Title: To James Madison from Rufus King, 3 February 1788
From: King, Rufus
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Boston. Sunday 3d. Feb. 1788
I inclose a newspaper of yesterday containing the propositions communicated by Mr. Hancock to the Convention, on Thursday last. Mr. Adams who contrary to his own Sentiments has been hitherto silent in convention, has given his public & explicit approbation of Mr. Hancock’s propositions.
We flatter ourselves that the weight of these two characters will insure our success, but the Event is not absolutely certain. Yesterday a committee was appointed on the motion of a doubtful Character to consider the propositions submitted by Mr. Hancock, and to report Tomorrow Afternoon. We have a Majority of Fedaralists on this Committee and flatter ourselves the result will be favorable. I have not Time to add except that I am with Esteem &c yours &c.
R King
PS. We shall probably decide on Thursday or Friday next, when our numbers will amount to about 363. Gerry has kept at Cambridge & Our Opponents say nothing of his reinvitation.


Title: To James Madison from Philip Mazzei, 4 February 1788
From: Mazzei, Philip
To: Madison, James

Carmo: Amico,
Parigi, 4. Febbraio 1788.
II mio libro è finalmente stampato, ma il breve tempo non à permesso di far legare il numero d’esemplari che ò destinato di raccomandare alla vostra amicizia per farmegli esitare. Mr. Jefferson essendo di parere che la novità può fàrne spacciare un piccol numero anche non legati, mi prendo la liberta di spedirvene una cassa cuciti, 64 in numero, 57 dei quali per vendersi, e 7 da distribuirsi come segue, cioè 2 per Edmond Randolph a cui scrivo di mandarne uno a Mr. de Rieux, 1. per il Bellini, 1. per Mr. Wythe, 1. per Mr. Blair, 1. per Mr. Oster, e 1 che spero mi farete la grazia d’accettare voi stesso. Se fosse possibile, sarebbe bene di mandare ad ognuno la sua lettera qui inclusa insieme coi libri. Quella di Mr. Wythe bisognerebbe mandarla per persona sicura, perchè contiene un sigillo che costa parecchie ghinee. Il libro in quarto, in cui questa e le altre lettere sono incluse, appartiene a Edmond Randolph, a cui lo manda l’Autore.
Mr. Jefferson crede che del mio libro se ne possano facilmente spacciare 25 in Boston, 50 in New-York, 50 in Filadelfia, 25 in Virginia, e 25 in Charlestoun; sicchè per il bastimento corriero, che deve partire il 25 di marzo, ve ne manderò altri 100 legati. Perdonate l’incomodo, caro Amico, sul principio che la necessità non à legge.
Mi son pervenute le 2. grate vostre degli 8 e 20 xbre., nella prima delle quali mi davi la speranza di qualche pronta rimessa, che mi togliete nella seconda. Vi rendo grazie d’aver terminato l’affare con Dohrman, come pure della maniera delicata con cui l’avete concluso. In luogo vostro avrei fatto lo stesso. Il rigor di giustizia in certi casi à un’apparenza di crudeltà, che l’anime delicate aborriscono. Le medesime riflessioni le confermerò a bocca a Mr. Dohrman; e dopo d’avergli fatto sentire quanto grato io vi sia del non avergli voi proposto un saldo di conti (al prezzo corrente de’suoi effetti) gli farò vedere, e lo convincerò, che tal condotta non sarebbe stata tanto crudele, quanto fù la sua verso di me, in tempo ch’io l’informai pienamente delle mie dure circostanze, e ch’ei sapeva che la sua cambiale non sarebbe stata pagata.
Nella mia precedente dei 21. xbre. v’informai della mia estrema povertà, e del mal fisico che me n’era risultato, oltre il morale che sempre è per me il maggiore. Dall’ultima vostra dei 20 xbre. vedo chiaramente, che non ò luogo di sperare alcun sollievo fino a tanto che il nostro governo federativo sia bene stabilito. Gli altri miei affari in Virginia soffrono per l’istessa causa, benchè non tanto direttamente. Io sono nell’estrama [sic] povertà, e non posso aver’ombra di speranza se non segue il detto stabilimento. Voi non ignorate che bramerei di servire in Europa la mia cara patria adottiva, perchè son persuaso che potrei esserle realmente utile, e che i miei amici d’America ne risentirebbero gran consolazione. È chiaro che anche questa remota speranza non può effettuarsi nella presente incerta situazione. Qualunque sia il nuovo sistema, le sue cattive conseguenze devon tardare più che non durerà la mia vita, ed io non ò, nè sono per aver figlj. Ma i posteri, caro e degno Amico mio, sono i figlj miei! Non posso mettere a competenza il mio solo interesse privato con quello di tanti milioni! Come avete voi potuto convenire nella proposta Costituzione di varj articoli, che preparano fulmini sterminatori alla povera libertà? Vi siete voi figurato Washington immortale? Vi siete voi lusingato che potrà esservi sempre un’egual successore? E quando vi fosse, come potrebbe ovviare agl’inconvenienti terribili, che nasceranno dalla cabala dell’Aristocrazia, colla quale l’avete circondato? Spero che non siate infettato della malattia, pur troppo epidemica, della bilancia e dei contrappesi in materia di governo. Livingston à ragione; dovendo ricorrere a un meccanismo, il girarrosto è più analogo senza paragone; o per meglio dire, la chimerica bilancia non lo è niente affatto. Mr. Jefferson spera, che 9. Stati adotteranno la proposta Costituzione, che ciò basterà per metter la cosa in moto, che gli altri pubblicheranno i giusti motivi del loro scisma, e che i 9. per loro proprio vantaggio converranno cogli scismatici per fare le prudenti e necessarie modificazioni.
Se le mie osservazione, al fine del supplemento, vi paiono atte a produrre qualche buono effetto, vi prego di tradurle e farle inserire nelle nostre gazzette. Addio, amico caro, scrivetemi presto, e consolatemi, chè ne ò gran bisogno. Tutto vostro
Filippo Mazzei

Condensed Translation
Mazzei’s book is finally printed. He is sending JM sixty-four sewn copies and will send another hundred on the mail vessel scheduled to depart 25 March. Mazzei has received JM’s letters of 8 and 20 December, the first of which gave him hope of some immediate remittance and the second of which removed that hope. He thanks JM for concerning himself with the Dohrman business. He is in extreme poverty and sees no hope of relief until a federal government is well established in America. He reminds JM of his offer to serve his adopted country in Europe. Mazzei criticizes the new Constitution as tending toward the destruction of humble liberty. He asks if JM has imagined Washington to be immortal, and whether JM has deluded himself into thinking that there could ever be a successor to equal Washington. Even if there were, how could the terrible difficulties be avoided which would arise from the intrigues of the aristocracy who would surround him? He hopes that JM is not infected by the disease of balance and counterbalance in the governmental structure. Jefferson hopes that nine states will adopt the Constitution but favors some modifications. If JM thinks the observations at the end of the supplement to his book might be of value, Mazzei requests that he translate them and insert them in the newspapers.


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, 5 February 1788
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Mount Vernon Feby. 5th. 1788.
I am indebted to you for several of your favors, and thank you for their enclosures. The rumours of War between France and England have subsided; and the poor Patriots of Holland, it seems, are left to fight their own Battles or negotiate—in neither case with any great prospect of Advantage. They must have been deceived, or their conduct has been divided, precip[it]ant, & weak. The former, with some blunders, have, I conceive, been the causes of their misfortunes.
I am sorry to find by yours, and other accts. from Massachusetts, that the decision of its Convention (at the time of their dates) remained problematical. A rejection of the New form by that State will envigorate the opposition, not only in New York, but in all those which are to follow; at the same time that it will afford materials for the Minority in such as have adopted it, to blow the Trumpet of discord more loudly. The acceptance by a bare majority, tho’ preferable to rejection, is also to be depricated.
It is scarcely possible to form any decided opinion of the general sentiment of the people of this State, on this important subject. Many have asked me with anxious sollicitude, if you did not mean to get into the Convention; conceiving it of indispensable necessity. Colo. Mason, who returned home only yesterday, has offered himself, I am told, for the County of Stafford; and his friends add, he can be elected not only there, but for Prince William & Fauquier also. The truth of this I know not. I rarely go from home, and my visitors who for the most part are travellers and strangers, have not the best information.
At the time you suggested for my consideration, the expediency of a communication of my sentiments on the proposed Constitution, to any corrispondent I might have in Massachusetts, it did not occur to me that Genl Lincoln & myself frequently interchanged letters—much less did I expect that a hasty, and indigested extract of one which I had written—intermixed with a variety of other matter to Colo. Chas. Carter, in answer to a letter I had received from him respecting Wolf dogs—Wolves—Sheep—experiments in Farming &ca &ca. &ca.—was then in the press, and would bring these sentiments to public view by means of the extensive circulation I find that extract has had. Altho’ I never have concealed, and am perfectly regardless who becomes acquainted with my sentiments on the proposed Constitution, yet nevertheless, as no care had been taken to dress the ideas, nor any reasons assigned in support of my opinion, I felt myself hurt by the publication; and informed my friend the Colonel of it. In answer, he has fully exculpated himself from the intention, but his zeal in the cause prompted him to distributt copies, under a prohibition (which was disregarded) that they should not go to the press. As you have seen the rude, or crude extract (as you may please to term it), I will add no more on the subject.
Perceiving that the Fœderalist, under the signature of Publius, is about to be re-published, I would thank you for forwarding to me three or four Copies; one of which to be neatly bound, and inform me of the cost.
Altho’ we have not had many, or deep Snows since the commencement of them, yet we have had a very severe Winter; and if the cold of this day is proportionably keen with you, a warm room, & a good fire will be found no bad, or uncomfortable antidote to it. With sentiments of perfect esteem and friendship I am, Dear Sir Yr. Affecte. & Obedt Servt
Go: Washington


Title: To James Madison from Tench Coxe, 6 February 1788
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Philada. Feb. 6th. 1788.
I trouble you with the last No. (3) of the freeman. In the paper N. 1. signed a Pennsylvanian I have opened a regular examination of the state of the opposition here, & shall endeavour to add a refutation of some of the objections of the minority. Consolidation I shall of course retouch, & therefore wish any thing you meet on that Subject to be enclosed. No. 44, & 45 of Publius are very valuable papers, I thank you much for them.
We are not entirely free from apprehensions about Massachussets, but we think we have solid ground to hope an happy issue. Things in the South are taking a pleasing turn yet no fair Measures should be omitted. I am very respectfully & sincerely yrs.
T. Coxe


Title: To James Madison from Rufus King, 6 February 1788
From: King, Rufus
To: Madison, James

My Dear Sir
Boston 6 Feb. 1788
I have the satisfaction to inform you that on the final Question of assinting to & ratifying the constitution our convention divided, and 187. were in the affirmative & 168 in the negative: the majority although small is extremely respectable, and the minority are in good Temper; they have the magnanimity to declare that they will devote their Lives & property to support the Government, and I have no Doubt but the ratification will be very cordially and universally approved through our State. N. Hampshire will undoubtedly decide in favor of the Constitution—their convention met Today. God bless you. Your’s &c.
R King


Title: The Federalist Number 51, [6 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[6 February 1788]
To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full developement of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels, having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties however, and some additional expence, would attend the execution of it. Some deviations therefore from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle; first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice, which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other, would be merely nominal.

But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the state.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defence. In republican government the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative, on the legislature, appears at first view to be the natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness; and on extraordinary occasions, it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department, and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several state constitutions, and to the federal constitution, it will be found, that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are moreover two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This at best is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government: Since it shews that in exact proportion as the territory of the union may be formed into more circumscribed confederacies or states, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated, the best security under the republican form, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security must be proportionally increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger: And as in the latter state even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves: So in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted, that if the state of Rhode-Island was separated from the confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits, would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities, that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place upon any other principles than those of justice and the general good: Whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of the major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter; or in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
Publius.


Title: To James Madison from Philip Mazzei, 7 February 1788
From: Mazzei, Philip
To: Madison, James

Caro Amico,
Parigi, 7 Febbraio 1788.
Questa la mando aperta al fratello d’un mio Amico, residente in Havre, affinchè c’includa la ricevuta del capitano, cioè la poliza di carico di una cassa impagliata e imballata e di un pacchetto coperto con tela incerata. Il pacchetto, che mando stamani per la diligenza, contiene un libro in 4to., nel quale sono 5 lettere sigillate per Mr. Edd. Randolp, Mr. Wythe, Mr. Blair, Mr. Bellini, e Mr. Oster, con una non sigillata per voi medesimo. Quella diretta a Mr. Wythe contiene un sigillo da oriuolo legato in oro a Firenze. La cassa spedita tempo fa contiene 64 esemplari del mio libro, per disporne a norma del contenuto nella lettera sopraddetta, la quale contenendo tutto ciò che è necessario per il presente, termino confermandomi nuovamente, Tutto vostro
Filippo Mazzei

Condensed Translation
Mazzei sends the bill of lading for the case and packet that he is having shipped to America. The packet contains letters for Mazzei’s friends, including the one to JM of 4 February. The packing case contains sixty-four copies of Mazzei’s book.


Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 7 February 1788
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Fredbg Feby. 7. 1788.
We have nothing new here. The proceedings of our assembly you are no doubt possess’d of thro’ the hands of the Governor, especially that part which is connected with the US. I mean the revenue act & the resolutions respecting the cession. In the former as much was advancd to the US. as cod. be obtain’d. In the latter more moderation was observ’d than at first appearances promis’d. It was perhaps brot. forward to serve other purposes, (I mean in the extent to wh. the Chairman advocated it) but it was put in its present form without debate & by his own consent, perhaps to avoid it. The rectitude of the measure depends on the want of it in some of the Comrs. Unless the objection agnst, at least one, is good, it cannot be defended. But you have the whole of the proceedings before you.
This new Constitution still engages the minds of people with some zeal among the partizans on either side. It is impossible to say which preponderates. The northern part of the State is more generally for it than the southern. In this county (except in the town) they are agnst. it I believe universally. I have however this from report only, having not been from home. My late Colleague is decidedly so. Mr. Page is for it & forms an exception to the above. It is said here that Georgia has adopted it, N.H. also. The object in the postponment of the meeting of our Convention to so late a day was to furnish an evidence of the disposition of the other States to that body when it shod. be assembled. If they or many of them were agnst. it our State might mediate between contending parties & lead the way to an union more palitable to all. If all were for it let the knowledge of that circumstance have its weight in their deliberations. This I believe was the principle on wh. that measure was adopted, at least those whose sentiments I knew express’d it to be theirs. We expect you in soon & shall be happy to see you here. Sincerly I am yr. fnd. & servt.
Jas. Monroe


Title: The Federalist Number 52, [8 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[8 February 1788]
From the more general enquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the house of representatives.

The first view to be taken of this part of the government, relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the states, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason, that it would have rendered too dependent on the state governments, that branch of the federal government, which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different states to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the states, as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every state; because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established by the state itself. It will be safe to the United States; because, being fixed by the state constitutions, it is not alterable by the state governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the states will alter this part of their constitutions, in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal constitution.
The qualifications of the elected being less carefully and properly defined by the state constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the state he is to represent, and during the time of his service must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The term for which the representatives are to be elected, falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered; first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.
First. As it is essential to liberty, that the government in general should have a common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation: And must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed, whenever it can be found.
The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to antient polity; it is in more modern times only, that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the house of commons in Great-Britain. The history of this branch of the English constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove, that parliaments were to sit only, every year; not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles IId. that the intermissions, should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William IIId, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people, that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term “frequently” which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles IId. is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the determination of the former. The last change from three to seven years is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the house of representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated except on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George IId. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people, consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be, that if the people of that country have been able, under all these disadvantages, to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.
Let us bring our enquiries nearer home. The example of these states when British colonies, claims particular attention; at the same time that it is so well known, as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which every where displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle; and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been every where enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth, and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good as well with regard to the then colonies, whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great-Britain; it was the first also in espousing by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances, was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British parliament, and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well founded maxim, that, where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shewn that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the people, as other legislative bodies are; but that it will be moreover watched and controled by the several collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the house of representatives from their duty to the people; and the means of influence over the popular branch, possessed by the other branches of the governments above cited. With less power therefore to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.
Publius.


Title: To James Madison from the Reverend James Madison, 9 February 1788
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

Williamsbg Feby. 9. 1788.
I should, my dear Friend, have acknowledged the Favr of your last, long before this, had my Answer been as little delayed, as the Satisfaction reced. from it, was sincere: but as I always write to you, rather to get your Observations upon political Subjects, than for the Sake of communicating my own, I have been unwilling to impose that Burthen too frequently upon you. Your Answer, tended greatly to satisfy some of my Doubts—whilst those valuable Papers (the Federalist) wch. are generally attributed to you, have well nigh worked a Conversion. Whoever may be the Author of them, they are certainly well written, as far at least as I have seen them, & well calculated to promote the great Object in View. They must be read with much Pleasure & Advantage by every one who wishes to examine the Subject with Candour.
But I fear, a Question of some Importance still remains, even admitting that the Govt. proposed, would, if adopted & conformed to, be productive of the Advantages expected. Is it, in reality practicable? You will say, Nothing but Experience can solve such a Question; and that, if it be the best, it should at all Events be tried—I agree with you—But we may still reflect upon the Consequences which will probably attend the Adoption of it. It’s Execution, or it’s Operation requires Sacrifices, wch. I suspect our State Legislatures, & that of Virga. in particular, will never be willing to make. For when has the Legislature of this State failed, evincing, as the Oppy. presented itself, Principles directly the reverse of those wch. the proposed Govt. requires. It’s Conduct, during the last Session, with Respect to the Treaty, (notwithstanding the plain & sensible Address from Congress upon that Subject, & notwithstanding the Impropriety of an Interference must occur, one wd think, to every Man of Common Sense, I do not say to those the least versed in the Laws of Nations) too plainly shews a Degree of antifederal Spirit, wch. will not easily be assimilated to the new Govt. Other Instances of the same Nature might easily be given as Proofs of the real Existence of this Spirit. The Love of Power is too great, the supposed Importance of an independent Legislator is too flattering to most, to admit of the least voluntary Diminution. Nor is it improbable, but that the same Spirit exists in most of the other States, because it originates from Principles common to Amns.—Viz—the highest Idea of the independent Sovereignty of their own States—& at the same Time, the Desire of enjoying all the Advantages of Govt. at the least possible Expence to Natural Liberty. Whether the new Govt. can, in it’s Operation, controul suffly. this Spirit, you are the best Judge. But that no Govt. can be durable wch. is not perfectly conformable to the Genius of the People, unless it be supported by Force, is plain, and whether this under Consideration will not meet with such Opposition from the Reaction or Jealousy of the State Legislatures, & from the Parties it will have to struggle with, in its very Infancy—as to render it impracticable, or of short Duration—is perhaps a Problem not unworthy of the Attention of a Philosopher. The Imperium in imperio will be the fruitful Source of a thousand jarring Principles, wch. will make the new Machine, notwithstanding all the Oil you can give it, to go heavily along.
Whether Virga. will adopt the Plan, if she be not in some Measure compelled by the previous Adoption of the other States, is considered as questionable, especially unless there be tack’d to it, some Clause of Amendment. How the Majority may be—is hard or impossible to determine. The opposite Parties however, greatly to their Credit, have hitherto observed the Line of candid Discussion. None of those acrimonious Principles have yet appeared wch. generally agitate a People, when Questions of such Importance create Divisions. It is hoped by all, that you will be in the Convention. The Atty Gen. will represent this Town.
We did not receive the Packet you were so kind as to forward till about a Fortnight past—but it came at last, safe thro’ the Hands of the Govr. Be pleased to remember me [to] Mr Griffin & Lady—& beleive me to be, my dear Col. Yr. truely Affe Friend
J Madison


Title: To James Madison from Edward Carrington, 10 February 1788
From: Carrington, Edward
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Manchester Feby. 10th: 1788
Since my last from Richmond I have made a circuit, through Cumberland, Powhatan & Chesterfield, and taking Petersburg in my way arrived here last ev’ning. The state of the ice is such as renders the passage of the River unsafe. A Canoe with difficulty makes its way through the Falls and by that means my letters from the post Office have today got to me. Amongst them I am favoured with yours of the 11th. 15th. & 25 Ult. inclosing sundry papers & letters for which be pleased to accept my most grateful thanks.
My Route has been pretty much within the Neighbourhood of Mr. Henry, and I find his politics to have been so industriously propagated, that the people are much disposed to be his blind followers. As an evidence of it the demagogues in the opposition suppose that their popularity is increased in proportion to the loudness of their clamours, whilst the Freinds to the constitution thinks it prudent to suppress their opinions, or at least to advance them with Caution. Without consulting the extent of my influence, or the dangers of facing the Torrent, I have thought it my duty to make an unequivocal declaration of my sentiments, and if my efforts can work a change in even a single man, you may rely upon that change being made. My drift will be, principally, to turn the elections upon Men of discernment and to bring about instructions upon the point of preserving the Union, which must, at a certain stage, separate the members from Mr. Henry. I can not find that he has even once specified the amendments he would have in the project, it is therefore fairly to be concluded, that his views are a dismemberment of the Union, & I do verily believe this to be the case. I have seen Mr. Ronald—his opinions are extremely mysterious, his objections are made in terms that would be taken for absolute in all events, yet he is alarmed at the probable extent of Mr. Henries views, & professes a determination to do nothing which may even endanger the Union. Judge Fleming is a Candidate for Powhatan, and is earnestly for amendments, but assures me he thinks the Union ought in no degree to be hazarded. He is one of the Characters whom I am for trusting in the convention. The danger there, is from weak Men, whatever may be the professions of such, before they assemble, there is no accounting for the effects which Mr. Henries address and Rhetoric may have upon them afterwards. In Chesterfield Tucker & Baker are Candidates, and both against the constitution. The former is for going equal lengths with Mr. H—— but with different views. He is unfortunately one of those who overrate the importance of Virga. and think she may dictate to the whole union. It happens that some of the most popular Men in the County are against both these Gentlemen in opinion & will oppose their election unless they alter their sentiments. From the more southern Counties I have as yet received no satisfactory information. Of this however I am pretty certain, that the doctrine of amendments has taken such strong ground, that the direct adoption of the Constitution cannot be well expected should less than Nine States have adopted when our Convention comes to set. Ideas of the necessity of preserving the Union are however so prevailent, that I think Mr. H—— will be able [to] draw but a small proportion of a discerning convention in opposition to that Number.
Your intelligence from Massachusetts is truly alarming because she is one of the Nine whose adoption can be counted upon by June. Indeed she is so important that even against Nine she & Virga. would be able, if not to prevent the effects of the Government altogether, to hold it in suspence longer than the State of our affairs can well admit of. I am anxcious to know the result in Massachusetts for on her every thing seems to depend. As to N. York her uniform opposition to every federal interest, for several years, gives us every reason to expect her dissent even to the calling a Convention. The letter of her dissenting deputies is perfectly in conformity with the views of their Mission. Should reason and Common sense have fair play in our Convention the dissentions amongst the opponents in different quarters must operate as the strongest arguments that can be brought in support of the project which has received the unanimous vote of a large & respectable Assembly.
I have lately seen a Gentleman who removed from my Neighbourhood to N. Carolina and is intelligent. He came directly from the Assembly. He says the postponement of the convention in that State by no means indicates a disposition to follow the politics of Virga. On the contrary there is a decided opinion in favor of the Constitution. As an evidence of it, Willy Jones an opponent declines going into the Convention seeing that his opposition will be unavailing, and Allan Jones who is of the contrary party is to be a Member. Davie—Williamson—& Johnson, all for the Constitution.
I shall do myself the pleasure to communicate to you from time to time the intelligence which events shall afford, and will thank you for such as may arise in your quarter. Be good enough to Present me in the most affectionate terms to the President and your other Worthy Colleague—also to Irvine & Reade, & beleive me to be with great sincerity Yr. Frd. &c.
Ed. Carrington


Title: To James Madison from John Fitch, 10 February 1788
From: Fitch, John
To: Madison, James

Honoured Sir
New York the 10 February 1788
My situation at present is tremendously allarming, it would be much less so, if I knew that I should sicken and die, than for me to return and inform the Company I must be dependant on them for my sustinance, so Vile a way of living, I heartily dispise. And was I under no obligations to any one, I would not solicit Courts for favours, was my claims ever so just, did I think it would be granted with reluctance. I would retire to the Wild forrests of Kentuckey, where My whole attention should be taken up in hoeing Corn & Tobacko, and where I could bid defiance to the blind unguided frowns of forturne, and if I ever came into public life again, it should be by the solicittations of others and not my own seeking.
When I heared of that report of Mr. Rumsey’s, knowing that he could not merit the reward in his way, it induced me to undertake it; which was the principle stimilas I had at that time, as I was persuaded it was not offered to him as being a favourite Citizen.
I do not wish it but on honourable terms, and altho I am conscious I have merited it, yet am willing to be laid under any reasonable restrictions. The following one I propose Viz—If I cannot make a Boat of fifty tons burthen, that two men shall be able to Navigate from the Rapids of Ohio to Fort Pitt, than and in such case I shall be obliged to pay the sum stipulated for Lands sold adjoining, or forfiet Said Lands. I really am Sir no more than a man, and it is as dificult for me to effect imposibilities as for another, and cannot compleat what I have begun without supplies. I have since I began been Idle more than six months waiting for the Casting of a Cylinder, and now am in doubts whether I can get it cast in america or not, and should I have to send to Europe for it, probable it would not arrive before August, when we should hardly be able to compleat our works next fall, which would be so discouraging to the Company it is hardly probable they would support me was I to request it.
Such delays has an inconceivable tendency to disharten more than we are aware of.
As to myselfe, I know that I have fortitude sufficient to dispise all the ill natured things that can be said, but the task of keeping twenty of the most delicate Characters in Countinence, will be too much for me with my other imbarrassments, espescially when so many feels themselves interested in preventing its coming to perfection, and no one more than good wishes to have it perfected. It is reasonable to suppose that the clammour will be much against it. And it is imposible to bring the World to reason on it; any more than what they hear from others. And where interest takes on one side, and nothing more than good wishes on the other, it is easily determinaed what the people at large will be. I do not wish Congress to give me because I am poor, but because the honour and interest of our Nation loudly calls for it. The Stigma of having it promoted by forign Nations, I pray Heaven may never be charged to the act. of the Country that gave me birth. And as to their interest, no man on Earth that will reason fairly, but must allow that two men can take a Boat of one hundred tons burthen up the Mississippi, which needs no commentation upon it, as it reduces them waters nearly equal to tide Water. And was the prayor of my Petition granted, I could build a Furnace and execute my own Castings myself, and whatever grants I have, shall be faithfully laid out for them purposes. Sir, you may have some faint Ideas of the situation of my mind, and can form a judgment whether a person so situated is altogether fit for so great an undertaking, as one who can give his whole thoughts and study to it. But Sir, should you not think it to be for the honour and interest of our Empire to grant my prayor, you may give it every opposition without the least offence.
But should you think my prayor reasonable and patronise my claim I should think I was in duty Bound ever to subscribe myselfe Your most Devoted much obliged and Very Humble Servant
John Fitch
NB If there should be any securities required as to the application of the money arising from Sd. grant I can produce such as shall be satisfactory.


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 11 February 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
N. York Feby 11. 88.
The Newspaper inclosed with the letter which follows, comprises the information brought me by the mail of yesterday.

Boston Feby. 3d.
“I inclose a Newspaper containing the propositions communicated by Mr. Hancock to the Convention, on thursday last. Mr. Adams who contrary to his own sentiments has been hitherto silent in Convention, has given his public and explicit approbation of Mr. Hancocks propositions. We flatter ourselves that the weight of these two characters will ensure our success; but the event is not absolutely certain. Yesterday a Committee was appointed on the motion of a doubtful character to consider the propositions submitted by Mr. Hancock and to report tomorrow afternoon. We have a majority of fœderalists on this Committee and flatter ourselves the result will be favorable: P.S. We shall probably decide on thursday or friday next when our numbers will amount to about 363.”

With greatest esteem & attachment I am Dear Sir, Yr. Obedt. & Affee servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from John Fitch, 11 February 1788
From: Fitch, John
To: Madison, James

Honoured Sir
New York the 11 February 1788
I was with Mr. Thompson the other day who informed me that he should report my petition ought to be committed but that he did not think that Congress would at this time do any thing in it. I beg leave Sir to enclose you some further observations on it praying not only your patronage but also that you will forgive the freedom taken by your ever Faithful Humble Servant
John Fitch


Title: The Federalist Number 54, [12 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[12 February 1788]
The next view which I shall take of the house of representatives, relates to the apportionment of its members to the several states, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended that the number of people in each state ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each state. The establishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases, a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the states, it is evidently the least exceptionable among the practicable rules; and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said: But does it follow from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens, as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.
We subscribe to the doctrine, might one of our southern brethren observe, that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities; being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects, as property. In being compelled to labor not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty, and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals, which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected on the other hand in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labour and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others; the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society; not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal constitution therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixt character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.
This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the Convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants when the shares of representation were to be calculated; and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected that the southern states would concur in a system which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprize also be expressed that those who reproach the southern states with the barbarous policy of considering as property, a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend that the government to which all the states are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more compleatly in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain?
It may be replied perhaps that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the states possessing them. They neither vote themselves, nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle then ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the constitution would in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to, as the proper guide.
This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several states is to be determined by a federal rule founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each state is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants, as the state itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend, are not perhaps the same in any two states. In some of the states the difference is very material. In every state a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the state, who will be included in the census by which the federal constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view, the southern states might retort the complaint, by insisting, that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular states towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves as inhabitants should have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who by the policy of other states, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence however, to this principle, is waved by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is, that equal moderation be shewn on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the slave as divested of two fifths of the man.
After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the constitution will admit of a still more ready defence? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of the states, and particularly in the state of New-York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal constitution this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought therefore to be paid to property in the choice of those hands.
For another reason the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each state, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the states. States have not, like individuals, an influence over each other arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation, very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A state possesses no such influence over other states. It is not probable that the richest state in the confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other state. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer states, possess any other advantage in the federal legislature over the representatives of other states, than what may result from their superior number alone; as far therefore as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new constitution is in this respect materially different from the existing confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual states. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller state, or a state more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy; in the same manner as the votes individually given in a state legislature, by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes.
Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the southern interests might employ on this subject: And although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet on the whole, I must confess, that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation, which the convention have established.
In one respect the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the congress, will necessarily depend in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not the co-operation of the states, it is of great importance that the states should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the states will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other; and produce the requisite impartiality.
Publius.


Title: To James Madison from Benjamin Hawkins, 14 February 1788
From: Hawkins, Benjamin
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
Warrenton 14th Feby. 1788.
A neighbour of mine who is a Wheelwright called last sunday to see me; he told me he had been reading for some days past the New-Constitution, and Richard Henry Lee’s letter, and he wished me to answer him some questions. They were the following literally
Is Mr. Lee thought to be a great man?
Is he not a proud passionate man?
Was he one of the Convention?
Could it be from Ignorance or design that he declares Virginia has but a thirteenth vote in the election of a president. For I who am illiterate saw at the first reading he was rong?
Is he fond of popularity?
Is he an enemy to General Washington and Docr. Franklin?
I informed you from Tarborough, of the time appointed for the election, and enacting of our Convention. I believe the Constitution is daily gaining friends, as far as I have been able to know, it is certain, that the honest part of the community whether merchants or planters, are for it. People in debt, and of dishonesty and cunning in their transactions are against it, this will apply universally to those of this class who have been members of the legislature. If you or our friend Mr. Jefferson should publish any thing upon it, I wish you would send it to me, this you can readily do by the Post to Petersburg. Addresse to me in Warrenton via Petersburg. Adieu & god bless you!
B: H:


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 14 February 1788
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 14th: Febry. 1788
From Fredericksburg I informed you of the issue of my endeavours to procure the Crab tree scyons. On my return to Richmond I found the chart of James River in the state it was when I left that place. Mr. Lambert says after waiting sometime in expectation of hearing from Harris respecting the canal he at length finding he did not call on him rode to his House but was disappointed in meeting with him. The trace of the canal is noted on the Map but some descriptive notes are wanting to make it more compleat, these I am in hopes I shall obtain Tomorow from Mr. Harris who I have just seen and he promises me they shall be left out at his house in the morning shod. business occasion his absence when I call. Col. Heth being soon to set out for N-York I shall, if it is ready, as I expect it will, confide the conveyance and delivery of it to him.
Your two last favors I have received that of the 25th. since my arrival here and am much obliged to you for the communications they contain. S. Adams’s silence as to the N. plan of Government, if not calculated to secure him a seat in the Convention, proceeded very probably from his desire of discovering the temper of the people in General before he took a decided part. This with the admission of Gerry to a seat in the Convention when not a member and the great number that compose the Body are unfavourable circumstances, and authorise a conjecture that the new system will not be adopted by Massts. Should that State give it a negative and not proceed to offer some amendments and propose another convention, I fear it will produce disagreeable consequences, as it will not only confirm N. York in her opposition but will contribute greatly to strengthen the opposition in the States that are yet to consider the measure. If nine States assent before Virga. meets in convention her course I think will be to adopt the plan, protesting or declaring her disapprobation of those parts she does not approve or if not agreed to by nine she will in that case propose amendments and another general Convention. H——y will I think use all his influence to reject at all events, but am satisfied those who are for it as it stands, and those who wish some alterations in it before its adoption if circumstances authorise the attempt, will be greatly the majority. What change may be produced shod. Mass. reject cannot well be foreseen; I think however in that event Virga. will propose amendments, and another Convention, and I trust such will be the conduct of Mass. rather than hazard the loss of the System, and the mischevous consequences that may result from disagreement and delay. I congratulate my friend Griffin on his being placed in the Chair to whom Be pleased to present my best wishes. R——d——h R. H. L. M——n, have been assailed in our papers. The inclosed will if you have not seen them exhibit some specimens, and serve to amuse you. Yr. aff: Servt.
Jos: Jones.


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 15 February 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
N. York Feby. 15. [1788]
I have at length the pleasure to inclose you the favorable result of the Convention at Boston. The amendments are a blemish, but are in the least Offensive form. The minority also is very disagreeably large, but the temper of it is some atonement. I am assured by Mr. King that the leaders of it as well as the members of it in general are in good humour; and will countenance no irregular opposition there or elsewhere. The Convention of N Hampshire is now sitting. There seems to be no question that the issue there will add a seventh pillar, as the phrase now is, to the fœderal Temple. With the greatest respect & attachmt I am Dr. Sir Yrs.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Tench Coxe, 15 February 1788
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Philada. Feb. 15th. 1788
If you thought it worth attention to publish N. 1. of the Pennsylvanian perhaps No. 2, enclosed may also be properly inserted in the same paper. The first was in Hall & Sellers’s of 6th. sent before.
I wish to believe the accot. of the 11th from New York informing of the Adoption by Massachussets on 5th instant—but we wait for the Numbers, the form, the more perfect Certainty. To Morrow I trust will bring it.
Will you take the trouble of mentioning to the hon. Mr. Contee from Maryland that Judge Hanson sent me a large pacquet of Pamphlets for him which I sent on yesterday. Mr. Hanson writes me there is no doubt in Maryland, and tho [he] considers the Opposition in Virga. as very powerful, he says he is well grounded in assuring me of its final Success there.
I am gratified by the Unanimity of Georgia, and by the unanimous Vote of thanks by the Senate of S. Carolina.
I have two letters from gentlemen of very opposite characters, and very differently situated in London, who assure me, one that the Constitution is approved by all the warmest friends of America in England, the other that [it] is in his opinion & all he has conversed with most likely to retrieve the lost Reputation of this Country. Those things are of little really consequence, opposite letters & opinions would have been used to its prejudice here. I shall therefore furnish some extracts to our printers.
I am very troublesome to you, but I can never be so again because I believe Nothing will ever happen again that will furnish so great an Apology. I am with sincere Esteem, Sir, yr. mo. respectf. Servt.
Tench Coxe


Title: The Federalist Number 56, [16 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[16 February 1788]
The second charge against the house of representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it, will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle, that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no farther than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation and the militia.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual state, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.
Taxation will consist in great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the state may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the state. Divide the largest state into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interest in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the state framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every state there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject, which will in many cases leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce them into one general act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information; and it may be expected, that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the states, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation, by the assistance of the state codes, we need only suppose for a moment, that this or any other state were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labour would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labours of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each state will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts; but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members of the state legislature, where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organization, movement and discipline, which apply universally.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single state, but of those among different states. Taking each state by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men therefore will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual state, perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole state might be competently represented, by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different states together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives therefore from each state may bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other states. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different states, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the states taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the states are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry, which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These however will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require on the part of each state a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.
The experience of Great Britain which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these enquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the house of commons, amount to five hundred fifty eight. Of this number one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty four persons, and one hall by five thousand seven hundred and twenty three persons.
   Burgh’s Political Disquisitions.
 It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests, in the legislative councils. On the contrary it is notorious that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore with great propriety be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will however consider them, in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction, to a considerable number of others, who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions two hundred and seventy nine persons only will be the depositary of the safety, interest and happiness of eight millions; that is to say; there will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it; and comparing it with that of the house of representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.

Publius.


Title: To James Madison from James Gordon, Jr., 17 February 1788
From: Gordon, James, Jr.
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
February 17th. 1788
Being favd. by Colo. Monroe with a sight of your letter of the 27 January and finding no mention therein of your being in our county in a short time, [I] take the Liberty as yr. Friend to solicit your attendance at march Orange court. I am induced to make such a request as I believe it will give the county in general great satisfaction to hear your sentiments on the new Constitution. Your Friends are very solicitous for your appointment in the convention to meet in June next. I trust were it not practicable for you to attend your election will be secured, but your being present would not admit a doubt. Colo. Thomas Barbour, Mr. Charles Porter & myself enter the list with you the two former gentlemen are exceedingly averse to the adoption of the constitution in this state and being acquainted with them you will readily determine, no means in their power will be wanting to procure a seat in convention. The sentiments of the people of Orange are much dividid the best men in my judgement are for the constitution but several of those who have much weight with the people are opposed, Parson Bledsoe & Leeland with Colo. Z. Burnley. Upon the whole sir I think it is incumbent on you with out delay, to repair to this state; as the loss of the constitution in this state may involve consequences the most alarming to every citizen of America. I am Dr Sir yr. Most Obt Sr
Jas Gordon Jun


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 17 February 1788
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 17th. Febry 1788.
Col. Heth came to Town and proceeded on his journey sooner than I expected and before I had an opportunity of seeing Mr. Harris. After calling upon him and geting the survey of the Canal I found little information could be collected from it and inserted on the map. I have therefore sent what Mr. Lambert had executed by Col. Henley who I understand means to go on Tomorow and has promised to deliver it safe to you. Some notes respecting the canal obtained from Mr. Harris’s information I send inclosed. They may be usefull if any thing beyond the labour of Mr. Lambert is intended.
We anxiously wait for the decision of the Masstts: convention—turn as it may the deliberations of the States yet to meet will be greatly affected by what shall be determined by that Body. Davis’s next paper will I expect contain another publication under the signature of Cassius agt. R H. L. You shall have it if printed. The plain dealer is suspected from the manuscript to come from essex R——ne. Pray do not fail to keep me informed from time to time of the proceedings of the States in the important business of the new government as they shall come to your knowledge. Yr. friend & Servt
Jos: Jones.
PS. I am well informed Col. Pendleton and Col. James Taylor will come from Caroline. H——y is preaching to the people in some of the Southern Counties.


Title: To James Madison from John Dawson, 18 February 1788
From: Dawson, John
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
Frdksburg. Feby 18. 1788.
It is now several months since I was honord with a letter from you. During the recess of Congress, while your attention was not closely confind to public business, and while the situation of the Union must have furnishd you with daily information which woud have been interesting to you, I flatterd myself you woud not have neglected your friend.
The approaching elections are the subject of general conversation in this state at this time, and uncommon exertions are made by all parties to have elected those persons whose sentiments agree with their own. In Orange I am inform’d there are three candadates, besides yourself, and that the election is very doubtful, as two of the Gentlemen, Barber and Porter, have declard their opposition to the proposd Goverment. I must therefore join your other friends and intreat your attendance at the election. Mr. Mason will probably be returnd for Stafford, as the people have signd a petition and sent it to him, requesting his services. He is however warmly opposd by Colo Carter and Mr. Fitzhugh. There is scarce a doubt but Mr. Randolph will be elected in Henrico, altho “the plain Dealer” thinks he ought not to be, as you will observe by the enclosd paper. Mr. Jones offers for King George. His election is doubtful. In this county the candadates are Genl. Spotswood, Mr. Page Mr. Monroe and my self. It is impossible to say who will be elected. The contest will probably be between the three last mentiond.
Never perhaps was a state more divided than Virginia is on the new Constitution. Its fate appears to hang in a great measure on the decision of Massachusetts bay. Shoud the convention of that state adjourn without doing any thing decisive, or shoud amendments be proposd, I think, Virginia will go hand in hand with her. Shoud she adopt, I cannot say what will be done. But shoud nine states agree to it in toto, I apprehend there will be a decided majority in this state for accepting it. Whatever the event may be I sincerely pray that my countrymen may act with moderation, altho I very much doubt it, and that they may weigh the subject with that coolness and impartiality, which its importance requires. With much respect and esteem, I am, dear sir Your Friend & hm: Sert.
J Dawson


Title: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 19 February 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Dear Sir
New York Feby. 19. 1788
By the Count de Moustier I received your favour of the 8th. of October. I recd. by his hands also the watch which you have been so good as to provide for me, and for which I beg you to accept my particular thanks. During the short trial I have made, she goes with great exactness. Since the arrival of the Count de Moustier, I have recd. also by the Packet Mr. Calonne’s publication for myself, and a number of the Mercure’s for Mr. Banister. The bearer was a Mr. Stuart. I had a conveyance to Mr. Banister a few days after the Mercure’s came to hand.
The Public here continues to be much agitated by the proposed fœderal Constitution and to be attentive to little else. At the date of my last Delaware Pennsylvania and New Jersey had adopted it. It has been since adopted by Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachussetts. In the first the minority consisted of 40 against 127. In Georgia the adoption was unanimous. In Massachussetts the conflict was tedious and the event extremely doubtful. On the final question the vote stood 187 against 168; a majority of 19 only being in favor of the Constitution. The prevailing party comprized however all the men of abilities, of property, and of influence. In the opposite multitude there was not a single character capable of uniting their wills or directing their measures. It was made up partly of deputies from the province of Maine who apprehended difficulties from the New Government to their scheme of separation, partly of men who had espoused the disaffection of Shay’s; and partly of ignorant and jealous men, who had been taught or had fancied that the Convention at Philada. had entered into a conspiracy against the liberties of the people at large, in order to erect an aristocracy for the rich the well-born, and the men of Education. They had no plan whatever. They looked no farther than to put a negative on the Constitution and return home. The amendments as recommended by the Convention, were as I am well informed not so much calculated for the minority in the Convention, on whom they had little effect, as for the people of the State. You will find the amendments in the Newspapers which are sent from the office of foreign Affairs. It appears from a variety of circumstances that disappointment had produced no asperity in the minority, and that they will probably not only acquiesce in the event, but endeavour to reconcile their constituents to it. This was the public declaration of several who were called the leaders of the party. The minority of Connecticut behaved with equal moderation. That of Pennsylvania has been extremely intemperate and continues to use a very bold and menacing language. Had the decision in Massachussetts been adverse to the Constitution, it is not improbable that some very violent measures would have followed in that State. The cause of the inflamation however is much more in their State factions, than in the system proposed by the Convention. New Hampshire is now deliberating on the Constitution. It is generally understood that an adoption is a matter of certainty. South Carolina & Maryland have fixed on April or May for their Conventions. The former it is currently said will be one of the ratifying States. Mr. Chace and a few others will raise a considerable opposition in the latter. But the weight of personal influence is on the side of the Constitution, and the present expectation is that the opposition will be outnumbered by a great majority. This State is much divided in its sentiment. Its Convention is to be held in June. The decision of Massts. will give the turn in favor of the Constitution unless an idea should prevail or the fact should appear, that the voice of the State is opposed to the result of its Convention. North Carolina has put off her Convention till July. The State is much divided it is said. The temper of Virginia, as far as I can learn, has undergone but little change of late. At first there was an enthusiasm for the Constitution. The tide next took a sudden and strong turn in the opposite direction. The influence and exertions of Mr. Henry, and Col. Mason and some others will account for this. Subsequent information again represented the Constitution as regaining in some degree its lost ground. The people at large have been uniformly said to be more friendly to the Constitution than the Assembly. But it is probable that the dispersion of the latter will have a considerable influence on the opinions of the former. The previous adoption of nine States must have a very persuasive effect on the minds of the opposition, though I am told that a very bold language is held by Mr. H——y and some of his partizans. Great stress is laid on the self-sufficiency of that State; and the prospect of external props is alluded to.
Congress have done no business of consequence yet, nor is it probable that much more of any sort will precede the event of the great question before the public.
The Assembly of Virginia have passed the district Bill of which I formerly gave you an account. There are 18 districts, with 4 new Judges, Mr. Gabl Jones, Richd. Parker, St. George Tucker and Jos. Prentis. They have reduced much the taxes, and provided some indulgences for debtors. The question of British debts underwent great vicicitudes. It was after long discussion resolvd. by a majority of 30 agst. the utmost exertions of Mr. Henry that they sd. be paid as soon as the other States sd. have complied with the treaty. A few days afterwards he carried his point by a majority of 50 that G.B. should first comply. Adieu Yrs. Affety.
Js. Madison Jr
P.S. Mr. St. John has given me a very interisting description of a System of Nature lately published at Paris—will you add it for me. The Boxes which were to have come for myself G. W. & A. D. &c have not yet arrived.