Title: The Federalist Number 19, [8 December] 1787
From: Madison, James,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[8 December 1787]
The examples of antient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century, Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke, and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependents; or to preserve the unity and tranquility of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees, till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century, the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.

Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system, which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire—of making war and peace—contracting alliances—assessing quotas of troops and money—constructing fortresses—regulating coin—admitting new members—and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights, and his possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts, prejudicial to the empire, from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities, by the aulic council and imperial chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them are, his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet—to negative its resolutions—to name ambassadors—to confer dignities and titles—to fill vacant electorates—to found universities—to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire—to receive and apply the public revenues—and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor he possesses no territory within the empire; nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be farther from the reality. The fundamental principle, on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns; that the diet is a representation of sovereigns; and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns; render the empire a nerveless body; incapable of regulating its own members; insecure against external dangers; and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money, disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire was on one side; and Sweden with the other half on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self defence; its situation is still deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions, of sovereign bodies; that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order, and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization; and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully, the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters, and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coertion, from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city, of the circle of Suabia, the abbè de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public occasion, outrages were committed on him, by the people of the city. The consequence was, that the city was put under the ban of the empire; and the duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city, with a corps of ten thousand troops and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory
   Pfeffel, Nouvel abreg. chronol. de l’hist. &c. d’Allemagne, says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expence of the expedition.
; he took possession of it, in his own name; disarmed and punished the inhabitants, and re-annexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked perhaps what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious. The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system, with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; these causes support a feeble and precarious union; whilst the repellent quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighbouring powers would suffer a revolution to take place, which would give to the empire the force and pre-eminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking, be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self government, and self defence, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbours; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury—no common troops even in war—no common coin—no common judicatory, nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position, by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbours, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions; an aid expressly stipulated, and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each chuse four judges out of the neutral cantons who in case of disagreement, chuse an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence; which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated, by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons; and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.
As far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States; it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said in fact to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets; where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence which merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers; of Bern as the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, as the head of the Catholic association, with France.
Publius.


Title: From James Madison to Philip Mazzei, 8 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Mazzei, Philip

8 December 1787. Acknowledged in Mazzei to JM, 4 Feb. 1788. Encourages Mazzei’s hopes for some immediate remittance in his complicated financial dealings with Dohrman.


Title: From James Madison to Horatio Gates, 11 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Gates, Horatio

Dear Sir
New York Decr. 11. 1787.
Your favour of the 26 Ult: was duly handed to me by Majr. Drumgole. However important the object of his errand may have been, it has not been possible to take any step with regard to it. No authority equal to the business exists in the recess of Congress; and the Authority of Congress has been out of existence for some time, and if we are to judge from the present aspect of things, will continue so for some time longer.
There seem to be pretty strong symtoms of approaching war on the other side of the Atlantic. Its flames are actually kindled between the Turks and Russians. If the English & French do not follow the example, the forbearance will be more the effect of inability than of disinclination. The fate of the Dutch Patriots is not yet decided here by any authentic communications, but every report and probability is ominous to their cause. A general war in Europe will open a new scene to this Country: a scene which might be contemplated with pleasure if our humanity could forget the calamities in which it must involve others; and if we were in a condition to maintain the rights and pursue the advantages of Neutrality. I am Dear Sir with the greatest respect and esteem your Obedt. & humble servt
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from George Lee Turberville, 11 December 1787
From: Turberville, George Lee
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Richmond City Decr. 11th. 1787.
Will you excuse an abrupt tresspass upon your leizure which has its rise from a desire to promote the welfare of Virginia & the Union a cause that has so long been the object of your pursuits—& that has already received so many beneficial supports from your attention—& still expects to receive so much future aid from your Counsel, Assiduity & patriotism?
Tis not sir to draw from you—your opinions—but merely to be informed of some parts of the Plan of Government proposed by the convention at Philadelphia—which appear obscure to a Reader that I have ventured to interrupt you, seeing that it is impossible to receive any information in the circle here—but what manifestly bears the Stamp of faction—rancour—or intemperance.
Upon a question of Such importance (on which perhaps it may be my lot to have a Vote) you will therefore excuse me for endeavoring to understand the subject as well as possible to the end that I may be enabled to form cooly & deliberately such an opinion of it as my best abilities—aided by extreme attention—& all the information I can obtain—will admit. Without further apology therefore I will proceed to mention such parts of the plan as appear obscure to me—always premising that it is not my wish to draw from you your own opinions, but only the reasonings thereon—& the objects thereof that weighed with the convention.
The principal objection that the opponents bring forward against this Constitution, is the total want of a Bill of Rights. This they build upon as an essential—and altho’ I am satisfied that an enumeration of those priviledges which are retained—wou’d have left floating in uncertainty a number of non enumerated contingent powers and priviledges—either in the powers granted or in those retained—thereby indisputably trenching upon the powers of the states—& of the Citizens—insomuch as those not specially retained might by just implication have been consider’d as surrender’d. Still it wou’d very much assist me in my determination upon this subject if the sense of the Convention and their opinion upon it cou’d be open’d to me.
Another objection (and that I profess appears very weighty with me) is the want of a Council of State to assist the President. To detail to you the various reasons that lead to this opinion is useless. You have seen them in all the publications almost that pretend to analyze this System—most particularly in Colo. Masons. We have heard from private persons that a system of government was engrossed which had an Executive council—and that the priviledge of importing slaves (another great evil) was not mention’d in it—but that a Coalition took place between the members of the small States & those of the southern States & they barter’d the Council for the Priviledge—and the present plan thus defective—owes it origin to this Junction. If this was the case it takes greatly off from the confidence that I ever conceived to be due to this Convention. Such conduct wou’d appear rather like the attempt of a party to carry an interested measure in a state legislature than the production of the United Wisdom—Virtue—& Uprightness of America called together to deliberate upon a form of Government that will affect themselves & their latest Posterity.
The operation of the Judiciary is a matter so far beyond the reach of most of our fellow Citizens that we are bounden to receive—& not to originate our opinions upon this branch of the Federal government. Lawyers alone conceive themselves masters of this subject & they hold it forth to us danger & distress as the inevitable result of the new system—& that this will proceed from the immense power of the general Judiciary which will pervade the states from one extremity to the other & will finally absorb & destroy the state Court[s.] But to me their power seem’s very fairly defined by the clauses that constitute them—& the mention of Juries, in criminal cases—seeming therefor by implication in civil cases not to be allowed is the only objection I have to this Branch.
Why shou’d the United States in Congress Assembled be enabled to fix on the places of choosing the Representatives?
Why shou’d the Laws of the Union operate agt. & supercede the state Constitutions?
Wou’d not an uniform duty—impost—or excise of £5. pr. hhd on Tobo. exported—throughout the United States—operate upon the Tobo. States alone? & have not the U.S. the power of levying this impost?
Why shou’d the states be prevented from raising a Revenue by Duties or Taxes on their own Exports? Are the states not bound down to direct Taxation for the support of their police & government?
Why was not that truely republican mode of forcing the Rulers or Sovereigns of the States to mix after stated Periods with the people again observed as is the case with the present members of Congress—Governors of this state &c &c?
For what Reason—or to an[s]wer what republican Veiw is it, that the way is left open for the importation of Negro slaves for twenty one Yrs.?
May not the powers of the Congress from the clause which enables them to pass all Laws necessary to carry this system into effect—& that clause also which declares their Laws to be paramount to the Constitutions of the states—be so operated upon as to annihilate the State Governments?
If the Laws of the United States are to be superior to the Laws & Constitutions of the several States, why was not a Bill of Rights affixed to this Constitution by which the Liberties of individuals might have been secured against the abuse of Fœderal Power?
If Treaties are to be the Laws of the Land and to supercede all laws and Constitutions of the States—why is the Ratification of them left to the senate & President—and not to the house of Representatives also?

These queries if satisfactorily answer’d will defeat all the attempts of the opposition—many of them I can readily answer to satisfy myself—but I still doubt whether my fondness for the new government may not make me as improper a Judge in its favor, as the rage of the opposition renders those who are under its influence inadequate to decide even agt. it.
You will I hope my good sir excuse this scrawl which is scarcely legible it has been written by peice meals—& as I cou’d snatch an opportunity from the hurry of business—& from the noise & clamour of the disputants at the house in which I lodge. The Mail is just going out and I have not time to add the detail of State politics—but as I have written on the subject of the federal Constitution—I will Just detain you for a moment on the present Situation of it in this state.
The people in the Country generally for it—the doctrine of amendments exploded by them—the Assembly I fear agt. it—Mr. Henry—Mr. Harrison—Mr. Smith—All the Cabells & Colo. Mason—agt., or at least favorer’s of the Amendatory system—& notwithstanding our Resolutions of the 25th. of October I fear we shall still pass some measure that may have an influence unwarrantable & derogatory. Mr. Henry has declared his intention (and perhaps this day may see his plan effectuated) of bringing in a bill for the purpose of promoting a second Convention at Philadelphia to consider amendments—& that the Speakers of the two houses shou’d form a Committee of Correspondence to communicate with our sister States on that Subject. You know the force of this wonderful mans oratory upon a Virginia house of Delegates—& I am sure will with me lament that that force shou’d be ever erroneously or injudiciously directed.
Much I hope sir that we shall have the assistance of your Counsel in the Convention. My best regards to Mr. Carrington—Mr. Griffin & Mr. Brown if they have arrived—& beleive me dear sir to remain with regard & respect Yr. Most Affectionate humble servant
George Lee Turberville


Title: The Federalist Number 20, [11 December] 1787
From: Madison, James,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[11 December 1787]
The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies, of a very remarkable texture; yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven co-equal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases not only the provinces, but the cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the union is represented by the states general, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three and one years. From two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The states general have authority to enter into treaties and alliances—to make war and peace—to raise armies and equip fleets—to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors—to execute treaties and alliances already formed—to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports—to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights—to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties—from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbours with higher duties than their own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now a hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from his independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union, in which provincial quality, he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals; and has throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has however considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail—to assist at the deliberations of the states general, and at their particular conferences—to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity, he commands the federal troops—provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs—disposes of all appointments from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity, he is admiral general, and superintends and directs every thing relative to naval forces, and other naval affairs—presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy—appoints lieutenant admirals and other officers—and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to 300,000 florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about 40,000 men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stampt upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria, kept them from being ruined by the vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an authority in the states general seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the theory.
The same instrument says another, obliges each province to levy certain contributions; but this article never could and probably never will be executed; because the inland provinces who have little commerce cannot pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to wave the articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland, enable her to effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened that the deficiencies have been ultimately to be collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confederacy, where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest; and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance: But utterly impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defence.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the states general are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by which their independence was formally and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great-Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has been supposed, that without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy, would long ago have dissolved it. “Under such a government,” says the abbé Mably, “the union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder.” It is remarked by Sir William Temple, “that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland by her riches and her authority which drew the others into a sort of dependence, supplied the place.”
These are not the only circumstances which have controuled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time, that they nourish by their intrigues, the constitutional vices, which keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices and have made no less than four regular experiments, by extraordinary assemblies, convened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy: As many times, has their laudable zeal found it impossible to unite the public councils in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause my fellow citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions; let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries and failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissentions among the states and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government, as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquility, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings, will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is, that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals; as it is a solecism in theory; so in practice, it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coertion of the sword, in place of the mild and salutary coertion of the magistracy.
Publius.


Title: From James Madison to Archibald Stuart, 14 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Stuart, Archibald

Dear Sir
N. York Decr. 14th. 1787.
I was yesterday favored with yours of the 2d. inst: and am particularly obliged by the accuracy and fulness of its communications. The mutability of the Legislature on great points has been too frequently exemplified within my own observation, for any fresh instance of it to produce much surprize. The only surprize I feel at the last Steps taken with regard to the New Constitution, is that it does not strike the well meaning adversaries themselves with the necessity of some anchor for the fluctuations which threaten shipwreck to our liberty. I am persuaded that the scheme of amendments is pursued by some of its patrons at least, with the most patriotic & virtuous intentions. But I am equally persuaded that it is pregnant with consequences which they fail to bring into view. The vote of Virga. on that subject, will either dismember the Union, or reduce her to a dilemma as mortifying to her pride, as it will be injurious to her foresight. I verily believe that if the patrons of this scheme, were to enter into an explicit & particular communication with each other, they wd find themselves as much at variance in detail as they are agreed in the general plan of amendments. Or if they could agree at all it would be only on a few points of very little substance, and which would not comprehend the objections of most weight in other States. It is impossible indeed to trace the progress and tendency of this fond experiment without perceiving difficulty and danger in every Stage of it.
We have received neither confirmation nor contradiction of the Reports concerning war between G. B. and France. The Dutch are prostrate before the prussian arms. The follies and misfortunes on the other side of the Atlantic ought to be lessons of wisdom to this side. I fear we shall not derive from them the profit of any sort, which they are calculated to afford us.
We have no Congs as yet; nor any increase of the materials for one. If one were formed, it would only perhaps make the nakedness of the federal situation more conspicuous. The contributions to the Treasury are every where failing. Massts. I am told has lately taken some resolution which effectually diverts the stream to some of her internal purposes.
I perceive by the Newspapers that Delaware has decided unanimously in favor of the new Constitution. Penna. has not yet decided. No delay however will diminish the great majority which are on the affirmative Side. The Convention of New Jersey, is meeting or actually met. The vote there will be nearly if not quite unanimous. That of Connecticut will succeed, and will pretty certainly make four ninths of the requisite number. The same cause which has instituted & countenanced the opposition in Virga. excites it in Massts. In one respect there is a remarkable difference. In Virginia we see men equally respectable in every point of character & marshalled in opposition to each other. In Massts. almost all the intelligent & considerable people are on the side of the new Government. The Governor & the late Govr. though rivals & enemies, the Judges and the Bar—the men of letters—the Clergy and all the other learned professions, with that part of the Society which has the greatest interest in Good Government, are with but few exceptions in favor of the plan as it stands. The weight of this description of friends, seems to countenance the assurance which that side professes, of success. I am Dear Sir Yr. friend & servt
Js. Madison Jr
I think I have recd. the letter which you suppose had miscarried.


Title: To James Madison from Hardin Burnley, 15 December 1787
From: Burnley, Hardin
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sir
Richmond Decr. the 15th. 1787
The Assembly have proceeded with so much tardiness that notwithstanding the length of time we have been convened our Journals furnish but little which would merit your attention. We have been more engaged in rejecting than in adopting the various political projects which have been proposed. The instalment plan was at first received with much seeming approbation. But ever since its first introduction its decline has been gradual & its death has at length become certain.
The scheme at present proposed to be substituted in its place is to this effect. When an execution is levied the property must be sold if it will command three fourths of its value, if not the Debtor will be suffered to replevy his property on giving bond & security for the Debt & Costs payable in twelve Months, if neither of these take place the property is to be sold at twelve months credit; in either of which Cases the bonds so taken will have the force of Judgments on which no appeal or replevy will be allowed. A Bill for the establishment of district Courts is now before the house. These two bills are intended as a kind of barter between the Creditor & Debtor & are to be so mutually dependant on each other that the fate of the one will determine that of the other. A Collection of pieces on the federal Constitution is just published by Davis one of which I should have inclosed you but am informed that Colo. Barbour has already done it. Another Collection is now on foot by Mr. Dixon. This I shall bring to Orange with me & shall be submitted to your perusal. It is [at] present expected that one half the tax on young Negroes & white tytheables will be taken off. Nothing will be done by this assembly which will injure the credit of public securities. With the highest esteem for yourself & family I remain Dr. Sir yr. Most Obt. Servt.
Hardin Burnley


Title: To James Madison from Lawrence Taliaferro, 16 December 1787
From: Taliaferro, Lawrence
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
Rose Hill Decemr: the 16th 1787
I recd: your vary Frendly Letter from New york sumtime ago & Am Much Oblige to you for the Information you gave Me of My Nephu John Taliaferro at Princetown. I am sorry to inform you that the Federal Sistum is rufly Handeld by sum vary Able Men in this State tho. we have sum vary good & Able Men that are Frends to that & thear Cuntary & Wish it to be Adopted as spedily as Posable. I am inform’d that that Exilent good Man Genl: Washington has Offer’d himself for the Spring convention & it is the sincere Wish & desier of Myself & a Grate Many others that you will Also represent the Peopel of this County in the Spring Convention & we Earnestly Beg that you will be hear sum time before the Elextion for even those that are Oppos’d to the Federal Sistum wish to have an Opportunity of conversing with you on it. I dare say you will be gratly suppd: to hear that it is report’d that you Are Opos’d to the Sistum & I was told the other day that you ware Actually writing a Pece against it. I am a vary pore Penman & dont wish to take up two Much of you time in reding a Long Letter or I could give you a grat many More Instances of the Rancor of the Enemes to Peac & Good Goverment & will only repet our ernest desier that you will be hear a Week or two before the Elextion by which Menes I make n[o] doubt but the Citicens of this state wi[ll] be prevented from being led into an Err[or] by a few Men that seme vary ernest in doing it. Am Dr Sir with the Gratest Esteme your Most Obt: Huml: Set
Lawe: Taliaferro


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 18 December 1787
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr Sr.
Richmond 18th. Decr. 1787.
Mr. Lambert has executed Col. Thompsons survey of James River excepting that part of it that comprehends the Canal—for a sketch of this part he depends on Mr. Harris the Manager of the Work who has not yet been pleased to furnish it. I shall if the day is fair ride there Tomorow myself and prevail on Harris to give me a sketch of it that Mr. Lambert may compleat the business which I think he has executed exceeding well. Col. R. Goode had promised me to endeavour to procure as many wild crab-tree scions as you wrote for but having heard nothing from him since I made the request, Anthony has gone over to try what he can do about them. I fear if they shall be procured an opportunity will not offer that can convey them by the time you proposed.

The Legislature have proceeded so slowly in the public business, and have even now concluded so few things of consequence that they are scarce worth mentioning. The Delegates will pass the district bill, and it is probable the Senate will do the same but of this there is some doubt—this measure would not have succeeded but for its being accompanied with another bill called a bill for amending the Execution law, which it is said is calculated to give some relief to Debtors, without any direct interference with private contracts. The principal object of this bill is to appoint Comrs. to act on oath to determine, instead of the Sheriff, whether the property offered to sale under executions goes at three forths the value. If they think it does not, the sale may be postponed on bond and security being given to pay in twelve month—which, at the end of the Term, shall be carryed in to a Judt. on motion and no further delay obtained if the money is not punctually paid. It is proposed these bills shall go together and commence the first of June next. The revenue bills is to be considered by a Committee this day. A short law has passed making some appropriations for a sinking fund the produce to be applied by the Executive to purchasing public securities carrying int. The revenue bill at present makes further provision for this fund but how it will terminate depends on the pleasure of the two Houses. A new naval office bill is before a Committee, but not yet reported. We are told you mean to come in and give us your assistance in the Convention. I hope you will do so. Publius is variously ascribed to M—d—n, H—lt—n, J—y. It is certainly among the first publications on the subject of the N. Constitution of Government. What has been done by the [states] on the business and when do their Conventions assemble. I am Dr Sr


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 20 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
New York Decr. 20. 1787.
I was favoured on Saturday with your letter of the 7th. instant, along with which was covered the printed letter of Col. R. H. Lee to the Governour. It does not appear to me to be a very formidable attack on the new Constitution; unless it should derive an influence from the names of the correspondents, which its intrinsic merits do not entitle it to. He is certainly not perfectly accurate in the statement of all his facts; and I should infer from the tenor of the objections in Virginia that his plan of an Executive would hardly be viewed as an amendment of that of the Convention. It is a little singular that three of the most distinguished Advocates for amendments; and who expect to unite the thirteen States in their project, appear to be pointedly at variance with each other on one of the capital articles of the System. Col. Lee proposes that the President should chuse a Council of Eleven and with their advice have the absolute appointment of all Officers. Col: Mason’s proposition is that a Council of six should be appointed by the Congress. What degree of power he would confide to it I do not know. The idea of the Governour is that there should be a plurality of co-equal heads, distinguished probably by other peculiarities in the organization. It is pretty certain that some others who make a common cause with them in the general attempt to bring about alterations differ still more from them, than they do from each other; and that they themselves differ as much on some other great points as on the Constitution of the Executive.
You did not judge amiss of Mr Jay. The paragraph affirming a change in His opinion of the plan of the Convention, was an arrant forgery. He has contradicted it in a letter to Mr. J. Vaughan which has been printed in the Philadelphia Gazettes. Tricks of this sort are not uncommon with the Enemies of the new Constitution. Col. Mason’s objections were as I am told published in Boston mutilated of that which pointed at the regulation of Commerce. Docr. Franklin’s concluding speech which you will meet with in one of the papers herewith inclosed, is both mutilated & adulterated so as to change both the form & the spirit of it.
I am extremely obliged by the notice you take of my request concerning the Potowmack. I must insist that you will not consider it as an object of any further attention.
The Philada. papers will have informed you of the result of the Convention of that State. N. Jersey is now in Convention, & has probably by this time adopted the Constitution. Genl. Irvine of the Pena. Delegation who is just arrived here, and who conversed with some of the members at Trenton tells me that great unanimity reigns in the Convention.
Connecticut it is pretty certain will decide also in the Affirmative by a large majority. So it is presumed will N. Hampshire; though her Convention will be a little later than could be wished. There are not enough of the returns in Massts. known for a final judgment of the probable event in that State. As far as the returns are known they are extremely favorable; but as they are cheifly from the maritime parts of the State, they are a precarious index of the public sentiment. I have good reason to believe that if you are in correspondence with any Gentlemen in that quarter, and a proper occasion offered for an explicit communication of your good wishes for the plan, so as barely to warrant an explicit assertion of the fact, that it would be attended with valuable effects. I barely drop the idea. The circumstances on which the propriety of it depends, are best known to, as they will be best judged of by yourself. The information from N. Carolina gave me great pleasure. We hear nothing from the States South of it. With the most perfect esteem & regard I am Dear Sir Your Affecte. friend & Obedt. servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 20 December 1787
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris Dec. 20. 1787.
My last to you was of Oct. 8. by the Count de Moustier. Yours of July 18. Sep. 6. & Oct. 24. have been successively received, yesterday, the day before & three or four days before that. I have only had time to read the letters, the printed papers communicated with them, however interesting, being obliged to lie over till I finish my dispatches for the packet, which dispatches must go from hence the day after tomorrow. I have much to thank you for. First and most for the cyphered paragraph respecting myself. These little informations are very material towards forming my own decisions. I would be glad even to know when any individual member thinks I have gone wrong in any instance. If I know myself it would not excite ill blood in me, while it would assist to guide my conduct, perhaps to justify it, and to keep me to my duty, alert. I must thank you too for the information in Thos. Burke’s case, tho’ you will have found by a subsequent letter that I have asked of you a further investigation of that matter. It is to gratify the lady who is at the head of the Convent wherein my daughters are, & who, by her attachment & attention to them, lays me under great obligations. I shall hope therefore still to receive from you the result of the further enquiries my second letter had asked. The parcel of rice which you informed me had miscarried accompanied my letter to the Delegates of S. Carolina. Mr. Bourgoin was to be the bearer of both and both were delivered together into the hands of his relation here who introduced him to me, and who at a subsequent moment undertook to convey them to Mr. Bourgoin. This person was an engraver particularly recommended to Dr. Franklin & mr. Hopkinson. Perhaps he may have mislaid the little parcel of rice among his baggage. I am much pleased that the sale of Western lands is so succesful. I hope they will absorb all the Certificates of our Domestic debt speedily in the first place, and that then offered for cash they will do the same by our foreign one.
The season admitting only of operations in the Cabinet, and these being in a great measure secret, I have little to fill a letter. I will therefore make up the deficiency by adding a few words on the Constitution proposed by our Convention. I like much the general idea of framing a government which should go on of itself peaceably, without needing continual recurrence to the state legislatures. I like the organization of the government into Legislative, Judiciary & Executive. I like the power given the Legislature to levy taxes, and for that reason solely approve of the greater house being chosen by the people directly. For tho’ I think a house chosen by them will be very illy qualified to legislate for the Union, for foreign nations &c. yet this evil does not weigh against the good of preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves. I am captivated by the compromise of the opposite claims of the great & little states, of the latter to equal, and the former to proportional influence. I am much pleased too with the substitution of the method of voting by persons, instead of that of voting by states: and I like the negative given to the Executive with a third of either house, though I should have liked it better had the Judiciary been associated for that purpose, or invested with a similar and separate power. There are other good things of less moment. I will now add what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly & without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal & unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land & not by the law of Nations. To say, as mr. Wilson does, that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved, might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express terms. It was a hard conclusion to say because there has been no uniformity among the states as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just & wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, and to have established general right instead of general wrong. Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no just government should refuse or rest on inference. The second feature I dislike, and greatly dislike, is the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. Experience concurs with reason in concluding that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if the constitution permits it. He is then an officer for life. This once observed it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs that they will interfere with money & with arms. A Galloman or an Angloman will be supported by the nation he befriends. If once elected, and at a second or third election outvoted by one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the reins of government, be supported by the states voting for him, especially if they are the central ones lying in a compact body themselves & separating their opponents: and they will be aided by one nation of Europe, while the majority are aided by another. The election of a President of America some years hence will be much more interesting to certain nations of Europe than ever the election of a king of Poland was. Reflect on all the instances in history antient & modern, of elective monarchies, and say if they do not give foundation for my fears. The Roman emperors, the popes, while they were of any importance, the German emperors till they became hereditary in practice, the kings of Poland, the Deys of the Ottoman dependancies. It may be said that if elections are to be attended with these disorders, the seldomer they are renewed the better. But experience shews that the only way to prevent disorder is to render them uninteresting by frequent changes. An incapacity to be elected a second time would have been the only effectual preventative. The power of removing him every fourth year by the vote of the people is a power which will not be exercised. The king of Poland is removeable every day by the Diet, yet he is never removed. Smaller objections are the Appeal in fact as well as law, and the binding all persons Legislative Executive & Judiciary by oath to maintain that constitution. I do not pretend to decide what would be the best method of procuring the establishment of the manifold good things in this constitution, and of getting rid of the bad. Whether by adopting it in hopes of future amendment, or, after it has been duly weighed & canvassed by the people, after seeing the parts they generally dislike, & those they generally approve, to say to them ‘We see now what you wish. Send together your deputies again, let them frame a constitution for you omitting what you have condemned, & establishing the powers you approve. Even these will be a great addition to the energy of your government.’ At all events I hope you will not be discouraged from other trials, if the present one should fail of it’s full effect. I have thus told you freely what I like & dislike: merely as a matter of curiosity, for I know your own judgment has been formed on all these points after having heard every thing which could be urged on them. I own I am not a friend to a very energetic government. It is always oppressive. The late rebellion in Massachusets has given more alarm than I think it should have done. Calculate that one rebellion in 13 states in the course of 11 years, is but one for each state in a century & a half. No country should be so long without one. Nor will any degree of power in the hands of government prevent insurrections. France, with all it’s despotism, and two or three hundred thousand men always in arms has had three insurrections in the three years I have been here in every one of which greater numbers were engaged than in Massachusets & a great deal more blood was spilt. In Turkey, which Montesquieu supposes more despotic, insurrections are the events of every day. In England, where the hand of power is lighter than here, but heavier than with us they happen every half dozen years. Compare again the ferocious depredations of their insurgents with the order, the moderation & the almost self extinguishment of ours. After all, it is my principle that the will of the Majority should always prevail. If they approve the proposed Convention in all it’s parts, I shall concur in it chearfully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall find it work wrong. I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. Above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty. I have tired you by this time with my disquisitions & will therefore only add assurances of the sincerety of those sentiments of esteem & attachment with which I am Dear Sir your affectionate friend & servant
Th: Jefferson
P.S. The instability of our laws is really an immense evil. I think it would be well to provide in our constitutions that there shall always be a twelve-month between the ingrossing a bill & passing it: that it should then be offered to it’s passage without changing a word: and that if circumstances should be thought to require a speedier passage, it should take two thirds of both houses instead of a bare majority.


Title: From James Madison to Philip Mazzei, 20 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Mazzei, Philip

20 December 1787. Acknowledged in Mazzei to JM, 4 Feb. 1788. Leads Mazzei to conclude that he has no hope of relief in the Dohrman business until a federal government is established in America.


Title: To James Madison from Philip Mazzei, 21 December 1787
From: Mazzei, Philip
To: Madison, James

Carmo: Amico,
Parigi, 21. Dicembre 1787.
Mi perviene la stimma: vostra dei 5. del passato mentre ò appena tempo da rispondere, non per trascuratezza del Comr: Jones o di Mr. Jefferson, ma a motivo di circostanze locali, &c. Riguardo all’affare di Mr. Dorhman, ò gran piacere di non essermi ingannato nel buon concetto che ne avevo formato; ma egli non sarà mai scusabile d’avermi assicurato su quel che sapeva dovere almen dubitare, dopo averlo io candidamente informato della mia trista situazione, e dell’irreparabil danno che mi avrebbe apportato un contrattempo. Nè l’ottenere adesso rigorosa giustizia, nè i suoi sforzi generosi a mio favore possono indennizzarmi. Io però non ò diritto di chiedere, nè chiedo più di quel che le leggi dichiarano. Da questo non posso astenermi senza essere ingiusto verso i miei creditori. Il denaro sarà preferibile ai certificati del Congresso, ma la sbrigazione è di tanta importanza, che dovendo aspettare per ottenerlo preferirei i certificati subito, purchè fossero valutati al prezzo corrente e messi in testa dei Sigri: Nicholas e Jacob Vanstaphorst, conforme vi scrissi già. Potete dunque ricevere denaro, o certificati, o porzione dell’uno e degli altri, conforme giudicherete più sbrigativo e più conveniente al mio interesse. Quanto alle cambiali (ricevendo denaro) vi prego di prenderle per quella piazza d’Europa, ove il cambio sarà più vantaggioso, o piuttosto meno svantaggioso per me. Soprattutto vi raccomando la sicurezza. Io dovrò continovare a pagare il cambio e ricambio, del debito che avrei dovuto pagare col denaro della cambiale di Dorhman, fino alla scadenza delle future cambiali che avrete la bontà di rimettermi. Troppo ci vorrebbe a dirvi quel che ò sofferto, e la vostra sensibilità non me lo permette. Vo’ dirvi un solo aneddoto, che non direi qui neppure a Jefferson. Il legno da bruciare, come forse saprete, qui è carissimo. La mia miseria è tale, che fino agli 11. Novembre fui senza fuoco. Ciò à probabilmente contribuito a produrmi qualche infermità corporale, della quale tuttavia mi risento. Il principal motivo, per cui vi informo di questa particolarità, è la sparanza che vogliate degnarvi di ragguagliarne Mr. Edmond Randolph, per tentar di risvegliare la sua compassione verso di me.
Quanto al mio libro, le vostre riflessioni mi paiono tutte savie e prudenti, sicchè mi regolarò a norma delle medesime. Vedo che non avete ricevuto tutti i foglj stampati chi vi ò mandato, ma poco importa, poichè tra 15 giorni circa potrò spedirvi tutta l’opera divisa in 4 parti, e legata in 3. volumi. Nel supplemento, di cui si stampa ora l’ultimo foglio, vedrete le mie osservazioni sulla proposta costituzion federativa, le quali spero che non vi dispiaceranno, quantunque non siamo unisoni in tutto. Il tempo è breve e la mano non mi regge; addio. Continovatemi la vostra cara amicizia, e credetemi invariabilmente, e di vero cuore, vostro sincero Amico
Filippo Mazzei.
P.S. Vi prego di spedir l’inclusa in modo che vada sicura al suo destino.

Condensed Translation
Mazzei has not had time to reply to JM’s letter of 5 November because of local circumstances. In settling his affair with Dohrman, Mazzei prefers money to congressional certificates, but a quick settlement is so important that he directs JM to accept money, certificates, or both—whichever JM thinks best serves Mazzei’s interests. Mazzei’s financial plight is so desperate, and kindling wood so expensive, that he could not afford to light a fire until 11 November—a fact probably contributing to his present illness. He wants JM to tell Randolph this to arouse his compassion. JM’s reflections on Mazzei’s book seem wise and prudent. Within fifteen days Mazzei will be able to forward the entire work bound in three volumes. The supplement will contain his observations on the proposed American Constitution.


Title: To James Madison from William Short, 21 December 1787
From: Short, William
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris Dec. 21. 1787
I am at present to acknowlege the reciept of your favor dated Oct. 24. If you consider yourself obliged to thank me for having procured you the acquaintance of M. de Crevecoeur; his friends here, of which he has a great number, are equally thankful to me on the occasion. They consider, & with great reason, that it would have been impossible to render him a more agreeable service. Allow me at the same time Sir to express to you my gratitude for the real information contained in your letter. It made us more master of the subjects, to which the convention has given rise, than any thing we had seen or heard till then. Since that, your letter to Mr. Jefferson by Commodore Jones has arrived. On the statement which you gave me Sir, of the advocates & opponents to the new Constitution in Virginia, it seems impossible that it should pass in that State. Should it have the same fate in Rhode-Island, N. York & Maryland, we shall see the ill consequences of a clause which alarmed me from the beginning; I mean the adoption of the new constitution by nine States. The dissenting States being thus dispersed seem to have the quality only of separating the assenting States without the power of uniting themselves. I think the adoption by nine & the refusal by four of the States is the worst possible situation to which the new plan can give birth; & it seems probable that that will be the situation. Would it not have been better to have fixed on the number eleven or twelve instead of nine? In that case the plan would have been either refused altogether or adopted by such a commanding majority as would almost necessarily have brought in the others in the end. There is one thing however which may be opposed to all the arguments that may be adduced in opposition to the new plan; & that is that the members who composed the convention must have had a fuller & better view of the ground & must have considered it more attentively than those who object to it. They must have seen certainly a variety of difficulties which their debates must have presented in full view & which are hidden perhaps from the most penetrating observation under other circumstances. Particularly to us at this distance, I am sure it is impossible to form a proper opinion on the subject. There is only one reflexion wch. occurs to me in which I have any confidence of being right: & that is that the Members of the convention would not have proposed so desperate a remedy if the evil had not appeared to them equally desperate. I am afraid the case will not be mended by the Patient’s refusing to take the violent dose prescribed.

You form a very proper idea of the little weight which the opinions of the learned in Europe on the result of the convention, deserve. I have only seen as yet such of that character as are in Paris, where they are so much occupied with their own affairs, as scarcely to have had time to have read the new plan, much less to have considered it attentively. In Europe however they are almost uniformly for strengthening the hands of Congress or the federal head. In this they are probably right; but they are right on wrong ground—there are many who have no idea of their being a governmental force existing any where but in Congress: you cannot put into their heads their being actually an efficient government in each of the States. They know only Congress as the Governors & the rest of the United States as the governed. When therefore they have read the act which forms the Congress, they determine that there is not power enough delegated by the governed & determine that the quantum ought to be increased—they leave out of the account altogether the governing force existing elsewhere. Still however their conclusion is right though the terms by which they get to it, are wrong. The fact is Sir, that they are inconcievably ignorant of whatever relates to the practice of free government, although they have many of them made valuable researches in the theory of it. Such of the English politicians as are here exult much at seeing that the American governments begin to consider themselves under the necessity of approximating toward the British constitution.
War or peace for the ensuing spring poses a problem impossible as yet to solve. I believe it depends on the arrangement of the finances of this country: they are certainly ameliorating; but slowly. A loan of 120. millions of livres has been opened some time ago. No body can say whether it is filled—or goes on well—or goes on slowly. I have heard all the three propositions advanced & equally well supported in the space of twenty four hours. The 1st. of Jan. a situation of the finances is to be made public. Until then opinions on the subject must be suspended. You will have heard that the King came to Paris & took a seat in the Parliament in order to engage them to enregister the edict of annual loans for five years—that the Duke of Orleans & two members of the Parliament were exiled the day after for their boldness in opposing Majesty that day. The King has promised the States-general in 1791. at the latest. This will be a revolution completely operated in the government in this country. Should it effect a permanent constitution this country will unquestionably be the richest & most powerful in the world in twenty years. I hope Congress will be pleased with the Count de Moustier. He is so good a man & so well disposed that it can hardly be otherwise. I am glad they have not renewed a commission for the court of London. Yet as that court thinks of sending out a minister to New-York, I fear that step will make Congress change their system. It would do them however no honor in Europe or any where else I think if they did. Their present Servants at London however are very worthy & deserving men notwithstanding the error into which one has fallen of having written a book, & the misfortune of the other in its being addressed to him. Adieu my dear Sir & be assured that no body can be more attached to your happiness than your ob
W Short


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 26 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
New York Decr. 26. 1787.
I am just informed by a Delegate from New Hamshire that he has a letter from President Sullivan which tells him that the Legislature had unanimously agreed to call a convention as recommended, to meet in February. The second wednesday is the day if I have not mistaken it. We have no further information of much importance from Massachussetts. It appears that Cambridge the residence of Mr. Gerry has left him out of the choice for the Convention, and put in Mr. Dana formerly Minister of the U. States in Europe, and another Gentleman, both of them firmly opposed to Mr. Gerry’s Politics. I observe too in a Massts. paper that the omission of Col. Mason’s objection with regard to commerce, in the first publication of his Objections, has been supplied. This will more than undo the effect of the mutilated view of them. New Jersey the Newspapers tell us has adopted the Constitution unanimously. Our European intelligence remains perfectly as it stood at the date of my last. With the most Affectionate esteem & attachment I am Dear [Sir], Your Obedient & very hble servt.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Randolph, 27 December 1787
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Madison, James

My dear friend
Richmond decr. 27. 1787.
Altho’ many mails have passed since I wrote to you last, I am not without excuses of a satisfactory nature; which are too long and unimportant to you to hear in detail. Having shaken off the impediments to writing, I shall be hereafter punctual.
My letter is now inclosed to you. What the general opinion is, I would not undertake to vouch because I stay much at home, and I find daily reason to distrust reports, which always receive a tincture from the wishes of the narrator. But I rather suspect, that the current sets violently against the new constitution. Nay I must be permitted to express a fear, lest true fœderalism should be pressed hard in the convention. General Wilkinson from Kentucke, who is now here, is not to be appeased in his violence against the constitution; and it is presumed that thro his means the vote of Kentucky will have the same direction. He is rivetted by Colo. Harry Lee, declaring to him, that the surrender of the Mississippi would probably be among the early acts of the new congress. Mr. Meriwether Smith moved yesterday for a circular letter from our to the other legislatures, intimating the likelihood of amendment here. But his motion was changed into an instruction to the executive to forward the late act. Mr. Henry is implacable. Colo. Mason seems to rise beyond his first ground. He will be elected, it is said, for Stafford, and Colo. Mercer, it is also said, will be sent for by the people of that county for a similar purpose. I need not assure you, that it would give me no pleasure to see my conduct in refusing to sign, sanctified, if it was to produce a hazard to the union; and if I know myself, I have no extreme ardor to acquire converts to my opinions. But I verily believe, that the only expedient which can save the fœderal government in any shape in Virginia, will be the adoption of some such plan, as mine. However the high-toned friends to the constitution are still very sanguine, that the whole will run thro with ease.
A district bill has passed the delegates. It sticks with the Senate, who are employed in making amendments, to which the delegates will not agree. The fate of the bill is uncertain.
The prohibition of the importation of spirituous liquors is gone & indeed cannot be executed, even if it was to be enacted into a law.
A sinking fund has been established and the executive are to speculate with it in the purchase of public securities.
A heavy impost is laid in certificates on goods imported. The object of it was to detach from the fœderal government those, who might be allured by the revenue. Yrs mo. afftely
E. R.


Title: From James Madison to Tench Coxe, 3 January 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Coxe, Tench

Dear Sir
New York Jany. 3d. 1788
I have been favored with yours of the 28 Ult: and thank you for the paper which it inclosed. Your arguments appear to me to place the subject to which they relate in its true light, and must be satisfactory to the writer himself whom they oppose, if he can suspend for a moment his preconceived opinions. But whether they should have any effect or not on him, they will unquestionably be of service in Virginia, and probably in the other Southern States. Col. Hamilton has read the paper with equal pleasure & approbation with myself. He seems to think that the Farmers of New York are in no danger of being infected with an improper jealousy of a sacrifice of their interests to a partiality for commerce or navigation. Connecticut is more likely perhaps to be awake to suspicions of that sort; and it will be well to counteract them every where by candid and judicious explanations. I propose to send a copy of yours to S. Carolina by the first conveyance; and to put another into the hands of some Gentleman who corresponds with Georgia if I can find one. I have no correspondent in that State.
I never till very lately received an answer from Virga. on the subject of your former observations in support of the fœdl Constitution. I find now that the three first letters were published at Richmond in a pamphlet with one or two other little pieces, and that they had a very valuable effect. The 4th. was circulated in the Newspapers, not having arrived in time to be put into the pamphlet.
We have received no information of very late date or of a satisfactory nature from Europe. The London Head in the paper of this morning which I inclose, mentions a circumstance which leads to some new reflections on the situation of the Dutch.
I have no intelligence from the States Eastward of this worth adding. The elections in Massts. must by this time authorize a pretty good estimate of the two parties with regard to the plan of the Convention, but I am not yet possessed of the conjectures on the subject. It seems that both Mr. Gerry who opposed the plan in Convention, and Mr. Dana who followed the example in Congs. are left out of the returns from their respective districts. Perhaps the enmity of the former may not only be embittered, but rendered more active and successful by this disappointment. On the floor of the Convention he could only have urged bad arguments, which might be answered & exposed by good ones. Without doors he will be able not only to urge them without opposition, but to insinuate that he could say much more, had he not been deprived of a hearing by the machinations of those who were afraid of being confronted.
The post from the South being not yet come in I can not give you any Richmond News. The last I received was a continuation of the evidences of an increasing opposition to the new Government. The Characters which head it account fully for the change of opinions. With very great esteem & regard I am Dr Sir, Yr Obedt. & very hble servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Randolph, 3 January 1788
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Madison, James

My dear friend
Richmond Jany. 3. 1788.
By this time the district-bill has passed, in nearly the same form with that of the last year, except that four additional judges are to be created. Mr. Jos: Jones, who is now absent, has thro’ Colo. Monroe signified his wish to be regenerated a judge. He will succeed. It is conjectured that the other three will appear in St. G. Tucker, Grayson, and Prentis.
The constitution is not even spoken of; not from a want of zeal in either party, but from downright weariness. No new conjectures have arisen. Mr. G. Morris is confident that the plan will run thro’ safely. I question it, unless nine states should adopt it before June.
You must come in. Some people in Orange are opposed to your politicks. Your election to the convention is, I believe, sure; but I beg you not to hazard it by being absent at the time.
A terrible fire began here yesterday in the same quarter of the town, which fell a victim to the flames last year. But it was stopped with difficulty after the loss of four houses.
The assembly will rise about the beginning of next week. Adieu yrs. mo. affetly.
Edm: Randolph


Title: From James Madison to Edward Carrington, 7 January 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Carrington, Edward

7 January 1788. Acknowledged in Carrington to JM, 18 Jan. 1788. Reports foreign news, including “the Memorials of France & England.”


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 10 January 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My dear friend
N. York Jany. 10. 1788.
I have put off writing from day to day for some time past, in expectation of being able to give you the news from the packet, which has been looked for every hour. Both the French & English have overstaid their usual time ten or 15 days, and are neither of them yet arrived. We remain wholly in the dark with regard to the posture of things in Europe.
I received two days ago your favor of Decr. 27. inclosing a copy of your letter to the Assembly. I have read it with attention, and I can add with pleasure, because the spirit of it does as much honor to your candour, as the general reasoning does to your abilities. Nor can I believe that in this quarter the opponents to the Constitution will find encouragement in it. You are already aware that your objections are not viewed in the same decisive light by me as they are by you. I must own that I differ still more from your opinion, that a prosecution of the experiment of a second Convention will be favorable even in Virginia to the object which I am sure you have at heart. It is to me apparent that had your duty led you to throw your influence into the opposite scale, that it would have given it a decided and unalterable preponderancy; and that Mr. Henry would either have suppressed his enmity, or been baffled in the policy which it has dictated. It appears also that the ground taken by the opponents in different quarters, forbids any hope of concord among them. Nothing can be farther from your views than the principles of different setts of men, who have carried on their opposition under the respectability of your name. In this State the party adverse to the Constitution, notoriously meditate either a dissolution of the Union, or protracting it by patching up the Articles of Confederation. In Connecticut & Massachussetts, the opposition proceeds from that part of the people who have a repugnancy in general to good government, to any substantial abridgment of State powers, and a part of whom in Massts. are known to aim at confusion, and are suspected of wishing a reversal of the Revolution. The Minority in Pennsylva. as far as they are governed by any other views than an habitual & factious opposition, to their rivals, are manifestly averse to some essential ingredients in a national Government. You are better acquainted with Mr. Henry’s politics than I can be, but I have for some time considered him as driving at a Southern Confederacy and as not farther concurring in the plan of amendments than as he hopes to render it subservient to his real designs. Viewing the matter in this light, the inference with me is unavoidable that were a second trial to be made, the friends of a good constitution for the Union would not only find themselves not a little differing from each other as to the proper amendments; but perplexed & frustrated by men who had objects totally different. A second Convention would of course be formed under the influence, and composed in great measure of the members of opposition in the several States. But were the first difficulties overcome, and the Constitution re-edited with amendments, the event would still be infinitely precarious. Whatever respect may be due to the rights of private judgment, and no man feels more of it than I do, there can be no doubt that there are subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal, and on which they must and will be governed by those with whom they happen to have acquaintance and confidence. The proposed Constitution is of this description. The great body of those who are both for & against it, must follow the judgment of others not their own. Had the Constitution been framed & recommended by an obscure individual, instead of a body possessing public respect & confidence, there can not be a doubt, that altho’ it would have stood in the identical words, it would have commanded little attention from most of those who now admire its wisdom. Had yourself, Col. Mason, Col. R. H. L. Mr. Henry & a few others, seen the Constitution in the same light with those who subscribed it, I have no doubt that Virginia would have been as zealous & unanimous as she is now divided on the subject. I infer from these considerations that if a Government be ever adopted in America, it must result from a fortunate coincidence of leading opinions, and a general confidence of the people in those who may recommend it. The very attempt at a second Convention strikes at the confidence in the first; and the existence of a second by opposing influence to influence, would in a manner destroy an effectual confidence in either, and give a loose to human opinions; which must be as various and irreconcileable concerning theories of Government, as doctrines of Religion; and give opportunities to designing men which it might be impossible to counteract.
The Connecticut Convention has probably come to a decision before this; but the event is not known here. It is understood that a great majority will adopt the Constitution. The accounts from Massts. vary extremely according to the channels through which they come. It is said that S. Adams who has hitherto been reserved, begins to make open declaration of his hostile views. His influence is not great, but this step argues an opinion that he can calculate on a considerable party. It is said here, and I believe on good ground that N. Carolina has postponed her Convention till July, in order to have the previous example of Virga. Should N. Carolina fall into Mr. H—y’s politics which does not appear to me improbable, it will endanger the Union more than any other circumstance that could happen. My apprehensions of this danger increase every day. The multiplied inducements at this moment to the local sacrifices necessary to keep the States together, can never be expected to co-incide again, and they are counteracted by so many unpropitious circumstances, that their efficacy can with difficulty be confided in. I have no information from S. Carolina or Georgia, on which any certain opinion can be formed of the temper of those States. The prevailing idea has been that both of them would speedily & generally embrace the Constitution. It is impossible however that the example of Virga. & N. Carolina should not have an influence on their politics. I consider every thing therefore as problematical from Maryland Southward.
I am surprised that Col. H. Lee who is a well-wisher to the Constitution should have furnished Wilkinson with the alarm concerning the Mississippi, but the political connections of the latter in Pena. would account for his biass on the subject.
We have no Congress yet. The number of Sts on the Spot does not exceed five. It is probable that a quorum will now be soon made. A Delegate from N. Hampshire is expected which will make up a representation from that State. The termination of the Connecticut Convention will set her delegates at liberty. And the Meeting of the Assembly of this State, will fill the vacancy which has some time existed in her Delegation. I wish you every happiness, and am with the sincerest affection Yrs.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from André Limozin, 10 January 1788
From: Limozin, André
To: Madison, James

Most Honored Sir
Havre de Grace 10 Janry 1788
I have the honor to inclose you a large Bundle of Papers sent to my Care by his Excellency Thoms Jefferson Ambassador of the US at the Court of Versailles to be Forwarded to you. I comply with a very great pleasure with his Excellency’s orders, Since it procures me the opportunity to assure you that I have the honor to be with the highest regard Most Honored Sir Your most obedt Hble Servt
Andr Limozin
I have the honor to inclose you likewise Charles Jenkin’s Bill of Lading for 3 Boxes Books sent to me by our said Mutuall worthy Friend Thoms Jefferson Esquire.


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, 10 January 1788
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Mount Vernon Jany. 10th. 1788.
I stand indebted to you for your favors of the 20th. & 26th. Ult; and I believe for that of the 14th. also, & their enclosures.
It does not appear to me that there is any certain criterion in this State, by which a decided Judgment can be formed of the opinion which is entertained by the mass of its Citizens with respect to the New Constitution. My belief on this occasion is, that whenever the matter is brought to a final decision, that not only a majority, but a large one, will be found in its favor.

That the opposition should have gained strength, among the members of the Assembly in Richmond, admitting the fact, is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the powerful adversaries to the Constitution are all assembled at that place, acting conjunctly; with the promulgated sentiments of Col. R. H. L as auxiliary. It is said however, and I believe it may be depended upon, that the latter (tho’ he may retain his sentiments) has with-drawn, or means to withdraw his opposition; because, as he has expressed himself, or as others have done it for him, he finds himself in bad Company; such as with M——r. Sm——th’s &ca &ca. His brother, Francis L. Lee on whose Judgment the family place much reliance, is decidedly in favor of the new form, under a conviction that it is the best that can be obtained, and because it promises energy—stability—and that security which is, or ought to be, the wish of every good Citizen of the Union.
How far the determination of the question before the debating club (of which I made mention in a former letter) may be considered as auspicious of the final decision in Convention, I shall not prognosticate; but in this Club, this question it seems, was determined by a very large majority in favor of the Constitution; but of all the arguments which may be used at this time, none will be so forcible, I expect, as that nine States have acceded to it. And if the unanimity, or majorities in those which are to follow, are as great as in those which have acted, the power of these arguments will be irrisistable.
The Governor has given his reasons to the Publick for withholding his signature to the Constitution. A copy of them I send you.
Our Assembly has been long in Session—employed chiefly (according to my information) in rectifying the mistakes of the last, and committing others for emendations at the next. Yet, “who so wise as we are.” We are held in painful suspence with respect to European Intelligence. Peace or War, by the last accts. are equally balanced a grain added to either scale will give it the preponderancy.
I have no regular corrispondt. in Massachusetts; otherwise, as the occasional subject of a letter I should have had no objection to the communication of my sentiments on the proposed Government as they are unequivocal & decided. With the greatest esteem & regd I am My dear Sir Yr. Most Obedt. & Affe Ser
Go: Washington
PS. I have this momt. been informed, that the Assembly of No Carolina have postponed the meeting of the Convention of that State until July. This seems evidently calculated to take the Tone from Virginia.