Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 6 November 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Near Bedford [N.Y.] Novr 6th 1778

Your Excellencys favour of Yesterdays date Came to hand with Sundre letters late last night.
the letters for New York I forwarded by a flag Early this morning and Sent Some of the Manifestos to be left about the lines and one to be carlesly Shown to the officer who receives the flag.
I have not been able to git any intelligence these tow days owing to the High Winds preventing our passing the Sound and North river. I am Still Shure that the Gentleman that I mentioned some days ago will not Deceive me. the Weather is now Very good and I hope will Continue untill we can Obtain Somthing that will lead us to the enemys intentions. By reports from Deserters they wear Still embarking on monday last, waggons and Teams Heavy Bagage & Troops. however these reports Bear but Little weight with me.
  I am unhappy to inform Your Excellency that we have lost by Desertion within Four days Fifty Six men all from the Eastorn Troops. I got intilligence of a large Number intending to go off last night upon

    which I orderd partys in the Rear of the Camp in as private a manner as possable to intercept them, with posative orders to fier upon them if they did not immediatly Serender about ten oClock at Night a Very brisk fier began in the Rear of the Camp about half a mile But Soon Seased, when immediatly a Scattering fier Began in front and on both flanks which lasted for Near an hour with small intervils. Unfortunatly Nobody was killed and but two made prisoners this put a Check to them, that we lost but Eighteen Last Night I shall order a Court for the tryal of those two that was taken and I hope an Example may Be made at least of one, as I am well assurd that nothing Else will put a Stop to it.
  Your Excellency has my Sincar thanks for Your kind indulgance in Suffering me to retire from this post, and am truly unhappy that circumstances will not admit of my Longer Stay. However before I proceed to give any instructions I Murst inform You that the Command will Devolve on Colo. Gist who is by no means equil to it. I would also inform Your Excellency that I Have kept him always Detached from this Corps where he has don no other duty than that of keeping Constant Scouting partys. pardon me Sir for advising, but if Your Excellency should think propper To give him a Seperate Command for the above purpose he Could take no offence at being deprived of the Command of the whole Corps. if this or his <Bei>ng recalled altogather could be don Ither of <the> Colos. that would be left would be Very Good. I am Your Excellencys Obedient Servant

    Chs Scott

P.s: the Deserters make immediatly for their Regiments where I have Dispatched officers to apprehend them and bring them Back under Guard.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 6 November 1778
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

    Dear Sir
    Eliz. Town [N.J.] Novr 6. 1778

A small Touch of the Rheumatism in my right Hand and Shoulder prevents my writing to your Excellency myself.
  Some Circumstances in Major Howells last journal induces me to send you the inclosed Original. they have become very strict within

    these few last Days at New-York about permitting any Persons to pass or repass. I have therefore found it difficult to get Intelligence from thence. they talk of an intended Expedition that is to take Place very soon, others say the Troops which remain are bound to St Augustine and Halifax. certain it is that many of the principle Tories appear to be in great Distress and at their Wits End what to do.
Colonel Spencer informs me that untill Yesterday there remained four different Encampments on the Island of New-York near Fort Washington that two of them moved from thence about nine oClock in the Morning that a Body of the Enemy was seen on the Move some Distance below towards New-York. the other two Encampments still remain. I am Your Excellency’s most humble Servant

  Stirling,


Title: General Orders, 7 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

    Head-Quarters Frederick’s burgh [N.Y.] Saturday Novr 7th 1778.
    Parole CarthagenaC. Signs Cambray. Condè—

At a Brigade General Court Martial held at Camp near Hartford by order of Brigadier General Poor October 31st 1778. Coll Hazen President, Lieutenant David Gilman of the 2nd New-Hampshire Regiment was tried first for ungentlemanlike behaviour in associating with Private Soldiers and offering them a reward of twenty dollars and engaging to secure them from harm, in case any should arise in consequence thereof, if they should take up and bring to him a Horse.
2ndly for taking two Stray horses the Property of private Persons and converting them to his own use without making any Publication thereof, much to the Prejudice of the service and to the good People of The United-States, unanimously found guilty, sentenced to be cashiered and rendered incapable of ever serving the United States again as a Military Officer and forfeit all his Pay that is now due to him.
The Commander in Chief approves the sentence & orders it to take Place immediately.
At a Brigade General Court Martial held in the Corps of Artillery by order of Brigadier General Knox—October 29th 1778—Lieutenant Coll Stevens President Captain Moody of Coll Lamb’s Regiment of Artillery was tried for disobedience of orders and contemptuous behaviour, found guilty of the Charges exhibited against him, and the Court are of opinion that Captain Moody should be reprimanded in Brigade orders.
The Commander in Chief confirms the opinion of the Court and orders the sentence to take place.
Captain Lilburn Williams of the second Maryland Regiment is appointed Pay-Master of the same.


Title: To George Washington from George Clinton, 7 November 1778
From: Clinton, George
To: Washington, George

    Sir.
    Poughkeepsie [N.Y.] Novr 7th 1778

About two Weeks hence the Commissioners will be ready (as they have informed me) to send off the last Cargo of Persons who have refused to take the Oath of Allegiance, as prescribed by Law, to this State and are sentenced to be banished within the Enemy’s Lines.
I have therefore to request that your Excellency will be pleased to direct the Commanding Officer at West Point to furnish an Officer to take the Vessel in charge on her arrival there, and to conduct her to New York. The necessary Instructions and the Flag will be forwarded to Colo. Malcom. I have the Honor to be with great Respect Your Excellency’s most Obedt servt

  Geo: Clinton


Title: To George Washington from Major General William Heath, 7 November 1778
From: Heath, William
To: Washington, George

    Dear General
    Boston 7 Novr 1778

I have been honored with yours of the 29th Ulto inclosing a Resolve of the Honorable Congress of the 22d.
Major General Gates arrived here yesterday and has taken the Command this Day.
  The Summerset Man of War is on shore on Cape Cod, and is taken possession of by our people. It is said Seventeen Sail of British Men of War of the Line had actually entered our Bay when the late severe Storm took place, and that some others are on shore; but this is not yet confirmed. perhaps Major General Gates will write Your

    Excellency more fully on this matter. I have the honor to be with the greatest respect Your Excellency’s Most obedient Servant

    W. Heath

P.S. The Count d’Estaing’s Squadron left Nantasket road on the 3d & 4th Instant.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Enoch Poor, 7 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Poor, Enoch

    Sir.
    Head Qrs [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 7th No[vembe]r 1778

I recd your letter of the 3d instant, inclosing the court martial proceedings in the case of Lieut. David Gilman.
I have approved and confirmed the sentance, and shall direct its publication in this days orders.
Major General Putnam who commands in the room of Major Genl Gates will take measures respecting a surgeon for the sick. I am &

  G.W.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 7 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

    Sir.
    [Fredericksburg, N.Y., 7 Nov. 1778]

You will immediately proceed to Harford, and take the command of Poors—Pattersons and Learneds Brigades till further arrangements can be made.
You are to hold the troops in a state of preparation to march at the shortest notice; and upon certain advices from Major Genl Gates of the british army appearing off Boston you will put them instantaneously in motion, and march by the shortest and most commodious route to Major Genl Gates. But as putting the troops in motion, in our present condition of supplies, is a matter of serious consideration you will not assume this measure without the information which you may receive from Genl Gates, is clear and decided. Given at Head Quarters this 7th day of Nov. 1778.

  G. W——n


Title: To George Washington from Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Regnier, 7 November 1778
From: Regnier, Pierre
To: Washington, George

    May it Please Your Excellency.Sir
    Camp Continental Village [N.Y.] November 7th 1778

  As the New York Brigade is Reduced to two Regiments, Only; & that, the Officers & Privates of the one I have the honour to Command at Present, are mostly Born on Long-Iland, & are well acquainted with the Shores, & every Individuals there, and Consequently, would be of more service, in some Posts on the Sound, where I am Informed,

    some Troops are to be Stationed this winter, who perhaps, are not so well Accquainted with that part of the Country, as the Natives. As five men of those of the Regt who were a part of the Detachement I had there this summer, are still De’tained to serve as Pilots, to major Grey’s Party, and I am Informed, by Orders of Brigr Genl Scott.
Therefore; from the above Circumstances and the Unanimous Egerness of the Officers of the Regt to Occuppy that Post (as it may be seen by the within Inclosed) I have the Honor to send, [(]for your Excellency’s Perusal) I beg you would be pleased (if there is yet any Possibility) to order the Regt on that part of the Country, if it is not designed to occuppy an Other post already. I am with Respect of Your Excellency the Most obt servt

  P. Regnier Lt Col. 4th N. York


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 7 November 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Near Bedford [N.Y.] Novr 7th 1778

The inclosd letter is from the Gentleman that I place so much Confidence in. Your Excellency will See how Desirous he is to have it Destroyd. But as I could not so well Convey the Intellegence without Sending the letter I have (in order that it Should go Safe) Sent it by an officer. I am informd by Lt Brewster that Genl Clinton has this day orderd the Boats men that was with him to Join their Brigade which Puts it out of his power to pass over to Long Island with any Degree of Safety. by which Means we Shall (perhaps) loose the advantage of Some important intellegence from this Gentn whose Letter is in closd. their Names are David Dickinson Zachariah Hawkins Ben Dickinson Jonathan Skinner & Joshua Davis. if Your Excellency Will be pleasd to order that they be Sent back I am Shure they will be of infanit Service. inclosd You will Receive a Rough Copy of an Acct from two Deserters. pardon Me Sir for Sending it in that Rough manner as I have no body to assist me and Am So onwell that I am hardly able to hold up my head a moment longer. I am Your Excellencys Obt Servt

  Chs Scott


Title: From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 7 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)

    My Lord,
    Head Quarters Fredericksburg [N.Y.] Novr 7th 1778

I have to acknowledge your favors of the 31st Ulto the 1st 3d & 4th Inst. with their several inclosures.
As your Lordship observes, the intelligence from the City must now become more important, since the sailing of so large an Embarkation of Troops—and will serve to determine in a great measure whether a complete evacuation of the place is intended. I need not pray your attention, and am, My Lord Your Lordships Most Obet Servant

    Go: Washington

P.S. You will be pleased to forward the inclosed letters.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 7–8 November 1778
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

    Dear Sir
    Eliz. Town [N.J.]Novr 7[–8] 1778 in the Evening

  I this Day have seen a Person from New-York who has had an Opportunity of being in a Variety of Company there lately, who “says: that the Embarkations of Troops and Stores are still going on the Day before Yesterday. that they talk there is a Garrison to be left for the Protection of Privatiering, of which there is now fifty Sail belonging

    to that Port. that there is a great Scarcity of Sailors both for the Privatiers and Men of War, of which there are several still at New-York particularly the Isis & Rhoebuck Capt. Hammond. the latter is to sail next Week for England is to carry Home Lord Carlisle and Mr Eden, Sir Harry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis are likewise going to England. Grant is gone with one Division of the Troops Vaughn and Grey are gone or going with the others. and notwithstanding the Promises of a Garrison and the Building of Hutts at Kings Bridge, the principle Tories are in great Despondency. That Colonel Creugers Corps is just embarked. she knows it is provided with Necessaries for a warm Climate, and she over heard him say a Day or two ago that he supposed his Destination was for St Augustine.”
By the Reports made by the Officers stationed at Amboy and at the Hook this day Nothing of Importance has sailed either in or out since the 3d Inst. I expect they will begin to assemble at the Hook as soon as the Weather appears settled and fair for there are nine or ten Transports with Troops on board near the Narrows, some in the Harbour others in the Mouth of the North River. Inclosed is the York Paper of the 5th the Printer speaks of the “Fleet which has sailed for Rhode Island,” that was the twenty three Sail which sailed on Saturday Morning 31st and returned in the Afternoon. he says nothing of the eighty odd sail which joined them on Monday after the Storm and sailed with them on tuesday and tho this eighty Sail carryed of[f ] above eight thousand Men he makes no Mention of them except “some Wind bound Vessels.” this must be another clear Evasion of mentioning an Embarkation of Troops.
I have just now recieved the following Letter dated New-York Novr 5th. “The Fleet sailed from the Hook a Tuesday. Their Convoy consist of five two Deckers. Generals Grant and Camble are gone in the Fleet, Genl Grant goes to Mobeal Genl Camble is appointed Governor of Pensicoler. there is some talk of a private Expedition going on it is said Genl Grey is to command. The Transports are ready in the North River to take the Troops aboard. the seventy first embarked Yesterday What Number is to embark is not yet known or where their Destination is. Seven hundred of the New Corps are aboard of Transports at the Narrows. The Commissioners it is said goe Home in the Phenix Man of War in twelve Days time—If anything of Consequence should happen you may rely on the earliest Intelligence.”
  8th 9 oClo’ a.m.
  I have seen another person from New york who say’s the private Expedition is to take place immediately after the Eleventh. from several Circumstances I am led to belive that they Mean to begin their

    Secret Expedition with a Surprize in the Bayoneting way. If it should be in this State I hope we shall give the “No flint General ” some reason to be Ashamed of his Title. The Rhuematism is much better, fine weather, and some Exercise (which I had too much neglected) will I hope shake it off. I am with the Most Sincere affection & Esteem your Excellency’s Most Obedient Humble Servt

  Stirling,


Title: From George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., 7 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan Sr.

    Dr Sir
    Head Quarters Fredericksburg [N.Y.] 7th Novr 1778

  I am honored by yours of the 28th. I had, previous to the receipt of it, determined upon such a disposition of the Troops for the winter, as will serve the purposes you mention. As soon as the intentions of

    the Enemy are more clearly known I shall fix upon the places of cantonment, and assign the Troops to their respective Stations.
A Fleet of upwards of one hundred sail left the Hook on the morning of the 3d and supposed to be bound to the West Indies. I cannot ascertain the number of Troops on board. Whether a further embarkation from New York is to take place this fall, I am not able yet to determine; but as we have spies upon their motions, I expect soon to learn that they are preparing for it. I am, Dear Sir your most Obedient humble Servant

  Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Colonel William Malcom, 8 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Malcom, William

    Sir
    Head Quarters [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 8th Novemr 1778

I recd yours of the 5th inclosing a weekly Return of the Garrison.
If you will make a Return of your Regiment and send an Officer up to this place he can have compleat suits of Uniform, Shoes and Stockings and a proportion of Hatts and Blankets. Let your Return specify the exact number of the two latter Articles already in the Regiment—There are no Shirts at this time in the Store, but they are daily expected. The Uniforms are Blue and Red and Brown and Red, either of which you may have.
  You may, if you think it is proper, put all things in readiness to take up the Chain and Boom. I do not think there is any danger of a Visit from the Enemy this Fall, but still there is no need of running any

    Risque by taking it up before there is a necessity for it. I am Sir Yr most obt.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Charles Scott, 8 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Scott, Charles

    Dear sir.
    Head Quarters [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 8 Novr 1778

I received your favor of the 7th with its inclosure last night thro’ the hands of Cornet Wells with whom it was sent.
I think you had better advise the person who communicates to withold his name from his letters or else to assume a false signature. But I do not see the necessity of any name so long as the writing is known by the parties.
The letter which accompanies this will procure the stay of the men employed in navigating to and from Long Island. I am Dear sir Your most hble servt.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 8 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)

    My Lord
    Head Quarters Fredericksbg [N.Y.] 8 Novemr 1778

Colo. Blands Regiment is ordered to Winchester in Virginia on Acct of their peculiar circumstances the times of the Men being out next month, be pleased therefore to permit the small party with you to join their Corps. I am Your Lordships most obt Servt

  Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Temple, 8 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Temple, Benjamin

    [Fredericksburg, N.Y., 8 Nov. 1778]

Colonel Bland having been ordered upon another Duty, you will take the command of the 1st Regt of Dragoons and march them immediately by the shortest Route to Winchester in Virginia, at which place they are to be quartered for the Winter. You will collect and carry with you all the Men, Horses and Accoutrements belonging to the Regt.

  When you have passed the Delaware at Coryells Ferry you will send the Regiment forward under the command of the senior Officer and proceed yourself to Philadelphia. Upon your arrival there you are to wait upon the Board of War and inform them, that the present terms of inlistment of the greater part of the men are near expiring, and that you have good Reason to suppose that many of them will re-inlist upon being allowed a Furlough for the Winter to visit their Freinds. Inform them also of the Value of the Men who compose the Regiment, who should not be lost for want of the indulgence they require—If the Board approve the plan you will apply to them for instructions and Money to pay the new Bounty.
You will at any Rate have a number more Horses than Men during the Winter, you must therefore direct the men that remain to take care of as many as they conveniently can, and quarter the remainder upon the neighbouring Farmers.
You will make use of all possible means to have the Horses put in good order and to have the accoutrements repaired.
You will constantly while you have the command of the Regiment see that a sufficient number of Officers remain with the Regiment to superintend the Men and Horses.
Given at Head Quarters at Fredericksburg 8th of Novemr 1778.

After you have arrived at Winchester and informed yourself of the number of Men who will reinlist, be pleased to make me a Return of them and of the state of the Regt in other particulars.


Title: To George Washington from Colonel Armand, 9 November 1778
From: La Rouërie, Armand-Charles Tuffin, marquis de
To: Washington, George

    sir
    [Fredericksburg, N.Y., c.9 Nov. 1778]

i took the liberty to acquaint your Exellency with the necessity which I am under to beg your goodness.
the bord of war to which i made my application for have the comissions of my officers, answer’d that he never had receiv’d any liste and power from your Exellency to grant them with their Expectations.

  not one of them has make the least objection to march to the enemy without his comission, and i swer that they <Enpassd> them selves with the same bravery and Confidence, which they had had if their Comissions had been granted to them. i pray your Exellency to considere that i have not make my self one officer in my Corps without athority, Exept three leutenan<ts> which were as one indispensable necessity: the Congress and bord of war say that as soon you[r] Exellency shall approve the nomination of my officer they will be granted with their Comissions so they desaere your approbation for the raising of my Dragons Company.
in respect to my owne business. i beg as a favour of your Exellency to order me in a reasonable way. for i will never ask nor obtain any thing without your good wish. since two [y]ears i am in your army, i never receiv’d any appointement nor gratification, i have done my endeavour to answer the favour of Congress and your Exellency which honour’d me with the comission of Cnl if your Exellency judge that i deserve to be promoted to the ranck of brigadier, i pray you to give me one recommendation to the Congress upon that object, if you do not judge that i deserves it, i am satisfy’d considering that i have not other judge here than your Exellency and the soldyear under my Comand. if had been possible to go in france only by a permission of your Exellency and the Congress, i had been glade to Conserve the Comand of my Corps which i had so much trouble to raise. the warm desaer to stay all my life under your Command is the only motive which make me ask that favour.
  in the both Case if i conserve that Comand or not, i beg of your Exellency to take the old Corps anexed to me from the new one being unpossible that the officer in the both side live well altogheter. good many of my offrcer want to go to france, i may assure your Exellency that the soldyears will all desert if they are not under the immediat Comand of the officer wh<ose> enlisted them. for prevint such thing it would be good if pleased to your Exellency to order me one quarter far from the line and nearer to the congress; the few time when they had been to the lines has been so hard that specially the Cavalery want for some reparations.
in purpose to give the least trouble i can to your Exellency, i present to you the list of the favour which i beg of your goodness. i am with the greatest respect of your Exellency sir the most humble and obediante servante

  armand


Title: To George Washington from Major General Alexander McDougall, 9 November 1778
From: McDougall, Alexander
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Camp Second Hill [New Milford, Conn.] Novr 9th 1778.

I was honored with your Favor of Yestarday in the Evening.
The two Connecticut Brigades are still on this ground & will probably be well supplied for a few Days.
Nixon’s is advanced to Woodbury, seven miles from hence.
General Huntington has applied to me to put their Officers to the respective Corps as they are arranged agreeable to the New-Establishment, as the rejected Officers are gone home, and untill that takes place, some Companies are now without any Commissioned Officers annexed to them; those who are to have Charge of them belong to other Companies or Corps. The Evils that have arisen to those Companies in their present State will increase; they are obvious. But as I am so near Head Quarters, I do not think myself authorised to remove them—It being a Question whether those Officers that are promoted by that intended arrangment can receive their Pay in the new Office, ’till Congress shall give the finishing Hand to the Work.

  I am therefore under the Necessity of troubling your Excellency for Directions on this Subject.
If the Weather is fair to morrow I intend to avail myself of the Opportunity to set off for Hartford, where my Stay will be very short. I have the Honor to be with great Truth and Regard your Excellency’s most Obedient humble Servant.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 9 November 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Near Bedford [N.Y.] Novr 9th 1778

Your Excellencys letter of Yesterdays date Came to hand Last evening. the letter which I sent You by Cornet Wills was from Sir John Bolton the person whom Majr Talmadge Recommended To Your Excellency Some time ago. there will be no Dainger of his being discoverd. I do not know his Propper name my self, for Nither of those are.
  Inclosd Your Excellency will receive Some intelligence from Capt. Williams. he tells <m>e that it is from good Authority. also a York paper. I am Your Excellencys Obt Servant

  Chs Scott


Title: General Orders, 10 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

    Head-Quarters Frederick’s burgh [N.Y.] Tuesday Novr 10th 78.
    Parole Oronoko—C. Signs Orkney—Ohio.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Horatio Gates, 10 November 1778
From: Gates, Horatio
To: Washington, George

    Sir,
    Boston 10th November 1778.

Your Excellency’s Letters of the 3rd & 5th Instant, are now before me. The First Divission of the Convention Troops marched Yesterday morning; the rest will follow in succession, until the whole are marched. Agreeable to Your Excellency’s approbation, their Heavy Baggage is sent by water, with all the precautions respecting the passes which Your Excellency recommends. The Count d’Staing being Sailed the Tuesday before the Arrival of your Letter, I return it inclosed to Your Excellency. Neither the Captain, nor any of the Officers of the Somerset Ship of War, lately wrecked near Cape Cod, are yet come to this Town; upon their Arrival, I shall send Your Excellency all the intelligence that can be procured from them. General Phillips, is very Anxious in his Application to me for a pass for Lieut: Campbell of the Convention Troops, to go into New York. I have refused granting one further than to Your Head Quarters.
Sir Henry Clinton’s not complying with General Phillips’s requisition for Money, throws the Officers of the Convention Troops into the greatest difficulties; at length Generals Phillips, & Reidesel, have Accepted their Bills, & become responsible to their Creditors: but I know not if in all Cases this will be consented to by the Inhabitants, though I cannot see the Advantages resulting to them from a contrary Conduct.
Their is no intelligence from Sea, since the Sailing of The French Fleet.
Colonel Harrison takes charge of a small Box, brought to Your Excellency from England by Mr Temple, with the Key. I am, Sir, Your Excellency’s Most Obedient Hume Servt

  Horatio Gates


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Edward Hand, 10 November 1778
From: Hand, Edward
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Albany [N.Y.] 10th Novr 1778

On the 2d Inst. I set out from this place on a Visit to the posts on The Western Frontier, in order to satisfy myself fully as to their Situation and Supplies At 12 OClock on the Night of the 7th I received the Inclos’d Intelligence from Fort Schuyler, at Cherry Valley, if the Acct be true it is alarming, as Cherry Valley & Schoharry are very Scantily supplied with Provision & Amunition yet hope to be Able to make, the Necessary Provision in time, a Number of Parties are out from Schoharry, Cherry Valley & Connyiharry to make discoveries, I waited on the Comg Officer of the Millitia of Trion County who promised to Reinforce Col. Alden with 200 Millitia & to collect a Body at Connyiharry to Act Occasionally. The Commanding Officer of the Millitia of Albany County  has Ordered a Reinforcement to Schoharry, and Stores are now on the way from Senectaday and this place for Cherry Valley & Schoharry, the Enemys Rout must be within 25 or 30 Miles of Schoharry, so that Col. Butler must undoubtedly get in their Rear, if he does not find himself strong enough to Attack them in Front, have Ordered Col. Vanscaiks Regt to proceed as expeditiously as possible to Connyiharry from whence it is but 12 Miles to Cherry Valley. if the discoveries made before my Return which will be tomorrow warrent it, shall detain them, the more effectually to secure a warm Reception for the Enemy.
Your Excellency will likewise receive enclosed the Coppy of a Letter Received from Fort Edward Respecting the Appearance of an Enemy at or near Crown Point, their Numbers are trifling, and only meant as a Diversion if an Attack from Tioga be intended—Measures are taken to prevent their being Able to effect anything of much Consequence, on the Night of the 2d two men were taken & an House & Barn Burnt, near Johnstown, three of the Perpetrators of this Villany are known.
There are a Serjt and 10 Privates of Col. Aldens Regt at West point if your Excellency thinks proper will be obliged to you to Order them to the Regt. I enclose a Return of the Continental Troops in this Department & am with much Respect Your Excelly most Obedt Humble Servant

  Edwd Hand


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Casimir Pulaski, 10 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Pulaski, Casimir

    Pougkeepsie [N.Y.] 10th Novemr 1778

Your favr of the 6th was delivered to me at Fishkill by Mr Gerard. I am sorry your indisposition deprived me of the pleasure of seeing yourself.
Upon consulting Govr Clinton, of the State of New York, upon a position, in which your Corps can be employed to advantage, and at the same time be plentifully subsisted in the Article of Forage, he advises the Minisink settlement upon Delaware. You will therefore be pleased to march immediately for that place, and take your Station as near Coles Fort as you conveniently can. Let your Cavalry and Infantry be quartered as near together as possible, that you may, in case the Indian Enemy make any attempt upon the settlement, draw your force quickly together. I must beg you to make use of all means to keep your Corps from marauding or in any way distressing the Inhabitants, who will cheerfully contribute every thing to your support if properly demanded. There are two Gentlemen of particular influence in that County Mr Depui and Mr Van Camp, who will assist you very much in procuring Forage and other necessaries. I am &ca.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 10 November 1778
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Near Bedford [N.Y.] Novr 10th 1778

I this moment Recd a letter from Capt. Leavenworth who is from long Island this Morning. he informs me that Sir William Easkin with 350 horse and 300 Infantry is at Jeric[h]o on long Island, he has Turnd the Inhabitance out of dors to Barrack his troops, and is throwing up Works round Doctr Townsends Hous where he him Self Quarters, he tells the people that he is to winter there, but the inhabitance thinks his business there Is only to Forrage. which they have begun very Rapidly. on fryday last Near one thousand Hessions Crossed from York to the Island and are now in Queens County Near Newtown. I have Long since Lost all confidence in this man and dont know what Credit may be given to the Acct I have another person appointed to take his post and have orderd him & his partie up to my Camp this day. Previous to the Rect of his letter. I have not been able to fix the Charge Sufficently Strong against him Respecting his Plundering the inhabitance But Still have Several persons imployd for that Purpose and make no doubt if he is guilty that we Shall be able to find it out.
I send to You a Gentleman Mr Hunt who has been a prisoner with the enemy Near 18 months and made his escape Last Fryday. He is Intelegent and I hope will be able to throw Some light on the enemys Disigns, I believe him to be a man of good Charictor he has a Brother An officer in our Service. the better Sort of people in these parts Speak well of him. I am Your Excellencys Obt Servant

  Chs Scott


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan, 10 November 1778
From: Sullivan, John
To: Washington, George

    My Dear General
    Providence [R.I.] Novemr 10th 1778

I had the honor of Receiving your Excellenceys favors of the 3d & 5th Instant & have Since waited in Expectation of having it in my power to give your Excellencey Some Intelligence of Importance from this Quarter There was an appearance Some time Since of an Evacuation of Rhode Island: about three Days Since I thought it almost Certain; but Some new maneuvres have Since taken place which Renders it at Least Doubtful. The Letter yr Excy did me the Honor to Inclose for the Marquis was Sent to Boston but he having Departed for Head Quarters it was Returned to this town & Delivered to Major Nevill his Aid who was then in this town & I Suppose has Since Delivered it. I have the Honor to Inclose your Excy an Acct of the Loss of the Somersett as also the Demonstration of Byrons Fleet before Boston Harbor agreable to Your Excellenceys Prediction. The Fleet of 108 Sail which Left the Hook the 3d Inst. have not arrived Eleven Sail only have Lately arrived which I Suppose to be the Fleet yr Excy mentioned in your former Letter Joined by Some others Accidentally—There are now thirteen Sail off the Harbor mostly Small vessels which I Suppose to be a wood Fleet. as Count D. Estaing has Sailed Several Days Since it is probable he may fall in with Biron in his Scattered Condition & take advantage of it. yr Excy may Depend upon the most punctual & Early Intelligence from this Quarter. I have the honor to be with the most Lively Sentiments of Esteem your Excellenceys most oblidged & obedt Servt

  Jno. Sullivan


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt, 10 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Van Cortlandt, Philip

    Dear Sir
    Pougkeepsie [N.Y.] 10th Novemr 1778

Since writing to you to move to Minisink I have ordered Count Pulaskis Legion to that place. If therefore you have not marched, you may remain where you are or in such place as you shall judge most convenient upon consulting with Colo. Cantine and the principal inhabitants. If you should have marched, you may return. When you have fixed upon a position, be pleased to inform me of it, that I may know where to address any future orders. I am Dear Sir Yr most obt Servt.


Title: General Orders, 11 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

    Head-Quarters Frederick’s burgh [N.Y.] Wednesday Novr 11th 78.
    Parole Europe—C. Signs Enfield Egra.

Lieutenant Joseph Crocker of Coll Greaton’s Regiment is appointed Pay-Master—Lieutt William Cheney is appointed Adjutant and Lieutt Samuel Mellish is appointed Quarter Master of the same from the 16th of September last.

  At a Division General Court-Martial held in the Pennsylvania line October 28th 1778—by order of General Wayne Lieutt Coll Adam Hubley President, Lieutt Thomas McCoy of the 7th Pennsylvania Regiment was tried for repeated disorderly Conduct unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman and for embezzling the State’s Money, found guilty of a breach of the 21st Article, 14th section of the Articles of War and sentenced to be discharg’d the service—The Court do acquit him of embezzling the States Money, but it appears by an Account render’d by Lieutt McCoy to Lieutt Coll Hay and laid before the Court that he is considerably indebted for publick Monies advanced by the State of Pennsylvania and do therefore order the Accompts to be transmitted with the Proceedings of the Court to Head-Quarters.
The Commander in Chief confirms the sentence; It gives him real Pain and regret that any officers should permit themselves to run into such frivolous, indecent quarrels and disorders.
As Lieutt McCoy appears considerably indebted to the State of Pennsylvania for public Money received by him it is but equitable that if there be any Money due him from the United-States, it should be stopped so far as not to exceed that Debt.
The Pay-Master will therefore attend to this and the Commanding Officer of the Regiment to which he belongs will see that the Money so due to Lieutt McCoy be paid to the State of Pennsylvania.
At a General Court-Martial of the Line Novr 5th 1778—Lieutt Coll Williams President—Lieutt Wolfen of the Marechaussie Light Dragoons was tried for disobedience of orders, cursing and damning the service, striking Serjeant Muller with a Sword and confining him afterwards and for offering to have him punished again without a trial and for being drunk when he committed the same.
The Court are of opinion that Lieutenant Wolfen in striking Serjeant Muller and then confining him without any apparent Provocation was highly blamable and that his conduct thro’out the affair was unbecoming the Character of an Officer and a Gentleman and do sentence him to be reprimanded in General orders.
The General approves the sentence—Lieutt Wolfen’s conduct was highly indiscreet & improper.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 11 November 1778
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Camp [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] Novem. 11 1778

We find ourselves exceedingly distressed for want of Waggoners. Mr Thomson Waggon Master General informs me there are a number of Soldiers now in the Hospital that are incapable of doing the duty of Soldiers any more. Who are about to be discharged from the service. Mr Thomson thinks they may be usefully employed as Waggoners and as they are enlisted during the War it will be a public loss to discharge them. If your Excellency thinks well of the matter I wish all such as have become incapable of doing Soldiers duty and are about to be discharged from the service may be turn’d over to the Waggon department. There they may serve themselves and their Country usefully. I have the honor to be with great respect Your Excellencys obedt humble Sert

  N. Greene Q.M.G.


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 11 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

    sir:
    Head Qrs [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] Novr 11: 1778

On Wednesday afternoon I received a Letter from the Honble Mr Lee & Mr Lovell, of the Committee for foreign affairs, inclosing a plan and sundry Resolutions of Congress for attacking Canada the next Campaign, in conjunction with the forces of his most Christian Majesty; and requesting my observations upon the same, to be transmitted to Congress—and a Copy to be delivered to the Marquiss De la Fayette. Those dispatches, thro the indisposition of the Marquiss, who unfortunately was seised with a fever in his journey from Philadelphia, which still detains him at Fish Kill, were prevented coming to hand till that time—and the great importance and extent of the subject they comprehend, would not permit me the honor of an earlier communication of my sentiments.
I hope Congress will excuse my not complying with that part of the Resolution, which requires me to deliver a Copy of my Observations to the Marquiss, as the manner in which I am obliged to treat this subject, opens such a prospect of our wants and our weaknesses—as in point of policy ought only to be known to ourselves.
  I am always happy to concur in sentiment with Congress—and I view the emancipation of Canada, as an Object very interesting to the future prosperity and tranquility of these States; but I am sorry to say—the plan proposed for the purpose does not appear to me to be eligible, under our present circumstances. I consider it as my

    duty—and what Congress expects from me, to give my reasons for this opinion, with that frankness and candor, which the importance of the subject demands; and in doing this, I am persuaded, I shall not fail to meet with their approbation.
It seems to me impolitic to enter into engagements with the Court of France for carrying on a combined operation of any kind, without a moral certainty of being able to fulfil our part, particularly if the first proposal came from us. If we should not be able to perform them—it would argue either a want of consideration—a defective knowledge of our resources—or something worse than either; which could not fail to produce a degree of distrust and discontent, that might be very injurious to the union. In the present instance should the Scheme proposed be adopted, a failure on our part would certainly occasion in them, a misapplication of a considerable land and naval force, which might be usefully employed elsewhere; and probably their total loss. It is true, if we were at this time to enter into the engagement, we shall be every day better able to judge, whether it will be in our power to accomplish what would be expected from us, and if we should find hereafter, that our Resources will be unequal to the undertaking, we may give notice to the Court of France in season, to prevent the sailing of the Troops and the ill effects, which might attend it. But, besides that a project of this kind could not be embraced by France, without its having an influence on the whole system of operations for the next Campaign, which of course would receive some derangement from it’s being abandonned—a renunciation of this could not fail to give a very unfavourable impression of our foresight and providence—and would serve to weaken the confidence of that Court in our public councils.
  So far from there being a moral certainty of our complying with our engagements—it may, in my opinion, be very safely pronounced, that if the Enemy keep possession of their present posts at New York and Rhode Island—it will be impracticable, either to furnish the men—or the other necessary supplies for prosecuting the plan. They will not attempt to keep those posts with less than ten Thousand men and a considerable Navy. If it should be thought best, for the advantage of carrying on the expeditions intended, to forego any offensive operations against these garrisons—and to leave them in quiet possession of such important places; we shall at least be obliged to provide for the security of the Country against their incursions and depredations, by keeping up a force sufficient to confine them within their own limits. It is natural too to suppose, that the people’s expectations of being protected will grow stronger, in proportion to the diminution of the Enemy’s force, and the greater facility with which it

    can be afforded. They will hardly be content to continue in a state of alarm and insecurity, from a force so inconsiderable, while the principal strength of the States is drawn out in the prosecution of remote Objects. If this reasoning is just, we shall be obliged to have a larger force than the Enemy, posted in different places, to prevent sudden inroads, which they would otherwise be able to make at different points; and the number required cannot be estimated at less than 12 or 15000 men. This will be two thirds as large a force, as we have been able to raise and maintain during the progress of the War—as these calculations, both of the Enemy’s strength and of our own, are meant to designate the number of effective rank and file.
If I rightly understand the plan in consideration, it requires for it’s execution 12,600 Men—rank & file. Besides these, to open passages through a Wilderness for the march of the several bodies of Troops—to provide the means of long and difficult transportations—by land and Water—to establish posts of communication for the security of our Convoys—to build and man Vessels of force—necessary for acquiring a superiority on the Lakes; these and many other purposes, peculiar to these Enterprises, which would be tedious in detail, will demand a much larger proportion of Artificers and persons to be employed in manual and laborious Offices, than are usual in the Ordinary course of military operations. When we add the whole together, the aggregate number of men requisite for the service of the ensuing Campaign, will be little less than double the number heretofore in the field; but to be more certain in the calculation, it may be placed at only one half more.
Experience is the only rule to judge by in the present case. Every expedient has been exhausted in the preceding Campaigns to raise men; and it was found impossible to get together a greater force than we had; though the safety and success of the cause seemed absolutely to require it. The natural and direct inference therefore is, that the resources of the Country were inadequate to a larger supply. I cannot then see that we can hope upon any principle, to be equal to so much greater exertions next year, when the people and the Army appear to grow dayly more tired of the War—and the depreciation of our money continually increasing—and of consequence proving a smaller temptation to induce Men to engage.
  The state of our supplies for transporting and subsisting the troops will stand upon a footing equally bad. We have encountered extreme difficulties in these respects, and have found, that it was full as much as we were competent to, to feed the Army we have already had and enable it to keep the field—and perform the movements required by the contingencies of the service. It is not likely that these difficulties

    will diminish, but on the contrary they will rather multiply, as the value of our currency lessens; and the enormous prices to which provisions have risen and the artificial scarcity created by monopolies, with what we have to fear from the effect of the same spirit, give us no reason to flatter ourselves, that our future prospects can be much better. In this situation of things we are hardly warranted to expect, that we shall have it in our power to satisfy the demands of numbers so much greater, than we have yet had to supply; especially if we consider, that the scene of our operations has hitherto been in the Heart of the Country furnishing our resources—and which of course facilitated the drawing them out; and that we shall then be carrying on the War at an immense distance, in a Country wild and uncultivated—incapable of affording any aid—and great part of it hostile. We cannot in this case depend on temporary or occasional supplies, as we have been accustomed, but must have ample magazines laid up beforehand. The labour and expence in forming these—and transporting the necessary stores of every kind for the use of the Troops, will be increased to a degree that can be more easily conceived than described. The transportation must be a great part of the way through deserts—affording no other forage than herbage; and from this circumstance, our principal subsistence of the flesh kind must be salted, which would not only be an additional expence, in the additional consumption of so scarce and dear an Article as salt, but would greatly increase the difficulty both of providing and transporting. My Letter of the 29th Ulto transmitting a Copy of one from the Quarter-Master General, which I had the honor of addressing to Congress and to which I wish to refer, will point out the difficulties and daily expence attending our supplies of the Article of flour only, in our present circumstances, exclusive of it’s Cost—and lay the foundation for a sort of comparative estimate to be formed, of those that would attend the support of the Troops, when employed at so great a distance.
If in addition to all this, we should have the French fleet to supply during the winter, the likelihood of which I have no sufficient information to ground a judgement upon—it will appear still more impracticable, to furnish the supplies requisite for the extensive operations proposed. But independent of this, the improbability of doing it is, in my apprehension, infinitely too great to justify the undertaking.
  This reasoning is founded on a supposition that the Enemy do not evacuate their present posts at New York and Rhode Island; nor can we presume upon any past appearances so far as to determine the contrary—and enter into a national contract, the fulfilment of which, at any rate in my Judgement, will depend on this event. Opinions on the subject are various and the arguments on both sides cogent—

    circumstances hitherto very indecisive. At Rhode Island, there is nothing that looks like an evacuation, that I have heard of; at New York, the length of time elapsed, since the event has been expected, which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, makes it not a little doubtful and problematical.
But if it were even certain, that the Enemy would shortly leave these States, I should think our ability to carry on the expeditions meditated from the nature of the Country and the remoteness from the source of our supplies, joined to the discouraging state of our fi nances, too precarious to authorise a preconcerted agreement with a foreign power, binding ourselves to the attempt.
On the other hand, if we were certain of doing our part, a co-operation by the French would, in my opinion, be as delicate and precarious an enterprize, as can be imagined. All the reasons which induce France and the United States to wish to wrest Canada and Hallifax from the dominion of England, operate with her, perhaps more forcibly, to use every possible effort for their defence. The loss of them would be a deadly blow to her trade and empire. To hope to find them in a defenseless state, must be founded in a supposition of the total incapacity of Britain, both by land & sea, to afford them protection. I should apprehend, we may run into a dangerous error by estimating her power so low.
  We have been informed, that a strong Garrison has been lately sent to Hallifax amounting by report to about 4000 men. A part of the detachments, which the Enemy are now making from New York are currently said to be, and in all probability are, destined for that place. If they evacuate entirely, a very considerable part of their force will no doubt go there; and, in any case, we may expect, that reinforcements will be thrown from thence into Canada, early in the Spring. The English are now greatly superior to the French by Sea in America; and will from every appearance continue so, unless Spain interpose—an event, which I do not know, we are authorised to count upon. However, as I am destitute of information with respect to the present state of European politics, this is a point upon which I can form but an imperfect judgement. But if it should not take place, I think it infinitely probable, from the maritime situation and advantages of Hallifax, which is represented as the finest port and best naval arsenal in America—from the security it is calculated to give to the general trade and possessions of Britain, both on the Continent and in the West Indies—that it will be a Station for a larger naval force, than the one intended to convoy the french Troops. It will naturally be the principal rendezvous of the British Ships of War in America. If this position be admitted, should the English have any knowledge or even

    suspicion of the designs of the French Court to send a Fleet up the river St Lawrence, nothing will be easier than to intercept this fleet on its way; or to take or destroy it, after it has gotten in.
Nor can we flatter ourselves with keeping this business a secret. Congress perhaps will be surprised to be told, that it is already in more hands than they suspect—and, in the progress of the negociation in France, it will get in many more. The preparations will announce the intention. It is indeed a part of the plan to avow the destination of the French Troops, though this is to be contradicted by the manner of their Cloathing &c. The stationing Troops this winter, as is proposed, particularly on the Mohawk & Connecticut river, would be unequivocal proofs of the design. It must at least excite the strongest suspicions; as to put the English nation upon their guard—and make them take precautions to counteract it.
But if the French troops should arrive before Quebec, I think their success against that strong place, fortified by every advantage of nature and of art, would be extremely doubtful. It is supposed this Capital post will be found in so weak a condition as to make it’s surrender a matter of course, owing to the Enemy’s having previously drained themselves for the defence of Detroit, Niagara—St Johns, Montreal &c. But we cannot depend that this will be the case. They may esteem it the part of prudence rather to sacrafice, or at least to hazard the extremities in order to collect their strength at the Heart. Montreal indeed and the posts essential to it must be defended, because the possession of them would throw too large a part of the Country into our hands. But if reinforcements are sent to Canada early in the spring, a circumstance extremely likely, these may be attended to, without too far weakening the garrison of Quebec; and, as before observed, we cannot build upon their conduct’s being regulated by an ignorance of our plans. The french troops instead of a coup de main would, in this case, be reduced to the necessity of carrying on a blockade.
  I will now take the liberty to turn my attention towards the operations of our own troops. The one against Detroit, I shall at present say nothing about—if well conducted, I should hope that place would fall without very great difficulty. The case is very different with respect to Niagara. This I am informed is one of the strongest fortresses in America; and can only be reduced by regular approaches or by famine. (In accomplishing this last war and a conquest as far as Montreal, I believe, General Amherst exhausted two campaigns, with all the advantages which he derived from the United efforts of Britain & America—with every convenience for water transportation, including plenty of Seamen—and with money that commanded every thing, which either Country could furnish.) The former mode would

    require great perseverance time & labour and an apparatus, which it would be almost impracticable to transport. The latter is practicable—but very difficult—To effect it we must gain a superiority on the lakes—the Enemy have already a respectable force there. If they suspect our design, which they cannot fail to do from the measures to be taken, they may improve the interval in adding to it—and, by providing materials and Artificers upon the spot, they may be able to encrease it—so as to keep pace with us. It is therefore easy to see, that we ought not to be too sanguine in the success of this expedition; and that, if a moderate force be employed in the defence of Niagara, without degarnishing Quebec and the intermediate post—it’s reduction will be a very arduous task.
The body of Troops to penetrate by way of the River St Francis, must meet with great obstacles. They will have a march of about 150 miles from the Co-os—which is about 160 beyond Hartford, a great part of which is through a hitherto uninhabited and tractless Country, with an immense train of Waggons. All the stores and provisions for the whole march—and the future supply of the troops, at least till they should get footing in Canada, must accompany them from the beginning. The impediments & delays in such a march, almost exceed conception. When arrived at the St Lawrence, fresh obstacles probably would present themselves. The presumption is, that if the Enemy could not make head there, they would desolate the Country—through which they were to pass—destroy all the provision and forage—remove every kind of Water craft—and demolish the materials for building Others. These precautions being taken on the Sorrel & St Lawrence, would pretty effectually obstruct our progress—both to Montreal and Cadosoqui, to say nothing of the rapidity of the current—and the numerous rifts between Montreal & Lagalette. When we deliberately consider all the obstacles in the execution; and the difficulties we shall find in preparing the vast magazines required, which have been already enumerated, if within the compass of our Resources—we shall be led to think it not very improbable, that this body may be unable to penetrate Canada, at least in time to co-operate with the French troops—if a cooperation should be necessary. The situation of these troops then would be delicate and dangerous. Exposed to a defeat from the United force of the Enemy; in great danger of having their retreat cut off by a superior naval force in the river—they would have every thing to fear.
  On the other hand, if our operation should be as successful as we may flatter ourselves, a tempest or a British fleet may deprive us of the expected aid; and, at a critical moment, we may find ourselves in the

    bosom of an Enemy’s Country—obliged to combat their whole force, with one inferior—and reduced by a tedious and wasting march. The five thousand men, when they arrived in Canada, would probably little exceed four capable of service—and would be still less, if, out of them, we should establish posts as we advanced to ensure a retreat—and protect escorts of provisions, which must follow for future support. Thus an accident in either case, would involve the defeat of the whole project—and the catastrophe might be attended with the most unhappy consequences to America.
The plan proposed appears to me not only too extensive and beyond our abilities, but too complex. To succeed—it requires such a fortunate coincidence of circumstances, as could hardly be hoped—and cannot be relied on. The departure of the Enemy from these States, without which we cannot furnish the stipulated force or supplies to maintain them, Such a want of power or want of foresight in the Enemy, as will oblige them, to neglect the reinforcement of Hallifax and of Canada and prevent them, however conveniently situated, of disputing the passage of four Ships of the line and four frigates up the River St Lawrence—or attempting their destruction afterwards—Such a combination of favourable incidents, as will enable several bodies, acting separately and independently by Sea and land, and from different countries, to conform to times & periods, so as to ensure a co-operation; These and many other circumstances must conspire, to give success to the Enterprize.
  Congress I am persuaded, had powerful reasons for fixing the convoy at the number they have—and their superior information respecting the affairs of Europe at this juncture, enables them to judge much better than I can pretend to do, of it’s sufficiency. But, from the imperfect view I have of the matter, I have been led in considering the subject, to look upon it as insufficient. From the general tenor of intelligence—the English outnumber the French in the Channel—In America, both on the Continent and in the Islands, they are greatly superior. If the last Toulon fleet is employed in the Mediterranean, the French may have the superiority there; but upon the whole the ballance of naval force seems hitherto to be on the side of the English. If we add to this, that the number of Ships of War in the french ports, built or building, bears no comparison to the number in the English ports; and that Britain, notwithstanding the diminution she has suffered, is still a Kingdom of great maritime resources—we shall be disposed to conclude, that the preponderance is too likely to continue where it is. The interposition of Spain indeed, would make a very interesting change; but her backwardness heretofore seems to be an argument that she is witheld from interfering, by some weighty

    political motives; and how long these may continue to restrain her, is a question I am unqualified to determine.
Besides these general objections to the plan, which have been stated—there appear to me to be some particular ones, which I shall take the liberty to point out.
In the first place, I observe there are to be 5000 Militia employed in the two expeditions against Detroit and Niagara. The drawing into service so large a number composed chiefly of Husbandmen, in addition to what may be found necessary for other exigencies on the Coast, at so interesting a season of the year, will certainly be very injurious to the culture of our Lands, and must tend to add to the deficiency of supplies. But this, though not to be overlooked, is not the principal objection. In the expedition against Detroit, Militia perhaps may answer, as it is not a post of very great strength—and may possibly be abandonned on, or in a little time after the approach of a force, that cannot be opposed in the field—and the garrison proceed to reinforce that of Niagara; but even here, troops of another kind would be far preferable. However the case will be very different with respect to this last. It is, as I have beforementioned, One of the strongest fortresses of America and demands for it’s reduction the very best of Troops. Militia have neither patience—nor perseverance for a siege. This has been demonstrated by all the experience we have had. An attempt to carry on One, which should materially depend on them, would be liable to be frustrated, by their inconstancy, in the most critical moments. Agreable to the plan under consideration 3,500 out of 5,600 are to be Militia.
It is a part of the plan, that the Troops sent against Detroit, whether successful or not, are to form a junction with those at Niagara. It appears to me on the contrary, that the expedition against Detroit under the present arrangement, must stand on it’s own bottom—and have no other object than the reducing that place—and destroying the adjacent indian settlements. Lake Erie is certainly occupied by Two armed Vessels of Sixteen and Eighteen guns—and it is said by five or six Others of smaller size, having two—three or four guns each, which, while the Enemy hold Niagara, will prevent the communication of our Troops by way of the lake, to say nothing of the want of batteaus for transportation. A communication by land, must be performed through an extent of more than 400 miles, and a great part of this at least, under many disadvantages of route—and through tribes of hostile Indians.
  My knowledge of the Country is not sufficiently accurate, to enable me to discover the reasons, which determined Congress to divide the force destined against Niagara—and to appoint the march of one

    body from Ononguaga to that place. It seems to me however, that this disposition might be subject to one great inconvenience—which is, that if each column be not superior to the whole collective force of the Enemy, they risk being beaten separately and successively; besides the trouble and expence of preparing, as it were for two expeditions instead of one—of opening two roads instead of one—and the uncertainty of a co-operation if no disaster should happen to either, at the moment when it might be necessary. The inquiries, I have as yet had it in my power to make, are opposed to the practicability of conveying Cannon in the route from Ononguaga to Niagara—or at least place it as a point infinitely doubtful; and without Cannon—nothing can be effected against that post. Upon the whole, the great matter essential to success against Niagara, is to subdue the Enemy’s force on Lake Erie and Ontario—particularly the latter. This once done and the Garrison by that means cut off from it’s supplies, the fort will be likely to fall an easy prey. Here our efforts should be directed; nor do I at present perceive the purposes to be answered by the body going from Ononguaga, unless the devastation of the intermediate Indian villages be the object—which perhaps might not be equal to the risk—labour and expence; and the more so—as they would fall of course, if we should succeed in the general operation.
The cantonning five Thousand troops this winter on Connecticut river, under our present prospects, will, in my opinion, be impracticable, and, in any case, unadviseable. When I had the honor of writing Congress in september last, on the subject of a winter campaign into Canada, I had been led by General Bayley and other Gentlemen acquainted with the Country, to expect that very considerable magazines of provisions might be laid up, on the upper parts of that river; but it appears on experiment, that their zeal for the expedition had made them much too sanguine in the matter. The purchases fall far, very far, short of what was expected. The difficulties of transportation as represented by the Quarter Masters & Commissaries, supported by facts that speak for themselves, are so great and complicated—that I should have no hope of our being able from remote parts of the Continent, to throw in the quantity requisite for subsisting these troops during the Winter—and, at the same time—of forming the Magazines, which would be necessary to prosecute the expedition in the Spring. We may be endeavouring to form the Magazines; but the Troops cannot be on the spot this Winter; otherwise they will exhaust the provisions, as fast as it can be collected. The same objection applies to the stationing troops on the Mohawk river.
  In estimating our force for the next Campaign—it is to be considered, that upwards of Four thousand of the present army will have

    compleated their term of service, by the last of May next, and, that a great proportion of the remainder will have done the same about the close of the ensuing fall; unless they can be induced to reengage—of which the ill success of our present exertions to inlist those, whose engagements are about to expire, affords but an unfavourable prospect. This and the general temper of the Officers, dissatisfied much with their situation—will suggest a strong argument against the extensive projects in contemplation.
In whatever point of light the subject is placed—our ability to perform our part of the contract—appears to me infinitely too doubtful and precarious—to justify the undertaking. A failure, as I have already observed, would involve consequences too delicate and disagreable to be hazarded. But, at the same time that my Judgement is against this, I am clearly of opinion, that we should attempt every thing that our circumstances will permit; but as the extent of our power must be regulated by many possible events, I would wish to hold ourselves free, to act according to either possibility, and as a clearer view of our future resources shall authorise. If the Enemy entirely leave these States, it will produce a vast change in our affairs and new prospects may open, of which we can at present have but a very imperfect idea. It would be a great step towards raising the value of our money, which would give a new spring to our military operations. We may be able to undertake much more than we can now foresee.
If the Enemy attempt to keep posts in these States—a primary object will be to expel them, if in our power; if not, we must make proper provision to bar their depredations; and must turn our attention to the security of our frontiers, by pursuing such measures, as shall be within the reach of our abilities.
  Though we may not be able to launch into so wide a field as we could wish—something upon a more partial scale may be enterprised. Detroit and Niagara may perhaps be reduced—though Canada may not be an accession to the confederacy. With a view to what is possible, preparations may be going on—and we can make such an application of them, as we shall find practicable. As there is no time to be lost in doing this—I shall give the necessary orders, so far as relate to the article of provision, which indeed has been already done in part. Magazines of forage—materials for boat and ship building—and other articles must also be provided; which will depend on the final arrangements, and more definitive instructions of Congress. These measures will be necessary to be taken, whether the present plan is carried on, or whether something less extensive, depending wholly on ourselves, is substituted in its place. I shall wait the further orders of Congress for the government of my conduct, in delivering the plan

    to the Marquis, as their resolution seems to require; or in transmitting it immediately to Doctor Franklin, as the Letter from the Committee seems to direct. At present I am under some doubt concerning the intention of Congress in this particular. I have the honor to be with the highest respect Yr Excellency’s Most Obedt servt

    Go: Washington

P.S. I shall use every means in my power to obtain intelligence, in the points mentioned in the Resolution of the 26th Ulto, and had taken measures for the purpose, with respect to Canada before. Mr Livingston, an Officer in the Corps of guards will have the honor of presenting these dispatches to your Excellency. Their importance requiring more than a common Messenger, he very obligingly undertook upon application, to give them a safe conveyance.


Title: To George Washington from Gouverneur Morris, 11 November 1778
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Washington, George

    Dr General.
    Philadelphia 11th Novr 1778

  As Congress have delegated to a Committee, of which I have the Honor to be a Member, the Superintendance of the Commissary & Quarter Masters Departments; this, together with our Finances which we have long been cobling at, hath obliged me to consider in a more compleat View the State of our Affairs than my former detached Attention would permit, or indeed than my natural Indolence would have led to unsolicited by Necessity. While I write to you, you must read and interpret with the Eye and the Mind of Friendship, and suppose a greater Modesty of Disposition than the Language may indicate. For tho I by no means beleive myself equal to the smallest of the Objects thrown upon me Yet in Speaking of them I must give a

    loose to my Imagination and my Pen nor can I find either Leizure or Inclination to attend to Style.
  First then it is a Position clear that we must act according to our Powers and not our Inclinations. It is I am afraid as clear that your Army will want Subsistence if kept together. Neither the Quarter Master nor Commissary Departments can in the mercantile Phrase do the needful while you are where you are. I take it the Number of the Enemy and the Season are against active Operations on their Part. Their Situation the Season our natural and political Circumstances are equally against them on our Part. To ravage the Country and to cover it from being ravaged are then the two Objects. The first is base and beyond a certain Degree impracticable. The second is to a certain Degree dangerous and ideal. If it is reduced to a Question for Instance whether the Counties of Bergen and WestChester shall be protected by our Arms or the Losses paid for I am ready to purchase the whole of both in Fee and lay them Waste by Way of saving Money. The like I take it will hold good with Respect to the Environs of Rhode Island. I cannot therefore help being of Opinion that few very few Troops should remain in the Eastern Department. But that many of them if many there be and a Part of your Army should be cantoned along thro the Towns about the Middle of Connecticut River. The Post in the Highlands cannot indeed be neglected and perhaps for the better Support of it another Post may be necessary about Fredericksburgh. To supply them with Provisions &ca will be very difficult and whenever the Frosts shall become severe these Posts will require much fewer Men and therefore it may be good Policy to place those whose Times are near expiring on that Ground. The Sick &ca &ca can perhaps be better and safer kept at Albany than elsewhere and then a Part of your Force will be there to cover them mount the necessary Guards &ca. At Aquaquenonck New Ark and Elizabeth Town advance Parties may be posted to cover the interior Country and Communication. A considerable Body at Morristown will be necessary to secure the Magazines which may there be drawn to a Point from all the Communications and there most properly because perfectly secure and because naturally a good Forage Country. A small Body of Men will be necessary for the Sake of Order &ca at Sussix Court House, Easton Coryells Brunswick Princeton &ca. Amboy will I imagine be too dangerous as by landing at the blazing Star or in very cold Weather on the Meadows between that and Amboy they might be cut off. A Part of the Army might be quarterd at Trenton Bordenton & Burlington and a Part at the Valley Forge. The Waggons of every Kind and Horses should be sent away from those not exposed. The advanced Posts will require a few good Horses but that they should

    have very little Baggage and only light very light Artillery a few good Cavalry also may be requisite for the Videttes. I cannot conceive that any Danger can arise from such Dispersion of the Army and I am confident they can in that Way be much better fed. My principle View is I confess this that almost all the Horses of the Army may travel Southwest perhaps as far as beyond the Potowmack in the two Counties of Frederick and in Washington & Barclay Counties there to be boarded with the Farmers by which Means they will be fit for Use as early as the Season will permit. The Cavalry might be quartered in little Villages and if the Officers are good the Men as well Horses might improve. This Peace and Ease would help recruiting but I have said too much already However as I have disposed of your Army Pray let me now dispose of their General. I think Philadelphia would be a very proper Place for him. In short Sir you must contrive to spend some Time near Congress and I am confident you will do more good by establishing a good Understanding between them and the Army forwarding it’s Business and the like than can easily be conceived. To all this I add that if the general the Quarter Master and the Commissary General are on this Spot all the Arrangments for the next Campaign will be properly made. One Thing more and I have done. It is that I wish most earnestly to see you. Adieu. I am yours

  Gouvr Morris


Title: From George Washington to Richard Peters, 11 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Peters, Richard

    Sir,
    Head Quarters Fredericksburg [N.Y.] Novemr 11th 1778

  I have been honored with yours of the 19th 27th 28th and 29th Ulto. A tolerable supply of Shoes have lately arrived to the issuing Clothier’s Store from the Eastward, Pennsylvania and Jersey, and if the different persons employed in procuring that article will exert

    themselves to keep up the supply, I hope we shall not be much distressed during the Winter, provided we remain quietly in Quarters.
It is much to be wished that Congress would come to a speedy resolution concerning the procuring Cloathing for the Officers at a price in proportion to their pay, more especially as they were led to expect this from a resolve which passed in November 1777. If the Cloathing itself cannot be conveniently procured, I imagine the alternative of allowing an adequate sum of money in lieu thereof would be the next best expedient.
As the Board must undoubtedly have experienced the many difficulties arising from want of a proper arrangement of the Cloathiers department, I hope they will press the Committee who have that business in charge to bring in their report, that the new system may be carried into execution without loss of time. Whether it has been owing to want of conduct in the late officer, or his want of proper powers and directions I will not undertake to determine; but the irregularity in that department has been an endless source of trouble to me, and a great cause of discontent in the Army.
I have given the issuing Cloathier directions to keep an account of the marks and numbers of the Bales of Blankets and of the quality of their contents, from whence you will be able to trace from whom those small ones were purchased. When the issues are compleated you shall have the account. The directions to Mr Mease were very proper. If any Corps want compleating, in any particular article, which is not to be procured here, I will sign the order myself.
In the present scarcity of Hatts, the Caps, of which you have forwarded a pattern, must be used by way of substitute. But an Officer very attentive to the health of his men, informs me that he found an inconvenience from the use of woolen Caps last Winter, instead of Hatts. When the men put them off in the Spring, they, many of them, took violent colds from the sudden transition—They also contribute to keep the Head dirty, than which nothing is more unhealthy.
  I find it impracticable to carry the recommendation of the Board, respecting calling in the old Cloaths upon delivery of the new, into execution; The Soldiers were not to be convinced of the good policy and œconomy intended by the application of the old Cloaths to Hospitals, and the followers of the Army; but looked upon it as an unjustifiable attempt to deprive them of what they had earned by their years service, and what, considering the scanty supply of some kinds of covering, Blankets in particular, would help to make them more comfortable during the Winter. These discontents were communicated to me the moment they arose, by some of the best Officers in the line, which determined me to let the matter drop, more especially as another argument was made use of which was unanswerable, this

    was, that upon a fair settlement there would be found a considerable deficiency of the bounty Cloathing for a year or two past, and that therefore it would be more equitable to make up the deficiency than to draw in the remains. I have the Honor to be Sir Your most Obet Servt

  Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel William Butler, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Butler, William

    Sir
    H.Q. [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 12 Nov. 1778

your letter of the 28th Ulto was duly communicated by Doctor Jones.
The arrangements for the winter being not yet complete your regiment will wait further orders. In the mean time I would be glad to know in what time you think your Regiment and Col. Morgans corps could move to Wyoming: you will also mention the difficulties and the best course for such a march at this season of the year.
In case I find it expedient to remove these two corps to Wyoming—your presence, will be necessary during the march—But When this is over, or if It should not take place I have no objection to complying with your visiting your family. This will be ascertained by the time I have your answer when I shall write you further on this subject.
Lt Dover of your Regt has signified his desire on the 2d instant, to resign you will be pleased to report whether Mr Dover has any accounts with the public unsettled. I am Sir &c.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General Edward Hand, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Hand, Edward

    Sir.
    Head Quarters [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 12th Nov. 1778

I have to acknowlege your letter of the 29th Ulto with its several inclosures.
The two militia companies, who were under General Starks discharge, and which you mention on the cover of your letter to have left you, will necessarily forfeit by this step the state bounty, as appears by its own resolutions of June the 10th 1778.
Cloathing has been already sent on to Aldens—Butlers and Poseys corps—When the other troops are mustered which are still unprovided and exact and accurate returns made out, you will then order officers down for the purpose of procuring them the necessary supplies. The return should correspond with their wants and include both their serviceable and unserviceable articles of cloathing. I am &c.

  G.W.


Title: From George Washington to Major General William Heath, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Heath, William

    Dear Sir
    Head Quarters Fredericksbg [N.Y.] 12th Novr 1778

I have your favs. of the 31st ulto and 2d and 3d instants. As I do not think myself at liberty to grant Genl Hamiltons request without the concurrence of Congress I have transmitted the Copy of his letter to them and have desired their immediate answer, that if they do not chuse to comply, the Flag Vessel may not be unnecessarily detained.
I have sent Officers to meet the troops at Enfeild and to conduct them thro’ the State of Connecticut, proper provision will be made from thence to the place of their destination.


Title: To George Washington from Major General William Heath, 12 November 1778
From: Heath, William
To: Washington, George

    Dear General
    Boston November 12th 1778

On the 8th I received the honor of yours of the 3d Instant and this evening of that of the 6th.
Major General Gates having taken the Command here the Day before the receipt of the former & received instructions similar to those contained in your Excellency’s letter to me, mine were of course superseded.
I had not the least doubt but that Major General Phillips was to march with the Convention Troops to Virginia, neither did I mean to hold up any such Idea. It is true I did not mention his name, in particular until the 30th Ultimo, the Day on which I had the honor to write you, when I wrote General Hamilton respecting him.
After General Phillips’s conduct & the pleasure of Congress expressed to me thereon, I had, & still have, a doubt on my mind, whether, consistant with the honor & dignity of these Sovereign States which have been so grossly insulted, he could with propriety be set at liberty & march with as much freedom as the other Officers, unless some concessions were made by him, and without such concessions I had determined (as I thoug[h]t the honor of my Country required) that he should go on under escort, at least through the District which I had the honor to Command. But Major General Gates having been appointed to the Command of this District, it now remains for him to determine.
The trouble & difficulty which I have had with the troops of Convention since they were placed under my direction are almost inconceiveable: Their numerous applications and equivocations, with my solicitude to preserve inviolate & unsullied the Faith & honor of a rising Empire in a matter so important and delicate as a Convention, & rendered more so by being the first in which its Honor has been pledged, have required such close attention & exercise of mind, almost without ceasation, as have injured my health but this & more is due to my Country, and ready to be offered when She calls.
The Troops marched on monday Tuesday and wednesday last in good order.
The Intelligince which will be communicated by Mr Dodge relative to the present State of Affairs in Canada will at this time be very fortunate. I have the honor to be with the greatest respect Your Excellency’s Most obedient Servant

  W. Heath


Title: To George Washington from James Johnston, 12 November 1778
From: Johnston, James
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Auditors Office [Philadelphia] 12th Novr 1778

The rations as settled by Congress before the 10th June 1777 were rated a 8d. from that to the 31st Decemr at 10d. & the deficiences on those drawn at 4d. Rations were settled by a Board of Genl Officers about the 16: April 1777 but cannot asscertain the Rate, as there are no copy in this Office—Your Hble Servt

  Jas Johnston


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

    Sir
    Head Quarters Fredericksbg [N.Y.] 12h Novemr 1778

Inclosed I have the honor to transmit the Copy of a letter from Brig: General Hamilton to Genl Heath. I did not chuse to grant the request without the concurrence of Congress; tho’ at the same time I think it may be safely done. It will save the trouble and expence of another escort at a future day. I shall be glad of the determination of Congress as speedily as possible as the Flag Vessell bound to Virginia with the Baggage of the Convention troops will perhaps be detained for the answer. I have the honor to be with the greatest Respect Your Excellency’s most obt Servt

  Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Colonel William Malcom, 12 November 1778
From: Malcom, William
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Fort Clinton [N.Y.] Novr 12. 1778

The Weekly return of this Garrison is herewith inclosed.
The Garrison is now so reduced that (altho’ with great reluctance) I am oblidgd to Stop the work on the defences in order to prepare for winter, By having a few hundreds more of men this month, we cou’d have provided Timber, & other materials, and employ’d the Artificers on the Bombprooffs &c. thro’ a great part of the winter—If your Excellencys pleases, I wou’d Wish for leave to come to Head Quarters in order to represent the Condition of the Works.
Col. Baldwin hath call’d off some men who were cutting Timber for Barracks And altho’ he knows nothing of the Matter takes upon him to say “we have enough” he confines his Idea entirely to barracks not considering the almost infinite use we have here for every Kind of materials especially Timber, I wish that your Excellency wou’d order the Company (a Capt. Law,) to Continue Cutting that Article for us, at least 30 m. feet more.
I have the Honor to be with great Respect Your Excellencys most obedient and very Humble Servant

    W. Malcom

The Commissary Sends us no Rum here—I have been oblidged to give a Warrant to purchase a few hogds—and we are now again Almost out of that Capital Article, to fatigue men.


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Daniel Morgan, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Morgan, Daniel

    Sir
    Head Quarters Fredericksbg [N.Y.] 12th Novemr 1778

The inclosed extract of an Act of the State of Virginia for recruiting the Continental Army was transmitted to me a few days ago by His Excellency the Governor.
  The Bounties and other encouragements offered by this Act are so liberal that I hope, if proper exertions are made use of, a number of the old Soldiers and Drafts may be inlisted. You will therefore be pleased to have the terms of the Act communicated to the Officers of your Brigade and by them to the Men—I have some money, belonging to the State of Virginia, in my hands. If any of the Men incline to

    inlist you may assure them of the Bounty at a certain day, and send up to me for the Amount. I have never been made acquainted, notwithstanding the directions in the recruiting instructions, whether any progress has been made in reinlisting the Drafts upon the Bounty of twenty dollars.
Colo. Febiger informs me that the State has sent up a number of Waistcoats, Breeches, Shirts and Blankets to their Agent, to be sold out to the troops at moderate prices. It will be well to deliver out the two latter Articles immediately as the Troops are in great want of them: But as they have just drawn a full supply of Waistcoats and Breeches from the Continent, I would recommend it to you not to permit those belonging to the State to be sold to the Men untill they are really wanted or, if they have already drawn those belonging to the State, that the Bounty Cloaths be reserved till wanted, as they are too apt to dispose of any thing more than what they have in wear, for liquor or for some trifling Consideration. I am Sir Yr most obt Servt

  Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Richard Peters, 12 November 1778
From: Peters, Richard
To: Washington, George

              Letter not found: from Richard Peters, 12 Nov. 1778. On 23 Nov., GW wrote Peters: “I have your favr of the 12th.”


Title: From George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Sullivan, John

    Dear sir.
    Head Quarters Fredericksburg [N.Y.]12th Nvr 1778.

I was duly favoured with your letter of the 4th instant.
The officers of Colonel Henleys Regiment shall not have occasion to complain for their commissions, if you will only direct an accurate return of the names, rank, and dates of their appointments properly authenticated. When I receive this I shall order commissions to be made out, and take the first opportunity to transmit them. But you will take precautions against the insertion of appointments not legally made; admitting those only of the first instance, or of a regular succession confirmed by proper officers. I am Dr Sir your most hble servt

  Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Nathaniel Tracy, 12 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Tracy, Nathaniel

    Sir.
    Head Quarters [Fredericksburg, N.Y.] 12 Novemr 1778.

It was not till the return of Major Gibbs from the Eastward that I discovered how much the cheerfulness of my table was owing to you. The pipe of wine which you sent me, was till then mistaken for a purchase of the commissary but notwithstanding its goodniss there still remained enough to remember the sender. I beg you may accept my thanks. and am Sir your most.


Title: To George Washington from Captain Abraham Whipple, 12 November 1778
From: Whipple, Abraham
To: Washington, George

    Sir—
    Port of Boston Novemr 12 1778

  Having made my passage good, through a Blockaded River, in attempting of which recieved no material damage, except that my Sails and Rigging were considerably cut to pieces, by a Smart Cannonade from the Lark and Juno Frigates, I flatter myself that a concise account

    of my proceedings, will not be disagreable as The only motive which induces me to transmit this to your Excellency, is from that principle of deference and respect which I think myself happy in every Oppertunity to publicly evince.
The severity of our Fire which was returned upon the British Frigates with the greatest spirit, effectually deterred them from putting to Sea After Us; May the 29th after a passage, in which met with nothing remarkable Arrived safe in France, the harbour of Paimbœuf Situate on the river Loire; here I attended the necessary refits of my Ship, and being Acquainted by The Honorable Commissioners of the United American States resident Passy—that there was a Quantity of Arms, Ammunition Cloathing &c., which were desirous to ship for the Continent, determined to take as much on board as possibly Could without impeding the Frigate in Sailing or fighting—which Accordingly did to Amount of Invoice inclosed which I transmit to your Excellency, as perhaps some of the Articles may be of a Nature requisite in your Department—The Honble Commissioners having Ordered the Continental Frigate Boston and Ship of War Ranger, to proceed with me for America I embraced the first favourable Oppertunity after the 25 of July—being then joined by the Boston, to proceed for Brest, and there touch for the Ranger, where did not Arrive till the 14th being wind bound part of the time—in harbour, as well as meeting with contrary winds at Sea—on the 21st of August sailed from the Port of Brest in the Providence with the Boston and Ranger—During the Cruize had the misfortune to make several large Ships at different times directly in the winds eye, which found it impossible to come up with though every effort was made which lay within the Compass of our Power—Entirely unacquainted with the British Naval force in America, I deemed it most prudent to make some port if possible, and gain certain intelligence of the Enemies rendezvous, which effected the 15th of October & having made the harbour of Portsmouth New Hampshire, to the general satisfaction of the Officers and Men whose Union and Harmony during the whole of the Cruize gives me the most sensible pleasure.
The Frigates Providence and Boston are at present in this port refitting for the Seas—the Cloathing &c. is delivered as per Order of the Navy Board—The Military Stores of every kind expect to fall under the direction of Colonel Chevres who superintends that particular Department.
  Not doubting in the least but that the American Navy will yet perform some Capital service to their Country and that the Military and Naval Force of The United states will act in concert to curb the insolence of their Enemies—have the honour to remain with every

    sentiment of the most perfect Esteem Your Excellencys Mot Obedt & very hume servt

  Abraham Whipple


Title: To George Washington from Colonel James Wood, 12 November 1778
From: Wood, James
To: Washington, George

    Sir
    Wmsburg [Va.] 12th Novemr 1778.

  I have been here near three weeks, without being able as yet, to get a final Determination On any part of the Business I Came to Transact. On my Arrival I discovered that the whole Legislative Body were highly Pleased with a thorough Persuasion, that the war was at an end, that the British Troops were embarking, and that there was not the most Distant Probability they wou’d again return to the Continent. On Governor Henry’s laying your Excellencys letter before the House, I was happy to find it effectually roused them from their Lethargy. they Immediately Appointed Mr Mason, Mr Page, Mr Nelson, and Mr Parker, a Committee to Confer with me on the State of the Troops belonging to the Virginia Line. I Informed the Committee of the reduction that had taken Place in the Virginia Regiments, Owing to the great Difficeincy in the Quota Assigned the State, that this Measure had Disgusted a Number of the Officers, who I was Confident wou’d leave the service at the Close of the Campaign; that it wou’d take 2731 rank and file to Complete the Regiments On the Present Establishment, making a Deduction for 800 Draughts, whose

    times of Service expires in February next. that by some Default in the Execution of the Act of Assembly, one half of the Draughts had never Joined the Army, but Still remain in their respective Counties; recommending proper Exertions for Apprehending them, and Obliging them to serve for the time they have been Absent, Agreeable to Law. that Desertion Prevails, particularly Among the Troops raised on the Frontiers, Owing in my Opinion, to that Pernicious measure of sending a Body of men for the Protection of the Settlement On Kentucké, which does not Consist of more than Sixty men, most of whom are Land Jobbers, and Runaways from the Different States, which has Formed a Harbour for Deserters, and every Other Species of Villains; besides, the Idea was ridiculous to think of extending Our Territory, when we Ought to be making Use of every Exertion to Secure what we Already Occupy; that a Number of enlistments have Expired this fall, many of whom might have been reinlisted, had your Excellency been made Acquainted with the additional Bounty allowed by the Assembly, and been furnished with the Necessary Sum to have Answered that Purpose. that reserving a sufficient Tract of Country for the Army, will have a good Effect; but that Opening a Land Office at this time will be a means of many Officers resigning, will make the men Acquainted with the Back Country, Uneasy Under their Confinement, and wou’d in my Opinion Effectually prevent the reinlisting any of those, whose times of Service are near Expiring, that the most Effectual mode for raising a Sufficient number of men to fill up the Regiments, will be to hold Out a Generous Bounty, to Proportion the Number of men to be furnished by each County according to the Number of their Militia, and limit a time by which they shall be raised, in failure of which, an Indiscriminate Draught to take Place; by this means it will Induce every Individual from motives of Interest, to Contribute towards increasing the Bounty, and in Effect to Become recruiting Officers. that Offering large rewards for Apprehending Diserters, and to Oblige them to Serve at least Double the time of their Absence, will be Attended with good Consequences. in all those Propositions the Committee Unanimously Concurred, and reported them to the House, which were Agreed to by a great Majority of the House, and Bills Ordered to be Brought in Agreeable to the resolutions.
  I have Preferred the Officers memorial respecting the Lands which they have been promised by Government; it is still Depending before a Committee, but I have the Pleasure to Inform your Excellency, that I have the Greatest reason to Believe they will be Unanimous in increasing the Proportions of both Officers and men, and that they will reserve a very large and Valuable part of the Back Country for

    their Use; Indeed, I am happy to find they Discover a real Inclination to make the Situation of their Troops in every respect, as Agreeable as Possible. a Great part of the Present Session has been taken up in Considering the Grants made by the Cherokees to Henderson & Company, which they have at Last declared totally Void. Disagreeable as my Present Situation is, I shall Continue here ’till the Bill for recruiting the Regiments Passes, and Other matters respecting the Army are Considered; which I am Afraid will not be long before Christmass, if I am to Judge by their manner of doing Business; what makes my stay so Very Disagreeable is, that my wife is in a Declining and Very Dangerous Situation, and that I had not time to Stay more than two Days with her On my way from Camp; if she shou’d not be recovered On my return, I must beg your Excellency’s Indulgence to Stay some short time with her, if my Absence Can be Dispensed with. I have Discovered the most shameful Neglects in the Executive Department in this state, respecting the Cloathing and other Necessaries furnished by the Assembly for the Virginia Troops; it appears that Cloathing, Liquors, and Other Necessaries, to the Amount of near two Hundred thousand Pounds have been sent On, Addressed to a Mr Hollingsworth a Deputy Quarter Master General at the head of Elk, who from every Information I Can Obtain, has sent a Great Proportion of them, to the Clothier General, and Continental Stores, Instead of forwarding them to the Virginia Agent for the Use of their Troops. I have represented this matter to the Assembly who have Directed a Strict Enquiry to be made, which I hope will be a means of Our being better supplied in Future.
I shall be Exceedingly Happy if my Poor endeavours meet with your Excellency’s Approbation. I have the Honor to be, with the Greatest Respect, Your Excellency’s Very Obt Servt

  James Wood.


Title: General Orders, 13 November 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

    Head-Quarters Frederick’s burgh [N.Y.] Friday Novr 13th 1778.
    ParoleC. Signs

Lieutt Benjamin Lodge and Ensign James Allen of the sixth Pennsylvania Regiment are appointed the first Adjutant and the second Quarter Master to the same from the first day of August last.