Title: Enclosure: Answer to Question the 3d. Proposed by the President of the UStates, 2 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Knox, Henry
To: Washington, George

Answer to Question the 3d. proposedby the President of the UStates,April 18th. 1793 viz
“If received” meaning a Minister from the Republic of France “shall it be absolutely or with qualifications, and if with qualifications of what kind”?

It is conceived to be adviseable, that the reception of the expected Minister from the Republic of France should be qualified by a previous declaration substantially to this effect—“that the Government of the United States uniformly entertaining cordial wishes for the happiness of the French Nation, and disposed to maintain with it an amicable communication and intercourse, uninterrupted by political vicissitudes, does not hesitate to receive him in the character which his credentials import; yet considering the origin, course and circumstances of the Relations contracted between the two Countries, and the existing position of the affairs of France, it is deemed adviseable and proper, on the part of the United States, to reserve to future consideration and discussion, the question—whether the operation of the Treaties, by which those relations were formed, ought not to be deemed temporarily and provisionally suspended—and under this impression, it is thought due to a spirit of candid and friendly procedure to apprize him before hand of the intention to reserve that question, lest silence on the point should occasion misconstruction.”
The grounds of this opinion are as follow—

The Treaties between the United States and France were made with His Most Christian Majesty, his heirs and successors. The Government of France which existed at the time those treaties were made, gave way, in the first instance to a new constitution, formed by the Representatives of the nation, and accepted by the King, which went into regular operation. Of a sudden, a tumultuous rising took place—the King was seized, imprisoned, and declared to be suspended by the authority of the National Assembly; a body delegated to exercise the legislative functions of the already established Government—in no shape authorised to divest any other of the constituted authorities of its legal capacities or powers. So far then, what was done was a manifest assumption of power.
To justify it, it is alleged to have been necessary for the safety of the nation; to prevent the success of a counter-revolution, meditated or patronized by the King.
On the other side it is affirmed, that the whole transaction was merely the execution of a plan, which had been for some time projected, and had been gradually ripening, to bring about an abolition of the Royalty and the establishment of a Republican Government.
No satisfactory proof is known to have been produced, to fix upon the King the charges, which have been brought against him.
On the other hand, declarations have escaped [from] characters, who took a lead in the measure of suppressing the Royalty, which seem to amount to a tacit acknowlegement, that the events of the tenth of August were the result of a premeditated plan of the republican party, to get rid of the monarchichal power—rather than a necessary counteraction of mischievous designs on the part of the King.
Mr. Deseze—one of the Counsel for the King makes these striking observations on the point—

“I know it has been said that he excited the Insurrection to gain the end of his plan. But who is now ignorant that this insurrection had been planned ripened—that it had its agents, its Counsul, its Directory? Who knows not, that there had been signed Acts and treaties on this subject?”
“Within this Hall has been contested the glories of the 10th of August. I do not come to dispute the glory; but since it has been proved that this day was meditated, how can it be attributed as a Crime to him?”
The events of the tenth of August were followed on the second and third of September with the massacre of a great number of persons in different parts of France including several distinguished individuals, who were known to be attached either to the ancient Government or to the constitution, which had succeeded it.
The suspension of the King was accompanied by a call upon the primary assemblies to depute persons to represent them in a Convention, in order to the taking of such measures as the exigency of the conjuncture might require.
Under circumstances not free from precipitation violence and awe deputies to a National Convention were chosen. They assembled on the  of September at Paris, and on the very day of their Meeting, decreed the abolition of Royalty.
They proceeded in the next place to organise a temporary provisional Government; charged with managing the affairs of the nation, till a constitution should be established.

As a circumstance that gives a complexion to the course of things, it is proper to mention that the Jacobin Club at Paris (a society which with its branches in different parts of France appears to have had a prevailing influence over the affairs of the Country) previous to the meeting of the Convention entered into measures with the avowed object of purging the Convention of those persons, favourers of Royalty, who might have escaped the attention of the primary assemblies.
In the last place, the late King of France has been tried and condemned by the Convention, and has suffered death.
Whether he has suffered justly or unjustly—whether he has been a guilty tyrant or an unfortunate victim is at least a problem. There certainly can be no hazard in affirming, that no proof has yet come to light sufficient to establish a belief, that the death of Louis is an act of National Justice.
It appears to be regarded in a different light throughout Europe, and by a numerous and respectable part, if not by a majority, of The People of the United States.
Almost all Europe is or seems likely to be armed, in opposition to the present Rulers of France—with the declared or implied intention of restoring if possible the Royalty, in the successor of the deceased monarch.
The present war, then, turns essentially on the point—what shall be the future Government of France? Shall the royal authority be restored in the person of the successor of Louis, or shall a republic be constituted in exclusion of it?
Thus stand the material facts, which regard the origin of our connections with France, and the obligations or dispensations that now exist. They have been stated, not with a view to indicate a definitive opinion concerning the propriety of the conduct of the present Rulers of France, but to shew, that the course of the Revolution there, has been attended with circumstances, which militate against a full conviction of its having been brought to its present stage, by such a free, regular and deliberate act of the nation, and with such a spirit of justice and humanity, as ought to silence all scruples about the validity of what has been done, and the morality of aiding it, even if consistent with policy.
This great and important question arises out of the facts which have been stated.

Are the United States bound, by the principles of the laws of nations, to consider the Treaties heretofore made with France, as in present force and operation between them and the actual Governing powers of the French Nation? or may they elect to consider their operation as suspended, reserving also a right to judge finally, whether any such changes have happened in the political affairs of France as may justify a renunciation of those Treaties?
It is believed, that they have an option to consider the operation of the Treaties as suspended, and will have eventually a right to renounce them, if such changes shall take place as can bona fide be pronounced to render a continuance of the connections, which result from them, disadvantageous or dangerous.
There are two general propositions which may be opposed to this opinion. I.   That a Nation has a right, in its own discretion, to change its form of Government; to abolish one, and substitute another. II   That real Treaties (of which description those in question are) bind the Nations, whose Governments contract and continue in force, notwithstanding any changes, which happen in the forms of their Government.
The truth of the first proposition ought to be admitted in its fullest latitude. But it will by no means follow, that because a Nation has a right to manage its own concerns, as it thinks fit, and to make such changes in its political institutions as itself judges best calculated to promote its interests—that it has therefore a right to involve other nations, with whom it may have had connections, absolutely and unconditionally, in the consequences of the changes, which it may think proper to make. This would be to give to a nation or society, not only a power over its own happiness, but a power over the happiness of other Nations or Societies. It would be to extend the operations of the maxim, much beyond the reason of it—which is simply, that every Nation ought to have a right to provide for its own happiness.

If then a Nation thinks fit to make changes in its Government, which render treaties that before subsisted between it and another nation useless or dangerous or hurtful to that other nation, it is a plain dictate of reason, that the latter will have a right to renounce those treaties; because it also has a right to take care of its own happiness, and cannot be obliged to suffer this to be impaired by the means, which its neighbour or ally may have adopted for its own advantage, contrary to the ancient state of things.
But it may be said, that an obligation to submit to the inconveniencies that may ensue, arises from the other maxim, which has been stated, namely, that real treaties bind nations, notwithstanding the changes which happen in the forms of their Governments.
All general rules are to be construed with certain reasonable limitations. That which has been just mentioned must be understood in this sense—that changes in forms of Government do not of course abrogate real treaties; that they continue absolutely binding on the party, which makes the change, and will bind the other party, unless in due time and for just cause he declares his election to renounce them—that in good faith he ought not to renounce them, unless the change which happened does really render them useless or materially less advantageous, or more dangerous than before. But for good and sufficient cause, he may renounce them.
Nothing can be more evident, than that the existing forms of Government of two Nations may enter far into the motives of a real treaty. Two republics may contract an alliance—the principal inducement to which may be a similarity of constitutions, producing common interest to defend their mutual rights and liberties. A change of the Government of one of them into a monarchy or despotism may destroy this inducement, and the main link of common interest. Two monarchies may form an alliance on a like principle, their common defence against a powerful neighbouring republic. The change of the Government of one of the allies may destroy the source of common sympathy and common interest, and render it prudent for the other ally to renounce the connection, and seek to fortify itself in some other quarter.

Two nations may form an alliance, because each has confidence in the energy and efficacy of the Government of the other. A revolution may subject one of them to a different form of Government—feeble fluctuating and turbulent, liable to provoke wars & very little fitted to repel them. Even the connections of a nation with other foreign powers may enter into the motives of an alliance with it. If a dissolution of ancient connections shall have been a consequence of a revolution of Government, the external political relations of the parties may have become so varied as to occasion an incompatibility of the alliance with the Power, which had changed its constitution with the other connections of its ally; connections perhaps essential to its welfare.
In such cases, Reason which is the touchstone of all similar maxims, would dictate, that the party whose government had remained stationary would have a right under a bona fide conviction that the change in the situation of the other party would render a future connection detrimental or dangerous, to declare the connection dissolved.
Contracts between nations as between Individuals must lose their force where the considerations fail.
A Treaty pernicious to the State is of itself void, where no change in the situation of either of the parties takes place. By a much stronger reason, it must become voidable, at the option of the other party, when the voluntary act of one of the allies has made so material a change in the condition of things, as is always implied in a radical revolution of Government.
Moreover, the maxim in question must it is presumed, be understood with this further limitation—that the Revolution be consummated—that the new Government be established and recognised among nations—that there be an undisputed organ of the national Will, to claim the performance of the stipulations made with the former Government.
It is not natural to presume, that an ally is obliged to throw his weight into either scale—where the war involves the very point, what shall be the Government of the Country; and that too against the very party with whom the formal obligations of the alliance have been contracted.
It is more natural to conclude, that in such a case, the ally ought either to aid the party, with whom the contract was immediately made—or to consider the operation of the alliance as suspended. The latter is undoubtedly his duty, rather than the former, where the Nation appears to have pronounced the change.
A doctrine contrary to that here supported may involve an opposition of moral duties, and dilemmas of a very singular and embarrassing kind.
A Nation may owe its existence or preservation intirely, or in a great degree, to the voluntary succours, which it derived from the Monarch of a Country—the then lawful organ of the national Will—the director of its sword and its purse—the dispenser of its aids and its favours. In consideration of the good offices promised or afforded by him, an alliance may have been formed—between the Monarch his heirs and successors and the country indebted to him for those good offices—stipulating future cooperation and mutual aid. This monarch, without any particular crime on his part, may be afterwards deposed and expelled by his nation, or by a triumphant faction, which may perhaps momentarily direct the national voice. He may find in the assistance of neighbouring powers friendly to his cause the means of endeavouring to reinstate himself.
In the midst of his efforts to accomplish this purpose—the ruling powers of the Nation over which he had reigned, call upon the Country, which had been saved by his friendship and patronage to perform the stipulations expressed in the alliance made with him and embark in a war against their friend and benefactor on the suggestion, that the treaty being a real one the actual rulers of the nation have a right to claim the benefit of it.
If there be no option in such case—would there not be a most perplexing conflict of opposite obligations?—of the faith supposed to be plighted by the treaty, and of justice and gratitude, towards a man, from whom essential benefits had been received, and who could oppose the formal and express terms of the contract to an abstract theoretic proposition? Would genuine honor, would true morality permit the taking a hostile part against the friend and benefactor, being at the same time the original party to the contract?
Suppose the call of the actual rulers to be complied with and the war to have been entered into by the ally—Suppose the expelled Monarch to have reentered his former dominions, and to have been joined by one half of his former subjects—how would the obligation then stand? He will now have added to the title of being the formal party to the contract that of being the actual possessor of one half the country and of the wishes of one half the Nation.
Is it supposeable, that in such a case the obligations of the alliance can continue in favour of those, by whom he had been expelled? Or would they then revert again to the Monarch? Or would they fluctuate with the alternations of good and ill fortune attending the one or the other party? Can a principle which would involve such a dilemma be true? Is it not evident, that there must be an option to consider the operation of the alliance as suspended during the contest concerning the Government—that on the one hand there may not be a necessity of taking part with the expelled Monarch, against the apparent will of the nation, or on the other, a necessity of joining the ruling powers of the moment against the immediate party with whom the contract was made and from whom the consideration may have flowed?
If the opinions of writers be consulted, they will, as far as they go, confirm the sense of the maxim, which is here contended for.

Grotius, while he asserts the general principle of the obligation of real treaties upon nations, notwithstanding the changes in their Governments—admits the qualification, which has been insisted upon—and expressly excepts the case where it appears that the motive to the Treaty was “peculiar to the form of Government, as when free States enter into an alliance for the defence of their liberties.” Book II Chapt. 16. § XVI. No. 1.
And Vatel who is the most systematic of the writers on the laws of nations lays down the qualification in the greatest latitude. To give a correct idea of his meaning it will be of use to transcribe the entire section with its marginal note. It is found Book II. Chapt: XII. § 197.
“The same question” (says he, to wit, that stated in the margin) “presents itself in real alliances, and in general in all alliances made with the State, and not in particular with a King for the defence of his person. An Ally ought doubtless to be defended against every invasion, against every foreign violence, and even against his rebellious subjects; in the same manner, a republic ought to be defended against the enterprizes of one, who attempts to destroy the public liberty. But it ought to be remembered that an ally of the State or the nation is not its judge. If the nation has deposed its King in form, if the people of a republic have driven out their Magistrates and set themselves at liberty, or acknowleged the authority of an usurper, either expressly or tacitly; to oppose these domestic regulations by disputing their justice or validity would be to interfere with the Government of the nation and to do it an injury. The ally remains the ally of the State, notwithstanding the change that has happened in it. However when this change renders the alliance useless, dangerous, or disagreeable, it may renounce it, for it may say upon a good foundation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the present form of Government.”
It is not perceived, that there is any ambiguity of expression, or any other circumstance to throw the least obscurity upon the sense of the author. The precise question he raises is what is the obligation of a real alliance when the King, who is the ally is driven from the throne? He concludes, after several intermediate observations, that the ally remains the ally of the State, notwithstanding the change which has happened. Nevertheless, says he, when the change renders the alliance useless, dangerous or disagreeable, it may be renounced.
It is observable, that the question made by writers always is whether, in a real alliance, when the King who is the ally is deposed, the ally of the deposed King is bound to súccour and support him. And though it is decided by the better opinions, as well as by the reason of the thing, that there is not an obligation to support him, against the will of the nation, when his dethronement is to be ascribed to that source—yet there is never a single suggestion on the other hand of the ally of such dethroned King being obliged to assist his nation against him. The most that appears to be admitted in favour of the decision of the nation is that there is no support due to the dethroned Prince.
Puffendorf puts this matter upon very proper ground. Referring to the opinion of Grotius, who with too much latitude lays it down “that a league made with a King is valid though that King or his successors be expelled the Kingdom by his subjects; for though he has lost his possession the right to the crown still remains in him”—makes the following observation. “To me so much in this case seems to be certain, that if the terms of the league expressly mention and intend the defence of the Prince’s person and family, he ought to be assisted in the recovery of his Kingdom. But if the league was formed for public good only, ’tis a disputable point, whether the exiled Prince can demand assistance in virtue of his league. For the aids mentioned are presumed to have been promised against foreign enemies, without view of this particular case. Not but that still such a league leaves liberty to assist a lawful Prince against an Usurper.”
The presumption here stated is a natural and a proper one, and in its reason applies to both sides, to the exiled Prince, who should demand succours against his nation, and to the nation, who having dethroned its Prince should demand succours to support the act of dethronement and establish the revolution. The ally in such case is not bound to come in aid of either party—but may consider the operation of the alliance as suspended, till the competition about the Government is decided.
What a difference is there between asserting it to be a disputable point, whether the ally of a dethroned Prince, in the case of a real Treaty, is not bound to assist him against the Nation—and maintaining that the ally is bound at all events to assist the Nation against him? For this is the consequence of asserting, that such a Treaty ipso facto attaches itself to the body of the nation, even in the course of a pending Revolution, and without option either to suspend or renounce.
If the practice of Nations be consulted—neither will that be found to confirm the proposition—that the obligation of real treaties extends unconditionally to the actual Governors of Nations, whatever changes take place. In the books which treat the subject, numerous examples of the contrary are quoted. The most prevailing practice has been to assist the ancient sovereign. In the very instance to which this discussion relates, this is the course, which a great part of Europe directly or indirectly pursues.
It may be argued by way of objection to what has been said—that admitting the general principle of a right for sufficient cause to renounce; yet still, as the change in the present case is from a monarchy to a Republic and no sufficient cause hitherto exists for a renunciation—the possibility of its arising here after in the progress of events, does not appear a valid reason, for resorting to the principle in question.

To this the answer is, that no government has yet been instituted in France, in lieu of that which has been pulled down—That the existing political powers are by the French themselves denominated provisional, and are to give way to a constitution, to be established.
It is therefore impossible to foresee what the future Government of France will be—and in this state of uncertainty, the right to renounce resolves itself of course into a right to suspend. The one is a consequence of the other; applicable to the undetermined state of things. If there be a right to renounce, when the change of Government proves to be of a nature to render an alliance useless or injurious—there must be a right, amidst a pending revolution, to wait to see what change will take place.
Should it be said that the Treaty is binding now, no objectionable change having yet taken place, but may be renounced hereafter if any such change shall take place? The answer is, that it is not possible to pronounce at present, what is the quality of the change. Every thing is in transitu. This state of suspense as to the object of option, naturally suspends the option itself. The business may in its progress assume a variety of forms. If the issue may not be waited for, the obligations of the country may fluctuate indefinitely, be one thing to day, another to morrow; a consequence which is inadmissible.
Besides: the true reasoning would seem to be, that to admit the operation of the Treaties while the event is pending, would be to take the chance of what that event shall be, and would preclude a future renunciation.
Moreover: the right to consider the operation of the treaties as suspended, results from this further consideration—that during a pending Revolution, an ally in a real Treaty is not bound to pronounce between the competitors or contending Parties.
The conclusion from the whole is, that there is an option in the United States to hold the operation of the Treaties suspended—and that in the event, if the form of Government established in France shall be such as to render a continuance of the Treaties contrary to the interest of the United States, they may be renounced.
If there be such an option, there are strong reasons to shew, that the character and interest of the United States require, that they should pursue the course of holding the operation of the Treaties suspended.

Their character—because it was from Louis the XVI, the then sovereign of the Country, that they received those succours, which were so important in the establishment of their independence and liberty—It was with him his heirs and successors, that they contracted the engagements by which they obtained those precious succours.
It is enough on their part to respect the right of the nation to change its government, so far as not to side with the successors of the dethroned Prince—as to receive their ambassador and keep up an amicable intercourse—as to be willing to render every good office not contrary to the duties of real neutrality.
To throw their weight into the scale of the New Government, would it is to be feared be considered by Mankind as not consistent with a decent regard to the relations which subsisted between them and Louis the XVI—as not consistent with a due sense of the services they received from that unfortunate Prince—as not consistent with National delicacy and decorum.
The character of the United States may be also concerned in keeping clear of any connection with the Present Government of France in other views.
A struggle for liberty is in itself respectable and glorious. When conducted with magnanimity, justice and humanity it ought to command the admiration of every friend to human nature. But if sullied by crimes and extravagancies, it loses its respectability. Though success may rescue it from infamy, it cannot in the opinion of the sober part of Mankind attach to it much positive merit or praise. But in the event of a want of success, a general execration must attend it.
It appears thus far but too probable, that the pending revolution of France has sustained some serious blemishes. There is too much ground to anticipate that a sentence uncommonly severe will be passed upon it, if it fails.
Will it be well for the United States to expose their reputation to the issue, by implicating themselves as associates? Will their reputation be promoted by a successful issue? What will it suffer by the reverse? These questions suggest very serious considerations to a mind anxious for the reputation of the Country—anxious that it may emulate a character of sobriety, moderation, justice, and love of order.

The interest of the United States seems to dictate the course recommended in many ways.
I. In reference to their character, from the considerations already stated.
II. In reference to their peace.
As the present Treaties contain stipulations of military succours and military aids in certain cases which are likely to occur, there can be no doubt, that if there be an option, to consider them as not binding, as not in operation—the considering them as binding, as in operation, would be equivalent to making new treaties of similar import—and it is a well settled point, that such stipulations entered into pending a war or with a view to a war is a departure from Neutrality.
How far the parties opposed to France may think fit to treat us as enemies, in consequence of this, is a problem which experience only can solve—the solution of which will probably be regulated by their views of their own interest—by the circumstances which may occur—and it is far from impossible, that these will restrain them so long as we in fact take no active part in favour of France.
But if there be an option to avoid it, it can hardly be wise to incur so great an additional risk and embarrassment—to implicate ourselves in the perplexities which may follow.
With regard to the good effect of the conduct which is advocated, upon the Powers at War with France, nothing need be said.
Considering our interest with reference even to France herself, some reasons may be urged in favour of considering the Treaties as suspended.
It seems to be the general, if not the universal sentiment, that we ought not to embark in the war.
Suppose the French Islands attacked and we called upon to perform the Guarantee.

To avoid complying with it—we must either say—
That the war being offensive on the part of France the casus fœderis does not exist.
Or, that as our cooperation would be useless to the object of the Guarantee and attended with more than ordinary danger to ourselves, we cannot afford it.
Would the one or the other be satisfactory to France?
The first would probably displease—the last would not please. It is moreover the most questionable & the least reputable of all the objections, which a nation is allowed to oppose to the performance of its engagements. We should not therefore be much more certain of avoiding the displeasure of the present ruling Powers of France, by considering the Treaties as in operation, than by considering their operation as suspended; taking it for granted that we are in either case to observe a neutral conduct in fact.
But suppose the contest unsuccessfull on the part of the present Governing Powers of France. What would be our situation with the future Government of that Country?
Should we not be branded and detested by it, as the worst of Ingrates?
When it is added, that the restoration of the Monarchy would be very materially attributed to the Interposition of Great Britain—the reflection, just suggested, acquires peculiar weight and importance.
But against this may be placed the consideration—that in the event of the success of the present Governing Powers we should stand on much worse ground, by having considered the operation of the Treaties as suspended, than by having pursued a contrary conduct.
This is not clear, for the reasons just given; unless we are also willing, if called upon, to become parties in the war.
But admitting, that the course of considering the Treaties as in present operation, would give us a claim of merit with France, in the event of the establishment of the Republic—our affairs with that Country would not stand so much the better on this account as they would stand worse, for giving operation to the Treaties—should the monarchy be restored.
We should still have to offer a better claim to the friendship of France than any other power—the not taking side with her enemies—the early acknowlegement of the Republic, by the reception of its Minister—and such good offices as have been and may be rendered, consistently with a sincere neutrality.
The reasons too, which induced us not to go further, will have their due weight in times, that shall restore tranquillity, moderation, and sober reflection! They will justify us even to France herself.
Is there not however danger, that a refusal to admit the operation of the Treaties might occasion an immediate rupture with France?
A danger of this sort cannot be supposed without supposing such a degree of intemperance on the part of France as will finally force us to quarrel with her, or to embark with her.

And if such be her temper, a fair calculation of hazards will lead us to risk her displeasure in the first instance.
An inquiry naturally arises of this kind—Whether from the nature of the Treaties, they have any such intrinsic value, as to render it inexpedient to put them in jeopardy—by raising a question about their operation or validity?
Here, it may freely be pronounced, there is no difficulty. The military stipulations, they contain, are contrary to that neutrality in the quarrels of Europe, which it is our true policy to cultivate and maintain. And the commercial stipulations to be found in them present no peculiar advantages. They secure to us nothing or scarcely any thing, which an inevitable course of circumstances would not produce. It would be our interest, in the abstract, to be disengaged from them, and take the chance of future negociation, for a better treaty of commerce.
It might be observed by way of objection, to what has been said—that an admission of the operation of the Treaties has been considered as equivalent to taking part with France.
It is true, that the two things have been considered as equivalent to each other—and in strict reasoning this ought to be the case. Because—
I. If there be an option, the effect of not using it would be to pass from a state of neutrality to that of being an ally—thereby authorising the Powers at War with France to treat us as an enemy.
II. If under the operation of the Treaties, we are not bound to embark in the war, it must be owing either to casualty or inability.
If the war is not offensive on the part of France, an attack on the West India Islands would leave us no escape but in the plea of Inability.
The putting ourselves in a situation, in which it might so happen, that we could preserve our neutrality under no other plea than that of inability is in all the political legal relations of the subject—to make ourselves a party. In other words, the placing ourselves in a position, in which it would depend on casualty, whether it would not become our duty to engage in the war—ought in a general question of establishing or recognising a political relation with a foreign power embarked in war—to be regarded in the same light as taking part with that Power in the War. To do a thing, or to contract or incur an obligation of doing it, are not in such a question materially different.

There remain some miscellaneous views of the subject, which will serve to fortify the general reasoning.
I. The conduct of the present Government of France gives a sanction to other Nations to use some latitude of discretion in respect to their treaties with the former Government. That Government, it is understood, has formally declared null various stipulations of the ancient Government with Foreign Powers—on the principle of their inapplicability to the new order of things. Were it to be urged that an erroneous conduct on the part of France will not justify a like conduct on our part, it might be solidly replied—that a rule of practice formally adopted by any nation for regulating its political obligations towards other nations may justly be appealed to as a standard for regulating the obligations of other Nations towards her. Suppose this general ground to have been explicitly taken by France, that all treaties made by the old Government became void by the Revolution, unless recognised by the existing authority. Can it be doubted that every other nation would have had a right to adopt the same principle of conduct towards France? It cannot. By parity of reasoning, as far as France may in practice have pursued that principle, other Nations may justifiably plead the example.
II. In addition to the embarrassment heretofore suggested, as incident to the admission of the present operation of the Treaties—this very particular one may attend our case. An Island may be taken by Great Britain, or Holland, with the avowed intention of holding it for the future King of France, the successor of Louis the XVI. Can it be possible, that a Treaty made with Louis the XVI. should oblige us to embark in the war to rescue a part of his dominions from his immediate successor? Under all the circumstances of the case, would the national integrity or delicacy permit it? Was it clear, that Louis merited his death as a perfidious Tyrant, the last question might receive a different answer, from what can now be given to it?
Ought the United States to involve themselves in a dilemma of this kind?
III. In national questions the general conduct of nations have great weight. When all Europe is or is likely to be armed in opposition to the authority of the present Government of France, would it not be to carry Theory to an extreme, to pronounce, that the United States are under an absolute indispensable obligation, not only to acknowlege respectfully the authority of that Government, but to admit the immediate operation of Treaties which would constitute them at once its ally?
IV. Prudence at least seems to dictate the course of reserving the question, in order that further reflection and a more complete developement of circumstances may enable us to make a decision both right and safe. It does not appear necessary to precipitate the fixing of our relations to France beyond the possibility of retraction. It is putting too suddenly too much to hazard.
It may be asked—Does an unqualified reception of the Minister determine the point?
Perhaps it does not. Yet there is no satisfactory guide by which to decide the precise import and extent of such a reception—by which to pronounce, that it would not conclude us, as to the Treaties. There is great room to consider the epoch of receiving a Minister from the Republic as that, when we ought to explain ourselves on the point in question—and silence, at that time, as a waver of our option.
It is probable that on the part of France it will be urged to have this effect, and if it should be truly so considered by her, to raise the question afterwards would lead to complaint, accusation, ill humour.
It seems most candid and most safe to anticipate—not to risk the imputation of inconsistency. It seems adviseable to be able to say to foreign Powers, if questioned—“In receiving the Minister of France, we have not acknowledged ourself its ally. We have reserved the point for future consideration.”

It may be asked, whether the reception at any rate is not inconsistent with the reservation recommended.
It does not appear to be so. The acknowlegement of a Government by the reception of its ambassador, and the acknowledgment of it, as an ally, are things different and separable from each other. However the first, where a connection before existed between two nations may imply the last, if nothing is said; this implication may clearly be repelled, by a declaration, that it is not the intention of the party. Such a declaration would be in the nature of a protest against the implication—and the declared intent would govern. It is a rule, that “Expressum facit cessare tacitum.”
It may likewise be asked, whether we are not too late for the ground proposed to be taken—whether the payments on account of the debt to France subsequent to the last change, be not an acknowlegement, that all engagements to the former Government are to be fulfilled to the present.
The two objects of a debt in money—and a Treaty of Alliance, have no necessary connection. They are governed by considerations altogether different and irrelative.
The payment of a debt is a matter of perfect and strict obligation. It must be done at all events. It is to be regulated by circumstances of time and place—and ought to be done with precise punctuality.
In the case of a nation—whoever acquires possession of its political power, whoever becomes Master of its goods, of the national property, must pay all the debts which the government of the nation has contracted.
In like manner, on the principle of reciprocity the Sovereign in possession, is to receive the debts due to the Government of the nation. These debts are at all events to be paid—and possession alone can guide as to the party to whom they are to be paid.
Questions of property are very different from those of political connection.
Nobody can doubt, that the debt due to France is at all events to be paid, whatever form of Government may take place in that Country.
Treaties between nations are capable of being affected by a great variety of considerations, casualties and contingencies. Forms of Government it is evident, may be the considerations of them. Revolutions of Government, by changing those forms, may consequently vary the obligations of parties.
Hence the payment of a debt to the sovereign in possession does not imply an admission of the present operation of political treaties. It may so happen, that there is a strict obligation to pay the debt, and a perfect right to withdraw from the Treaties.
And while we are not bound to expose ourselves to the resentment of the Governing Power of France by refusing to pay a debt at the time and place stipulated; so neither are we bound, pending a contested revolution of Government, to expose ourselves to the resentment of other nations, by declaring ourselves the ally of that Power, in virtue of Treaties contracted with a former sovereign, who still pursues his claim to govern, supported by the general sense and arm of Europe.
Philadelphia May 2d. 1793.Alexander Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Olney, 2 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Olney, Jeremiah

Treasury Department, May 2, 1793. “Your letter of the 18th of April was duly received. The practice which obtains in your District with respect to Exportation permits … appears to me to be right.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [2 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia, May 2, 1793]
Answers to remaining Questions proposed by the President of The United States on the Question the
Answer
The War is plainly an offensive war on the part of France. Burlamaqui, an approved Writer Vol II Part IV Chap III Sections IV & V thus defines the different species of War “Neither are we to believe (says he) that he who first injures another begins by that an offensive War, and that the other, who demands satisfaction for the injury received is always upon the defensive. There are a great many unjust acts, which may kindle a war and which however are not the war; as the ill treatment of a Prince’s Ambassador, the plundering of his subjects &c. If therefore we take up arms to revenge such an unjust Act, we commence an offensive, but a just war; and the Prince who has done the injury and will not give satisfaction makes a defensive but an unjust war. An offensive war is therefore unjust only, when it is undertaken without a lawful cause, and then the defensive War, which on other occasions might be unjust, becomes just.”

“We must therefore affirm, in general, that the first who takes up arms, whether justly or unjustly, commences an offensive war; and he who opposes him, whether with or without reason begins a defensive war.”
This definition of offensive and defensive war is conformable to the ideas of Writers on the Laws of Nations, in general, and is adopted almost verbatim by Barbeyrac in his Notes on § III & IV of Book the VIII Chap VI of Puffendorfs “Law of Nature and Nations.”
France, it is certain, was the first to declare war against every one of the Powers with which she is at War. Whether she had good cause or not therefore in each instance, the War is completely offensive on her part.
The forms, which she has employed in some of her declarations (whereafter reciting the aggressions she alleges to have been committed against her by a particular power she proceeds to pronounce that war exists between her and such power) cannot alter the substance of the thing. The aggressions complained of, if ever so well founded, and however they may have been of a Nature to kindle a war were not the War itself. The war was begun, in each case, by the declaration, & by the commencement of hostilities on the part of France. It was therefore clearly offensive on her part.
With regard to the causes that led to the War, in each case, it requires more exact information than I have to pronounce upon them with confidence. As it regards Austria & Prussia, the suggestion on one hand is that a combination was formed to overthrow the new constitution of France, and that the declaration on the part of the latter Country was only an anticipation of what would soon have proceeded from the confederated powers. On the other hand it is affirmed that the preparations and arrangements on their part were merely provisional and eventual; and that the Republican party in France precipitated a War under the idea that it would furnish opportunities for accusing and criminating the Kings administration and finally overthrowing the Royalty.
Mr. Short

Waving all definitive opinion on this point, better guides will enable us to pronounce with more certainty in the other cases.
In respect to Holland, there seems to be no doubt, that the aggression began with France.
France in different Treaties, had recognised a right in the Dutch to the exclusive Navigation of the River Scheldt.
It appears, that she had a leading agency in adjusting a controversy on the point, between the late Emperor Joseph & the U Netherlands.
The XXVIII Article of a Treaty between those parties concluded at Fontainebleau the 8th. of November 1785 is in these words:
“The Most Christian Majesty contributed to the completion of the arrangement made between the High-Contracting parties (namely the Emperor & States General), by his friendly intervention and his effectual and just mediation, his said Majesty is requested by the High Contracting Parties to charge himself likewise with being the Guarantee of the present Treaty.”
Nevertheless the Provisionary Executive Council, by a decree of the 16 of November 1792, break through all these formal and express engagements, on the pretext of their being contrary to natural right, and declare the Navigation of the Scheldt & Meuse free.
Such an infraction of Treaties on such a ground cannot be justified without subverting all the foundation of positive and pactitious right among Nations. It is equally agreeable to the doctrine of theorists and to the practice of Nations that rights to the common use of Waters of the description in question may be relinquished and qualified by Treaty. To resume them therefore on the ground of the imprescriptibility as it is called, of natural rights—is to set up a new rule of conduct contrary to the common sense and common practice of mankind, amounting in the party, which attempts the resumption, to an unequivocal injury to the party against which it is attempted.
In respect to Great Britain, the case is not equally clear; but there is sufficient ground to pronounce, that she had cause of complaint, prior to any given on her part.
It is known that in the early periods of the French Revolution she adopted the ground of neutrality and nothing is alleged against her till after the 10th of August.
That event led her to withdraw her Minister from the Court of France; but before his departure he left a note declarative of the intention of Great Britain to pursue still a pacific course; accompanied indeed with a cautious intimation, that personal violence to the King would excite the general indignation in Europe.
But it will hardly be affirmed, that this procedure amounted to an aggression. To recal a minister from or not to keep one at any Court is of itself an Act of indifference. The recall under such circumstances as took place on the 10th: of August was not an extraordinary step. Every Government had a right to deliberate, and was bound for its own safety to consider well—when it would recognize a new order of things, which had been produced by a National Revolution. None was obliged by a hasty determination to expose itself to the ill will of other powers who might be at war with that new order of things. The keeping of a Minister at France, after the deposition of the King, might be deemed a sanction of the change and indeed was useless until it was intended to give that sanction. It was not therefore incumbent upon any power to pursue this course; especially one which was not in the condition of an ally.
The intimation with regard to the King, to characterise it in the most exceptionable light, was at most an act of officiousness. Relating to a thing not at the time in agigation, it could only be considered as a caution to avoid a measure which might beget misunderstanding.

The conduct of France shews that she did not at the time consider this step as an injury; for she continued a Minister at the Court of London, and continued to negotiate.
The next step of Great Britain in order of time, which is complained of by France, and the first of a really hostile complexion is the restriction on the exportation of Corn to France, by way of exception to a general permission to export that article.

This was an unfriendly measure. It happened as far as I am able to trace it in the latter part of December 1792.
But prior to these causes of dissatisfaction an alarm had been given by France to Great Britain.
The Convention on the 19th. of November passed a Decree in these words—
“The National Convention declare, in the name of the French Nation, that they will grant Fraternity and Assistance to every People, who wish to recover their Liberty; and they charge the Executive Power to send the necessary orders to the Generals to give assistance to such People, and to defend those citizens who may have been or who may be vexed for the cause of Liberty” which Decree was ordered to be printed in all languages.
This decree might justly be regarded in an exceptionable light by the Government of every country. For though it be lawful and meritorious to assist a people in a virtuous and rational struggle for liberty, when the particular case happens; yet it is not justifiable in any government or Nation to hold out to the world a general invitation and encouragement to revolution and insurrection, under a promise of fraternity and assistance. Such a step is of a nature to disturb the repose of mankind, to excite fermentation in every country, to endanger government every where. Nor can there be a doubt that wheresoever a spirit of this kind appears it is lawful to repress and repel it.
But this generally exceptionable proceeding might be looked upon by Great Britain as having a more particular reference to her from some collateral circumstances.
It is known that various societies were instituted in Great Britain with the avowed object of reforms in the Government. These societies presented addresses to the Convention of France and received answers; containing an interchange of sentiments justly alarming to the British Government.

It will suffice by way of illustration to cite passages from two of these answers, each given by the President of the Convention, at a sitting on the 28 of November, one to a deputation from “The Society for constitutional information in London” the other to a deputation of English and Irish Citizens at Paris.
1   “The shades of Penn of Hampden and of Syndney hover over your heads; and the moment without doubt approaches, in which the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of Great Britain.”
2   “Nature and principles draw towards us England Scotland & Ireland. Let the cries of friendship resound through the two republics.” Again “Principles are waging war against Tyranny, which will fall under the blows of philosophy. Royalty in Europe is either destroyed or on the point of perishing, on the ruins of Feodality; and the declaration of rights placed by the side of thrones is a devouring fire which will consume them. Worthy Republicans &c”
Such declarations to such societies are a comment upon the Decree—are in every sense inconsistent with what was due to a just respect for a Neutral Nation and amounted to so direct a patronage of a Revolution in the essential principles of its government as authorised even a declaration of War.
It is true that Mr. Chauvelin in a Note to Lord Grenville of the 27 of December 1792—declares that the “National Convention never meant that the French Republic should favour insurrections, should espouse the quarrels of a few seditious persons or should endeavour to excite disturbances in any neutral or friendly country; the decree being only applicable to a People, who after having aquired their liberty, should call for the fraternity, the assistance of the Republic, by the solemn and unequivocal expression of the general Will.”
But this explanation could not change the real nature and tendency of the decree, which holding out a general promise of fraternity and assistance to every people who wished to recover their liberty did favour insurrections, was calculated to excite disturbances in neutral & friendly countries.
Still less could it efface the exceptionable and offensive nature of the reception which was given and the declarations which were made to the Revolutionary—or Reforming—Societies of G B.
The answer of Lord Grenville very justly observes that “Neither satisfaction nor security is found in the terms of an explanation, which still declares to the promoters of sedition, in every country, what are the cases in which they may count beforehand on the support and succour of France; and which reserves to that Country the right of mixing herself in the internal affairs of another, whenever she shall judge it proper, and on principles incompatible with the political institutions of all the Countries of Europe.”
Besides the Declarations, which have been mentioned, to the different English societies, and which apply particularly to Great Britain, there are other acts of France which were just causes of umbrage and alarm to all the Governments of Europe.
Her Decree of the 15 of December is one of them. This decree, extraordinary in every respect, which contemplates the total subversion of all the antient establishments of every country into which the arms of France should be carried—has the following article—
“The French Nation declare—That it will treat as enemies the People, who refusing or renouncing Liberty and Equality, are desirous of preserving their Prince and privileged Casts, or of entering into an accommodation with them. The Nation promises and engages not to lay down its arms, until the Sovereignty and Liberty of the People, on whose Territory the French Armies shall have entered shall be established and not to consent to any arrangement or Treaty with the Prince and privileged persons so dispossessed, with whom the Republic is at war.”
This Decree cannot but be regarded as an outrage, little short of a declaration of war, against every Government of Europe, and as a violent attack upon the freedom of opinion of all Mankind.

The incorpation of the territories, conquered by the arms of France with France herself is another of the acts alluded to, as giving just cause of umbrage and alarm to neutral Nations in general. It is a principle well established by the laws of Nations, that the property and dominion of conquered places do not become absolute in the conquerors ’till they have been ceded or relinquished by a Treaty of peace or some equivalent termination of the War. Till then it is understood to be in a state of suspense, (the Conqueror having only a possessory and qualified title) liable to such a disposition as may be made by the compact which terminates the War. Hence the citizen of a neutral nation can acquire no final or irrevocable title to land by purchase of the Conqueror during the continuance of the War. This principle, it is evident, is of the greatest importance to the peace and security of Nations—greatly facilitating an adjustment of the quarrels in which they happen at any time to be involved.
But the Incorporation, which has been mentioned, and which actually took place, in respect to the territories of different Powers, Savoy Antwerp &c. was a direct violation of that very important and fundamental principle; and of those rights which the laws of war reserve to every Power at War; a violation tending to throw insuperable difficulties in the way of peace. After once having adopted those territories as part of herself, she became bound to maintain them to the last extremity by all those peremptory rules which forbid a Nation to consent to its own dismemberment.
That incorporation therefore changed intirely the principle of the War on the part of France. It ceased to be a war for the defence of her rights, for the preservation of her liberty. It became a war of acquisition, of extension of territory and dominion, and in a manner altogether subversive of the laws & usages of Nations, and tending to the aggrandisement of France, to a degree, dangerous to the Independence & safety of every Country in the world.
There is no principle better supported by the Doctrines of Writers, the practice of Nations, and the dictates of right reason, than this—that whenever a Nation adopts maxims of conduct tending to the disturbance of the tranquillity and established order of its neighbours, or manifesting a spirit of self-aggrandisement—it is lawful for other Nations to combine against it, and, by force, to controul the effects of those maxims and that spirit. The conduct of France, in the instances which have been stated, calmly and impartially viewed, was an offence against Nations, which naturally made it a common cause among them to check her carreer.
The pretext of propagating liberty can make no difference. Every Nation has a right to carve out its own happiness in its own way, and it is the height of presumption in another, to attempt to fashion its political creed.
These acts and proceedings are all prior in time to the last aggressive step of Great Britain, the ordering out of the Kingdom the person who was charged with a diplomatic mission to that Court from the Government of France. The stile and manner of that proceeding rendered it undoubtedly an insult—and if the conduct of France before that time had been unexceptionable, the war declared by France, though offensive in its nature, would have been justifiable in its motive.
With regard to Spain, the War was likewise declared by France and is consequently offensive on her part. The conduct of the former towards the latter, previous to this event, appears not only to have been moderate but even timid.
The War on the part of Portugal appears to have been offensive.
The result from what has been said is that the War in which France is engaged is in fact an offensive war on her part against all the Powers with which she is engaged, except one; and in principle, to speak in the most favourable terms for her, is at least a mixed case—a case of mutual aggression.
The inference from this state of things is as plain, as it is important. The casus fœderis of the guarantee in the Treaty of alliance between the UStates and France cannot take place, though her West India Islands should be attacked.
The express Denomination of this Treaty is “Traité D’Alliance eventuelle et defensive” Treaty of Alliance Eventual and Defensive.
The 2 Article of the Treaty also calls it a “Defensive Alliance.” This then constitutes the leading feature—the characteristic quality of the Treaty. By this principle, every stipulation in it is to be judged.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 2 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia] May 2, 1793. “… encloses … a letter from the Commissioner of the Revenue on the subject of a Keeper of the Lt House for Cape Henlopen.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Joseph Whipple, 2 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Whipple, Joseph

[Philadelphia, May 2, 1793. On May 16, 1793, Whipple wrote to Hamilton and referred to Hamilton’s “directions of the 2d instant.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Wilhem and Jan Willink, Nicholaas and Jacob Van Staphorst, and Nicholas Hubbard, 2 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Willink, Wilhem,Willink, Jan,Van Staphorst, Nicholaas,Van Staphorst, Jacob,Hubbard, Nicholas

[Philadelphia, May 2, 1793. On July 1, 1793, Willink, Van Staphorst, and Hubbard wrote to Hamilton: “The letter you wrote us the 2d. May has … come to hand.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson, 3 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Treasury DepartmentMay 3d. 1793
Sir
I regret extremely, that I did not receive your letter respecting Mr. Ternant’s application till two oClock yesterday; after a warrant had issued in his favour for the sum requested.
Agreeing intirely in opinion with you, that all applications from Diplomatic characters, as well those relating to pecuniary matters as others, ought to be addressed to your Department—I should have taken no step on the present occasion had it not been put on the footing of a previous arrangement (as you will perceive by the copy of Mr. Ternant’s note to me) and had I not myself carried along in my mind a general impression, that the spirit of what had passed would comprise the advance requested in the individual case.
For greater caution, however, I thought it adviseable to mention the matter to the President—which was followed (if I remember right upon my own suggestion) by the conversation which I had with you.
You will remember that though your recollection, at the time, of what had passed from you agreed with what has been the result of your subsequent examination—yet you expressed an opinion that in the special case (adhering as a general rule to the spirit of your late communication) it might be adviseable to make the advance desired—as it would be well “to part friends.” And it was at my request, subsequent to this declaration, that you engaged to review your communications to Mr. Ternant.
Having told Mr. Ternant that the matter would be terminated the day succeeding his application—not having heard from you on that day—understanding it to be your opinion that on the whole it would be well to make the advance—I waited on the President yesterday Morning, stated what had passed between us, and obtained his consent for making the advance.
I am thus particular from a desire that you may see the ground upon which I have proceeded; as it would give me pain that you should consider what has been done, as the infringement of a rule of official propriety. I assure you this was not my intention.
With great respect I have the honor to be   Sir   Your Obed ser
A Hamilton
The Secretary of State


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Tobias Lear, 3 May 1793
From: Lear, Tobias
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia] May 3, 1793. Returns “the letters from our Bankers at Amsterdam which were laid before the President yesterday.” States “that the President approves of the appointment of Laban Goffigan to be Keeper of the Light House on Cape Henry.”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Murray, 3 May 1793
From: Murray, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York 3 May 1793
Alexr. Hamilton Esqr
Sir!
My particular Friend Mr. Philip Mark is now about to take up his residence in Germany; he has informed me that it would be a very pleasing thing to him to have an appointment to a Consulate from the United States to some part of the German Empire; as I have been long acquainted with him, I can with fredom recommend him as a man well qualified to fill that Office; I know him to be a man of abilities, & integrity. I am with respect
Sir   Your most obedt. hble. Sert.
John Murray


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [4 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia, May 4, 1793]
The Secretary of the Treasury presents his respects to the President. It has appeared to him that a circular letter of the enclosed form to the several Collectors would be a measure of utility. If not disapproved by the President it will be forwarded.
May 4 1793.

The enclosed paper is sent lest the president should not have received it otherwise. It contains intelligence critically important, tho’ requiring confirmation.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Tench Coxe, 6 May 1793
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, May 6, 1793. On May 8, 1793, Hamilton wrote to George Washington: “The Secretary of the Treasury has the honor to submit to the consideration of the President of the U States a communication from the Commissioner of the Revenue of the 6 instant.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Henry Lee, 6 May [1793]
From: Lee, Henry
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Richmond 6th. May [1793]
My Dear sir
I had your letter delivered to me last evening & feel myself hurt at the suggestions it contains concerning your own situation.
Knowing you as I do I should ever give to your political conduct the basis of truth honor & love of country however I might have differed from you on some measures.
When therefore I feel undiminished regard to you, I cannot help lamenting the misery to which you continue to be exposed & I wish to god they could be averted—our countrys prosperity will ever be with me the first object & next to that (speaking as to public matters) the happiness of my friends. Unfortunately those I most love have taken different sides in American questions & this discord in sentiment has issued in personal disgust & hate.
This event kept me from Congress & will confine me to my own state. I had once cherished a hope of finding full employment corresponding with my feelings in France, to which place I was almost in the act of embarkation 7 weeks ago, but the confusions there & the interposition of some of my best friends here arrested my project. I mean now to become a farmer & get a wife as soon as possible.
When I let you have my own riding horse, I did not mean to receive any thing for him save the expence which attended him in Alexa. previous to my obtaining an opportunity of conveying him, & your small advance exceeded this sum, but as you make a serious point of it I will draw on you for the ballance of his price which is 16 guineas. I would censure the delicacy which your ltr. exhibits on this subject [did] I not know that to one exposed to such a portion of incrimination from his foes would not be relished even ironical censure from his friends. Your attention to me in Philad. was as usual—friendly & affectionate tho’ your situation forbad us mingling much together. Was I with you I would talk an hour with doors bolted & windows shut, as my heart is much afflicted by some whispers which I have heard. Yours ever
H. Lee


Title: Treasury Department Circular to the Commissioners of Loans, 6 May 1793
From: Treasury Department,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Commissioners of Loans

Treasury DepartmentMay 6 1793
Sir
The Comptroller of the Treasury being in an ill state of health—I have found it necessary to avoid an interruption of business to direct Henry Kuhl his principal Clerk to countersign the warrants which may be issued during the Comptroller’s illness for transfering stock to the Books of your office. You will therefore regard his signature (a specimen of which is inclosed) as sufficient to authorise you to pass the Credits directed by the warrants thus countersigned.
The recovery of the Comptroller of which you will be advised, will terminate the object of this Instruction.
I am with Consideration   Sir your Obed Servt
Alexander Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Joseph Ward, 6 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Ward, Joseph

Treasury DepartmentMay 6. 1793.
Sir
Some very serious difficulties incident to the species of paper mentioned in your letter of the 18th of February last, which produced a real embarrassment in my mind as to a mode of treating them, at once proper and safe, have been the principal causes of the delay which has happened in reporting upon the Petitions relating to that subject.
It was nevertheless fully my intention to have done it at the last Session, but circumstances not unknown which unexpectedly intervened to occupy my time put it out of my power.
I regret any inconveniences which may have resulted to the holders of the paper.
With much consideration & esteem,   I am, Sir, your Obed Servant
A Hamilton
Joseph Ward Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Peter Colt, 7 May 1793
From: Colt, Peter
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Hartford 7th May 1793
Sir
Your favour of 10th April only reached me here the last Mail. I had left Paterson the 17th. of April, on the Evening of the Day that the Board of Directors left Town, in consequence of Letters from Hartford, stating the critical Situation of my Family, Sick with the Small pox. It has proved fatal to one of my children, & another has been confined to the Hospital for upwards of five Weeks; & is yet so weak as not to be removed. This unexpected Circumstance will necessarily detain me longer from Paterson than I had calculated. I hope however no serious difficulty will arrise, or disadvantage accrue to the affairs of the Society in consequence of this detention.
Your Letter not coming to hand before the meeting of the Directors, will prevent my obtaining the Money to discharge the Balance of your account, so soon as would otherways have been done. I will attend to it as soon as I get back to Paterson.
The Directors at their last meeting discharged Mort from their Service—his Salary to cease the first Instant. They advanced the Salary of Marshall & Pearce to £200 Sterlg ⅌ ann. for one Year, at which period, it is contemplated our Works will be in compleat operation; & when they may be put upon their first establishment. They reduced the Salary of Hall to the same sum. As I set out for home immediatly after this was declared to him, I had not time to see how this effected him; I only know he has not quit their Service in consequence of this reduction.
I am well aware that many persons, & even some of the Directors, consider him not only as a bad Man, but particularly unfriendly to the Interest of the Society. That he is an imprudent Man I can have no doubt. He does not conceale his want of confidence in the plans of the Society, respecting the mode adopted for geting command of the water &c. It is very possible that his supposed disaffection to the Interest of the Society may arrise from imprudent observations respecting this Business, & the deranged State of their Funds. It is very possible he may have calculated on a general Superintendance of the affairs of the Society; & that the appointment of Majr L’Enfant to construct the Canal & the Mills & other works has mortifyed not only him, but Marshall & pearce also. An English manufacturer cannot bring himself to believe that a French Gentleman can possibly know anything respecting manufactures. From this quarter I believe has orriginated much of the uneasiness amongst the head work men, who appear equally to consider the Factory sacrifised to the Town.
Pearce is certainly a very injenious Man, & at present very necessary to the Society but he has Substantial failings. He is intemperate; & I fear this evil will grow on him. From his natural temper he is easily led to hasty & inconsiderate Measures respecting his workmen &c—& He seems too much prone to new projects.
The Directors at their last meeting Seemed Seriously alarmed at the extensive plans & views of Major L’Enfant. They came together seeminly determind to confine his operations Strictly to the Canal; and to place everything else under my Sole direction. But he wishing to have the compleating his plan of the Town, & stating the impropriety of puting that under any other direction it was agreed to. On further conversation it appeard he considered the Cotton Mills as a part of the Canal—at least necessarily connected with it—and shewed the greatest reluctance at having that part of the Business taken out of his Management. After much conversation the Board seemed to acquiese in his having the superintendance of the Cotton Mill, altho they had passed a formal vote to restrict him to the Canal, which is to be compleated on the orriginal plan. He has assured them he will give them the entire command of the water this Season; & yet leave them some thing to operate with in future. Everything depends on his accomplishing this promise.
We have much to fear from the present State of the Funds of the Society. It is probable that the third payment which falls due the 13 Instant will be made wholly in the funded Debt of the united States, as well as the last, which falls due the 13 July next—& that these payments will be compleated only on about one half of the orriginal Shares. Should this prove to be the case, it must add greatly to our present embarrassments; as this debt could not be turned into Cash without great loss; and it will be even difficult to obtain Money, on the Credit of those Funds, in the different Banks, Sufficient for the Expenditures of this summer & fall.
I have serious fears that Majr L’Enfant will not be able to reduce his plans & operations, so as to square with the present Situation of the Funds of the Society. As he has the greatest relyance on you, it may be of essential Service to the affairs of the Society for you to press on him the necessity of the greatest Oeconemy in executing his plans; & confining his views to those things which are essential instead of what is ornimental in forming his works.
I am with great regard   Sir   your most obedt humble Servant
P. Colt
Honl Alexr. Hamilton Esqr


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 7 May 1793
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia May 7th. 1793.
Dear Sir,
As I perceive there has been some mis-conception respecting the building of Vessels in our Ports wch may be converted into armed ones; and as I understand from the Attorney General there is to be a meeting to day, or tomorrow of the Gentlemen on another occasion, I wish to have that part of your circular letter which respects this matter reconsidered by them before it goes out.
I am not disposed to adopt any measures which may check Shipbuilding in this Country. Nor am I satisfied that we should too promptly adopt measures—in the first instance—that is not indispensably necessary. To take fair and supportable ground I conceive to be our best policy, and is all that can be required of us by the Powers at War; leaving the rest to be managed according to circumstances and the advantages which may be derived from them.
I am always   Yours &ca.
Go: Washington
Quere,
Is it not expedient that the District Attornies should be written to, requiring their attention to the observance of the Injunctions of the Proclamation?
Colo. Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Stephen Higginson, 8 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Higginson, Stephen

[Philadelphia, May 8, 1793. On the cover of a letter that Higginson wrote to Hamilton on April 21, 1793, Hamilton wrote: “Answered May 8.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Thomas Jefferson, 8 May 1793
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia May 8. 1793.
Sir
I had wished to have kept back the issuing passports for sea vessels, till the question should be decided whether the treaty with France should be declared void, lest the issuing the Passport prescribed by that treaty might be considered as prejudging the question. The importunities however of the owners obliging me to give out a few, I had them printed in the Dutch form only. Not then having sufficiently considered on the best mode of distributing them, I took the liberty, as an expedient of the moment, of sending 7. (the number of vessels then waiting in this port) to mr Delany asking the favor of him to fill them up & deliver them for me. Application for another parcel coming, and the applicant not being able to wait himself till I could send them to be signed by the President, he desired I would lodge them with mr Coxe on whom it would be convenient for him to call for them. I did so; & afterwards sent a second parcel of a dozen, which were pressingly requested.
The President having now decided that the French passport may also be issued, it is at this time in the press, & the whole instrument compleat with the two passports, sea-letters, & certificates in it’s final form, will be ready for signature tomorrow. It has therefore now become necessary to determine on the ultimate channel of distributing them. I am not the judge whether the task of distribution might interfere too much with the other duties of the collectors of the customs. If it would not, their position seems best accomodated to that distribution. I took the liberty therefore to-day of proposing to the President that, if you should think there would be no inconvenience in charging them with the distribution, the blanks might be lodged with them; of which he approved: and I have now the honor of submitting that question to you. If you find no inconvenience in it, I will send 300 blanks, as soon as they shall be signed, either to your office or to that of the Commissioner of the revenue, whichever you shall prefer, to be forwarded to the collectors of the different ports; & from time to time afterwards will keep up a supply. Should it however, in your opinion, interfere too much with the other duties of those officers, I will submit to the President the depositing them with the deputy marshals appointed or to be appointed in every port. I will ask the favor of your answer, as the applications are numerous & pressing, & I am unwilling to be further troublesome to the gentlemen who have hitherto been so kind as to fill up & deliver them for me till some arrangement could be made which might relieve me personally from a business with the details of which I was not acquainted. I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir,
Your most obedt   & most humble sert
Th: Jefferson
The Secretary of the Treasury


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Richard Morris, 8 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Richard

[Philadelphia, May 8, 1793. On May 20, 1793, Morris wrote to Hamilton: “I am favoured with your letter of the 8th. instant.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 8 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Treasy. Departmt. 8 May 93.
The Secretary of the Treasury has the honor to lay before the President sundry papers relating to Ephraim Kirby, which is done merely on the score of propriety, as it is not perceived that any special provision in the case, can be consistently made.
Alexander Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [8 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia, May 8, 1793]
The Secretary of the Treasury has the honor to submit to the consideration of the President of the UStates a communication from the Commissioner of the Revenue of the 6 instant—respecting a contract provisionally entered into with Moses M. Hayes for a further supply of Oil for the Light Houses. It is respectfully conceived that the arrangement is in every view eligible.
A. Hamilton
8 May 1793.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson, 9 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Treasury DepartmentMay 9. 1793
Sir
I have this moment received your Letter of yesterday.
It appears to me, as it does to you, that the position of the Collectors of the Customs will render them the most convenient channel of distribution for the Passports; nor do I perceive, that it can interfere with their other duties.
It will be equally agreeable to me, that they be transmitted either directly from your office, or through this department. If you prefer the latter, which I shall with pleasure facilitate, I will request you to cause them to be sent in the first instance to me—when I will put them in the usual course of conveyance. With great respect
I have the honor to be   Sir   Your obedient servant
Alexander Hamilton
P.S.   Inclosed is the copy of a letter from the Collector of New York to Mr. Coxe of the 7th instant, which is transmitted for your consideration.

The Seretary of State


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John Kean, [9 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Kean, John

[Philadelphia, May 9, 1793]
D Sir
As soon as the term of the inclosed Note shall have come within your rule of Discount you will oblige me by having it presented for that purpose.
It is often my Lot to distress myself to accommodate friends. This is my present situation.
Yrs truly
A Hamilton
Philadelphia May 9. 1793


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Joseph Nourse, 10 May 1793
From: Nourse, Joseph
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Treasury Department, Register’s Office, May 10, 1793. Encloses “a Certified Copy of a Letter received from Stephen Hussuy Collr. of the District of Nantucket.… Enclosing 2 Ship Registers issued from that Port in the year 1791.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Pinckney, [10 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pinckney, Thomas

[Philadelphia, May 10, 1793]
The Secretary of the Treasury presents his compliments to Mr Pinckney and takes the liberty of troubling him with the charge of the enclosed letter for the Commissioners of the United States at Amsterdam.
Treasury Departmt.May 10. 1793.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Edmund Randolph, 10 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Randolph, Edmund

Treasury DepartmentMay 10. 1793
Sir
Inclosed are two letters one of the 16th of April from the Collector of the District of Charlestown, the other of the 29 of April from the Collector of the District of New Port—raising certain questions concerning the conduct to be observed in respect to prizes brought into the ports of the UStates by the Powers of Europe now at War with each other.
I request your opinion on the points of law which they suggest; marking the distinctions if any which arise out of Treaties with any or either of the parties.
The case requires that some precise and explicit instruction should be transmitted to the several Collectors as soon as possible; with a view to which your opinion as soon as convenient is desired.
This course, I understand [from] Mr Lear, was indicated by the President.
With respectful consideration   I am Sir   Your obed servant
The Atty General


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson, [12] May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Philadelphia, May [12] 1793. Transmits “the Copy of a letter of the 23d of April last from the Collector of the District of Nantucket to the Register of the Treasury” and “Copies of the declarations on the Registers, therein referred to.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Henry Knox, 13 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Knox, Henry

Treasury DepartmentMay 13. 1793
Sir
I have the honor to inclose an extract of a letter from me of this date to General Wilkinson, on a question of some importance lately raised by the Contractors.
I need not observe of how much moment it is, that the Commanding General should without delay establish with the Contractors the construction which I put on the Contract; about which I have no idea that they can mean any serious difficulty.
With respect   I have the honor to be &c
Secy of War


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Wilkinson, [13 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wilkinson, James

[Philadelphia, May 13, 1793]
My understanding of the Contract has always been different from that which seems to be intimated by Messrs. Elliott and Williams and constant usage hitherto furnishes a comment agreeable to my construction.
I entertain no doubt that the Contractors are not only to supply stationary posts, but are to keep measure with the movements of the Army or any detachment of it—in other words are to furnish the troops on their march as occasion may require—as well as in Garrison or at predetermined places. Where the scenes of supply are designated they are to receive the prices specified—Where they are not designated they are to receive such prices as shall be afterwards agreed upon between them and the Treasury.
In the first instance certain points are given, and they are to furnish what shall be required at any place or places between the given points—Wherever the Army or any detachment of it happens to be, there is a place at which they are to make the requisite supply and must be prepared accordingly. Nothing is said about posts or places previously known or fixed.
The same principle will apply to any places not between given points, with this only difference that in this case a price will be to be afterwards settled between the Contractors and the public.
In all such cases no doubt a reasonable course of practice must govern. It will always be incumbent upon the commanding Officer to give such due previous information to the Contractors of the supplies which will be wanted in any scene as will enable them with due diligence to be prepared for the demand. This attended to, it will be their duty in measure for answering it—whether on the march, in Camp or in Garrison.
The prices of the rations announce that an adequate calculation has been made for the casualties incident to this construction of the Contract and I doubt not the Contractors will readily accede to its being the true one.


Title: On the Reception of Edmond Charles Genet in Philadelphia, [14–16 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, May 14–16, 1793]
It is observable, that attempts are making to engage the good citizens of this place, to give some public demonstrations of satisfaction, on the arrival of M. Janet, the expected Minister Plenipotentiary from France.
The good sense and prudence of the Citizens of Philadelphia, it is hoped, will guard them against being led into so unadvised a step.
Every discreet man must perceive at once that it is highly the interest of this country to remain at peace and as a mean to this to observe a strict neutrality in the present quarrel between the European Powers.
Public manifestations even of strong wishes in our citizens in favour of any of the contending parties might interfere with this object; in tending to induce a belief that we may finally take a side.
If done, at the seat of the general Government, it may be suspected to have been done with the countenance of the Government. Tis easy to see, that such a supposition might not be without inconvenience.
The step recommended would be the more delicate, as nothing of the kind happened on the arrival of Mr. Ternant, the immediate predecessor of the expected Gentleman. Mr. Ternant, having served with reputation & usefulness, in our armies, during the late war, had a personal claim to marks of esteem, as far as on considerations of public propriety, it would have been right to bestow them. None were bestowed. To distinguish his successor would savour as little of kindness towards him as of prudence towards ourselves.
If we feel kind dispositions towards France for the assistance afforded us, in our revolution, it will not do us honor to forget that Louis the XVI was then the sovereign of the Country—that the succour afforded depended on his pleasure. Of this we are sure—there is no ambiguity. Whether he has suffered justly the melancholy fate, which he has recently experienced, is at least a question. No satisfactory evidence of the affirmative has yet appeared in this Country. We have seen strong assertions but no proof. To the last awful moment, he persevered in declaring his innocence.
In such a state of things, any extraordinary honors to the representative of those who consigned him to so affecting a doom, would be as little consonant with decorum and humanity, as with true policy.
It will not be difficult, either, to perceive that in such a state of things


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [14 May 1793]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Philadelphia, May 14, 1793]
The Secretary of the Treasury presents his respects to the President & sends for his information & direction two letters, one from the Collector of Oxford, the other from mr Murray member from Maryland. The Secretary, if not directed otherwise, will by the post of tomorrow, desire the Collector to detain the prize until further order; lest not receiving early instruction he may surrender her to one or the other party, contrary to the final determination of the Executive.
May 14 1793.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Richard Harrison, 15 May 1793
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Harrison, Richard

Treasury Department, May 15, 1793. “Mr. Bailey sometime since made a number of Seals for the use of the Supervisors.… it is proper that his claim be settled.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gulian Verplanck, 15 May 1793
From: Verplanck, Gulian
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, May 15, 1793. “I have paid to Mr Seton two thousand Dollars on Acct. & will be prepared to discharge the remainder of the Ballance with the further Interest that will have accrued to the time of the Deeds being returned.…”


Title: Introductory Note: To George Washington, 15 May 1793
From:
To:

According to Gouverneur Morris, United States Minister Plenipotentiary to France, Edmund Charles Genet had sailed from France in February, 1793, “with … three hundred blank commissions, which he is to distribute to such as will fit out cruisers in our ports to prey on the British commerce.” In July, 1793, Genet told Thomas Jefferson that on his arrival at Charleston on April 8 “he was surrounded suddenly by Frenchmen full of zeal for their country, pressing for authority to arm with their own means for it’s assistance, that they would fit out their own vessels, provide everything, man them, and only ask a commission from him.” While in Charleston Genet armed and sent to sea four privateers—the Republican, the Sans Culotte, the Anti-George, and the Patriot or Citizen Genet.
On May 2 and May 8, 1793, George Hammond, British Minister to the United States, presented memorials to Jefferson protesting the depredations by these vessels on British shipping along the coast of the United States. On May 2 he complained to Jefferson of the capture on April 25 of the British ship Grange, which “having a Delaware Pilot on board, was lying at anchor near the Buoy of the Brown in the Bay of Delaware, a Frigate appeared off the Capes under British Colours, which she continued to display until she approached within half a mile of the Grange at which time they were struck, the colours of France hoisted in their place, and the Frigate proved to be the French Frigate Embuscade.… The Captain of the Frigate then sent his boat with thirty or forty men, who took possession of the Grange as a prize to the French Republic, and sent the crew prisoners on board of the Frigate. The Grange arrived in the harbour of this city [Philadelphia] yesterday evening.… it is manifest that the French Frigate Embuscade captured the British Ship Grange, as she was lying at anchor within the Territory and jurisdiction of the United States, in direct violation of the Law of Nations.” On May 8 Hammond informed Jefferson that he had “received intelligence from his majesty’s Consul at Charleston South Carolina, that two privateers have been fitted out from that port under French Commissions. They carry six small guns and are navigated by forty or fifty men, who are for the most part Citizens of the United States.… [Hammond] does not deem it necessary to enter into any reasoning upon these Facts, as he conceives them to be breaches of that neutrality which the United States profess to observe, and direct Contraventions of the Proclamation which the President issued upon the 22d. of last month.” Further memorials from Hammond, also dated May 8, reported two additional prizes taken by L’Embuscade and complained that “considerable quantity of arms and military accoutrements, which an agent of the French Government has collected and purchased in this Country, is now preparing to be exported from New York to France.” The memorials also stated that the French consul in Charleston had condemned as legal prizes and presented for sale in that city two British ships seized by French privateers.
Jefferson submitted Hammond’s memorials to the President, who ordered “These Memorials to undergo a consideration before they are answered.” In order to decide on a reply to the British Minister’s charges, a meeting of the cabinet was called for May 15, 1793, at which time a draft of a letter to Hammond was approved. This letter reads in part as follows:
“Your several memorials of the 8th. instant, have been laid before the President, as had been that of the 2d, as soon as received. They have been considered with all the attention and the impartiality which a firm determination could inspire to do what is equal and right between all the belligerent powers.

“In one of these, you communicate on the information of the british consul at Charleston, that the Consul of France, at the same place, had condemned, as legal prize, a british vessel, captured by a french Frigate, and you justly add, that this judicial act is not warranted by the usage of nations, nor by the stipulations existing between the United States and France. I observe further, that it is not warranted by any law of the Land. It is consequently a mere nullity, as such it can be respected in no Court, can make no part in the title to the Vessel, nor give to the purchaser any other security than what he would have had without it.… The proceeding, indeed, if the British Consul has been rightly informed … has been an act of disrespect towards the United States, to which its Government cannot be inattentive.…
“The purchase of arms and military accoutrements by an agent of the french Government, in this Country, with an intent to export them to France, is the subject of another of the memorials. Of this fact we are equally uninformed, as of the former. Our citizens have been always free to make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their subsistence because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle, and impossible in practice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an internal derangement in their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President’s proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as shall fall into the Hands of any of the belligerent powers on their way to the ports of their enemies. To this penalty our Citizens are warned that they will be abandoned, and that even private contraventions may work no inequality between the parties at war, the benefits of them will be left equally free and open to all.
“The capture of the British ship Grange, by the French frigate l’Embuscade, has, on inquiry been found to have taken place within the Bay of Delaware and Jurisdiction of the United States, as stated in your memorial of the 2d instant. The government is therefore, taking measures for the liberation of the Crew and restitution of the ship and cargo.
“It condemns in the highest degree the conduct of any of our citizens, who may personally engage in committing hostilities at sea against any of the nations, parties to the present war, and will exert all the means with which the laws and constitution have armed them to discover such as offend herein and bring them to condign punishment. Of these dispositions I am authorized to give assurances to all the parties, without reserve.… Instructions are consequently given to the proper law officer to institute such proceedings as the laws will justify for apprehending and punishing certain individuals of our Citizens suggested to have been concerned in enterprises of this kind, as mentioned in one of your memorials of the 8th instant.
“The practice of commissioning, equipping and manning Vessels, in our ports to cruise on any of the belligerent parties, is equally and entirely disapproved, and the government will take effectual measures to prevent a repetition of it. The remaining point in the same memorial, is reserved for further Consideration.”
The question which remained to be considered was that of restoring to their proper owners prizes captured by privateers fitted out in American ports, and on this question the members of the cabinet submitted written opinions.
Jefferson in his opinion, dated May 16, 1793, stated that “considering that the present is the first case which has arisen, that it has been in the first moment of the war, in one of the most distant ports of the U S., and before measures could be taken by the government to meet all the cases which may flow from the infant state of our government and novelty of our position, it ought to be placed by Great Britain among the accidents of loss to which a nation is exposed in a state of war, and by no means as a premeditated wrong on the part of the Government.” Randolph in his opinion, dated May 17, 1793, also maintained that the United States was not required to make restitution to Great Britain but observed that it had been agreed “to advise the President to direct a remonstrance to Mr. Genet against what is passed, and a repetition of it in future, So that the dignity of the government will be asserted.” Knox’s opinion, dated May 16, 1793, closely corresponded to Hamilton’s.