Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 8 June 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London June 8. 1798.
My dear Sir
Since writing you a day or two past, I have had the pleasure to receive your Letter by the Packet, and am rejoiced to find my hopes confirmed by your Opinion that we shall not be wanting to ourselves in our Conduct towards France.
Immediately on hearing of the proceedings of the Admiralty Judge of st. Domingo, I remonstrated to the Government against them, and was without delay answered that General Simcoe had no power to erect the Court, that the appointment of Judge Cumbauld was illegal, and all his Decrees void and that those who had unfortunately suffered by them, must as in the Martinique Cases apply for Satisfaction to the High Court of Admiralty in England. I expected, and so it was determined, that orders Should have been instantly dispatched to suppress the Court: this was omitted from the negligence of the officer to whom the duty belonged in the Admiralty—hence the continuation of the Court of St. Domingo. Orders have however at length been Sent to suppress the Court.
The Instructions of the 25. of Jany. 1798, a copy of which was on the 7. Feby sent to the secretary of State, have been misrepresented or not understood; instead of enlarging the effect of them will, as it was intended it should be, to contract the Description of Cases in which the trade of neutrals will be liable to interruption. The order as it is called of the 6. Novr. 1793 authorized the Capture of all vessels carrying Supplies to, or laden with the produce of the French West Indies. The Instruction of the 8. of Jany 1794 revoked this order, and Substituted another in which the bona fide neutral Trade between the united States and the french west Indies was considered as legal, while that between the French west Indies and Europe was liable to interruption by the vessels being sent in for adjudication. The late Instruction of the 25. of January, which I have thought a point gained enlarges the rights and security of the Trade of Neutrals; for instead of former restraints, it is now admitted that a direct Trade by neutrals between their respective Countries and the French, Dutch and spanish West Indies, out and home, and likewise the direct voyage from those Colonies to any port in Great Britain, are lawful and not liable to interruption.
That the naval officers will often exercise their authority however limited in abuse, will continue to be the case so long as the military profession is disgraced by a sordid love of Gain, and so long as the System of the Admiralty Courts of England shall be so little satisfactory as they really are.
We are as you will naturally suppose extremely impatient to receive information from the medituranean. It appears certain that the Toulon Expedition sailed about the 19th. May. The force is variously reported. Buonaparte is supposed to be with the fleet, which is said to be 13 Ships of the Line as many frigates and nearly 400 Transports. All the naval characters agree that it is next to impossible that they can reach Ireland without Discovery. Indeed from the prevalence of the winds from the coast, a single ship would it is said be at this season, perhaps two months, in making her voyage from Toulon to Ireland. The Opinion that has most advocates is that the Expedition is against Portugal—that the Troops will be disembarked at Carthagina or Malaga in Spain, & that they will cross the mountains to Portugal. It is well understood that from the want of Subsistence they could not have marched thro Spain. But Portugal has no money, and all the Plunder that could be obtained wd. not defray the Expence of the Expedition! The enterprize would reduce Spain under the more complete controul of france: Cadiz wd. become a french Port, the English wd. be expelled from the Tagus, the Spanish fleet wd. be relieved as soon as the windy season arrives, and from the Tagus and Cadiz, the Expedition may go against the Brasils and the Treasure of So Amer. may be at the Disposal of the Directory. Besides that Country may be revolutionized on the french model, and this may prepare the way for the measures to be adopted towards us. Letters from Lord St. Vincents of the 19. May (when his fleet off Cadiz consisted of 25 sail of the Line in excellent condition) induce the belief that Sr. Roger Curtis would join him from the Greek Station by the 22. or 23d with 10 sail of the line. His orders are to leave a force to block up Cadiz and watch the Gut, and to proceed with the residue of the fleet to search for and fight the Toulon Fleet, and according to every thing that we know, there is great reason to expect that he will be in season to intercept them even shd. their object be Carthagina or Malaga.
Adieu!
R K
It is agt. every probability that the Toulon Expedition can pass the Gut without discovery.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 8 June 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[London, June 8, 1798. Second letter of June 8 not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 9 June 1798
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, June 9, 1798. On June 9, 1798, Pickering wrote to Hamilton: “I dropped you a hasty line to-day.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 9 June 1798
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia June 9. 1798.
Dr. Sir,
I dropped you a hasty line to-day, acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the 7th. & 8th. I now inclose a copy of the new British Instructions, with Mr. King’s remark upon them. These, I have not the least doubt, are the instructions which the American captains from the West Indies, by misconceptions, have represented to be so injurious to our commerce. Mr. Liston knows of no other; nor has Mr. King mentioned any besides these. And you will observe that Mr. King considers them as extending the right, or the privilege, of neutral commerce, beyond the former instructions, and the long avowed claim of a right on her part (Britain) to interrupt and prevent any commerce of neutrals with the colonies of her enemies which was not permitted in time of peace.
The alien bills introduced into both houses of Congress have undergone such alterations, I do not know, their present form; of one thing however you may rest assured, that they will not err on the side of severity, much less of cruelty. I wish they may really provide for the public safety.
Mr. Stoddert has accepted the office of Secretary of the Navy; and I expected him to arrive by this day at farthest; as soon as he comes to town, I will communicate what you say of Captain Van Renselaer.
In your letter of the 8th you renew the subject of the captures by the Thetis, Capt. Cochran. Suspecting that the Charleston complaints were the clamours of interested men engaged in illicit commerce, I mean with contraband goods, or covering the property of enemies to Great Britain, I mentioned the matter to Mr. Reed of the Senate, who confirmed my suspicions. In short, in order to favour the French, and acquire great profits in trade, many American merchants have prostituted every fair principle of commerce, and put their captains on taking such deceitful oaths, as to render suspicious the papers of innocent merchants to their vast injury. Nobody has been more noisy about British depredations than Genl. Smith of Baltimore. He particularly complained to me, ten months ago, of the loss of several of his vessels captured and sent into Mole St. Nicholas. I represented his complaints to Mr. Liston, who wrote to the Admiral or Commanding officer at St. Domingo. The answer returned showed that one of Smith’s vessels, on her voyage outward, had carried, and delivered to the French administration, eighteen hogsheads of gunpowder; cleared out as merchandize of callicoes &c. I communicated this to Genl. Smith who wrote me a long letter upon the subject; but without denying the fact as to the gun-powder. I do not mention this as tho’ it justified the judge, one Cambauld, a corrupt villain, in condemning the vessel captured on her return voyage; but the gunpowder having been delivered to the French govt. the Judge was disposed to suspect the produce received in return also belonged to the French; and that judge is so utterly unprincipled, a suspicion alone would induce him to condemn, unless handsomely bribed to acquit. His character and conduct I have long since described to Mr. King, Who has conferred with Ld. Grenville, who pronounces the Court itself (appointed by Simcoe) illegal, like that erected by Admiral Jervis, formerly at Martinico. In the mean time our fair merchants are suffering by its illegal acts. It is the shameful and often detected frauds in the documents furnished to our merchant vessels, that have induced the British naval officers to disregard their papers, and to rest satisfied with nothing short of an actual examination of their cargoes; and this vexation will doubtless continue, more or less, until the honest merchants come forward and expose their fraudulent neighbours.
I do not like the provisional army act: I do not believe gentlemens’ expectations from volunteers will be verefied: many small corps will be formed: but not in numbers to supply the place of an army; especially as the bill was so altered as to subject them to march not only to an adjoining state, but to the remotest state in the Union. It is true the President will not thus harass them: but they will be under apprehensions of it, and many will be discouraged. If they have spirit enough to disregard this; so would they march, when requested in time of invasion, into any state, altho’ by law they might remain in their own or an adjoining state. Instead of waiting an actual invasion, I think the raising of the army ought now to be commenced. It would take many months to form & bring it into a state of discipline in which we could place any confidence. Small, predatory incursions of the French, tho’ they might occasion great destruction of property, would not be dangerous, and the militia might be sufficient to repel them; but what we have to guard against is an invasion by a powerful army of veterans: and I do not know any body of militia adequate to stop their progress; and a fatal pannic might be the consequence. They would hold out their lives to entice, and they would entice multitudes, not to resist, at least, if they did not join their standard, as has happened in every republic in Europe which they have fraternized. I have indeed a confidence in the populous, well-armed, and unanimous northern states: but is there any 40,000 of that militia who could incounter, with any chance of success, 20,000 veterans? You know the militia cannot be moved at the order of the ablest commander—they are unmanageable; and the greater the number, the greater the mass of confusion. Gentlemen in Congress boast of the exploits of the militia in the American war: but where did they fight in a body of even five thousand men? Where did they fight successfully alone, without regular troops, except in small corps of a few hundred men, which might be put in motion without much hazard of disorder? And excepting at Bunker Hill (which was a wonderful action) the militia victories against regulars were after the war had raged several years, during which the men had been frequently called into actual service, and their minds and bodies were gradually prepared to meet dangers and hardships; and in the southern states, the militia men whose prowess is now panegyrized (not unjustly) were rendered desperate by their situation. But all these advantageous circumstances would be wanting in case of such an invasion as that against which we have to provide. Why is a provisional army thought of, if an invasion is not to be apprehended? To propose a provisional army, to depend for its formation on an actual invasion, is to me the height of absurdity. Multitudes who would now enroll themselves, would at the moment when an invasion should find them unarmed and defenceless, shrink into abject submission to the foe. But the president may also commence the raising this army in case of “imminent danger of invasion, discovered in his opinion to exist:” at the same time it is understood such danger does not now exist. And what circumstances will render the danger imminent? The successful invasion of England—or even of Ireland (for in either case, if not wholly subdued, England would be fully employed) would put us in jeopardy. If England still struggled, France might be induced to keep all her force in Europe until the conquest was complete: but considering that she has a redundancy of soldiers, and a natural expectation would be presented of an easy conquest and submission here if she made a sudden and unlooked for invasion—I own that the danger would then appear to me imminent—and I think it so imminent even now, that the army ought forthwith to be raised. But admitting that she fails in her projects against England, she may be induced to make peace with her—and her alone; for such has been the uniform policy of the French Rulers, in all their successions. They will then renew their demands upon us, and we must yield, or make war alone. Britain certainly will not recommence the war for our sakes: and tho’ she would regret our submission to France, and therefore might be willing, in her negociations of peace with France, to stipulate for us also, yet have we any right to expect it? With so many marks of aversion and repulsion towards her, could we have the face to ask it? I know there are some who deem her profligate enough, if France should propose a division of the states between herself & England, that the latter would agree to it: but I am not disposed to believe it. I think the animosities and hatreds engendered in the American revolution towards England exist yet in some breasts in greater force than our interest or our safety admit: and these passions will keep us aloof till any cooperation may become impracticable. We cannot expect overtures from England: I very much suspect she is waiting to receive them from us. I wish you were in a situation not only “to see all the cards,” but to play them; with all my soul I would give you my hand; and engage in any other game in which I might best co-operate, on the same side, to win the stakes.
I remain truly & respectfully yours,
Timothy Pickering.
Alexander Hamilton Esqr.


Title: For the Gazette of the United States, [13 June 1798]
From: “Detector”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 13, 1798]
Every day brings fresh confirmations of the truth of the prediction to our Envoys, that the French Faction in America would go all lengths with their imperious & unprincipled Masters. It is more and more evident, that as many of them as may dare will join the standard of France, if once erected in this Country. After all that has happened, there is no other solution of the indefatigable and malignant exertions which they are making to propagate disaffection to our own government and to justify or extenuate the conduct of France. The authors of these exertions understand too well the human heart not to know, that ideas which have once taken deep root in a community and have inlisted its passions against one object and in favour of another cannot suddenly be changed; and that in the event of an invasion they could not if so disposed prevent their followers from acting in conformity with the strong byass which had been previously given to their feelings. They know this so well, that if they were not in their hearts more Frenchmen than Americans: if they were not ready in the gratification of ambition vanity or revenge, or in compliance with the wages of corruption, to immolate the independence and welfare of their country at the shrine of France—they would not as they do pursue a conduct which they cannot be insensible leads to that fatal result. Their pride, if not their patriotism, would prevent them. Openly claimed by a foreign Government as its obsequious tools, the jealousy of their own honor would prompt them to be forward in giving the lie to a claim to them so pregnant with ignominy. That this has not been the effect is a convincing proof that they have embarked beyond the power of retreat. It affords a presumption that they are in a situation which leaves them no longer wills of their own. It is astonishing to observe, that they not only do not contradict the charge by their actions; but seem little if at all solicitous to disavow it in their language; And in the measures which they advocate with an effrontery unequalled under similar circumstances in the history of any nation they display unequivocally their prostitute devotion to the enemies of their country.
A principal expedient employed by these men to second the views of the French Government and counteract the salutary impressions on the public mind, which its abominable treatment of us is calculated to produce, is to inculcate that our envoys in the conferences they have communicated have been the dupes of unauthorized and swindling impostors, and that our Government in publishing their dispatches has been actuated by a desire to make the circumstance subservient to a long premeditated design of rupture with France.
The French account of a transaction in which the Despots of France have violated a right of nations sacred among savage as well as civilized men, by imprisonning the ambassador of Portugal, is pressed into the service of the infamous scheme of defaming our own government and vindicating those Despots. This account represents the Portugese minister as having been deceived into the advance of a large sum of money as a bribe to three of the Directory, by pretended agents of the French Government; which coming to light through the channel of the French Minister at the Court of Portugal occasionned the imprisonment of the Portugese ambassador and several of the pretended agents. And it is alleged that a like imposition has in all probability been practiced upon our envoys.
What may appear to be the real nature of the transaction in question can only be judged of when the Portugese Government free from the dread of France shall have told its story; when, if ever, the imprisonned Minister shall be at liberty to explain the grounds of the confidence which he reposes in the Agents to whom the money was advanced. Till then all judgment of the true complexion of the affair must be suspended.
In the mean time the character of bold inequity which the Directory have so eminently earned authorises the supposition that the Agents now disavowed were really Agents of the Government—that they actually received the bribe for the Directory; that these deeming it expedient afterwards to disappoint the expectation given to Portugal found it necessary to disclaim the inducement and as a color to their ill faith and as a shield against the infamy of the proceeding to imprison the Minister and the inferior agents. The present Rulers of France have soared to so stupendous a height of profligacy that the diminutive vices of other men afford no standard by which to judge of their conduct; no clue to the mysterious labyrinth of their complicated crimes.
There are even circumstances to countenance the supposition of this double plot. It is stated that Wascovich one of the persons disavowed and seized was apparently in close connection with Beaumarchais: was in “ostensible familiarity with government-men” and had actually had communication with a real agent of Government for the purpose of discovering the views of newly arrived foreign envoys: And it appears that Beaumarchais is not among the persons seized.
It may serve as an index to the affair to understand, that Beaumarchais is one of the most cunning and intriguing men of Europe—that he was employed under the royal government as a secret confidential Agent, in which capacity he acted between the UStates and France before the acknowlegement of our Independence, and that he is known to be in intimate connection with the present French Minister for foreign relations.
In the capacity of confidential Agent a considerable part of the monies advanced by France for the use of the U States passed through his hands. There was a sum of a million of livres which Doctor Franklin in the carelessness of confidence acknowleged to have been received of which the application could not be traced. When inquiry on behalf of our Government was made of the French Minister concerning the appropriation of this million the only answer to be obtained was that it was a “secret du cabinet”.

   a secret of the Cabinet

 But the Revolution has unravelled the secret. During the reign of Robespierre, Beaumarchais was in disgrace and a fugitive. The Ministry of that period not scrupling to unveil the corruptions of the old Government, charged the receipt of the missing million upon Beaumarchais; & furnished a copy of the receipt which he is alleged to have given for it.
This transaction proves that Beaumarchais, was besides being the confidential political Agent of the then Administration of France was the instrument or accomplice of its cupidity. What but the participation of the Minister in a scheme of embezzlement could have induced him to make a cabinet-secret of the application of this Million?
Who a more likely, a more fit instrument of the avidity of the present Government than this same Beaumarchais? When men apparently in close connection with him take bribes from foreign ministers professedly for the use of the Directory, what more probable than that they are truly for that use; that Beaumarchais is the link between the Directory and the ostensible Agents?
If afterwards—expedient or necessary to disavow, what more easy to be managed! Beaumarchais is no doubt too adroit to transact such business in a manner that can admit of proof of his Agency. If inculpated by his agents he has only boldly to deny the charge and to treat it as a part of the imposture. The all sufficient patronage of the Directory could not fail to insure credit to his denial and to shield him from detection.
In such a case the appearances to be expected are exactly such as occur in the present affair. The immediate and chief Agent goes untouched. The subalterns are consigned to punishment real or seeming. The semblance of punishment may even be a thing understood all round. As yet nothing more than imprisonment is known to have taken place; and it is very possible that final impunity may attend Wascowick and his colleagues; though from the character of the Directory, if necessary to their purposes, they would find no difficulty in the sacrifice of these men; by hurrying them to the guillotine after a mock-trial, or by giving them like Carnot a secret passport to the other world.

This comment upon the affair is justified by the facts ascertained in our case. The participation of the French Minister for foreign relations in the propositions of the secret Agents to our Envoys admits of no question. To be convinced of this we have only to compare the declarations and proposals of the Agents with those of the Minister himself.
In the communications of those Agents the leading ideas are—that the Directory were greatly incensed at some passages in the Presidents speech; that reparation must be made for them, that money might be a substitute for other reparation; that this money was to be offered by our envoys, and to serve as pocket money, as a gratuity for the Directory; and that in addition to it there must be a loan to the Republic in the shape of a purchase of Dutch Rescriptions or in some other shape. The gratuity to be about 50000 £ Sterling.
The same ideas substantially appear in the Conference with Talleyrand him self. In that of the 28th of October he begins by stating that the Directory has passed an arrete in which they had demanded of the envoys an explanation of some parts and reparation for other parts of the Presidents Speech to Congress; that he was sensible difficulties would exist on the part of the envoys relative to this demand, but that by their offering money he thought he could prevent the effect of the arrete.
The characteristic features in both cases are—offence given by the speech—reparation to be demanded by the Directory and a commutation of the required reparation for money. The only difference is that the Agents call this pocket money for the Directory, a gratuity &c, while the Minister gives it no specific name or destination. But we discover still more clearly from what follows that he means the same thing with the Agents. The envoy having answered that he and his colleagues had no power to make a loan, but could send one of their number for instructions on the proposition, if deemed expedient, provided that the other objects of the negotiation could be discussed & adjusted. Talleyrand replied that this matter about the money must be settled directly without sending to America; that he would not communicate the arrete for a week, and that if the envoys could adjust the difficulty with respect to the Speech an application would nevertheless go to the U States for a loan. The loan is here manifestly a different thing from the money to be advanced for reparation. The last must be arranged immediately though the first might wait the issue of an application to the Government of this Country. The first is plainly the 50000 Sterling for pocket money; the last is the contribution by way of loan to the Republic. This coincidence fixes definitively the concert between the Minister and the Agents and traces unequivocally to the former the double demand of a bribe and a loan. The conclusion is inevitable.
It is also confirmed by what took place on the 17 of December. When one of our envoys mentioned to the Minister that the person designated as Y had that morning made him propositions (alluding to those for the gratuity and loan) the Minister replied, that the information which Y had given was just and might always be relied upon. This was explicitly to recognize Y as his Agent and to authorize the giving of credit to his propositions. A quibble has been started on his point. It is pretended that the declaration that the information given by Y was just did not import that the propositions he had made was authorised. But besides that it was natural to look for vagueness of expression in so mysterious and so foul a transaction; as the term information was used in reply to the suggestion that propositions had been made, it must necessarily be understood to intend that the information which Y had given in reference to the propositions spoken of by the envoy was just and might be relied upon. Again information was the most apt term that could have been employed. Y and the other Agents professed not to make propositions but to inform our envoys what propositions made by them were likely to be acceptable.

Such are the wretched shifts to which the factious adherents of France are driven in the attempt to obscure the truth and to mislead their Countrymen. Their futility is evident. It is evident that the Agents who conferred with our Envoys were not impostors but were truly the emissaries of the French Minister, and that their most odious propositions were not only sanctionned but even reiterated by him. The connection between the Minister & the Directory from the nature of the thing can only be inferred from his Office and from his personal character. The most circumspect man in the world, it is utterly incredible that he would hazard himself in such a way, unless acting for the Directory he was assured of their omnipotent support. Whether he be himself a mercenary partaker of the bribes, which are extorted, or only the instrument of the Directory to maintain his influence with them for the accomplishment of some great ulterior design must be referred to time, and is of little moment to the United States.
Whatever then may have been the case with respect to the Portugese Minister, ’tis demonstrated that our Envoys have not been as alleged the dupes of unauthorised Agents; but have had the dexterity to ascertain the corruption & oppression from the mouth of the Minister himself. The probability is that in the other instance likewise the corruption which is now denied did really exist; as it most certainly does in our case, though it is to be looked for that here also it will be denied and our envoys if within the grasp of the Monsters made the victims of their fraudalent tyranny. The abject partisans of France anticipating this result are preparing the way for its justification.
Detector


Title: Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, and Ebenezer Stevens to James McHenry, [14 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Burr, Aaron,Stevens, Ebenezer
To: McHenry, James

[New York, June 14, 1798]
Sir
We have carefully attended to the subjects presented to our consideration, by your note of yesterday and now offer to you the result of our reflections.
The idea of a succession of batteries from the Hook, to the City, very naturally occurs in contemplating the defence of this port, and doubtless has advantages. It would present dangers in the approach which may be expected to have considerable influence in dissuading from an enterprise which should have no other object than to lay this City under contribution, but it does not appear to us that its efficacy could be sufficiently relied upon when it is considered how adventurous an Enemy we have to encounter. The mere passage to batteries by ships with leading breezes has so often been proved to be matter of little difficulty, that it cannot be hoped that it would not be effected, if attempted—and the booty of this place may fairly be considered as an adequate temptation to run the risque, to say nothing of the political consequences (as a mean of distressing and disabling us) which might enter into the calculation.
We submit that a plan, the success of which must entirely depend on the degree of enterprise of an enemy, which again depends on national and individual character, cannot safely be relied upon, and that it would be inexpedient to exhaust the slender pecuniary means which are hinted at in the execution of such a plan. If great and efficacious obstacles could be opposed to the passage of a fleet to the City, it would be of the greatest importance, and as an ulterior measure, is to be contemplated. But for this, we conceive, much greater means are requisite than seem to be at command and considerable time must be employed in the execution, more than it is imagined we ought to count upon having. The measure as an ulterior one engages our enquiries, and the result if deferred will be communicated. But for the present it has appeared to us on mature reflection, that the best thing to be done with the means already provided is to establish such defences as promise to be effectual to prevent ships from taking and keeping stations near the City, from which they can cannonade and bombard it with effect. To this end it seems to us of primary importance to put the works already begun on Governor’s, Bedlow’s and Oyster Islands in a condition to be defended, and to annoy—to occupy with small works Red Hook, and Powles Hook, and to erect four batteries on New-York Island at points which can be indicated.
We beg leave to add, that if the General Government will take the necessary measures in relation to the three first mentioned Islands, and to Red Hook, and Powles Hook, means will be found on the part of this City, provisionally, and in confidence of reimbursement by the General Government, to establish the batteries on NewYork Island with the necessary cannon and apparatus.
A few gun-boats may likewise be useful auxiliaries, and it will deserve examination whether the channel between Governor’s, and Long Islands, cannot be stopped without too great expence.
It is our opinion that in respect to those points which have been mentioned as for the immediate care of the General Government, such expedients ought to be adopted as will quickly place them in a tolerable state of preparation, leaving more substantial ameliorations to a progressive effort.

Any battery on Long Island, other than at Red Hook, seems to us not immediately essential, and best to be defined to the other objects.
Alexander Hamilton
Aaron Burr
Eben. Stevens


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Justus Erich Bollmann, 22 June 1798
From: Bollmann, Justus Erich
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, June 22, 1798. “When I had the Pleasure of seeing you last in this City, I informed you of my having established a commercial House in Partnership with my Brother.… The Circumstances of the Times, I believe, will make it necessary for the United States to provide a Supply of arms and other military Implements from Europe, and it appears to me that a Part of them might be advantageously imported from Germany. I should like therefore to come to some Arrangement with Government on this Subject … and I drop you these few Lines in order to request you to mention me favorably to mr. Wolcott.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, 22 June 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

[New York] June 22d. 1798
I believe my beloved that I omitted to write by the last Post thinking it would not find you at Albany; but as it seems possible from what Mr. Schuyler tells me that your stay may be prolonged I write this to say to my darling that I begin to [be] very anxious for her return & hope it will be accelerated. I was very glad to receive a favourable account of her health & spirits.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [25 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[New York, June 25, 1798]
Dear Sir
I understand that the Collector of Philadelphia will speedily offer his resignation & that McPherson does not incline to be the successor—but that Major Jackson is desirous of it.
If all this be so—and if your experience of his conduct in his present station gives you a confidence that he would execute the Office of Collector well, it would gratify me to see him appointed. Jackson has more than once given me marks of personal regard, that claim a reciprocal sentiment from me & a disposition to promote efficaciously his interest as far as it can be done consistently with the public Interest.
Should it coincide with your views you may make any use of my wishes that you can imagine may be serviceable to the Major.
Yrs. Affecty
A HamiltonJune 25. 1798
O. Wolcott Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, [27 June 1798]
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[London, June 27, 1798. Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Thomas Palmer, 28 June 1798
From: Palmer, Thomas
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, June 28, 1798. “Thomas Palmer one of the persons who had the honour to submit an Invention of a Spring Star Shot to Colonel Hamilton respectfully requests leave to trouble him again on that subject. In consequence of some objections stated by Colonel Stevens to the plan the projectors have studied the means of obviating them previous to their sending it up as requested by the Secretary at War to Philadelphia. Having one Shot now finished which may do for the trial of the plan & pecuniary circumstances not allowing them the means of trying it themselves T. Palmer presumes on Colonel Hamiltons known encouragement to Ingenuity & Industry to solicit his recommendation to the Secretary of War for encouragement to this Invention or any other that he may be found capable of & likewise for a recommendation to the Commandant at Governors Island for a trial of the Invention.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Henry Rutgers, 28 June 1798
From: Rutgers, Henry
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, June 28, 1798. “Immediately upon receipt of your Note I … found that 940 … are Enrolled, which I suppose is the better half of the Ward.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [28 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[New York, June 28, 1798]
Dear Sir
Col Burr sets out today for Philadelphia. I have some reasons for wishing that the administration may manifest a cordiality to him. It is not impossible he will be found a useful cooperator. I am aware there are different sides but the case is worth the experiment. He will call on McHenry upon going to the City.
Yrs. truly
A HamiltonJune 28. 1798
O Wolcott Esqr


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [29 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[New York, June 29, 1798]
Dear Sir
I have this moment seen a Bill brought into the Senate intitled a Bill to define more particularly the crime of Treason &c. There are provisions in this Bill which according to a cursory view appear to me highly exceptionable & such as more than any thing else may endanger civil War. I have not time to point out my objections by this post but I will do it tomorrow. I hope sincerely the thing may not be hurried through. Let us not establish a tyranny. Energy is a very different thing from violence. If we make no false step we shall be essentially united; but if we push things to an extreme we shall then give to faction body & solidarity.
Yrs. truly
A HamiltonJune 29. 1798
O Wolcott Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Pierre Charles L’Enfant, 1 July 1798
From: L’Enfant, Pierre Charles
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia July 1st 1798
Dr Sir
Being Just this moment told of a conversation you have had with Mr Soderestrom in reply to a note which he handed to you from me, am not perfectly comprehending what he related, he himself seeming to have but a Confuse recollection. While at the same time, as far as he has explained, it appear to me to be all Important well to understand you. I cannot esitate nor do I delay one Instant, requesting your own Explanation in what way has any political principles or connections, and the Conduct in my former public employment become matter for your animadversion!—and how, and upon what authority you asserted that I had been paid a good price by the french minister Adet, or other—from which I ought to be well satisfied with my actual situation.
Whether, Sir, these were your private Sentiments or those of other people you delivered, you may well imagine is not Indifferent to me to Know.—and Beliving in the veracity of Mr Soderestrom who stated those points as being the principal he recollected of the conversation with you, you can Surrely not be Surprised if I feel alive at the Injurious⟨–⟩ and in this direct manner ask you to Explaine and to trace out to me whence came those Ideas. Ideas which I must Say I held in too contemptible a light to belive orriginated with you. They are Sugestive indeed too vilainous and of an Ingenuity and base malice as I would hardly have suspected possible in any one man. well sensible however how generally them who would have done a man an Injury become the ⟨–⟩ Enemies of him that his Injuried. I should not much wonder but thus at once the Schem be to Cut short all my claims to the gratitude of the country, as this way of Exonerating the public of all debt to me, may well compleat the vilany of those swindling Individuals who have robed me of all my property the small saving from the ⟨–⟩ by laborious pursuits of twenty two years services to the united States.
With the hope this will find you ready either to substantiate those charges you have advanced as above—or to point out the author, clearing in this way the Stigma that naturally must attack in all those whose mistaken policy it may be to slander honesty I shall beg you to believe I remain
Dr Sir   Your obedient hubl Servant
P. charles L’Enfant
Colo Alr Amilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 2 July 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London July 2. 1798
Dear sir
France will pursue with us the Plan that she has elsewhere found successful. She will endeavour to overthrow us by the Divisions among ourselves which she will excite and support by all the means of which she is mistress. The Paris Papers of the 18. ulto. say le Citoyen Roziers est nommé Consul Genl. aux Etats unis. Gamier (en convenl. de Saintes) consul, & Boscq vice consul à Wilmington, Quillet, consul à Tanger, passe à Norfolk, Bosc à New York, et le Citoyen Sottin, ambassadeur pres la Republique Ligurienne, (& I presume the former Minister of Police) vient d’etre nommé Consul a New York.
If anything could exceed the past insolence of France, it would be this Attempt to plant in our chief Towns a corps of revolutionary agents under the mark of pub. Characters, and whom she expects, I hope falsely, that our Govt. will receive and permit to reside among us, after having herself repeatedly refused and expelled from her territories our pub. Ministers.
Another arreté of the Directory has added Havre to the Ports into which our vessels are forbid an Entry—so that we cannot now enter the Ports of Toulon, Rochefort, L’Orient, Brest, Dunkerque or Harve. Cadiz and the Texel are closed by the Br. Squadrons, and I apprehend that the Meuse will likewise be blockaded as the Br. north Sea fleet is by this time reinforced by the Russian Squadron.
We are still at a loss where Buena parte is bound—he sailed from Toulon the 19. of May. My opinion has been that Ireland was his object. At present it seems to be the general Opinion that he never intended to leave the Mediterranean. In a few Days we must hear of him. The Eng. confidently believe that he will fall into the Hands of Ad. Neilson who is in pursuit of him. In Ireland tho for some months there will be partial and unimportant Risings, the force of the Insurrection is broken and the Danger nearly over. The chief’s have been without much character and without any intellect. There is no indication that they have recd. a single musket from france, and in general they are without arms except Pikes. There is but one remedy for Ireland, and it is that which has proved so successful with Scotland. Ireland like Scotland must become an integral part of the Br. Empire, or she will continue ignorant, ill governed, oppressed, and wretched.
Yrs. &c
RK
Col Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher, 4 July 1798
From: Ducher, Gaspard Joseph Amand
To: Hamilton, Alexander

paris 4 juillet 1798
J’espere, Monsieur, que Cette Lettre vous trouvera ainsi que Mde. hamilton dans l’état de Bonheur que vous merités L’un et L’autre.
J’ai un très grand besoin de mes fonds; vous me devez jusqu’a aujourdhuy, deux mille neuf cents quatre vingt dix huit piastres. Cette somme comprend l’intérze de l’intéret Échu chaque année; votre délicatesse ne peut pas S’y réfuser; autrement je perdrois sur L’intéret, Le Bénéfice que vous feriez sur L’intéret de L’intéret, avec lequel vous vous L’èléveries d’une partie du principal.
Pour M’envoyer mes fonds, je vous prie de faire comme pour vous même.
Je vous ai voué estime et amitié pour la vie.
Ducher
Chez Le Citoyen Boileau notaire, Rue de Laloi près La fontaine.


Title: Plan for a Legion, [5–15 July 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[July 5–15, 1798]
To determine what is proper to be done it is necessary preliminarily to contemplate a fundamental or elementary organisation the aggregate of which constitutes the army.

This element ought to be a legion consisting of
Four Regiments of Infantry
One Squadron of Dragoons
one Batalion of Artillery
A Regiment of Infantry to consist of two Batalions each batalion of five companies (of which one a company of Grenadiers) each company of

1
Captain
2
Lieutenants
8
Sergeants
96
Rank & file

Each batalion to be commanded by a Major and a Regiment by a Colonel.
Each Regiment to have attached to it
one Troop of Dragoons
one Company of Artillery
Each batalion to have two six pounders and One Twelve pounder.
The Squadron of Dragoons of Legion composed of 4 Troops to be commanded by a Major & the batalion of Artillery composed of 4 Companies by a Major also. Every two batalions of Artillery a Regiment commanded by a Colonel. The Artillery aggregately to be commanded by a Major General. The Dragoons aggregately by a Major General.
The army will be the aggregate of these Corps with an additional quantity of Artillery men for Garrisons & the Park & with an additional number of heavy cavalry.
It is not to be understood that the Dragoons attached to the batalions are always to act with them—on the contrary they are to be combined & subdivided according to circumstances—but when a batalion a Regiment a brigade or a legion is to be detached it carries with it its appendages and the service is always performed by entire corps. So always the twelve pounders may be combined and transported from point to point as the service may require.
These corps to be thus further organized. Two Regiments with their appurtenances to form a brigade commanded by a Brigadier. The legion to constitute a division commanded by a Major General.
Two legions to constitute a grand Division commanded by a Lieutenant General.

The army itself to be commanded by a “General in Chief” or “General.”
The Army to have an Inspector General with the Rank of Major General—A Quarter Master General with the like rank—An “Intendant” without rank to to charged with the whole business of supplies—Deputies of course—The Adjutant General should be Deputy Inspector General.
It is understood that the existing establishment consists of four Regiments of Infantry

2 Corps of Artillery & Engineers
about 1600
2 Companies of Dragoons

And it is probable 12 Regiments of Infantry will be added.
On the principles of the foregoing plan These corps may be considered as forming 4 Legions & Eight brigades.
The appointments of Officers will correspond & there may be immediately a
Major General of Artillery & Qr. Master General. But the provision yet made permits only a Qr. Master General of the rank of Lieutenant Col.
There being already One Major General there would remain to be appointed three more besides the Major General of Artillery.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 5 July 1798
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Mount Vernon, July 5, 1798. Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 7 July 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London July 7. 98
Buena parte has made the Debut of the campaigne by the easy tho important conquest of Malta. This Island has been supposed impregnable and therefore was the Depositary of great wealth removed there from Italy. It contained likewise an excellent arensal, two or three ships of the Line, and as many as 6.000 excellent Seamen. It was the maltese Seamen who made the fine campaign under Suffrein in the E. Indies during the American war. Sicily is near and from thence the french will obtain Provision shd. Ad. Neilson attempt to blockade the fleet in the Harbour of Malta. Buena Parte may perhaps take possession of Sicily, after which Naples would almost fall of course. We are left to conjecture what are his ulterior Plans. I dont perceive that it is believed that the Eng. Squadron can owing to the tempests of those seas, maintain a long Blockade. At Rastadt procrastination is the game—the french journalists amuse themselves with calling it “the Eternal Congress.” I see no likelihood of a concert upon the Continent agt. france. The struggle is left to England, who certainly maintains it with increased zeal & Resolution for some months past. We hear not a word about peace, no one appears to think that peace would bring safety. The affair of Ireland is nearly finished. Cornwallis has requested that no more troops shd. be sent him, and that those on their way shd. be countermanded. In this state of things we are (for so I consider our Situation) forced into the war—a war of Defense. Have you recd. a former letter of mine on this subject. It is of infinite importance that we are not deceived by ourselves or others. We must do more than merely defend. I still think the object that I have before suggested demands all our consideration, wisdom and Energy. Dont suppose that I would combine our fortunes with those of others; on the contrary whatever our interest may require in regard to a cooperation with others I am averse to indissoluble engagements with any one. The Continent of Europe cannot be saved—but this is no reason why America shd. likewise perish. France is the only nation that projects enterprizes or succeeds in putting them in Execution—all others are puzzled in a perpetual Effort to find out & defeat the Plans of France without concerting and attempting to execute one that might give to france the Disadvantage of Defence. If we follow this course I dread the issue.
farewell yrs. &c
I am mortified with the probable result of the Elections of New york. Mr. Jay according to probabilities is reelected, but how very considerable has been the Opposition. Besides what is to become of us if we return such Members to Congress as I think it likely will compose a majority of our next Delegation?


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [8 July 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia, July 8, 1798]
Dear Sir
I was much surprized on my arrival here to discover that your nomination had been without any previous consultation of you. Convinced of the goodness of the motives it would be useless to scan the propriety of the step. It is taken and the question is—what under the circumstances ought to be done? I use the liberty which my attachment to you and to the public authorises to offer my opinion that you should not decline the appointment. It is evident that the public satisfaction at it is lively and universal. It is not to be doubted that the circumstance will give an additional spring to the public mind—will tend much to unite and will facilitate the measures which the conjuncture requires—on the other hand, your declining would certainly produce the opposite effects, would throw a great damp upon the ardor of the Country inspiring the idea that the Crisis was not really serious or alarming. At least then, Let me entreat you & in this all your friends indeed all good citizens will unite, that if you do not give an unqualified acceptance that you accept provisionally—making your entering upon the duties to depend on future events so that the Community may look up to you as their certain Commander. But I prefer a simple acceptance.
It may be well however to apprise you that the arrangement of the army may demand your particular attention. The President has no relative ideas & his prepossessions on military subjects in reference to such a point are of the wrong sort. It is easy for us to have a good army but the selection requires care—it is necessary to inspire confidence in the efficient part of those who may incline to military service. Much adherence to routine would do great harm. Men of capacity & exertion in the higher stations are indispensable. It deserves consideration whether your presence at the seat of Government is not necessary. If you accept it will be conceived that the arrangement is yours & you will be responsible for it in reputaton. This & the influence of a right arrangement upon future success seem to require that you should in one mode or another see efficaciously that the arrangement is such as you would approve.
I remain Dr Sir   Yr. Affect & obedt servant
A HamiltonJuly 8. 1798
General Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, 9 July 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

Philadelphia 9th July 1798
I arrived here, My Dear Betsey, on Saturday in good health & not much fatigued. But I was immediately surrounded by a number of persons who engaged me till the hour of the Post had past by; so that I did not write as I intended. I cannot lose the opportunity of today; though I intend certainly to leave this place tomorrow in the Mail stage which arrives on Wednesday Morning. Mean time I command you as you love me to take care of yourself, to keep up your spirits, and to remember always that my happiness is inseparable from yours.
You wil be glad to know that Decatur in one of our vessels of War has captured & brought in a French Privateer of Twelve Guns. It gives general satisfaction.
God bless My beloved
A Hamilton
Mrs. H.


Title: Introductory Note: From George Washington, [14 July 1798]
From:
To:

This letter contains the first mention in Hamilton’s extant correspondence of the question of who was to serve directly under Washington in his capacity as “Commander in Chief of all the armies raised, or to be raised, in the United States.” When Washington wrote this letter, he assumed that Congress would pass “An Act to augment the Army of the United States, and for other purposes,” which authorized the President “to raise, in addition to the present military establishment, twelve regiments of infantry, and six troops of light dragoons” and provided “that there shall be two major-generals, with aids-de-camp each; one inspector-general, with the rank, pay and emoluments of a major-general, and two aids-de-camp.” The ranking of the three major generals was obviously a question of some importance, for the one ranked first would be second in command to Washington. In the letter printed below Washington ranked Hamilton first, named him inspector general, and placed Charles Cotesworth Pinckney second and Henry Knox third. In addition, Secretary of War James McHenry, who at the request of President Adams had visited Washington at Mount Vernon, returned to Philadelphia on July 17, 1798, with Washington’s list ranking Hamilton ahead of Pinckney and Knox. Washington’s preference for Hamilton, however, placed him in direct conflict with Adams, who favored Knox and Pinckney. The result was an unseemly squabble which lasted three months and which in one way or another damaged the reputations of most of those who were directly involved.
What can charitably be termed a messy situation was made both more complicated and more tedious by the distances separating most of the principals. Following the adjournment of Congress on July 19, 1798, Adams left Philadelphia for Quincy, Massachusetts, where he stayed throughout the dispute, while the members of the cabinet remained at the seat of the Government. Washington was in Mount Vernon; Hamilton was in New York; Knox divided his time between Boston and his lands in Maine; and Pinckney had not yet returned from his mission to France. On one occasion, a letter mailed by Washington on September 25 did not reach Adams until October 8. But this was not all, for Adams’s absence permitted his far from loyal cabinet members to plot and connive in a fashion and to a degree that presumably would not have been possible if he had not left Philadelphia.
Throughout the controversy McHenry and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering left no doubt that their allegiance was to Hamilton rather than to the President they were putatively serving. On more than one occasion they schemed, dissimulated, procrastinated, and withheld information in their efforts to achieve their objective. Hamilton, who supported them at every step in their campaign, was undoubtedly motivated by his ambition and quest for military fame, but it has also been suggested that he and his allies in the cabinet were hoping to have him appointed the de facto head of an army that could be used to support Francisco de Miranda’s plans for the liberation of Spain’s American colonies. On August 22, 1798, when the question of the relative rank of Hamilton, Pinckney, and Knox had not been settled, Hamilton wrote to Miranda that he approved of Miranda’s project, but he “could personaley have no participation in it unless patronised by the Government of this Country.” Hamilton, however, then added: “We are raising an army of about Twelve Thousand men. Genl. Washington has resumed his station at the head of our armies. I am appointed second in command.” On the other hand, a few months earlier Hamilton had written that he considered Miranda “an intriguing adventurer.”
On July 18, 1798, Adams sent his nominations for general officers for the Army to the Senate. Hamilton was nominated inspector general, and his name was first on the list of major generals, followed by the names of Pinckney and Knox. On the following day the Senate approved the three appointments in the order in which the President had submitted them. On July 25 McHenry wrote to Hamilton: “I am directed to inform you that the President of the United States, by, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has appointed you Inspector General, with the rank of Major General; and to transmit you your commission made out accordingly.” On July 28 Hamilton wrote to McHenry accepting the appointment.
The difficulty with the list approved by the Senate arose from the fact that at the conclusion of the American Revolution Pinckney outranked Hamilton and Knox outranked both Pinckney and Hamilton. When Washington wrote the letter printed below, he was more concerned with the implications of placing Pinckney second than with having Knox third. As early as July 6, 1798, Pickering wrote to Washington: “There is one man who will gladly be Your Second.… You too well know Colo. Hamilton’s distinguished ability, energy and fidelity, to apply my remark to any other man.” On July 11 Washington replied that he was well aware of Hamilton’s ability, but that there were also reasons for placing Pinckney first. Pickering immediately relayed this information to Hamilton, who answered: “I had contemplated the possibility that Knox might come into service & was content to be second to him, if thought indispensable. Pinckney, if placed over me puts me a grade lower. I don’t believe it to be necessary.” Hamilton also wrote to Washington: “… I must conclude that General Pinckney, on a fair estimate of circumstances ought to be well satisfied with the [present] arrangement.” Pinckney, who had not yet returned from France, was unable to speak for himself. But it made little difference, for it was Knox, not Pinckney, who insisted on outranking Hamilton.
Although Washington originally was more concerned about putting Pinckney second than placing Knox third, he nevertheless took the trouble to write to Knox on July 16 concerning his decision. On July 29 Knox replied in a long and bitter letter in which he implied that he would refuse the appointment “unless the relative rank of the late War, should govern according to the established and invariable usuage of the former War.” Washington, in turn, sent copies of both letters to Hamilton, and on August 9 he again wrote Knox an explanatory letter concerning the relative rankings. In the meantime, Knox had written to the Secretary of War a letter dated August 5 in which he all but said that he would not accept the appointment if the “names as specified in the last, is intended to establish the priority of rank.”
Adams, who alone had the authority to settle the dispute, soon made clear his preference. On August 14, 1798, in reply to a letter from McHenry asking for permission “to call effectually to my aid, the Inspector General, and likewise General Knox; and to charge them with the management of particular branches of the service,” Adams wrote: “Calling any … general officers [other than Washington] into service at present will be attended with difficulty, unless the rank were settled. In my opinion, as the matter now stands, General Knox is legally entitled to rank next to General Washington, and no other arrangement will give satisfaction. If General Washington is of this opinion, and will consent to it, you may call him into actual service as soon as you please. The consequence of this will be that Pinckney must rank before Hamilton. If it shall be consented, that the rank shall be Knox, Pinckney & Hamilton, you may call the latter too into immediate service when you please. Any other plan will occasion long delay and much confusion. You may depend upon it, the five New England States will not patiently submit to the humiliation that has been meditated for them.”

Before receiving Adams’s letter, McHenry sent Hamilton a copy of Knox’s letter of August 5 and asked: “What is to be said to General Knox?” Hamilton, as always, was only too willing to help, and on August 19 he wrote two letters to McHenry—one official and the other private—and enclosed a draft of a reply to Knox’s August 5 letter. On August 20 McHenry forwarded to Adams the drafts of two letters—one private and the other official—addressed to Knox. If anything, McHenry’s proposals served to strengthen the President’s resolve. On August 29 he wrote from Quincy to the Secretary of War: “I have received your letter of August 20th, I believe, though the o is obscure.
“General Knox is gone to the Eastward as I understand, to return in ten or fifteen days. But if he were in Boston, I could not send him either your official or private letter, as neither contains sentiments that I can approve. My opinion is and has always been clear, that as the law now stands, the order of nomination or of recording has no weight or effect, but that officers appointed on the same day, in whatever order, had a right to rank according to antecedent services. I made the nomination according to the list presented to me, by you, from General Washington, in hopes that rank might be settled among them by agreement or acquiescence, believing at the same time, and expressing to you that belief, that the nomination and appointment would give Hamilton no command at all, nor any rank before any Major-General. This is my opinion still.
“I am willing to settle all decisively at present (and have no fear of the consequences) by dating the commissions Knox, on the first day, Pinckney on the 2nd. Hamilton on the third. If this course is not taken & the commissions are all made out on the same day, I tell you my opinion is clear that Hamilton will legally rank after Hand and I fear even after Lee.
“You speak to me of the expediency of attempting an alteration in the rank of the gentlemen in question. You know, Sir, that no rank has ever been settled by me. You know my opinion has always been as it is now, that the order of names in the nomination and record was of no consequence.
“General Washington has through the whole, conducted with perfect honor and consistency. I said and I say now, if I could resign to him the office of President, I would do it immediately and with the highest pleasure, but I never said I would hold the office & be responsible for its exercise, while he should execute it. He has always said in all his letters that these points must ultimately depend upon the President.
“The power & authority is in the President. I am willing to exert this authority at this moment and to be responsible for the exercise of it. All difficulties will in this way be avoided. But, if it is to be referred to General Washington or to mutual & amicable accomodation among the gentlemen themselves, I foresee it will come to me at last, after much altercation & exasperation of passions & I shall then determine it exactly as I should now—Knox, Pinckney & Hamilton.
“There has been too much intrigue in this business both with General Washington & me. If I shall ultimately be the dupe of it, I am much mistaken in myself.”
McHenry broke the news to Hamilton on September 6 in a letter enclosing Adams’s letter of August 29. McHenry held out no hope to Hamilton, for he concluded: “I hope you will acquiesce in the necessity which seems to govern, and save us from the confusion which may result from a different conduct.” On the same day he wrote to Adams: “… I shall follow the order you prescribe, and date Genl. Knox’s on the first day, General Pinckney’s on the second, and General Hamilton’s on the third.” On September 8 Hamilton replied to McHenry: “I shall certainly not hold the commission on the plan proposed, and only wait an official communication to say so.”
Pickering, like McHenry, had apparently done all within his power to support Hamilton and defeat Knox. He had been the first to suggest Hamilton’s name to Washington; he had gone out of his way to keep Hamilton informed on Washington’s views on how the major generals should be ranked; and early in August he had sought to force Adams’s hand by urging the President to call Hamilton and Knox into service. In addition, when Hamilton wrote to him on July 17 indicating his “willingness to serve under Knox,” Pickering had “concealed” the letter “in order that the arrangement of nominations of Major Generals,… as formed by General Washington … might leave … [Hamilton] in the first place.” Pickering’s efforts, however, had had no effect on Adams, and by the end of August the Secretary of State had run out of suggestions and had little advice to offer Hamilton beyond urging him to stand firm.
By the end of the first week in September, Pickering and McHenry had every reason to be discouraged, for Adams’s letter of August 29 to McHenry had apparently deprived them of any further opportunities for machination. They did not, however, give up easily. For a time they considered a letter to the President to be signed by Pickering, Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott, Jr., and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert. But, “after … a good deal of deliberation, the idea of a joint address was relinquished for a representation from Mr. Wolcott alone, who did not appear to be implicated in his [Adams’s] suspicions of intrigue.” Accordingly, on September 17, Wolcott wrote Adams a long, detailed brief on behalf of Hamilton. In the course of this letter, Wolcott attempted to refute Knox’s contentions that the order of rank at the end of the Revolution should prevail and Adams’s insistence that Knox was popular in New England; but most important of all, he subtly—but insistently—emphasized the importance of not offending Washington by denying him his choice for the second in command. “The circumstances of the case in respect to Genl Washington,” Wolcott wrote, “appear therefore to be, first, that he was nominated to command the armies without any previous consultation or notice; second, that his ‘advice in the formation of a List of Officers’ was requested, accompanied with an intimation that ‘his opinion on all subjects would have great weight;’ third, that General Washington formed a List of Officers, and after mature deliberation settled the rank, which in his judgement, the Officers in question ought to enjoy in the proposed Army; fourth, that in the nominations exhibited by the President to the Senate, the order proposed by General Washington respecting those Gentlemen was preserved.
“The ‘advice’ of General Washington was therefore that Alexander Hamilton should be appointed Inspector General, with the rank of first Major General, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, second Major General, and Henry Knox, third Major General—whatever may have been the opinion of the President respecting the effect of the order of appointment, the opinion of General Washington and the expectation of the public is, that General Hamilton will be confirmed in a rank second only to the Commander in Chief.
“I am persuaded that no personal considerations distinct from the public Interest have influenced General Washington, and it is impossible that the public should be governed by any but views of the general Welfare, in awarding the second rank to General Hamilton; there does not exist a more sincere friend to General Knox than the Commander in Chief; the preference has been founded solely on public considerations; on a peculiar fitness of character, and on the utility of vesting a high command in the Office of Inspector General.
“Contrary to expectation, General Knox claims the first rank, and in support of his pretensions refers to a rule adopted in the revolutionary War, by which according to his statement, among Officers appointed to the same grade, on the same day, their relative rank in the new grade, was to be determined by their respective ranks, prior to such new appointments.
“No general and unqualified rule of the kind alluded to by General Knox, is to be found by me in the resolutions of Congress; it is however presumed that the regulations prescribed on the 24th. of November 1778, are those to which he refers. A due attention to these regulations will evince, that they are wholly inapplicable to the present state of things, and that they contain many exceptions with reference to the Army for which they were formed.
“The first of the rules established on the 24th. of November 1778, is the only one, which can in any degree support General Knox’s pretensions; this merely determines the rank of Commissions in the eighty eight battalions ordered to be raised during the war, by the resolution of Congress of the 16th. of September 1776. Prior to this time the force of the United States consisted of Troops engaged for limited periods; some under the authority of Congress, others under the authority of the respective States. After the permanent Army was raised, new Commissions were issued to the Officers; the powers of appointment except of General Officers, being vested in the States, it could not but happen, that the dates would be filled up very erroneously; the true effect of the rule above referred to, was merely to correct these errors; —the rank of the Officers in the sixteen additional Battalions, of the new Levies, of the flying Camp and Militia, of Officers who had been or were prisoners with the Enemy and cases where different rules had been established in the respective States, were expressly excepted from the regulation; it was moreover provided that a resignation should preclude any claim or benefit from former rank, under a new appointment.
“Giving therefore the utmost latitude to the rule presumed to be refered to, by General Knox, it only proves, that in cases of continued service, under a Commission from Congress, and in respect to appointments made under the same Act, and where the rank has not been settled; and where no different rule was established by the particular State, the rank under a former Commission should govern. There is clearly nothing in this rule, which is highly equitable and perfectly well adapted to the difficulty which it was intended to redress, that can settle the grade of rank, between distinct Offices namely between the Office of Inspector General and that of Major General.
“But if it is contended that the Office of Inspector General and Major General are of the same dignity or if the former draws after it no precise rank and if recourse must be had to the obsolete resolutions of Congress, to settle the relative rank of the Gentlemen in question, the most apposite rule which I can discover will be found in the resolution of Congress passed on the 4th. day of January 1776. viz.
“‘Resolved that in all elections of Officers by Congress, where more than one are elected on the same day, to commands of the same rank, they shall take rank of each other according to their election and the entry of their names on the minutes; and their Commissions shall be numbered to shew their priority.’ The principle of this resolution pointedly applies to the present case; having been adopted to settle the rank of newly appointed Officers, for a new Army.
“My opinion however is, that the resolutions of Congress afford no rule for deciding the question, except as they are reconciliable with the present Constitution of the United States, the actual state of the Country, and as being founded in reason they may hereafter be adopted for the government of an Army when actually formed.
“The President is now about to form an Army; and it is an uncontrovertible fact, that before their recent appointments, Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox possessed no rank whatever; they were private Citizens; their just pretensions to appointments were founded solely on their merits; and their new stations, were consequently to be determined by their comparative qualifications.
“It would have been as becoming in the Candidates and certainly less embarrassing to the President if all had submitted in silence to the Presidents determination after consultation with General Washington; superlative disinterestedness is however rare; what has happened in this case, will eternally happen; there is not one man of real merit and virtue among a thousand whose estimate of himself does not exceed that of his acquaintance; if General Hamilton thinks the second rank his due, so does General Knox in respect to himself; General Hamiltons pretensions are however seconded by the wishes of General Washington and by the opinion of a vast majority of the wisest and most efficient supporters of the Government in every part of the United States; the political enemies of both Gentlemen are the same, but while they respect and confide in the great talents of the former, they estimate the abilities of the latter by a different scale.
“The opinion of General Washington being in favour of General Hamilton; the public voice having awarded the second rank to him, in consequence of his merits and the supposed effect of the act of the President himself; it being certain to my mind that General Knox will not accept an appointment with rank inferiour to Generals Hamilton and Pinckney; and it being equally certain, that General Hamilton will not renounce the station in which he supposes himself properly placed, but rather decline the service, the interesting question arises, What is to be done? Taking it for granted that General Knox or General Hamilton will decline service, it is necessary to consider maturely the consequences of a decision against either of these Gentlemen.
“The question of rank so far as it is a personal question ought to be entirely out of view, for surely the public Interest ought not to yield to the ambition or vanity of either of these Gentlemen: their relative rank is important only in relation to the duties of their Offices, and as it may affect the continuance of one of them in service; the Office of General Hamilton as that of Inspector General as well as Major General; that of General Knox only Major General.
“I am no Soldier, and no judge of military questions except so far as they are capable of being tested by the principles of Common sense; there are I presume some special duties, annexed to the Office of Inspector General, distinct from that of a Major General and also presume that it is important that the former should have an elevated rank to secure the full effect of his arrangements; The Law only determines that the Inspector General, shall enjoy the rank of Major General; the official grade being the same, personal rank, must therefore depend on the pleasure or determination of the President, on a full consideration of all the circumstances, which must influence his decision.
“General Washington has clearly expressed his opinion or rather ‘advice’ on this point, and by a Letter of his to General Hamilton, which I learn from the Secretary of War, was by him submitted to the Presidents perusal, but which doubtless has escaped his recollection, I find that General Washington relies, upon the efficient aid of General Hamilton. By the same Letter it appears further, that the only difficulty in his mind arose, (and that very much from local considerations) on the relative rank of Generals Hamilton and Pinckney, and that with a knowledge of all the Gentlemen and with the most intimate acquaintance with Generals Hamilton & Knox, General Washington deliberately and explicitly arranged the last below the other two; These are his words; ‘with respect to my friend General Knox, whom I love and esteem, I have ranked him below you both.’
“Considering all the circumstances of General Washingtons services and retirement, it was certainly a serious question for him to determine, whether he should again encounter the perils of public life—having consented, it will be expected by all dispassienate men, that his reasonable wishes should be gratified—and what is the present question? Merely, whether General Hamilton shall or shall not precede General Knox in command. If the question is important to one of the Gentlemen, it is equally so to the other. If the services of both cannot be retained, ought not General Washingtons deliberate advice, seeing it has been asked, to influence the final decision?”
Hamilton’s supporters in the cabinet also turned to Washington in their efforts to reverse the decision of their President. McHenry relayed the news to Washington that Adams was determined to place Knox first and Hamilton third, and on September 13 Pickering wrote to Washington: “… The Secretary of War has received from the President a Letter deciding the ranks of the three first General Officers in question —that they shall stand, Knox—Pinckney—Hamilton.… It is a decision which ought not to stand: I hope in God the President may be prevailed to reverse it: we have taken it upon ourselves to delay its execution.…” This letter was followed on September 19 by a detailed account of the situation by McHenry, in which he wrote that the President “agreed to follow your arrangement upon my admitting, that any of the parties, if dissatisfied with the order of arrangement might have their claims discussed and settled by a board of officers or the commander in chief.”
Washington then attempted to do for Hamilton, Pickering, and McHenry what they had been unable to do for themselves. He indicated to McHenry the possibility that he would resign if Adams changed the ranking of the three major generals, and on September 25, in a polite, but firm, letter to Adams, he made clear his preference for Hamilton. He wrote the letter, he said, “With all the respect which is due to your public station, and with the regard I entertain for your private character,” and he stated that “To encrease the Powers of the Commander in Chief—or to lessen those of the President of the United States … was most foreign from my heart.” But he wrote: “In the arrangement made by me, with the Secretary of War, the three Major Generals stood—Hamilton, Pinckney, Knox; and in this order I expected their Commissions would have been dated. This, I conceive, must have been the understanding of the Senate. And certainly, was the expectation of all those with whom I have conversed. But you have been pleased to order the last to be first, and the first to be last.…
“But if no regard was intended to be had to the order of my arrangement, why was it not altered before it was submitted to the Senate? This would have placed matters upon simple ground. It would then have been understood as it is at present—namely—that the Gentlemen would rank in the order they were named: but the change will contravene this, and excite much conversation, & unpleasant circumstances.…
“It is an invidious task, at all times to draw comparisons; and I shall avoid it as much as possible; but I have no hesitation in declaring, that if the Public is to be deprived of the Services of Coll. Hamilton in the Military line, that the Post he was destined to fill will not be easily supplied; and that this is the sentiment of the Public, I think I can venture to pronounce.…
“I have addressed you, Sir, with openess and candour—and I hope with respect, requesting to be informed whether your determination to reverse the order of the three Major Generals is final.…”
On October 9 Adams replied to Washington: “I received, yesterday, the Letter you did the Honor to write to me on the 25th. of September.
“You request to be informed, whether my determination to preserve the order of the three Major Generals is final.… I presume that before this Day you have received Information, from the Secretary at War, that I some time ago Signed the three Commissions and dated them on the Same day, in hopes Similar to yours that an amicable Adjustment or Acquiescence might take place among the Gentlemen themselves. But, if these hopes should be disappointed, and Controversies should arise, they will of course be submitted to you as Commander in Chief, and if after all any one should be so obstinate as to appeal to me from the Judgment of the Commander in Chief, I was determined to confirm that Judgment. Because, whatever Construction may be put upon the Resolutions of the ancient Congress which have been applied to this Case, and whether they are at all applicable to it or not, there is no doubt to be made that by the present Constitution of the United States, the President has Authority to determine the Rank of Officers.”
Most historians have suggested that Washington’s letter forced Adams’s hand and made him change his mind. Such a conclusion is at best only partially correct, for it appears that long before Adams had received the letter in question he had decided to refer the matter back to the principals in the dispute. In the first place, Adams signed the commissions of the three men on the same day and sent them to McHenry on September 30 (or eight days before he had received Washington’s letter). Secondly, the members of the cabinet proceeded on the assumption that the fact that Adams had signed the commissions on the same day meant that the order in which the names had been approved by the Senate now prevailed and that Hamilton was second in command to Washington. Finally, and most important, there is evidence that Adams had made up his mind more than two weeks before he had received Washington’s letter. In a draft of a letter to Wolcott, which is dated September 24 and which was never sent, Adams replied in detail to Wolcott’s letter of September 17. In Adams’s letter, which he said was “written in deep Affection” for Wolcott, he discussed all the reasons why he did not think Hamilton should be ranked first among the major generals; but he also stated: “I have given so much Attention to your Representations that I have dated the Commissions to Knox Pinckney and Hamilton all on the same Day, in hopes that under the Auspices of General Washington the Gentlemen may come to some amicable settlement of the dispute.…”
Adams’s letter to McHenry of September 30 consists of a single sentence reading: “Inclosed are the commissions for the three generals signed and all dated on the same day.” McHenry immediately relayed this news to Hamilton in a letter which concluded: “I shall, I expect, soon call upon you. Burn this letter,” and on October 10 Wolcott wrote to Hamilton that Adams’s letter to McHenry, “covering the Commissions of the Major Generals, dated on one day,” had settled the question of rank and “that you are established in the rank of first Major General.” But McHenry was still not sure. Instead of asking Adams what should be done, on October 12 he sent his fellow cabinet members most of the relevant documents and asked them the following four questions: “1st. Whether from the tenor of the letters, collectively, and particularly, from the President’s last letter (No. 13) including the commissions for the Major Generals of the army of the United States, all dated on the same day, it ought to be concluded, that the President acquiesces, in the settlement of the relative rank of the Major Generals, upon the principle of, and agreeably to, the order of their nomination and approbation by the Senate. If answered in the affirmative, then,
“2d. Whether the Secretary of war should immediately transmit their commissions to the Major Generals, and inform them respectively, that their relative rank is considered as definitively settled by the order of nomination, and approbation aforesaid, or
“3d. Whether the transmission of the commissions, and the communications aforesaid, ought not to be previously transmitted to the President.
“4th. Whether, if the Secretaries shall collectively agree in their answers to the above questions, it will not be proper for the Secretary of war to communicate to the President a copy of the questions now proposed and the answers thereto, as inducing to the opinion he entertains of the President’s will, and the conduct he has pursued.”

On October 13, Pickering, Wolcott, and Stoddert replied to McHenry: “The only inference we can draw from the facts … is, that the President consents to the arrangement of rank as proposed by General Washington and pursued in the order of nomination and appointment by the President and Senate.
“This being the conclusion which we make, it is our opinion, that the Secretary of war, ought to transmit the Commissions and inform the Generals that in his opinion the rank is definitively settled according to the original arrangement.
“We are of opinion that it will not be respectful to the President to address him again on a subject, which appears to have been attended with difficulties in his mind, and the discussion of which can produce no public advantage; we also think that no communication of our sentiments will be necessary, unless the Secretary of War shall discover hereafter, that we have mistaken the Presidents intentions, in which case it will be proper, that we should share in the censure.”
On October 15 McHenry sent Hamilton his commission and stated: “With respect to the relative rank between you, Generals Pinckney and Knox, I deem it necessary or observe, that the order of nomination and approval by the Senate is considered definitive.” Hamilton acknowledged the receipt of his commission on October 19, but Knox, stating that “no Officer can consent to his own degradation,” declined his appointment. Pinckney, who had had the good fortune to be out of the country throughout most of the dispute, returned to the United States in mid-October. Following his arrival he wrote to McHenry accepting his appointment and stating that he had no objections to being outranked by Hamilton.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, [14 July 1798]
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon 14th. July 1798
My dear Sir,
(Private & confidential)

Your letter of the 8th. instant, was presented to me by the Secretary of War on the 11th., and I have consented to embark once more on a boundless field of responsibility & trouble, with two reservations—first, that the principal Officers in the line, and of the Staff, shall be such as I can place confidence in; and, that I shall not be called into the field until the Army is in a situation to require my presence, or it becomes indispensible by the urgency of circumstances. Contributing in the meanwhile, every thing in my power to its efficient Organization, but nothing to the public expence until I am in a situation to incur expence myself.
It will be needless after giving you this information, and having indelibly engraved on my mind, the assurance contained in your letter of the 2d. of June, to add, that I rely upon you as a Coadjutor, and assistant in the turmoils I have consented to encounter.
I have communicated very fully with the Secretary of War on the several matters contained in the Powers vested in him by the President; who, as far as it appears by them, is well disposed to accomodate; But I must confess that, besides nominating me to the Command of the Armies without any previous consultation or notice, the whole of that business seems to me to stand upon such ground, as may render the Secretarys journey, & our consultation, of no avail.
Congress, it is said, would rise this week. What then has been done, or can the President do, with respect to appointments under that Bill, if it has been enacted? Be his inclinations what they may, unless a Law could, and has Passed, enabling him, in the recess of the Senate, to make appointments, conformably thereto, the nominations must have been made; & the business done here, with the Secretary is rendered nugatory.
By the pending Bill, if it passes to a Law, two Major Generals, and an Inspector Genl. with the Rank of Majr General and three Brigadiers are to be appointed. Presuming on its passing, I have given the following as my sentiments respecting the characters fit, & proper to be employed; in which the Secretary concurs.

Alexr. Hamilton. Inspector
}
Majr. Genls.

Chas. C. Pinckney

Henry Knox—or if either of the last mend. refuses

Henry Lee of Virginia

Henry Lee (if not Majr. Genl.)
}
Brigadiers

John Brooks—Massachusetts

Willm. S. Smith—N: York—or

John E. Howard—Maryld.

Either Edward Hand—Pennsa.
}
Adjt. Genl.

Jonathan Dayton Jr. N. Jer

or

Willm. S. Smith to be

Edwd. Carrington

Qr. Mr. Genl.

James Craik

Directr. Hosl

And I have enumerated the most prominent characters that have occurred to my mind, from whom to select field Officers for the Regiments of Infantry, & that of Cavalry, which are proposed to be raised.
And now, my dear Sir, with that candour which you always have, and I trust ever will experience from me, I shall express to you a difficulty which has arisen in my mind, relative to seniority between you & Genl. Pinckney; for with respect to my friend General Knox, whom I love & esteem, I have ranked him below you both. That you may know from whence this difficulty proceeds, it is proper I should observe, & give it as my decided opinion, that if the French should be so mad as to Invade this Country in expectation of making a serious impression, that their operations will commence in the States South of Maryland: 1. because they are the weakest; 2. because they will expect, from the tenor of the debates in Congress to find more friends there; 3. because there can be no doubt of their arming the Negros against us; and 4. because they would be more contiguous to their Islands, & to Louisiana & the Floridas, if they can obtain possession of them; & that this will be the case, if they are able to accomplish it, is, to my mind, a matter that admits of no doubt.
If these premises are just, the inference is obvious, that the services and influence of General Pinckney in the Southern States would be of the highest, and most interesting importance. Will he serve then, under one whom he will consider a Junr. Officer? and what would be the consequence if he should refuse, and his numerous, & powerful connections & acquaintances in those parts, get disgusted? You have no doubt heard that his Military reputation stands high in the Southern States; that he is viewed as a brave, intelligent and enterprising Officer; and, if report be true, that no Officer in the late American Army made Tactics, & the art of War so much his Study. To this account of him, may be added, that his character has received much celebrity by his conduct as Minister & Envoy at Paris.
Under this view of the subject, my wish to put you first, and my fear of loosing him, is not a little embarrassing. But why? for after all it rests with the President to use his pleasure. I shall only add therefore, that as the welfare of the country is the object, I persuade myself, we all have in view, I shall sanguinely hope that smaller matters will yield to measures which have a tendency to promote it. I wish devoutly that either of you, or any other fit character had been nominated in my place; for no one can make a greater sacrafice—at least of inclination, than will
Your ever Affectionate

Go: Washington
Alexander Hamilton Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de La Tour du Pin, 15 July 1798
From: La Tour du Pin, Marquis de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London, July 15, 1798. “j’ai eu l’honneur de vous écrire, Monsieur, vers le mois de mars dernier.… ma lettre en renfermoit une pour Mss. le Roy, Bayard, et mc Evers, et une pour m nicholas olive negotian a newyork. je n’ai recu ni d’eux, ni de vous, monsieur, aucune Reponse, ce qui fait que je viens vous importuner encore une fois. L’objet de la lettre ci jointe a messieurs le Roy &c. est de les prier de vendre ma petite ferme d’albany, et d’en placer le prix dans les fonds americains qui paroitront les plus avantageux, mais avant tout les plus Surs. j’osois vous prier, monsieur, de vouloir bien donner votre avis pour cette petite affaire, devenue d’une très grande importance, pour moi, et ma famille, puisque nous Sommes une fois encore emigrés.… c’est donc encore une fois chez vous que nous meditons de chercher azile.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Daniel C. Brent, 16 July 1798
From: Brent, Daniel C.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Woodstock [Virginia] July 16, 1798. “In a letter which I had the Honor of receiving from you, dated the 26th of Decemr 1793 … you did me the favor to assure me that … I might at all times consider myself as entitled to your good Offices, whenever they could be useful to me … and as I am desirous of obtaining an appointment under the Government at this time, you will give me leave therefore to ask the favor of you to furnish me with letters of recommendation to such of the Executive officers at Phila, including the President, as you shall think proper, to be made use of by myself.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 16 July 1798
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia July 16. 1798.
D Sir,

I have just received from Genl. Washington an answer to my letter which I showed you.
The General appears to have contemplated attentively the nature of the impending war with France, and that the southern states (if any part of the Union) will be invaded. Admitting this idea to be correct, the General says, “the inference I am going to draw from placing Colo. Hamilton over General Pinckney, is natural and obvious. The latter is an officer of high military reputation, fond of the profession, spirited, active, & judicious; and much advanced in the estimation of the public by his late conduct as minister and envoy at Paris. With these pretensions, and being senior to Colo. Hamilton, he would not, I am morally certain, accept a junior appointment; and its influence

   I suppose of Genl. Pinckney’s non acceptance.

 would spread where most to be deprecated, as his connections are numerous, powerful, and more influential than any other in the three southern states. Under this view of the subject, it would be impolitic, and might be dangerous to sow the seeds of discontent, at so important a crisis. To this may be added, that impediments to the return of Genl. Pinckney, and.causes unforseen, might place Colo. Hamilton in the situation you wish to see him. You will readily perceive, that the difficulty in my mind arises from thorough conviction that if an invasion is attempted, it will commence south of Maryland; and from the importance of so influential a character as Pinckney (if among us) being heartily engaged in repelling it.” The general concludes, from this reasoning with hoping, that the office of Inspector General, with a command in the line, will prove satisfactory to you. I ought to have first quoted the General’s preliminary observation: “Of the abilities and fitness of the Gentleman you have named for a high command in the provisional army, I think as you do; and that his services ought to be secured at almost any price.”
These communications from the General to me are “in confidence,” and as such you will receive them. I presume there is some understanding between you on the subject. At all events, I trust that the same genuine patriotism which determined you and some others to encounter the perils of the American revolution, and by your talents and active labours to swell anothers glory, will prompt you again to come forth in a situation, if not at the height of my wishes and of those of your friends, certainly in a situation in which you can render invaluable services, and as certainly obtain a large share of honor and military fame.
With great sincerity I am   ever yours

T. Pickering
Alexander Hamilton Esqr


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, [17 July 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

[New York, July 17, 1798]
My Dear Sir

I thank you for your friendly letter by the Post. I had contemplated the possibility that Knox might come into service & was content to be second to him, if thought indispensable. Pinckney, if placed over me puts me a grade lower. I dont believe it to be necessary. I am far from certain that he will not be content to serve under me—but I am willing that the affair should be so managed as that the relative ranks may remain open to future settlement, to ascertain the effect of the arrangement which has been contemplated. I am not however ready to say that I shall be satisfied with the appointment of Inspector General with the rank & command of Major General on the principle that every officer of higher rank in the late army who may be appointed is to be above me. I am frank to own that this will not accord with my opinion of my own pretensions & I have every reason to believe that it will fall far short of public opinion. Few have made so many sacrifices as myself—to few would a change of situation for a military appointment be so injurious as to myself—if with this sacrifice, I am to be degraded below my just claim in public opinion—ought I to acquiesce?
Yrs. Affecly

A HamiltonJuly 17
Timothy Pickering Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 20 July 1798
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philad. 20 July 1798.
My dear Hamilton.

I retained the inclosed letter which was put into my hands with permission to take a copy of it. I hope every thing has been arranged to your satisfaction, or if not wholly, yet nearly so.
I shall transmit you very soon the rules & regulations for the formation & movements of his Britannic Majestys forces, and manual exercise for the same, in order that you may consider and report whether the whole or what parts of them are suitable to be introduced into our service. If a proper system is formed, and becomes a Presidential act it will save you an infinity of trouble and perplexity. I wish you therefore to pay the earliest attention to the subject.
Yours sincerely

James McHenry
Alexr. Hamilton.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 21 July 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[London, July 21, 1798. Kings notation of this letter reads: “Hamilton. Duplicates of address Gallatin.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Ambrose Spencer, 21 July 1798
From: Spencer, Ambrose
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Hudson [New York] July 21, 1798. “It is undoubtedly time, that the affair of Avery & others with Proctor, be brought to a close.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, 22 July 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: McHenry, James

(private)
New York July 22d ⟨1798⟩
My Dear Sir

Your letter of the 20th. instant, inclosing one from General Washington came to hand this day.
The object you suggest in it is one, which no doubt deserves a primary attention; and it will be paid to it. But it will be useful, that I should shortly confer with you fully on a variety of subjects, and after receiving an official communication of my appointment, I shall without delay, repair to Philadelphia.
I count always upon your confidence as well in my personal friendship for you as in my zeal for the public service; and having no inclination to spare myself it only remains for us to trace together the plan in which I can best second your operations and promote the service.
Yrs. with true attachment

A Hamilton
New York July 22. 1798

PS In some instances we have missed it in our Brigadiers. It [is] very essential there should be no mistake about the field office. Festina lente in your choice of Officers.

J McHenry Esqr &c