Title: To James Madison from Samuel Johnston, 22 May 1789
From: Johnston, Samuel
To: Madison, James

Dear SirEdenton 22d. May 1789
The inclosed Address was voted unanimously and contains, I believe, the genuine Sentiments of much the greatest part of the Inhabitants of this Country; The State of North Carolina having no Agent or any person in a publick Character at this time in New York, I take the liberty to request the favor of you to deliver it, my Motive for troubling you on this occasion rather than any one else, arises from my knowledge of the benevolence of your disposition and the readiness you have on all occasions discovered to promote the Union & happiness of all the States.
I am very happy to find that the New Government is in so fair a way of being firmly established, notwithstanding the unwearied diligence of some factions and some weak and uninformed men in opposing it, the conciliating and accomodating Spirit which is observable from the Debates which have appeared in print is a happy presage of what the Publick may hope from the Wisdom of the present Congress. I beg you will pardon this Liberty and believe me, with every Sentiment of the most freindly regard and highest Esteem Dear sir Your most Obedient Servant
Sam Johnston
P. S. The reason why this address was not forwarded sooner arose from my indisposition.


Title: Citizenship, [22 May] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[22 May 1789]

   The House took up the petition of David Ramsay, who claimed that the election of William Smith of South Carolina was invalid because he had not been a citizen for seven years when elected (Ramsay to JM, 4 Apr. 1789 and n. 2).

Mr. Madison. I think the merit of the question is now to be decided, whether the gentleman is eligible to a seat in this house or not, but it will depend on the decision of a previous question, whether he has been seven years a citizen of the United-States or not.
From an attention to the facts which have been adduced, and from a consideration of the principles established by the revolution, the conclusion I have drawn is, that Mr. Smith, was on the declaration of independence a citizen of the United-States, and unless it appears that he has forfeited his right, by some neglect or overt act, he had continued a citizen until the day of his election to a seat in this house. I take it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided in our decision, by the laws and constitution of South-Carolina, so far as they can guide us, and where the laws do not expressly guide us, we must be guided by principles of a general nature so far as they are applicable to the present case.
It were to be wished, that we had some law adduced more precisely defining the qualities of a citizen or an alien; particular laws of this kind, have obtained in some of the states; if such a law existed in South-Carolina, it might have prevented this question from ever coming before us; but since this has not been the case, let us settle some general principles before we proceed to the presumptive proof arising from public measures under the law, which tend to give support to the inference drawn from such principles.
It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth however derives its force sometimes from place and sometimes from parentage, but in general place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will therefore be unnecessary to investigate any other. Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his birthright; his ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony.
It is well known to many gentlemen on this floor, as well as to the public, that the petitioner is a man of talents, one who would not lightly hazard his reputation in support of visionary principles: yet I cannot but think he has erred in one of the principles upon which he grounds his charge. He supposes, when this country separated from Great Britain, the tie of allegiance subsisted between the inhabitants of America and the king of that nation, unless by some adventitious circumstance the allegiance was transferred to one of the United States. I think there is a distinction which will invalidate his doctrine in this particular, a distinction between that primary allegiance which we owe to that particular society of which we are members, and the secondary allegiance we owe to the sovereign established by that society. This distinction will be illustrated by the doctrine established by the laws of Great Britain, which were the laws of this country before the revolution. The sovereign cannot make a citizen by any act of his own; he can confer denizenship, but this does not make a man either a citizen or subject. In order to make a citizen or subject, it is established, that allegiance shall first be due to the whole nation; it is necessary that a national act should pass to admit an individual member. In order to become a member of the British empire, where birth has not endowed the person with that privilege, he must be naturalized by an act of parliament.
What was the situation of the people of America when the dissolution of their allegiance took place by the declaration of independence? I conceive that every person who owed this primary allegiance to the particular community in which he was born retained his right of birth, as the member of a new community; that he was consequently absolved from the secondary allegiance he had owed to the British sovereign: If he was not a minor, he became bound by his own act as a member of the society who separated with him from a submission to a foreign country. If he was a minor, his consent was involved in the decision of that society to which he belonged by the ties of nature. What was the allegiance as a citizen of South-Carolina, he owed to the King of Great Britain? He owed his allegiance to him as a King of that society to which, as a society he owed his primary allegiance. When that society separated from Great Britain, he was bound by that act and his allegiance transferred to that society, or the sovereign which that society should set up, because it was through his membership of the society of South-Carolina, that he owed allegiance to Great Britain.
This reasoning will hold good, unless it is supposed that the separation which took place between these states and Great Britain, not only dissolved the union between those countries, but dissolved the union among the citizens themselves: that the original compact, which made them altogether one society, being dissolved, they could not fall into pieces, each part making an independent society, but must individually revert into a state of nature; but I do not conceive that this was of necessity to be the case; I believe such a revolution did not absolutely take place. But in supposing that this was the case lies the error of the memorialist. I conceive the colonies remained as a political society, detached from their former connection with another society, without dissolving into a state of nature; but capable of substituting a new form of government in the place of the old one, which they had for special considerations abolished. Suppose the state of South Carolina should think proper to revise her constitution, abolish that which now exists, and establish another form of government: Surely this would not dissolve the social compact. It would not throw them back into a state of nature. It would not dissolve the union between the individual members of that society. It would leave them in perfect society, changing only the mode of action, which they are always at liberty to arrange. Mr. Smith being then, at the declaration of independence, a minor, but being a member of that particular society, he became, in my opinion, bound by the decision of the society with respect to the question of independence and change of government; and if afterward he had taken part with the enemies of his country, he would have been guilty of treason against that government to which he owed allegiance, and would have been liable to be prosecuted as a traitor.
If it is said, that very inconvenient circumstances would result from this principle, that it would constitute all those persons who are natives of America, but who took part against the revolution, citizens of the United States, I would beg leave to observe, that we are deciding a question of right, unmixed with the question of expediency, and must therefore pay a proper attention to this principle. But I think it can hardly be expected by gentlemen that the principle will operate dangerously. Those who left their country to take part with Britain were of two descriptions, minors, or persons of mature age. With respect to the latter nothing can be inferred with respect to them from the decision on the present case; because they had the power of making an option between the contending parties: whether this was a matter of right or not is a question which need not be agitated in order to settle the case before us. Then, with respect to those natives who were minors at the revolution, and whose case is analogous to Mr. Smith’s, if we are bound by the precedent of such a decision as we are about to make, and it is declared, that they owe a primary allegiance to this country, I still think we are not likely to be inundated with such characters; so far as any of them took part against us they violated their allegiance and opposed our laws; so then there can be only a few characters, such as were minors at the revolution, and who have never violated their allegiance by a foreign connection, who can be affected by the decision of the present question. The number I admit is large who might be acknowledged citizens on my principles; but there will very few be found daring enough to face the laws of the country they have violated, and against which they have committed high treason.
So far as we can judge by the laws of Carolina, and the practice and decision of that state, the principles I have adduced are supported; and I must own that I feel myself at liberty to decide, that Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration of independence, a citizen at the time of his election, and consequently entitled to a seat in this legislature.


Title: To James Madison from Hugh Williamson, 24 May 1789
From: Williamson, Hugh
To: Madison, James

Dear sirEdenton 24th May 1789
We are told that Genl Person the bell Weather of Opposition in this State continues indefatigable in his Endeavours to preserve the Spirit of Antifederalism in the State. Our Judges, two of them at least, there are three, continue most malignant anti’s. They seem to think that the new Court will cast a Shade on them. Whether the constitution will or will not be adopted by the next Convention has been as I am told a Subject of Wager at ten to one on both sides according to the zeal of the Parties. To the best of my Beleif the true Anti’s in the State do not wish to hear that Congress have adopted many of the modifications or alterations proposed by this State & Virga. One Position however appears to be pretty certain viz that the Inhabitants of Edenton District are extremely unanimous, nine Counties. It is generally understood here that unless the People bordering on Virga in the Northern and Western Parts of the state shall agree to confederate we must of necessity adhere to the other States and divide this State leaving the Genlty who care nothing for Commerce to shift for themselves. By the Way, I verily believe that the desire of eluding all Taxes and defrauding the Nation leaving the Burden on other Shoulders is the great Object of our Antifeds. Qu: Would it not be proper for your Congress to call upon this State very pointedly for its Quota of the annual Supplies? Perhaps you cannot with Propriety charge us with the civil List, but you will doubtless charge us with our Quota of the Interest of all the liquidated Debts, foreign and domestic. On such a Call it might fairly be intimated to the State, that her not thinking fit to be governed as the other States are affords no possible Excuse for not discharging a Debt, & that full Payment will be expected. You know that our Assembly is to meet about two Weeks before the Convention meets & I verily believe that a pointed Call of Congress for Money would help the Federal Party more than any other Argument.
The Preservation of your Health requires occasional Exercise and Mrs Williamson will thank you if you call at Bloomingdale with the inclosed but if you have not Leisure for Exercise or have other Engagements you will be so good as [to] forward the Letter to Mrs Seabring. I have the Honour to be with the utmost Regard Dear sir Your most obedt servt
Hu Williamson


Title: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 27 May 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Dear SirNew York May 27th. 1789
Since my last which was written on sunday last and included an introduction of young Mr. Colden who is to be the bearer of it from Scotland where he now resides, I have had the pleasure of yours of March 15. My former letters will have made known to you the obstacles to a licence for your visit to America. The new authority has not yet taken up your application. As soon as the auxiliary offices to the President shall be established & filled, which will probably not be long delayed, I hope the subject will be decided on, and in the manner you wish. It is already agreed in the form of resolutions that there shall be three departments one for finance, another for foreign affairs, and the third for war. The last will be continued in the hands of General Knox. The second will remain with Mr. Jay, if he chooses to keep it. The first is also to be under one head, though to be branched out in such a manner as will check the administration. Chancellor wishes this department but will not succeed. It will be given I think to Jay or Hamilton. The latter is perhaps best qualified for that species of business and on that account would be preferred by those who know him personally. The latter is more known by character throughout the United States.
I have been asked whether any appointment at home would be agreeable to you. Being unacquainted with your mind I have not ventured on an answer.
The Bill of rates which passed the House of Representatives a few days ago is not yet come down from the Senate. The duties will it is said be pretty much reduced. In a few instances perhaps the reductions may not be improper. If they are not generally left as high as will admit of collection, the dilemma will be unavoidable, of either maiming our public credit in its birth, or resorting to other kinds of taxation for which our Constituents are not yet prepared. The Senate is also abolishing the discriminations in favor of nations in treaty whereby Britain will be quieted in the enjoyment of our trade as she may please to regulate it and France discouraged from her efforts at a competition which it is not less our interest than hers to promote. The question was agitated repeatedly in the House of Representatives and decided at last almost unanimously in favor of some monitory proof that our new government able and not afraid to encounter the restrictions of Britain. Both the senators from Virginia particularly Lee go with the majority in the Senate. In this I suspect the temper of the party which sent them is as little consulted as in the conduct of Lee in the affair of titles and his opinion in relation to the western country.
I have already informed you that Madam Brehan is every day recovering from the disesteem and neglect into which reports had thrown her and that Moustier is also becoming more and more acceptable or at least less and less otherwise. His commercial ideas are probably neither illiberal nor unfriendly to this country. The contrary has been supposed. When the truth is ascertained and known unfavorable impressions will be still more removed.
The subject of amendments was to have been introduced on monday last; but is postponed in order that more urgent business may not be delayed. On Monday sevennight it will certainly come forward. A Bill of rights, incorporated perhaps into the Constitution will be proposed, with a few other alterations most called for by the opponents of the Government and least objectionable to its friends.
As soon as Mr. Brown arrives who is the Representative of Kentucky, the admission of that district to the character of a State and a member of the union, will claim attention. I foresee no difficulty, unless local jealousy should couple the pretensions of Vermont with those of Kentucky: and even then no other delay than what may be necessary to open the way for the former, through the forms and perhaps the objections of this State, which must not be altogether disregarded.
The proceedings of the new Congress are so far marked with great moderation and liberality; and will disappoint the wishes and predictions of many who have opposed the Government. The spirit which characterises the House of Reps. in particular is already extinguishing the honest fears which considered the system as dangerous to republicanism. For myself I am persuaded that the biass of the federal is on the same side with that of the State Govts. tho’ in a much less degree. Yrs. truly.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Edward Carrington, 27 May 1789
From: Carrington, Edward
To: Madison, James

My dear SirPowhatan May 27. 1789
I have been favored with yours of the 8th. Instant and thank you for the notice you take of my declining a visit to N. Y. I am the less inclined to take such a trip, since you have mentioned the great numbers who are there. I would not be rated amongst them for the best that any one of them will obtain.
I am pleased to discover from the debates of your House that although an accurate attention appears to be given by Gentlemen to the local Interests of their respective States, yet a liberal spirit of concession and accommodation seems to be the prevailing principle of action. The paper you was so good as to enclose was truly acceptable; any that you will be pleased to send in future, will be gratefully acknowledged, although you may not have liesure to accompany them with a single line. The Motion for placing G. B. upon the footing of the most favored Nation is, in my mind incomprehensible; I see neither good Will, nor a necessary policy, for its foundation. In our supine State her hostility manifested itself in every commercial arrangement; and I really think that of all the Nations of the Earth she may be made the most dependent on our policy. The West India Islands must be supplied with provisions lumber & Cattle from the U. S. or be greatly diminished in their value to the Nations to whom they belong—G. B. is the greatest possessor, and of course must be the most affected by an interruption in the Supplies of these Articles.
I have not a Syllable of news to give you. As to rains we have a seasonable Spring, but as to warmth we have not yet advanced beyond the 1[s]t. of april, I am now writing by a fire. I know not whether those Philosophers may not be right who say the Earth is gradually cooling. Present me to your worthy Colleagues and beleive me to be, with great sincerity & truth yr. Affe. Freind & Hl. St.
Ed. Carrington


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 28 May 1789
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr Sr.Fredericksburg 28th. May 1789.
We have heard much of the di[s]agreement between the two Houses respecting titles and the rules to be established for their correspondence—if report speaks truth they have manifested a strong desire for titles and pre-eminence—how comes it that the doors where the Senate sit in their legislative capacity are shut and those of the representatives open—it appears to be equally proper and necessary for the information and satisfaction of the people that their conduct and proceedings in the Character I have mentioned should be as public and well known as that of the other house and I am inclined to think had the public Ear listened to their proceedings on the above subjects of discussion their propositions would have been more equal and their pretensions less lofty than they were. I am pleased with the plain manly stile of address “G. W. president &c,” the present name wants no titles to grace it and should the office be filled by an unworthy Person the stile will not dignify the man Or cast a beam of light around his head. The bill for levying impost according to the proportions of the duties on importations is in favor of the carrying States especially since the 10 ⅌ ct discount has been carryed—I am well satisfied it was wise to limit its duration—laws regulating the commerce of the States where their measures and interests have been so different cannot it is to be presumed in the outset be made so as to give general satisfaction, time and experience will prove the best expositors of the propriety of the regulations, and if found usefull and convenient may easily be continued, but if oppressive and injurious to some to the benefit and advantage of others states, the repeal will perhaps be difficult. State prejudices and interests are to be removed and reconciled by degrees—the first movement of the governmt. should be actuated by the spirit of accommodation—that mild feature shod. be seen in all the acts of the Congress, and will gradually establish the government in the hearts of the people. In a former letter I mentioned Mr. Lindsay to you—I am now requested to mention to you another of our naval officers Mr. H. Muse[.] What is the plan of the Judiciary if you can pray give me a sketch of what is intended. Yr. friend & Servt.
Jos: Jones.
P. S. I shall return to Richmond in about a week.


Title: To James Madison from Francis Mennis, 28 May 1789
From: Mennis, Francis
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 28 May 1789. Calendared in the lists probably kept by Peter Force (DLC: Madison Miscellany). Mennis (b. 1755) was a member of a prominent York County, Virginia, family.


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 31 May 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My dear friendN. York May 31. 1789.
I have been favored with yours of the 19th. instant and thank you for the answer to Mr. St. John’s enquiries. The apprehensions of Mrs. Randolph give me unfeigned concern, but I indulge strong hopes that they proceed from an imaginary cause. There are so many symptoms which mimic the cancerous that it would be wrong to suffer appearances to prevail against the favorable chances. At the same time it is impossible to disapprove of the forecast with which the occasion inspires you.
Our business here goes on very slowly, though in a Spirit of moderation and accomodation which is so far flattering. The bill for regulating the quantum of duties is not yet come back from the Senate. Some alterations will be made, but none that affect the substance of the plan, unless it be the abolition of a small favor to the Nations in Alliance with us copied from the laws of Virginia. One of our Senators whose ideas on another point excite animadversions among his constituents seems not to consult their sentiments on this. I think myself that it is impolitic, in every view that can be taken of the subject, to put G. Britain at once on the footing of a most favored nation. The bill for collecting the duties is now before the H. of Reps. and I fear will not be very quickly despatched. It has passed thro’ several hands legal as well as mercantile, and notwithstanding is in a crude state. It might certainly have been put into a better; though in every step the difficulties arising from novelty are severely experienced, and are an ample as well as just source of apology. Scarcely a day passes without some striking evidence of the delays and perplexities springing merely from the want of precedents. Time will be a full remedy for this evil; and will I am persuaded, evince a greater facility in legislating uniformly for all the States than has been supposed by some of the best friends of the Union.
Among other subjects on the anvil is the arrangements of the subordinate Executive departments. A Unity in each has been resolved on, and an amenability to the President alone, as well as to the Senate by way of impeachment. Perhaps it would not be very consistent with the Constitution to require the concurrence of the Senate in removals. The Executive power seems to be vested in the President alone, except so far as it is qualified by an express association of the Senate in appointments; in like manner as the Legislative is vested in Congress, under the exception in favor of the President’s qualified negative. Independently of this consideration I think it best to give the Senate as little agency as possible in Executive matters, and to make the President as responsible as possible in them. Were the heads of departments dependent on the Senate, a faction in this branch might support them agst. the President, distract the Executive department, and obstruct the public business. The danger of undue power in the President from such a regulation is not to me formidable. I see, and politically feel that that will be the weak branch of the Government. With a full power of removal, the President will be more likely to spare unworthy officers, thro’ fear, than to displace the meritorious thro caprice or passion. A disgusted man of influence would immediately form a party agst. the administration—endanger his reelection—and at least go into one of the Houses and torment him with opposition.
I can not close this without a disagreeable recollection of the date of my last. I am most negligent towards my best friends perhaps because I have most confidence in their forgiveness. I will at least in future inclose the newspapers when I can do no more. I never had less time that I could truly call my own than at present, of which I hope you will consider my irregular correspondence as the fullest proof, Yrs. truly Most Affecly.
Js. M. Jr


Title: To James Madison from Benjamin Hawkins, 1 June 1789
From: Hawkins, Benjamin
To: Madison, James

My dear friend!Warren the 1st. June 1789.
I have had the pleasure to receive your favour of the 5th of may, with the report of the committee, and the newspapers, and I can assure you I concur in every thing and from the bottom of my heart. The Character of the president, will give dignity and energy to our government, and will together with the favourable appearances stated by you tend to reconcile all parties to it. I, having know[n] the determination of the President never more to take any share in transactions, of a public nature was fearful that even our melancholy situation would not (altho’ the choice should be unanimous) call him forth. My fears arose from my love for him, I thought his character was as perfect as human nature is capable of being, that he wanted no additional lustre, and might eventually loose. But I was [w]rong, and he is right indubitably. Your scheme of impost, being temporary is highly approved here. Go on as you have begun and all things will come right.
A circumstance trivial indeed, but from its effect here, important, deserves to be told. The opponents had predicted that Congress being once possessed with power, the friends to the new Government would never consent to make any amendments, Your motion on that great and delicate subject directly contradicts it. And they swear that they will never forget Bland, Grayson and their other friends for suffering any business however important to be done in Congress prior to the subject of amendments, And moreover for suffering this important prophecy by their tardiness to be contradicted.
If you can do something by way of amendment without any material injury to the system, I shall be much pleased, and as far as I can learn it will be pleasing to my countrymen, or a majority of them I mean. We certainly are more friendly than we were at the meeting of our Convention, several counties who were much opposed to it, are now decidedly very friendly, and I count on its being adopted at Our next convention.
I wish the senate may do something effectual on the Indian department, I have had letters from McGillivray and some of my friends in that quarter, and I believe there will be great difficulties in accommodating a line of boundary between the white people and the Indians, and without such a line, we may hope for peace in vain. If our commissioners should not succeed I have promis’d our western people and the Indians to pay them a visit. The indians hope every thing from Congress, and the whites are afraid that their speculative views will be blasted, if the business should be left wholy in the power of Congress.
Pray excuse the liberty I take in requesting the favour of you to present my congratulations to the President, this I would do myself altho’ N. Carolina hath hitherto been in the Opposition. But I would not put his politeness to the trouble of answering it just now when he must be overwhelmed with the functions of his office.
I am to go on tomorrow to Wilmington for a fortnight, from whence I will write to you again. If you should have leisure to write to me sometime, address to me via Petersburg to the care of Mr. Gracie. Adieu my dear friend and believe me yrs.
Benjamin Hawkins


Title: Notes for Speech in Congress, [ca. 8 June] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 8 June 1789]
Reasons urging amendts.
1. to prove fedts. friends to liberty
2. remove remaining inquietudes
3. bring in N. C. & R. Island.
4. to improve the Constitution

Reasons for moderating the plan
1. No stop if door opend to theoretic amendts.
2. as likely to make worse as better till trial
3. insure passage by ⅔ of Congs. & ¾ of Sts.

Objectns. of 3 kinds vs the Constn:
1. vs. the theory of its structure
2. vs. substance of its powers—elections & direct taxes
3. vs omission of guards in favr. of rights & libertys

The last most urged & easiest obviated.
Read the amendments—

They relate 1st. to private rights—

Bill of Rights—useful—not essential—

fallacy on both sides—especy as to English Decln. of Rts—
1. mere act of parlt.
2. no freedom of press—Conscience
Gl. Warrants—Habs. corpus

jury in Civil Causes—criml.
attainders—arms to Protestts.

frequent parlts. cheif trust—

freedom of press & of Conscience unknown to Magna Cha. & Pet: Rts

Contents of Bills of Rhts—
1. assertion of primitive equality &c.
2. do. of rights exerted in formg. Govts.
3. natural rights, retained—as Speech, Con:
4. positive rights resultg—as trial by jury
5. Doctrinl. artics. as Depts. distinct—Electns free
6. moral precepts for the administrn. & natil. character—as justice—Œconomy—&c—

Object of Bill of Rhts
To limit & qualify powr. by exceptg. from grant cases in wch. it shall not be exercised or exd. in a particular manner.

to guard1. vs. Executive & in Engd. &c—
2. Legislative as in Sts—
3. the majority of people

ought to point vs greatest danger which in Rep: is Prerogative of majority—

Here proper, tho’ less nessary., than in small Repubs—

Objectns. vs. Bill of Rhts.
1. in Elective Govt. all power in people hence unnec[e]ssary & improper—this vs Sts—
2. In fedl. Govt. all not given retained—Bill of powers—needs no bill of Rhts—

Sweeping clause—Genl Warrants &c
3. St: Bills not repeald.—

too uncertain

Some Sts have not bills—others defect:—others—injurious—as Protestts.
4. dispar[a]ge other rights—or constructively enlarge—

the first goes vs St: Bills—

both guarded vs. by amendt.
5. Not effectl. vs Sts also—but some check

Courts will aid—also Ex: also.

Sts Legisls: watch

Time sanctify—incorporate public Sentiment

Bill of Rts ergo. proper—

II increase of Reps. 2 for each H.

III pay of Congs.

IV Interdict to States as to Conscience—press—& Jury—

this more necsy. to Sts. than Congs.

V Check on appeals—& Common law—

VI. partn. as to 3 Depts. & do. as to Genl. & St: Govts.


Title: Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[8 June 1789]

   On 25 May, the day assigned to take up amendments, JM moved to postpone the subject for two weeks (Gazette of the U.S., 27 May 1789). On 8 June he moved to refer the business to a Committee of the Whole. Jackson opposed amendments at this time as premature, and suggested a postponement until March 1790. Others objected that Congress had more pressing business to complete before amendments could be considered.

Mr. Madison. The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Jackson) is certainly right in his opposition to my motion for going into a committee of the whole, because he is unfriendly to the object I have in contemplation; but I cannot see that the gentlemen, who wish for amendments being proposed at the present session, stand on good ground when they object to the house going into committee on this business.
When I first hinted to the house my intention of calling their deliberations to this object, I mentioned the pressure of other important subjects, and submitted the propriety of postponing this till the more urgent business was dispatched; but finding that business not dispatched, when the order of the day for considering amendments arrived, I thought it a good reason for a farther delay, I moved the postponement accordingly. I am sorry the same reason still exists in some degree; but operates with less force when it is considered, that it is not now proposed to enter into a full and minute discussion of every part of the subject, but merely to bring it before the house, that our constituents may see we pay a proper attention to a subject they have much at heart; and if it does not give that full gratification which is to be wished, they will discover that it proceeds from the urgency of business of a very important nature. But if we continue to postpone from time to time, and refuse to let the subject come into view, it may occasion suspicions, which, though not well founded, may tend to inflame or prejudice the public mind, against our decisions: they may think we are not sincere in our desire to incorporate such amendments in the constitution as will secure those rights, which they consider as not sufficiently guarded. The applications for amendments come from a very respectable number of our constituents, and it is certainly proper for congress to consider the subject, in order to quiet that anxiety which prevails in the public mind: Indeed I think it would have been of advantage to the government, if it had been practicable to have made some propositions for amendments the first business we entered upon; it would stifle the voice of complaint, and make friends of many who doubted its merits. Our future measures would then have been more universally agreeable and better supported; but the justifiable anxiety to put the government in operation prevented that; it therefore remains for us to take it up as soon as possible. I wish then to commence the consideration at the present moment; I hold it to be my duty to unfold my ideas, and explain myself to the house in some form or other without delay. I only wish to introduce the great work, and as I said before I do not expect it will be decided immediately; but if some step is taken in the business it will give reason to believe that we may come at a final result. This will inspire a reasonable hope in the advocates for amendments, that full justice will be done to the important subject; and I have reason to believe their expectation will not be defeated. I hope the house will not decline my motion for going into a committee.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., I, 418–19 (also reported in Gazette of the U.S., 10 June 1789).

[8 June 1789]

   Several members continued to speak against going into a Committee of the Whole.

Mr. Madison. I am sorry to be accessary to the loss of a single moment of time by the house. If I had been indulged in my motion, and we had gone into a committee of the whole, I think we might have rose, and resumed the consideration of other business before this time; that is, so far as it depended on what I proposed to bring forward. As that mode seems not to give satisfaction, I will withdraw the motion, and move you, sir, that a select committee be appointed to consider and report such amendments as are proper for Congress to propose to the legislatures of the several States, conformably to the 5th article of the constitution. I will state my reasons why I think it proper to propose amendments; and state the amendments themselves, so far as I think they ought to be proposed. If I thought I could fulfil the duty which I owe to myself and my constituents, to let the subject pass over in silence, I most certainly should not trespass upon the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do this; and am therefore compelled to beg a patient hearing to what I have to lay before you. And I do most sincerely believe that if congress will devote but one day to this subject, so far as to satisfy the public that we do not disregard their wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the public councils, and prepare the way for a favorable reception of our future measures. It appears to me that this house is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the state legislatures some things to be incorporated into the constitution, as will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done, that those who have been friendly to the adoption of this constitution, may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it, that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a republican government, as those who charged them with wishing the adoption of this constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community any apprehensions, that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired, of such a nature as will not injure the constitution, and they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow citizens; the friends of the federal government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been distinguished.
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who at present feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of federalism, if they were satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution. The acquiescence which our fellow citizens shew under the government, calls upon us for a like return of moderation. But perhaps there is a stronger motive than this for our going into a consideration of the subject; it is to provide those securities for liberty which are required by a part of the community. I allude in a particular manner to those two states who have not thought fit to throw themselves into the bosom of the confederacy: it is a desirable thing, on our part as well as theirs, that a re-union should take place as soon as possible. I have no doubt, if we proceed to take those steps which would be prudent and requisite at this juncture, that in a short time we should see that disposition prevailing in those states that are not come in, that we have seen prevailing [in] those states which are.
But I will candidly acknowledge, that, over and above all these considerations, I do conceive that the constitution may be amended; that is to say, if all power is subject to abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the general government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done, while no one advantage, arising from the exercise of that power, shall be damaged or endangered by it. We have in this way something to gain, and, if we proceed with caution, nothing to lose; and in this case it is necessary to proceed with caution; for while we feel all these inducements to go into a revisal of the constitution, we must feel for the constitution itself, and make that revisal a moderate one. I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole structure of the government, for a re-consideration of the principles and the substance of the powers given; because I doubt, if such a door was opened, if we should be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the government itself: But I do wish to see a door opened to consider, so far as to incorporate those provisions for the security of rights, against which I believe no serious objection has been made by any class of our constituents, such as would be likely to meet with the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of the state legislatures. I will not propose a single alteration which I do not wish to see take place, as intrinsically proper in itself, or proper because it is wished for by a respectable number of my fellow citizens; and therefore I shall not propose a single alteration but is likely to meet the concurrence required by the constitution.
There have been objections of various kinds made against the constitution: Some were levelled against its structure, because the president was without a council; because the senate, which is a legislative body, had judicial powers in trials on impeachments; and because the powers of that body were compounded in other respects, in a manner that did not correspond with a particular theory; because it grants more power than is supposed to be necessary for every good purpose; and controuls the ordinary powers of the state governments. I know some respectable characters who opposed this government on these grounds; but I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed it, disliked it because it did not contain effectual provision against encroachments on particular rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and the magistrate who exercised the sovereign power: nor ought we to consider them safe, while a great number of our fellow citizens think these securities necessary.
It has been a fortunate thing that the objection to the government has been made on the ground I stated; because it will be practicable on that ground to obviate the objection, so far as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, and this without endangering any part of the constitution, which is considered as essential to the existence of the government by those who promoted its adoption.
The amendments which have occurred to me, proper to be recommended by congress to the state legislatures, are these:
First. That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration—That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.
Secondly. That in article 1st. section 2, clause 3, these words be struck out, to wit, “The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative, and until such enumeration shall be made.” And that in place thereof be inserted these words, to wit, “After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, until the number amount to  after which the proportion shall be so regulated by congress, that the number shall never be less than  nor more than  but each state shall after the first enumeration, have at least two representatives; and prior thereto.”
Thirdly. That in article 1st, section 6, clause 1, there be added to the end of the first sentence, these words, to wit, “But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall operate before the next ensuing election of representatives.”
Fourthly. That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit, The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.
No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law.
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
Fifthly. That in article 1st, section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit:
No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.
Sixthly. That article 3d, section 2, be annexed to the end of clause 2d, these words to wit: but no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not amount to  dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law.
Seventhly. That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be inserted the clauses following, to wit:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service in time of war or public danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury, shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorised in some other county of the same state, as near as may be to the seat of the offence.
In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.
Eighthly. That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th, be numbered as article 8th.
The first of these amendments, relates to what may be called a bill of rights; I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to the federal constitution, as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. I am aware, that a great number of the most respectable friends to the government and champions for republican liberty, have thought such a provision, not only unnecessary, but even improper, nay, I believe some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous. Some policy has been made use of perhaps by gentlemen on both sides of the question: I acknowledge the ingenuity of those arguments which were drawn against the constitution, by a comparison with the policy of Great-Britain, in establishing a declaration of rights; but there is too great a difference in the case to warrant the comparison: therefore the arguments drawn from that source, were in a great measure inapplicable. In the declaration of rights which that country has established, the truth is, they have gone no farther, than to raise a barrier against the power of the crown; the power of the legislature is left altogether indefinite. Altho’ I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, came in question in that body, the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which, the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British constitution.
But altho’ the case may be widely different, and it may not be thought necessary to provide limits for the legislative power in that country, yet a different opinion prevails in the United States. The people of many states, have thought it necessary to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments of government, and I am inclined to believe, if once bills of rights are established in all the states as well as the federal constitution, we shall find that altho’ some of them are rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a salutary tendency.
It may be said, in some instances they do no more than state the perfect equality of mankind; this to be sure is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of a constitution.
In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a plan of government. In other instances, they specify those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature. In other instances, they specify positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from the social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature. In other instances they lay down dogmatic maxims with respect to the construction of the government; declaring, that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches shall be kept separate and distinct: Perhaps the best way of securing this in practice is to provide such checks, as will prevent the encroachment of the one upon the other.
But whatever may be [the] form which the several states have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other words, against the majority in favor of the minority.
In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the executive department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker: It therefore must be levelled against the legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely to be abused, because it is under the least controul; hence, so far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper. But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.
It may be thought all paper barriers against the power of the community, are too weak to be worthy of attention. I am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen of every description who have seen and examined thoroughly the texture of such a defence; yet, as they have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be one mean to controul the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.
It has been said by way of objection to a bill of rights, by many respectable gentlemen out of doors, and I find opposition on the same principles likely to be made by gentlemen on this floor, that they are unnecessary articles of a republican government, upon the presumption that the people have those rights in their own hands, and that is the proper place for them to rest. It would be a sufficient answer to say that this objection lies against such provisions under the state governments as well as under the general government; and there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are inclined to push their theory so far as to say that a declaration of rights in those cases is either ineffectual or improper. It has been said that in the federal government they are unnecessary, because the powers are enumerated, and it follows that all that are not granted by the constitution are retained: that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people; and therefore a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the government. I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive to the extent which has been supposed. It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the constitution of the United States there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the government was established. Now, may not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for it is them who are to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary or proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the state legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended objects of those governments. I will state an instance which I think in point, and proves that this might be the case. The general government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the state governments had in view. If there was reason for restraining the state governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the federal government.
It may be said, because it has been said, that a bill of rights is not necessary, because the establishment of this government has not repealed those declarations of rights which are added to the several state constitutions: that those rights of the people, which had been established by the most solemn act, could not be annihilated by a subsequent act of that people, who meant, and declared at the head of the instrument, that they ordained and established a new system, for the express purpose of securing to themselves and posterity the liberties they had gained by an arduous conflict.
I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon it to be conclusive. In the first place, it is too uncertain ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision is at all necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I have mentioned are conceived to be, by the public in general, as well as those in particular who opposed the adoption of this constitution. Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are others provided with very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.
It has been said, that it is unnecessary to load the constitution with this provision, because it was not found effectual in the constitution of the particular states. It is true, there are a few particular states in which some of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; but does it not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. Beside this security, there is a great probability that such a declaration in the federal system would be inforced; because the state legislatures will jealously and closely watch the operations of this government, and be able to resist with more effect every assumption of power than any other power on earth can do; and the greatest opponents to a federal government admit the state legislatures to be sure guardians of the people’s liberty. I conclude from this view of the subject, that it will be proper in itself, and highly politic, for the tranquility of the public mind, and the stability of the government, that we should offer something, in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated in the system of government, as a declaration of the rights of the people.
In the next place I wish to see that part of the constitution revised which declares, that the number of representatives shall not exceed the proportion of one for every thirty thousand persons, and allows one representative to every state which rates below that proportion. If we attend to the discussion of this subject, which has taken place in the state conventions, and even in the opinion of the friends to the constitution, an alteration here is proper. It is the sense of the people of America, that the number of representatives ought to be encreased, but particularly that it should not be left in the discretion of the government to diminish them, below that proportion which certainly is in the power of the legislature as the constitution now stands; and they may, as the population of the country encreases, increase the house of representatives to a very unwieldy degree. I confess I always thought this part of the constitution defective, though not dangerous; and that it ought to be particularly attended to whenever congress should go into the consideration of amendments.
There are several lesser cases enumerated in my proposition, in which I wish also to see some alteration take place. That article which leaves it in the power of the legislature to ascertain its own emolument is one to which I allude. I do not believe this is a power which, in the ordinary course of government, is likely to be abused, perhaps of all the powers granted, it is least likely to abuse; but there is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without controul to put their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum in such power, which leads me to propose a change. We have a guide to this alteration in several of the amendments which the different conventions have proposed. I have gone therefore so far as to fix it, that no law, varying the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in the legislature; in which case it cannot be for the particular benefit of those who are concerned in determining the value of the service.
I wish also, in revising the constitution, we may throw into that section, which interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the state legislatures, some other provisions of equal if not greater importance than those already made. The words, “No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, &c.” were wise and proper restrictions in the constitution. I think there is more danger of those powers being abused by the state governments than by the government of the United States. The same may be said of other powers which they possess, if not controuled by the general principle, that laws are unconstitutional which infringe the rights of the community. I should therefore wish to extend this interdiction, and add, as I have stated in the 5th resolution, that no state shall violate the equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases; because it is proper that every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights. I know in some of the state constitutions the power of the government is controuled by such a declaration, but others are not. I cannot see any reason against obtaining even a double security on those points; and nothing can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those who opposed this constitution to these great and important rights, than to see them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; because it must be admitted, on all hands, that the state governments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the general government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against.
I think it will be proper, with respect to the judiciary powers, to satisfy the public mind on those points which I have mentioned. Great inconvenience has been apprehended to suitors from the distance they would be dragged to obtain justice in the supreme court of the United States, upon an appeal on an action for a small debt. To remedy this, declare, that no appeal shall be made unless the matter in controversy amounts to a particular sum: This, with the regulations respecting jury trials in criminal cases, and suits at common law, it is to be hoped will quiet and reconcile the minds of the people to that part of the constitution.
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the state conventions, that several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the constitution, that the powers not therein delegated, should be reserved to the several states. Perhaps words which may define this more precisely, than the whole of the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose it.
These are the points on which I wish to see a revision of the constitution take place. How far they will accord with the sense of this body, I cannot take upon me absolutely to determine; but I believe every gentleman will readily admit that nothing is in contemplation, so far as I have mentioned, that can endanger the beauty of the government in any one important feature, even in the eyes of its most sanguine admirers. I have proposed nothing that does not appear to me as proper in itself, or eligible as patronised by a respectable number of our fellow citizens; and if we can make the constitution better in the opinion of those who are opposed to it, without weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness, in the judgment of those who are attached to it, we act the part of wise and liberal men to make such alterations as shall produce that effect.
Having done what I conceived was my duty, in bringing before this house the subject of amendments, and also stated such as I wish for and approve, and offered the reasons which occurred to me in their support; I shall content myself for the present with moving, that a committee be appointed to consider of and report such amendments as ought to be proposed by congress to the legislatures of the states, to become, if ratified by three-fourths thereof, part of the constitution of the United States. By agreeing to this motion, the subject may be going on in the committee, while other important business is proceeding to a conclusion in the house. I should advocate greater dispatch in the business of amendments, if I was not convinced of the absolute necessity there is of pursuing the organization of the government; because I think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the people against the encroachments of the government.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., I, 423–37 (also reported in Gazette of the U.S., 10 and 13 June 1789).

   For a table showing the sources of JM’s proposed amendments and the subsequent action taken on them by Congress and the states, see Dumbauld, Bill of Rights, pp. 160–63.

   After further debate, the House agreed to refer JM’s propositions to a Committee of the Whole, as he originally intended.


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, [9 June] 1789
From: Pendleton, Edmund
To: Madison, James

[9 June 1789]
… I hope the idea of titles is sent to eternal repose. I know nothing which in my judgment would more strengthen opposition than the adoption of such a measure, giving countenance to all the suspicions hitherto forged only, of a tendency in the Goverment to fav’r Aristocratic principles.…


Title: To James Madison from William R. Davie, 10 June 1789
From: Davie, William R.
To: Madison, James

SirHalifax, No. Carolina, June 10h., 1789.
My private acquaintance with you would by no means warrant a correspondence of this kind, but the interest we have in your public character and exertions will sufficiently apologise for the freedom.
You are well acquainted with the political situation of this State, its unhappy attachment to paper money, and that wild scepticism which has prevailed in it since the publication of the Constitution. It has been the uniform cant of the enemies of the Government, that Congress would exert all their influence to prevent the calling of a convention, and would never propose an amendment themselves, or consent to an alteration, that would in any manner diminish their powers. The people whose fears had been already alarmed, have received this opinion as fact, and become confirmed in their opposition; your notification however of the 4h. of May has dispersed almost universal pleasure, we hold it up as a refutation of the gloomy profecies of the leaders of the opposition, and the honest part of our Antifederalists have publickly expressed great satisfaction on this event. Our Convention meet again in November, with powers to adopt the Constitution and any Amendments that may be proposed; this renders it extremely important that the Amendments, if any, should be proposed before that time. And although we may be nominally a foreign State, yet I hope the Alterations will come officially addressed to the people of this Country, an attention however trifling in itself, that will be of importance in the present state of the public mind here.
That farago of Amendments borrowed from Virginia is by no means to be considered as the sense of this Country; they were proposed amidst the violence and confusion of party heat, at a critical moment in our convention, and adopted by the opposition without one moments consideration. I have collected with some attention the objections of the honest and serious—they are but few & perhaps necessary alterations. They require some explanation rather than alteration of the power of Congress over elections—an abridgment of the Jurisdiction of the federal Court in a few instances, and some fixed regulations respecting appeals—they also insist on the trial by jury being expressly secured to them in all cases—and a constitutional guarantee for the free exercise of their religious rights and priviledges—the rule of representation is thought to be too much in the power of Congress—and the Constitution is silent with respect to the existing paper money an important and interesting property. Instead of a Bill of rights attempting to enumerate the rights of the Indivi[du]al or the State Governments, they seem to prefer some general negative as will confining [sic] Congress to the exercise of the powers particularly granted, with some express negative restriction in some important cases. I am extremely anxious to know the progress of this delicate & interesting business; and if you could find leisure from the duties of office and the obligations of Friendship to give me some information on this subject, it might perhaps be of some consequence to this Country, and would in any event be gratefully acknowledged by your mo. obt. humle. servt.
William R. Davie.
P. S. Letters addressed to the care of Kellock & Morrison, Merchts. Petersburg, will be certainly received.


Title: To James Madison from Henry Lee, 10 June 1789
From: Lee, Henry
To: Madison, James

My dear sirAlexa. 10h. June 89
I have not heard from you for a long time but often hear of you. All ranks of people within my observation seem highly pleased with the govt. since its commencement & reckon far too much on the benefits which it may produce—these expectations will meet with disappointment, which may create chagrin in the public mind & renew clamor.
The president is dear to the citizens beyond parralel or expression, the senate is reported to contain much wisdom & the house of representatives much integrity—our papers are full of your proceedings & debates, I suppose incorrectly taken from the contradictions which seem occasionally to be exhibited by the same speaker, the lameness of stile & crudeness of matter which seem generally to charecterize their doings. Much impatience & much self sufficie[ncy …] belong to your body. On the subject of title their conduct receives as it merits pointed opprobrium not because they opposed adding to the constitutional title of the cheif Majistrate, but because they treated the senate with marked indecency. Whether the President shall have a new name is merely a question of policy & its result must be insignificant in its consequences to the people, but that the two branches of Legislature should hold to each other the most marked respect is necessary for their honor, their respectability & our good.
The impost bill is thought too high & some proper articles for taxation (or duty rather) omitted—Bar iron for instance. Every idea of nationality seems to command that we should encourage those things essential to the independence of our country, we abound in iron ore, but unless encouraged by govt. must depend on […] requisite to national independence—your dutys are laid ad valorem at time & place of importation, this is opposite to the custom prevalent in this state and in my mind indeterminate as well as productive of loss to revenue—A imports from London a cargo of Merchandize into Norfolk, under the late act he is to pay dutys as above mentioned, who decides on the value of the cargo, the importer or your officer or how is this value to be ascertained.
Revenue will be diminished because the goods will be imported to the lowest market afterwards conveyed to the highest market.

We are told that your commercial officers will be numerous & that you mean to imitate the British usage in this particular, certainly it becomes you to advert to the difference between that nation & ours—the one most rich the other most poor, how can it be expected that we can sustain the expence of her numerous officers from the tide waiter to the collector. I thought that Mr. Pitts administration had convicted all the world that smuggling is only to be prevented by moderation in the laying of dutys, that hosts of officers & numerous coast guarders & tenders were insufficient. Why then will we run counter to this exper[ience …] when the creation of a new office frightens our people as well as adds to the drains on our scanty purse. Your house it seems has determined that our fiscal affairs should again be placed in the hands of one, here is another fruitful topic of censure. As integrity is in this department the first object to cherish, I must hold to my former sentiments on this subject & prefer three men to one for the management of the public money.
While I give this preference I acknowlegde [sic] I obtain a good with an evil, I confess while I secure the heart, I yeild the head up in degree. But if I am right in my first position viz that integrity is the first point in view, I am right in determining to prefer three to one, for I am secured by nature from intentional injury, which is a security far more valuable in my Judgement than all the checks which the ingenuity of man can invent to controul the individual. Three men cannot be found in the higher order so corrupt as to unite in peculation, if they did their own jealousys & rivalship […] them. One man [who] is des[perate …] the money of the people to his own uses & corrupt those who are entrusted by the community to superintend his conduct. On this point there are two opinions to be sure, & very good men embrace different sides of the question. I am among those who would feel safer & pay quicker, was the public coffers under the orders of a commission I confess, but whatever may be done I sincerely hope, good to the people may be its result.
Adieu to politics, the navigation of the river from fort C to the great falls is now in common use in various parts & will be free from every obstruction very soon.
Col. Gilpin tells me that not only the owners of the canal land are highly interested in getting possession of the spot for their own views, but that the potomac co, & the town of Alexa. [’]s interest require no longer delay should be permitted if possible to be prevented. I shall wait to hear from Mr. Jefferson & should his letr. be discouraging I will proceed to Philada. & N york to borrow the […]. Mr Gilpin says that he has recd. many applications from respectable people for lots, & that the desire of fixing at the great falls is very general among the commercial people here & above on both sides of the river.
Mr. Maury has sent in good sales of tobacco, for four Hhds. shipped by me I have 11 £ pr. hhd. sting, & some of his correspondents in spotsylvania & orange have recd. 16 to 18 £ pr. Hhd sting. I hope you may have been among this fortunate class.
You have heard of the loss we have met with in the death of Mrs. Fendall—better for her to be sure had this event taken place sooner & altho we are convinced of this truth yet our affliction is immoderate.
Poor Mrs. Lee is particularly injured by it, as the affiction [sic] of mind adds to the infirmity of her body. Be pleased to present us to our friend Mrs. Colden most affey & arrest her execution of the commission she was so good as to undertake. Adieu always […]ffly.
H Lee


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 12 June 1789
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.Richmond 12th. June 1789.
We have nothing in this quarter worth mentioning or I should more frequently make communications. I conclude you receive our papers regularly or would inclose them weekly. Although the proceedings of the House of representatives on the impost bill produced some remarks and altercation respecting its equality and policy yet I think the disputes appr. to have somewhat more of warmth respecting the allowances to the V. p. & the Members of the two Houses as reported by the Com:—these are generally thought too high at 5M dols. for the V. p. & six ⅌ day for the members of Congress. There are however some, but those not many who think the proposed allowances inadequate. Is it proposed to have collectors and naval officers. If a Minister of Finance does he appoint the officers in the States under him or will they do you think be nominated by the President. A Gentleman who has acted in the Treasury department in this State has been for some time attending and I suppose looks for employment—he may have his merit he has also his faults. Yr. friend & Servt
Jos: Jones.


Title: To James Madison from Walter Jones, 12 June 1789
From: Jones, Walter
To: Madison, James

Sir.Northumberland, Virginia June 12th. 1789.
Our personal acquaintance having been hitherto cursory I can claim no great Share of a correspondence, necessarily and very deservedly so extensive as yours. Your public Conduct, and the Intervention of our private & common Freinds have fixt you high in my Esteem, and I am persuaded that we are very intimately united, in our dispositions to exert our respective Talents & opportunities in promoting the true Republican honor & Interest of the united States. I can farther assure you, that any Communications, which you may have Leisure or Inclination to make me, will be very acceptable & obliging, and that I should value none more, either in respect to the Integrity or Selection of them.
The proceedings of your House, have met with general approbation in this part—the disappointed party are much puzzled to give any unfavourable turn to the appearance of the federalists, in their forward defence of republican principles, on the few occasions that have hitherto been offered. I regret that the Senate have so soon discovered, a vain predilection for European Corruption in respect to Titles. I hope nevertheless, that its progress will be effectually stifled, by the successive firmness & Complexion of the House of delegates. The duties, as they are presented by the Committee of your house, are generally thought high. I am a poor Judge of the matter, but I conceive that any Expedient, short of a material [Injury to] Commerce should be tried, rather than resort to the delicate [Experiment] of direct Taxation. Some persons here, of good Judgement in mercantile affairs, are of opinion that the eastern people, without very strict regulations, will elude the payment of the Duties on Salt & molasses, by feigned clearances of their Rum and Salt to foreign Ports.
Our Freind Mr. Page and myself have established a course of Communication; and thro his hands any Intelligence you may oblige me with, will be properly directed. I am Sir with much regard your obedient Servant
Walt: Jones


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, [12 June?] 1789
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

Friday Morng. [12 June 1789?]
As the Communications herewith enclosed will not take much time to Read; As there are matters related which to me are new; and as the information respecting land transactions, and other things in the Western Country will require to be noticed & acted upon in some way or another, I send them to you together with a Gazette with a marked paragraph containing some suggestions that have not, I believe, been touched upon in any of the Papers I gave you yesterday—but are handed to you for the same purpose that they were—i e—merely for Consideration.


Title: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 13 June 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Dear SirN. York. June 13th. 1789.
The letter herewith enclosed from Col: H. Lee with the papers accompanying it fully explain themselves. Inclosed also is a letter from Mr. P. Carr, who has been here several weeks. One of his inducements to visit N. York during the present vacation, was a hope of falling in with you on your visit to America. I regret much both your disappointments. It is not yet in my power to say when the cause of Yours will be removed. Every step taken under the new System is marked with tardiness; the effect of that want of precedents which give a mechanical motion to business under old establishments.
To the above inclosures is added a chart of the Great falls copied from a draught sent me by Col: Lee. I should have observed that all the papers from him, except this are duplicates, the originals having been consigned by a conveyance from Alexanda. to the care of Mr. Mason who resides at Bourdeaux, to be forwarded to Paris.
This will go by a Gentleman, Mr. Joy, who is returning to London, and will be forwarded by such opportunity as he may judge sufficiently certain. Considering it as likely to be long on the way, and having written pretty lately to you, I shall suspend further communications, till a more direct & convenient channel presents itself. The Newspaper inclosed will shew you the form and extent of the amendments which I thought it adviseable to introduce to the H. of Representatives as most likely to pass thro’ ⅔ of that Hs. & of the Senate & ¾ of the States. If I am not mistaken they will if passed, be satisfactory to majority of those who have opposed the Constitution. I am persuaded they will be so to a majority of that Description in Virginia. I wish you all happiness & am Dear Sir Yrs most affectly
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Fontaine Maury, 14 June 1789
From: Maury, Fontaine
To: Madison, James

Dear sir.Fredg. June 14th. 1789
I wrote you some time since, informing you that as exchange was higher with you, than here, that I should decline taking the Bill I applyed to you for, and that twould be most to your advantage to sell it in New York. Since this Letter, I have shiped the remaining three hhds of your Tobacco to my Brother, and you may draw as usual on them.
I have today drawn on you in favor of French L. Gray for £21.0.0 V C at 20 days Sight, it being the amount of sundries furnished Your Brother for the use of your plantation the last year, which you’ll please honor and place to my debit. Your freinds in Orange were well a few days ago. I am very Respectfully D sir your mo: ob st
Fontaine Maury


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 15 June 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My Dr frd.N. Y. June 15. 1789
The inclosed paper contains the proposition made on Monday last on the subject of amendments. It is limited to points which are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in those of none. The structure & stamina of the Govt. are as little touched as possible. Nothing of a controvertible nature can be expected to make its way thro’ the caprice & discord of opinions which would encounter it in Congs. when ⅔ must concur in each House, & in the State Legislatures, ¾ of which will be requisite to its final success. The article which I fear most for is that which respects the representation. The small States betray already a coolness towards it. And I am not sure that another local policy may not mingle its poison in the healing experiment. The papers inclosed from time to time mark our progress, or rather our delays in the revenue business. They are to be lamented, but seem unavoidably incident to the first essay on the subject. Subsequent tasks will be easy. I am anxious to hear that Mrs. R.[’]s alarm is removed. Yrs. mo. affectly.
Js. M. Jr


Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 15 June 1789
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Dear SirRichmond June 15. 1789.
Upon my return home the other day after the close of the Chancery term, I found a letter from you in the post office, wh. had been there for sometime. This will apologize for my not answering it sooner. I am again call’d here, & shall attend untill the last of this month, upon the genl. & court of appeals. Mr. Jefferson we are taught to believe will visit this state in the course of the summer—& reside some months at Monticello. But as his request for leave to perform this tour was, (as I have understood) presented in the interval between the dissolutn. of the late & organitn. of the prest. govt., whilst no one might be authoriz’d to grant it, & the season was far advanc’d before the latter event, I have feard the report was without foundation. Owing however to the contrary expectation together with the want of materials, I have declin’d writing him latterly. I had intended to have given Mrs. M. an opportunity of visiting her friends in N yk. this year, but have latterly declin’d it. The expence of the trip & approaching heat of the season present difficulties not to be surmounted. On my return I shall send my furniture, & soon after move up to Albemarle. This I expect to accomplish in the course of the next month or certainly in August. Mrs. M. was of our party to the district court & was well pleas’d with the country. You must not expect, in return for your attention, any communicatn. of importance from me. The country furnishes nothing of the kind, & you have intelligence from other quarters, sooner than it reaches us.
The operations of the government is the object here that engages the publick attention. As yet no act of importance has pass’d, and of course no ground laid, for particular approbation or censure. In general however so far as I have seen the effect, the discussion of the subjects that have been before you, has made, it hath been a favorable one. An anxiety seems to prevail for greater dispatch, but this the more discerning are sensible must be impracticable. Before I move shall arrange the line of correspondence between us & apprize you of it. I am with real esteem sincerely yours—
Jas. Monroe


Title: To James Madison from Anthony Wayne, 15 June 1789
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Madison, James

Dear SirRichmond State of Georgia 15th. June 1789
Permit me to congratulate you upon the adoption, & organization, of the Federal Constitution, a business in which you took so early—so conspicuous—& so Effectual a part, & altho’ I have not the honor of a seat in the Magnum Concilium of America—I feel myself much interested in her Dignity, wealth, & Power—& therefore take the liberty to suggest a measure which in my humble opinion will have a tendency to promote the whole—it is at least, interesting to the Southern States—& may merit some attention.
The present situation of this Country from the reiterated depredations of the Indians—on One Quarter—& the insiduous protection afforded our run-away Negros by the Spaniards on the other, are of so alarming & serious a nature as to th[r]eaten this lately flourishing State with ruin & desolation—unless timely Protected by Congress. I am now decidedly of Opinion that we shall never have a permanent peace with the Creek Nation (who are Numerous & insolent) until they experience our superiority or until an Army is Stationed for our Protection. I have been more than once engaged with those Indians—& always proved them Vulnerable—& was I clothed with proper Authority—& the necessary means—(which rests with you) I wou’d engage to raise—organize & discipline A Legionary Corps—in the course of a few months (say by Winter the season for Operation in this Climate)—at the head of which I wou’d pledge myself to Produce a Glorious—speedy—& happy Issue.
In fact—a regular force is indispensibly necessary to protect (not only) the Southern States against the Indians—but also the United States from the Ideal & insolent Claim of the Spanish Nation to that invaluable territory lately Ceded to Congress by the State of Georgia, possessing ever[y] possible advantage, that a happy Climate—luxuriency of soil & Navigation can afford—which in addition to other & further Cessions of Georgia & North Carolina—presents a field for National speculation vastly superior to all the Country between the Ohio & Mississipi.
These considerations will naturally draw the attention of Congress to this Quarter—& probably induce them to make an Establishment in the Southern District simular to that, which Genl. St. Clair presides over to the Westward—it will not only be an effectual barrier against the Indians & vague Claims of the Spaniards in future, but it will also open an Ample fund towards sinking the National debt, by the rapid sale of Lands superior to any on the Contenent, so that whatever expence may be incured at the first outset—will be more than Counterbalanced by the many Advantages resulting from it, independent of the expediency of a Measure equally fraught with—Prudence—honor—& Justice.
I candidly acknowledge that I feel myself interested in this business—not only as an individual—but as a Soldier—& a Citizen of America. You’l therefore have the goodness to pardon this liberty—& shou’d the Opinion I have hazarded—quadrate with your own, I am confident that you possess the Abilities to give it every necessary, & Proper support in your House. I shall however be particularly gratified by your sentiments on this subject. Interim I am with every sentiment of Esteem Your Most Obt. & very Huml Sert
Anty. Wayne


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 15 June 1789
From: Pendleton, Edmund
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 15 June 1789. The list probably kept by Peter Force (DLC: Madison Miscellany) notes that Pendleton wrote a two-page letter to JM on this day. The summary reads: “Commending Nathaniel Pendleton jr for the appointment of District Court Judge in Georgia” (see JM to Pendleton, 15 July 1789 and n. 3).