Title: To John Adams from Mark Lynch, 8 July 1780
From: Lynch, Mark
To: Adams, John

      Sir
      Nantes 8 July 1780

     I have the favor to acquaint you that pursuant to the directions of Philip Mazzei Esqr. I have Sent you by the Diligence that parted hence this morning for Paris, a Small case to your adress containing 7 Vol. in 4to. which Said friend left with me at his departure from this place. I have given Said case in the care of a young Man, Mr. John Kirwan, who is going to the Irish college of Paris, he brings it as part of his own effects, otherwise it coud not go by the Diligence, which carries none but what belongs to Such as go in it. And as he was obliged to pay the carriage here, you will be pleased to Reimburse him 6 Livers 15s for carriage of Said case from hence to Paris. I Shall be obliged to you to own me the receipt of these books, and Shall also esteem your mentioning if Mr. Mazzei be parted from Paris. By the last letter I had from him, he Says he intended setting out for Italy the 27 Ultimo.
     I presume to benefit of this opportunity to make you a tender of my best Service here, where I am a Resident in trade these 28 years. I Sincerely wish it may be agreable to you, and Shoud be extremely happy in having frequent occasions of demonstrating to you how truely and Respectfully I am Sir Your Excellency’s most humble & most obedient Servant

      M: Lynch


Title: To John Adams from Edmund Jenings, 9 July 1780
From: Jenings, Edmund
To: Adams, John

      Sir
      Brussels July 9. 1780

     I had the Honor of receiving yesterday Your Excellency Letters of the 4th and 5th of this Month, and to day Another of the 6th. I think myself particularly honored, that your Excellency shoud Advert to me at the close of the Day of the great Anniversary of public Liberty—I shoud have been happy at being present at the Commemoration of that Important Event, however I must content myself with wishing and praying for its perfect Completion.
     The Observations on Lord George Germaines and Conways Speeches have been inserted in the general Advertizer under the fittest Title that I Know. They were signed Probus. I suppose your Excellency has seen them by this Time and I trust you Approve of the Liberties, which I took with them, but which I had not taken but with your Excellencys Leave. The Letter to Mr. Wythe and the Constitution of the Massachusetts Goverment are sent to London and recommended to a particular Friend. I have not yet heard of their Receipt. Your character of Mr. Dana shall be sent by the next Post. I had the pleasure of Seeing your Observations on Conways and Germaines Speeches translated in the Mercure de Paris which I have an Opportunity of reading here every Week. They go constantly into Holland, where I trust every thing relative to America—is read—but they are too long to be inserted in their little News Papers, except in a very curtaild and disadvantageous Manner. The Dutch people in general have but little Inclination, or indeed Time to Spare from their Traffic, and the English from their Dissipation to take up a long detail of Matter and reasoning. Short Paragraphs Strike one and the other Most. I found it so in England before I left it, and complied with the public Taste accordingly and was sensible of the Effect.
     I beg your Excellency to send me the proposed Letters in Answer to the present Writings and Sentiments in England. I shall be honored by them, and will take the Utmost Care thereof. I have seen some of the Arguments, on which your Excellency has made most just remarks. I have long since Observed, that Nothing comes from England, which does not make against either the Constitution or Government—its folly exceeds if possible its Knavery. As Your Excellency writes your Letters on your proposed Subjects, would it not be worth the while to get them translated into French and sent to the Princes of the different Courts of Europe and a few others transmitted to the Leading men in Holland, that all may see, that the Reasons given by England for the Continuance of the War operate Strongly on their part to oppose her designs in doing it. In England I am convinced no reasoning will do—Nothing but the Sharpest Misfortunes and Misery can give the Sense of feeling. However, Nothing Shall be wanting on my part to instruct that infatuated Country through you of the folly Madness and Wickedness of its present System.
     The Blow at Charles Town, coming unexpectedly was a severe one but surely cannot dismay any one, who has the least Principle in this glorious Contest. If it had not taken place, the Ennemy must have been immediately Confounded. At present his Cowardly Insolence is at the Heigth; but it will serve to plunge Him into deeper disgrace and Misery, as it incites Him to continue the War against the Interests of all the World. It is true I felt severely for a Moment, but you, Sir, know Lord Chathams supposed Idea and my real One, that a Patriot can never despair, He may be afflicted at the Vices, and be ashamed of the follies of Mankind, but will ever be steady in his Maxim, Nil desperandum de Republica. So long as America is true to Herself She is Safe. When she is not, She will fall and that too deservedly. I mind not the fallacies and Falshoods of Lord George Germaine about Dissentions, but I have seen a Paragraph signed by Genl. Wayne and four other Officers, which gives me Concern, they declare, they will not Associate with any one who has ever been against the Independancy of America, however respectable his Character may be. I Know not what this Means, does your Excellency. I am happy to find, that America is contented With the new Regulation with respect to the Currency—England depends much on disagreements on that Head. Your Excellency speaking of Charles Town, says the Consumed Charles Town—has it suffered any Conflagration since the Siege?
     It is said here, that Mr. Fitzherbert, the English resident, has receivd an Account that Rodney has had an Engagement with Monsr. Guichen, and has crippled six of his Ships, and that He afterwards saild to Barbadoes, which was attacked by a Spanish Squadron.
     Mrs. Izard desires her respectful Complts to your Excellency.

      I am Sir, your Excellencys Most obedient & faithful Hble Servt.
      Edm: Jenings


Title: To John Adams from William Churchill Houston, 11 July 1780
From: Houston, William Churchill
To: Adams, John

      Sir
      Philada. 11 July 1780

     The principal military Event which has taken Place for some considerable Time past, is the Fall of Charlestown, the Capital of South Carolina. No very material Circumstances can, as yet, be added to those officially published, and which the several American Prints have given you, and the British still earlier. The Intelligence from the Southward being overland is very tedious in it’s Passage; and besides this, after the Capitulation the Enemy interposed every Means by dilatory and frivolous Pretences, by what Candour will, in my Opinion, decide to be a Breach of the Spirit of their Engagements, to delay the Dispatches General Lincoln had stipulated should be sent to Congress. This is in their usual Stile; and we have daily Accounts of Cases in which they pay no Sort of regard to their Promises sacredly pledged in Favour of the Citizens. Rapines, Violences and Abuses of every Kind are committed without Reserve, and with very little Discrimination. Their Conduct is of a Piece with what they have held in every similar Instance, uninfluenced by any Principles of Honour, Truth, Humanity or even Policy. In the Hour of Debility and Want of Preparation to oppose them, they have overun a considerable Part of the State of South Carolina; but as General Gates is collecting a Force to oppose them, and as their Cruelties and Oppressions will probably soon work up the Spirits of the People to Fury and Desperation, they will be expelled from the Country.
     It seems to be the Ordination of Providence, and, though the Sufferings are severe, it seems to be the Interest of the Union, that each State, in its’ Turn should be vexed with their Depredations and Barbarities. It operates an amazing Change in the Temper and Sentiments of the People, and fixes them in a rooted and resolute Determination to risque the Extremes of Destruction in Preference before Submission. It is clear and undisputed Experience, that in those States where they have made Progress, and from which they have been driven with Arms, or obliged to relinquish with Shame and Disappointment, the Flame of Liberty and Patriotism burns with more Strength and Brightness, and the Exertions of the People are most deciding and irresistible.
     Every Person who has attended to the Course of our Revolution knows the Meaning of what in Words is a Paradox, that “our Misfortunes are our Safety.” The Capture of Charlestown is much to be regretted when we reflect that our Soldiers will be starved and scourged into the Enemy’s Service; that the Citizens must suffer Pillagings, Conflagrations and Brutality, but it is obvious to every one that it will promote, under the Favour of Heaven, the general Cause. It has awaked a Spirit superiour to any Thing I have seen since the year 1775 and 6, a Spirit that is fast pervading the whole Comunity, a Spirit which enlivens and encreases every Day.
     Cornwallis commands to the Southward with between four and five Thousand Men; Clinton has brought back to New-York a Number somewhat larger; and at the Date of this they are encamped from Philipse’s on the North-river across the Country above King’s-bridge. When the News of the Fall of Charlestown arrived, and the Troops were returning from thence, they came out with much Confidence and Triumph into New-Jersey, setting Fire to the Country as they passed. The disaffected strengthened their Expectations of Despondence and Submission among the Militia, and Desertions from the regular Troops. In every Respect they were more disappointed, than perhaps they have ever been since the Commencement of the War. Scarce a Man deserted, or Citizen adhered to them, both regulars and Militia, particularly the latter, fought them with the most desperate internecine Fury. The Vengeance due to their former Baseness and Barbarities cannot be forgotten. Manet alta Mente repostum.
     Considering the Disaster we have met with on a general Scale, we are not in the least dejected by it. We are more apprehensive of the Effect it will have on your Side of the Water, where such Things strike much more forcibly than here. Hope you will take the necessary Steps to prevent any unnecessary unfavourable Impressions.
     Nothing but a better Supply of Money is wanting to give decisive Vigour to the War; and if we cannot get it we are not going to give up a good Cause for Want of it, however essential it may be thought.

      I am, Sir with great Respect your obedt. hble. servant
      Wm. Churchill Houston


Title: To John Adams from James Warren, 11 July 1780
From: Warren, James
To: Adams, John

      My dear Sir
      Boston July 11th: 1780

     My last Letters went by my Son Winslow who left this place about three weeks ago for Amsterdam and I hope will soon be Able to deliver them to you at Paris.
     At that Time I flattered myself that we should be Able to hold Charlestown, but you will find before this reaches you that the Enemy have got it, with the four Continental Ships that were ordered there last Novemr. This is a great reduction of our Navy and seems to be occasioned more by ill policy, than the fortune of War. It was certainly a very odd Measure to Shut up those Ships in a place where they could not possibly do any service and where probably they would be lost. The Loss of Charlestown at first seemed to have disagreeable Effects. It produced some degree of dejection, but those Effects were soon changed for more Agreable ones. It has done more good than hurt. It has waked us from a profound Sleep, and roused every Man to Action. We shall now have a fine Army and they will be supplied and when our Allies Arrive (who by the way we yet hear Nothing more of than that they sailed the 2d: May) I dare say we shall Beat the Britons, though flushed with Victory over the Capital of a Country, which had not public Spirit enough in the midst of plenty to supply provisions for those that would fight or Courage enough to fight themselves. The Spirit of 75 seems to be revived. Our Papers which will be sent you will give an Account of a Brilliant Action on our side in which a few Continental Troops, and a few of the brave Jersey Militia Beat back and drove out of that Country an Army of British Savages with a loss of 7 or 800 killed and wounded. We have no other News. As to our Navy the Confederacy is at Philadelphia, the Deane and Trumbull are here. The latter repairing after her Injurys suffered by a Noble and well Conducted Action with a Ship of superior force. The Alliance laying in France tho’ Exceedingly wanted here. Our New Constitution is Established, and is to Operate on the last Wednesday in October. The Election of Govr. Leut. Govr. and Senate to be made on the begining of Sept. Mr. Bowdoin has again come into public Life that he may with the greater Advantage stand as a Candidate in Competition with Hancock for the highest honor and rank in this State. Who will Carry the Election is very uncertain. I dont Envy either of them their feelings. The Vanity of one of them will Sting like an Adder if it is disappointed, and the Advancements made by the Other if they dont succeed will hurt his Modest pride. The upper Counties will be for H. The Interest of the Other will lay in the lower ones. I dont hear who is to be the Leut. or any thing about it, only that an Interest is making for Cushing in the Town. If H is Cheif, why will not C. make an Excellent second. The old General Court will have one short Sessions more and then Die, and give place to a New one. One of my last gave you an Account of the proceedings of this State with regard to Money. Notwithstanding which it has Continued to depreciate till it got to 75 and 80 for one. There is no Accounting for it, or reasoning about it. It is progressive, retrograde, Eccentric, regular or irregular Just as the D—l will have it and No Body not even Coll. Quincey can tell why. It seems Just now to make a pause and if there is any reasoning about it I think it will in the Course of a Month return to about forty. Would you wish to hear anything of the Husbandry of the Country, I have already told you in a former Letter that we had a most horrible winter. The Spring and former part of the Summer were very dry. The whole Country has suffered by droughts and some parts of it very severely. We have lately had fine rains, but they came too late for Hay and a full Crop of English Corn. I dont remember that you ever Mentioned to me your Friend the Abbe Reynal’ History of the East and West Indies. I told you before that I was Exceedingly pleased with it. I like it the better because it Contains many fine reflections on Agriculture and the dignity and Advantages of it.
     I shall write Nothing about your good Family as Mrs. Adams will write by this very good Opportunity herself, and Capt. Samson will take the best Care of all Letters to you. Please to make my regards to Mr. Dana, and remember me to Mr. Thaxter, and your two Sons, and beleive me to be with Great Sincerity Your Friend & Humbl. Servt.

      J. Warren

      Mr. Gerry has returned from Congress. Mr. Adams and Genl. Ward are gone. Mr. Partridge is also returned.


Title: To John Adams from Thomas Digges, 12 July 1780
From: Digges, Thomas,Church, William Singleton
To: Adams, John

      Dr. Sir
      Londn. 12 July 80

     I put on board a vessel which saild yesterday, the Books mentiond in the margin. I thought the Treaties might be servicable to You, and I mention the other particular pamphlets that you may prove whether all I send by that conveyance will come to hand. I have not heard from You since the letter ordering me to stop the sending the Papers via Ostend. There has been nothing material in the news way to inform you of since I inclosed a Gazette of the Chs. Town business. If I were to attempt to describe the folly and torrent of exultation about the taking that place it would fill pages; You, who do not Know this Country and the folly of its people, can have no Idea of it. The language of 1775 about unconditional submission is nothing to what You now hear. This people are absolutely mad with Exultation, and look upon America as much theirs as they do the Isles of Guernsey and Jersey. There is no standing against the Torrent; all reasonings upon the matter are vain. The Language comes from the Court, and gets thro the nobles and better people down to the lower and so on to the City; where the folly is not less obvious. Stocks have risen in consequence of it about five per Cent and every body is buying. The universal cry is, that America is again ours; we have beat the French fleet and remain masters of the Seas in the West Indies; (I wonder they do not claim dominion over the air) Rodney is certainly to intercept and take the Spanish Squadron; Mons. De Terneys fleet is thought an easy and sure prey to that of Adml. Graves; The Channel fleet is to continue blocking up the port of Brest, and prevent any junction of Ships from Cadiz &ce. &ce. Turning towards America they now say that No. Carolina will be certainly theirs, a body of Troops with arms and amunition for 2,000 of the back settlers have been sent there by invitation of the People; That Virga. will also be theirs, having sent Deputies to Ches. Town from the Back settlements praying to be aided by the British soldiery. If this is effected a fig say they for the northern Colonies tho they even boast too of having a considerable body of the Connecticut people in the Interest of Government. News of the taking Mobile came this day thro the Spanish papers but this is reckond nothing. The junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Wt. Indies would be reckond nothing; the taking Antigua, St. Kitts or other Islands, nay even beating the invincible fleet of Rodney, woud all be reckond nothing; since we have got (as they express it) all the Southern Colonies. Such folly was never seen, the joy of the King and Court is visible to every one, and I do realy believe they had rather hear of such another massacre as that of Tarltons against the Virginians on the Borders of North Carolina or the hearing that Colony had submitted, then the distruction of the whole french and Spanish fleet in the West Indies. It is inconceivable how implacably bent the first man here seems to be for the reduction of America. You may depend that every nerve will be straind to get more Men and to send more Ships to Ama., nothing but some disastrous news to put them again in the Dumps will prevent the ministry acting vigorously as they possibly can do against America. Everything will be risqued to carry on that war; and without France does assist Her Allies, with a small fleet to continue on the Coast, and thereby prevent the easy transportation of British soldiers from Place to place, that much mischief will be done. They brag here of more troops being engagd in Germany by General Faucit and that 4,000 are to be sent out the 1st. of Augt. next or between that and the 20th. with 4 sail of the Line and some frigates. The N York fleet is yet detaind about 60 sail, and notwithstanding all their passing of Graves’s superiority over De Terney, I believe they will not let it sail till they hear on a certainty where Terney is gone—they certainly apprehend it is gone towards N York.
     A fleet of 20 or 30 West India Men are also ready to sail and a few East India Men most likely the whole may go together soon after the return of the Channel Fleet which is now expected dayly to return to Torbay. News is come today that the Channel fleet is spread so as to extend a considerable way to intercept a homeward bound french St. Domingo fleet, three of which have been already taken by Adm Geary and sent to Plymouth.
     Much has been put forth and very industriously too about a secret negotiation with Spain by a Mr. Cumberland and an Irish friar of the name of Hussy—both of whom I know. I believe nothing of it; as Cumberland took his family abroad for the purpose of cutting a little in His Expences, He being supposed much behind hand in the world. The Fryar was Part of the Household to the late Spanish Ambassador and has been once to Madrid and back hither since the Ambassador took his leave. This storey has helpd to raise the Stocks; but I believe some late maneuvres of Sr. Jo. Yorke with the Dutch, has helpd them up more either than that or the late news from America. We are all anxious here to know whether the Dutch and Russians will act spiritedly or otherways in the protection of their Commerce. The line of conduct of Portugal most likely will be guided by these powers. I know every Corner of that Country well and am not unacquainted at its Court from having resided there three or four years. Should affairs so turn out that any person, I do not mean in a capital but subordinate way, should be wanted I am ready and willing to go there, for I am sure I could do it to the material service of my Country, either by encouraging adventure from thence or in other more substantial services. There is not a merchantile man of any eminence in the Country that I do not personally know.
     I am with the highest Esteem Sir Yr. obedt. Servt. W S. C—h

      PS Books Sent.
      The 2 Vols. of Treaties from 1688 to 1771. Westminr. Magazine for June 1780. Remembrancer containing an Account of the Riots—2 Sermons on a fast day during the late War. Legal mode for suppressing Riots—Considerations on the late Disturbances (by Burke). Tumulte De Londres—also three small Pamphlets publishd gratis.


Title: Editorial Note
From:
To:

      The eight letters exchanged by John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes between 13 and 29 July provide a resounding climax to Adams’ diplomatic efforts at Paris in 1780. Together they constitute one of the most controversial episodes in John Adams’ diplomatic career and reveal much about his views of both the Franco-American alliance and negotiations with Great Britain.
      The controversy played out in July superficially resembles the dispute in June over Congress’ revaluation of the currency, but the two episodes differ in both origin and significance. Ultimately, Adams’ opposition to Vergennes’ demand that the revaluation be modified in favor of Frenchmen won him a commendation from Congress. The positions of Adams and Vergennes in regard to the revaluation were irreconcilable, but their letters in June did not raise fundamental questions about the viability of the Franco-American alliance. The situation in July was quite different, for then, with no apparent provocation, Adams initiated a correspondence over the nature and adequacy of French aid, and the exercise of his commissions to negotiate Anglo-American peace and commercial treaties. The exchange left no doubt that Adams saw a sharp divergence between the objectives of France and the United States in continuing the war and concluding a peace.
      The confrontation opened with John Adams’ letter of 13 July (below) on a topic that had concerned him for a long time: French assistance to the United States, particularly the disposition of French naval forces in American waters. The American Commissioners’ letter to Vergennes of ante 9 January 1779 (vol. 7:305–311) on the subject had been largely Adams’ work and he had discussed the issue at considerable length in letters written after his return to America in 1779. But he had not raised the issue in any previous letter to Vergennes in 1780.
      Adams’ letter of the 13th indicated his belief that, while the naval dimension held the key to victory, France lacked a viable strategy for winning the naval war against Britain. In eighteen manuscript pages Adams sought to remedy the situation and to provide France with a plan that would make the most effective use of the resources committed. In his reply of 20 July (below), Vergennes did not deal directly with the substantive issues raised by Adams, but rather reassured him that France was doing all in its power to bring about victory and that statements to the contrary were false and served only to open divisions between the allies. In his letter of the 21st (below), Adams seemed to accept Vergennes’ reassurances, but on the 27th (below) he reopened the matter with renewed vigor, declaring that the fleet under Ternay’s command at Rhode Island was insufficient to achieve naval superiority and thus could not decisively affect Britain’s prosecution of the war.
      John Adams’ comments regarding French aid were divisive because they raised an issue that plagues all wartime alliances, namely the magnitude and effectiveness of each ally’s contribution to final victory. In view of the situation that existed in the American theater of operations, Adams’ criticism of French policy had merit, but it was, at the very least, impolitic, coming as it did from a person with no official diplomatic status in France and directed toward the only nation willing to give any form of aid to the United States. Although Adams’ unsolicited criticism may have angered Vergennes, it could be and was ignored, for Adams had no power to impose his views on France.
      John Adams’ letter of 17 July (below), however, was far more disturbing to Vergennes because Adams proposed to take direct action under the terms of his commissions. Adams’ exercise of his plenipotentiary powers had been discussed, and apparently settled, in letters exchanged with Vergennes in February and March, but in his letter of the 17th, Adams reopened the issue. He denied the validity of Vergennes’ reasoning, in his letter of 24 February (vol. 8:362–363), in prohibiting him from officially notifying the British government of his presence with powers to negotiate Anglo-American peace and commercial treaties. Not only was Vergennes’ position wrong, Adams argued, it was in direct opposition to American interests. Adams believed that disclosure would force the British government to clarify its position on negotiations, encourage those in Great Britain who wanted peace, dispel rumors that France enjoyed exclusive privileges under the Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and take advantage of the forces that were tearing at the fabric of British society. Moreover, Adams saw little difference between what Spain was doing in its negotiations with Richard Cumberland and what he proposed.
      The arrival of John Adams’ letter provoked in Vergennes an anger that was as intense as it was understandable. The letter was a monument to ingratitude at the very moment that a French fleet and army were arriving in America, the dispatch of which constituted the single most costly endeavor yet undertaken by France in the war. Moreover, Adams’ proposal to explore possible peace negotiations came as Spain appeared to waver in its commitment to the war, thus raising the specter of France, abandoned by its allies, fighting Britain alone. The depth of Vergennes’ concern is evident from his lengthy reply of 25 July (below) in which he undertook a point by point rebuttal of the issues raised in the letter of the 17th, making it clear that he believed Adams’ reasoning to be both absurd and dangerous.
      If Vergennes believed that his letter would end the discussion, he was disappointed, for Adams continued it in his letter of 26 July (below). In a gesture to Vergennes, Adams indicated that he would place the matter before Congress and await its instructions before taking any action. But he also declared that the American people were unwilling to continue the war indefinitely in pursuit of objectives of concern only to France. At some point there would be pressure for peace and it was the anticipation of this that Adams believed justified the proposals made in his letter of the 17th. The conflict ended three days later with Vergennes’ letter of 29 July (below), in which he declared that he would have no further correspondence with John Adams on matters concerning Franco-American relations, but by then Adams had already left Paris for Amsterdam.
      The central question concerning the exchange between John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes in July is why did it occur? One element in Adams’ decision to confront Vergennes may have been his impending departure for the Netherlands. Such a conclusion is supported by his letters of 26 and 27 July (both below), which do resemble the parting shots of a man who planned no further dealings with the French foreign minister. When the debate opened on 13 July, however, there was no sign that Adams planned anything more than the brief visit to the Netherlands that he had contemplated since early March and of which he had informed Vergennes earlier in July (to Edmund Jenings, 12 March; to Vergennes, 2 July, note 1, both above; to the president of Congress, 23 July, No. 99, and note 2, below). Moreover, only on 12 September did Adams indicate his plan to reside permanently at Amsterdam (to Francis Dana, 12 Sept., below). It seems unlikely, therefore, that his decision to visit the Netherlands was Adams’ only or even his principal reason for confronting Vergennes in July.
      Of more significance in provoking the exchange was Adams’ effort, also undertaken in June and July, to persuade the British people and their government that Britain’s interests required an immediate peace. Adams’ peace initiative proceeded from his reading of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial and Adams’ letters to Vergennes in July show the influence of the Memorial. Moreover, in their use of Pownall’s arguments, the letters parallel Adams’ answer to Joseph Galloway’s Cool Thoughts, leading to the conclusion that Adams may have come to see Vergennes’ opposition to direct Anglo-American negotiations in much the same light as he saw Galloway’s. It was no coincidence, therefore, that Adams’ debate with Vergennes over the sufficiency of French aid and the exercise of his plenipotentiary powers began at almost the same time he sent Edmund Jenings the manuscripts of his Translation of Pownall’s Memorial and his answer to Galloway.
      The content of the letters to Vergennes was determined by Adams’ desire that his peace initiative be more than a private, literary undertaking, which required that questions concerning French aid and Adams’ exercise of his powers be settled. Peace negotiations were unlikely so long as the war remained a stalemate, a situation that Adams believed would continue until France provided additional aid and deployed its military and naval forces more effectively in the American theater of operations. Adams was also aware that he could not undertake official negotiations without at least the tacit support of his French ally. It seems clear, therefore, that Adams’ decision to confront Vergennes in July was due largely to his determination to make one final attempt to create the conditions under which his peace initiative might succeed.

      Whatever John Adams intended, the issues raised in his correspondence with Vergennes did not disappear, but were referred to Congress for its consideration. Although Adams had agreed, in his letter of 26 July, to send the correspondence to Congress, Vergennes was not disposed to rely on Adams’ promise. On 31 July Vergennes wrote to Benjamin Franklin and requested that he send the enclosed correspondence to Congress. He declared that Franklin would discover in Adams’ letters “opinions and a turn which do not correspond either with the manner in which I explained myself to him or with the intimate connection which subsists between the king and the United States.” By seeing the letters Congress could determine whether Adams had “that conciliating spirit which is necessary for the important and delicate business with which he is intrusted” (Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev.Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Washington, 1889; 6 vols., 4:18–19).
      Franklin wrote to the president of Congress on 9 August. There he noted both the offense given Vergennes and the French court by Adams’ letters and Vergennes’ refusal to correspond further with him. Citing the inherent difficulties in having two ministers at the same court with different views regarding the proper conduct of business, Franklin observed that Louis XVI should be encouraged to reflect on his “generous benevolence . . . by our thankful acknowledgments, and that such an expression of gratitude is not only our duty, but our interest.” John Adams, however, thought that more “stoutness and a greater air of independence and boldness in our demands will procure us more ample assistance” (same, 4:22–23). But Franklin may have been uncomfortable in the role assigned him by Vergennes, for in a letter to Adams of 8 October (below), he indicated that he had not yet sent off the copies of the July letters and suggested that Adams might be able to rectify the situation by apologizing to the foreign minister. Adams did not follow Franklin’s advice.
      Benjamin Franklin’s letter of 9 August, together with the enclosed correspondence, reached Philadelphia on 19 February 1781 (JCCWorthington C. Ford and others, eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, Washington, 1904–1937; 34 vols., 19:174), but by then Congress had already reacted to copies sent at Adams’ direction. On 26 December, the correspondence reached Congress as enclosures in Francis Dana’s letter of 24 August, and a committee was immediately appointed to consider Adams’ letters of 17 and 26 July and Vergennes’ of the 25th (same, 18:1194). On 10 January 1781 the committee reported out a draft letter to John Adams which Congress promptly adopted and sent under that date (same, 19:41–42). The letter stated that Congress assumed that Adams’ letters to Vergennes concerning the communication of his commissions flowed from his zeal, but that it believed that Vergennes’ objections to such an undertaking were “well founded.” Adams was advised to be more circumspect in regard to his evaluations of the prospects for peace derived from his analysis of the vagaries of British politics and society.
      The multiple copies of the Adams-Vergennes correspondence sent to Congress can be confusing. Individual items, although numbered, were not kept with their covering letters or distributed in a consistent way through the Papers of the Continental Congress (see PCC, No. 84, II and Misc. Papers, Reel No. 1). Moreover, Vergennes sent Franklin the recipient’s copies of John Adams’ letters so that, instead of being in the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, they are in the Papers of the Continental Congress, and it is from that source that the copies printed in this volume are taken.


Title: From John Adams to the Comte de Vergennes, 13 July 1780
From: Adams, John
To: Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Comte de

       Sir
       Paris July 13th. 1780

      By the Treaty of Alliance of the sixth of February 1778, his Majesty and the United States agreed, in Case of War, to join their Councils and Efforts against the Enterprises of the common Enemy: to make it a common Cause, and aid each other mutually with their good Offices, their Councils and their Forces, according to the Exigences of Conjunctures, and each of the contracting Parties, in the manner it may judge most proper, is to make all the Efforts in its Power against the common Enemy.
      I have cited these Clauses from the Treaty, not as foundations of any demand, that I have to make, because they are neither proper to support any demand, nor have I Authority to make any if they were: but as an Apology for the Liberty I take of requesting your Excellency’s Attention to a few Observations upon the present Conjuncture of Affairs.
      It is certain from the best Intelligence from London, as well as from the debates in Parliament on the several Motions which have been made for a pacification, that the British Ministry are inflexibly determined to pursue the War another Campaign in America, to send more Troops and Ships there, if they possibly can obtain them, and to put to the hazard not only, the national Credit, but their maritime Power, and even their political Existence, rather than give up their designs of domination over America; and indeed this is not at all to be wondered at, that the Ministers and the Nation, who have so far lost their Justice, their Humanity and Policy, as to deliberately form and pursue the plan of changing the foundations of the Laws and Government of thirteen Colonies, and reducing them to Slavery; and who have pursued this object with such sanguinary Fury for so many Years, should persist so as to bury themselves in the Ruins of the Empire, rather than fail of their purpose, when it is plain they consider, and, that not without Reason, the same Ruin in the Independence of America and her Connections with France.
      The Conduct of Monsieur Le Comte de Guichen; on the seventeenth of April, and the fifteenth and nineteenth of May, in the West Indies, does great honor to the national Bravery, as well as their Science in naval Tacticks, and shews that there is no Cause to fear that the Enemy will obtain any Advantage there. Yet nothing has yet been done on either Side that seems decisive.
      The Advantages which Spain has gained in West Florida, and particularly of late at Mobile, and the probability that they will succeed in acquiring both the Floridas, shews that the English are on the losing hand in that quarter: but it is not the loss of both the Floridas, nor of all their West India Islands, in my Opinion, that will induce them to make Peace, and acknowledge the Independence of America in Alliance with France. They will see every posession they have beyond their Island lopped off, one after another, before they will do this.
      I pretend not to know, to what part of America Monsieur de Ternay, and Monsieur de Rochambeau are destined; but to whatever part it is, whether Canada, Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina or Georgia, I have no hopes of any thing decisive from their Operations, altho’ they should be instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should be destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed: but this success will not be decisive. If they are intended against New York, I have no hopes of their Success. The Naval Force is not sufficient to command the Seas. Admiral Graves, added to the Ships before at New York, will be superiour; and I shall venture to give my Opinion that without a Superiority of naval Force, clear and indisputable, New York will never be taken. It is so situated, it is so fortified, it is garrisoned with Troops so accustomed to War, and so imbittered and inflamed by cruel passions carefully nursed up in their Breasts by their King and their Generals, and it is universally regarded by them a Post of such essential Importance, that I confess I should dispair of Success against it, with an Army twice as numerous as that of the Generals Washington and Rochambeau united, while the English are Masters of the Seas, or even while they have there an Equality of naval Power.
      Most People in Europe have wondered at the Inactivity of the American Army for these two Years past, but it is merely from Want of Knowledge or Attention. The true Cause of it is; the English have confined themselves to their strong holds in Sea port Towns, and have been sheltered from all Attacks and Insults there by the Guns of their Men of War, and forever will be so, while they have the Superiority at Sea. If our Army had been three times as numerous as it was, it must have remained inactive, without a Fleet to co-operate with it; for an Attack upon New York, without a Fleet, would have been only sacrificing the Lives of thousands of brave Men, without a possibility of succeeding.
      Had the English two Years ago marched into the Country from Philadelphia, instead of retreating back with precipitation to New York, Europe would have heard more of the Exertions of the American Army: so much more, that in my serious Opinion, You would have heard of its total destruction. As it was, they were closely pursued, attacked, and if not beaten, yet they had much the worst of the Action; for besides their loss in killed, wounded, and in those who perished under the fatigue and heat of the day, not less than five hundred deserted from them and their desertions would have multiplied in every unsuccessful Engagement within the Country. If the last Year the British Army had marched out into the Country, instead of remaining under Cover of their Men of War, I am equally clear that they would have been ruined. The English ever since the Alliance have been fearfully apprehensive of an Attack upon their strong holds on the Sea Coast by the French. This it was induced them to retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them almost wholly confined to that Garrison, the last Year.
      I mention this, merely to wipe off the Imputation said to result from the Inactivity of our Army, since the Alliance, by shewing the true Cause of it; that it proceeds not from any Change of Sentiment in the Americans, but from the Change of the mode of prosecuting the War on the part of our Enemies.
      I am, however, clearly of Opinion, and I know it to be the general Sense of America, that the English, both in North America and the West India Islands, have been for these Two Years past absolutely in the Power of their Enemies, and that they are so now, and will continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the Forces of the Allies, to accomplish the entire Reduction of their Power in America. In order to shew this, let me beg your Excellency’s Attention to a few Remarks upon the Situation of the English; and upon the Method of applying the force of the Allies so as to reduce them.
      The English are in possession of Canada, a Province vastly extensive, and in which there is a great Number of Posts, at a great distance from each other, necessary to be maintained among a People too, who are by no means attached to them, but who would readily afford all the Assistance in their Power to the united forces of France and of the United States, and who would join them in considerable Numbers. In this whole Province, the English have not, comprehending the Garrisons of all their Posts, more than four thousand Men.
      The English are in possession of Nova Scotia. They have in Hallifax and the other Parts of the Province, and at Penobscot about three thousand Men. But the People of this Province, being descendants and Emigrants from New England chiefly, are discontented with British Government, and desirous of joining the United States.
      They are in Possession of New York Island, Long Island and Staten Island, where they have in all of regular British Troops, perhaps Thousand Men. The Militia and Volunteers &c., of whom they make such an ostentatious display in the dispatches of their Generals, and in the Gazette of St. James’s, are of very little Consideration. Their Numbers are much exaggerated. It is Force, and Fear and Policy, that enrolls the greatest part of them. There are perhaps fifteen thousand Inhabitants of the City. These, together with the Army and Navy, are fed and supplied with provisions and stores and fuel, and their Cattle and Horses with forage brought by Sea from Quebec, Hallifax, Ireland, and the West India Islands, except the small Quantity which they draw from Long Island and Staten Island.
      They are now in Possession of Charlestown in South Carolina and Savannah in Georgia. Their Armies and Navies in these places, as well as the Inhabitants, must be chiefly supplied by Sea in the same manner.
      They are still perhaps in possession of St. Augustine in East Florida and Pensacola in the West. From these places they have drawn of late Years great supplies of Lumber and Provisions for their West India Islands. The Number of Troops in Georgia and Carolina may amount to Thousands.
      They are in Possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Christophers, and St. Lucie and other Islands. These draw Supplies of Provisions and Lumber &c., from Quebec, Hallifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The Number of Troops they have in each Island, I am not able to ascertain: but certainly they are not strong in any of them. And the Climate in the West Indies and in Georgia and Carolina, is making a rapid Consumption of their Men.
      From this Sketch it will be easily seen, what a great Number of Posts they have to sustain, how these are mutually connected with and dependent on each other, and that their Existence in all of them depends upon their Superiority at Sea, and that to carry on the Intercourse and Communication between these various places, a vast Number of Transports, Provision Vessels and Merchant Ships, are necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English Nation has now little Navigation left but what is employed in maintaining the Communication of these places with one another and with Europe. Here then it is that the English Commerce and Navy is vulnerable, and this it is which clearly points out to their Enemies, the only sure and certain Way of reducing their Power in that quarter of the World; and if it is reduced there, it is brought into a narrow Compass every where.
      The Policy and Necessity of keeping always a superiour Fleet both in the West India Islands and on the Coast of the Continent of North America, is from all this very obvious. The English are so sensible of this, that they dread it as the greatest Evil that can befal them. The Appearance of the Count D’Estaing upon the Coast of North America never failed to throw the English into the utmost Terror and Consternation.
      The Appearance of a French Fleet upon our Coasts has repeatedly compelled, and ever must compel the English to call off from their Cruises, all their Frigates, and other Ships, and to assemble them at New York for their Security, and the defence of that place. These are among the happy Effects of such a measure. The Communication of the United States, not only with each other, but with the West Indies, with France, and all other parts of Europe, with which they have any Concern, is immediately opened, and they are thereby easily furnished, in all parts, with every thing fitting and necessary to carry on the War with the greatest Vigour. His Majesty’s Fleets and Armies will be amply and much more cheaply supplied, and his Subjects will reap, in Common with the Inhabitants of the United States, the benefits of this free Commerce. It will give free Sea-Room to the few Frigates belonging to Congress, and the several States, to cruise for the Merchant Ships, Provision Vessels and Transports of the Enemy. It gives Opportunity also to the Privateers to do the same. There are at this day, notwithstanding the dreadful Sacrifices made at Charlestown and Penobscot, Sacrifices the Necessity of which would have been entirely prevented by a few ships of the line, the Continental Frigates, the Confederacy, which is arrived at Philadelphia, the Alliance which will soon be there, the Trumbll, the Deane, the Bourbon, and also a Ship of fifty six Guns, which is nearly ready for Sea. The State of Massachusetts has two Frigates and several smaller Vessels. There are besides these now in being, belonging to Newbury Port, Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Boston and Rhode Island about forty Privateers. There are several belonging to Philadelphia. If a French Fleet should constantly remain upon that Coast, the Number of these Privateers would be doubled in a very few Months. What Havock then must these armed Vessels make, especially if a few French Frigates should be also ordered to cruise for Prizes, among the Provision Vessels, Merchant Ships and Transports passing and repassing to and from America and the West Indies to Europe, and to and from America and the West Indies, and to and from Quebec, Nova Scotia, New York, Charlestown, Savannah and the Floridas. Such depredations have several Times been made by our Cruisers alone, as to reduce the English at New York to very great distress: and it would be very easy to reduce them in this Way, to such Misery, as to oblige them to surrender at discretion.
      I therefore beg leave to submit it to your Excellency’s Consideration, whether there is any possible Way, that a Marine Force can be employed against the English, so much to the advantage of France, and the disadvantage of England, as in this Way: and whether upon the principles of French Interest and Policy alone, even without taking into Consideration that of the United States, a Fleet ought not to be constantly kept in North America. The Advantages they will there have, in Artists, Supplies, Accommodations &c. above the English are obvious.
      But the Question will arise, where shall they winter? I answer they may winter with perfect Security and Advantage, either at Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware or Cheasapeak Bay.
      Another Question will arise, whether they should all winter together in one Port, or be seperated to several Ports?
      I apprehend, however, that it would be most prudent to leave it to the discretion of the Commander in Chief of the Squadron, to keep the Squadron together, or to detach parts of it, according to the Exigences of the Service, advising with Congress, or with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, from time to time.
      Two Ships of the Line with three Frigates stationed at Boston, with orders to cruise occasionally for the protection of French and American Trade and the Annoyance of the Enemy: the same Number at Rhode Island with the same Orders—the same Number at Delaware River with similar Orders and a like Number in Cheasapeak Bay with like Orders, which would make eight Ships of the Line and twelve Frigates, I have a moral Certainty would in one Year reduce the Power of the English in North America to absolute Annihilation without striking a Blow at Land. Those Ships would make a diversion of an equal Force of the English from the West India Islands, so that they would be in that respect as usefully employed for his Majesty there as any where. Eight Ships of the Line and twelve Frigates stationed together at Rhode Island, with Orders to cruise for the same purposes would do the same thing.
      Which plan would be best I dare not undertake to say. But until further informed, and instructed by Congress, I should think however, that the best plan would be to station the Fleet for the Winter, either in Delaware, or Cheasapeak Bay: and as the War has lately turned to the Southward, I am most inclined to think that Cheasapeak Bay would be the most proper.
      But, in all Events, I beg leave to intreat in the most earnest manner that a powerful Fleet may be ordered to winter somewhere in North America. By this means I think there is a moral Certainty that the English will be ruined there; whereas if Dependence is had upon the Assault and Attack of their strong holds, without the most absolute Command of the Sea, I fear it will end in Disappointment and Disgrace.
      There is the more urgent Reason for laying these Considerations before your Excellency, because there is a proportion of the People in America, who wish to return to the domination of Great Britain, many of whom are sensible and artful Men. They take Notice of every Circumstance of the Conduct of France, and represent it in such a Light, as they think will throw a prejudice against the Alliance into the Minds of the People. They represent the Affair of Rhode Island and of Savannah and some other things, as proofs that the Court of France do not mean to give any effectual Aid to America, but only to play off her Strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust her both. The Refugees in England concur with them in these Representations, and the Ministry, and the Members of Parliament in their public Speeches represent the same thing. Even Mr. Hartley, who is more for Peace than any Man in that Kingdom, in a printed Letter to the Inhabitants of the County of York, says, “it is our duty to unravel by Negotiation, the Combination of Powers now acting against Us”: and he says further in express Words, that “it is apparent to all the World, that France might long ago have put an End to that part of the War, which has been most distressing to America, if they had chosen so to do.” He must mean here the War of their Frigates and Privateers upon our Trade. “Let the whole System of France be considered,” says he, “from the beginning down to the late Retreat from Savannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other Construction upon it, but this, viz, that it has always been the deliberate Intention and Object of France, for purposes of their own, to encourage the Continuation of the War in America, in hopes of exhausting the Strength and Resources of this Country, and of depressing the rising Power of America.” This is not only the Language of Mr. Hartley, but the general Language of Newspapers and Pamphlets, and, I am well informed, of Conversation, in England. These are very industriously sent to America, through various Channels which cannot be stopped, by Laws, Art, or Power.
      The body of the People have great Confidence in the sincerity of France; but if these contrary Opinions should be suffered to gain ground, as they most assuredly will, if something is not done to prevent it; when all the World sees and declares as they do, that it is the best Policy of France, if She considered her own Interest alone in the Conduct of the War, to keep a superiour naval Force upon the Coast of the Continent of North America; I leave your Excellency to judge, what a melancholy effect it will have upon our Affairs. There is no Event, in my Opinion, which would have so direct a tendency to give force and extent to Opinions so dangerous to both Nations, as the calling off from the Continent your Naval Force, during the Winter, and not keeping a Superiority there through the Year. I scruple not to give it as my opinion, that it will disunite, weaken and distress Us more than, We should have been disunited, weakened or distressed, if the Alliance had never been made.
      The United States of America are a great and powerful People, whatever European Statesmen may think of them. If We take into our Estimate, the Numbers and Character of her People, the Extent, Variety, and Fertility of her Soil, her Commerce, and her Skill and Materials for Ship building, and her Seamen, excepting France, Spain, England, the Emperor and Russia, there is not a State in Europe so powerful. Breaking off such a Nation as this from the English so suddenly, and uniting it so closely with France, is one of the most extraordinary Events that ever happened among Mankind. The prejudices of Nations in favor of themselves and against all other Nations, which spring from self-love, and are often nurtured by Policy for unworthy purposes, and which have certainly been ever cultivated by the English with the utmost Care, in the Minds of the Americans, as well as of the People of every other Part of their dominions, certainly deserve the Attention of the wisest Statesmen, and as they are not to be eradicated in a Moment, they require to be managed with some delicacy. It is too often said in France, where the Prejudice against the English has not been fostered into so much Rancour, because France never had so much to fear from England, as England has from France, That “the Americans and the English are the same thing,” not to make it appear that there are some Remnants of Prejudices against Americans among the French: and it must be confessed there are some in America against France. It is really astonishing however, that there are so few, and it is the Interest and Duty of both, to lessen them as fast as possible, and to avoid with the nicest Care every colourable Cause of reviving any part of them.
      I beg your Excellency to excuse this Trouble, because the State of things in North America, has really become alarming, and this merely for Want of a few French Men of War upon that Coast, and to believe me to be, with the greatest Respect Sir, your Excellency’s most obedient and most humble Servant

       John Adams


Title: M. Addenet to John Adams: A Translation, 13 July 1780
From: Addenet, M.
To: Adams, John

       Sir
       Paris, 13 July 1780

      The first portion of my translation is well advanced and as soon as I have the rest I will be able to complete the task. But I need to have the complete extract. It is essential in order to tie it together coherently, otherwise the style will suffer. If your copy is completed, please have the goodness to send it to me.
      I am with profound respect, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant.

       Addenet

       My residence is on Rue Transnonain at the house of Monsieur Blondel.


Title: To John Adams from Benjamin Rush, 13 July 1780
From: Rush, Benjamin
To: Adams, John

      Dear Sir
      Philada: July 13th. 1780

     The reduction—I will not say loss of Charlestown has produced a new Era in the politicks of America—Such as you and I saw—and felt—and admired in the years 1775 and 76. Our republic cannot exist long in prosperity. We require adversity, and appear to possess most of the republican Spirit when most depressed. The papers will inform you of the exploits of our governments—of our citizens—of our Soldiers—and even of our ladies. If there is a single philosopher in the cabinet of St. James’s he will advise immediately to make peace with America. “The Romans govern the world (said Cato) but the women govern the Romans.” The women of America have at last become principals in the glorious American Controversy. Their opinions alone and their transcendent influence in Society and families must lead us on to Success and victory. My dear wife who You know in the beginning of the war had all the timidity of her Sex as to the issue of the war, and the fate of her husband, was One of the ladies employed to sollicit benefactions for the Army. She distinguished herself by her Zeal and Address in this business, and is now so thouroughly enlisted in the cause of her country, that She reproaches me with lukewarmness. Mr. Searle will inform you of what is going forward within doors. His zeal and integrity in the service of America and of Pensylvania in particular entitle him to the good offices and regard of all the friends of liberty on your side the water.

      Adieu—From my dear friend yours most Sincerely
      Benjn. Rush


Title: Editorial Note
From:
To:

      On 22 July, John Adams sent Edmund Jenings the final portion of his reply to Joseph Galloway’s Cool Thoughts (London, 1780 [i.e. 1779]). Specifically, his reply was to the three sections of that pamphlet setting down Galloway’s views “On the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence”; “On the Expence of Great Britain in the Settlement and Defence of the American Colonies”; and “On the Value and Importance of the American Colonies and the West Indies to the British Empire” (see No. I, note 1, below). In an accompanying note, Adams declared that “I have done with this Pamphlet, but I have 20 more as full of Nonsense—would you advise me to go on? or is it worth while to print these or any part of them” (Adams Papers).
      In his reply to Cool Thoughts, Adams sought to convince the British public that peace, based on the acknowledgment of American independence, was in Britain’s self-interest. His arguments reiterated several points contained in his replies to speeches in Parliament by Henry Seymour Conway and Lord George Germain (to Edmé Jacques Genet, 17 and 28 May, both above), and in his revision of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial (London, 1780; A Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial, 19 April – ca. 14 July, above). But his response to Galloway was not published so expeditiously as those other productions. Not until 1782, from August through December, was the reply published by Parker’s General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer in London, and then it was under the title of “Letters from a Distinguished American.”
      Understanding Adams’ motives for writing the letters in 1780, and the reason for their publication in 1782 is important for analyzing the development of his vision of the basis upon which an Anglo-American peace could be established, the future of Anglo-American and Franco-American relations, and the long-term direction of American foreign policy.
      Joseph Galloway dominated pre-revolutionary Pennsylvania politics. An able lawyer from a prominent family, Galloway was elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1756 and, except for the year 1764– 1765, served continuously until 1775, holding the office of speaker from 1766 to 1774. In the Assembly he was allied with Benjamin Franklin in efforts to overturn the proprietorship and transform Pennsylvania into a royal colony. Whether intentional or not, Galloway’s choice of a title for his 1780 pamphlet recalls that alliance, for in 1764, when both men were engaged in a pamphlet war against the proprietorship, Franklin published a piece entitled Cool Thoughts on the Present Situation of our Public Affairs (EvansCharles Evans and others, comps., American Bibliography: A Chronological Dictionary of All Books, Pamphlets and Periodical Publications Printed in the United States of America 1639–1800, Chicago and Worcester, 1903–1959; 14 vols., No. 9664; Franklin, PapersThe Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree, William B. Willcox (from vol. 15), Claude A. Lopez (vol. 27), Barbara B. Oberg (from vol. 28), and others, New Haven, 1959–., 11:153–173).
      In 1774, hoping to prevent radical elements from provoking an irreversible rupture with Britain, Galloway obtained election to the First Continental Congress. John Adams met Galloway there and described him as a “sensible and learned but cold Speaker”; more significant was Adams’ association of Galloway’s conception of the proper Anglo-American relationship in 1774 with Thomas Hutchinson’s approach in 1764, on the eve of the Stamp Act crisis (JA, Diary and AutobiographyDiary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L. H. Butterfield and others, Cambridge, 1961; 4 vols., 2:150, 119). Adams’ perception of this connection may explain his immediate attribution to Hutchinson of a role in writing Cool Thoughts (No. I, below) and, after learning of his death, his inclusion of a lengthy appraisal of Hutchinson’s life (No. VII, below), as well as his enthusiasm for undertaking a rebuttal of Cool Thoughts.
      Galloway’s major contribution at the First Continental Congress was his “Plan of Union.” The “Plan,” ultimately tabled and expunged from the minutes, provided for an American legislature to govern the colonies, with legislation originating either there or in the British Parliament, but with the approval of both required for enactment. The defeat of his plan and Congress’ adoption of more radical measures, led Galloway to refuse election to the Second Continental Congress. In 1776 he crossed the British lines to join Gen. William Howe in New Jersey, and in 1777 he joined the British invasion of Pennsylvania. In December 1777, Howe appointed Galloway superintendent-general of Philadelphia, in effect the civil governor of that occupied city. Galloway accompanied Howe’s army when it evacuated Philadelphia in June 1778 to return to New York, and in October he sailed for England, never to return. But he did not abandon his hope for an imperial constitution, and between 1774 and 1788 he produced no less than seven constitutional plans, with those done after 1774 predicated on the military conquest of the colonies (Julian Boyd, Anglo-American Union, Phila., 1941).
      By the late 1770s, Galloway believed that the incompetence of British commanders and a lack of resolve in London had unduly delayed military victory. In 1779, first in testimony before the Parliament and later in pamphlets attacking the Howe brothers, he sharply criticized British efforts to subdue the Americans (DABAllen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American Biography, New York, 1928–1936; 20 vols. plus index and supplements.; DNBLeslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography, New York and London, 1885–1900; 63 vols. plus supplements.). By 1780, Galloway was the most prominent loyalist refugee supporting the military conquest of the colonies and it was this fixation on a military solution that produced his Cool Thoughts.
      Cool Thoughts was ostensibly an objective analysis of the effect of American independence on British economic and political power, but its real purpose was to counter the arguments of such men as Josiah Tucker, the Dean of Gloucester (to Genet, 9 May, note 1, above), and Thomas Pownall, member of Parliament and former governor of Massachusetts (A Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial, 19 April – ca. 14 July, above). Both Tucker and Pownall believed that Britain would profit from American independence because it could then enjoy the economic benefits derived from the colonies without the expense of governing and protecting them. Galloway dismissed such arguments as heresy, declaring that rather than reaping any economic or political benefits from the loss of its American empire, Britain would be so weakened as to be in danger of foreign conquest.
      John Adams believed that Galloway’s arguments were both absurd and dangerous because they played to the illusions of the North ministry and of many members of Parliament who believed that the war could be settled short of complete American independence. In fact, it was the very absurdity of Galloway’s arguments that led Adams to see Cool Thoughts as the perfect vehicle upon which to base an American manifesto regarding the war and the future of Anglo-American relations.
      In his reply, Adams noted repeatedly that Galloway’s arguments justifying Britain’s efforts to retain its colonies were equally valid as reasons for the United States and its allies to continue their resistance, and he asserted that every disaster that Galloway foresaw Britain suffering from American independence could be avoided by making peace. Where Galloway demanded that Britain serve its self-interest by continuing the war to victory and reimposing the mercantilist navigation acts, John Adams called on Britain to serve its self-interest by granting independence and forging a new commercial relationship based on free trade. Where Galloway saw America as the perpetual tool of France in its rivalry with England, Adams foresaw American neutrality in future European wars. Where Galloway saw American independence resulting in a weakened Britain, unable to compete with or resist its foreign enemies, Adams anticipated a stronger Britain, once again engaged in the familiar channels of Anglo-American trade. And where Galloway thought a military victory possible, Adams deemed such an outcome doubtful and, if achieved, then pyrrhic.
      John Adams’ arguments in his reply to Galloway were heavily influenced by those in Thomas Pownall’s Memorial. By the time that he began his response to Galloway, Adams had had ample time to consider his reworking of the Memorial, which he had sent to the president of Congress in a long letter of 19 April, and was in the process of composing his Translation of the Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe upon the Present State of Affairs Between the Old and New World into Common Sense and Intelligible English, which would be published in French at Amsterdam in 1780 and in English at London in 1781 (A Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial, 19 April – ca. 14 July, Nos. I and II, above). Pownall’s Memorial was itself a repudiation of Galloway and those who shared his views, and its influence on the “Letters from a Distinguished American” is clear. But there are significant differences in style and content between the Memorial, Adams’ Translation, and his “Letters.”
      Pownall’s Memorial appealed to Adams because it emphasized the identity of American and British interests in ending the war. Adams’ revisions of Pownall’s arguments were directed at making this coincidence of interests even clearer, while leaving no doubt as to the actual position of the United States vis-à-vis Britain and the rest of the world. Cool Thoughts took the opposite position, that American and British interests were fundamentally opposed, and Adams saw it as essentially a policy statement by the North ministry written by its loyalist lackeys. Thus his reply to Galloway, while it followed the lines set down in the Memorial and the Translation, was far more polemical and much more explicit about the future course of American policy and the impact of a peace settlement on that policy.
      This is most evident in John Adams’ treatment of the future Franco-American relationship. In both the Memorial and Adams’ Translation, statements about the future neutrality of the United States merely implied that the Franco-American alliance, but not the commercial treaty, would lapse with the end of the war. In the fifth “Letter,” however, Adams states explicitly that “this treaty the Franco-American alliance lasts no longer than this

      war” (No. V, and note 3, below). This declaration was presumably intended to remove a major obstacle to peace: the fear that Britain was to be faced for all time to come by a tripartite alliance of the United States, France, and Spain. But this statement, which does not appear in the corresponding section of the Adams letter of 16 June to the president of Congress (No. 84, above), was a remarkable assertion for Adams to make in 1780, particularly in a piece intended for publication, because it contradicted all previous statements of American policy and the language of the treaty itself.
      Had the reply to Galloway been published in 1780, as John Adams clearly intended, it is doubtful that his identity would have remained secret. In that event the “Letters,” with their emphasis on the identity of British and American interests in making peace and the statement regarding the French alliance, could only have been seen as a direct American initiative to open peace negotiations. It would appear that, at least in 1780, John Adams’ commitment to the continuance of the war under the terms of the French alliance extended only to the point at which Britain was forced to acknowledge American independence and begin peace negotiations.
      It is significant that on the same day, 16 June, on which he wrote his first letter to the president of Congress regarding Cool Thoughts (No. 84, above), John Adams also wrote to the Comte de Vergennes. That letter began an acrimonious exchange over Congress’ revaluation of its currency on 18 March, the adequacy of French aid to the United States, the proper FrancoAmerican relationship, and the opening of negotiations with Britain. This debate, which had been building towards a climax since Adams’ arrival at Paris in February, ended only with Vergennes’ letter of 29 July, the last communication between the two men for nearly a year (The Revaluation Controversy, 16 June – 1 July; The Dispute with the Comte de Vergennes, 13–29 July, both above).
      Adams could have had few illusions about the prospects for success of any peace overtures to Britain in 1780, but his reply to Cool Thoughts does seem to be an effort to circumvent Vergennes’ objections to any effort by Adams to exercise his powers to negotiate a peace treaty. It may well reveal the degree to which the conflict with Vergennes was convincing Adams that there was a sharp divergence of French and American interests in a negotiated peace, and that France was the major obstacle to achieving it. Adams’ brief covering notes to Jenings of 8 and 22 July (Adams Papers) suggest that his Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial and his “Letters” were intended as companion pieces, part of a peace offensive, undertaken unilaterally in the face of French objections, that died in the face of British intransigence and the failure of the “Letters” to reach their intended audience.
      John Adams received Joseph Galloway’s Cool Thoughts as part of a package of newspapers and pamphlets sent by Thomas Digges (8 June, enclosure, above) which he acknowledged in a letter to Digges of 28 June (below). The pamphlet apparently arrived on or about 16 June, for in one letter of that date and two on the 17th, Adams undertook to inform Congress of the pamphlet and his views regarding it (Nos. 84, 85, and 86, all above). But he did not then inform Congress of any plans to publish a reply to Galloway, and did not begin the first of his “Letters from a Distinguished American” until almost a month later, on or about 14 July (No. I, and note 1, below). The three letters sent to Congress each dealt with a separate section of Cool Thoughts and served as the basis for the individual “Letters” dealing with that section. Thus the first six “Letters” were based on the letter of 16 June to Congress which dealt with the first part of Cool Thoughts: “On the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence” (Nos. I through VI, below); the next four were drawn from the first letter of 17 June, which concerned the second section: “On the Expence of Great Britain in the Settlement and Defence of the American Colonies” (Nos. VII through X, below); while the second letter of 17 June served as the basis for the first unpublished letter and pertained to the third section: “On the Value and Importance of the American Colonies and the West Indies to the British Empire” (No. XI, below). Only the final unpublished letter (No. XII, below) was neither derived from one of the letters to Congress nor intended as a response to Galloway, but rather was a critique of George III’s speech closing Parliament on 8 July (Parliamentary Hist.The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, London, 1806–1820; 36 vols., 21:766–769). Adams probably received this text on or about 22 July, the date of a letter to the president of Congress concerning the speech (No. 98, calendared, below).
      The letters to Congress mirror the organization of Galloway’s pamphlet, and determine the content of Adams’ “Letters” replying to Galloway. Adams selected, in consecutive order, the passages from Cool Thoughts upon which he wished to comment; the only significant differences between the quotations used in the letters to the president of Congress and those in the published “Letters” being occasional changes in format. But in the “Letters” Adams adds a much lengthier commentary, which makes the “Letters from a Distinguished American” more than three times as long as the letters to the president of Congress.
      A comparison of the location and order of the quotations in the letters to Congress and in the “Letters” intended for publication strongly suggests that the “Letters” were not printed in the General Advertiser in the order in which they were written. The editors see no compelling reason to publish the letters in the order of their appearance in the General Advertiser, which seems only to reflect their ordering and dating in 1782, probably by Edmund Jenings. As published here, the letters are placed in the order in which Adams presumably wrote them. The order of their publication is indicated in arabic numerals in their titles, below.
      The “Letters,” which John Adams sent to Edmund Jenings as enclosures in his letters of 14 (below) and 22 July (Adams Papers), apparently comprised forty-three folio pages of text (No. I, and note 1; Nos. XI and XII, descriptive notes, below). Jenings acknowledged receipt of the second installment on 27 July (below), noting that the “Letters” were so important “that I shall be careful to whom, they are trusted, and therefore may perhaps wait a little while, before I find a Convenient Opportunity.” Six weeks later, on 14 September, Jenings wrote that “the Translation of Pownal and the other papers are got safe to my Friends Hands and He is preparing to publish them together and then proposes to retail it out in the News Papers” (below). If by “other papers” Jenings meant the “Letters,” then his friend’s preparations were considerably delayed—for nearly two years.
      Not until 11 February 1781, however, did Adams write to Jenings to inquire “what is become of the Remarks upon Galloway?” (Adams Papers). No reply has been found, and Adams did not inquire after his “Letters” again until 17 July 1782, when he added that “since they are not worth printing, in London I would have them published here in French” (Adams Papers). On 11 August, Jenings replied that “the Person to whom I sent some time ago the answer to Galloway is very idle or very busy,” for “I have written to him several times to publish it” (Adams Papers). Finally, on 22 August 1782, Jenings announced that the letters would soon appear in the General Advertiser (Adams Papers).
      Jenings’ letter of 11 August 1782 provides his only explanation for the delay in publication, and it explains very little. Nowhere does Jenings indicate why the “Letters” were not published in 1780 or 1781. In his letter of 11 August, he appears to be as perplexed as Adams about the holdup in publication, and seems to indicate that he had sent the manuscript off long before. That would accord with his letter of 14 September 1780. But did Jenings, in fact, send the “Letters” off to London in 1780 or did he wait until sometime after the fall of the North ministry in March 1782? Notations in Jenings’ hand on the final, undated and unpublished “Letter” (No. XII, descriptive note, and note 5, below) and a reference in the sixth published “Letter” (No. V, and note 9, below) seem to show that he began, but did not complete, work on the manuscript in the fall of 1780, resumed his editing at the end of 1781 or the beginning of 1782, and finished only after the North ministry had fallen.
      One can only conjecture why the “Letters from a Distinguished American” were not printed in 1780 or 1781. It may be that Jenings’ explanation in his letter of 11 August 1782, that his friend in London had been “very idle or very busy,” is correct. But it seems incredible that such idleness or business would extend over a period of almost two years. An alternative explanation might be that when Jenings received the manuscript in July 1780, Britain was in political turmoil owing to the capture of Charleston, the Gordon Riots, and the impending parliamentary elections. Jenings or his London printer may have thought that it was not a propitious time to publish a series of letters intended to bring about Anglo-American negotiations. Jenings may even have wished to spare John Adams the consequences of a diplomatic indiscretion if his authorship became known.
      Yet none of these conjectures explain why such circumstances or considerations did not also apply with regard to Adams’ other efforts during this period. John Adams’ replies to the speeches by Conway and Germain were published at London in late June or early July, and his Translation appeared in early January 1781 (from Edmund Jenings, 9 July, above; A Translation of Thomas Pownall’s Memorial, 19 April – ca. 14 July, Editorial Note, above). A quite different explanation, even more conjectural than the rest, would assign the delay to ministerial influence exerted through either Jenings or his printer, for the appearance of John Adams’ reply to Cool Thoughts could not have been pleasing to the North ministry.
      There is no similar uncertainty concerning the reasons for the “Letters’” publication in 1782. In Parker’s General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer of 16 August 1782 a letter, perhaps by Jenings, announced the forthcoming publication of the “Letters” and indicated that they were intended to counter any plans by the newly instituted Shelburne ministry to seek an Anglo-American peace settlement that would leave the United States short of complete independence (see No. I, note 2, below). The “Letters from a Distinguished American” would make it clear that any such solution was both unacceptable to the Americans and contrary to British interests.
      The publication of the “Letters” for that purpose made them part of the final peace process, which resulted in the signing of a preliminary peace treaty on 30 November 1782, a far different role for the essays than Adams had contemplated in 1780. Then Adams had intended his reply to Galloway to be seen as the work of an Englishman who, by pointing out the fallacies of Galloway’s arguments and their contravention of British self-interest, sought to influence the policies of his own country. The changed circumstances of 1782 required either Jenings or the printer to introduce the “Letters” in a new fashion.
      The introductory letter in the General Advertiser of 16 August implied that the “Letters” had been written just prior to the fall of the North ministry in March, and thus they were dated in late January and early February 1782. The dateline also indicated that they originated at Paris, a likely location for the American who wrote the “Letters.” This was particularly so since he was a “Distinguished American,” who by implication was not simply a representative of the Continental Congress, but one of its peace negotiators. This might have led one to conclude that the author was Benjamin Franklin, for John Adams was at Amsterdam in early 1782, but there is no evidence that Jenings, or whoever provided the date and location, intended anything more than a generic “Distinguished American.” Whatever the reason for dating the “Letters” at Paris in early 1782, they took on the status of an official policy statement of the reasons dictating an immediate commencement of Anglo-American peace negotiations as well as an assessment of the Anglo-American relationship that could be expected to result from those negotiations.
      Writing to Jenings on 16 and 27 September 1782 (both Adams Papers), shortly after he received the first of the published letters, John Adams indicated that he was happy that they were finally printed, but he expressed concern over the editorial changes. Although the essays were done “with the Design of being printed as written by a Briton,” the readers were told that they were the work of an American. The retention of Adams’ original pronouns to indicate British authorship in nearly every passage would probably lead to the conclusion that the essays were the work of “a Penitent Refugee,” rather than a true partisan of the American cause. Adams also wondered at the new date lines, believing that “they ought to have more Weight for having been written two years and an half ago.”
      Taken together, the “Letters from a Distinguished American,” Adams’ Translation, and several other pieces published in the London newspapers constitute a peace offensive intended to bring the British government to the bargaining table in 1780. A peace offensive undertaken, however, without Congress’ knowledge or consent. Adams did not inform Congress of his contributions to the London papers in 1780 or of the 1781 publication of the Translation. It learned of the “Letters from a Distinguished American” only from an entry in Adams’ “Peace Journal” for 4 December 1782, indicating their appearance in the General Advertiser, and his letter of 9 June 1783 to Robert R. Livingston that noted the publication of portions of the “Letters” in Antoine Marie Cerisier’s Le politique hollandais (JA, Diary and AutobiographyDiary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L. H. Butterfield and others, Cambridge, 1961; 4 vols., 3:88–89; Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev.Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Washington, 1889; 6 vols., 6:477–478). Adams’ disclosure of the “Letters’” publication in newspapers that Congress was unlikely to receive, may indicate his desire to take credit for furthering the peace process. But it also reflects Adams’ integrity and determination to deal forthrightly with Congress regardless of the consequences. In any case, Congress already had the three letters written in June 1780 that served as the basis for the printed reply to Galloway.
      In any event, Adams’ peace offensive was stillborn when the Translation did not appear until early 1781 and the “Letters” not until 1782. Had they been published promptly, however, they would probably not have achieved their objective because the “Letters,” and the other productions of Adams’ pen, were based on an analysis of the British political and economic situation that, while generally accurate, underestimated the ability or willingness of the North ministry to carry on the war. Britain was becoming increasingly isolated and its long-term economic prospects were endangered by a continuation of the war, but in 1780 this was not enough to bring about Anglo-American negotiations.
      By August 1782, when the first of the “Letters” appeared, the North ministry had fallen, the outlook of the new British leadership was quite different, and negotiations were in the offing. In that context, the “Letters” were more appropriate to the situation existing in August 1782 than that prevailing in 1780, and consequently were capable of exerting greater influence than they would have earlier, although the extent to which they did have influence is unclear. Nevertheless, one is left to conclude, in the absence of any wholly satisfactory explanation for the long publication delay, that if peace negotiations had not been imminent and such men as Jenings not doubtful of the Shelburne ministry’s willingness to grant full independence, the “Letters from a Distinguished American” might never have appeared.
      The publication history of the “Letters” is a short one. Of the letters to Congress of 16 and 17 June that formed the basis for the “Letters,” only that of the 16th and the first letter of the 17th have been published previously. Jared Sparks included them in his collection (Diplomatic Correspondenceof the American Revolution, 12 vols., Boston, 1829–1830, 5:190–200, 201–207), as did Francis Wharton in his (Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev.,Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Washington, 1889; 6 vols. 3:787–793, 794–798), but Charles Francis Adams omitted them from his Life and Works of John Adams. As to the “Letters” themselves, there were no additional European printings after their appearance in Politique Hollandais, and no American edition until 1978 when James H. Hutson compiled and edited Letters from a Distinguished American, the first edition to include both the published and unpublished “Letters.” In these volumes the editors have sought to present all of the material relevant to the drafting and publication of the “Letters” and to place them in their historical context.


Title: II. “Letters from a Distinguished American,” No. 2, 14 July 1780; 28 January 1782
From: Adams, John
To:

       SIR

        ante 14 July 1780

       Paris, Jan. 28, 1782

      Every American will agree with the writer on the consequence of American Independence, that the United States, when their Independence shall be no longer disputed, can wish for no other connection with Europe than that of commerce. No good American would wish to involve his country in the labyrinths of European negotiations, or in the iniquities of their wars. America will wish to be a common blessing to all the nations of Europe, without injuring any; and such will be her demand for the productions of each of them, that each one will derive material advantages in the increase of the means of subsistence, and consequent population, from supplying her wants. Each of them wants her commodities in exchange, and no one of them can reasonably wish to cramp the growth, and prevent the happiness of the human species in both worlds, by confining the advantages of this commerce to itself.
      It is equally clear, that this commerce will be better secured by her own wisdom, than by the domination of any European power; and safer in the hands of an ally than a master. But it is amazing that this man’s malice against his native country should have suffered such important truths in her favour to escape him. It shews that he knows not how to conduct the cause he has patronised, and that he is as wrong headed, as he is malicious and insidious.
      “The new states are, and will continue the allies of France, our natural enemy, unless reduced.” England ought to consider, whether all attempts to reduce the new States have not a tendency to rivet the alliance with France, and to drive the States to the necessity of forming closer connections with her than they have now; to make all America too the natural enemy of England for ever; to drive her to more rigorous renunciations of British trade; nay, to a final and total prohibition of it; to enter into engagements with France, Spain, Holland, and other maritime powers, to this effect. It ought to be considered, whether, the new States will not become soon the allies of Spain too, and continue so for ever, If this war is pursued much farther. As to reducing these States, the idea of it, at this day, is fit only for ridicule and contempt. It is derided in every town in America. This country will never again be in quiet and continual possession of one State of the thirteen, not even of Georgia. South Carolina, where we are melting into disease and death that army which ought to be defending the West India Islands, will never be ours a single month; no, not for an hour.
      This writer goes on, “The far greater part of the people wish and hope for an union with this country.” It is not possible to conceive any thing more barefacedly false than this. A Germain, or a Conway may be excused, on account of ignorance and misinformation; but this man knows better than he says. But having forfeited his life to the laws of his country, and by the black catalogue of his crimes, rendered himself unpardonable, he has vowed to revenge himself, not like Coriolanus, by his sword, but by misrepresentations.
      But he adds, “the greater part of the people are ready to unite with the King’s forces, in reducing the power of their tyrants,” by which he means, no doubt, the Congress and the new government. Nothing can shew the complection of this assertion better than to recollect the orders which are constantly given by the Commanding Officers in New York, which are published in the newspapers. They dare not trust the Provincials and Volunteers, and Militia, &c. as they call them, of whom such an ostentatious parade is made in the dispatches of Commanding Officers and Court Gazettes. They exercise them in the day time with bits of wood in their musquets for flints; they take the arms from them every night, and pile them in the magazines; and they forbid them to be trusted with any quantity of powder. The truth is, the only consequence that the Commanders of the English troops have found, in giving arms and cloathing and ammunition to any of the inhabitants, whenever they have been, has been to cloath, arm, and supply their expences. General Burgoyne found it so in New England, and New York. General Howe found it so in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware; and Sir Henry Clinton and Earl Cornwallis found it so in Georgia and South Carolina. What encouragement could have been given that has not? Is exemption from plunder encouragement? Forbid plunder, and half your army will desert; nay, for the provisions, horses, cattle, you take, you enrich the country with English guineas, and enable the people to buy arms, ammunition, cloathing, and every thing they want from your own soldiers. By large bounties, and by commissions, a few banditti, who have no honour nor principle to bind them to any country, or any cause, may be collected, but these would betray their new masters the first opportunity, and will be very few in number. The great body of the people in every state revere the Congress, more sincerely, than British soldiers revere their . . . . They reverence it as the voice of their country, the guardians of its right, and the voice of God; and they esteem their Independence and alliance with France, as the two greatest blessings which Providence ever yet bestowed upon the new world. They think them equal blessings to Europe in general, as to America; and are universally of opinion, that a Council of Statesmen consulting for their good, and the good of mankind, could not have devised a plan, so much for their honour, interest, liberty and happiness, as that which has been derived, by the folly and imprudence of Great Britain. He goes on, “the treachery of this country, in not exerting its powers for their relief, will create permanent resentment.” How many lives, and how many millions, has this country already sacrificed? Probably more lives, certainly more millions than the whole of the last war cost us. What was the fruit of the last war? Triumph and conquest by sea and land in every part of the world. What the effect of this? Defeat, disgrace, loss of America, West India Islands, African, Mediterranean, and German and Holland trade, the contempt of all nations, the Independence of Ireland, and a civil war in England; yet the war is to be continued!
      “Gratitude to the nations which shall save them from our ravages, will stamp impressions never to be effaced.” Stop the ravages then; and the further gratitude and impressions will be prevented. “Further Treaties of Alliance and Commerce will be made.” No longer war, no further Treaties. This can only be the effect of British imprudence. The treaties already made are well known. What further treaties Ministry may drive them to, will depend upon themselves.
      With the Independence of America, we must give up our fisheries “on the Banks of Newfoundland and in the American seas.” Supposing this true, which it is not at present, but our infatuation in continuing the war may make it so, what follows? If Britain lose them, who will gain them? France and America. Have not France and America then as urgent a motive to contend for the gain, as we to prevent the loss? Are they not an object as important and desirable to France and America, as to us? Have they not as much reason to fight for them, as England? Will they easily give up the Independence of America, which is to bear such tempting fruit? One would think this writer was in the interest of France and America still, and labouring to persuade them, that they are fighting for a rich and a glorious prize. The question then is reduced to another, viz. which has the best prospect of contending for them successfully—America, France and Spain, favoured by all the world, or England, thwarted and opposed by all the world? And to whom did God and Nature give them? Ministry lay great stress upon the gift of God and Nature, when they consider the advantages of our insular situation, to justify their injustice and hostility against all the maritime powers. Why should Americans hold the blessings of Providence in a baser estimination, which they can enjoy, without injury to any nation whatever.
      “With American Independence, says he, we must give up thirty-five thousand American seamen, and twenty-eight thousand more, bred and maintained in those excellent nurseries, the fisheries. Our valuable trade, carried on from thence with the Roman Catholic States, will be in the hands of America. These nurseries, and this trade, will ever remain the natural right of the people, who inhabit that country. A trade so profitable, and a nursery of seamen so excellent, and so necessary for the support of her naval force, will never be given up, or even divided by America with any power whatsoever.”
      If all this were true, what then? If Britain loses it all, by American Independence, who will gain it? These advantages are not to be lost out of the world. Who will find them, but America and France? These are the powers at war, for these very objects, if they are the necessary consequences of American Independence, will they not fight as bravely to obtain them, as the English? It is here admitted they are the natural right of America, will not she contend for it? Who then has the most power, one nation or three? Perhaps five or six before the end? Are 60,000 seamen a feebler bulwark for America or France, than for England? Are they feebler instruments of wealth, power and glory, in the service of America, than England? At the command of Congress, than the King? The question occurs then, who is the strongest? However, we need not lose so many seamen, nor the fishery, nor the trade with the Roman Catholick countries, by American Independence. America never thought of excluding England from the fishery; and even her seamen, her share of the fishery, and the profits of her trade to Roman Catholick countries would again, be useful to England, and center here, if peace were made now. But let it be remembered, America grows every day of this war more independent of England for manufactures, by the amazing increase of her own; and France, Spain, and even the states of Italy and Germany, and Ireland too, are every day putting themselves more and more in a condition to supply America; so that every day of the continuance of this ruinous war, increases the facility and the inclinations of America to supply herself elsewhere, and the capacity of other nations to supply her, and of consequence makes it more and more inevitable for England to lose the seamen, the fisheries, and the trade. The question recurs at every sentence, who is the ablest to hold out? America, that grows stronger every year, and that too in ways and degrees that England has no idea of, or England that grows weaker? But England’s misfortune and ruin are, that it never knew America, nor her resources, nor the character of her people.
      (To be continued.)