Title: To John Adams from Elbridge Gerry, 25 April 1797
From: Gerry, Elbridge
To: Adams, John

My dear sir
Cambridge 25th April 1797

I am honored with your letter of the 6th, which I took from the cover without breaking the seal. The secret shall not escape me; but, from the circumstance mentioned, I shall not be surprized to find, that it has transpired on it’s passage.
If the tho’t of sending Mr. Jefferson proceeded from both parties, it wears the appearance of “a natural one”, otherwise, coming from so many of one party, it looks like intrigue: be then as it may, the regret of departing in this instance from your own judgment, will, I am persuaded, be more than compensated by the resolution you will experimentally acquire, of firmly adhering to it in future: for I have always observed, that your decisions when uncontrould have been wise, & politic.
Your proclamation, for convening Congress as early as possible, is much approved. The Senate, it is true, is the only branch of the legislature which is invested with executive powers; but it must be always good policy in great natural concerns, if there is no danger of a war, and much more so if there is, to consult the representatives of the people: because, independent of their powers respecting war, they are the nerves of the body-politic, &, when acting in unison with the executive, bring to it, as to the sensorium, true information of the state of the extremities, and efficient aid in the discharge of its official duties. An executive, thus supported, stands on the broad basis of the people: but in not sufficiently attending to this particular, it is conceived by men of candor & discernment, that your predecessor erred—that he was persuaded, by some of his confidential executive officers, to rest his support on a more narrow basis: on a legislative augmentation of his powers, some of which are said to have trenched on the constitution: on having all his executive officers subject to his nod: on the union of the funded bank, commercial, Cincinnati, and antirevolutional or monarchical interest in his favor; powerful indeed, but not sufficiently so for his support: on confining as much as possible, appointments to this discription: on their sounding, incessantly, the high toned political trumpet of his fame: & on a system for narrowing the legislative authority, and transferring it to the executive—that these circumstances, previously to the British treaty, originated jealousies on the part of the representatives, & produced disputes between them & the confidants of the chief magistrate in the first instance, & afterwards between them & himself: an event the most unfortunate that could possibly have happened to him—and that the consequent abuse of these officers & of the President, & their resignations, are evidences of the impolicy of such measures. I shall make no comments on these observations: you can best judge of their accuracy & weight.
I am happy to inform you, that having conferred with a very candid & intelligent gentleman of New Hampshire, who has lately been to Tennissee, I find that you are very popular, in such of the southern states as were supporters of Mr. Jefferson. In this quarter you stand as firm, I beleive, as Mount Ætna. Indeed your political principles are so truly republican, as to render it inconceivable in my mind, how it could be otherwise. He further says, that in NH except Portsmouth the inhabitants have been generally against the French; but that they are changing their opinions, from further information: that on the great post road of this state, they are nearly divided, & how it is in the interior, he does not know: that in the southern states the case is different; for in the event of a war, which they dread, they conceive that the French will embody their negroes against them, there being now too enlightened to be controuled; as they were during our revolutionary war. Be the whole of this as it may, our Government, I am persuaded, will think well of a war with France, before they engage in it: for, in case of a successful war, we should plunge ourselves deeply in debt, check our growth, & feel the effects for many years, without the least possibility of acquiring by it, anything: but if unsuccessful, our government would be overthrown, a new one would be formed on the French model, & we should hereafter be meer French colonies. The French republic, vastly more formidable than the monarchy, having detached from the coalition, Prussia, Spain, Holland, Sardinia, Naples, & a number of the German & Italian states & Principalities, has added several of them to her own scale, & has great influence over the rest, who are verging to the same point. In addition to this, Rome is on the eve of subduction; Portugal will soon be added to the number of her neutral Friends; Russia, on whom Germany & G Britain placed great dependance for succour, favours France; & the Porte, which has been always her friend, seems disposed to make a diversion in her favor, in Germany.  On the other side, the Emperor of Germany is greatly embarrassed: many of his principalities, in treaty with France, refuse their contingents: the King of Prussia declares his intention of supporting them, if coerced; which, in fact, is a rebellion in the German Empire: the source of the Emperors supplies, in G Britain, is nearly dried up: & he, without adequate funds of his own, unable to repel France, & dreading the Porte, is in a state of desperation.  G Britain is in daily apprehension of a French invasion: her credit is sinking: the bank of England has stopt payment: and she is obliged to supply annually for herself & the Emperor, a sum which of itself would to us be an insupportable debt: the interest of her present debt, which Mr. Fox estimates at 550 millions, being about 22 millions; her war demands at least as much more, & her German subsidies 6 millions, making hr annual demand 50 millions sterling, besides the expence of her civil government, render it impossible for her, with all her resources, to progress. In 1792 the South Sea Consuls were at 98; Hammond, their Minister, boasted of it: the same stocks were at 53 before the bank stopt payment; I say stopt payment, for the King and his Council, the Parliament, Bank, & all the corporations of G B may vote, that the refusal of specie for the paper of the bank is no evidence of its insolvency, but no man of common sense will beleive them; for he must know, that at the moment when the paper of a Bank will not command its nominal value in specie, a bankruptcy commences. And the event proves it, for the bank stock fell at once 10 per Cent; & how much lower it will fall, time must determine. In short, the British nation, threatned as it is by an invasion of the powerful, enterprizing, & exasperated republick of France; reduced in her commerce, by French treaties which interdict it with some of the neutral nations, & by French cruizers which intercept it with the others; reduced to the necessity of substituting for specie, executive & legislative acts, to support bank paper; labouring under a debt, insupportable by any nation of Europe; having an indispensible demand for 50 millions sterling a year; & having ¼ or 1/3 of her subjects, as Mr. Burke states, disaffected & panting for a revolution, is in the condition of a man up to his chin in water; & subject by the least wave to be instantly drowned; & to involve in the same fate, any within his grasp. Indeed, it would not be surprizing to hear, that her national paper has shared the fate of ours; for their acts are as incompetent to stamp a value on unsupported paper, as were the acts of Congress. Thus circumstanced, if the U States should hastily plunge into a war with France, which we must expect the British party will effect if possible, they would probably change their opinions in six months; & the people would be prompted to avenge themselves on their advisers. But what are we to do, is the natural enquiry? Indeed, I feel for your situation, surrounded with difficulties which have not arisen from your own agency, & obliged to do something for diverting the evils threatened.  I fear nothing can be done by our friend Pinckney, & am sorry he was sent to be disgraced. I am also sorry that Monroe was recalled. The history of his recal I am ignorant of, but have requested it of him, for my own information. At the time it happened, I enquired of several the true cause, but could not learn it. Mr. Adet told me it was part of a plan to fill all the foreign offices with Antigallicans: I considered him as a prejudiced man, but presume, that the French directory were by him & then impressed with this beleif, & have counteracted the supposed project by rejecting Mr. Pinckney. If so, & Mr. Monroe is the honest man which I have always supposed him, may he not, if sent back, be able to render us more service than any other? It may be objected, that this would be humiliating to the U States, & encouraging France to dictate the nominations of our ministers; that untill there is an answer to her demands, if she has made any, Mr. Monroe coud not serve us; that an unfavorable answer by him would not satisfy them; that a favorable one by Mr. Pinckney would answer the purpose; that Monroe is a partizan of France; & that remanding him would be reversing the measures of President Washington &c &c.—And it might be urged on the other hand, that if humiliating the measure, it is much less so than those which we shall be compelled to, should we engage in an unsuccessful war with France; that to withstand her & her allies, or to check her alarming power by our own force, would be as impossible, as for an infant to resist an elephant; & that nothing is to be expected from a connection with such desperate allies as G B & the Emperor; that the sending back Monroe would wear the appearance of an amicable & conciliating disposition on our part; that by softening the directory, it would prepare the way for a reconciliation with them, which is not otherways to be expected; that veiwing Mr. Pinckney as the minister of an antigallican party here, the directory will be prejudiced against all he can say, as being unfriendly & insidious; but that they will have opposite feelings from the representations of Mr. Monroe. That he is not more a partizan of France, than Mr. King is of G B & it is invidious to recal one & continue the other; that President Wash would not have adopted the recal, had he foreseen the effects; that the reversing it cannot injure his, whilst it will establish your popularity in France, confirm her confidence in you, & enable you to accomplish what you will otherwise find impracticable. But I will not undertake to say, that the measure is entitled to a moments consideration, or if it is, that the arguments preponderate on this or that side. In such momentous concerns, every step being of vast consequence requires the best information before it is taken if possible, let us avoid war: for in peace with all the world we shall find our interest to consist—having been long convinced, that a party spirit was too deeply rooted amongst us, to be suddenly eradicated: that the politicks of both parties directly tended to foreign influence; & that, unless the greatness of the evil should cure itself, one of the parties would prevail & ruin this country; I have been a silent spectator, but have now freely submitted my sentiments to your judgment; and good, bad, or indifferent, they are uncontaminated by intrigue private veiws, a party spirit, or foreign influence.
I know not when I shall have the honor of writing to you again; I am sure I ought not to write for a long time, & only wish to be informed whether you have received this & so—
I have the honor to remain my / dear sir with the highest respect / & esteem—your most obedt. / & very huml. sert.
E Gerry


Title: To John Adams from James Montgomery, 25 April 1797
From: Montgomery, James
To: Adams, John

Sir
Philadelphia, April 25th 1797

In Consequence of Understanding there are several applicants for the Command I now hold of the Revenue Cutter which I imagine to proceed from the encouragement given by the Collector to the different applicants I do my self the Honour to transmitt to your Excellency all the Papers relative to the Dispute and the Charge against me which I trust those Certificates inclosed, with my first Letter to your Excellency will entirely invalidate I will just observe that there has been a Person employed to superintend the Building of the Vessell at an extra expence to Government which as I was on the Spot was entirely unnessery and could be accounted for in no other way but to gratify the undeserved picque and Malice of the Collector
My Character has been basely traduced and joined to the Favour I have in my former letter solicited of your Excellency’s continueing me in my Command I intreat you will have the Goodness to grant me the Satisfaction of knowing I am exculpated from those Charges I never have merited my Situation is painful to the highest degree there being still the same Man employed about the Vessell my self on the Spot my Time Unoccupied and my Mind in a State of Uneasy Suspense Your Excellency’s releiving me from so Undeserved a situation will confer the Highest obligation on your most devoted and obedient Humble / Servant
James Montgomery


Title: To John Adams from Timothy Pickering, 28 April 1797
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Adams, John

April 28. 1797.

The Secretary of State respectfully lays before the President of the U. States the copy of a letter sent this morning to the District Attorney of Georgia, & the draughts of letters to the British & Spanish ministers—left open for additions, if any should be thought necessary. Nothing is promised or intimated in either of the letters to the Ministers of the Use of military force to make our neutrality respected; because toward G. Britain it would have the semblance of a threat—and toward Spain, suggest to M. Yrujo the idea of requesting us to place a force where we deem it useless for our own purposes, but where he would say (where he has supposed) the British would attempt to pass. Besides, after declaring to both the sense of the American Government, ought we to admit the idea that either will violate our territory?
T. Pickering


Title: To John Adams from James McHenry, 29 April 1797
From: McHenry, James
To: Adams, John

War Office 29 April 1797

The Secretary of War, in conformity with the desire of the President as expressed in his letter of the 14th instant has the honour to submit the following suggestions.
1st Question.
It is difficult to fix the precise point at which indignity or affront from one state to another ceases to be negotiable without absolute humiliation and disgrace.  For the most part it is a relative question;—relative to the comparative strength of the parties;—the motives for peace or war,—the antecedent relations;— the circumstances of the moment, as well with regard to other nations as to those between whom the question arises—The conduct of France exclusive of the refusal of Mr. Pinckney, is no doubt very violent, insulting and injurious; and the treatment he has received, if it does not pass, at least, touches upon the utmost limit of what is tolerable. Yet it is conceived that under all the singular and extraordinary circumstances of the case, further negotiation may be admitted, without that absolute humiliation and disgrace which ought perhaps never to be incurred; to avoid which it is perhaps always wise to put even the political existence of a nation upon the hazard of the die.
It is presumed that every nation is free to receive or reject a minister sent to it by another nation. The right to send by no means imposes a rigorous obligation to receive;  the right to refuse being essential to the independence of nations—If a nation was not free to reject, it would be subject to the will of another, and if it had not a clear right to refuse a minister, it must permit the introduction of characters sent expressly for its destruction and whom it could not destroy.  The question viewed thus abstractedly, France cannot be considered as a violator of the laws of nations, nor the simple act of refusal as a just cause of war.
But waving this source of argument, the criticalness of the moment requires the utmost circumspection in conduct. The triumphs of France have been such as to confound and astonish mankind. Several of the principal powers of Europe, even England herself, have found it necessary or expedient, or both, in a greater or less degree to submit to some humiliation from France. At the present juncture the course of her affairs and the situation of her enemies more than ever admonishes those who are in danger of becoming so, and who are not  able, exclusively of foreign aid, to oppose barriers to her progress to temporise. The mind of mankind tired with the suffering or spectacle of a war, fatal beyond example, is prepared to see more than usual forbearance in powers not yet parties to it who may be in danger of being involved. It is therefore prepared to view as only prudent, what in other circumstances might be deemed dishonourable submission.
If on one hand we suppose the successes of France; the controul which she has acquired over the resources of so many countries; the wounds which she is daily inflicting by these means upon the trade of Great Britain, the deranged and precious state of the  with the deranged and precarious state of the credit and finances of that nation, to be of such a nature, as to force her into a sudden peace with France, the situation of the United States, were she hastily or rashly to become a party in the war, would be truely critical and dangerous.
If on the other hand, we suppose that the French armies cannot be much longer supported by contributions drawn from their allies or the countries they occupy; that when these fail she cannot from her own resources pay them in specie; that she has lost the power to give value to paper; that she is unable to clothe her armies from her own manufactories, that she cannot supply her West India Islands with provisions; that the King of Prussia will remain neuter; that Russia will menace; that the Emperor will be able to make a vigorous campaign; in a word, for that these causes combined with her internal discontents and calamities will force her to accede to a peace, still it would be prudent in the United States to take the path of negotiation, these circumstances being so many securities for its issuing honourably.
Under either aspect negotiation is the safest course. By war the United States may lose a great deal; they can gain nothing. They may be annoyed much, and can annoy comparatively but little. Tis even a possible event, as just suggested, that they may be left alone to contend with the conquerors of Europe. When therefore interests so great invite, and dangers so great threaten, delicacy is called upon to yield a great deal to prudence. Even a considerable degree of humiliation may, without ignominy be encountered to avoid the possibility of much greater, and a train of incalculable evils.
Besides, the former relations of the United States to France; the agency of that power in promoting our revolution, are reasons in the nature of things, for not lightly running into a quarrel with, nay even for bearing and forbearing to a considerable extent. There is, perhaps, in such a case peculiar dignity in moderation.
But France in declining to receive Mr. Pinckney, has not gone to the ne plus ultra.  She has declined to receive a minister, till grievances of which she complains, are redressed. She has not absolutely ordered away a minister as the preliminary to war. She has mingled some qualifications. It is not even clear that she means to say, she will not receive an extraordinary minister.  This leaves some vacant ground between her act and rupture.  The United States may occupy it by a further attempt at negotiation. This further attempt however, seems to be the last point beyond which we cannot proceed.
But there are other considerations which may place negotiations within the strict line of a regular proceeding.
Mr. Pinckneys mission, as appears from the Presidents communication to Congress dated the 19th of January ulto., went nor further than to authorise him, “to make to the French government such explanations of the principles and conduct of our own, as by manifesting our good faith might remove all jealosy and discontent.”
Since that  mission three important facts have emerged which have given rise to an entire new state of things. 1st a formal exhibit of grievances and requirement of redress by Mr. Adet. 2. The suspension of that ministers diplomatic functions. 3 The extended and aggravated depredations upon our commerce, in pursuance of a decree of the Derectory announced by Mr. Adet to the Secretary of State the 27th of Octbr. ulto.
To this state of things Mr Pinckneys powers were inapplicable, and it is to be presumed were so considered by the Directory. Mr. Pinckney could not demand reparation for the injuries done to our trade by illegal captures & condemnations, and had received no power to adjust and settle mutual complaints.  Inasmuch therefore as no commission has yet been issued which comprised these objects, one fully qualified to face them; one to complain and seek redress as well as to explain, cannot be viewed as a repetition of that which has been refused by the Directory, but as a measure necessarily resulting from and required by this new state of things.  This double object then contains at  least a great salvo for national honour.
We have just seen in the case of Sweden, the negotiation in some way or other of a similar insult. Though the refusal of our minister as being more pretextless is more offensive; yet the forbearance of Sweden is a precedent of some force for us.
As to our own country there is a general and strong desire; and with a considerable party still  a particular repugnance to war with France. The state of public opinion is not likely to consider a further attempt at negotiation as too humiliating. It may be safely taken for granted then that it will approve such an attempt as prudent, and that at home it will have no other effect, than to lay the foundation for greater union and constancy in case of failure.
But to preserve character abroad and esteem for the government at home it is essential that the idea of further negotiation be accompanied by measures that shall demonstrate a spirit of resistance in case of failure—that shall yield present protection and promise future security.
With this adjunct it is beleived that the government in pursuing the plan of further negotiation will raise rather than depress the character of the nation abroad, and will preserve the dignity of the American mind, and the esteem of the American people.
From a mission so combined the following important advantages may be expected, additional to those already suggested.
It will exhibit a sincere desire to preserve peace, while it carries with it convincing evidence that the United States do not fear war.
It will silence the clamour of opposition, by taking from it the popular argument, that the government refuses to France, (with an eye to war) what it yielded to Great Britain, with an eye to alliance.
It will tend to embarrass or suspend the hostile projects of France, should she meditate any.
It will gain time to make arrangements in matters of  revenue and war, and with foreign powers, should the latter be found necessary. The late King of Prussia used to say, he who gains time gains every thing. Let us then gain time.
It will give the United States what in the shiftings of foreign combinations may be very important, an opportunity to suspend a final determination, till the denoument of the political tragedy can be better understood.
It will take from France, the hope of continuing her depredations during a delusive and fradulent negotiation, and compel her to be just reasonable and explicit.
 There are strong grounds for beleiving that France has calculated upon deriving three important advantages from the system of injuries directed against the United States. 1. The severty of her depredations on our commerce, and the formation of an incidental nursery of sailors attracted by plunder, to be used occasionally in her navy. 2. The effects of these depredations upon the manufactures and finances of Great Britain. 3. Their unfitting the United States for energetic measures, by weakening or destroying their maritime resources, and thereby preparing them for humiliation and subjection.
Taking such to be her policy, it is not to be presumed that  a mission, denudated of military preparation and immediate protection, could induce her to listen to terms of admissible accommodation, or that any thing short of combining with it, strong protecting and defensive measures, can afford a reasonable hope of success. It would indeed offer a sad spectacle of national imbecility and weakness, and exhibit a mournful departure from all sense of dignity to send a more abstract mission after such insults and injuries.
The enunciation of one measure by the Executive ought therefore to be accompanied with a decisive recommendation of the other course. In doing this however it will be wise to avoid all expressions that may look like menacing France with what we intend to do. The attempt to negotiate, must be put upon the footing of an appeal to her justice and friendship The recommendations of preparations and defensive precautions, must consequently be put on the foot of present necessity (in reference to the actual and ruinous depredations on our commerce) and the possibility of future dangers which it may not be in our power to avert.
2 Question.
It will be expedient to declare to France, that if there be any thing in the treaty with Great Britain which France is desirous of incorporating in the treaty with her, the United States are ready to do so, having no wish to give to any other power privileges which France may not equally enjoy on the same terms
This general offer seems the most unexceptionable, and will stop (to use a vulgar phrase) as well the mouth of France, as of her partizans among ourselves. It will shew if rejected,  to the people of the United States, that our treaty with Great Britain was a pretext for injuries, & an  apology for plunder.
The duration of privileges should also in both cases be the same.
3 Question.
It does not occur that it will be expedient to propose the abolition of any of the articles of our treaties with France further than may be implied in the above general offer. To propose the abolition of things inconvenient to us would confirm the suspicion that we were disposed to narrow the privileges of France, and would do harm both there and here. The defining of some of the stipulations according to our practice upon them would be desireable if obtainable, but it is better to leave them as they are than define the other way.  And the probability is that the definition would end in the last way which might compromit us with other powers. The only thing that can be done with  advantage, is to propose to liquidate the meaning and effect of the mutual guarantee in the treaty of alliance. That guarantee is now general. The obligation it imposes on France towards us is essentially nominal in future, because our sovereignty and independence can hardly again come in question. That which it lays upon us, would expose us to a general war with the enemies of France, as often as in a purely defensive war her West India possessions should be attacked. This is a great evil.  The  alternative in such a case is, to chicane away our engagements and risk war with France for not performing them—or to perform them, if called upon, and encounter war with her enemies. It would be a great point gained to reduce this general guarantee to a treaty of mutual specific definite succour, excluding the present war, and defining the casus fœderis to be that case in which the first act of actual hostility by sea or land is committed against the ally—without reference to antecedent motives and causes which are ever vague and complicated.
4 Question.
If an amicable course of negotiation should take place modifications in this convention may be proposed. All parts of it which established an imperium in imperio, which extends foreign influence, and prevents Jurisdiction in our country—and which prevents efficacious justice between French citizens who are other than debtors &c ought to be got rid of. As it is not however of perpetual duration, and the obtaining proper alterations might protract and perplex negotiation it may perhaps be prudent to let it run out its term without notice.
5 Question.
It does not appear expedient to propose or agree to such new articles. In general it is wisest neither to give nor take peculiar privileges, but to equalize our commercial system with all nations. Indeed it will be very difficult to adjust such new articles without interference with other treaties. The only method of favouring France is to stipulate, that certain articles of her production or manufacture, not common to Great Britain, which enter largely into our supplies, should be admitted without duty or on light duties to be specified. This applies principally to her brandies and wines; but even then they must be on the same footing, if coming through Great Britain, as if coming directly from France.  Yet it may be observed,  the essential and ultimate benefit would accrue to France, as favouring the vent and consumption in our country of her peculiar commodities. But perhaps all this is far better avoided. The diminution of our revenue and jealosies in other powers will be certain evils for which France can give no real equivalent.
6 Question.
What was done in the case of G. Britain will be a good precedent for this case.
7 Question.
The terms of the remonstrances against spoliations should be mild and calm without offensive epithets, but serious and depicting strongly the extent of the evil. They should suppose the West India construction to be abuses of the orders of the Directory; but they should notice that these were so vague and indefinite in themselves as to be naturally liable to abuse. They should urge a revocation of these orders and compensation for the injuries they have produced, as due from the good faith justice and friendship of France to the violated rights of the United States and their citizens and to a restoration of cordial harmony between the two nations, which must otherwise suffer a deep and perhaps incurable wound.
8 Question.
This is answered in the answer to the seventh.
9 Question.
This claim of our citizens ought to be noticed and urged as a great and serious one, having from the motives of the individuals in the greatest number of cases, a title to peculiar attention. Yet the whole ought to be so managed as not to compromit the government for the ultimate vindication of the claim. It is very questionable whether it be not such a one (as far as credit was voluntary) as that these who gave it ought finally to be left to the honour of the government to which they trusted.
10 question.
This is answered in the affirmative in the answer to the seventh question. It is not conceived that there is any solid distinction between between captures and seizures by private vessels or public vessels. The government which gave the commission to cruise is liable in both cases. This observation has reference to those depredations which result from vague orders of the government or the abusive constructions of its agents, intrusted with local Jurisdictions, as governors, commissioners &c—
11 Question.
A commission like that of England ought to be agreed to as a very happy issue out of the embarrassment
12 Question.
This is answered in the answer to the second question. The equivalent privileges in the French East India trade will be the analogous compensation, though not of equal extent. But situated as we are with France, it seems proper to be content with less.  If privileges in her West India trade could be obtained it would be desireable. But this ought not to be a sine qua non.
A limitation of a new treaty as well of guarantee as commerce, is a great desideratum.
13 Question.
It scarcely seems adviseable to offer the project of such a new treaty. It opens at once all the cards. In that case there is no knowing how the game will terminate. It is better perhaps to deal in generals and avoid the risk. This procedure will leave less in the power of France or her partizans.
14 Question.
If the plan, project, or general outlines of either treaty or instructions be laid before the Senate, it is probable they would  acquire publicity here and in France before being officially submitted to the Directory or minister; that this would subject them to premature strictures and criticisms in both countries; that it would give information to nations with whom it may be necessary to negotiate in the mean while, of the terms upon which it was intended to treat, all of which might prejudice the attempt and work inconveniently to the country. It is therefore conceived most adviseable to follow former precedent in this respect, which may avoid much delay and embarrassment. In the exercise of this branch of Executive power it will be found the best course to reduce the co-operation of the Senate to the appointment of the negotiator and the ultimate fiat or negative.  Much I believe has been already done to this end, and it may not, for any partial reason, be expedient to relinquish the ground which has been gained.
All which is respectfully submitted—

James McHenry


Title: From John Adams to David Rawn, 1 May 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Rawn, David

1 May 1797

By the President of the United States.
Whereas John Steele Esquire Comptroller of the Treasury of the United States is at present absent from the seat of Government, and whereas it is represented to me as a matter of importance that the accounts of Edmund Randolph Esquire late Secretary of State should be forwith adjusted and Settled.
—Therefore be it Known that in pursuance of the authority Vested in me by the Eighth Section of the Act passed on the eighth day of May 1792. Entitled “An Act making Alterations in the Treasury and War Departments” I do hereby authorize David Rawn of the City of Philadelphia to perform the duties of Comptroller of the Treasury, in the absence of John Steele Esquire Comptroller as aforesaid in Respect to the settlement and adjustment of the Accounts of Edmund Randolph Esqr. late Secretary of State, for doing which according to Law, this shall be to the said David Rawn a sufficient Warrant—
Given under my hand at the City of Philadelphia / this first day of May in the year of our Lord one / thousand Seven hundred and Ninety Seven—


Title: To John Adams from James Gunn, 1 May 1797
From: Gunn, James
To: Adams, John

Sir,
Savannah May 1th. 1797

The day previous to my leaving Philadelphia I did my self the honor to enclose you a letter from Governor Lee recommending Col. Armstrong for the Appointment of Inspector and Surveyor for the Port of Savannah—On my Arrival in this State I am informed that Col. Armstrong drinks to an Extreem, Which Circumstance I had no knowledge of at the Time I Joined in recommending him; I therefore feel it my duty to apprize the President of his Situation.
I have the honor to be, with great / respect and Esteme, / Sir, / your Obt. Hbl. St.

James Gunn


Title: To John Adams from Timothy Pickering, 1 May 1797
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Adams, John

Department of State May 1. 1797.

The Secretary of State respectfully submits the following facts and observations, to the President of the United States, relative to matters of which he may deem is proper to give information, and to measures which he may think necessary and expedient to recommend to Congress, at the approaching Extraordinary Session.
I. General Pinckney’s mission to the French Republic.
The late President of the United States having information that the French Government had manifested its discontent, and meant formally to complain of some proceedings of the Government of these States said to affect the interests of France, deemed it expedient to send to that country a new minister, fully instructed to enter on such amicable discussions, & to give such candid explanations, as might happily remove the discontents, jealousies & suspicions of the French Government, and vindicate our own.
This direct and interesting object of General Pinckney’s mission was clearly announced in his letters of credence to the French Republic, which in their tenor differed materially from the usual letters of credence to ministers in ordinary, sent to reside with a foreign government, and show that his mission was in its nature special & extraordinary; altho’ when this first and immediate object of it... should be accomplished, he was to continue in France as the ordinary minister plenipotentiary of the United States.—The purposes of his mission expressed in his letters of credence were, “to maintain that good understanding which from the commencement of their alliance had subsisted between our two nations; and to efface unfavourable impressions, banish suspicions, and restore that cordiality which was at once the evidence and pledge of a friendly union.” And his instructions were to the same effect – “Faithfully to represent the disposition of the government & people of the United States (their disposition being one) to remove jealousies and obviate complaints, by shewing that they were groundless; to restore that mutual confidence which had been so unfortunately and injuriously impaired; and to explain the relative interest of both countries, and the real sentiments of his own.”
A minister thus specially accredited & commissioned, it was hoped & expected would have been readily received by the French Government, & have proved the instrument of restoring mutual confidence between the two Republics, as the basis of mutual goodwill, and of the exercise of offices reciprocally and highly beneficial. This hope & expectation were evidently just; and the first step of the French Government in relation to General Pinckney, manifested their intention to receive him. For by his letters of the 20th of December and 6th of January last, it appears, that two or three days previous to his arrival at Paris, the French Minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Delacroix, had informed Mr. Monroe of the formalities to be observed by himself and his successor, the former in taking leave, the latter in presenting himself as the minister plenipotentiary of the United States.—On General Pinckney’s arrival, the preliminary formalities were observed; and he & Mr. Monroe, together, presented officially to Mr. Delacroix, the one a copy of his letters of recall, & the other of his letters of credence to the French Republic. Mr. Delacroix promised to lay them immediately before the Executive Directory. This was on the ninth of December. On the twelfth, Mr. Monroe sent to General Pinckney a letter to himself from Mr. Delacroix, dated the 11th, in which that minister said “that he had laid before the Executive Directory the copy of his (Mr. Monroe’s) letters of recall, and of the letters of credence of Mr. Pinckney whom the President of the United States had appointed to replace Mr. Monroe, in quality of minister plenipotentiary from the United States to the French Republic; and that the Directory had charged him to notify to Mr. Monroe, “That they would not acknowledge nor receive another minister plenipotentiary from the United States until after the redress of injuries which the French Republic had demanded and had a right to expect from the American Government.”
General Pinckney expecting a similar letter to be addressed to him, waited that day; but receiving none, he, on the 13th, wrote to Mr. Delacroix, mentioning the indirect notice, thro’ Mr. Monroe, of the determination of the Directory concerning himself, and asking whether it was the intention of the Directory that he should immediately quit the territories of the French Republic. The verbal answers (for written ones were denied) as well from Mr. Delacroix as from his chief secretary, were, that the refusal to receive him was to be understood to mean that he should quit the territories of the Republic. General Pinckney not admitting this to be a clear deduction, desired an explanation in writing, or that he might be furnished with passports for himself and family, which he had a right to demand, to enable him to leave the territories of the Republic with safety. But he could obtain neither one nor the other; while at the same time the cards of hospitality, or official certificates, which had been promised him, and which were necessary to exempt him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the minister of police, were withheld. Yet because for the reasons above mentioned, he delayed his departure, the minister, Mr. Delacroix, as early as the 26th of December, threatened to inform the minister of police; as if General Pinckney, the known minister sent to France by the United States, was not under the protection of the law of nations, but like a dangerous foreigner, a spy, or a criminal, subject to the local laws of France, and the jurisdiction of the minister of police! General Pinckney, however, declared and maintained his rights under the law of nations; and he remained at Paris, undisturbed, until the news arrived there, about the 25th of January, of Buonaparte’s last, decisive victory over the Austrian army in Italy; the day after which, General Pinckney received orders to quit the territories of the French Republic. He accordingly left France, and went to Amsterdam, where he proposed to remain until he should receive instructions from his government. Instructions have been sent to him to continue there, or at some other convenient place, in readiness to resume his mission, should an opportunity present.
II. French Depredations on the Commerce of the U. States.
Very few representations have been made to the Government of depredations committed by French armed vessels on the commerce of the United States, subsequent to the decree of the Executive Directory, of the second of July 1796, ordering that the flag of France should treat the flags of neutral nations as these should suffer them to be treated by the English. Of the numerous claims of our citizens before that time presented to the French Government, on account of illegal captures & condemnations, unreasonable detentions of their vessels, goods purchased or forcibly taken by the agents of the Republic and not paid for, it was generally known that few had been satisfied; altho’ compensation had long and often been demanded. Hence, and on account of the peculiar situation of the United States in relation to France, since that decree of the Directory was communicated, our citizens have probably thought it unnecessary to present their new claims until the Government should call for them.  The facts, however, are sufficiently notorious. The French spoliations surpass those of all other nations northward of the states of Barbary. Whenever there shall be a prospect of redress, and the mode of pursuing it shall be prescribed, the claims of our citizens to compensation for these new and unexampled injuries, with the necessary proofs to support them, will certainly be produced.
The causes or pretenses for these numerous depredations are various.
By the law of nations, we, as a neutral power, have a right to trade with the subjects of all the belligerent powers, in all kinds of merchandize, contraband goods excepted. By virtue of our treaty with France, this right is confirmed, and other rights are reciprocally granted. By that treaty we have a right to carry freely in our vessels, the goods of the enemies of France, and ship-timber and naval stores; tho’ by the law of nations both would be liable to capture; the former because the property of enemies; the latter because they are contraband of war. Great Britain also insisted that cases might exist in which provisions would become contraband. This the Government of the United States did not admit. But as it was necessary to shut up this source of contention, a middle course was taken: it was agreed that if provisions or any other articles not generally deemed contraband, should under any circumstances become so, and consequently subjects of capture,—the party capturing should pay the full value thereof, with a reasonable mercantile profit, freight and demurrage.
This stipulation, together with the admission of the operation of the known law of nations in respect to enemies’ goods on board neutral vessels, and to the articles of ship-timber and naval stores as contraband of war, in our treaty with Great Britain, are stated and urged as grounds of just offence towards the French Republic, & are assumed as the basis of the decree before mentioned, as it respects the United States. Yet this decree, unjust as it is, would have operated injuries towards neutral commerce, comparatively trifling, if it had not been stretched by unwarrantable constructions, and by authorising some unjustifiable depredations, opened the door to a scene of plunder and piracy of which since the dawn of civilization it would be difficult to find an example. The Decree in substance declares, That French armed vessels shall treat the flags of neutrals as these shall suffer them to be treated by the English.
To judge of the nature and consequences of this decree, it will be necessary to inquire in what manner the English treat the flags of neutral nations.
British Captures.
1. Agreeably to the established rule of the law of nations, they capture neutral vessels having on board the goods of enemies; condemning such goods only, and releasing all others, with the vessels, and paying freight and reasonable expences, on account of the enemies’ goods condemned, where no mala fides; or prevarication appears, or is justly suspected, on the part of the neutral masters.
2. Agreeably to the same law, they capture neutral vessels having on board contraband goods, including in the list, ship-timber & naval stores.
3. Both before and subsequent to the formation of the commercial treaty between the United States & G. Britain, her cruisers captured neutral vessels “loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour or meal, bound to any port in France, or any Port occupied by the armies of France.” But the corn, flour or meal so captured was paid for, with a reasonable mercantile profit. However, no captures for this cause have been made by the British since early in the autumn of 1795. And as the decree of the French Directory was, in its terms, applicable not to antecedent, but to subsequent conduct of the English, of consequence the French ought not, by their own rule, to capture neutral vessels on this ground.
4. If the instructions of his Britannic Majesty of the 8th of January 1794 are still in force, then his cruisers are authorised to capture neutral vessels laden with goods the produce of the French West-India Islands, and coming directly from any port of the said islands to any port in Europe.—The other three causes of capture mentioned in the same instructions falling within the generally acknowledged rules of the law of nations, it is unnecessary to notice them, further than to say that they relate to French property, the produce of their islands, on board neutral vessels—to such vessels attempting to enter a blockaded port, and to such vessels laden wholly or in part with naval or military stores, & bound to any port in those islands.
Altho’ the capture of our vessels by the French for any of the four causes before mentioned, viz. for having on board the goods of her enemies—ship-timber and naval stores—corn, flour or mean, or provisions of any kind—or because laden with goods the produce of the British West-India islands, and coming directly from them to any port in Europe—would have been manifest violations of the treaty of commerce, yet if they had limited their captures to these cases, we should have but few subjects of complaint: and to these limits, by the terms of the decree, they ought to have been confined. How far these bounds have been exceeded, will appear, in some measure, by the following account of
French Captures.
Under colour of the decree of the Executive Directory, of the 2d of July 1796, & by the arbitrary orders & decrees of their agents in the West-Indies, and of their consuls & courts in Europe, the French capture neutral, and especially American vessels, for the following causes.
1. If they have enemies’ property on board, which they confiscate of course, without any allowance, as it is conceived, for freight or expences.
2. If they have on board any contraband goods, not only horses, arms and military stores, as enumerated in our treaty with France, but ship-timber and naval stores, which by the treaty are declared free. They do not stop, however, at the confiscation of these contraband goods; but in flagrant violation of the law of nations as well as of the treaty, they condemn all the residue of the cargoes, and the vessels themselves. But every question under this head of contraband is superceded and lost in the following: for as contraband articles are liable to confiscation only when destined, in a neutral vessel, to an enemy’s port, and the French capture and condemn our vessels with whatever they are laden if bound to or from a British port, the distinction between contraband and other goods ceases to be of any consequence.
3. The preceeding remark applies to the third cause before mentioned of British captures—to wit, that the neutral vessels were laden with corn, flour or meal, and destined to some port in France, or to a port occupied by the armies of France. All distinctions are merged in their indiscriminate captures, by the French, of neutral vessels, for the single circumstance that they are bound to or from a British port. Such captures transgressing every known rule, and outraging every principle, supercede all reasoning.—But if it were possible to offer an excuse for the French, in this case, the same would apply to the British and the other belligerent powers; and thus when so many, and the greatest commercial nations in the world are engaged in war, by subjecting to capture and confiscation neutral vessels destined to the enemy of either, the commerce of the United States would be nearly annihilated. And is it the intention and wish of France that neutral vessels should wholly cease to visit her ports? Is it her desire to extinguish all foreign commerce with her dominions?
It merits particular notice, that the first formal decree on this head (of capturing neutral vessels simply because going to or from a British port) by the agents of the Directory at Cape Francois, dated the 27th of November 1796, does not extend to neutral vessels generally,—but, peculiarly insulting and hostile, is expressly confined to American vessels. It is pretended, indeed, that the English pay no respect to neutral flags; and Mr. Adet, in his note of the 27th of October 1796, asserts, “that the English continue to stop and carry into their ports all American vessels bound to French ports, or returning from them.” But the pretence and assertion were alike destitute of truth.  The French agents at St. Domingo had almost daily proofs that the British ships meeting American vessels bound to and from the French ports in that island, let them pass unmolested.
4. Victor Hugues and Lebas, the Special agents of the Executive Directory for the Windward Islands, by their decree of the first of February 1797, hold up a distinction between the ports of the English possessed by that power before the war, and certain French and Dutch ports in the West-Indies taken by the English during the present war; or, as it is expressed in the decree, “delivered up to them, occupied and defended by Emigrants.” These the agents affect to consider as rebel ports, and declare that all neutral vessels and their cargoes destined thither are good prize, and shall be sold for the benefit of the captors. They also declare all neutral vessels cleared out, not for any particular port, by name, but generally for the West-Indies, to be good prize. Under this distinction, it would seem that these agents have cleared some few vessels going to or coming from the old English ports, contenting themselves with confiscating their cargoes; while other vessels going to or coming from the pretended rebel ports, are entirely confiscated, vessels & cargoes.
5. If the decree of the Executive Directory admitted contrary to the plain terms of it, of a retrospective construction, still it could not warrant these captures, under pretence that the like were made by the British, under the order of the 6th of November 1793; For those captures have since, in effect, been acknowledged (by the British treaty) to be irregular and illegal; and the British government have promised to make us compensation for them, as soon as the losses are ascertained. Therefore, if the Directory meant by their decree to authorize similar captures, they should, on their own principle of treating our flag as it is treated by the English, have made the like provision for giving us compensation. A provision, indeed, that would have been so extremely absurd as to demonstrate that such captures are not comprized within the meaning of their decree. For they could never intend to commission their privateers to commit such extensive spoliations for the benefit of individual captors, for which the nation should at the same time be declared bound to compensate the neutral sufferers.
6. The want of a sea-letter has also been made a pretence for condemning American vessels and cargoes, & where there was no question of the entire property being American. This cause of condemnation they pretend to find in the 25th article of the treaty of commerce, in which it is said, that “To the end that all manner of dissensions & quarrels may be avoided and prevented, on one side and the other, it is agreed, that in case either of the parties hereto should be engaged in war, the ships & vessels belonging to the subjects or people of the other ally, must be furnished with sea letters or passports, expressing the name, property and bulk of the ship, as also the name and place of habitation of the master or commander of the said ship, that it may appear thereby that the ship really and truly belongs to the subjects of one of the parties.” But the true design of the two governments in this provision is not merely to prove the property, but by exhibiting that decisive evidence of it, at the first meeting at sea, to prevent the vexation, delay and injury which, for want of such decisive proof, might arise from taking and carrying the vessels into port for examination & trial, on suspicion that they belonged to an enemy. This is plain from the 27th article of the treaty, in which it is provided, that the passport (or sea-letter) shall be exhibited to the cruiser, and the vessel, “when she shall have shewed such passport, shall be free and at liberty to pursue her voyage, so as it shall not be lawful to molest or search her in any manner, or to give her chace, or to force her to quit her intended course.” Without such sea-letters, our vessels would be liable to the inconveniences, delays and losses, of being searched, chaced, and forced out of their intended course, in order to be carried into port for trial; and have no right to claim any indemnity, because they neglected to provide themselves with the evidence which on the first inspection would have exempted them from molestation. But if a sea-letter was intended by the treaty to supersede and exclude all other evidence of the property, we should certainly find it so explicitly declared in the treaty. Nothing like it is to be found: and nothing can be clearer than that when other evidence proving the property is produced, it ought to be liberated.
7. But besides the captures and confiscations of American vessels and cargoes for the unjust causes & pretences before mentioned, the French privateers in the West Indies have exhibited a series of atrocious spoliations & outrages unexampled in the history of the civilized world. The news-papers in the United States have, for many months past, presented them to the public eye. Not contented with plundering the American vessels, the French have been guilty of personal insults and injuries to our citizens. And the outrages have not been confined to privateers. Statements have been published shewing that the agents themselves have sanctioned the pillage of our vessels by their immediate orders, in the French ports. And the special agents at Guadaloupe, after confiscating their vessels and cargoes, have thrown the American citizens into prison, fed them with coarse & scanty diet, treated them, in fact, as prisoners of war, and actually attempted to exchange them with the British for Frenchmen.
8. Unwarrantable captures and condemnations of American vessels and cargoes have also been made in Europe. Some have been carried into Spain, & condemned by French Consuls, on the single charge that they were bound to or from a British port. Some such have been captured on the Spanish coast, and within gunshot of their forts. The protection due to our vessels from the Spanish government, agreeably to the sixth article of our treaty with Spain, has been claimed; but without effect. In one case the French Consul has said that the capture within the Spanish jurisdiction was justifiable, because France & Spain made a common cause in the present war. The Spanish government, in this particular case, ordered the vessel to be restored: but the French Consul disobeyed, and said he should wait the orders of the Directory.
9. An official report from the consulate of the U. States at Paris, states, that captures of American vessels are made by privateers fitted out and owned in France. That the judges of the tribunals which in the first instance take cognizance of prizes, are chiefly merchants, who are directly or indirectly more or less interested in fitting out privateers, and are therefore parties in the controversies in which they decide. There, as well as in the West-Indies, the want of a sea-letter is now made a pretence for condemning vessel and cargo. One instance is related of an American vessel purchased in Europe, & which subsequent to the purchase had not been in America, and of consequence had it never in her power to procure a sea-letter. She had made several coasting voyages from one French port to another, her papers having been found regular: but at last, altho’ bound from a port in Holland to a port in France, she was captured by a French privateer belonging to Boulonge, and carried into that port. The judges of the tribunal there were most of them concerned in the privateer. The American vessel and cargo were of course condemned. The sole pretence was, that she had not a sea-letter. The cause was carried up to the highest judicial authority—the Minister of Justice. He acknowledged the property to be American; yet argued for its condemnation on the frivolous pretence that the vessel had not a sea-letter. It was shown by the American Consul that this furnished no cause for condemnation. “That the article of the treaty upon which he founded is opinion did not specify seizure or confiscation of vessels that should not be furnished with sea-letters—that every penal law was to be construed liberally” towards the supposed offenders —“that the object of the treaty must have been reciprocal benefit to the merchants and commerce of the two countries—that the interpretation given by him to that article would operate in a quite opposite manner, and place the merchants of the United States in a worse situation than if there had been no treaty; which most certainly could never have been the intention of either of the contracting parties: For if there existed no treaty, most undoubtedly the American vessel being brought into a French port, would be immediately released upon the proof being made that she was American property, and consequently neutral. That this doctrine had been sanctioned in France since the commencement of hostilities: several hundreds of our vessels having visited their ports, & no exception having been taken to the want of sea-letters—indeed they have never been heretofore asked for. That the French government had sold a very considerable number of prize vessels to our merchants in payment of supplies by them furnished, or otherwise, some of which had been chartered by the very agents of the government for sundry voyages in Europe, all of which had no sea-letters, nor could they ever obtain any before they make a voyage to the United States.”—Yet all that the consul could obtain from the minister was, his saying that he would reconsider the matter, and take the decision of the Directory.
This is the latest intelligence about American Vessels captured and carried into the ports of France; except that
10. Certain unprincipled American Citizens have resorted to the ports of France, where they have fitted out numbers of privateers, and capture American vessels. Most of the privateers fitted out at Brest, are said to be owned wholly or in part by Americans. One of these privateers is commanded by a captain Cowell from Boston.
From this view of the Attacks made by the French on the Commerce of the United States, it results, that they are directed by no just rule: That they are plain violations of our treaty with France, or of the law of nations, or of both: That these spoliations (to say nothing of the open and unrestrained piracies committed in the West Indies by their armed boats) appear to have been systematically designed and pursued: That there is no appearance of any relaxation; on the contrary, they are continued with circumstances of increasing outrage and personal abuse: That the ordinary means of seeking & obtaining redress, by friendly negociations, are denied; the Directory having refused to receive, and driven from their territory, the minister specially charged by the American Government to discuss and amicably terminate all subjects of complaint:
From all which it follows, That the United States must abandon their commerce, on which the prosperity of their citizens, and almost all their revenue depends, or resort to extraordinary means for its protection. And extraordinary means are as just as necessary in respect to a people who have laid aside all the rules of fair proceedure which have hitherto directed and still govern the other civilized nations of the world.
While therefore the Executive of the United States, desirous and endeavouring yet, if it be possible, to preserve peace, shall be making one more attempt by fair and candid negociations to terminate all subjects of controversy, with the French Republic, it appears to the Secretary of State, that the following are proper
Measures
To be recommended to Congress, at the approaching session, as necessary and expedient.
1. That provision be made for equipping & manning the frigates.
2. That provision be made for equipping a number of sloops of war.
3. As the extended and various navigation and commerce of the United States will not universally admit of convoys, or goes beyond the means of provision within the power of the United States, That the citizens be authorized to arm their vessels, but only for the purpose of defence; not to cruise, nor to capture, unless when attacked. The convoys to be confined to the same limits.
4. To prevent the further sacrifice of our commerce, it may merit consideration, whether any American vessel should be permitted to sail from the United States, unless armed and manned for defence, in proposition to her size; or that she sails under convoy. The expence of convoys might at least be partially defrayed by a contribution from each unarmed vessel taking the benefit of the public convoy.
5. That the principal seaports of the United States be put in a proper state of defence; and competent corps of militia artillerists formed & disciplined to reinforce the garrisons.
6. That the corps of artillery be increased: and that a provisional army be organized, to consist of thirty thousand men, to be in readiness for actual service, if a war should take place. This army to be composed of volunteers or draughts from the militia, & paid for the time spent in their formation & discipline. The several corps to remain in the respective states and districts where raised, until the public service should require their being drawn together.
7. That the laws for organizing, arming and training the militia be revised, and rendered efficient.
8. That the immediate manufacture of fire arms for the United States be encouraged to the utmost practicable extent; and other adequate measures taken to procure ample supplies of arms and military stores.
9. That a law be passed authorizing the Executive to cause spies and persons justly suspected of designs hostile or injurious to the United States, to be apprehended—offenders against the provisions of the law to be tried and punished—and foreigners compelled to quit the territories of the United States.
10. That the system for levying a land-tax be completed and put in operation; and other funds provided for carrying the proposed measures into effect, and to meet all other public demands.
12. That provision be made for punishing all citizens of the U. States voluntarily serving on board the national ships of any of the belligerent powers, which shall make prize of the vessels or other property of the U. States or their citizens; and especially to punish those American citizens who shall fit out or serve on board privateers which shall cruise against and annoy the commerce of the United States.
13. That the citizens who have sustained losses or injuries in their persons or properties from the armed vessels & privateers of the French Republic, or from the tribunals, agents or others under its jurisdiction, be required to procure the best evidence of those losses and injuries, their amount, and the circumstances attending them, whereon to found & support their claims of compensation and indemnity from the French Republic; and that these claims and evidence be transmitted to the office of the Secretary of State, to be used whenever the mode of seeking redress shall be prescribed.
III. Concerning the affairs of the United States in relation to the Barbary powers.
The payments stipulated with the Dey of Algiers, have been made to his satisfaction; and thro’ his friendly interposition, an advantageous treaty has been concluded with Tripoli. Measures were still pursued for effecting a peace with Tunis, which tho’ attended with some difficulties, was by the last intelligence expected to be soon accomplished.
Our harmony and good understanding with the Emperor of Morocco have been endangered by the prohibited commerce carried on by some American vessels with certain ports in his dominions which refuse submission to his authority. Repeated warnings have been publicly given to the Americans concerned in that traffic, by our minister in Portugal, and our consuls in that quarter of Europe: but all these cautions have been disregarded. Lucrative freights have tempted those citizens to continue this commerce, at the hazard of provoking a war between that empire and the United States. This evil demands the interposition of the legislative power to suppress.
The vast importance of a free trade in the Mediterranean, and with the ports in the Atlantic which are within the range of the Barbary Corsairs, demands that further provision be made for maintaining consuls with each of the Barbary States, and for vesting those consuls with the extraordinary powers necessary, in emergencies, to preserve our peace, and avoid the great sacrifices always necessary to recover it, if suffered to be broken for want of full powers & adequate means to appease the blind revenge and accommodate the capricious demands of their despotic rulers. The salary of two thousand dollars is particularly insufficient for the support of a consul at Algiers, whom perhaps it may be expedient to invest with a superior & superintending power over the consuls of Tunis & Tripoli. The Executive has never yet been able to find a citizen of the requisite abilities, and meriting the high confidence which that post demands, willing to accept of it.
Timothy Pickering


Title: To John Adams from Timothy Pickering, 1 May 1797
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Adams, John

Department of State, May 1. 1797.

To the Questions proposed by the President of the United States, on the 14th of the last month, the Secretary of State respectfully returns the following answers.
1. Question.Whether the refusal to receive Mr. Pinckney, and the rude orders to quit Paris & the Territory of the Republic, with such circumstances of indignity, insult & hostility, as we have been informed of, are bars to all further measures of negotiation? Or, in other words, will a fresh mission to Paris be too great an humiliation of the American People, in their own sense and that of the world?Answer. The Refusal of the Executive Directory of the French Republic to receive General Pinckney, and their rude treatment of him, and orders to quit the territory of the Republic, would justify the American Government in strongly expressing its resentment, in making a solemn and energetic demand of reparation for these and all other wrongs, and compensation for property purchased & unlawfully seized, and for all the damages to the property and injuries to the persons of our citizens: and a refusal to comply with these demands, would authorize reprisals. But the example of forbearance under British aggressions; the inestimable value of peace; and the general sentiment of our country decidedly point to further negociation as expedient to be attempted.—The measure may probably be marked with dignity in the manner of proposing and conducting it.—In addressing the Directory, all humiliating language may be avoided: no fraternizing words need be used: the former stile of “very dear great friends & allies” may be omitted. They know it is impossible that we should feel what those words import: and the dignity of our government demands that the spirit of Independence and the simplicity of Truth should distinguish the address. This may be—The President of the U. States of America, To the Executive Directory of the French Republic.And as the title is universally adopted by themselves and other public functionaries, and may now indeed be considered as appropriate,—instead of Friends & Allies, they may be called Citizens.Question 2. If another mission be admissible, can any part, and what parts or articles of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Great Britain be offered to France, or ultimately conceded to that power, in case of necessity, if demanded by her?Answer. As the French Government have complained (falsely indeed) that in the British treaty we have granted to their enemies commercial advantages which we have denied to them, I think we should make no difficulty in renouncing those stipulations in the treaty with France which we did not insist on in the treaty with Great Britain. I mean the stipulations that free ships should make free goods—and that ship timber and naval stores should not be deemed contraband.—But on the other hand, as horses are free by the treaty with Great Britain, and as they are an article of some consequence in our exports, we should endeavour to strike them from the list of contraband in our treaty with France.—These alterations being made, the 14th article of the French treaty, which subjects the property of the neutral nation found on board the enemies ships, to capture and condemnation, must of course be abolished.

In the treaty of Alliance,Art. VI. should be maintained, in order to exclude France from the islands of Bermuda, Canada and the Floridas, which, in the terms of this article, she renounced forever.Art. XI. It is too obvious to remark, that the mutual guarantees should if possible be abolished. A renunciation on our part, of what France may claim the guarantee, would be a desirable substitute. If she will not consent to this modification, I see no other alternative. If we maintained a standing army, and a fleet of ships of the line, we might stipulate to furnish specific numbers of each, in lieu of the indefinite guarantee: but possessing neither, and not likely to possess them in a considerable period to come, we must, if insisted on by France, still acquiesce in the present guarantee: judging, whenever the demand on her part shall be made, whether the case of the alliance applies.In the Treaty of Commerce.Art. VIII. This stipulation of doing us good offices to secure to us peace with the powers of Barbary has never yet done us any good; and I am persuaded never will procure us the smallest benefit. Notwithstanding this stipulation, her agents may secretly do us much harm with all the Barbary powers. I should make no difficulty in renouncing this article; and especially if it can be applied as a set-off for something to be relinquished on the part of France.Art. XI. “Goods moveable and immoveable”—does the latter word comprehend real estates? And was it intended that Our Citizens in France or its Dominions, and Frenchmen in the United States, should at their pleasure become landholders? So important a right, it should seem, ought not to be given by construction. The laws of some of the States in our union do not admit of foreigners holding real estates: and if this article was intended to operate that effect, the operation would be very unequal; as very few of our citizens will find any inducements to become land-holders in France. The contrary, in respect to the United States, was at the time when the treaty was formed, contemplated with pleasure, as it corresponded with the general policy of these states to increase their population by the admission of foreigners to settle & become landholders. The opposers of the British treaty made loud clamours against that article in it which secured to British subjects merely the estates then belonging to them, without allowing subsequent acquisitions.  But this 11th article of the French treaty, if I understand it, gives that right to Frenchmen indefinitely.—I have made these remarks to bring the subject into view.Art. XIV. In my answer to the second question, I have noted that so much of this article as authorises the confiscation of neutral goods on board enemies ships, must be abolished, if the corresponding stipulation, that free ships make free goods, is renounced.Art. XV. The damages done by men of war & privateers of one party to the commerce of the other may probably often exceed the funds of the individual aggressors, to make compensation: Ought not the respective Governments to be responsible for such damages, in the first instance; and each exact a reimbursement (as far as practicable) from its own citizens, as well as punish their aggressions.Art. XVII. The construction put on this article by the American Government to be insisted on; viz. That the admiralty courts of each party have a right to take cognizance of captures made within its jurisdiction, or by illegal privateers. And with regard to captures of neutral vessels at sea, and which shall afterwards be brought into the ports of the U. States, no asylum to be given to the captors or their neutral captured vessels, except when compelled to enter thro’ stress of weather, and then no longer than shall be necessary to enable them to get ready to proceed to the nearest port of the country of the captors.—Perhaps is would be eligible to fix the same rule for captured enemies’ ships (unless the contracting parties are engaged in a common cause) to exclude at once all questions and embarrassments about condemning and selling prizes.But if prize ships are so disabled as to be incapable of putting to sea again until refitted, or if they are utterly disabled, what should be done with their cargoes? Both cases occurred last year. The Government permitted (tho’ with hesitation, doubts & caution) the cargoes to be unladed, the vessels repaired – part of the prize goods to be sold to pay for the repairs, and the cargo of the prize vessel surveyed & reported to be unfit ever to go to sea again, was allowed to be exported in neutral bottoms, as prize goods, & consequently liable to recapture.Art. XXII. The express exclusion of foreign privateers, enemies of either party, from being fitted in the ports of the other, or selling what they have taken, has been (absurdly to be sure) construed by the French as an implied admission of French privateers to do both. To prevent this & similar unfounded claims in future, more explicit language must be employed. The sale of the prizes of privateers, and even when made by public ships of war, may be wholly forbidden by treaty. If not forbidden, it may be left to the pleasure of each government, without either having a right to complain of the prohibition, should it take place.Art. XXIII. This stipulates for the freedom of commerce. The modification proposed is mentioned in the answer to the 2d question.Art. XXIV. This article also to be modified as stated in the answer to the 2d question.There have appeared so many disgracefully quibbling causes for capture & condemnation, that it may be impossible to guard against them in any treaty that human ingenuity can devise, to be entered into with the French Republic. To state the shameful pretences that have been already advanced by their courts & agents, & even by their first minister of justice, as causes of capture & confiscation of American vessels & cargoes, for the purpose of expressly preventing their future application, would, I think, give pain to any man of sense whom they should employ to negociate another treaty or a modification of the treaties which exist, so that he would be unwilling to admit the possibility of such abuses: yet without being so explicit there will be no safety against repetitions of licensed piracies.

1.Under pretence that certain ports were surrendered to the English by the treachery of the French or Dutch Inhabitants, Victor Hugues & Lebas, Special Agents of the Directory at Guadaloupe, have declared that all neutral vessels bound to or from such ports shall be good prize.2.Under the false pretence that the English take all neutral vessels bound to or from French ports, the French Agents at St. Domingo decreed that all American vessels bound to or from English ports should be good prize.3.Under the absurd pretence that the sea-letters or passports, which were intended for the mutual convenience of the two nations, to save their commerce from vexations, are an indispensably requisite document, they confiscate our vessels which are destitute of them, even when they acknowledge the property to be American.4.Because horses and their military furniture when destined to an enemy’s port are by the 24th article of the Commercial treaty declared contraband, and as such, by themselves, liable to confiscation, Victor Hugues and Lebas decreed that all neutral vessels merely for having horses on board, should be good prize; & they accordingly condemned vessels and cargoes.Art. XXV5. The ancient ordonnances of the French monarchs required a variety of papers to be on board neutral vessels, the want of any one of which is made a cause for condemnation; altho’ the 25th article mentions what certificates shall accompany our vessels & cargoes, which by every reasonable construction ought to give them protection. Therefore it will be advisable to enumerate and describe the ships papers which shall be deemed necessary, and to declare that the want of any other shall not be a cause of confiscation.6. It will likewise be expedient to fix the mode of manning our vessels, as to the officers and propositions of men who must be natives, or naturalized citizens.—An accurate examination of the French Ordonnances concerning neutral vessels will be useful to the negociator of a new treaty, or in framing instructions for him.The freedom of commerce, stipulated by the 23d. & 24th. articles, requires more explicit language to secure it against French chicanery, in cases like those above mentioned, than would be necessary, I hope, in a treaty with any other nation. The same remark may be applied to other articles in the treaty. It may, among other things, be expedient to define what is a town or place “blocked up or invested.”Art. XXV.} The only consequence of the want of a sea-letter should be to excuse a privateer from damages for detention in carrying the neutral vessel into port; and by no means to supersede other proof of property. These two articles should be made conformable to each other. The 27th says that after the exhibition of the passport, the vessel shall be allowed to pass without molestation or search &c. The 25th requires that besides the passport, vessels shall be furnished with certain certificates, which of course also must be exhibited.Art. XXVII.Art. XXVIII. The prohibited goods here mentioned, have no relation to contraband: but refer merely to such as by the laws of the country are forbidden to be exported. In the case of exporting horses from Virginia, this article was perversely applied by the French minister to horses which by the French treaty are contraband of war.Art. XXX. The commerce of the U. States ought not to be restricted to certain “free-ports” in France; but be admitted into all her ports in the same manner as the commerce of France is admitted into the ports of the U. States.—The commerce to her Colonies will doubtless be more or less restricted, according to the usage of other European nations: yet on account of the deranged and nearly annihilated condition of French commerce, probably a larger latitude of trade with their Colonies will be readily permitted for a term of years; and perhaps the mutual advantages thence resulting will be so great as to induce afterwards a prolongation of that term, to which the course or habit of business may contribute.Question 3. What articles of the treaty of alliance and of the treaty of commerce with France should be proposed to be abolished?Answered under the second question: excepting that I omitted to speak of the reception to be given to the public ships of war of all nations; which indeed goes rather to the abolition of a French claim, than of any article in the treaty with France.—The French ministers have demanded that her enemies ships which had at any time and in any part of the world made prize of a French vessel, should be excluded from the ports of the U. States, altho’ they brought in no prizes with them. In opposition to this demand, we have contended that they were to be excluded only when they came in with French prizes. And the kind of asylum to be afforded in all other circumstances, is described in Mr. Jefferson’s letter to Mr. Hammond, dated the 9th of Septr. 1793, published (page 77.) with the State papers of that year, in the following words. “Thus then the public ships of war of both nations (English & French) enjoy a perfect equality in our ports, 1st, in cases of urgent necessity; 2d, in cases of comfort or convenience;—and 3d, in the time they chuse to continue.” Mr. Jefferson enlarged on this subject; saying, that there is a right secured neither to France nor Britain by treaty, “but due to both on the principles of hospitality between friendly nations,—that of coming into our ports, not under the pressure of urgent necessity, but whenever their comfort or convenience induced them.”Question 4. Whether it will be prudent to say any thing concerning the Consular Convention with that power; and if it will, what alterations in it should be proposed?Answer. The French, after usurping judiciary powers, by their consuls, in prize causes, with the rights of Admiralty Courts, being opposed by the American Government, laid aside the legal formalities; so that Consular sentences of condemnation could not secure to purchasers the property condemned, against capture on the high seas. But they still claim the means, by the Executive Officers of the U. States, of having the Consular decisions between French Citizens, under the 12th article of the Convention, carried into execution. This demand has recently been renewed by Mr. Létombe, their Consul General, who has produced a copy of the answer given by Merlin of Douay, the minister of Justice, to Mr. Delacroix, minister of foreign affairs, declaring that sentences of the American Consuls of France are carried into execution by the intervention of their officers of justice.—To this I have verbally answered to Mr. Létombe, that the attorney general Mr. Lee, the late Attoy. General Mr. Bradford, & the District attorney of New-York, Mr. Harrison, after deliberately examining this point, under the Consular Convention & the Act of Congress relating to it, concurred in one opinion, That the Marshals (& consequently other officers) of the U States. were not bound to execute the sentences of the French Consuls. I added, That it was plain by the 12th article, that the Consular jurisdiction between the citizens of the two nations respectively, was voluntary; and that if the parties or either of them refused submission to the sentence, each nation must provide the means of compulsion or punishment, in respect to its own citizens; and that the execution of such sentences might at any rate be suspended, by either of the parties to the suit before the Consul, by appealing to the proper tribunal of their own country. Upon this Mr. Létombe said, That France had made a provision in such case of disobedience—imposing a penalty of fourteen hundred livres on the citizen that refused to abide by the Consular decree. When Mr. Létombe shall send me a letter on the subject, I have promised an answer in writing.Another claim has been insisted on by the French, That the copy of a ships roll (or shipping paper) without producing the original, was an evidence sufficient to command the warrant of the District Judge to apprehend deserters from French vessels. Our district judges, according to their uniform construction of the 9th article, have required the Consuls to produce the original roll.These are the only two points which seem to demand an explanation. There need not perhaps be any difficulty in yielding the latter, by admitting copies of the ships roll, certified under the Consular seal, as competent evidence to the District Judge, for apprehending Deserters. But doubtless the jurisdiction of the Consul in the former case ought to remain, agreeably to our construction, wholly voluntary.The Consular convention will expire in about four years.Question 5.Whether any new articles, such as are not contained in either of our treaties with France or England, shall be proposed, or can be agreed to, if proposed by the French Government?
Answer.The remarks made in the answer to the second question contain an answer to this, in respect to new articles to be proposed by the U. States. What France may propose, can be matter of conjecture only: yet we may certainly conclude that any new propositions on her part will be calculated to increase her advantages; and these being already too many and too great, for such a power, in respect to her disproportionate strength and overbearing disposition, we may pretty safely determine to acceed to no new articles, to be proposed by her; such excepted as are noticed under the second question.Question VI.What documents shall be prepared to send to France, as evidence of insult and injuries committed against the commerce of the United States, by French ships of war and privateers, or by French Commissioners, Agents, Officers or Citizens?Answer. Their own decrees:—for they too well know the promptitude of their own citizens to execute rigorously, wantonly, villainously, cruelly & vexatiously what they have arbitrarily ordained, to doubt of their injurious and destructive effects on our commerce.—But if more be requisite we may add some few sentences of their interested tribunals, and the depositions of such Captains as have witnessed their depredations and violence to the persons of our citizens. Some of these decrees, sentences and depositions we already possess; and I have taken measures to procure more, from Boston, New-York, Philadelphia and Baltimore—to which Norfolk & Charleston may be added. These I presume will be sufficient to support our demand that some plan of investigation into all our losses, and of indemnification for them, be agreed on.Question VII. In what terms shall remonstrances against spoliations of property, capture of vessels, imprisonment of masters and mariners, cruelties, insults and abuses of every kind to our citizens be made?Answer. The Envoy appointed to the proposed extraordinary mission to the French Republic, will frame his remonstrances on these subjects agreeably to their nature and extent; to which he will certainly be competent, and which, being on the spot, he may adapt to the characters of those to whom they shall be addressed: the only direction necessary from the government (and this is dictated by the very circumstance that under all our countless sufferings from French atrocities, we nevertheless choose to negociate, and if possible obtain a redress of our wrongs with the preservation of peace,) will be, to be firm, yet decent and respectful.Question VIII. In what terms shall restitution, reparation, compensation and satisfaction be demanded for such insults and injuries?Answer. The same as to the 7th question.Question IX. Shall demand be made of payment to our citizens for property purchased by the French Government in Europe, or in the East and West Indies?Answer. This sort of claims against the French Government has already been patronized by our own: and I think it will be indispensably necessary to continue it: partly for the very circumstance that the demands are against the French Government itself.Question X. Shall demand be made of the French Government of payment for vessels and cargoes captured & seized, whether by ships of war or private ships?Answer. I have no hesitation to answer in the affirmative. These captures & seizures, in general, have been made not under any known rule of the law of nations; but by virtue of the arbitrary, unjust and faithless orders of the French Government itself; which therefore is under peculiar obligations to give the indemnity.Question XI. Shall any commission of enquiry and examination, like that with England, be agreed to?Answer. This, I conceive, will be the only mode in which the just claims of our citizens can be ascertained. But it should have no relation, as in the British treaty, to further proceedings, by way of appeal, in any French Courts: the claims should be carried, at once, before the board of commissioners.—If the French should agree to this plan, and the claims in consequence, be adjusted, I am apprehensive that time for paying the awarded indemnities must be allowed: and that our citizens must be satisfied with becoming creditors to France, receiving interest on their credits, and the principal by instalments. They will be fortunate to obtain this. The board must sit in France—because many of the claims arise in that country because the French part of the board will probably desire to have recourse to the government itself, in settling principles; and the American Minister must be there to maintain our views of right and justice in fixing principles. Another reason is, the British precedent—the board for captures and commercial injuries sits in London.Question XII. What articles in the British treaty can be offered to France, without compensation—and with compensation—and what compensation shall be demanded?Answer. I do not know of any advantages in commerce that we have granted to Great Britain: if we had done so, they would, by the second article of the commercial treaty with France, have become common to her. The only article that strikes me (in the British treaty) as related to this question, is the third, regulating our commercial & friendly intercourse with the British provinces to the northward of us; in which, as it is founded wholly on locality, the junction of territories, it is impossible that France should participate.Question XIII. Shall a project of a new treaty abolishing the old treaties and consular convention, be proposed to France?Answer. If France would say—Let all our existing treaties with the United States be abolished—I should rejoice to meet them: but she will not do this: she possesses some advantages over other nations, by the present treaties, which by the stipulations with other powers she could not introduce into a new treaty.Question XIV. Shall such a project, with a project of instructions to the minister be prepared and laid before the Senate for their advice and consent, before they be sent to Europe?Answer. A project of instructions for negociating a treaty with Spain, was laid before the Senate in 1792, and approved. The peculiar situation of the United States, and especially of the Executive Branch of the Government, in relation to France would render an adoption of that precedent highly expedient, if we could trust to the fidelity of all the members of the Senate: There was no inducement, if passions or interest to betray the instructions to Spain: but any instructions alike communicated, for negociating a new treaty with France, would reach the Directory sooner than we could send them to our minister.
All which is respectfully submitted.
Timothy Pickering


Title: To John Adams from Robert Montgomery, 2 May 1797
From: Montgomery, Robert
To: Adams, John

CopyHis Excellency the Honl. John Adams President of the United States of AmericaSirAlicante 2d May 1797

Please permit me the honour of presenting you with my most sincere and warm congratulation on an event which not only Contributes highly to the happiness of your numerous friends, but also may reasonably be concluded well to the whole of a Nation who has wisely honoured you withe the dignified station of their President. Accept of my best wishes for your health your success in Office which may you fill to the satisfaction and lay down to the regreat of a generous and thankfull People.
Emboldened by a long attachement to your Talents and Virtues I take the liberty of Subscribing myself with all respect and Esteem / Sir / Your most Obedient / humble Servant

Robt MontgomeryAlicante 24 October 1797
Sir
During the Plague at Algiers in July last Mr Barlow wrot me Several letters very pressingly requesting I would send over some person of my confidence to attend to the buseness of the United States while he should return to Europe as was absolutely necessary for him at that period. I had then no person I could depend on but my own Nephew Mr George Clark, from whom I have Just received the Original Treaty of Peace with the Bey of Tunis in the Arabic and French languages, a Copy of the latter you will please find herewith, which being the first made out in your Presidentship I hope will plead my excuse for the liberty of addressing you with it. The Original I hold at the disposal of Colonel Humphreys whos Orders respecting it I expect from Madrid
May you finish your precedency in happiness and peace with all mankind is the Constant prayer of / Dear Sir / Your affectionate and / very humble Servant

Robt Montgomery


Title: From John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, 3 May 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Gerry, Elbridge

Dr Sir
Phila. May 3. 1797

I have this morning yours of the 25th and as yours are the best Letters I receive I must hasten to acknowledge it. But the Press upon me is so great that I must be very short.
Your Brief of the formidable Position of France is very true as it appears, at present: but Intelligence of the surest kind which is not laid before the public shews it to be all hollow at home and abroad: in Spain, Holland, Italy, and even in France itself.
The English affairs are well described in your Letter: but England can go thro Revolutions as well as America and France and sink their debt in Paper in the same Way. But will England be the weaker or less formidable to France for this? Ask Oliver Cromwell. I believe she would be more dreadful to France, after going through all the Horrors that france has experienced than she is now.
You Speak of an English Party. The French call all Americans who are not their Fools English men. Is there any English Party in the sense that there is a french Party? I.e. a Party for forcing Us or seducing Us off our neutral Ground into a War with France? if there is I know it not but should be glad to discover it. on the contrary there is a Party and a numerous and powerful one too, who are striving to force Us off our neutral Ground into a War with England.
You know as well as any Man in the United States that france under all Governments from the Year 1776, from the Days of Deane De Coudray and Marshall Mailbois, through Luzerne  & Marbois down to this moment have invariably preserved a Course of Intrigue to gain an undue Influence in these states.—to make Us dependent upon her, and to keep up a quarrell with England. I want a Weeks conversation and to write a Volume to you upon this, but your Recollections will supply enough.
I am a little surprized at your sorrow that Monroe was recalled.—His House was a battery playing incessantly under the Engineer T. Paine upon the Religion the Government the Policy of this Country.—I would as soon appoint Tom Paine to be Ambassador in France.—He will not tell you the Cause of his recall.—I would rather fill all foreign Places with Antigallicans sooner than with servile fawning base intriguing flatterers of french Jacobins, and worthless Speculators in French funds and Confiscations.
I am amazed at your Language about the Power of France.—Where is it possible for her to get ships to Send thirty thousand Men here? We are double the Numbers We were in 1775—We have four times the military skill and We have eight times the Munitions of War.—What would 30,000 Men do here? As to going to War with France lightly, I know of nobody who is willing for it—But she has already gone to War with Us lightly.—She is at War with Us: but We are not at War with her.—
The Pique of France was not the recall of Monroe—The truth is he was despized there, and coldly and contemptuously treated, untill the Caprice took them to sett off their Affront to Pinckney by a splendid Audience of Leave to Monroe—
If possible We shall certainly avoid War. But Would a War with England be more comfortable to Us than a War with France?—If a War with France cannot be avoided but by an unjust and unnecessary War with England, what would you say then?
I would engage in a War with either or both together rather than prostrate our honour or Surrender our Independence. this must be Secret.—You must prepare yourself for Something—you cannot lie idle, by your fireside in these hard times. You must come on to Congress—or assist Us some way or other—Your Information Experience, Intrepidity and Fidelity are not to be lost in such times.
your assured Friend

John Adams