Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Irvine, 3 July 1780
From: Irvine, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
[Preakness, N.J.] July 3d 1780

Notwithstanding several changes, have taken place since your Excellency laid the situation of our affairs before the Board at Morristown; I apprehend our operations must be nearly the same.
I am pretty clearly of opinion, that before our levies can be got together, and Stores collected to a proper point, it will be too late to think of Caneda, unless provision is amply made for remaining there all the Winter, whatever our success may be.
I think an attempt against Halifax, will be extremely hazardous unless the French fleet is indubitably superior, to any the British can possibly be supposed, able to bring on this coast—and that we are provided with Transports sufficient for carrying such of our Troops, as should be thought proper to be sent on this Expedition—my reasons are the same as in the case of Caneda, with this addition—that long land marches, (especially where great part of the Country is uninhabited) never fails to wear down an Army however well appointed, Should we fail in an attempt on either of these places, our Troops & Stores will be greatly exhausted—the term of service of the levies expired, the People at large dispirited, and perhaps our Allies disappointed & disgusted, may

withdraw—As the main Army will only be able to Act on the defensive, the Enemy will remain uninjured ready to take advantage of these events—For the same reasons that the Enemy find it their interest to possess New york—it is ours to dispossess them—It is in the very heart of our Country our men and Stores can be drawn together here with the greatest facility—should we succeed in the enterprize it must effectually ruin them, consequently as effectually serve us—by putting a Glorious end to the War. The Spirits of the people seem at present roused; they ought to be made use of, in the favourable moment—ten will assist in the reduction of new York for one that will go to Caneda or Halifax—Or even Join in acting on the defensive here—whilst the operations are carrying on abroad—Should we be unfortunate, still it is to be hoped the Enemy will be so cripled as not to be able to Act very offensively—& we better able to act on the defensive than if large Detachments were gone.
Our principle support lies in the middle States—they, we are to depend on as well for Men as for Necessarys for the supplies of Our Army—If we drain them too much & are even successfull abroad yet so long as the Enemy continue in force here, the event will remain doubtfull—For these reasons I am of Opinion that our Operations ought to be carried on against New york.
I shall here take the liberty of observing that tho, the French Ships of the Line may be sufficient—yet a number of small Craft Armed Boats & Vessels of Various constructions, may also be Necessary—these ought to be got ready without loss of time. I have the Honour to be Your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble Servant

Wm Irvine


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Henry Knox, 3 July 1780
From: Knox, Henry
To: Washington, George

Camp Prackenis N. Jersey 3d July 1780

Return of Shells, Shot and Powder, in possession of the Continent, and the places where they are deposited; compared with an estimate of stores presented to the Committee of Congress with the Army, 27 June 1780, and the deficiencies pointed out.
In addition to the remarks already presented on the estimate made last October, it is to be observed, that 50 shells and sixty shot were then, agregately on the total, thought to be sufficient for each piece. But the

day’s being now one third longer than when that calculation was made, consequently the estimate is deficient one third of the quantities necessary for sixty days service of the mortars and cannon specified.
It was, in the former remarks, mentioned, that the twelve pounders were scarcely heavy enough for batteries. From returns received lately, it appears that six 24 pounders and forty eight 18 pounders can be procured from Providence, West Point and Philadelphia, provided a sufficiency of shot can be had for them. The only possible method to obtain them, is to have a number of furnaces in Jersey and Pennsylvania instantly put into blast. It is true, this mode would be expensive, if it is practicable; but the magnitude of the object in view would amply justify the measure.

H. Knox Brig. Genl Artillery


Title: To George Washington from Major General Arthur St. Clair, 3 July 1780
From: St. Clair, Arthur
To: Washington, George

Sir
[3 July 1780]

The Reduction of New York together with the british Army, is certainly, of all Others, the most desirable Object, as it would put an immediate End to the War; But the Siege of any Place, altho’ not regularly fortified, furnished with such a Garrison as that will be, is a very serious Business, and tho’ it may finally succeed, carries not with it that Degree of probability that, in our Circumstances, should induce the

undertaking it. the failing in some lesser Operation might distress Us—in one of that Magnitude it would go near to ruin Us.
The Force in New York and its Dependencies is estimated at 8000 effective rank & file Militia and Refugees 5000 Those returned with Sir Henry Clinton are probably not less than 3000[;] 16000 total.
To besiege these we have, exclusive of the Garrison of West Point, which, in that Case may be reduced to 500 Men[,] 7500[.] Recruits may possibly come in to the amount of 6000 and the French may perhaps rise to 8000 [in total] 21500.
With this Force Possession is in the first Place to be gained of York Island, which will be opposed by every Means in the Enne[m]ys Power; and in effecting it our Numbers, for the Campaign at least, may be considerably lessned. But suppose we get footing on the Island with twenty Thousand Men—they will be unequal to the Purpose; for their Operations must be directed either solely against N. York and such Posts as may be occupied on York Island, or they must be divided, to act with part upon long Island—If they are kept entire on York Island, the whole of the Ennemys Force, nearly, will be opposed to them; we may expect that every Spot capable of Defence will be occupied; every Inch of Ground disputed, and tho they will at last be driven within their Lines, it will not probably happen till after a number of Combats, in which as Assailants we must expect the greater Loss, and by which both Parties may be reduced to nearly equal Numbers; If they are divided the Ennemy may have an Opportunity to make a stroke at either Part, and their succeeding against either defeats the Designs of the Whole—Twenty thousand Men then appears to me necessary on York Island, and a Force on long Island sufficient to give them a Jealousy at least in that Quarter. But further all Prospect of Success depends upon the Command of the Water, and however answerable our Force may be to the reduction of New York, it should be brought to a Certainty that the Ennemy, during the Siege, which may be expected to be of no short Duration, cannot oblige the Fleet to abandon Us.
But supposing the Point fixed with regard to the naval Force, will it not be a surer Way to distress the Ennemy to operate against them in some distant Part, with a Part of the Troops and Ships, and keep them bloqued in New York with the Rest.
Canada is an Object of considerable Importance, and the Loss of it would be felt by them very sensibly. The Trade of that Country is valuable, and the Friendship of almost all the Savages of the Continent depends on it. The Troops for its Defence are not numerous, and the Disposition of the Inhabitants may be, I believe, depended upon. If a Body of Troops, equal perhaps to the whole Force in Canada, was to enter that Country by Colonell Hazens Road and another Body of the

French Troops of about the same strength, which should carry with them the necessary Apparatus, with a few Ships of War should enter it by St Laurence, supposing no Accident to happen to the Fleet, their Junction before Quebec would not be difficult, and the Reduction of the Country the almost certain Consequence, even a greater Force than I have mentioned might be spared and enough left to keep up the Blocade.
If the Exertions of the States should produce a very considerable Reinforcement to our Army, and the naval superiority of France be decided, another Detachment might be made to operate against Halifax, which, tho the Harbour should be found too well fortified for the Ships to force the Entrance, may nevertheless be carried by Land, there being many Places where Troops may conveniently be debarked, and where there are good Harbours—in La Heve Bay particularly on the Halifax side, which runs, if my Memory serves me Right, within fifteen Miles—In the Bay of Fundy likewise, but the march from thence is long.
I have said a few Ships should enter St Laurence Those, I think need be no other than Frigates, and they may be very safe against a superior Force by occupying the Island of Coudre which lays betwixt twenty and thirty Miles below Quebec, where the River is verry difficult, and no Anchorage near it on the lower side, but there is a very fine Bason within it.
A single Frigate in Penobscot will prevent the withdrawing the Troops there, and they cannot march from thence by Land.
St Augustine will probably fall into the Hands of the Spaniards, who seem intent on the Floridas, and the Army under General Gates will, tho there is little probability that it can recover Carolina, check at least Lord Cornwallis, if not oblige him to act on the Defensive.
These are my Thoughts on the Matters your Excellency was pleased to refer to me, and to all or some of these Points, I think, our views and Preparations should be directed, but how our Finances and the Resources of the Country may accord with them, I cannot determine. I have the Honour to be Your Excellenys most obedient Servant

Ar. St Clair Mr Gl

The Blocade of the british Army, if it could be effected whilst our Operations are carried on with Vigour in some Distant Quarter, would do them as much Injury in Europe, if not more, than the surrender of New York—It would render them ridiculous.
Canada can furnish Wheat in great Abundance, but very little Flour and no Meat.


Title: From George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., 3 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan Sr.

Head Quarters Colo. Deys Bergen County [N.J.]3d July 1780.
Dear Sir

I have been informed, that the State of Connecticut have in possession a very considerable quantity of Salt petre, which they are unable to manufacture into Gun powder, for want of Sulphur—The Continent, on the contrary, have a quantity of Sulphur at Springfeild which lies idle for want of the other necessary ingredients. I have therefore to propose to Your Excellency, that the Sulphur, or as much as may be necessary, shall be delivered over to the State, to be manufactured into Powder for the use of the Continent—the public making compensation for the same.
When we come to make the Estimate of Ammunition necessary for the probable expenditure of our expected cooperation, we find a most alarming deficiency in the public Magazines, and it therefore behoves us, to fall upon every expedient, to raise an adequate supply, and no one seems to present a fairer or readier prospect, than the plan I have just mentioned. If the measure meets Your Excellency’s approbation, I shall be glad to be informed of the quantity of public Salt Petre in the State, and how much powder can be manufactured in a Week, or in any given time. You will also oblige me exceedingly by informing me whether the State have any, and how much powder, and whether they could spare it to the Continent upon an emergency. I have the honor to be with very great Esteem Your Excellency’s Most obt and Humble Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from James Wilkinson, 3 July 1780
From: Wilkinson, James
To: Washington, George

sir
Phila. July 3rd 1780

I had the honor to receive your Excellencys Letter of the 27th Ultmo Yesterday, and I doubt not you will be as much surprized to hear from me, as I am distressed in being obliged to Answer your Excellency from this place; but I trust you will pardon my abrupt departure from Camp when I assure you that Measure was compeled by a Most extraordinary demand of the Treasury Board, which reached my Hand on the 25th Ult. & I found immediately involved my Honor & reputation: previous to my departure from Morris Town I addressed the Committee of Congress on the Subject of the Clothing at springfield. I requested their influence with the Legislature of Connecticut to furnish a specific Number of Teams for the immediate Transport of the Summer Clothing &c: and recd a Verbal Answer from Mr Matthews that the requisition should be considered as soon as the Committee heard from the State in Answer to their Circular Letter: I have apprized my Depy of this & directed to stand prepared for the occasion, but ordered him to embrace every Means which he could in the mean time effect to bring forward the Sumer Overalls & few Shirts which he has on Hand—We have not a rag in Store at this place & I understand that the Clothing respecting which I wrote your Excellency on the 24th Ult: was halted at Trenton by Genl Knox. I shall go to that place Tomorrow & if it is not already in Motion shall use my Endeavour to forward it with dispatch.
I rely confidently that the address & Industry of Mr Moylan who for the present remains with the Army will fully Answer every claim on the Department And I have the honor to be most truly Your Excellencys Obliged & ready Servant

J. Wilkinson C. Gen.


Title: From George Washington to a Board of General Officers, 4 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

Gentn
Head qrs [Preakness, N.J.] July 4. 1780

I have the Honor to transmit You such papers and Resolutions in my possession as respect the appointments of Brigadier Generals Hand & Irvine and the dispute between them, which the Board will be pleased to return with their proceedings in the case. The appointment of Genl Hand will be found in the Journals of Congress in 1777—page 107: Genl Irvine’s in those of May 1779—page 7.
Besides the papers respecting Generals Irvine & Hand—I inclose the Board a State of Sundry Facts respecting Lt Colo. Conway and Other Officers of the Jersey line—and request that they will give me their opinion upon it. I have the Honor to be with great respect & esteem Gentn Yr Most Obedt St

G.W.


Title: From George Washington to the Board of War, 4 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

Gentlemen
Head Quarters Bergen County [N.J.] July 4th 1780

Brigadier General Knox, at my direction, has made out an estimate of military stores wanted for the expected cooperation dated the 3d instant, which he has transmitted to the Board. I have carefully examined it and find it not to exceed the necessary quantity, nor ought we to undertake a decisive operation on a more contracted scale. I must therefore entreat the Board to employ every expedient in their power to procure the articles demanded agreeable to the estimate, with as much dispatch as possible. The expence will no doubt be great; but in a crisis like the present, this ought not to be an objection. If we aim at an important object, adequate means ought to be employed, or it would be unreasonable to undertake it; if the means cannot be furnished we must desist from the undertaking; I therefore entreat the Board to let me know what they determine to attempt and what they hope to effect. With every sentiment of respect & esteem I have the honor to be Gentlemen Your most Obed. & hum. servant.


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Daniel Brodhead, 4 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Brodhead, Daniel

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Bergen County [N.J.] 4th July 1780.

I have duly received your favors of the 18th March—24th April and 13th and 30th of May. It is much to be regretted that the state of our regular Troops will not admit of a detachment sufficient to reduce the posts of the enemy to the Westward or even to undertake any thing

offensive against the hostile tribes of Indians—Militia, besides being very expensive, are so exceedingly capricious that I should be loth to attempt any thing with them which depended upon more than a very short time to accomplish the object.
We are in hourly expectation of a considerable French Land and Sea force which is intended to cooperate with us agt the common enemy. We are, for this purpose, endeavouring to draw out a competent reinforcement of Men and supplies to enable us, in conjunction with our Allies, to strike decisively at the enemy. I fear we shall, notwithstanding the emergency of the occasion, fall very far short of the number of men required. I mention these matters to shew the impracticability of detaching any troops at present to the Westward, altho’ I look upon the reduction of the post at Detroit, as a measure most desirable—and without which I beleive the Savages upon that quarter will never be kept in proper order.
I do not conceive that I have a right to delegate a general power to hold Courts Martial. There must be an application for a Court whenever particular objects present themselves. This may, it is true, in some measure delay the course of justice, but it cannot, from the necessity of the case, be avoided. I am with great Regard Dear Sir Your most obt Servant

Go: Washington


Title: Circular to Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 4 July 1780
From:
To:

Sir
Head Quarters Bergen County [N.J.] July 4th 1780

On an examination of the quantity of powder in the hands of the public we find that the whole together with what we are to expect from the French fleet will not be more than one third of the quantity required for a decisive operation, and that unless we can derive very extensive aids from the respective States this deficiency alone must subvert our plans. I am therefore to request The Honorable the Council will be pleased to inform me whether we can obtain a supply from your State and to what amount. In an exigency like the present every State must

contribute to the utmost of its ability or, we must fail in our prospects and disappoint our allies.
It is with infinite chagrin and mortification I find that at this day the fourth of July more than Six weeks since the first application to the States for the succours necessary towards the intended cooperation, not more than thirty levies have to my knowledge joined any part of the Army, nor have I any information what has been effected in this respect by any one of the States. Some of them have not even informed us what they intend to do. The Council will easily conceive the embarrassment of my situation—The french fleet and Army momently expected to call upon me for information of our prospects and for a plan of cooperation America looking to me to improve the aid which our allies are sending us—A British fleet expected at the heels of the French fleet—preliminary measures demanding an instant determination; if taken replete with hazard and involving certain disgrace should we not be able to go on with vigor—if suspended, losing an advantage on which the whole chance of success must in all probability depend—While I remain unfurnished with means to begin; uninformed with tolerable certainty of those which will be put into my hands the time they will be ready, and consequently unable to decide any plan on reasonable grounds: I see the best oppertunity America has had to establish her independence, fettered with delays, and clouded with uncertainties, which will not permit the most sanguine to hope for such an Issue as vigor, decision, and dispatch might have insured. With every sentiment of esteem & Respect I have the honor to be Sir Your most Obedt humbe servant

Go: Washington

P.S. In the course of our operations a number of seamen may become necessary; I request to be informed what number may be obtained from your State, on what terms and in what time after notice? Should any Vessell arrive in your ports with any intelligence of the French fleet and Army, or of the British fleet, said to be coming out, I shall be much Obliged to you to send me immediate as precise and particular an account as you can obtain.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 4 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, Robert

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Colo. Deys 4th July 1780.

I have recd your favs. of the 27th and 30th ulto and that of the 3d instant covering a letter from Genl Heath—Mr Moylan has not yet come in—I imagine he is stopped by the heavy rain.
I am informed that Genl Glover had missed my letter directing him to stop at Springfeild for the purpose of receiving and forwarding the drafts of Massachusetts—I make no doubt but you have sent him back to execute that business—I have written in the most pressing terms to the Executives of Connecticut and Massachusetts to collect and forward their drafts to the place of rendezvous as expeditiously as possible, from whence it is also my wish to have them come forward to their respective lines without loss of time, that we may endeavour to arrange and discipline them in some degree before they go into Action. It is my intent to bring the Regiments as nearly as possible to a level, and I must therefore desire you to attend to this point in the distribution of the Men as they arrive. Where a predilection for any particular Corps can be allowed without materially affecting the strength of other Regiments, I shall have no objection to indulging individuals—What I mean is that particular Regiments shall not on any account be compleated and others left in a situation too weak to engage the care and attention of the Officers. I am &.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, 4 July 1780 [letter not found]
From: Washington, George
To: Maxwell, William

  Letter not found: to Brig. Gen. William Maxwell, 4 July 1780. Maxwell wrote GW on 4 July: “I have Your Favour of this date” (see GW to a Board of General Officers, 4 July, source note).


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, 4 July 1780
From: Muhlenberg, Peter
To: Washington, George

Sir
Fredericksburg [Va.] July 4th 1780

I was Yesterday honord with a Letter from His Excellency The Governor, wherein he desires me to transmit Your Excellency a Return of the Officers of the Virginia Line at present in the State; I now do myself the Honor to enclose a Return of all The Officers I could get intelligence of, with their Rank and date of Commission.
General Gates this Morning left Town for Richmond and has ordered all the Officers to meet at this place on the 15th of this Month.
The plan I did myself the honor to mention to Your Excellency in my last, proposd by a Committee of the Assembly, to fill up the Continental Battallions, is not yet finally determind on, but I have no doubt it will go through. a Brittish Fleet is at present in our Bay, but we have not yet been able to ascertain their Strength or destination. I have the Honor to be with great Respect Your Excellencys Most Obedt hble Servt

P: Muhlenberg


Title: To George Washington from Esther De Berdt Reed, 4 July 1780
From: Reed, Esther De Berdt
To: Washington, George

Sir
Philada July 4th 1780

The Subscription set on foot by the Ladies of this City for the use of the Soldiery is so far compleated as to induce me to transmit to your Excelly an account of the Money I have received, to which, altho it has answered our Expectations, it does not equal our Wishes but I am perswaded will be received as a proof of our Zeal for the great Cause of America, & our Esteem & Gratitude for those who so bravely defend it—The amount of the Subscription is 200,580, Dolls. & £625.6.8 in Specie, which makes in the whole in Paper Money 300,634 Dolrs.
The Ladies are anxious for the Soldiers to receive the benefit of it & wait your Directions how it can best be disposed of—We expect some considerable additions from the Country—& have also wrote to the other States in hopes the Ladies there will adopt a Similiar plan to render it more General & Beneficial.
With the utmost pleasure I offer any further Attention & care in my power to compleat the execution of the Design, & Shall be happy to accomplish it agreable to the intention of the Donors & your Wishes on the Subject.
The Ladies of my Family Join me in their Respectful Compliments & sincerest prayer for Your Health Safety & Success. I have the honor to be With the highest Respect Your Obt hume Servt

Esther Reed


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 4 July 1780
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

Camp Perckenis [N.J.] July 4th 1780

The Several points which your Excellency laid before the Council of General Officers the 6th of June last I think may now be reduced to one General Question, vizt “how shall the Army under your Excellencys Command be imployed dureing the present Campaign.”
In our present Scituation we can do no more than to observe the Enemy, and endeavour to prevent them from Strikeing any Stroke of Consequence, and unless we should be Strongly reinforced I do not see what we Can do more while the Enemy do so intirely Command the Navigation; But on the Supposition of a french fleet and Army arriveing and giveing us the Command of the Navigation, I am of opinion that we should Cooperate with them in the reduction of New York as the first Measure; after which I would Jointly with them endeavour to reduce Halifax; smaller operations such as the reduction of Penobscot

&c. might be Commenced immediately after. and If Successful to the Northward the Winter Campaign should be Spent in the recovery of Georgia & South Carolina. I am your Excellency’s Most Humble Servant

Stirling,


Title: General Orders, 5 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

						Head Quarters Pracaness [N.J.] Wednesday July 5th 1780

							Parole Magnanimity
							 Countersigns Lincoln LisleWatchword Persevere

					[Officers] Of the Day Tomorrow[:] Brigadier General Irvine[,] Lieutenant Colonel North[,] Brigade Major Van Laër


Title: From George Washington to General Henry Clinton, 5 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, Henry

						Sir
						Head qrs [Preakness, N.J.,] July the 5th 1780

					In Your Excellency’s absence from New York, I had the honor on the 2d of June to address a Letter to His Excellency General Knyphausen. The final answer to the propositions it contained being referred to Your Excellency, and as I have not been yet honoured with it—I take occasion to inclose You a Copy of the Letter and request that You will favour me with your determination on the several points to which it extends. I have the Honor to be With great respect Your Excellency’s Most Obedt servant

						Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from the Committee at Headquarters, 5 July 1780
From: Committee at Headquarters
To: Washington, George

						In Committee of Congress Morris Town [N.J.]July 5. 1780
						sir—

					We inclose your Excellency copies of two Letters to us, this moment receiv’d, One from the Governor of Delaware, and the other from the Governor of Maryland. We are with the greatest respect & Esteem Your Excellency’s Most Obt Hble Servts

						Jno. MathewsNathl Peabody


Title: To George Washington from Lieutenant Colonel Fleury, 5 July 1780
From: Fleury, François-Louis Teissèdre de
To: Washington, George

							on board the felicity. 66° longitude.off chesapeak bay 5th july 1780.
							sir

						Employed as a field officer in the french army, which as I believe, is to Cooperate with the american forces; I think it my duty, to express to your Excellency, the sense I shall allways entertain of your kindness for me; and how happy I should think myself, to find me under your Command, again.
						My intention when I left america Last december, was to come back before the beginning of this Campaign; but my Country having been pleased to Require my services, I have obey’d.
						I hope in this new station, to justify your kindness for me when in the american army, & find opportunitys to deserve your Esteeme. I have the honor to be with great Respect your Excellency’s the most obedient humble servant.

							L. Fleury

						I think it will not be disagreable to your excellency, to be inform’d, that the king of france has given me Leave to wear as a Croix de st. louis. the medall, which congress, had voted for me, & which doctor franklin, had struck By order of the threasury board at paris.


Title: From George Washington to the Board of War, 6 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

						Gentn
						Head qrs [Preakness, N.J.] July the 6th 1780

					As we may now expect that Levies will be coming in from the States in a little time—and we shall have many occasional demands for Arms, I request that the Board will be pleased to order Three thousand Stand

compleat, to be forwarded immediately to the North River. For fear of accidents in case the lower communication should be exposed by the removal of the Army—I think it will be prudent that one half of the Arms & Accoutements should be sent on the back route To New Windsor. The other half may be risked on the lower one leading to Kings ferry, from which the person having the care of them may be directed to depart, and to gain the upper Country should any movements on the part of the Enemy make it necessary. Our demands for Cartouch Boxes it is probable will be considerable; and in this view I wish the Board to forward a large number over and above those which will be material for the Arms required. I have the Honor To be with great respect & esteem Gentn Yr Most Obedt st

						Go: Washington

						P.S. The Arms now requested, are to be exclusive of those which will be delivered the Pennsylva. Levies—and which I desired Colo. Johnson to obtain for them.

						P.S. Altho’ I have recommended half the Arms to be sent on the back Route to New Windsor, yet, upon second thoughts, I am [of] opinion that they may all safely proceed by the Road to Kings ferry if upon their arrival at Trenton, the Conductors hear that all matters are quiet upon that communica⟨tion⟩.


Title: To George Washington from Corny, 6 July 1780
From: Corny, Dominique-Louis Ethis de
To: Washington, George

						Dear General
						Providence 6th July 1780

					I am just Arrived from Poppisquash, too much applause cannot be given to the Zeal and attention of Doctor Craig; the dispositions relative to this Establishment entitle him to every gratefull Sentiment, and I shall be particularly carefull to acquaint the Count de Rockambeau how much we are obliged to him.
					This Hospital will be exceeding usefull for Summer, and for the Convalescents, the Salubrity of the Air is excellent, but it must be confess’d that it may be subject to the Attempts of the Enemy, if New Port is not Guarded, and if the Batteries at the Entrance of the Harbor remain unprovided with Cannon.
					Doctor Craig had in vain requested the Colledge of this Town to be given up to him that the principal Hospital might be Establishd there, General Heath without doubt reluctantly Approved the Objections of the Council of this State, which influenced them to reject the Doctors request. on my Arrival here, I took the liberty to represent in the most firm and pressing Manner, that this House was indispensably necessary; I represented my reasons, in the Requisition I made to the Council, who Orderd the Colledge to be imediatly given up to me, and I lost no time in employing Workmen to put it in a proper Condition for the destin’d Service.
					I must acquaint your Excellency, that the difficulties encounterd in this Affair, arrise principally from Mr Manning a Minister of this place; who endeavord to inflame the people, and to perswade them that the Town would be infected with a Contagious disorder, in Consequence of the Establishment; I was beyond measure astonished that the two Browns, the Brothers of Collo. John Brown, publickly opposed it, they so far forgot themselves as to declare loudly, that they hoped the People would blow up the Hospital, and they threatned the Carpenters who were at work at the Colledge with the loss of the Esteem and Custom of the townsmen and Action of Damages at Law, if they continued to work; nor could the Workmen (who had left their Bussiness) be prevailed upon to begin again, untill Bonds of Indemnification were given them, Under other Circumstances I should have been induced to demand of Messrs Brown’s the Reasons of their proceedure, and of the insult, which marks their Conduct; at Present I confine myself to represent it to your Excellency, convinced that you will acquaint them,

that this Stran⟨ge⟩ Conduct is totally opposite to those Sentiments that Unite the two Nations, and too full of Sedition and disrespect to be tolerated at the Instant His Majesty is sending assistance to his Allies; and will not I trust be pass’d over with impunity.
					I cannot refrain my dear General from acquainting you that on the Journey I made to New Port for the purpose of receiving the Establishments, and of making some dispositions, I saw both with regret and surprize, that notwithstanding the Application I made on the 24th of last Month there has not been even at this time any Measures put in execution to repair the Ferrys which must be Cross’d in the Road from Providence to Newport; Bristoll Ferry is inaccessable, and the Wharfs on each Side are impracticable; I bruised the Wheels of my Carriage, and was obliged to hire a Sloop to return to Providence, it ought to have been foreseen that these Ferrys were indispensibly necessary for the service of the Army, and that the repairs become every day more urgent; I represented this Consideration to General Heath on Monday 26th June, and I entreated him at the same time to have them repaird at the King’s Expence, because I have observed that the Quarter Masters attribute their want of Activity to the failure of their Supplies, the General wrote on this head to the Council of the State on Tuesday the 4th July, but as I was convinced that these delays (which are without doubt inevitable) would be prejudicial to the service of the Army which we hourly expect; I am determined to prevail on Monsr De la Touche to assend to Bristoll for the purpose of imploying his Crew to repair the Ferry.
					I shall have the Honor to acquaint your Excellency the Moment the Fleet Arrives. I am with every respect and Consideration Your Excellencys Most Obedient and Most humble Servt

						Ethis De Corny


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 6 July 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

						Sir
						Camp Precaness 6th July 1780.

					All that I can say, in answer to your Excellency’s letter of the 4th, is, that I see not the remotest prospect of providing anything in the Quarter Master’s Department, but by requisitions to the States. Orders have been given for repairing the Boats, and having them in readiness: I have great hopes this will be effected; but how we are to get the Oars and Boat-hooks, is beyond my conception. Inclos’d I send your Excellency, a copy of a letter from Mr Sickles at Albany: from which you will see the state things are in there. I have no doubt everything will be done, that can be done without Money; but the dependence cannot be great.
					The Anchors, Cables &c., mentioned in your Excellency’s letter of the 31st of May, can be had either at Boston, Providence, or Philadelphia. If your Excellency thinks proper to direct the Estimates to be made and laid before the Committee, it shall be done without loss of time; but will not the french fleet be able to furnish these things?
					The public business is conducted thro’ so many channels, and

dependent upon so many different hands in the execution, that I am altogether at a loss to know what is done, or what is doing; nor will it be in my power to get better information untill I know where, and on whom I can depend. I am, with great respect, Your Excellency’s Most Obedient Hume Servt

						Nath. Greene Q.M.G.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 6 July 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

						Sir,
						Camp [Preakness Area] New Jersey July 6th 1780.

					The loss of the garrison of Charles Town, and the return of part of the troops from the Southward to join the Enemy’s force at New York, mate[r]ially change the face and state of things laid before the General Officers at a Council of War held at Morris Town the sixth Ulto; in which your Excellency demanded their opinions on the several questions laid before them in Council.
					I have frequently had it in contemplation, to give your Excellency some answer to the several propositions laid before us, but have been interupted by the Enemy’s operations in this State, and hourly calls of business of another kind. The greatest difficulty with me has been and still is, that such is the state of our political affairs, that I can see nothing to rest an opinion upon. What force we shall have in the field, how they will be appointed, and when they will be collected are all matters of

conjecture; nor is there any scheme upon which we can rely with confidence for provision and supplies while operating, even after they arrive. It must be confessed that collecting an Army and providing for their subsistance are two of the most material considerations to be attended to in a plan of military operations; but there are a great variety of other measures on which offensive operations will depend, after those two points are provided for, nor will it be in the power of a general to carry his plans into execution unless they are accomodated to his designs. How far the state of our finances the loss of public credit, the distrust and jealousy which prevails among the people at large, as well as the discontent and dissatisfaction which pervades the different orders of the Staff will tend to embarrass the operations, are matters not to be neglected in taking our measures.
					To attempt what we cannot effect will be followed by disgrace, and to neglect what we have in our power will be a reproach. It is very disagreeable in the present state of uncertainty to advise to measures which depend upon contingencies, and are to be judged of by future events. The requisitions which are made to the respective States consist of a variety of articles which are all collectively necessary to one plan of operations. therefore should either fail, the whole scheme must fall to the ground. To impress each Legislature with the importance of the object, and diffuse among them a spirit of exertion equal to the occasion, where there are such different characters and tempers that influence every measure which is taken, is little short of an Herculean task. Nor is it less unhappy for our cause, than unfortunate for the Officers who are in the Army that the success of our operations both offensive and defensive depend upon such a great variety of contingencies. I wish it was in my power to give your Excellency my opinion upon some better footing than I have to found it on from the present prospects that lay before me. It would afford me pleasure to give my sentiments decidedly; but when I attempt it, I find the whole rests upon a baseless-fabrick, and feel my mind floating in the ocean of uncertainty. It is both mortifying and vexatious in this advanced state of the Campaign when such objects of magnitude invite our attention, that we cannot determine with certainty which, or whether any of them are within our grasp.
					In order to fix upon some foundation on which to rest an opinion, as well as to explain my sentiments with more facility I have stated the actual and probable force of the Enemy and our own, which may be employed at the three great objects of attention, New York, South Carolina & Canada. The first is undoubtedly the greatest and is never to be lost sight of as long as there is a probability of our attempting it with success; but I must confess from present appearances I have but little hopes that our force will be sufficient. The garrison is large and from

the opportunity they had and still have, we may reasonably expect their fortifications will be strong. It is true the City from it’s being upon a peninsula renders it unnecessary to draw lines of circumvallation round the place, and consequently it can be invested with a much less force than if they were necessary on every side. But this advantage is not so great as might appear at first view, for it enables the enemy to know the point of attack, and as there is but a small front, it gives them an opportunity to oppose an equal front with a much less force than must be employed to beseige the place; and to fight upon equal terms. To this may be added the difficulty of approaching an Enemy possessed of a superior train of Artillery and every way better provided with Amunition—Another disadvantage that will attend our operations is that the greater part of our Army will be new levies, nor shall we have time to discipline them, before the operations must necessarily commence; and it is not difficult to foresee that from such a large Garrison of veteran troops there will be many sallies in the course of the seige, which may prove ruinous to our approaches, should our troops be thrown into confusion and routed, as will be the case unless they acquire a habit of steadiness.
					We shall be under the necessity of investing the City on the Island of New York, and the works on Long Island; this will produce such a division of our force as will give the Enemy when united a supe[r]iority to either and an opportunity of attacking them to advantage.
					Upon the whole I am persuaded this business will have a doubtfull issue after making the best possible arrangements that time and circumstances will admit. But should the exertions of the people fall short & not give the necessary support to the operations in the middle of the expedition, we shall be obliged to abandon the object under circumstances of certain disgrace, if not of total ruin. The empire of the sea is so necessary to the success of this expedition that it would be almost madness to attempt it without the fairest prospect of being masters of the ocean. It will be impossible to carry on the business of transportation by land which will be required for the support of such an Army; nor should I hope for success without this advantage altho’ every other circumstance might be calculated to pave the way to it; and the larger the Army the more difficult will be the business. Our prospects upon this quarter depend not upon ourselves, or the exertions of these States; and therefore this matter should be laid before Admiral de Ternay and the French General, as the point on which the whole business turns. If they can give us assurances from the situation of the navy in Europe and the West Indies that they will be able to preserve a superiority in the American seas we may venture upon the necessary steps preparatory to an investiture of the City: but without this it would

be idle for us to attempt it, and hazardous if not ruinous to them to engage in it. The object is of such importance in its consequences that it should not be relinquished but from the fullest persuasion that it cannot be accomplished: On the other hand our wishes should not mislead our judgment; and engage us in a business which our strength and resources are unequal to, and which by the heavy drafts that it will make from the Country both of men and stores, must give the people a great shock by a disappointment, if not totally discourage them from further exertions. We should not be less carefull on the part of our Ally, than that of ourselves; for should we engage in the attempt and fail in the enterprize, and a superior British fleet block up the French Squadron in the harbour of New York, the whole must inevitably fall a sacrafice. To say nothing worse—this circumstance must be distressing to us, as well as painfull to our great and good Ally.
					To decide positively upon any plan of operations in the present moment would be both permature and improper. We are not sufficiently informed to fix upon any object, and therefore I cannot see that any thing better can be done than to prepare with a view to all, and govern our choice hereafter by future events.
					Should it be found upon the arrival of the French-fleet that they have not a prospect of maintaining the dominion of the sea, or that the force we are likely to collect will be unequal to the investiture of New York; I would beg leave to suggest to your Excellency two objects South Carolina and Canada. I do not think it will be in our power to reduce Charles Town with the present garrison that is in it, and the probable strength which will be added by the recruits raised in that Country. I am apprehensive could we detach a force adequate to the purpose, they could not be subsisted there in the present state of the country a sufficient time for the reduction of the place; but as there is a difficulty in detaching a proper force, and as we are but indifferently provided with Artillery and Amunition for such an attempt, and the issue being uncertain from the strength of the garrison, these reasons together with the bad effects that a failure must have upon the people of that Country distressed and dispirited as they are, would prevent me from recommending the measure. I would advise sending a sufficient force, to give full protection to the country, and confine the British Army within their lines. We shall by this step recover the confidence of the people, and pave the way to the entire expulsion of the Enemy hereafter: we shall at least convince the world that they cannot extend their conquests beyond their fortifications; and shoud there be any negotiations towards a peace next winter, they will have but little claim from their possessions in that Country. This measure may not be attended with any great degree of splendor, but I am confident it would be productive of many

good consequences both to the people of that country and the cause in general.
					Canada is an object of great importance not so much from the positive advantages we can derive from the possession of it, as from the security it will give to our frontiers. Our possess⟨i⟩ons already are more extensive than usefull. but that country appears to be so necessary for the protection of this, that to possess and hold it would be the most effectual measure, and least expensive to give quiet to these States. I would not think of reducing Quebec, but endeavour to posse⟨ss⟩ the most fertile part of the Colony and cut off the communication between the upper and lower Country. St John’s and Auswegotia are the only fortified places between the lakes and the lower Country at which there is the least probability of the Enemy’s making any considerable defence. Their strength in that Province may be about four thousand Men, but they are divided and dispersed in such a manner as to be able to give but little opposition; except at the fortified places. I would employ upon this expedition about four thousand Continental Troops and one thousand Militia from the States of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. If the French General could be prevailed on to divide his force I would employ about two thousand in Canada and the rest in South Carolina. The whole of the Troops should march into Canad[a] by the way of Co’os. The inhabitants would be much more likely to join us and give support to our Army with a body of French forces than without them. It will also be a gratification to our Ally to be employ’d in dispossessing the enemy of that country from whence he had been expelled. To facilitate this business it would be necessary that a fleet with Cannon, amunition, provision and stores should go up the river St Laurence under convoy of a few frigates they being more suitable for this service than larger Ships. But whether this will be practicable must depend upon the situation of the French fleet after their arrival. If their force is small it cannot admit of a division; and therefore the whole must be employed in convoying the Troops to the Southward. But I would not relinquish the expedition into Canada, supposing this last circumstance should not be favourable to our wishes. Many reasons may be offered why the French troops should share the glory of the operations in every quarter. This will evince them of our entire confidence and at the same time give our internal enemies no opportunity to alarm the credulous among ourselves. I suppose the French-fleet will rendezvous at New Port, from whence the Troops may march through the Country to Co’os the distance being about 170 Miles. Those that may be detached from the Continental Army to rendezvous at Albany and march from thence to Co’os about ninety miles. The troops should be detached for this expedition about the 10th of August; they will then

be able to enter that Country immediately after the harvest is over, when the people will be at liberty to give every aid and assistance that may be required of them. And as the first object of the expedition is only to take possession of the open country, Montreal &c., there will be sufficient time for the purpose before the cold season comes on, and to make the necessary arrangements for holding it through the winter.
					An expedition of this sort will have great weight in the politicks of Europe, and disconcert the Enemy at least for the next Campaign should the War continue, and if it should not, it will have a happy influence to settle a peace upon advantageous terms. Should we be able in the winter to destroy the enemy’s fleet upon lake Champlain and even obliged to abandon our conquests the next Campaign; the expedition will produce many solid advantages: but on the contrary should we hold our ground there, and the forts and fortifications in the upper country fall into our hands the good consequences will be numerous.
					I have only proposed these two last objects as secondary considerations in the plan of military operations, as such I would wish them to be viewed and our measures taken accordingly. But should they be considered with a design to carry them into execution, some previous steps will be necessary in the Staff departments which may be more fully laid before your Excellency hereafter.
					From the circumstance of the season to the Southward and the state of the harvest to the Northward, which must govern our operations at those places, we shall have sufficient time to determine with certainty, whether it will be in our power to attempt any thing here.
					In stating the force to be employed in S. Carolina and Canada I have taken in the whole of the French troops, but should they agree to be employed in a divided state it will materially alter the estimate. I am by no means certain that the Army for want of provisions, pay and supplies will be in a condition to attempt any thing; nor can I see how it is possible for your Excellency to decide with certainty what can, or ought to be done, while things are so much in the dark.
					I have written upon this subject more with a view of complying with your Excellency’s order, than an expectation that my sentiments will be of use. I have only to add this observation, that if the French General should decline dividing his forces and nothing can be attempted against New York; and should your Excellency think Canada an object, and that a reinforcement ought to be sent to the Southward; the whole of the French troops may be employ’d here and detachments made from the Continental Army for those two purposes. I have the honor to be With the most perfect respect Your Excellency’s Most Obedient Humble Servant

						Nath. Greene M.G.


Title: From George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 6 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

						Sir
						Head Quarters near Posaick Falls [N.J.] July 6th 1780

					I have the honor by this morning’s Post, to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s dispatches of the 25th Ulto which have been presented to me by General Lincoln. The several objects to which they extend, will have my consideration, and I shall do myself the honor of informing Congress of the result.
					Since the Enemy left Jerseys, their main body has proceeded into the County of West Chester; and they have extended themselves from Philips’s across towards the Sound: in which position they lay, according to my last intelligence. Their object most probably is to forage that Country, and strip it of all Supplies.
					We have not yet received any Levies, except between thirty and forty from Pensylvania. This is a most painful circumstance, and such as keeps me still unable to prepare any plan to lay before the French Admiral and General.
					I enclose Your Excellency Rivington and Gaine’s New York Papers of the 1st and 3d Inst. Congress will find in the latter, if they have not already got it, a Memorial of the Empress of Russia to the States of Holland; The substance of which, she had also laid before the Courts of Copenhagen—Stockholm, and Lisbon on the subject of neutrality—Also a Declaration to those of London, Versailles, and Madrid; And an act of His Britannic Majesty in Council, declaring Holland to be on the footing of a Neutral Nation, not previleged by Treaty. I have the honor to be With the highest respect and esteem Your Excellency’s Most Obedient Servant

						Go: Washington


Title: General Orders, 7 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

						Head Quarters Pracaness Friday July 7th 1780

							Parole Alexandria.
							 Countersigns Narva Nile.Watchword Look about

					[Officers] For the Day Tomorrow[:] Colonel Chambers[,] Lieutenant Colonel Mentges[,] Brigade Major Bradford
					The manœuvring Battalions which were to have Paraded this Morning are to parade tomorrow morning at four o clock.
					A Detachment for a Week’s command to parade at 6 o clock this afternoon with two days provisions and 40 rounds ⅌ man.
					Ensign Bloomfield of the 3d Jersey Regiment is appointed Adjutant to the same vice Lieutenant Sheppard.
					A Return of Shoes actually Wanting by the Infantry and Artillery to be made tomorrow morning at Orderly time regimentally digested; as the supply in Camp at Present is small, it is expected that the officers commanding Brigades and Regiments will see that no more Men are

included in the Returns than those who are upon the Ground and in immediate want.
					The Board of General officers appointed by the Order of the 3d Instant composed of Major Generals Greene, Lord Stirling, Marquis De La Fayette, Brigadiers General Maxwell Knox and Wayne: have made the following Report.
					“It is the unanimous opinion of this Board that they have not powers to alter the standing of any General officers different from their Appointment and therefore cannot determine upon the Claim of General Irvine of precedence to General Hand.[”]
					At a Division General Court Martial the 27th ultimo Major Talbot President; Mr Swain Clothier for the State of Pennsylvania was tried on the following Charges—Absenting himself from Camp without Leave[,] Neglect of duty—Abuses in the Execution of his Office & Fraud.
					Found Guilty of the first and second Charges being a Breach of section 18th Article 5th also of the 3d Charge being a breach of section 12 Article 1st of the Articles of War (acquitted of the 4th Charge) and sentenced to be dismissed the Service as a Person unworthy the Trust reposed in him.
					The Commander in Chief approves the sentence and orders it to take Place immediately.

						After Orders
						While We remain in this incampment a Corporal and four dragoons are to mount with the daily Guards and will receive their orders from the Brigadier or senior officer of the Day.
						Colonel Moylan gives them Tomorrow.


Title: From George Washington to David Brearley, 7 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Brearley, David

						Dr Sir
						Head qrs near posaick Falls [N.J.] July 7th 1780

					I have to request that You will be so obliging as to inform me by the earliest opportunity, at what time You accepted the appointment of Chief Justice of this State. My reason for this request is, A Board of General Officers have determined on a late occasion, that Several Officers in the Jersey line ought to take rank from that time—and that reference should be had to You to fix it. I have the Honor to be with great respect & regard Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt sert

						Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 7 July 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

						Sir
						Camp Precaness 7th July 1780.

					I inclose your Excellency a copy of a letter from Colo. Biddle, containing a short state of the forage department; the train things are in; and the prospects that lay before us. This article is so necessary in all offensive operations, that nothing can be undertaken without it. I am sorry to find, that very few are impressed with its importance; and many entertain an opinion that it may be had upon the spur of occasion: this might be the case, was the demand but small, and that for no considerable time; but where the quantity is so great as will be necessary to afford a supply for such an Army as we have in contemplation to employ, measures ought to be taken with certainty to produce it, and nothing left to chance or accident. Should we engage in an important expedition, and leave this business upon a precarious and uncertain footing, ten to one but we shall be obliged to abandon, with disgrace, what might be accomplished had measures been taken to provide means equal to the end.
					The articles of provision and forage are so necessary to an Army, that they determine all other considerations, in measures, either offensive, or defensive: history affords innumerable instances of sieges and expeditions of the highest importance failing for want of these articles;

and they are always mentioned as matters of the first consideration in determining upon a plan of operations. We have frequently seen and felt the want of provision and forage, when our Army has been but small, and in many instances we have suffer⟨e⟩d for want of the former, when it might have been had, if the latter could have been supplied to have kept up the necessary transportation.
					I am sensible your Excellency is fully impressed with the importance of this article; but I am very apprehensive that is not the case with those on whom we must depend for a supply; on the contrary, I am persuaded few know the importance, and still fewer attend to the consequences. People who are not well acquainted with the dependence of one thing upon another in an army, nor see how remote events depend upon present causes, are not apt to be sufficiently impressed to take proper measures seasonably upon such occasions; and however fully they may be convinced afterwards, it will be too late to prevent the misfortune.
					The importance of the Quarter Master’s department, to the operations of an army, is either not sufficiently known, or not sufficiently attended to; which of the two is the case, I shall not undertake to determine. To raise an army, and not put the Staff Departments upon a footing which will enable the General to operate, is like a Merchant’s building a Ship, and then refusing to rig her: the profits of the Merchant is not more dependent upon this, than the successes of an army depend upon a proper arrangement of those departments. Military operations are often governed by contingences, even where measures are taken upon the best grounds of information; but where both information and execution are upon an uncertain footing, and dependent upon a great variety of characters and tempers, with different interests, and different views, nothing is to be expected but disappointment. I see no preparations making, nor a prospect of any, either in the line of the Staff, or thro’ the medium of the States, that look like putting the army in a condition to operate offensively, or even to act, with security, upon a defensive plan; nor am I convinced that either administration, or the several States, consider the present preparations in the light of a serious intention to offensive operations.
					There are many things, which will be necessary to provide for the army, that cannot be had upon the spur of occasion, such as forage, tents, knapsacks, Canteens, &c. Unless measures are taken to provide these articles, previous to the demand for them, a disappointment of the most serious nature will ensue. Tents are a very important article: we have no prospect of getting a competent number; and should our operations be long and tedious, the injury that the troops will suffer from a want of them, is not difficult to foresee. I would beg leave to suggest to your Excellency the propriety and necessity of applying to

the associated Merchants in Philadelphia for a supply of this article. Tho’ that association did not take place for this purpose, yet their good intentions cannot be directed to a more necessary point than this propos’d. It will take a considerable time to provide them, with the utmost exertions; and therefore the business cannot be too early attended to.
					The present channel, in which the public business is conducted, appears to be well calculated to produce disappointment; and if the object of Goverment had been to disgrace those at the heads of the great departments, no measures could have been better adapted to the purpose: for we can neither tell what is provided, or providing; nor are we able to give your Excellency the necessary information to take your measures upon. I am, with great respect, Your Excellency’s Most Obedient, Hume Servant

						Nath. Gre⟨ene⟩ Q.⟨M.G.⟩


Title: From George Washington to Major General Robert Howe, 7 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, Robert

						Dear Sir
						Head Quarters Bergen County 7th July 1780

					I recd your favr of the 3d with the Returns, to which it refers, inclosed. Colo. Gouvion—anxious to prepare Fascines, Gabions and sleepers for platforms, wishes a reinforcement of fatigue Men, to be kept constantly down towards the Village upon that service. I know not how such a measure may interfere with your present arrangements, and I can therefore only recommend to you to spare as many for that duty as you possibly can. By a letter from Genl Parsons of the 4th he expected 1000 of the Connecticut Levies, in the course of this Week,

at Danbury. My directions to him were to forward them by divisions as fast as they arrived. This I have repeated in the inclosed, which be pleased to send on. Should they come in according to expectation, you may afford Colo. Gouvion the assistance which he requires. I am &.


Title: To George Washington from Colonel Francis Johnston, 7 July 1780
From: Johnston, Francis
To: Washington, George

						May it please Your Excelly
						Philada July 7th 1780.

					Lieutt McKinney who carries this to Your Excelly, has in charge another Detachment of the new Levies consisting of Ninety five men—The Route he will shew to Your Excelly, wh. probably will answer the several Detachments that are to be sent in future—Two hundred and thirty men including Captn Hubley’s Party have already been sent on, the present Detachment, together with those I shall be enabled to forward will amount to near 600 more, wh. the President informs me, will include the number he intended—I shou’d be happy, were it in my power to forward these men more expeditiously, but am prevented by the County Lieutts not having settled fully with them, however, I have procur’d an Order from Council directing an immediate settlement, wh. will enable me to send them on more rapidly.
					From what I can learn from President Reed it appears, he is determind to have the recruiting Service for the War opened, as soon as the last Detachment of the present Levies is sent on. I have the honor to be Your Excellys Most Obtedient Servt

						F: Johnston


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, 7 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Parsons, Samuel Holden

						Dear Sir
						Head Quarters Bergen County 7th July 1780

					I am pleased to hear by yours of the 4th that the State of Connecticut have directed one thousand Men to be added to the number for compleating the Continental Battalions. I have only to repeat my directions to have the Levies forwarded from Danbury to West point as fast as they arrive—that we may lose none of the little time allowed for arranging and training them.
					By a late letter from General Heath I learn that the Hermione is gone out upon a cruise.
					My letter of the 29th June will inform you that it is not in my power to dispose of the drafts from the Connecticut light Horse agreeable to their wishes. I am &.


Title: From George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., 7 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan Sr.

						Head Quarters near Passaic Falls [N.J.]July 7th 1780
						Dear Sir,

					I am informed there are two Regiments of State Troops, amounting to six hundred men posted at Stanford, under the Command of Colo. Willis; to which place Major Murnon has been sent, for the purpose of cutting fascines, and will stand in need of every assistance, which can be afforded him: If Your Excellency will give directions that such of these Troops, and of the Militia which may be occassionally there, and can possibly be spared from other duty, should be employed, in making these preparations, it will be a very acceptable and important service.
					Should Major Murnon have made application personally to your Excellency, I doubt not the necessary orders are already given—If he has not, the pressing nature of the service is such, that I flatter myself, there will be no delay, in giving such instructions to the Commanding Officer, as will effectually promote the public interest in this respect. I have the honor to be with great respect & esteem Your Excellency’s Most Obedt Servt

						Go: Washington


Title: General Orders, 8 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

						Head Quarters Pracaness Saturday July 8th 1780

							Parole Paramus
							 Countersigns T: K.Watchword Bombard

					[Officers] Of the Day Tomorrow[:] Colonel Humpton[,] Lieutenant Colonel Conway[,] Brigade Major Ross
					A Corporal and four light dragoons from Major Lee’s Corps to attend the Grand Parade tomorrow morning seven o Clock.


Title: From George Washington to the Board of War, 8 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

						Gentn
						Head Quarters Col. Dey’s Bergen County 8 July 1780

					Inclosed is a letter from Brgr Gen. Knox on the subject of an instant provision of shot and shells, and proposing the employing of Feash’ and Ogden furnaces for this purpose. As the matter is of the utmost importance, and requires an immediate decision, I intreat it of the Board. And should no arrangement have been made on this head I think these furnaces would answer the intention, and should be engaged in the business without a moments delay. I am &c.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Robert Howe, 8 July 1780
From: Howe, Robert
To: Washington, George

						Dear Sir
						Highlands [N.Y.] 8th July 1780

					The Enemy both with Horse and Infantry in all as Capt. Sackett Writes me, about One Hundred and Fifty of Delancys Corps were up the other day into our Settlements—a Party of this State Troops attach’d to this Command who were Posted on the lines under Captain Sackett, turn’d out to Oppose them, but the Captain finding them Double his number and the Ground he possess’d not very Defensible, he prudently Retreated, Determin’d however to Ambuscade them in their way down—They Collected above a Hundred Head of Cattle, and above two Hundred sheep with th⟨ese⟩—they were returning in Triumph when they were suddenly Attack’d by Captain Sacket and his Party, they were thrown into Confusion, but rallied and Attack’d our

Party, who though not above half their number defeated and Pursued them several miles, and Retook all the Cattle and sheep—Captain Sacket writes me these Particulars—and many Persons of judgement down there Speak of this little affair as Clever—and having done Captain Sacket and his men and Officers Honour—The Enemy had one man kill’d and three or four mortally wounded—The Connecticut State Troops also fell in with this Party lower down, and after some fire Drove them, Colo. Beby who Commanded the Party lost one man and had a Lieut. Shot thro’ the sholder, one man of the Enemy was kill’d and a good many wounded. I am Dear Sir with great Respect Your Excellencys most Obd. Sert

						Robert Howe


Title: General Orders, 9 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To:

						Head Quarters Pracaness Sunday July 9th 1780

							Parole Lancaster.
							 Countersigns Lynn; Nantz.Watchword. All is Well

					[Officers] Of the Day Tomorrow[:] Colonel Shreve[,] Major Thayer[,] Brigade Major Van Laër
					A General Court Martial of the Line to assemble the day after tomorrow to try such Persons as shall come before them Colonel Richard Butler is appointed President Lieutenant Colonel Olney Major Edwards; two Captains from the 1st and 2d Pennsylvania Hands and Maxwell’s Brigades and one from Stark’s to attend as Members.
					An Orderly Serjeant from each Brigade to be sent to the Court.
					The Quarter Master General is desired to point out a place for them to sit in.
					Application to be made tomorrow morning to the Deputy Clothier General near the two Bridges for the respective Proportion of Shoes for the Troops.
					An Adjutant or other Commissioned officer from Moylan’s

regiment and from Major Lee’s Corps to attend at the Orderly Office daily 12 oClock for Orders.
					Maxwell’s Brigade is for the present annex’d to Major General Lord Stirling’s Division.

						After Orders.
						Two Battalions from the Line to manœuvre tomorrow—Lieutenant Colonel Harmar is requested to attend the Discipline and Brigade Major Bradford the Formation.
						Colonels Spencer and Craige and Majors T. L. Moore and Burrowes will take command of them under Brigadier General Hand.
						The Battalions are to be formed in the field contiguous to the Grand Parade half past four in the morning.
						Hand’s and Maxwell’s give the Adjutants and Colours.


Title: To George Washington from Colonel David Forman, 9 July 1780
From: Forman, David
To: Washington, George

						Sir
						Frehold [N.J.] Sunday Morning 9th July 1780

					Enclosed your Excly has a Diary kept on the Highlands of Middle Town, by it Your Excellancy will Observe that the small Fleet prepared for sinking & to Inturupt the Navigation to New York are returned to Sandy Hook—The same person Informes me, that two Deserters landed yesterday from one of the Enemies Ships of War who says they had a report on Board that a French fleet was on the Coast.
					All the Watermen on the Shoar agree that should the Enemy sink there Vessells at or Near the point of the Hook, That they will drive away with the first gale of Wind that Happins.
					The place they last removed from is the Shoalist water in the Channell way to New York and so far removed from the Sea that in all probability there Vessells when Sunk would remain unmoved untill they ware Weighed—Yet I am of the opinion they will (if at all) sink them at or Near the Point of the Hook—& for these reasons—If they have the passage of the Hook open the French fleet as soone as they get in will have a good Harbour behind the Hook or In Amboy [Raritan] Bay, by which means they will be secure from all Gales of Wind & have it absolutely in there power to Cut off all supplyes & at there leasure to plan the mode of

removeing any obstructions they Can Throw in the Channell way betwen the Banks—Which time, and a superior Naval force would Certainly affect, As the Channell betwen the Banks is too far distant to be cover’d by any Land Batterys they can erect—& by interrupting the Channell way at the point of the Hook & at the same Time Takeing possession of the Hook with a Body of Troops and Heavy Cannon they would make the passage if not Impassable at least very dificult—The same Storm that will displace the Vessells they may sink will in all probality Oblige the French fleet to put to Sea & the Weather that will permit them to return will again affoard an Opportunity of Sinking other Vessells.
					When I observed the Enemy would by Sinking a Number of Vessells at or near the point of the Hook and occupying it with a body of Troops &c. Make that passage Impassable or at least very dificult.
					I had referance only to a Naval Attack and that the British Ships with the Assistance of the Troops and Cannon on Shoar would prevent our Allyes from Weighing the Sunk Vessells or Warping through Them.
					Should a Body of our Troops Attack and take possession of the Hook every Dificulty would be removed in a very Short Time.
					By Landing a few piecus of Heavy Cannon the Troops Could Cover the French Ships While they drew the Sunk Vessells out of the Channell or Untill they Could Warp there Ships Through them The Hook at presant is guarded by a Lieut. and Twenty of the New raised Troops at the Light House—in the Cedars are about 60 or 70 refugees White and Black—At the Time Count De Estang lay off the Ennemy Erected a Bumb Battery at the Point of the Hook but sent very few Troops.
					Last Summer they Erected some Works and Sent some Heavy Cannon from New York for them—the works are now Intirely out of repair; the Cannon has long since been removed, I belive to New York—Should Your Excely on the Arival of the French fleet meditate an Attack on New York & think the possession of Sandy Hook of any Importance—it may not be amiss to remind your Excely that the Hook is made of a Very loose sand, A perfect Beach—& That it will be impossable to Erect any Works without the Assistance of Gabions or Fascines, or Some other Materials to give Stability to the sand—and as it is possable th[e]y may not be procured in Time should such a plan be in Existance it might be proper to have them prepared.
					from the Late Law of [this] State there is so few of the Militia Horse ordered out and so much use for them that in many Instances I Can not be furnished with one in fore and Twenty Hours and Never untill I send 15 or 20 Miles for them—by which means my Inteligence should the French fleet arrive will probably be delayed—Should your Excly be of Opinion that it will be Necessary I Can engage a Couple of Trusty

Ladds allways to be ready at a Minutes Warning. I have The Honour to be Your Exellancyes Most obdt Humble Servt

						David Forman


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 9 July 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

						Sir.
						Camp Precaness July 9th 1780.

					Inclosed I send your Excellency a letter from Colo. Hay covering some conditions proposed by the Ship-carpenters at Fish Kill on which to engage in the Continental service. I have had the letter by me some days and have defered giving an answer untill things were in such a train as to enable me to judge whether we should stand in need of

their services or not. But this being settled in your Excellency’s verbal instructions yesterday, to make all the preparations in my power with a view to an important expedition; I beg your directions respecting these Carpenters.
					It is high time an answer was transmitted, as it is more than probable they will all seek other employ. I am with great respect Your Excellencys Most Obedt Humble Servant.

						Nath. Greene Q.M.G.

						P.S. Be pleased to return the papers with your Excellency’s instructions on the subject.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 9 July 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

						Sir
						Camp Precaness 9th July 1780.

					Inclos’d I send your Excellency a copy of a letter from Mr Thompson, Waggon Master General, respecting Waggoners. His plan and reasons you will judge of, and give your directions accordingly. This, or some similar mode, is indispensibly necessary to promote the service; and however inconvenient it may be to the line of the army, Congress have put things upon such a footing, that there is no alternative: In the first place, we cannot engage Waggoners without money or credit; and in the second place, we have no order to attempt it.
					If your Excellency approves of Mr Thompson’s plan, I beg a general order may be given to the Adjutant Genl to detach, from time to time, for this service, as calls may arise, and applications are made by the Waggon Master Genl, and approved of by the Quarter Master General. I am, with great respect, Your Excellency’s Most Hume Servt

						Nath. Greene Q.M.G.


Title: To George Washington from Lieutenant Colonel Udny Hay, 9 July 1780
From: Hay, Udny
To: Washington, George

						Sir
						Fish Kill [N.Y.] 9 July 1780

					Your Excellencys letter of 30th ult: reachd this in my absence, the baker was ordered on to West Point, where General Mcdougal was of opinion he could not give him the necessary assistance for rendering him of that service your Excellency designed—As soon as I knew this I sent to West Point after the baker, and proposed his coming to Fish Kill Landing, but he was unluckily gone.
					After receiving your orders to turn out teams to bring on the flour from Sussex ⟨I we⟩nt to that place, and proposed to the Qr Master either to procure Forage for our teams after they enterd Jersey, or send on the flour to the borders of this State, he not only proposed doing the latter but said that the flour would be deliverd at Chester, upon which I raisd a large number of teams and sent on as far as Warwick, but not a barrell of flour there, and having no money they were oblidged to return empty, This circumstance has really embarrassed me much, and am affraid will render the inhabitants much more backward in turning out again than they otherwise would have been; I shall ⟨w⟩rite them as ha[n]dsome an apology as I can, what effect it may have I am at a loss to determine. I have the Honour to be wh the greatest respect—Your Excellencys most obedient and very humble Set

						Udny Hay


Title: To George Washington from Major General Steuben, 9 July 1780
From: Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, baron von
To: Washington, George

						Fish Kill [N.Y.] July 9th 1780

					Aussi dificile et presque impossible il est de tracer un plan pour les operations d’une Campagne, Quand on ne peut pas Comter avec sureté sur les Moyens qu’on peut Employer. Notre situation presente exige de prendre une partie-pour ne pas perdre L’Avantage d’un secour Eficace que nous Esperons d’un jour à L’autre de la part de Nos Allies.
					Dans un Moment ou Nous etions mieux prepares de notre côté nous pourrions Esperer qu’avec le Renfort qui nous Arrive de france de prendre La Ville de New:York, d’Ecraser L’Ennemi Terminer la Guerre et Manifester notre independence dans le Cours de cette Campagne.
					Mais ce n’est pas notre Cas; des Circonstances Malheureuses ont Empecher tous preparatifs pour cette Campagne, et dans le moment ou Les Operation[s] doivent Commencer, Nous ne scavons pas encore sur quoi nous pouvons Compter ni en hommes, ni les Autres Moyens neccessaire pour faire La Campagne.
					La Campagne derniere notre Armé inferieur en Nombre à celle de L’Ennemie nous etions forcer d’aller a la defensive; Le depart de 5000 hommes dont le temps etoit expirer—La prise de Charlstown—la

desertion etc: nous a enlever la Moitie de ce nombre; La force de L’Ennemie n’a guere diminuér et il sagit de faire une Campagne a L’offensive.
					La force que L’Ennemi nous presente a New-York est de quatorse Milles hommes Combattans; Notre Armé—tout y Compris fait environs Sept milles. Le Corps de francois serat entre Six et sept mille. Ce qui nous mette a peu près au nombre egal avec L’Ennemi.
					Si les Etats Complettent Les Regimens nous aurons 13000 Recrues a Espérer—joint au nombre Cy dessus—nous Aurons prés du double de La force de L’Ennemi. il n’en faut pas moins pour faire L’entreprise sur New York. Ou L’ennemie nous présente Dix mille Veterans derriere des Retranchement, pou[r]vue de tout. Nous Lui opposeront la Moitie des Recrues qui n’ont recue aucune instruction Militaire. Mais si J’adopte L’oppinion mal fondé que chacque homme fait un soldat! pouvons nous Compter sur le nombre de 13000 Recrues? Pourons nous compter sur Dix mille? il ne faut pas moins pour faire une entreprise aussi importente.
					Comme L’attaque de New York exige des co-operations Navales, il me semble que la balances des Vaisseau[x] doit etre aussi bien tires que celle des hommes: La superiorité d’une flotte de L’Ennemie a celle que nous Esperons, me paroit un obstacles non seulement dans cette—mais dans tout autre expedition que nous pourrions entreprendre.
					Dans L’incertitude ou nous sommes L’oppinion que Le Gen: en Chef m’a demandé sur la conduite des operation de cette campagne, ne peut etre fondé que sur des suppositions, dont la Varianté doit determiner notre Conduite.
					1: Supposition
					Que L’Ennemi n’a point de Renfort en trouppes de terre a attendre; quil se dispose a defendre New-York, Long et staten island, avec les 14000 homme quil a ensemble quil est pourvue de Munition de Guerre et de bouche⟨s⟩ pour soutenir un blocus de trois mois.
					Quil n’a que Quatre Vaisseaux de Battaille dans Le port, qu’aucune flotte superieure de L’Ennemi peut mettre celle de nos Allies en danger et interrompre L’Entreprise.
					Que de notre Côte nous serons pret a Commencer no⟨s⟩ operation Aussi tot que la flotte francoise arrive.
					Que nous Ayons pour le moin dix milles hommes de plus; Armé equippe et ranger en battaille.
					Que notre Artillerie et celle des francois serat suffis⟨ant⟩ pour faire nos Attacques par tout ou il serat neccessaire.
					Que notre Armé serat pou[r]vue de munition de Guerre et de bouche.
					Que Les instrument et Matteriaux neccessaire, pour construire des batterie et autres ouvrages soit a la Main.

					Que les batteaux de transport soit pret, tant sur la Riviere du Nord que sur le East River.
					Que La flotte de nos Allies serat superi[e]ur en force a celle de L’Ennemi.
					Dans cette supposition Le prémier objet qui se presente est sans Contredire L’Entreprise sur New-York. Avant que de hazardes mon Opinion sur L’ordre des Operations; J’avoue mon entiere ignorence sur les operation Navales; si je me trompe sur ceux de terre il faut L’attribuer a la faute de ne pas connoitre le terrein que par des Cartes, incorrecte et des description tout aussi imparfait.
					Ordre des Operation.
					La flotte arrivé sur la hooc, pou[r]vue des bon Pilottes entrerat avec le premier Vent favorable dans le ⟨Harbour⟩ Deux mille hommes trouppes francoises debarqueront tout ⟨de⟩ suite sur staten island; Tandis qu’en meme temps la Brigade de jersey et milles homme de Milices passeront sur cet isle ou d’Elisabeth Point ou a Raway Supposé que L’Ennemi Reste en defence des Ouvrages sur staten island ou il a maintenant 12 a 1500 hommes; je Voudrois poser ici la question que si notre flotte a passer les Narrows, nous ne pouvions pas defendre la retraite a L’Ennemie en Envoyant une force proportionné sur Barren Neck.
					si cela etoit possible L’objet en Vaudroit bien la peine et meme quelques Risque, N’ayant aucun doute que les Ouvrages sur staten island, avec plus ou moins des peines seront a la fin reduit et si nous serions assez malheureux de ne pas reussir dans notre grand objet, La prise de 1500 hommes serat aumoins un Coup assez sensible pour L’Ennemi.
					Aussi tot que la flotte a passer les Narrows, il serat neccessaires qu’une couples des Vaisseau ou fregattes franchissent la riviere du Nord.
					Dans le temps que les operations Vont en Avant sur staten island Notre Armé S’assemblerat a Kings brige, ou elle resterat J’usqu’a ce que nous sommes decides et que toutes les preparatifs sont fait pour porter nos operations sur Long-island. trois mille hommes de notre avec 2000 Miliciens et tout notre Cavallerie seront suffisant de tenir L’Ennemie en echec a Kingsbrige.
					Tout le reste de notre armée joint de 4 a 5 milles trouppes francois serat porter sur Long iland; ou les hauteur de Broklyn seront attacques ou par des approches régulieres ou par une entreprise hardie. Celles-cy reduit nos Vaisseaux auront L’entré libre dans le East River je m’imag[i]ne quils seront maitres et de bruler toutes les Vaisseau de L’ennemie, de bombarder et Cannoner La Ville et meme les position de L’Ennemi sur L’isle de York.
					Quand les Affaires sont J’usque là, la situation de L’Ennemi devient Critique si non desesperé, Maitre des hauteurs de Brooklin nous

pouvons bombarder la Ville, sous les Auspices de la flotte un Corps de 6 a 7. mille homme suffirait pour tenir les hauteurs de Brooklin et comme je suppose Vers ce temps L’Affaire sur Staten island finie. Les Trouppes francoises tiendront la position sur long island et toute notre Arme pourrat franchir le Passage de King’s brige et serrer L’Ennemi Vers la Ville de York ou le manque de Vivre, ou une Valeureuse Action terminerat le sort des Anglois.
					Mais je ne me borne pas ici au supposition favorable quils precedent cet ordre des Operation; je pretend que pour une Entreprise de cette Nature, ou le sort des Etas unie depend de notre succes ou de notre chute, je pretens di-je que toute Les Provinces et particulierement celle de la Nouvelle Angleterre, doivent ⟨accourir⟩ par terre et par Eaux pour porter leurs Assistence et secour a L’armé Que toutes les Piratterie soient Suspendue, tout interet personnel doit cesser quand il S’agit de notre independence de notre honneur et de celui de nos Genereux Allies.
					Que tout les Vaisseau Grand et petit suffisament provisionne accours de Boston, New-Port, Philadelphie et de tout les ports de L’amérique que le Sound soit couvert des Batimens pour nous fournir toute ⟨assistance⟩ Possible. Cette Entreprise serat l’Epoque de notre gloire ou de notre Esclavage, je me flatte que cette pensé Annimerat chacque bon Citoyen d’employer tout ses Efforts.
					Seconde supposition
					Que les forces de L’Ennemie par Eau et par terre, et toutes les Moyens pour la defense de New:York serat le meme comme mentionné dans la precedente.
					Mais, qu’au Lieu de 10 a 13000 Recrues, il ne nous entre que ⟨5,⟩ 6. meme J’usqu’a 8000. hommes. Cette seule consideration me fait de-sister du Projet sur New-York. N’ayant allors pas meme le ⟨double⟩ de la force de L’Ennemie, laquelle force nous seront obligé de divisé en plusieurs point; nous seront foible par tout; La force de L’Ennemi est compacte, il tombe sur une partie, et la defaite de celle La pourroit entrainer si non une defaite mais une deroute Generale.
					Dailleur Les Operations dans L’Entreprise de New-York sont si compliques, un seul delai une seule fause maneuvre par Eau ou par terre, pourrat fournir a L’Ennemi une Occasion de nous pu⟨nir⟩ si ce n’est pas la superiorite du Nombre qui L’impose et le tient en Echec.
					C’est donc dans cette supposition je changerai L’objet; je desiste de New York et je m’attache a la Conquette du Canada.
					Cette Conquette pas si decisive que la prise de New-York, ne laisserat pas de nous Offrir des grandes Avantages. La prémiere est la sureté de nos frontieres contre les invasion des indiens. la seconde de detourner le Theatre de Guerre, pour soulager les Provinces de York et gersey presque enervé. et troisiemement comme je regarde la Conquette du

Cannada comme tot ou tard inevitable pour la tranqui⟨lite⟩ des Etat Unies, Cette Epoque favorable ou une flotte et des trouppes francois sont pret pour nous Assister ne pourrat peut etre ⟨illegible⟩ se presenter d’aussitot. Une inclination Reciproque des francois et des Canadiens faciliterat L’Entreprise et notre succes pourrat nous produire la paix.
					Ordre des Operations.
					Aussi tot que La flotte arriverat sur les cotes, Elle entrerat dans le port de Rhode island, les trouppes debarque et raifrachir; on determinerat le nombre des trouppes et vesseau francois déstiné pour cette expedition. Supposer que 3000 hommes fùrent neccessaire pour entrer avec la flotte dans la riviere de st Laurans, je croie qu’alors il ne serat pas impropre de joindre a 2000 francois ou la Brigade de New-hanshire ou celle de New-York, Enfin mille homme de notre armé. Ces 4 a 5000 hommes trouppes francoises Marcherons une distence par Eau une autre parterre pour joindre notre Armé qui allors aurat passé la riviere du Nord pour nous aprocher de Whit plans.
					Les Brigades de stark et de Hand seront toutes faite detaché, remonteront la Riviere de Connecticut, pour entrer dans le Canada par le chemin que le Collonel Hazen a Commencer.
					Le Lac Champlain en possession de L’Ennemi il me paroit que la jonction de nos trouppes doit se faire au Dessus du Lac.
					Ceci fait L’objet principal est certainement la reduction de la Ville de Quebec. Mais supposé que cette reduction deviendrai impracticable dans le Cours de cette campagne; je pose la question. Pourrons nous maintenir la possession de la province, sans mettre en danger les trouppes et surtout les Vaisseau dans la riviere de st Laurens. d’apres les informations que J’ai particulierement du Gouverneur Clinton, il se trouve un detroit dans la riviere environs 20 Meiles au dessus de quebec ou le Canal ne permet que L’entrer d’un Vaisseau a la foi—Ceci metterat nos Vaisseau a L’abris, pour hyverner, mais cette avantage deviendroit un obstacle pour nous, en cas que L’Ennemi avait des Vaisseau de force dans la riviere avant notre arrivé.
					Dans tout les Operation de Guerre il faut toujour risquer pour Gagner, pourvue qu’on ne met pas au jeu dans une Entreprise mal calcules, c’est qu’on a gagner dans plusieures campagne glorieuses.
					Si cette expedition trouverat Lieu, Notre armé combiné a New York agirat entierement a la defensive J’usqu’a ce que les detachement de L’Ennemi ou des Mouvement auquel il serat forcer pour secourrir le Canada nous offrer des Occasions favorable de Changer notre systeme.
					Troisieme supposition.
					Toujour que les forces de terres de L’Ennemie ne soit ni Augmentes ni diminues. Mais que la flotte Angloise devient superieur a celle des francois.

					Que Nos forces combiné de terre soit allors 8000 hommes de plus ou de moins du nombre pretendue. L’un ou L’autre entreprise mentionne me paroit dengereux L’entrer dans la riviere de st Laurens, ou dans le Harbour de new-york; devint critique quand il y une flotte superieure qui peut boucher L’embouchure.
					Mais comme les Operation navale sont entierement hors de ma Sphere. je me bornerai de citer les autres object qui meritent notre attention en Cas que Les deux mentionné furent trouvé impracticable.
					Hallifax le Magazin de la Marine Angloise en Amerique, La Reduction de cette place serat un Coup sanglant pour L’ennemie. La difficuté Consiste dans L’Entrer du Port—qui selon mes information est Garnie des batterie et des Ouvrages tres solide et bien entendue. Mes Connoissence sur cette place sont trop borné pour que je puisse projetter une Ordre des Operation.
					Si cette entreprise fut choisie je croie quil falloit en laisser toute la Conduite et L’Execution a nos Allies. Leurs fournir tout les Moyens dans notre pouvoir et tenir avec notre Armé la force de L’Ennemie aussi bien en echec que possible.
					Charlstown. Le Port principal pour L’exportation de nos plus Valable produit, le Tabac et L’indigo. Reprendre cette place ferat oter a L’Ennemie le fruit d’une Campagne Dispendieux et tout Esperence de nous Assujettir.
					Encore dans ce Cas je Voudroit proposer d’envoyer toute la force francoise pour cette Entreprise; Les Officiers et les soldat francois ont plus d’experience dans les Attaques et defenses des places qu’aucune Armé ne peut se flatter.
					Nos trouppes de Virginies de Marryland auquel nous pourrions encore sans risque joindre deux milles hommes de notre Armé ici seront en nombre suffisant pour Cooperer avec la force francoise.
					Dans cette Entreprise nous gagnons L’avantage du temps, qui nous manque dans tout autre entreprise.
					Les Trouppes francoises pourront se refraichir a Rhode island, nous pourrions completter et exercer nos Regimens, Toujour tenant L’Ennemi en Respect a New-York, J’usqu’a ce que la saison nous permette d’agir dans ce climat chaud, nous aurons suffisament du Temps pour faire nos preparatifs.
					C’est dans cette Expedition que la superiorite d’une flotte Angloise me paroit moins a aprehender que dans toutes les Autres. Nous aurons le temps d’estimer la flotte de L’Ennemie, et la proximite des Escadres francoises et Espagnoles, pourront supleer si nous sommes trop inferieur.
					st Augustin est Enfin un Autre objet plus eloigne a la Verite, et plus difficile d’y porter beaucoup de force de notre Coté. Mais il S’agit que

L’Admiral francois trouve plus de facilité d’y porter un Coup, et allors notre Campagne se reduit ici a la defensive. D’observr L’ennemi a New-York; de Garantir nos frontieres.
					je conviens que L’entreprise sur New-York serat la plus Glorieuse si le succes la Couronne. Mais Elle est la plus hazardé si nous la feront sans avoir les Moyens suffisant. je repete encore que les Operation Navale et de terre me paroissent soit complique, un faut pas un delai peut attirer des suites Facheuses. Celle de Charlstown nous donne plus de temp pour les preparatif; il y a moins a risquer; Le seule obstacle que je trouve est qu’une partie de notre Armé aurat finie son temps avant que nous pouvons L’employer a cette Expedition.


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton, 10 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Dayton, Elias

						Head Quarters Colo. Deys [Bergen County, N.J.]10th July 1780
						Dear Sir

					I have been favd with yours of the 3d 4th and 7th—Upon your representation, and that of Mr Caldwell of the exposed state of the Country in the Vicinity of Elizabeth town, I have ordered down your Regiment, for the purposes of affording protection to the inhabitants—and

enabling you to remain with safety below, to procure intelligence and put Flags again under proper regulations. I would wish you to station the Regiment in a place of perfect security. I am told West Farms, where the Brigade lay before the enemy moved out upon the 6th of last month, will be safe and convenient: But I have directed the commanding Officer to go forward to you, when you will direct him to take any other position which you may deem more eligible.
					I have no objection to the plan you mention in your last, for sending a Man into New York—The nearer the time of expecting our Allies upon the Coast, the more interesting it becomes to obtain most exact intelligence, and you will therefore be pleased to exert yourself in procuring every thing material and as often as possible. I am Dear Sir Yr most obt Servt.


Title: From George Washington to Major William Galvan, 10 July 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Galvan, William

						Head Quarters Col. Dey’s Bergen County10th July 1780
						Sir

					I have received your several favors of the 2d 3d and 13th of June.
					I am much obliged to you for the intelligence they contain, and should any thing else occur worth attention, you will be pleased to forward it with your other dispatches.
					What further instructions are necessary at your post are transmitted you on this occasion by the Marquiss la Fayette.
					With respect to the infantry—the army has undergone no changes since you left it, and I can only remind you of what I have said to yourself on this subject.