Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Marquis de Barbé-Marbois, [17 August 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Barbé-Marbois, Marquis de

[Orangetown, New York, August 17, 1780]
In the present state of affairs I know of no certain mode for procuring the release of your Brothers, unless there are naval prisoners in the French department whose situations will apply to theirs. I have however directed our Commissary of Prisoners to use all his influence at least to obtain permission for them to make you a visit at Philadelphia—to ascertain in what light they are considered by the enemy that we may see what further can be done. The question of prisoners between us and the enemy at this time stands upon so disagreeable a footing that we can hardly hope to effect any thing. Be assured my Dear Sir that, if I can contribute in any way to accomplishing your wishes in an affair so interesting to you, I shall take the greatest pleasure in doing it, being with the sincerest attachment Dr Sir Yr. most Obed ser   A Hamilton
The Marine Prisoners with us are intirely under the direction of the Marine Board. If they have it in their power, I am persuaded they will be glad of an opportunity of obliging you.
Our privateers have fallen in with a provision fleet going to Quebec and have taken a number of them. Sixteen sail had already arrived in different ports to the Eastward.
Clinton remains on Long Island. He seems again to be preparing for a serious embarkation with a part of his force. There are different conjectures of their destination; but none intirely satisfactory. That which obtains most is that they are going to the West Indies, and are to be replaced by a detachment from South Carolina.
Aug 17th.


Title: George Washington to the Committee of Cooperation, 17 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Committee of Cooperation

Orangetown [New York] August 17, 1780. Describes present situation of Army. Recommends a new appeal to the states.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Colonel Clement Biddle, [20 August 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Biddle, Clement

[Orangetown, New York, August 20, 1780]
My Dear Sir
Mr. Laurence who will deliver you this, is I am informed, a character that by his attachment to the cause, his suffering, &c. has a claim to all the indulgence we can show him with consistency. All his grass is gone. He expects soon to have his hay taken away and then he says his cattle and his family in consequence must starve. If you can manage to spare him without incurring the charge of partiality, you will have the pleasure of doing an act of humanity. I know the necessities of the army must ultimately contro⟨vert⟩ every other consideration, and it may become unavoidable to take Mr Laurance’s his hay, but from his position it may not be bad policy to let him be the last devoured. This will give him a chance to escape. You will perceive I write not officially but as a friend. I leave the rest to you.
Adieu
A Hamilton
Hd. Qrs.Aug 20.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 20 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

Orangetown [New York] August 20, 1780. Thanks Congress for increase in powers. Describes situation in Army. Discusses position of Great Britain both here and abroad. Reviews European situation. Argues for establishing a draft either for duration of war or for three years. Reiterates need of “ample and equal provision for the Army.” Repeats need for half-pay provision for officers. Urges centralization under Congress of all matters pertaining to Army.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de Barbé-Marbois, 21 August 1780
From: Barbé-Marbois, Marquis de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, August 21, 1780. Asks if there is any information concerning his brothers, who are British prisoners.


Title: George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, 21 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Rochambeau, Comte de

Orangetown [New York] August 21, 1780. Agrees that it will be best to defer the debarkation on Long Island. Considers various plans for attacking New York. Inquires into the possibilities of an interview. Reports rumor of new British expedition.


Title: George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 24 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, Robert

[Teaneck, New Jersey] August 24, 1780. Questions manner in which Howe’s baggage was guarded.


Title: George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, 26 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Rochambeau, Comte de

[Teaneck, New Jersey] August 26, 1780. Is concerned that Captain Pierre Landais failed to bring more arms; trusts they will arrive on the Ariel. Hopes that the second French division will not be held in blockade. Fears that internal troubles in Ireland and England will not directly aid American cause. Sends news of the Comte de Guichen’s plans to sail to Jamaica. Agrees that the British expedition may be headed for Marthas Vineyard. Is apprehensive that a letter to Rochambeau may have been intercepted. Reports that several British ships are returning to England.


Title: Circular to the States from George Washington, 27 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

[Teaneck, New Jersey] August 27, 1780. Discusses lack of provisions in Army. Writes: “Either the Army must disband, or what is, if possible, worse, subsist upon the plunder of the people.” Asks the states to requisition enough food to set up winter magazines.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de Lafayette, 28 August [1780]
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Light Camp [near Fort Lee, New Jersey, August] 28 [1780]
I wish, my dear Hamilton, you will please to invite your father in law to come and dine tomorrow with me. Mr Duane has engag’d he would do me that honor. I Beg you will also come. Be so kind as to write to me if any intelligence is come to hand, and when the General has determin’d to leave this place. Don’t forget what I told yesterday to you. I request, my dear Sir, you will Beg the General to Countersign my dispatch to Rhode island that it may go with more speed and security. The expresses ought most particularly to guard against tories, as in case our letters were intercepted, the enemy could derive the most immense advantages of it. They should be directed to change some times theyr course. I send to Count de Rochambeau letters from the Minister of france to which I add one from me, and some advices to my friends at Rhode island.
Adieu, Yours
Lafayette
The sending of the dispatches might be differrd till tomorrow morning in case M. de Pontgibaud could arrive to night.


Title: George Washington to James Bowdoin, 28 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Bowdoin, James

[Teaneck, New Jersey] August 28, 1780. Believes an operation against New York no longer possible. Regrets that at present the Army cannot repay its loan of arms. Approves of resolutions of the convention of the four eastern states. Reviews European situation.


Title: George Washington to James Bowdoin, 28 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Bowdoin, James

Liberty Pole [New Jersey] August 28, 1780. Thanks Bowdoin for loan of arms. Reports that Rhode Island Militia except for those at West Point have been dismissed. Mentions need for supplies. Urges completion of Continental battalions.


Title: George Washington to Major General William Heath, 28 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Heath, William

Liberty Pole [New Jersey] August 28, 1780. Directs Heath to dismiss the members of the militia if they are no longer of use to the French.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Goose Van Schaick, 28 August 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Van Schaick, Goose

[Liberty Pole, New Jersey] August 28, 1780. Orders Van Schaick to join Army.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Colonel Otho H. Williams, 30 August 1780
From: Williams, Otho H.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Hillsborough [North Carolina] 30th August 1780.
Dear Hamilton.
About the 23d. Instant I wrote my Friend Harrison from Salisbury giving him a very hasty, particular account of the Defeat of Genl. Gates’s Army at Suttons near Campden the 16th Instant. We were truly unfortunate and compleatly routed. The infamous Cowardice of the Militia of Virginia and North Carolina gave the Enemy every advantage over our few Regular troops whose firm opposition and Gallant behaviour have gain’d them the applause as well of our successful Foes as of our runaway Friends. If I mention’d to Coll. Harrison the loss of two Howitzers I was mistaken. We had Eight Pieces of Light Artillery with Six ammunition Waggons which, with the greatest Part of our Baggage, were lost.
Our retreat was the most mortifying that cod. have happen’d. Those who escaped the Dangers of the Field knew not where to find protection. The Wounded found no relief from the Inhabitants who were immediately in arms against us, and many of our Fugitive Officers and men were disarm’d by those faithless Vallains who had flatter’d us with promises of joining us against the Enemy. The Tories are now assembling in different parts of the Country, and there is actually a sort of partizan War Waged between them and the Whigs of this Country.

The greatest part of our Baggage was plunder’d by those who first left the Field. The Enemy took a part and much of what escaped them has been pillaged by the Inhabitants on the Retreat. The Waggon Horses have been stolen and frequently taken from the drivers and some of those desperate Rascals have been daring enough to fire upon parties of our Regular Troops many miles from the place of Action.
General Gates used the utmost expedition in getting from the lost Field to this place. As this step is unaccountable to me you must expect to know the reason another time and from better authority. An unfortunate Genl. usually looses the Confidence of his Army, and this is much the case with us at present. However I suppose every thing necessary will be done in justification of the Steps that have been taken and then all will be understood. Besides my ignorance there is another reason for my silence on this subject. The General is extremely mortified at the disappointment his hopes have met with, and I think it ungenerous to oppress dejected spirits by a premature censure.
The Legislature of this State is now sitting at this place and devising means of defending the Country. The General has exhibited Estimates (he informs me) of the supplies wanting to carry on the Campaign, both to the Legislature of this state and to Virginia and hopes they will be furnish’d. The Officers of North Carolina talk confidently of Reembodying a great number of Militia. Genl. Stephens had collected about Eight hundred of the Va. Militia at this place since the action but, I’m sorry to add, at least half that number have deserted. The Maryland Division, including the Delaware Regt., will, I hope, muster six hundred when all are collected. Part are now here, a party are with Genl. Smallwood at Ellis’s Ferry, Adkin River, and a small party with Major Anderson, who Genl. Smallwood left some time at Charlotte to receive the Fugitives as they arrived. But this is the place of Genl. Rendesvous.
From the best accounts I can get Ld. Cornwallis had with him on the Day of Battle the 71st, 63d., 33., & 23 British Regiments, a Corps of Hessians, Tarltons Legion and some New Levies ⟨amoun⟩t ing to about 3000 Men. Our Num⟨bers⟩ were ⟨very little⟩ greater and our force will not be ⟨imagined⟩ great ⟨by⟩ those who are inform’d of our long March ⟨in⟩ a Baron Country with very little other subsistence than a short allowance of Fresh Beef, Green Corn Apples & Peaches.
As soon as I recover from a relaxation of Spirits, which is all my present complaint, I will write you again and inform you that we are resolv’d not to dispair but bear our fortunes like Veterans in the South, while you like Heroes in the North win and wear the Laurells of the present Campaign. Present my most respectful Compliments to the General whom I Love, to all my Friends at Head Qrs. and in Camp. Not a man among you have been generous enough to write a single sentence to Yr sincere Friend & Servt
O H Williams
I mentiond the Surprize of Genl. Sumters party, wch. happen’d the 18 Inst., in my last.


Title: Plan for an Attack on New York, [August 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[August, 1780]
If upon reconnoitring Dobbes ferry it is found susceptible of batteries to establish a communication, So soon as we can assemble ten thousand men leaving a sufficient garrison at West Point, let them be drawn to Dobbe’s ferry this side of the River and immediately set about erecting batteries; let a sufficient number of boats be brought from Kings ferry, by water if practicable, if not by land, to transport the troops to the other side. Let fascines be prepared & let the troops pass over and immediately establish themselves on the other side; by this time they will have increased in strength sufficiently to have nothing to fear; if not they must wait till they have.
Should it not be found practicable to establish a communication at Dobbes ferry, still let our principal force be on this side till we are strong enough to approach the enemy rear on the other side; then let the army cross at Kings ferry and proceed towards New York.
When we have assembled 20.000 men let the army proceed to West Chester and intrench parallel to Harlæm river establishing a battery over that river, possessing if possible the Islands about Hell gate for communicating with long island. But It may be found more expedient to open a communication by Frog’s point where the Sound appears narrowest. Boats must be brought from the North River and the Sound calculating their transportation and our movements so as that there may be no delay on account of boats.

The French troops reimbark at New London and fall down the sound, debark at Oyster bay while a corps from us debarks somewhere at West Chester, say Frogs point, form a junction at Jamaica & proceed towards Brooklyn along the Green Hill, where they immediately take an intrenched camp.
The securest way to form this junction will be to leave ten thousand men intrenched on the main and cross over with the rest of the army, a part of which can return after the post before Brooklyn is in a state of security.
The movements of the French troops must be so regulated with ours as that they may arrive at Oyster Bay nearly by the time we shall be ready to cross the Sound.
This plan is in case the enemy should maintain their upper posts at Kings bridge &c. and we should deem it too hazardous to attempt a passage of Harlæm river; if this should be found practicable with security it will be best to do it either with our force alone or conjointly with the French as may be found eligible from the circumstances on the spot; a corps can afterwards be detached to Brooklyn. But the preliminary movements will be the same in either case.
If we can get upon York Island we may be carrying on our approaches at the same time they are going on against Brooklyn; if not we must content our selves to remain quiet and push Brooklyne with our principal efforts. When Brooklyn is carried we shall open all the sound and may destroy the city if we think proper, we shall have a better chance of getting upon York Island, which we must endeavour to do; if we cannot we must depend on a Blockade and must make our dispositions accordingly.
I do not know enough of the spot to judge where it will be easiest in the first instance to establish our communications but I suspect it will be at Frogs point.
Fire ships and fire rafts should be preparing to burn the enemy’s ships in the sound. The Fascines preparing on the Sound should be embarked in small vessels to be brought to us at West Chester; with gabions &c. they will greatly facilitate our movements.
It is of great importance the Fleet should endeavour to clear all the Harbour and the North River, which will certainly induce the enemy to abandon their upper posts or if it does not will give us a better opportunity to intersect their line and ruin them.
I suppose by the 25th. we may be able to collect the force of ten or twelve thousand men at Dobbs ferry; the 28th. we may if we please cross to the other side, but we may find it more convenient to wait till the 30th. to gather strength. The 30th. we may cross and the 2d. have established our battery on the other side; if we are in force enough and otherwise ready we may march the 3d. towards West Chester, arrive the evening of the 4th., and have six days to the 10th. to intrench and establish our communication.
The 6th. the French troops may embark at New London & be the 10th. at Oyster bay.
Should Dobbs ferry not be susceptible of a communication we may then think of Closter; but we shall require more force before we can begin here. The connecticut troops may however immediately come to this side at . When the garrison of West Point will admit of it another corps may come to this side &c. If we are finally obliged to go by Kings ferry, putting the whole in motion the 26th. we may be at West Chester the 4th. as in the other case & ready to act on the 10th.
These would be the outlines of my plan; the period may be rather short but as our prospects open we may extend it; it will I think be impolitic to fix it at first to one more remote; because men may be successively brought to a point which would at first alarm them, and the impatience of the French character must be managed.
Any plan however that can be formed now may require material deviation in the execution from the local circumstances of the scene of action &c. &c.


Title: On the Proposed Conference at Hartford with the Comte de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, [August 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[August, 1780]
The Marquis De la Fayette by your order proposed New York as the object of the intended cooperation and assured the Count De Rochambeau that by a certain period we should have fourteen thousand Continental troops and six thousand militia, and shortly after four or six thousand more.
It is of great importance to us that it should appear we are ready and in condition to act; our allies not. It will therefore be good policy to keep out of sight the disappointments we met with in the number of men &c. and to hold up the idea that we should have been prepared to cooperate. The contrary will have several ill effects—it will discredit us with the Court of France, it will argue either that we wished to deceive, or that we did not understand our true resources, the former w⟨ould⟩ be a reflection upon our honesty the latte⟨r⟩ upon our judgment, and either would prod⟨uce⟩ an injurious distrust of our future engage⟨ments.⟩ If we are pushed about our present force we may say that we have exclusive of mi⟨litia⟩ between twelve and thirteen thousand men, the deficiency arises from our having ordered back the Maryland troops to reinforce the Southern army, despairing of an operation ⟨there.⟩ It may be added by the way without laying much stress upon it, that the States relaxed their exertions to complete their batalions on finding the probability of an expedition against New York decrease.

Including the infantry of Sheldon and Lee Major Gibbes corps and Livingstons regiment Our Continental force in this quarter may well be estimated at
10800

The Regiment at Rhode Island is
500

The two Connecticut state Regts.
800

The Jersey state Regts. that may be had for the occasion
  400

12.500

Besides the 12500—Van Schaicks Regiment and the German batalion may be counted upon which will make our Continental and state troops near thirteen thousand; so that saying we are between twelve and thirteen thousand exclusive of Militia is, as near the truth as the most rigid good faith requires.

It will be necessary however that we should confess our wants and weaknesses very fuly. We must paint the distresses of our finances of the army, the impossibility of bringing out the resources of the Country much longer, unless by the help of a foreign loan, the necessity of activity if practicable on any reasonable ground; but we must carefully inculcate this distinction that though we cannot count upon continued exertions for future and remote operations; yet the states from a desire of getting rid of the present embarrassments by one decisive stroke, there is every reason to believe would have given us effectual aid in the expedition which was in contemplation. In painting the distresses of the army we must be silent on the want of provisions at this time, because the Count will infer too much from it.
As to operations in my opinion we should propose three plans—
If a decided superiority is acquired before the end of this Month and the Admiral will engage immediately to take possession of the harbour of New York and cooperate to the end of the expedition, till the siege is carried or is raised, New York should still be attempted. While He goes round to the Hook the army should proceed down the Sound under a proper convoy either to join us or throw itself upon Long Island to act against Brookline as circumstances may point out. If the operations of the fleet and the dispositions of the enemy put it in our power to throw the army upon York Island in the first instance it ought to be done—a part intrenched before the enemy’s lines and the rest thrown upon Long Island to establish itself before Brookline. I would content myself to leave in the intrenchments 6000 Continental troops and 6000 Militia; the remainder of the army if thought necessary for security might cross to Long Island; there take a camp as near Brooklin as might be thought expedient and intrench ten thousand men; of which eight to be regular troops two militia; the remainder to recross to York Island. By this plan the operations against York Island and Long Island may go on at the same time. The french troops must join us to make good our ground upon York Island; otherwise the operation might be critical.
If the fleet should be retarded in gaining full possession of the harbour and the enemy’s dispositions should make it dangerous to force our way in the first instance upon the Island, then we may intrench a corps of ten thousand men (of which four or five thousand to be Continental troops) at Frogs neck or some other advantageous spot in West Chester and proceed with the main body of the army to Brooklyne to reduce that post. This movement and the operations of the fleet will oblige the enemy to collect their force at their works near the city; by the time Brookline was carried, the fleet in all probability will have gained the harbour, and in either case the enemy cannot remain at their advanced posts, for we might then throw ourselves into their rear and cut them off from their supplies. We shall by this time find no difficulty in establishing ourselves on the Island in front of the enemys lines and beginning our approaches. Brookline being carried some momentary repairs must be given to it, and a garrison sufficient to be secure against a coup de main left to defend it and the posts near it and to bombard the city, while the rest of the army with the part intrenched at West Chester unite on York Island. The precise mode of effecting this will be determined by the circumstance of the moment.
In the first plan after Brookline is carried it must be garrisoned in like manner, and the remaining troops must rejoin those on York Island to push the approaches with the greater vigor and efficacy.
The fleet so soon as it gets possession of the harbour must clear the North River by such methods as the Admiral thinks best. To force the passage on York Island on the first plan, the army will extend from the North River to the Sound, with all the boats of the fleet and all that can be collected in the North River and in the Sound on each flank; the position of the enemy will decide the rest.
Should not the fleet arrive in time for New York and should a decided naval superiority be afterwards required, we must attempt the relief of the Southern states. The french troops will embark where they are. A corps of four thousand American troops will embark in the Delaware. The french fleet will be convoyed to the mouth of the Delaware and there form a junction with the American corps and proceed to Charles Town. The troops will move by water as Sir Henry Clinton did by way of Wappoo Cut&c. till it can arrive before Charles Town.

A landing in South Carolina will make the enemy draw in all their out posts and General Gates may approach Charles Town in proportion to form a junction there with the army under your command. Perhaps it may be found expedient to detach immediately into Georgia to regain possession of the state; but the circumstances on the spot will best decide this.
The fleet after protecting the landing may return to cruise off New York and protect the successive supplies going to the allied army. Its station when it finds it necessary to go into port should be  road Chesapaek bay. Most of the transports may be sent away with it. Some frigates must be left—superior to the enemys naval force. It would be useful to gain possession of Charles Town harbour if it can be effected, to exclude the enemy from supplies.
Any vessels which may be laden in the Eastern ports with provisions &c. for us must be convoyed to the Delaware.
We should have a train of seige artillery of 60 pieces of ordnance with a proportion of stores for both armies. ⟨It should⟩ if possible set out with three months ⟨supplies.⟩ If we embark so as to arrive ⟨sometime in⟩ November, it would be the ⟨most⟩ convenient season.
After reducing ⟨Charles⟩ Town a sufficient force must be ⟨sent to⟩ Savannah, St Augustine &c.
If for want of a naval superiority we can attempt neither New York nor Charles Town we should endeavour to make a Winter expedition into Canada. The force I would propose for this would be five thousand men, half French troops half American. The Count De Rochambeau to engage him in the enterprise should be chief in the expedition; Major General Greene should command the American corps. The Marquis should go under him; it would be well to let the latter have the chief command, but the people might not be satisfied with it. There are political reasons which would induce me to prefer Greene. I do not think, The Commander in Chief should go; for two reasons—the one already mentioned respecting Rochambeau and the general situation of the Country, which requires his presence and influence within the states; for in the present crisis there is no saying what may happen and Congress stand in need of support.
In order to this, I would endeavour to have Magazines of bread & forage at Coos and at Albany—snow shoes &c. provided. I would encourage the late offer from the grants concerning one, and write to the state of New York concerning the other. These Magazines will ⟨be⟩ useful on any supposition.
I prefer the route by Coos ⟨for⟩ the expedition.
The army should go light ⟨in⟩ the first instance; but after having established ⟨itse⟩lf at Montreal, a train of seige Artillery ⟨sho⟩uld follow and every preparation should ⟨be⟩ made to break ground before Quebec ⟨as⟩ early as the season will permit & too soon for succours to come up the River St. Laurance; for till the capital is carried, I think nothing done. Perhaps we may be able to carry it by assult.
As we may not have specie to maintain our part of the expedition we must endeavour to make this arrangement—The Count De Rochambeau to advance the money to procure such additional supplies as we cannot send, we to deliver flour &c. here for that part of the French troops which remains and the account to be afterwards liquidated. The difficulty of supplying our troops may not be so great as may at first sight seem; for when the St. Laurance is once open we may have a water transportation for such flour &c. as we think proper to send. The giving Count ⟨De⟩ Rochambeau the chief direction of the expedition will be a strong motive to engage him in this agreement.
We should endeavour at all events to get the Count to send the fleet to Boston and come with the army this way; at least this should be done as the Winter approaches. It will have many advantages; it will prevent the enemy detaching from New York to push their advantages in the Southern states; it will enable us to take advantage of their faults; it will prevent the evils we have to apprehend from the diminution of our army in the Winter; it will enable us to detach to the Southward if we should find it necessary.
Should the Canadian expedition take place, the remainder of the troops should by all means join us.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, [August 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Teaneck, New Jersey, August, 1780]
Impatiently My Dearest have I been expecting the return of your father to bring me a letter from my charmer with the answers you have been good enough to promise me to the little questions asked in mine by him. I long to see the workings of my Betseys heart, and I promise my self I shall have ample gratification to my fondness in the sweet familiarity of her pen. She will there I hope paint me her feelings without reserve—even in those tender moments of pillowed retirement, when her soul abstracted from every other object, delivers itself up to Love and to me—yet with all that delicacy which suits the purity of her mind and which is so conspicuous in whatever she does.
It is now a week my Betsey since I have heard from you. In that time I have written you twice. I think it will be adviseable in future to number our letters, for I have reason to suspect they do not all meet with fair play. This is number one.
Meade just comes in and interrupts me by sending his love to you. He tells you he has written a long letter to his widow asking her opinion of the propriety of quitting the service; and that if she does not disapprove it, he will certainly take his final leave after the campaign. You see what a fine opportunity she has to be enrolled in the catalogue of heroines, and I dare say she will set you an example of fortitude and patriotism. I know too you have so much of the Portia in you, that you will not be out done in this line by any of your sex, and that if you saw me inclined to quit the service of your country, you would dissuade me from it. I have promised you, you recollect, to conform to your wishes, and I persist in this intention. It remains with you to show whether you are a Roman or an American wife.
Though I am not sanguine in expecting it, I am not without hopes this Winter will produce a peace and then you must submit to the  mortification of enjoying more domestic happiness and less fame. This I know you will not like, but we cannot always have things as we wish.
The affairs of England are in so bad a plight that if no fortunate events attend her this campaign, it would seem impossible for her to proceed in the war. But she is an obstinate old dame, and seems determined to ruin her whole family, rather than to let Miss America go on flirting it with her new lovers, with whom, as giddy young girls often do, she eloped in contempt of her mothers authority. I know you will be ready to justify her conduct and to tell me the ill treatment she received was enough to make any girl of spirit act in the same manner. But I will one day cure you of these refractory notions about the right of resistance, (of which I foresee you will be apt to make a very dangerous application), and teach you the great advantage and absolute necessity of implicit obedience.
But now we are talking of times to come, tell me my pretty damsel have you made up your mind upon the subject of housekeeping? Do you soberly relish the pleasure of being a poor mans wife? Have you learned to think a home spun preferable to a brocade and the rumbling of a waggon wheel to the musical rattling of a coach and six? Will you be able to see with perfect composure your old acquaintances flaunting it in gay life, tripping it along in elegance and splendor, while you hold an humble station and have no other enjoyments than the sober comforts of a good wife? Can you in short be an Aquileia and chearfully plant turnips with me, if fortune should so order it? If you cannot my Dear we are playing a comedy of all in the wrong, and you should correct the mistake before we begin to act the tragedy of the unhappy couple.
I propose you a set of new questions my lovely girl; but though they are asked with an air of levity, they merit a very serious consideration, for on their being resolved in the affirmative stripped of all the colorings of a fond imagination our happiness may absolutely depend. I have not concealed my circumstances from my Betsey; they are far from splendid; they may possibly even be worse than I expect, for every day brings me fresh proof of the knavery of those to whom my little affairs are entrusted. They have already filed down what was in their hands more than one half, and I am told they go on diminishing it, ’till I fear they will reduce it below my former fears. An indifference to property enters into my character too much, and what affects me now as my Betsey is concerned in it, I should have laughed at or not thought of at all a year ago. But I have thoroughly examined my own heart. Beloved by you, I can be happy in any situation, and can struggle with every embarrassment of fortune with patience and firmness. I cannot however forbear entreating you to realize our union on the dark side and satisfy, without deceiving yourself, how far your affection for me can make you happy in a privation of those elegancies to which you have been accustomed. If fortune should smile upon us, it will do us no harm to have been prepared for adversity; if she frowns upon us, by being prepared, we shall encounter it without the chagrin of disappointment. Your future rank in life is a perfect lottery; you may move in an exalted you may move in a very humble sphere; the last is most probable; examine well your heart. And in doing it, dont figure to yourself a cottage in romance, with the spontaneous bounties of nature courting you to enjoyment. Dont imagine yourself a shepherdess, your hair embroidered with flowers a crook in your hand tending your flock under a shady tree, by the side of a cool fountain, your faithful shepherd sitting near and entertaining you with gentle tales of love. These are pretty dreams and very apt to enter into the heads of lovers when they think of a connection without the advantages of fortune. But they must not be indulged. You must apply your situation to real life, and think how you should feel in scenes of which you may find examples every day. So far My Dear Betsey as the tenderest affection can compensate for other inconveniences in making your estimate, you cannot give too large a credit for this article. My heart overflows with every thing for you, that admiration, esteem and love can inspire. I would this moment give the world to be near you only to kiss your sweet hand. Believe what I say to be truth and imagine what are my feelings when I say it. Let it awake your sympathy and let our hearts melt in a prayer to be soon united, never more to be separated.
Adieu loveliest of your sex
AH
Instead of inclosing your letter to your father I inclose his to you because I do not know whether he may not be on his way here. If he is at home he will tell you the military news. If he has set out for camp, you may open and read my letters to him. The one from Mr. Mathews you will return by the first opportunity.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, 2 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Parsons, Samuel H.

Bergen County [New Jersey] September 2, 1780. Instructs Parsons to move to “the vicinity of North Castle” and to take command of troops there.


Title: George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Levi Wells, 2 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Wells, Levi

Bergen County [New Jersey] September 2, 1780. Orders Wells to join Colonel Elisha Sheldon in vicinity of North Castle.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [3 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Duane, James

[Liberty Pole, New Jersey, September 3, 1780]
Dr. Sir
Agreeably to your request and my promise I sit down to give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may perhaps be the reveries of a projector rather than the sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make what use you please of them.
The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it seems to be universally acknowleged, or to point out how it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it. It may however be said that it has originated from three causes—an excess of the spirit of liberty which has made the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety or necessity, a diffidence in Congress of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly making concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies and of vigor to draw forth those means; which have occasioned them to depend on the states individually to fulfil their engagements with the army, and the consequence of which has been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its dependence on each state separately rather than on them, that is rather than on the whole collectively.
It may be pleaded, that Congress had never any definitive powers granted them and of course could exercise none—could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed would warrant, and the public good required, that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power to preserve the republic from harm. They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always chearfully submitted to—the declaration of independence, the declaration of war, the levying an army, creating a navy, emitting money, making alliances with foreign powers, appointing a dictator &c. &c.—all these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of Administration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they were given—in the present case, the independence and freedom of America. The confederation made no difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had no operation. But from what I recollect of it, Congress have even descended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives them, while the particular states have no further attended to it than as it suited their pretensions and convenience. It would take too much time to enter into particular instances, each of which separately might appear inconsiderable; but united are of serious import. I only mean to remark, not to censure.
But the confederation itself is defective and requires to be altered; it is neither fit for war, nor peace. The idea of an uncontrolable sovereignty in each state, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances without number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress must interfere with the internal police of the states, and there are as many instances in which the particular states by arrangements of internal police can effectually though indirectly counteract the arrangements of Congress. You have already had examples of this for which I refer you to your own memory.
The confederation gives the states individually too much influence in the affairs of the army; they should have nothing to do with it. The entire formation and disposal of our military forces ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential cement of the union; and it ought to be the policy of Congress to des⟨troy⟩ all ideas of state attachments in the army and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose all appointments promotions and provisions whatsoever ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people. Already some of the lines of the army would obey their states in opposition to Congress notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army—if any thing would hinder this it would be the personal influence of the General, a melancholy and mortifying consideration.
The forms of our state constitutions must always give them great weight in our affairs and will make it too difficult to bend them to the persuit of a common interest, too easy to oppose whatever they do not like and to form partial combinations subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation and that of an empire under one simple form of government, distributed into counties provinces or districts, which have no legisla⟨tures⟩ but merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a common sovereign. Here the danger is that the sove[re]ign will have too much power to oppress the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederated states each with a government completely organised within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself—the danger is directly the reverse. It is that the common sovereign will not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole.
The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof of this. They were continually at war with each other, and for want of union fell a prey to their neighbours. They frequently held general councils, but their resolutions were no further observed than as they suited the interests and inclinations of all the parties and at length, they sunk intirely into contempt.
The Swiss-cantons are another proof of the doctrine. They have had wars with each other which would have been fatal to them, had not the different powers in their neighbourhood been too jealous of one-another and too equally matched to suffer either to take advantage of their quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and to the cause just mentioned. These ties will not exist in America; a little time hence, some of the states will be powerful empires, and we are so remote from other nations that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we can wish to cut each others throats.
The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example in favour of the position.
The United provinces may be thought to be one against it. But the family of the stadtholders whose authority is interwoven with the whole government has been a strong link of union between them. Their physical necessities and the habits founded upon them have contributed to it. Each province is too inconsiderable by itself to undertake any thing. An analysis of their present constitutions would show that they have many ties which would not exist in ours; and that they are by no means a proper mode for us.
Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country and inducing the states to combine in equal exertions for the common cause. The ill success of our last attempt is striking. Some have done a great deal, others little or scarcely any thing. The disputes about boundaries &c. testify how flattering a prospect we have of future tranquillity, if we do not frame in time a confederacy capable of deciding the differences and compelling the obedience of the respective members.
The confederation too gives the power of the purse too intirely to the state legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds in the disposal of Congress—by a land tax, poll tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid by Congress and appropriated to their use, for without certain revenues, a government can have no power; that power, which holds the purse strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium, which without making Congress altogether independent will tend to give reality to its authority.
Another defect in our system is want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect, but in a great degree from prejudice and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much into their own hands and have meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision, or with system. Two thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them or what connection the subject in hand has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members, who have been more permanent, will only give information, that promotes the side they espouse, in the present case, and will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must distract, and the proneness of every assembly to debate must at all times delay.
Lately Congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of appointing boards. But this is in my opinion a bad plan. A single man, in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would give us a chance of more knowlege, more activity, more responsibility and of course more zeal and attention. Boards partake of a part of the inconveniencies of larger assemblies. Their decisions are slower their energy less their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the same abilities and knowlege as an administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them, because they will be less cospicuous, of less importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive to eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the state in the hands of individuals. As these men will be of course at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy and republic in our constitution.
A question has been made, whether single men could be found to undertake these offices. I think they could, because there would be then every thing to excite the ambition of candidates. But in order to this Congress by their manner of appointing them and the line of duty marked out must show that they are in earnest in making these offices, offices of real trust and importance.
I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrangements, as though they would lessen the importance of Congress and leave them nothing to do. But they would have precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happily disencumbered of the detail. They would have to inspect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their plans, originate others for the public good—only observing this rule that they ought to consult their ministers, and get all the information and advice they could from them, before they entered into any new measures or made changes in the old.
A third defect is the fluctuating constitution of our army. This has been a pregnant source of evil; all our military misfortunes, three fourths of our civil embarrassments are to be ascribed to it. The General has so fully enumerated the mischief of it in a late letter of the  to Congress that I could only repeat what he has said, and will therefore refer you to that letter.

The imperfect and unequal provision made for the army is a fourth defect which you will find delineated in the same letter. Without a speedy change the army must dissolve; it is now a mob, rather than an army, without cloathing, without pay, without provision, without morals, without discipline. We begin to hate the country for its neglect of us; the country begins to hate us for our oppressions of them. Congress have long been jealous of us; we have now lost all confidence in them, and give the worst construction to all they do. Held together by the slenderest ties we are ripening for a dissolution.
The present mode of supplying the army—by state purchases—is not one of the least considerable defects of our system. It is too precarious a dependence, because the states will never be sufficiently impressed with our necessities. Each will make its own ease a primary object, the supply of the army a secondary one. The variety of channels through which the business is transacted will multiply the number of persons employed and the opportunities of embezzling public money. From the popular spirit on which most of the governments turn, the state agents, will be men of less character and ability, nor will there be so rigid a responsibility among them as there might easily be among those in the employ of the continent, of course not so much diligence care or economy. Very little of the money raised in the several states will go into the Continental treasury, on pretence, that it is all exhausted in providing the quotas of supplies, and the public will be without funds for the other demands of governments. The expence will be ultimately much greater and the advantages much smaller. We actually feel the insufficiency of this plan and have reason to dread under it a ruinous extremity of want.
These are the principal defects in the present system that now occur to me. There are many inferior ones in the organization of particular departments and many errors of administration which might be pointed out; but the task would be troublesome and tedious, and if we had once remedied those I have mentioned the others would not be attended with much difficulty.
I shall now propose the remedies, which appear to me applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extricate our affairs from their present deplorable situation.

The first step must be to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two ways, one by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them for the safety of the states and resting their conduct on the candor of their country men and the necessity of the conjuncture: the other by calling immediately a convention of all the states with full authority to conclude finally upon a general confederation, stating to them beforehand explicity the evils arising from a want of power in Congress, and the impossibily of supporting the contest on its present footing, that the delegates may come possessed of proper sentiments as well as proper authority to give to the meeting. Their commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole or a proportion of the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the states by whom they are granted.
The first plan, I expect will be thought too bold an expedient by the generality of Congress; and indeed their practice hitherto has so rivetted the opinion of their want of power, that the success of this experiment may very well be doubted.
I see no objection to the other mode, that has any weight in competition with the reasons for it. The Convention should assemble the 1st of November next, the sooner, the better; our disorders are too violent to admit of a common or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I require them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority are that the business may suffer no delay in the execution, and may in reality come to effect. A convention may agree upon a confederation; the states individually hardly ever will. We must have one at all events, and a vigorous one if we mean to succeed in the contest and be happy hereafter. As I said before, to engage the states to comply with this mode, Congress ought to confess to them plainly and unanimously the impracticability of supporting our affairs on the present footing and without a solid coercive union. I ask that the Convention should have a power of vesting the whole or a part of the unoccupied land in Congress, because it is necessary that body should have some property as a fund for the arrangements of finance; and I know of no other kind that can be given them.
The confederation in my opinion should give Congress complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police, which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals and to raising money by internal taxes. It is necessary, that every thing, belonging to this, should be regulated by the state legislatures. Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance, and to the management of foreign affairs, the right of declaring war of raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect, of equipping fleets and doing the same with them, of building fortifications arsenals magazines &c. &c., of making peace on such conditions as they think proper, of regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on, granting indulgencies laying prohibitions on all the articles of export or import, imposing duties granting bounties & premiums for raising exporting importing and applying to their own use the product of these duties, only giving credit to the states on whom they are raised in the general account of revenues and expences, instituting Admiralty courts &c., of coining money, establishing banks on such terms, and with such privileges as they think proper, appropriating funds and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance, transacting every thing with foreign nations, making alliances offensive and defensive, treaties of commerce, &c. &c.
The confederation should provide certain perpetual revenues, productive and easy of collection, a land tax, poll tax or the like, which together with the duties on trade and the unlocated lands would give Congress a substantial existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of finance. What more supplies were necessary should be occasionally demanded of the states, in the present mode of quotas.
The second step I would recommend is that Congress should instantly appoint the following great officers of state—A secretary for foreign affairs—a President of war—A President of Marine—A Financier—A President of trade; instead of this last a board of Trade may be preferable as the regulations of trade are slow and gradual and require prudence and experience (more than other qualities), for which boards are very well adapted.
Congress should choose for these offices, men of the first abilities, property and character in the continent—and such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted with the several branches. General Schuyler(whom you mentioned) would make an excellent  President of War, General McDougall a very good President of Marine. Mr. Robert Morris would have many things in his favour for the department of finance. He could by his own personal influence give great weight to the measures he should adopt. I dare say men equally capable may be found for the other departments.
I know not, if it would not be a good plan to let the Financier be President of the Board of trade; but he should only have a casting voice in determining questions there. There is a connection between trade and finance, which ought to make the director of one acquainted with the other; but the Financier should not direct the affairs of trade, because for the sake of acquiring reputation by increasing the revenues, he might adopt measures that would depress trade. In what relates to finance he should be alone.
These offices should have nearly the same powers and functions as those in France analogous to them, and each should be chief in his department, with subordinate boards composed of assistant clerks &c. to execute his orders.
In my opinion a plan of this kind would be of inconceivable utility to our affairs; its benefits would be very speedily felt. It would give new life and energy to the operations of government. Business would be conducted with dispatch method and system. A million of abuses now existing would be corrected, and judicious plans would be formed and executed for the public good.
Another step of immediate necessity is to recruit the army for the war, or at least for three years. This must be done by a mode similar to that which is practiced in Sweeden. There the inhabitants are thrown into classes of sixteen, and when the sovereign wants men each of these classes must furnish one. They raise a fixed sum of money, and if one of the class is willing to become a soldier, he receives the money and offers himself a volunteer; if none is found to do this, a draft is made and he on whom the lot falls receives the money and is obliged to serve. The minds of the people are prepared for a thing of this kind; the heavy bounties they have been obliged to pay for men to serve a few months must have disgusted them with this mode, and made them desirous of another, that will once for all answer the public purposes, and obviate a repetition of the demand. It ought by all means to be attempted, and Congress should frame a general plan and press the execution upon the states. When  the confederation comes to be framed, it ought to provide for this by a fundamental law, and hereafter there would be no doubt of the success. But we cannot now wait for this; we want to replace the men whose times of service will expire the 1st of January, for then, without this, we shall have no army remaining and the enemy may do what they please. The General in his letter already quoted has assigned the most substantial reasons for paying immediate attention to this point.
Congress should endeavour, both upon their credit in Europe, and by every possible exertion in this country, to provide cloathing for their officers, and should abolish the whole system of state supplies. The making good the depreciation of the currency and all other compensations to the army should be immediately taken up by Congress, and not left to the states; if they would have the accounts of depreciation liquidated, and governmental certificates given for what is due in specie or an equivalent to specie, it would give satisfaction; appointing periodical settlements for future depreciation.
The placing the officers upon half pay during life would be a great stroke of policy, and would give Congress a stronger tie upon them, than any thing else they can do. No man, that reflects a moment, but will prefer a permanent provision of this kind to any temporary compensation, nor is it opposed to economy; the difference between this and between what has been already done will be insignificant. The benefit of it to the widows should be confined to those whose husbands die during the war. As to the survivors, not more than one half on the usual calculation of mens lives will exceed the seven years for which the half pay is already established. Besides this whatever may be the visionary speculations of some men at this time, we shall find it indispensable after the war to keep on foot a considerable body of troops; and all the officers retained for this purpose must be deducted out of the half pay list. If any one will take the pains to calculate the expence on these principles, I am persuaded he will find the addition of expence from the establishment proposed, by no means a national object.
The advantages of securing the attachment of the army to Congress, and binding them to the service by substantial ties are immense. We should then have discipline, an army in reality, as well as in name. Congress would then have a solid basis of authority and consequence, for to me it is an axiom that in our constitution an army is essential to the American union.
The providing of supplies is the pivot of every thing else (though a well constituted army would not in a small degree conduce to this, by giving consistency and weight to government). There are four ways all which must be united—a foreign loan, heavy pecuniary taxes, a tax in kind, a bank founded on public and private credit.
As to a foreign loan I dare say, Congress are doing every thing in their power to obtain it. The most effectual way will be to tell France that without it, we must make terms with great Britain. This must be done with plainness and firmness, but with respect and without petulance, not as a menace, but as a candid declaration of our circumstances. We need not fear to be deserted by France. Her interest and honor are too deeply involved in our fate; and she can make no possible compromise. She can assist us, if she is convinced it is absolutely necessary, either by lending us herself or by becoming our surety or by influencing Spain. It has been to me astonishing how any man could have doubted at any period of our affairs of the necessity of a foreign loan. It was self evident, that we had not a fund of wealth in this country, capable of affording revenues equal to the expences. We must then create artificial revenues, or borrow; the first was done, but it ought to have been foreseen, that the expedient could not last; and we should have provided in time for its failure.
Here was an error of Congress. I have good reason to believe, that measures were not taken in earnest early enough, to procure a loan abroad. I give you my honor that from our first outset, I thought as I do now and wished for a foreign loan not only because I foresaw it would be essential but because I considered it as a tie upon the nation from which it was derived and as a mean to prop our cause in Europe.
Concerning the necessity of heavy pecuniary taxes I need say nothing, as it is a point in which everybody is agreed; nor is there any danger, that the product of any taxes raised in this way will over burthen the people, or exceed the wants of the public. Indeed if all the paper in circulation were drawn annually into the treasury, it would neither do one, nor the other.

As to a tax in kind, the necessity of it results from this principle—that the money in circulation is not a sufficient representative of the productions of the country, and consequently no revenues raised from it as a medium can be a competent representative of that part of the products of the country, which it is bound to contribute to the support of the public. The public therefore to obtain its due or satisfy its just demands and its wants must call for a part of those products themselves. This is done in all those countries which are not commercial, in Russia, Prussia, Denmark Sweden &c. and is peculiarly necessary in our case.
Congress in calling for specific supplies seem to have had this in view; but their intention has not been answered. The states in general have undertaken to furnish the supplies by purchase, a mode as I have observed, attended with every inconvenience and subverting the principle on which the supplies were demanded—the insufficiency of our circulating medium as a representative for the labour and commodities of the Country. It is therefore necessary that Congress should be more explicit, should form the outlines of a plan for a tax in kind, and recommend it to the states, as a measure of absolute necessity.
The general idea I have of a plan, is that a respectable man should be appointed by the state in each county to collect the taxes and form magazines, that Congress should have in each state an officer to superintend the whole and that the state collectors should be subordinate and responsible to them. This Continental superintendent might be subject to the general direction of the Quarter Master General, or not, as might be deemed best; but if not subject to him, he should be obliged to make monthly returns to the President at War, who should instruct him what proportion to deliver to the Quarter Master General. It may be necessary that the superintendents should sometimes have power to dispose of the articles in their possession on public account; for it would happen that the contributions in places remote from the army could not be transported to the theatre of operations without too great expence, in which case it would be eligible to dispose of them and purchase with the money so raised in the countries near the immediate scene of war.
I know the objections which may be raised to this plan—its tendency to discourage industry and the like; but necessity calls for it; we cannot proceed without [it], and less evils must give place to greater. It is besides practiced with success in other countries, and why not in this? It may be said, the examples cited are from nations under despotic governments and that the same would not be practicable with us; but I contend where the public good is evidently the object more may be effected in governments like ours than in any other. It has been a constant remark that free countries have ever paid the heaviest taxes. The obedience of a free people to general laws however hard they bear is ever more perfect than that of slaves to the arbitrary will of a prince. To this it may be added that Sweden was always a free government, and is so now in a great degree, notwithstanding the late revolution.
How far it may be practicable to erect a bank on the joint credit of the public and of individuals can only be certainly determined by the experiment; but it is of so much importance that the experiment ought to be fully tried. When I saw the subscriptions going on to the bank established for supplying the army, I was in hopes it was only the embryo of a more permanent and extensive establishment. But I have reason to believe I shall be disappointed. It does not seem to be at all conducted on the true principles of a bank. The directors of it are purchasing with their stock instead of bank notes as I expected; in consequence of which it must turn out to be a mere subscription of a particular sum of money for a particular purpose.
Paper credit never was long supported in any country, on a national scale, where it was not founded on the joint basis of public and private credit. An attempt to establish it on public credit alone in France under the auspices of Mr. Law had nearly ruined the kingdom; we have seen the effects of it in America, and every successive experiment proves the futility of the attempt. Our new money is depreciating almost as fast as the old, though it has in some states as real funds as paper money ever had. The reason is, that the monied men have not an immediate interest to uphold its credit. They may even in many ways find it their interest to undermine it. The only certain manner to obtain a permanent paper credit is to engage the monied interest immediately in it by making them contribute the whole or part of the stock and giving them the whole or part of the profits.
The invention of banks on the modern principle originated in Venice. There the public and a company of monied men are mutually concerned. The Bank of England unites public authority and faith with private credit; and hence we see what a vast fabric of paper credit is raised on a visionary basis. Had it not been for this, England would never have found sufficient funds to carry on her wars; but with the help of this she has done, and is doing wonders. The bank of Amsterdam is on a similar foundation.
And why can we not have an American bank? Are our monied men less enlightened to their own interest or less enterprising in the persuit? I believe the fault is in our government which does not exert itself to engage them in such a scheme. It is true, the individuals in America are not very rich, but this would not prevent their instituting a bank; it would only prevent its being done with such ample funds as in other countries. Have they not sufficient confidence in the government and in the issue of the cause? Let the Government endeavour to inspire that confidence, by adopting the measures I have recommended or others equivalent to them. Let it exert itself to procure a solid confederation, to establish a good plan of executive administration, to form a permanent military force, to obtain at all events a foreign loan. If these things were in a train of vigorous execution, it would give a new spring to our affairs; government would recover its respectability and individuals would renounce their diffidence.
The object I should propose to myself in the first instance from a bank would be an auxiliary mode of supplies; for which purpose contracts should be made between Government and the bank on terms liberal and advantageous to the latter. Every thing should be done in the first instance to encourage the bank; after it gets well established it will take care of itself and government may make the best terms it can for itself.
The first step to establishing the bank will be to engage a number of monied men of influence to relish the project and make it a business. The subscribers to that lately established are the fittest persons that can be found; and their plan may be interwoven.
The outlines of my plan would be to open subscriptions in all the states for the stock, which we will suppose to be one million of pounds. Real property of every kind, as well as specie should be deemed good stock, but at least a fourth part of the subscription should be in specie or plate. There should be one great company in three divisions in Virginia, Philadelphia, and at Boston or two at Philadelphia and Boston. The bank should have a right to issue bank notes bearing two per Cent interest for the whole of their stock; but not to exceed it. These notes may be payable every three months or oftener, and the faith of government must be pledged for the support of the bank. It must therefore have a right from time to time to inspect its operations, and must appoint inspectors for the purpose.
The advantages of the bank may consist in this, in the profits of the contracts made with government, which should bear interest to be annually paid in specie, in the loan of money at interest say six per Cent, in purchasing lives by annuities as practiced in England &c. The benefit resulting to the company is evident from the consideration, that they may employ in circulation a great deal more money than they have specie in stock, on the credit of the real property which they will have in other use; this money will be employed either in fulfilling their contracts with the public by which also they will gain a profit, or in loans at an advantageous interest or in annuities.
The bank may be allowed to purchase plate and bullion and coin money allowing government a part of the profit. I make the bank notes bear interest to obtain a readie currency and to induce the holders to prefer them to specie to prevent too great a run upon the bank at any time beyond its ability to pay.
If Government can obtain a foreign loan it should lend to the bank on easy terms to extend its influence and facilitate a compliance with its engagements. If government could engage the states to raise a sum of money in specie to be deposited in bank in the same manner, it would be of the greatest consequence. If government could prevail on the enthusiasm of the people to make a contribution in plate for the same purpose it would be a master stroke. Things of this kind sometimes succeed in popular contests; and if undertaken with address; I should not despair of its success; but I should not be sanguine.
The bank may be instituted for a term of years by way of trial and the particular privilege of coining money be for a term still shorter. A temporary transfer of it to a particular company can have no inconvenience as the government are in no condition to improve this resource nor could it in our circumstances be an object to them, though with the industry of a knot of individuals it might be.
A bank of this kind even in its commencement would answer the most valuable purposes to government and to the proprietors; in its progress the advantages will exceed calculation. It will promote commerce by furnishing a more extensive medium which we greatly want in our circumstances. I mean a more extensive valuable medium. We have an enormous nominal one at this time; but it is only a name.
In the present unsettled state of things in this country, we can hardly draw inferences from what has happened in others, otherwise I should be certain of the success of this scheme; but I think it has enough in its favour to be worthy of trial.
I have only skimmed the surface of the different subjects I have introduced. Should the plans recommended come into contemplation in earnest and you desire my further thoughts, I will endeavour to give them more form and particularity. I am persuaded a solid confederation a permanent army a reasonable prospect of subsisting it would give us treble consideration in Europe and produce a peace this winter.
If a Convention is called the minds of all the states and the people ought to be prepared to receive its determinations by sensible and popular writings, which should conform to the views of Congress. There are epochs in human affairs, when novelty even is useful. If a general opinion prevails that the old way is bad, whether true or false, and this obstructs or relaxes the operation of the public service, a change is necessary if it be but for the sake of change. This is exactly the case now. ’Tis an universal sentiment that our present system is a bad one, and that things do not go right on this account. The measure of a Convention would revive the hopes of the people and give a new direction to their passions, which may be improved in carrying points of substantial utility. The Eastern states have already pointed out this mode to Congress; they ought to take the hint and anticipate the others.
And, in future, My Dear Sir, two things let me recommend, as fundamental rules for the conduct of Congress—to attach the army to them by every motive, to maintain an air of authority (not domineering) in all their measures with the states. The manner in which a thing is done has more influence than is commonly imagined. Men are governed by opinion; this opinion is as much influenced by appearances as by realities; if a Government appears to be confident of its own powers, it is the surest way to inspire the same confidence in others; if it is diffident, it may be certain, there will be a still greater diffidence in others, and that its authority will not only be distrusted, controverted, but contemned.
I wish too Congress would always consider that a kindness consists as much in the manner as in the thing: the best things done hesitatingly and with an ill grace lose their effect, and produce disgust rather than satisfaction or gratitude. In what Congress have at any time done for the army, they have commonly been too late: They have seemed to yield to importunity rather than to sentiments of justice or to a regard to the accomodation of their troops. An attention to this idea is of more importance than it may be thought. I who have seen all the workings and progress of the present discontents, am convinced, that a want of this has not been among the most inconsiderable causes.
You will perceive My Dear Sir this letter is hastily written and with a confidential freedom, not as to a member of Congress, whose feelings may be sore at the prevailing clamours; but as to a friend who is in a situation to remedy public disorders, who wishes for nothing so much as truth, and who is desirous of information, even from those less capable of judging than himself. I have not even time to correct and copy and only enough to add that I am very truly and affectionately D Sir   Your most Obed ser
A. Hamilton
Liberty PoleSept. 3d 1780


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, [3 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Liberty Pole, New Jersey, September 3, 1780]

I wrote you last night the inclosed hasty note in expectation that your papa would take his leave of us this morning early; a violent storm in which our house is tumbling about our ears prevents him. He and Meade are propping the house (I mean the Marquis), and I sit down to indulge the pleasure I always feel in writing to you.
The little song you sent me I have read over and over. It is very pretty and contains precisely those sentiments I would wish my betsey to feel, and she tells me it is an exact copy of her heart. You seem by sympathy to have anticipated the inquiries I made in one of mine lately, and to have answered them all by this little song; a pretty method indeed when I am asking a set of sober questions, of the greatest importance, to answer me with a song. I confess however that they scarcely deserved a better and that if you should in reality refer me to your song, I shall be very well served. For after all the proofs I have of your tenderness and readiness to share every kind of fortune with me it is a presumptuous diffidence of your heart to propose the examination I did. But be assured My angel it is not a diffidence of my betsey’s heart, but of a female heart, that dictated the questions. I am ready to believe everything in favour of yours; but am restrained by the experience I have had of human nature, and of the softer part of it. Some of your sex possess every requisite to please delight, and inspire esteem friendship and affection; but there are too few of this description. We are full of vices. They are full of weaknesses; though I will not agree with the poet that they are, “Matter too soft, a lasting mark to bear. And best distinguished by black brown or fair.” Nor will I join in the exclamation of Adam against the Creators having formed woman, “a fair defect of nature.” Yet I have reason to think that these portraits are applicable to too many of the sex; and though I am satisfied, whenever I trust my senses and my judgment that you are one of the exceptions, I cannot forbear having moments when I feel a disposition to make a more perfect discovery of your temper, and character. In one of those moments I wrote the letter in question.
Do not however I entreat you suppose that I entertain an ill opinion of all your sex. I have a much worse of my own. I have seen more of yours that merited esteem and love, but the truth is, My Dear girl, there are very few of either that are not very worthless. You know my sentiments on this head. I think I have found a precious jewel. I pray you do not think your sex injured and undertake to be their champion; for it will be taking an unfair advantage of your influence over me.
We have been fortunate of late in Quarters. I gave you a description of a fair one in those we had at Tappan. We have found another here; a pretty little dutch girl of fifteen. Every body make⟨s⟩ love to her, and she receives every body kindly. She grants every thing that is asked and has too much simplicity to refuse any thing; but she has so much innocence to shield her, that the most determined rake would not dare to take advantage of her simplicity. This you will say is a very favourable character; but I have summed up all her excellencies—beauty, innocence, youth, simplicity. If all her sex were like her, I would become a disciple of Mahomet. I am persuaded she has no soul; and as I am squeamish enough to require a soul in a woman, I run no great risk of becoming one of her captives.
You see I give you an account of all the pretty females I meet with; you tell me nothing of the pretty fellows you see. I suppose you will pretend there is none of them engages the least of your attention, but you know I have been told you were something of a coquette, and I shall take care what degree of credit, I give to this pretence. When your sister returns home, I shall try to get her in my interest and make her tell me of all your flirtations. Have you heard any thing more of what I hinted to you about Fleury? When she returns, give my love to her and tell her, I expected, she would have outstripped you in the Hymenial line.
Adieu My love
A Hamilton
Sep. 3d


Title: George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, 3 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Rochambeau, Comte de

Liberty Pole [New Jersey] September 3, 1780. Describes movements of Army. Reports preparations for a new British expedition. Congratulates Rochambeau on visit from Indians.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Philip Schuyler, 5 September 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Philip

[Bergen County, New Jersey, September 5, 1780. On September 10, 1780, Philip Schuyler wrote to Hamilton: “I am very apprehensive the unhappy event mentioned in your favor of the 5th Instant will draw serious consequences in its train.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, [6 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Bergen County, New Jersey, September 6, 1780]

I wrote you My Dear Betsey a long letter or rather two long letters by your father. I have not since received any of yours. I hope I shall not be much longer without thus enjoying this only privilege of our separation.
Most people here are groaning under a very disagreeable piece of intelligence just come from the Southward; that Gates has had a total defeat near Cambden in South Carolina. Cornwallis and he met in the night of the 15th. by accident marching to the same point. The advanced guards skirmished and the two armies halted and formed ’till morning. In the morning a battle ensued, in which the Militia and Gates with them immediately run away and left the Continental troops to contend with the enemy’s whole force. They did it obstinately, and probably are most of them cut off. Gates however who writes to Congress seems to know very little what has become of his army. He showed that age and the long labors and fatigues of a military life had not in the least impaired his activity; for in three days and a half, he reached Hills borough, one hundred and eighty miles from the scene of action, leaving all his troops to take care of themselves, and get out of the scrape as well as they could. He has confirmed in this instance the opinion I always had of him.
This event will have very serious consequences to the Southward. Peoples imaginations have already given up North Carolina and Virginia; but I do not believe either of them will fall. I am certain Virginia cannot. This misfortune affects me less than others, because it is not in my temper to repine at evils that are past, but to endeavour to draw good out of them, and because I think our safety depends on a total change of system, and this change of system will only be produced by misfortune.
Pardon me my love for talking politics to you. What have we to do with any thing but love? Go the world as it will, in each others arms we cannot but be happy. If America were lost we should be happy in some other clime more favourable to human rights. What think you of Geneva as a retreat? ’Tis a charming place; where nature and society are in their greatest perfection. I was once determined to let my existence and American liberty end together. My Betsey has given me a motive to outlive my pride, I had almost said my honor; but America must not be witness to my disgrace. As it is always well to be prepared for the worst, I talk to you in this strain; not that I think it probable we shall fail in the contest; for notwithstanding all our perplexities, I think the chances are without comparison in our favour; and that my Aquileia and I will plant our turnips in her native land.
Adieu my lovely girl
A Hamilton
Sept 6th.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 8 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

New Bridge [New Jersey] September 8, 1780. Asks Congress to explain resolve of August 5, 1780, concerning Washington’s powers. Inquires about Congress’s ability to furnish currency, about North and South Carolina’s ability to supply provisions, and about measures to replace men whose terms of service end in January.


Title: George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, 8 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Rochambeau, Comte de

New Bridge [New Jersey] September 8, 1780. Describes British preparations for an expedition to Virginia. Describes defeat of Major General Horatio Gates at Camden. Proposes meeting with Rochambeau on September 20 at Hartford.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Philip Schuyler, 10 September 1780
From: Schuyler, Philip
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Poughkepsie [New York] Sept: 10th 1780
My Dear Sir.

I am very apprehensive the unhappy event mentioned in your favor of the 5th Instant will draw very serious consequences in its train. It will certainly much embarrass us, and probably retard the termination of the war. It will however be attended with one good, the adherents in Congress to the Gallant commander will not have it any longer in their power to play him off against the General. Gracious God! that any rational being should put two men in compe[ti]tion, one of which has commanded an army the other only been at the head of one, for I aver that when he was to the northward he never made a disposition of his troops. Indeed he was incapable, he never saw an Enemy except at a good distance and from places of perfect security. Indeed! Indeed, he has not lost a whit in my estimation by this last stroke of his.
The General will have shewn you the Extracts from the senate and Assemblys adresses to the Governor; a committee of both houses is appointed to report on the proceedings of the Convention. They will certainly adopt and extend the views of that Convention. Some here are for appointing a Dictator with a vice dictator in each state, invested with all the powers conferred formerly by the roman people on theirs; I made great Interest to be left out of the delegation and obtained It altho not with out much difficulty. Gen: McDougal is appointed in my stead, but I believe I shall be obliged to go to the eastern convention, If I shall not repair to Rhode Island so soon as I Intended.
Colo Warner is wounded & two of his officers killed near fort Edward.
Pray make my respects acceptable to the General, to the Gentlemen of the Family, the Marquis & those of his.
Adieu   I am   Dear Sir,   very affectionately   & Sincerely   Yr most obed servt
Ph. Schuyler

I forgot to Inform the General that the Governor had sent him an extract of the proceedings of the convention, which I had promised to transmit.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, [12 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Laurens, John

[New Bridge, New Jersey, September 12, 1780]

We ought both my Dear Laurens to beg pardon of our friendship for mutual neglect in our correspondence, though I believe you are a good deal in arrears to me, and I am sure one of my letters must have miscarried. I informed you that the application, in favour of Portail, and yourself, had been referred to a general exchange as I expected.

When this general exchange will take place is precarious; but it may happen in two or three months. The enemy have offered to exchange all the officers and men on Long Island and in New York for an equivalent in our hands. They have about four hundred private men. The offer has been hitherto evaded in hope of offensive operations; four hundred men you know in garrison would have been equal to twice their number out of it, and might have made a critical difference in the event. But unhappily for us our prospects of offensive operations vanish, and that of a general exchange becomes probable in proportion. Two months will explain the business; and I counsel you to defer your plan; you will then have time enough to execute it against Next Campaign or to ruin yourself in a rash attempt. If we are able to act offensively, we shall do it on good grounds, and you may look with certainty for relief. If we are not able to do this, I believe the enemy’s offer will be accepted; and I think there will be no difficulty in including you.
I am angry with you for having “taken the liberty” to introduce Van derhorst and Mr. Call. If you had simply introduced them, (without taking such a liberty with me) I should have been obliged to you. They will tell you however, that we have done all we could to make their stay in Camp agreeable.
I have conveyed your reproof to the lads. They have considered me as the secretary of the family and fancied a partnership which did not exist. Writing or not writing to you, you know they love you and smypathise in all that concerns you. Indeed my Laurens, I often realize your situation.
But play the Philosopher if you can and improve your captivity in improving your mind. Tell me not of the difficulty. I expect you will surmount difficulties which would bear down other men with your sensibility and without your fortitude. I was told you were going to explore the caverns of the blue mountains in quest of knowlege; enterprises of this kind are worthy of you, not fruitless repinings at your fate.
I gave you in a former letter my ideas of the situation of your country and the proper remedies to her disorders. You told me, my remedies were good, but you were afraid would not go down at this time. I tell you necessity must force them down; and that if they are not speedily taken the patient will die. She is in a galloping consumption, and her case will soon become desperate. Indeed, my Dear friend, to drop allegory, you can hardly conceive in how dreadful a situation we are. The army, in the course of the present month, has received only four or five days rations of meal, and we really know not of any adequate relief in future. This distress at such a stage of the campaign sours the soldiery. ’Tis in vain you make apologies to them. The officers are out of humour, and the worst of evils seems to be coming upon us—a loss of our virtue. ’Tis in vain you attempt to appease; you are almost detested as an accomplice with the administration. I am losing character my friend, because I am not over complaisant to the spirit of clamour, so that I am in a fair way to be out with every body. With one set, I am considered as a friend to military pretensions however exorbitant, with another as a man, who secured by my situation from sharing the distress of the army, am inclined to treat it lightly. The truth is I am an unlucky honest man, that speak my sentiments to all and with emphasis. I say this to you because you know it and will not charge me with vanity. I hate Congress—I hate the army—I hate the world—I hate myself. The whole is a mass of fools and knaves; I could almost except you and Meade. Adieu
A Hamilton

My ravings are for your own bosom.
The General and family send you their love
New Bridge
Sep. 12. 80


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Varick, 12 September 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Varick, Richard

[Bergen County, New Jersey] September 12 1780

The following is the address which the Marquis thinks will best answer the purpose—The Right Honorable The Marquis de la Fayette, Marechal de camp of the armies of His Most Christian Majesty and Major General in the Service of the United States.


Title: George Washington to Chevalier de la Luzerne, 12 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: La Luzerne, Chevalier de

Bergen County [New Jersey] September 12, 1780. Asks La Luzerne to put letter to Comte de Guichen in cypher and to forward it. Discusses need for a land force to accompany fleet. Emphasizes need of French aid.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Philip Schuyler, 13 September 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Philip

[New Bridge, New Jersey, September 13, 1780. In September, 1780, Schuyler wrote to Hamilton: “[Your letter] of the 13th … was delivered me this moment.” Letter not found.]


Title: George Washington to Comte de Rochambeau, 13 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Rochambeau, Comte de

New Bridge [New Jersey,] September 13, 1780. Asserts that British expedition “seems to be on the point of taking place.” States that under these circumstances “we should be with our respective armies.” Asks to defer the proposed meeting to September 20.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 15 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

New Bridge [New Jersey] September 15, 1780. Asserts that the fall of Camden “adds itself to many others to exemplify the necessity of an army, the fatal consequences of depending on Militia.” Regrets that South still relies on militia. Is to meet the French commanders on September 20. Explains measures taken concerning certificates. Does not think it expedient to send a detachment to South at this time.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Colonel Clement Biddle, [16 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Biddle, Clement

[Bergen County, New Jersey, September 16, 1780]
D Sir

There is to be an interview at Elizabeth Town the 19th. between General Lincoln General Philips, The British & American Commissaries of Prisoners. You will endeavour to provide them, with forage, and for this purpose if you please, take the directions of General Lincoln.
Yr Obed serv.
A Hamilton   Aide De Camp
Hd. Qrs. Sep. 16: 80


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Philip Schuyler, 16 September 1780
From: Schuyler, Philip
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Poughkepesie [New York] Sept: 16th 1780
Dear Sir

The great Scarcity of wheat before harvest and the drought Since has prevented the agent appointed to Collect the Supplys required from this State to deliver It to the Issuing Commissary and we are at least ten thousand barrels in rear. The wheat for all which is already assesed, a considerable quantity of it brought to the mills to be manufactured, and the remainder daily collecting, hence unless a second drought should prevail our deficency can be made good in the Course of a month, and this may be relied on, but should the army actually be in operation, I do not make a doubt but that the hand of Government will be laid on all in the Country and in that case a constant supply can be kept up so as to Compleat to 30.000 barrells, and perhaps half as much more should Congress order the quota of Pensylvania (If she deigns to furnish any) to be sold and the money transmitted to this state, Exclusive of the wheat already assessed to compleat our quota of flour, the Inhabitants of Tryon County and the western part of Albany are threshing. This [the] legislature has ordered to be purchased for a State magazine; should we not be able to purchase the whole, the whole may however be obtained and without delay if an operation takes place; to procure flour Casks is the greatest difficulty. I wish those at west point were ordered to be Immediately put in order. Those and an aid of bags may be necessary.
I have communed with the Governer on the Subject of McHenrys wish; he is very much disposed to use his Influence on the occasion but doubts if he should be able to obtain a lieutenancy unless the Ensigns that now are could all be provided for. If McHenry merely wants military rank for the campaign and will not accept of an Ensigncy, The Governor can and will give him a Lieut Colonelcy in the State levies, which will always give him rank in our militia and Consequently in the army when the militia is in the field; but this must be determined before the legislature rises; please therefore to desire McHenry to write me on the Subject without delay, and to assure him of my best services in my power.
If I knew when you would be at Fish Kill, if you pass that way, I would meet you there, or if I believed it would not be disagreable to the General I would go to Hartford as I wish to see the other Sachem.
A Spirit favorable to the common cause has pervaded almost both houses, they begin to talk of a dictator and vice dictators, as if it was a thing that was already determined on. To the Convention to be held at Hartford I believe I shall be sent with Instructions to propose that a Dictator should be appointed.
I have just seen V Schaick’s whim; there is not one lieutenancy vacant.
I have had the inclosed several days with me for want of a conveyance. Please to dispatch the bearer back as expeditiously back as you can.
Compliments to all   I am Dr Sir affectionately   yours &c. &c.
Ph: Schuyler
Colo Hamilton.


Title: George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 16 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

New Bridge [New Jersey] September 16, 1780. Is setting out for Hartford. States that Greene is to be in command of the Army. Sends instructions concerning post at Dobbs Ferry. Reports that Admiral Rodney is “at the Hook and that the Enemy are making an embarkation for Rhode Island.” States that if this information is true, Greene is to make preparations for attacking New York.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Philip Schuyler, 17 September 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Philip

[September 17, 1780. In September, 1780, Schuyler wrote to Hamilton: “Your favor of the 17th I received on that day.” Letter not found.]


Title: George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 18 September 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

Peekskill [New York] September 18, 1780. Reports arrival of Admiral Rodney. Directs Greene to move the Army to vicinity of Tappan and to send a Continental regiment to West Point.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [25 September 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Verplancks Point, New York, September 25, 1780]
Dr. Sir

You will see by the inclosed we are too late. Arnold went by water to the Vulture. I shall write to General Greene advising him without making a bustle to be in readiness to march and even to detach a Brigade this way, for though I do not believe the project will go on, it is possible Arnold has made such dispositions with the Garrison as may tempt the enemy in its present weakness to make the stroke this night and it seems prudent to be providing against it. I shall endeavour to find Meigs and request him to march to the Garrison, and shall make some arrangements here. I hope Your Excellency will approve these steps as there may be no time to be lost.
I am Yr. most Obed   & humb
A Hamilton
Sep. 25. 80
The Vulture is gone down to NY.