Title: To George Washington from Captain Lieutenant John Henderson, 22 July 1779
From: Henderson, John
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Camp near West Point July 22d 1779.

        With the greatest deference and Respect I would beg leave to lay before your Excellency my Claims to Rank as a Captain in the Third Pennsylvania Regiment, from the ninth Day of March 1778.
        When the Twelfth Pennsylvania Regiment was Ordered to be raised and the Officers appointed to it, I was Commissioned a First Lieutenant on the first day of October 1776, and upon Captain Brady’s Resignation, which was on the 9th day of March 1778, I as Senior Lieut. in the Regiment, then became entitl⟨ed⟩ to his Company and ought to have fill’d the vacancy; But as I was at that time and for some Months afterwards on Command as an Assistant to the Surveyor General of the Army, and few or no Promotion’s taking place in the Line except upon particular Application, I could not attend to my Rank till an Arrangement of the Army took place, the Twelfth Regiment reduced and incorporated with the Third and I being the Senior Subaltern of both Regiments was appointed Captain Lieutenant, and on Application made to Governor Reed, and the Gentlemen appointed to settle the Arrangement (at White Plains last Summer) laying before them my pretensions to Rank as a Captain, I was Ordered to do Captains Duty, with a promise to fill the first vacancy that should happen in the Regime⟨nt⟩ and have my Rank from the Date of the Vacancy which happened in the Twelfth Regiment.
        It gave me great uneasiness to be so long deprived of a Ran⟨k⟩ I esteem’d myself justly Entitled to, and could not have born it to this Time if Colo. Craig had not always gave me th⟨e⟩ strongest assurances that upon the first Arrangement of t⟨he⟩ Regiment I should be fully redress’d and have my Rank compleat as far back as the aforesaid 9th of March 1778. He likewise ordered that upon Guards, Commands, Detachme⟨nts⟩ Courts Martial &ca. I should take the Rank I claim’d and return myself as such in the Muster Rolls of the Company, which I have done since the last vacancy happened and thought my Rank

secure as it has never been call’d in Question by any Officer in the Line, ’till last Evening I was presented with a Captain Lieutenants Commission to Rank as such from the 12th Day of May last, notwithstanding there has been two Vacancys for Captains in the Regiment a considerable time, one of which I was ordered by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment to fill, and had taken the Company under my Care and Command.
        I am sorry to trouble your Excellency at such a Time as this; but I conceive myself so highly Injured that I cannot consistent with my Honour and Duty as an Officer accept of, or Submit to an inferior Rank than what I have hitherto been Honoured with, and which I hope will appear to your Excellency to be my indisputable Right to require especially as there is now a vacancy to obtain it, And as the most Active part of the Campaign is (to all appearance) just now commenceing when every Officer that pays the least regard to his Honour would wish to be with his Regiment in whatever circumstances it may be, I would humbly request your Excellency to grant me an appointment that I may take Rank agreeable to the Vacancy that offered for me in the Twelfth Regiment and Order that I may be Commissioned accordingly. I am with the highest Respect Your Excellency’s most Obedient And most Humble Servant

          Jno: Henderson Capt. L.3d P. Rt


Title: From George Washington to Major Henry Lee, Jr., 22 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Lee, Henry Jr.

          Dr Sr
          Wt Pt 22d July 1779

        This morning I received your favor of yesterdays date—I did not think it necessary to change your position or, the kind of duty I had alloted to you—therefore only repeated to you, that it was my wish you should keep a good watch down the river—This I have now to request you will do in the most effectual manner—I am happy to hear of the fate of the Marauding party your letter mentions—The 24 pounder said to be taken off by the enemy, if gone is only the loss of an Iron piece. The 7 Prisoners taken at the slote you will order by the nearest route to Junes where your escort wil⟨l⟩ be relieved by Lord Stirling & another sent on with them to Goshen.

          G. Washington


Title: From George Washington to John Penn, 22 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Penn, John

          sir
          West point July the 22d 1779

        I have received Your favor of the 12th Instant. I was exceedingly sorry for Major Taylor’s resignation—and used my interest to dissuade him from it, as I deemed him a valuable Officer—capable of rendering his Count⟨ry⟩ good Service. But The Major having resigned, I do not see how he can be reintroduced, more especially after so long an absence. Attempts of this sort when they have succeeded, though the instances are few in which they have, have never failed to excite great uneasiness and to produce some Resignations. Indeed it is natural enough that this should be the case, as the moment an Officer resigns his Commission—there is a sort of successional right vested in some Other—and to make it give way for the readmission of the party who resigned, when ever it suits him to return, is certainly an injury and a bad encouragement to perseverance. If the vacancy is filled by ⟨a Commission it is abso⟩lutely impracticable. I have the Honor to be with great regard & esteem sir Your Most obedt sert

          G. Washington


Title: To George Washington from Colonel Oliver Spencer, 22 July 1779
From: Spencer, Oliver
To: Washington, George

          May it please your Excellency
          Wyoming [Pa.] July 22d 1779

        the Bearer Cap: Combs, late of Forman’s Corps, waits on your Excellency to inform you that their Situation at present, is not So agreable as they could wish, Originating in Some degree from a want of their Commissions, and not knowing whether they are annexed, or incorporated with the Regt which I have the Honor to Command; which last circumstance, renders it also Somewhat inconvenient to the Regiments in General, for as their being incorporated remains with me a matter of Uncertainty, I cannot take the necessary Steps

towards an Arrangement, which if it was determined I could wish to do agreable to the enclosed.
        I would also take the Liberty of informing your Excellency, that in the Commissions forwarded for the Regt I find there is none for Lt Col: Smith, the Surgeons, nor myself. Which circumstances if your Excellency will please to Consider, and make me Acquainted with your pleasure concerning them, I Should Acknowledge an addition to the Obligations I am at present under. I have the Honor to Subscribe myself your Excellency’s Most Obedt & Devoted Servant

          Oliver Spencer


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General William Woodford, 22 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Woodford, William

          Dr Sr,
          July 22d 1779

        I have this morning received your letter dated yesterday.
        Col. Nevils regiment will be ordered up to join you—no relief will be required.
        The inclosed letter I must beg the favor of you to have forwarded to Mr Skinner. I am Sir Yrs &c.

          P.s. Major Lee will shortly send a small number of Prisoners lately taken to Junes—His Lordship will be pleased to relieve the escort that conveys them there, & forward them by an other to the Commissary of Prisoners at Goshen—should the Prisoners now there be gone off, those to be forwarded, must follow.


Title: General Orders, 23 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moores-House [West Point] Sunday July 23rd 1779.
          Parole Minorca—C. Signs Malo Lisbon—

        A board of General Officers to be composed of Major Generals Heath and St Clair and Brigadier Generals Nixon, Parsons Smallwood, Knox and Paterson are to sit tomorrow morning ten ôclock at General Heath’s quarters to make a complete and final arrangement of the officers in the Massachusetts line.
        The board will be pleased to fix the precise rank & station of every Field officer and also the precedence of the Captains—The Commander in Chief will lay before them all the papers in his hands upon the subject.
        The Commissary General of Issues in his arrangements for supplying the respective brigades with provisions will take care that the allowance for the Garrison of West Point is not broken in upon nor reduced, but that thirty days provision, (at least) is always in store for it.
        It was omitted to be mentioned in the order of yesterday that the Light-Infantry from Nixon’s & Larned’s brigades are to form one battalion; That from Patersons & the North Carolina to form another: Major Hull to command the former and Major Murphy the latter: Colonel Putnam will have the command of both.
        The Light-Infantry from these brigades to parade at nine ô clock tomorrow morning at West-Point to be inspected and formed into battalions.
        The recruits coming on from the State of Massachusetts immediately on their arrival in camp are to be reported to the Adjutant General who is to direct their distribution to the several regiments of that

State in proportion to the strength of each, to bring the whole, as near as may be to an equality.
        The officers commanding regiments will have a similar distribution made to the several companies that these also may be nearly of the same standard.
        The present encampment of the Army being rather confined and not admitting a change of ground, an extraordinary degree of attention will be necessary to preserve cleanliness—The regulations for this purpose are punctually to be carried into execution.
        At a brigade General Court Martial held at Smith’s-Clove, by order of Brigadier General Smallwood the 5th inst. Lieutenant Colonel Howard President, John Club, John Whitmore, Roger Leonard and Charles Knox of the 3rd Maryland regiment were tried for, “desertion & attempting to go to the enemy”—found guilty of a breach of the 1st Article of the 6th Section of the Articles of War and sentenced (two thirds of the court agreeing thereto) to suffer death. His Excellency, the Commander in Chief confirms the sentences.


Title: To George Washington from Thomas Jefferson, 23 July 1779
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Washington, George

          Sir,
          Williamsburg [Va.] July 23. 1779

        I take the liberty of begging leave of your Excellency to forward the enclosed by the first flag which may happen to be going into New york. They are addressed to [a] good man in distress which I am sure will apologize with you for my asking your intervention. I am with the greatest respect your Excellencys mos. obdt & most hbl. servt

          Th: Jefferson


Title: From George Washington to Philip Schuyler, 23 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Schuyler, Philip

          Dear Sir
          West point July the 23. 1779

        I received Your favor of the 7th some days ago and was extremely happy to hear that Our friend Colo. Lewis had returned. I really feared that some accident had befallen him—and that he might have been sacrificed for his attachment to our cause. His intelligence if well founded, is interesting; as we shall have little to apprehend from any force below—and I think not a great deal from the Ottawas and Chippeways, notwithstanding Brandt’s declaration. If they mean to take Arms—it seems more probable that their operations will be more to the Westward.

        If it is agreeable to His Excellency Governor Clinton—Yourself and the Other Commissioners to make the exchanges proposed by Butler—it will be perfectly so to me. You will know better than me the consequence of the Indian personages in question—and the probable political advantages or disadvantages that they will produce. I had seen Governor Haldimand’s Speech before. It does not appear to be a very brilliant one; however I have heard that it has had some influence upon our Oneida Friends. I return you Butler’s Letter.
        My Letter of the 9th & 11th advised you of the ravages of the Enemy to those periods—and since they destroyed Norwalk and Bedford.
        I have the pleasure to inform you—that in the night of the 15th we made a successful attack upon the Enemy’s post at Stoney point. It was carried by Storm, by our Light Troops under Genl Wayne. The Enemy’s loss was 63 killed—543 prisoners, of which 56 were wounded—and 15 pieces of Artillery—Small Arms and Other Stores; Ours—13 killed and 64 wounded; among the latter General Wayne himself slightly in the head by a Musket Ball. You will see a particular account of the Enterprize in two or three days in the papers—and therefore I will not trouble you with a detail. I cannot however conclude without assuring you—that the conduct of our Troops upon the occasion, does them the highest honor, as they behaved with the greatest order—and the most determined resolution. We had some hopes, that the reduction of Verplanks point would have followed; but before we could bring our operations to bear, the Detachment intended to effect it, was obliged to retire by the arrival of a number of the Enemy’s Ships with Troops—and of General Clinton with the remainder of the Army in the Neighbourhood. I am Dr Sir with the most perfect regard Yr Most Obedt sert

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to a Board of General Officers, 24 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Board of General Officers

          Gentlemen
          Head Qrs West point July 24: 1779

        Col. Harrison will have the honor of delivering the Board the papers relating to the arrangement of the Massachusettes line—As these have passed through his hands and he has had occasion to inquire into the circumstances on which the determinations of the Board will turn he may be able to give information which will facilitate the business. I have the honor to be Gentlemen Your most Obedt servt.


Title: To George Washington from Major Thomas Cogswell, 24 July 1779
From: Cogswell, Thomas
To: Washington, George

          July 24th 1779
          To His Excellency General Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States of America—

        The Humble Petition of Thomas Cogswell Major in the Massachusetts Line, Sheweth.
        That in settling the Rank of the Feild Officers of the Fifteen Battalions from said State, at Valley Forge Your Petioner was (as he thinks) much injured, in not having justice done him as to his Rank, in a number of instances, He mentions only one instance, which will be Sufficient to convince your Excellency that there was not that attention paid to your Petioner which in justice ought to have been—Major Porter was rank’d before your Petioner although he was not a Captain till several months after him—& your Petioner receiv’d a Majors Commission the first of January 1777 Major Porter did not receive his Commission till the 14th of June following, and there was no Vacancy till after the 20th of may—Your Petioner has been in the Service ever since the Commencement of the War, & Major Porter was not in the Line in 1776—Your Petioner was absent on Command at the time the Rank was settled at Valley Forge, & did not join the Army till a few days before the Battle at Monmouth which being an improper time to trouble your Excellency with matters of that kind, he thought proper to wave it—& has had no opportunity Since by reason of movements of the Brigade—With this I shall present my pretensions to Rank, & rest assured that your Excellency will rank me in such place as my long Services Deserve & my Pretensions entitle me to—and Your Petioner as in Duty bound will ever pray.

          Thomas Cogswell Majorof the Massts Regt Commd by Col. Vose


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Nathaniel Gist and Officers of the Virginia Line, 24 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Gist, Nathaniel,Officers of the Virginia Line

          Gentlemen
          Head Quarters West Point 24th July 1779

        I have received your letter of yesterday and am sorry for the uneasiness which has taken place on so disagreable a subject. I assure you I have not heard any charges against your Brigade in particular relative to the transaction of the night of the 15th. I have only heard it said in general terms that some of the common soldiers had embezzled part of the Articles taken upon that occasion and that some officers had made purchases of them, without involving any particular corps in the censure; and as it is improbable any persons will appear as accusers, I do not see upon what grounds an inquiry could be conducted— But if you continue to think one necessary to vindicate the reputation of the Brigade, I shall chearfully order a Court to be held so soon as the circumstances of the Army will permit.
        The question how far a Corps de reserve may be intitled to a share of the booty, taken upon any occasion, does not admit of a general determination. Every case must stand on its own merits—In the present, the promises made before hand were confined to the Corps of Light Infantry who of course have the sole claim to the benefit of what was taken. Your Brigade was intended as a covering party in Case of Accident and to give countenance to the Assailants rather than as a body of support, to give serious aid in the attack. I am Gentlemen With great Esteem Your most obd. hum. Serv.

          Go. Washington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General John Glover, 24 July 1779
From: Glover, John
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Ridgfield [Conn.] 24 July 1779

        After much Labour & pains I have Completed The Arrangements, of the four Regits in my Brigade, which are annexed, and Signd, by

all the field Officers now on the Ground, agreeable to your Excellncys Letter of the 29 May; and are Sent on to the Board of Genl Officers appointed to Sett at Major Genl Heaths Quarters.
        I am Desired (by Col. Harrison in his Letter of yesterday) to transmit to your Excellency, the time Col. Vose was appointed to the Command of a Regit, the 21 Feby 1777, with Several others hereafter mentiond—Col. Vose Succeeded to the Command of the Late Col. patterson Regit but Claims Rank from the first of Jany—Col. Bigelow obtaind his appointment on the Resignation of, Learned, the 8th Feby 1777. Lt Col. Colman Resignd on or about the 6th of March 1779—Major Balls promotion took place the 9th Sepr 1778.
        Inclosed is Major Bradishs Letter to Col. Bigelow requesting a Discharg; I am Verey Sorry the averris of the Country, is the means of Driveing Good office⟨r⟩s out of the Service at a time when they are So much Wanted; Major Bradish has Served with me in My Brigde two years, During which, he has ever, Dischargd his duty as a faithfull Good Officer; its with regret I part with him.
        Major Cogswell, the bearer of this is a Gentleman who I have Served with Since Sept. 1776 in which Time he has ever been Verey Attentive & has don an uncomon Share of Duty in Camp Compard with many other officers, he thinks himself not onely Neglected, but Injured, in his Rank; their being three field officers on the Ground, To the Regiment which he belongs; I have indulged him with a few days, that he may have an Oppertunity to Waite on, & Say his Griveencies, befor your Excellency. I have the Honor to be your Excellencys Most Obdt Hble Sert

          John Glover B. General


Title: From George Washington to Philip Schuyler, 24 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Schuyler, Philip

          Dear Sir,
          Westpoint July 24th 79

        Permit me to thank you for your obliging Letter of the 15th, & to acknowledge with pleasure & gratitude, Mrs Schuylers intended favor to Mrs Washington; who, I am sure, would have been exceedingly happy in seeing her at head Qrs if it had been convenient to her to have stayed.
        My Letter of yesterday’s date will convey to you the acct of the taking of Stoney point. I was tolerably sanguine in my expectations of reducing Verplanks, but some untoward accidents defeated my plan— of course my hopes—I am with the most sincere esteem & affection, & with best respects to Mrs S——r Dr Sir Yr Most Obt & Obligd Ser.

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 24 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)

          My Lord,
          West point July 24th 79

        Having received intelligence (though not in so precise a manner as I could wish) of a pretty considerable imbarkation at Dobbs’s ferry, and that the Transports which received the Troops had fallen down the River, I think it advisable that your division should remove to Suffrans.
        By the time you reach that place some further information of the Enemys movements and designs may point to the expediency of your remaining there, or advancing to Pompton &ca—The latter is to take place upon well grounded information, or strong appearances of the enemys operating in the Jerseys, in which case, or rather actual invasion, the force of the Country is to be called out, agreeably to the plan already fixed with the Governor and the Militia Officers of that State.
        I have ordered Captn Bedkin with his Troop of Horse to join your division being perswaded that your Lordship will not suffer them to be used improperly—a contrary practice has worn down our horse and dismounted more than half the Dragoons.
        I need not recommend vig⟨i⟩lence, because I am sure your Lor⟨d⟩ships caution & prudence will see the necessity of it, and will use the means to guard against surpriz⟨es⟩. I am with esteem & regard Yr Lordships Most Obedt Hble Se⟨rvant⟩

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to the Board of War, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

          Gentlemen
          Head Quarters West Point July 25th 1779

        I am honored with your two letters of the 15th and 16th. I am very happy to learn the Board have adopted the salutary expedient they mention for repairing the men’s cloaths and shoes. Something of this kind has been long wanting; and I hope the present plan will answer very valuable purposes, save much expence to the public and conduce greatly to the comfort and decency of the troops. An extra allowance to the men employed in this way is necessary. That which the Board proposes, considering the depreciation of the money is not too much, and I hope it will not be so great as to occasion any discontent among the other soldiery. Perhaps it may not be amiss to confine it to working days.
        The provision of buckles will also be very useful. When they arrive I shall give orders for their distribution agreeable to the wish of the Board. I have the honor to be With perfect respect Gentlemen Your Most Obed. ser.


Title: From George Washington to Conrad-Alexandre Gérard, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Gérard, Conrad-Alexandre

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point July 25th 1779

        Col. Fleury having signified to me his intention of shortly returning to France and requested permission to go to Philadelphia to make some arrangements for this purpose on which his final determination will depend; I take the liberty to give him this letter to Your Excellency as a testimony of the sense I entertain of his conduct and services in this country, which have been such as to merit my approbation and acquire the esteem of the army. He has been very useful in the different capacities in which he has been employed, has distinguished himself upon several occasions, and in every instance manifested the talents real activity and bravery which constitute a valuable officer. In a recent one he has particularly signalized himself—He commanded one of the advanced parties in the late assault of Stoney point, was the first that entered the enemys works, and struck the British flag with his own hand. I beg your Excellency to accept my warmest thanks for

your obliging letter of the 16th Inst. With the most perfect respect and the sincerest personal attachment I have the honor to be Your Excellency’s most Obedient and very humble servant.


Title: From George Washington to Major Henry Lee, Jr., 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Lee, Henry Jr.

          Dr Sir,
          Head Qrs West point July 25 1779

        I have received your two letters of the 21st and 22d—The intelligence you communicate is interesting and I am anxious to have the movements it mentions more clearly and certainly unfolded—You will spare no pains nor cost for this purpose. It is of great importance we should ascertain as early as possible the reality of the supposed embarkation—its extent and the course it takes in the first instance. & under whose command.
        I must also request you will endeavour to obtain the most precise ideas of the situation of affairs at Stoney Point, as well from your own observation as the intelligence of Spies and deserters of whom you will make very critical and minute enquiries—I wish to know upon what plan the enemy are now constructing their works—particularly whether they inclose them or not—what is the strength of the garrison, the corps that compose that strength the number and sizes of cannon who commands—and the precautions made use of for the security of the post—These points are important and I shall be obliged to you to assist me with the most exact information respecting them all. ⟨I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obet, servt⟩

          ⟨Go: Washington⟩

          P.S. I beg also that you will hire some intelligent Person to cross the River, & discover what Corps lye at Phillips & ⟨mile Square—what⟩ others are at, and abt Kings ⟨Bridge & the works there⟩ & what others are between ⟨that & the City of New York⟩ & in the City.


Title: From George Washington to David Mason, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Mason, David

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point July 25th 1779

        Major General Gates has transmitted me sundry letters received by him from yourself Col. Chevers and other Officers at Springfield principally relating to some discontents which have lately happened there among the Artificers on the subject of provisions—I am uninformed by what authority the ration was reduced to the standard complained of—or the reasons on which the reduction was founded—Under this want of information I could not undertake to give any precise directions myself about the matter; but have written to General Gates on this principle “That the artificers ought to receive what they are intitled to by their contract, so far as the state of the public magazines will permit” and as he is on the spot, I have left it with him to judge how far this can be done and to give orders to the Commissary accordingly.
        With respect to those who have been refractory upon the present occasion I would wish no more rigor to be used with them than is dictated by necessity. I have two reasons for this—one is, that they have some plausible foundation for their discontent and the other is, that, as I am informed by General Knox, the time of service for which they are engaged is near expiring, it is to be apprehended that any severity at this time would discourage their reinlistment. I do not mean however that they should be tolerated in any dangerous extremes, but only that the affair should be as much as possible an affair of management and palliation.
        With respect to the officers & guards, stationed at the Laboratory, their ration ought to be regulated by what is allowed to the troops in general in the Eastern district—There is no reason, that suggests itself to me, for giving a larger allowance, than is customary.
        I understand from General Knox that there is no person at Springfield with power to appoint Courts Martial, which of course must

produce a relaxation of discipline. As you are the commanding Officer at the place, you will be pleased for the future to appoint Courts Martial on the same principle and with the same powers as regimental Court Martials, for the trial of all but capital offenders—These must be sent to the nearest post where a general Officer commands, with the proper witnesses, that he may direct the necessary proceedings.
        Serjeant Hoey may draw a ration $ day for his wife while she is on the spot. I am Sir Yr Mo. Obet hum. Servt

          Go: Washingto⟨n⟩


Title: From George Washington to Major General Arthur St. Clair, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: St. Clair, Arthur

          Dr Sir,
          Head Quarters [West Point] July 25th 1779

        I wrote you a line yesterday on the subject of Lieutenant Broadheads claim, since which I received the inclosed letter and arrangement of the 11th Pennsylvania regiment from the Board of war. You will perceive that Captain Keene is not included in it & probably for the reason suggested by the Board—His original appointment as Captain according to the memorial he preferred and the answer I received from you on the occasion was the 13th of Jany 1777—the same date of Captain Bush’s—I wish you to refer the arrangement to a Board of your Field Officers—who will consider Captain Keenes and Lieutenant Broadheads cases. It has been already determined that the former should be attached to the 11th Regt. there must be several alterations in the arrangemen⟨t,⟩ which you will be pleased to have adjusted. As the Officers are very importunate for their Commissions, the business cannot be too soon finished. I am Dr Sir With great regard Yr Most Obet, servt

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Tallmadge, Benjamin

          Sir,
          West-point July 25th 79.

        All the white Ink I now have (indeed all that there is any prospect of getting soon) is sent in Phial No. I. by Colo. Webb. the liquid in No. 2 is the Counterpart which renders the other visable by wetting the paper with a fine brush after the first has been used & is dry—You will

send these to C——r Junr as soon as possible & I beg that no mention may ever be made of your having received such liquids from me or any one else—In all cases & at all times this prudence & circumspection is necessary but it is indispensably so now as I am informed that Govr Tryon has a preparation of the same kind, or something similar to it which may lead to a detection if it is ever known that a matter of this sort has passed from me.
        I beg that you will use every possible exertion through C—— & other channels to ascertain with a degree of precision, the enemy’s Corps, & how they are disposed of—I wish to know where every Regiment lyes. in order to govern my own movements with more propriety—To learn with certainty what Regiments are on Staten Island—long Island & in what part of it—The City of York—between the city & the bridge—about the bridge—at Philip’s, or Mile square—&ca—would be extremely useful to me at all times, but more so at this.
        I am informed that in the afternoon of the 21st 40 Sail of Vessells passed Eastward by Norwalk. I have also advice that a number of Troops imbarked at Dobbs’s Ferry, & fell down the River on the 22d— In short, that Genl Clinton & Sir George Collier were with this Fleet. but these things not being handed with certainty rather perplex than inform the judgment. I have heard nothing further of either of these Fleets—nor do I know whether that in the Sound had Troops on board or not. let me hear from you soon on the subject of this letter. I am Sir Yr Most Obedt Servt

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Jeremiah Wadsworth, 25 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Wadsworth, Jeremiah

          Sir,
          West point July 25th 1779

        By a letter from Col. Hall to Genl Gist—who was left with his Regt to guard the stores at Middle Brook I find that magazines of provision are laying up there—as this is both contrary to my wish & orders I must beg you will let me know the reasons for establishing a magazine in that part of the Country or whether such a thing has actually been don, or is intended. I am Sir Yr Most Obet servt

          Go: Washington


Title: General Orders, 26 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moores-House [West Point] Monday July 26th 1779.
          Parole Valencia—C. Signs Vigo Van.

        All the brigade Majors to attend at the Orderly-Office tomorrow 12 ô clock, except the one from General Glover’s brigade.


Title: Council of General Officers, 26 July 1779
From: Council of General Officers
To:

          [West Point, 26 July 1779]

        At a Council of General Officers held at Head Quarters this 26th day of July 1779

            Present

            The Commander in Chief

            Major Generals
            Brigadiers

            Heath
            Nixon

            Greene
            Parsons

            St Clair
            Smallwood

            DeKalb
            Knox

            McDougal
            Patterson

            Steuben
            Wayne

            Huntington

            Duportail

            Gist.

            Irvin

        The Commander in Chief laid before the Council sundry papers relative to the Muster Masters department transmitted him by a Committee of Congress in a letter of the 5th instant—and requested their advice respecting the matters therein referred to his consideration; but particularly as “to the necessity or expediency of continuing the department” in the present circumstances of the army.
        He also submitted a letter from Congress of the 20th instant, transmitting sundry letters and papers relative to certain complaints, preferred by Doctor Morgan against Doctor Shippen, Director General;

and requested the opinion of the Board on the measures which it will be proper for him to persue in consequence—whether at this time to arrest Doctor Shippen or not, and whether to bring him to an immediate trial, or defer it, to a future and more convenient period.
        On consideration of the point submitted respecting the Muster Master’s department—The Council determined—the Department unnecessary and the continuing of it inexpedient.
        The Council were unanimously of opinion—That Doctor Shippen could neither be tried now nor a precise day fixed for the purpose; and also that as the sitting of a Court would depend much if not altogether upon the operations & movements of the Enemy—and of consequence would be uncertain and precarious—and might be postponed a considerable time—that it would not be adviseable to arrest him at this time—as the delay might operate not only a great private injury—but also deprive the public of his services at a season when they might be most material.


Title: Council of General Officers, 26 July 1779
From: Council of General Officers, 26 July 1779
To:

          [West Point, 26 July 1779]

        At a Council of General Officers held at Head Quarters at West Point this 26th day of July 1779—
        Present
        The Commander in Chief

            Major General,
            Putnam
            Brigadrs
            Nixon

            Heath

            Parsons

            Greene

            Smallwood

            St Clair

            Knox

            Howe

            Wayne

            DeKalb

            Huntington

            McDougal

            Duportail

            Steuben

            Gist

            Irvine

        The General states to the Council that by his last advices the enemy had repossessed stoney point with between thirteen & fourteen hundred men under the Command of Brigr Stirling and were very busily employed in reconstructing the works—That they had reinforced Verplanks point with four companys of Fannings Corps which now increased the garrison to about 700 men—That the remainder of their force had been encamped near Dobbs ferry and at Phillipsburgh; but by some advices (not yet well confirmed) a very considerable part is said to have embarked and the Shipping containing them to have fallen down the river on the afternoon of the 22d—their destination unknown—That on the evening of the 22d forty sail of Vessels passed by Norwalk steering Eastward; no mention made of their having troops on board—That the enemy’s whole efficient force in this quarter under Genl Clinton, including the late reinforcement from Rhode Island & the garrisons of New York Long & Staten Island amounts by the best estimate he has been able to form—to about twelve thousand exclusive of Cavalry and Artillery.
        The Genl further informs the Council, that our whole force in this quarter exclusive of Cavalry and Artillery also and including the

Garrison of West point amounts to nearly 10,300 That two divisions of the right wing are at this post & in the vicinity, amounting with the garrison—to about 5,800—one division of 1700 at sufferns—the left wing on the East side of the river, two Brigades opposite West point one Brigade at the gorge of the mountains in the rear of the Continental Village—& one Brigade at Ridgefield the whole amounting to about 2800.
        The Commander in Chief submits the above state of facts to the consideration of the Council and requests they will favour him with their opinion tomorrow at Twelve OCloc⟨k,⟩ respecting a general disposition for the army, on a comprehensive view of our circumstances and prospects—the comparative strength of the two Armies—and those objects, which from their importance demand our principal attention, including the discussion of this question, whether any and what offensive operations can with propriety be undertaken by us against the enemy—at the present juncture?


Title: To George Washington from William Shippen, Jr., 26 July 1779
From: Shippen, William Jr.
To: Washington, George

          July 26: 1779

        Extract of a Letter from Doctor Shippen
        “It gives me pain to inform you Sir, that I am very fearful that all the Physicians & Surgeons of the Hospitals & Army will resign unless the Congress will attend very soon to their memorials & petitions & put them on an equal footing with the rest of the Army, all whose priviledges are now denied them, and ’tis with difficulty we can prevail on the Surgeons to continue a few weeks longer.”


Title: General Orders, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moores-House [West Point] Tuesday July 27th 1779.
          Parole Chesterfield—C. Signs Coventry Dover.

        The troop, ’till further orders, to be beat at seven ô clock in the morning.


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Theodorick Bland, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Bland, Theodorick

          Dr Sir
          West point July 27: 1779

        I received Your favor of the 10th by Yesterday’s post. I cannot at this time permit any of the Officers of the Convention Army to go to Canada by Land. But, if there is a necessity for it, Two of them may proceed in the first instance to New York and from thence to Quebec by Water. For this purpose I will furnish a passport upon request for their and the safe conduct of the Vessel in which they may embark, provided she goes in ballast and for their & her safe return directly to Virginia, with any quantity of Cloathing or other necessaries for the Convention Troops, that may be enumerated; and for her safe return afterwards to New York. If these terms, the only ones that can be granted, are agreable—You will permit the Officers to set out as soon as circumstances will admit, after taking their paroles for the strict observance of them—and not to communicate any intelligence &c.
        With respect to the Deserters from the Convention Army, I must entreat that you will use every possible means to have them recovered— and to prevent any farther desertions. There is not the smallest confidence to be placed in the professions of the Soldiery and let them be as solemn as they will—and even sanctified by an Oath—they will seize the first opportunity to escape to the Enemy. They must be well guarded and pretty much restricted—or the whole of the Army by degrees will slip through our fingers. The Men who deserted should suffer a close confinement, at least for a good while, both to convince

them of their error, and as an example to Others. You will see in the public papers an Account of our success against the Garrison at Stoney point. I am Dr Sir with great regard Yr Most Obedt servant

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Duportail, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Duportail, Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point July 27th 1779

        You will be pleased to make an arrangement of the officers who have presented themselves for appointments in the companies of Sappers and Miners, which I will transmit to the Board of War to obtain their commissions—The numerous drafts that have [been] made from the line for different purpose⟨s,⟩ would make it inconvenient at this time to take out others for the purpose of forming these companies, which must therefore be suspended, ’till men can be recruited, or ’till the situation of the army wil⟨l⟩ better admit a draft—A part of the officers may be employed in the mean time in gaining the necessary previous instruction and in aiding you in the operations of your department—the rest may be sent on the recruiting service. For this purpose, I inclose you a warrant for [  ] dollars which you will distribute to them in such proportions and with such instructions respecting the qualifications of the men to be engaged as you shall judge proper. A bounty of two hundred dollars is to be given to each man who shall inlist during the war and twenty dollars to the officer as a gratuity for every man so inlisted—The regulations of Congress for the recruiting service in general are to be observed in the present case. The Officers will be accountable for the money they receive. I am with very great esteem Sir Your most Obed. servant.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 27 July 1779
From: Duportail, Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle
To: Washington, George

          [27 July 1779]

        West Point being to us a point which it is of the greatest importance to preserve and to put once for all in a state of defence, I think that we ought not to touch the fund of troops necessary to the defence of this post, in its present state, and to the construction of the works already undertaken. According to what his Excellency has been pleased to submit to our view, it appears that we have there about 5000 men— This is perhaps more than sufficient to receive the enemy ’till the rest of the army can arrive to their succour; but it is not too much for the work we are carrying on—I therefore think it best to leave them there—The question then is what we can do with the rest—Can we attack Stoney point or Verplank’s point?
        The English having augmented considerably the number of their troops at Stoney point, labouring to inclose their works, and probably keeping themselves more upon their guard, than heretofore, I think that we ought not to attack them, because we should be likely to lose a good many men and perhaps without success—Besides, according to my conception of the matter, we should not have any great advantage by gaining possession of Stoney Point; because we must be also masters of Verplanks—Here then is another fort to be attacked and taken, which can hardly be hoped for, the enemy being advertised to go to the succour of one by the capture of the other; and when after all we should be masters of both places, I do not see what would result from it to us, so very advantageous. Our army (after leaving the necessary garrison at West Point) not being in a state to make head during the campaign below Kings ferry, I do not see what good we should derive from the possession of these places—The army could not go further down on this account and as to the communication by water a single English frigate always has been able and always would be able to hinder it—If we should attack Stoney point, it could only be

to possess ourselves of the garrison and of the magazines, but though we have succeeded once without loss, we must not believe, that we should succeed in the same manner a second time; and it would not be prudent to risk the loss of a great number of men, upon hopes not well founded, who may become very necessary to us—The arriva⟨l⟩ of Lord Cornwallis, and the strong appearances of an embarkation seem to indicate that the English have received, or are sure of receiving a reinforcem⟨ent⟩ which enables them to send troops to Carolina or elsewhere—Perhaps therefore until we know with what number of troops we shall have to do, it will be proper not to adventure our troop⟨s⟩ in expeditions more than uncertain.
        We cannot propose to ourselve⟨s,⟩ to attack Stoney point by regular approaches—The ground which is on a level with it, or which commands it, is too distant, for the batteries erected there, to be able to batter the works to advantage and render them more easy to be carried by assault, in which it must ultimately end. Besides by the disposition of the roads, we should run great risk of losing our cannon mortars &c.
        What I say respecting the attack of stoney Point sword in hand, applies itself to Verplanks point—But as to attacks by means of batteries Verplanks point is very susceptible of them; and I think if the enemy should be impruden⟨t⟩ enough to abandon Verplanks point to its own force, and there is no body of troops near enough to support it, we ought not to hesitate to make the attack, because we risk nothing—If the enemy arrives in time to bring them succour, we get rid of the business by retiring—I think therefore that we ought always to be ready for this enterprise.
        Though I do not think that we ought to attack Stoney point or Verplanks point by assault or otherwise, unless in some extraordinary circumstances which may present themselves, nevertheless it appears to me essential to menace them continually—I should then have been glad that 12 or 1500 men had been left at the outlet of the mountains above Stoney Point and a like corps at the Continental village. These corps will absolutely risk nothing unless they should suffer themselves to be surprised—and even this would be very difficult—They could be turned on neither side and they have always their communication secure with West Point. By showing themselves always ready to attack the forts, they oblige the enemy to have within reach to support them, a corps of at least three thousand men, to have nothing to fear—Then, which will appear singular, the possession which the enemy have of Verplanks and Stoney points will turn against them and become an advantage to us—For here are 5000 men employed to

maintain a point which is of no great consequence to us—Let us add to these the number of men they must have at New York for the security of that place, and on this side of Kings bridge to support readily the three thousand men advanced, unless they keep their men upon the water; and we shall see that the enemy by having posted themselves at Kings ferry have imposed on themselves the necessity of establishing a chain of posts from Kings ferry to New York, which will prevent their having so many for distant operations; and thus, we shall perhaps save the Country from pillage.

          Duportail


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Mordecai Gist, 27 July 1779
From: Gist, Mordecai
To: Washington, George

          27 July 1779

        The entire command of the North River appears to be a principal object with the enemy whose present movements seem to be calculated to divert our Attention from this post that they may with the greater facilty and Assurance of success through the advantage of their shipping attack and carry our Works; these reasons Induce me to believe that the execution of any offensive plan at this Juncture, may not operate to advantage—notwithstanding, I am of opinion that a Movement of part of our Army on each side the River within supporting distance of this post to shew a disposition of attack on their Works, may in some measure counteract their scheme of plundering by detachments, and perhaps afford an opportunity of attacking part of their force successfully. I am with due deference & Respect Yr Excellencys Mo. Obdt Hum: Servant

          M: Gist


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 27 July 1779
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          West Point July 27th 1779

        I confess my self at a loss what opinion to form, or what measures to advise to upon the State of the Enemies force and position and the strength and situation of our Army which your Excellency laid before the Board of General Officers yesterday for this purpose.
        Was our strength equal to the attempt Offensive opperations would be by far the most elegible. This would give security to our Sea Coast and by finding the Enemy employ at Home prevent their depradations abroad.
        But it is a melancholy truth that we have neither force or ammunition to commence any serious opperations against New York or its dependancies except Ver Planks Point; and therefore we must accomodate our measures to our circumstances.
        To attempt to insult the Enemy in New York, in such a secure position as they are, strongly fortified withal, and of superior strength, aided by a large Naval force, will be madness in the extreme.
        I could wish for an action either general or partial, could it be had upon any thing near equal terms; but the security of the North River and the protection to be given to the Sea Coast of Connecticut and New Jersy so divides our force that it prevents us from attacking to advantage and gives the Enemy a great opportunity of attacking us with success.
        The North River I consider as the first object upon the Continent and the communication between the Eastern and Western States essential to the Independance of America. Therefore this object is to be securd at all events. We have only one line of communication at this time and this straightened on both sides. The Enemy on the Sea Coast are within 16 or 18 Miles of it on one side and the Indians with in 20 or 25 Miles on the other. Our fortifications at this place which is the only security for this line of communication is far very far from being complete.
        Under these circumstances I would recommend, detaching two brigades to the borders of the State of Connecticut with orders to move

Eastward or Westward as the Country should want protection. I would also detach two Brigades more into the State of New Jersy to cover the Inhabitants there and to protect our Stores coming from Trenton to this place for the support of the Army. All this I think can be done, and this Post be little less secure, by the improvement of the Works, than it was at first with our whole strength.
        The light Infantry should be posted near the Enemy at Stony Point, with orders to change their position frequently to prevent a surprize.
        The rest of the Troops should be employed, in finishing the fortifications at this place. I cannot think a second attack upon Stony Point would be crowned with the same success as before; and our Army is not in force to make a great sacrafice of men by way of experiment, or for the purpose of giving Military glory to individuals.
        Should it be thought that our Magazines, will admit of the necessary consumption of powder, for carrying on approaches against Ver Planks Point, (which General Knox thinks is not the case), I conceive our remaining strength will be equal to the purpose. If not a part of the Infantry may be called over to the East side, or the two brigades upon the borders of Connecticut be recalled. Any opperations against Ver Planks Point, I consider only as a secondary object, that will rather serve to amuse the public, than procure them any solid advantages; and therefore should give place to more capital concerns.
        Neither time or circumstances will permit me to go more largely into the subject. I have endeavord to be explicit and concise and hope I have said sufficient to signify pretty clearly my Ideas of the proper modes and measures to be pursued. I am with great respect Your Excellencys Most Obedient humble Servant

          Nath. Greene Maj. Grl


Title: To George Washington from Major General Robert Howe, 27 July 1779
From: Howe, Robert
To: Washington, George

          Sir,
          Robinson’s Farm [N.Y.] July 27th 1779

        I enter with diffidence, tho’ in compliance with your Excellency’s Request upon the Subjects referred to the General Officers in Council Yesterday; and tho’ Judgment should have but little to do with the Opinion I give you, such as it is; you may be assured it shall be given with Candour.
        The great Object with us appears to me to be not so much what we can achieve ourselves, as what we can prevent the Enemy from achieving. It is, I persuade myself, a Fact not to be doubted, that the diminished Trade of Britain—their failing Credit, and—the Disappointments your Conduct has occasioned them, have excited Discontents which pervade the whole Nation, and make our Ministerial Persecutors totter in their Seats. The only Ray of Hope they had left, and the only Means by which they obtained Credit for a little while longer, were the Successes which they flattered the people would result from another Campaign. To disappoint them, then, in this End would be to obtain that we aim at: Those Measures, therefore, which can induce or compel the Enemy to waste the Summer without acquiring

any capital advantages, are those which in my humble Opinion we ought to pursue.
        They appear, Sir to have entirely relinquished the very Hope of any important Benefits from a general Action, or by any Attack upon our formidable Posts, and seem to confine their whole View to the cruel kind of War they have been lately waging. Whether from this they vainly hope that those Individuals they reduce to Distress and Ruin will become disgusted with a Cause which could not lend them protection, and therefore resort to them as to an Assylum from Calamity, and that other Individuals, as yet uninjured, may be intimidated by an Apprehension of similar Distress, and so flee to them to avoid it—Or, whether they expect that the Ruins of Towns and Ravages of a People may be give an Eclat to their Arms, and obtain their Employers’ Credit for another Year, it is impossible for us to determine: But be their Views what they may, it is our Duty to counteract them by every Means in our power—And here, Sir, I confess I feel myself unhappy when I reflect how difficult a Card we have to play. The State of your Army as exhibited to us yesterday, places it beyond doubt that your Excellency has it not in your Power to carry on a War avowedly and effectually offensive and much, I fear (assailable as we are to the Enemy’s Ravages at a Variety of places, and unprepared from the Nature of Things, as we are, to repel their Attempts)—that a War merely defensive will not answer our purpose. The Facility with which the Enemy can move their Troops from one place to another, and the Expedition that will attend these Movements, will give them an Opportunity of executing their purposes at particular Places, in spite of any Vigilance or Activity, unless their Attention by some Means can be brot home to themselves.
        The Squadding our Army about at the many Spots unhappily liable to attack would answer no End but to put it in their power to beat us in detail; for wherever Detachmts may be posted their Strength will be known, and no Descent upon the places they are intended to guard will be made but by superior Numbers; nor will the Army in this subdivided State, be of much more Importance to our Friends than if a Corporal’s Guard were to be placed on every Plantation.
        Thus, Sir, the more I reflect the more I am confirmed in opinion, that to be formidable to Your Enemies, a great part of your Troops should act collectively: For tho’ it may not be in your power to proceed as offensively as you wod wish, yet the greater Semblance of this Mode of Operation you assume the more you will reduce your Adversaries to the Necessity of collecting their Force to a Point; and, consequently, render them less able to continue those Ravages as disgraceful to Humanity as distressing to our Fellow Citizens.

        To attack, or if that is not eligible, to hover about their favourite Posts might oblige them to keep a large Body of Troops in and about their Works, to the Diminution of their Main Body—But what would most effectually prevent their Depredations—if it can be done without too much risque—would be to post ourselves in force in the vicinity of their Army. This, I persuade myself, would call off their Attention from collateral Objects, and impress them with such Alarm and Apprehension as to oblige them for their own Security to remain collected—Or, should they be hardy enough to weaken themselves by large Detachments, it is not impossible but it may give us An Opportunity of attacking them with Effect.
        Upon the whole, Sir, I am of Opinion, That tho’ we may not be equal to an Offensive War, and consequently, that a War defensive should be our principal Care, yet to answer the purposes of the latter the Appearances of the former ought to be put on I am strength’ned in this Belief by the Conduct of the Enemy, Every Movement they make, however trifling in its Consequences, being made with a Caution which degenerates into Timidity, plainly demonstrating the Force of their Apprehensions, which the brilliant Affair of Stoney Point must contribute to increase.
        By appearing, then, continually prepared to attack them, they will probably be compelled to relinquish many, if not all, of their predatory Schemes, and to waste the Summer without any capital Benefit to themselves, or Injury to us.
        I have now only to apologize for having taken up so much of your Excellency’s Time, and to add that if from what I have thrown out you can derive the least Hint useful to yourself, or of Service to the Common Cause, I shall be happy—having no desire so prevalent as that of contributing to either. I am, with the greatest Respect Your Excellency’s Most obedt hble Servt

          Robert Howe


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Jedediah Huntington, 27 July 1779
From: Huntington, Jedediah
To: Washington, George

          Dear Sir
          Neilsons Point [N.Y.] 27 July 1779

        I have stated the subject of your Excellency’s Requisition, with my Opinion, in the few following Cases.

        That the Army immediately under sir H. Clinton is stronger than that under the immediate Command of your Excellency.
        That all their Men fit for Duty may be safely drawn from the Posts at & near N. York whilst their main force lies between N.Y. & the High Lands.
        That they command the River and can, on short Notice, bring a superior force into the field.
        That the posts at Kings Ferry may be evacuated to favour any capital Operation & again possessd without any great Difficulty.
        That the Posts on the High Lands must not be left without a very sufficient Garrison & ample supplies of Ammunition.
        That an Attack in form on both or one of the Posts at Kings ferry would occasion too great an Expenditure of the latter considering our present Stores.
        That were the Enemys comparative strength less than at present by three thousand Men and our Stock of Ammunition would admit, I should advise a serious Attack on the posts at Kings Ferry.
        That a Feint may now be eligible in Order to divert them from a plundering & burning Expedition or reinforcing their southern Army.
        I can think of no other Operation worth undertaking under present Circumstances. I am, with submission, Your Excellency’s affectionate and obedient servant

          Jed. Huntington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Irvine, 27 July 1779
From: Irvine, William
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Camp near West Point July 27 1779

        On considering the business your Excellency laid before the Board yesterday—so many Matters of Moment occur that it is with the greatest difidence I venture on giving an opinion; As the Enemy are so superior to us Collectively—and a probability of their being soon more so—And no prospect of any addition to Our strength—my Opinion is that we should not loose any opportunity—(where there is a rational

prospect of success) of Attacking them by Detachment—Stoney; and Verblanks Points—are the only places at present that appear to me in our reach; The Infant state of their Works on Stoney Point renders it in my Opinion practicable—I am for Attacking it, at the same time make a show of Attacking Verblanks point—I think about four thousand Men—or five at most will be sufficient on this side—One Thousand on the East side will be enough both to amuse and distract The remainder, will be able to defend this Garrison against Assault, at least untill these Troops can return to their Relief—By keeping a proper Eye on them they can never land up the River so as to elude the Troops below from Acting on their Flank & rear The most desirable position in my Opinion for us to Attack them in, should they make regular approaches to West Point—I am not sufficiently Acquainted with the ground to know the most suitable spotts to establish Batterys on—But in general—think we should occupy from the River to the White House—should we be obliged to retire—by their coming out in force—and the Artilery can not be got off by Kakiate—yet still I think they may be brought A mile in the Rear of Spring Steels—where it is not probable the Enemy will venture untill time is gained to bring them off farther—I believe four or five Pieces of Artilery will be sufficient and presume Amunition enough to supply them has been taken at Stoney Point, A few Troops well disposed off along the Denderburgh from Fort Montgomery to Doodle Town, will effectually prevent a Surprize and Cover the Flank—When this position is taken should it even be thought too hazardous—or that we should loose too Many Men in making a Serious Attack—yet in its Consequences, may in a great degree Answer our End—by drawing the attention of the Enemys Main Army this way—which will put a Stop to their Depridations in different parts of the Country—in Short brake in on their plans of Operation for the Campaign and render their efforts ineffectual—Which in Our Circumstances—considering Our force, scarcity of Amunition &ca is as much as the most Sanguine expectations of Congress, or our Country at large; can hope for—from the Army under your Excellencys Command; If in stead of being obliged to follow them to different parts of the Continent (—by which we shall be harrassed and worn down) we keep them Marching and Countermarching, and perpetua⟨lly⟩ Alarumed—it will undoubtedly answer us great and good purposes—I have the Honor to be Your Excellencys Most Obedient Most Humble Servant

          Wm Irvine


Title: To George Washington from John Jay, 27 July 1779
From: Jay, John
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Philadelphia 27th July 1779

        The Success of the Enterprize against stony Point was splendid and important—It has added another Laurel to your Wreath, and given a grateful Country a fresh opportunity of presenting you their Thanks for the Vigilance wisdom and magnanimity, with which their Arms have been conducted. I have now the Honor of conveying them expressed in the enclosed Act of Congress. Prudence forbids me to indulge my Feelings or my Pen on this interesting Occasion; lest in their Warmth, too little Attention might be paid to the Delicacy blended with the Virtues they wish to celebrate. Permit me however most sincerely to assure you That I am with the greatest Respect & Esteem Your Excellencys obedient & h’ble Servt

          John Jay Presidt


Title: To George Washington from Major General Alexander McDougall, 27 July 1779
From: McDougall, Alexander
To: Washington, George

          west point ⟨2⟩7th July 1779

        His Excellency General Washington informed the Council of General offic⟨ers,⟩ Convened at His Quarters last evening, that from the best intelligence he could get of the Strength of the Enemy in and about New York and its dependencies, it amounted to about Twelve thousand men, exclusive of Horse and Artillery. That the Rank & file of the Army, under His immediate command was Ten thousand, including Glovers Brigade & the Garrison of west Point, besides Artillery and Horse. That from the last advices the Enemy had reinforced the Garrison at Verplanks Point, and is repair⟨ing⟩ the works at Stony Point, with 1000 men⟨.⟩ That our Stock of ammunition is not as Suffecient as might be wished, to carry on offensive opperations against those works with Cannon. Under these circumstance⟨s,⟩ the Commander in chief desires the opinion of the Council, in writing, whether it is adviseable to carry on offensive opperations agai⟨nst⟩ the

Enemy? The present Strength of the Garrisons and works at Kings ferry are such, as renders a Second attack by Storm on either of the⟨m⟩ Very Hazardous, and would in all Probabil⟨ity,⟩ (if carried) cost us more men, than the acquisition would be worth. If we Sett dow⟨n⟩ in form before the works at the Ferry, the Consumption of Powder will be more than we can spare; and if the Enemy does not releive the Garrisons he can take them of⟨f⟩ by water. And we have not force enough to spare to Garrison those Posts & west point. If the Garrisons are releived we shall be disgraced with out a probability of any Compensation for i⟨t.⟩ Should the Army move towards the Plains, the Supplies of Bread will be very uncertain, from the Circuitous route, on which it mus⟨t⟩ go, besides the danger of its being intercepted by the Enemy, unless larger detachments than Can be spared are Posted on the Communication.
        But if neither of those difficulties attended this movement, our Force would be So far inferior to the Enemy, when a Suffecient Garrison is left at West Point, that we cannot promise our Selves any advantage equal to the risque. For these and many other obvious reasons I am of opinion offensive opperations are inexpedient under present circumstances, unless the Enemy should move out of his works, or give us an opportunity to attack him in detachment. All which is Submitted His Excellency by his Humble Servant

          Alexr McDougall


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General John Nixon, 27 July 1779
From: Nixon, John
To: Washington, George

          May it please Your Excellency
          Continental Village [N.Y.]July 27th 1779

        My thoughts Respecting the Disposition of our Army—the expediency of making an attack upon Stony & Verplanks points—you have in the following.
        The Disproportion of the Two Armies, as to their Strength—renders the Disposition of our Army Very Difficult—to act offensively in any Capital Instance except (against the Two points) woud be Verry hazedous—the improbability of Success would be So Grate

that I Should rather Decline Such an attempt, except Some favourable opportunity Should present, in which the advantage Should be Evidently in our favour.
        Should it be Judged inexpedient to act offensively the next object to be Considered is the most proper, Distribution of our troops—So as to best secure the property of the Inhabitants who are most Exposed to the Depradations of the Enemy—to Effect which—after leaving One Brigade in the Clove, & about three Thousend to Garrison west point and its Dependancies—I Should think the Right wing of our army Sh:d be posted at or near the Continental Village—& a Line to be formed to the Left—So as to Extend our Left wing at Least as far as Ridgfeild—to Counter act the Enemy, Sho’d they make another Excoursion into Connecticut, from Such a Disposition of our army. we might procure an ample Supply of forrage for our Teams & Horses—as also Vegitables for our troops—which would Contribute much to their Health in this sickly Season of the year, we might Likewise (in a Great measure) prevent the Enemy from forrageing &c. this Disposition appears to me the most elegeble—if an attack upon their army Sho’d be Judged inexpedient. To attack Verplanks Point, with any Degree of Probable Success, unless by Regular approaches—appear to me impracticable, & in this Case—unless Some plan Could be adopted to prevent Genl Clintons marching up to their assistance—it would be altogether fruitless, We Should be under the Disagreable Necessity of raising the Siege.
        the Same reason could not operate respecting an attack upon Stony point—because that post must be Carried by Storm—& if Successful—would be Carried before any reinforcements Could be Sent them, a faint upon Verplanks point at the Same time—might prevent their Sending over any assentance—However—Considering the Great Effusion of Blood in taking Stony point, it might more then Countervail the advantage we Should Gain thereby—I could not therefore advise to an attack upon either—unless upon both at the Same time—upon Verplanks point by Regular approaches—& upon Stony point by assault in the Night—a body of troops to be Sent Down on the East Side the River at the Same time to prevent the Enemy from advanceing into the rear of the Beseagers to Cut of their retreat whereby their artillary at Least would be Grately Indangered—What I have Suggested is Humbly Submitted to your Excellencies Superior Wisdom—while I have the Honor to be with the utmost Esteem—Sir your Excellencies Most Obedient Humble Servt

          Jno. Nixon B.G.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Arthur St. Clair, 27 July 1779
From: St. Clair, Arthur
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          West Point July 27th 1779

        As your Excellency has desired my Opinion with Respect to such offensive Operations as may be undertaken against the Ennemy, taking into Consideration the Strength of both Armies, and the State of our military Stores, I am very free to give it that our Position admits of no considerable Change, untill the Works here are finished, or so nearly so, as to leave the Completion of them in the Power of their proper Garrison, within the Time that will probably elapse before they are attempted by the Ennemy.
        The Attack of Stony-Point in form would, if there is any considerable Force there, induce a Movement of the whole Army, which, if Circumstances admit, might be made with a View to bring the Ennemy to an Action; but that is not a certain Consequence as it depends entirely upon their Pleasure: for, should the Post taken be such as to render the Event too doubtful, they can either withdraw the Garrison by Water, or, what would be much worse, by passing a Body of Troops up the River, get possession of the Defiles of the Mountains in our Rear: neither should an Action be risqued in that Neighbourhood without an almost moral Certainty of Success, as a Misfortune would probably be attended with the Loss of a great Part of our Artillery.
        To attempt that Post by Storm, if the Garrison is near fifteen hundred Men, which is, I think, the Number it is at present supposed to consist of, would probably be attended with such a Loss, as the Advantages resulting from Success would not counterballance. It may however, perhaps, be carried by Surprize, which seems to me the only eligible Method all things considered; as a Retreat might be effected without suffering much, if the design should prove abortive; but their late Misfortune will probably have rendered them too vigilant to give even that much probability of Success.
        Verplancks Point is in much the same Circumstances with Stony-Point, tho the Ennemy, as it is more accessible, may be driven from it with more Ease; but not without such an Expense of Powder as our present Stock will not, perhaps, allow; besides, as it is within little more than a Days March of the main Body of the Ennemys Army, it cannot be attempted without drawing yours down to cover the

Approaches, and putting it in their Power to bring on an Action, or oblige you to abandon the Enterprise.
        Both These Posts are however of great Importance to the Ennemy, as they put them in a Situation to act with much Security on either side of the North River below the Mountains; as they must, suposing we were in that part of the Country, give us forever great Jealously about that Flank upon which they respectively lay.
        Should your Excellency then determine upon some offensive Operation, The Attack of Stony Point, in one Way or other, seems to me that from which, if successful, the greatest Advantages would flow: and the Possession of it, would render Ver Plancks Point of little Moment to them, as, I believe, the Passage of the River might from thence be interdicted. At the same time it should be taken into Consideration whether, if the Ennemy should endeavour to repossess it, we could easily prevent them. On this I can offer no Opinion, not having a sufficient knowledge of the circumjacent Country.
        On the Whole, I think we ought, for the present, to keep our Position, labouring with the greatest Assiduity to put the Posts here in a Situation to stand by themselves; when that is done a Party of Militia on either side the River, as Circumstances may require will probably be sufficient to restrain the Garrisons of these Posts, and leave the Army at liberty to act as Occasion may require.
        Give me leave to add that a much greater Number of Boats are necessary than are now at this Post, as the Ennemy have it in their Power to oblige us to pass and repass the North River frequently. It is very probable some may be spared from Albany. I have the Honour to be Sir Your Excellencys Most obedient Servant

          Ar. St Clair


Title: To George Washington from Major General Steuben, 27 July 1779
From: Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, baron von
To: Washington, George

          [27 July 1779]

        Our present situation is nearly the same as it was at the opening of the campaign. The enemy are still superior in number, their troops better provided. They possess more means of executing their projects by the help of their vessels. They are masters of our coast and of the entrance of the North River.
        The capture of Stoney Point has given a great advantage to our side. It has not only encouraged our army, but the inhabitants of the country—It has shown the enemy that our generals know how to make dispositions and our officers and soldiers to execute them with intrepidity and precision. It has retarded the enemy’s operations for the campaign, but it has not intirely interrupted the persuit of their project.
        Let us now examine what may be the project of the enemy. The great preparations they have made to secure the two sides of the River to King’s ferry—The time, the labor and the expence they have employed to fortify this point—Can it have no other object than to burn and sack the coasts of Connecticut? Can they have fortified Stoney and Verplank’s point to terminate their conquests there for the campaign? Neither one nor the other appears probable.
        His project ought to be more extensive. Having fortified these two points, and leaving there a sufficient garrison, He is at liberty to transport the rest of his force wherever he thinks proper, and in case of a check these two points are a support to his troops and a port for his vessels.
        This being done, he will make incursions into the Country to engage us to follow him either by detachment or with our whole force, whilst three or four thousand men and the necessary vessels will be always ready, to attempt an enterprise against West Point. If we do not suffer ourselves to be tempted by his incursions to quit our present position, he will perhaps bring a body of 5 or 6000 men on the one or the other side of the River to make a diversion upon our flanks and will try to manœuvre us & oblige us to make retrograde movements,

to come at West Point, which appears to me however very difficult, particularly on this side of the River where the fort is.
        In short, whatsoever methods he makes use of, I am persuaded his operation tends only to render himself master of the post—and thereby of the River as far as Albany—If he has not this project he has none which is worth the expence of a campaign. On his success depends the fate of America—It follows then that we have no other object more important than to parry this blow. Let him burn what remains still to be burnt, and this campaign will augment his disgrace but not his success.
        West Point solidly fortified, provided with sufficient artillery, with ammunition and provisions, and with a garrison of two thousand men—ought not to determine us to carry our force beyond one day’s march of succouring it—I say more, our army ought to be destroyed, or taken before the enemy can make an attack upon West Point—Our position on the two sides of the River is advantageous for an army inferior in force. The enemy cannot easily turn us. It is favourable with regard to our supplies, by the help of water transportation. If this ground has any inconvenience, it is that one post cannot easily succour the other—Each brigade must defend itself—’Tis for this reason, not only The General Officers, but all the field officers, ought well to reconnoitre the ground, all the roads and paths that are accessible.
        The right wing which extends as far as Suffrans is in a very advantageous point. If nevertheless it were possible to place one or two brigades at some intermediate post between Suffrans and Fort Montgomery, the enemy would be obliged to keep more men and more vessels in the proximity of Stoney point; and though I am not of opinion to hazard a second attempt upon the same point, I would wish to make the enemy afraid of it—The more of their force we can keep at bay here, the less they can employ in operations elsewhere.
        Little posts of warning; along the River, on this side as far down as Newark and on the other from Croton River to Norwalk with relay horses, may serve to give us timely notice of the movements of the enemy, and advertise the Militia to take arms.
        The Hay harvest is almost over, which will enable the inhabitants to take arms in case of necessity. But in my judgment, neither Jersey nor Connecticut ought to count upon detachments from this army. Let us defend the North River—Let us maintain West Point, and the end of our campaign will be glorious.
        This is my opinion under our present circumstances. The arrival of a fleet of our allies upon the Coast would certainly change our plan of operations.

          Steuben


Title: From George Washington to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Tallmadge, Benjamin

          Sir
          West-point July 27th 79

        Your Letter of the 25th came safe—the Ink I sent a day or two ago by Colo: Saml Webb who I hope has delivered it safe e’re this. I shall examine your dictionary the moment I am at leizure thanking you in the mean while for the trouble you have had in preparing it. I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel John Taylor, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Taylor, John

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point July 27th 1779

        I have rec’d your letter of the 20th & am much obliged to you for the intelligence it contains. You cannot promote the service more than by continuing your exertions to get information of whatever passes with the enemy, particularly at New York & in the river. It is of great importance that we should get immediate notice of any embarkation—the sailing of any troops out of the harbour or the arrival of any in it, or the departure or arrival of any Vessels, whether they have troops on Board or not—Besides sending proper persons into their lines for these purposes, it would be extremely useful to have look outs in Monmouth county & at the town of Amboy, to keep an exact account of all Vessels coming in & going out & make dayly reports to be transmitted to me. I wish also to know from time to time what naval force the enemy have at New York—in ships of the line frigates & armed Vessels the names & force of the principal ones.
        Could you employ trusty spies to go into the enemy, I would

chearfully enable you to pay the expence & if a little hard money should be necessary it shall not be wanting—But you must be careful in the choice of them, that they may not go merely to serve a private interest or to serve the enemy more than us—We have not heretofore, for want of caution derived all the advantages from our Spies which might have been expected.
        We are told that Lord Cornwallis is arrived at New York. some accounts say with troops others without—Tis very interesting to ascertain the truth, and if he has brought a reinforcement, the number & particular corps. I am Sr Yr Mo. Obet hume Servt

          G.W.


Title: From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Temple, 27 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Temple, Benjamin

          Sir
          West point July the 27th 1779

        Mr Harrison has shewn me your Letter of the 19th, which only came to his hands by Yesterday’s post.
        I shall have no objection to your coming to the General Court in October for the reasons you mention—nor to your proceeding afterwards to Head Qrs to adjust & settle your Accounts, if the situation of affairs and the circumstance of the Regiment in point of Officers will admit of it.
        You have inclosed a Commission, by which you rank from the 31st of March 1777, according to the date of your Old One.
        I am concerned that the Officers of the Regiment are reduced to the alternative you mention. They must be permitted to use the public Horses for the present as an Expedient to prevent a greater evil. I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt Sert

          G. Washington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 27 July 1779
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          West Point 27th July 1779

        The Circumstances situation & Numbers of this Army, as well as that of the Enemy—which your Excellency was pleased to lay before the Council of General Officers last evening—I have fully Considered, & am of Opinion that something ought to be attempted in order to draw Genl Clinton’s attention towards Kings Ferry, which will not only give great Security to the Adjacent States—but leave it in your power to cover this post, the possession of which, I believe to be the main Object of the Enemy cou’d they once draw your Army out of protecting distance.
        In order to effect this, about 5000 men should march down, & one half of them take post in the Vicinity of Smith’s white House—and the remainder in front of Spring Steels with their left on the River, North of Stoney point, & Erect two Batteries—one on the Hill where the felled trees lay, in front of the point, the Other on a high piece of ground near the River and North of Kings Ferry—which enfilades not only the Works on Stoney point—but also Verplanks point, & from which there are roads leading to Spring Steels, practicable for Artillery with a little Opening into the gorge of the Mountain in the Rear of Storms where it may be protected, should the Enemy move up in force so as to prevent us from drawing it off by Suffrens.
        I would not wish to make use of more than four pieces of Ordnance on this side—i.e. two heavy twelves & two Eight Inch Howzs. on traveling Carriages with One Hundred rounds of Amunition ⅌ Gun—more may be ready in Waggons to be brought from Suffrens if wanted.
        I wou’d in Addition to this advise the moveing down One Thousand or Fifteen Hundred men in the East side with two travelling twelves & one or more Howzts. which would Annoy & distract them on Verplanks point—keeping a good look out down the River so as to have timely notice of the Approach of the Enemy, & to fall back Occationally.
        to this will be objected—“the practicability of the Enemy passing up the River in their Vessels & Investing West point, or landing at Doodle town & falling on our rear, together with the scarcity of Amunition”—to obviate these Objections I answer, that three or four Thousand men in the works & Vicinity of West point will be sufficient to guard against a Storm—& should the Enemy effect a Landing in our rear either at Doodle town, or Fort Montgomery, I will undertake with the Light Corps to secure that Quarter, part of the Amunition taken at Stoney point will be sufficient for our purpose without breaking in upon our old Stock.

        I have no Idea of it being practicable for the Enemy to pass up the River in force Undiscovered by us, we certainly shall always keep such a watchful eye on their movements as to give time to draw off our Artillery before they can possibly effect a Landing, and to take post so as to prevent us.
        shou’d we by this Manoeuvre draw them into a focus, it answers the end we wish—and we have no further buisness there, but should Sr Henry Clinton leave these posts to be defended by the troops now in possession of them, they will Inevitably fall into our hands, in either case we shall attain our purpose—i.e. by obliging the Enemy to spend the Campaign in Marching & Counter Marching up the North River, or reduce their Garrisons, which is performing more than Congress have any right to expect from the force under your Excellencies Immediate Command.
        Whether it will be most advisable to move & attack them before they have Effected their Works—& before a Reinforcement arrives from Europe, or to wait until they Complete their fortifications & make detatchments, so as not to be in a Condition to Succour their posts & annoy us in our approaches, your Excellency will best determine. Interim I have the Honor to be with every Sentiment of Esteem Your Excellencies most Obt & very Huml. Sert

          Anty Wayne


Title: From George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 28 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, Robert

          Sir,
          [West Point, 28 July 1779]

        You will be pleased without delay to repair to Ridgefield and take your quarters with that part of your command—This will comprehend Glovers brigade the cavalry Armands independent corps and the militia in service in that part of the country—The primary object of this command is to cover the country and prevent as far as possible the depredations of the enemy; but this is not to be done at the expence of the security of the troops, which are therefore not to take any stationary post within surprising distance of a superior body of the enemy. As far as circumstances will permit you are to keep constantly in view a communication with the main army. On this account in case of any movement of the enemy on your right flank by land or water, you are to approach this post in proportion and always preserve a relative position—It is suggested in a letter from General Glover that Pound Ridge would be good position for your corps—I am not certain where this is; but as far as I recollect, it is an intermediate point, between Ridgefield and Bedford which will at once bring the troops nearer to the sound and nearer to this post. If this should be a just idea, I should recommend this place in preference to Ridgefield because it better answers the two objects of covering the country and communicating with the forts and is at the same time sufficiently secure. When you arrive at Ridgefield, you will be best able to determine the propriety of the change.
        Great vigilance and care will be necessary on your part—The enemy are pretty numerous in horse. By mounting them double, and taking ⟨infantry⟩ behind the dragoons, and mounting others upon their baggage horses, they may with a good deal of celerity bring a force superior to yours against you, which makes it essential that you should use every precaution to have timely notice; and it would not be amiss as an additional security to incamp with your infantry on some spot, where the enemys cavalry could not act to advantage.
        If the enemy should lay themselves open to any little partisan strokes, You have my consent to improve the opportunities; but it must not be done at the risk of the corps under your command.
        General Wolcott with a body of Militia is now stationed at Horseneck—This appears to me to be a very insecure situation, and such as nothing but a want of enterprise in the enemy can reconcile to any degree of safety—He ought, in my opinion immediately to change his position for another, at some proper point between Horseneck and the post you may occupy, from which parties can be occasionally detached towards the Sound. Given at Hd Qrs the 28th July 1779.

          G.W.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 28 July 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)

          My Lord
          Head Quarters West-point 28th July 1779

        I have been deceived I beleive, in the information of a considerable Embarkation of Troops in the North River—no subsequent intellige⟨nce⟩ from deserters & others speak of such an event, but all agree that the present position of the enemy is from Phillips’s to East Chester—Tryon and his burning crew streching up the River towards Dob⟨bs’s⟩ Ferry. The foundation therefore of the March of your division to Suffrans was bad; but as it ⟨has⟩ taken place I shall not alter the position im⟨m⟩ediately, but wish your Lordship to be in the mos⟨t⟩ perfect readiness to move at a moments warning light; and without waiting further orders, that you do immediately advance to the forest of Deane ⟨if⟩ you should receive advice of the enemy’s movemen⟨t⟩ towards Kings ferry by land or Water, in Order tha⟨t⟩ you may be ready to afford us timely assistance. In case of such an event your baggage may ret⟨ire⟩ to Sloots or futher on the road to Chester, if necess⟨ary⟩—In the mean while I beg your Lordship to ha⟨ve⟩ the Country between Suffrans and Simon House⟨s⟩ at the Beaver pond (which is within a mile of the road from Junes’s to Haverstraw) well

explore⟨d—⟩ as also from Houses to the other road from the Furnace of Deane to Haverstraw by Clements’s Brushes & Storms—In a word, I wish to know if some middle way cannot be had between the Clove road & that by Haverstraw forge, by which light Troops could march from Suffrans to Storm⟨s,⟩ Brewsters or Clements’s; that in Case it should be found necessary (to answer particular purposes) for your division to take post thereabouts, it could be done without making a circuitous March by the Clove road on the one hand, or approaching too near Stoney Point by pursuing that one which leads by Haverstraw forge on the other—some of the intelligent and well affected Inhabitants, accompanied by an Officer or two (acquainted with the woods) and a small party, would soon ascertain the practicability of a road by the rout here described—with the advantages & disadvantages of it. I am with great esteem and regard Your Lordships Most Obedt Servt

          Go: Washington

          Capt. Jones of Guest’s Regiment has arrested Mr Greary Clothier at Newburgh and I have ordered a Court Martial to sit at this place the day after tomorrow, in the morning, for his trial—Capt. Jones with any Witnesses he may have are to attend—Your Lordship will be pleased to give him notice.


Title: Enclosure: Samuel Culper to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 15 July 1779
From: Culper, Samuel
To: Tallmadge, Benjamin

            Sir
            20 [Setauket, N.Y.] July 15 1779

          Mr C. Junr informed me at our Intervew that Christofer Dycink Sail Maker of 10 [New York] formerly Chairman of the Committee of Mechanicks is amongst you and is positively an agent for David Mathews Mayor of 10 [New York], under the direction of Tryon. he assisted Mathews John Rome—and others in effecting their escape Mr C. Junr Wishes for Some of that Ink or Stain that he may Paint out his Charecter to you—dont fail to forward it Imediately. And When you receive the History of his Conduct be very Causious how you handle it for if it Should get to the above Mentioned Persons ears Cu. Junr tells me They would imediately Suspect him—In the mean Time I Would advise and is approved on by Culper Junr Obtain the Mayors Signature and let a Letter be wrote Sutable for deception—and let it be handed him by Some Person of good address Praying his assistance to escape from the Tiranny of Congress which is the terme used by the Mayor—or Sometheng like this Plan I do not doubt will have the desireed effect John Rome is Secretary to M. Genl Jones—it is not in my Power to favour you with the Mayors Signature at Present. I am your &c.

            Samuel Culper


Title: Enclosure: Samuel Culper, Jr., to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 15 July 1779
From: Culper, Samuel Jr.
To: Tallmadge, Benjamin

            No. 2.
            sir,
            10 [New York], July 15th 1779.

          I did not mean that Nr 1 shou’d be sent as it was wrote, I intended it as hints for my friend S.C. Senior, and expected that he wou’d have wrote you more particular—the shortness of the notice, and not at that time being sufficiently acquainted with the Character of 30 [post rider], prevented my writing so particular as I cou’d have wished—However I flatter myself that it was of some service. I saw S.C. Senior a few days ago, and inform’d him of the arrival of 10 sail of Vessels from the West Indies, with Rum &c. and a small fleet from Hallifax, but no Troops—12 sail of Cork Victuallers arrived on sunday last—2, which were then missing, are since arrived; also a ship from Thineruffe loaden with wines—A Fleet (say about 6 sail) from Jamaica laden wth Rum &c., is daily expected—they are to take the

advantage of the June Convoy for England. The Romelus of 44 Guns fell down to the Hook this day—The Daphne & Deleware Frigates are to fall down to-morrow, with some light Transports, which are said to be bound for Hallifax—The Romelus, Daphne & Deleware are to cruise in Boston Bay for the purpose of annoying their trade, and to intercept a number of Privateers & arm’d vessells which it is said are now fitting out of Boston. I have conversed with some of the most inteligent of the Masters of the Cork Victuallers, and from what I can collect from them, there will be but few Troops from England this season. some say, who I am certain do not wish it, that there will not be more than 4 Redgments to this place—Ireland is almost to a man against the present Administration; and that most loyal of all Countrys, Scotland, has been for some time past in the greatest confusion, said to be occassion’d by a motion made by Lord North for to pass some Laws in favor of the Scotch Roman Catholicks—They have gone so far as to burn that Minister in Effigee—This is fact. I have recd yours of the 10th Inst., and note the contents—The instructions shall be followed as far as in my power—30 [post rider] came unexpectedly this evening, and says he must go out to-morrow morning, which prevents my being so particular as I cou’d wish—I did not expect him ’till saturday. The situation of the army I cannot give you with any exactness; but will endeavour to do it by next opportunity. You may rest assured that I will not give you any entiligence as fact, but such as I am certain is so—I will not intentionally deceive you, as I know that it may be attended with the most fatal consequences. I gave S.C. Senior some hints concerning a Cristopher Duychinck, formerly Chairman of the Committe of Mechanicks of this place, which hope he has transmited—This much I will inform you that he has acted as an agent for David Mathews, since the commencement of the war—The particulars must be kept a profound secret, as few persons but myself know them, and it is known that I do. Note a paragraph in Rivingtons paper of the 10th Inst. under the N.-Yk head, and you’ll observe that something has either leaked out, or they have conjectur’d very right. I am, sir, Your Humble servant,

            samuel Culper, Junior