Title: Draft of a Constitution, [17 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 17, 1787]

§ 6   A senator when impeached shall continue to exercise his office until conviction

The People of the United States of America do ordain and establish this constitution for the government of themselves and their Posterity.
Article I
§ 1   The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies of men one to be called the Assembly the other the Senate, subject to the negative hereinafter mentioned.
§ 2   The executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter specified, shall be vested in a President of the United States.
§ 3   The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases other wise provided for in this constitution, shall be vested in a court to be called the Supreme Court to consist of not less than six nor more than twelve judges.
Article II
§ 1   The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called representatives, who shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male citizens and inhabitants of the several states comprehended in the Union; all of whom of the age of twenty one years and upwards shall be intitled to an equal vote.
§ 2   But this first Assembly shall be chosen in the mann⟨er⟩ prescribed in the last article and shall consist of one hundred members of whom New Hampshire shall have five Massachusettes thirteen Rhode Island two Connecticut seven New York nine New Jersey six Pensylvania twelve Delaware two Maryland Eight Virginia sixteen North Carolina Eight South Carolina seven Eight Georgia five four.
§ 3   The Legislature shall provide for the further elections of representatives, apportioning them in each state, from time to time, as nearly as may be to the number of persons described in the 4 § of the 7 article, so as that the whole number of representatives shall never be less than One hundred nor m⟨ore⟩ than  hundred. There shall be a census taken for this purpose within three years after the first meeting of the legislature and within every successive period of ten years. The term for which representatives shall be elected shall be determined by the Legislature but shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general election at least once ⟨in three years⟩ ⟨and the⟩ time of service of all the members in each Assembly ⟨shall begin⟩ (except in filling vacancies) shall begin on the same day and shall always end on the same day.
§ 4   Fifty one Forty members shall make a house sufficient to proceed to business; but this number may be increased by the Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a majority of the whole number of representatives.
§ 5   The Assembly shall choose its President and other officers shall judge of the qualifications & elections of its own members, shall punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of Repres: not extending to life or limb and shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment except in the case of the President of the United States; but no impeachment of a member of the senate shall be by less than two thirds of the representatives present.

⟨Qu⟩aere?
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§ 6   Member Representatives may act vote ⟨by proxy⟩ but no representative present shall be proxy ⟨for more⟩ than one who is absent.

§ 7   Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating monies for the support of fleets and armies and for carrying on war and paying the salaries of the officers of government, shall originate in the Assembly; but may be altered and amended by the Senate.
§ 8   The acceptance of an office under the United States shall by a representative shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.
Article III
§ 1   The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen, except in the first instance, by electors elected for that purpose by the pers citizens and inhabitants of the several states comprehended in the Union who shall hold have in their own right or in the right of their wives an estate in land for not less than life, or a term of years, whereof at the time of giving their votes there shall be at least fourteen years unexpired.
§ 2   But the first senate shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last article and shall consist of forty members to be called Senators of whom New Hampshire shall have  Massachusettes  Rhode Island  Connecticut  New York  New Jersey  Pensylvania  Delaware  Maryland  Virginia  North Carolina  South  Carolina  Georgia
§ 3   The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Senators; for which purpose the states respectively, which have more than one senator, shall be divided into convenient districts to which the Senators shall be apportioned EachA state having but one senator shall be itself a district. On the death resignation or removal from office of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election in the district from which he came. Upon each election there shall be not less than six nor more than twelve electors chosen in a district.
§ 4   The number of Senators shall never be less than forty, nor shall any state, if the same shall not hereafter be divided, ever have less than the number allotted to it in the second section of this article; but the legislature may ⟨incr⟩ease the whole number of Senators, in the same proportion to the whole number of representatives as forty is to one hundred, and such increase, beyond the present number, shall be apportioned to the respective states in a ratio to the respective numbers of their representatives.
§ 5   If states shall be divided or if a new arrangement of the limits boundaries of two or more states shall take place, the Legislature shall apportion the number of Senators, (in elections succeeding such division or new arrangement) to which the constituent parts were intitled according to the change of situation having regard to the number of persons described in the 4th § of the 7th. article.
§ 6   The Senators shall hold their places, during good behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. They shall continue to exercise their offices when impeached until a conviction shall take place. Sixteen Senators attending in person shall be sufficient to make a house to transact business; but the legislature may increase this number yet so as never to exceed a majority of the whole number of Senators. The absent Senators may vote by proxy but no senator who is present shall be proxy for more than two who are absent.
§ 7   The Senate shall choose its President and other officers; and shall judge of the qualifications and elections of its members and shall punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of senators; but such punishment shall not extend to life or limb; nor to expulsion. In the absence of their President they may choose a temporary president. The President shall only have a casting vote when the house is equally divided.
§ 8   The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring war and granting pardons for treason. No treaty shall be made without their advice and consent; norwhich shall also be necessary to the appointment of all officers, except such for which a different provision is shall be made, in this constitution.

Article IV
§ 1   The President of the United States of America shall (except in the first instance)be elected in manner following—
The judges of the Supreme Court shall within sixty days after a vacancy shall happen, cause public notice to be given in each state of such vacancy appointing therein three several days for the several purposes following to wit—a day for commencing the election of electors for the purposes hereinafter described specified to be called the first electors with which day shall be not less than forty xxx nor more than sixty days xx after the time day of the publication of the notice in each state—another day for the meeting of the electors not less than thirtyforty nor more than ninety days from the day for commencing their election—another day for the meeting of electors, to be chosen by the first electors, for the purpose hereinafter specified, and to be called the second electors, which day shall be not less than forty xx days nor more than sixty days after the day for the meeting of the first electors.
§ 2   After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there shall be chosen in each state a number of persons, as the first electors in the preceding section mentioned, equal to the whole number of the representatives and senators of such state in the legislature of the United States; which electors shall be chosen by the citizens of such state having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in land, or a clear personal estate of the value of five hundred one thousand Spanish milled dollars of the present standard.

§ 3   These first electors shall meet in their respective states at the time appointed, at one place, and shall proceed to vote by ballot for a President who shall not be one of their own number, unless the legislature upon experiment should hereafter ⟨di⟩rect otherwise. They shall cause atwo lists to be made of the name or names of the person or persons voted for, which they or the major part of them shall sign and certify. They shall also then proceed each to nominate individually and openly in the presence of eachthe others two persons as for second electors and out of the persons who shall have the four highest numbers of nominations they shall afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes choose two who shall be the second electors, to each of whom shall be delivered one of the lists beforementioned. These second electors shall not be any of the persons voted for as President. A copy of the same list signed and certified in like manner shall be transmitted by the first electors to the seat of the government of the United States under a sealed cover directed to the President of the Assembly, which after the meeting of the second electors shall be opened for the Inspection of the two houses of the legislature.

§ 4   These second electors shall meet precisely on at the timeday appointed (and not on another day) at one place. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or if there be no chief Justice, the judge senior in office in such Court, or if there be no one judge senior in office, some other judge of that court by the choice of the rest of the Judges or of a majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall preside at the meeting but shall have no vote. Two thirds of the whole number of the electors shall constitute a be sufficient to execute their meeting for the execution of their trust. At this meeting the lists delivered to the respective electors shall be produced and inspected, and if there be any person who has a majority of the whole number of the votes given by the first electors, he shall be the President of the United States; but if there be no such person, the second electors so met shall proceed to vote, by ballot, for one such of a President out of the persons, named in the lists, who shall have the three highest numbers of the votes of the first electors; and if upon the first or any succeeding ballot on the day of this meeting thereof either of those persons shall a have a majority number of votes equal to a majority of the whole number of second electors chosen, he shall be the President. But if no such choice be made on the day appointed for the meeting either by reason of the non attendance of the second electors or their not agreeing or any other matter the person having the greatest number of votes of the first electors shall be the President.
§ 5   If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some other judge of the Supreme Court should not attend in due time, the second electors shall proceed to the execution of their trust without him.
§ 6   If the judges should neglect to cause the notice required by the first section of this article to be given within the time therein limited, they may nevertheless cause it to be afterwards given; but their neglect, if wilful, is hereby declared to be an offence for which they may be impeached and if convicted they shall be punished as in other cases of conviction on impeachment.
§ 7   The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such further regulations as may be necessary for the more orderly election of the President ei not contravening the provisions herein contained.
§ 8   The President before he shall enter upon the execution of his office shall take an oath or affirmation faithfully to execute his office,the same and to the utmost of his judgment and power to protect the rights of the people and preserve the constitution inviolate, unless altered in the mode specified in the. This oath or affirmation shall be administered by the President of the Senate for the time being in the presence of both houses of the legislature.
§ 9. The two houses of the LegislatureSenate and the Assembly shall always assemble convene in session on the day appointed for the meeting of the second electors and shall continue sitting till a the President be sworn into off take the oath or affirmation of office. He shall hold his office during good behaviour removeable only by conviction by upon an impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor.
§ 10   If the President depart out of the United States without the consent of the Senate and Assembly he shall thereby abdicate his office.
§ 10   The President at the beginning of every meeting of the Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business shall convene them together at the place where the Senate shall sit and shall communicate to them all such matters as may be necessary for their information or as may require their consideration. He may by message during the session communicate all other matters which may appear to him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the public business shall require it convene the Senate and Assembly or either of them and may prorogue them for a time not exceeding forty days at one prorogation; and if they should disagree about their adjourn them may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. He shall have a right to negative all bills resolutions or acts of the two houses of the Legislature about to be passed into laws. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall be the commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States and of the Militia ofwithin the several states and shall have the direction of war when commenced; but he shall not take the actual command in the field of an army, without the consent of the Senate and Assembly. All treaties conventions and agreements with foreign nations shall be made by him, by and with the advice consent of the Senate. He shall have the appointment of the principal or chief officer of each of the departments of war naval affairs finan⟨ce⟩ and foreign affairs; and shall have the nomination, and, by and with the advice consent of the Senate, the appointment of all other officers to be appointed under the authority of the United States except such for whom different provision is made by this constitution and; provided that this shall not be construed to prevented the legislature from appointing, by name, in their laws, persons to special and particular trusts created in such laws, nor shall be construed to prevent principals in offices merely ministerial, from constituting deputies. In the recess of the Senate he may fill vacancies in offices by appointments to continue in force until the end of the next session of the Senate and He shall commission all officers. He shall have power to pardon all offences except treason for which he may grant a reprieves until the opinion of the Senate and Assembly can be had, and with their concurrence may pardon the same.
§ 12 11   He shall receive a fixed compensation for his services to be paid to him at stated times and not to be increased nor diminished during his continuance in office.
§ 12   If he depart out out of the United States without the consent of the Senate and Assembly, He shall thereby abdicate his office.
§ 13   He may be impeached for any crime or misdemeanor by the two houses of the legislature, two thirds of each house concurring, and if convicted shall be removed from office. He may be afterwards tried and punished in the ordinary course of law. His impeachment shall operate as a suspension from office until the determination thereof.
§ 14   The President of the Senate shall be vice President of the United States. On the death, resignation impeachment removal from office  or, absence from the United States, of the President thereof, The Vice President shall exercise all the powers by this constitution vested in the President until another shall be appointed or until he shall return within the United States if his absence was with the consent of the Senate and Assembly.
Article V
§ 1   There shall be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who together with the other judges thereof shall hold their offices during good behaviour removeable only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. Each judge shall have a competent salary to be paid to him at stated times and to not to be diminished during his continuance in office.
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all causes, in which the United States shall be a party, except touching a claim and in all controversies between the United States and a particular state or between two or more states, except, in either case, such as relate to a claim of territory between the United States and one or more states, or between two or more states which shall be determined in the mode prescribed in the VI Article, in all cases affecting foreign ministers consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction in all both as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern the citizens of foreign nations and in all questions between the citizens of different states su and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions ⟨as⟩ are herein contained and to such regulations and restrictions as the Legislature shall provide.
The judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the Legislature shall also hold their places during good behaviour removeable only by on conviction on impeachment for some crime or offencemisdemeanor; and shall have competent salaries to be paid at stated times and not to be diminished during their continuance in office; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the legislature from abolishing such the Courts themselves.
All crimes, except upon impeachment shall be tried by a jury of twelve men and if they ha shall have been committed within any state, shall be tried within such state and all civil causes arising under this constitution of the like kind with those which have been heretofore triable by jury in the respective states except those between the United States and one or more states or between different states shall in like manner be tried by jury in the unless in special cases the Legislature shall think proper to make different provision to which provision the concurrence of two thirds of both houses shall be necessary.
§   Impeachments of the President and V. Pres: of the U S members of the Senate the Governors and Presidents of the several States the principal or chief officers of the departments enumerated in the 10 § of the 4th article ambassadors and other like public ministers, the judges of the Supreme Court, generals and admirals of the navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice or first or senior judge of the superior court of law in each state of whom twelve shall constitute a Court. A majority of the Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried on impeachment by a court to consist of the judges of by the Supreme Court and six senators drawn by lot; a majority of whom may provided that it shall require the assent of six judges to convict.
Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence for which the party accused is to be tried and judgment on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be either of removal from office singly or removal from office and disqualification for holding any future office or place of trust, but no judgment on impeachment shall prevent prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law, provided that no judge concerned in such conviction shall sit as Judge on the second trial. The Legislature may except remove the disabilities incurred by an conviction on impeachment.
Article VI
Trial of Territorial claims All Controversies about the right of territory between the United States and particular one or more states shall be constituted in determined by a Court to be constituted in manner following. The state or states claiming in opposition to the United States as parties shall nominate a number of persons, equal to double the number of the Judges of the Supreme Court for the time being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth by treaty of the states which are parties nor actual inhabitants thereof when nominated and of whom not more than two shall have their actual residence is one state. Out of the persons so nominated the senate shall elect one half who together with the Judges of the Supreme Court and majorityshall form the Court. Two thirds of the whole number present shall decide the Controversy may hear and determine the controversy, ⟨—⟩ by plurality of voices. The states concerned may at their option claim claim a decision by the Supreme Court only. All the members of the Court hereby instituted shall prior to the hearing of the cause take an oath impartially and according to the best of their judgments and consciences to hear and determine the controversy.
Article VII
§ 1   The legislature of the United States shall have power to pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and safety and to the general welfare of the Union: But no bill resolution or act of the Senate and Assembly shall have the force of a law until it shall have received the assent of the President or of the vice president when exercising the powers of the President; for which purpose and if such assent shall not have been given within ten days after such bill shall resolution or other act shall have been presented for that purpose the same shall not be a law. No bill resolution or other act not assented to shall be revived in the same session of the legislature. The mode of signifying such assent shall be by signing the bill act or resolution and returning it so signed to the either house through ⟨—⟩ which it last passed of the legislature.
§ 2   The enacting stile of all laws shall be “Be it enacted by the People of the United States of America.”
§ 3   No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law; nor shall any title of nobility by granted by the United States or by either of them; nor shall any person holding an office or place of trust under the United States without the permission of the legislature accept any present, emolument, office, or title from a foreign prince or state. Nor shall any religious sect or denomination, or religious test for any office or place, be ever established by law.
§ 4   Taxes on lands houses and other real estate and capitation taxes shall be proportioned in each state by the whole number of free persons (except indians not taxed) and by three fifths of all other persons.
§ 5   The two houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer of the United States. Neither house (in the session of both houses) without the consent of the other shall adjourn for more than three days at a time. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat of government which shall be fixed by law. The Senators and representatives in attending going to and coming from the session of their respective houses shall be privileged from arrest except for crimes and breaches of the peace.
§ 6   The laws of the United States and the treaties which have been made under the articles of confederation and which shall be made under this constitution shall be the supreme law of the land and shall be so construed by the Courts of the several states. Any thing to the contrary notwithstanding.
§ 7   The Legislature shall convene at least once in each year s which unless otherwise provided for by law shall be the first monday in December.
§ 8   The members of the two houses of the Legislature shall receive a reasonable compensation for their services to be paid out of the treasury of the United States and ascertained by law. The first D The law for making such provision shall except in the first instance be passed with the concurrence of the first assembly and shall extend to succeeding assemblies; and no succeeding assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision so as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be always a law in existence for making such provision.
Article VIII The Gover
§ 1   The Governor or President of each state shall be appointed under the authority of the United States and shall have a right to negative all laws about to be passed in the state of which he shall be Governor or President subject to such qualifications and regulations as the Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He shall in other respects have the same powers only which the constitution of the state does or shall allow to t its governor or President except as to the appointment of Officers of the Militia.
§ 2   Each governor or President of a state shall hold his office until a successor be actually appointed, unless he die or resign or be removed from office by conviction on impeachment. There shall be no appointment of such governor or President in the recess of the Senate.
The Governors and Presidents of the several states at the time of the ratification of this constitution shall continue in office in the same manner and with the same powers as if they had been appointed pursuant to the first section of this article.
The officers of the Militia in the several states may be appointed under the authority of the U: S; The Legislature thereof⟨—⟩ may authorise the Governors or Presidents of states to make such appointments with such restrictions as they shall think proper.
Article the IX
§ 1   No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a citizen of one of the states or hereafter be born a free citizen of the United States.
§ 2   No person shall be eligible as a senator or Representative unless at the time of his election he be a citizen and inhabitant of the state in which he is chosen; provided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a temporary absence from the state.
§ 3   No person intitled by this constitution to elect or to be elected President of the United States, or a senator or representative in the legislature thereof shall be disqualified but by the conviction of some offence for which the law shall have previously ordained the punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature may by law powers provide that persons holding offices under the United States or either of them shall not be eligible to a place in the Assembly or Senate and shall be during their continuance in office suspended from sitting in the senate.
§ 4   No person having an office or place of trust under the United States shall without permission of the Legislature accept any present emolument office or title from any foreign prince or state.
§ 5   The Citizens of each state shall be intitled to the rights privileges and immunities of citizens in every other state; and full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of another.
§ 6   Fugitives from justice from one state who shall be found in another shall be delivered up⟨on⟩ the application of the state from which they fled.
§ 7   No new state shall be erected within the limits of another or by the junction of two or more states without the concurrent consent of the legislatures of the United States and of the states concerned. The Legislature of the United States may admit new states into the Union.
§ 8   The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guarantee to each state a republican form of government and to protect each state as well against domestic violence as foreign invasion.
§ 9   All treaties contracts and engagements of the United States of America under the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union shall have equal validity under this constitution.
§ 10   No state shall enter into a treaty alliance contract with another not or with a foreign power without the consent of the United States.
§ 11   The members of the Legislature of the United States and of each state and all officers executive and judicial of the one and of the other shall take an office or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States.
§ 12   This constitution may received such alterations and amendments as may be proposed by the Legislature of the United States with the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both houses and ratified by the legislatures of, or by conventions of deputies chosen by the people in, two thirds of the states composing the Union.
Article X
§   This constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of Conventions in the several states w the members whereof shall be chosen ofby the People of such states respectively under the direction of the state their respective legislatures. Each Convention which shall ratify the same shall appoint the first members of Assemb representatives and senators from such state according to the rule prescribed in the  § of the  Article. The representatives so appointed shall continue in office for one year only. When Each convention so ratifying shall give notice thereof to the Congress of the United States to transmitting at the same time a list of the representatives and senators chosen. When the constitution shall have been duly ratified Congress shall give notice of a day and place for the mee⟨ting⟩ of the Senators and representatives from the severall states; and when these or a majority of them shall have assembled according to such notice they shall by join ballot by plurality of votes elect choose a President of the United States; and the Constitution thus organized shall be carried into effect.


Title: Constitution of the United States, 17 September 1787
From:
To:

Philadelphia, September 17, 1787. Not only was Hamilton one of the signers of this document but the names of the states listed before the names of the signers are also in Hamilton’s writing.


Title: Conjectures about the New Constitution, [17–30 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[September 17–30, 1787]
The new constitution has in favour of its success these circumstances—a very great weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity of General Washington—the good will of the commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union—the good will of most men of property in the several states who wish a government of the union able to protect them against domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property; and who are besides anxious for the respectability of the nation—the hopes of the Creditors of the United States that a general government possessing the means of doing it will pay the debt of the Union—a strong belief in the people at large of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the existence of the Union and of the necessity of the union to their safety and prosperity; of course a strong desire of a change and a predisposition to receive well the propositions of the Convention.
Against its success is to be put the dissent of two or three important men in the Convention; who will think their characters pleged to defeat the plan—the influence of many inconsiderable men in possession of considerable offices under the state governments who will fear a diminution of their consequence, power and emolument by the establishment of the general government and who can hope for nothing there—the influence of some considerable men in office possessed of talents and popularity who partly from the same motives and partly from a desire of playing a part in a convulsion for their own aggrandisement will oppose the quiet adoption of the new government—(some considerable men out of office, from motives of ⟨am⟩bition may be disposed to act the same part)—add ⟨to⟩ these causes the disinclination of the people to taxes, and of course to a strong government—the opposition of all men much in debt who will not wish to see a government established one object of which is to restrain the means of cheating Creditors—the democratical jealousy of the people which may be alarmed at the appearance of institutions that may seem calculated to place the power of the community in few hands and to raise a few individuals to stations of great preeminence—and the influence of some foreign powers who from different motives will not wish to see an energetic government established throughout the states.
In this view of the subject it is difficult to form any judgment whether the plan will be adopted or rejected. It must be essentially [a] matter of conjecture. The present appearances and all other circumstances considered the probability seems to be on the side of its adoption.
But the causes operating against its adoption are powerful and there will be nothing astonishing in the Contrary.
If it do not finally obtain, it is probable the discussion of the question will beget such struggles animosities and heats in the community that this circumstance conspiring with the real necessity of an essential change in our present situation will produce civil war. Should this happen, whatever parties prevail it is probable governments very different from the present in their principles will be established. A dismemberment of the Union and monarchies in different portions of it may be expected. It may however happen that no civil war will take place; but several republican confederacies be established between different combinations of the particular states.
A reunion with Great Britain, from universal disgust at a state of commotion, is not impossible, though not much to be feared. The most plausible shape of such a business would be the establishment of a son of the present monarch in the supreme government of this country with a family compact.
If the government be adopted, it is probable general Washington will be the President of the United States. This will insure a wise choice of men to administer the government and a good administration. A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed constitution seems to promise for so great a Country. It may then triumph altogether over the state governments and reduce them to an intire subordination, dividing the larger states into smaller districts. The organs of the general government may also acquire additional strength.
If this should not be the case, in the course of a few years, it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government and the momentum of the larger states in such contests will produce a dissolution of the Union. This after all seems to be the most likely result.
But it is almost arrogance in so complicated a subject, depending so intirely on the incalculable fluctuations of the human passions, to attempt even a conjecture about the event.
It will be Eight or Nine months before any certain judgment can be formed respecting the adoption of the Plan.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Ezekiel Forman, 24 September 1787
From: Forman, Ezekiel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, September 24, 1787. “… I wish to know if the process against Mr. Livingston was served and return made to the … July Term and if any thing more is wanted for the effectual prosecution of that suit. Please to look over the papers I left, and judge, if the accts. stated by the sheriff, and the writing thereon be not sufficient to empower me to carry on a suit.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Samuel Brailsford, 25 September 1787
From: Brailsford, Samuel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Charleston, South Carolina, September 25, 1787. “Mr Mullett lately transmited me Copy of your Letter to him of the 22d July, together with his answer, which I approve, tho’ he was mistaken in saying that the terms on which Wooldridge has been liberated, were all that I required; as there was another matter of great importance that I wished to accomplish previous to that event, & on which I have ⅌ this conveyance wrote Mr Mullett fully, & requested of him to endeavour to obtain it, & if W. should in consequence of his being at large refuse to comply with what he repeatedly proposed to me at the different interviews I had with him in Gaol, & which Mr. M. will explain to you, I must beg Sir, that you will give him your assistance.… Mr Mullett … informed me that you had mentioned to him your having wrote me several times.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Angelica Church, [2 October 1787]
From: Church, Angelica
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[London, October 2, 1787]
You had every right my dear brother to believe that I was very inattentive not to have answered your letter; but I could not relinquish the hopes that you would be tempted to ask the reason of my Silence, which would be a certain means of obtaining the second letter when perhaps had I answered the first, I should have lost all the fine things contained in the Latter. Indeed my dear, Sir if my path was strewed with as many roses, as you have filled your letter with compliments, I should not now lament my absence from America: but even Hope is weary of doing any thing for so assiduous a votary as myself. I have so often prayed at her shrine that I am now no longer heard. Church’s head is full of Politicks, he is so desirous of making once in the British house of Commons, and where I should be happy to see him if he possessed your Eloquence. All the graces you have been pleased to adorn me with, fade before the generous and benevolent action of My Sister in taking the orphan Antle under her protection.
I do not write by this packet to either of my sisters, nor to my father. It is too Meloncholy an employment to day, as church is not here to be my consolation: he is gone to New Market. You will please to say to them for me every thing you think that the most tender and affectionate attachment can dictate. Adieu, my dear brother! be persuaded that these sentiments are not weakened when assiged to you and that I am very sincerely your friend.
AC
Town Place Oct: 2, 1787
Is Kitty Livingston Married?


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [11–15 October 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[October 11–15, 1787]
D Sir,
You probably saw some time since some animadversions on certain expressions of Governor Clinton respecting the Convention. You may have seen a piece signed a Republican, attempting to bring the fact into question and endeavouring to controvert the conclusions drawn from it, if true. My answer you will find in the inclosed. I trouble you with it merely from that anxiety which is natural to every man to have his veracity at least stand in a fair light. The matter seems to be given up by the Governor and the fact with the inferences from it stand against him in full force, and operate as they ought to do.
It is however, of some importance to the party to diminish whatever credit or influence I may possess; and to effect this they stick at nothing. Among many contemptible artifices practiced by them, they have had recourse to an insinuation that I palmed myself upon you and that you dismissed me from your family. This I confess hurts my feelings, and if it obtains credit, will require a contradiction.
You Sir will undoubtedly recollect the manner in which I came into your family and went out of it; and know how destitute of foundation such insinuations are. My confidence in your justice will not permit me to doubt your readiness to put the matter in its true light in your answer to this letter. It cannot be my wish to give any complexion to the affair which might excite the least scruple in you; but I confess it would mortify me to be under the imputation either of having obtruded myself into the family of a General or of having been turned out of it.
The New Constitution is as popular in this City as it is possible for any thing to be—and the prospect thus far is favourable to it throughout the state. But there is no saying what turn things may take when the full flood of official influence is let loose against it. This is to be expected, for though the Governor has not publicly declared himself his particular connections and confidential friends are loud against it.
I remain with perfect esteem   Yr. Excellency’s obed ser
A Hamilton
Mrs Hamilton joins in respectful compliments to Mrs. Washington
General Washington


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de Lafayette, 15 October 1787
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Paris October the 15th 1787
My dear Hamilton
While you Have Been Attending your Most Important Convention, debates were also Going on in france Respecting the Constitutional Rights, and Matters of that kind. Great Reforms are taking place at Court. The Parliaments are Remonstrating, and our provincial Assemblies Begin to pop out. Amidst Many things that were not Much to the purpose, some Good principles Have Been laid out, and altho our Affairs have a proper Arrangement, the Nation will not in the last Be the looser. The prime Minister is a Man of Candour, Honesty, and Abilities. But Now the Rumour of War has us a Going. Not that france is Wishing for it, and great Britain ought to be Satisfied With an Advantageous treaty of Commerce, and the profit of Hers, and Prussia’s treachery in Holland. But while I consider the Madness of the Turks, the Movements of the Imperial Courts, the folly of His prussian Majesty, the late Catastrophe in Holland, and the Cry of England for war, I Hardly think that the peacefull dispositions of this Ministry, and they say [of] Mr Pitt, will Be able to Extinguish a fire that is Catching at Every Comit of Europe.
It would Be Consistent with My Inclination and self views that America Be engaged in an Active Cooperation. But as I Do not think it Consistent with Her interest, I have taken the liberty to Express My ideas in an official letter to Mr jay to whom I refer you. It seems to me that a friendly, Helping Neutrality would Be Useful to france, profitable to the United States, and perfectly safe on the footing of the treaties. Should America Be forced to War, I wish it would Be But for the last Campaign, time enough to Occupy Canada and Newfoundland. But I see no inconvenience in privateering with french letters of Marque.
Inclosed is the journal of a preliminary Assembly in Auvergne. I am returning there as soon as we Have done some Arrangements Respecting American Commerce which will put it on as Good footing in this Kingdom as it is for the Moment possible—the Ministry are Most favourably disposed.

I Hope You will be satisfied with Count de Moustier, and the Countess de Brehan His Sister in law. I Beg leave to introduce Both to You and Mrs Hamilton to whom I offer My Most affectionate Respects. Remember me to the Rest of the family and all friends. My Best Compliments wait on genl Schuyller and the doctor. Adieu, My good friend, the post is going to Brest. I have only time to tell you that I am for Ever
Your Most affectionate friend
Lafayette
There goes a young gentleman in the frigate Named Mr dupont—a son to a man of much merit, who is emploied By Administration in our Commercial Arrangements. I Recommend Him to your Acquaintance and patronage.
Tell Colonel Lee that I depend on you to introduce the passengers to Him and that I shall write fully to Him By the November packet that sails in a fortnight—pray don’t forget it.
The journals they say will go By post. I shall send them By the packet.


Title: [Caesar No. II], [15 October 1787]
From:
To:

[New York, October 15, 1787]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 18 October 1787
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Octr. 18th. 1787.
Dear Sir;
Your favor without date came to my hand by the last Post. It is with unfeigned concern I perceive that a political dispute has arisen between Governor Clinton and yourself. For both of you I have the highest esteem and regard. But as you say it is insinuated by some of your political adversaries, and may obtain credit, “that you palmed yourself upon me, and was dismissed from my family;” and call upon me to do you justice by a recital of the fact. I do therefore, explicitly declare, that both charges are entirely unfounded. With respect to the first, I have no cause to believe that you took a single step to accomplish, or had the most distant ⟨idea⟩ of receiving, an appointment in my ⟨fam⟩ily ’till you were envited thereto. And ⟨with⟩ respect to the second, that your quitting ⟨it was⟩ altogether the effect of your own ⟨choice⟩.
When the situation of this country ⟨calls⟩ loudly for unanimity & vigor, it is to be lamented that Gentlemen of talents and character should disagree in their sentiments for promoting the public weal; but unfortunately, this ever has been, and more than probable, ever will be the case, in the affairs of man.

Having scarcely been from home since my return from Philadelphia, I can give but little information with respect to the general reception of the New Constitution in this State. In Alexandria however, and some of the adjacent Counties, it has been embraced with an enthusiastic warmth of which I had no conception. I expect notwithstanding, violent opposition will be given to it by some characters of weight & influence, in the State.
Mrs. Washington unites with me in best wishes for Mrs. Hamilton and yourself.
I am—Dear Sir   Yr. most obedt. & affecte. Hble. servt.
Go: Washington
Alexr. Hamilton Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher, 26 October 1787
From: Ducher, Gaspard Joseph Amand
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Wilmington, 26. 8bre. 1787Caroline du Nord
Monsieur
je suis arrivé ici apres bien des fatigues et des dangers; je me Repose et j’en ai grand Besoin.
Rappelles vous, je vous prie, que vous m’aves promis Deux pièces Relatives à La nouvelle constitution; je les attends avec Le plus grand empressement et je vous scaurai gré de me faire passer tous les pamphlets qui seront imprimés sur ce sujet.
mes Respects je vous prie à Madame hamilton.
jai l’honneur d’etre avec un Respectueux attachement   Monsieur Votre tres humble et tres obeissant Serviteur
Ducher


Title: Baron von Steuben to George Washington, [26 October 1787]
From: Steuben, Baron von
To: Washington, George

[October 26, 1787]
Sir
I have lately made a fresh application to Congress for a final settlement of my affairs on the ground of a contract made with that honorable body previous to my joining the American army. The particulars and the evidence of that contract are stated in a printed pamphlet a copy of which Mr. Hamilton informs me he has transmitted to your Excellency. I have been just informed that Congress intend making some inquiry of Your Excellency respecting a matter which they suppose will throw light upon the subject. I am glad of this reference, because though I doubt that it will be in your power to elucidate the question of the contract, I have entire confidence in your justice and favourable sentiments towards me as to any collateral point which may arise in the inquiry.
The truth is my situation is peculiarly grievous. The manner in which the compensations, I have received from the public have been dealt out to me, has been such as to prevent their having been of any use to me beyond a momentary supply. I trust I shall not be necessitated to abandon a country to which I am attached by the strongest ties to return to Europe destitute of resources with no consolation for my services but the right of complaining of the unkindness of those to whom they were rendered. Surely it cannot redound to the Credit of America to drive me to so painful an extremity. I am persuaded Your Excellencys feelings will not approve of my experiencing so ill-deserved a lot.
I have the honor to be   With the most perfect respect and esteem Yr. Excellencys   Most Obed & hum servant


Title: Introductory Note: The Federalist, [27 October 1787–28 May 1788]
From:
To:

[New York, October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788]
The Federalist essays have been printed more frequently than any other work of Hamilton. They have, nevertheless, been reprinted in these volumes because no edition of his writings which omitted his most important contribution to political thought could be considered definitive. The essays written by John Jay and James Madison, however, have not been included. They are available in many editions, and they do not, after all, properly belong in the writings of Alexander Hamilton.
The Federalist, addressed to the “People of the State of New-York,” was occasioned by the objections of many New Yorkers to the Constitution which had been proposed on September 17, 1787, by the Philadelphia Convention. During the last week in September and the first weeks of October, 1787, the pages of New York newspapers were filled with articles denouncing the Constitution. The proposed government also had its defenders, but their articles were characterized by somewhat indignant attacks on those who dared oppose the Constitution rather than by reasoned explanations of the advantages of its provisions.
The decision to publish a series of essays defending the Constitution and explaining in detail its provisions was made by Alexander Hamilton. Both the reasons for his decision and the date on which he conceived the project are conjecturable. Having gone to Albany early in October to attend the fall session of the Supreme Court, he was not in New York City during the early weeks of the controversy over the Constitution. He must, nevertheless, have concluded that if it were to be adopted, convincing proof of its merits would have to be placed before the citizens of New York. His decision to write the essays may have been made before he left Albany, for according to tradition he wrote the first number of The Federalist in the cabin of his sloop on the return trip to New York.
At some time before the appearance of the first essay, written under the pseudonym “Publius,” Hamilton sought and found collaborators, for the first essay, published in The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser on October 27, 1787, was followed in four days by an essay by John Jay. Neither Hamilton nor Jay left a record of any plans they might have made, but the third collaborator, James Madison, later wrote that “the undertaking was proposed by Alexander Hamilton to James Madison with a request to join him and Mr. Jay in carrying it into effect. William Duer was also included in the original plan; and wrote two or more papers, which though intelligent and sprightly, were not continued, nor did they make a part of the printed collection.” Hamilton also sought the assistance of Gouverneur Morris, who in 1815 remembered that he had been “warmly pressed by Hamilton to assist in writing the Federalist.”
In reprinting the text of The Federalist the original manuscripts have been approximated as nearly as possible. As the first printing of each essay, despite typographical errors, was presumably closest to the original, the text published in this edition is that which was first printed. The texts of those essays among the first seventy-seven which were written by Hamilton or are of doubtful authorship are taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are taken from the first edition of The Federalist, edited by John and Archibald McLean.
With the exception of the last eight numbers, all the issues of The Federalist were first printed in the newspapers of New York City. The first essay was published on October 27, 1787, in The Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser, edited by John McLean and Company. Subsequent essays appeared in The Independent Journal and in three other New York newspapers: New-York Packet, edited by Samuel and John Loudon; The Daily Advertiser, edited by Francis Childs; and The New-York Journal, and Daily Patriotic Register, edited by Thomas Greenleaf.

The first seven essays, published between October 27 and November 17, 1787, appeared on Saturdays and Wednesdays in The Independent Journal, a semiweekly paper, and a day or two later in both New-York Packet and The Daily Advertiser. At the conclusion of essay 7 the following announcement appeared in The Independent Journal: “In order that the whole subject of these Papers may be as soon as possible laid before the Public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week, on Tuesday in the New-York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.” The intention thus was to publish on Tuesday in New-York Packet, on Wednesday in The Independent Journal, on Thursday in The Daily Advertiser, and on Saturday in The Independent Journal.
The announced plan was not consistently followed. On Thursday, November 22, The Daily Advertiser, according to the proposed schedule, published essay 10, but after its publication no other essay appeared first in that newspaper. To continue the proposed plan of publication—a plan which occasionally was altered by publishing three instead of four essays a week—the third “Publius” essay of the next week appeared on Friday in New-York Packet. After November 30 the essays appeared in the following manner: Tuesday, New-York Packet, Wednesday, The Independent Journal, Friday, New-York Packet, and Saturday, The Independent Journal. The third essay of the week appeared either on Friday in the Packet or on Saturday in The Independent Journal. This pattern of publication was followed through the publication of essay 76 (or essay 77, in the numbering used in this edition of Hamilton’s works) on April 2, 1788. The remaining essays were first printed in the second volume of McLeanThe Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788).’s edition of May 28, 1788, and beginning on June 14 were reprinted, at intervals of several days, first in The Independent Journal and then in New-York Packet.
The first edition, printed by J. and A. McLean and corrected by Hamilton, is the source from which most editions of The Federalist have been taken. On January 1, 1788, McLeanThe Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788)., having observed “the avidity” with which the “Publius” essays had been “sought after by politicians and persons of every description,” announced plans for the publication of “The FEDERALIST, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York, Corrected by the Author, with Additions and Alterations.” The promised volume, including the first thirty-six essays, was published on March 22, 1788. Hamilton was not altogether pleased with the volume, for he stated in the preface that it contained “violations of method and repetitions of ideas which cannot but displease a critical reader.” Despite such imperfections, he hoped that the essays would “promote the cause of truth, and lead to a right judgment of the true interests of the community.” Interested readers were promised a second volume of essays as soon as the editor could prepare them for publication.
“This Day is published,” The Independent Journal advertised on May 28, 1788, “The FEDERALIST, VOLUME SECOND.” This volume contained the remaining essays, including the final eight which had not yet appeared in the newspapers. As in the first volume, there were editorial revisions which probably were made by Hamilton. The final eight essays, which first appeared in this volume were reprinted in The Independent Journal and in New-York Packet between June 14, 1788, and August 16, 1788.
In addition to the McLean edition, during Hamilton’s lifetime there were two French editions and two American editions of The Federalist. The second American edition, printed by John Tiebout in 1799, was not a new printing but a reissue of the remaining copies of the McLean edition with new title pages. The third American edition, published in 1802, not only was a new printing; it also contained revisions presumably approved by Hamilton. It is this, the HopkinsThe Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). edition, which must be taken as Hamilton’s final version of The Federalist.
George F. Hopkins announced his plan for a new edition of The Federalist in the January 13, 1802, issue of New-York Evening Post. “Proposals, By G. F. Hopkins, 118 Pearl Street,” read the advertisement in the Post, “For Publishing by Subscription, in Two handsome Octavo Volumes, THE FEDERALIST, ON THE CONSTITUTION, BY PUBLIUS Written in 1788. TO WHICH IS ADDED, PACIFICUS, ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY. Written in 1793. The whole Revised and Corrected. With new passages and notes.” Hopkins proposed not only to issue a revised text but to give the author of each essay; by naming Hamilton, Madison, and Jay as the authors of The Federalist, he publicly broke the poorly kept secrecy surrounding its authorship. Almost a year passed before Hopkins, on December 8, 1802, offered to the public “in a dress which it is believed will meet with general approbation” the new edition.
Although it is certain that Hamilton did not himself revise the text published in the Hopkins edition, available evidence indicates that he approved the alterations which were made. In 1847 J. C. Hamilton wrote to Hopkins requesting information on the extent to which Hamilton had made or approved the revisions. Hopkins replied that the changes had been made by a “respectable professional gentleman” who, after completing his work, had “put the volumes into the hands of your father, who examined the numerous corrections, most of which he sanctioned, and the work was put to press.” The editor, who was not named by Hopkins, was identified by J. C. Hamilton as John Wells, an eminent New York lawyer. The Hopkins edition, Hamilton’s son emphatically stated, was “revised and corrected by John Wells … and supervised by Hamilton.” Henry B. Dawson in his 1864 edition of The Federalist contested J. C. Hamilton’s conclusion and argued that the changes were made by William Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post, and that they were made without Hamilton’s authorization or approval. According to Dawson, Hopkins declared on two different occasions in later years—once to James A. Hamilton and once to John W. Francis—that Hamilton refused to have any changes made in the essays. Although it is impossible to resolve the contradictory statements on Hamilton’s participation in the revisions included in the 1802 edition of The Federalist, J. C. Hamilton presents the more convincing evidence. He, after all, quoted a statement by HopkinsThe Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802)., while Dawson related only a conversation.
The McLean and Hopkins editions thus constitute Hamilton’s revision of the text of The Federalist. Hamilton made some minor changes in essays written by Jay and Madison—changes which in the McLean edition they presumably authorized. Jay never revised the essays he wrote, and it was not until 1818 that Madison authorized the publication of an edition which included his own corrections of his essays. This edition was published by Jacob Gideon, a printer in Washington, D.C.
It is, then, from the newspapers of the day, the McLean edition of 1788, and the Hopkins edition of 1802 that a definitive text of Hamilton’s contribution to The Federalist must be reconstructed. In the present edition, as stated above, the texts of essays 1–77 have been taken from the newspapers in which they first appeared; the texts of essays 78–85 are from volume two of the McLean edition. All changes which Hamilton later made or approved in the texts of the essays he wrote have been indicated in notes. Thus in essays 1–77 all changes made in the McLean and Hopkins editions in Hamilton’s essays are given. In essays 78–85 all the changes which appeared in the Hopkins edition are noted. The edition in which a revision was made is indicated by a short title, either by the name “McLean” or “Hopkins.” To this rule there are, however, three exceptions: 1. When an obvious typographical error appears in the text taken from the newspaper, it has been corrected without annotation. 2. When in McLean there is a correction of a printer’s error which, if left unchanged, would make the text meaningless or inaccurate, that correction has been incorporated in the text; the word or words in the newspaper for which changes have been substituted are then indicated in the notes. 3. Obvious printer’s errors in punctuation have been corrected; a period at the end of a question, for example, has been changed to a question mark. When a dash is used at the end of a sentence, a period has been substituted.
Because of changes made in the McLean edition, the numbering of certain essays presents an editorial problem. When McLean, with Hamilton’s assistance, published the first edition of The Federalist, it was decided that the essay published in the newspaper as 35 should follow essay 28, presumably because the subject matter of 35 was a continuation of the subject treated in 28. It also was concluded, probably because of its unusual length, that the essay which appeared in the newspapers as essay 31 should be divided and published as two essays. When these changes were made, the original numbering of essays 29–36 was changed in the following way:

Newspaper Number
Number in the McLean Edition

29
30

30
31

31
32 and 33

32
34

33
35

34
36

35
29
Essays 36–78 in the McLean edition thus were one number higher than the number given the corresponding essay in the newspaper.
Because McLean changed the numbers of some of the essays, later editors have questioned whether there were 84 or 85 essays. This is understandable, for there were only 84 essays printed in the newspapers, the essays 32 and 33 by McLean having appeared in the press as a single essay. The last essay printed in The Independent Journal accordingly was numbered 84. The last eight essays published in New-York Packet, on the other hand, were given the numbers used in the second volume of McLean’s edition. The last number of The Federalist printed by New-York Packet in April had been numbered “76”; the following essay, published in June, was numbered “78.” By omitting the number “77,” the editor of New-York Packet, like McLean, numbered the last of the essays “85.”
Later editions of The Federalist, except for that published by Henry B. Dawson, have followed the numbering of the McLean edition. Since no possible purpose would be served and some confusion might result by restoring the newspaper numbering, the essays in the present edition have been given the numbers used by McLean in 1788, and the newspaper number has been placed in brackets.
Almost a century and a half of controversy has centered on the authorship of certain numbers of The Federalist. Similar to most other eighteenth-century newspaper contributors, the authors of The Federalist chose to write anonymously. When The Federalist essays appeared in the press, many New Yorkers probably suspected that Hamilton, if not the sole author of the “Publius” essays, was the major contributor. Friends of Hamilton and Madison, and perhaps those of Jay, certainly knew that this was a joint enterprise and who the authors were. The number of essays written by each author, if only because the question probably never arose, aroused no curiosity. The Federalist, after all, was written for the immediate purpose of persuading the citizens of New York that it was to their interest to adopt the Constitution; certainly not the authors, and probably few readers, realized that the essays which in the winter of 1788 appeared so frequently in the New York press under the signature of “Publius” would become a classic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. In 1802, George F. Hopkins proposed to publish a new edition of The Federalist in which the authors would be identified; but because of Hamilton’s “decided disapprobation” no identification of the authors was made in that edition. It was not until three years after Hamilton’s death that The Port Folio, a Philadelphia weekly, published a list of the authors of the essays, thus opening a controversy which still remains unsettled.
The evidence on the authorship of several of the essays is contradictory because both Hamilton and Madison made, or allegedly made, several lists in which they claimed authorship of the same essays. It is neither necessary nor instructive to discuss the minor discrepancies found in the claims by the two men in their respective lists. The whole problem is simplified by keeping in mind that of the eighty-five essays the authorship of only fifteen is disputed. Despite contrary claims in several of the least credible lists published during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, it has long been accepted that Hamilton wrote essays 1, 6–9, 11–13, 15–17, 21–36, 59–61, and 65–85; that Madison was the author of essays 10, 14, 37–48; and that Jay contributed essays 2–5 and 64. The authorship of only essays 18–20, 49–58, and 62–63 is therefore debatable.
The number of disputed essays can be reduced by examining the reliability of the several Madison and Hamilton lists. There are four reputed Madison lists: 1. An article, signed “Corrector,” which appeared in the National Intelligencer on March 20, 1817, and which, according to the anonymous author, was copied from “a penciled memorandum in the hand of Madison.” 2. A statement of authorship, supposedly endorsed by Madison, made by Richard Rush, a member of Madison’s cabinet, in his copy of The Federalist. 3. An article in the City of Washington Gazette, December 15, 1817, claiming to set forth a list “furnished by Madison himself.” 4. The edition of The Federalist published by Jacob Gideon in 1818, which based its attribution of authorship on Madison’s own “copy of the work which that gentleman had preserved for himself.” There is no evidence that Madison approved the first three lists; the fourth, the Gideon edition, was not only based on Madison’s copy, but it was endorsed by him as correct.
Hamilton’s claims to authorship are more complicated. Despite statements by his partisans, there are only three Hamilton lists that merit the serious attention of the historian who applies any known tests for evaluating historical evidence. They are the so-called “Benson list,” the list allegedly preserved by Hamilton in his own copy of The Federalist, and the “Kent list.”
The Benson list, according to a story first related by William Coleman in March, 1817, was left by Hamilton, shortly before his death, between the pages of a book in the library of his long-time friend, Judge Egbert Benson. Arriving at Benson’s office, Hamilton was told by Robert Benson, Jr., Egbert’s nephew and clerk, that the Judge and Rufus King had gone to Massachusetts for a few days. As Hamilton conversed with the law clerk, he idly handled one of the volumes on the shelves in the office. After Hamilton’s death which occurred two days later, Benson remembered the incident and, looking in the book Hamilton had picked up, he found a scrap of paper, unsigned but in Hamilton’s hand, listing the essays he had written. Judge Benson, according to the traditional account, pasted it on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist but somewhat later, fearing that he might lose such a valuable document, deposited it in the New York Society Library. The memorandum was presumably stolen in 1818.
The existence of the Benson list was corroborated by two witnesses, Robert Benson and William Coleman. Coleman, editor of New-York Evening Post, is the less credible authority; he may have seen the Benson list, but it is significant that he never definitely stated that he did. The most emphatic statement that he made, elicited by the demands for proof made by an antagonist in a newspaper controversy over the authorship of The Federalist, was as follows:
“I, therefore, for the entire satisfaction of the public, now state, that the memorandum referred to is in General Hamilton’s own hand writing, was left by him with his friend judge BENSON, the week before his death, and was, by the latter, deposited in the city library, where it now is, and may be seen, pasted in one of the volumes of The Federalist.”
The statement of Robert Benson, the law clerk to whom Hamilton spoke on the day before his encounter with Burr, is more convincing, but it was made many years after the event, and it is far from being conclusive. “I was then a student in the office,” Benson recalled “and well known to the General” who called and enquired for Judge Benson.
“I replied that he had left the city with Mr. King. The General in his usual manner then went to the book case and took down a book which he opened and soon replaced, and left the office. Some time after the General’s death, a memorandum in his handwriting was found in a volume of Pliny’s letters, I think, which, I believe, was the book he took down, and which memorandum was afterwards wafered by the Judge in the inside cover of the first volume of the Federalist, and where it remained for several years. He subsequently removed it, and, as I understand, gave it to some public library.… The marks of the wafers still remain in the volume, and above them in Judge Benson’s handwriting is, what is presumed, and I believe to be, a copy of the General’s memorandum above referred to.”
The Benson list is suspect, then, because the claim for its authenticity is based on the evidence of two men neither of whom stated that he actually saw it. If there had not already been too much fruitless speculation on Hamilton’s thoughts and intentions, it would be interesting to explain why Hamilton chose such a roundabout method to make certain that future generations would recognize his contribution to such a celebrated book. Perhaps he knew that Robert Benson would search all the volumes in his uncle’s office on the suspicion that Hamilton, however uncharacteristically, had concealed a note on some important subject; or perhaps he thought that Benson frequently read Pliny’s Letters and thus could be sure the note would be found. One can speculate endlessly on the motives for Hamilton’s extraordinary behavior, but the significant fact is that the Benson list is inadequate as historical evidence.
Evidence of the existence of Hamilton’s own copy of The Federalist in which he supposedly listed the essays he wrote comes from a notice which appeared on November 14, 1807, in The Port Folio. “The Executors of the last will of General Hamilton,” the Philadelphia weekly announced, “have deposited in the Publick Library of New-York a copy of ‘The Federalist,’ which belonged to the General in his lifetime, in which he has designated in his own handwriting, the parts of that celebrated work written by himself, as well as those contributed by Mr. JAY and Mr. MADISON.” No one has seen Hamilton’s copy in the last 150 years; whether it existed or what happened to it, if it did exist, cannot now be known.
While the numbers claimed by Hamilton in the Benson list and in his own copy of The Federalist are the same, the list by Chancellor James Kent disagrees in several particulars from the other two. The Kent list, in the Chancellor’s own writing, was found on the inside cover of his copy of The Federalist, now in the Columbia University Libraries. Because of differences in the ink and pen he used, Kent’s statement may be divided into three parts, each of which was written at a different time. In the following copy of Kent’s notes the three parts are indicated by Roman numerals:

  I.
  “I am assured that Numbers 2. 3. 4. 5. & 54 [number ‘6’ was later written over the number ‘5’] were written by John Jay. Numbers 10, 14. 37 to 48 [the number ‘9’ was later written over the number ‘8’] both inclusive & 53 by James Madison Jun. Numbers 18. 19. 20. by Messrs Madison & Hamilton jointly—all the rest by Mr. Hamilton.

  II.
  “(Mr. Hamilton told me that Mr. Madison wrote No. 68 [the number ‘4’ was later written over the number ‘6’] & 69 [the number ‘4’ was later written over the number ‘6’] or from pa. 101 to 112 of Vol 2d)

  III.
  “NB. I showed the above Mem. to General Hamilton in my office in Albany & he said it was correct saving the correction above made—See Hall’s Law Journal Vol 6 p 461.”

The numbers which were written over the numbers Kent first wrote are not in Kent’s writing. However familiar one is with the handwriting of another, it is difficult to determine if a single numeral is in his writing. But despite the impossibility of positive identification, a close comparison of numerals made by Hamilton with the numerals which were added to the Kent list strongly indicates that the changes are in the writing of Hamilton. The Kent list thus becomes the only evidence in Hamilton’s writing which now exists. See also James Kent to William Coleman, May 12, 1817 (ALS, Columbia University Libraries).
Certain reasonable deductions can be made from the evidence presented by Kent’s notes. The ink clearly reveals that the three notes were made at different times. The information in part I of the notes was obtained from someone other than Hamilton, for otherwise Kent would not have written in part II “that Mr. Hamilton told me.” The information in part II must have been given to Kent in a conversation, for it is evident that Kent was not sure that he remembered what Hamilton had said or that Hamilton could remember, without reference to a copy of The Federalist, which essays he had written.

Part III—because it refers to Hamilton as “general” (a rank which he attained in 1798), and because the conversation alluded to took place in Albany—must have been made between 1800, the year in which Hamilton resumed his law practice after completing his duties as inspector general of the Army, and his death in 1804. The third section of Kent’s memorandum also indicates that Hamilton corrected and approved the Kent list. It constitutes, therefore, the most reliable evidence available on Hamilton’s claims of authorship. It should be noted, however, that Kent later doubted the accuracy of Hamilton’s memory, for on the page opposite his memorandum he pasted a copy of the article from the City of Washington Gazette, which stated that Madison had written essays 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37–58, 62–63, and that Jay was the author of essays 2, 3, 4, 5, 64. Underneath this clipping Kent wrote:
“I have no doubt Mr. Jay wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power—He made a Speech on that Subject in the NY Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it. I suspect therefore from internal Ev. the above to be the correct List, & not the one on the opposite page.”
A comparison of the Kent list (for those essays claimed by Hamilton) with the Gideon edition (for those essays claimed by Madison) makes it clear that there is room for doubt only over the authorship of essays 18, 19, 20, 50, 51, 52, 54–58, and 62–63. About three of these—18, 19, and 20—there should be no dispute, for there is a statement by Madison which Hamilton’s claim does not really controvert. On the margin of his copy of The Federalist opposite number 18 Madison wrote:
“The subject matter of this and the two following numbers happened to be taken up by both Mr. H and Mr. M. What had been prepared by Mr. H who had entered more briefly into the subject, was left with Mr. M on its appearing that the latter was engaged in it, with larger materials, and with a view to a more precise delineation; and from the pen of the latter, the several papers went to the Press.”
The problem of determining the authorship of these three essays is merely one of deciding on the comparative contributions of the two men. Although there are several sentences which are very similar to remarks Hamilton recorded in the outline for his speech of June 18, 1787, on the Constitution, most of the material was undoubtedly supplied by Madison who without doubt wrote these essays. Essay 20, for example, is virtually a copy of notes which Madison had taken in preparation for the Constitutional Convention. On the other hand, Hamilton, however slight his contribution, did contribute to these essays. The authorship of 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, and 63 is more difficult to determine, but Madison’s claim as represented by the Gideon edition appears more convincing than Hamilton’s claim as represented by the Kent list.
Internal evidence has proved to be of little assistance in determining the authorship of The Federalist. The ablest studies in this field are those by Edward G. Bourne and J. C. Hamilton. Bourne attributes all disputed essays to Madison; J. C. Hamilton asserts that they were written by his father. Bourne and J. C. Hamilton attempt to prove their respective cases by printing excerpts from the disputed essays parallel to similar, and sometimes identical, passages from other writings by each man. Bourne presents very convincing evidence for Madison’s authorship of numbers 49, 51, 53, 62, 63, and a fair case for Madison having written numbers 50 and 52; his case for 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 is particularly weak as he offers no evidence from Madison’s other writings and relies on the argument that, as essays 48–58 are a group, the author who wrote the earlier essays must also have written the later ones in the group. J. C. Hamilton, on the other hand, produces some evidence that Hamilton wrote essays 55–58, and he offers contrived and unconvincing arguments in support of Hamilton’s authorship of the remaining disputed essays. The significant point, however, is that each man was able to find evidence that his candidate wrote all the disputed essays. The contradictory conclusions of these two men—one of whom studied intensively the previous writings of Madison and the other whose life-long study of his father gave him a knowledge of Hamilton’s writings which never has been excelled—point up the difficulties of deciding this dispute on the basis of internal evidence.
The problems posed by internal evidence are made even more difficult by the fact that both Hamilton and Madison defended the Constitution with similar arguments and by the fact that they both had a remarkably similar prose style. To attempt to find in any of the disputed essays words which either man used and which the other never employed is futile, if only because the enormous amount which each wrote allows the assiduous searcher to discover almost any word in the earlier or subsequent writings of both. The search for parallel statements in the disputed essays and in earlier writings is also an unrewarding enterprise. Madison doubtless did not approve of the ideas expressed in Hamilton’s famous speech on June 18, 1787, to the Convention; but before 1787 both men agreed on the weaknesses of the Confederation and the necessity of a stronger central government. The similarity of their thinking is particularly apparent to one who examines their collaboration when they were both members of the Continental Congress in 1783. Their later political differences prove little about what they wrote in 1787–88.
If one were to rely on internal evidence, it would be impossible to assign all the disputed essays to either Hamilton or Madison. While such evidence indicates that Madison surely wrote numbers 49–54 and probably 62–63, it also suggests that Hamilton wrote 55–58. In this edition of Hamilton’s writings, however, greater weight is given to the claims made by the disputants than to internal evidence. Madison’s claims were maturely considered and emphatically stated; Hamilton, on the other hand, showed little interest in the question, and he died before it had become a matter of acrimonious controversy. But the fact remains that Hamilton’s claims have never been unequivocally refuted, and the possibility remains that he could have written essays 50–52, 54–58, 62–63. As a consequence, these essays have been printed in this edition of Hamilton’s writings. Madison’s adherents may, however, derive some consolation from the fact that in the notes to each of these essays it is stated that Madison’s claims to authorship are superior to those of Hamilton.


Title: The Federalist No. 1, [27 October 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,“Publius”
To:

[New York, October 27, 1787]
To the People of the State of New York.
After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fœderal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from ref[l]ection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the æra in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism to heighten the sollicitude, which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicous estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished, than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the State-establishments—and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views: Candour will oblige us to admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted, that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable, the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation of those, who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right, in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as upon those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more illjudged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at all times, characterised political parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications, that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations, and by the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatised, as the off-spring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An overscrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice; the bait for popularity at the expence of public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their carreer, by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing Demagogues and ending Tyrants.
In the course of the preceeding observations I have had an eye, my Fellow Citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I effect not reserves, which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation, when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not however multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast: My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit, which will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose in a series of papers to discuss the following interesting particulars—The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity—The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union—The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the attainment of this object—The conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican government—Its analogy to your own state constitution—and lastly, The additional security, which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty and to property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavour to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every state, and one, which it may be imagined has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.

   The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the New Constitution.

 This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution, or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [30 October 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[New York, October 30, 1787]
I am much obliged to Your Excellency for the explicit manner in which you contradict the insinuations mentioned in my last letter. The only use I shall make of your answer will be to put it into the hands of a few friends.
The constitution proposed has in this state warm friends and warm enemies. The first impressions every where are in its favour; but the artillery of its opponents makes some impression. The event cannot yet be foreseen. The inclosed is the first number of a series of papers to be written in its defence.
I send you also at the request of the Baron De Steuben a printed pamphlet containing the grounds of an application lately made to Congress. He tells me there is some reference to you, the object of which he does not himself seem clearly to understand—But imagines it may be in your power to be of service to him.
There are public considerations that induce me to be somewhat anxious for his success. He is fortified with materials which in Europe could not fail to establish the belief of the contract he alleges. The documents of service he possesses are of a nature to convey an exalted idea of them. The compensations he has received though considerable, if compared with those which have been received by American officers, will according to European ideas be very scanty in application to a stranger who is acknowleged to have rendered essential services. Our reputation abroad is not at present too high—To dismiss an old soldier empty and hungry, to seek the bounty of those on whose justice he has no claims & to complain of unkind returns and violated engagements will certainly not lend to raise it. I confess too there is something in my feelings which would incline me in this case to go farther than might be strictly necessary rather than drive a man at the Baron’s time of life, who has been a faithful servant, to extremities. And this is unavoidable if he does not succeed in his present attempt.
What he asks would, all calculations made, terminate in this—an allowance of his Five hundred and Eighty guineas a year. He only wishes a recognition of the contract. He knows that until affairs mend no money can be produced. I do not know how far it may be in your power to do him any good; but I shall be mistaken, if the considerations I have mentioned do not appear to Your Excellency to have some weight
I remain with the great respect and esteem   Yr. Excellys Obed serv
A Hamilton
October 30. 1787
His Excellency General Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, [October 1787–March 4, 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

[New York, October, 1787–March 4, 1788]
If Mr. Madison should be disengaged this Evening Mr. Hamilton would be obliged by an opportunity of conversing with him at his lodgings for half an hour. If engaged this Evening he will thank him to say whether tomorrow Evening will suit.
Wednesday