Title: To John Adams from Nathaniel Falconer, 30 June 1789
From: Falconer, Nathaniel
To: Adams, John

Sir
Philada June 30th. 1789

I hope Your Excellency will excuse the liberty I have taken to address you,  having made application to the President through my friends for an appointment in the Customs at Philadelphia.—When the Revolution began I lent all the Money I had to the United States. There it lays still—I have made shift to keep my Certificates as yet—The small Real Estate I had is a small house in the City and a small Place about 5 miles from the City—They both suffered much in the War—I have sent to Mr Robert Morris a Copy of the Certificate of my conduct by Gentlemen out of Trade which will satisfy you, Sir, that I have been a uniform friend to the Independence and good Government of the Union, ever since I had the Honor of fitting out Hopkinson’s Fleet under your directions—As there are a great many Appliers from this place to Mr Morris, I beg Leave to crave your Interest, if consistent with your own opinion—General Mifflin has wrote to the President and to Mr. Langdon of New Hampshire—If I am so happy as to have Your Excellency’s good Opinion in this Matter, I shall be ever obliged—I am / Your Excellency’s / most obedt. humble Servt

Nath Falconer


Title: To John Adams from Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, Baron [von] Steuben, 1 July 1789
From: Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, Baron [von]
To: Adams, John

Sir,
New York, July 1st. 1789—

I have the honor to inform you that on the 4th. instant, at half past twelve, the society of the Cincinnati in commemoration of the day, will proceed to St: Paul’s church where an oration will be pronounced by one of its members—On this occasion, seats will be set apart for the reception of particular public characters.
I have the honor to be, / very respectfully / Sir, / your most Obedt: Servt:

SteubenPresidentEnclosure—6 tickets for the family of His Excellency the V: President.


Title: To John Adams from John Jenks, 1 July 1789
From: Jenks, John
To: Adams, John

Honour’d sir
Salem July 1st. 1789

Not having had the honour of seeing you since your arrival from Europe, permit me to congratulate you upon your safe return to your Country & Friends—
dear Sir I have a Favour to ask for a Friend whom I would more earnestly sollicit for, than I possibly could for myself— Majr. Jos: Hiller is my particular acquaintance, He has for a number of years annually appointed by the General Court the Naval Officer for this Port—in which Capacity he has given as universal Satisfaction as any person in the United States. he is well respected in this Town, bears a moral, honest irreproachable Character, and I believe every Person, who is not a seeker for that office sincerely wishes that he may be continued in it. The many applications made for Offices has induced him not to make any, but my long acquaintance with his Abilities, justly demands my making this application to you (unbeknown to him) that, if my any means I can be instrumental in rewarding his Merit, I shall only discharge a duty I owe to so worthy a Citizen—
I am dear Sir with sentiments / of Esteem your very / Humbl. Servt.
John Jenks


Title: To John Adams from William McPherson, 2 July 1789
From: McPherson, William
To: Adams, John

Sir
July 2d. 1789—

Having offered myself to the President of the United States, a Candidate for employment under the new system of government that has now happily commenced its operation—I beg I may be permitted to mention my pursuit to you Sir—By the Bill for the collection of the impost now under the consideration of the House of Representatives, it seems in the Port of Philadelphia three principal Officers will be established—A Collector—a Naval Officer—and a Surveyer, the last of which is the object at which I point—I am well aware Sir, of the extreme impropriety of asking from a Gentleman in your exalted Station, any thing like a promise—I mean not Sir to presume so far—I only beg leave to make known my wish—and to hope, that when the appointments come under consideration, shou’d no Person more eligible appear—I may be honored with your countenance—
I have the honor to be Sir—with the most perfect respect / your most obedient— / hble Servt
W Macpherson


Title: To John Adams from James Sullivan, 2 July 1789
From: Sullivan, James
To: Adams, John

Sir
Boston July 2d. 1789

When I had the honor of addressing a Letter to your Excellency, upon a subject of allowed importance to the united states, I did not indulge a hope, that you would step aside from the important concerns in which you are engaged, to acknowledge the receipt of it. nor was I vain enough to imagine, that I was  able to suggest one thought, which was not fully possessed by the Learned body of Partriots in which you preside.
But having been informed that the report which you are obliging enough to mention, was generally spread round the seat of Government; and being well aware, that it could not fail to give great uneasiness, as well to the President, and Congress, as to every real friend to his Country, I threw upon paper, such sentiments, as might be well improved, in some measure to contradict it. for if I beleived that the report was true, I should appear to be, Either in traitorous enmity to the united states, or very little versed in those politicks, which are founded in the feelings of the human heart, in advising to a measure that wears the appearance of coercive decision. for if what is as I suppose intended by the Minority here, would support that state, a coercive Experiment might be disagreeable in its consequences.
When the frame of Government for the united states was submitted to the people, as a political proposition, it could not be conceived, that they would be intirely united in any one opinion besides that, of a federal Government being necessary: this was not only an avowed, but I believe a real, & general Sentiment. every one had an  indubitable right to express his mind upon the subject; and he was a Coward, and unworthy of that freedom we have contended for, who would not dare to do it. I was myself, and still am, an advocate for amendments: but not for one half the alterations proposed by Mr. Madison. the trial by Jury, as a democratical balance in the Judiciary department, in all matters where alliens are not wholly concerned, or where the revenue is in question, constitutionally Established, has ever been my principal wish in amendments. I may therefore be placed in what is called the minority. or if by minority is intended, those members of our state convention who voted against the Constitution, the report your Excellency has mentioned, has very little foundation. there can be no minority, or majority, composed of a large number, but what must include some unprincipled men; and as it cannot be fully concluded, that all those of the Massachusetts convention, who voted for the adoption of the Constitution, were Patriots instigated by genuine Love to their Country, so the conclusion on the other side, that all who voted against it, were Enemies to their Country, would be equally fallacious. my opinion is, and I know as much of the people of this Commonwealth, as any one man in it, that the minority (with few exceptions) both in Convention and out, are as zealously inclined to support the general Government as the majority are; they wish amendments, but they neither wish them in any other mode than the one pointed out by the Constitution, nor that the effecting them should interrupt the necessary business of the Revenue, or that of organizing the Government
there are in this Commonwealth, some men in whom the people have no confidence, who are seeking for themselves, and who hope to succeed by scandalizing men, whose merit & services give them the preheminence with the people. they will no doubt, alarm the apprehension of good men, and create jealousies and a want of confidence, and may thus succeed in their enterprises if they answer their sinister purposes without destroying that confidence between Rulers, and Ruled, which is the bond of society. it will be fortunate. their political situation of some of them in years past obliges them to direct their arrows in a particular manner, and though some revolutionists are raised above their reach, yet whenever they are found vulnerable there will be no want of shafts. a grateful Country has a plaister, sooner or later, for every wound.
perhaps some Individuals, unworthy, unprincipled, and distressed in their pecuniary circumstances, and whose were in the minority in the convention of this state, may prompt the majority in Rhode Island to wrong and destructive measures. but I do most solemnly assure you, that I beleive the report to be fabricated to serve particular purposes, and that the people in general of this Commonwealth, minority as well as majority, are as ready to support and defend this Constitution as they would the Revolution of the states if it was in danger. the sentiments contained in the first production  in the paper inclosed are those of the people in general. let me add here, that I am assured, that there are some men who have a hand in sowing these Jealousies, that would be very willing to bury the Constitution of the united states, in the ruins of our Independence. in short these misrepresentations originate from men who  have an habitual hatred to the old Whigs, and are used by men who have no other politicks, than office and emolument, and who circulate the reports to wound those who stand in their way.
I will intrude no longer upon your Excellencys goodness; time will discover who are the friends of the people, and of the Government they people have established
I am with the most perfect sentiments of Esteem your Excellencys most obliged & most Humble Servant
Ja Sullivan


Title: To John Adams from Thomas Mifflin, 3 July 1789
From: Mifflin, Thomas
To: Adams, John

Sir
Philada July 3d 1789

Captain Nathaniel Falconer of this City, one of your Excellency’s best friends, has requested me to write to you, and to entreat Your Excellency’s Support of an application he has made to the President, for an Appointment in the Customs at Philadelphia; which may not interfere with any person now in Office—Captain Falconer has a just claim to the attention of Government: He was with the first Patriots Who promoted the Revolution and present form of Government of the Union; and has on many important Occasions and for a long Series of Years given his Services to his Country, without a Reward—
Having full confidence in his Integrity; and knowing his Ability, I venture to comply with his Request and to beg Your Excellency’s favorable attention to his Application—
With every Sentiment of ardent friendship, I am / Your Excellency’s obedt. & devoted Servt.
Thomas Mifflin


Title: From John Adams to Nathaniel Falconer, 4 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Falconer, Nathaniel

Sir
Richmond hill July 4 1789

I received your letter of the 30 of June, with a pleasure that I always experience from renewing an acquaintance with those persons, with whom I had an opportunity to cooperate, in the early Stages of the late revolution. That you have been an uniform friend to the independence and good government of this nation, I cannot entertain a doubt, from the knowledge I had of your principles and conduct, when employed in fitting out Hopkins’s fleet under a committee of which I was a member in 1775. The President however, who as the common father of the people, is wisely entrusted with authority to weigh all the pretensions of every competitor, is personally so well acquainted in Pensylvania, and has so many able and faithful men within his call to consult upon such matters, that my testimony in your favor can add little weight. The Presidents love of justice, will be motive enough with him to weigh every pretension with impartiality: his wisdom and policy will determine him to choose from the multitude of candidates, those whose qualifications are the fittest for the service of the public.
I am &c.
John Adams


Title: From John Adams to William McPherson, 4 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: McPherson, William

Sir
Richmond hill July 4. 1789

I have received your polite letter of the second of this month, and am obliged to you for this instance of respect and attention to me. The competition for employment under the national government, is I preceive, in Philadelphia, very numerous, and the merits of various candidates are considerable The personal knowledge of the President, and the able and faithful characters within the reach of his inquiry, from that district, cannot leave him at a loss to determine whose pretensions ought to be prevalent.
As according to my construction of the constitution the Senate have only a negative on the nominations of the President, and as I have a voice only in case of division of the Senators, the case is not likely very soon to happen, that I shall venture to put a negative on the nomination of the Presidents supported by the suffrages of half the Senate. I should be very likely to make presumptions in favor of a constitutional nomination.
The recomendation of your friend Colo. Smith in addition to all that I have seen or heard of your character, would dispose me to wish well to your pursuits as far as they may be found consistent with Justice and public polity.
I am &c &c
John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Benjamin Rush, 5 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Rush, Benjamin

Dear Sir
Richmond Hill, July 5. 1789

Without waiting for an answer to my last, I will take a little more notice of a Sentiment in one your letters. You say you "abhor all Titles." I will take the familiar freedom of Friendship to say I don’t believe you.—Let me explain my self.—I doubt not your veracity, but I believe you deceive yourself, and have not yet examined your own heart, and recollected the feelings of every day and hour.—What would you say or think or feel, if your own Children, instead of calling you, Sir, or Father, or Papa, should accost you with the title of "Ben"? Your Servant comes in, and instead of saying my "Master! my hat is much worn, would you please to give me a new one;" cries "Ben! my old hat is all in rags, and makes you the laughing stock of the Town! give me a new one."—What think you of this simple manly republican Style?
Had I leisure to write Plays like Gen. Burgoine, I would undertake a Comedy, under the Title of "Government with out Title." The Dramatis Personæ should be a Quaker and his Wife, ten Children and four Servants. They should all live in the Same room, dine, breakfast & sup at the same Table.—They should promiscuously call each other by their Names, without Titles and live without form.—We should See, what order, Virtue and œconomy would ensue.—The Sons would soon be married to the female servants, and the Daughters to the Male. Both Children & Servants would soon twick and cuff the old man & woman.
Poh, Poh Poh! say you all this is vulgar and beneath the Dignity of a Legislator.—Give me leave to say nothing in Human life is beneath the Dignity of a Magistrate to consider. The Principles of Government are to be seen in every Scene of human Life. There is no Person and no society,                         to whom Forms and Titles are indifferent. "Look through the Deeds of Men, and then say whether Shenestone is not in the right, when he says in a whimsical Production called the "School-Mistress" which he wrote in imitation of Spencer.
"Albeit ne flatt’ry did corrupt her Truth
Ne Pompous Title did debauch her ear,
Goody, good-Woman, gossip n’aunt, forsooth
or Dame, the Sole additions she did hear;
Yet these she challeng’d; these She held right dear;
Ne would esteem him Act as mought behoove
Who Should not honor’d eld with these revere:
For never title yet So mean could prove,
But there was eke a mind, which did that title love."
The two last lines contain a truth to great, so universal, and so litteral, that I declare to you, in the Course of fifty years Experience, in various stages of life, among all Classes of people and in Several different nations I have never yet met with one Man Woman or Child, who was destitute of a Passion for a Title. Let us consider, my Friend more reverently and therefor more truly, the Constitution of human nature, and the invariable progress of human life and manners. Family titles are necessary to Family Government Colonial Titles We know were indispensable, in Colonial Government; and we shall find national Titles essential to national government. As long as Titles are respected by others, they will be esteemed by every man. But it is not to gratify individuals that public Titles are annexed to offices. It is to make offices and laws respected; and not so much by the virtuous part of the Community, as by the Profligate the criminal and abandoned, who have little reverence for Reason Right or Law divine or human. These are reverenced by Titles frequently, when laws and Punishments cannot restrain them.
Think of these Things, and perhaps I may hint to you some others hereafter. Yours with sincere esteem
John Adams


Title: To John Adams from William Thompson, 5 July 1789
From: Thompson, William
To: Adams, John

Sir
Boston July 5. 1789

From a full Persuasion of the great Necessity, and vast Advantage of an effectual National Government in the United States, I gladly embraced, and early gave my hearty Assent to the Constitution, that is now commencing it’s Operation under very fortunate Circumstances.—A sincere Desire to promote and support the General Government, as far as lay in my Power, induced me to make that Tender of my Service to the Public, which I did myself the Honour to communicate to You, in my Letter of the ninth Day of March last, presented to my Brother in Law. Col. Tudor, who informed me of the Polite and favorable Reception it met with from You, which afforded me a Mixture of Pleasure and Hope, and demands my grateful Respect—
If an habitual Inclination to Business, an honest Desire to subserve, in my small Sphere, the common Interest of my Country, and an Ambition to acquire the Approbation of Good Men, by a faithfull and upright Conduct, are Qualifications for a Public Office, I am conscious I may venture to persevere in offering myself as a Candidate for some Public Employ;—and I beg to be indulged in renewing my former Request to You, Sir, for Your favorable Interposition with, and Recommendation to the President General, in my Behalf, as far as Your own just Discernment, and unbiased Regard for the Public Welfare will admit.—Should I be favored with your Interest, I shall be proud to acknowledge and owe a new and great Obligation to You, and will assuredly exert my Attention to justify the Recommendation, and fulfill the Responsibility You may thereby undertake for me—but should I fail of obtaining the requested Favor, I shall not forget, nor cease to express, that Respect and Gratitude, which as an individual Citizen, I already owe You, for the very eminent Services You have rendered to Your Country, the great Benefit of which I now feel, and the Continuance and Increase of which I enjoy in Prospect.—
With very sincere, and great Respect / I am Sir / Your most Obedient / and humble Servant
Wm. Thompson


Title: To John Adams from Frederick Phile, 6 July 1789
From: Phile, Frederick
To: Adams, John

Most Honored Sir
N York July 6th. 1789

Knowing your Goodness, induces me to trouble you with a few lines on a Subject of the greatest Importance to me, and on which the future Welfare of my Family very much depends.—
I have served as Naval Officer for the Port of Philadelphia, either as Principal, or Deputy, for upwards of thirty five Year,. previous to the revolution, I acted as deputy Naval Officer under Dr. Thomas Grame, Mr. Richard Stockley & Mr. Richard Penn, during the periods in which they successively had the Appointments of Naval Officer, and after the declaration of Independence, as soon as the Government of the Common Wealth of Pennsylvania was Organized, I was honored with the Appointment of Naval Officer for the Port of Philadelphia, by his Excellency the President and the honorable Supreme Executive Council of the Common Wealth of Pennsylvania, and have been continued by them in the said Office untill the present time. but as all Commercial regulations will in future depend upon Congress, all State Appointments must of Consequence cease, My Opportunities and Experience in the Business has made me well acquainted with the Duties of Said Office, and as I find that Congress think it necessary in the Commerical regulations they are about to make, that a Collector, a Naval Officer and a Surveyor, shall be appointed in each Important Port in the United States. I therefore Sir, beg leave to solicit that in case the President of the United States should think proper to nominate me as Naval Officer, for the Port of Philada., that you would be pleased to favor me with your Interest & Patronage.—My publick duties requiring all my Attention, I have long since been obliged to relinquish the practice of my Profession as a Physician, without being able to draw more than a Maintenance from the Emoluments of Office, If therefore I should now the deprived of this only means of Support, when old Age is rapidly approaching, the Consequence might be fatal to myself and a large Family of seven Daughters at home, This consideration will doubtless weigh with a benevolent Mind, and I have only to add, that I stood forward amongst the first Whigs, and faithfully adhered to the Cause of American Liberty during the late glorious Contest.
I have procured the most ample Testimonials from the Supreme Executive Council of the State of Pennsyla., also a Certificate from the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General, with respect to my Conduct as Naval Officer (which Testimonials I have deliver’d to the President of the United States) and should I be so fortunate as to be favored with your Approbation, I shall ever remember it with the Warmest Sentiments of Gratitude.—
I have the honor to be, with the  /Greatest respect, Your  /Most Obedient & very Humble Servant
Fredck. Phile


Title: To John Adams from Thaddeus Burr, 7 July 1789
From: Burr, Thaddeus
To: Adams, John

Sir
Fairfield July 7th. 1789

Our friend Capt Saml Smedley will hand you this—This place being now fixed upon as the Port of Entry for the Western district of this State, he is soliciting the appointment of Collector of the Port—Capt Smedley is a Man that is well acquainted with the duty of the Office, will be pleasing to the people of the district; is a Man of much honor and honesty, and should he get the appointment, I am persuaded he will give intire satisfaction to the public—
Your interest in his behalf will much oblige him, and Sir / Your real friend / and humbl Servt.
Thaddeus Burr


Title: To John Adams from Stephen Hall, 7 July 1789
From: Hall, Stephen
To: Adams, John

Honored Sir;
Portland 7 July 1789.

By the last Post, I was honored with your very kind, & obliging Favor of the 26 Ulto—To make a Return may intrude upon your precious time; to be silent would savor of ingratitude: Your Goodness therefore will excuse the interruption I give You.
Accept my sincere gratitude for the favor done me, and give me leave to assure you I shall niver be insensible of your kindness.— I have written to my friend General Lincoln on the subject kindly intimated by You, who has assured me of his readiness to serve me whenever it shall be in his power.—
I wish to add a little in the epistolary way but I have not, lest I should too much tresspass on your Goodness.— Permit me to congratulate You on the safe arrival of your Lady & Son at New york: and after wishing You the Presence & blessing of almighty God in the management of the great Affairs You are engaged in, give me leave to subscribe myself with very great respect, / your most obedient, / & very humble Servant;
Stephen Hall


Title: To John Adams from Theophilus Parsons, 8 July 1789
From: Parsons, Theophilus
To: Adams, John

My dear Sir
Newbury Port July 8th. 1789

Consisous of the perceptions you would meet with, by applications for your influence in the appointment to offices, I had determined not to increase the number of them; but being just informed that the President proposes to nominate as officers, for the collection of the national revenue, those personswhich who hold the like office in the collection of the state revenues, unless complaint was made against them,can I am compelled to trouble you on the subject. If such was openly known to be the presidents intentions, there would not be wanting well founded complaints against Messrs. Titcomb and Cross, the Naval-Officer and collector of excise for this port. I must sollicit your patience, while I give a short history of the manner, in which those gentlemen came into those offices, and of their conduct afterwards—
Michael Hodge, Esq., a gentleman of this town, of undoubted integrity and capacity, and of pure public principles, was, upon the first erection of the naval office, appointed to fill it; he continued in it a number of years, while the fees were receiveable in paper-money, but soon after, the office being then deemed lucrative, Mr. Titcomb, availing himself of his influence as a representative, procured the place for himself, by the exclusion of Mr. Hodge. He continued in that office two or three years until, for his misdemeanors, in permitting an entry of vessels while at sea, to evade our lumber acts, he lost his election, and Mr. Hodge was rechosen. Tumults arose in our governments soon after. Mr. Titcomb was elected a representative, and by the influence of the malcontent party, to which he always adhered as much as he dared, he was rechosen as Naval-Officer—When the rebellion arose, he took every method, in his power, to render the government odius, and the conduct of the rebels unexceptionable, and his tools, in this town, were in a flame, when the legislature declared that a rebellion existed. Time Soon after that rebellion has been was crushed, the federal government came upon the carpet, and it was not judged expedient to attempt his removal, as it was supposed that, upon the adoption of that government, he would drop of course.
I might add, that although, when one of our delegates in convention, the spirit of the man he was with, compelled him to the adoption of the constitution, yet, at the same time, his principles were hostile to every federal measure, and all his out-door connections were railing at the new government. Judge then my dear Sir, what must be the sentiments and feelings of people here, to see that man carefully provided for, under a government to which he is not friendly, and who has opposed every honest measure proposed in our own state government; and a man who has really, in my opinion, no moral principles to guide him in any department. Nor can the fear of losing his property, influence him to right conduct, as that is all gone, and the house, he now lives in, has lately been taken by execution over his head.
As to Mr. Cross, he obtained the excise in the same unworthy manner. Mr. Saml. Tufts, a brother of the Honorable Cotton Tufts, was the excise-officer, until Mr. Cross, going representative, availed himself of the influence of that place, to procure himself chosen in his room. As to our own government, he has always been opposed to every measure calculated to support, either its credit, or its energy, and has been heartily in favour of it’s the insurgents—But to the federal government he has been openly and avowedly its opponent—and was he an officer under it, instead of feeling grateful for the favour, he would use that very office, to create or ferment an uneasiness among the people, to justify his former opposition—such is this man’s temper—Besides, as he is a Collector of our excise, there are can be no great propriety in his collecting the national revenues at the same time—It may be said, that he may resign the former office, but he will not do it, if he can hold both; and why should such a man, acquiring an office in the manner he did, still have his election to hold a lucrative and influential place under a government to which he was openly hostile—From this view of these two men, which in my opinion is quite a just one, the good people here would feel exceedingly sore at this appointment to office—and did they conceive any information to the president, upon this subject, proper, it would be given him, signed by very respectable names—I conceive the energy of the federal government will depend much on the principles of the men, who are first appointed to office—Our own government has been ruined, for want of attention to this point.Whenever men, disesteemed by the respectable part of the Community, or antifederal in their principles, are designated to offices, the people will soon have no respect for the government—They will reason, and reason very naturally, that a government which will take it’s enemies into it’s bosom, and neglect it’s friends, who have supported it in trying times, does not wish to have friends, or to serve to itself the public attachment—I think these sentiments are in some degree just—and if they are, I hope trust our beloved president will feel the influence of them—He can, with the most perfect propriety, act agreably to them—He is not obliged to court friends—and he has a weight of character, that will support him firm as Atlas—Had I the honour of his notice, I would intreat him, from my knowledge of the people in this place, and from the principles and character of Messrs. Titcomb & Cross, to pass them by, & to nominate other characters—I  would, with great humility & sincerely, tell him, that I had no personal interest depending, but that I was influenced only, by a devout attachment to a firm, energetic, federal government—
Perhaps you may ask me who are suitable men for the three offices in theNewbury Port—I will give you the opinions of the respectable people here upon that subject—Mr. Hodge, as the Naval Officer, they all agree in, from a sense of his merits, and from the ill-treatment he has received, Mr Tufts would make an honest, faithful, and disinterested collector of the revenue, and so would Ebenezer March, Esq; and probably, no man would make a better surveyor, than Mr David Moody—To speak my own ardent wishes, I hope Mr. Hodge may be provided for at all events—
I have a great reliance on your good nature, when I expect your excuse for troubling you on this tedious subject. I will quit it & take one ageeable to you. Your son is indefatigable in the office. Too much so I fear; and his whole conduct gives me the greatest pleasure. May it be my fortune to have reason to think so well of a son of mine, as I do of yours—
My particular regards wait on Mrs Adams who, I hear, is with you, and believe me to be, notwithstanding all this trouble, yours most affectionately
Theop Parsons


Title: To John Adams from James Lovell, 9 July 1789
From: Lovell, James
To: Adams, John

Dear Sir
Boston July 9th. 1789—

altho’ this letter is somewhat of a public nature, yet I dare not address you in a consonant manner, ‘till the Point is settled between his Excellency and John Adams. I apply to you, as I feel you in my Heart to be; satisfied that the Yeas & Nays of no public Body whatsoever concerning Epithets can in any way measure alter Essences.
Dear Sir,
Sturgis Gorham of Barnstable is my Brother in Law, whether I wished it or not; He is less beloved by me however on that Score, than because he has been habituated to esteem you. Inspired early by Prognostications of James Otis junr when you was on your first Barnstable Circuit, he has looked for an event of eminence which Time has realized; and he feels happy in considering the Merits of a young Barrister ripened into the Dignity of a Vice President of the United States for the Promotion of his and my Felicity in common with other Fellow Citizens. He is so situated in Barnstable as to be locally fit for a Collection. He has been so educated as to be fit for a Scientific and officious officer of the Customs—is in Estate responsible and is deeply interested, personally and as a Citizen, to make a good Collector for the United States, in that District.
I cannot conceive how the President will nominate so great a Number of Officers as the Districts make necessery, without depending much upon Information, for he certainly cannot have personal Knowledge in such various Localities. In this Idea, I have written to Mr. Partridge who is representative of the District.—I do not consider Mr. S.A.O as one whom the President will consult with Propriety—or as fit to be consulted in this Case, especially.
As on the one hand I would not seek for a Place myself unless in the full Idea of Faithfulness, so on the other I would not recommend any Man for any other Place but on the same Idea.
I consider this attempt as connected with my own Reputation Mr. Partridge’s and your so far as the President may be influenced by it, and I feel a conscientious Awe with Firmness.
I am Sir / your devoted Friend
James Lovell


Title: To John Adams from William Tudor, Sr., 9 July 1789
From: Tudor, William, Sr.
To: Adams, John

My dear Sir
Boston 9 July 1789

However you & I may have been taught by Civilians, & however History confirms the Maxim, that an Imperium in Imperio is a Solecism, this Country will continue to learn from its own limited school, & by the most expensive Experiments, those Truths which Statesmen, Legislators & enlightened Politicians have in vain pointed out to them.—
Our present Confederacy is not very unlike the Monster of Nebuchadnezzar, which was composed of Brass, Clay & Iron—It is neither completely national, federal nor sovereign, for each state has reserved some seperate & independent Powers. Was it composed of the four Eastern States only: or did it embrace the Inhabitants from the Hudson to the Potomack: or did the Limits of Virginia & Georgia confine its operations, the Inhabitants might soon agree in consolidated national Principles. But a Country, extensive as the present united States, so differently settled, & so widely dissimiliar in Manners and Ideas cannot easily be reduced to a homogeneous Body. Nature & circumstances have marked the dividing lines of the three Kingdoms that fifty years hence will occupy & part the present immense Territory, which the glorious Peace of Paris, gave to the United States. Twenty years ago New England contained but one set of People, the middle colonies two, & the Southern Provinces three. It may be different now. Common dangers & Common sufferings have had effects in bringing us nearer together, but it is a Monarchy alone, limited & republican if they please, that can make us great or contented. While each State exercises the Powers of making distinct & particular Laws, independent in numerous instances of the general governancy, although perhaps they may not amount to a direct Contravention of the Statutes of Congress, they will operate in perpetuating local & different Principles of action, in the distant Parts of the Empire. I most heartily wish my Countrymen Freedom & an honest Independence, because myself & Children are to participate in it, but I also wished an energetic, stable & magnanimous Government, that shall protect us at home, and make our Country respectable abroad.
Mr. Ames & Mr. Minot are two excellent young Men and very capable of serving their Country, in different Walks. I show to the latter the Paragraph which so flatteringly mentions him and his History. He has beg’d me to return his thanks for so obliging a Testimony of your Approbation of well intended Labour.
I find by the Judiciary Bill which has been printed, that my Letter to the President is superceded by a certain office being to be disposed of as the District Judge shall think proper. And of that Judge whoever he may be, I shall have no Favours to sollicit.
I am with great Affection & Respect / Dear Sir / your faithfull Friend & Servant
Wm. Tudor


Title: To John Adams from Peter Cunningham, 13 July 1789
From: Cunningham, Peter
To: Adams, John

State of Connecticut, Pomfret July 13th, 1789

Most Honored Sir; Having nothing to recommend me to you but the knowledge of me when a lad. And the relationship I have the honor to claim, and the service I have attembted to render my Country in Person, and the love of my Interests, Embolding me to take the Opportunity of Mr: Mc:Guire’s going to New York to write to You (this man is an honist one) and If your Excellency can spare the time, and will take the trouble to write me a line he will deliver it to me—If I take the liberty to mention to you the activation of my family I hope it will not be unpleasing, as I have now, and always had a very grate desire of the welfare of You and your Family. I married ten years ago and have had eight Children (have lost five, I have two sons & One daughter—Since the Peace I have been in the Merchants Service, but trade being in so bad a State, I found it Impossible to make a Voyage to profit, and it being equally difficult on Shore. Four years since I took to farming. I have a large farm but in bad condition, but could live very well If it was not so far from the Salt water, which Circumstance dose not altogether agree with my health. On that account Sir I turn my thoughts on serving the publick again. My Abillity is small, and theirfore any grate must not be expected from me, but heretofore I have not been Impeacht for misconduct, or neglect of duty—I know your excellency’s Character so well that you will be exceding carefull of using your Influence in the Senate, or with the President in any ones behalf, but Especially one that claims no merit. For in Such case if any misconduct should take place your feelings would be much hurt.—Wether so small a matter as a packet comes within your notice, if their is any Appointed to any part of the world or not, I don’t know but If their is or should be any appointed, and you should see fitt in your wisdom to recommend me to the command, I would Endeavor by my conduct and future behaviour to merit so grate a Consideration in you, If their should be any other Imploy or the Service that you would think propper for me, and will use your influence you will much Oblidge your Very humble Servant.—
Peter CunninghamNB If you will please to present our most respectfull compliments to your lady and family.


Title: From John Adams to Thomas Mifflin, 14 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Mifflin, Thomas

Dear Sir
New York July 14 1789

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write me on the third of this month, and I thank you for giving me an opportunity of renewing a friendly intercourse which has continued I believe with some interruption for these seventeen years.
I was early acquainted with the activity, Zeal, and Steadiness of Capt. Falconer in the cause of his country: but as the number of competitors for employment in your city, is greater than that of the offices to be bestowed, and the merits of many of them are considerable; The President will no doubt think himself obliged to seek information from all quarters and carefully weigh the merits and qualifications of every one.
In order to preserve and improve the Ballance of our constitution, it is so necessary that the nominations of the President should be revered, that I shall generally support to the utmost of my power the men of his choice, and it must be a very strong case indeed that would justify me to myself in venturing to differ from him.
I congratulate you on the prospect we have that our countrymen will by degrees recover their original national character, and their native veneration for the wisdom and virtue of those institutions of our Ancestors, which have been so long obscured and misrepresented by passion, prejudice, ignorance, and error.
With great esteem &c
John Adams


Title: From John Adams to James Sullivan, 14 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Sullivan, James

Sir
New York July 14 1789

I have received your favor of the second of this month. The report I mentioned to you in a former letter, was spoken of to me by gentlen. from Rhode Island, who are good citizens. One of these assured me of the fact as of his own knowledge, that there was an intimate intercourse between some of the leading antifederalists in their State and some of the same character in Massachusetts, belonging to the neighboring counties, particularly Bristol. I do not believe however that there is any general encouragement given by those who were against the constitution, or those who voted for it with amendments; tho the Gentn: from Rode Island assured me that the majority in their state kept up the spirit of party, by roundly affirming that in case of a contest they should be supported by half Massachusetts.
With regard to amendments, there is no man more sensible  that amendments are necessary then I am. There is not in the world I believe a more decided friend to juries than myself, and I should chearfully concur in any measures necessary to render this admirable institution permanent and immortal. But there are other particulars, which seem to me to require amendment which have not been suggested by any of the States. The great divisions and distributions of powers on which depend that delicate equipoise, which can alone give security to liberty, property, life, or character, have not been attended to with necessary accuracy. An equilibrium of power is the only parent of equality and liberty; but the executive authority cannot in our constitution preserve an equilibrium, with the legislative; nor can the President in his legislative capacity preserve or defend himself against the two houses; nor perhaps can the representatives preserve their share against the Senate without convulsions—nor can the President and the house in concert, form a ballance to the Senate, if this house is pleased to exert the power it has and the people suffer it. I am more clearly impressed with this because I know that the equilibrium if preserved, would of itself, and by its natural, and necessary operation cure every defect in the constitution: whereas all the other amendments which have been proposed, if adopted will never remedy the defect in the equilibrium and consequently will never secure the rights of the citizen.
We may study to all eternity: but I am bold to say, we never shall discover any other security for the rights of mankind but in a ballance of trusts and laws. It is and ever has been amazing to me, that the people of America who boast so much of their knowledge of government, and who really understand so well the principles of liberty, should have so far forgotten the institutions of their ancestors, as to have been so negligent of this indispensible ballance in all the State constitutions as well as in that of the united states. Untill we shall correct our ideas under this head; we never shall get right: and we shall be tormented with a government of men and parties instead of being blessed with a government of laws. In what manner the public opinion can be weaned from those errors which passion prejudice and ignorance have propagated I know not.
I am &c &c
John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Benjamin Lincoln, 14 July 1789
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Adams, John

Dear Sir
Hingham July 14th. 1789—

I had the pleasure a few days since of receiving your kind favor of the 19th. ulto—
When I first saw the new constitution I was very apprehensive that the President would not be able to maintain his ground and preserve such a stand, on the stage of our political theatre, as to keep up that equilibram essential to our enjoying all those blessings which are derived from a constitution in which the powers of the first magistrate are sufficient to ballance the other branches. If our constitution shall, on trial, be found defective in this respect, it should be mended as soon as may be. In the mean time we ought to be exceedingly attentive that we avoid every thing which may have a tendency to enervate and reduce those degrees of influence which the President may derive from the present government. I hope and trust that there will not exist in either house a wish to invade the right of the other or a desire to press upon the prerogative of the first Magistrate, their caution, in this point, will have its influence, and their conduct will give a tone to the actions of the citizens at large, who ought to know in what their real interest lies, and that the moment they are so far duped as to put an entire relyance on the popular branch, they may date their ruin; and they will know, when it is too late, that they have been jockeyed out of their reason and rights, by men who wanted either better information or better hearts.—
The conduct of our great man is no less painful to us than alarming to you. He is not, from any thing which appears, an enemy to monarchical powers—He has, I think, in present instances exercised those powers, and is daily pursuing a line of conduct which will enable him to carry them to a much greater length. The very message to which you refer, is in my opinion, a proof in point, however paradoxical it may seem—By his frequent addresses to the people, through their representatives, and by the trumpeters of his fame they are taught to believe that he is, almost, the only guardian of their rights now remaining in the commonwealth. With these impressions and under the idea, equally curious, that it is the fixed design of others to enslave them the first hour they shall have the power of doing it  Mr. H—may sport with the rights of the people and trample upon our constitution with impunity. When ever his conduct is arraigned, it is enough for him and his friends to give out that the aristocratical junto, as those are stiled who are for a firm energetic government, want his removal that they may be in the saddle themselves the more easily to execute their nefarious purposes with success. Many of the people, not the class with which you have been much connected, seem to consider Mr. H—as the only man in the Common wealth who can preserve the state in peace and order in freedom and happiness strange delusion! Such however are the facts and he may now go almost any lengths in acts of monarchy not limited by any other principle than his policy, that may suggest to him, (or his friends may do it) the propriety of his keeping within some bounds.—
As soon as an influential character is discovered in any town, he must however be on the right side, he is immediately nominated for a justice of the peace, this line of conduct has filled most of our towns with such officers whose influence at home, and weight in the house of representatives, many of them find means to get there, secure to their creator his darling object—I would not be misunderstood our justices are not all so there are many of them who have not bowed the knee and are men of pure mind, and independent principles—The next Gentleman who writes a book & is pointing out the danger of any order of men in the community will not I hope forget to mention the danger of so liberal, if not wanton, exercise of the power given to our governour of appointing justices
It is unfortunate for us and it may be so for the union that such leading characters as Mr. H—and Mr. A—do not with more cordiality love and embrace the new constitution. They are considered by many as opposers of it and by all as men wishing for such alterations as will essentially change it—They cannot, I trust, wish its annihilation.—So far as I can judge from all I have seen and heard they want a constitution which, in my opinion, would be little more than a puppet and the play thing of the different States. Any thing which looks national or like a consolidation of the different states is thought to be one of the greatest evils which can befall us and to be avoided as such—We had better annihilate the new constitution at once than amuse and deceive the people with false ideas and groundless expectations which we shall certainly do if we suffer it to be garbled according to the wishes of all the sticklers for amendments. This will not do a national government we must have and that soon, I think we shall find it, notwithstanding the exertion of all its opposers, under our present constitution. If we can but once get our system of revenue into operation under officers, who shall not know any other rule by which to regulate their conduct than the laws of their country and shall banish from their minds every idea of temporizing, and that they are not legislators but meer executors of the law and can and will sacrifice to their duty every other consideration which may come in competition there with we shall have made great progress. We have to combat in this business long and deep rooted prejudices, and to do away the evils which have taken place in consequence of repeated popular elections—It is said that not more than one third of the duties are now collected, things must not remain so. No state can exist without more punctuality funds in the collection of the revenue must be pregnant with the most fatal evils as they will render abortive the best devised schemes of the most able financier and will soon destroy that good faith without which no people can flourish and be happy—
As soon as our revenue laws are in full operation, we may consider the works as nearly done, for if the government is not opposed, in this tender point, and the officers of it are permitted to do their duty without interruption, as they will be here I presume, in the first instance, the novelty of the scene will be over and precedents after, will come in aid of law. Besides the moment our long harassed treasury shall be replenished, people, friends and foes, will look upon the government with respect and will flock to our national standard as to that of a successful potintate.—
I am very happy that the duty on molasses is reduced. I wish it could be farther so, for the draw back on molasses  Rum would have given us trouble, and especially if our duties could not be collected with more punctuality than such duties have heretofore been. I hope they will, I hope so because I know it ought to be.
Our general court is in recess. If they have it has not done things which it ought not to have done and left undone those which it ought to have done I have judged wrong.
I beg you would tender my best regard to Mrs. Adams & Colo. Smith & Mrs. Smith and / believe me to be towards / you Dr. Sir all which / esteem, confidence, and / affection can make / me—
B. Lincoln
NB You will, burn the above when you have read it


Title: From John Adams to John Jenks, 15 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Jenks, John

Sir
New York July 15 1789

I received your letter of the first of this month and thank you for your kind congratulations. The application in favor of Joseph Hiller to be naval officer for the port of Salem must be made by himself or friends to the President. The indispensible duties of my office render it impossible for me to give much attention to nominations and appointments in the executive departments: but if this were otherways, the opinion and judgment of the Senators and representatives from the neighbourhood, whose professional knowledge and other means of information are so much superior will and ought to have much more influence. I shall however be attentive to your recommendation, and those of others in favor of the same person, and if a fair opportunity presents, mention them, leaving the decision to that wisdom, to which the constitution has confided it
Your &c
J Adams


Title: To John Adams from United States House of Representatives, 15 July 1789
From: United States House of Representatives
To: Adams, John

					Mr. President:
					July 15, 1789

				 The House of Representatives have passed the bill, entitled "An act to regulate the collection of the duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandises, imported into the United States;" to which they request the concurrence of the Senate.


Title: From John Adams to Theophilus Parsons, 16 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Parsons, Theophilus

Dear Sir
New York July 16. 1789

I have received your favor of the eighth of this month, and am much obliged to you for the frank and manly representation it contains. I wish however you had written the same things to the President. I doubt whether the President has prescribed to himself any rule so rigid as that you have heard of to appoint all men who are in possession, against whom there is no complaint of superior merit and better qualifications are made to appear. I dare say they will have the preference, Ceteris paribus, the rule may be good to make no change, but not otherwise. I have determined to lay your letter before the President, this day: because it contains information which ought not to be concealed from him. As you have began, I hope you will continue to favour us with you sentiments on public affairs.
We want all the speculations of the ingenious as well as the prayers of the faithful, and unless our countrymen more highly favored than their prejudices, passions, follies, and errors and vices have deserved all will not extricate them from the castigating rod.
Your Testimony in favour of my John gives comfort to my inmost soul, and from my heart I wish you a double portion of the same consolation. Will you give him leave to visit us, when it suits his and your convenience.
With great esteem I am &c
J Adams


Title: From John Adams to George Washington, 16 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
Richmond hill July 16. 1789

The inclosed letters are from two as respectable characters as any in Massachusetts, containing information which I hope has been transmitted to you, through other channels. But as it is possible, it may be otherwise, it is my duty to lay them before you, which I beg leave to do by the bearer Colo: Smith.
With all possible deference and respect I have the honor to be, Sir your / most obedient, friend
John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Benjamin Lincoln, 16 July 1789
From: Lincoln, Benjamin
To: Adams, John

Dear Sir
Boston July 16th. 1789—

As I have not taken any steps respecting my return to public life to which you are a stranger and have no measures to pursue to which I would have you ignorant I have as a gratification of my own feelings given you a Copy of my letter this day to the President. From it you will learn the reasons which have induced the measures—
"When I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the subject of returning to public life I did not wish suggest a wish to hold one office in preference to another—indeed at that time it was not ascertained what offices would be established under the new constitution—It was however the general idea that the Union would be divided into different districts and that there would be an officer appointed in each to fill up the large space between the treasury board and the several Collectors & Naval officers—As the partiality of my friends here has excited a public expectation that I might be called to an office of more respectability than either of the two last mentioned it may possably be supposed that I would decline accepting either should your Excellency think me quallified to fill one of them—But this so far from being the case that I should feel well satisfied to hold that, in which I might be thought by your Excellency to be most useful—To prevent any misapprehensions I have considered it expedient to be this particular"
Is it possible Sir  for the Union to succeed in the collection of the revenue without some which, other than what will be in the treasury board, on the tribe of officers who will have public monies in his hand.
I am Dear Sir with perfect / esteem your obliged / humble servant
B. Lincoln


Title: From John Adams to Roger Sherman, 17 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Sherman, Roger

Dear Sir
Richmond Hill July 17. 1789

I have read over with Pleasure, your Observations on the new federal Constitution, and am glad of an opportunity to communicate to you my opinion of some Parts of them. it is by a free and friendly Intercourse of Sentiments that the Friends of our Country may hope for Such an unanimity of opinion and Such a Concert of Exertions, as may sooner or later produce the Blessings of good Government.
You Say "it is by Some objected, that the Executive is blended with the Legislature, and that those Powers ought to be entirely distinct and unconnected, but is not that a gross Error in Politicks? The united Wisdom and various Interests of a nation Should be combined in framing the Laws, by which all are to be governed and protected, though it would not be convenient to have them executed by the whole Legislature. The Supreme Executive in Great Britain is one branch of the Legislature, and has a negative on all the Laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a Republic, but the Negative vested in the President by the new Constitution, on the Acts of Congress, and the consequent Revision, may be very useful to prevent Laws being passed without mature deliberation; and to preserve stability in the Administration of Government. And the Concurrence of the Senate in the Appointment to office, will Strengthen the hands of the Executive, and Secure the Confidence of the People, much better than a Select Council and will be less expensive."
Is it then "an extreme not to be imitated by a Republic, to make the Supreme Executive a Branch of the Legislature, and give it a Negative on all the Laws?" if you please we will examin this Position, and See whether it is well founded. In the first Place what is your definition of a Republic? Mine is this, A Government, whose Sovereignty is vested in more than one Person. Governments are divided into Despotisms, Monarchies, and Republics. A Despotism is a Government, in which the three Divisions of Power, the Legislative, Executive and Judicial are all vested in one Man. A Monarchy is a Government, where the Legislative and Executive Powers are vested in one Man; but the Judicial, in other Men. in all Governments the Sovereignty is vested in that Man or Body of Men, who have the Legislative Power. in Despotisms and Monarchies therefore, the Legislative Authority being in one Man, the Sovereignty is in one Man. in Republicks, as the Sovereignty  that is the Legislative Power is always vested in more than one, it may be vested in as many more as you please. In the United States, it might be vested in two Persons, or in three Millions or in any intermediate Number, and is every Such Supposable Case the Government would be a Republic, in conformity to these Ideas Republics have been divided into three different Species, monarchical, Aristocratical and Democratical Republics. England is a Republic; a monarchical Republic it is true: but a Republic Still: because the Sovereignty, which is the Legislative Power, is vested in more than one Man: it is equally divided indeed between the one, the few, and the many: or in other Words between the three natural Divisions of Mankind in every Society; the monarchical, the Aristocratical and the Democratical. it is essential to a monarchical Republic, that the Supream Executive Should be a Branch of the Legislature, and have  Negative on all the laws.—I Say essential because, if Monarchy were not an essential Part of the Sovereignty the Government would not be a monacharical Republic. Your Position therefore is clearly and certainly an Error, because the Practice of G. Britain in making their Supreme Executive a Branch of the legislative and giving it a Negative on all the Laws, must be imitated, by every Monarchical Republic.—
I will pause here if you please—but if you will give me leave, I will write you another Letter or two upon this subject. mean time I am with / unalterable friendship yours
John Adams.


Title: From John Adams to Roger Sherman, 18 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Sherman, Roger

Dear Sir
Richmond Hill July 18, 1789

In my Letter of yesterday, I think it was demonstrated that the English Constitution is a Republic, and that the Regal Negative upon the Laws, is essential to that Republic: because that without it, that Government would not be what it is a monarchical Republic, and consequently could not preserve the Ballance of Power between, the Executive and Legislative Powers, nor that other Ballance, which is in the Legislative between the one, the few and the many, in which, two Ballances the Excellence of that form of Government must conflict.
Let us now enquire, whether the new Constitution of the United States is, or is not a monarchical Republic, like that of G. Britain.—The Monarchical, and the Aristocratical Power, in our Constitution, it is true are not hereditary: but this makes no difference in the nature of the Power, in the nature of the Ballance, or in the name of the Species of Government.—it would make no difference in the power of a Judge, or Justice, or General, or Admiral, whether his Commission were for Life or Years. his authority, during the time it lasted would be the same, whether it were for one year or twenty, or for Life, or descendible to his eldest son.—The People the Nation in whom all Power resides originally, may delegate their Power, for one year, or for ten years, for years or for Life, or may delegate it in fee simple, or fee Tail, if I may so express myself or during good behaviour, or at Will, or till further orders.
A nation might unanimously create a Dictator or Despot, for one year, or more, or for Life, or for Perpetuity with hereditary descent. in Such a Case, the Dictator for one year, would as really be a Dictator during the Time, his Power lasted, as the other would be whose Power was perpetual and descendible.—a Nation in the same manner might create a Simple Monarch, for years, Life or Perpetuity, and in either Case the Creature would, be equally a Simple Monarch during the Continuance of his Power. So the People of England might create King, Lords and commons, for a year, or for several years, or for Life—and in any of these Cases, their Government would be a monarchical Republic, or if you will a limited Monarchy, during its continuance, as much as it is now, when the King and Nobles are hereditary. They might make their house of commons hereditary too. what the Consequence of this would be it is easy to foresee: but it would not in the first moment make any change in the legal Power, nor in the name of the Government.
Let us now consider what our Constitution is: and see whether any other name can with propriety be given it: than that of a monarchical Republic, or if you will a limited Monarchy.—The Duration of our President is neither perpetual nor for Life, it is only for four years: but his Power, during those four years, is much greater than that of an Avoyer, a Consul a Podesta, a Doge, a Statholder, nay than a King of Poland.—nay than a King of Sparta—I know of no first Magistrate, in any Republican government, excepting England and Neuchattel, who possesses a constitutional Dignity, Authority, and Power comparable to his.—The Power of sending and receiving Ambassadors of raising and commanding Armies and Navies, of nominating appointing and commissioning all officers—of managing the Treasures, the internal and external affairs of the nation—nay the whole Executive Power, coextensive with the legislative Power is vested in him: and he has the Right and his is the duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.—These Rights and Duties, these Prerogatives and Dignities, are so transcendant, that they must naturally and necessarily excite in the Nation all the Jealousy, Envy, Fears, apprehensions and opposition, that is so constantly observed in England against the Crown.
That these Powers are necessary I readily admit. That the Laws cannot be executed without them: that the Lives, Liberties, Properties and Characters of the Citizens cannot be Secure, without their Protection is most clear. But it is equally certain I think that they ought to have been still greater, or much less.—The Limitations upon them, in the Cases of War, Treaties, and appointments to office and especially the Limitation, on the Presidents Independence as a branch of the Legislature, will be the destruction of this Constitution, and involve us in Anarchy, if not amended. I shall pass over all these particulars for the present, except the last: because that is now the Point in dispute between you and me.
Longitude and the Philosophers Stone, have not been sought with more Earnestness by Philosophers, than a Guardian of the Laws has been studied by legislaters from Plato to Montesquieu. but every Project has been found to be no better, than committing the Lamb to the Custody of the Wolf, excepting that one, which is called a Ballance of Power.—a Simple Sovereignty, in one, a few, or many has no ballance, and therefore no Laws. a divided Sovereignty without a ballance, or in other Words, where the division is unequal is always at War, and consequently has no Laws. in our Constitution the Sovereignty, i.e the Legislative Power is divided, into three Branches. The House and Senate are equal, but the third Branch, tho essential is not equal.—The President must pass Judgment upon every Law—but in Some Cases his Judgment may be overruled. These Cases will be such as attack, his constitutional Power. it is therefore certain he has not equal Power to defend himself, or the Constitution or the Judicial Power, as the Senate and House have.
Power naturally grows.—Why? because human Passions are insatiable. but that Power alone can grow which is already too great. that which is unchecked. that which has no equal Power to controul it. The Legislative Power in our Constitution, is greater than the Executive. it will therefore encroach—because both Aristocratical and democratical Passions are insatiable.—The Legislative Power will increase, the Executive will diminish.—in the legislature, the Monarchical Power is not equal, either to the Aristocratical, or democratical—it will therefore decrease, while the others will increase. indeed I think the Aristocratical Power is greater than either the Monarchical or Democratical. that will therefore Swallow up the other two.
in my Letter of yesterday, I think it was proved, that a Republic might make the Supream Executive an integral Part of the legislature. in this it is equally demonstrated as I think, that our Constitution ought to be amended, by a decisive adoption of that Expedient.
if you dont forbid me, I shall write you again, / yours Sincerely
John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Jeremy Belknap, 18 July 1789
From: Belknap, Jeremy
To: Adams, John

Much respected & dear Sir
Boston July 18. 1789

It was a very singular pleasure to me to receive a Line from you approving the discourse which I did myself the honor to send to you: the good opinion of such a gentleman as Mr Adams & the very great honor wch he has done me will as easily be effaced from my remembrance.
Not till this Week have I met with the political annals of George Chalmers printed in London 1780 in one Vol. 4 to. From what little I have as yet had Opportunity to read of the work, I conceive the author to have the spirit of indefatigable enquiry which is necessary in a historian, tho’ I think not so much of that Candor which is becoming in judging the characters & actions of those who have trod the stage before us—The reason of my mentioning him to you is to introduce an enquiry whether you know the author Man Whether he be an American refugee or an Englishman—a Lawyer I think he is—& whether there is or is likely to be a second volume of his work. When I observe his having had access to the papers in the Plantation Office, I feel a regret that an Ocean seperates me from such a grand repository—how necessary to form a just judgment of the secret springs of many American transactions!
The want of public repositories for historical materials as well as the destruction of many valuable ones by fires, by war & by the lapse of time has long been a subject of regret in my mind. Many papers which are daily thrown away may in future be much wanted; but except here & there a person who has a curiosity of his own to gratify no person one cares to undertake the Collection & of this class of Collectors there are scarcely any Who take care for securing what they have got together after they have quitted the stage. The only sure way of preserving such things is by printing them in some Voluminous work as the Remembrancer—but the attempt to carry on such a work would probably not meet with encouragement—the publication of Govr Winthrop’s journal labours & I fear will come to nought.—
You have done what I wished in publishing the Letters to Dr Calkoen, a Copy of which I was favoured with the Sight by Mr Cranch before this publication was made. It is certainly an important point in the History of our Revolution that it was the work of the people at large & not of any party or faction as our Enemies have affected to believe. There is another point which ought to be as fully ascertained & that is that our Opposition to Great Britain did not originate in a desire of Independence, but that we preserved our loyalty & affection to the Crown of Great Britain as long as was practicable considering the immense provocation which we received. Pray my dear Sir is it a fact that Baron Kalb was sent over hither by the Court of France to sound the inclinations of the Americans after the Repeal of the Stamp act & that he found us so passionately attached to the British nation as to report the impossibility of attempting a seperation?
You will pardon me for thus intruding on your more important engagements—& if you think me too forward or impertinent in my enquiries, suggest to me the propriety of being less so & you shall be obeyed—for really Sir I have a regard for your Character little short of veneration—
Believe me therefore yr truly respectful & much obliged friend & humble Servt
Jere Belknap


Title: To John Adams from Samuel Mather, 19 July 1789
From: Mather, Samuel
To: Adams, John

Sir
London 19th. July 1789

My Friend Robert Young, Esqr. of Warwick Court Holborn having lately published an Essay on the Powers and Mechanism of Nature, in which he has advanced some new and important Doctrines, which he wishes may be investigated by the Philosophers of America, has desired me to distribute a few of them to the Persons, whom I know to be the most eminent for their Learning and Love of the Sciences—and as I know of none more so than Your Excellency, I am to request You will be pleased to accept of the herewith inclosed Book from him—and I am very happy in the opportunity it gives me of congratulating Your Excellency on your appointment to the very high and important Office to which You have been chosen by your Country, and in the execution of which, I wish You may meet with all the Success and satisfaction which I am sure your Endeavours for the Public Good will merit—
If You should be so obliging as to acknowledge the receipt of my letter, be pleased to direct for me, to the care of Saml. Rogers Esqr. No. 23 Charlotte Street Portland Place.
I have the Honor to be with very great Respect and Esteem— / Sir / Your Excellency’s / most obedient / and most humble Servant
Saml. Mather


Title: To John Adams from Edmund Randolph, 19 July 1789
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Adams, John

Dear Sir
Williamsburg July 19. 1789.

Your friendly answer to the letter, which I took the liberty of addressing to you in favor of Colo. Heath, has increased the attachment, which your civility to me in 1775, and your public conduct since, first produced My application in that gentleman’s behalf being founded on a conviction of his worth, I conceived, that it might not be improper to make that worth known to all those, who might eventually decide on his pretensions.
I am almost unable to inform you, where my uncle, Mr. Jenings, is, or how he is employed. I have not received a letter from him for five months; and indeed he communicates so little concerning himself, that, notwithstanding his affectionate letters, he is almost a perfect stranger to me. Among the few particulars, however, which have fallen from his pen, respecting himself, his esteem and veneration for you have been the most considerable. In both I beg leave to assure you that I cordially concur, and that I always am, / Dear Sir, / your obliged And obt. Serv.
Edm: Randolph


Title: From John Adams to Roger Sherman, 20 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Sherman, Roger

Dear Sir
Richmond Hill July 20. 1789

There is a Sense, and a degree, in which the Executive, in our Constitution, is blended with the Legislature: The President, has the power of Suspending a Law; of giving the two Houses an opportunity to pause, to think, to collect themselves, to reconsider a rash step of a Majority; he has the Right to urge all his Reasons against it, by Speech or Message; which being Public is an appeal to the Nation—But the rational Objection here is not that the Executive is not blended with Legislature: but that it is not enough blended; that it is not incorporated with it, and made an essential Part of it.—If it were an integral part of it it might Negative a law, without much Noise, Speculation, or Confusion amoung the People. But as it now stands, I beg you, to consider, it is almost impossible that a President should ever have the courage to make use of his partial negative. what a Situation would a President be in, to maintain a Controversy against a Majority of both Houses, before the Tribunal of the Public. To put a stop to a law, that more than half the Senate and House, and consequently We may Suppose more than half the Nation, had set their hearts upon.? it is moreover possible, that more than two thirds of the Nation, the Senate and House, may in times of Calamity Distress, Misfortune and ill Success of the Measures of Government from the momentary Passion and Enthusiasm, demand a law which will wholly Subvert the Constitution. The Constitution of Athens was overturned in such a moment by Aristides himself.—The Constitution Should guard against a Possibility of its Subversion.—But We may take Stronger ground and assert that it is probable that Such Cases will happen, and that the Constitution will in fact be Subverted in this Way.—May I go further and say, that from the constitution of human nature and the constant Course of human affairs it is certain, that our Constitution will be Subverted, if not amended, and that in a very short time, merely for Want of a decisive negative in the Executive.
There is another Sense, and another Degree, in which the Executive is blended with the legislature, which is liable to great and just objection; which excites alarms, Jealousies and Apprehensions in a very great degree.—I mean 1. the Negative of the Senate, upon appointments to office; 2. the Negative of the Senate upon Treaties, and 3. the Negative of the two Houses upon War.—I shall confine myself at present to the first.  The Negative of the Senate upon Appointments, is liable for the following objections. 1. It takes away, or a least it lessens the responsibility of the Executive—our Constitution obliges me to say, that is lessens the Responsibility of the President. The blame of an hasty, injudicious, weak or wicked Appointment, is Shared so much between him and the Senate, that his part of it will be too Small.—Who can censure him, without censuring the Senate, and the legislatures who appoint them? all their Friends will be interested to vindicate the President, in order to Screen them from censure. besides if an Impeachment is brought before him against an officer are they not interested to acquit him, least some part of the odium of his Guilt Should fall upon them, who advised to his appointment.
2. It turns the Minds and attention of the People, to the Senate, a Branch of the legislature, in Executive matters. it interests another Branch of the legislature in the management of the Executive,. it divides the People, between the executive and the Senate: whereas all the People ought to be united to watch the Executive, to oppose its encroachments, and resist its Ambition.—Senators and Representatives, and their Constituents, in short the Aristocratical and Democratical Divisions of Society ought to be united on all occasions to oppose the Executive; or the Monarchical Branch when it attempts to overleap its Limits. But how can this union be effected, when the Aristocratical Branch has pledged its Reputation to the Executive by consenting to an Appointment.
3. It has a natural Tendency, to excite ambition in the Senate,—An active ardent Spirit in that House, who is rich, & able; has a great Reputation and influence; will be solicited by the candidates for office. not to introduce the idea of Bribery, because tho it certainly would force itself in, in other Countries, and will, probably, have when We grow populous and rich, yet it is not yet, I hope to be dreaded.—But Ambition must come in, already.—A Senator of great influence, will be naturally ambitions and desirous of increasing his influence. Will he not be under a Temptation to use his influence with the President as well as his Brother Senators, to appoint persons to office in the several states who will exert themselves in elections to get out his Ennemies or opposers both in Senate and House of Representatives, and to get in his Friends, perhaps his Instruments.? Suppose a Senator, to aim at the Treasury office, for himself, his Brother, Father or son—Suppose him to aim at the President’s Chair, or Vice Presidents, at the next Election, or at the office of War, foreign or domestic affairs, will he not naturally be tempted to make Use of his whole Patronage his whole Influence, in advising to appointments, both with President Senators to get such persons nominated, as will exert themselves for Elections of President Vice President, Senators and H. of Representatives to increase his interest and promote his Views. in this point of View I am very apprehensive that this defect in our Constitution will have an unhappy Tendency to introduce Corruption of the grossest kinds both of Ambition and Avarice into all our Elections. and this will be the worst of Poisons to our Constitution—It will not only destroy the present form of government, but render it almost impossible to substitute into its place any free Government, even a better limited Monarchy, or any other than a Despotism or a Simple Monarchy.
4. To avoid the Evil, under the last head, it will be in danger of dividing the Continent into two or three Nations, a Case that possesses no prospect but of perpetual War.
5. This Negative on appointments, is in danger of involving the Senate in reproach, obloquy, Censure and Suspicion, without doing any good.—Will the Senate use their Negative or not. If not; why should they have it—many will censure them for not using it. many will ridicule them, call them Servile &c—if they do, use it. The very first Instance of it, will expose the Senators, to the Resentment not only of the disappointed Candidate and all his Friends, but of the President and all his Friends; and those will be most of the Officers of Government, through the nation.
6. We shall very soon have parties formed—A Court and Country Party, and these Parties will have names given them. one Party in the House of Representatives will support the President and his Measures and Ministers—the other will oppose them, a Similar Party will be in Senate. These parties will Struggle with all their Art, perhaps with Intrigue—perhaps with Corruption at Every Election to increase their own Friends and diminish their opposers. Suppose Such Parties formed in Senate, and then consider what Factious divisions We shall have there, upon every Nomination
7. The Senate have not time. The Convention & Indian Treaties.
You are of opinion "That the concurrence of the Senate in the Appointment to office, will Strengthen the hands of the Executive and secure the Confidence of the People, much better than a Select Council, and will be less expensive" but in every one of these Ideas, I have the Misfortune to differ from you. 1. it will weaken the hands of the Executive, by lessening the obligation, gratitude and attachment of the Candidate to the President: by dividing his attachment between the Executive and Legislative which are natural Ennemies.—officers of Government instead of having a Single Eye and undivided attachment to the Executive Branch, as they ought to have consistent with Law and the Constitution, will be constantly tempted to be factious with their factious Patrons in the Senate. The Presidents own officers in a thousand Instances will oppose his just and constitutional Exertions, and Screen themselves under the Wings of their Patrons and Party in the Legislature. Nor will it Secure the Confidence of the People. The People will have more confidence in the Executive, in Executive matters than in the Senate.—The People will be constantly jealous of factious Schemes in the Senators to unduly influence the Executive, and of corrupt bargains between the senate and Executive, to serve each others private Views. The People will also be jealous that the influence of the Senate will be employed to conceal, connive and defend guilt in the Executive officers, instead of being a guard and watch upon them and a terror to them. A Council selected by the President himself at his Pleasure, from among the Senators, Representatives and Nation at large, would be purelyresponsible. in that Case, the Senate as a Body would not be compromised. The senate would be a Terror to Privy Councillors. its Honour would never be pledged to support any Measure or Instrument of the Executive, beyond Justice, Law, and the Constitution. Nor would a privy Council be more expensive. The whole Senate must now deliberate on every Appointment and, if they ever find time for it, you will find that a great deal of time will be required and consumed in this Service. Then the President might have a constant Executive Council, now he has none.
I said under the Seventh head that the Senate would not have time.—You will find that the whole Business of this Government will be infinitely delayed, by this Negative of the Senate on Treaties and appointments.—Indian Treaties and Consular Conventions have been already waiting for months and the Senate have not been able to find a moment of time to attend to them.—and this Evil must constantly increase. So that the Senate must be constantly sitting, and must be paid as long as they Sit.
but I have tired your Patience. Is there any Truth or Importance in these broken hints and crude Surmises? or not? To me they appear well founded and very important. I am / with usual Affection Yours
John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Robert Montgomery, 20 July 1789
From: Montgomery, Robert
To: Adams, John

Sir
Alicante 20 July 1789.

The honour I had of an Acquaintance with your Excellency Shortly after your arrival at the Court of Versailles; and some friendly letters you was pleased to write me after my return to Alicante, together with my affection for the United States to which you have rendered so many Signal Services, Impel me to take the liberty of addressing you at this time with my Sincerest Congratulations on your being Ellected Vice President; accept Sir or my warmest wishes for your wellfare and happiness, and may that Success and Prosperity which has so much distinguished your Character continue to attend you thro’ a long and useful Life.
As by a long residence here as a Merchant I have acquired a tolerable knowledg of the Language and manners of the People, and the Interests of this Countrey with respect to Ours and of Ours with respect to this; I may be able occatonally to give such Informations on those points as your Station of Second Legislator of our Countrey may require for your goverment in framing any laws respecting our commerce with Spain, in which should you think I can be any way useful I Shall be highly honoured by recieving any of your Commands
As Madrid is at so great a distance from every part of the Coast of Spain; a person who Resides there cannot be of Such immediate service to our Vessels and the Active part of our commerce as may often be required, which will I Suppose make it Necessary to follow the Example of other Nations, and appoint Consuls in the Principal Ports, whose business it will be to attend to those matters in perticular, and give such advices to Congress as may be prudent and useful in that Line, and as I have by approbation of the Honorable Mr Jay and Mr. Carmichael continued to do the office of Consul ever Since the Independance, I hope you will do me the honour to confirm me in it, and you may depend on my utmost Exertions to be useful and Give every Satisfaction to the United  States, with honour to your recommendation, being with the greatest Respect and Veneration / Dear Sir / Your Excellency’s Obedient and affectionate / Humble Servant
Robt Montgomery


Title: To John Adams from Roger Sherman, 20 July 1789
From: Sherman, Roger
To: Adams, John

Sir
New York July 20th. 1789

I was honored with your letters ofthe 17th. and 18 Instant and am much obliged to you for the observations they contain. The subject of Government is an important one, and neccessary to be well understood by the Citizens and especially by the legislators of these States. I shall be happy to receive further light on the subject, and to have any errors that I amy have entertained corrected.
I find that writers on government differ in their definitaion of a Republic Entick’s Dictionary defines it "A commonwealth without a King" I find you do not agree to the negative part of his definition. What I mant by it was a government under the authority of the people consisting of legislative, executive and judiciary powers, the legislative powers vested in an assembly consisting of one or more branches, who together with the executive are appointed by the people, and dependent on them for continuence by periodical elections, ageeably to an established Constitution, and that what especially denominates it a Republic is its dependence on the public or people at large without any hereditary powers. But it is not of so much importance by what appellation the government is distinguished, as to have it well constituted to secure the rights and advance the happiness of the community. I fully agree with you sir, that it is optional with the people of a state, to establish any form of government they please, to vest the powers in one, a few or many, and for a limited or unlimited time, and the idividuals of the state will be bound to yield obedience to such government while it contnues; but I am also of opinion that they only alter their frame of government when they please, any former act of theirs, however explicit to the contrary notwithstanding.
but what I principally have in view is to submit to your consideration the reasons that have inclined me to think that the qualified negative given to the Executive by our constitution is better than an absolute negative. In Great Britain where there are the rights of the nobility as well as the rights of the common people to support, it may be neccessary that the crown should have a complete negative to preserve the ballance. But in a Republic like ours wherein is no higher rank than that of common citizens, unless distinguished by appointment to office, what occasion can there be for such a balance? It is true that some men in every society, have natural and acquired abilities Superior to others, and greater wealth. Yet these give them no legal claim to offices in preference to others, but will doubtless give them some degree of influence, and justly, when they are men of integrity and may procure them appointments to places of trust in the government, yet they having only the same common rights with the other citizens, what competition of Interests can there be to require a balance? Besides while the real estates are dividable among all the children, or other kindred in equal degrees and entails are not admitted, it will operate as an agrarian law. And the influence arising from great estates in a few hands or families, will not exist to such a degree of extent or duration as to form a system, or have any great effect.
In order to trace moral effects to their causes and vice versa, it is neccessary to attend the principles as they operate on mens minds. Can it be expected that a chief Magistrate of a free and enlightened people on whom he depends for his election and continuance in office, would give his negative to a law passed by the other two branches of the legislature if he had power? But the qualified negative given to the Executive by our Constitution, which is only to produce a revision, will probably be exercised on proper occasions. And the legislature have the benefit of the Presidents reasons in their further deliberations on the subject. And if a sufficient number of the members of either house should be convinced by them to put a nagative upon the Bill it would add weight to the Presidents opinion and render it more satisfactory to the people. But if two thirds of the members of each house after considering the reasons offered by the President should adhere to their former opinion, will not that be the most Safe foundation to rest the decision upon? On the whole it appears to me that the power of a compleat megative if given would be a dormant and useless one and that the provision in the constitution is calculated to operate with proper weight, and will produce beneficial effects.
The negative vested in the Crown of Great Britain has never been exercised since the revolution, and the great influence of the Crown in the legislature of that nation is derived from another source, that of appointment to all offices of honor and profit, which has rendered the power of the Crown nearly absolute. So that the nation is in fact government by the cabinet council, who are the creatures of the Crown. The consent of Parliament is neccessary to give sanction to their measures, and that they easily obtain by the influence aforesaid. If they should carry their points so far as directly to affect personal liberty or private property the people would be alarmed and oppose their progress. But this forms no part of their System, the principal object of which is revenue, which they have carried to an enormous height. Where ever the chief Magistrate may appoint to offices without control, his government may become absolute or at least oppressive. Therefore the concurrence of the Senate is made requisite by our Constitution.
I have not time or room to add, or apologize. I am with great respect your obliged humble servant

Roger Sherman


Title: To John Adams from United States House of Representatives, 20 July 1789
From: United States House of Representatives
To: Adams, John

					Mr. President:
					July 20, 1789

				 The House of Representatives have passed a bill, entitled “An act for the establishment and support of light-houses, beacons, and buoys.” They have concurred in the amendments proposed by the Senate to a bill, entitled “An act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs.” And they have received from the President of the United States an enrolled bill, entitled “An act imposing duties on tonnage,” with his signature affixed thereto.


Title: From John Adams to Peter Cunningham, 21 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Cunningham, Peter

Dear Sir
New York July 21. 1789.

I have received your favor of the thirteenth of this month, from the hand of Mr. McGuire, and am much obliged to you for the information of your welfare, and the situation of your family. A country life like yours, retired on a farm is seldom acceptable to a man educated in a city and accustomed to the sea: and therefore your inclination to return into the active world is no surprise to me: Yet there is more safety, more tranquility, and perhaps better prospects for your family, in your present course. What opening there may be, for the employment of your talents in the public service, I am not at present able to conjecture. But I should be obliged to you, if you would write me, in confidence an account of your former actions and services, which will at least be a pleasure to know, if I should never have an opportunity to make use of it to your advantage.
My Family consists of a daughter and three sons. The former is married to Col: Smith and has presented me with two grand sons. My Eldest Son, John, is in the study of the law at Newbury port with Mr Parsons—Chas had his degree this month and is now with me—Thomas will take his degree next year. By this detail you will see, what you knew however very well before that I am not a young man. But I shall never be too old to wish well to your prosperity and that of your family:
Being with great esteem Yours
J.A.


Title: From John Adams to Alexander Hamilton, 21 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Sir
Richmond Hill July 21. 1789

Mr. Charles Adams, my Second Son, the Bearer of this Letter, I beg leave to introduce to you.—He took his degree at our University of Cambridge this year, and is destined to the Study of the Law.—I wish to get him into some office in New York, and should give the Preference to you
But there are two Contingencies, one possible the other probable in the Way. The first is that Congress may force me to Philadelphia or the Lord knows where: the other that you may become a Minister of State, or some other Thing better or worse than the Practice of the Bar, but, however, incompatible with it.
As it is my Intention that my Son shall board with me, he must follow, wherever Congress shall lead me—If you should leave the Bar, Some other arrangement must be made for him.
He may go into Town, and come out, with me every day, and attend your office, from between ten and Eleven, to between three and four. When your Business presses, he may attend earlier or latter as you shall direct.
If you will take him into your office immediately, subject to these Contingencies, I shall be obliged to you, and ask the favour of you to mention to me your Terms. The Circumstances of my Family and Fortune will not permit me to be  generous: but it is my determination, in every Circumstance of Life, to be  just.—With great Esteem I have / the Honour to be, Sir, your most / obedient Servant
John Adams.


Title: From John Adams to Daniel McCormick, 21 July 1789
From: Adams, John
To: McCormick, Daniel

Richmond Hill July, 21. 1789.

The Vice President presents his Compliments to Mr. McCormick, and will be obliged, if he will get two thousand Dollars negotiated at the Bank, for his Use.
John Adams.