Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 7 June 1787
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 7th. June 1787.
Since my return to Richmond, which place I left soon after the Governor set out, I have yours of the 27th. from Philadelphia. Mr. Dorhman who has arrived here within a few days past informed us your information from New York of other Delegates coming forward was well founded as you had ten States represented when he came away. I entertain hopes from the disposition of the Members convened that harmony will prevail and such improvements of the fœderal system adopted as will afford us a prospect of peace and happiness. I am however strongly impressed with fears, that your labours in Convention, though wisely conducted and concluded, will in the end be frustrated by some of the States under the influence of interests operating for particular rather than general we[l]fare. Be this as it may I cannot doubt but the meeting in Philadelphia will (composed as it is of the best and wisest persons in the Union) establish some plan that will be generally approved.
The Lieutenant Governor tells me he does and shall continue to write to the Governor once a week at least. I shall do the same to you if I can furnish any sort of materials for a letter worth communicating. At any rate I may support a correspondence by inclosing you the News papers if I can entertain you with nothing more interesting.

A letter from Mr. A. Lee which the Governor has sent us intimates the propriety of proceeding withot. delay (if the Executive have any money at their command) to purchase up continental securities, which are now low, but which he seems to think will, (if the Convention do any thing that will probably meet the approbation of the States, and the Sales of the lands by Congress take place,) rapidly rise in value. He says also that other States are doing this while it is to be effected on easy terms. I wish for information as to the fact, and your Sentiments so far as you conjecture respecting the rise of the value of these papers. We have forbid any further advances of Specie to the Commr. of the U.S. untill we can be assured the proportion of indents will be admitted. Those on the requisition of the last year have been withheld consequently it is too late for the present collection to furnish a proportion of them, and we understand the construction of the Treasury board of the U.S. is that under the requisitions of 84 & 85, the indents issued under each requisition can be received in payment of each and none of the one be admitted in the other, and so of the last year, had they come forward; and of the year 85 none to be recd. but such as were in hands of the State Treasurer the 1st. Janry 87 and of 86 none but such as shod. be in his hands by the 1st. July 87. This was not I believe so understood here by the requisitions, and if they were so intended, wch. may Probably have been the case, a point so material for the States to be acquainted with shod. have been clearly, and not doubtfully expressed. We have letters from several of the County Lieutenants of the Kentucke district of Indian incursions and depredations many persons killed and horses carried off, of the families many of them on the frontier coming in particularly in Jefferson. These letters are sent to the Delegates in Congress. We have authorised measures of defence only, well knowing an adherence to the Militia law our best Policy as a State but the measures of the U.S. should go further whenever there is reason for it. Our informations seem to call for such measures or I am persuaded very great distress will attend the Kentucke district. We hear nothing of or from Mr. Butler or the Commander of the Troops of the U. St. My Compliments to the Governor. I beg your excuse as I really had forgot your former request abt. the 2 books. It shall be attended to now but you will inform me where they are to be sent.


Title: Election of the Senate, [7 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[7 June 1787]

   Dickinson moved that the members of the Senate be elected by the state legislatures.

Mr. Madison. If the motion (of Mr. Dickenson) should be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed from Mr. D. who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number. The example of the Roman Tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert; were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite factions, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters; the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political authority lodged in them the smaller the number the greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one.

   Ms (DLC).

   King’s version:

   “Madison—We are about to form a national Govt. and therefore must abandon Ideas founded alone in the plan of confedn. the Senate ought to come from, & represent, the Wealth of the nation, and this being the Rule, the amendment cannot be adopted—besides the numbers will be too large—the Proofs of History establish this position, that delegated power will have the most weight & consequence in the hands of a few—when the Roman Tribunes were few, they checked the Senate; when multiplied, they divided, were weak, ceased to be that Guard to the people which was expected in their institution” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 158).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Maddison—If each State retained its Sovereignty an Equality of Suffrage would be proper, but not so now” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 38).

[7 June 1787]
Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr. D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice wd. be made? If an election by the people, or thro’ any other channel than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived thro’ that channel than from the people thro’ some other. The great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say that the Natl. Legislature witht. a proper check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.

   Ms (DLC).


Title: To James Madison from the Reverend James Madison, 11 June 1787
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

Dear Col.
June 11th. 1787
I am greatly indebted to you for the Books you were so good as to send me by Mr Griffin, particularly the Observations of Mr Adams; not however that he has made a Convert of me, any more than I trust, he has of you, to what appears to be the secret Design of his Work. Is it probable, my dear Friend, that all that Trouble was taken, & Shew of Learning displayed, merely to refute the Opinion of Mr. Turgot—an opinion suffly. innocent in itself, and which had no, or but very few Advocates in America, if we judge from the Govts. wch. have been established. Mr. Adams is greatly mortified that our Executives have not a Negative upon the Legislatures—and thinks the British System of Govt., beyond Comparison, the wisest & the best ever yet invented. He must wish then to introduce a similar Govt. into America. His Executive (wch. he also thinks shd be single) must be a King, the Senate—Lords, the House of Delegates—Plebeians or Commons. Thus under the Mask of attacking M. Turgot, he seems insidiously attempting, notwithstanding now & then a saving Clause, to overturn our present Constitutions, or at least to sow the Seeds of Discontent. I beleive, if this Supposition be just, it is the first Instance wherein a public Minister at a foreign Court, has been foremost in openly & avowedly plotting Revolutions in the Govt. he represents. I fear his Optics have been too weak to withstand the Glare of European Courts. Their Air may have corrupted the plain Republican, & lest he should be farther Mortified, I think Congress wd. do well, to give him as speedily as possible, the oppy. of breathing once more the purer American Air. Jefferson thanks his God, that the Days of Kings, Nobles & Priests are almost past. Adams must trust in his, that they will be seen to rise in America with new Splendor; which Sentiment is the most worthy of a Man of common Sense, I will not say political Knowledge, we need not determine. The Truth is I beleive—the Outlines of the American Govts. are as well drawn, in Order to promote public & private Happiness, & to secure that greatest possible Portion of Liberty which we have so successfully contended for, as human sagacity could possibly devise. These Outlines only require to be skilfully filled up—perhaps in some Cases to be somewhat extended; but as to a Renunciation of the original Plan, I hope in God, no honest, independant Man will hesitate. The least that ought to be done surely, is to make a fair Experi[men]t. This requires Time—particularly as we may reasonably expect that the rising Generation will be much better Actors upon the republican Theatre than their Predecessors. Besides, Time is essentially necessary to give Force & Energy to any Govts. Nothing is more illusory on most Occasions, than the Use of metaphorical Language. I question whether, this Balance, wch. Adams talks so much about, has not served somewhat to mislead him. Governments must be properly balanced. But a Balance must be supported or held up, & there must also be something to be weighed in each Scale. Hence the Idea of a Monarch, King or Executive with negative Powers, holding in his all powerful Hand, the Beam—& Lords & Commons dancing up & down in each Scale, untill his Majesty takes as many of his good People out of one Scale, & throws them into the other, as will produce the desired Equipoise. Then arises a goodly Govt. admirably balanced.
There is another Circumstance of much more Importance which these Admirers of British Govt. seem entirely to forget. There did exist in that Country, & indeed throughout both antient & modern Europe, from the earliest Periods, this spurious Race of Men called Nobles. They became so firmly established either thro Power or Prejudice, that to eradicate them was impossible; so that, in settling the British Govt.—the only Question could be, how shall we moderate this enormous Evil as much as possible. It could not be removed, & therefore it was wise to adopt a System, by wch. the least probable Injury should be sustained from it. Perhaps the British Govt. may be considered as having fortunely adopted that which would best temper an Evil inseperable from the Nation. But surely, notwithstanding what Adams may dream, & De Lome think, it would be as rational for a healthy, robust Mountaineer to take a moderate Dose of Arsenic, or something else, in Order to reduce himself to the Temperament of a Lowlander, as for America, free & uncorrupted as she now is, to encourage a System by wch. a Race of Men might be gradually introduced, which must eventually prove a certain Poison both to public & private Happiness, tho’ she might be assimilated to that Idol—Great B. Fortunate as we are in knowing no Distinction amongt Men, but such as Nature has established; singularly fortunate indeed, in being free from the most absurd & degrading Differences amongst Citizens—Differences which Ignorance & Poverty gave Birth to, & wch. Nothing but Folly & Pride would introduce or maintain—I trust the Patriots of America will ever evince to their Country & the World, not only the Resolution to maintain our present Forms of Govt.—pure as they originated—but that they will discover the Means of giving them that Energy wch. a Govt. of Law requires—& that Permanence which, if possible, may be everlasting.
Thus have I said twice as much as I intended, or need have said to you. But the Subject is interesting & you see the Impressions wch. the first Reading of the Defence has made upon me. Besides, I find even here, the Publication of that Book is considered as a Sanction for the open Avowal of Opinions wch tend effectually to undermine or stab our Republic.
As to Mr Smith’s Essay, for wch. I am also much obliged—as far as I have yet seen of it, it appears very doubtful whether he has given Buffon the Credit he ought to have done—or whether a better Defence of the same Opinion may not there be found, it is however agreable & ingenious. My Wife desires to be affly. rem[em]bered, as well as Dr Col Yr most sincere Friend
J Madison
I hope our Friends the Govr & MC. are well.


Title: To James Madison from John Dawson, [12 June] 1787
From: Dawson, John
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
[12 June 1787]
After an absence of near three weeks I have just return’d to this place and am favourd with your letter of the 27 of May. The prospect of a general convention of the States appears to me very faint, and I wish to be informd, whether the states assembled, or those that probably will meet, will proceed to any business. I apprehend that nothing decisive can be done, without the concurrence of the whole.
I have lately been on the south side of James River—the people, in general appear very much discontented, and I realy fear that a majority of that part of the state are in favour of paper money—neighbours to the Carolinians, (whose money had depreciated one hundred pr Cent—) they have contra[c]ted a similar way of thinking. And inattentive to the future honour and interest of the state they are friends to any measure, which will afford present relief. In Henry county the high Sheriff has not given security for the collection of the taxes, and I was told it wou’d be dangerous for any person to offer. Of course no collection goes on, and they people appear happy in this expedient of evading payment. In King William, the night before their May court, the court house with all the records of the county, was burnt down. Some circumstances prove that it was designedly done.
You, I know, are oppos’d to the plan of incorporating towns, which in this state, has been so much in vogue, for some years past. The people in this county, convinc’d of the bad policy, intend to petition the next assembly for a repeal of the law incorporating this town. I have promisd to forward their wishes, and will thank you for any information you can give me on this subject, together with your reasons for being unfriendly to them. Are any towns in the Eastern states incorporated? Is Philadelphia? Was it before the war and how long?
I had the pleasure of seeing your Father a few days since. He is very well.


Title: Term of the First Branch of the Legislature, [12 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[12 June 1787]

   Jenifer proposed a three-year term for members of the first branch of Congress.

Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to & from the seat of national business.

   Ms (DLC).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison—Instability of popular Government his Reason for wishing three Years. “Distance of Extremities of Union renders it necessary. The Lessons the Representatives have to learn another Reason” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 48).

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison was for the last amendment—observing that it will give it stability, and induce gentlemen of the first weight to engage in it” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 220).

[12 June 1787]

   Gerry, replying to JM’s first speech, warned that the people of New England would insist upon annual elections.

Mr. Madison observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it wd. be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; & still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper Governmt. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself. The respectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and All the most enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of Citizens will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.

   Ms (DLC).

   JM heavily deleted nine or ten words following and completed the sentence as it stands.

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison. The people’s opinions cannot be known, as to the particular modifications which may be necessary in the new government—In general they believe there is something wrong in the present system that requires amendment; and he could wish to make the republican system the basis of the change—because if our amendments should fail of securing their happiness, they will despair it can be done in this way, and incline to monarchy” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 220–21).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison—Public Opinion fluctuating—it has no Standard—is changing Rapidly.

   “Local Attachments and temporary Opinions ought to be laid aside” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 49).


Title: Salaries for Members of the First Branch of the Legislature, [12 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[12 June 1787]

   The clause of the fourth resolution providing for the members “to receive liberal stipends” was under consideration.

Mr. Madison moves to insert the words “& fixt.” He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the Natl. legislature to be provided for by the State Legisls: because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat or some other article of which the average price throughout a reasonable period precedn’g might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard.


Title: From James Madison to Ambrose Madison, 13 June 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, Ambrose

Dear Brother
Philada. June 13th. 1787
Your favor of the 28th. of April, the first I have recd. from you, has but just come to hand. It gave me the first information of the indisposition of my Father. I hope he has since fully recovered, and flatter myself the more that this is the case, as you or some one else would not have left me so long unapprized of the Contrary.
I was disappointed at the arrival of 8 Hhds only. Tobo. only of the best quality had sold as high as 45/. of this currency. Old Tobo. will still fetch that price. Mine is being now sold for 42/6. As this is considerably better than the Va. price, I wish you to lose no time in forwarding the 2 remaining Hhds. If you chuse to add others on your own account or that of any body else you may do it. Send none but of the best quality. All below that sells for 32/. only.
The event of the Election was contrary to my expectation as far as it related to Majr. Moore. Mr. Wm. Strother gave me the first acct. of it.
The Convention have been sitting several weeks. Eleven States are on the floor, including between 40 & 50 members. The rules adopted oblige me to disappoint the curiosity you will naturally feel to know something of their proceedings. I think the Session will be of considerable length. Remember me affly. to all friends. Adieu Yrs. &c.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: Method of Choosing the Judiciary, [13 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[13 June 1787]

   Charles Pinckney and Sherman moved that the judges of the supreme tribunal be appointed by the national legislature.

Mr. Madison objected to an appt. by the whole Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The canditate [sic] who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.


Title: Power of Originating Money Bills in the Legislature, [13 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[13 June 1787]

   Gerry moved to prohibit the Senate from originating money bills.

Mr. Madison observed that the Commentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st. branch. If they sd. have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it wd. be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum wd. be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.


Title: Reply to the New Jersey Plan, [19 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[19 June 1787]

   On 13 June the Committee of the Whole reported to the convention the amended Virginia Plan. Consideration of that report was postponed on 14 June at the request of Paterson in order that the small states might have time to prepare a plan “purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 240). Paterson introduced the New Jersey Plan the next day. Yates’s notes leave the impression that JM was trying to block consideration of the small states’ proposals by moving “for the report of the committee [the Virginia Plan], and the question may then come on whether the convention will postpone it in order to take into consideration the system now offered.” However, according to the Journal and Lansing, JM only moved to commit Paterson’s resolutions to the Committee of the Whole (ibid., I, 246, 241; Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 52). The convention agreed to consider the New Jersey Plan and the amended Virginia Plan in the Committee of the Whole “in order to place the two plans in due comparison” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 242). The next three days of debate were taken up with extensive discussion of the two proposals. After JM’s speech, the New Jersey Plan was rejected in favor of the amended Virginia Plan.

Mr. Madison. Much stress had been laid by some gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection. One characteristic was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised not on the people individually; but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was that a federal Govt. derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect. and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs. were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and the plan of Mr. P. intended no change in this particular.
It had been alledged (by Mr. Patterson), that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? Does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it cannot be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole, which the Gentn: from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States, What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional requisition of Congs.—and yielded no farther to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patterson’s plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1. to preserve the Union. 2. to provide a Governmt. that will remedy the evils felt by the States both in their united and individual capacities. Examine Mr. P.s plan, & say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.
1. Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrouled as ever.
2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as well in every other confederated republic antient and Modern. By the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them. In like manner no two or more States can form among themselves any treaties &[c]. without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga. & Maryd. in one instance—Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise troops in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most scrupulous observance. Has not Massts, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she not now augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprize Congs. of Her intention? In fine have we not seen the public land dealt out to Cont. to bribe her acquiescence in the decree constitutionally awarded agst. her claim on the territory of Pena.? For no other possible motive can account for the policy of Congs. in that measure? If we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achæan confederacies among the antients; and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns, tracing their analogy to the U. States—in the constitution and intent of their federal authorities—in the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these authorities; and to bring confusion & ruin on the whole. He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat——son besides omitting a controul over the States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1. Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the legislatures. It could not therefore render the Acts of Congs. in pursuance of their powers, even legally paramount to the Acts of the States. 2. It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only—even in the criminal cases enumerated. The necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals. Of what avail cd. an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective Constitutions the right of pardg. How could this be taken from them by a legislative ratification only?
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virga. & Maryland which give a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money & other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one another being each of them either Debtors or Creditor; The Creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating acts on this subject which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the tranquility of the Union. The plan of Mr. Patterson, not giving even a negative on the Acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects agst. each other.
4. Will it secure the internal tranquility of the States themselves? The insurrections in Massts. admonished all the States of the danger to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. P. contained no provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point. According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous. According to fact & experience, a minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority. 1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill & habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2. One third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of the established Government. 3. Where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.
5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the U.S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail within the States individually as well as those which affect them collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full share in the motives which produced the present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and animadverted on 1. the multiplicity of the laws passed by the several States. 2. the mutability of their laws. 3. the injustice of them. 4. the impotence of them: observing that Mr. Patterson’s plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils; and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigences of the Community.
6. Will it secure the Union agst. the influence of foreign powers over its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the Achæans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: Among the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia: And in the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr. Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the will of the particular States, left the door open for the like pernicious machinations among ourselves.
7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to Mr. Pattersons plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them. In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if they were willing to bear this burden, no others had a right to complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently unrepresented in Congs. were not the larger States. He reminded the convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden of maintaining a Representation in Congs. During a considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen & Resident of Pena. and held an office in his own State incompatible with an appointment from it to Congs. During another period, the same State was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penna. and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been intended to avoid the burden of supporting delegates from their own State. But whatever might have been the cause, was not in effect the vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it? In the 2d. place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic Confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb wch. could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.
8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful; but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining it at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen. Either the States must remain individually independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed among them. In the first event would the small States be more secure agst. the ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a general Government pervading with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part agst. every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would confederate with them on the principle of the present confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States, than are proposed in the scheme of Mr. Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by both the gentlemen from N. Jersey, (Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson) that it would not be just to allow Virga. which was 16 times as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virga. 16 times as many votes. The expedient proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into one mass and a new partition be made into 13 equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe (K. of France), directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic Ministers (Mr. Neckar) that any age has produced, to equalize in some points only the different usages & regulations of the different provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of the States, to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real; would not a particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety. If N. Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessaryly form a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would be lessened, by confining it to themselves. The prospect of many new States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. If they shd. be entitled to vote according to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 20 June 1787
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris June 20. 1787.
I wrote you last on the 30th. of Jan. with a postscript of Feb. 5. Having set out the last day of that month to try the waters of Aix, and been journeying since till the 10th. inst. I have been unable to continue my correspondence with you. In the mean time I have received your several favors of Feb. 15. Mar. 18. 19. & Apr. 23. The last arrived here about the 25th. of May, while those of Mar. 18. & 19. tho’ written five weeks earlier arrived three weeks later. I mention this to shew you how incertain is the conveyance thro’ England.
The idea of separating the executive business of the confederacy from Congress, as the judiciary is already in some degree, is just & necessary. I had frequently pressed on the members individually, while in Congress, the doing this by a resolution of Congress for appointing an Executive committee to act during the sessions of Congress, as the Committee of the states was to act during their vacations. But the referring to this Committee all executive business as it should present itself, would require a more persevering self-denial than I supposed Congress to possess. It will be much better to make that separation by a federal act. The negative proposed to be given them on all the acts of the several legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Primâ facie I do not like it. It fails in an essential character, that the hole & the patch should be commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment. Not more than 1. out of 100. state-acts concern the confederacy. This proposition then, in order to give them 1. degree of power which they ought to have, gives them 99. more which they ought not to have, upon a presumption that they will not exercise the 99. But upon every act there will be a preliminary question[:] Does this act concern the confederacy? And was there ever a proposition so plain as to pass Congress without a debate? Their decisions are almost always wise; they are like pure metal. But you know of how much dross this is the result. Would not an appeal from the state judicatures to a federal court, in all cases where the act of Confederation controuled the question, be as effectual a remedy, & exactly commensurate to the defect. A British creditor, e.g. sues for his debt in Virginia; the defendant pleads an act of the state excluding him from their courts; the plaintiff urges the Confederation & the treaty made under that, as controuling the state law; the judges are weak enough to decide according to the views of their legislature. An appeal to a federal court sets all to rights. It will be said that this court may encroach on the jurisdiction of the state courts. It may. But there will be a power, to wit Congress, to watch & restrain them. But place the same authority in Congress itself, and there will be no power above them to perform the same office. They will restrain within due bounds a jurisdiction exercised by others much more rigorously than if exercised by themselves. I am uneasy at seeing that the sale of our Western lands is not yet commenced. That precious fund for the immediate extinction of our debt will I fear be suffered to slip thro’ our fingers. Every delay exposes it to events which no human foresight can guard against. When we consider the temper of the people of that country, derived from the circumstances which surround them, we must suppose their separation possible at every moment. If they can be retained til their governments become settled & wise, they will remain with us always, and be a precious part of our strength & of our virtue. But this affair of the Missisipi by shewing that Congress is capable of hesitating on a question which proposes a clear sacrifice of the western to the maritime states will with difficulty be obliterated. The proposition of my going to Madrid to try to recover there the ground which has been lost at New York by the concession of the vote of seven states I should think desperate. With respect to myself weighing the pleasure of the journey & bare possibility of success in one scale, and the strong probability of failure and the public disappointment directed on me in the other, the latter preponderates. Add to this that jealousy might be excited in the breast of a person who could find occasions of making me uneasy.
The late changes in the ministry here excite considerable hopes. I think we gain in them all. I am particularly happy at the reentry of Malsherbes into the council. His knolege, his integrity render his value inappreciable, and the greater to me because while he had no views of office we had established together the most unreserved intimacy. So far too I am pleased with Montmorin. His honesty proceeds from the heart as well as the head and therefore may be more surely counted on. The king loves business oeconomy order & justice. He wishes sincerely the good of his people. He is irascible rude & very limited in his understanding[,] religious bordering only on bigotry. He has no mistress loves his queen and is too much governed by her. She is capricious like her brother and governed by him devoted to pleasure and expence not remarkable for any other vices or virtues. Unhappily the king shews a propensity for the pleasures of the table. That for drink has increased lately or at least it is become more known. For European news in general I will refer you to my letter to Mr. Jay. Is it not possible that the occurrences in Holland may excite a desire in many of leaving that country & transferring their effects out of it? may make an opening for shifting into their hands the debts due to this country, to it’s officers & farmers? It would be surely eligible. I believe Dumas, if put on the watch, might alone suffice: but surely if mr. Adams should go when the moment offers. Dumas has been in the habit of sending his letters open to me to be forwarded to Mr. Jay. During my absence they passed through Mr. Short’s hands who made extracts from them by which I see he has been recommending himself and me for the money negociations in Holland. It might be thought perhaps that I have encouraged him in this. Be assured, my dear Sir, that no such idea ever entered my head. On the contrary it is a business which would be the most disagreeable to me of all others, & for which I am the most unfit person living. I do not understand bargaining nor possess the dexterity requisite to make them. On the other hand Mr. A. whom I expressly and sincerely recommended, stands already on ground for that business which I could not gain in years. Pray set me to rights in the minds of those who may have supposed me privy to this proposition. En passant, I will observe with respect to Mr. Dumas that the death of the C. de V. places Congress more at their ease how to dispose of him. Our credit here has been ill treated here in public debate, and our debt deemed apocriphal. We should try to transfer this debt elsewhere, & leave nothing capable of exciting ill thoughts between us. I shall mention in my letter to mr. Jay a disagreeable affair in which Mr. Barclay has been thrown into at Bordeaux. An honester man cannot be found, nor a slower nor more indecisive one. His affairs too are so embarrassed and desperate that the public reputation is every moment in danger of being compromitted with him. He is perfectly amiable & honest with all this.
By the next packet I shall be able to send you some books as also your watch & pedometer. The two last are not yet done. To search for books and forward them to Havre will require more time than I had between my return & the departure of this packet. You did perfectly right as to the paiment by the Mr. Fitzhughs. Having been a witness heretofore to the divisions in Congress on the subject of their foreign ministers, it would be a weakness in me to suppose none with respect to myself, or to count with any confidence on the renewal of my commission, which expires on the 10th day of March next: and the more so as, instead of requiring the disapprobation of 7. states as formerly, that of one suffices for a recall when Congress consists of only 7. states, 2 when of 8. &c which I suppose to be habitually their numbers at present. Whenever I leave this place, it will be necessary to begin my arrangements 6. months before my departure: and these, once fairly begun and under way, and my mind set homewards, a change of purpose could hardly take place. If it should be the desire of Congress that I should continue still longer, I could wish to know it at farthest by the packet which will sail from New York in September. Because were I to put off longer the quitting my house, selling my furniture &c I should not have time left to wind up my affairs: and having once quitted, and sold off my furniture, I could not think of establishing myself here again. I take the liberty of mentioning this matter to you not with a desire to change the purpose of Congress, but to know it in time. I have never fixed in my own mind the epoch of my return so far as shall depend on myself, but I never suppose it very distant. Probably I shall not risk a second vote on this subject. Such trifling things may draw on one the displeasure of one or two states, & thus submit one to the disgrace of a recall.
I thank you for the Paccan nuts which accompanied your letter of March. Could you procure me a copy of the bill for proportioning crimes & punishments in the form in which it was ultimately rejected by the house of delegates? Young Mr. Bannister desired me to send him regularly the Mercure de France. I will ask leave to do this thro’ you, & that you will adopt such method of forwarding them to him as will save him from being submitted to postage, which they would not be worth. As a compensation for your trouble you will be free to keep them till you shall have read them. I am with sentiments of the most sincere esteem Dear Sir Your friend & servt
Th: Jefferson


Title: Relationship between Federal and State Governments, [21 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[21 June 1787]

   Having rejected the New Jersey Plan, the convention now was considering the amended Virginia Plan as reported out of the Committee of the Whole on 13 June. The resolution calling for a legislature with two branches was under debate. Johnson argued the small states’ view that it was necessary to give each state an equal vote in the legislature in order to preserve state sovereignty against the encroachment of the national government.

Mr. Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment from the Genl. Govt. than from the State Govts. 2. that the mischeif from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than to usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will be said that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency, that the genl. Govt. will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the Govts. of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Genl. Legislature, and the States reduced to corporations dependent on the Genl. Legislature; Why shd. it follow that the Genl. Govt. wd. take from the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavored to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a general Govt. to State Govts. is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary agst. encroachments of the State Govts. on the Genl. Govt. than of the latter on the former. The great objection made agst. an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Genl. Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not agst. the probable abuse of the general power, but agst. the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of Country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency of the Genl. Govt. itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the genl. Govt. to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the State Govts. the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of America: supposing therefore a tendency in the genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse of the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Govts. towards an independence on the General Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the cheif motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.


Title: Election of the First Branch of the Legislature, [21 June] 1787
From: King, Rufus
To:

[21 June 1787]

   Charles Cotesworth Pinckney moved that the members of the first branch of the legislature “‘instead of being elected by the people, shd. be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct’” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 358).

Wilson & Madison
Agt. the Election by the Legislatures and in favor of one by the People—the Election by the States will introduce a State Influence, their interest will oppose that of the Genl. Govt: the Legislators will be not only Electors of the members of the House—but they will manage the affairs of the States—The mode of Election may be essential to the Election, this may be different in the several States—if the Legislatures appt. they will instruct, and thereby embarrass the Delegate—not so if the Election is by the people—there will be no difficulty in their Election. The Returns may be made to the Legislatures of the several States—They may judge of contested Elections.


Title: Term of the First Branch of the Legislature, [21 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[21 June 1787]

   Ellsworth moved to substitute annual for triennial elections in the first branch of the legislature.

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so: he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of Governmt.; confiding that their absence would not affect them. The members of Congs. had done this with few instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new Members who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.


Title: To James Madison from Philip Mazzei, 22 June 1787
From: Mazzei, Philip
To: Madison, James

Caro e Stimato Amico,
Parigi, 22. Giugno 1787.
Alquanto infermo di corpo, e più di spirito, vi scrivo in fretta pochi versi, per ringraziarvi delle tante prove d’amicizia che mi avete dato finora, per pregarvi di continovarmele in riguardo al mio bisogno più che al mio merito, e per includervi quella porzione del mio libro che è già stampata. Ò ricevuto, a poca distanza l’una dall’altra, le 3 lettere che mi avete favorito da New-York, delle quali mi ricordo il contenuto, sebbene non l’abbia presenti onde trascriverne le date. Sul particolare di Dohrman, sarà per me un gran sollievo il sollecito saldo de suoi conti col Congresso, purchè mi ceda immediatamente (al prezzo della piazza) un fondo bastante a bilanciare il mio credito, il quale sarà dai Fratelli Van Staphorst accettato in pagamento del mio debito con essi, voltandolo in testa loro, conforme vi notificai nella mia precedente. Vi prego dunque di procurare al mio spirito questo sollievo il più presto possibile.

L’infermità del mio corpo è una conseguenza dell’abbattimento di spirito, procedente da varie cause, la principale delle quali è la continovata serie di lugubri notizie dalla nostra cara Patria, che le vostre lettere pur troppo mi confermano. Di grazia non mi ritardate neppure un giorno la notizia del primo raggio di futuro bene. Se i miei compatriotti non vogliono adattarsi alle circostanze, preferendo una prudente e saggia economia alla meschina disprezzabil soddisfazione di soddisfare l’indiscrete voglie giornaliere; se non vogliono darsi l’incomodo di riflettere alla nobile, durevole, incomparabil soddisfazione di sacrificare i frivoli appetiti al dover d’uomo giusto e di buon cittadino; se il frutto di un’acquisto fatto col sangue di tanti eroi dev’essere il disonor della Patria, non vi aspettate, Amico, di ricevere molte più lettere scritte di mia mano. Addio, il soggetto è troppo triste, e la mia mente non resiste. Tutto vostro,
Filippo Mazzei.
P.S. Avevo negletto di parlarvi di ciò che riguarda il mio libro. La rimostranza è giunta in tempo, e ve ne ringrazio di vero cuore. Non giudicate della carta, nè dell’impressione dai foglj che vi mando, perchèson prove. Ò fatto cucire quei che contengono la prima parte, ai quali unisco i primi 4 della seconda, che è tutto ciò che ci è di stampato finora. Vi mando l’introduzione manoscritta. La seconda parte conterrà la confutazione dei due Abati, Mably e Raynal. Saranno 3. parti in vece di 4. La terza conterrà la descrizione del presente e il prospetto dell’avvenire, tratterà delle finanze, delle cause ⅌ cui sono in sì cattivo stato, del denaro di carta, dei selvaggj, dei Cincinnati &c. Potrei io sperare che fosse tradotto in Inglese, sotto la vostra inspezione, arricchito da qualche vostra aggiunta, purgato d’errori, e stampato costà in modo che potessi io ricavarne qualche vantaggio? Volevo mandarvi l’originale italiano, ma non ò potuto copiarlo. Procurerò di mandarvelo quanto più presto potrò. Vi prego di dirmi quanti esemplari potrò mandare del francese, per esser venduti per mio conto. Di nuovo, addio.

Condensed Translation
Mazzei is indisposed but sends the introductory part of his book, which has recently been printed. He has received three letters from JM addressed from New York. The settlement of the Dohrman claims will relieve some of Mazzei’s distress if enough money is remitted to the Van Staphorst brothers to cover his debt to them. His poor health is owing to a spiritual despondency caused by a variety of problems, including reports of distress in the United States. Mazzei hopes that Americans will forego frivolous whims and follow the course of virtuous men. He hints that further news of dishonorable conduct in America will cause unbearable personal suffering. In the postscript, Mazzei mentions receipt of JM’s Memorial and Remonstrance. His book is only in the first stages of printing. The second part will have a confutation of Mably and Raynal. A third section will describe the United States at present and give a prospectus of the future, including remarks on paper money, Indians, and the Society of the Cincinnati. Mazzei hopes JM will supervise an English translation, enriching the text with some additions of his own. Mazzei intended to send the text in the original Italian but cannot. JM is asked to speculate upon the number of copies of the French text Americans will buy.


Title: Salaries for Members of the First Branch of the Legislature, [22 June] 1787
From: Madison, James,Yates, Robert
To:

[22 June 1787]

   The clause in the report of 13 June providing that the members of the first branch of the legislature “receive fixed stipends … to be paid out of the National-Treasury” was under debate (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 228).

Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations for the Natl. Govt. independent on the State Govts. but at the same time approved of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be done by taking a standard which wd. not vary with circumstances. He disliked particularly the policy suggested by Mr. Wiliamson of leaving the members from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the precarious & parsimonious support of their constituents. If the Western States hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives were to be associated in the Common Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions should be made as would invite the most capable and respectable characters into the service.

   Ms (DLC).

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison. Our attention is too much confined to the present moment, when our regulations are intended to be perpetual. Our national government must operate for the good of the whole, and the people must have a general interest in its support; but if you make its legislators subject to and at the mercy of the state governments, you ruin the fabric—and whatever new states may be added to the general government the expence will be equally borne” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 378).

[22 June 1787]

   Wilson moved that in place of fixed stipends the salaries be determined by the national legislature.

Mr. Madison. I oppose this motion. Members are too much interested in the question. Besides, it is indecent that the legislature should put their hands in the public purse to convey it into their own.

   Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 378 (Yates).

   JM did not originally report this speech. Paraphrasing Yates, he inserted it later: “Mr. Madison thought the members of the Legisl: too much interested to ascertain their own compensation. It wd. be indecent to put their hands into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets” (Ms [DLC]).


Title: Members of the First Branch of the Legislature Barred from Federal Offices, [22 June], [23 June] 1787
From: Yates, Robert,Madison, James
To:

[22 June 1787]

   Gorham moved to strike out that part of the third resolution of the report of 13 June making a member ineligible to hold any office “under the national government for the space of one year after” the member’s term of service expired (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 228).

Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others too little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause, there may be danger of creating offices or augmenting the stipends of those already created, in order to gratify some members if they were not excluded. Such an instance has fallen within my own observation. I am therefore of opinion, that no office ought to be open to a member, which may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature.

   Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 380 (Yates).

[23 June 1787]
Mr. Madison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the members of the 1st. branch “ineligible during their term of service, & for one year after—to such offices only as should be established, or the emoluments thereof, augmented by the Legislature of the U. States during the time of their being members.” He supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut agst. them, it might properly be left open for the appointt. of members to other offices as an encouragemt. to the Legislative service.

   Ms (DLC).

   Although there is no record of such a formal motion by JM on 22 June, see his brief remarks on the subject recorded by Yates for that day. JM himself noted the absence of a recorded motion in an undated memorandum (ibid.; Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 390).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison moves after established insert or Emoluments whereof shall have been augmented by the Legislature of the United States during the Time they have been Members or within one Year thereafter—He wishes Executive to have Appt of Officers—He thinks it necessary to hold out Inducements to Men of first Fortune to become Members” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 79).

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison then moved, that after the word established, be added, or the emoluments whereof shall have been augmented by the legislature of the United States, during the time they were members thereof, and for one year thereafter” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 391).

[23 June 1787]
Mr. Madison had been led to this motion as a middle ground between an eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification. He admitted the probable abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices, particularly within the gift of the Legislature. He had witnessed the partiality of such bodies to their own members, as had been remarked of the Virginia assembly by his colleague (Col. Mason). He appealed however to him, in turn to vouch another fact not less notorious in Virginia, that the backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative service gave but too great success to unfit characters. The question was not to be viewed on one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on both ought to be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to fill all offices with the fittest characters, & to draw the wisest & most worthy citizens into the Legislative service. If on one hand, public bodies were partial to their own members; on the other they were as apt to be misled by taking characters on report, or the authority of patrons and dependents. All who had been concerned in the appointment of strangers on those recommedations must be sensible of this truth. Nor wd. the partialities of such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their own members. Candidates for office would hover round the seat of Govt. or be found among the residents there, and practise all the means of courting the favor of the members. A great proportion of the appointments made by the States were evidently brought about in this way. In the general Govt. the evil must be still greater, the characters of distant states, being much less known throughout the U. States than those of the distant parts of the same State. The elections by Congress had generally turned on men living at the seat of the fedl Govt. or in its neighbourhood. As to the next object, the impulse to the Legislative service, was evinced by experience to be in general too feeble with those best qualified for it. This inconveniency wd. also be more felt in the Natl. Govt. than in the State Govts. as the sacrifices reqd. from the distant members, wd. be much greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably, more disproportiate. It wd. therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections to the Legislative service by an absolute disqualification of its members. The point in question was whether this would be an objection with the most capable citizens. Arguing from experience he concluded that it would. The Legislature of Virga. would probably have been without many of its best members, if in that situation, they had been ineligible to Congs. to the Govt. & other honorable offices of the State.

   Ms (DLC).

   JM’s version may be a blend of two separate speeches. Yates has him speaking twice. Yates’s version (first speech):

   “Mr. Madison. My wish is that the national legislature be as uncorrupt as possible. I believe all public bodies are inclined, from various motives, to support its members; but it is not always done from the base motives of venality. Friendship, and a knowledge of the abilities of those with whom they associate, may produce it. If you bar the door against such attachments, you deprive the government of its greatest strength and support. Can you always rely on the patriotism of the members? If this be the only inducement, you will find a great indifferency in filling your legislative body. If we expect to call forth useful characters, we must hold out allurements; nor can any great inconveniency arise from such inducements. The legislative body must be the road to public honor; and the advantage will be greater to adopt my motion, than any possible inconvenience” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 392).

   Yates’s version (second speech):

   “Mr. Madison. This question is certainly of much moment. There are great advantages in appointing such persons as are known. The choice otherwise will be chance. How will it operate on the members themselves? Will it not be an objection to become members when they are to be excluded from office? For these reasons I am for the amendment” (ibid., I, 393).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison—Men of Ability are not found [?] in Virginia to step forward in Public. Persons of other Descriptions press for Admission” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., pp. 79–80).


Title: Term of the Senate, [26 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[26 June 1787]

   Read moved that the term be nine years.

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were first to protect the people agst. their rulers: secondly to protect the people agst. the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of Govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those chargd. with the public happiness, might betray their trust. An obvious precaution agst. this danger wd. be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each other. In this they wd. be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Govt., where all business liable to abuses is made to pass thro’ separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It wd. next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro’ want of information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection wd. naturally suggest that the Govt. be so constituted, as that one of its branches might have an oppy. of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, wd. be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence agst. this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose agst. impetuous counsels. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Govt. for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes havg. a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors, farmers, merchts. & manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observd. (by Mr. Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Govts. as well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd. not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symtoms, of a leveling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst. on republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded agst.? Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Govt. sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergences, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Govt. he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation wd. decide for ever the fate of Republican Govt. we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation cd. require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out.


Title: Salaries for Members of the Senate, [26 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[26 June 1787]

   Ellsworth moved that the members of the Senate be paid by their respective states instead of by the national treasury.

Mr. Madison considered this a departure from a fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of 6 years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the Genl. Govt. in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different States. The motion would make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents & Advocates of State interests & views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and general Good. Congs. had lately by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims between the U. States & the individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation.


Title: From James Madison to Joseph Jones, 26 June 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Jones, Joseph

26 June 1787. Acknowledged in Jones to JM, 6 July 1787. Reports proceedings in the Massachusetts legislature.


Title: Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the Legislature, [28 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[28 June 1787]

   Lansing moved for equal representation of the states in the first branch of the legislature.

Mr. Madison sd. he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor necessary for the safety of the small States agst. the large States. That it was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Breerly & Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws for the government of them. If France, England & Spain were to enter into a Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c with the Prince of Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. Wd. the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of deputies from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy troops, determine the value of coin &c? Would 30 or 40. million of people submit their fortunes into the hands, of a few thousands? If they did it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. Why are Counties of the same states represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the Nationl. Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake than the smaller? The case will be the same with the larger & smaller States. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons & properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater degree under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property & persons of individuals depend on the laws of Congs. By the plan proposed a compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is proposed to be vested in the national Govt. Many other powers are added which assimilate it to the Govt. of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the State Legislatures & of course will require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles with the other branches of those Legislatures. That it is not necessay. to secure the small States agst. the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious: Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some interest common to Va. Masts. & Pa. & distinguishing them from the other States or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other States. In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Masts. was fish, of Pa. flower, of Va. Tobo. Was a Combination to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. The journals of Congs. did not present any peculiar association of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified. Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England & France have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal members of antient & modern confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause. The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens & Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted & oppressed the Germanic empire. Were the large States formidable singly to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to wish for such a general Govt. as will operate with equal energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor. What is the situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of Civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government? The Heroic period of antient Greece the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no controul but the nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it happened but too often that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly trampled upon; and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which the Constitution of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about ½ the People, supplies about ½ of the money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of Govt. which will most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the Genl Govt. be feeble, the large States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance & security may depend on their own size & strength, will never submit to a partition. Give to the Genl. Govt. sufficient energy & permency, & you remove the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, & junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at once.


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 29 June 1787
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 29th. June 1787.
We are not to know the result of your deliberations for five or six weeks to come, as from all accounts your Session will continue untill some time in August. Some of your uxorious members will become impatient from so long absence from home. How does the Dr. stand it—enjoy himself as usual in the society of his friends, or cast longing looks towards Richmond. Mrs. McClurg is, and looks well, and will I dare say on his return prove at least a full match for him. Mrs. Randolph & the children have I hope got up Safe. Present her if you please my compliments. Tell the Governor we shall not venture to speculate in indents or any other cont. securities. Had we the power and the means to follow a certain Gentlemans advise the adoption of his plan wod., with me at le[as]t, have required other authority to support it. We have directed the sale of the Tobacco on hand in the manner as you will see by the inclosed paper and have some hopes the price will be advanced nearly to the State price by the receipt of the interest warrants. These will soon answer the purposes of specie. I am told it has had the effect to appreciate the warrants 2 [½] Pct. The sudden demand at Petersburg the last week for Tobacco in consequence of many arrivals started The price there to 24/6 wch. had for some time stood at 22/6. Here it rose from 23 to 24/. I am told at Fredericksburg the price has got to 22/6—it has been 20/ only. Somehow it is kept down here and will I fear be checked in Petersburg.
We last evening had a letter from the Searcher at Alexandria complaining of a rescue from his possession of a Schooner he had seized. She is from St. Kitts[,] had entered in Maryland but was detected in landing in Alexandria some rum [(]the number of Hhds. not mentioned) which occasioned her seizure by the Searcher. The communication we have received shews that the people of the Town were more disposed to act in opposition to law than support the Officer in the execution of his duty. We have directed one of the armed Boats to endeavour to recover the Vessell wch. we hear moved towards G. Town. We have also called for the names of those who assisted the Capt of [the] Vessell to escape and directed the Searcher to move for the penalty agt. those who refused to assist him, when summoned by him to afford their aid. The last post I heard, late in the evening, that Mr. Harrison was to set out in the Stage in the morning, I sent Anty. to him with the two books, requesting he wod. convey them to you. Yr. friend & Servt
Jos: Jones

Will you send me the 7th. essay on Finance. Adams’s book is here and I can get the reading of it.


Title: Rule of Representation in the First Branch of the Legislature, [29 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[29 June 1787]
Mr. Madison agreed with Docr. Johnson, that the mixed nature of the Govt. ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analogous to that of bye laws to the supreme law, within a State. Under the proposed Govt. the Powers of the States will be much farther reduced. According to the views of every member, the Genl. Govt will have powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the states were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without the consent of the state Legislatures, to levy money directly on the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such unequal portions of the people as composed the several States, of an equal voice, would subject the sy[s]tem to the reproaches & evils which have resulted from the vicious representation in G.B.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a principle wch. was confessedly unjust, which cd. never be admitted, & if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to last for ever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been sd. that the want of energy in the large states wd. be a security to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security of the States agst. all external danger. Let each state depend on itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring states, & the languishing condition of all the states, large as well as small, wd. soon be transformed into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was that their Govts. wd. then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, wd. soon produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small States wd. quickly introduce some regular military force agst. sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The example wd. be followed by others, and wd. soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence agst. foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing m[a]xim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of Absolute power in Europe cd. maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence wch. cd. not be used for the purpose of oppression. These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from each other, or shd. enter into partial confederacies. Either event wd. be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.