Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 21 (Francis Childs’s Version), [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton then reassumed his argument. When, said he, I had the honor to address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances which attended the Convention, when forming the Plan before you. I endeavored to point out to you the principles of accommodation, on which this arrangement was made; and to shew that the contending interests of the States led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the second place I attempted to prove, that, in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure.
Sir, no man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree that there should be a broad democratic branch in the national legislature. But this matter, Sir, depends on circumstances; It is impossible, in the first instance to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on the subject of government, I rely more on the interests and the opinions of men, than on any speculative parchment provisions whatever. I have found, that Constitutions are more or less excellent, as they are more or less agreeable to the natural operation of things: I am therefore disposed not to dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and forms; but to adopt a system, whose principles have been sanctioned by experience; adapt it to the real state of our country; and depend on probable reasonings for its operation and result. I contend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies afford perfect security, in the present state of things; and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the General Convention, will leave not an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation: This will be the standing instruction to their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the Members of Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reasoning upon the subject, there seems to be this fallacy: They suppose that the representative will have no motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty; or on the other, but corruption: They do not reflect, that he is to return to the community; that he is dependent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this rule: There are certain conjunctures, when it may be necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the people have formed: But in the general course of things, the popular views and even prejudices will direct the actions of the rulers.
All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case: In these, the will of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the laws which control the community, receive their tone and spirit from the public wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined: Here then we may expect the laws to be proportionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy; and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate conformity between the views of the representative and his constituent. If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place: They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the State Legislatures, which appoint the Senators, may enjoin it also upon them. Sir, if I believed that the number would remain at sixty-five, I confess I should give my vote for an amendment; though in a different form from the one proposed.

The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twenty thousand: I would ask, by what rule or reasoning it is determined, that one man is a better representative for twenty than thirty thousand? At present we have three millions of people; in twenty-five years, we shall have six millions; and in forty years, nine millions: And this is a short period, as it relates to the existence of States. Here then, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have, in forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be true, and if this be a safe representation, why be dissatisfied? why embarrass the Constitution with amendments, that are merely speculative and useless. I agree with the gentleman, that a very small number might give some colour for suspicion: I acknowledge, that ten would be unsafe; on the other hand, a thousand would be too numerous. But I ask him, why will not ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation? This at present appears to be the proper medium. Besides, the President of the United States will be himself the representative of the people. From the competition that ever subsists between the branches of government, the President will be induced to protect their rights, whenever they are invaded by either branch. On whatever side we view this subject, we discover various and powerful checks to the encroachments of Congress. The true and permanent interests of the members are opposed to corruption: Their number is vastly too large for easy combination: The rivalship between the houses will forever prove an insuperable obstacle: The people have an obvious and powerful protection in their own State governments: Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual observation, will be capable of forming and conducting plans of regular opposition. Can we suppose the people’s love of liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused into resistance, and the madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow? Sir, the danger is too distant; it is beyond all rational calculations.
It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity: When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. In these assemblies, the enemies of the people brought forward their plans of ambition systematically. They were opposed by their enemies of another party; and it became a matter of contingency, whether the people subjected themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant or by another.
It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous representation was necessary to obtain the confidence of the people. This is not generally true. The confidence of the people will easily be gained by a good administration. This is the true touchstone. I could illustrate the position, by a variety of historical examples, both ancient and modern. In Sparta, the Ephori were a body of magistrates, instituted as a check upon the senate, and representing the people. They consisted of only five men: But they were able to protect their rights, and therefore enjoyed their confidence and attachment. In Rome, the people were represented by three Tribunes, who were afterwards increased to ten. Every one acquainted with the history of that republic, will recollect how powerful a check to the senatorial encroachments, this small body proved; how unlimited a confidence was placed in them by the people whose guardians they were; and to what a conspicuous station in the government, their influence at length elevated the Plebians. Massachusetts has three hundred representatives; New York has sixty-five. Have the people in this state less confidence in their representation, than the people of that? Delaware has twenty-one: Do the inhabitants of New-York feel a higher confidence than those of Delaware? I have stated these examples, to prove that the gentleman’s principle is not just. The popular confidence depends on circumstances very distinct from considerations of number. Probably the public attachment is more strongly secured by a train of prosperous events, which are the result of wise deliberation and vigorous execution, and to which large bodies are much less competent than small ones. If the representative conducts with propriety, he will necessarily enjoy the good will of the constituent. It appears then, if my reasoning be just, that the clause is perfectly proper, upon the principles of the gentleman who contends for the amendment: as there is in it the greatest degree of present security, and a moral certainty of an increase equal to our utmost wishes.
It has been farther, by the gentlemen in opposition, observed, that a large representation is necessary to understand the interests of the people. This principle is by no means true in the extent to which the gentleman seems to carry it. I would ask, why may not a man understand the interests of thirty as well as of twenty? The position appears to be made upon the unfounded presumption, that all the interests of all parts of the community must be represented. No idea is more erroneous than this. Only such interests are proper to be represented, as are involved in the powers of the General Government. These interests come compleatly under the observation of one, or a few men; and the requisite information is by no means augmented in proportion to the increase of number. What are the objects of the Government? Commerce, taxation, &c. In order to comprehend the interests of commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat is raised, and in what proportion it is produced in one district and in another? By no means. Neither is this species of knowledge necessary in general calculations upon the subject of taxation. The information necessary for these purposes, is that which is open to every intelligent enquirer; and of which, five men may be as perfectly possessed as fifty. In royal governments, there are usually particular men to whom the business of taxation is committed. These men have the forming of systems of finance; and the regulation of the revenue. I do not mean to commend this practice. It proves however, this point; that a few individuals may be competent to these objects; and that large numbers are not necessary to perfection in the science of taxation. But granting, for a moment, that this minute and local knowledge the gentlemen contend for, is necessary, let us see, if under the New Constitution, it will not probably be found in the representation. The natural and proper mode of holding elections, will be to divide the state into districts, in proportion to the number to be elected. This state will consequently be divided at first into six. One man from each district will probably possess all the knowledge the gentlemen can desire. Are the senators of this state more ignorant of the interests of the people, than the assembly? Have they not ever enjoyed their confidence as much? Yet, instead of six districts, they are elected in four; and the chance of their being collected from the smaller divisions of the state consequently diminished. Their number is but twenty-four; and their powers are co-extensive with those of the assembly, and reach objects, which are most dear to the people—life, liberty and property.
Sir, we hear constantly a great deal, which is rather calculated to awake our passions, and create prejudices, than to conduct us to truth, and teach us our real interests. I do not suppose this to be the design of the gentlemen. Why then are we told so often of an aristocracy? For my part, I hardly know the meaning of this word as it is applied. If all we hear be true, this government is really a very bad one. But who are the aristocracy among us? Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank above their fellow citizens; and possessing powers entirely independent of them? The arguments of the gentlemen only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men who are poor, some who are wise, and others who are not—That indeed every distinguished man is an aristocrat. This reminds me of a description of the aristocrats, I have seen in a late publication, styled the Federal Farmer. The author reckons in the aristocracy, all governors of states, members of Congress, chief magistrates, and all officers of the militia. This description, I presume to say, is ridiculous. The image is a phantom. Does the new governmen render a rich man more eligible than a poor one? No. It requires no such qualification. It is bottomed on the broad and equal principle of your state constitution.
Sir, if the people have it in their option, to elect their most meritorious men; is this to be considered as an objection? Shall the constitution oppose their wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege? While property contines to be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of information pervades the community; the tendency of the people’s suffrages, will be to elevate merit even from obscurity. As riches increase and accumulate in few hands; as luxury prevails in society; virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature: It is what, neither the honorable member nor myself can correct. It is a common misfortune, that awaits our state constitution, as well as all others.
There is an advantage incident to large districts of election, which perhaps the gentlemen, amidst all their apprehensions of influence and bribery, have not adverted to. In large districts, the corruption of the electors is much more difficult: Combinations for the purposes of intrigue are less easily formed: Factions and cabals are little known. In a small district, wealth will have a more complete influence; because the people in the vicinity of a great man, are more immediately his dependants, and because this influence has fewer objects to act upon. It has been remarked, that it would be disagreeable to the middle class of men to go to the seat of the new government. If this be so, the difficulty will be enhanced by the gentleman’s proposal. If his argument be true, it proves, that the larger the representation is, the less will be your choice of having it filled. But, it appears to me frivolous to bring forward such arguments as these. It has answered no other purpose, than to induce me, by way of reply, to enter into discussions, which I consider as useless, and not applicable to our subject.

It is a harsh doctrine, that men grow wicked in proportion as they improve and enlighten their minds. Experience has by no means justified us in the supposition, that there is more virtue in one class of men than in another. Look through the rich and the poor of the community; the learned and the ignorant. Where does virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the quantity but kind of vices, which are incident to the various classes; and here the advantage of character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the prosperity of the state, than those of the indigent; and partake less of moral depravity.
After all, Sir, we must submit to this idea, that the true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect, in proportion as the current of popular favour is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is adhered to; where, in the organization of the government, the legislative, executive and judicial branches are rendered distinct; where again the legislative is divided into separate houses, and the operations of each are controuled by various checks and balances, and above all, by the vigilance and weight of the state governments; to talk of tyranny, and the subversion of our liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm. This balance between the national and state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other. Indeed they will both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional limits, by a certain rivalship, which will ever subsist between them. I am persuaded, that a firm union is as necessary to perpetuate our liberties, as it is to make us respectable; and experience will probably prove, that the national government will be as natural a guardian of our freedom, as the state legislatures themselves.
Suggestions, Sir, of an extraordinary nature, have been frequently thrown out in the course of the present political controversy. It gives me pain to dwell on topics of this kind; and I wish they might be dismissed. We have been told, that the old Confederation has proved inefficacious, only because intriguing and powerful men, aiming at a revolution, have been forever instigating the people, and rendering them disaffected with it. This, Sir, is a false insinuation. The thing is impossible. I will venture to assert, that no combination of designing men under Heaven, will be capable of making a government unpopular, which is in its principles a wise and good one; and vigorous in its operations.
The Confederation was framed amidst the agitation and tumult of society. It was composed of unfound materials put together in haste. Men of intelligence discovered the feebleness of the structure, in the first stages of its existence; but the great body of the people, too much engrossed with their distresses, to contemplate any but the immediate causes of them, were ignorant of the defects of their Constitution. But, when the dangers of war were removed, they saw clearly what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suffer from a feeble form of government. There was no need of discerning men to convince the people of their unhappy situation—the complaint was co-extensive with the evil, and both were common to all classes of the community. We have been told, that the spirit of patriotism and love of liberty are almost extinguished among the people; and that it has become a prevailing doctrine, that republican principles ought to be hooted out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such remarks as these are rather occasioned by the heat of argument, than by a cool conviction of their truth and justice. As far as my experience has extended, I have heard no such doctrine, nor have I discovered any diminution of regard for those rights and liberties, in defence of which, the people have fought and suffered. There have been, undoubtedly, some men who have had speculative doubts on the subject of government; but the principles of republicanism are founded on too firm a basis to be shaken by a few speculative and sceptical reasoners. Our error has been of a very different kind. We have erred through excess of caution, and a zeal false and impracticable. Our counsels have been destitute of consistency and stability. I am flattered with a hope, Sir, that we have now found a cure for the evils under which we have so long labored. I trust, that the proposed Constitution affords a genuine specimen of representative and republican government—and that it will answer, in an eminent degree, all the beneficial purposes of society.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 21 (John McKesson’s Version), [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
I endeavoured to Shew that the Contending Interests of the States produced that Compromise—
That it would finally produce Safety—
That all Attempts to vary that Clause will be useless—
That it will finally from Circumstances & Cause produce a sufficient Represantation—
I Contend that 65 & 24 will [be] sufficient for the Safety of the Country—the [number] will encrease—in 20 or 25 years be 200 sufficient—
The Gent. Contends that the encrease being by Ratio will not encrease the Power—The Members interested in not encreasing the Number—
This falacy—the Gentleman considers this as a permanent Body—but it is only for 2 years—
In General The Voice of the People governs the Representatives—
This becomes more in every Governmt.
Example France—

Our People are more enlightened than any other and will become more and more so—
If [it] shall be the Wish of the People of America to encrease the Representation it must be done—
The Senate will also have their Effect
Confident that the Augmentation of the Representation will be progressive—
The Man in place where his Governmt. does not grow must Consent to encrease the number to save his own States nos
The State Governmts. must have great Influence on the Genl. Govt.—
It was necessary to leave Discretion [to] the Genl Govt.
And it is impossible they should not encrease—
On [the] Gent plan it will encrease in the Ratio of 20,000 instead of 30,000—
At present 3 Mill. 25 years 6 Mill 40 years 9 Mill—
30,000 for 1 a safe Representation at that time it will be more so now—
I admit 10 too Small—he admits 1000 would be a Mob
Is not 91 a Sufficient Safe Number & the Presidt. himself a Represent—we have but 65 & 24
Why is not the Same Number Safer for the united States than for this State—
91 Members in the first Instance for the Genl Govt.
Suppose that Govt. could be corrupted—
Would there be equal Danger as Corruption in the State Govt—
Would not the State Govermts interfere—
How Soon would their Despotism or Combinations be defeated—
It would be disagreable to trace it but all that can be alldged agt. the National Govt. may be alledged agt. the Governmt. of this State—
We may Suppose Men Love power—but not Suppose them mad—
When a Representation is encreased One Step it thence remains permanent—
The Senate will have the Same Sentiments as the assembly—
A large Body of Men more easily distracted and Managed than a Smaller or Selected Body Men—
Where people met in Bodies they never Acted with System

The Magistrates managed them & brot thro their plans—
A Collective Body less Safe than a Select Body—
The wish of the larger States to encrease their Represent in proportion to their Population will encrease the Represent—
Said the Confidence of the People necessary and therefore numbers necessary—
Negativ[e] Few or many if they have Confidence
In Sparta 2
In Rome at first 2 afterwards 10—From their power extended the power of the Democracy over the Aristocracy—
Is the Confidence of Mass. in 30. more than in 21 in Delaware
We have 65. is Confidence less here—
Therefore the Confidence of the people not in proportion to the number of Representatives—
Ergo—the Number here is sufficient for Confidence and to answer all our Purposes—
This Numerous Representat necessary to know and understand the Interests of the People
If a Man can Understand the Interest of 20,000 why can he not understand the Interest of 30,000—
What are they to know—Commerce—Taxes—Treaties—and Some minuter things—
Commerce he must know the produce of the Country and to what Extent exported—
Select men will know enough of this without all the minutiæ of the matter—
There will be sufficient Security—Suppose this State in 6 Districts, take one Man out of each District will he not know the wants of the people—
In our State Senate we chuse only in 4 Districts—find no Inconvenience in it—
Six would necessaryly possess all that local Knowledge of their Constituents contended—
Much Imagination than attention to facts in the reasoning on this Subject—
We hear more which tends to encrease Prejudices—
Aristocracy—

1st.   The best men who have most Virtue & Goodness of Heart
2d.   An Independt. Body of men not depending on the Choice of the People—We have none such
There will always be Men more Rich and more wise or Sensible than others—
2d Vol. of federal Farmer—Natural Aristocracy—
1st. Govrs. of States.
2d. Members of Congress
3 Judges of Sup. Court
4 Officers of Militia
Does this fix any other Qualifications to Electors or elected than your own Constitution
If men chuse Rich or wise men they will have their Choice
This Country will change—
As wealth encreases Men of greater Fortunes will be elected
This is according to the State of Society—
A Moderate Representation will occasion larger Districts of Election—This will operate well—The best men and of probity will [be] elected—This will therefore be the best Govt—It will not be Rich or Poor but the men who have deserved Confidence—
Wealth might operate in Small Districts—Merit in large ones—
It was observed
It would be disagreable to men of Middling Class to be sent to mix with such a Body—
There will always be there different Classes
The point of Connection between Representative and the Represented are duty and Gratitude—
There is not more Virtue or Vice in one class of Citizens than Another—
It is harsh to suppose a Monopoly
This System founded on Republican Principles—The People are to be represented by whom they think proper to chuse
The Judic[i]al Separated—One Body Checks another and therefore the People must be free—
The People will have the greatest Security by a State Govt and a National Govt.
This is essential to the Liberty of the Country—It sets Power agt.

Power—Let usurpation arise the People will have an Arm of Support—
As to power when we come to that I shall Shew that the State Govts. are safe—Safer than the Genl Governmt.
Things to be dismissed
That the Confederat. has failed of Effect because it has been traduced by many Gentlemen—
1st. This is an Ill complimt. to the People—2d. If a Constitution or Governmt. has operated well and had a good Effect the People will not believe any thing said agt. it—Therefore traduction vain—It weakness in a Govt. will make it an Object of Criticism & Contempt—to its radical defectiveness muct be attributed its Contempt—
I find the Spirit of Patriotism as high as ever—
I believe No fact to Support Republican Principles hooted out of the World—
There are men of Different Ideas—but all men agree that Republican Principles & govt. are the most Noble
—We have been too diffident of the Noblest princ[ip]les which should be cherished—and restrained a Sufficient Power
—This Constitution tempered tis that Moderate mean we shall here find the true support of Liberty and republican Governmt—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of June 21, [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton   I do contend that this Constitution is a federal Republic.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of June 21 (Francis Childs’s Version), [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
The Hon. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman I rise to take notice of the observations of the hon. member from Ulster. I imagine the objections he has stated, are susceptible of a complete and satisfactory refutation. But before I proceed to this, I shall attend to the arguments advanced by the gentlemen from Albany and Dutchess. These arguments have been frequently urged, and much confidence has been placed in their strength: The danger of corruption has been dwelt upon with peculiar emphasis, and presented to our view in the most heightened and unnatural colouring: Events, merely possible have been magnified by distempered imagination into inevitable realities; and the most distant and doubtful conjectures have been formed into a serious and infallible prediction. In the same spirit, the most fallacious calculations have been made: The lowest possible quorum has been contemplated as the number to transact important business; and a majority of these to decide in all cases on questions of infinite moment. Allowing, for the present, the propriety and truth of these apprehensions, it would be easy, in comparing the two constitutions, to prove that the chances of corruption under the new, are much fewer that those to which the old one is exposed. Under the old confederation, the important powers of declaring war, making peace, &c. can be exercised by nine states. On the presumption that the smallest constitutional number will deliberate and decide, those interesting powers will be committed to fewer men, under the ancient than under the new government. In the former, eighteen members, in the latter, not less than twenty-four may determine all great questions. Thus on the principles of the gentlemen, the fairer prospect of safety is clearly visible in the new government. That we may have the fullest conviction of the truth of this position, it ought to be suggested, as a decisive argument, that it will ever be the interest of the several states to maintain, under the new government, an ample representation: For, as every member has a vote, the relative influence and authority of each state will be in proportion to the number of representatives she has in Congress. There is not therefore a shadow of probability, that the number of acting members in the general legislature, will be ever reduced to a bare quorum; especially as the expence of their support is to be defrayed from a federal treasury: But under the existing confederation, as each state has but one vote, it will be a matter of indifference, on the score of influence, whether she delegates two or six representatives: And the maintenance of them forming a striking article in the state expenditures, will forever prove a capital inducement to retain or withdraw from the federal legislature, those delegates which her selfishness may too often consider as superfluous.
There is another source of corruption, in the old government, which the proposed plan is happily calculated to remedy. The concurrence of nine states, as has been observed, is necessary to pass resolves the most important, and on which, the safety of the republic may depend. If these nine states are at any time assembled, a foreign enemy, by dividing a state and gaining over and silencing a single member, may frustrate the most indispensible plan of national policy, and totally prevent a measure, essential to the welfare or existence of the empire. Here, then, we find a radical, dangerous defect, which will forever embarrass and obstruct the machine of government; and suspend our fate on the uncertain virtue of an individual. What a difference between the old and new constitution strikes our view! In the one, corruption must embrace a majority; in the other, her poison administered to a single man, may render the efforts of a majority totally vain. This mode of corruption is still more dangerous, as its operations are more secret and imperceptible: The exertions of active villainy are commonly accompanied with circumstances, which tend to its own exposure: But this negative kind of guilt has so many plausible apologies as almost to elude suspicion.
In all reasonings on the subject of corruption, much use has been made of the examples furnished by the British house of commons. Many mistakes have arisen from fallacious comparisons between our government and theirs. It is time, that the real state of this matter should be explained. By far the greatest part of the house of commons is composed of representatives of towns or boroughs: These towns had antiently no voice in parliament; but on the extension of commercial wealth and influence, they were admitted to a seat. Many of them are in the possession and gift of the king; and from their dependence on him, and the destruction of the right of free election, they are stigmatized with the appellation of rotten boroughs. This is the true source of the corruption, which has so long excited the severe animadversion of zealous politicians and patriots. But the knights of the shire, who form another branch of the house of commons, and who are chosen from the body of the counties they represent, have been generally esteemed a virtuous and incorruptible set of men. I appeal, Sir, to the history of that house: This will shew us, that the rights of the people have been ever very safely trusted to their protection; that they have been the ablest bulwarks of the British commons; and that in the conflict of parties, by throwing their weight into one scale or the other, they have uniformly supported and strengthened the constitutional claims of the people. Notwithstanding the cry of corruption that has been perpetually raised against the house of commons, it has been found, that that house, sitting at first without any constitutional authority, became, at length, an essential member of the legislature, and have since, by regular gradations, acquired new and important accessions of privilege: That they have, on numerous occasions, impaired the overgrown prerogative, and limited the incroachments of monarchy.
An honorable member from Dutchess, (Mr. Smith) has observed, that the delegates from New-York, (for example) can have very little information of the local circumstances of Georgia or SouthCarolina, except from the representatives of those states; and on this ground, insists upon the expediency of an enlargment of the representation; since, otherwise, the majority must rely too much on the information of a few. In order to determine whether there is any weight in this reasoning, let us consider the powers of the national government, and compare them with the objects of state legislation. The powers of the new government are general, and calculated to embrace the aggregate interest of the Union, and the general interest of each state, so far as it stands in relation to the whole. The object of the state governments is to provide for their internal interests, as unconnected with the United States, and as composed of minute parts or districts. A particular knowledge, therefore, of the local circumstances of any state, as they may vary in different districts, is unnecessary for the federal representative. As he is not to represent the interests or local wants of the county of Dutchess or Montgomery; neither is it necessary that he should be acquainted with their particular resources: But in the state governments, as the laws regard the interests of the people, in all their various minute divisions; it is necessary, that the smallest interests should be represented. Taking these distinctions into view, I think it must appear evident, that one discerning and intelligent man will be as capable of understanding and representing the general interests of a state, as twenty; because, one man can be as fully acquainted with the general state of the commerce, manufactures, population, production and common resources of a state, which are the proper objects of federal legislation. It is to be presumed, that few men originally possess a complete knowledge of the circumstances of other states; They must rely, therefore, on the information, to be collected from the representatives of those states: And if the above reasoning be just, it appears evident, I imagine, that this reliance will be as secure as can be desired.
Sir, in my experience of public affairs, I have constantly remarked, in the conduct of members of Congress, a strong and uniform attachment to the interests of their own state: These interests have, on many occasions, been adhered to, with an undue and illiberal pertinacity; and have too often been preferred to the welfare of the Union. This attachment has given birth to an unaccommodating spirit of party, which has frequently embarrassed the best measures: It is by no means, however, an object of surprize. The early connections we have formed; the habits and prejudices in which we have been bred, fix our affection so strongly, that no future objects of association can easily eradicate them: This, together with the entire and immediate dependence the representative feels on his constituent, will generally incline him to prefer the particular before the public good.
The subject, on which this argument of a small representation has been most plausibly used, is taxation. As to internal taxation, in which the difficulty principally rests, it is not probable, that any general regulation will originate in the national legislature. If Congress in times of great danger and distress, should be driven to this resource, they will undoubtedly adopt such measures, as are most conformable to the laws and customs of each state: They will take up your own codes and consult your own systems: This is a source of information which cannot mislead, and which will be equally accessible to every member. It will teach them the most certain, safe and expeditious mode of laying and collecting taxes in each state. They will appoint the officers of revenue agreeably to the spirit of your particular establishments; or they will make use of your own.
Sir, the most powerful obstacle to the members of Congress betraying the interests of their constituents, is the state legislatures themselves; who will be standing bodies of observation, possessing the confidence of the people, jealous of federal encroachments, and armed with every power to check the first essays of treachery. They will institute regular modes of enquiry: The complicated domestic attachments, which subsist between the state legislators and their electors, will ever make them vigilant guardians of the people’s rights: Possessed of the means, and the disposition of resistance, the spirit of opposition will be easily communicated to the people; and under the conduct of an organized body of leaders, will act with weight and system. Thus it appears, that the very structure of the confederacy affords the surest preventives from error, and the most powerful checks to misconduct.
Sir, there is something in an argument, that has been urged, which, if it proves any thing, concludes against all union and all government; it goes to prove, that no powers should be entrusted to any body of men, because they may be abused. This is an argument of possibility and chance; one that would render useless all reasonings upon the probable operation of things, and defeat the established principles of natural and moral causes. It is a species of reasoning, sometimes used to excite popular jealousies, but is generally discarded by wise and discerning men. I do not suppose that the honorable member who advanced the idea, had any such design: He, undoubtedly, would not wish to extend his argument to the destruction of union or government; but this, Sir, is its real tendency. It has been asserted, that the interests, habits and manners of the Thirteen States are different; and hence it is inferred, that no general free government can suit them. This diversity of habits, &c. has been a favorite theme with those who are disposed for a division of our empire; and like many other popular objections, seems to be founded on fallacy. I acknowledge, that the local interests of the states are in some degree various; and that there is some difference in their habits and manners: But this I will presume to affirm; that, from New-Hampshire to Georgia, the people of America are as uniform in their interests and manners, as those of any established in Europe. This diversity, to the eye of a speculatist, may afford some marks of characteristic discrimination, but cannot form an impediment to the regular operation of those general powers, which the Constitution gives to the united government. Were the laws of the union to new-model the internal police of any state; were they to alter, or abrogate at a blow, the whole of its civil and criminal institutions; were they to penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and controul, in all respects, the private conduct of individuals, there might be more force in the objection: And the same constitution, which was happily calculated for one state, might sacrifice the wellfare of another. Though the difference of interests may create some difficulty and apparent partiality, in the first operations of government, yet the same spirit of accommodation, which produced the plan under discussion, would be exercised in lessening the weight of unequal burthens. Add to this that, under the regular and gentle influence of general laws, these varying interests will be constantly assimilating, till they embrace each other, and assume the same complexion.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of June 21 (John McKesson’s Version), [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
Under the present Confederation 26 Men may do every thing that

the proposed Governmt. may do—and 18 of these may form a Majority—
Under the new Governmt. the proportionate Streng[t]h in the Legislature is gain[e]d because the Vote per Capite—
—Members will attend as their State Constitutents will require it—As to the Albany Member
The Representation ought to be small because you will more easily obtain men to attend and who will engage to attend—
A Quorum of the House of Commons 40, but every great Question a Numerous Body attends—
Corruption in the House of Com
1st. the Rotton Burroughs—
2d. the Scotch members—
The County Members obliges the Crown to change his men and Measures, and preserved the Liberties of the People—
The [government] Began with Small powers—
The Represent of the People always encrease their Powers
As to his Excy Govr.
The Members from other States must take Information from the State Members—
Is not that the Case in our own State—
New York must take Information from Ulster or Dutchess as to Agriculture or Manufactures—
Information is not encreased in proportion to the encrease of Numbers—
A few Intelligent Men can give all the Information from any State that is necessary—
Internal Taxes cannot be regulated by the General Governmt. unless in Times of War or great Distress—If that must be done your own Laws or Sistem must be by them adopted—
It appears to me the State Governmts. can better watch their General Representatives than their State Representatives—
The People at a Distance in the State must depend on Partial Information
The State Govt. can establish regular methods of Enquiry Act with more System and acquire more certain Informat. of their National Representatives then the People of the State of their Rulers.

Something in this Argumt. proves there should not be any Union If it is improper to entrust them to make war, peace, raise taxes, there cannot be a union—
After a Representation gets to a certain Number it will be sufficient—When the Number is Sufficient for all the Business and a Sufficient Guard agt. Corruption, there the Number should Cease—More would be injurious—and if intended to raise a usurpation more Dangerous—
Manners and Habits of the different States not so great as the Counties in the large States or in Great Britain—
Position
As the Clause no[w] Stands it will operate to establish a large Representation—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Fourth Speech of June 21, [21 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 21, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton. I only rise to observe that the gentleman has misunderstood me. What I meant to express was this; that if we argued from possibilities only; if we reasoned from chances, or an ungovernable propensity to evil, instead of taking into view the controul, which the nature of things, or the form of the constitution provided; the argument would lead us to withdraw all confidence from our fellow-citizens, and discard the chimerical idea of government: This is a true deduction from such reasoning.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James Madison, 22 June 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Richmond June 22. 1788.
Dear Sir
The Judiciary Department has been on the anvil for several days; and I presume will still be a further subject of disquisition. The attacks on it have apparently made less impression than was feared. But they may be secretly felt by particular interests that would not make the acknowledgement, and wd. chuse to ground their vote agst. the Constitution on other motives. In the course of this week we hope for a close of the business in some form or other. The opponents will probably bring forward a bill of rights with sundry other amendments as conditions of ratification. Should those fail or be despaired of, an adjournment will I think be attempted. And in case of disappointment here also, some predict a secession. I do not myself concur in the last apprehension; though I have thought it prudent to withold, by a studied fairness in every step on the side of the Constitution, every pretext for rash experiments. The plan meditated by the friends ⟨of⟩ the Constitution is to preface the ratification with some plain & general truths that can not affect the validity of the act; & to subjoin a recommendation which may hold up amendments as objects to be pursued in the constitutional mode. These expedients are rendered prudent by the nice balance of numbers, and the scruples entertained by some who are in general well affected. Whether they will secure us a majority, I dare not positively to declare. Our calculations promise us success by 3 or 4; or possibly 5 or 6 votes. But were there no possibility of mistaking the opinions of some, in reviewing those of so many, the smallness of the majority suggests the danger from ordinary casualties which may vary the result. It unluckily happens that our legislature which meets at this place tomorrow, consists of a considerable majority of antifederal members. This is another circumstance that ought to check our confidence. As individuals they may have some influence, and as coming immediately from the people at large they can give any colour they please to the popular sentiments at this moment, and may in that mode throw a bias on the representatives of the people in Convention.
Yrs. affecty.
Js. Madison, Jr.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 23 (Francis Childs’s Version), [23 June 1788]
From: Childs, Francis,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 23, 1788]
The honorable Mr. Hamilton. It is not my design, Mr. Chairman, to extend this debate by any new arguments on the general subject. I have delivered my sentiments so fully on what has been advanced by the gentlemen this morning, that any further reasonings from me will be easily dispensed with. I only rise to state a fact, with respect to the motives which operated in the general convention. I had the honor to state to the committee the diversity of interests which prevailed between the navigating and non-navigating—the large and the small states; and the influence which those interests had upon the conduct of each. It is true, a difference did take place between the large and small states; the latter insisting on equal advantages in the house of representatives. Some private business calling me to New-York, I left the Convention for a few days: On my return, I found a plan, reported by the committee of details; and soon after, a motion was made, to increase the number of representatives. On this occasion the members rose from one side and the other, and declared, that the plan reported was entirely a work of accommodation; and that to make any alterations in it, would destroy the Constitution. I discovered that several of the states, particularly New-Hampshire, Connecticut and New-Jersey, thought it would be difficult to send a great number of delegates from the extremes of the continent to the national government: They apprehended their constituents would be displeased with a very expensive government; and they considered it as a formidable objection. After some debate on this motion, it was withdrawn. Many of the facts stated by the gentleman and myself are not substantially different. The truth is, the plan in all its parts was a plan of accommodation.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 23 (John McKesson’s Version), [23 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 23, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
It is true the great object of the Smaller States was an equal Suffrage in Senate—but some of them also wished to retain what advantages in Suffrage the[y] Could in the other House. I was absent 10 days—found on Return the plan as it now is—A Motion was made to encrease the Numbers—It was declared that the Number was the Effect of Compromise—New Hampshire & the South declared the difficulty of Send[ing] a greater Number into the Center—and the Expence too great—Some also Saw that the Expence would be made an Argumt agt the Constitution—And Many really feared the Expence—Connecticut could not avow but did really compromise some things to preserve their Suffrage in Senate—The Delegates represented to their State held it up as a merit that the Number was not encreased beyond what it might have been under the Old Confe[de]ration—
It was in all his parts a Matter of Compromise—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of June 23, [23 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 23, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton. I recollect well the alteration which the gentleman alludes to; but, it by no means militates against my idea of the principles on which the convention acted at the time the report of the committee was under deliberation. This alteration did not take place till the convention was near rising, and the business compleated; when his excellency the president expressing a wish that the number should be reduced to thirty thousand; it was agreed to without opposition.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Notes on Debates, [24 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 24, 1788]

Lansing …
mode of appointment duration in office means of controul—

Chancellor—
Senators equally interested in preserving the residuary powers—

Senate intended as representation of the sovereignties of the states—Therefore ought to be dependent.

{
States have never exercised power of rotation—

Rotation in Congress has been valuable—Parties have been extinguished—Will not have less stability—If there no danger that they may betray their trust—Small number—Sickness of a member—Non attendance—

Will other members be solicitous to compell attendance?
}

Mr. Lansing—
☞

1—
to make them actual repres:

Representatives will be guardians of state sovereighties
}

2
to make them dependent—

3
Knowlege of circumstances best promoted

4
Perpetual body—

Perpetiation of faction—

5
Corruption

6
Social views ought to be regarded—
{
Can represent be divested of local views?

[Hamilton]
Observations on Necessity of—

stable principle—

Necessary of considerable duration

for knowledge

responsibil[it]y

sense of national character

safety against executive

Influence of the states

Melancton Smith—

Senate ought to have power to perpetuate themselves—
}

Lansing
Contrast views of the states with the views of the people
}

State passions &c. will operate.

Lansing—
Representation of the StatesRepresentation of States—
}

Smith impossible to form a genuine representation—

Therefore must checkTherefore must weaken the senate.Question whether a sufficient stability will not be given?—Six years sufficient to acquire but when practice?Unchangeable bodyDistance will weaken dependence!Policy of the present confederation.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Francis Childs’s Version), [24 June 1788]
From: Childs, Francis,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 24, 1788]
Honorable Mr. Hamilton. I am persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn, shall be indulged, in addressing the committee. We all, with equal sincerity, profess to be anxious for the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the United States, and I presume I shall not be disbelieved, when I declare, that it is an object of all others the nearest and most dear to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose become the most important study, which can interest mankind. It is our duty to examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to chuse the best and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from nature, from reason, from examples, the justest principles of policy, and to pursue and apply them in the formation of our government. We should contemplate and compare the systems, which, in this examination, come under our view, distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each, and discarding the former, incorporate the latter, as far as circumstances will admit, into our constitution. If we pursue a different course and neglect this duty, we shall probably disappoint the expectations of our country and of the world.

In the commencement of a revolution, which received its birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more natural, than that the public mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became predominant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention: But, Sir, there is another object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little capable of regarding. I mean a principle of strength and stability in the organization of our government, and vigor in its operations. This purpose could never be accomplished but by the establishment of some select body, formed peculiarly upon this principle. There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is evident that a body instituted for these purposes must be so formed as to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities, and that mutability which it is designed to remedy. It is therefore necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its authority during a considerable period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its powers, as will divest it as much as possible of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be the center of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system. Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never have an efficient government.
It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity: But it is equally unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government. To deny that they are frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of administration especially, which involves our political relation with foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths are not often held up in public assemblies—but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me. From these principles it follows that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our government—one which shall be immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and possess all the popular features; another formed upon the principles, and for the purposes before explained. Such considerations as these induced the convention who formed your state constitution, to institute a senate upon the present plan. The history of ancient and modern republics had taught them, that many of the evils which these republics suffered arose from the want of a certain balance and mutual controul indispensible to a wise administration. They were convinced that popular assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden impulses and the intrigues of ambitious men; and that some firm barrier against these operations was necessary: They, therefore, instituted your senate, and the benefits we have experienced, have fully justified their conceptions.
Now, Sir, what is the tendency of the proposed amendment? To take away the stability of government by depriving the senate of its permanency: To make this body subject to the same weakness and prejudices, which are incident to popular assemblies, and which it was instituted to correct; and by thus assimilating the complexion of the two branches, destroy the balance between them. The amendment will render the senator a slave to all the capricious humors among the people. It will probably be here suggested, that the legislatures—not the people—are to have the power of recall. Without attempting to prove that the legislatures must be in a great degree the image of the multitude, in respect to federal affairs, and that the same prejudices and factions will prevail; I insist, that in whatever body the power of recall is vested, the senator will perpetually feel himself in such a state of vassalage and dependence, that he never can possess that firmness which is necessary to the discharge of his great duty to the union.
Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the interests of the several states, and those of the United States in contrast. This is not a fair view of the subject. They must necessarily be involved in each other. What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence of these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public good; and against this influence we ought to provide. The local interests of a state ought in every case to give way to the interests of the Union: For when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the former becomes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one. When you assemble from your several counties in the legislature, were every member to be guided only by the apparent interest of his county, government would be impracticable. There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of local advantage to general expediency. But the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by this important principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the senate should be so formed, as to be unbiassed by false conceptions of the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their several states.
Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions of danger to the state governments. They seem to suppose, that the moment you put men into the national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all their affection for their fellow-citizens. But can we imagine that the senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents? The state governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the general system. As long, therefore, as Congress have a full conviction of this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This conviction can never leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues to be read, and its principles known, the states must, by every rational man, be considered as essential component parts of the union; and therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is totally inadmissible.
The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of the state governments, which will ever give them an important superiority over the general government. If we compare the nature of their different powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall find the advantage entirely on the side of the states. This consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout the states may be two thousand. Their personal influence will therefore be proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in Congress. The state establishments of civil and military officers of every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the predilection and support of the people. Whenever, therefore, Congress shall meditate any infringement of the state constitutions, the great body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic representatives. Can the general government withstand such a united opposition? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their privileges? Will they suffer their legislatures to be reduced to a shadow and a name? The idea is shocking to common sense.
From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be mentioned, results a complicated, irresistable check, which must ever support the existence and importance of the state governments. The danger, if any exists, flows from an opposite source. The probable evil is, that the general government will be too dependent on the state legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious to their humours; that the states, with every power in their hands, will make encroachments on the national authority, till the union is weakened and dissolved.
Every member must have been struck with an observation of a gentleman from Albany. Do what you will, says he, local prejudices and opinions will go into the government. What! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these prejudices? Shall we confirm the distemper instead of remedying it? It is undeniable that there must be a controul somewhere. Either the general interest is to controul the particular interests, or the contrary. If the former, then certainly the government ought to be so framed, as to render the power of controul efficient to all intents and purposes; if the latter, a striking absurdity follows: The controuling powers must be as numerous as the varying interests, and the operations of government must therefore cease: For the moment you accommodate these differing interests, which is the only way to set the government in motion, you establish a general controuling power. Thus, whatever constitutional provisions are made to the contrary, every government will be at last driven to the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their reasoning, to distinguish between the real, genuine good of a state, and the opinions and prejudices which may prevail respecting it: The latter may be opposed to the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrificed; the former is so involved in it, that it never can be sacrificed. Sir, the main design of the convention, in forming the senate, was to prevent fluctuations and cabals: With this view, they made that body small, and to exist for a considerable period. Have they executed this design too far? The senators are to serve six years. This is only two years longer than the senators of this state hold their place. One third of the members are to go out every two years; and in six, the whole body may be changed. Prior to the revolution, the representatives in the several colonies were elected for different periods; for three years, for seven years, &c. Were those bodies ever considered as incapable of representing the people, or as too independent of them? There is one circumstance which will have a tendency to increase the dependence of the senators on the states, in proportion to the duration of their appointments. As the state legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the senator will have more attachments to form, and consequently a greater difficulty of maintaining his place, than one of shorter duration. He will therefore be more cautious and industrious to suit his conduct to the wishes of his constituents.

Sir, when you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you will certainly see, that the senators will constantly look up to the state governments, with an eye of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to continue in office, they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose, and, whatever may be their private sentiments of politics, they will be convinced, that the surest means of obtaining a re-election will be a uniform attachment to the interests of their several states.
The gentlemen to support their amendment have observed that the power of recall, under the old government, has never been exercised. There is no reasoning from this. The experience of a few years, under peculiar circumstances, can afford no probable security that it never will be carried into execution, with unhappy effects. A seat in congress has been less an object of ambition; and the arts of intrigue, consequently, have been less practised. Indeed, it has been difficult to find them, who were willing to suffer the mortifications, to which so feeble a government and so dependent a station exposed them.
Sir, if you consider but a moment the purposes, for which the senate was instituted, and the nature of the business which they are to transact, you will see the necessity of giving them duration. They, together with the President, are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations: They must understand all their interests, and their political systems. This knowledge is not soon acquired. But a very small part is gained in the closet. Is it desirable then that new and unqualified members should be continually thrown into that body? When public bodies are engaged in the exercise of general powers, you cannot judge of the propriety of their conduct, but from the result of their systems. They may be forming plans, which require time and diligence to bring to maturity. It is necessary, therefore, that they should have a considerable and fixed duration, that they may make their calculations accordingly. If they are to be perpetually fluctuating, they can never have that responsibility which is so important in republican governments. In bodies subject to frequent changes, great political plans must be conducted by members in succession: A single assembly can have but a partial agency in them, and consequently cannot properly be answerable for the final event. Considering the senate therefore with a view to responsibility, duration is a very interesting and essential quality. There is another view, in which duration in the senate appears necessary. A government, changeable in its policy, must soon lose its sense of national character, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators will not be solicitous for the reputation of public measures, in which they have had but a temporary concern, and will feel lightly the burthen of public disapprobation, in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure. Our political rivals will ever consider our mutable counsels as evidence of deficient wisdom, and will be little apprehensive of our arriving at any exalted station in the scale of power. Such are the internal and external disadvantages which would result from the principle contended for. Were it admitted, I am firmly persuaded, Sir, that prejudices would govern the public deliberations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union. If it were necessary, I could illustrate my subject by historical facts: I could travel through an extensive field of detail, and demonstrate that wherever the fatal principle of the head suffering the controul of the members, has operated, it has proved a fruitful source of commotions and disorders.
This, Sir, is the first fair opportunity that has been offered, of deliberately correcting the errors in government. Instability has been a prominent and very defective feature in most republican systems. It is the first to be seen, and the last to be lamented by a philosophical enquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our government. If this be not done, Sir, we shall feel, and posterity will be convulsed by a painful malady.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (John McKesson’s Version), [24 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 24, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
We all Aim at the best Govt.
We should mix the Happy Ingredients, and not go into Extremes or we shall build Utopia upon Utopia—
It was a time of Jealo[u]sy—We seemed to have attended only to tie the Representat
Another Prin.
To have in our Govt. some Stable Body that will pursue a System—
Guard agt. Innovations and know and direct public Affairs—
The People of every Country desire the Interests of the Country—
But in many Cases the People want Necessary Information respecting public Measures—
peculiarly relating to foreign affairs
2d.   The People are mislead by Men of Influence who have pa[r]tial Views
Therefore 2 objects
To have one Body dependt. on the People who will have a quick Sensibility of the Ideas of the People—
The Representatives for 2 years
The other object
To have some permanent Body who will pursue the public Interest notwithstanding some popular dissatisfactions the Arts of Demagogues and designing Men—Hence the Senate—
Why have we a Senate with a duration of 4 years & one 3d. to go out every year—
We should look at Truth with a degree of firmness, and without prejudice
This is a Senate.
What is the Amendmt.

That the Senators Shall depend on the will of the State. Legislatures—but not be continued beyond Six Years—
If so the Senators will not have the Stability necessary nor the firmness to abide by national Interests—
A measure may appear to affect a State Interest yet be for its Benefit—
Nay It may in Some Instances be agt. a particular State Interest—yet ought to be done—
Without a Power of this House your Building will be a House of Sand
Will the People agree their States Govt should be given up—if not will not the persons elected by the People preserve them—
State Govts. will have greater Influence that the National Govt.
2000 Repres[ent]atives in State Govts
100 Represent. in the National Govts.
State Governmts. appoint many Offices
Genl Govt. but few.
Ambassadors and foreign ministers no influence
Some Judges—not many
Officers of the Customs—not many—
The State Govermts will provide Laws respecting agriculture and such things as more sensibly affect Individuals
When Men know that Men with Arms in their Hands under the Influence of the State Govts.
The State Govts. will have a vast Influence on the national Governmt.
The Members will have their Connections in their own States which will influence—
The Observation of the Hon Member from Abl. Mr Lansing)
The Argumt. then should be oppose[d to] the principal of Local
Interests as far as possible.
Has the form of Governt. carried this Power too far—No
One third may be changed in two years—the whole in Six years—
Every Election here changes one half
Will they not be sufficiently dependt.
Did not the former Represent before the War represent the People and were sufficiently
The Representatives will watch their Representa[ti]ves in the national Senate this will make them perhaps too dependent—yet that duration of Office will give firmness to a certain Extent—
The Persons who would be sent to Senate will endeavour to please Six years soon elapses—As the Time shortens the Influence will be greater—One third thrown into the Body will always keep the Body from Corrupt Measures—
You will find a Number always ready to Supplant the Senators—
The Objects to which the Senate is destined requires Permancy—
They are with the President to make Treaties, manage Commerce and direct the foreign Interests—
This Knowledge gained by Experience
Permancy also necessary to its Responsibility—
In its objects will be a System of Links—
They must have a lasting Tenure to be responsible for the Effect of their Measures—
They should have a National Character, and have a Sensibility of it—As the public Eye will be turned on them—
This not necessary for a Body who transact temporary measures from day to day—
With the Amendment they will be dependt. to a degree that will disqualify
The Amend[ment] will thro State Interests and factions into your National Govt—Will create a Mutability of Measures which will prevent the Country from enjoying advantages—
Without blending Liberty and Stability we cannot establish a good republican Govermt.
Let us rescue Republican Govt. from mutability inconstancy &c charged on it


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Melancton Smith’s Version), [24 June 1788]
From: Smith, Melancton,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 24, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—
The mind at ye Revolution run into extremes—the extreme was, we consulted nothing but to tie the Representative to ye people.
A Stable body
wh. oppurtunty. to know
guard ags. instability
The people of every country desire its prosperity but want information.
Frequently misled by artful Men.
Concilliate two objects. One Body who shall be closely united to the people, this in the Representative.
The other Body of firmness to pursue the true Interest of the people against the fluctg. humty of the people.
This the object, tenor of Offc app &c—
The Senate in this 4 Years vs reeligible—
The proposal is, that they are to hold their places during the pleasure of the Legis.
If the Senator are dependent as The State Legisl. they cannot have firmness.
The State Legisls, may be misinformed upon ye Int. of ye S. Consd.
It may be necess. to yield a part. State Int.
Too great anxieties for State Ints.
It is suppd. when we app. men to genl. govt. they will be vultures, preying upon ye State govermts
They will be attached to the States.
The States will have gr. powers.
1st. The difft. States have near 2000.
2. More Offices in ye gift of the State—The general govt. may appoint revenue offices but will only appt. custom officers—Judges—Ambs.—&c.
Supposing they appoint all—bear no comparisons—
Gov. Senate Assembly Judges Justices Sheriff.
3. It is natural for the people will look to those who regulate agriculture &c.
Whenever they geny. meditate any encroachments the whole body of the People to resist.
The State government will have great inf—by the S. Legislature by choosing Senate and influencing the choice of Representative. The remark of ye Alby. gen. yt the State should be restrd—certain permt.
Interests—but other local Intts—
6 Years—little more than the State
one third may be changed—in 6 yrs. all may be changed.
Will not 6 years be responsible
not. In former gots. we elected for 7 Years were responsible enough.
The senate will be under ye controul of the State governt. because they will watch them.
Responsible & firmness consist.
The State have not exercised the powr
We cannot argue yt from ye past to the future—The partl. situ of ye present Conf. not appl.
The objects to which they extend proves the propriety of duration.
A knowledge of the powers of Europe—their commerce—politics—face & Interest—the comr. In—of your own country into produce, finances &c. this requires time.
Its necessary to make them responb.
knowledge—
firmness—
Responsibility—
Dependent to such degree as to render them useless—violently to promote the S. Govs.
Historical facts proves its imp.
Our own States prove it, a Lawyer at ye end of every session has to learn a new System.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, [25 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

[New York, June 25, 1788]
My Dr Sir
I am very sorry to find by your letter of the 13th that your prospects are so critical. Our chance of success here is infinitely slender, and none at all if you go wrong. The leaders of the Antifederalists finding their part seems somewhat squeamish about rejection, are obliged at present to recur to the project of conditional amendments. We are going on very deliberately in the discussion and hitherto not without effect.
Communicate this to our friend G. Morris, to whom I have not time to write. And add, if you please, that his friend would certainly be exposed to a suit; but may pay in our paper money; the
depreciation of which is about 7seven per Cent. It is possible however that a jury in estimating damages would calculate the sterling money at the current exchange in paper. But this is not probable.
Yrs. Affy
A Hamilton
New York. June 25. 1788


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 25 (Francis Childs’s Version), [25 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 25, 1788]
The Hon. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, in debates of this kind it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged, that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situation, it is the province of judgment and good sense to determine their force and application, and how far the arguments advanced on one side, are balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress, in which both may appear, renders it a difficult task to make this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some of the principles on each side are admitted, and the conclusions drawn from them denied, while other principles, with their inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument.
There are two objects in forming systems of government—Safety for the people, and energy in the administration. When these objects are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter object be neglected, the people’s security will be as certainly sacrificed, as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government: If the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual controul of these bodies, the government will reach, in its regular operations, the perfect balance between liberty and power. The arguments of the gentlemen chiefly apply to the former branch—the house of representatives. If they will calmly consider the different nature of the two branches, they will see that the reasoning which justly applies to the representative house, will go to destroy the essential qualities of the senate. If the former is calculated perfectly upon the principles of caution, why should you impose the same principle upon the latter, which is designed for a different operation? Gentlemen, while they discover a laudable anxiety for the safety of the people, do not attend to the important distinction I have drawn. We have it constantly held up to us, that as it is our chief duty to guard against tyranny, it is our policy to form all the branches of government for this purpose. Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illustrated by experience, that when the people act by their representatives, they are commonly irresistable. The gentleman admits the position, that stability is essential to the government, and yet enforces principles, which if true, ought to banish stability from the system. The gentleman observes that there is a fallacy in my reasoning, and informs us that the legislatures of the states—not the people, are to appoint the senators. Does he reflect, that they are the immediate agents of the people; that they are so constituted, as to feel all their prejudices and passions, and to be governed, in a great degree, by their misapprehensions? Experience must have taught him the truth of this. Look through their history. What factions have arisen from the most trifling causes? What intrigues have been practiced for the most illiberal purposes? Is not the state of Rhode-Island, at this moment, struggling under difficulties and distresses, for having been led blindly by the spirit of the multitude? What is her legislature but the picture of a mob? In this state we have a senate, possessed of the proper qualities of a permanent body: Virginia, Maryland, and a few other states, are in the same situation: The rest are either governed by a single democratic assembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon democratic principles. These have been more or less embroiled in factions, and have generally been the image and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to reason on this point, without touching on certain delicate cords. I could refer you to periods and conjunctures, when the people have been governed by improper passions, and led by factious and designing men. I could shew that the same passions have infected their representatives. Let us beware that we do not make the state legislatures a vehicle, in which the evil humors may be conveyed into the national system. To prevent this, it is necessary that the senate should be so formed, as in some measure to check the state governments, and preclude the communication of the false impressions which they receive from the people. It has been often repeated, that the legislatures of the states can have only a partial and confined view of national affairs; that they can form no proper estimate of great objects which are not in the sphere of their interests. The observation of the gentleman therefore cannot take off the force of my argument.
Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a reflection, that their future existence is absolutely in the power of the states. Will not this form a powerful check? It is a reflection which applies closely to their feelings and interests; and no candid man, who thinks deliberately, will deny that it would be alone a sufficient check. The legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great influence over the electors. Indeed they convey their influence, through a thousand channels, into the general government. Gentlemen have endeavoured to shew that there will be no clashing of local and general interests. They do not seem to have sufficiently considered the subject. We have in this state a duty of six pence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly and with advantage: But such a duty would be very burthensome to some of the states. If Congress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt tax, would it not be opposed by the eastern states? Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure, they could only feel its apparent injustice. Would it be wise to give the New-England states a power to defeat this measure by recalling their senators who may be engaged for it? I beg the gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction between the real and apparent interests of the states. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the government—yet every state is not the government: Every petty district is not the government. Sir, in our state legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties: The same must happen in the general government between states. In this, the few must yield to the many; or, in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members of Congress are too dependent on the state legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from local views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their interest is interwoven with their dependence, and they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situation. Those who have been in Congress have seen these operations. The first question has been—How will such a measure affect my constituents, and consequently, how will the part I take affect my re-election? This consideration may be in some degree proper; but to be dependent from day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present would be the source of innumerable evils. Six years, sir, is a period short enough for a proper degree of dependence. Let us consider the peculiar state of this body, and see under what impressions they will act. One third of them are to go out at the end of two years; two thirds at four years, and the whole at six years. When one year is elapsed, there is a number who are to hold their places for one year, others for three, and others for five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant and frequent change of members; but there will be some whose office is near the point of expiration, and who from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of their dependence. The biennial change of members is an excellent invention for increasing the difficulty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advocates, and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating and virtuous men. When two principles are equally important, we ought if possible to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither. We think that safety and permanency in this government are completely reconcileable. The state governments will have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence over the senate, without the check for which the gentlemen contend.
It has been remarked that there is an inconsistency in our admitting that the equal vote in the senate was given to secure the rights of the states, and at the same time holding up the idea, that their interests should be sacrificed to those of the union. But the committee certainly perceive the distinction between the rights of a state and its interests. The rights of a state are defined by the constitution, and cannot be invaded without a violation of it; but the interests of a state have no connection with the constitution, and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally sacrificed. A uniform tax is perfectly constitutional; and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain members of the union. The gentlemen are afraid that the state governments will be abolished. But, Sir, their existence does not depend upon the laws of the United States. Congress can no more abolish the state governments, than they can dissolve the union. The whole constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentlemen would introduce an additional useless provision against it. It is proper that the influence of the states should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual states be the judges how far? Shall an unlimited power be left them to determine in their own favor? The gentlemen go into the extreme: Instead of a wise government, they would form a fantastical Utopia: But, Sir, while they give it a plausible, popular shape, they would render it impracticable. Much has been said about factions. As far as my observation has extended, factions in Congress have arisen from attachment to state prejudices. We are attempting by this constitution to abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare. That a man should have the power, in private life, of recalling his agent, is proper; because in the business in which he is engaged, he has no other object but to gain the approbation of his principal. Is this the case with the senator? Is he simply the agent of the state? No: He is an agent for the union, and he is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the whole, though his state should condemn them.
Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe also that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other states have; and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the states to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may; he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument: Nay, he will feel temptations, which few other situations furnish; to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good.
It has been observed, that it is not possible there should be in a state only two men qualified for senators. But, sir, the question is not, whether there may be no more than two men; but whether, in certain emergencies, you could find two equal to those whom the amendment would discard. Important negociations, or other business to which they shall be most competent, may employ them, at the moment of their removal. These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men, capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine.
As to corruption, sir, admitting in the president a disposition to corrupt; what are the instruments of bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a great number of offices: But how many offices are there, for which a man would relinquish the senatorial dignity? There may be some in the judicial, and some in the other principal departments: But there are very few, whose respectability can in any measure balance that of the office of senator. Men who have been in the senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of a reelection, will not be easily bought by offices. This reasoning shews that a rotation would be productive of many disadvantages. Under particular circumstances, it might be extremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our country.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 25 (John McKesson’s Version), [25 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 25, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
The Principles laid down on both Sides may be true to a certain Extent—
Each appears plausible and have a certain degree of force
We must then determine where one principle must give way to another—
We Should combine the Principles which will [give] Stability on one Side—and Safety to the Interests of the People on the other Side
The Argumts. applied here to the Senate should be applied to the House of Represent—The Senate should be formed for Stability—When the People have an Organized Will which will pursue Measures Sistematically they will always prevail—
But danger
The Genl. Argumts. would destroy Stability
The Gent Says that there is a falacy in my argumt. because this Body is to be chosen by the State Legislatures and not by the People—does the Gent. recollect that the Assembly come immediately from among the People with the like Ideas principles and passions—
Is not Rhode Island an Example—A depreciating Paper Medium carried with Violence in the Legislature—
In this State we have a Security from our Senate
—In many States only annual Bodies who represent the Violencies and Passions of the People—
The People at Times are deceived for want of Information
By this Process the Senate of the united States must guard as an Anchor to the State Govt. agt. the violencies of State Legislatures and even agt. the Assemy of the Genl Govt.
The State Legislatures will Always have a vast momentum in the genl Govt.
The Power they have combining the Sentimts. of the People will have Influence—will not this have weight on the Represent in Assembly—on the Senators—on the officers of Genl Governmt.
The State Govts. will influence the Election of Presidt.
Will they not then have too much Influence
Will there not be a Clashing of local Interests—there will—
We have a Tax of 6d a Bushel on Salt—The Eastern States on acct. of their Fisheries would oppose it—
A thousand other Instances
The agregate Good of the States I admit must be
But if they can be recalled at any Moment they will be so dependt. that they will yield to it and not have firmness for national Purposes—
We have seen Members in Congress considering how will this
Affect my Seat my Interest my popu[larity]

To what point is a dependence useful—I say that Six years is little enough—Experience of 3 years & 7 years represent has confirmed this—Six years admits a great degree of Dependence—More would destroy Stability—
⅓d. at two years ⅓d 4 years—⅓d Six years—
This goes as far as is consistent with any degree of Energy in the Gnl Govt. and gives a due Degree of Dependence
And the House of Represent. have a due degree of Dependence
The great Danger will be that the Genl. Legislature will scarcely retain sufficient Power
Position Stated—That the Rights of the State should not be destroyed but preversed—
The Rights of the States must be that portion of Sovereignty which is left—which be such as should not be surrendered for the general Good—
The State Govts. will perhaps prevail too much—
The Genl Govt. should have ability to execute Powers properly that it may be established on solid & lasting Principles—
The Gent. Consider this as a lasting Body and Subject to factions—Is this true—will not ⅓d be changed every year if necessary—If there are improper Factions will not the Legislature change—
I found that the factions in Congress turned on local Interests of States—Change the Men the Causes remained—
The Present System will amend this at least in part—
We must have reasonable degree of Confidence and of attention in the State Legislatures and not form too many Checks, or we Shall go into an Extreme and have no Govermt.
It is not true that in Govt. a person delegated should be Subject to immediate recal—the Delag[at]e in many Instances has the Power of Judging—
As to Rotation
If we make them so dependt. will destroy the very use of the Senate—Credit suffers even in this State—more in the others—
Rotation
I say it lessens the motives to good Behavior
The Interest of the Officer in many Cases may inter[fer]e with the Interest of the Community—He knows that however well [he] acts his office must cease—If he is Ambitious—will he not influenced to an ambitious

Concurrence to ambitious designs—
We shall oppose the Current of the Human Heart too Violently—
It will check the Improvmt. of Knowledge—
The changing of men more frequently does Injury than is supposed
It oftener occurs than is supposed—the most useful Individuals may all be removed at the same time—
Let the Legislatures be left to Judge and take the men they think best able to Serve the Country—
It is sufficient to recall at the Time
Another bad Consequence of Rotation—
One third of the Senate must go Out—the Executive says as you must go out to answer such purposes to me I will give you Such or Such Offices—
How Many Offices to Corrupt

1st. The Judges—how few fit to accept
2d forreign Ambassadors—Seldom to be changed
3d. A few Offices in a State
4 Customs—

Many of these not more respectable than Office of a Senator
Will not the Legislature Elect men in whom they can confide Gross Corruption or gross Seduction much less extensive than some Gentlemen Suppose
Rotation will be attended with danger—It will banish men perhaps most useful and send in new men who may be imposed on for want of Information or Experience.
Deeply Convinced without such a principle in Govt. there will not be Stability—Without Stability as well as securing the Rights of the People Govt. is not Govt—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of June 25, [25 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 25, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—The Genl. Intent of the Clause is Suppose what is expressed in the Resolution proposed—
Mr. Hamilton   If that is the opinion of the Committee—there will be no debate on the Question—


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, [27 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 27, 1788]
My Dr. Sir
A day or two ago General Schuyler at my request sent forward to you an express with an account of the adoption of the Constitution by New Hampshire. We eagerly wait for further intelligence from you, as our only chance of success depends on you. There are some slight symptoms of relaxation in some of the leaders; which authorises a gleam of hope, if you do well; but certainly I think not otherwise.

Friday MorningJune 27. 1788


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Notes on Debates, [27 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 27, 1788]

                Mel Smith
                Powers ought to be precisely defined—

                Peculiarly so in a government of the particular kind.

                Ought to rest as well for operation as organisation—

                Harmony.

                Money necessary to existence of both—

                Interference or clashing of power—

                And one must fall a sacrifice to the other.

                No limitation to discretion of legislature—

                State Governments & G Government have concurrent

                jurisdiction in all cases but imposts Tonage Poundage.—

                In all cases of intereference as the laws of the US. are supreme they must prevail—

                Every government finds use for all the money it can raise—

                Conveniency of the People will suffer them to pay—

                Two sets of Supervisors—&c

                Two sets of Courts—

                Plantation

                Which side will prevail—

                      Exclusive possession of
                      impost

                    force

So long as attachment lasts the state Gov. cannot be destroyed—
No example of a republican Government of similar extent
Same authorities declare that governments over very great extent must be despotic.
Provide a system which could superintend taxation throughout this extensive Country—
Turkish dominions
Proper representation
Astonishing that we have done so well—
G. U Netherlands
Can any government calculate upon collecting all their taxes—.
Requisitions—
Improvement of the Country
Diversity between the Counties—

Williams    Electors Germany
Sophistical Constructions of men who may be interested in betraying the liberties of the people & erecting themselves on the liberties of the people—

Either that the people will be doubly taxed—or state governments destroyed—
Engl:     marriages & deaths—light