Title: To George Washington from Major General Johann Kalb, 2 September 1778
From: Kalb, Johann
To: Washington, George

            Camp at White plains 2d septembr 1778.

          His Excellency The Commander in chief having laid the following points before the Board
            of General officers to be considered, and to deliver their opinion Thereon.

                Questions

              Answers.

              1º Whether it would be adviseable to march, this army, either part of
                it, or the whole, to the Eastward, if the Enemies Should reinforce Rhode Island or
                land on the Continent in either of the Eastern States?
              Since the Enemies may with So much more ease than we, carry their
                Troops to and fro, as long as they are masters of the Sound it appears to me, that
                to follow their movements would be only harrassing and fatigueing our Army without
                any annoyance to them.

              As the Enemies divided forces in their present Situation can answer no
                valuable Prospect, as His Excellencey observed, a short Time will clear up, whether
                they will continue in their present defensive Situation or collect their forces in
                one Place to act      offensively, or Evacuate intirely. Which it
                is my opinion they will as soon as they can conveniently do it, to Secure their
                West-Indies & perhaps England herself, rather than waste their Forces
                & Money on an imaginary Conquest.

              2º How to Suply the army, if moving to the Eastward, together with the
                Troops already there, & a large Body of militia the the Enemies attempts on
                the New-England States would render necessary, besides Victualling the French
                Fleet?
              The New-England States may be able to Suply the whole with Beef
                & Pork, but the more Southern States must of course provide all the Flour,
                the Transporting of which by land carriages will be attended with immense but
                unavoidable Expenses. for I would by no means advise to Venture anything by Sea,
                though four parts out of Five Should arrive (and this is not to be Expected) the
                Fifth part would be for the Enemies a Suply of what they are most in need of.

              Whether this army will move more Easterly or not, I think it is highly
                necessary that a considerable quantity of flour should be Stored up as soon as
                possible, in or near Connecticut State, (in a place out of the reach of the British
                Ships & land forces) for All the above mentioned Exigencies.

              3º In case this army was to march to the Eastward what could be done to
                Secure the Highlands?
              The North River ought to be fortified at the Points & Narrows,
                not only on the Water side but also on the Land sides, at least the most important
                posts, well Suplied with Provisions, artillerie, arms & ammunitions,
                & Sufficiently Garrisoned.

              4º whether an attack on the Enemies lines near kings Bridge or on
                New-york Island would be eligible or proper in the present Situation of affairs with
                any probability of Success?
              It being Evident that the City of New york can not be kept by the
                american Troops I would by no means advise Such a Attempt, which answering no
                Valuable purpose must nevertheless be attended with the loss of many Men &
                perhaps other bad Consequences even with the fairest Success.

            The Baron de Kalb


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Henry Knox, 2 September 1778
From: Knox, Henry
To: Washington, George

            Park Artillery [White Plains] 2d Septr 1778

          I shall give my opinion on the subjects propos’d by your Excellency to your General
            Officers with as much brevity as they will admit.
          The first is.
          Whether a movement of the greater part of this Army to the Eastward under the present
            information and circumstances will be eligible?
          I cannot see the propriety of such a measure at present, or that it could be warranted
            from the State of information which your Excellency gave the Council last evening.
            Suppose the enemies force at Rhode-Island including the reinforcement they may receive
            from New York to amount to 10,000 men what enterprize will this force be adequate to or
            what will be its object? Surely 10,000 men at this season of the Year will not attempt
            to penetrate the Country to Boston from Rhode Island. if they should, from what place
            will they probably procure the Carriages and assistance necessary to such a project? I
            confess I know not. It will take a great number of Carriages and Horses which cannot be
            procur’d from the Country contiguous to Rhode-Island. Boston will be of little value to
            them supposing they were possess’d of it. every body acquainted with it and its
            neighbourhood will know the force I have suppos’d unequal to its possession and the
            adjacent Country.
          probably it may be urg’d that the fleet of Count DEstaing now at Boston is an object of
            sufficient magnitude to warrant the supposition of a combin’d operation of the British
            fleet and Army that Way to effect its destruction, and thereby give England the
            Ascendency on the Ocean during the War with France.

          The probability of this supposition is founded on the existence of two circumstances,
            either of which being taken away or not existing must render the whole supposition
            groundless. Vizt The superiority of the British to the French fleet and the destruction
            or capture of the troops under Genl Sullivan.
          If the troops get Off from the Island without much injury, they will constitute a
            sufficient Stamina for to collect the Force of the Country. and the experience we have
            had of the Militia when combin’d with the continental troops will warrant the
            supposition That if they are not equal to tottaly stop the March of the British troops
            to Boston they will be able to retard them as to give time for the greatr part of this
            army to arrive to their assistance—It is my opinion they will be able to stop them
            entirely, considering the roughness of the Country, The difficulty of Obtaining
            intelligence and the want of carriages to transport provisions &c.
          But suppose they should overcome all difficulties and arrive at Boston. The British
            fleet allowing it to be superior to the french in a broad sea where the whole could act,
            would not be so in the Channel leading to Boston, where from its narrowness it is not
            possible for two ships to lead abreast, and where very few Hulks sunk which are ready
            prepar’d would make the approach above the Castle impossible. The reduction of Castle
            Island would be an ardous and extensive task too unequal to the Strength of 10,000 men
            who would be oblig’d besides Boston to occupy a number of Islands either of which being
            carried, the whole enterprize would be frustrated and in all probability the remainder
            made prisoners.
          For these and other reasons which might be urg’d I am of opinion The Enemy have not
            extended their views so far as the reduction of Boston and the French fleet there.
          But should General Sullivans troops be captur’d the Event would be so unfortunate to us
            and so advantageous to the Enemy as to ind[uce] them to undertake enterprizes of which
            they did not dream. A Calamity so dreadful even in supposition would demand the
            immediate march of the greater part of this Army to counteract the consequences which
            may be suppos’d to arrive from so unexpecd an incident.
          There is another expedition which indeed the Enemy may undertake. That is against the
            Town of Providence. Their reinforcement will probably arrive at the period that General
            Sullivan has effected his retreat from the Island. He then will be at two days march
            from Providence encumberd with his heavy Cannon, which came from and are almost the only
            defence of that Town and all his baggage and Stores. The Enemy in full possession of the
            Waters, flush’d with our retreat, a formidable force at Command, their Troops ready
            embark’d and only  three or four hours sail from Providence, a rich
            defenceless obnoxious Town with a considerable quantity of shipping and stores.
          Under these circumstances I think the Enemy will push and destroy that Town. it may be
            effected without any loss or even risque in twenty four hours.
          The Army under your Excellency can have no possible Agency in preventing this
            apprehended Evil.
          2d supposing the Army to move to the Eastward what number of troops would be necessary
            to secure the highlands and the Forts on Hudsons River?
          The force to be left for the security of these posts and Forts should I conceive be
            relatively strong to those the Enemy may leave in New York . I suppose the Question
            cannot be determined with precision untill this circumstance be tolerably well
            ascertained.
          3 Can any attack be made on the troops in NewYork under the present information and
            circumstances with a probability of success?
          The situation of the Island of New-York is such, surrounded by Waters, as to give the
            party possessing the Navigation a great Superiority. The Enemy having nine thousand men
            have force fully adequate to its defence against our Army.
          To batter their Redoubts on this side Kings Bridge would require Cannon and an
            Apparatus which are at a distance and which would take time to bring to this place.
          To Attempt the Redoubts by Supprize would require a most perfect knowledge of their
            number, construction, Strength & situation. Upon the acquisition of this
            knowledge and the matter of risque being fully weighed against the advantages of success
            and the ballance preponderating in favor of the latter I should be for such an attempt.
            But I beleive on such a trial the reasons would be more forcible against the attempt
            than for it.
          4th supposing the Army to move Eastward how shall it be supplied with provision
            &c?
          Forage for the Horses can be procur’d with ease and Meat fresh and Salted. The
            difficulty would be in providing bread. This can be done no otherways than by the
            Quarter Master General making a proper arrange[ment] of a great number of Waggons to
            transport it from the southern States. It may be had altho’ it will require much pains
            and trouble. I am with the greatest respect Your Excellenys most obedient Humble
            Servant

            H. Knox


Title: To George Washington from Major General Benjamin Lincoln, 2 September 1778
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Washington, George

            Dear General
            White Plains Sept. 2d 1778

          On consideration of the several questions proposed by your Excellency to the Council,
            the last evening, I beg leave to give it as my
            opinion—that the army ought to be immediately removed eastward—One
            division of it consisting of a number sufficient fully to reinforce the troops in the
            Highlands and in conjunction with them be equal to the defence of that post to be
            marched to Danbury and there halted untill the designs of the enemy are better known
            than at present—And for the sake of convenient forage & dispatch the remainder
            of the army I think should move in two routs towards Providence to be halted on their
            march or proceed as the operations of the enemy shall make it necessary—Because it
            appears to me that if the enemy mean to act offensively, they have it in idea either to
            effect the possession of the Highlands on the North River Or the town of Boston our
            general Magazine for many stores & asylum for our ships of war or to seek
            & disband the army of the United States and that many advantages will result
            from this movement some of them are that we shall have it in our power hereby more
            speedily and effectually to counteract the designs of the enemy in general—secure the
            North River and the Highlands—possibly be in time to succour General Sulivan, in Case he
            be invested or to reduce the garrison on the Island of Rhode Island in conjunction with
            him on the return of Count d’Estaing’s fleet although the enemy may have received a
            reinforcement—have it in our power early to give support to the town of Boston, should
            it be invaded—and should the enemy mean to look up the army of the united States, we
            shall lead them into a strong country, and be encircled by our friend, and supported by
            a good militia—Though there may be many objections to a movement of this kind, indeed
            there are some in my own mind, yet I see none which out weigh the reasons in favor
            thereof. I am induced also to this measure because I see no probability of success
            should we attempt New York or any of the enemies posts in this vicinity.
          Considering the large number of teams now employed in transporting stores from the
            eastern States to this camp and the many which may be procured, I have no doubt but a
            full supply of bread for the army may easily be obtained. I have the honor to be Dear
            General with the greatest regard & esteem your Excelleny Most obt servant

            B: Lincoln


Title: To George Washington from Major General Alexander McDougall, 2 September 1778
From: McDougall, Alexander
To: Washington, George

            Camp white Plains 2d Sepr 1778

          His Excellency the Commander in chief of the American Army informed the Council of
            General officers conven’d at His quarters last night,
            that General Sullivan with the Army under His Command had  retired on
            the 29th Ultimo to the North End of Rhode Island, and that the Enemy from the best
            information the General could obtain, had embarked about Four Thousand Troops on Board
            of ⟨a⟩ number of Transports in the Sound near Frogs neck, and had Sailed to the Eastward
            on Sunday last.
          That the strength of the American Army in this Camp exceeded 12,000 men; and that by
            advice received from Count De-Estang, then in the Harbour of Boston, He intended to
            return to Rhode Island, with Ten ships of the Line and three Frigates. Under this
            information the Commander in chief, desires the opinion of the Council on the Following
            points vizt 1st whether a movement of the Army to the Eastward under the present
            circumstance would be Eligible?
          2dly If So, what Force will be necessary to leave, for the Security of the
            Communication on Hudsons River?
          3dly If a movement to the Eastward should be determined on, what Probability is there
            of a supply of Provision for the Army?
          4thly Can any attack be made on the Troops in, and about Newyork with a probability of
            success? Previous to my opinion on these points, I beg leave to Enemerate Some Facts.
            Dire necessity obliged Lord North to declare in the British Senate, that it was
            impracticable to Conquor America. Under the influence
            of this Conviction, and our Alliance with France, the Grand British Army evacuates the
            state of Pensylvania; and apparently changes the seat of War to the East of Hudsons
            River; where the American Army can be better supplied with meat than in Pensylvania; and
            in no danger of wanting Bread—Neither that state nor those near it could give that
            speedy reinforcement, to our Army, by Militia in Cases of emergency, as the New England
            States Can; Nor is the nature of the country So favorable in Pensylvania, for the
            Co-opperation of the Militia with the regular Army, as that on the East side of Hudsons
            River. Add to these, the long and expencive carriage to the Army of many Articles of
            Stores of Various kinds. The Enemy could not be ignorant of the advantage He derived in
            Pena, from the embarassments we laboured under. To what then is the change of His
            Position, to one less favourable for opperation to be ascribed? Certainly the security
            of His Army, until the result of the negotiation with America should be known. From this
            the Minister entertained great and Flattering Hopes. The Commissioners dis-appointed in
            the object of their Commission, and the Idea of Conquest no longer existing, a new
            system must be formd for the opperation of the Enemy. But no Demonstrations of the Enemy
            has yet marked the object of the Campaign. This I conceive is owing to there not being
            Sufficient time since the Commissioners received the answer of Congress, for the
            Minister to Form and Transmit the Plan of opperation on His unexpected disappointment.
               In the mean time the Enemy is endeavoring to Secure the Islands,
            taken into His Posesssion. Hence a reinforcement is sent to New Port, about the time
            Philadelphia was evacuated, and a Second attempted soon after the French Admiral
            appeared in those Seas; but it returned to Newyork on the French squadron’s appearing
            before that place. The Co-opperation of this Fleet with
            American army on Rhode Island, was so necessary to the Success of the enterprize, at the
            Critical moment of its Second departure, that the Enemy could be at no loss to conclude,
            it was owing to Some pressing distress of the French Fleet, which occationed its going
            from that station. on this event it was natural, for the enemy, to send such a
            reinforcement to Rhode Island, as would secure releif to the Garrison. Perhaps if events
            favor him, He may design to Sack Providence. But if even this is in Contemplation, it is
            utterly out of the Power of this army, or any part of it to be in time, to prevent it.
            However no inference can be drawn from the Sending a reinforcement to Rhode Island, or
            its strength, that any Capital opperation is intended on the Main in New England. For
            this strong reinforcement was necessary, to give certain releif to that Garrison,
            because the whole strength of the Enemy at Rhode Island, including this reinforcement,
            when arrived would not much exceed the number of General Sullivans Army. In a Country
            such as New England, where the People are generally So well affected to America; and
            where Twenty Thousand Zealous Militia may be collected in a few days; and where there is
            no Capital object for the Enemy, there is little Reason to fear, that He will carry the
            war into that Country, after relinquishing the Posession of Philadelphia, and other
            advantages He Had in that Quarter. It is therefore my opinion that a movement of the
            Army to the Eastward, under present circumstance will not be Eligible. But the Enemy may
            attempt a Coup de main on our stores at Springfield, or the release of General Burgoynes
            Army. To be ready for Such an event, it is also my opinion, that the Number of Troops
            which our Army in this Camp, exceed that of the Enemy in Newyork and its dependencies,
            should be held in perfect readiness to march to the Eastward, on the shortest notice,
            should the Enemy make any demonstrations to opperate on the Main in New England. This
            force with the Continental Troops now with General Sullivan; and the great aid which can
            readily be collected from the Militia will stop the progress of the Enemy, till His
            object for the Campaign shall be more clearly discoverd. The Condition of the Enemy in
            carrying on the war in this Country, will always expose him to want of regular supplies
            of Bread & Flour; meat is plentifully sent him from Ireland. All accounts agree,
            that His Army is but Illy furnished with Bread. The American Embargo and the French
            Cruizes will contribute to make His subsistance of this Article, still  more precarious. This state will furnish Him with more Flour, than all the eastern
            states. And he has far less to Fear from the Militia of the former, than the Latter. If
            He intends to opperate in the Country, can it be supposed he will carry the War into the
            strongest states, where he has no chance of procuring any additional subsistence for His
            Troops, and Forego the advantage of the Co-opperation of His Navy, in this state. It
            cannot. For these Reasons I think we ought to have a sufficient Force here, to meet the
            Enemy in the field, otherwise; if this Army should move to the Eastward, the Enemy might
            take the advantage of its march, collect His Troops from Rhode Island, in four days, and
            get compleat Posession of Hudsons river and this state. Such a misfortune would expose
            our Army to great Sufferings for want of Bread. At the last Council of war held at
            wrights Mills, the Enemis whole Force at Newyork, Rhode Island and their Dependencies
            was estimated at 18,000 infantry, vizt, 14,000 at Newyork and 4000 at Rhode Island. All the Force Stationed at Newyork and its dependencies
            may be collected in Twelve Hours, to any part of the Island, that at Rhode Island,
            making Large allowances may be brought to Newyork in Eight days, from the time they
            receive orders for that purpose. The Enemy at present Have the Command of the internal
            Navigation, from Sandy Hook to Rhode-Island, and probably will have it for this
            Campaign, from the Islands near Frogs neck, to Sandy Hook inclusive; if not from
            Stanford to Sandy Hook; for I do not conceive it would be prudent for the French Admiral
            to risque His Sqadron in the narrow part of the Sound between Connecticut, and Long
            Island, as Admiral Byron is daily expected in these Seas. our Force in this Camp is
            Stated at 12,700, and that of the Enemy in Newyork and its dependencies, (vizt long,
            & Staten Islands) at 10,000. From the heights on this side of Kings Bridge, to
            the South Point of the Island of Newyork, the Enemy have four lines of Redoubts and
            other works, nearly across the Island, beside Some intermediate ones, which must be
            forced. It cannot be imagined the Enemy will abandon these works like Poltroons. Upon
            the most moderate Calculation of loss, these four lines would cost us, Seven Hundd men
            each, Killed and wounded, which by the time we got to the environs of the City, leave us
            a force not superior to the Enemy. His retreat being Secure by the ships and boats, if
            He declined disputing the City with us, He might with ease retire to Long Island, there
            wait the Junction or Co-opperation of His Army from Rhode Island, and by a landing of
            these Troops, or the whole Army, at Pells neck, Frogs
            Point, or Morrisenia, put us in the dangerous Position the American Army was in, the
            Campaign of 1776, from which it escaped by the slow movements of the Enemy. Thus after
            the loss of three Thousand men, we Should be obliged to relinquish the purchase of their
            blood; or become Prisoner by our Communication and Subsistence being Cut off.  For every Soldier of observation and experience must grant, that
            10,000 Troops, well Posted on the Heights of Kings-Bridge and Morrisena, will defeat
            15,000 of equal Quality, who shall attempt to pass from york Island to westchester, when
            the navigation is commanded by the Power of that Army, which shall take Post on those
            Heights, to prevent an impression from York Island; as the only route, the american Army
            could take on Such an Event, must be on two Bridges, not Twenty five feet wide, under
            full command of the Smallest artillery placed on the Eastern heights. If even the Enemy
            was to abandon York Island, and take Post on Long Island, as He Commands the waters of
            the neighbourhood, it would be utterly unadviseable for our Army to take Post on the
            Former, because we should be exposed to the joint opperation of the Enemies army above
            mentioned. For these reasons I am against any opperations being undertaken against the
            Enemy now in Newyork, or its dependancies with our present
            Force.

            Alexr McDougall M. General


Title: From George Washington to Colonel William Malcom, 2 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Malcom, William

            Sir
            [White Plains] 2d Septr 1778

          I recd your letter of the 31st Ult. with its inclosure.
          The troops are intitled by a general order of the 6th August to one gill of rum or
            whiskey per day when to be had—but it was not my intention that
            they should be allowed tickets for deficiencies.
          In case the gally is of service or can be an additional security to your command, Captn
            Lewis may engage seamen, but upon no other consideration. I am Sir &c.

            G— W—

            P.S. The militia are to have the same allowance in every respect as the
              soldiers in this army.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, 2 September 1778
From: Muhlenberg, Peter
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            [White Plains] Septr 2d 1778

          The uncertainty of the Enemys real Intention in transporting a part of their Army, from
            York to Rhode Island, renders it allmost impossible in our present Situation, to judge
            with propriety in what manner their Designs may, or ought to be counteracted. The Object
            of their Expedition must be, either to reinforce the Garrison or bring them of[f], or
            perhaps they intend to try their Fortune on the Main, in the Neighbourhood of Rhode
            Island with the best part of their Army—either of these Objects may be their Aim, but,
            untill it can be determind with some degree of Certainty, which of these they have in
            view, a Movement of this Army to the Eastward might prove very prejudicial; especially
            if their Object is either of the two first mentioned, for they would have time enough to
            take of[f] the Garrison, or Compell General Sullivan to Quit the Island, before We could
            possibly come to his Assistance—and as they have so great an Advantage over us, by
            transporting their troops by Water, They might possibly find an Opportunity to bring
            their whole Force to Act agt this State or any other, on the South side of the North
            River & cut of[f] our Communication with the Southern States, before We could be
            in a Condition to prevent it—Should they accomplish this; besides other ruinous
            Consequences, The Army would be distressd for want of Provisions, especially Bread—from
            this I conceive, nothing could Justify the March of the Army to the Eastward at this
            time, except the Army with General Sullivan should be so entangled That without the
            Assistance of this Army, they must fall into the Hands of the Enemy—Relative to an
            Expedition against York Island—as I did not understand Your Excellency meant to make a
            Serious Impression, I can see no desireable Object; except it is, to make a Diversion in
            favor of General Sullivan, but if He has left the Island, that Object Vanishes of
            Course—The Enemys Works on this Side Kingsbridge may probably be Wrested from them by a
            Coup de Main but even there the Enemy would have the Advantage. They would defend the
            Works so long as they thought it could be done to Advantage, & then retreat over
            the Bridge, which we could not prevent, so that We should only gain a post, with the
            loss of a Number of Men, We would not care to Occupy.
          Upon the whole I conceive, That the Post which the Army at present Occupies is best
            Calculated for a General plan of Defence—We cover the Communication between the Southern
            & Eastern States—Awe the Enemy in New York & its dependencies—and can be
            ready at the shortest Notice to March to the Assistance of any State East or South, as
            the Operations of the Enemy shall make it necessary; or as soon, as their  intentions shall be better known, which probably will be in a few
            days. I have the Honor to be Your Excellencys Most Obedt humble Servt

            P: Muhlenberg.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General John Nixon, 2 September 1778
From: Nixon, John
To: Washington, George

            May it Please your Excellency
            Camp White Plains 2d Sept. 1778 2d Sept. 1778

          The Movements of the Enemy to the Eastward Renders their Designs very Dubious. as Such:
            our Necessary Operations to Counter act their Designs must be very uncertain, unless we
            could acquire With Some Degree of Certainty their Determination. Should we find that
            Boston: or any part of Connecticut Should be their main Object: In that Case—a
            reinforcement from this army to be imediatly Detach’d to the Eastward: in My Opinion,
            would be highly requisite after Properly Securing the Several Passes On the North
            river.
          Considering the Situation of the Enemy, at & Near New york: Surrounded by
            waters; of which they have The entire Command; being Strongly fortified by Land; In the
            most advantageous manner, and the Difficulty or An attack with any Probable Success,
            Influences my mind to be utterly averse to Such an attempt at Present. the reasons
            against it, Given by the Honle Majr Genl McDougle the Last Evening—in my opinion are
            very Obvious.
          If upon further intelligence from the Eastward, it Should be Judged Expedient to Detach
            part of this army to Their assistance—the greatest Difficulty in Supplying them with
            Provisions there, Consists—in my opinion, in the transporting the article of flower from
            Hence, as all other Necessary articles may be procured in that Quarter.
          Upon the whole I Submit My Judgment to your Excellencys Superior Wisdom.

            Jno. Nixon B.G.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, 2 September 1778
From: Parsons, Samuel Holden
To: Washington, George

            [White Plains] Sepr 2d 1778

          Q. 1. What or whither any Operations can be undertaken with Probability of Success?

          2d Shall any Part of this Army move Eastward?
          3. Can any Attempts be made on the Posts at New York with a Probability of Success?
          An. The Number & Strength of the Enemy. The Situation of Genl Sullivan’s Army
            the Probable Intention of the Enemy in my Opinion ought to be known with greater
            Certainty before a Judgment can be given on the Subject. the Number of the Enemy’s
            Troops at or near New York or at Rhode-Island: the Strength of their posts, &
            Works ought to be known with more certainty than appears in the State your Excellency
            gave Us before I can form an Opinion whither we can Attack them with a Probability of
            Success—The Strength of the Enemy at Rhode Island and the Condition of Genl Sullivan’s
            Army before I can determine the Propriety of Moving Eastward with any part of our
            Force.
          My General Idea of carrying on the War, is not to seperate our Force in any
            considerable Degree, or to follow the Enemy’s Motions (leaving them in Possession of any
            Post of Importance) when our United Force will reduce it—if therefore our Force is now
            or may soon be able to reduce the Posts at & near New York I am of Opinion it
            ought to be attempted, without so dividing our Strength by detaching any great Part
            Eastward, as to prevent our Attempts on those Posts—I am the rather induc’d to this
            Opinion from a Beleif that the Depreciation of our Currancy, the State of our Finances,
            the Discontent & Anarchy of the Country, the general, just & increasing
            Complaints of the Army aford very little Hope of bringing so respectable a Force into
            the Field the next, as in the Present Year: and we have no Reason to beleive Great
            Britain will be in a worse State at any future Time—but if there’s no Prospect of acting
            offensively, I am of Opinion we ought to send about 6000 or 7000 Men Eastward to join
            the Army under General Sullivan to Oppose the Progress of the Enemy there the Remainder
            about 5000 or 6000 will be sufficient to maintain the Passes of the Highlands.
          The Commissary ought to send forward Flower & form a Magazine at or near
            Norwich as soon as possible, most of it may be sent from Norwalk by Water I think
            there’s very little Danger.

            Saml H. Parsons


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Enoch Poor, 2 September 1778
From: Poor, Enoch
To: Washington, George

            Camp Wh. Plains September 2dt 1778

          as your Excellency laid the State of your army before the Councel last Evening and
            Desire’d their opinyens on the following Question⟨s⟩ (Viz.)
          1 whether any operations Can be carried on with a probabillity of Success against the
            Enemy at Present.
          2 whether it will be advizeable to move to the Eastward if So how Can the Highlans on
            Hudson⟨’s⟩ river be Secur’d.
          4 Can any attact be made on the troops at new York with a probabillity of Success.
          5 if the army moves to the Eastward how will they be Supplied with Provissions.
          in answer to the first Question I think if any attact is made it must be upon the
            troops at or near New York, whare their works are very Strong and if Carried must be
            Obtained with Grait loss, and the ground when obtain’d or even if the Enemy Should leave
            the whole Island of New York, I Cant Concive that you’d Derive any advantage by taking
            posession while the Enemy Command the north & East river.
          as to the Second Question if you move to the Eastward I think it will be two late to
            afford any relief to general Sullivan as he must Either be off the Island before your
            troop Can reach their or fall into the Enemys hand—besides I am of apoinyon that General
            Clinton will Emediatly Colect all his troops to New York and Either operrate with his
            whole force against you upon this Ground or take them from the Continent.

          as to the article of Bread it is well known that the Eastern States Scearsly raise a
            Supplie for its Inhabitents, and Considering the large number of the Kings Troops
            Billited their, togather with the united States troops I think by this time their Stores
            must be nearly Exspended (I mean the article of bread).
          that upon waying the whole matter your Excellency laid before the Councel I think it
            most Advizable to remain in your present Situation untell you know sumthing more of the
            Intentions of the Enemy, which I think a few days will Determen—however I may differ in
            Sentiment do asure your Excellency that I am ready with the graitest Cheerfulness to
            Execute any plan of operration you in your wisdom Shall See fitt to order—I am Sir with
            grait respect your Excellencys most obeden⟨t⟩ & very Hue Servent

            Enoch Poor.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 2 September 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            [near White Plains] 2d Sept. 1778

          I am Sorry to inform You that I have not been able to get any Intelligence worth Your
            attention since The Rect of Your Instructions. Colo.
            Butler returnd last evning who tells me it is next to an impossability to get a proper
            person to go on long Island, I Have Still out Colo. Grayham & Capt. Levengsworth
            I hope they may bring somthing. Inclosd Your Excellency will Receive a Paper of the
            29th. I am Your Excellencys Obt Servt

            Chs Scott


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Smallwood, 2 September 1778
From: Smallwood, William
To: Washington, George

            Dear Sir
            Camp White Plains 2d September 1778

          I am clearly of opinion no movements or Opperations in this army ought to be
            undertaken, ’till we can with more Certainty ascertain the designs of the Enemy, which
            from their present Manœuvres, and the  aspect before us, is difficult
            to limit, with any degree of precission, so as to render our movements secure, or to
            hold up any great prospect of success; they must have had two objects in view in going
            to Rhode Island, either (as Circumstances might require) to intercept General Sullivan
            and his army during the absence of the Count de Estaing, or to relieve and bring off
            their Garrison, should Sullivan have debarked on the main, and there should be a
            probability of the Count’s speedy return to his Station, in either instance they have it
            evidently in their power to evade our pursuit, or relief, from the Superior Advantages
            they derive from their fleet, and their future opperations must be Governed, and must be
            more or less inlarged or confined in their prospect of the Arrival of a Superior Naval
            force, which in the event must determine our Conduct, the impediment and risk which our
            Army must encounter (from Particular Circumstances which your Excellency can be no
            stranger to) in going to Rhode Island or New York, in the present instance to me appear
            if not insuperable at least to promise but a slender prospect of any Material Success,
            because in either instance our Endeavours after much fatigue and risk, may be
            frustrated, and rendered abhortive, by a slight exertion of theirs, and in the first
            might open a prospect up Hudsons river which might be very flattering to them; and no
            less distructive to us, by cutting off our resources for a time from the Southward, and
            from their Superior Land and Naval force, and the Advantages derived from the latter,
            might with great facility by a sudden and rapid Movement, endanger any body of forces
            which we could spare to Garrison the Highlands, before we could come to their relief,
            admitting our Supplies to be ample in the Interim, which to me is doubtfull, and in the
            latter Instance, by making an attempt on New York, our Supplies might not only be
            intercepted, but the force now at Rhode Island getting in our rear, might render the
            situation of our forces Critical & Alarming; I am therefore for waiting the
            event a few days when Circumstances may enable us to act with more precission. I have
            the Honor to be with great regard Your Excellencys most Obdt Hble Servt

            W. Smallwood


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 2 September 1778
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

            Camp White plains September 2d 1778.

          On Considering the Several Questions Stated by your Excellency Yesterday to your
            General Officers I am of Opinion,

          That any Attempt on the troops on New York Island must be futile
            and extremly dangerous. Futile because, if we could drive the
            troops from that Island, and they should retire either to their Ships or to Long Island,
            our acquisition would be Useless; especially while the Enemy have a Naval force there
            and we none.
          Dangerous because, 1st Wee know not with any Certainty what troops are on the Island,
            and Consequently the Event of an Attack on it Uncertain; the probability is, that it
            would be attended with such a loss of Troops as this Army ought not to risque. 2dly
            because this Army would be thrown into Such a Scituation, that if the Enemy with their
            force returning from Rhode Island, Joined by those now at New York should land at frogs
            point or any other good landing in the Sound, and take post on this Side of Kings
            bridge; it would infalliably be Cut off from their provision, and in Short from all
            further Connection with the Continent.
          That an immediate Movement of this Army to the Eastward is unecessary and must be
            Attended with many disadvantages.
          Wee have as yet received no advices that the Enemy have made such preparations as will
            enable them immediately to operate on the Continent; it is most probable they have not.
            should we move, and they afterwards return with their whole force, they might force the
            passage of the high lands, and be Masters of all the Country West of Hudsons River
            before we could possibly return to Oppose them.
          We have no Magazines of bread or flower formed near that line of March. the Country is
            not a Bread Country, and Cannot Subsist an Army in that Essential Article, untill a
            Supply can be brought from other parts. This necessarily makes it proper to Collect
            Magazines of that Article, and to form them in that Country previous to the March of an
            Army into it.
          It therefore seems Judicious to keep the Army in this
              Neighbourhood ’till such Magazines can be formed, or ’till we find by our advices
            of the Motions of the Enemy, it becomes Necessary for some important purpose to Change
            our ground.
          When I say this Neighbourhood I do not mean the Identical spot we are now encamped
            upon: for I have my Suspicions that we are now too low down in the Cul
              de Sac. for Supposeing the Enemy should retire with their whole force from Rhode
            Island, should land at Norwalk and be Joined with their whole force from Nyork Meeting
            them either thro’ the Sound or by way of Long Island: would not this Army be so hem’d in
            that it would be difficult to gain the Enemy’s Right, or to Maintain itself in
            provisions, especially if the Enemy should push a few small ships up Hudsons River even
            so far as to Kings ferry. I would therefore  Suggest the propriety of
            looking out in time for some ground fitting to encamp on, further in our Rear.
          I take the liberty here of Mentioning that I think there is too much flower brought to
            Tarry Town, it is a precious Article, and I fear may be Cut off. The Army should by that
            Communication receive enough to Subsist upon, whatever can be Collected more than that
            should be Stored Elsewhere; if we have a large stock on hand here, it will in Case of a
            Movement be lost for want of Teams to Carry it off.
          The Secureing the passage of Hudsons River thro’ the Highlands is of the Utmost
            importance, and in Case of a Movement of this Army to the Eastward; a proper force
            should be left for that purpose in the Vicinity of the works at West point; what Number
            of Troops will be Competent I can form no Judgment of, as I do not know the Nature of
            nor the State of those works.

            Stirling,


Title: From George Washington to Jean-Baptiste Ternant, 2 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Ternant, Jean-Baptiste, chevalier de

            Sir,
            Head Quarters [White Plains] Septr 2d 1778

          I received your letter of the 29th of August, which hurry of business has prevented my
            answering before.
          You express an opinion that rank is essential to a proper and effectual discharge of
            the duties of your station from the respect and authority it commands, which you seem to
            think are unattainable without it—The abuses formerly existing from a lavish
            distribution of rank in the departments of the staff obliged me to exert my utmost
            influence to have all rank out of the line of the army abolished—Whatever may be my opinion of the merit of an individual, I
            cannot recommend a deviation from a general principle in his favour. I should incur by
            doing it the charge of inconsistency and partiality—It would be made a precedent for a
            similar claim, at least throughout the department to which he belongs, if it did not
            extend to others—These could not be complied with without overturning the whole system,
            we have been  labouring to establish, and could not be refused
            without exciting much clamour and dissatisfaction. I am aware, that a distinction may be
            made between the civil and military branches of the department; but this distinction has
            been hitherto unknown in our army, and the ideas now familiar could not easily be
            changed.
          I am sensible of the prejudice in favour of rank; but I cannot agree with you, that it
            is essential to authority—Your authority must be founded in the nature of your office,
            not in the degree of rank you may hold. In your transactions with the officers of the
            line, the rank you would expect or which could be given you would be of little efficacy;
            because as obedience on the principle of rank can only be demanded from inferiors in
            rank the extent of your authority from that source would be too limited to answer any
            material end—With respect to your subalterns in office, they are all of course officially under your direction and controul; and I will engage to
            support you in enforcing obedience, whenever it may be necessary, by all the means
            commonly used in armies.
          With respect to the office you first acted in—there are some arrangements now in
            contemplation with Congress which if adopted, will put it out of my power to employ you
            again in that line—Agreeable to that, the inspectors must be taken from the line of the
              army.
          You intimate an apprehension that your conduct may not have met my approbation—I take
            pleasure in assuring you of your mistake—Justice and inclination induce me to
            acknowlege, that in the different capacities in which you have officiated you have
            distinguished yourself as an officer of intelligence zeal and activity, and have
            rendered valuable services. I shall be happy, it may be agreeable to you to continue in
            the line you are in, from a full conviction of your usefulness. I am with esteem Sir
            Your most Obedt servant.
          Df, in Alexander Hamilton’s writing, DLC:GW; Varick transcript, DLC:GW.

   For an expression of GW’s views, see GW to a Continental Congress Camp Committee, 29
              Jan. 1778. Congress had resolved on 29 May “That no persons, hereafter appointed upon
              the civil staff of the army, shall hold or be entitled to any rank in the army by
              virtue of such staff appointment” (
                JCC
              Worthington Chauncey Ford et al., eds. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. 34 vols. Washington, D.C., 1904–37., 11:555).

   Congress had asked GW to give his opinion of a pending report about army inspectors;
              see Henry Laurens to GW, 20 Aug., and note 2,
              and GW to Laurens, 12 Sept., and note 1.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 2 September 1778
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            Camp at White Plains 2nd Sepr 1778.

          In Obedience to your Excellencies Desire I have Maturely Considered the Questions which
            you were pleased to put to the Board of General Officers yesterday, the purport of which
            was

            1st Whether it will be Advisable to make a Movement with the Whole or any part of
              this Army to the Eastward.
            2nd If such a move should be thought proper how is this Army to be
              Supplied—& what force will be necessary for the Defence of the passes at the
              High Land & north River.
            3rd Whether an Attempt can be made with any probability of Success on New York In
              the Absence of so great a part of the Enemies forces.

          As to the first, I can’t Conceive what Advantage we should Derive from any Movement to
            the Eastward at this time—on the Contrary would we not by a
            Movement that way give an Opening to the Enemy to cut off all our Supplies of Bread
            & flower by possessing themselves of the passes of the North River, and leave us
            the more Distressed for  want of Provision by the Additional
            Consumption of the French Fleet & Army—and when they found us far Advanced
            Eastward they might with great facility Return up the Sound to New York & thus
            Harrass us at pleasure.
          In my Opinion the Enemy have but two moves to make i.e. the Withdrawing their troops
            from Rhode Island & Seeking this Army in force—Otherwise to leave the Continent;
            for by three years Experience they find that the possession of a State, tends little to
            the Subjugation of America, whilst we have an Army in the field.
          But should Boston & De Estang’s fleet be their Object
            (as some Gentlemen Suppose) then our possition is the most favourable that we could wish
            for making a Capital push at New York—without the Danger of loosing the passes of the
            north River, or of being Enclosed in our Rear.
          I am therefore clearly of Opinion that we should Remain in this Camp & take the
            first Opening to Strike the Enemy in the Vicinity of Kings Bridge, the mode &
            manner of this Attempt your Excellency will best Determine.
          In the Interim every possible Exertion should be used to Collect a large Quantity of
            flower & Bread on this side the north River—as well as Materials for Barracks in
            case the Enemy Continue on the Continent. I am with every Sentiment of Esteem your
            Excellencies most Obt & very Hume Sevt

            Anty Wayne B.G.


Title: General Orders, 3 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

            Head-Quarters W. Plains Thursday Septr 3rd 1778.
            Parole Languedoc—C. Signs Leech. Ludlow.

          The troop to beat at 7 ôClock and the Guards to be on the Grand Parade at 8 in the
            morning ’till further orders—All the Drums and Fifes of the Right Wing, Second Line and
            Left Wing to attend the Parade in Rotation; Those of the Right Wing tomorrow.
          The Inspector of Music will daily attend the Parade.


Title: To George Washington from Ezekiel Cheever, 3 September 1778
From: Cheever, Ezekiel
To: Washington, George

            Hond Sir
            Springfield [Mass.] Sepbr 3. 1778

          I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellencys Letter the 31st ulto
            and observe the Contents & will take all necessary precautions respecting the
            Same. Will write immediately to his Excelly Govr Trumbull to give me the earliest Notice
            in Case the Enemy Should make a Landing upon the Coast of Connecticut, and If He
            apprehends it adviseable or necessary to remove the public Stores from this Place; to
            grant me as many Teams as possible for the purpose.
          Yesterday I recd an order from Genl Heath to Send to Boston with the utmost dispatch,
            100,000 on Cart’gs. 4 doz. portfires Four Tons Cannon Powder all wch is gone forward,
            His honrs letter is Dated the 31st ulto. He Sayes a Fleet of Ships are now in our Bay,
            But who or what  they are is yet unknown—perhaps they are the Ships
            your Excellency mentions ever Solictous Sir for your Health & Prosperity—I have
            the Honor to be your Excellencys Obedt Hume Servt

            Ezekl Cheever D.C.G. M. Stores


Title: From George Washington to Vice Admiral d’Estaing, 3 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Estaing, Charles-Hector Théodat, comte d’

            Sir,
            Head Quarters White Plains Septr 3d 1778

          I had the honor of writing to you yesterday communicating the intelligence I had
            received of the arrival of four large ships of war at the Hook—I
            have just received a New York paper of the 1st instant announcing the arrival of Admiral
            Parker with six ships of the line. I send it you inclosed. With every sentiment of respect & esteem, I have the
            honor to be Sir Your most Obedt servant

            Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 3 September 1778
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

            My dear General
            Camp Near Bristol [R.I.] the 3d September 1778

          I Can’t let Mons. de la Neuville go to headquarters without Recalling to Your
            Excellency’s memory an inhabitant of the Eastern Rhode island schore, who long much to
            be again united with you, and Conceive now great hopes from Sir henry Clinton’s motion
            to Newport, that you will Come to oppose him in person—I think if we mean to oppose the
               ennemy in this quarter that more troops are absolutely necessary,
            for we are not able to do any thing in our Scattered Situation—I Confess I am myself
            very uneasy in this quarter, and fear that those people will put in theyr heads to take
            some of our batteries &ca which if properly attak’d will be difficult to
            prevent, and I am upon a little tongue of land where in case of an alarm a long stay
            might be very dangerous—but we’ll do for the best.
          I am told that the ennemy is going to Evacuate Newyork—my policy leads Me to believe
            that some troops will be sent to hallifax, to the west indias, and Canada—that Canada I
            aprehend will be your occupation of next winter and spring—this idea, my dear general,
            alters a plan I had to Make a voyage home, in some Months, for as long as you fight I
            want to fight along with you, and I much desire to see your excellency in quebec Next
            Summer.
          Mons. de la Neuville is going to head quarters—that gentleman I have a Great Regard for
            on account of his politeness, Candor, and military merit—I am very happy that he might
            deserve your excellency’s approbation—I will take his brother in my family—Mons.
            touzard’s arm is in pretty good Situation. With the most tender affection and highest
            Respect I have the honor to be dear general Your excellency’s the most obedient humble
            Servant

            the Marquis de lafayette


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 3 September 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            [Westchester County, N.Y.] 3d of Sept. 1778

          Capt. Levensworth returnd last Night but Was not able to procure any Intelligence
            Material, he Is again gon to meet another person whom he expects from Whitestone, Colo.
            Grayham also expects to meet a person from New York this Day. So soon as it can possably
            be had I will Transmit it to Your Excellency. Inclosd You’l Receive a York paper of
            Yesterdays date. I am Your Excellency’s Obt Servant

            Chs Scott


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan, 3 September 1778
From: Sullivan, John
To: Washington, George

            My Dear General,
            Providence Septemer 3d 1778

          I had Last night the honor of Receiving your Excellenceys Favor of the first Instant
            & impatiently wait your Excellenceys Sentiments on The Steps I have taken Since
            the 29th ult. an Account of which has been Transmitted by Major Morris.
          The Justice of the observations in your Excellenceys Letter Respecting the Departure of
            the French Fleet are So obvious That if a Consciousness of my Duty to yield implicit
            obedience to your Excellenceys Commands did not Ever make that obedience a pleasure The
            Reasoning alone must have pointed out the part I have to Act—I have the pleasure to
            Inform your Excellencey That Though the first Struggles of passion on So important a
            Disappointment were Scarcly to be Restrained: Yet in a few Days by Taking advantage of
            the Subsiding passion I found means to Restore the former harmony between the American
            & French officers of the Army. The Count DEstaing & myself are in the
            Same friendship as heretofore. The Reason of the Protest has been Explained to him & he is now perfectly Satisfied he has offered to
            come on with his Land Forces & do every thing which I may Request of him
            & his Troops but This Step has become unnecessary—The Reason of Drawing the
            Protest was this: The Count himself wished to Remain with us but was by his Captains
            overruled in Council as Deviating from the voice of his Council would be attended with
            ill Consequences to him in Case of misfortune it was Supposed that The protest might
            Justify his Deviating from the voice of the Council & Acting a part agreable to
            his own Sentiments & those of the Coopperating Army. prudence Dictated it as our
            Duty to keep it Secret from all but him your Excey & the Congress & no
            publication of it was Ever thought of on our part & your Excy may Rely on my
            Exertions to prevent it—Every thing in my power Shall be Done for Repairing the Injury
            Sustained by the French Fleet. The Fleet off Boston Harbor of which I gave your Excy an
            Account yesterday are Eight Ships of the Line ten Frigates one Sloop & a
            Schooner There can be no Doubt of its being Lord Howes Fleet watching the motions of the
            French Fleet to facilitate the Relief of Rhode Island & perhaps to Cover the
            Retreat of the British Army from Rhode Island & New York to other places where
            they are more needed. Those Ships were out of Sight yesterday morning Eight of Clock but
            I hear they afterward hove in Sight again. The Report here is That Six thousand Troops
            have arrived at Newport. I know they are numerous but cannot as yet ascertain the
              number your Excellencey will please to Transmit Copy
            of This Letter to Congress & believe me  to be with Every
            Sentiment of gratitude Respect & Esteem your Excellenceys most obedt &
            very Humble Servant

            Jno. Sullivan


Title: General Orders, 4 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

            Head-Quarters White Plains Friday Septr 4th 1778.
            ParoleC. Signs

          At a General Court Martial of the Line of which Coll Hazen was President—Captain
            Norwood of the 4th Maryland Regiment appeared before the Court charg’d
            with—1st—Publickly declaring and implying that he did not regard the Censure of the
            Commander in Chief, because the Facts set forth on his trial, to Him, were
            mis-stated—2ndly—With Conduct unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman in suggesting
            publickly that the Facts were mis-represented; which has an implied tendency to reflect
            on His Excellency, on the Court Martial, on General Smallwood or on the whole.
          3rdly—With declaring that General Smallwood has been guilty of partiality in his
            Case—That the General was no Gentleman and that he would make it his business to declare
            publickly [“]that General Smallwood was a partial Man and no Gentleman”—plead not guilty
            of the first and second charges—Captain Norwood requested the Court not to proceed on an
            examination of the third charge exhibited against him unless he was permitted to lay
            before them those facts which had occasioned the Expressions he had used relative to the
            Character of General Smallwood in this Case—he said he could justify them.
          As such an Enquiry would lead to the trial of General Smallwood, which the Court do not
            think themselves authorized to enter on—and as passing sentence on Captain Norwood for
            Expressions he has made use of without hearing his reasons for those Expressions might
            do injustice to that Gentleman; The Court are unanimously of Opinion that they cannot
            with Propriety, enter into an Enquiry of said charge exhibited against Captain
            Norwood.
          At the particular request of General Smallwood the Court deferred hearing the Witnesses
            on the 1st & 2nd charges exhibited against Captain Norwood ’till they should be
            empowered to try him for the 3rd likewise—The Court adjour[n]s ’till tomorrow 9
            oClock.

            Moses Hazen Colonel President. Head Quarters August 22nd 1778.

            Sirs—I have read and considered the proceedings of the Court Martial in the Case of
              Captain Norwood.
            If our military constitution does not authorise the Court to investigate the 3rd
              charge exhibited against him, and to determine upon the same, and on the defence he
              offers, no Power can be derived from Me for the purpose—However I am of opinion that
              they have a Jurisdiction in the Case, and that tho’ a trial before such a Court, may
              in it’s consequences and operation bring in question the Character of a General
              Officer, yet that this Circumstance will not supercede their power of Enquiry as to
              the matters in charge, as they are not to pass sentence against the General
              Officer.
            This I deliver as mere matter of opinion and without the least design or wish to
              influence the Court to proceed in the Case of Captain Norwood, if their sentiments are
              still the same respecting the Incompetency of their Power. I am Sir your most obedient
              Servant

            Geo. Washington Coll Moses Hazen President of the Court Martial now
              sitting— Saturday August 22nd 1778

            The Court of which Coll Hazen is President met after intermediate
              Adjournments.
            A letter from His Excellency General Washington to the President respecting a former
              determination of the Court Martial, that they could not with Propriety enter into an
              investigation of the third Article in charge exhibited by General Smallwood against
              Captain Norwood, was laid before the Court.
            They reconsidered their former decision & still remained of Opinion that it
              was founded on Military Principles & that they could not depart from it.
            Captain Norwood observed to the Court that he had been arraigned before them, that he
              had plead to that part of his charge which they tho’t themselves competent to proceed
              on and that he now insisted on being tried on those Articles of the Charge exhibited
              against him, to which he had already plead.
            The Court were of opinion that as Captain Norwood had plead to his charge, he had a
              right to insist on his trial and determined that they would proceed to an
              Investigation of the two first Articles of the Charge exhibited against Captn
              Norwood—The Court adjourns ’till Monday morning next 9 ôClock.
            The Court having met on Monday the 24th adjourn’d ’till the day following and then
              proceeded to an investigation of the two first Charges exhibited against Captain
              Norwood as before recited.
            General Smallwood made an objection to the Court’s proceeding on the two first
              Articles of the charge exhibited against Captain Norwood, unless they would include
              the whole of the charge, in which Case he was willing to give Captain Norwood the
              fullest Power of justifying those Expressions with which he was charged. The Court
              after considering the objection made by General Smallwood to their proceeding farther
              in the Case of Captain Norwood, were of opinion that it was inadmissible, since
              stoping their proceedings in consequence of this objection, would be supposing they
              had no right to continue them and consequently that any officer who has arrested
              another possesses the power of  preventing the Supreme Military
              Court in the American Army from examining into the Merits of the Charge—The Court then
              proceeded to hear the Witnesses on the two first Charges and came to the following
              determination.
            The Court having considered the Charges and the Evidence are of Opinion that Captain
              Norwood did say that he did not regard, or did not mind the Censure of the Commander
              in Chief, because the Facts stated to Him on his (Captain Norwood’s) trial were
              mis-represented, and are farther of opinion that this Expression had a tendency (tho’
              Captain Norwood could not mean it) to reflect on His Excellency as well as on General
              Smallwood—The Court find Captain Norwood guilty of breaches of the 5th Article of 18th
              Section and of the 2nd Article of 2nd Section of the Articles of War & do
              sentence him to be reprimanded in general Orders.
            The Court acquit Captain Norwood of unofficer- and ungentleman-like behaviour and of
              reflecting on the Court-Martial.
            Moses Hazen President.
            The Commander in Chief finds himself under the disagreeable necessity of disapproving
              the proceedings of the Court because they have not tried all the charges exhibited
              before them—On each Fact agreeable to Precedent and common usage they ought to have
              given either a sentence of Acquittal or Condemnation; To this end their power
              & Jurisdiction seem to have been fully competent. The third Charge from it’s
              very nature implied a right of Justification in the prisoner and could not be
              discriminated in Point of reason from either of the preceding ones or any other—The
              matter in question between the Parties in this instance was the Character and conduct
              of one of them—the Prisoner by the strongest Implication acknowledges he had made the
              charge as stated and if permitted would justify it.
            General Smallwood on the other hand consented and declared himself willing that he
              should have the fullest Power of doing it—This circumstance supposing there had been
              room for doubt before respecting the Court’s authority to try the matter was
              sufficient to remove every objection—Captain Norwood still remains in Arrest and is to
              be tried on the several charges exhibited against him.
            At the same Court Joseph Askins a soldier of the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment was tried
              for desertion twice—2ndly for making his escape from a Guard and endeavoring to desert
              to the Enemy found guilty of the charges exhibited against him & sentenced to
              receive one hundred lashes.
            Also Peter Wood of the 1st New-York Regiment was tried for Robbery and
              Desertion—acquitted of the charge of Robbery but found guilty of desertion &
              sentenced to receive one hundred lashes. The
              Commander in Chief approves the sentences and orders them to be put in Execution
              tomorrow morning at the head of the Regiments to which said Askins and Wood
              belong.


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, 4 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Cadwalader, Lambert

            Dear Sir
            H. Qers [White Plains] 4 Sepr 1778

          I am pressed by a number of causes to beg your determination on a point which is likely
            to give rise to much disquietude in the Pennsylvania line. The officers consider the
            retention of your commission as an obstacle to their rise, while it is urged that you
            are not viewed by the enemy as a prisoner of war.
          It appears to me that the workings of a delicate sentiment should
            never be discouraged, tho we do not find men much inclined to favor its operation
            against their own rank. But this is not the principal consideration your liberty is
            supposed to be the price of General Prescots obligation to your Father which it is
            thought implied no inactivity whatsoever on your part.
            The circumstances of the transaction which came to my knowledge I must confess led me to
            think in the same manner—And The inclosed letter will also explain the judgement of the
            comissioners of arrangement on this subject. I wish to
            have your decision as soon as possible; and should it be to return to the army I shall
            consider it a fortunate circumstance to the service. I
            am Sir with much esteem your most Obt &.

            G. W—n


Title: To George Washington from Major Alexander Clough, 4 September 1778
From: Clough, Alexander
To: Washington, George

            Sr
            [Hackensack, N.J.] Sepr 4th [1778] 12 OClock—

          I am inform’d by a person from New York, that the 27th Regt have sent thayr Baggage on
            board the Britania transport, three companys of Artillery are orderd on board the Howe,
            the Officers Baggage is sent on board—Another informs me thayr waggons are repair’d, and
            the horses are shoeing in every part of the town—Major tenpeny is order’d to raise a
            Corps of horse. I am Your Excellency[s] Most Obt Hbl. Servt

            A. Clough


Title: From George Washington to Colonel James Hogun, 4 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Hogun, James

            Sir
            Head Quarters White plains 4 Sepr 1778

          Since the orders sent to you last Evening, I have seen
            the surgeon General, who wishes to have the innoculation of your Regiment put off at
            present, especially as there is not the least danger of infection. You will therefore
            march to Fort Arnold at West point and there put yourself under the command of Colo.
            Malcom and assist in carrying on the Works at that post, untill Arms and Accoutrements
            can be provided. I am Sir Your most ob.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Jabez Huntington, 4 September 1778
From: Huntington, Jabez
To: Washington, George

            Honrd Sir
            New London [Conn.] 4th Sepr 1778, 1 OClock P.M.

          Yesterday 2 O’Clock P.M. this Quarter was Alarmed by the Appearence of a British Fleet
            from the Eastward which Appeared to be making an Attempt to Gaine this Harbour. the Wind
            then at North. at 6 O’Clock the whole Fleet Came to Anchor, About a Mild from the
            Enterence of the Harbour.
          I Arived here Early this Morning & have Reconoiter’d them as near as possible
            find they Consist of About Fifty Sail Six of which Appear to be Frigats the other
            Transports Row Gallies &c. they Appear to be full of Troops. I have Ordered the
            3d & 5th Brigade of Militia into this Place. they are now Collecting fast.
          the Fleet still Continue the Position in which they Anchor’d Last Evning
            Notwithstanding the wind is now Favourable for them to proceed Either East or West.
          it Remains Very Uncertain what there Design may be but with the Present Appearences I
            thought Proper to Acquaint your Excellency. Interem Remaine your Excellency’s Most Obedt
            & Most Humb. Servant

            Jz Huntington


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 4 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

            Sir
            Head Qrs White plains Sept. 4 1778

          I had the pleasure to hear this morning by a Letter from General Sullivan of the 31st
            Ulto, that he had effected a retreat to the main, the preceding night, without any loss,
            either of men or Stores. As he has written to Congress fully upon the subject, and I
            feel their anxiety to hear it, I shall not detain Major Morris longer than to observe,
            that I think the retreat a most fortunate—lucky and well timed event.
          Major Morris informs me he has heard that Lord Howe was off Boston with his fleet—and
            it appears by a New York paper of the 2d, that Rear Admiral Parker arrived at Sandy Hook
            on this day week, with Six Ships of the line of Seventy four guns each, which is
            corroborated by other accounts. I transmitted the intelligence to His Excellency, Count
            D’Estaing yesterday, and the day before—as it acquired more and more the appearance of
              certainty as I have regularly done every
            occur[renc]e, interesting to his Fleet, & our Operations. I have the Honor to be
            with the greatest respect & esteem sir Yr Most Obedt Servt

            Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 4 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

            Dear Sir,
            White plains—Sep. 4th 1778

          I am your debtor for two Letters bearing date the 28th & 29th Ulto—The contents shall be the subject of a future address.
          Feeling myself interested in every occurrance that tends to the honor of your worthy
            Son; and sensible of the pleasure it must give you to hear his Just plaudit, I take the
            liberty of transcribing a paragraph of General Greens Letter to me (giving some Acct of
            the conduct of particular Officers in the action on Rhode Island):
          “Our Troops behaved with great spirit, and the Brigade of Militia under the Command of
            Genl Lovel advanced with great resolution, and in good order; and stood the fire of the
            Enemy with great firmness—Lt Colo. Livingston, Colo. Jackson, & Colo. H.B.
            Livingston did themselves great honor in the transactions of the day. But it is not in
            my power to do justice to Colo. Laurens, who acted both the Genl & Partizan—His
            command of regular Troops was small, but he did every thing possible to be done, by
            their numbers.”
          Major Morris affords me too good an oppertunity of returning your paper parcel of gold,
            sent me by Messenger Jones, to pass by—& therefore I embrace it—A more
            particular acknowledgement of, and thanks for this favor, shall, as I have promised
            before, be conveyed in my next—At present I shall only assure you—& with the
            most perfect truth I can do it, that with every sentiment of regard and Affection, I
            have the Honor to be Dr Sir, Yr Most Obedt & Obligd Servt

            Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 4–5 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

            Sir
            Head Qrs White plains Septr 4th[–5] 1778

          I have been duly honored with your favors of the 28th, and that of the 30th Ulto with
            the several Inclosures, to which they refer.

          Congress may rely, that I will use every possible means in my power to conciliate any
            differences that may have arisen, in consequence of the Count D’Estaings going to
            Boston—and to prevent a publication of the protest upon the occasion. Several days
            before the receipt of the Resolution, I had written to the Eastward; urging the
            necessity of harmony—and the expediency of affording the Admiral every assistance to
            refit his Ships. This I repeated after the Resolution came to hand—and I have also taken opportunities to request all the General
            Officers here, to place the matter in the most favorable point of view, whenever they
            hear it mentioned.
          The Five Hundred Guineas, which Congress were pleased to order, came safe to hand—and shall be appropriated to the purposes
            they intended, and as the exigency of the service may require. For want of supplies of
            this sort, we have been very deficient in intelligence, in many important and
            interesting points. In some cases, no consideration in paper money has been found
            sufficient to effect, even, an engagement to procure it; and where it has been
            otherwise, the terms of service, on account of the depreciation, have been high—if not
            exorbitant.
          The designs of the Enemy, as to their future movements, remain yet entirely unfolded;
            but the expectation of their leaving the Continent is daily decreasing. The hurricane
            season seems opposed to their going to the West Indies—and the passage to Europe in a
            little time will become more and more dangerous. Besides these, there is another
            circumstance of some weight, if true, to induce a belief that they mean to stay. It
            appears by the papers, that part of the Regiments lately raised in Britain, are ordered
            to Hallifax. If the troops here were intended to be
            recalled, it would seem, that some of them would be sent to reinforce that Garrison,
            sooner than troops from England or Scotland; and hence I think it may be presumed, that
            another Campaign will take place in America, especially if Administration are
            disappointed in their expectations from the commission. Where the theatre of War may be,
            must be a matter of conjecture, but as it is an acknowledged fact, that an Army acting
            in the Eastern States must derive flour for it’s support, from those more Western, I
            submit to Congress the expediency, and in my opinion the necessity, of establishing
            without loss of time, Magazines of this Article at convenient places, removed from the
            Sound, in Connecticut & Massachussets. I am the more induced to wish an early
            consideration of this point, as by a sudden move of the Army, should events make it
            necessary, the departments of Commissary & Quarter Master would be greatly
            distressed. Nor would such Magazines, I should immagine, be attended with any
            considerable loss, though the Army should not operate in that Quarter, as the flour
            would answer  occasionally for our Shipping and the surplus might, in
            all probability, be otherwise readily disposed of.
          I take the liberty of transmitting to Congress, a Memorial I received from the Reverend
            Mr Tetard. From the certificates annexed to it, he appears to be a Man of great
            merit—and from every account he has suffered in the extreme, in the present contest. His
            attachment—services and misfortunes seem to give him a claim to a generous notice; but
            according to the now establishment of the Army, it is not in my power to make any
            provision for him. I therefore recommend his case to the attention and consideration of
              Congress.
          6 OClock P.M. I this minute received a Letter from General Sullivan, of which the
            Inclosure, No. 2, is a Copy. I shall be exceedingly
            happy, if a perfect reconciliation has taken place between him and the Count and all the
            Officers. His Letter will shew some of the reasons that led to the protest and that it
            was the hope of our Officers, that it would have operated as a justification to the
            Admiral, to return against the sentiments of his Council, especially as it coincided, as
            it is said, with his own inclination. I had these reasons from another hand, when the
            protest first came.
          Septr 5. I was duly honored yesterday evening, with your favor of the 31st Ulto—Though
            it is not expressed in the Resolution of that date, that any other bounty is to be given
            to the Men who engage for three years or during the War, than Twenty Dollars, I shall
            take it for granted they are to receive the usual allowances of Cloathing &
            Land. There are several Continental Troops, whose time of service will expire at the end
            of the fall or during the Winter. I shall consider these within the meaning and
            operation of the Resolve, though they are not mentioned—and shall direct every necessary
            measure to be taken to reinlist them. From the exorbitant State—Town and Substitute
            bounties, I am very doubtful whether Twenty Dollars will be found sufficient to engage
            so great a proportion either of the Draughts or Continentals, as was at first
            apprehended. Our failure in the enterprize against Rhode Island will have it’s weight
            and every day, from the approach of the fall and Winter, will add new difficulties. As
            it is a work of the most essential importance, I will order it to be begun, the instant
            the Money arrives; and lest on experiment, the sum should prove too small, I would
            submit it to Congress, whether it will not be expedient to pass another Resolve,
            authorising a further bounty of Ten Dollars, to be used as circumstances may make it
            necessary. This can remain a secret, and will not be carried into execution, but in case
            of evident necessity. I feel very much interested upon the occasion, and have submitted
            this mode, that there may not be the least possible delay in attempting to engage the
            men, under a second expedient, if the first should not succeed.
             The Articles of Cloathing and blankets should also employ the utmost
            attention to provide them. We are now in great want, particularly of the latter, there
            not being less than  actually wanted at this moment. I have the honor to be with the greatest respect &
            esteem sir Yr Most Obedt servt

            Go: Washington

            P.S. The return of Blankets has not come in and therefore I cannot ascertain
              the deficiency by this conveyance.


Title: To George Washington from Pierre-Charles L’Enfant, 4 September 1778
From: L’Enfant, Pierre-Charles
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            White Plains, September the 4th 1778

          It is with the greatest surprize that I have read in the New York papers, the pretended
            Translation of a Letter I had written to a Friend of mine in Europe.
          Of all the little, mean Tricks the English makes use of to sow dissentions among their
            Adversaries, This is indeed the most odious and abominable. They have most Villainously
            abused of the Liberty of a Translator, and have artfully altered the Words and Phrases
            of my Letter to a most horrid performance.
          Your Excellency may remain assured, that the real Letter I wrote to my Friend was
            nothing but a faithful Exposition of the real State of the Army. I wondered with him
            that with so few means, and so little Experience, the Americans had been able to
            withstand the flower of the British Troops. But all the injurious reflections, and Even
            hazarded Expressions that are artfully thrown in the Translation, they are certainly the
            Work of a newspaper writer, hired undoubtedly by Government for Such inequitous
            purposes.
          I dare hope however, Sir, that my Conduct since I have the honor to serve in the Army
            under your Command, and my Zeal in sharing All their labours and dangers, has convinced
            fully, that I have never been able to Entertain sentiments such as Mr Rivington gives
              me. I Shall haste to insert in the publick papers an
            Explicit disavowal of my Letter, such as it is translated in the New York Gazette. And as Your Excellency’s Esteem is infinitely precious to
            me, I beg you will accept of my Justification, & render Justice to my
            Sentiments. I have the honor to be With great respect Sir Your Excellency’s Most
            obedient and most humble servant

            P. L’Enfant


Title: To George Washington from Cornet James Paton, 4 September 1778
From: Paton, James
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            Marenock [N.Y.] Septr 4th 1778

          I have to inform your Excellency, that this forenoon, I Observed three Sloops &
            2 Schooners from Cow Bay the Schooners and Sloop
            Appeared to be Armed, Came to off City Island in Company with Several Vessels on that
            Station before the Other Sloops Stood for N. York, About the middle of the Afternoon
            Came one Brigg from the West, and Came too off City Island, About Sun ⟨Or⟩ Half an Hour
            high Observed 1 frigate of 20 Guns and One Arm’d Brigg from the Westward Stood East,
            when Past City Island fired a Gun, when the Brigg two Schooners, and Sloop Made Sail and
            Stood After them some Small Boats Appeared from the West but the Evening prevented me
            making any Discovery. I have the honor to be your Excellencys humble servt

            Jas Paton


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan, 4 September 1778
From: Sullivan, John
To: Washington, George

            Dear General
            Head Qrs Providence Septr 4th 78

          I am sorry to inform your Excellency of a Disscontent which at present prevails among
            the Officers of Webbs and Sherburnes Regiments—They have lately been so clamorous as to
            verge towards quitting the Service, & I am really apprehensive, that we shall
            lose many valuable Officers by Resignations if a speedy Redress is not had for  their Grievances. Their uneassiness seems to have arisen from
            comparing their Situation with that of those Regiments, which are acknowledgd and
            provided for by their Respective States, at a considerable discount while they are
            considerd as belonging to no particular State, & are neglected by the whole—Many
            of them (if we may judge from their Appearance,) have great reason to complain—Your
            Excellency will be pleasd to mention this Circumstance to Congress & use your
            Influence for a more liberal Provision for those Officers & Men who have in our
            late Action so greatly distinguishd themselves. I have the honor to be, with the utmost
            Regard Yr Excellencys most obedt humble Servt

            Jno. Sullivan


Title: To George Washington from Jean-Baptiste Ternant, 4 September 1778
From: Ternant, Jean-Baptiste, chevalier de
To: Washington, George

            sir
            White Plains september 4, 1778.

          your Excellency’s kind answer was handed to me yesterday evening—from the Idea I entertain of a good military constitution, I
            am, & have always been sensible of the necessity of limiting rank to the line of
            an army, & of the dangerous impropriety of lavishing it to men mercantilely or
            otherwise civily employed in the Staff departments; nor did I ever think of proposing
            any direct or indirect deviation of this principle in favor of myself or any body
            else—It is true I Spoke of having military business transacted by military men,
            & so far your Excelly seems to be aware of the
            distinction that should be made between the civil & military branches of the
            department I have lately acted in—if the familiar grown Ideas of this army about the
            matter are a Sufficient ground for not ratifying what is So different in other services
            & So opposite in this, to the true principles of military science, your
            Excellency knows best—I am very sorry to find that arrangements of Congress, or of any
            body else, will prevent my being any longer employed in the Inspection, after having
            cheerfully encountered & surmounted the difficulties which opposed its success,
            & gone through the most toilsome & fastiduous details of it—As for my
            continuing any longer in the line I am at present in; was the office a military one
            & on a proper footing, I would; & had it not been represented &
            offered to me as such, I would not have accepted of it—for—when I undertook the
            laborious task of the Inspection; when I exposed myself to danger in several occasions;
            when I took pains to exercise the office of Dy Q. Mr upon military principles, my
            intention was to share the toils & glory attached to  the
            defense of the cause of America, which glory I could not arrive to, but by being a
            military man, & deserving by real services, what constitutes him—I am sorry all
            my endeavours could not get me any other reward but a kind of a Clerkship in the Qr Mr’s
            department. if I must resume a civil employment; I’ll try to get one which may be more
            honorable or profitable to me, & if possible more beneficial to the
            community—I’ll have the honour to call tomorrow morning at head quarters, to take my
            leave of your Excellency & beg the necessary passes for my journey to
            Philadelphia. I have the honor to be with respect your Excellency’s most obedient
            & humble servt

            John Ternant


Title: General Orders, 5 September 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

            Head-Quarters White-Plains saturday Septr 5th 1778.
            Parole Mount-Joy—C. Signs Maroneck Milton—

          The General expects agreeable to former orders that the whole Army is now prepared to
            move at the shortest notice—Circumstances may, very
            soon make it necessary.
          Coll Chambers is appointed to relieve Colonel Craige who is now Superintending the
            hospitals in Pennsylvania.


Title: To George Washington from the Board of War, 5 September 1778
From: Board of War
To: Washington, George

          Letter not found: from the Board of War, 5 Sept. 1778. On 14
            Sept., GW wrote the board: “On sunday night I had the honor to receive your favors of
            the 5th & 7th Instant.”


Title: To George Washington from Vice Admiral d’Estaing, 5 September 1778
From: Estaing, Charles-Hector Théodat, comte d’
To: Washington, George

            Sir.
            [Boston] 5th September 1778.

          I have the honor of transmitting to Your Excellency a copy of the account which I have
            rendered Congress, in my letter to His Excellency Mr henry Laurens.
          Men who like you found and support empires, have the same privileges as those who
            govern them—the admiration and confidence which you inspire—ensures them to you—and it
            is a homage which my heart pays you with eagerness—I annex to this packet a copy of the
            Protest and my letter to Genl Sullivan in consequence of it—I hope
            you will find in the latter a proof of my being devoted to the common cause, and the
            union of the two nations. it is but too common for
            those who exercise an art, which is not known by every body—and such as Naval War, to be
            judged with a degree of prejudice—especially when such prejudice is supported by the
            interested opinion of some individuals, who tho good pilots and worthy men in other
            respects have no idea of what a squadron is—however successfully they may have acquitted
            themselves in conducting small barks—it likewise no uncommon thing to give way to ones
            passion—Every man is not a Washington, nor like him a Fabius during a Campaign—to
            reassume the character of Cæsar or Alexander at Monmouth and in every engagement. it was
            for a great Statesman such as Mr Hancock good policy which dictates reason and never
            injuries, to put so respectable a name as his to the protest, because as a General
            Officer he could not dispense with following the example of him who commanded—and
            because tho he subscribed the words “hitherto esteemed” he certainly suppressed many
            others—his conduct in rendering us the greatest services, the valuable and flattering
            present which he has been so kind as to make me—in your portrait—are marks of his
            sentiments which he entertains for us. You will pardon me for having a good opinion of
            my own way of thinking, when it coincides with Your Excellencys—this has been the case
            Sir, for at the very time that you recommended in a letter, to suppress the
               which often arise from ill-success. I
            offered and was ready at the head of a Regiment to go and serve under Genl Sullivan, as
            I formerly did under Marshal Saxe, in the war which finished in 48. I would not take
            this step at present under the idea of reinforcing an army, with such a handful of
            men—or Of proving what is already known—viz.—that the french Nation can sacrifice life
            with a good grace. but I was anxious to demonstrate that my nation could not have been
            offended by a vivacity—and that he who had the honor of commanding it in America was
            & would be all his life, one of the most affectionate and zealous Servants of
            the United States.
          I have this moment received a letter from Mr de chouin, of the 2d inst: which confirms
            the arrival of Admiral Byrons Squadron—the point now is
            to divine the projects which their naval superiority may probably give rise to.
          I am endeavouring with the permission of council, to render the batteries which defend
            Nantasket Road, as respectable as possible—if I should withdraw to Kings Road, I might
            be blocked up there, and the possession of the islands without, would give the enemy
            considerable advantages over me—As I have not the
            assistance of any American Troops in guarding the islands and peninsulas, they are but
            illy defended—if the enemy are enterprising they may force me by sea—and  then the Ships with which they attack me, and my own may remain
            there—if they disembark on the continent, doubtless their superior numbers will make
            them masters of the adjacent posts, which are but feebly occupied—by me—the loss of the
            Squadron would easily follow, it might be burned without difficulty or danger—and Boston
            would certainly be much exposed—It appears to me that this Metropolis may be menaced,
            and ought to be well defended—I will do whatever lies in my power in the Road—but if the
            coast is left defenceless, I shall be driven from the Road, or my Vessels will be burnt
            by the enemys possessing themselves of the peninsulas. Perhaps the English may design to
            winter in our Southern Colonies—Masts arrived yesterday from Portsmouth, they must be
            made—provisions and water must be procured, before we think of sacrificing ourselves and
            going to defend them—if any point of the territory of the United States is attacked, I
            shall act in the same manner on the first requisition made by Your Excellency—because in
            the eyes of the King, there exists no difference between what belongs to him and what is
            the property of his allies.
          In order to counteract the enemy’s projects, it is essential to penetrate them without
            loss of time—it is impossible to employ money more usefully than on this object—and I
            would readily engage for the Kings Share of the expence of Spies— in order to act is essential to have intelligence. I have the
            honor to be &ca.