Title: To George Washington from Captain Charles Craig, 28 November 1777
From: Craig, Charles
To: Washington, George

Sir
[Frankford, Pa.] 28th Novr [1777]

I receiv’d some intillegence this morning from the City and have thought my duty to forward to Yr Excellency.
Yesterday a Number of the enemy Cross’d over Schoolkell it is said the intend to March Towards Wilmington, The whole of British Army are under Marchg orders, a Number of Boats are prepared to go up the river. I am with Great Respect Yr Excellencys Most Obt Servt

C. Craig


Title: From George Washington to Capt. Charles Craig, 28 November 1777 [letter not found]
From: Washington, George
To: Craig, Charles

Letter not found: to Capt. Charles Craig, c.28 Nov. 1777. In his second letter to GW of this date, Craig says that “I have this moment been Honoured with your Excellencys Letter.”


Title: To George Washington from Captain Charles Craig, 28 November 1777
From: Craig, Charles
To: Washington, George

Sir
Frankfort [Pa.] 28th Novr 1777

I have this moment been Honoured with your Excellencys Letter—and embrace this oppertunity of returning an Answer By every Account—Lord Cornwallis is return’d, it is a Certainty that a number of Troops are Arived at the City—both Horse and foot, I wrote Yr Excellency this Morning the Enemy ware under Marchg orders, it is expected the will March to night Your Excellency may Depend on the earliest information of their Movements, by some Accounts the enemy intend to Send their Boats one way—and the Greater part of their Army Another, it is thought the boats are intended for Deleware. I have the Honour to be With High Respect Yr Excellencys Most Obt Servt

C. Craig


Title: To George Washington from Major General Philemon Dickinson, 28 November 1777
From: Dickinson, Philemon
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
Elizabeth Town [N.J.] Novemr 28th 1777

Having obtained the fullest Information, respecting the Strength & Situation, of the Enemy upon Staten Island, & made the necessary Preparations, I called in many Volunteers, whose Numbers, in addition to those who were on Duty at this Post, amounted to about 1400 Men, with this Detachment, I landed Yesterday Morning before Day, upon the Island, from Halsteads Point—The whole Strength of the Enemy, were drawn to this side of the Island, & extended from the Blazing Star, to their former works; Genl Skinner with five Regiments of Greens, were quartered in different Parts, about three hundred Waldeckers with Genl Campbell lay at the Works, in which were light cannon with a company of Artillery, cover’d by a fifty Gun Ship, & a Sloop of War—I landed in three Divisions (having the best Guides) & intended to have march’d bye roads, in order to get in the rear of the Greens, & cut off their Retreat—the Divisions proceeded as far as was intended, (7 Miles) & then met at the appointed Rendezvous, but to my great disappointment, they secured their retreat in the Works, by the most precipitate flight, Genl Skinner, Col: Allen & many other officers having narrowly escaped—We drove in all their Pickets with little opposition, & now & then skirmished a little with them as they fled—I kept my Design as much as possible, not having communicated it, to the Field officers, untill 8, OClock the Evening before, but notwithstanding all my precaution, Mr Skinner recieved the Intelligence at 3, OClock in the Morng which frustrated my Plan—I flatter’d myself, I should have had the Pleasure, of giving your Excellency a good account of the General & his Green Brigade, which undoubtedly would have been the case, had he not unluckily have received the above Information—We made the following Prisoners—vizt two Lieutenants, (one Col: Buskirks Son) one Surgeon, one Commissary, & twenty Privates—Mr Hud of Brunswick among the Numbers—& killed five or six Greens—our loss was, three Men made Prisoners, & two slightly wounded—In justice to both officers & Men, I must inform your Excellency,

they behaved well, & wanted nothing but an opportunity, to have done honor to the State they belong to, their Expectations were great, & their Spirits high. I was astonished the Enemy had not collected, & formed upon some advantageous Ground, this I expected would have been the case; & proceeded with caution—They came down in a Body, to play the old Game upon our Rear, this I expected, & was sufficiently prepared for, having thrown up a small Work at Halsteads Point, & placed two Field Pieces in it, from which we kept up a brisk fire, & soon dispersed them—After remaining on the Island Eight hours, & driving them within their Works, we made an easy & secure retreat—not having lost a single Man, Horse, or Boat—By a Flag just come over, I am informed they say, in excuse for their Gallant Behaviour, that we were joined by 2,000 Continental Troops—had it not have been strong tide of Flud, by which means, they might easily have been reinforced from N. York—as General Putnam only intended a Feint there, & their having two Gondola’s, & an armed Sloop, lying in the Sound, I should have remained in Possession of the Island for the Day; those considerations & the Troops being much fatigued, as the Night was very cold, & they obliged to march thro’ much water, determined me to return—which reasons, I hope will mee⟨t your⟩ Excellency’s approbation.
⟨I pr⟩oposed to the Governor, to march most of the Men ⟨from th⟩is Post to the Southern Part of this State, to serve out ⟨th⟩e remainder of their Time, (indeed the whole Force should have marched long ago, but the Council would not consent) if I am not forbid, shall take the Liberty of sending on six hundred of the best Troops early tomorrow Morng which Detachment, I shall accompany—the Weather is very bad, but hope it will clear up this Eveng.
My Indisposition, being much fatigued, & very wet in crossing the river, prevented my giving your Excellency the above Information earlier.
A Fleet consisting of 25 Sail, is just arrived at the Narrows, said to come from England, & to have brought over some of the New raised Irish Regts. I have the honor to be, Your Excellencys most Obt Servt

Philemon Dickinson


Title: From George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene or Brigadier General James Mitchell Varnum or Brigadier General Jedediah Huntington, 28 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael,Varnum, James Mitchell,Huntington, Jedediah

Dear Sir
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.]28th Novemr 1777. 7 oClock P.M.

Capt. Duplessis has just delivered me yours of this Morning from Burlington. Every account from Philada confirms the Report that the Enemy mean to make a speedy Move. I shall not be disappointed if they come out this Night or very early in the Morning. You will therefore push forward, the Rear Brigades with all possible expedition and the Moment that the Troops and Baggage have all passed, let the Boats be instantly sent up the River to Coryells ferry, for one part of my information is that the Enemy are preparing to send Boats up the Delaware, and it cannot be for any other purpose than to destroy the remainder of our Water Craft. I shall be glad that you would come on immediately upon the Rect of this, and send word back to the Brigadiers to hasten their march. I am &ca.

If Genl Green should not be found Genl Varnum or Huntingdon will be pleased to do what is directed above. And send word to the Captains of the Gallies to fall lower down the River to meet any Boats that may be coming up to annoy the passage of the Troops or Baggage.


Title: From George Washington to General William Howe, 28 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Howe, William

Sir
Head Qrs [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Nov. 28th 1777

In Answer to your Letter of the  Instant which came to Hand on Wednesday Evening, I am to inform you, that I accede to the proposition contained therein, and have directed measures to be immediately taken for releasing All your Officers upon the condition you mention. At the same time I wish that a more extensive relief had been agreable to you.
I have sent Mr Boudinot to examine into the state and wants of the prisoners, who are in philadelphia, and request that he may obtain your permission for the same. He will also have an Opportunity of agreeing with your Commissary upon the form & terms of parole for the Officers to be mutually released, which, I presume, may not be improper in order to prevent any misunderstanding on that Head.
Passports shall be granted for the Commissaries or Quarter Masters you may appoint to carry supplies to the prisoners in our hands, when you chuse to apply for them. Two will only be necessary—One for the person assigned to goe to the Eastward—The Other for the Officer having supplies for the prisoners in pensylvania—Maryland & Virginia. Mr Boudinot will also inform your Commissary of the proportion of prisoners in each Quarter.
When Major Stockdon was first captured, I believe that he and One or Two Officers taken with him, suffered the Treatment which you mention. This was without my privity or consent. As soon as I was apprized of it releif was ordered. But surely this Event, which happened so long ago will not authorize the charges in your Letter of the 6th. In a word, I shall be happy, as I ever have been to render the situation of all prisoners in my hands, as comfortable as I can, and nothing will induce me to depart from this Rule, but a contrary line of conduct to those in your possession. Captivity of itself is sufficiently grievous, and it is cruel to add to it’s distresses. I am with due respect Sir Your Most Obedt servt

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Captain Allen McLane, 28 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: McLane, Allen

Sir
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 28th Novemr 1777

I have certain information that Lord Cornwallis returned from Jersey Yesterday, and ’tis said they intend an Attack upon this Army with their joint force before Genl Green can rejoin us. I therefore depend upon your keeping a very good look out upon their line, and gaining every intelligence from people coming out of Town, that I may have the earliest Notice of their Movements or Intentions. I am Sir Yr most obt Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Captain Allen McLane, 28 November 1777
From: McLane, Allen
To: Washington, George

sr
Rising Sun [Pa.] 12 oClock [28 November 1777]

Evry Intelligence from the City agree that the enemy is in motion and intend a Grand stroke last night they gave out that a body Cross Schulkill and to Cover the deception they kept, their Waggons and Artillery moveing through the City all night this moment I Reced a few lines from my old friend I have good Reason to believe that he keeps a Good look out, and Gives the best intelligence I Remain on my Guard Excellency Humble servt

Allen McLane


Title: From George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 28 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Whitemarsh [Pa.] 28th Novemr 1777.

The inclosed remonstrance was laid before me by Colo. Drake and Mr Hunt Commissioners appointed in the County of West Chester to

take Care of all Forage and property exposed to the depredations of the Enemy—and also Commissioners of sequestration to dispose of the personal property of those who have fled to or joined the Enemy.
They complain that parties from your Army frequently take property which they pretend is going to, or is within reach of the Enemy and make sale of it for their own Benefit pretending they do it by Virtue of a General order issued by me in Jersey last Spring.
That they may be under no mis-apprehension of that Order in future, I now declare that it was only meant to extend to such property as shall be actually taken from the Enemy by force of Arms, which I directed to be divided among the Captors as an encouragement to them.
I therefore desire that for the future all property of what kind soever, that shall be removed from the Neighbourhood of the Enemys lines whether it belong to persons well or ill affected, shall be delivered to the Commissioners appointed by the state, to be by them disposed of in such Manner as they shall think proper. If the Army is in want of The forage or provision so removed or taken the Commissaries or Quarter M⟨asters⟩ are to purchase it of the Commissioners. This will en⟨tirely⟩ quiet the Inhabitants who upon the plan that has lately b⟨een⟩ adopted, find the Army their oppressors instead of pro⟨tectors.⟩ I am &ca.


Title: General Orders, 29 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Novr 29th 1777.
Parole Kensington.C. Signs Newtown. Princeton.

The officers commanding regiments are to see that their men’s arms are put in the best order possible; and of the loaded ones, such as can be drawn, are to be drawn, and the others discharged the first fair day,

at eleven o’clock in the forenoon; but to prevent the waste of lead, the men of each regiment, or brigade are to discharge their pieces, into a bank of earth, from whence the lead may be taken again.
A court of enquiry is to sit to morrow morning at nine o’clock at Col. Gist’s quarters, to enquire into the conduct of Capt: Edward Scull of the 4th Pennsylvania regiment in “Ordering the pay Master of that regiment to pay Capt. Weitz a sum of money, for a purpose suggested to be unwarrantable”—Col. Gist is appointed president of this court—Lieut. Col. Barber and Major Ross are to be members.
Col. Spencer is appointed president, and Major Bayard and a Captain of Col. Lee’s regiment members, of a Court of enquiry to sit to morrow morning at ten o’clock, at the president’s quarters, to inquire into the conduct of Lieut. Reynold’s of Col. Malcom’s regt for “Abusing Daniel Messerly Esqr. and other persons on the 2nd of last August,” as exhibited in their depositions.


Title: To George Washington from Major John Clark, Jr., 29 November 1777
From: Clark, John Jr.
To: Washington, George

sir
Radnor [Pa.] November the 29th 1777—Six oClock A.M.

Your Favor of the 27th I received last Night and will pay a particular attention to your request—By a Gentleman of veracity (a worthy Friend) who left Philadelphia the Evening before last, I am informed that General Howe is Billeting his Troops on the Citizens, two to every Housekeeper, which has occasioned a universal murmur among the Citizens—By a person who left the City Yesterday Evening, I am further informed the Enemy a few Days ago lost a Ship & a Brig (richly laden) in passing the Chevaux de frize—no more Ships of force have got up—’tis strange that the Enemy still say Lord Cornwallis is wounded &

lying in Jersey—he had not returned when my informant came away, & many of the Officers were exceedingly uneasy about him—they give out that they intend making an Attack on your Army but have made no preparation, they confess they’ve lost 30 Men at Gloucester in embarking.
A Baker who lives in the City assured my Friend when the Troops were all in the City he baked for them by order of Genl Howe (four Days rations) 40000 lbs. of Bread including his Officers & followers of the Army—I forget his name but credit the account—they have removed all their Horses from Province Island. I am your Excellency’s Most Obedt

Jno: Clark Junr

P.S. I expect three Spies from the City any moment.


Title: From George Washington to the Continental Navy Board, 29 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Continental Navy Board

Gentn
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 29th Novemr 1777

I am favd with yours of the 28th. I see no Reason for changing my former opinion in respect to sending the Frigates to ensure their safety. If they are weighed again and converted into Barracks for the Seamen, they must be brought near the shore and when the Frost sets in they cannot be sunk should the Enemy approach at such time. I however leave the Matter to your judgment.
The Hulls of the Vessels will be all that are necessary for Barracks, if you should determine to put them to that use. The sails, Rigging and all other Stores of them and the Vessels that have been burned should be removed to some distance from the Water side. I am &ca.


Title: General Orders, 30 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] November 30th 1777.
Parole NorthamptonC. Signs Greenland. Portsmouth.

On the 25th of November instant, the Honorable Continental Congress passed the following resolve—vizt.
“Resolved. That General Washington be directed to publish in General orders, that Congress will speedily take into consideration the merits of such officers as have distinguished themselves by their intrepidity and their attention to the health and discipline of their men; and adopt such regulations as shall tend to introduce order and good discipline into the army, and to render the situation of the officers and soldiery, with respect to cloathing and other necessaries, more eligible than it has hitherto been.
“Forasmuch as it is the indispensible duty of all men, to adore the superintending providence of Almighty God; to acknowledge with gratitude their obligations to him for benefits received, and to implore such further blessings as they stand in need of: and it having pleased him, in his abundant mercy, not only to continue to us the innumerable bounties of his common providence, but also, to smile upon us in the prosecution of a just and necessary war, for the defence of our unalienable rights and liberties”—It is therefore recommended by Congress, that Thursday, the 18th day of December next be set apart for Solemn Thanksgiving and Praise, that at one time, and with one voice, the good people may express the grateful feelings of their hearts, and consecrate themselves to the service of their divine benefactor; and that, together with their sincere acknowledgements and offerings, they may join the penitent confession of their sins; and supplications for such further blessings as they stand in need of—The Chaplains will properly notice this recommendation, that the day of thanksgiving may be duly observed in the army, agreeably to the intentions of Congress.
After Orders. The whole army are to be under arms to morrow morning, at five o’clock, if it should not rain or snow—Lord Stirling’s division are to lay upon their arms and be ready to turn out at a minute’s warning.


Title: To George Washington from Colonel Mordecai Gist, 30 November 1777
From: Gist, Mordecai
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp White Marsh [Pa.] 30 Nov. 1777

I have the Misfortune to be on camp Near the Quarters of General Maxwell and have no good Water convenient except at his house.
I endeavoured first by virtue of an order and since by personal Application to obtain some water for my own use, which contrary to the principles of politeness was refused to me.
You will pardon me sir for troubling You on so frivolous an occasion, and permit me to observe to Your Excellency that the Service must prove disgustful to Gentlemen where their Officers deprive them of

the common rights and privileges of Mankind. I have the honor to be with due Respect Yr Mo. Obdt H. Servt

M. Gist


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 30 November 1777
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
york [Pa.] 30th Novemr 77

On the 26th Currt by the Messenger Barry I paid my respects to your Excellency & conveyed Such Orders as I had then received from Congress—pretty late last Night Jones brought in your Excellency’s favors of the 26th & 27th which Shall be presented to Morrow, in the mean time I dispatch Franis Seall with the undermentioned Resolves of Congress—a packet containing one hundred Commissions—two Copies of articles proposed to the States for Confederation—& Taxation—Copy of a Letter by Major Genl Gates to Congress dated 16th.
of the 27th on the appointment of three additional Members to the Board of War & Major Genl Gates President.
of the 28th appointing a Committee of three Members of Congress to confer with your Excellency for enquiries to the Causes of Losses & failures & for divers other matters.
of the 29th Submitting to your Excellency the regulating Rank in the Causes of Majr Genl Arnold Brigadiers Woodford & Scott referring to a Subjoined Resolve of the 12th.
29th Ordering Copy of Majr Gates’s Letter to be transmitted.
I take the liberty of Sending a packet directed for Govr Livingston which I request your Excellency will order to be forwarded by the earliest opportunity. I remain with very great regard.


Title: From George Washington to James Mease, 30 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Mease, James

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Whitemarsh [Pa.] 30th Novr 1777

There are such Variety of applications constantly for matters that concern your department that I find it absolutely necessary you should be with the Army. This you may now do without any public inconvenience as you have no store of Goods by you to draw your attention. I therefore desire you may repair immediately to Head Quarters, and endeavour to form and fall upon some plan in concert with the Officers from the different states for the more effectual supply of their Troops. I am Dear Sir Yr.


Title: To George Washington from Eight Continental Army Field Officers, November 1777
From: Eight Continental Army Field Officers
To: Washington, George

Sir,
[Whitemarsh, Pa., November 1777]

Impress’d with Sentiments of real concern for the safety and freedom of America, Apprehensive that the Constitution of the Army, in

its present languid and weak state may not be productive of the great ends for which it was rais’d, should not an immediate reform be effected, We take the liberty to offer to your Excellency’s perusal the hints and observations contain’d in the enclos’d sheets.
Our knowledge of mankind hath taught us that Interest, tho’ inferior in point of Honor or others, is yet the most general motive to action; that by consulting the interest of any body politick, Government will be strengthned and obedience secured, and that those rewards, which will acquire estimation in men’s minds must be either honorary or lucrative.
The Officers of the Army of the United States under it’s present establishment have neither of these to attach them to the service; their pay is of little value, when we consider the Scarcity and dearness of every necessary of life; their other allowances are small and difficult to be obtain’d through the unlicens’d chicanery of the Staff, And to support their rank as Gentlemen, they must either injure their patrimonies, or incur debts which they can have no prospect of discharging. The rank they ought to derive from their commissions will not distinguish them or command respect; That is lost in the deluge of those to whom that priviledge is extended, consequently the Officers having nothing to incite them to duty and obedience, but the Commands of their superiors and the love of their Country, (which latter consideration ought to be common to the Citizen as well as to the Soldier, but having unhappily in some Measure fail’d in the Country cannot be relied on in Camp) do not act with that chearfulness and alacrity, which will procure good order and discipline.
The exertion of power is ever bitter, and unless sweetned with some real advantage will become irksome and odious; from these causes the Officers of the American Army are disgusted with trifling Occurrences, and any Opportunity serves as an excuse for resignation.
Those frequent resignations among other evils introduce a continual rotation of Officers, which keeps our Army young and raw, while the bravery and Exertion of Veterans is expected from it.
We cannot help complaining of eccentric promotions, promotions not calculated to reward the meritorious, but which only prefer the favorite, and tend to disgust the Army. Our honour as Soldiers obliges us to dwell on this Article. Bravery, Enterprize, or Accident, will sometimes make an Officer ostensible and render him famous; We mean not to obviate such a man’s promotion. We know it is necessary to keep this incitement to Gallantry and Valour. But when An Officer is thus promoted, whom even good fortune hath not favor’d with an appearance of superior military abilities; It must argue great demerit in

those to whom he is preferr’d and is an Affront which they must highly resent.
Should we prove so happy as to have afforded in these essays, any observations on the present state of the army which may meet with your concurrence, We shall think our time well bestow’d and beg that you will be pleas’d to communicate them to Congress. We have the honor to be with every Sentiment of respect and Attachment. Your Excellency’s most obedt Servts

Theok Bland
M: Gist
Jo. Carvl Hall
Thos Hartley
Robt Lawson
Jas Innes
John Taylor
Henry Miller


Title: Remarks on Proposed Reform of the Continental Army, November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Remarks.
[November 1777]

To abolish Coloniel distinctions, however desirable it may be, is next to impossible—Great pains in the early part of this war was used, in vain, to do this; but even in the New England States, where the Sentiments—& customs of the People have an exact semilarity, it was found impracticable.
The new modeling of the Army, and reducing supernumerary Officers is a very desirable matter, and ought, if possible, to take place; but quære, would not such a total change in our military system, as is proposed, occasion too great a convulsion? would not the number of rejected Officers promote discontent & disorder among the common Soldiery? nay even Mutiny and desertion.
The allowance of Land to the disbanded Officers may be proper enough—but will not half pay be attended with enormous expence? and would not this, and allowing half pay to the Officers of reduced regiment⟨s⟩ at the end of the War, add such weight to a debt already, & probably will be, of such magnitude, as to send the Colonies under the load of it; & give great disgust to the peopl⟨e⟩ at large?


Title: General Orders, 1 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] December 1st 1777.
Parole Durham.C. Signs Brunswick. Amboy.

Mr Robert Duncan is appointed Paymaster to the fourth North Carolina regiment, and is to be respected as such.
A General Court Martial is to sit to morrow at 9 o’clock in the morng, at the tavern next to Col. Biddle’s quarters, for the trial of all prisoners which shall be brought before them—Col. Ogden is appointed

president of this court—Lieut. Cols. Simms, Wallace and Major North and a captain from the 1st and 2nd Pennsylva: Maxwell’s, Conway’s, Woodford’s, Scott’s, Poor’s, Paterson’s, and Learned’s brigades are to be members of the court.
The Officers are to make out their Muster rolls to the first of December, immediately—The term of time, which the men inlisted for, is to be inserted in every muster roll—The non-effectives are not to be inserted a second time.
Officers must pay strict attention to the orders issued respecting this part of their duty.


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Armstrong, 1 December 1777
From: Armstrong, John
To: Washington, George

May it please yr Excely
Camp at W: March [Pa.] 1st Decr 1777

I beg leave to recommend, that as early as it may be Safe to make such movement, the Army may pass Over the Scuilkill & take for Some time a position on that Side.
With respect to Winter Quarters for the Army—The longer I consider the measure pointed out in the back Villiages of this State, the more inadmissable that Step appears to be, as by the large lattitude thereby given the Enemy thro’ the Winter & early part of the Spring, every doleful & pernitious consequence must be expected—The hearts of good-men thro’ all the States depressed, and this State in particular, little less than Sacrificed to the whole without real necessity! Amongst the innumerable evils resulting from that Situation, the impossition of the Oaths of Allegiance & an end to Government & the future aids of the Militia thro’ a great part of the State, must inevitably follow.
I’m therefore of opinion that in proper time, part of your Army Take possession of Wilmington, and the residue form a Chain from thence to Downingstown & perhaps the White Horse on the Lancaster road, at these two Some Cover may be had, and Hutts with Some use of Houses in the intermediate Space—these are the best Out lines that appears to me, which may be corrected and better determined when

the Army is on that Side. And am with perfect respect, Yr Excellencys Most Obedt humbe Servt

John Armstrong

P:S: I hear that some part of the Bridge is already broken or carried off. G1 Potter is not yet come Over, I suppose Owing to the bad weather I expect him today.

J:A.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 1 December 1777
From: Duportail, Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle
To: Washington, George

[1 December 1777]

By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading, we abandon to the Enemy Jersey, and all the Country adjacent to Derby, Chester and

Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent—By establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so completely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor even Jersey, because our proximity to the Enemy and the ease with which we could throw ourselves upon the Rear of their Lines in case the Schuylkil should be frozen, will keep them in respect, and put it out of their power to send considerable Detachments on the other side of Delaware from the fear of weakening themselves too much—and the small detachments which they may send will be greatly restrained by the Jersey Militia—The Position then of Wilmington answers the end of making subsistance very difficult to Genl Howe, who has not only his Army to feed but likewise the Inhabitants of the Town, and who must besides furnish Provisions for the Army of Genl Bourgogne if he means that they should embark for England—This position farther deprives him of the means of recruiting in the Country, extending himself in it, adding to the number of his Partisans in a word gaining the Country—It has besides the advantage of rendering his Communication with his fleet difficult, for I imagine the Vessels will not be able to approach Philadelphia when the Ice prevails—I should not omit mentioning a case in which this Inconvenience would be very considerable—if War should be declared between France and England, and Genl How from a dread of finding himself blocked up in the spring by a French Fleet, should wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall be within distance at Wilmington for hindering his Embarkation of which we should have timely notice.
This Position then unites great Military Advantages—but it must be confess’d at the same time that these very advantages ought perhaps to prevent our taking it—because the Enemy probably will not suffer us there, and will march out against us—Thus to ask whether the Position of Wilmington is eligible, is to ask at the same time whether it is eligible to expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one.
If the Season were less advanced, I don’t see why we should avoid them—but at present—what end would be answer’d—if we should gain an advantage we should be unable to pursue it—if we experience a Check—we run the risque of seeing our Army dissipated in the rude marches consequent on a defeat—Consistently with the plan which we ought to form of putting our Army in good condition this winter and preparing it for a good Campaign, we ought not to have it’s Repose preceded by a Defeat.
As to the other points to be consider’d in this Question, whether Wilmington or Lancaster will be the most proper Situation for furnishing the Army with every necessary—I cannot decide being ignorant of the Country, but it appears to me in general that this point deserves

our most serious attention—it is much better to lose Soldiers in Combats with the Enemy to whom we Cause a Loss at the same time—than to lose them by Disorders, & Desertion arising from their Misery—Misery destroys part of an Army and leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage, and without good Will—we should find ourselves then in the spring with a Body of an Army incapable of any thing, and consequently have no right to expect a successful Campaign.

Sign’d Du Portail


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 1 December 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

[1 December 1777]

Agreeable to your Excellency’s command I shall in a few words give my Sentiments with respect to the necessity of puting the troops into Winter quarters and the properest place to canton them in. Every one that views the Condition of the army and is acquainted with the severe duty they have gone through will readily agree that good warm comfortable quarters are necessary to supply the defect of cloathing, and that some relaxation is essential to give a proper tone to both men and Officers to prepare them for the ensuing campaign—In doing this we must have regard not only to the army, but the country. An army without a country is like an infant incapable of feeding or cloathing itself—Every part of the country whether Whig or Tory that we suffer to be ravaged is a diminution of our strength and an increase of theirs—Men are essential in war, but provisions, cloathing, and accoutrements are equally so—The first and great object in cantoning the troops is to take a position secure from surprise; the next is covering; the third is a situation convenient for drawing forage and provisions for the subsistence of the army and the cattle belonging to it. These are the great principles to be attended to in quartering the troops and cannot be dispensed with without certain and inevitable ruin to the whole military machine. There are other secondary considerations such as covering the country and distressing the enemy in drawing their supplies; where a position can be found to answer all those valuable purposes is the subject of enquiry.
It is said by many that a total relaxation is necessary [for] the good of the army—to enable the officers to recruit their Regt and to give the men time to recover their spirits. I must confess if I was to speak

from my own feelings and declare my wishes instead of my sentiments I should be of that opinion. Pleasure is ever agreeable to human nature, but never more so than after long and severe duty. An opportunity to unbend the mind must be the wish of every one and it is not very difficult to accommodate our reasong to our wishes; but whether a total or a partial relaxation will be for the general interest of the army is worth enquiring into.
If we retire so far back as to be totally out of danger, pleasure and dissipation will be the consequence. Officers of all ranks will be desirous of visiting their friends—the men will be left without order, without government—and ten to one but the men will be more unhealthy in the spring than they now are, and much worse disciplined. The health and discipline of troops can only be preserved by constant attention and exercise—we must not flatter ourselves that going into quarters will recover the health and discipline of the troops without regard is paid to one and attention to the other.
It is said we must carry on war upon the great Scale and that particular interest must not be brought in competition with the general interest and that by attending to the minutiæ we will sacrifice the principle object. I readily agree that it is perfectly consistant with the maxims of sound policy for the lesser to give place to the greater—but is it necessary for us to throw open a great extent of country to give a necessary relaxation to the army? It is the country that feeds, cloaths and furnishes us with troops—If the substance of the Inhabitants is destroyed they will be incapable of giving us the necessary aid—if the army in the winter season leaves the country unprotected—will it not be a discouraging circumstance to sending recruits to join us—which will be a diminution of their local security, if they can expect no protection from the collective force. I am no advocate for taking measures from popular opinions, but it is necessary to preserve the confidence of the country; for by the union and spirit of the people alone can the opposition be continued.
The Legislator is in some measure under the necessity of accommodating his measures to the prejudices of the people—Mankind will only be subservient to your purposes in proportion as they conceive their interest and happiness connected with your measures—I have heard it remarked that the sufferings of the army, spread in all directions throughout the continent, alarms the people and prevents them from entering into the service. The same may be said with regard to the poor plundered inhabitants—It is true the eyes of all the continent are upon us for protection—but it is natural for men to reason, what is my neighbours condition may bye and bye, be mine.
If the army seems disposed to exert its force to shelter the country

from ravage; it is natural to expect the people will be anxious to strengthen its hands, but if the enemy are left at liberty to ravage at large, as the inhabitants of one State make the condition of another their own, it will be an alarming consideration. Therefore I think some regard should be had in taking our measures to afford as much cover to the country as possible without militating with the principal design—not for the sake of the particular spot that is covered, but to prevent the disagreeable influence it will have upon the surrounding Inhabitants.
I cannot conceive a total relaxation to be necessary to recruit the army or recover its spirits. I am fully persuaded that recruiting by voluntary inlistments is in a great measure at an end. The enormous bounties that are given so far exceed the american funds and the continental bounty now allowed falls so far short of private bounties, that few if any recruits are to be expected through that channel—If this be granted then the recruiting Service will wholly depend upon the exertion of the civil authority of the respective States, and this exertion doubtless will be in proportion to the reputation and confidence the legislative bodies place in the army—For it cannot be expected from the local prejudices of mankind that the several legislative bodies will be willing to strip themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their own internal safety unless they are well persuaded the measure is essential to their own happiness and security.
It is absolutely necessary the army should have an opportunity to relax and recover it’s spirits—but there is a great difference between constant duty and total relaxation—A proper medium between these two extremes will be found better adapted to restore the spirits of the army and preserve its discipline—We must be in a situation to take off that constant watching and yet not so remote from danger but that some attention to duty is necessary.
Men are naturally apt to sink into negligence without there is something constantly to rouse their attention—The objects of pleasure are so much more inviting than those of Duty that without a restraint is laid on one and a necessity imprest to attend to the other it is ten to one that the objects of Pleasure steal the mind wholly from the discharge of its duty. I do not mean to urge these reasons for taking a position near the enemy to oblige us to be constantly on the watch but to shew that a total relaxation may be dangerous—Remember Hannibal’s army in Capua.
The general discontent among the officers of almost all ranks renders winter quarters essential to redress the prevailing grievances and new organize the army for the spring—but the fatigues and hardships of the campaign and the want of rest and relaxation are not the great

sources of the discontent that prevails. It springs from a different fountain—It is the pay and subsistence which are found to be incompetent to the necessary demands of the officers to preserve their dignity and support their families—This is the great evil and this must be remedied or else this army must and will dissolve—There are some other things complained of—Such as, Rank, that military Jewel, being confered on almost all orders of men to the disgrace of rank, and great mortification of officers who find themselves often reduced to a level with persons they despise, from the prostitution of military dignity.
The manner of cloathing the troops is a subject of complaint—There is no provision made proportionable to the demand of the army; and the difficulty of obtaining that which is provided has given great disgust to some and discontent to others—These are some of the principal subjects of complaint—and a partial relaxation from military duty is necessary to put every thing in a proper train for opening the next campaign.
It is necessary that an appearance should be kept up as much as possible of beseiging the enemy, not only to cover the country but to preserve the credit of our currency which will always rise and fall as our army appears superiour or inferior to the enemy. The enemy will also draw out of the country many recruits without they are kept within bounds—All these are objects worthy our Attention.
There have been two places proposed for cantoning the troops. One from Bethlehem to Lancaster, the other at Wilmington and it’s environs—There can be great objections raised to both—It is said (with how much truth I know not) that all the back towns are crouded with inhabitants; refugees from Philadelphia, if that be true, to turn them out to make room for the Soldiery will bring great distress upon the inhabitants & be productive of no small discontent—I have no doubt in my own mind but that there can be quarters procured in the proposed Line of cantonment from Bethlehem to Lancaster but there appears to me to be many evils attending it—It is a great distance back in the country and leaves the Enemy a great range in front and upon each flank. It must distress the back inhabitants. We shall be consuming the substance in the bowels of the country which should be always held as a reserve against a misfortune—In withdrawing ourselves to so great a distance it will be improved abroad into a kind of dispersion into the mountains and among ourselves it will wear the complexion of a retreat, and many will be suing for Protections.
I must confess however that, if safety and relaxation are the only objects under consideration, the geography of the country from Bethlehem to Lancaster is more favorable for a Cantonment than Wilmington—but I cannot help thinking that quarters can be got at

Wilmington with much less distress to the Inhabitants of the State—that the position will be secure enough with the force cantoned in and abo⟨ut⟩ it—That provision and forage can be got easier and cheaper in that position than in the other—that from this Position we can draw it from the enemy while the other will leave it for them—that this gives us a better opportunity to protect the lower Jersey, and not less the upper—that this will distress the enemy in drawing supplies—and upon the whole cover a greater extent of country than any other. For these reasons I am for the Position of Wilmington, and if any part of our Stores are insecure I would immediately have them removed—I would have about a brigade of continental Troops in the Jerseys and about one thousand militia between the Delaware & Schuylkill, and about a thousand more at or near the Gulph—and an advance post at Chester of continental troops.

Nath. Greene M.G.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Johann Kalb, 1 December 1777
From: Kalb, Johann
To: Washington, George

Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 1st Xber 1777.

Rest, Recruiting & Cloathing being most necessary for the army I am of opinion that taking Winter quarters at Wilmington almost behind the Ennemy, will not answer the purpose, because every movements the Ennemies will make Up Schuylkill river we must follow their motions or be cut off from our Stores, or forced to fight whether it will Suit us or not, I am apprehensive this position will of necessyty bring on a Winter Campaign.
It appears to me, unless His Excellency has very Strong reasons, to maintain Delawar State & part of Chester County, that more tranquility & safety could be expected between Lancaster & Reading by building partly hutts for that purpose, if it is equally (as was observed by several Gentlemen) unavoidable to have hutts near & about Wilmington.

Baron de Kalb


Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 1 December 1777
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

[1 December 1777]

Your excellency ordered me to give my opinion about these three places for winter quarters 1º the chain from about the Sculchill till betheleem—2º this from reading to lancaster—3º building hutts about and quartering in willmington.
I must Confess My being prevented of fixing my Sentiments in a decicise manner by my want of knowledge about very interesting points amongs them as
1º  how far we should distress and perhaps disaffect those persons who schould be turned out from the diferents places they are in.
2º  how far we may expect to collect and keep with the army all the officers who perhaps will think themselves intitled to go home, to occupate themselves with theyr businesses or pleasures if we are not in a kind of warlike quarters, and then we will loose the same advantage of theyr being instructed and disciplined we schould endeavour to gain in going into peaceful places.
3º  What effect can it make upon the people our leaving the country entirely oppened to the excursions, cruelties, and also to the seductions of the ennemy, when we schall give them all the opportunities they can wish to draw all the provisions from every where and in the same time to inlist provincial soldiers.
4º  if our giving a greater idea of the army in covering the country

and laying near the ennemy will more facilitate our making recruits than if we were in good confortables towns and not in a place and in a manner, which will seem to the eyes of people a kind of winter campaigne.
5º  till what point those different measures will please or distress the officers and (what is generally to the militar world the less attended to, and deserves the greater attention) our private soldiers.
6º  till what point we may depend upon our intelligences and light troops to avoid equally and being surprised and tiring the troops by false alarms.
7º  if we can hope that the soldiers will now receive cloathes &c. in order to be fit for some winter marches and operations, if in case where they schould be defeated we may hope to meet them again.
Such are the points of knowledge which I am deprived of by my being stranger in this country, and my being stranger in the arrmy, if I can speak so, for I have no officers no soldiers under my particular direction whom I could consult and know theyr temper, theyr inclinations, and all what it is possible to expect from them.
however I’l tell to your excellency my very imperfect sentiments about the matter.
1st  the first proposition seems to me the less eligible, and my reason for it is the scarcity of villages and principally the report of the commissaires and other gentelemen who know the country.
2º  the second seems to me the most prudent. there we schall be quiete, there we can discipline and instruct our troops, we can be able to begin a early campaign, and we shall not fear to be carried into a winter campaign if it pleases general howe. therefore in consulting only prudence, and as far as my little knowledge can go, I am at less certain that I’l have nothing to reproach to me in giving my choice to this second proposition.
however (and in making excuses to your excellency for such an indecision and refering myself to your knowledge about the suppositions I will make) if it was not distressing neither for officers neither for soldiers, if going to lancaster &c. will disaffect and make a bad impression as far as to prevent our recruiting, if we can keep better our officers when we schall be in a kind of encampement near the ennemy, if principally you think that we schould be fit for some winter march’s we should be able to support some disadventages then I am fully and with a great chearfulness of opinion that we must go to willmington. my reasons would be then
1º  this position enable us to do in the course of the winter what we shall think proper to annoy, to deprive of resources of every kind, to attack if possible the ennemy.

2º  this position has some thing shining and military like which will make the best effect and upon the continent and even in europe.
3º  the doctors, and american ones who know the manners and phisik constitution of our soldiers say that nothing is so confortable as well made hutts.
prudence orders me to choose lancaster but if the inconveniences I fear (without being able to know them) if those inconveniences I explain to your excellency are not as strong as they can be, if principally our present civil situation ask from us something shining and perhaps bold then I give all my wishes and all my choice to willmington.

the marquis de lafayette M.G.


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 1 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

Sir
Head Qrs White Marsh [Pa.] December 1st 1777.

On Saturday I had the Honor to receive your Favor of the 26th Ulto with it’s Inclosures.
The Resolve of the 25th, I have published in Orders agreable to direction, and shall be happy if Congress can fall upon measures to render the situation of the Officers & Soldiery more eligible than what it now is. At present it is truly distressing, and unless some means can be divised to support them more comfortably, we shall have to apprehend the most alarming consequences. The Officers, or at least a large proportion of them, as well as the Men are in a most disagreable condition as to Cloathing, and without any certain prospect of relief; And what is still more painful, if perchance they have an Opportunity of purchasing, which is seldom the case, they have the mortification to find themselves totally incompetent to it, from the depreciation of our Money and the exorbitant prices demanded for All Articles in this way. This is the source of great uneasiness—of indifference to the Service—and of repeated, I may say daily applications to leave it—and these too, by as good Officers as are in the American line. In respect to promotions for merit and intrepidity, I would beg leave to observe, that though these are proper considerations to found them upon, yet they should be made with the greatest caution & attention, and only in cases of the most eminent and distinguished services. Every promotion or rise out of common course cannot fail to excite uneasiness in a greater or lesser

degree, and Nothing will reconcile them to the Army at large, and particularly the Officers more immediately affected by them, but where the causes are known and acknowledged. This I mention from my wishes to promote the public interest—from my knowing that Harmony is essential to this end, and from no Other motives whatever.
Before the receipt of your Favor, I do not recollect to have heard of John Simper’s case: His Brother has not been with me; As soon as he arrives, I shall give directions for him to be released from his present confinement and to be forwarded to Cecil County.
I have nothing material to inform you of. Lord Cornwallis and the Detachment under his command, mentioned in my last, returned from Jersey on Thursday. We had reason to expect an Attack since from our advices from the City, but have been disappointed. Genl Greene has also joined me, with all the Troops that were with him, except Huntington’s Brigade, which will be in to day. I have the Honor to be with great respect Sir Your Most Obedt servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 1 December 1777
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
York [Pa.] 1st Decemr 77.

I had the honour of writing to your Excellency Yesterday by Thos Seale—this Morning I reported to Congress your Excellency’s Letter of the 26th 27th November together with the Copy of General Sr William Howe’s, which came inclosed in it. I am now charged to inform Genl Gates, the Council of Massachusetts Bay & Genl Heath, that it is the Resolution of Congress, the Troops of Lt Genl Burgoyne which were Surrendred in terms of the Convention of Saratoga Should be embarked at the port Stipulated by that agreement & at no other.
I am also ordered to Signify to your Excellency it is highly agreeable to Congress that the Marquis de lafayette be appointed to the Command of a division in the American Army—Your Excellency will find a minute from the Journal of Congress on these points here inclosed

—I hasten this forward in order to transmit at the Same time the following intelligence deliverd to me by the Board of War—this I am persuaded will afford your Excellency a particular degree of pleasure & the account may have Some good influence in the approaching conference between your Excellency & the Committee deputed by Congress.
Extract of a Letter from Wm Finnie D.Q.M.G. at Williamsburg 22d Novembr 1777.

I wrote you yesterday by Post inclosing a Genl return of the Continental Stores in this State I also mentioned the Report of the arrival of the Congress Sloop with a valuable Cargo of Blankets Cloth & other necessaries for the Army from France—which News was confirmed last Night Such of these articles as are intended for Head Quarters I Shall dispatch as Soon as possible.

God forbid any disappointment between the Cup & the Lip. I have the honour to be with the utmost respect &ca.


Title: To George Washington from William Livingston, 1 December 1777
From: Livingston, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
Princeton [N.J.] 1st Decr 1777

It gives me great Concern that our recruiting upon your Plan is not yet begun in this State, for want of my being able to give the proper Instructions to the persons appointed respecting the Security to be given & the Manner in which they are to draw for the Money—To obtain proper Directions on these Subjects I wrote to Congress on the 11th of last Month, but have received no Answer, I now send a Copy of that Letter with an Express, which should your Excellency have an

Opportunity to York Town, I would beg the Favour of you to forward—If not, the Express is ordered to proceed—I see no probability of our equalling the Enemy in Numbers by next Spring, should they only procure a reinforcement of 4000 or 5000 Men & that I cannot but think British money or British Credit may collect unless we strain every Nerve to complete our Compliment of Troops.
General Dickenson has sent me two Lieutenants one Surgeon & one Commissary taken Prisoners on Staten Island by a Detachment of our Militia under his Command—As we found them all to be Subjects of this State who had joined the Enemy since that Offence was declared high Treason by our Law, I have sent them to Trenton Gaol to be tried in the County of Hunterdon, where a Court of Oyer & Terminer is to be held about the Middle of this Month. If your Excellency apprehends any ill consequence respecting our Prisoners will result from our treating them in that manner, I should be glad to be favored with your Sentiments on that Subject; & I doubt not the Council of Safety will do every thing in their Power to manage the Matter as your Excellency shall think most conducive to the general Interest.
Of the Prisoners condemned at Morris for attempting to join the Enemy, 23 are pardoned on Condition of inlisting during the War—9 reprieved till the 2nd of January next and two to be executed to morrow.
General Dickenson informed me sometime since, that Genl Putnam was to attack New-York at the same time that he attempted Staten Island; but I cannot learn that the Old Gentleman has bore any part in the Concert. I fear Sir there are Newcombs—in your Army as well as in our Militia. I am with great Respect Your Excellency’s most Hum: Servt

Wil: Livingston

P.S. Our Assembly is just now in a most glorious Disposition for settling the prices of the Articles wanted by the Army; & I hope to be able to acquaint you in my next, that it has been done agreable to your Excellency’s Liking.


Title: To George Washington from Colonel Henry Emanuel Lutterloh, 1 December 1777
From: Lutterloh, Henry Emanuel
To: Washington, George

Remarks.
Decbr 1st 1777

As the present Camp wants Wood & other comfords for the Men, in this Severe Weather, and the Enemys Situation being to strong for an Attaque; I would propose to post our Army into Refreshings Quarters (as We do abroad In such Cases) I have been lucking out where won could forme Such a Line, Sufficientely stocked with houses for that purpose, & find We could form Such a Line between the Two Rivers Shuylkill & Delavar. where We could effectually Cover our Country, Stores, & provide the Necessary Supplyes easy, as allso prevent the Enemy from doing our Army any Material hurt. To do this We should place our Right Whing allongst the Shuylkill & the left on the delavar. our Van Troops in German Town & Those hights, & So in Dept[h] up towards Reading all the Army could lay. Head quarter to be at Pots Grove—whih I find a good large Town for it. The great Magazin to be in Reading & in the Trap & Hickery Town the Mooving Magazins & Backerys must be established—to which those places are proper. All that Country is full of Forrage & those Supplyes can be got easy as allso over the Shuylkill. The Right Whing Melitia could be over the Shuylkill as from Mottsons ford upwards I find the Country very advantagious with hills where No Sorprise could happen to Them. at the Van postes & in each devision Some poles must be fixed on it a Caske with Pich & Combustibles whih are fired & lightend directly upon the Allarm Gun

from the Commander of the Van. by which all the Troops Marsh to their Larm postes forwards, pointed out to them by their going into the quarters. all Commanders do Keep in the Nights their Troops in their houses together &c. &c. over Shuylkill must be Two bridges Move one by Wolley forge & one near Pots grove to get quik Communications. When this is done directly, We Keep our Men in health & are refreshed to stand any attaque, & our Supplyes can be good & Regulair.

H. E. Lutterloh.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Maxwell, 1 December 1777
From: Maxwell, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
White Marsh [Pa.] the 1st Decmr 1777

Agreeable to Your Excellencys request of last evening, that we should give our opinion concerning the most eligible place for Quartering or incamping the Troops during the winter. As much has been said on the Subject of Quartering in different places some with a view of covering the Country, & others for recovering, recruiting, and gathering the Troops together for another Campaign and to ly at such a distance from the Enemy that they were not liable to be harrased by them during the winter. If covering the Country is your Excellencys chiefest object I would recommend that our Armey should be moved to the west side of Schoolkil, at the distance of about 30 Miles from Phila. with our left tolerable near that River, leaving a party of observation on the East side; and there Hutt in the most convenient place. But if the other part Viz. the refreshing and recruiting our Armey be your Excellencys chief object in that case I would recommend that our Armey should retire back in the Country on a line from Reading to Lancaster and in the Neighbourhood of that line, and try to collect all our scattered Troops of every sort near the main body, and take every Method in our power to get the Regts filled up during the winter and those well cloathed we have. If the last proposition takes place I would recommend that a party of observation be stationed one on the West & the other on the East side of Schoolkill to prevent the Enemys partys from penetrating far into the Country.

Likewise a party should be sent into New Jersey to relieve the Militia there who has been a long time on duty & to give them an opertunity to fill up their Quotas in the Continental line. Those Troops might return in the Spring as soon as the roads was fit for traveling on, should it be thought necessary. This last Scheme I prefer to the first—and am Your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble Servant

Wm Maxwell


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, 1 December 1777
From: Muhlenberg, Peter
To: Washington, George

Sir
December 1st 1777.

Agreeable to Your Excellency’s requisition I transmit You my Sentiments on the Question proposd in Council Yesterday.
I would beg leave to premise that agreeable to my Sentiments, the Army should continue in a Position, where they can most effectually Annoy the Enemy, untill it shall be absolutely necessary on Account of the Severity of the Weather to Quit the Field—2dly That the Preservation of the Army by getting them into good Winter Quarters, will be of much greater Utility, than any small Advantages, which can be gain’d over the Enemy, by keeping the Army near their Lines.
With regard to the place, propper for the Army to take Winter Quarters, I must confess, I am more inclined to Join in Sentiment with those Gentlemen who propose Lancaster for the Right of the Cantonment & Reading for the left, than with those who propose Wilmington—my reasons are these. Wilmington, &ca are so near the Enemy that there is the greatest probability of their frequent Alarming us, consequently the end intended, that is the Ease of the Army will not be Answered.
2dly  Our Army will certainly diminish, at least for the Winter, by a Number of the Soldiers receiving permission to return to the different States they came from which would perhaps enable the Enemy to gain Material Advantages over us, especially if it should be found necessary, on account of Covering, to Quarter the Men some distance apart.
3dly  The upper part of Pensylvania would be left entirely to the Mercy of the Enemy, & the Communication with the Eastern States cut of.
4thly  The Enemy will have it in their power to draw more Supplies from the Jersey, than it would be possible for them to draw from the

lower Counties even if they were entirely given up to them, for if the Army lay at Wilmington, One Armed Vessell would be sufficient to prevent us from affording any relief to the Jerseys.
Perhaps if your Excellency was to Order some Person to Reconnoitre the Country from Reading to Easton it would be found more eligible, to make Reading the right of the Cantonment, & Easton the left, than any other place proposed, especially if the Hint thrown out by a Gentleman in Council, was Adopted that is, to erect Hutts for the more Robust, & let the Feeble, be quartered in Houses, &ca. In Reading the Refugees from Philadelphia, are less Numerous than in Lancaster, Lebanon, &ca. Reading, Allentown Bethlehem & Easton lie in a direct line, very near the same distance from Philadelphia—a few Miles in front of this Line, in Maxetawny & Macungy, one, if not two Divisions may be Quartred with the greatest ease, & here the Troops would be ready, either to protect our Stores, or prevent any considerable Ravages in the Country. Your Excellencys Most Obedt & humble Servt

P: Muhlenberg


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Enoch Poor, 1 December 1777
From: Poor, Enoch
To: Washington, George

Sir
Monday 1st December 1777

in answer to the questions propos’d yesterday, Rispecting the Quartering Army this winter I am Clear of apoinyen that the grait Object is to Secure our men from the Inclemency of the wather Incres our numbers Dissapline our men and make our Army as Formadable as possable that we may be able to take the field early in the Spring.
I am not acquainted with this Country So as to point out the most Sutiable place—by Information do think that the line from Lankester to Reading is the most Elagable of the three places mention’d. I am Sir your most obedient Humble Servt

Enoch Poor, B. Genl


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Casimir Pulaski, 1 December 1777
From: Pulaski, Casimir
To: Washington, George

[1 December 1777]

I leave the choice of Ground to those who are well acquainted with the Country—& confine myself to considering the advantages which will attend a continuance of the Campaign, and the Inconveniences which will flow from retiring to Winter Quarters—Our continuing in a state of activity will give courage to our Friends, be an antidote to the Effeminacy of young Soldiers, and enure them to the fatigues which veterans undergo—keep them in the exercise of their profession and instruct them—Whereas the inactivity of winter quarters, will ruin the Army, discourage the Country, leave an extent of Territory for the Enemy to ravage and depopulate; besides how do we know what Reinforcements the Enemy may receive before the next Campaign—for my part therefore I only think that the invalids of each Regiment should be suffer’d to retire where they may, under the direction of proper Officers, be refreshed and recruited—with all the rest collected I would make a vigorous attack upon the Enemy as soon as the Schuylkil is frozen.

Sign’d C. Pulaski

In case winter quarters are determined upon—I sollicit His Excellency to allow me a body of Cavalry and Infantry to remain near the Enemys Lines.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 1 December 1777
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp White Marsh [Pa.] Decembr 1st 1777.

In Agitating the General Question which your Excellency put to the Council of General Officers Yesterday, there Arose three propositions as to the Stationing of this Army for the Winter, all attended with very great Inconveniencies. That of placeing it at Wilmington does not answer the purpose of Quartering the Army, as the buildings in & about that place are not Capable of receiveing above one third part of the Army; besides I think it is one of the Most dangerous Scituations that I know of, for If the Enemy were to make a Sudden Movement and take post near Kennet Square or New Garden, our Army would have no Retreat, we should be reduced to the Necessity of fighting them, with the Delaware and two Other Impassable Waters on our flanks and Rear. It is true it would Cover the three lower County’s and part of Maryland from the Incursions of the Enemy by land, yet they would have what

Communication they pleased with it by Water, this advantage would therefore be trifling, & for it we should give up all pensilvania & New Jersey, for the Enemy to Ravage at large, and put it in their power Effectually to Cut of our Communication with all the Country to the Eastward of Delaware River; these are reasons I think Sufficient to Induce us to drop all thoughts of Quartering the Army at Wilmington. As to the plan of putting the Army into Huts in the Township of Tryduffrin in the great Valley, I must acknowledge it is a Scituation well Calculated for Covering Chester & Lancaster Counties, and for Checking any Attempts the Enemy may design against Maryland & the Lower Counties on the one Side and a Great part of the Country between the Schuylkill and delaware on the other, the Communication with Jersey and the Northern States will be preserved, the Encampment will be easily guarded as there is but one way to Approach it from Philadelphia; But it is Still only an Encampment It is not going into Winter Quarters, It is not procureing for the Officers and Men that Comfort and Oppertunity of recruiting which they richly deserve after a long and fatigueing Campaign; these perhaps are not in our power to give them any where and should that be the Case, this may be as good a Scituation to hut in as any; provision Can be handily brought in from all Quarters, but how it is for forage I know not. The third proposeal was to Cantoon the Army in the Towns of Reading & Lancaster and the Villages between them or in their Vicinity, If this is practicable I should like it best of any, as the Men would have a Chance of getting better refreshed than by either of the other two proposeals; but it has been objected that it is impracticable, as those towns and Villiages are already filled with persons who have fled to them for Refuge, and if it is so, we must be Content. If the Safety and Comfort of the Army is principally to be Considered, they can Easily be Cantooned in the Towns in New Jersey which are in a great Measure deserted by the Inhabitants, But I think it is also of high Importance to Cover as much of the Country as we can; and that the possition in the Valley will Cover as much or more of the Country than any other that can be pointed out; the Enemy will never Venture out as far as Chester on that side, as we Can Cut them off by takeing post at Darby, to which there is a direct Road. nor would they be fond of penetrating far to the Northward of Philadelphia, least we might pass a body of troops over between them and the Town; Upon the Whole I should be for hutting the Army somewhere in or Near Tryduffrin especially if it is so fine and Rich a Country as has been represented. I am with the Highest Esteem and Respect your Excellency’s Most Humble Servant

Stirling,


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan, 1 December 1777
From: Sullivan, John
To: Washington, George

Dear General
Camp at Whitemarsh [Pa.] Decemr the 1st 1777

Agreeable to your Excellenceys Commands I have Considered upon the most Suitable place to Canton the Army During the winter The Several places proposed in Councill have their Advantages and Disadvantages but that which has the Least objections ought to be fixed upon The Intention of the Board is to take that Station which will answer best to Cover the Country Refresh the Troops & Discipline the Army & by adding to its numbers by Recruits & otherways prepare it to take the field with vigour Early in the Spring—in order to Determine what place will be most Likely to answer this purpose it will be proper to Consider the Several places proposed with the objections that may Justly be made to Each: The first is The great valley on the other Side Schulkill There it is proposed to Hutt the Army for the winter the Second is to Canton The Troops in Wilmington & its Neighbourhood The Third is to Canton them from Lancaster to Reading.
The first place proposed will Cover the Country west of Schulkill provided Large Detachments are kept near the Schulkill & on the Delaware to prevent the Enemy from making Inroads and Collecting Forage &ca in the Neighbourhood of Darby Chester & Wilmington but in Case the Enemy Should take post with a Large party at Wilmington you must Send a Force Superiour to theirs to Attack them or move a Larg part if not the whole of your Army near that place to prevent them from Foraging & Drawing provisions in which Case your Huts must be forsaken & of Course become useless—one great objection to Hutts is that they are Exeeding unhealthy and are at Best but a miserable Shelter from the Inclemencey of the weather—The mortality among the Hessians at Brunswick Last Spring as well as Common observation will Justify this assertion Should you be Able to Cover the west Side of the Schulkill by adopting the plan it must be by making a Winters Campaign but it is to be Rememberd at the Same time that you Leave Exposed the State of New Jersey and all That part of Pensylvania which Lies on the East of Schulkill and put it in the power of the Enemy to

Render your Communication with the Eastern States across the Delaware very Difficult if not impracticable—The Second post proposed namely Wilmington & its Environs will not only Leave New Jersey & the Eastern part of Pensylvania with most of your Hospitals & Stores Exposed but Even the western part of Pensylvania will be in great Measure Exposed unless you keep a Force near the Schulkill to prevent the Incursions of the Enemy—This will also occasion a Winters Campaign without answering any other purpose but that of Covering part of Maryland & the Delaware States & your Situation will put it in the power of the Enemy Compleatly to Cut off your Communication with all the States East of Schulkill—in addition to those Difficulties There is another of great weight in my mind whic is that Though it is not Easy to Surprize the post it is by no means Impracticable This will necessarily Increase our out Guards & Pickets—& make they Duty of the Soldiers Something Severe—& add to it Mr How by a move of his army up the Schulkil toward yr Stores may compel you to move yr Army as often as he Chuses to repeat the manoeuvre If therefore either of the before mentioned posts are taken a Winters Campaign must be the Consequence This in my opinion ought if possible to be Avoided. The most Warlike Nations in the world both in Ancient & Modern times have Endeavoured to Avoid them Even when they had a Sufficiency of Cloathing for their Troops & were in Climates much more temperate than ours. Experience Convinced them that the gain was by no means Equal to the Loss and though in most Instances whole Provinces have been given up this Consideration has not been thought of Sufficient weight to keep Armies in the Field through the winter Season—The Situation of your Army will be Scarcely Tolerable if placed in the warmest Houses During the winter The whole of them without Watch Coats one half without Blankets & more than a Third without Shoes Stockings or Breeches & many of Them without Jackets Indeed There are Some without Coats & not a few without Shirts—Even the officers in Sundry Instances are Destitute of proper Cloathing Some of them being almost Naked—These Considerations Should Induce us to avoid a Winters Campaign if it may be Done without the Greatest Inconveniencys. The Third place will Leave Exposed The East & West Side of Schulkill near the Enemy & at the Same time Expose New Jersy it will however Cover the Back parts of the Country give opportunity of Recruiting & Disciplining your Army & at the Same time furnish Houses that will Supply the want of Comfortable Cloathing to your Troops & give you & your officers a proper opportunity of Turning your Thought to proper Measures for Regulating your Army & Enabling it to take the field with vigor in the Spring To Secure the Country as much as possible one Brigade Should be placed in New Jersey for the Militia to

Collect to in Case of Invasion & Scouting parties of the Militia Should be Constantly near the Enemy to intercept Small parties from making inroads into that State—at Potsgrove or Reading in Pensylvania Should also be another Brigade or Division for the Same purpose & the Militia of this State Should be Constantly Scouting near the Enemies Lines to keep them from foraging with impunity. This Disposition will Cover your Hospitals & Stores & keep open your Communication with all the States—Though you may in taking the above Situation be under a Necessity of Removing Some Inhabitants who have fled from Philadelphia farther Back into the Country yet this is a much Less Evil than Exposing the Army to be Ruined by the Inclemency of the Season & the want of Cloathing but this may in Some measure be Remedied as the Distance between you & the Enemy will permit you to Canton your Troops in Towns Considerably Back of the Line which marks your Front—I know that there are also objections against this Disposition which have great weight among which is that of Leaving So much Country open to the Enemy but in Every view of the Subject I think this the Least Liable to objections—I cannot help giving it as my opinion if we are to make a Winters Campaign & our force is Deemed Sufficient to Dispute the field with the Enemy after the Seven Virginia Regiments Leave us: that Germantown will be the most proper place for the purpose—as that & Beggars Town will afford Cover for most of the Troops The Several Roads Leading to it may Soon be fortified against a Surprize & Corps Selected to Defend the Houses which will Supply in great measure our want of Numbers. The proximity of our Situation to the Enemy will keep them within Bounds & by keeping a Strong party of Pensylvania Militia on the west of Schulkill and 1 of the Jersy Militia on the east of Deleware their Incurtions into the Country will be totally prevented if a winters Campaign is to be Carried on this will be the most advantageous and Comfortable Quarters for the purpose—but if a winters Campaign is to be avoided The other is to be preferred for the Reasons before assigned. I know that both officers & Soldiers Dread a Winters Campaign The prospect of which Induces our officers to Resign in Such Numbers & prevents privates from Engaging in the Service—With Respect to the post our Army takes previous to Retiring to Winter Quarters I think it immaterial at present for if Mr Howe Declines a general Action no Situation we can Take Either on this or the other Side the Schulkill will Compell him to fight us as he has the Delaware open to furnish him with Supplies and if he is Determined to bring on an Engagement he will Seek out the Army Let their Station be where it will. Dr General the above is Submitted will with All Due Defference & Respect by your Excellenceys most obedt Servt

Jno. Sullivan


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General James Mitchell Varnum, 1 December 1777
From: Varnum, James Mitchell
To: Washington, George

May it please your Excellency!
Whitmarsh [Pa.] 1st Decr 1777.

From a cursory View of the present State of your Army, compared to the Position of the Enemy, I am fully convinced that your Troops should immediately go into quiet, peaceable Winter Quarters. By the various Fatigues of the Campaign, your Men are dispersed thro’ many parts of the Country, incapable of taking the Field at this advanced Season. The Hospitals are crouded with Sick and Invalids, occasioned, in a great Measure, by the Want of Clothing & Rest—Your Officers are very discontented, as their Families are suffering at Home, not being able to purchase the Necessaries of Life. The Credit of the Mony is so amazingly decreased, by the prevailing Avarice of the Times, that the recruiting Service rests upon a very precarious Basis. Your great Dependance must therefore be upon the present Army. To make it respectible, it is necessary to collect the feeble together; to nurse and cloath them, and give to the whole such a Spirit of Discipline and Order, as will make them truly formidable. The Enemy is in good Quarters not to be attackd, without the greatest Hazard. He will not attack you, unless he imagines he has a manifest Advantage. In this Situation, you have much to loose, nothing certain to gain. As therefore another Campaign is morally inevitable, your Troops should be put in the best Situation, to open it early, with Vigor & Activity. To fix upon the Line of Cantonment, is a matter of perplexity. If you attempt covering the Country from the Excursions of the Enemy, you make a Winter’s Campaign necessary. But that Position w’ch will give them the greatest Check, consistent with the Ease of the Troops, is the most eligible. That part of Pennsylvania w’ch lays between the Deleware and the Schylkill seems best calculated for this Purpose. While it preserves a Communication with the Southern and Northern States, it gives some kind of Security to New Jersey. A removal to Wilmington and Places adjacent, would give the Enemy the full command of the Deleware, and perhaps, affect a Seperation of the States. It cannot be supposed that the large Villages in the back parts of Pennsylvania are so crouded with Inhabitants as to give no Shelter to the Army. Should the Buildings too scanty to receive all the Troops, the Deficiency might be made up by substituting Hutts, w’ch would prove a sufficient Cover for

the more healthy and robust. I am with great Submission, your Excellency’s most obdt Servt

J. M. Varnum


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 1 December 1777
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp at White Mash [Pa.] 1st Decr 1777

The procuring good and easy Winter Quarters for the Troops under your Excellencies Command—and Covering the Country from the Depredations of the Enemy as far as Possible without too much fatigue to the Army—are Objects of the first Consequence, & to which too much Attention can not be paid.
A Chain of Cantonments has been proposed (and Supported with very plausible Arguments) from Lancaster to Reading and the Intermediate Villages between them, to which Cantonments I can’t agree for the following Reasons.
Because by taking Quarters at the Distance of Sixty Miles West of Philadelphia, you at once give up to the Enemy all the Delaware State, the Eastern shore of Maryland, the Counties of Phila. Bucks and Chester.
Because by this access of fine Country the Enemy will be enabled to draw Supplies, not only for the Winter—but to lay up Stores for the next Campaign—to Vittual their Transports—carry Genl Burgoyne’s Army to Great Brittain—and perhaps bring out an Equal Number to Re enforce Genl Howe early in the Spring.
Because the Sick and feeble of the Army in the Respective Hospitals will in a great Measure be left between the Enemy and us—Otherwise Intermixed with the healthy Troops—and Subject them to the same Disorders that the Sick may be Infected with Because you Cannot in these Villages procure cover for more than one third of your Effective’s without casting to the Mercy of Weather and Howling Wilderness—those families who flew before the Enemy to these very places for Shelter—giving up ease & Affluence, for Liberty and protection.
Because other States are Subject to Invasion—who will Naturally Conclude if these are given up to Distruction—that it may be their case next, and will thereby be Detered from giving that aid, which they Otherwise would Afford—least they should first Irritate, & Afterwards be left to the Mercy of a more than Savage foe.

Because the Eyes of the World are upon us—and we have given the Country some Ground to expect, some protection since the Junction of so great a part of the Northern Army.
For these Reasons I am positively against taking Quarters at the places before Mentioned—but would propose making good our Quarters in a Position that will at once Afford cover to the Country and Enable you to draw supplies for your Army—from the Vicinity of the Enemy—in doing of which you will not only Distress them—but save for the use of the Campaign those Stores which you would be necessitated to expend if Quartered at the Distance of Sixty Miles from the Delaware River.
You will also leave such Houses as can be procured in that Country to be Converted into Hospitals for the use of the Sick and Convalescents—to which the feeble of the Army may be Collected & Commissioned Officers sent (in Proportion to the number of the sick) to Superentend them—who will not only preserve Order but Introduce Discipline amongst the Convalescents, by Obliging them to Appear clean on the parade and Manoeuvre them whenever the Weather will permit, which will be more Conducive to their health and be a means of saving more live’s than the whole powers of the Materia Medica—they will also afford protection to our Stores by Detering any small party from Attempting their Destruction.
For these Reasons, and to Sweeten the tempers of those Officers that at present may be a little Sowered as well as for the ease and Conveniency of Others—I am Induced to meet those Gentlemen in Sentement—wh⟨ich⟩ are for Quartering the Army at Willmington & in it’s Vicinity—which with the aid of some Hut⟨s⟩ will afford Cover Sufficient.
The position is such as to give the Enemy the Greatest Annoyance—with the least fatigue to your own Troops.
Your Excellencies own good Judgment will point out the proper Measures necessary to guard against the Surprise which some Gentlemen Effect so much to dread—I can only asure your Excellency that whatever Position you may think most proper I shall always be ready to Acquiesce with, & to serve you with the best Service of Your Most Obt and very Hume Sert

Anty Wayne


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General George Weedon, 1 December 1777
From: Weedon, George
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
[1 December 1777]

I have agreeable to your Excellency’s direction, considered in every point of view I am able; “A proper position for this Army during the winter.” Three plans for facilitating this desirable purpose have been proposed, Vizt Hutting, Drawing them down to Wilmington & its vicinity, or Cantoning them in the back country from Reading to Lancaster. In my opinion there will be great inconveniencies attending any measure we may take. The first plan is certainly the most desirable, but I fear, the least eligible; & both for reasons so obvious that they hardly need mentioning. Does not the present situation of affairs promise another Campaign? Tis true that by wintering your Troops within ten or fifteen miles of the enemy you might in some measure cover the country contiguous thereto, but would not this subject your Army to a Winter campaign? Add to this the unhealthy quarters they would be confined to, rendered still the more so by the very nature of the materials which compose them. Our service has already driven us to this necessity on a former occasion which proved more fatal to the troops than all the actions they fought during the campaign! Let us benefit by experience—Your army, Sir, is now much reduced by hard service & other sufferings during this Summer & Fall; I fear & believe, I may say with truth, (& consequently on this occasion with propriety) that a third of them, tho’ now in the field, are more fitting for the Hospital than the Camp: without Blanketts, without Shoes, & in short almost destitute of every comfort required by the strong & robust, much more the weak & feeble. What then must be the effects of keeping them out all winter in this dispiriting situation? Can you promise yourself service from them in the spring? When the Enemy find your troops exhausted by fatigue, they will no doubt avail themselves of it, what must then necessarily follow is disagreeable & needless to anticipate. Troops undisciplined worn-out by service, deprived of every comfort which is necessary to restore health & vigor, cannot be supposed to support an attack against those who thro’ the Winter have been in comfortable quarters, constantly trained in Manœvreing & other exercises. That this will be the case I make not the least doubt.
A position at Wilmington, I should have no very great objection to, if the troops could be covered in a tolerable compact body, but this I fear cannot be done; & Cantoning by Detachment is a dangerous experiment.

I look Sir, on this Army as the Herculean hinge, on which American Independance turns—The covering this, or the other spot for the space of three or four months is not a motive sufficient to hazard, or expose this Army for, the object is in no wise adequate to the disadvantages that may result from it: you would in my opinion subject yourself to frequent alarms by taking post at Wilmington, Christiana, Newport & Chester, particularly at the latter. The Enemy are masters of the River—have a numerous Fleet at their command, and within one nights march of you—I should not indeed dread a surprize—but supposing the enemy not inclined to attack you by a sudden march, (which at the same time they would have in their power) but to manœvre up the Schuylkill & cross above you, should we not be in the predicament we have all this campaign been endeavouring to shun, by keeping their left-flank must we not instantly leave our quarters, perhaps at a season of the year when our Magazines could not be got off. The Sick must fall into their hands also, unless we fight them & are successful—Should any disaster attend us, by an action with them in this situation, what would be the consequences? A total Anihilation of this Army & with it, the Liberties of America! Upon the whole Sir, distressing as it is to leave a country uncovered, & at the mercy of an ungenerous Enemy, who no doubt will ravage & plunder the inhabitants; yet Sir, we must view our affairs on a more extensive Scale. Subjugating a few individuals who must be left at their mercy, or possessing a small tract of country for a few months goes but a small way in the American cause, while you have this Army in full health. That we must have another Campaign is, I believe, beyond controversy, prudence therefore dictates a timely provision for the same, the success of it will depend on the health & discipline of your Troops, the care & vigilance of your Officers, and early operations in the field. To provide for such important purposes, I give it as my opinion This Army be quartered as soon as circumstances will permit, in a country where not only your Officers may have it in their power to make themselves comfortable during the winter, but your troops be relieved from heavy guards, covered from the inclemency of the weather, nursed in sickness, disciplined, & restored to their former health & vigor—This Sir, & this alone, will give you the Superiority over your Enemy. Your Hospitals are now, as strong nearly, as your Battalions: & while you are followed by an Army of feeble invalids, what reward can you expect for your unwearied exertions, by any atchievements such Troops can obtain? The Chain of Cantonments from Reading to Lancaster has been mentioned, I cannot with precision say they are the most eligible, but from the small knowledge I have of the country, should suppose them the most likely to

cover the troops, & afford them rest thro’ the winter. I am Sir Yr Very Hbe Servt

G. Weedon


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Woodford, 1 December 1777
From: Woodford, William
To: Washington, George

Dear Genl
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 1st Decemr 1777.

Upon considering the several places purposed for the winter Cantoonments of the army, I think the Villages from Reading to Lancaster with the addition of some Hutts, the most Eligable position for the Troops in their present situation.
Were the Men warmly clad, I should give it as my Opinion that Willmington, or some post nigher the Enemy should be taken in preference to the above, where we might annoy them in their Forrageing &c. in the course of the winter.
But upon considering our present circumstances & looking forward to the opperations in the Spring, I think the advantages we should give them of possessing a part of this state & the Lower Countys, would be over ballanced by our having a Vigorous army ready to take the Field early in the next Campaign, with sufficient Magazines of provision & Forrage laid up in the course of this winter.
If the Range of Cantoonments I purpose should meet the approbation of your Excellency (after hearing the sentiments of the Genl Officers) I would purpose that as much Forrage & provisions as possible (of every kind) be immediately drawn from the Country between our Quarters & the Enemy, & that such as we had it not in our power to remove be distroy’d (saveing a bare sufficiency for the subsistance of the Inhabitants) & that the Country in our Rear be kept as a Reserve.
previous to the removal of the army, I would recommend that one or more Genl Officer go with the D. Qr Master Genl to view the cover that can be procured for the Troops, & make their Report to your Excellency as speedily as posible.
If these Villages are found too much crouded with the Refugees from Philadelphia & its neighbourhood, I should think it no great hardship for them to be obliged to remove to the Farm Houses contiguous,

& that the D. Qr Master Genl (after having assertain’d their numbers) be order’d to assign them Quarters at a distance that it would be unsafe to squander the Troops in, & that the publick Waggons remove their affects. I am with much respect your Excellencys Most obedt humble Servt

Wm Woodford


Title: To George Washington from Captain Charles Craig, 2 December 1777
From: Craig, Charles
To: Washington, George

Sir
2nd Decemr 1777.

I have thought it my duty to inform Your Excellency that about five Hundred of the enemy Crossed over Schoolkill Last night.

The enemy intend to make a push out—and endeavour to drive Your Excellency from the present encampment, Destroy our Fleet Burn German Town & Frankford shou’d the not Succeed in this expedition the will return to the City and prepare for a retreat, Genl How gave orders for not one of the Vessels to be unloaded before the return. I am With great Respect your Excellencys Most Obt Servt

C. Craig


Title: From George Washington to Major General Philemon Dickinson, 2 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Dickinson, Philemon

Dear sir,
Head Quarters White Marsh [Pa.] 2d Decr 1777

I have this day receiv’d your Favor of 28th Ulto—& can only say it gives me concern that your Excursion to staten Island was not attended with success equal to your expectation, which, from the Plan you had formed, the Secrecy with which you expected to have executed it, I suppose was pretty Sanguine—but Experience shews us that the most triffling incidents will frustrate the best concert’d schemes; & as Mr Skinner had Notice of your approach I think you may be Satisfied with the small loss you sustaind & the Capture you made.
It is highly agreeable to me that you are coming towards the Delaware with the Detachmt you mention & am certain it will be in your power to afford much greater protection to the State by having a pretty considerable body of Men station’d at Mt Holly than in any other part of it—As I conceive that a small party will be sufficient under the present Circumstances to Defend it against Incursions from Staten Island.
Having found that Lord Cornwallis had return’d from the Jersey with his Troops & having advice that they intended a Genl Stroke at this Army (which I thought not improbable) I was under the necessity of withdrawing the Continental Forces from your side the River. I am &c.

G.W.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 2 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

Sir
Head Quarters Whitemarsh [Pa.] 2d Decemr 1777

I was yesterday favd with yours of the 23d Novemr and am glad to find that you were upon your guard against any attempt of Genl Burgoine to endeavour to change the place of embarkation. No Transports have yet sailed from the Delaware for the purpose of carrying the Troops to Europe, nor do I hear that any have gone from New York. I can only attribute this delay to want of provision for the Voyage. Bread we know is exceedingly scarce among them.
By Resolve of Congress of the 5th Novemr (Copy of which I perceive by the Resolve itself has been transmitted to you) you are directed, with

a certain part of the northern Army, and the assistance of the Militia of New York and the Eastern States, to attempt the recovery of the posts upon the North River from the Enemy, and to put them, if recovered, in the best posture of defence. The Enemy having themselves vacated Forts Montgomery and Clinton while the Resolve was in agitation, but of which the Congress could not at the time be informed, the first part falls of course, but the last deserves our most serious attention, as upon the possession of the North River depends the security of all the upper part of the Government of New York, and the communication between the Eastern middle and southern States. It is also the Quarter in which the Enemy will probably attempt a diversion in the Spring, as, from the small force remaining in Canada, there is not a possibility of their doing any thing on that side till very late in the Campaign, if at all.
My not having heard from you what Steps you have taken towards carrying the Resolve, for repairing the old Works or building new, into execution, or when you might be expected down into that part of the Country, has made me hitherto delay recalling Genl putnam from the command. But I beg leave to urge to you the necessity of your presence in that quarter as speedily as possible, for I fear few or no measures have been taken towards putting matters in a proper train for carrying on these important Works.
Genl George Clinton will necessarily be employed in the affairs of his Government, but I have wrote to him for, and I am certain he will call for and contribute all the Aid that the State of New York can possibly afford. You are vested by the Resolve of Congress to demand a proportionable Share of Assistance from the Eastern States.
I observe by a paragraph in the Fishkill paper of some days later date than your letter, that the Enemy had evacuated Ticonderoga and Independance. If this should have happened, it will not only releive your attention from that object, but it will enable you to draw the Force, which you might have intended to watch the operations of the Enemy in that quarter, lower down the River.
Lieut. Colo. Willet, who was here a few days ago, mentioned that Gansevoorts Regiment was at Fort Schuyler and Van Scaicks at Schenectady. He seemed of opinion from his knowledge of that Country, and from the disposition of the Indians since your success to the Northward, that a much less Garrison than the whole of Gansevoorts Regiment would be sufficient for Fort Schuyler, and that the remainder of that and Van Scaick’s might be brought down the Country. Your own knowledge and Judgment will undoubtedly point out the propriety or safety of such a measure. I barely mention Colo. Willets opinion of the matter.
You must be so well convinced of the importance of the North River,

that nothing more need be said to induce you to set about the security of it with the greatest vigour. I sometime ago sent up Colo. La Radiere to Fishkill to assist in carrying on the Works, but if he, with the Gentlemen who were before with you should not be sufficient, I can send up another who I beleive is a Master of his profession.
Genl Howe has withdrawn himself close within his lines which extend from the upper Ferry upon Schuylkill to Kensington upon Delaware. They consist of a Chain of strong Redoubts connected by Abattis. We have reconnoitered them well, but find it impossible to attack them while defended by a force fully equal to our own in Continental Troops. The Reinforcement from New York unluckily arriving before ours from the Northward, it was out of my power to afford adequate releif to Fort Mifflin, which fell after a most gallant defence of seven Weeks. The Works upon the Jersey Shore, which were not tenable after the Reduction of Fort Mifflin, were evacuated, as it would have been impossible to have supported the Garrison there. We have not yet determined upon a position for the Army during the Winter. That Situation will undoubtedly be most eligible which will afford best cover to the Troops, and will at the same time cut off the Enemy from Resources of provisions, which they may probably stand in need of, when the Navigation of Delaware is obstructed by the Ice. I am Sir Yr most obt Servt

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