Title: Editorial Note
From:
To:

          Following his receipt of Congress’s official notification that Vice Admiral d’Estaing had arrived on the Georgia coast with a large French fleet, GW

in the short span of the first week of October expanded and put into motion his plans for a joint campaign with the French to drive the British from New York.
          GW had begun contemplating an attack on the British military bastion of New York in May when the French minister, Conrad-Alexandre Gérard, informed him that d’Estaing might return with his fleet. In a conference with Gérard, GW discussed a plan of cooperation with the French fleet “for striking a decisive blow”: the complete “reduction of the enemy’s Fleet & army at New York, Rhode Island and the dependencies.” But the two had instead settled on a more limited plan involving only attacks on the outlying British garrisons in the New York area. That design would allow GW to continue his long-planned expedition against the Iroquois and also let d’Estaing aid the Continental army in Georgia. In September, GW received spotty intelligence that d’Estaing might be on the American coast and seemed to be headed for Georgia. He accordingly sent the French admiral a proposal for attacks on the British outposts in the New York City area and at King’s Ferry, N.Y., that accorded with the limited plan agreed on with Gérard in May. He positioned his army to carry out the plan.
          On 26 Sept., Congress notified GW that d’Estaing had arrived off the Georgia coast and referred “the whole System of co-operation” to GW’s direction. They authorized him to “concert & execute” any plans with the French he thought proper and to call on the states for any aid in militia and supplies he might require. In short, Congress simply vested GW with complete power to plan and execute any operations anywhere on the continent with as many men as he could put in the field.
          Although it seemed that the French commander intended to execute the limited strategy agreed upon in May, official notification of likely French cooperation with his army seems to have changed GW’s thinking on the scale of joint operations. Fitting the broad authorization of power Congress had given him, GW now hoped to persuade the French admiral to execute the more ambitious, decisive plan discussed in May. He immediately began making preparations for what he called “a speedy and decisive effort”: an all-out attack on New York, the citadel of British power in North America. GW had already informed d’Estaing that he expected “decisive advantages” from the joint campaign. Now, GW envisioned a “decisive stroke” to eliminate both of the two largest British forces in North America: the over 17,000 troops in and around New York and the 4,000-man garrison holding Newport, Rhode Island.
          GW explicitly stated to the French admiral why they should make the capture of New York the goal of their joint campaign: “New York is the first and Capital object upon which every other is dependant. The loss of the Army and Fleet there, would be one of the severest blows the English Nation could experience.” In addition to attacking New York, GW proposed that in the three to four weeks it would take for the Continental militia to assemble, d’Estaing should, in conjunction with Continental troops in Rhode Island, attack and capture the British garrison at Newport. The scope of the operation GW envisioned required all of his and d’Estaing’s troops and all the militia the northern states could raise. GW believed that a minimum of 30,000 men would be required for the operation. Of these, GW would supply 25,000, planning to augment his Continentals with over 10,000 militiamen. In formulating his plans for these operations, GW received written advice from his generals, and he stated to Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair that he preferred such proposals written for his consideration to formal councils of war. GW seems to have incorporated elements of their proposals into his plans.

          GW intended to bring all the military and naval power of the allies to bear on New York and its supporting garrisons. He concentrated the Continental army, calling in most of the outlying brigades and regiments. The French fleet was essential to the campaign. The operations GW proposed required the French fleet, which vastly outnumbered the British squadron at New York (twenty-two ships of the line against five), to control New York Harbor, the Hudson River, and Long Island Sound, denying the British the mobility they had possessed in this region since 1776. In his memorandum on the attack, GW set this out as “the first object” for the French fleet. GW emphasized this point to the officers he assigned to meet d’Estaing. He considered it essential that French warships enter New York Harbor as soon as d’Estaing’s fleet arrived off New York, which they had not been able to do in the summer of 1778. GW spent considerable effort in arranging for skilled pilots to go onboard d’Estaing’s ships as soon as they appeared off the coast, stationing them at both the Capes of Delaware and in Monmouth County, New Jersey.
          GW’s memorandum on the attack and his 4 Oct. letter to d’Estaing contain the main components of his prospective offensive. Although GW’s first proposal to d’Estaing, dated 13 Sept., had been for a more limited attack than he sets out in these documents, he incorporated most of its elements into his plans in October. He clearly intended that d’Estaing should receive the letter as a proposal for combined operations. Therefore, rather than recalling the letter before it could be delivered to d’Estaing, GW sent him an additional copy with his October proposals. But his 4 Oct. proposals expanded the scope of the operations.
          The central features of GW’s campaign plan were speed and the capture of troops. He planned for two possible cases: the first, which he considered the most desirable, that the British would maintain troops in their outlying garrisons; the second, that they would concentrate their troops in lower Manhattan Island near the city and at Brooklyn on Long Island. In the first case, GW intended to capture or isolate all British troops in the outlying posts of Staten Island, King’s Ferry, and Newport (some 7,000) with rapid attacks in conjunction with the French fleet. The French ships would first move in and take control of Long Island Sound, thus cutting off the garrison of Newport. Then, the allies would move against the outlying British garrisons at King’s Ferry and on Staten Island. Because his goal was to capture enemy troops in the outlying garrisons and prevent them from reinforcing other British posts, GW emphasized that these operations should be “speedy,” immediate, and “as prompt as possible”; his generals should be ready to move “at the shortest notice.” GW emphasized to d’Estaing that he should “immediately” enter New York Harbor to block the movement of enemy troops by water and that he should “as suddenly as possible” cut off the British garrisons on Staten Island and at King’s Ferry. The objective of the French fleet would be to keep those posts isolated by preventing their evacuation or reinforcement, and GW ordered his division commanders on either side of the Hudson to position their troops to “intercept” the King’s Ferry garrisons—operations that GW was sure would render the “reduction” of those troops “certain.” But GW also made preparations for direct attacks on the forts at King’s Ferry, attacks he had been preparing even before official word arrived of d’Estaing’s intention to come to North America. GW considered the possession of Staten Island “absolutely necessary” to joint operations against New York. In support of potential allied landings on the island, he requested detailed intelligence on British troop strength and fortifications from militia officers in New Jersey who operated spies on the island.

          With British troops reduced to those on Long Island and Manhattan Island, Washington planned for main army landings on Manhattan Island and a contingent landing on Long Island. Divisions would assault Manhattan from the Hudson River and across the Harlem River to seize Harlem Heights below the main British forts, thus cutting them off from the troops in the city. But Major General St. Clair disagreed, believing the main effort should be focused on Long Island. The capture of Brooklyn Heights, he believed, would mean the certain fall of New York. GW himself believed that on Long Island the British would hold only Brooklyn. As the final stage of the offensive in either of the two cases, GW planned a siege of New York City by “regular approaches.” To support these prospective operations, GW called on his “Culper” spy network to gather intelligence on the British situation and their shipping in the harbor.
          GW did not underrate the difficulty of such a complex campaign. He told d’Estaing that “the reduction of fourteen thousand Men concentered upon a small Island, with the assistance of Fortifications, is an enterprize of no inconsiderable difficulty.” The Continental commander fully realized the high stakes involved in such a complicated and difficult—but potentially decisive—operation, and he set these out to the state executives.
          Even in the face of French reluctance, GW was determined to carry out this bold campaign. Before 30 Sept., Gérard had received dispatches from d’Estaing informing him of the French admiral’s intended operations. When Gérard visited GW’s headquarters at West Point on 5 and 6 Oct. on his way to Boston, he discussed GW’s plans for allied operations. During their conference, Gérard almost certainly informed GW that d’Estaing, after completing his operations in Georgia, planned to bring his fleet to the Capes of Delaware. After his meeting with Gérard, GW shifted the point of rendezvous for the pilots. He changed the pilots’ area of assembly to the Delaware River instead of Monmouth County, N.J., and he dispatched a copy of his letter to d’Estaing of 4 Oct. to the Capes of Delaware. Gérard also appears to have informed GW that d’Estaing might not have time for a complicated operation against New York and was most likely to pursue an operation other than a joint attack on the fortress city. But he does not seem to have absolutely ruled out New York. GW, still believing New York was the prime objective, dispatched Brigadier General Duportail and Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton to meet d’Estaing at the Capes of Delaware. They carried GW’s letter to d’Estaing of 7 Oct., which contained GW’s most forceful appeal to the French admiral to join him in a campaign against New York.
          GW’s marshaling of resources fit the scale of his conceived operations. To achieve his pivotal victory, GW made preparations to use all the resources of the continent. He called on the states for a total of 12,000 militiamen to serve for three months, a force he deemed “indispensible” to the operation. The great offensive would necessarily demand the use of all available equipment and supplies. GW asked Q.M. Gen. Nathanael Greene to have boats, tents, and wagon teams made ready “as soon as possible” to support the operation. He ordered that siege materials be constructed. In response to GW’s orders that he prepare transportation and equipment to support the joint operation, Greene advised GW of the difficulties he expected, largely from a lack of money. He ended his letter, however, with the optimistic opinion that, given the potentially decisive nature of such an offensive, the states could be relied upon to provide “double the assistance” the army could normally expect for a campaign. Declaring that “The exigency of our Affairs demands it,” GW ordered all available clothing of all types (notably including winter clothing) brought to the main army’s camps.

Stating that it was “indispensible to our measures,” GW ordered Commissary General Jeremiah Wadsworth to lay in large supplies of ship bread and rum. The army had an ample supply of meat. Informing them that the “emergency is pressing,” GW called on the states for food, transportation, and powder supplies. He acknowledged the difficulties of meeting his calls for support, but GW was convinced—given “the magnitude of the object”—that the states would rise to the crisis. The states, in fact, responded generously, meeting almost all of his requisitions for men and supplies.
          With such a commitment of resources on such a scale, GW did not intend to win just a victory. He envisioned the campaign as potentially war-winning. Just before sending d’Estaing his letter outlining the campaign, GW explained to Maj. Gen. John Sullivan that he was planning a decisive campaign “that a period may be put to the hostilities of the enemy in these states.” And when given the opportunity, GW did not refute Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates’s assertion that “You mean by one Great Stroke to Finish the War.”
          GW, however, was not wedded to his own designs. For the sake of achieving allied military cooperation, he was prepared to give up these plans and join d’Estaing in any operation against the British at New York or Rhode Island that the French admiral might prefer. He intended to make it clear to d’Estaing that his goal was to strike an important joint blow against the British, and he left the choice of objective up to d’Estaing. This approach would characterize GW’s strategy for the next two years.
          The British commanders reacted defensively to GW’s preparations and to reports of the approach of the French fleet. Although he told George Germain, secretary of state for the American colonies, that he believed GW’s “demonstrations” were not serious, British commander Gen. Henry Clinton prepared an expeditionary force of the British grenadiers and four other regiments under Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis as a potential relief force for the Stony Point garrison. Clinton himself went by ship to Stony Point between 11 and 12 October. In anticipation of the arrival of the French fleet, the British sank hulks near the bar at Sandy Hook, N.J., to restrict the ship channel, and they strengthened the defenses at Governor’s Island. British vice admiral Marriot Arbuthnot feared for the safety of his own squadron at New York and for that of the port of Halifax in Nova Scotia.
          The most important British reaction was the evacuation of Newport. The British army’s abandonment of Newport on 25 Oct. was the major fruit of the campaign, and it had important strategic consequences: in 1780 the city became the base for a French fleet and expeditionary army. While not a direct result of allied operations, like the evacuation of Newport, Clinton’s retreat on 20–21 Oct. from the King’s Ferry forts—which GW quickly reoccupied and refortified—produced important strategic results by easing GW’s supply situation and strengthening his hold on West Point.
          After receiving Congress’s 26 Sept. notification, GW had expected the imminent arrival of the French, and by 20 Oct.—with no word regarding d’Estaing’s intentions—he was expressing “impatience & anxiety.” On 1 Nov., GW had all preparations “done, & doing” but could only await the arrival of the French fleet. D’Estaing and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln had launched their joint campaign against Savannah, Ga., on 11–12 Sept. when d’Estaing began debarking troops. The siege had culminated on 9 Oct. with an attack by the French and Continental armies on the British lines, which failed disastrously with the loss of over 800 men. The French commander re-embarked his troops and sailed back

to France with part of his fleet, sending the remainder back to the West Indies. GW did not receive word of the failure until 15 Nov., but the delay had already caused him to doubt the allies’ ability to launch a joint offensive in the north. On 11 Nov. he recalled his letters to d’Estaing. Three days later he notified Congress that he considered it “too late” for an “extensive operation,” and began his preparations to move the army to its winter encampments.


Title: III. From George Washington to George Clinton, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, George

            Sir
            Head Quarters West Point 4th Octobr 1779

          I have the honor to inclose your Excellency the Copy of a Resolution of Congress of the 26th September, by which you will perceive they expect the arrival of his Excellency Count D’Estaing; and that I am directed to pursue measures for cooperating with him, and to call upon the several States for such aid as shall appear to me necessary for this important purpose—In compliance with these directions, I have made an estimate of the force of Militia which will be indispensible, in conjuction with the Continental Troops; and have apportioned this force to the neighbouring States according to the best judgment I am able to form of their respective circumstances and abilities. The number I have to request of the State of New York is two thousand five hundred In forming this estimate, I assure your Excellency I have fixed upon the smallest number which appeared to me adequate to the exigency, on account of the scantiness of our supplies, and I think it my duty explicitly to declare that the cooperation will altogether depend on a full compliance with these requisitions. If I am so happy as to obtain the whole number demanded a decisive stroke may be attempted against New York with a reasonable prospect of success. If the supply falls short the disappointment will inevitably produce a failure in the undertaking. In this case, Congress and my Country must excuse a want of enterprize and success of which the want of means will have been the unfortunate cause. If the honor and interest of the States suffer from thence, the blame must not be imputed to me.
          I have taken the liberty to dwell on these points to induce a persuasion that I have not in any degree exaggerated the number of Men really necessary, lest a supposition of this kind and a regard to the ease of the people should relax the exertions of the State and occasion a deficiency which would certainly be fatal to the views of Congress and to the expected co-operation.
          I am now to add to this request another equally essential which is that the most effectual and expeditious means be immediately adopted to have the Men drawn out properly equipped to serve for the term of three Months from the time they join the Army unless the particular service for which they are drawn out should be sooner performed. I beg leave to recommend Fishkill as a proper place of rendezvous. If the laws of the State now in existence or the powers vested in your Excellency are not competent to these objects, permit me to intreat that the legislature may be called together without loss

of time, and that you will be pleased to employ your influence to procure laws for the purpose, framed on such principles as will secure an instant and certain execution.
          There are other objects which I beg leave at the same time to recommend to the most zealous and serious attention of the State. These are, making every exertion to promote the supplies of the Army in provisions, particularly in the Article of Flour, and to facilitate the transportation in general of necessaries for the use of the Army—Our prospects with respect to Flour are to the last degree embarrassing—we are already distressed—but when we come to increase the demand by so large an addition of numbers, we may expect to be obliged to disband the troops for want of subsistence unless the utmost care and energy of the different legislatures are exerted. The difficulties we daily experience on the score of transportation justify equal apprehensions on that account without a similar attention to this part of the public service.
          These difficulties were sufficient to deter me from the plan I mean to pursue, were I not convinced that the magnitude of the object will call forth all the Vigor of the States and inspire the people with a disposition to second the plans of their Governors, and give efficacy to the measures they adopt. I doubt not our resources will be found fully adequate to the undertaking if they are properly exerted—and when I consider the delicacy of the Crisis—and the importance of the object to be attained—I cannot doubt that this will be the case. On one side—the reputation of our Councils & our Arms and an immediate removal of the War present themselves. on the other, disgrace and disappointment—an accumulation of expence, loss of Credit with our Allies and the World—loss of confidence in ourselves—the exhausting our Magazines and Resources, the precipitated decay of our Currency and the continuance of the War. Nor will these evils be confined to ourselves: Our Allies must share in them, and suffer the mortification of having accomplished nothing to compensate for withdrawing their operations from a quarter where they had a right to expect success, and for exposing their own possessions to hazard in a fruitless attempt to rescue ours.
          From the accounts received we are hourly to look for the appearance of the French Squadron on this Coast—the emergency is pressing—and all our measures ought to be attended with suitable expedition. Every moment is of infinite value. With the most perfect reliance on your Excellency’s exertions and on those of the State, and with the greatest Respect and Esteem I have the honor to be Your Excellency’s Most obt Servt

            Go: Washington


Title: IV. From George Washington to Vice Admiral d’Estaing, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Estaing, Charles-Hector Théodat, comte d’

            Sir
            West point 4th October 1779

          On receiving advice that your Excellency had been seen in a latitude, which indicated your approach to our Coasts, and supposing it possible you might direct your course this way, I did myself the honor to write you a Letter on the 13th of September and stationed an Officer in Monmouth County to meet you with it, on your arrival at the Hook. In that Letter I explained the situation and force of the Enemy, and took the liberty to propose some preliminary movements, on which the successive operations would materially depend. In the uncertainty of your coming and having little more than conjecture on which to found an expectation of it, these were all the measures I was then authorised to take. But I have just received dispatches from Congress, acquainting me with your arrival at Georgia, and of your intention after accomplishing your object to proceed this way. I have in consequence called upon the neighbouring States for a reinforcement of Militia, and am taking every other measure in my power, to prepare for a co-operation, with all the dispatch and vigor our circumstances will permit.
          I beg leave to inclose a Copy of the above mentioned letter, and the substance of the intelligence since recieved. Your Excellency will observe, that only Two detachments of Troops have sailed from New York—One consisting of three German and one British Regiment for Hallifax or Quebec—and the Other, composed of the Grenadiers, Light Infantry and One British Regiment supposed to be destined to the Southern States. I have not receive⟨d⟩ any account of the debarkation of the Hallifax detachment—and I believe it has prosecuted it’s Voyage: One of the Transports has been taken and carried into philadelphia, with 160 Men on board. She reports Hallifax to have

been her destination. I have reason to believe from some information recently obtained, that the latter detachment has returned; these however are not altogether authentic, but I am the more inclined to give them credit, as I think it probable they were bound to South Carolina, and in thier way may have heard of your Excellency’s arrival in that Quarter, which would naturally occasion their return to New York.
          The Enemy’s force in New York and its dependencies, supposing the return of the above detachment, I now estimate at Fourteen thousand. Their fleet consists of the Russel of 74—the Europa of 64—the Renown of 50—the Roebuck of 44 and a few smaller Frigates. Your Excellency will perceive that their affairs are in a fluctuating State, and therefore many changes may have taken place since my last advices.
          From the advanced season of the year every instant of time is infinitely precious, and must be even more so to your Excellency than to us. This makes it to be lamented, that it had not been possible, to preconcert a plan before your arrival. The force under your command and the time you can devote to this business, are essential points in determining what can with propriety be undertaken, and the first steps will be of great consequence to all the succeeding ones. To enable you the better to regulate your own movements—I shall expose to you our prospects and the different plans which present themselves to me with the obstacles attending each.
          New York is the first and Capital object upon which every other is dependant. The loss of the Army and Fleet there, would be one of the severest blows the English Nation could experience. Rhode Island would fall of course. But your Excellency will be sensible that the reduction of fourteen thousand Men concentered upon a small Island, with the assistance of Fortifications, is an enterprize of no inconsiderable difficulty, and requires a vigorous exertion of our resources in conjunction with your force, to give it a sufficient probability of success. Not less than 30,000 Men will in my opinion be adequate to the operation, and we cannot collect the numbers necessary on our part, in addition to what we have already in the field in less than three Weeks from this time. The interval between your arrival and that period, must for the most part be spent in a state of inactivity on your side, unless you judge it proper to direct your attention to an attempt upon Rhode Island.
          The knowledge you have of this place will enable you better than me, to decide on the eligibility of this project. The Garrison there is respectable and as I am informed, secured by a chain of redoubts

and retrenchments from one flank of the Island to the other, which would be exceedingly formidable to an assault. The town however may be burnt and with it the Enemy’s magazines, which it is probable, would speedily reduce them to a surrender. Your Excellency is a better judge than I am of the time which would be exhausted in this enterprize; but I should imagine it might require at least four Weeks for it’s accomplishment. If you should think it proper to pursue this plan; we have a body of two thousand troops now ready at Rhode Island, and can march thither any additional number you deem necessary for a co-operation. But in order to [do] this, I must request you will give me previous notice of your intention.
          Success in this attempt would be favourable to our ulterior operations against New York; but a failure would be attended with the reverse, as it would damp the spirits of the Country and diminish its exertions: Another inconvenience would attend it, which is, that without a division of your force to continue the blockade of New York, the fleet now there would make it’s escape. Indeed in any plan, a division of your force will be indispensible; Rhode Island and the Sound must be blockaded, otherwise the garrison there will form a junction with the main body at New York, which would be so great an accession of force, as would render the success of our operations improbable; and the Frigates and smaller vessels may find a passage through the sound—and elude your Excellency in that way: But the difference is this: In the latter case two or three fifty Gun Ships and as many Frigates will answer the purpose; in the former, some of your Ships of the line must be left at New York to have a superiority to the two that are there, aided by the Frigates. In case of the attempt upon Rhode Island, the only expedient to avoid a division of your Ships of the line, will be to remain with the whole at New York, and send your Troops round under the protection of your frigates. Your Excellency is the best judge with what propriety a movement of this kind can be hazarded.
          In either event it appears to me advisable, that you should first enter the bay of New York with a part at least of your fleet—and as suddenly as possible, to intercept the Troops on Staten Island and the Garrisons up the River, as the capture of these will materially facilitate the reduction of the remaining force; and I take the liberty strongly to recommend, that a proper detachment may without loss of time be made to block up the sound, and the port of Rhode Island. I have taken measures for furnishing you with pilots, one of them accompanies this Letter; but I have directed three or four to be stationed with Major Lee at Monmouth to put off to your Excellency on your

first appearance. Among these is one, who is acquainted with the navigation of the North River in it’s present state, and will be able to take up the Frigates, which I had the honor to request might proceed into Haverstraw bay—I have written to Congress to recommend the assembling all our Frigates and armed Vessels, to act in conjunction with the fleet under your command.
          With candor and freedom I have exposed to Your Excellency my sentiments and expectations: and I entreat you will honor me with a similar communication of your views and intentions. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than to concur with these to the utmost of our ability.
          I have not concealed the difficulties in the way of a co-operation because I thought it my duty fully to apprise you of them; I am persuaded you will ascribe what I have said to the proper motive, and to that caution, which ought always to influence enterprises, pregnant with such interesting consequence⟨s⟩—You will not impute them to an unwillingness to exert the resources of the country or to a distrust of the event; for I assure Your Excellency, I feel the importance of this generous and seasonable succour; and have the highest hopes of it’s utility to the common cause—and a termination glorious to the allied Arms. I rejoice in the opportunity it affords—nor is the prospect of acting in immediate conjunction with Your Excellency, one of the least flattering circumstances. I shall with the greatest alacrity concur in the execution of any plan, which shall be thought advancive of the interest and glory of the two nations, and may add to the laurels you have already reaped, in so distinguished a manner. I hope soon to have the pleasure of assuring you personally, of those sentiments of respectful attachment, with which I have the honor to be Your Excellency’s Most Obedient & Most Hble servant

            Go: Washington

            P.S. Mr Holker soon after Your Excellency left Boston communicated to me your desire to have the navigation of Hell Gate ascertained. I have taken the greatest pains to answer your views and the result of my inquiries is, that never more than a Fifty Gun Ship has gone through that passage—and this with difficulty and hazard. A larger Ship it is believed could not pass. The reasons are not a want of depth of Water, but the extreme narrowness of the Channel, the rapidity of the current—whirlpools & rocks. The least misteerage will precipitate the Vessel on the banks and shoals on either side; and the power which the current and whirlpools have upon larger Vessels, would make it almost impossible to keep them in their proper course. The only time this passage is practicable for Ships of any burthen, is at the height of flood tide.

            I have since writing the foregoing learnt, that the Renown of 50 Guns and not the Raisonable of 64, convoy⟨ed⟩ the Detachment to Hallifax. We may therefore suppose that the Raisonnable is in the harbour of New York.


Title: V. From George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, Robert

            Dear Sir
            West-point Octr 4th 1779

          I have received such advices from Congress respecting the French fleet under the command of Count D’Estaing, that I have not a doubt of his coming to this part of the Coast for the purposes of cooperation—nor of his being upon it immediately. I therefore request you to resume yr position on Croton—near pines bridge to effect, if possible, the end mentioned in my letter of the 13th Ulto. I am with esteem and regard Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt Servt

            Go: Washington


Title: VI. From Major General Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, 4 October 1779
From: St. Clair, Arthur
To: Washington, George

            Sir
            West Point October 4th 1779

          I have been revolving in my Mind the Matters your Excellency had under Consideration last Night, and beg leave to submit my Sentiments upon them. They are however only broken hints as I have a very imperfect knowledge of the Local Situation, not having been upon the Grounds for many Years, and then not having viewed them in a military Light.
          From Fort Washington to the high Grounds at the Bottom of the Bay below the Mouth of Haarlem River there is a Front to that River of three Miles, at no part more than two Miles distant from the North River. The drawing our Troops down towards Kingsbridge would probably enduce the Ennemy to take that Position.
          About six Miles below Fort Washington a Bay makes in from the North River, from the Bottom of which, across the Island to the east River, the Distance is one Mile only or thereabout. Supposing the

Ennemy obliged to change the above Position, this would probably be their second; as it has these Advantages that, be our Superiority in Numbers what it may, they can present an equal Front; neither Flank can be turned, and in so short a Line great Obstacles can be immediatly thrown in the Way. But Quære whether here their left Flank would not be exposed to the Fire of the Ships from the North River.
          The Ennemy in the first Position, if a Landing could be effected in that Bay, to the Bottom of which I have supposed their left Flank applied in the second, it appears very eligible, as the Distance across is I believe very capable of Defense, and they would thereby be cut off from the Town, where doubtless, their Stores of all kinds are deposited; but unless this could be effected with perfect Secresy, the Attempt would probably prove abortive.
          Drawing the Troops to Kingsbridge and Haarlem River would certainly induce the first Position, or one nearly similar; as it promises to be effectual for preventing the forcing a Passage over that River, and from its contiguity to the North River is convenient for preventing a Landing in the Rear.
          A Landing on long Island, it seems to me, may be easily effected from Haarlem River, either above or below the Mouth of it; and the collecting Boats there would not discover the real Design, as they are equally necessary for the Passage of either River. Flushing tho some Distance above would be a very convenient landing Place if not occupied by the Ennemy. It is four Miles from thence to Jamaica, and eight from thence to Bedford, where there is a Capital Pass which should be instantly possessed, otherwise the Army would be obliged to make a considerable Circuit by new Lots to approach Brooklyn. It is an open Country and good Roads from Flushing to Bedford.
          The Count D’Estaing can land his Troops any where upon the southern Coast of long Island—in Jamaica Bay for Instance, from whence the Junction could be easily made near Bedford. The Distance, I think is not more than eight Miles.
          The Ships may certainly be destroyed from Long Island, as they must run into the East River, and the Post at Brooklyn will soon fall. with these New York, be its Garrison what it will, must fall also.
          This Appears to me the most eligible Method, as there is great probability of Success, and much less Risque than in forcing a Passage over Haarlem, or landing on York Island by the North River, as in either of these the Fate of America must, in a great Measure, be set upon a single Cast.
          When once established upon long Island, perhaps a sufficient Number of Troops may be spared to reduce Rhode-Island.

          If the Posts on the North River are not drawn in, I suppose two thousand Men, with a proper Artillery might, in a Week, reduce Stoney Point without breaking in much upon the greater Operations of the Army—Verplanks would follow of itself.
          These Hints are founded upon a Supposition that we can deceive the Ennemy, and throw ourselves upon long Island whilst the Gross of their Army remains upon York-Island; but it is not altogether improbable that they may betake themselves entirely to long-Island—in that Case, the high Grounds according to the Idea I retain of them, from Flat Bush by Bedford to the East River would be a good Position. I Am with the greatest Respect Your Excellencys most obedient and very humble Servant

            Ar. St Clair


Title: VII. From George Washington to Major General Arthur St. Clair, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: St. Clair, Arthur

            Dear Sir,
            Head Qrs [West Point] Octr 4th 79.

          I have received, and thank you for the thoughts contained in your Letter of this date—& pray you to continue them as they may occur. I prefer receiving the sentiments of Officer[s] in this way to Councils of War; as I can digest every matter and thing at my leizure, and act with more secrecy than it is possible in pursuance of a determination discovered by a Majority of votes & known to numbers—perusing as I observed before the thoughts of each Officer individually & comparing their reasoning with my own—and forming conclusions which may be secret if necessary. I am sincerely Yr Obedt Servt

            Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Thomas Clark, 3 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Clark, Thomas

          Sir
          Head Quarters West-point 3d Octr 1779

        I have received intelligence from Congress which makes it unnecessary for you to proced further on your route to Carolina—you will therefore on receipt of this letter—rejoin the main army by easy marches. I am Sir your most obt servt.


Title: From George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 3 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Sullivan, John

          Dr Sir
          Head Quarters [West Point] October 3d 1779

        From an account I have just received I hope this will meet you on your route from Tioga. It is intended to quicken your march that you may with all possible dispatch form a junction with this army. You will feel the importance of this when I tell you that it is probable we shall shortly have a cooperation with his Excellency Count D’Estaing, which from the enemy’s numbers in New York will absolutely require all the force we have to give it success. The Count arrived about the 2d of September on the Coast of Georgia—and by the advices just received from Congress after effecting the reduction of the enemys force there we may expect him in this quarter. The honor and interest of these states will exact from us in this case every exertion within the compass of our abilities to render the assistance of this fleet decisive—that a period may be put to the hostilities of the enemy in these states—When an object of this magnitude is in prospect, I am confident your activity will effect every thing that is practicable and that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you—in as little time as circumstances will by any means admit—The troops I dare say will be much

fatigued and in want of many necessaries but these ought not to be impediments to their alacrity, at a moment so critical and so infinitely interesting—On their arrival with the army they may depend on every attention to their wants which their services merit and our resources will permit—I have directed the Quarter Master and Commissary to make the proper arrangements on the route to facilitate your march. I repeat it, my Dr Sir, the occasion may be the most important that America has seen during this war; and I entreat that your exertions to join us on which much depends may be proportionable—I am with very great esteem and regard Dr Sir Your most Obed. servant.
        If a Garrison should be essential at Wyoming, you may leave one or two of the small broken corps; but come with all the force you can.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 3 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Wayne, Anthony

          Dear Sir,
          Head Qurs [West Point] Octor 3d 1779

        General Du Portail proposes tomorrow to reconnoitre a second time the post of Stony point and to ascertain the distances from the En[e]mys works to the places proper for establishing batteries—He will arive there precisely by eleven oClock—You will therefore please to have a reconnoitring party consisting of a Regiment ready at the second place to which you went the other day, not the high hill on which you first

took your stand—This is the spot General Du Portail points out; and he will be on the place punctually at the time appointed—The Officer commanding the party will take his orders from him; You will also send an escort to meet him at the house where you stopped the last time to take refreshment on your return to Camp, as he might otherwise mistake his route. I am D. Sir Your most obt Servt

          Go: Washington

          P.S. Two companies of light infantry from Glovers Brigade are ordered to join you to replace those of the Carolina troops—You will send a proper person here to conduct them to you—I am to request you will take pains to ascertain whether the enemy have bomb proofs in Stony point, what number, exten⟨t⟩ and thickness—This is an essential point to know towards any opperations against that post.

            Go: Washington


Title: General Orders, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moores-House [West Point]Monday Octr 4th 1779.
          Parole Jucatan—  C. Signs Kildare. Lake-George.

        Lieutenant Jonathan Gibson of the 5th Maryland regiment is appointed Pay-Master to the same from the 25th of February last, and Lieutenants Benjamin Garnet and James Gould are appointed, the 1st—Adjutant from the 23rd—and the 2nd Quarter Master from the 20th of September last to said regiment.


Title: To George Washington from the Board of War, 4 October 1779
From: Board of War
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          War Office [Philadelphia] Octr 4th 1779

        The Bearer Samuel Potts Esqr. is ⟨desirous⟩ of ⟨conferring⟩ with his Brother Mr John Potts on the Lines. His Brother is about taking his Departure for England. As his Request comes most properly within your Excellency’s Determination we have referred Mr Potts to you making no Doubt of your granting him what he requires if you can with Propriety. We believe Mr Potts entitled from his Character ⟨illegible⟩ Confidence the Situation of our Affairs will admitt. We have the Honour to be with the most sincere Regard & Respect your very obedt servants

          Richard PetersBy order


Title: From George Washington to John Cox, Jr., 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Cox, John Jr.

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point Octobr 4th 1779

        By advices I have received it is highly probable His Excellency Count D’Estaing will very speedily appear on this coast to cooperate with us; it will be of great importance that he should be met with intelligence of the enemy’s situation and with good pilots to conduct him into the

harbour—For this purpose I am to request you will without loss of time take effectual measures to engage at least half a Dozen fast sailing boats, to be kept constantly out from the Jersey shore to endeavour if possible to fall in with the Count—I am preparing dispatches to be sent by them, which shall be forwarded to you the moment they are finished and I hope by the time you receive them the vessels will be ready. You will see the vast importance of dispatch and will take your measures accordingly—If the Count comes at all, he may be hourly expected and a very few days can at any rate elapse before he will appear. I am with great esteem Sir Your most Obedt serv.
        The Commanders of these boats ought to be men on whose fidelity we can absolutely rely, as the miscarriage of the dispatches would be a very serious misfortune.


Title: From George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

          Sir
          Head Quarters West Point 4th October 1779

        I had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 26th and 27th ultimo at half after twelve OClock yesterday. Immediately upon the Receipt of it, I set about concerting the measures necessary for a cooperation with His Excellency the Count D’Estaing, agreeable to the powers vested in me by the Resolve of Congress of the 26th ulto.

        I have called upon the State of Massachusetts for 2000 Militia—Connecticut for 4000—New York for 2500—New Jersey for 2000 and Pennsylvania for 1500. the last is below the quota that she ought to furnish in proportion to her strength, but I was induced to make a requisition of that number only, upon a consideration, that we shall be obliged to call largely upon that State for the means of transportation of provision and supplies of all kinds. I have also taken the liberty, to press the States abovementioned, to use the most vigorous exertions in procuring supplies of provision, especially of Flour, for the want of which, I fear we shall be much embarrassed, should we draw such a head of Men together as will be necessary to give our operations a tolerable prospect of success.
        I have not heard from General Sullivan, but by report, since the 30th August. I have however dispatched an Express to him (upon a supposition that he has compleated the object of his expedition and is upon his return) desiring him to hasten his march, and directing him to leave as few Men as he possibly can in the frontier Garrisons. I have also wrote to Genl Gates, desiring him to hold all the Continental troops under his command ready to march this way, should the Count D’Estaing, upon settling a plan of operations, determine upon an attempt against New York: But as there is a possibility that he may, upon being made acquainted with the numbers and situation of the enemy, prefer an attack upon Rhode Island, I have desired General Gates to be looking towards and preparing for such an event. I had, upon the first report of the Counts standing towards this Coast, stationed Major Lee in Monmouth with a letter for him, to be carried on board upon his first appearance, in which, I informed him of the enemy’s force by Sea and land—their position at that time—and pointed out to him the measures which I thought it would be most advantagious for him to pursue upon his arrival. I am preparing fresh letters for him, in which, I shall inform him fully of all posterior Events, and the measures I am taking for a cooperation. I am also engaging and sending down proper pilots to him.
        I have taken the liberty to countermand the march of Colo. Clarke with the two Regiments of North Carolina, upon a presumption, that, from the favorable aspect of affairs to the Southward, I shall stand justifiable for such a measure.
        I observe by a Resolve of Congress lately transmitted to me, that three of the Continental Frigates were ordered to South Carolina. I do not know the views of Congress in making this disposition, but should they have no particular object in contemplation I would venture to recommend their being ordered to join the Counts Fleet, which in my opinion would be much benefitted by an additional

number of Frigates, especially for the Navigation of the North River and the sound. I think it would be also well, should the Marine Committee be directed to turn their attention to the transportation of Flour from the Delaware and Chesapeake by Water. Should we obtain the command of the Sea, Vessels may, without the least dange⟨r,⟩ be introduced into the Hook, thence the Amboy from whence their Cargoes may be easily conveyed in Boats up Newark Bay. Or should some of them run round into the Sound it would be equally, nay, more convenient. Should we operate to the Eastward, measures of this kind will be indispensibly necessarry, as the length and difficulty of land Carriage will render the support of any considerable Body of Men almost impossible.
        The Wheat of Maryland being in more forwardness for grinding than any other, I could wish that Governor Johnson may be requested to push the purchases within that State. The Commissary General gives the fullest incouragement on the score of Beef, but of Flour he continues to express his fears. I have the honor to be with the greatest Respect Your Excellency’s Most obt Servt

          Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to William Livingston, 4 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Livingston, William

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point Octr 4th 1779

        It is essential that some good pilots should be ready to go on Board the French fleet the moment it appears perfectly acquainted with the entrance into New York harbour. Wm Van Drill who resides in your State I am informed is one of the best that can be had. I shall be much obliged to your Excellency immediately to engage Mr Van Drill to go down to Monmouth and join Major Lee at English town who is instructed on the subject. If there are any others on whose skill and fidelity we can depend within Your Excellency’s reach, I request they may be also sent. It will be a point on which the successive operations will much depend that the Count should have it in his power to enter on his first arrival; I therefore entreat your Excellency’s immediate and particular attention to the procuring of pilots—I have the honor to be With the truest respect and esteem Your Excellency’s Most Obdt servant.
        Samuel Ashleton at Brunswick Isaac Symonson Elizabeth Town are recommended as good hook Pilots.


Title: General Orders, 5 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moore’s House [West Point]Tuesday Octr 5th 1779.
          Parole Louis XVI.  C. Signs Gerard. D’Estaing—

        The Commander in Chief requests that the commanding officers of corps will immediately call upon their respective officers who are absent from camp and not employed on special commands or who have not obtained recent furloughs in the most pointed and peremptory terms to join their Corps without a moments delay: A period may arrive in this campaign, and perhaps it is very near at hand, when the absence of an officer, unless there are powerful reasons for it, may fix an indelible stigma upon him—This consideration, if motives of public duty are not sufficient of themselves ought to bring every one under the above description to their respective commands.
        The General Court Martial whereof Colonel Bradford is President is dissolved and another ordered to sit tomorrow morning nine ôclock at the usual place whereof Coll Starr is appointed President, for the trial of such persons as shall come before them.


Title: Circular to Pilots, 5 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Sir,
          Hd Qrs [West Point] 5th Octor 79

        An event may very soon take place which will render your services of the greatest importance to the public. I shall therefore be glad to see you without delay at Head Quarters—when I will explain to you in what manner your services will be necessary. You will come prepared for a journey of some length—Your expences shall be borne and your trouble amply rewarded; of this I shall myself take care. All possible dispatch ought to be made and the greatest secrecy observed. I am Sir Your most Obed. servant.


Title: From George Washington to Thomas Hunt, 5 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Hunt, Thomas

          Sir,
          Head Quarters [West Point] October 5th 1779

        There is a probability that some pilots well acquainted with the entrance into New York Harbour and the two Rivers North and East will be wanted for a service of the most important nature. I am persuaded you will be glad to have an opportunity of serving your Country upon this occasion; and I shall be obliged to you to engage any others in whose skill and fidelity you can rely. There is not a moments time to be lost for which reason I hope to see you at Head Quarters tomorrow together with those you may be able to engage. Their expences will be paid and a handsome compensation made for their services. I am Sir Yr Most Obedt huml. servant.


Title: To George Washington from Samuel Huntington, 5 October 1779
From: Huntington, Samuel
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Philadelphia Octor 5th 1779

        I am favourd with the receipt of your Excellencies favours of the 29th & 30th ultimo. In conseqence of the latter Congress have directed the North-Carolina Troops to halt at Trenton until further Orders.
        You will receive enclosd the Act of Congress of the 4th Instant and Copy of the Orders to Col. Clarke on that Subject. I have the honour to be with the highest Sentiments of Esteem & regard your Exys humble Servant

          Saml Huntington President


Title: To George Washington from Timothy Pickering, 5 October 1779
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Washington, George

          Sir,
          Philaa Octr 5. 1779.

        Yesterday afternoon arrived here the armed Cutter Royal George of 14 guns, prize to the Pickering of Salem. Coming addressed to me, a number of private letters found on board fell into my hands. Some of them contained intelligence which seemed of importance sufficient to be communicated to your Excellency. I have therefore made in haste the inclosed extracts. The private sentiments & anecdotes interspersed I thought would not be disagreeable. I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your Excellency’s most obedient servant

          Tim: Pickering


Title: From George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 5 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Sullivan, John

          Dear Sir
          West-point Octr 5th 79

        The 3d Instt I wrote to you, & for fear of accidents inclose a copy of the letter as your forming a junction with this Army as speedily as possible may be of the utmost importance.
        I have not received a line from you since the 30th of Augt which I can no otherwise acct for than by a miscarriage of letters—I am altogether unacquainted with your movements since the battle at Newtown & have only common report for your having advanced to Conosadaga, & returning to Teoga.
        The French fleet have not yet appeared upon this coast but I expect every moment to hear of it off Sandy hook. I am with great regard Yr Most Obed. Ser.


Title: From George Washington to James Wilkinson, 5 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Wilkinson, James

          Sir
          Head Qrs [West Point] Octob. 5: 1779.

        I request that you will use every practicable exertion to have All the Coats—Waistcoats—Breeches—Blankets Woollen Overalls—Shirts—Shoes—Stockings—Hats—Caps—Watchcoats & Woollen Mitts—belonging to the Continent, brought on to Newburg without a moment’s delay. The exigency of our Affairs demands it. I am Sir Your Most Obt st

          G.W.

          P.S. You may leave Cloathing at the Eastward for about Twelve Hundred Troops at Rhode Island.


Title: General Orders, 6 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moore’s House [West Point]Wednesday Octr 6th 1779.
          Parole Vergennes—  C. Signs Luzerne Sartine—

        All the non commissioned officers and privates in the brigades at and near this post who are Ship-Carpenters or acquainted with making tents, not already employed in the Q.M. Genl’s Department, are to be drafted and sent to the Qu. M. Genl’s Markee tomorrow morning 8 ôclock where they will receive their orders.


Title: From George Washington to the Continental Congress Marine Committee, 6 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Continental Congress Marine Committee

          Gentn
          West point Octobr 6th 1779

        I had the honor yesterday to receive your favor of the 28th of September—accompanied by a Copy of your Letter of the same date to the Commissioners of the Navy Board at Boston; and am happy in the correspondence of your ideas, with mine upon the subject of it. I wrote Congress on the 4th Instant, and suggested to them the eligibility of the plan which you had already adopted.
        I take the liberty to transmit the inclosed Letter for his Excellency Count D’Estaing to your care—and request that it may meet him on his earliest arrival off the Capes of Delaware. The contents of it are very important and interesting; which considerations will induce the Honourable Committee not to confide it to the care of any person, who is not a trusty and good friend. It cannot reach His Excellency the Count too expeditiously.
        Two pilots—Capn Dobbs & a Mr Redfield set out a few hours ago for Philadelphia—and I should hope from the measures I have taken—that there will be Others immediately with you—or on the Coast of Monmouth, ready to embark on board the Count’s Squadron. I have the honor to be with great respect Gentn Yr Most Obedt servant

          Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General William Phillips, 6 October 1779
From: Phillips, William
To: Washington, George

          Sir
          Chatham [N.J.] October 6th 1779

        I shall answer the letter you have, Sir, been pleased to send me by Major Skinner from Easton for which place I am going to set out.
        I writ to you, Sir, from Elizabeth Town in consequence of the detention of Major General de Riedesel and myself, but to that letter I have not received any answer.
        I will not wound General Washington’s feelings with a description of my sentiments of the unkind treatment of the American Congress, they are such as I believe every Man of sense and honor must approve.
        I am greatly obliged for much politeness shewn me by Major Skinner. I have the honor to be, Sir, with due respect Your Excellency’s most Obedient and most humble Servant

          W. Phillips


Title: To George Washington from Philip Schuyler, 6 October 1779
From: Schuyler, Philip
To: Washington, George

          [Albany, N.Y., 6 Oct. 1779]

        Extract of a Letter from Mr Schuyler to his Ex: Gen: Washington dated Albany Octo. 6th 1779
        “I have Just received letters from Colo: Van Dyck and Mr Deane copies whereof are Inclosed. The letter to Colo: Butler I wrote at the request of Governor Clinton to procure Information with respect to Colo. Thurston and the Militia taken with him In July last at Minisink. I also took Occassion to ask him If he was Impowered to treat of An Exchange of such prisoners as were In the Indian Country.
        “I shall request Colo: V. Dyck and Mr Deane to Inform the Cayuga’s thro the Oneidas that the Commissioners cannot decide upon their proposal Until Your Excellencys pleasure is known; A real and permanent peace with the Indians I conceieve would be greatly beneficial to the States And It appears to me very probable that If It is granted to the Caiyugas the Senecas will also make application for the purpose. If Your Excellency Should think proper to enter Into a treaty with the Cayugas and Commit the business to the Commissioners of Indian

Affairs I as one would wish Uninformed as we are of the views And Intentions of Congress with respect to the Indians & the Country to be fully Instructed on the Occassion.”


Title: From George Washington to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, 6 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Tallmadge, Benjamin

          Dr Sir
          Head Quarters West-point 6th Otbr 1779.

        I received last evening your letter of the 3d with its inclosure.
        In your first communication with C——, and you will make it as soon as possible, I shall want to be as perfectly ascertained ⟨as⟩ the nature of the inquiry will ad⟨mit—viz.—⟩The quantity and quality of the ⟨provisions⟩ in New-York—comprehending their whole stock—whether in magazines, or on ship-board. He will be particular as to the kind, and size of the works that are lately formed, or that may be erected—And at all times, keep his attention on the changes of situation or the new positions which may be taken by the enemy. He will tell me what new works are erected on Long-Island, besides those at Brooklyn—and what nature. I wish also to know where their shipping lyes, and if they appear to be taking measures, and what measures, for their security in case of a French ⟨fleet⟩’s entering the harbour. I am Dr Sir Your most obt Servt

          Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from George Clinton, 7 October 1779
From: Clinton, George
To: Washington, George

          D’r Sir,
          Pokeepsie [N.Y., 7] Oct’r 1779.

        Immediately on the Rec’t of your first Letter intimating that it might be necessary to reinforce your Excellency by a formidable Body of the State Militia, I recommended to the Legislature the enact’g such Laws as sho’d appear adequate to this Purpose as well as for draw’g forth new Supplies of Provision on this extraordinary occasion. Since which I have been favored with a Copy of the act of Congress of the 26 ult. on that Subject (a Duplicate of which you inclose me) & have laid it before the Legislature, and as they discover the most chearful Disposition for promoting this Service I have not the least Doubt but they will adopt the most vigorous measures. Notwithstand’g the peculiar Situation of the State, I have not to complain of the Number of Men which your Excellency has required of us, and I flatter myself with the Hope that no Failure will take Place, for want of a prompt & full Compliance on our Part & it shall be my first Business to issue the necessary Orders and my greatest Care to see them carried into effectual Execution. I think it proper however to mention to your Excellency, that we will not be able to take the Field with Tents & Camp Kettles as what we have had of these articles has been long since expended or delivered over to the Continent and we have not had it in our Power to replace them. Exclusive of the Flour & Wheat which the Legislature have by Law enabled the Commissary to furnish the Army with it is proposed that the militia provide themselves with 40 Days Flour, as it is thought they may be able to draw this Supply from their

own private Stock without interfering with such as the Commissary may be able to collect.

          [G.C.]


Title: To George Washington from John Parke Custis, 7 October 1779
From: Custis, John Parke
To: Washington, George

          Hond Sir
          Abingdon [Va.] October 7th 1779

        Your very Affectionate Favor of the 24th of August came to my Hands, while very unwell with a bilious Fever at Mt Vernon. I return You many thanks for Your excellent Advice, and have determined to follow it in both instances, altho I have been offered seventy five thousand Pounds for my eastern Shore Land, and am confident can get more; but as I have fixed Matters for another Crop, shall not think of parting with it, unless I can purchase Phil. Alexander’s Land, which I have some distant hopes of doing for about £40,000. I think this Sum will tempt Him, and I would willingly give it him, as I can get such a Price for my Land. I shall try Him tomorrow.
        I do with the most sincere Pleasure congratulate You, on the Arrival of the Count De Estang on the American Coast, and his important Success in Georgia. our reports make his Success very compleat in that Quarter, and that He has blocked up N. York. You are therefore better inform’d than I can be. I pray that no Storm, or other Accident will now arise, to blast the fair Prospect now before Us, of reducing our Enemy to the Condition, to which, they vainly hoped to reduce the United States, I am very sanguine in my Expectations, of a

glorious Close to the War this Campain, and in seeing You in Fairfax this Winter, it will render Me more happy, than any Circumstance I know off can do; to see You at Abingdon, after the Success I wish You to meet with.
        It is with the utmost reluctance and Concern that I find myself constraind to trouble You at this very important Crisis with any thing of a private Nature, and which may give You the least Concern, but the Situation in which I am in, and the Fear of giving the least Offence to You, compel Me to intrude on Your important Moments, and claim Your Attention to a Matter in which We are equally concern’d—When I returnd this time twelve month, from Camp, I found that the Assembly had been sitting for some time, I therefore hurried down; I applied to, and inform’d Colo. Bassett, that I had rented Your Plantation, and that I was to have (as I thought our Bargain really was) the Choice of the Cattle at Claibornes, and that He was to set a Value on them. the Assembly continued sitting, untill near Christmas, it broke up but a few Days before. Colo. Bassett hearing that my Mother was sitting out for Camp, left the Assembly with an Intention of accompanying Her; I applied to Him to value the Cattle before He sat out, but He declin’d it as he was on his Journey, it was then agreed, that the Cattle should be distinguish’d by a Mark of Tar in the Face, to distinguish them from my own, that He might value them on their Arrival in Fairfax or if He met them on the road, the rout was likewise agreed upon between Us, I had the Cattle markd and ordered them the road We had appointed. Colo. Bassett being disappointed in finding My Mother at home left Fairfax before the Cattle arrived and on his return took a different rout from the One We had fix’d on by which means He did not value the Cattle. I am now extremely sorry that the Cattle were removed before they were valued, but as I had twenty odd Negroes, with some Cattle of my own comeing up, and the Winter so far advanced, I could not loose so good an Opportunity of driving them up, without great Injury to My self, and as Colo. Bassett and Myself had fallen on the before mentioned Expedients; I did not apprehend it could be productive of any ill Event and certain it is, no Dispute could possibly have arisen, had He have return’d the rout We actually agreed on; my People arrived here with the Cattle but two Days before Christmas—I have now Sir I do assure You given You a faithful Account, why the forty seven Head of Cattle I have had from Your Plantation, were not valued when the others were. & I should not have now troubled You, did I not think Myself greatly injured by the Value Colo. Bassett says he must put upon them, I am confident, it is not Your wish, that He should value them higher than any Person in the world but Himself would have done; and I do assure You on my

Honour, I do not wish to have them under their full value. at the time I brought these Cattle away, Beef was selling ⟨at⟩ a Shilling a Pound, Davenport sold Yours at that Price. in February I had four stall’d Beeves very fine, that I offered at half a Crown, and could not get it. I could not sell but three Quarters at that Price. the rest I was oblidged to salt for Workmen; the Cattle I got, were both smal, and in bad order. I was at a very great Expence in Wintering them, which I did on good Hay, and the ill Luck to loose by accidents eight of them. I have taken particular Care of them this Summer, and they are now very fat. I always thought Myself bound to pay for the dead as well as the living, and to pay You six P. Cent or Loan office Certificates for their Price, from the time I took them away, but always thought, I was to have them Valued as last Fall, instead of the present, and without any relation being had to their present Appearance, or what they would now sell for. I am certain You cannot think that these Cattle would have averaged £40 round at that time, I hardly think were they as I got them that they would do it now, Supposing they would have averaged £40 why did Colo. Bassett make so great a difference in the Value, when no such Difference existed in the Cattle. He valued Yearlings at 50/ and two year-olds at £40. The Yearlings will be as good when as old. the common breed You know are small and very indiferent, the half Bloods are much better, tho far from large Cattle; I have inclosed You a faithful list, and a very particular one. I should be happy if You would fix a Value on the Cattle Yourself, or if agreeable to You, I would wish Lund Washington, who I think a very proper Person, as He saw the Cattle on their Arrival, and is well accquainted with them as they were wintered at his Plantation. but I shall be perfectly contented, You should say what You think they were worth, and I think the Valuation last Fall of the Cattle that remain’d a good rule to go by. I shall pay the Certificates as soon as it is determined—I must beg You would inform Me Your Determination as soon as Your important Concerns will admit. be pleased to direct to Me in Wmsburg as I shall be on the Assembly.
        I am now happy enough to inform that Nelly and my two youngest Girls are recovered from their Illness, my eldest is still afflicted with the Fever & Ague, Nelly begs You will accept Her affectionate regards, and joins with Me in wishing You every Blessing in this Life and Success in Your present Undertaking. I am Hond Sir Your ever Affecte

          J. P. Custis


Title: From George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 7 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

          Dear Sir
          [West Point] Octr 7th 1779

        I have lost—& cannot tell how—an old & favourite penknife & am much destressed for want of one—if you have any in your stores please to send me one—if you have not, be so good as to get one immediately. perhaps Mr Bayley could furnish me. one with two blades I should prefer, where choice can be had. I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt

          Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 7 October 1779
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

          My dear general
          havre [France] 7he October 1779

        from those happy ties of friendship By which you were pleas’d to unite yourself with me, from the promises You So tenderly made me when we parted at fishkill, I had Such expectations of hearing often from you, that Complaint ought to be permitted to my affectionate heart—not a line from you, my dear General, is yet arriv’d into My hands, and tho Several Ships from America, several dispatches from Congress or the french Minister are Safely Brought to france, My ardent hopes of Getting at lenght a letter from General Washington, have ever been unhappily disappointed—that Bad luck I can’t any way account for, and when I Remember that in these little Separations where I was But Some days from you, the most friendly letters, the most minuted account of Your Circumstances, were kindly writen to me, I am Convinc’d You have not neglected, and almost forgotten me for So long a while—I am therefore to Complain of fortune, of Some Mistake or Neglect in acquainting you that there was an opportunity of any thing indeed, But what Could injure the sense I have of your affection for me—let me Beseech you, my dear General, By that mutual, tender and experienced friendship, in which I have put An immense part of My happiness, to be very exact in inquiring for occasions, and Never to Miss these which may Convey to me letters that I will be so much pleas’d to Receive.
        inclos’d I send to your excellency the Copy of My letters to Congress, which, in concert with Mister franklin’s longer dispatches will Give you a Sketch of European intelligences—Contrary minds have much delay’d an expedition which, I think, Should have been undertaken much Sooner—the kings of france and spain seem desirous of Carrying it on Before the winter—it May be however differed till next Spring, and the Siege of Gibraltar would be the only land expedition for the present Campaign—in some week’s time, when west india Successes will be Compar’d to these in europe My Gazettes and predictions will have a Greater degree of Certainty, But one Must not be a Conjuror to See that england is in Such a way that one may defy her to Get up again, and that an happy peace Bless’d with American independency will this or the ensuing Campaign be the Certain effect of the present war.
        As My private Circumstances are Somewhat interesting to your friendship, I will tell you, my dear General, that Since My last letter I have alwaïs been in this place, where head quarter had been fix’d—I was to disembark with the Grenadiers forming the van guard, and am therefore one of the first who will land on the English

Shore—the king’s own Regiment of dragoons, which he Gave me on my Return, was to embark at Brest, and join us a few days after the landing—from Count d’estaing’s expedition on the American Coasts, the Nation Raises Great expectations and very impatiently waits for intelligences—how unhappy I am to find myself so far from you on Such an occasion, you will easily Conceive—the impression of Sorrow Such a thought Gives me, Cannot be alleviated But By the Sense I have, that the General opinion of the turn warlike operations would take this Campaign, the ties of My duty towards My own country where My services had been employ’d for the expedition against england, and the hope I entertained of being here More useful to the Unites States, had not left me the choice in the party I Should take for this Campaign—I hope, My dear Sir, you will agree in opinion with me.
        Whatever may be Count d’estaing’s succès in America, it will Bring on new projects and operations—My ideas I lay’d Before Your excellency at fishkills—But permit me to tell you again how earnestly I wish to join You—nothing Could make me So delighted as the happiness of finishing the war under your orders—that I think if ask’d By you will be Granted to Congress and Your excellency—But be Certain, My dear General, that in any Situation, in Any Case, let me Act as a french or as an American officer, My first wish, My first pleasure will be to Serve again with you—however happy I am in france, however well treated By My Country and king, I have taken such an habit of being with you, and am tied to you, to america, to My fellow Soldiers By such an affection, that the moment when I will Sail for your Country, shall be one of the most wished for and the happiest in My life.
        from An American newspaper I find that a Certain english intelligence had been propagated through the United States—that at they head of fifteen hundred officers or non Commissioned officers I was Going to embark for America, and that with Soldiers of your army embodied under them, I wanted to teach Military discipline through the American Army—however Remoted I am from thinking of teaching My own Masters, and however distant from Such wiews was that Command in france whose end you very well know, I Could not help taking it as a Reflexion on the American Army—the english troops May Remember that on Some particular occasions, I have not been to lament the want of discipline and spirit in the troops I had the honor to Command—while we have But the Same British army to fight with, we need not looking out for any other improvement, But the same qualities, which have often enabl’d my felow american Soldier, to Give, instead of Receiving, pretty Good leçons to an ennemy whose

justly Reputed Courage added a new Reputation to American Bravery and Military Conduct.
        The above article, my dear General, I beg you will have printed in the Several news papers.
        As there is But a little time to write Before the Sailing of the vessel, I Cannot Remind of me the friends I have in the Army, unless your excellency is pleas’d to Make them thousand Compliments from one who heartily loves them, and whose first wish is to be again in theyr Compagny.
        I Congratulate you, My dear General, on the Spirited expedition of Stoney point, and am Glad it has added a new lustre to your arms.
        Be so kind, My dear friend, as to present My best Respects to Your lady—Mine Begs leave to be kindly Remembered to you and to her—thousand assurances of friendship waït from me on your family.
        oh, My dear General, how happy I Would be to embrace you again! With Such an affection as is above all expressions any language may furnish I have the honor to be very Respectfully My Good and Beloved General Your affectionate friend

          Lafayette


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 7–9 October 1779
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

          Dear sir.
          Philadelphia 7th[–9] October 1779.

        The day before yesterday I was made very happy by the receipt of Your Excellency’s Letter of the 29th Ulto. I had been for some time wishing for a good occasion to pay my respects, nor had subjects been wanting, but such as appeared to me worthy of Your Excellency’s attention were of so serious a cast, as to awe me into silence in more than one attempt, nor dare I even upon the present opening expatiate or be explicit. When I had the honor of seeing you in Town I expressed my apprehensions of calamitous events in a short contrast of gain & loss. Your Excellency will also remember my sentiments on the question of appreciation of our paper Money & the foundation on which I built the opinion which I had then the honor of delivering. I had not been long returned to this City when I discover’d there was no solidity in the intelligence alluded to; & our internal circumstances from that time have been descending from bad to worse, referring to the latter I hope we are now at our ne plus ultra. At length you have seen Sir, a Resolution to “stop the Press” as it is termed, an act which I ardently wished for in Augt 1777. on condition of necessary previos steps of taxation, had we then determined this important point our public debts foreign & domestic would have been at this day comparatively trifling but when the proposition even at a much later day & when we were overwhelmed with paper, was, to make that an Harbinger which ought to have been consecutive & secondary I found my self necessitated to dissent from it. We have pledged our honor that we will emit no more promisary Notes & are reduced to a dependence on contingent circumstances for supplies for carrying on the War & for supporting public Credit. we are now but beginning to call on the several States for their quota of 15 Million Dollars per Month from the 1st ffebruary to the 1st October next inclusive. I doubt the practicability the possibility of a compliance & my suspicions are strengthned by this observation, that those who were most anxious, most outrageously or blindly pressing for the premature determination, are most reluctant to bearing an equitable proportion of the burthen—’tis impossible says one—’tis impracticable says another, for my State to raise such a Sum in one Month. Should we fail

in this project & find an empty Treasury in the Month of March or earlier which I most feelingly dread, what will be the consequence?
        To reply in the mildest terms, much confusion & derangement of public affairs, peradventure commotions & convulsions in the Army, in the Country, & in the Cities—to repeat Emissions would be infamos & inefficacios—all Credit would be lost. For averting these impending evils vigoros Resolutions are absolutely necessary in the several States to comply fully & punctually with the requisitions of Congress & those must be supported by virtuos & patriotic exertions of Individuals, nor ought we to lose a moment or to wait till January for beginning the work. I shall say every thing I can think of to induce my Country distressed as it is, to contribute her part for the salvation of our Independence, but alas we have no fix’d principles for our guide, the requisition is barely 15 M. $ Month; our expenditure the lately voted subsistence to the Army included amounts fully to that Sum & the daily increasing prices of provisions deprives us of all ground for prospective calculation. Your Excellency is too well acquainted with the difficulties of procuring proper supplies of food for the Army, but are you apprized Sir, of the probability of our deficiency in Cloathing? You may have been told that ample quantities are expected from France if you place any reliance on such information, ’tis high time you should be undeceived & I esteem it a duty to my Country & an act of friendship to Your Excellency to assure you that our applications to our Ally for Clothing & Military Stores, which humanity foresight & vigilance would have sent forward in March last or earlier, were not embarked until the latter end of July or beginning of August. from this improvident delay we cannot, even hope to, receive those articles before January or ffebruary next, the application must undergo the necessary formalities at Court, admitting success there, Orders are to be issued, Clothing to be provided Ships prepared the Atlantic to be cross’d & a port to be entered at 3 or 4 hundred Miles distance from the Army in the very worst season for transportation. Can the several States supply the necessary wants & in proper time for saving our brave fellow Citizens from another Valley-forge scene? or, are we again & again to rely on the Chapter of accidents or the interposition of Heaven in favor of Men who will not make a proper use of means. these things unknown to some & unheeded by others who ought to be attentive & indeed answerable, were they declared abroad would alarm many an honest & zealous heart now wrap’d in profound security—If in this confidential communication I have offered any thing new Your Excellency who in every view, is peculiarly Interested in the happy existence of the Army & the event of the War, will make some advantages from the disclosure & in any case I am perfectly satisfied

there will be no unfavorable construction passed upon my motives—what I have said in private can have no tendency to sounding unnecessary alarms & yet in truth it appears to me almost time to rouse & call forth that virtuos spirit which led us into the present War & which is now benumned & motionless—upon our own virtues our final success depends—I am sure there still exists virtue enough scattered among us to Insure that success—I lament the prospect of a convulsion as necessary for collecting & bringing it into action.
        We have chosen Ministers Plenipotentiary for treating with the Courts of Madrid & London, the former was a necessary appointment, the latter if the Act be not unseasonable, the publicity of it I am afraid will be attended with pernicious effects, can we expect the pride of Great Britain will condescend to treat abruptly & directly with a revolted subject & immediately too after having refused the mediation of a Crown head, I entertain certain distrusts on this point which I wish could be communicated without the use of pen. the thing however is done & become notorious before this day in the Garrison at New York from whence I expect to see in a few days droll strictures & severe animadversions by some of Mister Rivington’s correspondents.
        I must now turn to Your Excellency’s Letter from which I have wandered perhaps too far. The Proclamation by His Britanic Majesty which has been lately published, implies an apprehension of a serious attack on his Kingdom, but neither my depth in politics nor in the secrets of the European Courts reach far enough to determine on the utility of one step beyond keeping that Kingdom alarmed & acting vigorosly against its Marine—but it seems to me a joke to say the English Fleet was blocked up in Torbay, which if I am not mistaken is as accessible as any part of the British Channel & as undefended except by the Fleet which may chance to ride there. a little time will enlighten us on these & other important subjects. I am seldom detected in anticipating events but I must confess that I feel an unusual anxiety to see our late King’s Speech to his Parliament at their Meeting which I suppose will be early in the present Month, I wish he may have an opportunity of undeclaring that Georgia is at his Peace. General Prevost’s ill success in south Carolina will however supply him with an unpalatable spice for the composition & I trust Count d’Estaing has added a still more bitter ingredient for a subsequent Message.
        Your Excellency’s Letter to General Lincoln will go forward by an Express to morrow, ’tis now the 9th. I have been three Mornings on this performance in scraps, I live at a considerable distance from the State House, have many Committees to attend & waste much of my time by a useless habit of punctuality.

        Colonel Laurens having intimated to me under the 3d September a design to return into Your Excellency’s service by Sea in Count d’Estaing’s ffleet, I have directed to him at Head Quarters, my Letter will be inclosed with this, & I am persuaded he will tell Your Excellency what I have said on his late appointment. I have not presumed to say, don’t go—but I beg the liberty upon second thoughts of leaving the Letter under a flying Seal until Your Excellency shall have perused it if you will be pleased to take that trouble. from the prospect abovemention’d I shall also return Your Excellency’s Letter for him under the present cover. I beg pardon Sir, for this long intrusion & subscribe with great truth Your Excellency’s Much obliged & most Obedient servant

          Henry Laurens


Title: From George Washington to Major Henry Lee, Jr., 7 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Lee, Henry Jr.

          Dear sir.
          Head Quarters West-point 7th October 1779.

        Your favor of the 3d inst. came to hand yesterday.
        I shall comply with your present ingagements to the spies, which you have promised to pay in specie: but as we have so little of this to spare for even the most pressing and important purposes within the

enemy’s lines—You will be careful to effect as much as possible with such other means as we have in our power; And as œconomical in all other expenditures as our circumstances are limited.
        It is an object at present particularly interesting to be well informed as to the enemy’s naval force—You will therefore be attentive to this, as well as to such other intelligence as may be of use.
        I have given a warrant to Captn Rudulph for the sum granted by Congress to the non-commissioned officers and privates concerned in the attack of Powles Hook. You will be pleased to distribute this money in proportion to the pay of the non-commissioned officers and privates, which was the manner observed in the case of Stoney-point. I am Dr Sir Your most obt servt

          Go: Washington

          P.S. You may in future, or while on your present command mark your letters private.
          I presume that you constantly keep an intelligent officer to observe the arrival or sailing of the enemy’s vessels—I wish to have his diary transmitted from time to time—say once a week—and more especially when any move extraordinary occurs in th⟨is line⟩.


Title: To George Washington from William Livingston, 7 October 1779
From: Livingston, William
To: Washington, George

          Dear Sir
          Trenton [N.J.] 7 Ocbr 1779 5 oClock P.M.

        I just now received your Excellencys Letter of the 4th respecting the Pilots—For Vandril I have enquired for a week past; but by the best Intelligence I can obtain he is gone on a privateering Voyage. for the others mentioned by your Excellency, with the addition of ⟨Sheror⟩ and ⟨Iscloline⟩, I shall dispatch Expresses early in the Morning.
        With the same Messenger I received your Excellencys requisition for Men & Provisions to co-operate with you & our Ally against the British at New york. The Council had already past a Bill for 4000 men almost exactly upon your Plan. But it meets with great

Obstruction in the Assembly, & they talk of rising this very night. I hope the Contents of your Excellency’s Letter will expel that absurd & ruinous measure from their Imagination. for if they do, there is no power in the State to bring out a single man, the whole Legislature being dissolved on that Event; & the Governor tho’ continuing in office till the Election having no authority to call out the militia, except in the case of an Invasion of this State. I trust however that voluntiers would be procurable to the number your Excellency mentions without any Difficulty. But the Business of the Supplies gives me the greatest Anxiety. your Excellencys Troops at West point are already strenghtened on that Account; the western Army will soon return without Provision⟨s.⟩ the addition of the Militia of different States will require a proportionable augmentation of Supplies; and as for the Count⟨’s⟩ Squadron, we know that Frenchmen eat at least twice as much bread as other people—What I can do, I will do, and never with a better heart, tho’ always I hope with a good one. God Almighty bless & preserve you. With the greatest Esteem I have the Honour to be Dear Sir your Excellencys most obedient & very humble Servt

          Wil: Livingston

          P.S. Your Excellency will be pleased for a fortnight to come, to direct to me at Raritan.


Title: From George Washington to Jeremiah Powell, 7 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Powell, Jeremiah

          Sir
          Head Quarters West Point 7th October 1779

        I had the honor of addressing you on the 4th Inst. upon the subject of an expected cooperation with His Excellency Count D’Estaing against the common enemy. Upon consulting Major Genl Greene Qr Mr Genl and Brigr Genl Knox commanding the Artillery, I am apprehensive that we shall fall short in two most essential

Articles—Gun powder—and Tents. Of the former—we have lately been much disappointed, by the failure of the arrival of a supply from the West Indies. You and the Gentlemen of the Council must be so fully sensible of the consequences which would follow the interruption of our operations for want of powder, even for one day, that I shall make no apology for requesting a loan from the State of Massachusetts of as much of that Article, from their private Magazines, as can possibly be spared, should an operation of any consequence be undertaken in conjunction with the french fleet and Army. General Greene calculates the probable deficiency of Tents at 1500. Should it be possible for the State to furnish the Continent with that number, it will render a most essential public service, and I will engage that they shall be replaced or paid for as may be most agreeable.
        Should a joint operation against New York be determined upon—The service of a number of Men, well acquainted with the management of Boats, will be most material indeed, I know not how we should be able to make a descent without them. It is the opinion of some Gentlemen, with whom I have conversed, that it would be possible to engage a number of sailors at Boston and the other Coast Towns in the State for this purpose. Should the measure be found practicable, I should esteem it as a favor if the Council would undertake the raising of a number, not exceeding one thousand, with a proper proportion of Officers. The Men to be engaged to the last of December unless the service should admit of their discharge sooner, and both Officers and Men to draw the pay of the Navy. Should we, as I hope we shall if we operate, command the navigation of the sound, the Men may be brought from Bedford or some part of Rhode Island by Water—Your answer to the several points contained in this letter as early as possible will oblige me much. I have the honor to be with great Respect Sir.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 7 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)

          My Lord.
          Head Quarters West-point 7th Octbr 1779.

        I have been duly honored with your Lordships letter of the 5th; and the observations that were inclosed. I shall not fail should we be fortunate enough to have it in our power to enter upon such an undertaking as your Lordship has supposed, to pay them a proper attention and I have to request such further suggestions as may occur to your Lordship on this subject. We have however no certainty of the Counts designs, or how far he may mean to extend his operations this way.
        I am this moment favored with yours of the 4th.
        It does not appear to me that Paramus is a situation calculated to answer the purposes which we have more immediately in view particularly the support of the Light Infantry, and your relation to the succour of this post. We are not justified in over looking these objec⟨ts.⟩ Your Lordship will therefore be pleased to take such measures as may most effectually answer these purposes, attending at the same time as much as possible to the object mentioned in a former letter.
        I wish your Lordship a better state of health; and have no objection to your journey to Baskinridge. I am my Lord your Lordships most obt & humble ⟨st⟩.


Title: From George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., 7 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan Sr.

          Sir,
          Head Quarters West Point Octor 7th 1779

        I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 4th instant upon the subject of an expected cooperation with the Count D’Estaing against the common Enemy. I find upon a consultation with Brigadier General Knox, that the probable expenditure of ammunition, should such an event take place, will be more than our Continental Magazines are likely to afford—You must be so fully sensible of the consequences which would follow the interruption of our operations for want of powder, even for one day, that I shall make no apology for requesting a loan from the State of Connecticut, of as much of that article, from their private Magazines, as they can possibly spare, should any enterprise of consequence, in conjunction with the fleet and army of His Most Christian Majesty be undertaken. I have upon every occasion, so fully experienced your Excellency’s zeal and attention to the concerns of the general interest, that I am convinced of your using all your influence with the State in obtaining the grant of this my request—I shall be glad to know what reliance I may have upon you and what quantity I may expect. I have the honor to be With the greatest respect & esteem Your Excellency’s Most Obet servant

          Go: Washington

          P.s. I have this moment been honored with yours of the 2d—the contents of which afford me great pleasure—Your Excellency may depend on the earliest intelligence of the Counts approach—I beg leave to refer you to mine of the 4th for the particulars required in yours of the 2d.


Title: General Orders, 8 October 1779
From: Washington, George
To:

          Head-Quarters Moore’s House [West Point]Friday October 8th 1779.
          Parole Norlingen—  C. Signs Oleron Padron—

        The fatigue parties which go on in the morning to take their breakfast with them; At twelve they are to be relieved by an equal number who are to remain on duty ’till twilight.

        The North-Carolina troops will resume their former position on the Island and the regiments of Pennsylvania rejoin their respective brigade.
        Tomorrow the troops will begin to exercise in the following manner.
        Two regiments by brigade will exercise daily from 9 to 11 ôclock in the morning, and from three to half past four in the afternoon; For this purpose the duty is to be done regimentally as far as possible.
        Each regiment will form a battalion as complete as possible and absolutely not under the number of men fixed in the Ordinance.
        Each Colonel will himself command his battalion and will perform the following exercise.
        1st—The Manual Exercise.
        2ndly—To wheel by Platoons from the right or left—to march the regiment in the ordinary step—to form it again on the same place which it has quitted.
        3rdly—To advance in battalion in the ordinary step.
        4thly—To retire in battalion in the same step.
        5thly—To fire by Platoons, Division & Battalion standing—The Inspectors will assist in the Exercise and will see that nothing is done contrary to the principles established in the regulations.
        The Honorable the Congress on the 25th of September were pleased to pass the following resolves, and His Excellency the President adds that, “The important business in which Congess have been engaged, has prevented an earlier attention to the brilliant action at Powle’s-Hook.[”]
        Resolved—That the thanks of Congress be given to Majr General Lord Stirling for the judicious measures taken by him to forward the Enterprise and to secure the retreat of the Party.
        Resolved—That the thanks of Congress be given to Major Lee for the remarkable prudence, address and bravery displayed by him on the occasion, and that they approve the humanity shewn in circumstances prompting to severity as honorable to the Arms of the United States and correspondent to the noble principles on which they were assumed.
        Resolved—That Congress entertain a high sense of the discipline fortitude and spirit manifested by the officers and soldiers under the command of Major Lee in the march, action and retreat, and while with singular satisfaction they acknowledge the merit of these gallant men, they feel an additional pleasure by considering them as part of an Army in which very many brave officers and soldiers have proved by their cheerful performance of every duty, under every difficulty that they ardently wish to give the truly glorious examples they now receive.

        Resolved—That Congress justly esteem the military caution so happily combined with daring activity by Lieutenants McCallister and Rudolph in leading on the Forlorn-Hope.
        Resolved—That a Medal of Gold emblematical of this affair be struck under the direction of the Board of Treasury and presented to Major Lee.
        Resolved—That a Brevet and the Pay and Subsistence of Captains be given to Lieutt McCallister and Lieutt Rudolph respectively.
        Resolved—That the sum of fifteen thousand dollars be put into the hands of Major Lee to be by him distributed among the non commissioned officers and soldiers of the detachment he commanded at the attack and surprise of Powle’s Hook in such manner as the Commander in Chief shall direct.
        Resolved—That the Pay and Subsistence of Captains be allowed to Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox, the officers who led on the Forlorn-Hope in the late attack on Stony-Point & also to Mr Archer, the bearer of the General’s letter & Volunteer Aide, to commence from the date of their respective commissions of Brevets voted by Congress the 26th day of July last.