Title: Enclosure: Answers to Questions Proposed by the President of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury, [15 September 1790]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, September 15, 1790]
Answers to Questions proposed by The President of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Question the first
“What should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?”
Answer
In order to a right judgment of what ought to be done in such case, it may be of use previously to consider the following points.
First. Whether there be a right to refuse or consent, as shall be thought most for the interest of the United States.
Secondly. The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent.
Thirdly. The motives to the one or to the other.
As to the first point, if it were to be determined upon principle only, without regard to precedents, or opinions, there would seem to be no room for hesitation about the right to refuse. The exc[l]usive jurisdiction, which every independent Nation has over its own territory appears to involve in it the right of prohibiting to all others the use of that territory in any way disagreeable to itself, and more especially for any purpose of war, which always implies a degree of danger and inconvenience: with the exception only of cases of necessity.
And if the United States were in a condition to do it, without material hazard, there would be strong inducements to their adopting it as a general rule never to grant a passage for a voluntary expedition of one power against another, unless obliged to it by treaty.
But the present situation of the United States is too little favourable to encountering hazards, to authorise attempts to establish rules, however eligible in themselves, which are repugnant to the received maxims or usages of Nations.
It is therefore necessary to inquire what those maxims or usages enjoin in the case suggested.
With regard to usage it has been far from uniform. There are various instances in ancient and modern times of similar permissions being demanded; many in which they have been granted; others in which they have been refused and the refusal acquiesced in; but perhaps more in which, when refused, a passage has been forced—and the doing it has often been deemed justifiable.
Opinions are not more harmonious. Among those who may be considered as authorities on such subjects, Puffendorf and Barbeyrac confine within narrow limits the right of passage through neutral territories; while Grotius and Vatel, particularly the former, allow to it greater latitude. Puffendorff treats it not as a natural right but as derived from compact or concession; especially when the enemy of a neighbouring state desires leave to march troops through a neutral Country against its neighbour. For it seems (says he) to be a part of the duty which we owe to our neighbours, especially such as have been kind and friendly, not to suffer any hostile power to march through our Country to their prejudice; provided we can hinder the design with no great inconvenience to ourselves. And as it may have a tendency to make our own Country the theatre of the war (since the power intended to be attacked may justifiably march within our limits to meet the approaching enemy) he concludes that it is the safest way of acting in such case, if we can do it, without any considerable prejudice to our own affairs to deny the enemy passage, and actually to oppose him, if he endeavour to force it without our consent. But if we are either too weak to hinder his progress or must on this score engage in a dangerous war, he admits, that the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbour.

Examples, he adds, have little force in the decision of this question. For, generally, as people have been stronger or weaker, they have required passage with modesty or with confidence, and have in like manner granted or refused it to others.

   Puffendorffs Law of Nature & Nations page 239, 240

Barbeyrac in his commentary on Grotius is still stronger against the right of passage.

   Note 1 on Book II Chapt II § XIII

 He affirms that even though we have nothing to apprehend from those who desire a passage, we are not therefore obliged in rigour to grant it. It necessarily follows (says he) from the right of property, that the proprietor may refuse another the use of his goods. Humanity indeed requires that he should grant that use to those who stand in need of it, when it can be done without any considerable inconvenience to himself; but if he even then refuses it, though he transgresses his duty, he does them no wrong, properly so called; except they are in extreme necessity, which is superior to all ordinary rules. Thus far and no further extends the reserve with which it is supposed the establishment of property is accompanied.
Grotius on the other hand, expresses himself thus.

   Rights of War & Peace, Book II Chap II § XIII No. 1. 2. 3. 4.

 A free passage ought to be granted to persons where just occasion shall require, over any lands or rivers, or such parts of the sea as belong to any nation; and after enumerating several examples in support of his position, he concludes that the middle opinion is best, to wit, that the liberty of passing ought first to be demanded, and if denied may be claimed by force. Neither (says he) can it be reasonably objected that there may be suspicion of danger from the passing of a multitude; for one man’s right is not diminished by another man’s fear. Nor is the fear of provoking that prince against whom he that desires to pass is engaged in a just war, a sufficient reason for refusing him passage. Nor is it any more an excuse that he may pass another way; for this is what every body may equally allege, and so this right of passing would be entirely destroyed. But ’tis enough that the passage be requested without any fraud or ill design, by the nearest and most convenient way. If indeed, he who desires to pass undertakes an unjust war, or if he brings people who are my enemies along with him, I may deny him a passage; for in this case I have a right to meet and oppose him, even in his own land, and to intercept his march. Thus it would seem to be the opinion of Grotius that a party engaged in a just war has a right, of course, to a passage through a neutral territory, which can scarcely, if at all, be denied him, even on the score of danger or inconvenience to the party required to grant it.
But Vatel, perhaps the most accurate and approved of the writers on the laws of Nations, preserves a mean between these different opinions. This is the sum of what he advances—

   Book III Chap VII § 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

“That an innocent passage is due to all nations, with whom a state is at peace, for troops equally with individuals; and to annoy as well as to avoid an enemy. That the party asking and the party asked are both, in different degrees, judges of the question when innocent? That where the party asked has good reasons for refusing, he is not under any obligation to grant, and in doubtful cases his judgment ought to be definitive; but in evident ones, or those in which the harmlessness of the passage is manifest, the party asking may, in the last resort, judge for himself, and after demand and refusal may force his way. That, nevertheless, as it is very difficult for the passage of a powerful army to be absolutely innocent, and still more difficult for its innocence to be apparent, a refusal ought to be submitted to, except in those very rare cases, when it can be shewn in the most palpable manner, that the passage required is absolutely without danger or inconvenience. And lastly that this right of passage is only due in a war not manifestly unjust.”
Perhaps the only inference to be drawn from all this is, that there exists in the practice of nations and the dogmas of political writers a certain vague pretension to a right of passage in particular cases, and according to circumstances, which is sufficient to afford to the strong a pretext for claiming and exercising it, when it suits their interests, and to render it always dangerous to the weak to refuse, and, sometimes not less so, to grant it.
It is, nevertheless, a proper enquiry, whether a refusal could be placed on such ground as would give no reasonable cause of umbrage to the party refused, and as in the eye of the world would justify it.
Against the propriety of a refusal are the following circumstances; that there is no connection between us and Spain, which obliges us to it: That the passage asked will be down rivers, and for the most part through an uninhabited wilderness; whence no injury to our citizens or settlements will be to be apprehended: And that the number of troops to be marched, especially considering the route, will probably not be such as in their own account, to be a serious cause of alarm. These circumstances may give our refusal the complexion of partiality to Spain and of indisposition towards Britain which may be represented as a deviation from the spirit of exact neutrality.
In support of the propriety of a refusal, the following is the only assignable reason: That it is safer for us, to have two powerful, but rival nations, bordering upon our two extremities, than to have one powerful nation pressing us on both sides and in capacity, hereafter, by posts and settlements, to invelop our whole interior frontier.
The good offices of Spain in the late war; the danger of the seduction of our Western inhabitants; the probable consequences to the trade of the Atlantic States; are considerations rather to be contemplated, as motives, than alleged, as reasons.
The first reason, however, is of a nature to satisfy the mind of the justice of a refusal; admitting the authority of the more moderate opinions, which have been cited. And the danger, too, upon the supposition of which it is founded, appears to be obvious enough, to vindicate it in the opinion of the disinterested part of Mankind; little likely as it may be to engage the acquiescence of the party whose wishes would be thwarted by the refusal. It deserves notwithstanding to be noticed on this point, that the ground of dissent would not result from the thing itself, that is the mere passage, but from the nature of the acquisition, to which it would give facility. This circumstance may somewhat obscure the clearness of the conclusion that there is a perfect right to refuse.
But upon the whole there does not appear to be room enough for a scruple about the right, to deter from refusal, if upon examination it shall be found expedient.
Does the right of consenting to the passage stand upon ground equally unexceptionable?
This question Vatel answers in the following manner—

   Vatel Book III Chap VII Section 127

 “When I have no reason to refuse the passage, the party against whom it is granted has no room for complaint, much less for making it a pretence for war; since I did no more than what the law of nations enjoins. Neither has he any right to require, that I should deny the passage, because he is not to hinder me from doing what I think is agreeable to my duty, and even on occasion when I might with justice deny the passage, it is allowable in me not to make use of my right; especially when I should be obliged to support my refusal by my sword. Who will take upon him to complain of my having permitted the war to be carried into his own country rather than draw it on myself? It cannot be expected, that I should take up arms in his favour, unless obliged to it by a Treaty.” And Puffendorff admits, as has been before noted, that if we are either too weak to hinder his progress or must on that score engage in a dangerous war, the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbour.
Nothing need be added to reasoning so perspicuous and convincing. It does not admit of a moment’s doubt as a general rule that a neutral state, unfettered by any stipulation, is not bound to expose itself to a war, merely to shelter a neighbour from the approaches of its enemy. It remains to examine, if there are any circumstances, in our particular case, capable of forming an exception to that rule.
It is not to be forgotten that we received from France, in our late revolution, essential succour, and from Spain valuable countenance, and some direct aid. It is also to be remembered that France is the intimate ally of Spain, and that there subsists a connection by treaty between the former power and the United States.
It might thence be alleged that obligations of Gratitude towards those powers require that we should run some risk, rather than concur in a thing prejudicial to either of them, and particularly in favour of that very nation against which they assisted us. And the natural impulse of every good heart will second the proposition, ’till reason has taught it, that refinements of this kind are to be indulged with caution, in the affairs of Nations.
Gratitude is a word the very sound of which imposes something like respect. Where there is even an appearance upon which the claim to it can be founded, it can seldom be a pleasing task to dispute that claim. But where a word may become the basis of a political system, affecting the essential interests of the state, it is incumbent upon those who have any concern in the public administration, to appreciate its true import and application.
It is necessary then to reflect, however painful the reflection, that gratitude is a duty or sentiment which between nations can rarely have any solid foundation. Gratitude is only due to a kindness or service, the predominant object of which is the interest or benefit of the party to whom it is performed. Where the interest or benefit of the party performing is the predominant cause of it, however there may result a debt, in cases in which there is not an immediate adequate and reciprocal advantage, there can be no room for the sentiment of gratitude. Where there is such an advantage there is then not even a debt. If the motive to the act, instead of being the benefit of the party to whom it is done, should be a compound of the interest of the party doing it and of detriment to some other, of whom he is the enemy or the rival, there is still less room for so noble and refined a sentiment. This analysis will serve as a test of our true situation, in regard both to France and Spain.
It is not to be doubted that the part which the Courts of France and Spain took in our quarrel with Great Britain is to be attributed, not to an attachment to our independence or liberty but to a desire of diminishing the power of Great Britain by severing the British empire. This they considered as an interest of very great magnitude to them. In this their calculations and their passions conspired. For this, they united their arms with ours and encountered the expences and perils of war. This has been accomplished; the advantages of it are mutual; and so far the account is ballanced.
In the progress of the war

   France has made us one loan since the peace.

 they lent us money as necessary to its success and during our inability to pay they have foreborn to press us for it. The money we ought to exert ourselves to repay with interest, and as well for the loan of it, as for the forbearance to urge the repayment of the sums, which have become due, we ought always to be ready to make proportionate acknowledgements and, when opportunities shall offer returns answerable to the nature of the service.
Let it be added to this, that the conduct of France in the manner of affording her aid bore the marks of a liberal policy. She did not endeavour to extort from us, as the price of it any disadvantageous or humiliating concessions. In this respect however she may have been influenced by an enlightened view of her own interest, she intitled herself to our esteem and good will. These dispositions towards her ought to be cherished and cultivated but they are very distinct from a spirit of romantic gratitude calling for sacrifices of our substantial interests; preferences inconsistent with sound policy; or complaisances incompatible with our safety.
The conduct of Spain towards us presents a picture far less favourable. The direct aid we received from her during the war was inconsiderable in itself, and still more inconsiderable compared with her faculty of aiding us. She refrained from acknowleging our independence—has never acceded to the Treaty of Commerce made with France, though a right of doing it was reserved to her, nor made any other Treaty with us. She has maintained possessions within our acknowleged limits without our consent. She perseveringly obstructs our sharing in the navigation of the Mississippi, though it is a privilege essential to us, and to which we consider ourselves as having an indisputable title. And perhaps it might be added upon good ground that she has not scrupled to intrigue with leading individuals in the Western Country to seduce them from our interests and to attach them to her own.
Spain therefore must be regarded upon the whole as having slender claims to peculiar good will from us. There is certainly nothing that authorises her to expect we should expose ourselves to any extraordinary jeopardy for her sake. And to conceive that any considerations relative to France ought to be extended to her would be to set up a doctrine altogether new in politics. The ally of our ally has no claim, as such, to our friendship. We may have substantial grounds of dissatisfaction against him, and act in consequence of them, even to open hostility, without derogating in any degree from what we owe to our ally.
This is so true, that if a war should really ensue between Great Britain and Spain, and if the latter should persist in excluding us from the Mississippi (taking it for granted our claim to share in its navigation is well founded) there can be no reasonable ground of doubt that we should be at liberty, if we thought it our interest, consistently with our present engagements with France, to join Britain against Spain.
How far it might be expedient to place ourselves in a situation which in case France should eventually become a party in the war, might entangle us in opposite duties on the score of the stipulated guarantee of her West India possessions, or might have a tendency to embroil us with her would be a mere question of prudential and liberal calculation, which would have nothing to do with the right of taking side against Spain.
These are truths necessary to be contemplated with freedom, because it is impossible to foresee what events may spring up, or whither our interests may point; and it is very important to distinguish with accuracy, how far we are bound, and where we are free.
However vague the obligations of gratitude may be between Nations, those of good faith are precise and determinate. Within their true limits, they can hardly be held too sacred. But by exagerating them, or giving them a fanciful extension, they would be in danger of losing their just force. This would be converting them into fetters which a nation would ere long become impatient to break, as consistent neither with its prosperity, nor its safety. Hence while it is desireable to maintain with fidelity our engagements to France, it is adviseable on all occasions to be aware, that they oblige us to nothing towards Spain.
From this view of the subject there does not appear any circumstance in our case capable of forming an exception to the general rule; and as it is certain that there can hardly be a situation less adapted to war than that in which we now find ourselves, we can with the greatest sincerity offer the most satisfactory excuse to Spain for not witholding our consent if our own interests do not decide us to a contrary course. The conclusion from what has been said is, that there is a right either to refuse or consent as shall be judged for the Interest of the United States; though the right to consent is less questionable than that to refuse.
The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent present themselves next to consideration. Those of consent shall be first examined.
An increase of the means of annoying us, in the same hands is a certain ill consequence of the acquisition of the Floridas and Louisiana by the British. This will result not only from contiguity to a greater part of our territory but from the increased facility of acquiring an undivided influence over all the Indian tribes inhabiting within the borders of the United States.
Additional danger of the dismemberment of the Western Country is another ill consequence to be apprehended from that acquisition. This will arise as well from the greater power of annoying us, as from the different policy, which it is likely would be pursued by that nation, if in possession of the key to the only outlet for the productions of that Country. Instead of shutting, they would probably open the door to its inhabitants, and by conciliating their good will on the one hand, and making them sensible on the other of their dependence on them for the continuance of so essential an advantage they might hold out to them the most powerful temptation to a desertion of their connection with the rest of the United States. The avarice and ambition of individuals may be made to cooperate in favour of these views.
A third ill consequence of that acquisition would be material injury in time to come to the Commerce of the Atlantic states. By rendering New Orleans the emporium of the products of the Western Country, Britain would at a period, not very distant have little occasion for supplies of provisions for their Islands from the Atlantic States; and for their European Market they would derive from the same source copious supplies of Tobacco and other articles now furnished by the Southern States: Whence a great diminution of the motives to establish liberal terms of Commercial Intercourse with the United States collectively.
These consequences are all expressed or implied in the form of the Question stated by the President. And as far as our consent can be supposed likely to have influence upon the event they constitute powerful objections to giving it.
If even it should be taken for granted that our consent or refusal would have no influence either way, it would not even then cease to be disagreeable to concur in a thing apparently so inauspicious to our interests. And it deserves attention, that our concurrence might expose us to the imputation either of want of foresight to discover a danger or of vigour to withstand it.
But there is almost always in such cases a comparison of evils; and the point of prudence is to make choice of that course which threatens the fewest or the least, or sometimes the least certain. The consequences of refusal are therefore to be weighed against those of consent.
It seems to be a matter taken for granted by the writers upon the subject, that a refusal ought to be accompanied with a resolution to support it if necessary by the sword or in other words, to oppose the passage if attempted to be forced, or to resent the injury, if circumstances should not permit an effectual opposition. This indeed is implied in the nature of the thing; for to what purpose refuse, unless it be intended to make good the refusal? Or how avoid disgrace, if our territories are suffered to be violated with impunity, after a formal and deliberate prohibition of passage?
There are cases in which a nation may without ignominy wink at infractions of its rights; but this does not appear to be one of them. After having been asked its permission and having refused it, the presumption will be that it has estimated the consequences, calculated its means, and is prepared to assert and uphold its rights. If the contrary of this should turn out to be its conduct, it must bring itself into contempt for inviting insult which it was unable to repel, and manifesting ill will towards a power whom it durst not resist. As on the one hand, there cannot be conceived to be a greater outrage than to pass through our country, in defiance of our declared disapprobation, so on the other there cannot be a greater humiliation than to submit to it.
The consequence therefore of refusal if not effectual must be absolute disgrace or immediate war. This appears at least to be the alternative.
Whether a refusal would have the desired effect is at best problematical. The presumption perhaps, is, that Great Britain will have adverted to the possibility of it; and if under the uncertainty of what would be our conduct she should still have resolved on prosecuting the enterprise through our territory, that she will at the same time have resolved, either to ask no questions or to disregard our dissent. It is not unlikely, that the reasoning of the British Cabinet will have been to this effect. If the United States have no predilection for Spain, or if their views of their own interest are not opposed to the acquisition we meditate they will not withhold their consent; if either the one, or the other be the case, it ought to be determined before hand, whether their enmity be a greater evil, than the projected acquisition, a good, and if we do not choose to renounce the one we must be prepared to meet the other.
A further ill-consequence of the refusal, if ineffectual, not wholly destitute of weight is this, that Great Britain would then think herself under less obligation to keep measures with us and would feel herself more at liberty to employ every engine in her power to make her acquisition ⟨as⟩ prejudicial to us as possible; whereas, if no impediment should be thrown in the way by us, more good humour may beget greater moderation, and in the progress of things, concessions securing us may be made as the price of our future neutrality. An explicit recognition of our right to navigate the Mississippi to and from the Ocean with the possession of New Orleans, would greatly mitigate the causes of apprehension from the conquest of the Floridas by the British.
The consequences of refusal or consent constitute leading motives to the one or to the other; which now claim a more particular discussion.
It has been seen that the ill effects to be apprehended from the conquest of the Spanish territories in our neighbourhood, are an increase of the means, whereby we may be hereafter annoyed, and of the danger of the separation of the Western Country from the rest of the Union and a further interference with the trade of the Atlantic States, in a manner too not conducive to the general weal.
As far as there is a prospect that a refusal would be an impediment to the enterprize, the considerations which have been mentioned afford the strongest inducements to it. But if that effect of it be doubtful, the force of these inducements is proportionably diminished; if improbable, it nearly ceases. The prospect in this case, would be that a refusal would aggravate instead of preventing the evil it was intended to obviate. And it must be acknowleged that the success of it is at least very doubtful.
The consideration that our assent may be construed into want of foresight or want of vigour, though not to be disregarded, would not be sufficient to justify our risking a war in our present situation. The cogent reasons we have to avoid a war are too obvious and intelligible, not to furnish an explanation of and an apology for our conduct in this respect.
Whatever may be the calculations with regard to the probable effect of a refusal, it ought to be predicated upon the supposition, that it may not be regarded, and accompanied with a determination to act as a proper attention to national dignity would in such an event dictate. This would be to make war.
For it is a sound maxim, that a state had better hazard any calamities than submit tamely to absolute disgrace.
Now it is manifest, that a Government scarcely ever had stronger motives to avoid war, than that of the United States, at the present juncture. They have much to dread from war; much to expect from peace; something to hope from negotiation, in case of a rupture between Britain and Spain.
We are but just recovering from the effects of a long arduous and exhausting war. The people but just begin to realise the sweets of repose. We are vulnerable both by water and land without either fleet or army. We have a considerable debt in proportion to the resources which the state of things permits the government to command. Measures have been recently entered upon for the restoration of Credit, which a war could hardly fail to disconcert, and which if disturbed would be fatal to the means of prosecuting it. Our national government is in its infancy. The habits and dispositions of our people are ill suited to those liberal contributions to the treasury, which a war would necessarily exact. There are causes which render war in this country more expensive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on than in any other. There is a general disinclination to it in all classes. The theories of the speculative and the feelings of all are opposed to it. The support of public opinion (perhaps more essential to our government than to any other) could only be looked for in a war evidently resulting from necessity.
These are general reasons against going into war. There are others of a more particular kind. To the people at large the quarrel would be apt to have the appearance of having originated in a desire of shielding Spain from the arms of Britain. There are several classes of men to whom this idea would not be agreeable, especially if the Dutch were understood to be in conjunction with the British. All those who were not friendly to our late revolution would certainly dislike it. Most of the descendants of the Dutch would be unfriendly to it. And let it not be overlooked, that there is still a considerable proprotion of those who were firm friends to the Revolution who retain prepossessions in favour of Englishmen, and prejudices against Spaniards.
In a popular government especially, however prejudices like these may be regretted, they are not to be excluded from political calculations.
It ought also to be taken into account, that by placing ourselves at this time in a situation to go to war against Great Britain we embark with the weakest party—with a total uncertainty what accession of strength may be gained—and without making any terms, with regard either to succour, indemnity or compensation.
France is the only weight which can be thrown into the scale capable of producing an equilibrium. But her accession however probable ought not to be deemed absolutely certain. The predominant party there may choose to avoid war as dangerous to their own power. And if even obstacles should not arise from that quarter, it cannot be foreseen to what extent France will be in condition to make efforts. The great body of malcontents comprehending a large proportion of the most wealthy and formerly the most influential class; the prodigious innovations which have been made—the general and excessive fermentation which has been excited in the minds of the people, the character of the Prince, or the nature of the government likely to be instituted, as far as can be judged prior to an experiment, does not prognosticate much order or vigour in the affairs of that country for a considerable period to come.
It is possible indeed that the enthusiasm which the transition from Slavery to Liberty may inspire, may be a substitute for the energy of a good administration, and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions of enthusiasm must ever be a precarious reliance. And it is quite as possible that the greatness, and perhaps immaturity, of that transition may prolong licentiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may happen in France must be unusually fallible; not merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change, which has been wrought in the situation of the people.
These considerations are additional admonitions to avoid as far as possible any step that may embroil us with Great Britain. It seems evidently our true policy to cultivate neutrality. This at least is the ground on which we ought to stand, until we can see more of the scene, and can have secured the means of changing it with advantage.
We have objects which in such a conjuncture are not to be neglected. The Western posts, on one side, and the navigation of the Mississippi, on the other, call for a vigilant attention to what is going on. They are both of importance. The securing of the latter may be regarded in its consequences as essential to the unity of the Empire.
But it is not impossible if war takes place, that by a judicious attention to favourable moments we may accomplish both, by negotiation. The moment however we became committed on either side the advantages of our position for negotiation would be gone. They would even be gone in respect to the party, with whom we were in cooperation; for being once in the war we could not make terms as the condition of entering into it.
Though it may be uncertain how long we shall be permitted to preserve our neutrality; that is not a sufficient reason for departing from it voluntarily. It is possible we may be permitted to persist in it throughout. And if we must renounce it, it is better it should be from necessity than choice; at least ’till we see a prospect of renouncing, with safety and profit. If the government is forced into a war, the chearful support of the people may be counted upon. If it brings it upon itself, it will have to struggle with their displeasure and reluctance. This difference alone is immense!
The desire of manifesting amity to Spain, from the supposition, that our permanent interest is concerned in cementing an intimate connection with France and Spain ought to have no influence in the case. Admitting the existence of such an interest, it ought not to hurry us into premature hazards. If it should finally induce us to become a party, it will be time enough, when France has become such and after we shall have adjusted the conditions, upon which we are to engage.
But the reality of such an interest is a thing about which the best and the ablest men of this country are far from being agreed. There are of this number, who, if the United States were at perfect liberty, would prefer an intimate connection between them and Great Britain as most conducive to their security and advantage; and who are of opinion, that it will be wise to cultivate friendship between that country and this, to the utmost extent which is reconcileable with the faith of existing engagements: While the most general opinion is, that it is our true policy, to steer as clear as possible of all foreign connection, other than commercial and in this respect to cultivate intercourse with all the world on the broadest basis of reciprocal privilege.
An attentive consideration of the vicissitudes which have attended the friendships of nations, except in a very few instances, from very peculiar circumstances, gives little countenance to systems which proceed on the supposition of a permanent interest to prefer a particular connection. The position of the United States, detached as they are from Europe admonishes them to unusual circumspection on that point. The same position, as far as it has relation to the possessions of European powers in their Vicinity, strengthens the admonition.
Let it be supposed, that Spain retains her possessions on our right, and persists in the policy she has hitherto pursued without the slightest symptom of relaxation of barring the Mississippi against us, where must this end, and at a period not very distant? Infallibly in a War with Spain, or separation of the Western Country. This Country must have an outlet for its commodities. This is essential to its prosperity, and if not procured to it by the United States must be had at the expence of the Connection with them. A war with Spain, when our affairs will have acquired greater consistency and order, will certainly be to be preferred to such an alternative. In an event of this sort we should naturally seek aid from Great Britain. This would probably involve France on the opposite side, and effect a revolution in the state of our foreign politics.
In regard to the possessions of Great Britain on our left, it is at least problematical, whether the acquisition of them will ever be desireable to the United States. It is certain that they are in no shape essential to our prosperity. Except therefore the detention of our Western posts (an object too of far less consequence than the navigation of the Mississippi) there appears no necessary source of future collission with that power.
This view of the subject manifests, that we may have a more urgent interest to differ with Spain, than with Britain. And that conclusion will become the stronger, if it be admitted, that when we are able to make good our pretensions, we ought not to leave in the possession of any foreign power, the territories at the mouth of the Mississippi, which are to be regarded as the key to it.
While considerations of this nature ought not to weaken the sense, which our Government ought to have of any obligations which good faith shall fairly impose, they ought to inspire caution in adopting a system, which may approximate us too nearly to certain powers, and place us at too great a distance from others. Indeed every system of this kind is liable to the objection, that it has a tendency to give a wrong biass to the Councils of a Nation, and sometimes to make its own interest subservient to that of another.
If the immediate cause of the impending war between Britain and Spain be considered, there cannot be drawn from thence any inducements for our favouring Spain. It is difficult to admit the reasonableness or justice of the pretensions on her part, which occasioned the transaction complained of by Great Britain, and certainly the monopoly, at which those pretensions aim, is intitled to no partiality from any maritime or trading people. Hence considerations, neither of justice nor policy, as they respect the immediate cause of the quarrel, incline us towards Spain.
Putting therefore all considerations of peculiar good will to Spain or of predilection to any particular connection out of the Question, the argument respecting refusal or consent, in the case supposed, seems to stand thus—
The acquisition of the Spanish territories, bordering upon the U States, by Britain, would be dangerous to us. And if there were a good prospect, that our refusal would prevent it, without exposing us to a greater evil, we ought to refuse. But if there be a considerable probability that our refusal would be ineffectual, and if being so, it would involve us in war or disgrace, and if positive disgrace is worse than war, and war, in our present situation, worse, than the chances of the evils, which may befal us, from that acquisition, then the conclusion would be that we ought not to refuse. And this appears to be the true conclusion to be drawn from a comprehensive and accurate view of the subject; though first impressions are on the other side.
These reflections also may be allowed to come in aid of it. Good or evil is seldom as great, in the reality, as in the prospect. The mischiefs we apprehend may not take place. The enterprise, notwithstanding our consent, may fail. The acquisition, if made, may in the progress of things be wrested from its possessors. These if pressed hereafter (and we are willing to accept it) may deem it expedient to purchase our neutrality by a cession to us of that part of the territory in question, which borders on the Mississippi accompanied with a guarantee of the navigation of that river. If nothing of this sort should happen, still the war will necessarily have added millions to the debt of Britain, while we shall be recruiting and increasing our resources and our strength. In such a situation, she will have motives of no inconsiderable force for not provoking our resentment. And a reasonable confidence ought to be reposed in the fidelity of the inhabitants of the Western Country; in their attachment to the Union; in their real interest to remain a part of it, and in their sense of danger from the attempt to separate, which at every hazard ought to be resisted by the United States.
It is also to be kept in view, that the same danger, if not to the same extent, will exist, should the territories in question remain in the hands of Spain.
Besides all this, if a war should even be deemed a less evil than the neighbourhood of the British in the quarter meditated, good policy would still seem to require as before intimated, that we should avoid putting ourselves in a situation to enter into it, till we had stipulated adequate indemnities and considerations for doing so; that we should see a little further into the unravellment of the plot, and be able to estimate what prospect there would be by our interference of obviating the evil. It deserves a reflection, that if those territories have been once wrested from Spain, she will be more tractable to our wishes, and more disposed to make the concessions, which our interests require, than if they never passed into other hands.
A question occurs here whether there be not a middle course between refusal and consent; to wit, the waving an answer by referring the matter to further consideration. But to this there appear to be decisive objections. An evasive conduct in similar cases is never dignified, seldom politic. It would be likely to give satisfaction to neither party—to effect no good—to prevent no ill. By Great Britain, it would probably be considered as equivalent to a refusal—as amounting to connivance by Spain—as an indication of timidity by all the world.
It happens that we have a post on the Wabash, down which River the expedition, it is presumeable, must go. If the Commanding Officer at that post has no orders to the contrary, it will be his duty to interrupt the passage of the British troops; if he does, it would seem necessary for them in order to the safe passage of their boats, with their artillery stores, provisions, and baggage, to take that post. Here then would be a passage through our territory, not only without our permission, but with the capture of a post of ours; which would be in effect making war upon us. And thus silence, with less dignity, would produce the same ill consequence, as refusal.
If to avoid this, private orders were to be sent to the commanding officer of that post not to interrupt the passage, his not being punished for his delinquency would betray the fact and afford proof of connivance.

The true alternative seems to be to refuse or consent: And if the first be preferred to accompany it with an intimation, in terms as free from offence as possible, that dispositions will be made to oppose the passage if attempted to be forced; and, accordingly, as far as practicable to make and execute such dispositions.
If on the contrary consent should be given it may deserve consideration whether it would not be expedient to accompany it with a candid intimation that the expedition is not agreeable to us, but that thinking it expedient to avoid an occasion of controversy, it has been concluded not to withhold assent. There are however objections to this mode. In case of consent an early and frank explanation should be given to Spain.
Question the Second
What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?
If leave should be asked and refused and the enterprise should be prosecuted without it, the manner of treating it has been anticipated, that is the passage if practicable should be opposed, and if not practicable, the outrage should be resented by recourse to arms.
But if the enterprise should be undertaken without asking leave, which is presumed to be the import of the question, then the proper conduct to be observed will depend on the circumstances.
As the passage contemplated would be by water, and almost wholly through an uninhabited part of the Country, over which we have no actual jurisdiction, if it were unaccompanied with any violence to our citizens or posts, it would seem sufficient to be content with remonstrating against it, but in a tone that would not commit us to the necessity of going to war: the objections to which apply with full force here.
But, if as is to be feared will necessarily be the case, our post on the Wabash should be forced, to make good their passage, there seems to be no alternative but to go to war with them; unwelcome as it may be. It seems to be this, or absolute and unqualified humiliation: Which as has been already noticed, is in almost every situation a greater evil than war.
In such an event, it would appear adviseable immediately to convene the Legislature; to take the most vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand of satisfaction; to commence negotiations for alliances; and if satisfaction should be refused to endeavour to punish the aggression by the sword.

Alexander HamiltonSecretary of the Treasury
New York September 15. 1790


Title: Treasury Department Circular to the Commissioners of Loans, 16 September 1790
From: Treasury Department,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Commissioners of Loans

[New York, September 16, 1790. On September 23, 1790, Nathaniel Appleton wrote to Hamilton: “I recd. your circular Letter of 16th Inst.” Circular not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Benjamin Lincoln, 17 September 1790
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Boston, September 17, 1790. “Your private letter of the 10th came by the post the last evening. I find by the collection act which authorizes the building ten cutters … the President is limited to ten thousand dollars. You will permit me to observe that although ten thousand dollars may be a fund sufficient to build ten boats or cutters of a size which may with safety act in the different part of the United States, Yet one thousand dollars will not pay the expence of a Cutter which can keep the offing from december to march, three or four months, the weather is commonly so inclement in those months that a cutter so small as she must be if her cost is not to exceed one thousand dollars. As much smaller boats or Cutters will do in the southern States I cannot but hope that the one which shall be assigned to this State may be so large as to embrace the objects intended.… From the best information I can obtain the Duck made here is superior to any imported … the imported duck is about 10 dollars peice.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Olney, 17 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Olney, Jeremiah

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 17. 1790.
Sir,
The case of the Brig Happy Return as stated in your letter of 19th. July has lain over some time for consideration. If the owners prove to your satisfaction that the goods imported are all as they allege of the produce or manufacture of the United States, no duty is now to be paid as the new collection law gives relief to the owners of such articles brought back. You will examine however whether the requisitions of the Law have been complied with in the manner of proceeding on the arrival of the Goods so far as circumstances admitted.
If any of the Goods prove to be Foreign, they will pay like duty with other Foreign articles of the same kind. It may have an appearance of hardship, but the Legislature have either not chosen to exempt property thus circumstanced or they have not contemplated the occurrence of such cases. The Gentlemen will be sensible, that what the Legislature have not rendered lawful, cannot be done by any executive officer of the United States.
I am Sir,   with respect   Your Obedient Servant
A. Hamilton
Jeremiah Olney EsquireCollector, Providence.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 18 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Treasury DepartmentSeptr. 18th. 1790.
sir
I have the honor respectfully to inform you that on the 15th. inst: your Commission to William Winn as Surveyor of the port of Winton in N. Carolina was brought to my Office by a gentleman from that State. Conceiving it an irregular mode of procedure in a case of that nature, I have written to Mr. Winn a letter of which the enclosed is a copy. In the mean time I have deemed it my duty to lay the circumstances before you.
I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, sir,   Yr. most Obedient & most hume. servt.
Alexander Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 18 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Septr. 18th. 1790.
sir
Your letter dated the 3d. inst. inclosing a Copy of the instructions you have forwarded to Mr. Short, came to my hands by the mail of Wednesday.
The appointment of that gentleman to negotiate the Loans in Holland, and the Instructions you have given for his government, meet my approbation. The first as no inconvenience it is conceived will result from his absence from Paris, is a measure of œconomy; the latter, are full and cautionary; and under his agency will, it is to be hoped, be satisfactorily executed.
I am Sir   Your mo. Obt. & very hble Servt.
Go: Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Wynne, 18 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wynne, William

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 18th. 1790.
sir
Mr. Justin Foote has delivered at this Office a Commission from the President of the United States, vesting you with the office of Surveyor of the Port of Winton in North Carolina. This Gentleman informed me that he was not charged with any letter of resignation from you, but stated the substance of your verbal communication to him at the time.
Passing over the obligation of every good Citizen, to deport himself with due respect to the Chief Magistrate, and especially of those to whom he and the Senate may have previously given indications of confidence, which I am persuaded you would not intentionally deviate from, I beg leave to observe, that questions may be raised, whether the return of a commission is all that is requisite from gentlemen who decline an appointment to a public trust. Under these circumstances I find myself constrained to request, that you will make known to the President in a regular way, your intentions as to your late appointment.
I am sir  Your Obt. Servant
Alexander Hamiltonsecy. of the Treasury
Wm. Winn Esqr.Winton North Carolina


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Barton, 20 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Barton, William

[New York, September 20, 1790. The endorsement in Hamilton’s writing on the letter which Barton wrote to Hamilton on August 9, 1790, reads: “From Mr Barton acknowleged Sepr 20. 90.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Sharp Delany, 20 September 1790
From: Delany, Sharp
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, September 20, 1790. On September 24, 1790, Hamilton wrote to Delany: “I have received your letter of the 20th instant.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Lee, 20 September 1790
From: Lee, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Penobscot, District of Maine, September 20, 1790. On November 13, 1790, Hamilton wrote to David Sewall: “The day before yesterday a letter from the Collector of Penobscot of the 20th. of September … came to hand.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 20 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Septemr. 20th. 1790.
sir
In answer to your letter of the 10th. instt. relative to the establishment of the boats or Cutters for the protection of the revenue, I have to observe, That, if there appears to exist a necessity for equipping the whole number therein mentioned, the arrangement for building and stationing them, seems judicious, and is to me perfectly satisfactory.
It is my wish that your Enquiries, respecting proper characters to command these Vessels, may be extended to the States south of Virginia. Mr. Lear can furnish you with the List of Applications already made. Two persons, with nearly equal recommendations, have offered themselves from Philadelphia—Captains Montgomery, & Roach. There are several respectable names subscribed in favor of each of these persons; some of them, I believe, in favor of both: such is the facility, with which, on certain occasions, recommendations are granted. It would seem, however, that they are both qualified; but, in favor of the former, it is stated that he now fills a subordinate station in the revenue, which he accepted with a view of being brought into notice when such an appointment, as that which he now solicits, should be made.
Captain Barney was not at Baltimore when I passed through, nor cou’d I learn with certainty whether he wished to receive the appointment or not. But I was informed that he had written an answer to an intimation made to him, by you or one of his friends, on the subject, whence I suppose his wish may be collected.
There is a Mr. Richard Taylor of this State, an applicant for one of the appointments, who from my knowledge of him, appears to be a proper person both as to character, and experience in the profession.
Remarking to you that the advantage, which might accrue from their superintendance, seems to suggest the propriety of nominating the Commanders before the Vessels are put on the stocks—you have my permission to carry the arrangement for building the Boats or Cutters, stated in your letter into immediate effect, in such extent as to your judgment shall seem necessary for the public service.
I am, sir,   Your most Obedient servant
Go. Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 21 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

New York septemr. 21st 1790.
sir
Doctor Craigie has communicated to me, a letter from Mr. Daniel Parker to him, dated, London the 12th of July, which mentions that he had just seen Mr. De Miranda, who had recently conversed with the Marquis Del Campo, from whom he had learnt that the Court of Spain had acceded to our right of navigating the Mississippi.
Col: Smith has also read to me a passage out of another letter of the 6th of July, which mentions, that orders had been sent to the Vice Roy of Mexico and the Governor of New Orleans, not to interrupt the passage of Vessels of the United States through that river.
It is probable that other communications will have ascertained to you, whether there be any and what foundation for this intelligence; but I have thought it adviseable notwithstanding to impart it to you.
The reports from Europe favour more and more the idea of peace. They are however not conclusive, and not entirely correspondent.
Captain Watson of the ship New York, who left London the 28th of July and Torbay the 16th or 17th of August, informs that the evening preceding her departure from Torbay, he was informed by different Officers of the fleet, that peace between Britain and Spain had taken place and had been notified by Mr. Pitt, in a letter to the Lord Mayor of London; of which an account had arrived that Evening. He had however seen no papers containing the account. And the press of Seamen had continued down to the same evening.
On the other hand, Capt. Hunter of the ship George, who left St. Andero the 8th of August, affirms that vigorous preparations for War were still going on at that port.
I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect and truest attachment  sir  Yr. most ob. & hume. servt.
Alexander Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jedediah Huntington, 22 September 1790
From: Huntington, Jedediah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New London [Connecticut] September 22, 1790. “Mr Nathaniel Richards will contract to supply the Light House at this Port, for one year from the first of October next with Oil, Wick, Candles & Soap … for 380 Dollars.… I have agreed to give Daniel Harris for tending the Light 80 dollars ⅌ year.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Nathaniel Appleton, 23 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Appleton, Nathaniel

[New York, September 23, 1790. On September 29, 1790, Appleton wrote to Hamilton: “I am favoured with yours of 23d Inst.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Habersham, 23 September 1790
From: Habersham, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Savannah, September 23, 1790. Encloses weekly returns. Recommends Captain Hendrick Fisher to command a revenue cutter.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Benjamin Lincoln, 23 September 1790
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Boston, September 23, 1790. “The repair of the Light-Houses on Plumb Island are now finished & the accounts have been presented for settlement; they correspond with the agreement I made saving the Painter’s bill—that I reported to you would be seven pounds fourteen shillings: the painters have charged sixteen pounds odd; the mistake arises in this way; they estimated the expence of painting it once over; that was found insufficient they therefore painted it twice over.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Smith, 23 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Smith, Thomas

[New York] September 23, 1790. “I duly received your letter of the 30th Ultimo.… I have no objection to the two Gentlemen, whom you mention as your Securities, but I have on consideration of the Magnitude of the trust, thought it prudent to require three Bondsmen in several of the principal Loan Offices, of which that of Pennsylvania is one.…”


Title: Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs, 23 September 1790
From: Treasury Department,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Collectors of the Customs

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 23d 1790.
Sir,
Some very important objects in the business of the next sessions of the Legislature will render the early transmission of the several quarterly returns and accounts that will be due the 30th. instant indispensibly necessary. The early receipt of these papers is not only requisite for some extraordinary purposes of this Department, but information drawn from them will be particularly desired by several members of the Legislature.
From the Omission of returns from some of the Custom Houses, when no imports or exports have taken place, and no impost or tonnage have accrued; I find it necessary to request, that all the returns may be regularly made at the periods fixed for them respectively.
If no business of the kind intended to be stated in any one of them should have been done, it is nevertheless absolutely necessary that a return be made for the purpose of being filed in this office. Without the regular receipt of these papers, periodically made up, no reliance can be placed on statements of this office, relating to the business of the Custom House; and they should be made agreeably to the forms transmitted by the Comptroller, including the value of exports, which has been in some instances omitted.
For the convenience of filing separately, I request that the copies of endorsements of Registers and the returns of seizures be made in future on pieces of paper separate from your letters & unconnected with any other matter. I also wish that your papers may be folded of the breadth of the inner sheet of this letter, in its folded state, and that they may be indorsed by you according to their Contents, before transmission to me.
Relying on particular attention to the several points noticed in this letter, I am   with respect,   Sir Your Obedt. Servt.
A Hamilton

P.S. The remarks made upon your accounts similar to those in your past letters to me, are hereafter to be made in the column of remarks in the accounts themselves, or at the foot of the papers, as they must go to the Auditor and Comptroller.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Sharp Delany, 24 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Delany, Sharp

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 24th 1790.
Sir
I have received your letter of the 20th instant, enclosing one to you from Mr. William Bell of the same date. The Certificate mentioned in the latter was not found in your inclosure.
I am always disposed to exercise the discretion that may be vested in me by the laws for the reasonable benefit of the fair trader in cases and under circumstances that admit of relief from me. Considerable difficulty occurs in the present instance wherein I am called on to authorize an allowance without any precise fact to direct me.
If the salt were yet on board, or if the proportion of Foreign matter had been ascertained at the time of landing I should now have something to govern my opinion. But at this late day every thing rests on mere conjecture. This appears to me to create an indispensable impediment & the more so because the Legislature have been very particular in directing the mode to be pursued when allowance for damage, drawback or any abatement of duty is permitted. Could this difficulty be surmounted the case would still remain embarrassed by questions of this kind—whether the salt could be considered as damaged during the Voyage, which circumstance is requisite to obtaining an allowance or whether it may not be considered as salt of an inferior quality & if so whether the Legislature meant to discriminate in the duty on Salt more than in that on Sugar. Upon consideration of all the circumstances attending this case I am not satisfied that it is in my power to authorize an allowance to Mr. Bell.
I am Sir  with respect   Your Obedient Servant
Alexander Hamilton
Sharp Delany EsquireCollectorPhiladelphia.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Charles Lee, 24 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Lee, Charles

Treasury Department, September 24, 1790. “In this enclosure you will find ⟨a⟩ letter for you transmitted to me by the collector of Providence. You will find also a copy of my answer to the letter which covered that to you. I request from you an account of the Cargo which the Nancy carried from Alexandria to Providence.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Olney, 24 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Olney, Jeremiah

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 24th 1790
Sir
I have received your letter containing a state of Facts in the case of the Cargo of the Sloop Nancy seized by the Collector of Alexandria. The Coasting Act renders it the duty of the Collectors to seize all Goods not contained in the Manifests of Vessels trading between two Districts in States that do not adjoin. Mr Lee therefo⟨re⟩ appears merely to have obeyed the injunctions of the Legislature for in a case wherein no Manifest was produced to him all Goods stood in that predicament which works a legal forfeiture, & renders a seizure an indispensible duty. The Circumstances however as stated by you place the owners in a fa⟨vou⟩rable light. I recommend therefore to those Gentlemen their persuing the mode of obtaining relief contained in the Act “for mitigating or remit⟨ting⟩ the forfeitures & penalties accruing under the Revenue Laws in certa⟨in⟩ cases therein mentioned” passed the 26th day of May last. The District Ju⟨dge⟩ of Virginia is now in New York & I find on enquiry which I have ca ⟨used⟩ to be made that he will be in Williamsburgh by the middle of Octo⟨ber⟩ where he will hold a special Court on any day that the partie⟨s⟩ desire. I need not observe to you that it is only on his report ⟨of the⟩ Testimony that I am enabled to remit a forfeiture even in cases of ⟨innocence⟩.
As your Testimony appears to be of great importance on the present occasion you will do well to have your deposition taken before the District Judge of your State and if convenien⟨t in⟩ the presence of the Attorney of the United States for the pu⟨rpose⟩ of transmission to the District Judge of Virginia.
I observe your information that the same Sloop the Nancy Captain Thornton returned fro⟨m⟩ Alexandria without a Manifest or permit, the cause of which will be enquired into in course. On receipt of this letter you will be pleased to send me particular information of the Cargo imported by her from Alexandria to providence distinguishing the Foreign & American Articles.
I am Sir with respect   Your Obedient Servant
Alexander Hamilton
⟨Jer⟩emiah Olney EsqrCollectorProvidence, R.I.


Title: Conversation with George Beckwith, [25–30 September 1790]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Beckwith, George
To:

[New York, September 25–30, 1790]
… 7.   23. is a man of capacity, but apt at particular times to give himself up too much to the impressions of his own mind.
From the Duke of Leed’s reply to 23.’s first application I confess I did not think favorably of the prospect, although it was far from being conclusive. The June packet brought us accounts of his interviews with Mr. Pitt, and from 23.’s own detail of what passed, there was a something in his conduct on that occasion, which I confess I do not altogether approve.
[Beckwith]   “It strikes me as possible that 23 has been occasionally out of England, has he been in France?”
[Hamilton]   Not that I know of, and if 23. has cultivated an intimacy with the Ministers of any other power in Europe, or has caused suspicion on that ground with respect to France, or elsewhere, he has had no authority, for so doing; it occurs to me, that he was very intimate with Monsr. de La Luzerne the Ambassador of France now in London, when he was Minister in this country, possibly from that circumstance he may have been more frequently there, than prudence ought to have dictated, and the knowledge of this circumstance may have produced a greater reserve on the part of Your administration; these ideas strike me, although I have no grounds to go upon.
[Beckwith]   “Do You wish to have a West India Island?”
[Hamilton]   I answer without hesitation No, we do not, it is not in our contemplation. We wish the liberty of trading in that quarter, at least this is decidedly my own opinion, we should consider the Sovereignty of a West India Island as a burthen. Our territories are already very extensive, and I can assure You, the idea of having possessions further to the northward than our present boundaries would be esteemed an incumbrance, with an exception to the Forts. On that score therefore I cannot foresee any solid grounds for a national difference with You; to the southward the case is very different. We look forward to procuring the means of an export for our western country, and we must have it. We cannot suffer the navigation of the Missisippi to remain long in its present state. That country is at this moment ready to open it if they met with the smallest encouragement, and undoubtedly we look forward to the possession of New Orleans.
[Beckwith]   “Since my arrival here I have made it a point to preserve the strictest silence with respect to (23) yet I have more than once had occasion to hear his name mentioned by his relations and their acquaintances; it came out in their conversations that 23 is greatly liked in London, that he is frequently with the French Ambassador Monsieur de la Luzerne, and with Mr. Fox, who had expressed himself to be greatly pleased with his character and company.”
[Hamilton]   Yes, it is so reported; I believe it in some measure to be true; I am the more inclined to be of this way of thinking from extracts of letters, which I have seen of 23., in which he throws out, that such and such were Mr. Fox’s opinions on particular subjects, and from the former intimacy, which subsisted here between 23 and Monsieur de la Luzerne, as well as from Mr. Fox’s line of politics during the war, his general character, and from my knowledge of 23 himself.
I do not question this gentleman’s sincerity in following up those objects committed to his charge, but to deal frankly with You, I have some doubts of his prudence; this is the point in which he is deficient, for in other respects he is a man of great genius, liable however to be occasionally influenced by his fancy, which sometimes outruns his discretion.
[Beckwith]   “Mr. Fox is a very able man, very generally respected, and his character as a statesman is known in the world; but professing every possible respect for Mr. Fox, and for Monsieur de la Luzerne likewise, it is for Your consideration, how far a gentleman in 23. situation ought to form intimacies with persons in public political situations, excepting they are in administration.”
[Hamilton]   I am quite of Your opinion, and this amongst other causes led me to remark, that it is greatly desirable, that this negotiation should be transferred to our seat of Government. However we have no reason on the whole to question Mr. Pitt’s good dispositions towards us, on the contrary he seemed personally disposed to grant us more, than other members of Your Cabinet thought advisable for Your general commercial interests.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Charles Lee, 25 September 1790
From: Lee, Charles
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Alexandria, Virginia, September 25, 1790. On October 10, 1790, Hamilton wrote to Lee concerning the “purchase of a Boat such as is generally described in your letter of the 25th Ulto.” Letter not found.]


Title: Conversation with George Beckwith, [26–30 September 1790]
From: Beckwith, George
To:

[New York, September 26–30, 1790]
… 7. I have already explained my opinions very fully on the mutual advantages, that must result to the two countries from an approximation in commercial matters in the first instance; foreign nations in common are guided solely by their respective interests in whatever concerns their intercourse; between You and us there are other circumstances; originally one people, we have a similarity of tastes, of language, and general manners; You have a great commercial capital, and an immense trade, we have comparatively no commercial capital, and are an agricultural people, but we are a rising country, shall be great consumers, have a preference for Your manufactures, and are in the way of paying for them; You have considerable American and West India possessions, our friendship or enmity may soon become important with respect to their security, and I cannot foresee any solid grounds of national difference, between us; I do not think the posts are to be considered in this light, and we have no desire to possess any thing to the northward of our present boundaries as regulated by the peace; but the navigation of the river Missisippi we must have, and shortly, and I do not think the bare navigation will be sufficient, we must be able to secure it by having a post at the mouth of the river, either at New Orleans, or some where near it; there are reports, that the Spanish Government are disposed to change their system, but this I doubt, for it is so different from their national character.
You know we have two parties with us; there are gentlemen, who think we ought to be connected with France in the most intimate terms, and that the Bourbon compact furnishes an example for us to follow; there are others who are at least as numerous, and influential, who decidedly prefer an English connexion, but the present condition of Great Britain and the States is favorable to the former party, and they are zealous to improve it; the present therefore is the moment to take up the matter seriously and dispassionately, and I wish it done without loss of time.
We consider ourselves perfectly at liberty to act with respect to Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join You.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Ellery, 27 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Ellery, William

[New York, September 27, 1790. The dealer’s catalogue description of this letter reads: “Hamilton asserts that the duty on ships collected by the State of Rhode Island is illegal under the present form of federal government, and requests Ellery ‘to give some proper & respectful intimation of this to the Governor … that the collection may be discontinued;—as I should not wish to see any formal question made on the subject if it can be avoided.…’ Hamilton then writes that he has placed some ‘checks’ in a bill before the House of Representatives for the regulation of Coasters.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Nathaniel Gilman, 27 September 1790
From: Gilman, Nathaniel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

September 27, 1790. On October 6, 1790, Hamilton wrote to George Washington: “I have received from Nathl. Gilman … a letter of the 27th. September.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 27 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Septr. 27th 1790.
sir
Mr. John Cogdell having resigned his appointment as Collector of the port of George town in south Carolina, I have to request that you will make enquiry respecting a proper person to succeed him.
Mr. Corbin Braxton having also resigned his appointment as Surveyor of the ports of Richmond and Manchester—Colonel Heth informs me that he has nominated Mr. Z. Rowland to do the duties of the office until another appointment is made. Colo. Heth’s letter together with one from Colonel Griffin on the same subject, are herewith transmitted.
I enclose to you, a letter from Mr. Thaddeus Burr to Colonel Humphreys, recommendatory of Capt. John Maltbee to the command of a revenue Cutter, and a recommendation of Capt. Montgomery by some Citizens of Philadelphia, to a similar station. These papers are not intended to influence your opinion in favor of these persons farther than as they may serve to form a comparison of their merits with other candidates.
I am, sir,   Yr. most Obt. Servant
Go. Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Beverley Randolph, 28 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Randolph, Beverley

Treasury Department, September 28, 1790. “I have the honor to inform you, that the funds necessary to discharge the arrears due to the Virginia line have been placed in the hands of the Pay-Master General, with instructions to remit them to John Hopkins Esquire Commissioner of Loans for your State, to whom the execution of the business is committed.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Nathaniel Appleton, 29 September 1790
From: Appleton, Nathaniel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Boston] September 29, 1790. “I had the honor of writing you the 23d. Inst., since which I am favoured with yours of 23d Inst.… I now transmitt you an account of the Registers which I now have on hand, as far as they respect the Army Accounts & the Accounts of the Five great departments.… I have employed Printers to strike off blanks of the various Forms and Bookbinders to prepare the necessary books, but I fear I shall not be able to open the Office so soon as the 1st of next month.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 29 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Treasury DepartmentNew York Septr. 29th. 1790.
sir
I have been duly honor’d with your two letters of the 18th and 20th of Septemr.

My opinion on a certain subject has been forwarded, and I hope will, ‘ere this, have come to hand.
Inclosed you will be pleased to receive a list of such characters, as from the documents furnished by Mr. Lear, from my enquiries, and from the intimations contained in you letter of the 20th, appear to stand, upon the whole, fairest for the command of the revenue boats; except for the stations of North Carolina and Georgia, concerning which, there is no satisfactory information.
Capt. Montgomery is said to have on some accounts greater pretensions to respectability than Capt. Roach (tho’ both are represented to be men of merit) and something like claim to preference from situation.
Mr. Gross is submitted on the recommendation of Capt. Barney, who mentions favourably both him and a Mr. Daniel Porter, naming Gross first, but without expressing a preference of either.
The Vice President put into my hands a day or two ago, the enclosed letters concerning Captain Lyde, but as Williams, who is recommended by Governor Hancock, is also warmly recommended by Genl. Lincoln, the evidence in his favor may be deemed to preponderate.
The manifest expediency of the previous nomination or appointment of the persons, who are to command the boats, to oversee the building and equipping of them, will suspend the further execution of the business till your pleasure, as to the persons, shall be signified. The subaltern officers, can be appointed at greater leisure, for which purpose I am collecting information, as I am also doing in respect to Commanders for the two boats destined for North Carolina & Georgia; but I presume the others need not be delayed on this account.
I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect and truest attachment  sir  Yr. mo: Obt. & hble servt.
A Hamilton
P.s: The British packet is just arrived. The rumour is, that the declarations in the enclosed paper were regarded as the prelude of peace; but that the matter was not consider’d as finished and accordingly the press of seamen had continued with as much vavacity as before. In the letter from the Minister to the Lord Mayor those declarations seem to be regarded in the abovementioned light. The letter says, the negotiators were about to proceed to the discussion of the other matters in dispute, with a view to a definitive arrangement.
Persons who have been recommended for the Command of revenue Boats.
Hopley Yeaton—New Hampshire
John Foster Williams—Massachusetts
Richard Law—Connecticut
Patrick Dennis—New York
James Montgomery—Pennsylvania
Simon Gross—Maryland
Richard Taylor—Virginia
William Hall—Charlestown
The last gentleman is recommended by Mr. Smith, but on information, not on personal knowledge. However if an appointment is now made for that quarter, he is the person who seems to stand most favourably.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Nathaniel Appleton, 30 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Appleton, Nathaniel

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 30th. 1790
Sir
I have received your favor of the 23d instant and observe the forms and Circular of the 16th have reached you. Before this gets to hand you will receive a number of Blank Certificates for the subscribers to the New Loan.
The Warrants for Indents issued by the late Board of Treasury cannot with safety or propriety be received at the Loan Offices. The old emission Money is directed in the Circular Instructions to be transmitted with the other Certificates of public Debt. If the quantity should be very large it must be divided & sent by several Mails, or if too Bulky for that conveyance it may on application be transmitted by Water being first punched, or otherwise cancelled to prevent injury from theft or loss.
A Certificate for the Amount of each kind of every subscribers Stock is all you ought to issue. They can transfer to any persons who may buy of them such part as they shall sell.
The Salary of Fifteen Hundred Dollars granted to you is the only sum of which I can legally order the payment to you. The act expressly declares the salaries to be in full compensation for services & expences.
I am Sir   with respect   Your Obedient Servant
Alexander Hamilton
Nathl Appleton Esquire


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Sharp Delany, [30 September 1790]
From: Delany, Sharp
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, September 30, 1790]
Sir
Your circular Letter of the 23rd Inst. I recd. and shall pay due regard to the instructions therein. I beg leave to observe that from the Nature of the Accounts and the Number of them in my office it will be hardly possible with every exertion to make the returns agreeably to the forms before the Middle of November, although the Accounts in my books are up to the 20th of last Month, but information respecting the gross Amt. of Duties & Tonnage if necessary can be furnished sooner. As to the Value of Exports it will be almost impossible to make it exact, which was my only reason for omitting it heretofore. The produce of the United States may be furnished with a degree of Exactness—others mere supposition unless such Articles as are intitled to Drawbacks and they are but trifling in respect to the Whole. If entries outwards would not be thought burthensome to Trade and made a necessary duty of the Exporter, it could be always ascertained—however till this is done (should it be deemed an object), I shall make the best Estimate I can. I inclose a Receipt of the Bank for 40,000 Dollars. The goods imported this fall from Europe especially G Britain are much more than any year since 1784. I have better than 300 Bonds to receive this Month and have the pleasure to say I believe they will all be punctually paid.
I am Sir with great respect &c
S D
Sept 30th 1790
Alexdr Hamilton Esq S of the Treasury


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Smith, 30 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Smith, Thomas

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 30. 1790.
Sir
I am apprehensive that further applications to Congress on the subject of compensation for the service of paying Indents in Pennsylvania will be unpleasing and perhaps unsuccessful. It appears that all expence of that kind might be avoided by a payment of Indents to the state of Pennsylvania in full of the Interest due on such Loan Office Certificates as are yet in the hands of the Comptroller General. He would then be at liberty to complete the exchanges at his leisure. I find it necessary to remark that I cannot authorise any further expence to the United States in that business unless reasons for it which do not now present themselves can be offered.
I am Sir, with respect   Your Obedt. servant
A. Hamilton
Thomas Smith Esqr.Commissr. of Loans for the state of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia.


Title: Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs, 30 September 1790
From: Treasury Department,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Collectors of the Customs

Treasury DepartmentSeptember 30th 1790
Sir
I request you to furnish me as soon as may be with the Forms of reports entries Oaths Bonds Certificates and other Documents & papers that shall have been adopted by you in the execution of the several laws which concern your Office. This will of course not include those papers or proceedings for which forms have been sent from this Department. Any papers of the nature above described remaining in your Office which were used in the Custom Houses of your State & any Foreign papers of the same kind that you may have collected from time to time may also be transmitted. The purpose of what I now desire is with the aid of these precedents to digest a general & uniform plan of Custom House documents, which will conduce to order facilitate business & give satisfaction.
I am Sir   Your Obedient Servant
A Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 30 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

New York Sepr. 30. 1790
Sir
I had lately a visit from a certain Gentleman the sole object of which was to make some observations of a delicate nature, concerning another Gentleman employed on a particular errand; which, as they were doubtless intended for your ear, and (such as they are) ought to be known to you, it is of course my duty to communicate.
He began (in a manner somewhat embarrassed which betrayed rather more than he seemed to intend to discover) by telling me that in different companies where he had happened to be, in this City (a circumstance by the way very unlikely) he had heared it mentioned that that other Gentleman was upon terms of very great intimacy with the representative of a certain Court at the one where he was employed and with the head of ⟨the party⟩ opposed to the Minister; and he proceeded ⟨to say,⟩ that if there were any symptoms of bac⟨kwardness⟩ or coolness in the Minister, it had occ⟨urred to⟩ him that they might possibly be occa⟨sioned by⟩ such an intimacy; that he had no ⟨intimation⟩ however of this being the case, and th⟨at the idea⟩ suggested by him was mere matter of ⟨conjecture;⟩ that he did not even know it as a fact that the intimacy subsisted. But if this should be the case ⟨said he⟩ you will readily imagine that it cannot be calculated to inspire confidence or facilitate free communication. It would not be suprising, if a very close connection with the representative of another power should beget doubts and reserves; or if a very familiar intercourse with the head of the opposition should occasion prejudice and distance. Man, after all, is but man; and though the Minister has a great mind, and is as little likely as most men to entertain illiberal distrusts or jealousies; yet there is no saying what might be the effect of such conduct upon him. It is hardly possible not to have some diffidence of those, who seem to be very closely united with our political or personal enemies or rivals. At any rate, such an intimacy, if it exists, can do no good, may do some harm.
This, as far as I recollect was the substance of what he said. My answer was nearly as follows—
I have never heared a syllable Sir, about the matter you mention. It appears to me however very possible than an intimacy with both the persons you mention may exist: With the first, because the situation of the parties had naturally produced such an intimacy, while both were in this Country; and to have dropped and avoided it there would not have been without difficulty, on the score of politeness, and would have worn an extraordinary and mysterious aspect: With the last, from the patronage of American affairs, which is understood to have been uniformly the part of that Gentleman, and in some degree, from a similarity of dispositions and characters; both brilliant men, men of wit and genius; both fond of the pleasures of society. It is to be hoped that appearances, which admit of so easy a solution will not prove an obstacle to any thing which mutual interest dictates. It is impossible that there can be any thing wrong.
He replied that he certainly had no idea that there could be any thing wrong; but that as trifles often mar great affairs he thought it best to impart to me his conjecture, that such use might be made of it as should be thought adviseable.
I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect & truest attachment   Sir Your most Obed & humble serv
A Hamilton
PS   The letters herewith were through hurry omitted in my dispatch of yesterday.
The President of the United States


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Joseph Whipple, 30 September 1790
From: Whipple, Joseph
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Portsmouth, New Hampshire, September 30, 1790. “In Conformity with the 12th Section of the Act for Registering & Clearing Vessels I herewith enclose Copies of the Memos, enclosed on Certificates of Registry, of the Change of Masters that appear to have taken place in Vessels belonging to this district. Inclosed also are the Certificates of Registry of Vessels given up in consequence of the change of property conformably to the 10th. Section of the same Act.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jeremiah Olney, 1 October 1790
From: Olney, Jeremiah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Custom HouseProvidence 1. Oct 1790
Sir,
Your letters of the 7. & 24. of Sept relative to the Brig Happy-Return and the Sloop Nancy have been received: I am extremely sorry that my misconstruction of the Law should be the cause of so much trouble and expence to those concerned in freighting the Sloop Nancy, and shall therefore attend immediately to your recommendations respecting the seizure of the Cargo at Alexandria. She returned from thence with only three barrels of flour and two barrels of fish on board, besides the necessary stores for the passage; of which the Captain delivered a manifest on his arrival here.
I have the honor to be with great esteem   Sir, your most obedt & most hume servt
Jereh Olney Collr
Alexander Hamilton EsqrSecretary of the Treasury.


Title: Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs, 1 October 1790
From: Treasury Department,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Collectors of the Customs

Treasury DepartmentOctober 1st 1790
Sir
It being intended that one of the Revenue Boats or Cutters shall be built in Connecticut I request that you will on receipt of this endeavor to agree with some proper persons for the building & fitting of a Vessel of a size suitable to the nature of the service. From my inquiries in the Port of New-York I find that a complete Vessel capable of keeping this Coast in the Winter season may be fitted for One Thousand Dollars which sum you are not to exceed. The President of the United States has before him the names of persons proper to Command these Boats & when he shall have signified his pleasure in this matter the Officer appointed to the Command will have the superintendance of the building & outfit. Till that time nothing is to be done further than preparation but the business is to be put in as forward a Train as possible. It is my wish if it be found equally good and considering its quality as cheap that home made sail Cloth be used in preference to Foreign.
I have been recently informed by the Collector of Boston that the No 1 Cloth of the Factory of that place is sold at Eleven Dollars per piece warranted to contain Thirty Nine yards and that it is three Quarters of an Inch wider than British.
If it should be deemed best to use the Boston sail Cloth it will be proper to inform me as I can direct the purchase of the several parcels that will be wanted to be made at the same time by the Collector of Boston. The largeness of the quantity will enable & induce the owners of the factory to supply it on the most reasonable terms.
I am Sir   with respect   Your Obedient Servant
Alex Hamilton
On further consideration, I believe it will be best to take the Boston Cloth and therefore request your estimate and agreements may include it, and that you will inform me how much will be required.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 3 October 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Oct: 3d. 1790.
Sir
I have received your letters of the 18th and 21st Ulto. and thank you for the intelligence therein communicated; of which I have not as yet received any confirmation. I shall be oblig’d by your continueing to give me such information on public affairs as you may think sufficiently interesting to be imparted.
I am, Sir,   Your mo: obt. Servt.
Go: Washington


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 3 October 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon Octr 3. 1790
Dear Sir,
Since my last to you, your letter dated the 15th Ulto containing your sentiments on the questions I had proposed for your opinion and advice, is come duly to hand. I feel myself much obliged by the full and able consideration you have given to the subject. From present appearances, however, it does not seam as if there would be occasion for any decision on either point which gave birth to my questions. With very sincere regard and affection.
I am Dear Sir   Your Obedient & very Hble Ser
Go: Washington.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Sharp Delany, 4 October 1790
From: Delany, Sharp
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia] October 4, 1790. “The new Collection Law commen[ce]d on Saturday last. A strict obedience shall in our district be punctually adhered to, although I doubt whether the 2nd secto in to Page 25th can be followed, unless at a considerable expence to the Continent, and as I believe out of the power of the Collector Naval Officer & Inspectors in the first instance to put in force. However we will give it a fair trial and then apply to You for farther directions.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Benjamin Lincoln, 4 October 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Lincoln, Benjamin

Treasury Department, October 4, 1790. “It being necessary that I should prceed according to the directions of the Legislature to complete the Light house at Portland in the Province of Maine, I find the remote situation of the place will render your assistance requisite on the occasion. Enclosed you will find the Act of Congress which must limit your disbursements. I wish this business to be well executed in a way corresponding and that no time may be lost. If it is possible to compleat the work this season it is very desirable that it be done.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to the President and Directors of the Bank of New York, 4 October 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: President and Directors of the Bank of New York

Treasury DepartmentOctober 4th 1790
Gentlemen
The indisposition of the Comptroller of the Treasury renders it necessary for me to ask your acquiescence in the following temporary arrangement for the discharge of Monies payable at the Treasury.
I propose that the Warrants signed by me shall be presented to you for payment from time to time by individuals to whom the Monies are due or by their lawful Attornies. It is my request that you discharge the same as they shall be presented which I hereby authorise you to charge to the United States though in a distinct account from that now kept with the Treasurer. You will take the endorsements of the persons receiving the Monies which must be those to whom the Warrants are payable or their lawful Attorneys. In the latter case the power of Attorney duly authenticated must be left with you annexed to the Warrant, and I recommend for the more perfect safety of the United States & your institution that whenever a doubt occurs with regard to the sufficiency of a Power reference be made to me.
On the recovery of the Comptrollers health due formality shall be immediately given to these transactions. Your advances in this way will of course not be expected to exceed the amount of public money in deposit with you.
I am   Gentlemen   very respectfully   Your Most Obedient Servant
Alexander HamiltonSecretary of the Treasury
The President Directors & Company of the Bank of New York


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jeremiah Olney, 4 October 1790
From: Olney, Jeremiah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Custom House Providence 4. Oct 1790.
Sir,
On the second instant I went to Newport and made oath to my declaration (of which the enclosed is a copy) relative to the case of the Sloop Nancy, Chrisr Thornton master, before the District Judge agreeably to your directions; excepting the presence of the Attorney of the United States who was absent. Mr. Marchant has enclosed it to the District Judge of Virginia, and it will be forwarded by this Post. I hope, and doubt not but the Judge’s report will be favorable, and the Goods seized by the Collector of Alexandria speedily released.
The above business and loading a vessel with public Military Stores for West Point, to which I am obliged personally to attend, will prevent the completion of the Return of Exports in season for transmission by this Post.
I have the honor to be, with great respect & esteem   Sir, your most humble & most obedt servant
Jereh Olney Collr
Alexr Hamilton EsqrSecretary of the Treasury.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Nathaniel Hazard, [5 October 1790]
From: Hazard, Nathaniel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[New York, October 5, 1790]
Sir
Were a Lottery established annually by Congress towards sinking the National debt One hundred thousand dollars or more might every year be obtained in addition to the other modes for raising Money; And should the plan be adopted, the public ought to be well assured That the money arising therefrom should with the greatest faith be appropriated & laid out for the purchasing of public securities, which would lessen the public debt and of course the annual Interest.
I therefore take the liberty of laying before you the following

Scheme

1
prize of

30,000
Dollars
is
30,000
Dollars

2

20,000

are
40.000

3

10,000

30.000

4

5.000

20.000

10

3.000

30.000

30

1.000

30.000

60

500

30.000

100

300

30.000

300

100

30.000

1500

60

90.000

16000

40

640.000

18010
Prizes
1,000,000

31990
Blanks

50.000
Tickets
@
20
Dollrs
1.000,000
Dollars

Deduction
@
15
⅌ Cent
150,000
Drs.

Out of which a Premium of One, or One and a half, or two ⅌ Cent to every person who will purchase One hundred Tickets; and  ⅌ Cent to the Managers on Tickets disposed of by them, by retail, in parcels under one hundred Tickets.
Premiums given in this way would tempt many a person in the Cities & Towns in the United States to purchase 100 Tickets to sell again for the sake of the premiums and the advantage of selling out in shares at a small advance; And will thereby fill the Lottery the more expeditiously, which I think is a very essential consideration; The Money for the Tickets will then not remain long Idle in Bank, but being paid out again for the Prizes as soon as the Lottery is drawn and the fortunate numbers published, will thereby continue that circulation, which money ought to have, and give Confidence, Spirit and Courage to new Adventurers; I therefore hold it as no bad policy to give one or two ⅌ Cent to such as take 100 Tickets. It will certainly be better to have 12 ⅌ Cent out of the 15 ⅌ Cent, clear of premiums and every Incidental expence, with Credit and Character to the United States, than to grasp at the whole of the 15 ⅌ Cent and the Lottery to move with langour and take double the time in filling, which produces discontents and destroys confidence.
Perhaps you may Judge That the highest prize of the within Scheme to be too great, I think not. It has this effect, It draws the attention of people every where, as well at home as abroad, and in proportion to its magnitude produces Adventurers. I remember an opinion of the late Dr. Franklin, which was, That were a Lottery to be made of 10,000 Tickets at 20/ ⅌ Ticket, And only one prize, and that to be £10000 subject to the usual deduction, and all the remaining Tickets to be Blanks, That such a Lottery would fill, And declared That he himself would become an Adventurer, as knowing one ticket only could draw it, And Why not his as well as any other.
I’m afraid you are by this time tired of what I’ve written, I must therefore conclude with only adding That I am   with the greatest esteem   Your most Obedt. Servt.
N. H.
New York Octr. 5th. 1790
The Honble. Alexr. Hamilton Esqr.Secy. to the Treasy of the United States.