Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John Dickinson, [25–30 September 1783]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Dickinson, John

[Albany, September 25–30, 1783]
Sir,
Having always entertained an esteem for you personally I could not without reluctance yield to impressions that might weaken that sentiment, and it is with pain I find myself drawn by circumstances to animadvert upon the late message from the Executive Council to the Assembly of Pensylvania relative to the mutiny in a manner which may seem to impeach the candor of those who were the authors of it. But it will be impossible for persons who have read the report of the Committee and the message of the Council, however inclined to make allowances for the force of involuntary biass, not to conclude that on one side or the other the facts have been wilfully discoloured. I decline any attempt to set the public opinion right upon this subject, because after all that can be said the judgments of men will eventually be determined by personal and party prepossessions. So far as I am concerned, I persuade myself those who are acquainted with me will place intire confidence in my fairness and veracity. I doubt not Your Excellency’s friends will be equally partial to you and those of the council to them. But though I should dispair of rectifying or fixing the public opinion by an appeal to the public, and though I have seen too much of the ridicule thrown upon such appeals from men in official stations, and of the ill effect they have had upon the national character, not to be willing to sacrifice the desire of justifying myself to considerations of prudence and propriety; yet I cannot forbear indulging my feelings so far as to enter into a few explanations with Your Excellency, submitting the justness of them to the testimony of your own mind.
As this is a mere private discussion I address myself to your Excellency in particular; and the rather as from the stile and manner of the message, I take it for granted you had the principal agency in it; and I shall consider on the same grounds the notes in  paper of the  as a commentary on the report of the Committee by yourself, in aid of the message.

I take up the matter individually, because I mean to treat it on a private footing; and because though I do not acknowlege any peculiar responsibility, it happened to be my lot as Chairman principally to conduct the conferences on the part of the Committee.
I regard the whole of this business as a most unfortunate one; in which probably none of the actors will acquire great credit. I deplore it as tending to interrupt the harmony between Congress and a respectable a meritorious member of the Union. Who were right or who were wrong is a question of less importance than how mutual irritations may be best treated? Whatever revives or continues the former is to be regretted. I lament to be under any inducement to discuss circumstances that relate to it in the remotest degree. Nothing but an attack upon the ingenuousness of my conduct could have called me to it. Its prudence either collectively or individually would patiently have been consigned to the lash of censure and cri[ti]cism merited, or unmerited.
Happily in the present case the members of the Committee have a strong ground from which they cannot easily be forced. Apprehensive of misconception, I will not say of misrepresentation, they tried to render it impossible by written documents. The presumption with impartial minds cannot fail to be in favour of that side which gave so decisive a proof of its disposition to fairness as to endeavour to put it out of its own power to misrepresent.
The professed scruples of the Council cannot be admitted to have any weight. Usage and the plainest rules of propriety will dictate that it never could have wounded the dignity or delicacy of the executive of any state, to have given to a Committee of Congress appointed to confer on a subject of moment, a written answer to a request in writing after previous explanations. The fact stated speaks for itself. The consequences show that the precaution of the Committee was well judged and that it would have been well for the Council to have concurred. In the present case it might be observed, that there was in the first instance a written application from Congress to the Council in the customary form of resolutions; and though a Committee was authorised to confer and explain, a formal and authentic answer might reasonably have been expected by Congress and when desired by the Committee should have been understood as desired on their behalf.
There is an awkwardness in reasoning upon self evident positions, but as the Council have by their conduct in the first instance and by their message since put forward a doubt upon the subject and made it a point of importance, I shall be excused for examining it a little further. On what could the objection of the Council be founded? They say it had been unusual. Admitting the fact, was the mere novelty of the thing a sufficient reason against it? If there was no apparent inconvenience in making a new precedent, if on the contrary there was a manifest convenience in it, ought not such a punctilio to have given way to considerations of utility?
Was it derogatory to the dignity of the Council? Surely if they communicate in writing with the executive servants of Congress, even those in subordinate stations, as is the practice of every day and as is indispensable to the prosecution of public business, they might at less expence of dignity pursue the same mode with a part of that body itself.
The distinction taken by the Council in their message to the assembly, respecting the responsibility of such executive officers, as not applicable to a Committee, if it amounts to any thing, proves only this—that such officers ought in prudence to take greater precautions for their own justification than a Committee of Congress need to do. It is not to be inferred, if a Committee of Congress acting ministerially think it expedient to use circumspection, that those with whom they are transacting business can with propriety refuse to join with them in that mode which is best adapted to precision and certainty.
But indeed the ground of the d⟨istinction⟩ is erroneous. A committee of Congress act in ⟨a⟩ ministerial capacity and are therefore responsi⟨ble to⟩ the body to which they belong as well as the servants of that body though in a different manner. If it be said they do not act ministerially but stand in the place of Congress, then the Council upon their own principles ought to have complied with their request.
To diminish the exceptionableness of their refusal, it is true, as stated by the Council that though they said they could not condescend to do what the Committee had asked yet they declared themselves to grant an answer in writing, if Congress should request it; and that they proposed that the Committee should put their verbal answer in writing to be afterwards perused and examined by them.
The answer of the Committee as I doubt not Your Excellency will recollect was—as to the first point that Congress in all probability would not make the request, having determined (as the Council had been already informed) not to resume their deliberations in the city till effectual measures had been taken to suppress the mutiny—and should they assemble would naturally feel a delicacy in requesting what had been denied to their Committee. And as to the second point, that the Council having judged it inexpedient to give a written answer, the Committee would content themselves with making the most accurate report in their power, relying upon the confidence of the body to which they belonged and upon the candour of the council.
Your Excellency is too good a judge of human nature as well as of the force of language not to have perceived at the time of effect which the refusal of the Council had upon my mind. I own it struck me either as an uncandid reserve or an unbecoming stateliness; and in either supposition a disrespect to the body of which the Committee were members.
Though nothing enters less into my temper than an inclination to fetter business by punctilio, after the Council had discovered, such overweening nicety, I should have thought it a degradation to my official character to have consented to their proposal.
The desire of self justification is so natural that I should not have been surprised to have seen the transactions which are the subject of the council’s message receive a colouring favourable to their purpose. But I did not expect to find material facts either suppressed or denied.
The report made by the Committee on the first interview with the Council was I acknowlege from memory and therefore I admit the possibility of error; but so far as my memory can be relied on the representation was just. And I am certain that there is a mistake in the insinuation, that the circumstance of the message sent to Congress by the Board of serjeants, was not mentioned at all to the Council, for I have a note of it taken immediately after the first conference subsequent to the mutiny. The affair, by the event of  having assumed a more serious aspect I kept a regular minute of the proceedings a summary of which made up our report to Congress and which I shall annex at large to this letter for your Excellency’s perusal.
The message intirely omits the declaration of the Council that
and the note says, that the Council only declared, “that they could not be sure, that such another insult would produce those exertions.” The difference in this article is of great importance. The declaration made so deep an impression at the time, that almost the precise words remained in my memory. They were twice repeated as well when we saw Your Excellency alone in your own house in the morning, as when you delivered to us in the Council chamber the determination of the Council. Mr. Elseworth in half an hour afterwards repeated them to several members of Congress assembled at the Presidents house, and in a few hours from that time I committed them to writing. I cannot suppose Your Excellency’s recollection fails you in this particular and I must pointedly appeal to your candour.
To show the inaccuracy with which the report of the Committee was composed it is observed in the notes with respect to that part which relates to the commission given by the mutineers to the officers, whom they had chosen to represent them, that only two hours intervened between that event and the conference with the Council—and that it was very improbable the knowlege of it could have so early reached the Committee. It is added that none of the Council remembers to have heard a single syllable respecting it during the whole conference.
As to the argument drawn from the short interval between the delivery of the commission and the conferrence, it will be sufficient to say that the Committee held a constant communication with General St Clair and that he kept a vigilant eye upon all the motions of the mutineers—that his access to them was easy—that the fact in question was a matter of immediate notoriety—that two hours were abundant time for a thing of that nature to be conveyed from the barracks to General St Clairs quarters and that one of the Committee had actually seen and obtained the intelligence from him, a little time before the interview with the Council commenced. It is much more extraordinary that the Council should have been apprized of it so late than that the Committee should have known it so early. As to the memory of the Council it is unfortunate it should have been so fallible as it is said to have been; but I would rather suppose in the quick succession of circumstances, the matter had escaped their recollection than that my minutes as well as my memory should have deceived me. I will recollect also that Your Excellency when it was mentioned acknowleged that it rather contradicted the pacific appearance which the conduct of the troops in other respects wore.
These are the essential differences in point of fact between the report of the Committee and the message of council. The whole complexion indeed of the one materially varies from the other, but the most common observer must have noticed how different an aspect the same facts will bear differently dressed and arranged. It was to avoid this we proposed to reduce them to writing; but as this has not been done, spectators must judge from the situation of the parties and the course of the transactions which side has given the justest relation.
I cannot however forbear remarking that I see expressions of civility on the part of the Committee making a figure in the message very different from their genuine intention; being introduced in a manner that gives them the air of concessions in favour of the conduct of the Council. Your Excellency will certainly recollect that the Committee were very remote from a concurrence in sentiment with the Council; and though they did not presume to judge of the disposition of the citizens strongly urged the expedience and necessity of calling out the Militia and facility of employing them with success against an unofficered and disorderly body of mutinous soldiers. It is true also that they acknowleged the candour with which the Council exposed to them what they deemed the temper of their citi⟨zens⟩ and their own difficulties and embarrassments which were no doubt delineated with great energy of language and display of circumstances. But they certainly never admitted the candour of refusing an answer in writing which was a part of the business transacted with the Council; nor did they withdraw without giving an intelligible intimation of their sense of this proceeding.
I was also surprised to see any part of the private and confidential conversation I had with your Excellency ushered into the message from the council and moulded into such a shape as to imply by an obvious construction an approbation of their reasons. Your Excellency will admit the following state of this transaction to be a just one.
I waited upon the Council to correct a piece of information I had given them respecting ammunition; but even this is mistated, as will be seen by my minutes. Having done this my official business ended when I was taken aside by Your Excellency and a conversation passed in declared confidence. You informed me that a meeting of the Militia officers was then holding and in consultation with the Council about eventual measures (in consequence as I conjectured of a communication to you the preceding evening from the delegates of the state of the intention of Congress to remove from the city in case they did not receive satisfactory assurances of support) you added that you hoped nothing would be precipitated; but that proper allowances would be made for the situation of the Council.
I understood your observation, with reference to the departure of Congress, and replied to this effect—that I viewed the departure of Congress as a delicate measure, including consequences important to the national character abroad and critical with respect to the state of Pensylvania and in particular the city of Philadelphia. That the triumph of a handful of mutinous soldiers permitted in a place which is considered as the capital of America to surround and in fact imprison Congress without the least effort on the part of the citizens to uphold their dignity and authority, so as to oblige them to move from the place which had been their residence during the revolution, would it was to be feared be viewed at a distance as a general disaffection of the citizens to the fœderal government, might discredit its negotiations and affect the national interests. That at home it might give a deep wound to the reputation of Pensylvania might draw upon it the resentments of the other states and sow discord between Congress and the state. That the removal of Congress would probably bring the affair to a crisis and by convincing the mutineers that extremities were intended, would either intimidate them into a submission or determine them to immediate excesses. That impressed with these considerations, and still hoping, notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary, that the mutineers might be sincere in their professions of submission, or that the Council on further examination would find it in their power to act with vigour, I had declined giving my assent to a report in writing which would necessarily be followed by the departure of Congress. That though the Committee had no discretion by the powers under which they acted, but were bound by the tenor of their instructions, the moment they did not receive, “satisfactory assurances of prompt and adequate exertions on the part of the state for supporting the public authority” to advise the adjournment of Congress to Trenton or Princeton—and I therefore considered the delay of this advice as at their extreme peril, yet as to myself, I should persist in it ’till the result of the present consultation with the Militia officers or ’till some new circumstance should turn up to explain the designs of the mutineers. That in persuing this line of conduct, I should counteract the sense of some Gentlemen whose feelings upon the occasion were keen and the opinions of others who thought the situation of Congress under the existing circumstances extremely awkward precarious and unjustifiable to their constituents.
Your Excellency approved my intention, wished for time and promised if any new resolution should be taken to give me immediate notice of it.
The Meeting of the Militia officers dissolved. I heard nothing from Your Excellency. General St Clair about two in the afternoon informed the Committee that the officers appointed by the Soldiers to manage their business had in the first instance refused to give him an account of their transactions—that which was only extracted from them by a peremptory demand. He mentioned to us the instructions they had received from the soldiers which contained faint and affected concessions mixed with new and inadmissible claims. The whole affair wore the complexion of collusion between the officers of the Committee and the soldiery and of a mere amusement on their part ’till they could gain fresh strength and execute their project whatever it might be with greater advantage.
This behaviour of the officers gave the affair a new and more serious aspect and overcame my opposition to the report. Mr. Peters on hearing the relation of General St Clair declared at once that he thought the Committee had then no alternative; at least what he said was understood in this sense by General St Clair, Mr Elseworth and myself. If I am not much mistaken General St Clair also expressed his opinion that Congress were unsafe in the city.
The ideas I suggested to Your Excellency in the conversation I have mentioned, were substantially expressed to several members of Congress as the motives of my delay—and particularly I recollect to Mr. Maddison, with these observations in addition. That though I was fully convinced Congress under an immediate view of circumstances, would in reality be justified in withdrawing from a place where such an outrage to government had been with impunity perpetrated by a body of armed mutineers, still for several days in complete command of the city and where either the feebleness of public councils or the indisposition of the citizens afforded no assurance of protection and support; yet as the opinions of men would be governed by events, and as the most probable event was that the removal of Congress, announcing decisive measures of coertion to the soldiery would awe them into submission, there was great danger that the reputation of Congress would suffer by the easy termination of the business, and that they would be accused of levity timidity or rashness.
Though not within the scope of my original intention I will indulge a few additional reflections on this subject.
I am sensible, that the Council in some respects stand upon advantageous ground in this discussion. Congress left the city because they had no forces at hand, no jurisdiction over the Militia and no assurances of effectual support from those who had. The Council, as the Executive of the state, were necessitated to remain on the spot. Soon after Congress removed, the Mutineers were deserted by their leaders and surrendered at discretion.
The Multitude will be very apt to conclude that the affair was of triffling consequence that it vanished under its own insignificance—that Congress took up the matter in too high a tone of authority—that they discovered a prudish nicety and irritability about their own dignity—that the Council were more temperate more humane and possessed of greater foresight.
The byass in favour of an injured army—the propensity of the human mind to lean to the speciousness of professed humanity rather than to the necessary harshness of authority—the vague and imperfect notions of what is due to public authority in an infant popular government—and the insinuating plausibility of a well constructed message will all contribute to that conclusion.
But let us suppose an impartial man of sense well acquainted with facts to form an argument upon the subject. It appears to me he might naturally fall into this train of combination.
It is a well known fact that from the necessities of the war or the delinquencies of the several states Congress were not enabled to comply with their engagements to the army, which after a glorious and successful struggle for their country, much suffering, exemplary patience and signal desert, they were compelled by the irresistible dictates of an empty treasury and a ruined credit to disband, after having given strong indications of their discontent and resentment of the public neglect. A large part of the army suffer themselves to be patiently dismissed; a particular corps of four or five hundred men stationed in the place where Congress reside, refuse to accept their discharges but on certain specified conditions. They even go further and stimulated by their injuries, or encouraged and misled by designing persons are emboldened to send a threatening message to Congress declaring to them that unless they would do them justice immediately, they would find means of redress for themselves. Measures are indirectly taken to appease this disorder and give the discontented soldiers as much satisfaction as the situation of things will permit. Shortly after accounts are received that another corps at  miles distance have also mutinied, and that a part of them to the number of about Eighty men are on their march to join those who had already discovered so refractory a disposition. A Committee of Congress is immediately appointed to confer with the Executive of the State on the measures proper to be persued in this exigency. That Committee in the first instance suggests to the Council the expedience of calling out a body of Militia to intercept the detachment of mutineers on its march and represent the danger of the progress of the spirit of mutiny and of future outrages should those on their march be suffered without molestation to join a more numerous corps in the same temper with themselves. The Council urge a variety of difficulties: the shortness of the time to collect the Militia, before the mutineers would arrive, the reluctance with which the citizens would obey a call against men whom they consider as meritorious and injured and the like. The Committee perceiving the unwillingness of the Council to employ the Militia desist from pressing and recur to expedients. The day after the mutineers march in triumph into the city and unite themselves with those who are already there; and the following day the whole body assemble in arms throw off all obedience to their officers and in open defiance of government march to the place which is the usual seat of Congress and the Council of the state, while both are actually sitting, surround it with guards and send a message to the council, demanding authority to appoint themselves, officers to command them, with absolute discretion to take such measures as those officers should think proper to redress their grievances; accompanied with a threat that if there was not a compliance in twenty minutes, they would let in an injured soldiery upon them and abide the consequence. The members of Congress who were at the time assembled request General St Clair, who happened to be present, to take such measures as he should judge expedient without committing the honor of government to divert the storm and induce the troops to return to their quarters without perpetrating any acts of violence. General St Clair in concert with the Council grants the mutineers permission to elect out of officers then or formerly in commission such as they should confide in to represent their grievances to the Council, with a promise that the Council would confer with the persons elected for that purpose. Having obtained this promise the mutineers return to their quarters, in military parade, and continue in open defiance of government.
The concession made was a happy compromise between an attention to dignity and a prudent regard to safety. Men who had dared to carry their insolence to such an extreme and who saw no opposition to their outrages were not to be expected to retreat without an appearance at least of gratifying their demands. The slightest accident was sufficient to prompt men in such a temper and situation to tragical excesses.
But however it might become the delicacy of government not to depart from the promise it had given, it was its duty to provide effectually against a repetition of such outrages and to put itself in a situation to give instead of receiving the law; and to manifest that its compliance was not the effect of necessity but of choice.
This was not to be considered as the disorderly riot of an unarmed mob but as the deliberate mutiny of an incensed soldiery carried to the utmost point of outrage short of assassination. The licentiousness of an army is to be dreaded in every government; but in a republic it is more particularly to be restrained, and when directed against the civil authority to be checked with energy and punished with severity. The merits and sufferings of the troops might be a proper motive for mitigating punishment when it was in the power of the government to inflict it—but it was no reason for relaxing in the measures necessary to arrive at that situation. Its authority was first to be vindicated and then its clemency to be displayed.
The rights of government are as essential to be defended as the rights of individuals. The security of the one is inseparable from that of the other. And indeed in every new government, especially of the popular kind the great danger is that public authority will not be sufficiently respected.
But upon this occasion there were more particular reasons for decision.
Congress knew there were within two or three days march of the city a more considerable body of the same corps part of which had mutinied and come to town and had been the chief actors in the late disorder—that those men had with difficulty been kept by the exertions of their officers from joining the insurgents in the first instance—that there was another corps in their neighbourhood which a little time before had also discovered symptoms of mutiny—that a considerable part of the same line which were in mutiny in town was every moment expected to arrive from the Southward, and there was the greatest reason to conclude would be infected with the same spirit on their arrival, as had presently happened in the case of a small detachment which had joined a few days before—that there were besides large numbers of disbanded soldiers scattered through the country in want and who had not yet had time to settle down to any occupation and exchange their military for private habits—that some of these were really coming in and adding themselves to the revolters—that an extensive accession of strength might be gained from these different quarters—and that there were all the sympathies of like common distresses and resentments to bring them together and to unite them in one cause. The partial success of those who had already made an experiment would have been a strong encouragement to others—the rather as the whole line had formerly mutinied not only with impunity but with advantage to themselves.
In this state of things decision was most compatible with the safety of the community as well as the dignity of government. Though no general convulsion might be to be apprehended serious mischiefs might attend the progress of the disorder. Indeed it would have been meanness to have negotiated and temporised with an armed banditti of four or five hundred men, who in any other situation than surrounding a defenceless senate could only become formidable by being feared. This was not an insurrection of a whole people—it was not an army with their officers at their head demanding the justice of their country—either of which might have made caution and concession respectable. It was a handful of mutinous soldiers, who had equally violated the laws of discipline as the rights of public authority.
Congress therefore wisely resolve that “it is necessary that effectual measures be immediately taken for supporting the public authority” and call upon the state in which they reside for the assistance of its militia at the same time that they send orders for the march of a body of regular forces as an eventual resource.
There was a propriety in calling for the aid of the Militia in the first place, for different reasons. Civil government may always with more peculiar propriety resort to the aid of the citizens to repel military insults, or encroachments. Tis there it ought to be supposed where it may seek its surest dependence especially in a democracy, which is the creature of the people. The citizens of each state are in an aggregate light the citizens of the United states and bound as much to support the representatives of the whole as their own immediate representatives. The insult was not to Congress personally it was to the government to public authority in general; and was very properly put upon that footing. The regular forces which Congress could command were at a great distance, and could not but in a length of time be brought to effecuate their purpose. The disorder continued to exist on the spot where they were, was likely to increase by delay and might be productive of sudden and mischievous effects by being neglected. The city and the bank were in immediate danger of being rifled and perhaps of suffering other calamities. The citizens therefore were the proper persons to make the first exertion.
The objection that these were not the objects of the care of Congress can only serve to mislead the vulgar. The peace and safety of the place which was the immediate residence of Congress endangered too by the troops of the United States demanded their interposition. The President of the State of Pensylvania was himself of this opinion having declared to a member of that body that as their troops were the offenders it was proper for them to declare the necessity of calling out the Militia as a previous step to its being done.
Nor is there more weight in the supposition that the danger was inconsiderable and that from the pacific appearances of the troops it was to be expected the disorder would subside of itself. The facts were that the troops still continued in a state of mutiny—had made no submissions—nor offered any—and that they affected to negotiate with their arms in their hands. A band of mutinous soldiers in such a situation uncontrouled and elated [by] their own power was not to be trusted. The most sudden vicissitudes and contradictory changes were to be expected; and a fit of intoxication was sufficient at any moment with men who had already gone such lengths to make the city a scene of plunder and massacre. It was the height of rashness to leave the city exposed to the bare possibility of such mischiefs.
The only question in this view is whether there was greater danger to the city in attempting their reduction by force than in endeavouring by palliatives to bring them to a sense of duty. It has been urged and appeared to have operated strongly upon the minds of the Council, (Your Excellency will recollect that in our private conversation, you urged this consideration and appealed to my military experience & that I made substantially the observations which follow) that the soldiers being already embodied accustomed to arms and ready to act at a moments warning it would be extremely hazardous to attempt to collect the citizens to subdue them as the mutineers might have taken advantage of the first confusions incident to the measure to do a great deal of mischief before the Militia could have assembled in equal or superior force.
It is not to be denied but that a small body of disciplined troops headed and led by their officers with a plan of conduct could have effected a great deal in similar circumstances; but it is equally certain that nothing can be more contemptible than a body of men used to be commanded and to obey when deprived of the example and direction of their officers. They are infinitely less to be dreaded than an equal number of men who have never been broken to command, nor exchanged their natural courage for that artificial kind which is the effect of discipline and habit. Soldiers transfer their confidence from themselves to their officers, face danger by the force of example the dread of punishment and the sense of necessity. Take away these inducements and leave them to themselves they are no longer resolute than ’till they are opposed.
In the present case it was to be relied upon that the appearance of opposition would instantly bring the mutineers to a sense of their insignificance and to submission. Conscious of their weakness from the smallness of their numbers—in a populous city and in the midst of a populous country—awed by the consequences of resisting government by arms, and confounded by the want of proper leaders and proper direction, the common soldiers would have thought of nothing but making their peace by the sacrifice of those who had been the authors of their misconduct.
The idea therefore of coertion was the safest and most prudent, for more was to be apprehended from leaving them to their own passions than from attempting to controul them by force. It will be seen by and by how far the events justly appreciated corresponded with this reasoning.
Congress were not only right in adopting measures of coertion; but they were also right in resolving to change their situation if proper exertions were not made by the particular government and citizens of the place where they resided. The want of such exertions would evince some defect, no matter where, that would prove they ought to have no confidence in their situation. They were to all intents and purposes in the power of a lawless armed banditti enraged whether justly or not against them. However they might have had a right to expose their own persons to insult and outrage, they had no right to expose the character of representative, or the dignity of the states they represented or of the Union. It was plain they could not with propriety in such a state of things proceed in their deliberations where they were and it was right they should repair to a place where they could do it. It was far from impossible that the mutineers might have been induced to seize their persons as hostages for their own security as well as with a hope of extorting concessions. Had such an event taken place the whole country would have exclaimed, why did not Congress withdraw from a place where they found they could not be assured of support—where the government was so feeble or the citizens so indisposed as to suffer three or four hundred mutinous soldiers to violate with impunity the authority of the United States and of their own state?
When they resolved to depart on the want of adequate exertions, they had reason to doubt their being made from the disinclination shown by the Council to call out the militia in the first instance; and when they did actually depart they were informed by the Council that the efforts of the citizens were not to be looked for even from a repetition of the outrage which had already happened and it was to be doubted what measure of outrage would produce them. They had also convincing proof that the mutiny was more serious than it had even at first appeared by the participation of some of the officers.
To throw the blame of harshness and precipitancy upon Congress it is said that their dignity was only accidentally and undesignedly offended. Much stress has been laid upon the message from the soldiery being directed to the Council and not to them. All this however is very immaterial to the real merits of the question. Whatever might have been the first intention of the mutineers in this particular act whether it proceeded from artifice or confusion of ideas, the indignity to Congress was the same. They knew that Congress customarily held their deliberations at the state house; and if it even be admitted that they knew saturday to be a day of usual recess, which perhaps is not altogether probable, when they came to the place they saw and knew Congress to be assembled there. They did not desist in consequence of this; but proceeded to station their guards and execute their purposes. Members of Congress went out to them—remonstrated with them—represented the danger of their proceedings to themselves and desired them to withdraw, but they persisted until they obtained what they supposed a part of their object. A majority of the same persons had some days before sent a message almost equally exceptionable to Congress; and at the time they scarcely spoke of any other body than Congress; who indeed may naturally be supposed to have been the main object of their resentments: for Congress having always appeared to the soldiery to be [the] body who contracted with them and who had broken faith with them. It is not to be supposed they were capable of investigating the remote causes of the failures so as to transfer the odium from Congress to the state.
But the substantial thing to be considered in this question is the violation of public authority. It cannot be disputed that the mutiny of troops is a violation of that authority to which they owe obedience. This was in the present case aggravated to a high degree of atrociousness by the gross insult to the government of Pensylvania, in the face of Congress and in defiance of their displeasure. It was further aggravated by continuing in that condition for a series of time.
The reasons have been assigned that made it incumbent upon Congress to interpose; and when they called upon the state of Pensylvania not only to vindicate its own rights but to support their authority—the declining a compliance was a breach of the confederation and of the duty which the state of Pensylvania owed to the United States. The best apology for the government of Pensylvania in this case is that they could not command the services of their citizens. But so improper a disposition in the citizens if admitted must operate as an additional justification to Congress in their removal.
The subsequent events justly appreciated illustrate the propriety of their conduct. The mutineers did not make voluntary submissions in consequence of negotiation persuasion or conviction. They did not submit ’till after Congress had left the city publishing their intentions of coertion, ’till after there had been an actual call upon the Militia—till their leaders and instigators alarmed by the approach of force and the fear of being betrayed by the men fled. They were reduced by coertion not overcome by mildness. It appears too that while they were professing repentance and a return to their duty, they were tampering with the troops at York Town and Lancaster to increase their strength—and that two officers at least were concerned in the mutiny, who by their letters since, have con⟨fessed⟩ that some project of importance was in contemplation.
The call for the militia was made the day after it had been pronounced ineligible by the Council. There could have been little change in that time either in the temper or preparation of the citizens. The truth is that the departure of Congress brought the matter to a crisis and that the Council were compelled by necessity to do what they ought to have done before through choice.
It is to be lamented that they did not by an earlier decision, prevent the necessity of Congress taking a step which may have many disagreeable consequences. They then would


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Jay, 28 September 1783
From: Jay, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Passy [France] 28 Septr. 1783
Dear Sir:
Mr. Carter lately delivered to me your friendly letter of the 25 July last. You was always of the Number of those whom I esteemed, and your Correspondence would have been both interesting & agreable.
I had heard of your marriage, and it gave me Pleasure, as well because it added to your Happiness, as because it tended to fix your Residence in a State of which I long wished you to be and remain a citizen.
The Character and Talents of Delegates to Congress daily becomes more and more important, and I regret your declining that appointment at this interesting Period. Respect however is due to the Considerations which influence You; but as they do not oppose your accepting a Place in the Legislature, I hope the Public will still continue to derive advantage from your Services. Much remains to be done, and Labourers do not abound.
I am happy to hear that the Terms of Peace, and the Conduct of your Negociat⟨ions⟩ give general Satisfaction—But there are some of our Countrymen it seems who are not content, and that too with an article which I thought to be very unexceptionable, vizt. the one ascertaining our Boundaries. Perhaps those Gentlemen are Latitudinarians.
The american news papers for some months past contain advices which do us Harm. Violencies and associations against the Tories pay an ill compliment to Government and impeach our good Faith in the opinions of some, and our magnanimity in the opinion of many. Our Reputation also suffers from the apparent Reluctance to [taxes] and the Ease with which we incur Debts without providing for their Payment. The Complaints of the army—The Jealousies respecting Congress—the Circumstances which induced their leaving Philadelphia— and the too little appearance of a national Spirit pervading uniting and invigorating the Confederacy, are considered as omens which portend the Diminution of our Respectability, Power and Felicity. I hope that as the wheel turns round other & better Indications will soon appear. I am persuaded that america possesses too much wisdom and virtue, to permit her brilliant Prospects to fade away for want of either.
The Tories are almost as much pitied in these Countries, as they are execrated in our’s. An undue Degree of Severity towards them would therefore be impolitic as well as unjustifiable: They who incline to involve that whole Class of Men in indiscriminate Punishment and Ruin, certainly carry the Matter too far—it would be an Instance of unnecessary Rigour and unmanly Revenge without a parallel except in the annals of religious Rage in Times of Bigotry and Blindness. What does it signify where nine tenths of these People are buried? I would rather see the Sweat of their Brows fertilize our Fields, than those of our Neighbours which it would certainly water those Seeds of Hatred, in
Victory and Peace should in my opinion be followed by Clemency, Moderation and Benevolence; & we should be careful not to sully the Glory of the Revolution by licenciousness and Cruelty. These are my Sentiments, & however unpopular they may be, I have not the least Desire to conceal or disguise them.
Mr. & Mrs. Carter are well, and our Endeavours shall not be wanting to render Paris agreable to them.
Be pleased to present our best Compliments to Mrs Hamilton, and believe me to be with great Regard & Esteem   Dear Sir   Your most obt. & hble servt.
John Jay
Col. A. Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [30 September 1783]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Albany, September 30, 1783]
Sir
I think I may address the subject of this letter to Your Excellency with more propriety than to any other person, as it is purely of a military nature, as you are best acquainted with my services as an officer, and as you are now engaged in assisting to form the arrangements for the future peace establishment.
Your Excellency knows that in March 82, I relinquished all claim to any future compensation for my services, either during the residue of the war, or after its conclusion—simply retaining my rank. On this foundation I build a hope that I may be permitted to preserve my rank, in the peace establishment, without emoluments and unattached to any corps—as an honorary reward for the time I have devoted to the public. As I may hereafter travel I may find it an agreeable circumstance to appear in the character I have supported in the revolution.
I rest my claim solely on the sacrifice I have made; because I have no reason to believe that my services have appeared of any value to Congress—as they declined giving them any marks of their notice, on an occasion, which appeared to my friends to intitle me to it, as well by the common practice of sovereigns as by the particular practice of this country in repeated instances.
Your Excellency will recollect, that it was my lot at York Town to command as senior officer a successful attack upon one of the enemy’s redoubts, that the officer who acted in a similar capacity in another attack made at the same time, by the French troops has been handsomely distinguished in consequence of it by the government to which he belongs, and that there are several examples among us where Congress have bestowed honors upon actions, perhaps not more useful nor apparently more hazardous.
These observations are inapplicable to the present Congress, further than as they may possibly furnish an additional motive to a compliance with my wish.
The only thing I ask of Your Excellency is that my application may come into view in the course of the consultations on the peace establishment.
I have the honor to be With sincere esteem   Your Excellency’s Most Obed servant
Alex Hamilton
Albany Sepr. 30th. 1783
His Excelly General Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Nathanael Greene, [1 October 1783]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Greene, Nathanael

[Albany, October 1, 1783]
By this time I presume My Dear General you have returned to your ancient residence. I had the pleasure of seeing Mrs. Greene at New York; and was induced by her to hope you would be prevailed upon to become a fellow citizen of ours. I know you have long had a partiality for our state; but I have been afraid, and have not yet banished my apprehensions, that your new Mistress would detach you from your old. I could not indeed very much blame your inconstancy when I consider how much South Carolina has done to attach you to her. Yet now you have revisited the ruddy and health-teeming countenance of our Northern lass, I am not without expectation that you may prefer it to the palefaced charms of the one you have left behind. I know besides that she will have a powerful advocate in one that will have a powerful influence with you.
Mr. Carter sometime before he left this informed me that he had sent a Bond of Mr. Kinlocks to you to be renewed by him—and which was to be transmitted to me by you. I have some confused idea that he afterwards mentioned something to me on the subject, which however I have forgotten. But I shall be glad to receive a line from you to inform me whether the Bond has been renewed or not and what has been done with it.
Let me assure you that no one interests himself more warmly in your health and happiness than myself, and request that you will present my affectionate compliments to Mrs. Greene. Mrs. Hamilton joins hers to you both   Dr Sir   Yr. affect & Obed ser
A Hamilton
Albany October 1st 1783
General Greene


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, 3 October 1783
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Clinton, George

Albany Octr. 3d. 1783
Sir
I have lately received from Messrs. Duane and Lhommedieu an extract of a letter from Your Excellency to the Delegates of the 23d. of August last requesting “a particular detail of the motives which influenced the determination of Congress” respecting the application of the legislature to have their state troops released from Continental pay, for the purpose of garrisoning the frontier posts.
In my letters to Your Excellency of the 1st of June and 27th of July, which were intended to be official, I summarily informed you that Congress had made temporary provision for garrisoning the frontier posts and that a plan was under deliberation relative to a peace establishment, which would of course embrace that object permanently—that such temporary provision being made at the common expence, and a general plan being under consideration for the future, I had declined pressing a compliance with the application of the Legislature, conceiving it to be more for the interest of the state that the expence should be jointly borne than that it should fall exclusively upon itself.
I did not enter into a more full detail upon the subject because the business continued to the time I left Congress in an undecided state and it was impossible to judge what views would finally prevail. The concurrent resolutions of the two houses had been immediately on their receipt referred to a Committee appointed to report on a peace establishment who had suspended their report on these resolutions ’till it should appear, what would be the fate of a general plan, which had been submitted.
As to the motives that influenced Congress in making the provision they did make, rather than immediately assenting to the application of the state—as far as I was able to collect them they were these. The opinions of many were unsettled as to the most eligible mode of providing for the security of the frontiers, consistent with the constitution, as well with respect to the general policy of the union, as to considerations of justice to those states, whose frontiers were more immediately exposed. A considerable part of the house appeared to think, from reasons of a very cogent nature, that the well being of the Union required a fœderal provision for the security of the different parts and that it would be a great hardship to individual states peculiarly circumstanced to throw the whole burthen of expence upon them by recurring to separate provisions in a matter the benefit of which would be immediately shared by their neighbours & ultimately by the Union at large—that indeed it was not probable particular states would be either able or upon experiment, willing to make competent provision at their separate expence and that the principle might eventually excite jealousies between the states unfriendly to the common tranquillity.
I freely confess I was one who held this opinion.
Questions naturally arose as to the true construction of the articles of confederation upon this head—questions as delicate as interesting and as difficult of solution. On one hand it was doubted whether Congress were authorised by the confederation to proceed upon the idea of a fœderal provision—on the other it was perceived that such a contrary construction would be dangerous to the union, including among other inconveniences, this consequence, that the United States in Congress, cannot raise a single regiment, or equip a single ship for the general defence ’till after a declaration of war or an actual commencement of hostilities.
In this dilemma, on an important constitutional question, other urgent matters depending before Congress and the advanced season requiring a determination upon the mode of securing the Western posts in case of a surrender this fall, all sides of the house concurred in making a temporary provision in the manner which has been communicated.
My apprehension of the views of the legislature was simply this, that looking forward to a surrender of the posts and conceiving from some expressions in the articles of confederation, that separate provision was to be made for the frontier garrisons, they had thought it expedient to apply the troops already on foot to that purpose and to propose to Congress to give their sanction to it.

Under this apprehension, reflecting besides that those troops were engaged only for a short period, upon a very improper establishment to continue, on account of the enormous pay to the private men, and that the expence which is now shared by all and which would have fallen solely upon the state, had the application been complied with—would probably be at the rate of nearly Eighty thousand dollars per annum, a considerable sum for the state in its present situation. I acknowlege to your Excellency that I saw with pleasure rather than regret, the turn which the affair took. I shall be sorry however if it has contravened the intentions of the legislature.
I will take the liberty to add upon this occasion, that it has always appeard to me of a real importance to this state in particular, as well as to the Union in general that Fœderal rather than state provision should be made for the defence of every part of the confederacy in peace as well as in war. Without entering into arguments of general policy, it will be sufficient to observe that this state is in all respects critically situated. Its relative position shape and intersections viewed on the map strongly speak this language—strengthen the confederation—Give it exclusively the power of the sword. Let each state have no forces but its Militia.
As a question of mere œconomy the following considerations deserve great weight: The North River facilitates attacks by sea and by land, and besides the frontier forts all military men are of opinion that a strong post should be maintained at West Point or some other position on the lower part of the River. If Canada is well governed it may become well peopled and by inhabitants attached to its government. The British Nation while it preserves the idea of retaining possession of that Country may be expected to keep on foot there a large force. The position of that force either for defence or offence will necessarily be such as will afford a prompt and easy access to us. Our precautions for defence must be proportioned to their means of annoying us; and we may hereafter find it indispensable to increase our frontier garrisons. The present charge of a competent force in that quarter thrown additionally into the scale of those contributions which we must make to the payment of the public debt and to other objects of general expence, if the Union lasts, would I fear enlarge our burthen beyond our ability: that charge hereafter increased as it may be would be oppressively felt by people. It includes not only the expence of paying and subsisting the necessary number of troops, but of keeping the fortifications in repair probably of creating others and of furnishing the requisite supplies of military stores.
I say nothing of the Indian nations because though it will be always prudent to be upon our guard against them; yet I am of opinion we may diminish the necessity of it by making them our friends; and I take it for granted there cannot be a serious doubt any where as to the obvious policy of endeavouring to do it. Their friendship alone can keep our frontiers in peace. It is essential to the improvement of the furr trade an object of immense importance to the state. The attempt at the total expulsion of so desultory a people is as chimerical as it would be pernicious. War with them is as expensive as it is destructive. It has not a single object, for the acquisitions of their lands is not to be wished ’till those now vacant are settled—and the surest as well as the most just and humane way of removing them is by extending our settlements to their neighbourhood. Indeed it is not impossible they may be already will[ing] to exchange their former possessions for others more remote.
The foregoing considerations would lose all force if we had full security that the rest of the world would make our safety and prosperity the first object of their reverence and care; but an expectation of this kind would be too much against the ordinary course of human affairs—too visionary to be a rule for national conduct.
It is true our situation secures us from conquest, if internal dissentions do not open the way; but when Nations now make war upon each other the object seldom is total conquest—partial acquisitions, the jealousy of power, the rivalship of dominion or of commerce, sometimes national emulation and antipathy are the motives. Nothing shelters us from the operation of either of these causes. The fisheries, the furr trade, the navigation of the lakes and of the Mississippi—the Western territory—the Island[s] in the West Indies with referrence to traffic, in short the passions of human nature are abundant sources of contention and hostility.
I will not trespass further on Your Excellency’s patience; I expected indeed that my last letter would have finished my official communications; but Messrs. Duane and Lhommedieu having transmitted the extract of your letter to Mr. Floyed and myself in order that we might comply with what your Excellency thought would be expected by the Legislature, it became my duty to give this explanation. Mr. Floyed having been at Congress but a little time after the concurrent resolutions arrived and being now at a great distance from me occasions a separate communication.
I have the honor to be With perfect respect   Your Excellys Most Obed serv
A Hamilton
NB
I did not at the time inclose the resolution directing the general to provide for garrisoning the frontier posts because, I understood it would in course be transmitted to you by the President or the Secretary at War.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James Madison, 16 October 1783
From: Madison, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Princeton [New Jersey] Octr. 16. 1783
Dear Sir
Your favor of the 6th. of July by some singular ill luck never found its way to my hands till yesterday evening. The only part that now needs attention is a request that I will answer the following Question “What appeared to be my idea and disposition respecting the removal of Congress—did I appear to wish to hasten it, or did I not rather show a strong disposition to procrastinate it?” If this request had been recd. at the time it ought it might have been answered as fully as you then wished. Even after the delay which has taken place, my recollection enables me with certainty to witness that the uniform strain of your sentiments as they appeared both from particular conversations with myself, and incidental ones with others in ⟨my⟩ presence, was opposed to the removal of Congress except in the last necessity; that when you finally yielded ⟨to⟩ the measure it appeared to be more in compliance with the peremptory expostulations of others than with any disposition of your own mind, and that after the arrival of Congress at Princeton your conversation shewed that you recieved the removal ⟨rather⟩ with regret than with pleasure.

Perhaps this obedience to your wishes may be too ⟨late⟩ to answer the original object of them; But I could not ⟨lose⟩ such an opportunity of testifying the esteem & regard with ⟨which I am Dr. Sir Yr. very Humle. servt.
J. Madison Jr.⟩


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 18 October 1783
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Rocky Hill [New Jersey] 18th Octr. 1783
Dear Sir,
I am favoured with your two letters of the 30th September.
The debate on Indian Affairs which I believe is got through, and that on the residence of Congress wch. is yet in agitation has entirely thrown aside for sometime the consideration of the peace establishment. When it is resumed I will take care that your application comes into view and shall be happy if any thing in my power may contribute to its success being with great truth Dr. Sir Yr. most obedt. servt.
Go: Washington
Colonel Hamilton.


Title: Oath of Allegiance, 20 October 1783
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Albany, October 20, 1783. On this date Hamilton signed an oath of allegiance to the State of New York. The oath, signed by six other lawyers, reads as follows: “I  do solemnly without any mental reservation or Equivocation whatsoever swear and declare and call God to witness That I renounce and adjure all allegiance to the King of Great Britain; and that I will bear true faith & allegiance to the State of New York, as a free and Independent State, and that I will in all things to the best of my knowledge & ability Do my duty as a good and faithful Subject of the said State ought to do. So help me God.”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 22[–23] October 1783
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Princeton [New Jersey] 22 [–23] Octbr. 1783.
Dear Hamilton.
I obey you. The homilies you delivered in Congress are still recollected with pleasure. The impressions they made are in favor of your integrity and no one but believes you a man of honor and republican principles. Were you ten years older and twenty thousand pounds richer, there is no doubt but that you might obtain the suffrages of Congress for the highest office in their gift. You are supposed to possess various knowlege, useful—substantial—and ornamental. Your very grave and your cautious—your men who measure others by the standard of their own creeping politics think you sometimes intemperate, but seldom visionary, and that were you to pursue your object with as much cold perseverance as you do with ardor and argument you would become irresistable. In a word, if you could submit to spend a whole life in depicting a fly you would be in their opinion one of the greatest men in the world. Bold designs—measures calculated for their rapid execution—a wisdom that would convince from its own weight—a project that would surprise the people in greater happiness, without giving them an opportunity to view it and reject it, are not adapted to a council composed of discordant elements, or a people who have thirteen heads each of which pay superstitious adoration to inferior divinities.
I have been deterred from day to day from sending you the extract you desire by a proclamation on the subject which I expected would have passed. It is still in dubio. I have reported on Fleury’s case on the principle you recommend. I fear his half pay will not be granted.
Congress some time ago determined to fix their fœderal Town on the Delaware near Trenton. Yesterday they determined to erect a second fœderal Town on the Potomac near George Town: and to reside equal periods (not exceeding one year) at Annapolis & Trenton till the buildings are completed. We adjourn the 12 of next month to meet at Annapolis the 26.
Adieu my dear friend and in the ⟨da⟩ys of your happiness drop a line to yours

James McHenry
Octbr. 23d

our examplification of the treaty has passed and will be transmitted to the State officially.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Hugh Knox, 27 October 1783
From: Knox, Hugh
To: Hamilton, Alexander

St Croix Octr. 27th 1783
Dear Colonel Hamilton!
My old & good friend. Faith between you and me, it hath puzzled me very much to account for your long Silence. Three years have now Elapsed since my last from you, tho’ I have wrote you frequently in that time. Can any thing have happened on my part, which Should have So long deprived me of the pleasure of hearing from you? When you were Covered with the dust of the Camp, & had cannon balls whistling thick about your ears, you used to Steal an hour’s Converse with an old friend every 5 or 6 months; & now, in a time of profound peace & tranquillity, you cannot, it Seems, find two minutes for this kind office. I think I know you too Well, to Suppose you could take offence at any free Strictures on the times which might have dropped from my pen in the Confidence of friendship, when you know how firmly & enthusiastically I was attached to the Cause in which you were Embark’d. Or, Since your Marr⟨iage to t⟩he amiable Miss Schyler, are you So loss’d in ⟨– – –⟩ as to render you forgetful of your other friends? ⟨Or⟩ are you grown too rich & proud, to have a good Memory? Or are you so Engaged in Writing the History of the American War (Cujus Maxima pars facisti, & which you know I have appointed you to) that you have no time to write letters? Or— or— or— pray what is it? Pray make Haste to Explain this Strange Mystery!
This Hasty line goes to you in the Care of Lawyer Peter Markoe Esqr. Son of Abraham Markoe Esqr. of this Island, now Settled in Philadelphia. To this Young man’s learning, Genius & merit you cannot be a stranger. He thinks of practising law (I believe) in Philadelphia, for which he is well qualified, having Studied that Science in the Temple, & having those talents which must needs render him eminent in that line. Uncertain where your present residence is, whether in the State of York, Jersey or Pennsylvania, I can only Say, that if your influence or recommendation can promote his prosperity, they will not be wanting I believe on your part.
Mr. & Mrs. Mitchell have, I hear, left these Islands and gone to America. I have not hear’d from them or of them Since their Departure. I am Sorry to Inform you that no Justice Seems to be done in the dealing of Mr Litton; & that as things are Situated & perplexed, I fear little will come out of it for Any of the Heirs.
With a humble tender of Mrs Knox’s & my best respects & Kindest Wishes to ⟨your lady⟩, Self & family, I remain   My [– –] respected friend   Yours Unalterably
Hugh Knox


Title: Army Promotion, [28 October 1783]
From: Committee on Pensions
To:

[Princeton, New Jersey, October 28, 1783]
In pursuance of an Act of Congress of the 30th. day of September 1783.
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton is to take rank as Colonel by brevet in the Armies of the United States of America.
Given under my hand at Princeton the 28th. Day of October 1783.
Elias Boudinot   Presidt.
B: Lincoln.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 6 November 1783
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Rocky Hill [New Jersey] Novr. 6th. 1783
Dear Sir,
The enclosed is a letter which I had written, and was about to dispatch at the date of it; but upon second thoughts, determined to Postpone it, and try, if from the importance of the matter, I could not bring forward the Peace Establishment, previously.
I have tryed it, in vain. Congress, after resolving on the  of last Month to adjourn upon the 12th. of this, did, equally unexpectedly & surprizingly to me, finish their Session at this place the day before yesterday; without bringing the Peace Establishment, or any of the many other pressing matters, to a decision.
Finding this was likely to be the case, I shewed your letter to some of your particular friends, and consulted them on the propriety of making known your wishes; with my testimonial of your Services to Congress; but they adviced me to decline it, under a full persuasion that no discrimination would, or indeed could be made at this late hour as every other Officer from the highest to the lowest grades (not in actual command) were retiring without the retention of Rank—and that the remainder upon a Peace establishment (if a Continental one should ever take place) would come in upon the New System, under fresh appointments; so that unless you wished to come into actual command again, (which none supposed) they saw no way by which you could preserve your Rank.
I have the pleasure to enclose you a Brevet; giving you the Rank of full Colonel; and with best respects to Mrs. Hamilton & General Schuyler & family I am   Dr Sir   Yr. Most Obed Servt.
Go: Washington
Colo. Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, 1 December 1783
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Clinton, George

New York, December 1, 1783. Writes as the legal representative of “Mrs. Chamier, widow and Administratrix of Daniel Chamier deceased.” Asks that George Birks, who owed money to Daniel Chamier, be “apprehended” and compelled to appear in court.


Title: Alexander Hamilton, John Laurance, Morgan Lewis, and Richard Varick to Thomas Mifflin, [10 December 1783]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Laurance, John,Lewis, Morgan,Varick, Richard
To: Mifflin, Thomas

[New York, December 10, 1783]
Sir,
Being concerned as Council for a number of persons, who, since the annunciation of the provisional treaty have been indicted under the confiscation laws of this state for the part they are supposed to have taken in the late war, we are induced at the desire of our clients and in their behalf, to apply to Congress through your Excellency for an exemplification of the definitive treaty. We take it for granted that ere this it will have been proclaimed for the information and direction of the respective states; but as there is a great strictness in the Courts of this State, it will we apprehend, be necessary to be able to produce an ex⟨emplif⟩ication of the treaty under the seal of the United States. In a matter so interesting to a great number of individuals (for it does not belong to us to urge considerations of national honor) we hope we shall be excused when we observe that there appears to us no probability that the legislature of this state will interpose its authority to put a stop to prosecutions ’till the definitive treaty is announced in form. In the mean time a period is limited for the appearance of the indicted persons to plead to their indictments, and if they neglect to appear within the time judgment by default will be entered against them. It is therefore of great consequence to them, that we should have in our possession as speedily as possible an authentic document of the treaty and of its ratification by Congress; and we on this account pray an exemplification of both.
We persuade ourselves that the justice and liberality of Congress will induce a ready compliance with our prayer; which will conduce to the security of a great number of individuals who derive their hopes of safety from the national faith.
We have the honor to be with perfect respect   Your Excellency’s   Most Obedient and humble servants

John Laurance
Alex Hamilton
Morgan Lewis
Richd. Varrick
City of New YorkDecember 10th. 1783
His Excellency The President of Congress


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John B. Church, 12 December 1783
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Church, John B.

[New York, December 12, 1783. On February 7, 1784, Church wrote to Hamilton: “I received a few Days since my Dear Sir your Favor of the 12th Decemr.” Letter not found.]


Title: Thomas Mifflin to Alexander Hamilton, John Laurance, and Richard Varick, 17 December 1783
From: Mifflin, Thomas
To: Hamilton, Alexander,Laurance, John,Varick, Richard

Annapolis December 17th: 1783
Gentlemen
Yesterday I received the letter you did me the honor to write to me on the 10th: instant, and laid it before Congress; but as seven States only have met, the Subject of it cannot be taken up so soon as its Importance requires.
I will transmit to you an authenticated copy of the Ratification of the definitive Treaty the moment that Congress shall put it into my power.
I am with much Respect & Esteem   Gentlemen   Your obedt: & hble Servt:
Thomas Mifflin


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Chaloner, [18] December 1783
From: Chaloner, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philada Decr [18] 1783
Dear Sir
I have consulted the president of the Bank respectg the information you required in your Letter of the 11th. Instant. He informs me that you must send a regular Power of attorney reciteing the power left by John Carter, that it must be attested by one of the chief Magistrates of your City authourizing whom you please to receive the dividend & vote for Mr Carter’s Shares. I wrote you some time past on this subject & forwarded your Letters from Mr Carter but as they were sent on to Albany It is propable you have not reced it—for which reason I now trouble you with duplicate.
I am with great Respect   Sir   Your most Obdt Servt
Alexr Hammilton Esqr.