the position that the Proclamation\noperated so as to extend the scope o f the INA to the new twelve mile limit of the\nterritorial waters. Specifically, the INS argues in the submissions considered here\nthat an entitlem ent to an exclusion proceeding now arises whenever an undocu\xc2\xad\nmented alien arrives within the twelve mile limit. As the INS acknowledges, how\xc2\xad\never, its past practice and views on this subject have not been consistent. In 1980,\nan INS m em orandum to this O ffice concerning the treatment of Cuban refugees\nm aintained that an alien apprehended within the territorial waters before landing\n\xe2\x80\x9cdoes not appear to have a right to apply for asylum\xe2\x80\x9d under the Refugee Act of\n1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (\xe2\x80\x9cRefugee Act\xe2\x80\x9d), and could be towed to a\nthird country where he or she would not face persecution. See Memorandum for\nJohn Harm on, A ssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from David\nCrosland, Acting Commissioner, INS, Re: Cases on Illegal Entry to Cubans in\nBoats at 1 (May 6, 1980) (\xe2\x80\x9cINS C uba M em orandum \xe2\x80\x9d). However, a different INS\nposition is reflected in a 1986 m emorandum concerning procedures to be followed\nunder Executive Order No. 12324, 4 6 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), which provided for\nthe return of Haitians interdicted on the high seas, with the exception of refugees.\nSee M em orandum for Alan C. N elson, Commissioner, INS, from Maurice C.\n2\nS e e A rg e n tin e R ep u b lic v. Am erada H e ss Shipping C orp , 488 U S 428, 441 n.8 (1989), C u n a rd S.S.\nCo. v M e llo n , 262 U .S. 100, 122 (1923), U n ite d States v. P o sta l, 589 F.2d 862, 869 (5th C i r ), cert denied,\n4 44 I! S 832 (1979). T h e \' \xe2\x80\x98te rn to n a l\xe2\x80\x9d or \'\xe2\x80\x98m a rg in a l\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99 sea is th e belt o f w ater im m ediately adjacent to a na\xc2\xad\ntio n \xe2\x80\x99s co ast. S ee R e sta te m en t (T h ird ) o f the F o reig n R e la tio n s L a w o f the U nited States, \xc2\xa7 5 1 1(a) (1986).\n1\nO n th e P roclam ation, see Argentine R e p u b lic , 488 U.S. at 441 n 8, John E. N oyes, U nited Stales o f\nA m e n ta P r e sid e n tia l P ro cla m a tio n No. 5 9 2 8 : A 12-M ile U.S. T erritorial Sea, 4 In t\xe2\x80\x99l J. E stu a n n e and\nC oastal L. 142 (1989); C om m ent, The E xtension o f the U n ited Slates T erritorial Sea R easons a n d E ffects,\n4 C onn . J I n t\xe2\x80\x99l L. 6 9 7 (1989).\n4\nS e e g e n e ra lly H ea rin g B e fo re the Suhcom m on O cea n o g ra p h y and G reat Lakes o j the H ouse Com m , on\nM e rch a n t M a rin e a n d F isheries, 101st C ong. 4 9 , 60 (1989) (\xe2\x80\x9c 1989 H earings\xe2\x80\x9d)\n\n78\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\' A rrival in U.S. Territorial W aters\n\nInman, Jr., General Counsel, INS, Re: Interdiction o f Aliens (Feb. 21, 1986) (\xe2\x80\x9cINS\nHaiti Memorandum\xe2\x80\x9d). Executive Order No. 12324 stated that its provisions for the\ninterdiction-and-return of Haitians \xe2\x80\x9care authorized to be undertaken only outside\nthe territorial waters of the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,109. Following the\nterms of that Executive Order, the INS memorandum stated that \xe2\x80\x9c[individuals in\xc2\xad\nterdicted within the territorial waters of the United States are transported to a port\no f the United States for an adjudication of their immigration status pursuant to the\nImmigration and Nationality Act.\xe2\x80\x9d INS Haiti M emorandum at 3. The m em oran\xc2\xad\ndum further asserted that \xe2\x80\x9cit is rather well settled that individuals within our territo\xc2\xad\nrial waters may not be forcibly removed to the high seas.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 4.5 Thus, the\nIN S \xe2\x80\x99s current position is at variance with its views as of 1980 \xe2\x80\x94 though not with\nits views as of 1986 \xe2\x80\x94 as well as being inconsistent with the position of the State\nDepartment and the Coast Guard.6\nW e conclude in Part II below that an undocumented alien who is intercepted\nwithin the twelve mile zone now comprising the United States\xe2\x80\x99s territorial waters is\nnot entitled to an exclusion hearing under the INA. W e base this conclusion pri\xc2\xad\nmarily on an examination of the text of the statute \xe2\x80\x94 most importantly, its explicit\nrequirements for exclusion proceedings. See INA sections 235, 236, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7\n1225, 1226. We also examine the statute\xe2\x80\x99s provisions for asylum and withholding\no f deportation, and conclude that these provisions are consistent with, and indeed\nsupport, our reading o f the statutory sections regarding exclusion. See Refugee\nAct, \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 201(b), 202(e), 94 Stat. at 105, 107 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7\n1158, 1253). We then consider the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s definition of the term \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States,\xe2\x80\x9d\nINA section 101(a)(38), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1101 (a)(38), and reject IN S\xe2\x80\x99s contention that\nthis definition, coupled with the Proclamation, compels the conclusion that the\nIN A \xe2\x80\x99s procedural protections must apply to undocumented aliens who have entered\nthe twelve mile zone. W e also consider, and reject, IN S\xe2\x80\x99s alternative claim that the\njurisdictional section of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1333,\n(\xe2\x80\x9cOCSLA\xe2\x80\x9d) operates to extend the INA \xe2\x80\x94 and in particular the right to an exclu\xc2\xad\nsion hearing \xe2\x80\x94 to the limit of the territorial waters. Finally, we scrutinize the\nProclamation itself, and conclude that it has no effect on the procedural entitlement\nthat the INA provides to undocumented aliens.\n5 N o authority was cited for this proposition\n6 In a letter responding to this O ffice\xe2\x80\x99s invitation to su b m it view s on this issue, the State D epartm ent\nstated, \xe2\x80\x9c [a]t a m inim um , it appears that the conduct o f INS exclusion and deportation procedures by their\nvery nature are only relevant once an alien has reached the land territory of the U nited States.\xe2\x80\x9d L etter for\nR obert D elahunty, A cting D eputy A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal C ounsel, from M aureen\nW alker, Chief, D ivision o f M arine Law & Policy, B ureau o f O ceans and International Environm ental and\nS cientific A ffairs, D epartm ent o f State at 2 (July 28, 1993) (\xe2\x80\x9c State D epartm ent S ubm ission"). T he State\nD epartm en t\xe2\x80\x99s view s are discussed further, infra, p 87 n.23. In a sim ilar subm ission, the C oast G uard took\nthe position that undocum ented aliens interdicted w ithin the three m ile zone encom passed by the pre-1988\nterritorial w aters w ould be en titled to exclusion proceedings, b u t that those interdicted in the w aters beyond\nthat zone would not be entitled to such proceedings. L etter for R obert D elahunty, A cting D eputy A ssistant\nA ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal Counsel, from David K antor, C hief, M aritim e and International Law D ivi\xc2\xad\nsion, U nited States C oast G uard at 1 (A ug. 10, 1993).\n\n79\n\n\x0cOpinions o f the O ffice o f L egal C ounsel\n\nIn Part III below, we review the INS interpretative regulation, 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 287\n(1993), that purports to construe the meaning o f the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal boundaries\xe2\x80\x9d of the\nUnited States, as that term is used in INA section 287, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357. The latter\nstatute sets forth various investigative and enforcement powers o f the INS. O f\nparticular relevance, it empowers the INS to conduct certain warrantless searches\nwithin \xe2\x80\x9ca reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d\nINA section 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357(a)(3). W e conclude that the INS had the\nauthority to construe that section in a manner that reflected the enlargement of the\nUnited States\xe2\x80\x99s territorial waters under the Proclamation, and we offer two theories\nto justify that result. We also note an ambiguity in the IN S\xe2\x80\x99s regulation, and rec\xc2\xad\nommend that, if INS decides to maintain its interpretation of INA section 287, it\ncure this defect.\n\nII.\nA. Exclusion Proceedings Under The INA\n\xe2\x80\x9cIt is undoubtedly within the pow er o f the Federal Government to exclude aliens\nfrom the country.\xe2\x80\x9d Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973);\nsee also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408\nU.S. 753, 765-66 (1972); 1 Charles Gordon and Stanley Mailman, Immigration\nLaw and Procedure, \xc2\xa7 1,03[2][a] (rev. ed. 1993) (\xe2\x80\x9cGordon & M ailman\xe2\x80\x9d).\nThe m eans by which the Federal Government may prevent aliens from coming\ninto the country are varied. Some aliens seeking to enter the United States must\nfirst be accorded the procedural rights provided by the INA, including an eviden\xc2\xad\ntiary hearing, before any determination to exclude them from this country can be\nmade. O ther aliens may, however, be prevented from entering the United States by\nExecutive actions that do not implicate any INA procedures. Thus, in its recent\ndecision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993), the\nSuprem e C ourt held that neither the INA nor the United Nations Protocol Relating\nto the Status o f R efugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (\xe2\x80\x9cthe\nProtocol\xe2\x80\x9d), placed any lim it \xe2\x80\x9con the President\xe2\x80\x99s authority to repatriate aliens inter\xc2\xad\ndicted beyond the territorial seas o f the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d7 The question presented\nhere is w hether undocumented aliens seeking to enter the United States but inter\xc2\xad\ndicted within its territorial waters \xe2\x80\x94 that is, within twelve nautical miles from the\nUnited States\xe2\x80\x99 baselines \xe2\x80\x94 must be accorded an exclusion proceeding under the\nINA.\n\n7\nT h e C o u rt also noted that a provision o f the IN A , 8 U S C \xc2\xa7 1182(0, "grants the P resident am ple\npow er to estab lish a naval b lo ck ad e that would sim ply deny illegal . . . m igrants the ability to disem bark on\nour shores " S a le, 509 U .S. at 187.\n\n80\n\n\x0cImm igration Consequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\' A rrival in U S Territorial W aters\n\nSection 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1225(b), \xe2\x80\x9cprovide[s] the jurisdictional\nbasis for an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge.\xe2\x80\x9d M atter o f Waldei, 19\nI. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (1984). That section reads in part as follows:\nEvery alien (other than an alien crewman) and except as otherwise\nprovided in subsection (c) of this section and in section 1323(d) of\nthis title,181 who may not appear to the examining immigration offi\xc2\xad\ncer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to\nland shall be detained for further inquiry to be conducted by a spe\xc2\xad\ncial inquiry officer.\n8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1225(a) (emphasis added).\nSection 236(a), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1226(a), provides for exclusion hearings before a\n\xe2\x80\x9cspecial inquiry officer\xe2\x80\x9d (i.e., an immigration judge, see 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1101(b)(4)).\nSection 236(a) states:\nA special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this sec\xc2\xad\ntion, administer oaths, present and receive evidence, and interro\xc2\xad\ngate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses. He shall\nhave authority m any case to determine whether an arriving alien\nwho has been detained for further inquiry under section 1225 o f this\ntitle shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.\nAs the plain language of the INA makes clear, it is a predicate for conducting\nexclusion proceedings that the alien seeking admission be examined \xe2\x80\x9cat the port o f\narrival\xe2\x80\x9d by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1225(b); see also id. \xc2\xa7 1225(a)\n(\xe2\x80\x9cAll aliens arriving at ports o f the United States shall be examined by one or more\nimmigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such\nregulations as he may prescribe.\xe2\x80\x9d)\'(em phasis added); 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 235.1 (1993)\n(\xe2\x80\x9cApplication to enter the United States shall be made . . . in person to an immi\xc2\xad\ngration officer at a U.S. port o f entry enumerated in part 100 o f this chapter.)\n(emphasis added); id. \xc2\xa7 100.4 (c)(2) (designating ports of entry); 1 Gordon &\nMailman, at \xc2\xa7 8.05[2][b] (\xe2\x80\x9cThere are many places designated as ports o f entry\nalong the land borders of the United States and at international airports and sea\xc2\xad\nports. It is to such a place, and at a time open for inspection, that an alien seeking\nentry to the United States must make his or her application for admission. . . .\n\xe2\x80\x98Instream \xe2\x80\x99 inspections are conducted aboard arriving ships.\xe2\x80\x9d).9 An alien mter8 8 U S C \xc2\xa7 1225(c) refers to the tem porary exclusion by sum m ary procedures o f certain aliens w ho\nappear to be excludable on national security o r related grounds 8 U S.C. \xc2\xa7 1323(d) refers to aliens w ho\narrive as siow aw ays, and renders them subject to exclusion w ithout a hearing Se e M atter o f W aldei, 19 1 &\nN. Dec at 192\n9 M ere arrival at a port o f the U nited States, w ithout more, does not entitle an alien to an exclusion\nhearing before a special inquiry o fficer under INA section 236 Rather, that section lim its the special inquiry\n\n81\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L egal C ounsel\n\ndieted at sea \xe2\x80\x94 even if within the territorial waters of the United States \xe2\x80\x94 is not at\nany \xe2\x80\x9cport.\xe2\x80\x9d 10 Consequently, there is no jurisdiction to conduct an exclusion pro\xc2\xad\nceeding in such a case."\nThis construction of INA sections 235(b) and 236(a) comports with the text and\nstructure o f the INA. Both sections are located within Part IV, \xe2\x80\x9cProvisions Relat\xc2\xad\ning To Entry And Exclusion,\xe2\x80\x9d of Subchapter II, \xe2\x80\x9cImmigration,\xe2\x80\x9d of the INA. An\nanalysis o f these provisions confirms that statutory arrangements for exclusion pro\xc2\xad\nceedings presuppose that the alien is no longer at sea, but has reached port. The\nfirst provision o f Part IV relates to the duties o f persons transporting alien and citi\xc2\xad\nzen passengers to provide immigration officers with lists or \xe2\x80\x9cmanifests\xe2\x80\x9d of the per\xc2\xad\nsons they are transporting. The duty to provide such a list attaches under INA\nsection 231(a), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1221(a), \xe2\x80\x9c[u]pon the arrival of any person by water or\nby air a t any port within the United States from any place outside the United\nStates\xe2\x80\x9d (em phasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 231.1(a) (1993). Under INA section\n232, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1222, aliens \xe2\x80\x9carriving at ports of the United States\xe2\x80\x9d may be de\xc2\xad\ntained for observation and examination by immigration officers and medical offi\xc2\xad\ncers if it is thought that they may be excludable for medical reasons (emphasis\nadded). Before its repeal in 1986, the next section, INA section 233, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\n1223, authorized immigration officers to order the temporary removal of aliens\n\xe2\x80\x9c[u]pon the[ir] arrival at a port o f the United States, . . . but such temporary re\xc2\xad\nmoval shall not be considered a landing\xe2\x80\x9d (emphasis added). Section 234, 8 U.S.C.\n\xc2\xa7 1224, deals with physical and mental exam inations o f certain arriving aliens, and\nprovides for appeals therefrom. Sections 235 and 236, as discussed above, con\xc2\xad\ncern other inspections o f arriving aliens and the institution o f exclusion proceed\xc2\xad\n\no ffic e rs \xe2\x80\x99 au th o rity to c o n d u ct exclusion pro ceed in g s to cases in w hich aliens have reached port and have\nbeen d etain ed o r taken into cu sto d y by im m ig ratio n officers.\n10 B la c k \'s L a w D ic tio n a ry (6th ed 1990) defines a \xe2\x80\x9c p o rt\xe2\x80\x9d as:\nA place for the lo adin g and unloading o f the cargoes o f vessels, and the collection o f duties or\ncu sto m s upon im ports o r exports A p la c e , on the seacoast, great lakes, or on a n v e r, where ships\nsto p fo r the purpose o f loading and u n lo ad in g cargo, o r for the purpose of taking on o r letting off\npassen g ers, from w hence they depart, a n d where they finish their voyage. A port is a place in\xc2\xad\nten d ed fo r lo ad in g or unloading goods; hence includes the natural shelter surrounding w ater, as\nalso sh eltered w ater pro d u ced by artificial jetties, etc. T he B aldhill, C C A N Y , 42 F 2d 123,\n125.\nId. at 1161.\nA \xe2\x80\x9c port*\' m ust th u s be a \xe2\x80\x9c p lace" and, as C h ie f Justice John M arshall w rote, \xe2\x80\x9c [t)he objects w ith w hich the\nw ord 4p la c e \' is associated, are all, in their n a tu re , fixed and territo rial." U nited S tates v. Bevans, 16 U S. (3\nW heat.) 336, 390 (1 8 1 8 ) (em p h asis added) (U n ited States w arship lying at anchor in B oston H arbor not a\n\xe2\x80\x9cp la c e \xe2\x80\x9d w ith in m eaning o f 1790 statute), s e e also id. at 340 (arg um ent o f D aniel W ebster, citing com m on\nlaw m eaning o f \xe2\x80\x9cport\'*); D eva to v. 823 B a rrels o f Plum bago, 20 F 510, 515 (S D N Y 1884).\nB eing at a p o rt does not req u ire that a \xe2\x80\x9c la n d in g \xe2\x80\x9d be m ade A \xe2\x80\x9cla n d in g \xe2\x80\x9d occurs w hen a vessel is left and\nthe shore is reach ed . T a y lo r v U nited S ta te s, 207 U.S. 120, 125 (1907). We note that an alien w ho has\narrived at a p o rt b u t w h o has not landed m ay be entitled to an exclusion proceeding See M a tter o f Pierre,\n14 1 & N . D ec 4 6 7 ,4 6 9 -7 0 (1 9 7 3 ).\n11 E ven if it is assu m ed th at an alien s p resen ce at a \xe2\x80\x9c p o rt\xe2\x80\x9d is not a ju r isd ic tio n a l requirem ent o f an exclu\xc2\xad\nsion pro ceed in g , the statu te nonetheless m a k e s clear that the rig h t to such a proceeding does not attach u n \xc2\xad\nless the alien is at a \xe2\x80\x9cp ort \xe2\x80\x9d\n\n82\n\n\x0cIm m igration Consequences o f Undocum ented A lie n s \' A rriv a l in U S Territorial W aters\n\nings. Section 237, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1227, provides for the immediate deportation of\nexcluded aliens.\nJudicial support for our interpretation is provided by Haitian Refugee Center,\nInc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff\'d on other grounds, 809 F.2d\n794 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a suit challenging the G overnm ent\xe2\x80\x99s interdiction o f visaless\naliens on the high seas. There the district court stated:\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act has established procedures for\nthe exclusion of aliens, including the entitlement to a hearing. See 8\nU.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1226. Those rights, however, are reserved for aliens ar\xc2\xad\nriving \xe2\x80\x9cby water or by air at any port within the United States from\nany place outside the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. Contrary to plaintiffs\xe2\x80\x99 as\xc2\xad\nsertion, the interdicted Haitians also have no statutory \xe2\x80\x9cright to\ncounsel\xe2\x80\x9d, which is reserved to those aliens in \xe2\x80\x9cexclusion or deporta\xc2\xad\ntion proceedings.\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1362.\nAgain, because those\n\xe2\x80\x9cexclusion or deportation proceedings\xe2\x80\x9d are restricted to aliens ar\xc2\xad\nriving \xe2\x80\x9cat any port within the United States,\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1221, it is\nclear that the interdicted Haitians are entitled to none of these\nstatutorily-created procedural rights, including the right to counsel.\nId. at 1404.\nIn sum, then, the overall statutory scheme regulating the exclusion of an alien is\nactivated by the alien\xe2\x80\x99s arrival at a port of the United States. That event triggers\nsignificant legal effects, including the transporter\xe2\x80\x99s duty to provide a manifest, the\nimmigration officers\xe2\x80\x99 powers to inspect and detain, and the alien\xe2\x80\x99s right, if de\xc2\xad\ntained, to an exclusion proceeding. Nothing in the statute contemplates that the\nsame effects are to follow if the alien is interdicted at sea before reaching port \xe2\x80\x94\neven if interdiction occurs within United States territorial waters. For purposes of\nexclusion under the INA, the ports of the United States \xe2\x80\x94 not the limits of its ter\xc2\xad\nritorial waters \xe2\x80\x94 are functionally its borders. Accordingly, we conclude that aliens\ninterdicted within United States territorial waters do not have a right to exclusion\nproceedings under INA section 236.\n\nB. Asylum and Withholding Provisions o f the INA\nExamination of the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s basic distinction between exclusion and deportation\nproceedings, and of its provisions for asylum and withholding of deportation or\nreturn, confirms the conclusion reached in the previous section.\n\xe2\x80\x9c \xe2\x80\x98[0 ]u r immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens\nwho have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the\nUnited Slates after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the\nCourt has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the\n\n83\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L egal C ounsel\n\nformer category who are merely \xe2\x80\x9con the threshold of initial entry.\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x9d Sale, 509\nU.S. at 175 (quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)) (quoting\nShaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). The dis\xc2\xad\ntinction in the rights and privileges accorded to these two groups is reflected in the\ndifferent procedures applied to each. \xe2\x80\x9cThe deportation hearing is the usual means\nof proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the ex\xc2\xad\nclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the\nUnited States seeking admission.\xe2\x80\x9d Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25.\nThe differences between exclusion and deportation, and the varying procedural\nprotections attached to each, turn on whether the alien has made an \xe2\x80\x9centry\xe2\x80\x9d into the\nUnited States. \xe2\x80\x9cE ntry\xe2\x80\x9d is here a term of art.12 See id. at 28-29; Matter o f Patel, 20\nI. & N. Dec. 368, 370 (1991). \xe2\x80\x9cPhysically coming into the United States does not\nnecessarily accom plish an entry, else all inspections would effectively have to be\nmade on foreign soil. Presence after inspection and admission, without further\nrestraint, however, does amount to entry. So does penetrating the functional border\nby intentionally evading inspection before being apprehended.\xe2\x80\x9d I Gordon &\nM ailm an, at \xc2\xa7 1.03[2][b]. Aliens w ho have made an \xe2\x80\x9centry\xe2\x80\x9d are entitled to depor\xc2\xad\ntation proceedings; those who are seeking admission but who have not entered are\naccorded, at most, an exclusion proceeding \xe2\x80\x94 \xe2\x80\x9ca process in which the alien usually\nhas less protection under the statute and little, if any, under the Constitution.\xe2\x80\x9d Id.u\nBefore 1980, aliens who were excludable but not deportable did not have the\nright to apply for either asylum or withholding of deportation or return.14 By the\nenactm ent o f the Refugee Act, \xc2\xa7 203(e), 94 Stat. at 107, Congress extended those\nbenefits to both types o f aliens.15 Section 201(b) o f the Refugee Act, as amended,\nnow codified at 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1158(a), prescribed that the Attorney General was to\nestablish procedures for asylum applications. The Refugee A ct\xe2\x80\x99s asylum provision\nstates in part: \xe2\x80\x9cThe Attorney G eneral shall establish a procedure for an alien\nphysically present in the United States or a t a land border or port o f entry, irre\xc2\xad\nspective of such alien\xe2\x80\x99s status, to apply for asylum .\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1158(a) (emphasis\nadded). As explained immediately below, aliens interdicted within United States\nterritorial waters are neither \xe2\x80\x9cat a land border or port of entry,\xe2\x80\x9d nor even\n\xe2\x80\x9cphysically present in the United States\xe2\x80\x9d within the meaning of the asylum statute.\n12 T he term \xe2\x80\x9cen try \xe2\x80\x9d is d efin ed in the INA to "m ean [] any c o m in g o f an alien into the U nited States, from a\nforeign port o r place o r from an outlying p ossession, w hether voluntarily or otherw ise " 8 U S C. \xc2\xa7\n1101(a)( 13)\n13 F o r an explanation o f the different e n titlem en ts under each procedure, see Landon v Plasencia, 459\nU S. at 25-28.\n14 Se e Leng M a M a y v. B a rb er, M a ld o n a d o -S a n d o va l v. IN S, 518 F 2d 278, 280 n 3 (9th C ir 1975);\nU nited S ta te s e x ret. Tom We Shitng v. M urff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 260 (S .D .N .Y . 1959), a f f d sub nom U nited\nStates ex. rel. Tom We Sh u n g v. Esperdv, 274 F.2d 667 (2d C ir I960); M a tter o f Cenatice, 16 I. & N Dec\n1 6 2 ,1 6 4 -6 5 (1977).\n13 S ee S a le, 509 U.S at 176 n 33 (w ithholding); id. at 159-60 (asylum and w ithholding); H aitian R efu \xc2\xad\ngee C en ter v. C ra cev, 809 F.2d at 841 (E d w ard s, J., con cu rrin g in part and dissenting in part), 8 C F.R. \xc2\xa7\n208 2 (a) (1 993); M a tte r o f S a lim , 18 1 & N. D ec. 311, 314 (1 982); 2 G ordon & M ailm an, at I) 33.05[2][a][bl.\n\n84\n\n\x0cIm m igration Consequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s \xe2\x80\x99 A rrival in U.S Territorial W aters\n\nSee Sale, 509 U.S. at 160 (IN A \xe2\x80\x99s protections apply \xe2\x80\x9conly to aliens who reside in or\nhave arrived at the border o f the United States\xe2\x80\x9d) (emphasis added).\nIn Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert, de\xc2\xad\nnied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992), the court construed the language of the asylum provi\xc2\xad\nsion and held:\n[T]he plaintiffs in this case \xe2\x80\x94 who have been interdicted on the\nhigh seas \xe2\x80\x94 cannot assert a claim based on the INA or the Refugee\nAct. . . . The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and lim\xc2\xad\nits the application o f the provision to aliens within the United States\nor at United States\xe2\x80\x99 borders or ports o f entry. The plaintiffs in this\ncase have been interdicted on the high seas and have not yet reached\n\xe2\x80\x9ca land border\xe2\x80\x9d or a \xe2\x80\x9cport of entry.\xe2\x80\x9d\nId. at 1510 (citations omitted).\nPrecisely the same can be said of aliens who have been interdicted within terri\xc2\xad\ntorial waters: they have not yet reached a land border or a port of entry.16\nFurthermore, aliens interdicted within the territorial waters are also not\n\xe2\x80\x9cphysically present in the United States,\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1158(a), in the sense o f that\nexpression evidently intended by Congress. The statute\xe2\x80\x99s distinction between ali\xc2\xad\nens \xe2\x80\x9cphysically present in the United States\xe2\x80\x9d and aliens \xe2\x80\x9cat a land border or port of\nentry\xe2\x80\x9d is evidently designed to refer to the difference between deportable and ex\xc2\xad\ncludable aliens: as pointed out above, the former are understood to be \xe2\x80\x9calready\nphysically in the United States,\xe2\x80\x9d while the latter are deemed to be \xe2\x80\x9coutside the\nUnited States seeking admission.\xe2\x80\x9d London v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25. Aliens\ninterdicted within the territorial waters are undoubtedly not entitled to deportation\nproceedings. They are therefore not \xe2\x80\x9cphysically present in the United States\xe2\x80\x9d\nwithin the meaning of the Refugee A ct\xe2\x80\x99s asylum provision.\nThe Refugee Act also amended the INA to allow aliens in exclusion proceed\xc2\xad\nings to seek \xe2\x80\x9cwithholding\xe2\x80\x9d under INA section 243(h), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1253(h). See\nSale, 509 U.S. at 175-76 (\xe2\x80\x9cThe 1980 am endm ent erased the long-maintained dis\xc2\xad\ntinction between deportable and excludable aliens for purposes o f section 243(h).\nBy adding the word \xe2\x80\x98return\xe2\x80\x99 and removing the words \xe2\x80\x98within the United States\xe2\x80\x99\nfrom \xc2\xa7 243(h), Congress extended the statute\xe2\x80\x99s protection to both types o f al\xc2\xad\niens.\xe2\x80\x9d).17 In Sale, the Supreme Court held that this amendment did not limit the\n\n16 W e note that, in its 1980 m em orandum concerning the treatm ent o f C uban refugees, INS itself agreed\nlhat \xe2\x80\x9can alien apprehended w ithin territorial w aters before landing does not appear to h av e a n g h t to apply\nfor asylum under the Im m igration and N ationality Act \xe2\x80\x9d INS C uba M em orandum at 1\n17 W ithholding and asylum d iffer in significant ways, net the least o f w hich is that asylum is d iscretio n \xc2\xad\nary relief w hich the A ttorney G eneral may o r m ay not bestow upon qualified applicants, w hereas w ithholding\nis m andatory as to those who qualify for it See, e g , S ale, 509 U S at 162 n 11, IN S v C ardoza-F onseca,\n\n85\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L e g a l C ounsel\n\nPresident\xe2\x80\x99s pow er to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens in\xc2\xad\nterdicted on the high seas. Id. at 174-77. In our view, the amendment also does\nnot limit the President\xe2\x80\x99s power to order the C oast Guard to turn back undocu\xc2\xad\nmented aliens interdicted within United States territorial waters.\nINA section 243(h), 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1253(h), provides that:\nThe Attorney G eneral shall not deport or return[18] any alien . . . to\na country if the Attorney General determines that such alien\xe2\x80\x99s life or\nfreedom would be threatened in such country on account o f race,\nreligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or\npolitical opinion.\nSection 243(h) by its terms applies only to the actions o f the Attorney General.\nSee Sale, 509 U.S. at 177 (Attorney General is \xe2\x80\x9cthe government official at whom\n[section 243(h)] is directed\xe2\x80\x9d). Nothing in the language o f the provision speaks to\nthe responsibilities of the Coast G uard or of any other agency that may encounter\nundocum ented aliens, whether in the territorial waters or elsewhere. Moreover, the\nINA confers authority on executive branch officers other than the Attorney Gen\xc2\xad\neral, specifically including the President. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1182(f) (authorizing\nthe President by proclamation to suspend the entry of \xe2\x80\x9cany class of aliens\xe2\x80\x9d or to\n\xe2\x80\x9cimpose on the entry o f aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate\xe2\x80\x9d);\nsee also Sale, 509 U.S. at 171-72. If the President orders the Coast Guard to inter\xc2\xad\ndict and turn back aliens within the territorial waters, nothing in section 243(h)\nprecludes that agency from obeying his instructions, any more than the section pre\xc2\xad\ncluded the agency from obeying a sim ilar Presidential order with regard to aliens\non the high seas. Cf. id. at 172.19\n480 U S. 421 (1 987); IN S v. S ievic, 467 U S 4 0 7 , 421 n.15, 4 2 3 n 18, 4 2 6 (1984) R elatedly. the alien s\np roof b u rd en is m ore readily disch arg ed in asy lu m cases. S ee 2 G ordon & M ailm an, at \xc2\xa7 33.05[3].\n18 A s ex p lain ed above, w ith o u t having m a d e an \xe2\x80\x9cen try \xe2\x80\x9d into the U nited States, an alien w ould not be\nsubject to d e p o rtatio n ; necessarily, therefore, he o r she w ould not be eligible for w ithholding o f deportation\nAn alien w ho has not m ade an \xe2\x80\x9c en try \xe2\x80\x9d but is in exclusion pro ceed ings can, how ever, apply for the relief of\nw ithholding o f \xe2\x80\x9c return \xe2\x80\x9c As the Suprem e C ourt explained in S a le, the am endm ents m ade by the R efugee Act\nadded the w ord \xe2\x80\x9cre tu rn " to sectio n 243(h) to e n su re that a form o f relief analogous to w ithholding o f d e p u \xc2\xad\ntation w ould be av ailab le in ex clu sio n proceedings See Sale, 509 U S. at 174 ( \xe2\x80\x9cW e can reasonably conclude\nthat C on g ress used the tw o w ords \xe2\x80\x98deport\' and \xe2\x80\x98re tu rn \xe2\x80\x99 only to m ake \xc2\xa7 2 4 3 (h )\'s protection available in both\ndeportatio n and e x clu sio n pro ceed in g s \xe2\x80\x9c)\n19 Fu rth erm o re, it w ould be incongruous if the INA p ro v id ed that an alien seeking adm ission had the\nright to a hearing on a w ith h o ld in g claim, but n o t on an a sy lu m claim , if he or she w ere intercepted in the\nte m to n a l w aters T h e tw o form s o f relief are bro ad ly sim ilar in substance, and petitions for both are alike\nfounded on the fear o f persecution. Applicants frequently p lead (and are invited by im m igration officers and\njudges to plead) fo r both types o f relief to g e th e r indeed, u n d e r Board o f Im m igration A ppeals rules, an\nasylum ap p licatio n presented initially to an im m ig ratio n ju d g e in an exclusion proceeding, or renew ed in\nsuch a p ro ceed in g fo llo w in g d enial by an INS officer, is a lso deem ed an application fo r w ithholding See\nM a tter o f G h a ra d a g h i, 19 1 & N. Dec 311, 3 1 6 (1985); 8 C .F .R . \xc2\xa7 208.3(b) (1993); see also id \xc2\xa7 208 5(a)\n(INS shall m ake available ap p licatio n forms fo r asylum and w ithholding to requesting aliens in its custody);\nid. \xc2\xa7 2 0 8 .1 6 (a) (if A sy lu m O ffice r denies asy lu m application, he o r she shall also decide w hether alien is\nentitled to w ith h o ld in g ); id \xc2\xa7 23 6 .3 (a)(l)-(2 ) (im m ig ratio n ju d g e is to advtse an alien expressing fear o f\n\n86\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f Undocum ented A lie n s \xe2\x80\x99 A rrival in U S T erritorial W aters\n\nThis analysis of the scope of section 243(h) is consistent with Congress\xe2\x80\x99s under\xc2\xad\nstanding of the scope of Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to\nthe Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150\n(\xe2\x80\x9cUnited Nations Convention\xe2\x80\x9d). As the Supreme Court has noted on several occa\xc2\xad\nsions, see Sale, 509 U.S. at 177-78; INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. at 421, the main intent\no f the Refugee A ct\xe2\x80\x99s changes in section 243(h) was to clarify the language o f the\nprovision so that it conformed to Article 33. The legislative history of the Refugee\nAct discloses that Congress construed the United Nations Convention to \xe2\x80\x9cinsure\nfair and humane treatment for refugees within the territory o f the contracting\nstates.\xe2\x80\x9d H.R. Rep. No. 96-608, at 17 (1979) (emphasis added). W hile this legisla\xc2\xad\ntive reference to \xe2\x80\x9crefugees within the territory\xe2\x80\x9d of a contracting State could con\xc2\xad\nceivably include aliens within the marginal waters over which the State claimed\nsovereignty,20 we think it accords better with the realities o f immigration practice\n(particularly the difficulties of patrolling a border in the sea) to understand Con\xc2\xad\ngress to be referring only to aliens who have reached port or who have landed.21\nFurthermore, Article 33 does not convey any entitlements that could be relevant\nhere but that are not provided by section 243(h) itself. See Stevie, 467 U.S. at 42830 n.22; Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d at 841 (Edwards, J., concur\xc2\xad\nring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, Article 33 does not serve as an inde\xc2\xad\npendent basis for requiring procedural protections not conferred by the statute.22\nIn addition, the State Department has advised us o f its view that the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\ninternational law obligations under the Protocol do not require it to provide exclu\xc2\xad\nsion hearings to aliens who have merely arrived in its territorial waters.23 That\nconclusion concerning the territorial scope o f the signatories\xe2\x80\x99 obligations under\npersecution that he o r she may apply for asylum o r w ithholding and shall m ake appropriate forms available).\nT here is no apparent reason, therefore, why the statutory requirem ent that an applicant be at a port or a land\nborder in order to seek asylum in an exclusion proceeding should not also govern applicants seeking w ith \xc2\xad\nholding\n20 T h e word \xe2\x80\x9cterritory" can in som e contexts be understood to include the territorial sea S ee C u n a rJ\nS S . Co v M ello n , 262 U S at 122 (E ighteenth A m endm ent); Lam M ow v. N agle, 24 F 2d 316, 318 (9th Cir.\n1928) (Fourteenth A m endm ent), In re A\xe2\x80\x94 , 3 I & N. Dec. 677, 679 (1949) (quoting M ello n , 262 U .S. at\n100).\n21 C ertain international law docum ents distinguish betw een a n a tio n \'s \xe2\x80\x9c territory\'\xe2\x80\x99 and its \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial\nseas." For exam ple, the 1982 U nited N ations C onvention on the Law o f the Sea declares that in the zone\ncontiguous to its territorial sea, a State m ay exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringe\xc2\xad\nm ents o f its im m igration and other laws \xe2\x80\x9cw ithin its te m to ry o r territorial sea." See T h ird U nited N ations\nC onference on the L aw o f the Sea, D ec. 10, 1982, art. 33(1), 21 1 L.M . 1245, 1276 (\xe2\x80\x9c 1982 C onference1\xe2\x80\x99)\nIn any event, w e have previously opined that there is no private right o f action under A rticle 33 See\nM em orandum for Edw in D W illiam son, Legal A dviser, D epartm ent o f State, from T im othy E Flanigan,\nA cting A ssistant A ttorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal C ounsel, R e \xe2\x80\xa2 A rtic le 33 o f the R efu g ee C onvention at 3\n(D ec. 12, 1991)\n\xe2\x80\x9c3 T he State D epartm ent takes the position that \xe2\x80\x9c the non-refoulem ent obligation o f the Protocol [w hich is\nreflected in the \xe2\x80\x9c w ithholding o f return\xe2\x80\x9d language o f INA \xc2\xa7 243(h)] applies only with respect to aliens w ho\nhave \xe2\x80\x98entered* the U nited Slates in the im m igration law sense. T hat is, the international treaty obligation\nonly applies with respect to an alien w ho is physically present on the land m ass o f the U nited States and w ho\nhas passed a port o f entry .\n. [T]he non-refoulem ent obligation o f the R efugee Protocol does not apply at\nsea at all and therefore has no bearing on the questions presented to you by IN S ." State D epartm ent S u b m is\xc2\xad\nsion, at 2\n\n87\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L eg a l C ounsel\n\nArticle 33 is re-enforced by the negotiating history of the article and the interpreta\xc2\xad\ntions o f com m entators.24\nA ccordingly, we conclude that the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s sections relating to asylum and with\xc2\xad\nholding do not require that an exclusion hearing be provided for aliens interdicted\nwithin territorial waters.\nC. The G eographical Lim its of the \xe2\x80\x9c United S ta tes\xe2\x80\x9d\nO ur reading o f the INA is consistent with the statute\xe2\x80\x99s definition of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited\nStates,\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1101 (a)(38). \xe2\x80\x9c [t]he term \xe2\x80\x98United States\xe2\x80\x99, except as otherwise\nspecifically herein provided, when used in a geographical sense, means the conti\xc2\xad\nnental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of\nthe United States.\xe2\x80\x9d\nT hat definition makes no reference to the United States\xe2\x80\x99s territorial waters and\non its face is consistent with the view , supported by other sections of the INA, that\nan undocum ented alien is entitled to an exclusion hearing only if he or she has ac\xc2\xad\ntually arrived at a port o f entry.25\nThe INS takes a contrary view, arguing that the procedural protections of the\nINA are triggered w henever an undocum ented alien arrives within United States\nterritorial waters. INS D raft M emorandum, at 2. As INS concedes, however, id. at\n3, its current position conflicts with an opinion of the INS General Counsel issued\nonly four years ago.26\nIn its current submission, INS relies primarily upon International Longshore\xc2\xad\nm en\xe2\x80\x99s and W arehousemen\xe2\x80\x99s Union v. Meese, 891 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1989)\n\n24 T h e m aterials cited in S a le , 509 U S. at 179-87 reflectin g the negotiations on A rticle 33, d o not sug\xc2\xad\ngest th a t the sig n ato ries c o ntem p lated obligations extending b ey o n d their land borders Rather, at least some\nco m m en tato rs im p ly a co n trary conclusion S e e 2 A G rahl-M adsen, The S ta tu s oj R efugees in International\nLaw 94 (1 9 7 2 ) (\xe2\x80\x9c [A rticle 33] does not obligate the C o n tractin g Stales to adm it any person w ho has not a l\xc2\xad\nready set jo o t on th eir resp ectiv e territories \xe2\x80\x9d (em phasis ad d ed )), N. R obinson, C onvention R elating to the\nStatus o f R e fu g e e s Its H isto r\\\\ C ontents a n d In terpretation 163 (1953) (\xe2\x80\x9c [I]f a refugee has succeeded m\neluding the fro n tier guards, he is safe [under A rticle 33]; if he has not, it is his hard luck \xe2\x80\x9d ). A person who\nhas m erely en tered th e territorial w aters within three or tw elve m iles o f a nation s coast can hardly be view ed\nas h a vin g "set foot\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99 in that nation or as having "e lu d ed " its fro n tier guards.\n25 In n u m ero u s o th er statutes, Congress h a s specifically included a reference to the territorial waters\nw hen d e fin in g the \xe2\x80\x9c U nited States " For e x am p le, the L o n g sh o re and H arbor W orkers C om pensation Act\ndefines the term \xe2\x80\x98\xe2\x80\x98U nited States\'* \xe2\x80\x98\xe2\x80\x98when used in a g eo g rap h ical sense [to include] the several States and\nT errito ries and the D istrict o f C olum bia, in clu d in g the territorial w aters th e re o f * 33 U .S C. \xc2\xa7 902(9) The\nC o n gressio n al R esearch Service has identified a large n u m b er o f statutes referring explicitly to the territorial\nsea S e e M em o ran d u m for C o m m ittee on M erch an t M arine and Fisheries, from A m erican Law D ivision. Re\nE ffect o j T e rrito ria l S ea E xten sio n on S e le cte d D o m estic L a w , C R S -I2 (M a r 16, 1989), reprin ted in 1989\nH earings, at 60.\n26 S ee IN S G eneral C o u n se l\'s Opinion 89-30, en titled *\xe2\x80\x988 C F R \xc2\xa7 274a. 1(h) - \xe2\x80\x98e m ploym ent\' and\n\xe2\x80\x98touches at p o rt\': in the U nited Stales" (M a r 15, 1989). T h a t o p in io n \'s m ain conclusion was that labor\nperform ed on a U nited States vessel within U nited States territorial w aters, but w hile the vessel is not\ntouching at a port in the U nited States, does n o t constitute \xe2\x80\x9cem p loym ent\xe2\x80\x9d in the U nited States w ithin the\nm eaning o f the IN A . The op in io n further co n clu d ed th at *\xe2\x80\x98[t]he term \xe2\x80\x98U nited States*, as defined in INA\n$ I0 1 (a)(3 8 ), does not include its \xe2\x80\x98territorial w a ters \xe2\x80\x9d Id at 4.\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s \' A rrival in U S. Territorial W aters\n\n(\xe2\x80\x9cILWU"). There, the INS had determined that Canadian nationals who operated\ncranes aboard vessels operating in U.S. coastal waters were bona fide \xe2\x80\x9calien crew \xc2\xad\nmen\xe2\x80\x9d within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1101 (a)( 15)(D), and were therefore not\nrequired to obtain labor certification from the Department of Labor under 8 U.S.C.\n\xc2\xa7 1182(a)(5). In an action challenging that determination brought by an American\nlabor union, the court of appeals held that the crane operators did not qualify as\n\xe2\x80\x9calien crewm en\xe2\x80\x9d under the INA and therefore were subject to domestic labor certi\xc2\xad\nfication requirements. The court rejected the Government\xe2\x80\x99s contention that the\nIN A \xe2\x80\x99s labor certification requirements were inapplicable because the crane opera\xc2\xad\ntors never \xe2\x80\x9c \xe2\x80\x98actually enter the United States as that term is applied to the crew of\nvessels in U.S. waters because the crane operators never leave the vessel.\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at\n1384. In rejecting this argument, the court stated:\nAn \xe2\x80\x9centry,\xe2\x80\x9d however, is not a prerequisite to the applicability of the\nimmigration laws, those laws are triggered whenever an alien\nmerely arrives in the United States, regardless of whether he actu\xc2\xad\nally effectuates an \xe2\x80\x9centry.\xe2\x80\x9d The territorial waters surrounding this\ncountry are classified as part of the United States. Thus, if persons\nemployed aboard a foreign vessel do not fall within the definition of\nan alien crewman, then their arrival into U.S. territorial waters could\nviolate provisions of the Act.\nId. (citations omitted).\nIN S \xe2\x80\x99s reliance on ILWU is misplaced. The court was not presented with any\nquestion that required it to decide whether mere arrival within territorial waters\nentitles an undocumented alien to an exclusion hearing. Moreover, to the extent\nthat the court\xe2\x80\x99s broad language implied an answer to that question, its analysis was\nflawed.\nFirst, the ILWU court paid no attention to the detailed requirements for any ex\xc2\xad\nclusion hearing that are specified by the statute. It is the specific language of the\nspecialized provisions in the INA that determines the extent of an undocumented\nalien\xe2\x80\x99s procedural rights in pursuing the various legal methods o f gaining adm is\xc2\xad\nsion into the United States. In reaching out for an unduly broad result, the court\nfailed to analyze those provisions.\nSecond, the court\xe2\x80\x99s assertion that a vessel\xe2\x80\x99s mere arrival in United States territo\xc2\xad\nrial waters triggers the general applicability of the domestic immigration laws was\nunsupported by any pertinent reasoning or legal authorities. The court cited only\ntwo cases, neither of which in fact supports its conclusion. One of the cases does\nno more than establish that the United States has the legal capacity to assert ju ris\xc2\xad\ndiction and apply its penal statues within territorial waters; the other case tends, if\nanything, to undercut ILWU by demonstrating the significance of reaching a port of\n\n89\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L eg a l Counsel\n\nentry, rather than the territorial seas, for triggering jurisdictional consequences\nunder the IN A .27\nINS also relies on Piledrivers\xe2\x80\x99 Local Union No. 2375 v. Smith, 695 F.2d 390\n(9th Cir. 1982). There the court held that the INA and its labor certification re\xc2\xad\nquirem ents apply to the outer Continental Shelf because the OCSLA extended the\ngeneral legal jurisdiction o f the U nited States to the outer Continental Shelf. See\n43 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 1331-1356. Specifically, the operative section of OCSLA extends\n\xe2\x80\x9c[t]he C onstitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States\n. . . to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial is\xc2\xad\nlands, and all installations and other devices perm anently or temporarily attached\nto the seabed, which may be erected thereon.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. \xc2\xa7 1333(a)(1).\nW hile citing P iledrivers\xe2\x80\x99 Local, INS states that it \xe2\x80\x9cdisagrees\xe2\x80\x9d with its holding\nthat the IN A and its labor certification requirements extend to alien workers on the\nouter C ontinental Shelf. INS adds, however, that \xe2\x80\x9c if the Act did apply to the outer\ncontinental shelf, a fortiori it would extend through the territorial sea.\xe2\x80\x9d INS Draft\nM em orandum , at 3 n.2.\nO ur O ffice has previously considered the relationship between the INA and the\nOCSLA in Outer Continental Shelf \xe2\x80\x94 Drilling Rigs \xe2\x80\x94 Alien Workers, 3 Op.\nO.L.C. 362 (1979). Specifically, w e addressed the question whether, in light of\ncertain 1978 am endments to the O CSLA, the INA applied to drilling rigs on the\nouter C ontinental Shelf. W e characterized the OCSLA, which was originally en\xc2\xad\nacted in 1953, as \xe2\x80\x9cbasically a guide to the adm inistration and leasing of offshore\nm ineral-producing properties.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 362. Considering OCSLA\xe2\x80\x99s federal juris\xc2\xad\ndiction provision, 43 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1333(a)(1), without reference to the 1978 am end\xc2\xad\nments to the Act, we found that (3 O p. O.L.C. at 363-64):\nBased on a literal reading of that provision, it is certainly possible to\nconclude that the immigration laws should apply. The 1953 law\nadopts Federal law \xe2\x80\x9cto the sam e extent as if the Outer Continental\nShelf were an area o f exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a\nState.\xe2\x80\x9d The immigration law s apply, o f course, to Federal enclaves\nwithin States. It appears that \xc2\xa7 1333(a)(1) was drafted so that it\nwould include Federal laws which, read by themselves, might be\n\n27\nT h e c o u rt c u e d C u n a rd S .S C o v> M e llo n . 262 U S at 122, and L azarescu v. U nited States, 199 F.2d\n898, 900-01 (4th C ir. 1952). IL W U , 891 F 2d a t 1384. C u n a rd h eld that the Eighteenth A m endm ent and the\nN ational P ro h ib itio n A ct im plem enting it a p p lie d to both foreign and dom estic m erchant ships w ithin the\nterritorial w aters o f the U nited States. 262 U S. at 124-26. L a za rescu involved the prosecution o f a previ\xc2\xad\nously d ep o rted seam an for unlaw ful re-entry in to the U nited S tates The c o u rt\xe2\x80\x99s discussion o f the geo g rap h i\xc2\xad\ncal factors g o v e rn in g application o f the INA in that case does not, in fact, place controlling significance on\na m v a l m the territo rial w aters. As the court o b serv ed , \xe2\x80\x9c[t)he p o rt and harbor of Baltim ore is territory o f the\nU nited States E ntry into th a t territory even in a vessel am o u n ted to a violation o f the act unless appellant\nwas under restrain t w hich prev en ted his d ep artin g from the v e sse l.\xe2\x80\x9d Id at 900-01 (em phasis added). The\nco u rt\xe2\x80\x99s lan g u ag e seem s to underm ine IL W U \'s suggestion th at an a lie n \'s arrival in the territorial w aters\n(rather than at a port) triggers the IN A \'s procedures governing exclusion.\n\n90\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lien s\' A rrival in U S. Territorial Waters\n\ninterpreted as being limited in their application to the continental\nUnited States.\nSee also id. at 364 (citing legislative history supporting such an interpretation);\nWarren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New\nFrontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 38, 41-42 (1953) (to like effect).28\nIn light of our 1979 analysis, we are prepared to assume here that, except as\nOCSLA otherwise specifically provides, that statute extended the INA to \xe2\x80\x9cthe sub\xc2\xad\nsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,\xe2\x80\x9d as well as to \xe2\x80\x9cartificial islands\xe2\x80\x9d and\ncertain \xe2\x80\x9cinstallations or other devices\xe2\x80\x9d attached to the seabed or used for transport.\nSee 43 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1333(a)(1). We do not see, however, how such an extension of\nthe INA would be relevant to the question whether undocumented aliens are enti\xc2\xad\ntled to an exclusion hearing if they are interdicted in the territorial waters.\nFirst, O C SLA \xe2\x80\x99s very definition of the \xe2\x80\x9couter Continental S h e lf\xe2\x80\x99 shows that\nIN S\xe2\x80\x99s argument is mistaken. The \xe2\x80\x9couter Continental S h e lf\xe2\x80\x99 is defined at 43 U.S.C\n\xc2\xa7 1331(a) to mean \xe2\x80\x9call submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of\nlands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and of\nwhich the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its\njurisdiction and control.\xe2\x80\x9d There is an obvious distinction between the Continental\nShelf\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9csubsoil and seabed\xe2\x80\x9d (and certain structures attached to the Shelf or used in\nexploiting its resources) and the waters lying above the Shelf. The extension of\nFederal jurisdiction to the subsoil and seabed of the Shelf would by no means re\xc2\xad\nquire or imply its extension to the waters above it. Congress\xe2\x80\x99s intent in enacting\nOCSLA was to protect the Federal G overnm ent\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cparamount rights to the seabed\nbeyond the three-mile limit,\xe2\x80\x9d and specifically its interests in \xe2\x80\x9cthe leasing and de\xc2\xad\nvelopment of the resources o f the seabed,\xe2\x80\x9d including oil, natural gas, and minerals.\nUnited States i>. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 526-27 (1975) (emphases added). Nothing\nin that purpose requires, or even suggests, the extension of the immigration laws to\nthe waters lying above that seabed.\nMoreover, as a matter o f international law, the waters lying above the seabed\nand subsoil of the Continental Shelf are considered to be open sea to the extent that\nthey are outside territorial waters. See Oil Tanker Officer Tax Liability Case, Bundesfinanzhof [BFHE][Supreme Tax Court] 123, 341 (F.R.G.), translated in 74\nInt\xe2\x80\x99l L. Rep. 204, 210 (E. Lauterpacht and C.J. Greenwood eds., 1987). Thus, \xe2\x80\x9ca\n28\nIn connection w ith o ur 1979 opinion, w e note U nited A s s \xe2\x80\x99n o f Journeym en v Thornburgh, 76 8 F.\nSupp 375 (D D C . 1991) T hat case dealt w ith the question w hether aliens, in order to perform w ork in \xc2\xad\nstalling oil rigs on the outer C ontinental Shelf, m ust obtain visas o f the type issued to nonim m igrant aliens\nentering the U nited States to perform tem porary service o r lab o r The d istrict court gran ted sum m ary ju d g \xc2\xad\nm ent, holding that the INA applied to the outer C ontinental Shelf, and explicitly disagreeing w ith o u r O f\xc2\xad\nfic e \'s conclusion that O C SLA precluded application o f the INA to the Shelf. Id. at 379 H ow ever, the c ourt\no f appeals vacated the district c o u rt\'s grant o f sum m ary ju d g m e n t and rem anded for resolution o f m atters o f\nfact See U nited A s s \'n o f Journeym en v Barr, 981 F.2d 1269 (D C C ir 1992), te r t dented, 117 S C t. 49\n(1996) The court o f appeals sp ecifically declined to decide \xe2\x80\x9cthe broad question w hether the Im m igration\nand N ationality Act generally applies on the o u te r C ontinental S h e lf " Id at 1274.\n\n91\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L egal C ounsel\n\nship operating beyond the territorial sea above the area o f the continental shelf is\nstill to be regarded as being on the high seas and not subject to the sovereignty of\nthe coastal State.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 211. S a le, of course, has settled the issue of the Presi\xc2\xad\ndent\xe2\x80\x99s pow er under the IN A to return, without any hearing, aliens interdicted on the\nhigh seas \xe2\x80\x94 including, therefore, the high seas above the outer Continental Shelf.\n\nD. E ffect O f P residential Proclamation No. 5928\nAs discussed above, Presidential Proclam ation No. 5928 of December 27, 1988,\nannounced that the territorial sea o f the United States would extend to twelve nau\xc2\xad\ntical miles from the baselines of the United States. The President further stated:\nN othing in this Proclamation:\n(a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any\njurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom;\n54 Fed. Reg. at 111.\nD espite this expressed intent not to alter dom estic law, the INS suggests that the\nProclam ation did operate to extend the scope o f the INA. M ore precisely, the INS\nappears to argue that the Proclamation operated to enlarge the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s definition of\nthe \xe2\x80\x9cU nited States,\xe2\x80\x9d found in 8 U .S.C . \xc2\xa7 1101 (a)(38). See INS/OGC M emoran\xc2\xad\ndum, at 1-3.29\nW hen the Proclam ation was proposed, this Office considered various issues re\xc2\xad\nlating to its legality. As to the possible effect of the Proclamation on domestic law,\nwe opined:\nBy its terms, the Proclamation will make clear that it is not intended\nto affect dom estic law. Congress may, however, have enacted stat\xc2\xad\nutes that are intended to be linked to the extent o f the United States\xe2\x80\x99\nterritorial sea under international law. The issue, therefore, in de\xc2\xad\nterm ining the effect of the proclam ation on domestic law is whether\nCongress intended for the jurisdiction o f any existing statute to in\xc2\xad\nclude an expanded territorial sea. Thus, the question is one of leg\xc2\xad\nislative intent.\nLegal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the Ter\xc2\xad\nritorial Sea, 12 Op. O .L.C. 238,253 (1988).\n\n29\nT h e re is no b asis for assu m in g , as INS p e rh a p s does, lh ai the P roclam ation\'s expansion of the territo\xc2\xad\nrial sea w o u ld u n iform ly affect each discrete pro v isio n o r definition in the INA, w ithout regard to us par\xc2\xad\nticular p h rasin g o r function\n\n92\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\' A rrival in U S Territorial W aters\n\nOur 1988 opinion invites the question whether Congress intended the INA, or\nparticular sections of the INA, to track any changes in the bounds o f the United\nStates\xe2\x80\x99s territorial sea. We have therefore considered whether Congress intended\nthe IN A \xe2\x80\x99s definition of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d at 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1101 (a)(38) to track, and\nconform to, changes in international law determining the extent o f the United\nStates\xe2\x80\x99s territorial sea. We believe that Congress had no such intent. The INS has\noffered no evidence that Congress meant either the INA as a whole, the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s pro\xc2\xad\nvisions governing the treatment of aliens seeking entry in particular, or the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s\ndefinition o f the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States,\xe2\x80\x9d to track such changes in international law. After\nreviewing the legislative history, we have discovered no such evidence ourselves.\nThus, we conclude that it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s\ndefinition o f the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d to be ambulatory, and to follow changes in inter\xc2\xad\nnational law.\nWe shall, however, assume arguendo that Congress intended the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s defini\xc2\xad\ntion of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d to track changes in the extent of the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\nterritorial sea recognized by international law. Cf. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at\n441 (suggesting by negative implication that if injury had occurred in territorial\nwaters, it would have taken place within the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d as defined in the For\xc2\xad\neign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1330). It still does not follow\nthat exclusion proceedings must be provided for undocumented aliens interdicted\nwithin the twelve mile bounds that now comprise the territorial waters. An implicit\nenlargement of the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s definition of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d to include the new ter\xc2\xad\nritorial waters has no bearing on the scope of the statute\xe2\x80\x99s exclusion provisions,\nINA sections 225-226. As discussed above, these sections do not refer to the\n\xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d in any relevant way; rather, they refer to \xe2\x80\x9cthe ports o f the United\nStates,\xe2\x80\x9d and condition exclusion proceedings on arrival at such ports.\nId.\n(emphasis added). In short, by enlarging the territorial waters, the Proclamation\nmay also have extended the geographical scope of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States\xe2\x80\x9d under the\nINA; but it does not follow that aliens for whom exclusion proceedings need not\npreviously have been provided have become entitled to them.\nFurthermore, the Proclamation should have no impact on the procedural enti\xc2\xad\ntlements o f undocumented aliens under the INA because the statute\xe2\x80\x99s only signifi\xc2\xad\ncant reference to the territorial waters occurs in a provision establishing the\nGovernm ent\xe2\x80\x99s power to deter illegal immigration rather than in any of the provi\xc2\xad\nsions establishing an alien\xe2\x80\x99s procedural rights in seeking to enter the United States.\nA computer search shows that the terms \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d or \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial sea\xe2\x80\x9d are\nmentioned in only one section of title 8 (which includes the INA).30 That provision\n30\nT he co m p u ter search also identified a provision in the notes follow ing 8 U S C. \xc2\xa7 1101, referring to\nthe \'T re a tm e n t o f D epartures from Territorial W aters o f G uam o r D epartures from G uam .\xe2\x80\x9d The note states\nthat section tw o o f the A ct o f Oct 21, 1986, Pub L. No 99-505, 100 Stat 1806, had provided that \'"[ljn the\nadm inistration o f section 10l(a)( I5)(D )(n) o f the [INA]\nan alien crew m an shall be considered to have\ndeparted from G uam after leaving the territorial w aters o f G uam , w ithout regard to w hether the alien arrives\nin a foreign stale before returning to G uam . \xe2\x80\x98\n\n93\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L egal C ounsel\n\nis section 287(a)(3) o f the INA, 8 U .S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357(a)(3), discussed in detail in Part\nIII below, which authorizes the IN S to conduct warrantless searches of vessels\n\xe2\x80\x9cwithin the territorial waters of the U nited States.\xe2\x80\x9d The absence o f any other use in\nthe INA o f the terms \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial w aters\xe2\x80\x9d or \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial sea\xe2\x80\x9d \xe2\x80\x94 and particularly\ntheir absence in the detailed provisions governing the treatment of aliens seeking to\nenter the United States \xe2\x80\x94 strongly suggests that an alien\xe2\x80\x99s arrival or presence in\nthe territorial waters is simply not a relevant consideration for establishing or ex\xc2\xad\npanding the rights o f aliens seeking entry. Had Congress wanted to make mere\nentry into the territorial waters sufficient to guarantee the entrant an exclusion\nhearing, it could easily have written such language into an appropriate section of\nthe INA, as it did elsewhere in the A ct. Indeed, inasmuch as the only usage of the\nterm \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial w aters\xe2\x80\x9d appears in section 287\xe2\x80\x99s description of IN S\xe2\x80\x99s authority to\nsearch vessels in order to thwart aliens attempting illegal entry, there is reason to\nview the territorial waters as a buffer zone, rather than as a safe harbor, in the\noverall schem e o f the INA.\nA ccordingly, we conclude that Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 does not\nhave the effect o f requiring exclusion hearings to be provided to undocumented\naliens interdicted within the territorial sea.\nIII.\nA. IN S \xe2\x80\x99s E nforcem ent Powers U nder INA Section 287\nSection 287 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357, sets forth various investigative and\nenforcem ent powers granted to IN S. O f particular relevance here, INA section\n287(a)(3) provides that the INS shall have power, without a warrant \xe2\x80\x94\n(3)\nwithin a reasonable distance from any external boundary of\nthe United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within\nthe territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, air\xc2\xad\ncraft, conveyance, or vehicle.........\n8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1357(a)(3).\nIn the wake of the Presidential Proclam ation No. 5928, INS amended its inter\xc2\xad\npretative regulation construing section 287. See 57 Fed. Reg. 47,257 (1992), codi\xc2\xad\nfied at 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(1) (1993). This interpretative rule construes the term\n\xe2\x80\x9cexternal boundary,\xe2\x80\x9d as used in INA section 287(a)(3), as follows:\n(a)(1) External boundary. The term external boundary, as used\nin section 287(a)(3) of the Act, means the land boundaries and the\nterritorial sea o f the United States extending 12 nautical miles from\nthe baselines o f the United States determined in accordance with\ninternational law.\n\n94\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s \' A rrival in U S. T erritorial W aters\n\n8 C.F.R. at \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(1). The regulation does not purport to construe any provi\xc2\xad\nsion of the INA other than section 287.\nThe main question posed to us concerning INA section 287 is whether the INS\nhad the authority to construe that provision so as to reflect the enlargem ent o f the\nUnited States\xe2\x80\x99s territorial waters effected by the Proclamation. W e believe that\nIN S\xe2\x80\x99s authority to issue the regulation could be defended on either o f two theories.\nFirst, the Proclamation may have operated of its own force to enlarge the scope of\nsection 287. Second, the INS may have the authority to construe section 287 by\nregulation in a manner that reflects changed circumstances, including such facts as\nthe expansion of the territorial waters by Presidential proclamation. O f these two\ntheories, the latter appears to us the more persuasive.\nW e also note that the broad enforcement powers granted to the Attorney G en\xc2\xad\neral under section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1103 \xe2\x80\x94 powers which have been\ndelegated to the INS \xe2\x80\x94 could provide a separate legal basis for a regulation estab\xc2\xad\nlishing that IN S\xe2\x80\x99s seaward search authority extends to the limits o f the twelve-mile\nterritorial waters and even beyond. See United States v. Chen, 2 F.3d 330 (9th Cir.\n1993), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1039 (1994), discussed infra in Pt. III(C).\n\nB. \xe2\x80\x9cTerritorial Waters\xe2\x80\x9d Under INA Section 287\nAs discussed in Part II above, this Office has taken the position that the question\no f the Proclamation\xe2\x80\x99s effect upon domestic law depends on a case-by-case analysis\no f the legislative intent behind each statute. Accordingly, we sought evidence that\nCongress intended the IN A \xe2\x80\x99s definition of the \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States,\xe2\x80\x9d 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\n1101 (a)(38), to track changes in international law respecting the United States\xe2\x80\x99s\nterritorial waters. We discovered no such evidence. The legislative history o f sec\xc2\xad\ntion 287\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d limitation provides some guidance as to that term \xe2\x80\x99s\norigins, but we find it inconclusive on the question of whether the meaning o f the\nterm was meant to be static or dynamic.\nThe language of section 287 authorizing warrantless vessel searches was origi\xc2\xad\nnally enacted as an amendment to a Justice Department appropriations bill in 1925.\nAppropriations for Department of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Departments\no f Commerce and Labor, Pub. L. No. 68-502, 43 Stat. 1014, 1049-50 (1925). That\namendment was primarily intended to provide authority for INS border patrol offi\xc2\xad\ncials to make arrests upon sighting illegal entry of aliens, but it also provided\nauthority for warrantless searches of vessels and other vehicles in that same con\xc2\xad\ntext. 66 Cong. Rec. 3201-02 (1925) (statements of Sen. M cKellar and Sen. Reed).\nThe limitation o f vessel searches to the territorial waters was added as a House\nfloor amendment to the bill as reported out of the conference committee. Id. at\n4553, 4555. The sponsor o f that amendment, Mr. Connally of Texas, offered the\namendment to address his concern that the absence of any limitations on the vessel\n\n95\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e Office o f L egal C ounsel\n\nsearch authority was \xe2\x80\x9capt to entangle our Government in difficulties with foreign\nnations.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 4555. In further addressing this concern, Mr. Connally stated,\n\xe2\x80\x9cBut why not limit it? It is just such loose legislation as this that produces compli\xc2\xad\ncations with other nations.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. Ju st before offering the amendment, Mr. Connally\nspecifically considered using \xe2\x80\x9cwithin the 3-m ile limit\xe2\x80\x9d as alternative language to\n\xe2\x80\x9cwithin territorial w aters,\xe2\x80\x9d but he opted for the latter formulation and the amend\xc2\xad\nment was adopted by voice vote. Id. The am endm ent was accepted by the Senate\nwith little discussion. Id. at 4519.31\nIn 1946, Congress amended the IN S \xe2\x80\x99s search authorization statute by inserting\nthe additional provision limiting searches to \xe2\x80\x9cwithin a reasonable distance from any\nexternal boundary of the United S tates.\xe2\x80\x9d Act o f Aug. 7, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-613,\n60 Stat. 865. Although there was some House debate on that bill, S. 386, 79th\nCong. (1945), it did not make any reference to the term \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d or indi\xc2\xad\ncate that any change in the scope or effect of that term was intended. See 91 Cong.\nRec. 5504-05, 5513 (1945). The debate did indicate that some Congressmen\nviewed the scope o f the IN S\xe2\x80\x99s sea search authority under the then existing territo\xc2\xad\nrial waters provision as quite broad. As one M em ber stated, \xe2\x80\x9cunder the present law\n[an official] may go on any boat in any waters and search that boat, without a war\xc2\xad\nrant, to see if there are any people there attempting to enter.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 5505\n(emphasis added).32\nA lthough the legislative history o f the territorial waters provision is inconclu\xc2\xad\nsive on the precise issue at hand, it does demonstrate that the phrase was inserted in\norder to avoid friction with other nations by limiting vessel searches within the\nthree-m ile territorial waters claimed by the U nited States in 1925. The legislative\nrecord also reveals that the author and sponsor of the territorial waters amendment\nconsidered but rejected alternative language that would have explicitly limited the\nvessel search authority to a \xe2\x80\x9cthree-mile limit\xe2\x80\x9d \xe2\x80\x94 a factor that militates against the\nview that an im m utable three-mile lim it was intended. It is also apparent that the\nlimitation ultimately imposed by C ongress reflected international rather than do\xc2\xad\nmestic concerns. W hile these factors are inconclusive on the question of whether\nC ongress intended a fixed or expandable interpretation of the territorial waters,\nthey do suggest that the term should be interpreted with international perspective in\nmind. Inasm uch as the 1988 Proclamation expanded United States territorial wa\xc2\xad\nters in conform ity with international law and practice, interpreting the term as used\nin section 287 to reflect that reality could be viewed as consistent with the provi\xc2\xad\n\n11 S e n a to r Jo n es, the F lo o r M anager, c o m m e n ted on the am endm ent as follows before its adoption: \xe2\x80\x9c It\nseem s to m e that is en tirely p roper; I doubt if a v essel co u ld b e searched outside o f territorial w aters even if\nwe d id not have that language in it; so I think th e Senate sh o u ld co n cur in the am endm ent o f the H ouse \xe2\x80\x9d 66\nC ong R ec at 4 5 19\n12 T h e present language o f section 287(a)(3) was en acted as part o f the INA in 1952. That language,\nw hich m ade no sig n ifican t c h an g es to the statu te as m odified in 1945, was adopted by unanim ous consent,\nw ithout any d eb ate o r d iscu ssio n as a floor a m e n d m en t to the bill \xe2\x80\x94 H R . 5678, 82d C ong. (1952) \xe2\x80\x94 that\nbecam e the IN A 98 C ong. Rec. 4 4 0 0 (1952).\n\n96\n\n\x0cIm m igration C onsequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\' A rrival in U S. Territorial W aters\n\nsion\xe2\x80\x99s original design \xe2\x80\x94 i.e., limiting the IN S\xe2\x80\x99s search authority to within United\nStates\xe2\x80\x99s territorial waters as declared and recognized under international law.\nAccordingly, there is little evidence to show that Congress intended its use of\nthe term \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d to constitute an irrevocable commitment to the threemile limitation in effect at the time o f section 287\xe2\x80\x99s enactment. A reasonable in\xc2\xad\nterpretation of that term, taking into account the statute\xe2\x80\x99s evident intention to pro\xc2\xad\nvide sufficient enforcement powers to prevent illegal immigration, would therefore\nincorporate the expansion of the territorial sea declared in the Presidential procla\xc2\xad\nmation.\nAlternatively, it can be argued that even if the Proclamation did not o f its\nown force enlarge section 287\xe2\x80\x99s reference to the territorial waters, it nonetheless\nprovided a sufficient basis for INS to promulgate its interpretative regulation. Un\xc2\xad\nder section 103(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1 103(a), the Attorney General has broad\nauthority to promulgate regulations interpreting and implementing provisions of\nthe INA in furtherance of her duties, including the duty to protect the N ation\xe2\x80\x99s bor\xc2\xad\nders against illegal entry by unauthorized aliens.33 The courts have accorded sub\xc2\xad\nstantial deference to the Attorney G eneral\xe2\x80\x99s regulations under the IN A .34\nINS appears to have regulatory authority to construe the terms \xe2\x80\x9cexternal bound\xc2\xad\nary\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d in INA section 287 to refer to the twelve-mile territo\xc2\xad\nrial sea announced in Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, rather than to the\nhistoric three-mile territorial sea. Even if the Proclamation did not operate o f its\nown force to alter the scope of section 287, it represented a significant change in\ncircumstances \xe2\x80\x94 the international law definition of the United States\xe2\x80\x99s territorial\nwaters \xe2\x80\x94 which INS could reasonably take into account in deciding to revise its\nconstruction o f that statutory provision.\nNeither the language of section 287 nor (as discussed above) the legislative\nhistory demonstrates an unambiguous congressional intent either to link the term\n\xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d permanently to the historic three-mile boundary or to track sub\xc2\xad\n\n33 INA section 103(a) provides.\nT h e A ttorney G eneral shall be charged w ith the adm inistration and enforcem ent o f this chapter\nand all o th er law s relating to the im m igration and naturalization o f aliens, except insofar as\n[pow er is delegated to other E xecutive B ranch officials] .\nHe shall establish su ch regulations\n. . as he d eem s necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter . . . .\nHe shall have the pow er and duty to control and guard the boundaries and borders o f the U nited\nStates against the illegal entry o f aliens . . .\nSee 8 U S C \xc2\xa7 1103(a).\nThe INA further provides that the A ttorney G en eral\xe2\x80\x99s d eterm inations and rulings \xe2\x80\x98\xe2\x80\x98w ith respect to all\nquestions o f law [under the INA] shall be controlling \xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99 Id. W ithout divesting the A ttorney G eneral o f any\npow ers, privileges o r duties, the A ttorney G e n eral\xe2\x80\x99s authority under section 103(a), in cluding the a u th o rity to\nprom ulgate regulations, has been delegated to the C om m issioner o f INS See 8 C F.R. \xc2\xa7 2 1 (1993); I G o r\xc2\xad\ndon & M ailm an, at \xc2\xa7 3 03[ 1]\n34\nSee, e g . Jean v. N elson, 727 F 2d 957, 967 (11\'" C ir 1984), tiff\'d, 472 U.S 846 (1985) (IN A -p e rm its\nwide flexibility in decision-m aking on the part o f executive officials involved, and the courts are g enerally\nreluctant to interfere"), N a ren ji v C ivd etti, 617 F.2d 745 (D C. Cir. 1979), cert denied, 4 4 6 U S 9 57 (1980)\n(im m igration regulations prom ulgated by the A ttorney G eneral under the INA will be upheld as long as they\nare \xe2\x80\x98\xe2\x80\x98directly and reasonably related to the A ttorney G e n eral\'s duties and authority under the A c t\')\n\n97\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L eg a l C ounsel\n\nsequent developm ents in the law, including international law. Accordingly, in\nadopting its interpretative rule, INS has not failed to \xe2\x80\x9cgive effect to the unambigu\xc2\xad\nously expressed intent o f Congress.\xe2\x80\x9d Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources\nDefense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Rather, because \xe2\x80\x9cthe statute\nis silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,\xe2\x80\x9d the question is whether\nIN S\xe2\x80\x99s construction of section 287 was \xe2\x80\x9cperm issible.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 843. Here, we believe,\nINS was engaging in rulemaking to fill a \xe2\x80\x9cgap\xe2\x80\x9d implicitly left open by Congress.\nIn such a case, Congress has impliedly delegated the question of construction to the\nenforcing agency. Id. at 843-44. The IN S \xe2\x80\x99s interpretation should therefore be up\xc2\xad\nheld so long as it is \xe2\x80\x9ca reasonable one.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 845. We think that the interpretation\nwas reasonable.\nFirst, the IN S \xe2\x80\x99s interpretation ensures that section 287 will be understood in a\nm anner that is consistent with the current international law understanding o f the\nUnited S tates\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters,\xe2\x80\x9d as declared by the Proclamation. As discussed\nabove, the territorial waters limitation was originally inserted in section 287 in or\xc2\xad\nder to prom ote ju st such clarity of understanding with other nations as to the scope\nof U nited States search authority at sea.\nM oreover, the special problems o f maritime enforcem ent of the law appear to\nsupport the extension o f the INS\xe2\x80\x99s authority to board and search vessels beyond the\nthree-m ile limit. Such problems have been recognized in the context of customs\nenforcem ent, but they apply to immigration enforcem ent with equal force. Thus, in\nUnited States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1976), the court observed\nthat \xe2\x80\x9cit is not practical to set up checkpoints at the outer perimeters o f the territorial\nwaters. Nor is it likely that incoming vessels will pick up or discharge passengers\nor cargo betw een their points of entry into territorial waters and their anchorages at\nUnited States ports.\xe2\x80\x9d Accordingly, the courts have upheld warrantless customs\nsearches o f vessels beyond the three-m ile lim it but within \xe2\x80\x9ccustoms waters\xe2\x80\x9d as\nvalid border searches under the Fourth Am endm ent.35 See id. (holding that a cus\xc2\xad\ntoms search of a vessel within custom s waters can be valid as a border search);\nUnited States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 80-81 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1990)\n(pointing out that custom s officers are statutorily authorized to search vessels\nwithin custom s waters, and noting suggestions that the contiguous zone, i.e., the\nwaters lying between three and tw elve nautical miles off the coast, be considered\nthe functional equivalent o f the border for purposes o f the Fourth Amendment);\ncert, denied, 500 U.S. 932 (1991); United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267,\n1273 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (holding the contiguous zone to be the functional equivalent\nof the border); United States v. M acPherson, 664 F.2d 69, 72 & n.2 (5th Cir.\n1981) (sim ilar to Victoria-Peguero)\', Note, High On The Seas: Drug Smuggling,\n\n35\n\xe2\x80\x9c [T ]h e law s o f the U nited States have s in c e 1790 p ro h ib ited various acts w ithin 12 m iles, or 4 leagues,\nof the shore, as a m eans to en fo rce com pliance w ith the cu sto m s law s.\xe2\x80\x99\xe2\x80\x99 W illiam W. B ishop, International\nL aw . C a se s a n d M a teria ls 622-23 (3d ed. 1971). The offsh o re w aters reaching to the tw elve-m ile lim it in\nw hich su ch e n fo rc e m e n t was authorized were k n o w n as the \xe2\x80\x9ccu sto m s w aters \xe2\x80\x9d See 19 U S.C \xc2\xa7 1401(j).\n\n98\n\n\x0cIm m igration Consequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s \xe2\x80\x99 A rrival in U.S Territorial W aters\n\nThe Fourth Amendment, And Warrantless Searches At Sea, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 725,\n733-34 (1980) (detailing difficulties in law enforcement at sea near borders, and\narguing for \xe2\x80\x9cfunctional\xe2\x80\x9d understanding o f borders that could extend them beyond\nthree-mile limit). Analogously, the special difficulties in policing the seaward\nboundaries can justify IN S\xe2\x80\x99s regulatory extension of its search authority up to the\ntwelve-mile limit.36\nFinally, it is no objection to IN S \xe2\x80\x99s regulation that it might be said to represent a\ndeparture from the agency\xe2\x80\x99s prior position. An agency\xe2\x80\x99s position is \xe2\x80\x9cnot instantly\ncarved in stone,\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cthe agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, m ust con\xc2\xad\nsider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.\xe2\x80\x9d\nChevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186\n(1991 ).37\nC. INA Section 103 Authority and \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States v. C hen\xe2\x80\x9d\nAlthough we have been specifically asked to examine the validity o f the INS\ninterpretive regulation expanding its authority to conduct warrantless searches in\nthe territorial waters under section 287 of the INA, it should be pointed out that the\nbroad enforcement powers granted the Attorney General under section 103 o f the\nINA could provide the legal basis for a substantive regulation authorizing an equal\nor even greater range for INS search authority at sea. Section 287 authorizes and\nlimits INS\xe2\x80\x99s direct authority to conduct searches at sea, but its territorial limitations\ndo not apply to the Attorney G eneral\xe2\x80\x99s broader enforcement powers (which are\ndelegable to INS) under the INA. The recent opinion in United States v. Chen, 2\nF.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1993) provides strong support for this position.\nIn Chen, the court unanimously held that section 103 of the INA provided INS\nwith adequate statutory authority (under delegation from the Attorney G eneral) to\nconduct an undercover \xe2\x80\x9csting\xe2\x80\x9d operation some three hundred and twenty miles off\nthe coast of the United States to thw art the smuggling o f illegal aliens from China.\n16 W e also believe that INS officials w ould have authority to make arrests under the provisions o f INA\nsection 287(a)(2) within the tw elve-m ile territorial sea recognized in the INS regulation Section 287(a)(2)\nauthorizes INS officials, w ithout w arrant, \' \xe2\x80\x98to arrest any alien who in his presence o r view is en te rin g or\nattem pting to e n te r the U nited States in violation o f [the im m igration law s regulating adm ission, exclusion,\nor expulsion o f aliens] " A lthough undocum ented aliens detected in the tw elve-m ile territorial w aters before\nreaching a port m ight not yet be \' \xe2\x80\x98entering \' the U nited States, there w ill be circum stances w here an INS\no fficial\xe2\x80\x99s observations provide reasonable grounds to believe that aliens are \' \xe2\x80\x98attem pting to enter" in violation\no f the im m igration laws, thereby providing the basis for arrest under section 287(a)(2).\n17 W e also can discern no international law o bjection to the INS regulation See 1982 C o n feren ce, at\n1276 (allow ing regulation w ithin contiguous zone for purpose o f enforcing im m igration law), U .N C onfer\xc2\xad\nence on the Law o f the Sea, C onvention on the T errito rial Sea and the C ontiguous Z one, opened f o r sig n a \xc2\xad\nture A pr 29, 1958, art 24, I 5 U S T 1606, 1612, 516 U N T.S 205, 220 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964)\n(sam e), see a lto C hurch v H uhhart, 6 U S (2 C ranch) 187, 234-35 (1804); U nited S ta te s w B engochea, 279\nF. 537, 539-41 (5th C ir 1922) In M olvan v A tto rn e y G en era l, [ 1948] A pp C as 351 (P .C 1964), the Privy\nC ouncil im plied that international law was not violated by a British d e stro y er\'s seizing a vessel on the high\nseas and forcing it to port w hen the seized v essel was carry in g several hundred undocum ented aliens who\nintended to land illegally\n\n99\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L egal C ounsel\n\nThe operation upheld in the Chen opinion included the apprehension o f approxi\xc2\xad\nmately 132 aliens, who were transferred to a vessel operated clandestinely by INS\nagents for transport to custody in the United States. The court specifically held\nthat the territorial lim itations on w arrantless INS searches set forth in section\n287(a)(3) did not offset or contradict IN S \xe2\x80\x99s authority to conduct such an extrater\xc2\xad\nritorial enforcem ent operation when exercising the enforcement powers delegated\nto it by the Attorney G eneral. Id. at 334.\nThe court pointed out that section 274 of the IN A , 8 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 1324, prohibiting\nthe sm uggling o f illegal aliens into the United States, was intended to have extra\xc2\xad\nterritorial application. It then stressed that \xe2\x80\x9cCongress intended to grant the Attor\xc2\xad\nney General the corresponding power to enforce the immigration laws both within\nand without the borders o f the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d Chen, 2 F.3d at 333. Noting that\nthe Attorney G eneral has delegated these broad enforcem ent powers to the INS, the\ncourt reasoned that INS has \xe2\x80\x9cthe pow er to take such acts as are deemed necessary\nfor the enforcem ent o f the immigration laws, including extraterritorial enforce\xc2\xad\nm ent.\xe2\x80\x9d Id. at 334. In rejecting the defendants\xe2\x80\x99 argument that section 287(a)(3)\xe2\x80\x99s\nterritorial lim itations on INS warrantless search authority also circumscribed its\npower to conduct enforcem ent operations in international waters (i.e., on the high\nseas), the court stated, \xe2\x80\x9cbecause the Attorney General may delegate her authority,\nthe list o f pow ers granted [to INS] in section 1357(a) cannot be read as exhaus\xc2\xad\ntive.\xe2\x80\x9d Id.\nThus, the Chen decision demonstrates that INS may draw upon the broad sec\xc2\xad\ntion 103 authority delegated to it by the Attorney General to conduct undercover\ninvestigations and seizures of undocumented aliens in international waters extend\xc2\xad\ning far beyond the territorial waters of the United States. That same authority\nwould appear to provide ample basis \xe2\x80\x94 apart from the authority granted directly to\nINS by section 287 \xe2\x80\x94 for a substantive regulation authorizing INS to conduct war\xc2\xad\nrantless searches o f vessels transporting illegal aliens within the limits o f the\ntwelve-m ile territorial waters and beyond.38\n\nD. The IN S Regulation\nA lthough we conclude that INS had authority to promulgate a regulation inter\xc2\xad\npreting the section 287 search authority to encom pass the twelve-mile territorial\nsea, the language o f the regulation adopted is susceptible to ambiguous and uncer\xc2\xad\ntain application when read in relation to the statute. W e recommend that if the\npolicy decision to retain the regulation is made, INS should redraft it to dispel this\nW e note that the INS regulation at issu e here was in ten d ed to be only an \xe2\x80\x9cinterpretative\'\xe2\x80\x99 regulation\nthat c o n stru ed sectio n 287, not a substantive reg u latio n d eriv in g from the authority ascribed to the A ttorney\nG eneral by C hen A su b stan tiv e regulation issu ed pursuant to the A ttorney G en eral\xe2\x80\x99s broad section 103\nauthority to en fo rce the im m ig ratio n laws w o u ld not be lim ited by the particularized restrictions o f section\n287, w hich w ere sp ecifically desig n ed to place lim its on the w arrantless search authority o f the IN S \xe2\x80\x99s B order\nPatrol\n\n100\n\n\x0cIm m igration Consequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\' A rrival in U S Territorial W aters\n\nambiguity or, if it concludes that curative legislation is necessary, submit such a\nproposal to Congress.\nSection 287 limits INS authority for warrantless searches at sea to vessels found\n\xe2\x80\x9cwithin the territorial waters,\xe2\x80\x9d but then superimposes the additional limitation that\nsuch searches (along with INS searches of vehicles on land) must be confined\n\xe2\x80\x9cwithin a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d\nAs outlined in Part III(B) above, these two limitations \xe2\x80\x94 which on their face are\ndifficult to reconcile \xe2\x80\x94 were inserted in the statute at different times and for dif\xc2\xad\nferent purposes. The territorial waters limitation was added as an amendment to\nthe original 1925 enactment to provide a seaw ard limitation upon searches of ves\xc2\xad\nsels at sea. In contrast, the \xe2\x80\x9creasonable distance\xe2\x80\x9d limitation was added to the stat\xc2\xad\nute in 1946 for the apparent purpose of allowing INS officials to stop and search\n\xe2\x80\x9cvehicles\xe2\x80\x9d within a reasonable distance inland from the external boundaries of the\nUnited States.\nDespite the different functions and origins o f section 287\xe2\x80\x99s two limiting phrases,\nthe INS regulation attempts to combine them in its definition of the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal\nboundary\xe2\x80\x9d of the United Stales. See 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(1). It provides that, for\npurposes of section 287, the external boundary means both the land boundary and\nthe twelve-mile territorial sea. It then provides that the \xe2\x80\x9creasonable distance\xe2\x80\x9d\nlimitation (100 air miles) is to be measured from the external boundary thus de\xc2\xad\nfined \xe2\x80\x94 i.e., it can be measured either from the land boundary or from the outer\nlimit of the territorial waters. Id. \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(2).\nBecause section 287 expressly limits IN S\xe2\x80\x99s vessel-search authority to the terri\xc2\xad\ntorial waters, the question arises whether the separate \xe2\x80\x9creasonable distance from\nany external boundary\xe2\x80\x9d limitation has any relevance to searches of vessels at sea.\nW hether the statute\xe2\x80\x99s reference to territorial waters is equated with the pre-1988\nthree-mile zone or the expanded twelve-mile zone, it seems clear that any search\nwithin either of those zones would also be well within \xe2\x80\x9ca reasonable distance from\nany external boundary.\xe2\x80\x9d In that regard, the courts have upheld distances of up to\none hundred (land) miles from that boundary as constituting a reasonable distance\nwithin the meaning of section 287. See Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283,\n286 (9th Cir. 1963). It therefore seems that section 287\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9creasonable distance\xe2\x80\x9d\nprovision does not impose any additional limitation upon the IN S \xe2\x80\x99s authority to\nsearch any vessel found within the territorial waters. Nor does the \xe2\x80\x9creasonable\ndistance\xe2\x80\x9d provision serve to expand the area of permissible INA searches of ves\xc2\xad\nsels at sea. Since vessel searches are confined to vessels within the territorial wa\xc2\xad\nters by the specific terms of section 287, the \xe2\x80\x9creasonable distance\xe2\x80\x9d provision\ncannot operate to override that specific limitation.\nThese considerations support the view that the reasonable distance limitation has\nno meaningful application to INS searches at sea. INS points out, however, that\nthe reasonable distance limitation may have conceivable application to searches o f\nvessels on the inland waters. As the INS Draft Memorandum states (at 6-7):\n\n101\n\n\x0cOpinions o f th e O ffice o f L egal Counsel\n\nA lthough there appears to be surface tension between the require\xc2\xad\nm ent that the enforcement pow ers be exercised within the territorial\nwaters and the provision that it may be exercised within 100 miles\no f any external boundary, this tension is resolved if the \xe2\x80\x9creasonable\ndistance\xe2\x80\x9d provisions are read to limit the distance inland from any\nexternal boundary within which Service officers may board and\nsearch vessels or carry out their other enforcement powers under\nsection 287(a)(3) o f the INA. Read together, \xc2\xa7 287(a)(3) o f the\nINA and 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 287.1 (a)( 1)-(2) provide that the Service may,\nwithout a warrant, board and search vessels beginning twelve miles\nseaward from the coast line and extending 100 air miles inland.\nHow ever, this interpretation of section 287 also generates complications. If INS\nmay search vessels found on waters located 100 miles inland of \xe2\x80\x9cany external\nboundary o f the United States,\xe2\x80\x9d see 8 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 287.1(a)(2) (emphasis added), there\nappears to be no need to deviate from use o f the land boundary alone as the base\xc2\xad\nline for such purposes. Using the outer limit o f the territorial sea as the baseline\nfor fixing the inland scope of the section 287 authority \xe2\x80\x94 an interpretation sug\xc2\xad\ngested by IN S \xe2\x80\x99s current submission (INS Draft M emorandum at 7, quoted above)\nand its past practice39 \xe2\x80\x94 would appear to reduce the scope of inland search\nauthority that would otherwise be allow ed by reference to the land boundary as the\nbaseline.\nThe INS regulation would be clarified by explicitly recognizing that searches\nat sea are lim ited only by the scope o f United States territorial waters, and that in\xc2\xad\nland searches (including searches on inland waters) are separately governed by the\nreasonable distance inland measured from the land boundary. This would entail\nproviding separate definitions for the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal boundary\xe2\x80\x9d and the \xe2\x80\x9cterritorial wa\xc2\xad\nters,\xe2\x80\x9d and linking the reasonable distance limitation solely to the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal [land]\nboundary.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nIV. Conclusion\nUndocum ented aliens interdicted within the twelve-mile zone that now com\xc2\xad\nprises the territorial sea of the United States are not entitled to a hearing under the\nexclusion provisions o f the INA, and may be turned back from the United States by\nthe Coast G uard if the President so orders.\n19\nIN S a p p lied the reaso n ab le distance lim itatio n in this fashion as long ago as 1952. See M em orandum\nfor the IN S C o m m issio n er, from the General C o u n sel, Re. M e a n in g o f \xe2\x80\x9cexternal boundary\xe2\x80\xa2" o f the U nited\nS tates in A c t o j F e b ru a ry 27, 1925, as am ended, 8 U .S.C. 110, w ith relation to coastlines: Texas g u lf coast\n(July 7, 1952) T h ere, INS took the position th a t the \xe2\x80\x9cexternal bou n dary\xe2\x80\x9d baseline from w hich a reasonable\ndistance inland sh o u ld be m easu red for search p u rposes w as the o u te r lim it o f the three-m ile territorial w aters\noff the eastern shore o f Padre Island, Texas, a narrow strip o f lan d ten m iles from the coast line w hich e n \xc2\xad\nclosed an arm o f the G u lf o f M exico.\n\n102\n\n\x0cIm m igration Consequences o f U ndocum ented A lie n s\xe2\x80\x99 A rriva l in U.S Territorial W aters\n\nThe INS had the authority to promulgate an interpretative rule construing the\n\xe2\x80\x9cterritorial waters\xe2\x80\x9d of the United States, as referred to in INA section 287, to ex\xc2\xad\ntend for twelve nautical miles, and not merely three nautical miles.\n\nW ALTER DELLINGER\nActing Assistant Attorney General\nOffice o f Legal Counsel\n\n\x0c'