Title: The Defence No. I, [22 July 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July 22, 1795]
IT was to have been foreseen, that the treaty which Mr. Jay was charged to negociate with Great Britain, whenever it should appear, would have to contend with many perverse dispositions and some honest prejudices. That there was no measure in which the government could engage so little likely to be viewed according to its intrinsic merits—so very likely to encountre misconception, jealousy, and unreasonable dislike. For this many reasons may be assigned.

It is only to know the vanity and vindictiveness of human nature, to be convinced, that while this generation lasts, there will always exist among us, men irreconciliable to our present national constitution—embittered in their animosity, in proportion to the success of its operation, and the disappointment of their inauspicious predictions. It is a material inference from this, that such men will watch with Lynx’s eyes for opportunities of discrediting the proceedings of the government, and will display a hostile and malignant zeal upon every occasion, where they think there are any prepossessions of the community to favor their enterprizes. A treaty with Great Britain was too fruitful an occasion not to call forth all their activity.
It is only to consult the history of nations to perceive, that every country, at all times, is cursed by the existence of men, who, actuated by an irregular ambition, scruple nothing which they imagine will contribute to their own advancement and importance. In monarchies, supple courtiers; in republics, fawning or turbulent demagogues, worshipping still the idol power wherever placed, whether in the hands of a prince, or of the people, and trafficking in the weaknessess, vices, frailties, or prejudices of the one or the other. It was to have been expected, that such men, counting more on the passions than on the reason of their fellow citizens, and anticipating that the treaty would have to struggle with prejudices, would be disposed to make an alliance with popular discontent, to nourish it, and to press it into the service of their particular views.
It was not to have been doubted, that there would be one or more foreign powers, indisposed to a measure which accommodated our differences with Great Britain, and laid the foundation of future good understanding, merely because it had that effect.
Nations are never content to confine their rivalships and enmities to themselves. It is their usual policy to disseminate them as widely, as they can, regardless how far it may interfere with the tranquility or happiness of the nations which they are able to influence. Whatever pretentions may be made, the world is yet remote from the spectacle of that just and generous policy, whether in the cabinets of republics or of kings, which would dispose one nation, in its intercourses with another; satisfied with a due proportion of privileges and benefits to see that other pursue freely, its true interest, with regard to a third; though at the expence of no engagement, nor in violation of any rule of friendly or fair procedure. It was natural that the contrary spirit should produce efforts of foreign counteraction to the treaty, and it was certain that the partizans of the counteracting power would second its efforts by all the means which they thought calculated to answer the end.
It was known, that the resentment produced by our revolution war with Great-Britain had never been entirely extinguished, and that recent injuries had rekindled the flame with additional violence. It was a natural consequence of this, that many should be disinclined to any amicable arrangement with Great Britain, and that many others should be prepared to acquiesce only in a treaty which should present advantages of so striking and preponderant a kind, as it was not reasonable to expect could be obtained, unless the United States were in a condition to give the law to Great Britain, and as if obtained under the coercion of such a situation could only have been the short lived prelude of a speedy rupture to get rid of them.
Unfortunately too the supposition of that situation has served to foster exaggerated expectations, and the absurd delusion to this moment prevails, notwithstanding the plain evidence to the contrary, which is deducible from the high and haughty ground still maintained by Great Britain, against victorious France.
It was not to be mistaken that an enthusiasm for France and her revolution throughout all its wonderful vicissitudes has continued to possess the minds of the great body of the people of this country, and it was to be inferred, that this sentiment would predispose to a jealousy of any agreement or treaty with her most persevering competitior—a jealousy so excessive as would give the fullest hope to insidious arts to perplex and mislead the public opinion. It was well understood, that a numerous party among us, though disavowing the design, because the avowal would defeat it, have been steadily endeavouring to make the United States a party in the present European war, by advocating all those measures which would widen the breach between us and Great Britain, and by resisting all those which could tend to close it; and it was morally certain, that this party would eagerly improve every circumstance which could serve to render the treaty odious, and to frustrate it, as the most effectual road to their favorite goal.
It was also known beforehand that personal and party rivalships of the most active kind, would assail whatever treaty might be made, to disgrace, if possible, its organ.
There are three persons prominent in the public eye, as the successor of the actual President of the United States in the event of his retreat from the station, Mr. Adams, Mr. Jay, Mr. Jefferson.
No one has forgotten the systematic pains which have been taken to impair the well earned popularity of the first gentleman. Mr. Jay too has been repeatedly the object of attacks with the same view. His friends as well as his enemies anticipated that he could make no treaty which would not furnish weapons against him—and it were to have been ignorant of the indefatigable malice of his adversaries to have doubted that they would be seized with eagerness and wielded with dexterity.
The peculiar circumstances which have attended the two last elections for governor of this state, have been of a nature to give the utmost keen[n]ess to party animosity. It was impossible that Mr. Jay should be forgiven for his double, and in the last instance triumphant success; or that any promising opportunity of detaching from him the public confidence should pass unimproved.
Trivial facts frequently throw light upon important designs. It is remarkable, that in the toasts given on the 4th of July, wherever there appears a direct or indirect censure on the treaty, it is pretty uniformly coupled with compliments to Mr. Jefferson, and to our late governor Mr. Clinton, with an evident design to place those gentlemen in contrast with Mr. Jay, and decrying him to elevate them. No one can be blind to the finger of party spirit, visible in these and similar transactions. It indicates to us clearly, one powerful source of opposition to the treaty.
No man is without his personal enemies. Pre-eminence even in talents and virtue is a cause of envy and hatred of its possessor. Bad men are the natural enemies of virtuous men. Good men sometimes mistake and dislike each other.
Upon such an occasion as the treaty, how could it happen other wise, than that personal enimity would be unusually busy, enterprising and malignant?
From the combined operation of these different causes, it would have been a vain expectation that the treaty would be generally contemplated with candor and moderation, or that reason would regulate the first impressions concerning it. It was certain on the contrary, that however unexceptionable its true character might be, it would have to fight its way through a mass of unreasonable opposition; and that time, examination and reflection would be requisite to fix the public opinion on a true basis. It was certain that it would become the instrument of a systematic effort against the national government and its administration; a decided engine of party to advance its own views at the hazard of the public peace and prosperity.
The events which have already taken place, are a full comment of these positions. If the good sense of the people does not spe[e]dily discountenance the projects which are on foot, more melancholy proofs may succeed.
Before the treaty was known, attempts were made to prepossess the public mind against it. It was absurdly asserted, that it was not expected by the people, that Mr. Jay was to make any treaty; as if he had been sent, not to accommodate differences by negociation and agreement, but to dictate to Great Britain the terms of an unconditional submission.
Before it was published at large, a sketch, calculated to produce false impressions, was handed out to the public through a medium noted for hostility, to the administration of the government. Emissaries flew through the country, spreading alarm and discontent: the leaders of clubs were every where active to seize the passions of the citizens and preoccupy their judgments against the treaty.
At Boston it was published one day, and the next a town meeting was convened to condemn it, without ever being read; without any serious discussion, sentence was pronounced against it.
Will any man seriously believe that in so short a time, an instrument of this nature could have been tolerably understood by the greater part of those who were thus induced to a condemnation of it? Can the result be considered as any thing more than a sudden ebullition of popular passion, excited by the artifices of a party, which had adroitly seized a favourable moment to surprize the public opinion? This spirit of precipitation and the intemperance which accompanied it, prevented the body of merchants and the greatest part of the most considerate citizens from attending the meeting, and left those who met, wholly under the guidance of a set of men, who, with two or three exceptions, have been the uniform opposers of the government.
The intelligence of this event had no sooner reached New York, than the leaders of the clubs were seen haranguing in every corner of the city to stir up our citizens into an imitation of the example of the meeting at Boston. An invitation to meet at the City Hall quickly followed, not to consider or discuss the merits of the treaty, but to unite with the meeting at Boston to address the president against its ratification.

This was immediately succeeded by a hand bill, full of invectives against the treaty as absurd as they were inflammatory, and manifestly designed to induce the citizens to surrender their reason to the empire of their passions.
In vain did a respectable meeting of the merchants endeavour, by their advice, to moderate the violence of these views, and to promote a spirit favourable to a fair discussion of the treaty; in vain did a respectable body of citizens of every discription, attend for that purpose. The leaders of the clubs resisted all discussion, and their followers, by their clamours and vociferations, rendered it impracticable, notwithstanding the wish of a manifest majority of the citizens convened upon the occasion.

Can we believe, that the leaders were really sincere, in the objections they made to a decision, or that the great and mixed mass of citizens then assembled had so thoroughly mastered the merits of the treaty, as that they might not have been enlightened by such a discussion.
It cannot be doubted that the real motive to the opposition, was the fear of a discussion; the desire of excluding light; the adherence to a plan of surprize and deception. Nor need we desire any fuller proof of that spirit of party which has stimulated the opposition to the treaty, than is to be found in the circumstances of that opposition.
To every man who is not an enemy to the national government, who is not a prejudiced partizan, who is capable of comprehending the argument, and passionate enough to attend to it with impartiality, I flatter myself I shall be able to demonstrate satisfactorily in the course of some succeeding papers—
1. That the treaty adjusts in a reasonable manner the points in controversy between the United States and Great-Britain, as well those depending on the inexecution of the treaty of peace, as those growing out of the present European war.
2. That it makes no improper concessions to Great-Britain, no sacrifices on the part of the United States.

3. That it secures to the United States equivalents for what they grant.
4. That it lays upon them no restrictions which are incompatible with their honour or their interest.
5. That in the articles which respect war, it conforms to the laws of nations.
6. That it violates no treaty with, nor duty toward any foreign power.
7. That compared with our other commercial treaties, it is upon the whole, entitled to a preference.

8. That it contains concessions of advantages by Great-Britain to the United States, which no other nation has obtained from the same power.
9. That it gives to her no superiority of advantages over other nations with whom we have treaties.
10. That interests of primary importance to our general welfare, are promoted by it.
11. That the too probable result of a refusal to ratify is war, or what would be still worse, a disgraceful pas[s]iveness under violations of our rights, unredressed and unadjusted; and consequently, that it is the true interest of the United States, that the treaty should go into effect.
It will be understood, that I speak of the treaty as advised to be ratified by the Senate—for this is the true question before the public.

Camillus.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James Nicholson, [22 July 1795]
From: Nicholson, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Sir
[New York, July 22, 1795]
From the late hour of A Vissit from one of our Acquaintance & her frequent attempts to get Mrs. Nicholson alone in the Garden & from the Converasation I had with the Lady in waiting upon her home, I have no doubt on my mind She came to Alarm my family of what was likely to take place. I have therefore to insist upon the matter being determined at an early hour this Morning, (that all further corrispondence discontinue) & at a place that our seconds may agree upon.
I am yrs. &c.

Jas. Nicholson
Wednesday Morng.½ past 5
A. Hambleton Esqr.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Nicholson, 22 July 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Nicholson, James

Sir.
New York July 22nd. 1795.
Your letter of this morng. surprises me as one part of it seems to imply that I had been seeking further correspondence between us. This certainly is not the fact. I considered your last letter as closing the business—nor did any step originate with me, or that I know of with any friend of mine for opening anew the discussion.
Measures it is true towards an accommodation have been subsequently in train; but I have had no other agency in the affair than that of meeting them, as I concieve, in a liberal & Gentlemanlike manner.
With this explanation, I shall only add that motives which affect me as an honest Man put it out of my power to abrige the time originally named—that I am sure, if alarms were excited in my family, I could find means to quiet them—that I should take it for granted the same would be equally practicable to You and that in every event I shall be ready to pursue our plan.
As to place I certainly did not mean Paulus Hook as the exact spot. I meant that as a point of rendezvous to proceed thence to some convenient place in the vicinity. But Col. Fish is instructed to arrange with You or your friend any other place out of this State which may be preferred. The reason of the choice of a place out of the State cannot need explanation.
I am Sir   Your humble Servt.

A. Hamilton
James Nicholson Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Benjamin Lincoln, 24 July 1795
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear sir
Boston July 24th. 1795
I have the pleasure to forward the enclosed letter from our Treasurer which will give the best Light I can obtain on the question you submitted to me.
Are the people mad!
With the highest esteem and the warmest affection I am your friend & ob servant

B Lincoln
Alexander Hamilton Esq


Title: The Defence No. II, [25 July 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July 25, 1795]
Previous to a more particular discussion of the merits of the Treaty, it may be useful to advert to a suggestion which has been thrown out, namely that it was foreseen by many, that the mission to Great Britain would produce no good result, and that the event has corresponded with the anticipation.
The reverse of this position is manifestly true.
All must remember the very critical posture of this Country at the time that mission was resolved upon. A recent violation of our rights too flagrant and too injurious to be submitted to had filled every American breast with indignation and every prudent man with alarm and disquietude. A few hoped, and the great body of the community feared, that War was inevitable.
In this crisis two sets of opinions prevailed; one looked to measures which were to have a compulsory effect upon Great Britain, the sequestration of British debts and the cutting off of intercourse wholly or partially between the two Countries—the other to vigorous preparation for war and one more effort of negotiation by a solemn mission to avert it.
That the latter was the best opinion no truly sensible man can doubt, and it may be boldly affirmed that the event has intirely justified it.

If measures of coertion and reprisal had taken place, War in all human probability would have followed.
National pride is generally a very intractable thing. In the councils of no country does it act with greater force, than in those of Great Britain. Whatever it might have been in her power to yield to negotiation, she could have yielded nothing to compulsion, without self-degradation, and without the sacrifice of that political consequence which, at all times very important to a nation, was peculiarly so to her at the juncture in question. It must be remembered too that from the relations in which the two Countries have stood to each other it must have cost more to the pride of Great Britain to have received the law from us than from any other power.
When one nation has cause of complaint against another, the course marked out by practice the opinion of writers, and the principles of humanity, the object being to avoid War, is to precede reprisals of any kind by a demand of reparation. To begin with reprisals is to meet on the ground of war and puts the other party in a condition not to be able to recede without humiliation.
Had this course been pursued by us it would not only have rendered War morally certain, but it would have united the British Nation in the vigorous support of their government in the prosecution of that war; while on our parts we should have been quickly distracted and divided. The calamities of War would have brought the most ardent to their senses, and placed them among the first in reproaching the Government with precipitation rashness and folly; for not having taken every chance by pacific means to avoid so great an evil.
The example of Denmark and Sweden is cited in support of the coercive plan. These powers, it is asserted, by arming and acting with vigour brought Great Britain to terms.

But who is able to tell us the precise course of this transaction or the terms gained by it? Has it appeared that either Denmark or Sweden has obtained as much as we have done, a stipulation of reparation for the violations of our property contrary to the laws of War?
Besides what did Denmark & Sweden do? They armed and they negotiated. They did not begin by retaliations and reprisals. The UStates also armed and negotiated, and like Denmark and Sweden prudently forebore reprisals which were likely to render War inevitable. The conduct of the three countries agreed in principle, equally steering clear of a precipitate resort to reprisals, and contradicting the doctrines and advice of our War-party.
The course pursued by our Government was then in coincidence with the example of Denmark and Sweden—and it may be added was in every view the wisest.
Few nations can have stronger inducements than the U States to cultivate peace. Their infant state in general—their want of a marine in particular to protect their commerce would render war in an extreme degree a calamity. It would not only arrest our present rapid progress to strength and prosperity, but would probably throw us back into a state of debility and impoverishment from which it would require years to emerge. Our Trade navigation and mercantile capital would be essentially destroyed. Spain being an associate with Great Britain a general Indian war would probably have desolated the whole extent of our frontier. Our Exports obstructed, Agriculture would have seriously languished. All other branches of industry must have proportionally suffered. Our public Debt instead of a gradual diminution must have sustained a great augmentation and drawn with it a large increase of taxes and burthens on the people.
But this perhaps was not the worst to be apprehended. It was to be feared that the war would be conducted in a spirit which would render it more than ordinarily calamitous. There are too many proofs that a considerable party among us is deeply infected with those horrid principles of Jacobinism which proceeding from one excess to another have made France a theatre of blood and which notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts of the national representation to suppress it keeps the destinies of France to this moment suspended by a thread. It was too probable that the direction of the War if commenced would have fallen into the hands of men of this description. The consequences of this even in imagination are such as to make any virtuous man shudder.
It was therefore in a peculiar manner the duty of the Government to take all possible chances for avoiding War. The plan adopted was the only one which could claim this advantage.
To precipitate nothing, to gain time by negotiation, was to leave the country in a situation to profit by any events which might turn up tending to restrain a spirit of hostility in Great Britain & to dispose her to reasonable accommodation.
The successes of France which opportunely occurred allowing them to have had an influence upon the issue so far from disparaging the merit of the plan which was pursued serve to illustrate its wisdom. This was one of the chances which procrastination gave, and one which it was natural to take into the calculation.
Had the reverse been the case, the posture of negotiation was still preferable to that of retaliation and reprisal; for in this case, the triumphs of Great Britain the gauntlet having been thrown by us, would have stimulated her to take it up without hesitation.
By taking the ground of negotiation in the attitude of preparation for war, we at the same time carried the appeal to the prudence of the British Cabinet, without wounding its pride, and to the justice and interest of the British Nation without exciting feelings of resentment.
This conduct was calculated to range the public opinion of that country on our side to oppose it to the indulgence of hostile views in the Cabinet, and in case of War to lay the foundation of scism and dissatisfaction.
But one of the most important advantages to be expected from the course pursued was the securing of unanimity among ourselves if after all the pains taken to avoid War, it had been forced upon us.

As on the one hand, it was certain that dissention and discontent would have embarrassed and infeebled our exertions in a war produced by any circumstance of intemperance in our public councils or not endeavoured to be prevented by all the milder expedients usual in similar cases—so on the other, it was equally certain that our having ineffectually exhausted those expedients would cement us into a firm mass, keep us steady and persevering amidst whatever vicissitudes might happen and nerve our efforts to the utmost extent of our resources.
This union among ourselves and disunion among our enemies were inestimable effects of the moderate plan; if it had promised no other advantage.
But to gain time was of vast moment to us in other senses. Not a sea port of the U States was fortified, so as to be protected against the insults of a single frigate. Our Magazines were in every respect too scantily supplied. It was highly desireable to obviate these deficiencies before matters came to extremity.
Moreover, the longer we kept out of the War, if obliged to go into it at last, the shorter would be the deviation of the calamities incident to it.
The circumstances of the injury of which we more immediately complained afforded an additional reason for preceding reprisals by negotiation. The order of the 6th of Novemr directed neutral vessels to be brought in for adjudication. This was an equivocal phrase, and though there was too much cause to suspect that it was intended to operate as it did—yet there was a possibility of misconstruction. And that possibility was a reason in the nature of the thing for giving to the British Government an opportunity of explaining before retaliations took place.
To all this it may be added, that one of the substitutes for the plan pursued, the sequestration of debts—was a measure no less both dishonest than impolitic; as will be shewn in the remarks which will be applied to the Xth article of the Treaty.
But is it unimportant to the real friends of Republican Government that the plan pursued was congenial with that pacific character which is ascribed to it? Would it have been more desireable that the Government of our Nation outstripping the war maxims of Europe should without a previous demand of reparation have rushed into reprisals and consequently into War?
However this may be, it is a well ascertained fact, that our Country never appeared so august and respectable as in the position which it assumed upon this occasion. Europe was struck with the dignified moderation of our conduct, and the character of our Government and Nation acquired a new elevation.
It can not escape an attentive observer that the language, which in the first instance condemned the mission of an envoy extraordinary to Great Britain, and which now condemns the Treaty negotiated by him, seems to consider the U States as among the first rate powers of the world in point of strength & resource and proposes to them a conduct predicated upon that condition.
To underrate our just importance would be a degrading error. To overrate it may lead to dangerous mistakes.
A very powerful state may frequently hazard a high and haughty tone with good policy, but a weak State can scarcely ever do it without imprudence. The last is yet our character, though we are the embryo of a great empire. It is therefore better suited to our situation to measure each step with the utmost caution; to hazard as little as possible; in the cases in which we are injured to blend moderation with firmness; and to brandish the weapons of hostility only when it is apparent that the use of them is unavoidable.
It is not to be inferred from this that we are to crouch to any power on earth or tamely to suffer our rights to be violated. A nation which is capable of this meanness will quickly have no rights to protect, no honor to defend.

But the true inference is that we ought not lightly to seek or provoke a resort to arms; that in the differences between us and other nations we ought carefully to avoid measures which tend to widen the breach; and that we should sc[r]upulously abstain from whatever may be construed into reprisals ’till after the fruitless employment of all amicable means has reduced it to a certainty that there is no alternative and ought then only to endanger the necessity of that resort.
If we can avoid War for ten or twelve years more we shall then have acquired a maturity, which will make it no more than a common calamity and will authorise us on our national discussions to take a higher & more imposing tone.
This is a consideration of the greatest weight to determine us to exert all our prudence and address to keep out of War as long as it shall be possible to defer to a state of manhood a struggle to which infancy is ill-adapted. This is the most effectual way to disappoint the enemies of our welfare; to pursue a contrary conduct may be to play into their hands and to gratify their wishes. If there be a foreign power which sees with envy or ill will our growing prosperity, that power must discern that our infancy is the time for clipping our wings. We ought to be wise enough to see that this is not the time for trying our strength.
Should we be able to escape the Storm which at this juncture agitates Europe, our disputes with Great Britain terminated, we may hope to postpone war to a distant period. This at least will greatly diminish the chances of it. For then there will remain only one power with whom we have any embarrassing discussion. I allude to Spain and the question of the Mississipi; and there is reason to hope that this question by the natural progress of things and perseverance in an an amicable course will finally be arranged to our satisfaction without the necessity of the dernier resort.
The allusion to this case suggests one or two important reflections. How unwise was it to invite or facilitate a quarrel with Great Britain at a moment when she and Spain were engaged in a common cause, both of them having besides controverted points with the U States! How wise will it be to adjust our differences with the most formidable of those two powers & to have only to contest with one of them.
This policy is so obvious that it requires an extraordinary degree of infatuation not to be sensible of it; and not to view with favour any measure which tends to so important a result.
This cursory review of the motives which may be supposed to have governed our public councils in the mission to Great Britain serves not only to vindicate the measures then pursued but to warn us against a prejudiced judgment of the result which may in the end defeat the salutary purposes of those measures.
I proceed to observe summarily that the objects of the Mission contrary to what has been assented have been substantially obtained. What were these? They were principally—I to adjust the matters of controversy concerning the inexecution of the Treaty of peace and especially to obtain restitution of our Western posts. II to obtain reparation for the captives and spoliations of our property in the course of the existing war.
Both these objects have been provided for, and it will be shewn when we come to comment upon the articles which make the provision in each case, that it is a reasonable one, as good a one as ought to have been expected—as good a one as there is any prospect of obtaining hereafter one which it is consistent with our honor to accept and which our interest bids us to close with.
The provisions with regard to commerce were incidental and auxiliary—some provisions on this subject were of importance to fix for a time the basis on which the commerce of the two countries was to be carried on, that the merchants of each might know what they had to depend upon—that sources of collision on this head might be temporarily stilled if not permanently extinguished—that an essay might be made of some plan conciliating as far as possible the opinions and prejudicies of both parties—and laying perhaps the foundation of further & more extensive arrangements. Without something of this kind, there would be constant danger of the tranquillity of the two countries being disturbed by commercial conflicts.

Camillus


Title: Drafts of Apology Required from James Nicholson, [25–26 July 1795]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July 25–26, 1795]
Draft I
Mr. Hamilton declares & would repeat that when he interposed in the altercation between Mr. Nicholson & Mr. Hoffman what he said was addressed to both & was purely intended without offence to either to prevent the continuance of a controversy which might lead to disturbance & riot.
Mr. Nicholson replied very harshly to Mr. Hamilton that he was not the man to prevent his quarrelling called him an Abettor of Tories and used some other harsh expressions which are forgotten.
Mr. Hamilton replied that that was not a place for altercation & Mr. Nicholson & he would discuss it upon a more fit occasion.
Mr. Nicholson replied he & Mr. Hamilton would not pursue the affair for he had declined an interview upon a former occasion.
Mr. Hamilton replied that no man could affirm that with truth & that he pledged himself to convince Mr. Nicholson of his mistake.
Here then was clearly a violent offence without provocation.
If Mr. Nicholson is disposed to accommodation justice & propriety require that he should say
That the subject of offence to Mr. Hamilton was the effect of misapprehension & temporary passion—that he does not entertain the opinion which his declaration would seem to imply and that he regrets the pain which it must have given to Mr. Hamilton.
Draft II
Mr. Nicholson declares that the expressions made use of by him in the first instance which appeared to give offence to Mr. Hamilton proceeded from a supposition that Mr. Hamilton had interposed in favour of Mr. Hoffman and in a manner that implied censure on him —that understanding from Mr. Hamilton that he dropped some expressions which indicated that Mr. Hamilton had declined an interview upon a former similar occasion Mr. Nicholson further declares that he is not conscious nor can he recollect that such expressions dropped [from] him—that however relying on the information he has since received that expressions of such import did escape him he declares that they proceeded from the heat of altercation—that he does not entertain the opinion which they seemed to imply and that he regret[s] the pain which his expressions upon the occasion must have given to Mr Hamilton.
Draft III
Mr. Nicholson declares that the warmth of the expressions which he recollects to have used to Mr. Hamilton proceeded from a misapprehension of the nature of his interposition in the alter[c]ation between Mr. Hoffman & Mr. Nicholson that as to the suggestion alleged to have been made by Mr. Nicholson namely that Mr. Hamilton had declined a former interview he does not recollect and is not conscious of having made it neither did he intend the imputation which it would seem to imply and that if he did make the suggestion he regrets the pain which it must have occasionned to Mr. Hamilton.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert Troup, 25 July 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Troup, Robert

My Dear Troupe
New York July 25. 1795.
Confiding in your integrity and friendship to me, I have made you Executor of my Will. My concerns are not very extensive and of course will not give you much trouble. Indeed I might have dispensed with the ceremony of making a Will as to what I may myself leave had I not wished that my little property may be applied as readily and as fairly as may be to the benefit of my few Creditors. For after a life of labour, I leave my family to the benevolence of others, if my course shall happen to be terminated here.
My property will appear in the list herewith marked A.
My creditors are John Barker Church to whom I owe about five thousand pounds as will appear by Account marked B. The Office of Discount & Deposit New York who hold a note of mine for five hundred Dollars indorsed by Nicholas Fish. The holders unknown of two drafts drawn upon me by my father one for five hundred the other for two hundred Dollars. Mr. Meade to whom Ceracchi gave a bill on me for six hundred and odd dollars which I told Mr Ludlow it was my intention to pay. Mr. Sheaff of Philadelphia Wine merchant, to whom I owe a ballance of account not very considerable. Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher who has my bond in duplicates for £689 principal being for money which he left in my hands when he went to France having no better disposition of it. This being a bond debt will claim a preference, and from the nature of it, I am glad of it. I hope the poor fellow may be alive. He was a member of the Convention. Arthur Noble Esquire who has my bonds for the fourth part of the lands purchased of him in company with yourself Laurance & Fish. The lands themselves will be a fund for the payment of these Bonds.

I have left in the hands of Col Fish the obligations mentioned in the list of Cortlandt and of Wickham & Thompson to secure him in this mere act of friendship from the possibility of loss & to accelerate his reimbursement.
I hesitated whether I would not also secure a preference to the drafts of my father—but these as far as I am concerned being a merely voluntary engagement, I doubted the justice of the measure and I have done nothing. I regret it lest they should return upon him and increase his distress. Though as I am informed a man of respectable connections in Scotland he became bankrupt as a Merchant at an early day in the West Indies and is now in indigence. I have pressed him to come to me but his great age & infirmity have deterred him from the change of climate.
I hope what I leave may prove equal to my Debts. If it does not I have the consolation of hoping that the loss will be permitted by himself to fall upon my brother in law Mr. Church whose friendship and generosity I do not doubt.
I regret that his affairs as well as my own have suffered by my devotion to the public service. But I trust upon the whole that the few operations I have made for him will more than recompense him for my omissions; though they will not have been as profitable to him as they ought to have been & as they would have been if I could have paid more attention.
Purchases of lands have been made for Mr. Church first in Pensylvania in Company with Tench Coxe to whom I advanced ten thousand Dollars secondly in the City of New York in company with J. Laurence to whom I have advanced the sums mentioned in the Account marked C in bundle AA. Besides these advances, I have put into his hands a draft of Fitsimmons upon Constable accepted by the latter for four thousand Dollars, and a sett of bills for five hundred pound Sterling received from Robert Morris drawn by Harrison & Sterret upon the house of Cazenove & Co. London. These all on the same account of the purchases.
You will find in the bundle marked AB a smaller bundle marked D which will explain the nature and state of the business with Mr. Coxe, by which also you will see that Mr. Anthony who is a very good man is my Agent in that Affair.
You will also find in the bundle AA a note of Mr. Morris for Nine thousand five hundred Dollars on account of which the abovementioned bills are. This note was for money lent belonging to Mr. Church. Mr. Morris will not dispute that it bears interest from the date. Indeed the real sum was Ten thousand Dollars but Mr. Morris after some time paid me five hundred. The interest ought to be calculated accordingly. Mr Morris can furnish the data.
As this money was thus disposed of without being warranted by the spirit of Mr. Church’s instructions I consider myself as responsible for it. And I trust that Mr. Morris will exert himself to pay the ballance speedily to be applied to the investments which Mr. Laurance is making.
I have received some large fees for which the parties could not have had equivalents—from Williamson One hundred pounds from Constable One hundred pounds from Macombe One hundred pounds from Mr. Bayard in behalf of Wilhem & Jan Willink One hundred pounds. It would [be] just if there [were] means that they should be repaid. But what can I direct who am (I fear) insolvent?
God bless you My friend. Be assured always of the attachement of Yrs.

A Hamilton

P.S. I remitted Sheaff on my way through Jersey an order on the Bank of the U States for a good part of his demand. This will appear by my bank Account.
In my leather Trunk where the bundles abovementioned are is also a bundle inscribed thus—J R To be forwarded to Oliver Wolcott Junr. Esq. I entreat that this may be early done by a careful hand.
This trunk contains all my interesting papers.
Robert Troupe Esq.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 28 July 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

Dr. Sir
New York July 28. 1795
We have some cause to suspect though not enough to believe that our Jacobins medidate serious mischief to certain Individuals. It happens that the Militia of this City, from the complexion of its officers in general, cannot be depended on and it will be difficult for some time to organise a competent armed substitute. In this situation our eyes turn as a resource in a sudden emergency upon the military now in the forts—but these we are told are under marching orders. Pray converse confidentially with the Secretary at War & engage him to suspend their march. Matters in Eight or ten days will explain themselves.
How are things truly in Philadelphia? I had good reason to believe that the President before he left Philadelphia had concluded to ratify the Treaty according to the advice of the Senate. Has any thing finally been done? Or are we where we were?
Yrs.

A Hamilton
Oliver Wolcott Esq.


Title: The Defence No. III, [29 July 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July 29, 1795]
The opposers of the Treaty seem to have put invention on the rack, to accumulate charges against it, in a great number of cases, without regard even to plausibility. If we suppose them sincere, we must often pity their ignorance; if insincere, we must abhor the spirit of deception which it betrays. Of the preposterous nature of some of their charges, specimens will be given in the course of these remarks; though while nothing, which is colorable, will remain unattended to, it were endless to attempt a distinct refutation of all the wild and absurd things which are and will be said. It is vain to combat the vagaries of diseased imaginations. The monsters they engender are no sooner destroyed, than new legions supply their places. Upon this, as upon all former occasions, the good sense of the people must be relied upon, and it must be taken for granted, that it will be sufficient for their conviction to give solid answers to all such objections as have the semblance of reason; that now, as heretofore, they will maintain their character abroad and at home, for deliberation and reflection, and disappoint those who are in the habit of making experiments upon their credulity; who treating them as children, fancy that sugar plumbs and toys will suffice to gain their confidence and attachment and to lead them blind fold, whithersoever it is desired.
In considering the treaty, it presents itself under two principal heads; the permanent articles, which are the first ten, and which, with some supplementary provisions, adjust the controverted points between the two countries; the temporary articles, which are all the remaining ones, and which establish the principles of mutual intercourse, as to general navigation and commerce. The manner of the discussion will correspond with this natural division of the subject.

An objection meets the treaty at the threshold. It is said that our envoy abandoned the ground which our government had uniformly held, and with it our rights and interests as a nation, by acceding, in the preamble of the treaty, to the idea of terminating the differences between the two countries, “in such a manner as, without reference to the merits of their respective complaints and pretentions, may be best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding.”
It is observed in support of this, that our government has constantly charged the first breaches of the treaty upon Great Britain, in the two particulars of carrying away the negroes, and detaining the posts; that while the evacuation of New-York was going on, a demand of the surrender of the negroes was made by Congress, through our Commander in Chief, which not being complied with, Commissioners were sent to ascertain the number carried away, with a view to a claim of compensation; that early and repeated applications were also made for the surrender of the Western Posts, which not only was not done but it is proved by the circumstances, that orders were not given for it according to the true intent of the treaty, and that there was, from the beginning, a design to infract and a virtual infraction of the article with respect to this object—all this, it is alledged, has been the uniform language of our government, and has been demonstrated by Mr. Jefferson to be true, in his letter to Mr. Hammond, of the 29th of May, 1792; and it is asserted that the ground ought not to have been given up by Mr. Jay, because it was the standard of the mutual rights and duties of the parties, as to the points unexecuted of the treaty of peace.
A proper examination of these matters is therefore called for, not only by the specific objection which is made to the principle which is contained in the preamble, but by the influence which a right solution is calculated to have, in giving a favourable or unfavourable complexion to the whole plan of the adjustment.
It is true, as suggested, that our government has constantly charged as breaches of the treaty by Great Britain, the two particulars which have been stated; but it is believed to be not true, that it has uniformly charged them as first breaches of the treaty. Individuals may have entertained this idea. The state of Virginia seems to have proceeded upon it in some public acts; but as far as is recollected, that ground was never formally or explicitly taken by the government of the United States, till in the above mentioned letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, when, for the first time, an attempt was made to vindicate or excuse the whole conduct of this country, in regard to the treaty of peace, contrary, I will venture to say, to the general sense of well informed men.
The most solemn act of our government on this head, is an address of Congress to the different States of the 13th of April, 1787.
This address admits contraventions of the treaty on our part, and instead of deriving either justification or extenuation of them from prior infractions by Great Britain, urges the different states to a repeal of all contravening laws.
But if the fact, in this respect, were admitted to be as stated by the adversaries of the treaty, it would not authorise their conclusion.
It would not follow, that, because the ground had been taken by the government, it ought to have been pertinaciously kept. If upon fair examination it had appeared to be not solid, or if an adherence to it would have obstructed a reasenable adjustment of differences.

Nations, no more than individuals, ought to persist in error, especially at the sacrifice of their peace and prosperity; besides, nothing is more common in disputes between nations, than each side to charge the other with being the aggressor or delinquent. This mutual crimination, either from the nature of circumstances or from the illusions of the passions, is sometimes sincere; at other times it is dictated by pride or policy. But in all such cases where one party is not powerful enough to dictate to the other, and where there is a mutual disposition to avoid war; the natural retreat for both is in a compromise, which waves the question of first aggression or delinquency. This is the salva for national pride; the escape for mutual error; the bridge by which nations, arrayed against each other, are enabled to retire with honor; and without bloodshed, from the field of contest. In cases of mutual delinquency, the question of the first default is frequently attended with real difficulty and doubt. One side has an equal right with the other, to have and maintain its opinion. What is to be done when the pride of neither will yield to the arguments of the other? War, or a waver of the point, is the alternative. What sensible man, what humane man will deny that a compromise, which secures substantially the objects of interest, is almost always preferable to war on so punctilious and unmanageable a point?
Reject the principle of compromise, and the feuds of nations must become much more deadly than they have heretofore been. There would scarcely ever be room for the adjustment of differences without an appeal to the sword; and when drawn, it would seldom be sheathed but with the destruction of one or the other party. The earth now too often stained, would then continually stream with human gore.
From the situation of the thing, and of the parties, there never could be a rational doubt that the compromising plan was the only one on which the United States and Great Britain could ever terminate their differences without war; that the question, who was the first delinquent, would have been an eternal bar to accommodation, and consequently that a dismission of that question was a prerequisite to agreement. Had our envoy permitted the negociation to be arrested by obstinacy on this head, he would have shewn himself to be the diplomatic pedant, rather than the able negociator, and would have been justly chargeable with sacrificing to punct[i]lio, the peace of his country. It was enough for him, as he did, to ascertain by a preliminary discussion, the impossibility of bringing the other party to concede the point.
An impartial survey of the real state of the question, will satisfy candid and discerning men, that it was wise and politic to dismiss it. This shall be attempted.
[It has been observed that two breaches of the Treaty of peace are charged upon Great Britain, the carrying away of the negroes and the detention of the posts. It remains to investigate the reality of these breaches and to fix the periods when they can be said to have happened.
As to the negroes, the true sense of the article in the Treaty of peace which respects them is disputed.
The words of the stipulation are (Article 7) that “His Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed and without causing any destruction or carrying away any negroes or other property of the American Inhabitants withdraw all his armies garrisons and fleets from the U States.”
These terms admit of two constructions, one that no negroes or other articles which had been American property should be carried away—the other that the evacuations were to be made without depredation, consequently that no new destruction was to be committed and that negroes or other articles which at the time of the cessation of hostilities continued to be the property of the American inhabitants unchanged by the operations of War should be foreborne to [be] carried away.
The first is the construction which was adopted by this country—the last is that insisted upon by Great Britain.
The arguments which support her construction are these—
1   The established laws of War give to an enemy the use and enjoyment during the war of all real property of which he obtains possession, and the absolute ownership of all personal property which falls into his hands. The latter is called booty, and except Ships becomes vested in the Captors the moment they acquire a firm possession. With regard to Ships it seems to be a general rule of the Marine law that condemnation is necessary to the complete investment of the property in the Captor.
II   Negroes by the laws of the states in which slavery is allowed are personal property. They therefore on the principle of those laws like horses, cattle and other moveables were liable to become booty—and belonged to the enemy as soon as they came into his hands. Belonging to him he was free either to apply them to his own use or to set them at liberty. If he did the latter the grant was irrevocable—restitution was impossible. Nothing in the laws of Nations or in those of Great Britain will authorise the resumption of liberty once granted to a human being.
III   The negroes in question were either taken in the course of military operations or they joined the British army upon invitation by proclamation. However dishonorable to Great Britain the latter may have been as an illiberal species of warfare, there is no ground to say that the strict rules of war did not warrant it or that the effect was not in the one case as well as the other a change of propery in the thing.
IV   The stipulation relates to “negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,” putting Negroes upon the same footing with any other article. The characterickstic of the subject of the stipulation being property of American Inhabitants, whatever had lost that character could not be the object of the stipulation. But the negroes in question by the laws of war had lost that character. They were therefore not within the stipulation.
Why did not the U States demand the surrender of captured vessels and of all other moveables which had fallen into the hands of the enemy? The answer is because common sense would have revolted against such a construction. No one could believe that an indefinite surrender of all the spoils or booty of a seven years war was ever intended to be stipulated.
And yet the demand for a horse or an ox or a piece of furniture would have been as completely within the terms “negroes and other property” as a negro. Consequently the reasoning which proves that one is not included excludes the other.
The silence of the U States as to every other article is therefore a virtual abandonment of that sense of the stipulation which requires the surrender of Negroes.
V   In the interpretation of Treaties things odious or immoral are not to be presumed. The abandonment of negroes, who had been induced to quit their Masters on the faith of Official proclamations promising them liberty, to fall again under the yoke of their masters and into slavery is as odious and immoral a thing as can be conceived. It is odious not only as it imposes an act of perfidy on one of the contracting parties; but as it tends to bring back to servitude men once made free. The general interests of humanity conspire with the obligations which Great Britain had contracted towards the Negroes to repel this construction of the Treaty if another can be found.
VI   But Another and a less exceptionable construction is found in considering the clause as inserted, for greater caution, to secure evacuations without depredation. It may be answered, that this was superfluous, because hostilities having ceased the stipulation to surrender implied of itself that it was to be done without depredation. But to this the reply is that a part of the clause manifestly contemplates the case of new depredations and provides a guard against it in the promise that the evacuations shall be made without causing any destruction. To cause destruction is to do some new act of violence. This reflection destroys the argument drawn from the superfluousness of the stipulation in the sense here given to it, and by shewing that it must have such a sense in one part authorises the conclusion that the remainder of the clause has a similar sense. The connection of the two things as parts of one sentence confirms this inference.]
These arguments certainly have great weight, and do not admit of easy refutation. It is a fact too, that the opinions of some of the ablest lawyers of our own country have, from the beginning, corresponded with the construction they enforce.
It is not enough for us to be presuaded, that some of the negociators, who made the peace, intended the article in our sense. It is necessary that it should be found in the instrument itself, and from the nature of it, ought to have been expressed with clearness and without ambiguity. If there be real ambiguity in such a case, the odiousness of the effect will incline the scale against us.
It does not remove the difficulty to say, that compensation for the negroes might have been a substitute for the thing. When one party promise a specific thing to another, nothing but the thing itself will satisfy the promise. The party to whom it is made cannot be required to accept in lieu of it an equivalent. It follows, that compensation for the negroes would not have been a performance of the stipulation to forbear to carry them away, and therefore, if there be any thing odious in the specific thing itself, the objection to the interpretation which requires it, is not done away by the idea of substituting compensation. For the article does not admit such substitution, and its sense cannot be defined by what it does not admit.
Some colour to our sense of the article results from these expressions in the same clause, “leaving in all fortifications, the American artillery that may be therein.” But this expression is not of equivalent force to that of property of American inhabitants. For example, suppose an American ship to have been captured and condemned, it might still be said of her in a certain sense, this is an “American ship” alluding to the country of which she had been the ship, but it could not be said in any sense of her, this ship is American property, or the property of American inhabitants. The country of which a thing was, may often be used with aptness as a term of description of that thing, though it may have changed owners; but the term property, which is synonimous with ownership, can never be used in the present tense as descriptive of an ownership which has ceased. Moreover, if the expressions in the two cases had been (as they are not) of equivalent force, it would not follow that they were to have the same meaning in both cases, being applied to different matters. For an odious consequence in one instance would be a reason for rejecting a particular sense of a word or phrase, which would be proper in another, to which no such consequence was attached.
Let me now ask this question of any candid man. Is our construction of the article respecting the negroes, so much better supported than that of Great Britain, as to justify our pronouncing with positiveness that the carrying them away was a breach of the treaty?
To me it appears clear, that this must be considered, speaking favorably for us, as a very doubtful point, and that we cannot with confidence predicate a breach of the treaty by Great Britain upon this event. If it was one it happened in May 1783.
The affair of the western posts is now to be examined; that the detention of them, after the proper point of time for delivering them up, was a breach of the treaty, will not bear dispute. But what that proper time was, is a serious question between the parties.
Our government has contended, that the posts ought to have been surrendered with all convenient speed after the provisional treaty took effect, and Mr. Jefferson, who is much cited on the present occasion, has shewn, by an ingenious and elaborate deduction of circumstances, that this was not only not done, but never intended.
But Mr. Jefferson has not even discussed the question, whether the provisional or the definitive treaty was the act from which the obligation to perform was to date. This is an important omission, for Great Britain affirms the definitive treaty to be the criterion.
As an original question much might be said on both sides. The natural relation of the terms provisional or preliminary and definitive seems to exhibit the former as inchoate and imperfect, and to refer to the latter the conclusive obligatory force and legal perfection. There is room therefore to say, that all but the mere cessation of hostilities, or for the execution of which there is no precise point of time fixed in the preliminary articles, is referred to the definitive treaty.
On the other hand, it may be argued, that a preliminary treaty, is as much a national treaty as a definitive one, both being made by an equal and the competent authority, and that there is no good reason why those things which are sufficiently regulated by the preliminary, should not go into immediate and complete effect, equally as if regulated by the definitive treaty, or why the latter should be considered as any thing more than an instrument for adjusting points which may have been left open by the preliminary articles, and for giving more perfect form. Accordingly, there are examples of preliminary treaties going into mutual and full execution, though never followed by definitive treaties.
But, however, this question may have stood on principle, the conduct of our government in the particular case has settled it against us, and has completely sanctioned the doctrine of Great Britain.
If performance was to date from the provisional articles, this applies as well to us as to Great Britain. It was incumbent upon Congress to have notified the treaty with the proper solemnities to the different States and their citizens; to have made the recommendations stipulated by the fifth article, and to have enjoined the observance of all those things which were promised on our part. The nature of some of these stipulations rendered it particularly urgent that no time should be lost. But all was deferred till after the ratification in this country of the definitive treaty. The 15th day of January 1784, is the date of the act which attempts to carry the treaty into effect on our part. This then is a practical settlement by ourselves of that principle that performance was to date from the definitive treaty.
It is no objection to the position, that our sea-ports were previously evacuated; that was matter of mutual convenience, and though done does not change the state of strict obligation between the parties. Even in the view of liberal and conciliating procedure, the prompt surrender of our sea-ports are, for obvious reasons, very different things.
But our dilemma is this, if the delay of orders for evacuating the western posts, previous to the ratification of the definitive treaty, was on the part of Great Britain a breach of treaty, our delay to act upon the points stipulated by us till after that ratification, must have been equally a breach of treaty; and it must have been at least cotemporary with any breach that could have been committed by Great Britain.
We are compelled then by our own example to agree with Great Britain that she was not obliged to surrender the western posts till after the mutual ratification of the definitive treaty, and to abandon the superstructure, however soothing to our wishes, which has been reared upon a different foundation. If so, we must look to the period of the exchange of the ratification in Europe for the date of the orders for evacuating. I have not in my possession materials for fixing with accuracy that period, but considering the time of the ratification here, and the time of its probable arrival in England, we are carried to the latter end of April or beginning of May 1784; so that it is not till about May 1784 that we can charge upon Great Britain a delinquency as to the surrender of the posts.
Having now examined the nature of the infractions of the treaty of peace charged upon Great Britain with reference to dates, I shall, in the next number of this defence, trace some instances of infraction on our part with a like reference. The conclusions to be drawn from this comparison, if I mistake not, will greatly disconcert some articles of the prevailing creed on this head, and go far towards confirming what was preliminarily offered to evince the prudence of our Envoy in relinquishing the favourite ground.

Camillus.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 29 July 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

   Mount Vernon 29th July 1795My dear Sir,
      (Private)

Your letters of the 20th and 21st. Instt found me at this place, after a hot & disagreeable ride.
As the measures of the government, respecting the treaty, were taken before I left Philadelphia, something more imperious than has yet appeared, must turn up to occasion a change. Still, it is very desirable to ascertain, if possible, after the paroxysm of the fever is a little abated, what the real temper of the people is, concerning it; for at present the cry against the Treaty is like that against a mad dog; and every one, in a manner, seems engaged in running it down.
That it has received the most tortured interpretation, & that the writings agt. it (which are very industriously circulated) are pregnant of the most abominable mis-representations, yet, there are to be found, so far as my information extends, many well disposed men who conceive, that in the settlement of old disputes, a proper regard to reciprocal justice does not appear in the Treaty; whilst others, also well enough affected to the government, are of opinion that to have had no commercial treaty would have been better, for this country, than the restricted one, agreed to; inasmuch, say they, the nature of our Exports, and imports (without any extra: or violent measures) would have forced, or led to a more adequate intercourse between the two nations; without any of those shackles which the treaty has imposed. In a word, that as our exports consist chiefly of provisions & raw materials, which to the manufacturers in G. Britain, & to their Islands in the West Indies, affords employment & food; they must have had them on our terms if they were not to be obtained on their own; whilst the imports of this country, offers the best mart for their fabricks; &, of course, is the principal support of their manufacturers: But the string which is most played on, because it strikes with most force the popular ear, is the violation—as they term it—of our engagements with France; or in other words, the prediliction shewn by that instrument to G. Britain at the expence of the French nation. The consequences of which are more to be apprehended than any, which are likely to flow from other causes, as ground of opposition; because, whether the fact is, in any degree true, or not, it is the interest of the French (whilst the animosity, or jealousies betwn. the two nations exist) to avail themselves of such a spirit to keep us & G. Britain at variance; and they will, in my opinion, accordingly do it. To what length their policy may induce them to carry matters, is too much in embryo at this moment to decide: but I predict much embarrassment to the government therefrom—and in my opinion, too much pains cannot be taken by those who speak, or write, in favor of the treaty, to place this matter in its true light.
I have seen with pleasure, that a writer in one of the New York papers under the Signature of Camillus, has promised to answer—or rather to defend the treaty which has been made with G. Britain. To judge of this work from the first number, which I have seen, I auger well of the performance; & shall expect to see the subject handled in a clear, distinct and satisfactory manner: but if measures are not adopted for its dissimination a few only will derive lights from the knowledge, or labour of the author; whilst the opposition pieces will spread their poison in all directions; and Congress, more than probable, will assemble with the unfavorable impressions of their constituents. The difference of conduct between the friends, and foes of order, & good government, is in nothg. more striking than that, the latter are always working like bees, to distil their poison, whilst the former, depending, often times too much, and too long upon the sense, and good dispositions of the people to work conviction, neglect the means of effecting it. With sincere esteem & regard
I am your Affecte.

Go: Washington
Colo. Hamilton


Title: Address on the Jay Treaty, 30 July 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July 30, 1795. “Mr. Hamilton said, ‘unless the treaty was ratified, we might expect a foreign war, and if it is ratified we might expect a civil war.’ He adds, ‘true, a gentleman observed to me, that a foreign war might be procrastinated by further negociations, but this would be degrading to the honor of the nation.’ To this he added, although not in direct terms, yet such as purported to every hearer, that, of the alternative (of foreign or civil war) he would chuse the latter…. In the course of his speech, after having reprobated as uncertain and fraudulent the means hitherto used (viz.) the assembling of the populace, he proposed several methods in order to ‘obtain the true sense of the people, which had not been done, although asserted to have been.’ One of the proposals was, ‘to go round in the several wards of the city to the people individually.’ He adds, ‘we will let the question respecting the treaty, rest in the constitutional authority, and put the question to the people, are you for or against the constitutional authorities!’” The text of this speech has not been found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 30 July 1795
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Private.
Dear Sir.
Phila. July 30th. 1795
I have your Letter of the 28th: I will see the Secy of War this morning, and you may rely upon it, that the movement will be suspended.
The true state of things in this city is, that the Treaty was at first unpopular, the expectations of vain sanguine men, who considered this Country as all powerful & intittled to dictate, were not satisfied—every engine of faction was successfully set at work; at present there is more temper & moderation—the truth begins to prevail. I think we shall have no dangerous riots—but one month will determine the fate of our Country, so far as depends on ourselves—the extreme hazards of foreign war I do not take into account.
I dare not write & hardly dare think of what I know & believe respecting a certain character; whose situation gives him a decided influence. There has as yet nothing more passed between the Government & Mr. Hammond, than a verbal conference, in which the Presidents opinion respecting the merits of the Treaty has been declared to be like that of the Senate—no written memorial has passed nor have any measures as relative to the ratification been adopted—the ratification of the President has moreover been connected with the repeal of some unknown order respecting Vessells bound with provisions to France—though this was a condition improperly prescribed in my opinion, yet the circumstance might have been mentioned in a manner which would not be offensive and have assumed the form of a prudent precaution on the part of the President.
But what must the British Government think of the United States, when they find the Treaty clogged with one condition by the Senate, with another by the President—no answer given in a precise form, after forty days, no Minister in that Country to take up negociations proposed by ourselves, the Country rising into a flame, their Ministers house insulted by a Mob—their flag dragged through the Streets as in Charleston & burnt before the doors of their Consul—A driveller & fool appointed Chief Justice—&c &c. Can they believe that we desire peace?
I shall take immediate measures with two of my Colleagues, this very day—they are firm & honest men. We will if possible, to use a French phrase save our Country. You must not think we have been to blame for the delay. We have been constantly amused by R—who has said that the President was determined to ratify—the precise state of the business has never been communicated till within a few days—the affairs of his Dept. are solely conducted by himself. Feel no concern however, for I see a clue which I know will conduct us through every labyrnyth except that of War. On that point we must take our chance. It would be well if you or Mr. King or Gov. Jay could be here some time next week—provided too much speculation would not be excited.
Yrs. truly

Oliv. Wolcott.
A Hamilton Esqr.


Title: Horatius No. II, [July 1795]
From: “Horatius”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, July, 1795]
No. II

To The People of the U States
Countrymen & Fellow Citizens
Nothing can be more false or ridiculous, candidly considered, than the assertion that great sacrifices of your interests are made in the Treaty with Great Britain. As to the controverted points between the Two Nations, the Treaty provides satisfactorily for the great and essential ones; and only foregoes objects of an inferior and disputable nature, of no real consequence to the permanent welfare of the Country. As to Trade the dilemma is this; if an article is added for granting us such privileges in the British West Indies as are satisfactory to us, it will give a duration of twelve years to the Treaty & will render it as good a one as the most sanguine could desire, and a better one than any other powers of Europe can make with us: For no other power of Europe can give us the advantages in the East Indies, which this Treaty confers. If that article be not added, the commercial part of the Treaty will expire in two years; after the present war, by its own limitation. It is therefore preposterous to talk of great sacrifices in a commercial sense. This observation is to be understood with the exception of the third article; which regulates the Trade between us and the neighbouring British territories, which is permanent, and which is certainly a precious article; inevitably throwing into our lap the greatest part of the furr Trade with the Trade of the two Canadas. This is a full answer to the idle tale of sacrifices by the Treaty as the pretext for violating Your constitution and for sullying your faith and your honor.
It is an unquestionable truth, fellow Citizens! and one which it is essential you should understand, that the great and cardinal sin of the Treaty in the eyes of its adversaries is that it puts an end to controversy with Great Britain. We have a sect of politicians among us, who influenced by a servile and criminal subserviency to the views of France have adopted it as a fundamental tenet that there ought to subsist between us and Great Britain eternal variance and discord.
What we now see is a part of the same system which led the Ministry of Louis the 16 insidiousness to advise our Commissioners for making peace to treat with Great Britain without the acknowlegement of our Independence; wishing that the omission of this acknowlegement might perpetuate a jealousy and dread of Great Britain and occasion a greater necessity for our future dependence on France.
It is a part of the same system, which during our War with Great Britain produced a resolution of our public Councils, without adequate motive or equivalent, to sacrifice the navigation of the Missisippi to Spain; and which also begat a disposition to abandon our claim to an equal participation in the Codfisheries.
It is a part of the same disgraceful system which fettered our Commissioners for making peace with the impolitic & humiliating instruction to submit all their motions to the direction of the French Cabinet—and which attempted a censure upon them for breaking through that system, and in consequence of it effecting a peace glorious and advantageous for the Country, beyond expectation.
The present Rulers of France have proclaimed to the world the insidious and unfriendly policy of the former Government towards this Country. Their successors may hereafter unmask equally insidious and unfriendly views in the present rulers.
But if you are as discerning, as I believe you to be you will not wait for this evidence to form your opinion. You will see in the conduct of the Agents of that Government, wherever they are, that they are machinating against your independence peace and happiness; that not content with a fair competition in your trade on terms of equal privilege they are labouring to continue you at variance with Great Britain, in order that you may be dependent on France.
This conduct in the known Agents of a foreign Government is not to be wondered at. It marks the usual and immemorial policy of all the Governments of Europe.
But that any of your Countrymen, that men who have been honored with your suffrages should be the supple instruments of this crooked policy, that they should stoop to nourish and foster this exotic plant and should exchange the pure and holy love of their own Country for a meritricious foreign amour—that they should be willing to sacrifice your interests to their animosity against one foreign Nation and their devotion for another is justly matter of surprise and indignation. No terms of reprobation are too severe for so faithless and so unworthy a Conduct.
Reason, Religion, Philosophy, Policy, disavow the spurious and odious doctrine that we ought to cherish and cultivate enmity with any Nation whatever. In reference to a Nation with whom we have such extensive relations of Commerce as with Great Britain—to a power, from her maritime strength, so capable of annoying us—it must be the offspring of treachery or extreme folly. If you consult your true interest Your Motto cannot fail to be “Peace and Trade with all Nations; beyond our present engagements, political connection with none” You ought to spurn from you as the box of Pandora—the fatal heresy of close alliance, or in the language of Genet a true family compact with France. This would at once make you a mere satellite of France, and entangle you in all the contests broils, and wars of Europe.
Tis evident that the Controversies of Europe must often grow out of causes intirely foreign to this Country. Why then should we by a close political connection with any power of Europe expose our peace & interest as a matter of course to all the shocks with which their mad rivalships and wicked ambition so frequently convulse the earth? ‘Twere insanity to embrace such a system. The avowed and secret partisans of it merit our contempt for their folly or our execration for their depravity.
Horatius


Title: The Defence No. IV, [1 August 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, August 1, 1795]

An accurate enumeration of the breaches of the Treaty of peace on our part would require a tedious research. It will suffice to select and quote a few of the most prominent and early instances.
One of the earliest is to be found in an Act of this state for granting a more effectual relief in cases of certain Trespasses passed the 17 of March 1783.

This act takes away from any person (subjects of Great Britain of every description included) who had during the war occupied injured destroyed or received property real or personal of any inhabitant without the British lines the benefit of the plea of a military order; consequently the justification which the laws and usages of war give, and the immunity resulting from the reciprocal amnesty which expressly or virtually is an essential part of every Treaty of peace. To this it may be added, that it was considered by Great Britain as a direct infraction of the 6th article of her Treaty with us, which exempts all persons from prosecution “by reason of the part they might have taken in the War.”
Mr. Jefferson, not controverting the point that the provisions of this act were contrary to the Treaty, endeavours to get rid of the inference from it, by alleging three things.
1st. That it passed antecedently to the Treaty, and so could not be a violation of an act of subsequent date.
2   That the Treaty was paramount [to] the laws of the particular States & operated a repeal of them.
3   That the exceptionable principle of this act was never sanctioned by the Courts of Justice and in one instance (the case of Rutgers and Waddington in the Mayors Court) was overruled.
As to the first point, it is sufficient to answer that the law continued to operate, in fact, from the time of the Treaty till the 4th of April 1787, when there was a repeal of the exceptionable clause by an act of our legislature. During this period of four years, many suits were brought and many recoveries had—extending even to persons who had been in the military service of Great Britain.
To the second point, these observations may be opposed.

The articles of confederation did not like our present constitution declare that Treaties were supreme laws of the land. The U States under that system had no courts of their own to expound and enforce their Treaties as laws. All was to depend on the comparitive authority of laws and Treaties in the judgment of the State Courts.
The question, whether Treaties were paramount to and a virtual repeal of antecedent laws was a question of theory, about which there was room for, and in this country did exist much diversity of opinion. It is notorious, that it has been strenuously maintained that however a national Treaty ought in good faith to be conclusive upon a state to induce a repeal of laws contrary to it—yet its actual laws could not be controuled by Treaty without an actual repeal by its own authority. This doctrine has been emphatically that of the party distinguished by its opposition to national principles.
And it is observable that Congress not relying intirely upon the force of the Treaty to abrogate contravening laws, in their address already cited, urge the states to a repeal of those laws. It is likewise observiable in respect to the very act under consideration that the Legislature of this State in April 1787 thought a positive repeal of the exceptionable clause necessary.
The complaints of a power, whose treaty with us was in fact violated by the operation of a state law, could never be satisfactorily answered by referring to a theoretic abstract disputed proposition. Such a power might reply with irresistible force. Tis not for us to concern ourselves about the structure or meaning of your political constitutions, or the force of the legal maxims deducible from the forms and distributions of power which you have adopted for your Government—’tis the fact, in which alone we are interested. You have stipulated this and that to us. Your stipulation in practice is contravened. Tis your duty to see that there is no impediment from conflicting authorities within yourselves to the exact fulfilment of your promises. If you suffer any such impediment to exist, you are answerable for the consequences.
As to the third point it is to be observed that though there may have been no express formal decision of our Courts enforcing the exceptionable principle of the Trespass act—yet there never was a decision of a superior Court against it. And it may not be amiss to remark incidentally that the decision of the Mayors Court from which Mr. Jefferson is glad to derive an exculpation of our conduct was the object of severe animadversion at a popular meeting in this City as a judiciary encroachment on the legislative authority of the State.
The truth on this point is that according to the general opinion of our bar a defence under a military order was desperate; and it was believed that a majority of our Supreme Court Bench would overrule the plea. Hence in numerous cases where it might have been used it was waved; and the endeavour on behalf of defendants was either to effect on collateral grounds a mitigation of damages or to accomplish the best compromises that could be obtained. Even the suit of Rutgers & Waddington after a partial success in the Mayors Court was terminated by a compromise according to the advice of the defendants counsel owing to the apprehension of an unfavourable issue in the Supreme Court; and this notwithstanding the defendant was a British subject.
It is pertinent to remark, that the British Commander in Chief very early remonstrated against this act, but the remonstrance produced no effect.
Under these circumstances which are faithfully represented, is it possible to doubt that the Act in question operated a breach of our Treaty with Great Britain? and this from the very commencement of its existence? Can we reasonably expect that the nations with whom we have treaties will allow us to substitute theoretic problems to performances of our engagements, and will be willing to accept them as apologies for actual violations?
Another Act of the State of New York may be cited as a violation of the Treaty on our part which must have been nearly co-temporary with that of the detention of the posts. Its date is the 12 of May 1784. This act confirms in express terms all confiscations before made, nothwithstanding errors in the proceedings, and takes away the writ of error upon any judgment previously rendered.
This was in substance a new confiscation. Judgments which from error were invalid were nullities. To take away the writ of error by which their nullity might be established was to give them an efficacy which they did not before possess—and as to the operation cannot be distinguished from the rendering of new judgments. To make voidable acts of confiscation valid and conclusive is equivalent to new acts of confiscation. A fair execution of the Treaty required that every thing in this respect should be left where it was and forbade the remedying of defects in former proceedings as much as the institution of new .
Another and an unequivocal breach of the Treaty is found in an Act of South Carolina of March 26. 1784. This Act suspends the recovery of British Debts for nine months, and then allows them to be recovered only in four yearly installments cont[r]ary to the express stipulation of the 4th article “that Creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in Sterling money of all bona fide debts theretofore contracted”.
It is idle to attempt to excuse infractions of this kind by the pleas of distress and inability. This is to make the convenience of one party the measure of its obligation to perform its promises to another. If there was really an impossibility of payment, as has been pretended, there was no need of legislative obstruction. The thing would have regulated itself, and the very interest of the creditor was a pledge that no general evil could have resulted from allowing a free course to the laws. If such impediments could be justified, what impediments might not be justified? What would become of the Article—the only one in the Treaty to be performed by us of real consequence to Great Britain?
This infraction by South Carolina was prior to that of the detention of the Posts by Great Britain.
But the case of Virginia is still stronger than that of South Carolina. There is evidence which cannot be disputed that her courts in defiance of the Treaty have constantly remained shut to the recovery of British Debts, in virtue of laws passed during the War.
An Act of her General Assembly of the 22 of June 1784 after suggesting as breaches of the Treaty by Great Britain the carrying off of the negroes and the detention of the posts, after instructing her delegates in Congress to request a remonstrance to the British Court complaining of those infractions and desiring reparation, and after declaring that the national honor and interest of the Citizens of that commonwealth obliged the Assembly to withold their co-operation in the complete fulfilment of the said Treaty until the success of the aforementioned remonstrance is known, or Congress shall signify their sentiments touching the premises—concludes with the following resolution:
“That so soon as reparation is made for the foregoing infraction, or Congress shall judge it indispensably necessary, such acts of the legislature passed during the late war as inhibit the recovery of British Debts ought to be repealed and payment thereof made in such time and manner as shall consist with the exhausted situation of the Commonwealth.”
The plain language of these resolutions is—that there were acts, passed during the War, which then actually inhibited the recovery of British Debts and that for the removal of this inhibition a repealing Act by the Authority of Virginia was necessary.
However unsound this position may have been in theory, it is conclusive evidence that the fact in Virginia was conformable with it—that her Courts had been ever since the peace, then were, and until a repealing law was passed were likely to continue to be, shut against the recovery of British Debts. When testimony of this kind was urged by the British Minister was it possible for our envoy to make any solid reply? Who could be supposed to know better than the Legislature of Virginia the real state of the fact? When that Legislature had declared it to be as has been stated who or what could contradict it? With what truth has it been asserted that “it was at all times perfectly understood that Treaties controuled the laws of of the States?”
Additional Proof of the contrary is found in the subsequent conduct of Virginia. On the 12th of December 1787 that state passed an act repealing all such acts or parts of acts of the state as had prevented or might prevent the recovery of Debts due to British subjects according to the true intent of the Treaty; but with this proviso that there should be a suspension of the repeal till the Governor with advice of Council had by proclamation notified that Great Britain had delivered up the Posts and was taking measures for the further fulfilment of the Treaty by delivering up the negroes or making compensation for them. This denotes clearly that in the opinion of the legislature of Virginia, there were acts of that State which had prevented and might prevent the recovery of Debts according to the Treaty.
It is observable too that the resolutions of June 1784 do not even give the expectation of a complete repeal of the impeding laws, in the event of a reparation of the breaches of Treaty by G: Britain. They only promise such a modification of them as would permit the payment in such time and manner as should consist with the exhausted situation of the Commonwealth; that is, not according to the true intent of the Treaty, but according to the opinion of the legislature of Virginia of the ability of the Commonwealth.
As the infraction, which these proceedings of Virginia admit, resulted from acts passed during the war, it of course was coeval with the first existence of the Treaty of peace—and seems to preclude the possibility of any prior breach of Great Britain. It has been at least demonstrated, that the detention of the posts was not such prior breach—as there was no obligation to surrender till after the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive Treaty in England.
I pass by the serious contraventions of the Treaty, in this important article of the Debts, which are of later date, because they do not affect the question of the first breach; though they are of great weight to demonstrate the obligation of the U States to make compensation.
The argument then, upon the whole, as to the question of first breach stands thus—It is a great doubt whether the carrying away of the negroes was at all a breach. If it was one, the Trespass Act of this state preceded it in date and went into operation the very moment it was possible to issue process. The detention of the posts, is subsequent to breaches of the article concerning the recovery of Debts on our part. This in the case of South Carolina is determined by the date of her act (March the 26. 1784) which is before the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive Treaty could have taken place. In that of Virginia it results from her own testimony, that impediments to the recovery of British Debts created by acts passed during the war continued from the first moment of the peace till after the war 1787. Or if contrary to our own interpretation, we are disposed to adhere to the provisional treaty as the act from which performance was to date we were guilty of a breach in not acting ourselves upon that Treaty—a breach at least cotemporary with any that can be imputed to G Britain. From all which it follows, that take what ground we will, we must be perplexed to fix the charge of the first breach of the Treaty upon Great Britain.
Let the appeal be to the understandings and hearts of candid men, men who have force of mind sufficient to rescue themselves from the trammels of prejudice and who dare to look even unpalatable truths in the face. Let such men pronounce whether they are still satisfied that Great Britain is clearly chargeable with the first breaches of the Treaty—whether they are not on the contrary convinced that the question is one so mixed and doubtful as to have rendered a waver of it even on the score of intrinsic merits expedient on our part—and principally whether they can entertain a particle of doubt, that it was wiser to wave it than to suffer it to prove a final obstacle to the adjustment of a controversy on which the peace of the Country was suspended.
This was undoubtedly the alternative to our Envoy. In the choice he made, the final opinion of an enlightened Country cannot fail to applaude his prudence.
Camillus


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 3 August 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon 3d Augt 1795
Dear Sir,

The enclosed was written, as you will perceive, on the 29th. Ulto; & with many other letters, was sent to the Post Office in Alexandria; to proceed with the Northern Mail next morning. But the blundering Post Master of that place, in putting the letters addressed to, put all the letters from me, into my own bag: of course they were returned to me. Since which the unusual (at almost any season of the year), and violent rains which have fallen, have given such interruption to the Post, as to detain my letters ‘till this time: and altho’ I am now sending them to the Post Office, I have little expectation of their proceeding tomorrow; the waters being yet very high, & the bridges all gone. In short, the damage of every sort, is very great in these parts.   Yours always
G Washington
Colo Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 3 August 1795
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, August 3, 1795. On August 5, 1795, Hamilton wrote to Wolcott: “I have received yours of the 3d instant.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from William Bradford, 4 August 1795
From: Bradford, William
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philada. Aug. 4. 1795.
My dear Sir,

The record of the proceedings in the cause relating to the Carriage Tax is not yet returned —but I expect it this week. I learn however that Taylor, who has published his speech, has advised the defendant to make no further argument & to let the Supreme Court do as they please & that in consequence of this advice no counsel will appear in support of the writ of Error. I have denied that the District Attorney would take measures to counteract this manœvre which is of a piece with the rest of Taylor’s conduct. Having succeeded in dividing the opinions of the Circuit Court, he wishes to prevent the Effect which a decision of the Supreme Court on full argument would have, & perhaps by the circulation of his pamphlet in the mean time to indispose the people of Virginia to paying the next annual duty on their Carriages. If the Defendant persists in pursuing this advice, I presume your attendance will not be necessary; for in such case I would think it most advisable to submit the cause to the court upon the two arguments that have been already made. That of Mr. Wickham’s, has arrived in manuscript: that of Taylor we expect by the next post. I will take Care however to apprize you as soon as the record arrives what is to be expected.
In consequence of the situation of things & some new occurences, it has been thought advisable to request the president to return to Philada. He is expected to be here next week.
The crazy speech of Mr. Rutledge joined to certain information that he is daily sinking into debility of mind & body, will probably prevent him to receiving the appointment I mentioned to you. But should he come to Philada. for that purpose, as he has been invited to do—& especially if he should resign his present Office —the embarrassment of the President will be extreme—but if he is disordered in mind in the manner that I am informed he is, there can be but one course of procedure. I write in great haste, & can only add that I am with great regard
Your friend & hum sert.
WB.
Alexander Hamilton Esq.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Tench Coxe, [4 August 1795]
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, August 4, 1795]
Sir

I have been prevented from answering your last letter partly by a journey into the woods, which I have since risqued in person to secure justice in laying the warrants under Ball & Smith, and partly by the difficulties arising with Messrs. Wheelen, Miller & Co. they had from me certain counter Notes for the Greater part of the Notes furnished by them, which I do assure you I was not able to procure after applications once or twice a week for a quarter of year. I have however within a few Days obtained the return of two of those counter Notes of mine, & a promise to search for & send me one more, which is not yet done. At present I am e[n]gaged in another question with them, which is, whether they are bound to give notes or Bonds for the 2d. & 3d. payments. This new difficulty will evince to you, what I have to contend with, & I have not yet got them to consent to the matter.
As I learn you are coming to Philada. on the Subject of the Carriage Tax, which will be argued before the approaching supreme Court, opportunity will then be given for such adjustment as is now practicable.
I am, Sir,   your very obedt. hble. servant
Tench Coxe
Philada. Augustth4. 1795
Alexr. Hamilton Esqr.Atty. of J. B. Church Esqr.