Title: To James Madison from “Pacificus,” 14 August 1789
From: “Pacificus”
To: Madison, James

Sir,
New-York, Aug. 14, 1789.
In a debate upon the Impost Bill, you declared yourself an enemy to local attachments, and said you considered yourself not merely the representative of Virginia, but of the United States. This declaration was liberal, and the sentiment just. But Sir, does this accord with the interest you take in amending the constitution? You now hold out in justification of the part you take in forwarding amendments, that you have pledged yourself in some measure to your constituents. But, Sir, who are your constituents? Are they the electors of a small district in Virginia? These indeed gave you a place in the federal legislature; but the moment you were declared to be elected, you became the representative of three millions of people, and you are bound, by the principles of representation and by your own declaration, to promote the general good of the United States. You had no right to declare that you would act upon the sentiments and wishes of your immediate constituents, unless you should be convinced that the measures you advocate coincide with the wishes and interest of the whole Union. If I have any just ideas of legislation, this doctrine is incontrovertible; and if I know your opinions, you believe it to be so.
Permit me then, with great respect to ask, Sir, how you can justify yourself, in the eyes of the world, for espousing the cause of amendments with so much earnestness? Do you, Sir, believe, that the people you represent generally wish for amendments? If you do Sir, you are more egregiously mistaken than you ever were before. I know from the unanimous declaration of men in several states, through which I have lately travelled, that amendments are not generally wished for; on the other hand, amendments are not mentioned but with the most pointed disapprobation.
The people, Sir, admit what the advocates of amendments in Congress, generally allow, that the alterations proposed can do very little good or hurt, as to the merits of the constitution; but for this very reason they reprobate any attempt to introduce them. They say, and with great justice, that, at the moment when an excellent government is going into operation; when the hopes of millions are revived, and their minds disposed to acquiesce peaceably in the federal laws; when the demagogues of faction have ceased to clamor, and their adherents are reconciled to the constitution—Congress are taking a step which will revive the spirit of party, spread the causes of contention through all the states, call up jealousies which have no real foundation, and weaken the operations of government, when the people themselves are wishing to give it energy. We see, in the debates, it is frequently asserted, that some amendments will satisfy the opposition and give stability to the government.
The people, Sir, in the northern and middle states do not believe a word of this—they do not see any opposition—they find information and experience every where operating to remove objections, and they believe that these causes will, though slowly, produce a change of conduct in North-Carolina and Rhode-Island. Is it not better to wait for this event, than risk the tumults that must grow out of another debate upon the constitution in every one of the United States.
It seems to be agreed on all hands that paper declarations of rights are trifling things and no real security to liberty. In general they are a subject of ridicule. In England, it has been necessary for parliament to ascertain and declare what rights the nation possesses, in order to limit the powers and claims of the crown; but for a sovereign free people, whose power is always equal, to declare, with the solemnity of a constitutional act, We are all born free, and have a few particular rights which are dear to us, and of which we will not deprive ourselves, altho’ we leave ourselves at full liberty to abridge any of our other rights, is a farce in government as novel as it is ludicrous.
I am not disposed to treat you, Sir, with disrespect; many years acquaintance has taught me to esteem your virtues and respect your abilities. No man stands higher in my opinion, and people are every where willing to place you among the most able, active and useful representatives of the United States. But they regret that Congress should spend their time in throwing out an empty tub to catch people, either factious or uninformed, who might be taken more honorably by reason and equitable laws. They regret particularly that Mr. Madison’s talents should be employed to bring forward amendments, which, at best can have little effect upon the merits of the constitution, and may sow the seeds of discord from New-Hampshire to Georgia.
I am, Sir, &c.
Pacificus.


Title: Amendments to the Constitution, [14 August] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[14 August 1789]

   Under consideration was an amendment providing for one representative for every thirty thousand people until the number reached one hundred. Ames proposed a ratio of one for every forty thousand.

Mr. Madison. I cannot concur in sentiment with the gentleman last up, that 1 representative for 40,000 inhabitants will conciliate the minds of those to the government, who are desirous of amendments; because they have rather wished for an encrease, than confined themselves to a limitation.
I believe, by this motion, we shall avoid no inconvenience that can be considered of much consequence, for one member for either 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants, will, in a few years, give the number beyond which it is proposed congress shall not go.
Now if good policy requires that we accommodate the constitution to the wishes of that part of the community who are anxious for amendments, we shall agree to something like what is proposed in the report, for the states of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, New-York, Virginia and North-Carolina, have desired an alteration on this head; some have required an encrease as far as 200 at least; this does not look as if certainty was their sole object.
I do not consider it necessary, on this occasion, to go into a lengthy discussion of the advantages of a less or greater representation. I agree that after going beyond a certain point, the number may become inconvenient; that is proposed to be guarded against; but it is necessary to go to a certain number in order to secure the great objects of representation. Numerous bodies are undoubtedly liable to some objections, but they have their advantages also; if they are more exposed to passion and fermentation, they are less subject to venality and corruption; and in a government like this, where the house of representatives is connected with a smaller body it might be good policy to guard them in a particular manner against such abuse.
But for what shall we sacrifice the wishes of the people? Not for a momentary advantage: Yet the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts will lose its efficacy after the second census; I think, with respect to futurity, it makes little or no difference; and as it regards the present time, 30,000 is the most proper, because it is the number agreed upon in the original constitution, and what is required by several states.


Title: To James Madison from the Reverend James Madison, 15 August 1789
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir
Aug. 15h. 1789
I am much obliged for your Favr. of the 29h. July, and also for the Papers inclosed. Nothing gives me more Pleasure than hearing from you, but I have been always unwilling, to add to the Burthen of those Correspondences, in wh. you must be engaged. Mr Randolph generally gives me a sight of the Papers you send him, so that I shall think myself sufficiently attended to, by occasional Instances of your Remembrance.
That the Business of Amendments has been entered upon in so dispassionate a Manner must afford real Satisfaction to every Friend to the Union. Some of those proposed appear to be important, at least in removing the Objections of many of the Opponents to the Constitution; tho’ I do not observe that the Commee. has proposed such as appear of the first Magnitude. Would it not be adviseable to seize the present Moment to render the Constitution more perfect in the most essential Parts; or to do away those Defects, wh. it’s warmest Friends admit, must eventually if continued, render the Govt. less prosperous. Suppose, for Instance, that the Union of the Legislative & Executive Powers was entirely done away—& that the Executive, or cheif Magistrate, had his Council with whom he shd. always consult & not with a Branch of the Legislature. Let the Senate be entirely confined to the Object of Legislation, let not one of it’s Members be styled Vice-Presidt. But let the Senior Councillor transact the necessary Business in Case of Inability—or Absence of a President. I wd. not wish to weaken the Hands of the Executive, or diminish aught of the Powers assignd by the Constitution, but I think they might be modelled anew in a Manner, wh. wd promise more Stability & Prosperity to the Genl. Govt. Other Improvements of perhaps a more important Nature may have occurred to you, who have so long & so deeply reflected upon the Subject; and if it were not presumptuous to advise one who will always be directed by the most enlightened & patriotic Views, I wd. recommend the present Moment as the most proper to attempt the Introduction of them.
Defects themselves gain Strength & Respect by Time. Wd. it not then be better to expose fully, & in the Manner of wh. you are so capable, those Alterations wh. are necessary, or wch. wd in Theory render the Govt. more perfect. The first Object shd. be to render the Theory as perfect as possible: if the Theory be such, the Practice will be correspondent. Principles wh. are true in Theory, cannot fail in the Execution of them. Besides such an Exposition of those Alterations wh. wd. really render the Govt. more perfect, if they were not adopted at present, wd. at least have this important Effect: it wd. fix the public Mind upon those great & necessary Improv[em]ents; it wd. thus be gradually prepared for them, & Time might bring about, what the Spirit of Faction may now prevent. I hope then, as you have begun, you will compleat, or attempt to compleat the arduous Task.
I was glad to see the Manner in wch. the Question concerning Removal from office was determined, because I believe, the more independent the Exe. is made of the Senate, the better the Govt. will succeed. But surely there never came from a respectable Body of Men—a more ridiculous or truely contemptible Prop. than that wh. respected Titles.
The Conduct of your House is highly approv’d by every one. Upon what Principle in the Constitution is it, that the Assent of the Vice Presidt. is necessary to the Laws wch. Congress may pass? This is a Question wch. has occurred to every one. The Acquiescence of your House wd. lead one to suppose it was not improper—but we are inclined to beleive, for the most Part at least, that Mr Adams might as well affix—Ambassador Extraordy., Author of his luminous Book, Member of the Boston Academy L.L.D &c &c. But Consistency is not the lowest D[…] in the Scale of Merit, Titles are impertinent Things wh. will obtrude themselves wherever they can.
The French are making a glorious Effort for the Reestablishment of their former Liberties—May Heaven grant them Success.
When your Recess shall take Place, wd. it not be your best Way to return by Water. We shd then have once more the Pleasure of seeing you here. I have flattered myself this Event was not improbable. Shd it take Effect Nothing wd. afford a higher Pleasure to Dr Sir Yr. sincerely Affe. Friend
J Madison

My Wife always desires to be affey. remembered by you. Pray—give my best Respects to Mr Page & Griffin. Can Zimmerman’s Work be had in N. York—and at what Price. I could remit the Price to Col. Griffin.


Title: From James Madison to George W. Smith, 15 August 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Smith, George W.

Letter not found. 15 August 1789. Acknowledged in Smith to JM, 22 Sept. 1789. Discourages Smith’s hopes for a federal appointment.


Title: To James Madison from Alexander White, 17 August 1789
From: White, Alexander
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Woodville 17th August 1789
I wrote you a Line from Philadelphia mentioning such Facts as had come to my knowledge respecting the sentiments of the People on Public Affairs. My Journey was fatiguing, the weather being excessive hot, and the Stages over-burdened with Passengers and Baggage. I reached Baltimore on Tuesday afternoon—and took breakfast before I sat out on Wednesday morning. Several Gentlemen waited on me who all concurred in Assurances, that the Proceedings of the House of Representatives had given more general Satisfaction than could have been expected from any Assembly of men, that where there had been a diffirrence of opinion among us on great Political Principles a similar differrence had existed among the People at large, but that all united in giving full credit to their Representatives for their good intentions and Patriotism, and were pleased with the cool discussion of subjects so important. I found, however, that our own pay and Salaries in general were considered as too high—and that any distinction between the Senate and the Representatives in respect to pay would be thought improper. At the Inns on the Road I was surprised to find the knowledge, which the Land Lords, and Country People who were at some of them, had acquired, of the Debates and Proceedings of Congress. At Fredericktown I met with General Gates, and Governour Johnston who had come to Town in expectation of seeing me. The day was so far advanced, and the heat so excessive, that I could indulge myself but little in the Governours Company. I rode home with the General, where was old Adam waiting my arrival. These two Veterans had conned over the Presidents right of Removal, and seemed inclined to think he ought to have the Power, but were not so well satisfied with the propriety of Legislative Constructions. On Friday I reached home, and am now preparing to set out for Berkeley Court, In the mean time several Gentlemen Federal and Anti Federal from Winchester and its Vicinity have been to see me—they express a perfect universal Satisfaction with the Conduct of their Representatives. I found that the Temporary Residence of Congress, is (on this side of Philadelphia) considered as of little importance—the permanent Seat is the great Object. And in this Respect I was happy to find the expectations of the People, not more sanguine than reason seems to justify. Mr Smith the Manager of the Patowmack Works, and Mr Gilpin one of the Trustees have been up to the Head Branches of that River, have taken an accurate account of its State, and explored the communications with the Branches of the Ohio—they passed Shepherdstown on their Return a few days before I passed thro’, but I could learn no particulars either as to Facts or Opinions.
The Navigation of the River appears to be at a stand, the Water is low, and some little time ago a Boat loaded with Seventeen Hhds. Tobo. stove against a Rock and went to the Bottom, No lives lost, and the Tobacco was got on shore somewhat damaged. I am extremely anxious to hear what is going on in Congress. I think I desired Mr Beckley to fold up and send me the Papers by every Post, and to get you, or some of my Colleagues to frank them, for I believe they will not come free without. I am not certain whether the Post which leaves N. York on Monday reaches Winchester on Tuesday Se’night, So that if you oblige me with Weekly communications Friday may be the most speedy. I have scarcely time to write this Scrall And no time to write any one but you, Must therefore request you to present my Compliments to all the Gentlemen of our Delegation, to Mr. Beckley and the other Gentlemen of our House And remain with Sentiments of Great Regard Dear Sir Your most Obt. Servt
Alex White


Title: Amendments to the Constitution, [17 August] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[17 August 1789]

   Tucker moved to strike out, “No state shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.”

Mr. Madison Conceived this to be the most valuable amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to restrain the government of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against the state governments; he thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to the people.


Title: Amendments to the Constitution, [18 August] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[18 August 1789]

   The last proposition of the select committee read: “The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.” Tucker moved to insert “expressly” before “delegated.”

Mr. Madison Objected to this amendment, because it was impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express powers. There must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the constitution descended to recount every minutiæ. He remembered the word “expressly” had been moved in the convention of Virginia, by the opponents to the ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given up by them, and the system allowed to retain its present form.


Title: From James Madison to Richard Peters, 19 August 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Peters, Richard

Dear Sir
N. York Aug: 19. 1789
I have been much delighted with the extract from your collection of fables, and should have told you so sooner, were I less incumbered with a number of involuntary correspondencies, which stand in the way of those which my inclination would cherish. May I hope that “The wise Cooks & foolish Guests” is but a sample of the treat you meditate for your friends, out of the “Aunciente & connynge balladdes.” It will be criminally selfish to keep so delicious and precious a donation of the Muses wholly for your own entertainment.
The papers inclosed will shew that the nauseous project of amendments has not yet been either dismissed or despatched. We are so deep in them now, that right or wrong some thing must be done. I say this not by way of apology, for to be sincere I think no apology requisite. 1. because a constitutional provision in favr. of essential rights is a thing not improper in itself and was always viewed in that light by myself. It may be less necessary in a republic, than a Monarchy, & in a fedl. Govt. than the former, but it is in some degree rational in every Govt., since in every Govt. power may oppress, and declarations on paper, tho’ not an effectual restraint, are not without some influence. 2. In many States the Constn. was adopted under a tacit compact in favr. of some subsequent provisions on this head. In Virga. It would have been certainly rejected, had no assurances been given by its advocates that such provisions would be pursued. As an honest man I feel my self bound by this consideration. 3. If the Candidates in Virga. for the House of Reps. had not taken this conciliary ground at the election, that State would have [been] represented almost wholly by disaffected characters, instead of the federal reps. now in Congs. 4. If amendts. had not been proposed from the federal side of the House, the proposition would have come within three days, from the adverse side. It is certainly best that they should appear to be the free gift of the friends of the Constitution rather than to be extorted by the address & weight of its enemies. 5. It will kill the opposition every where, and by putting an end to the disaffection to the Govt. itself, enable the administration to venture on measures not otherwise safe. Those who hate the Govt. will always join the party disaffected to measures of the admi[ni]s[tra]tion, and such a party will be created by every important measure. 6. If no amendts. be proposed the language of antifedl. leaders to the people, will be, we advised you not to adopt the Constn. witht. previous amendts—You listened to those who told you that subsequent securities for your rights would be most easily obtained—We urged you to insist on a Convention as the only effectual mode of obtaining these—You yielded to the assurances of those who told you that a Convention was unecessary, that Congs. wd. be the proper channel for getting what was wanted. &c &c. Here are fine texts for popular declaimers who wish to revive the antifedl. cause, and at the fall session of the Legislares. to blow the trumpet for a second Convention. In Virga. a majority of the Legislature last elected, is bitterly opposed to the Govt. and will be joined, if no amends. be proposed, by great nos. of the other side who will complain of being deceived. 7. Some amendts. are necssy for N. Carola. I am so informed by the best authorities in that State. I set out with an apology for not writing sooner, I must conclude with one, for writing so much, & still more for writing so scurvily. Yrs truly
Js. Madison Jr


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 21 August 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Pendleton, Edmund

Dr Sir
N. Y. Aug. 21. 89.
The last 8 or 10 days have been spent on the subject of amendts. The work has been extremely difficult and fatiguing, as well on account of the dilatory artifices of which some of the antifederal members are suspected, as of the diversity of opinions & fancies inseparable from such an Assembly as Congress. At present there is a prospect of finishing to day, the plan so far as it lies with the H. of Reps. It does not differ much from the original propositions offered on that subject.
The Judiciary bill was postponed in order to consider the preceding subject. Many circumstances justified an opinion that if amendts. were not decided on at this crisis, other business & the approach of the time at which the members are generally determined to adjourn till December, would prevent any decision at [this] Session. A push was therefore made, and the House is now so […] in for the measure that it cannot well be relinquished. I am Dr. Sir Yours mo: Affecly.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 21 August 1789
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My Dear friend
N. Y. Aug. 21. 89.
For a week past the subject of amendts. has exclusively occupied the H. of Reps. Its progress has been exceedingly wearisome not only on account of the diversity of opinions that was to be apprehended, but of the apparent views of some to defeat by delaying a plan short of their wishes, but likely to satisfy a great part of their companions in opposition throughout the Union. It has been absolutely necessary in order to effect any thing, to abbreviate debate, and exclude every proposition of a doubtful & unimportant nature. Had it been my wish to have comprehended every amendt. recommended by Virga. I should have acted from prudence the very part to which I have been led by choice. Two or three contentious additions would even now frustrate the whole project.
The Judiciary bill was put off in favr. of the preceding subject. It was evident that a longer delay of that wd. prevent any decision on it at this Session. A push was therefore made, which did not succeed without strenuous opposition. On Monday the bill will probably be taken up & be pursued to a final question as fast as the nature of the case will allow.
I find on looking over the notes of your introductory discourse in the Convention at Philada. that it is not possible for me to do justice to the substance of it. I am anxious for particular reasons to be furnished with the means of preserving this as well as the other arguments in that body, and must beg that you will make out & forward me the scope of your reasoning. You have your notes I know & from these you can easily deduce the argument on a condensed plan. I make this request with an earnestness wch. will not permit you either to refuse or delay a compliance. Yr. affecly.
J. M Jr


Title: Joseph Barnes to George Clymer, 23 August 1789 (Abstract)
From: Barnes, Joseph
To: Clymer, George

Abstract. 23 August 1789, Philadelphia. James Rumsey’s supporters are anxious for Congress to take action on copyright and patent legislation so that the inventor’s improvements in milling machinery will be protected against those who would “reap the benefits of anothers toil: which is the only thing we most fear.” A bill should be acted upon before Congress adjourns.


Title: To James Madison from Richard Peters, 24 August 1789
From: Peters, Richard
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Belmont Augt. 24. 1789
I have to acknowledge your Favour of the 19th. I am obliged by your Information & acknowledge that some of your Reasons are the best that can be given. They are such therefore as I knew you could give. But many of them are founded on Apprehensions which forgive me for saying I think too highly wrought. I believe that a Firmness in adhering to our Constitution ’till at least it had a longer Trial would have silenced Antifederalists sooner than magnifying their Importance by Acknowledgments on our Part & of ourselves holding up a Banner for them to rally to. All you offer comes not up to their Desires & as long as they have one unreasonable Wish ungratified the Clamour will be the same. I know there are among them good Characters but many of those who lead do it not from other Motives than to make or keep themselves Heads of a Party. Our Character abroad will never acquire Consistency while Foreigners see us wavering even in our Government about the very Instrument under which that Government acts. In short I fear worse Consequences from the good Disposition of the Conciliators (especially now when some Things done by Congress have startled even many Federalists) than I apprehend from an Adherence to the System. But I have agreed with myself not to enter far into a Subject which you have so long considered. I have therefore for your Amusement sent you another of the “aunciente Balladdes” which I have scarcely had Time to copy or correct as our House is sitting & the Thick of our Business coming on. I will always find Time however to assure you of my being affectionately yours
Richard Peters

[Enclosure]

The Entering Wedge Written a Century ago by an Illegitimate of the Pindar Family.
Reader, I mean not any Quibble
Double Entendre or Scorn-moving Pun,
Not so devoted to the vulgar Fun
As grave & decent Converse to forego;
Or, like thin Critics, at a Word to nibble
And vehement proceed from Word to Blow.
I hate the light sophisticating Tribe
Who throw out Baits for th’ little Fry,
Or microscopic Spectacles prescribe
To search for Motes i’ th’ public Eye.
Yet not too fond of the didactic Style,
Which lends Stupidity its dozy Aid,
And comes in learned Follies oft array’d
With Lumber brought from Schools;

From Wisdom, ’tho austere to force a Smile
But urge to Exstacy the solemn Fools.
I shall not therefore thumb o’er Rowning
Or gravely quote the sage Maclaurin—
Authorities with Proofs for ever warring.
Nor shall I idly waste your Hours
With Descants on mechanic Pow’rs
In Definitions Comprehension drowning.
Yet, Reader, pause—& set your Muscles—
My subject is nor Screw nor Lever:
Let not Impatience raize your Fever,
For soon to broach it I myself will pledge;
’Tis known to Clowns of dense Corpuscles
—’Tis simply then—an ent’ring Wedge—
In long Harrangues I never glory
Or gravely sit with Dulness down,
Assisting with an Owl-like Frown,
To pass upon the World her leaden Lies—
But will relate a simple Story—
—“A Word’s sufficient for the wise”—
A Bungler once assay’d to split a Tree
And sweating strove to cleave it at the Crotch—
—Thought he had hit it to a Notch—
Yet fail’d & curs’d & curs’d & fail’d again—
An Adept passing chanc’d the Oaf to see
And shew’d the Clown what he had sought in vain.
My Friend, the knowing one full waggish cries,
I have been married for these twenty Years—
Stare not my Friend—no clownish Jeers—
The Thing I tell you is quite apposite—
I’ve driven at a Crotch with Wedge & Prize
But tho’ industrious—have not split it yet.
Another Thing you’l say’s a Tree,
’Tis true—but then reverse your Toil;
The Butt of this will split most free
—The Crotch of both your Wedge will foil.
The Clown, delighted, took the Hint
His Wedge so easy driving,
He left together not a Splint
And spoil’d his Tree with Riving—

Reader, there’s Moral in our Tale—
To Marplots never shew the Way—
Lest Mischief over Right prevail;
The more you teach, the more they’l stray.
In Politics your Plans you marr
If you’re forever splitting;
The Malcontents will rage & jarr
Like Colts you’ve spoil’d in Bitting.
Assist them not to raize their Storm
On Caution keep an Edge;
When solid Systems once you form—
Beware of th’ ent’ring Wedge.


Title: To James Madison from Benjamin Hawkins, 27 August 1789
From: Hawkins, Benjamin
To: Madison, James

My dear friend!
Warrenton the 27th August. 1789
I have had the pleasure to receive yr. favour of the 24th June. Our Elections ended on saturday last, and appearances as far as I can learn, are decidedly federal, in the County where I live, they were violent in the opposition, and now have changed, I was elected by a large majority, Colo. Davie who attends our court, is in for Halifax, they are all from the town and County federal, Mr. Willie Jones lives in that County but he did not offer. I have a letter from Nashville on the Cumberland of the 25th. July, informing of sundry predatory and murderous excursions of the indians, supposed, of the Creeks. I send a short extract on a subject some what important, in its consequences, Colo. Morgan and his associates. “Col. Morgans settlement on the mississippi is come to nothing the land they settled on, overflowed amazingly, and numbers of the adventurers are returned to Kentuckey very Much disgusted.” I believe I dated my last letter June for July. Adieu or the opportunity to Petersburg will be lost.
B. Hawkins


Title: To James Madison from James Innes, 27 August 1789
From: Innes, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sr.
virginia, Richmond—August 27th 1789.
It is with reluctance, that I for a moment obtrude any little private Concerns of my own, on yr Attention, which, I doubt not is fully engrossed, by a Multiplicity of Objects of public moment. But as the Satisfaction I wish to obtain, can only be derived from public Soursces, I flatter myself, you will pardon me for the trouble I now give you.
I hold a considerable quantity of lands, granted as a bounty by this State to me, as a late officer of the virginia line, in Continental Service. These lands have been located, and Surveyed, under the laws of our Country on the western side of the Ohio. The fee’s of office, and other Contingent charges, amounting to a very inconvenient Sum of money for me to be deprived of—have been long since advanced. A resolution of the late Congress—passed some time in the fall of 1788, requiring impossibilities of this State—will, if carried into Effect, most probably deprive me of my lands. Such an Act, I shall deem, as will very many others in my Situation—oppressive, illegal, unjust, and impolitic. I discover by your Journals, that Mr White brought into yr house a resolution to rescind the one, I have been alluding to, which was orderd to lie on the table. I mean to solicit no favors. I only wish for Justice, and speedy decision. If Congress think speculators, and land jobbers, of more de[se]rving favor and reward—than the officers of the late American Army—be it so—our interests must, I suppose, be yielded. But let me request of you, my dear Sir, to bring this matter to a speedy issue, if possible, before the Adjournment of yr present Session, that, should the former resolution remain in force, myself, and others similarly oppressed—may have an opportunity, of submitting our Cases to the Consideration of our legislature at their approaching Sessions.
With respect to politics, I will say but one word—The old fashond Whigs very much regret, that Congress, in their commercial regulations, have not adopted the discrimination, for which, you so ably, and righteously Contended—while the new fangled Whigs and Anglo-Americans most heartily sing Io triumphe! I am most Cordially, dear Sir, yr friend & Sert.
Jas: Innes.


Title: To James Madison from James Manning, 29 August 1789
From: Manning, James
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Providence August 29th. 1789.
I take the liberty to introduce to your acquaintan[ce] the bearer, Benjamin Bourne Esquire of this Town; and to request your assistance in obtaining the object of the petition to Congress, which he is sent forward to present, vizt: that the Seaport Towns in the State of Rhode Island may be exempt from the Tonage imposed on foreigners; & from the Impot also, to which they are subjected by the late acts of Congress, by considering them as foreigners.
When we reflect that Congress had the most irrefragable documents that the Seaports of this State were all federal; & that the landed Interest had prevented the adoption of the new Constitution heretofore, we were striken with amazement to find a discrimination in favour of the latter, in those acts.
Inevitable ruin stares us in the face in being thus secluded from all intercourse with the United States. We address the Magnanimity of Congress, & intreat them to rescue us from that destruction to which we are doomed by these acts, by granting the prayer of our petition. All the Seaports, of consideration, in the State, come forward with similar petitions; and we have this Argument to urge in our favour, in addition to those we could, before, bring, that at the Election of Representatives on Tuesday last, the Towns, as we calculate, have chosen a decided Majority of Federalists; so that we look forward with Expectation of coming into the union at the next meeting of Congress, but if the aforesaid laws operate upon us till then, from our dependance on the States now in the union to carry on our Commerce, all our vessels must lie rotting at the Wharfs, & that numerous class of our Citizens, dependent upon commerce must starve, or at least be reduced to the greatest distress. Your influence in Congress emboldens me to address you thus freely on the subject, & to solicit your interest in our favour. Will you ask what can be done? One thing, at least, I presume can be done, bonds can be demanded from the Inhabitants of this State, requiring them to pay the foreign Tonnage & impost, provided the State did not adopt the Constitution within a given time; say six or twelve months, or a shorter term; if it should be found that relief can be extended to us in no other way.
I was in the appointment with Mr Bourne but the necessary attentions to the College, (it being the Anniversary Commencement, & meeting of the Corporation,) will delay me for several days.
In a conversation with the Revd: Isaac Backus, one of our noted ministers, whom I mentioned as having visited Virginia the last Spring, (when I had the hononour [sic] of an interview with you at New York last June) he informed me that almost every where in his tour through Virginia he was consulted on the propriety & safety of the New Constitution, especially in regard to the rights of conscienc[e] on which head they appeared much alarmed; the result, he informed me, was that in general they appeared to be satisfied after he had gone through the subject. I thought proper to communicate this as I conceived it would give pleasure to you as it did to Sir Your very humble Servt
James Manning


Title: Judiciary Bill, [29 August] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[29 August 1789]

   The judiciary bill, originating in the Senate, had been sent to the House on 20 July. Consideration of it had been postponed until the House completed the business of amendments to the Constitution. Livermore’s motion to strike the third section (providing for district courts) provoked a lengthy debate as to whether inferior federal tribunals were necessary.

Mr. Madison Said it would not be doubted that some judiciary system was necessary to accomplish the objects of the government, and that it ought to be commensurate with the other branches of the government. Under the late confederation, it could scarcely be said, that there was any real legislative power; there was no executive branch, and the judicial was so confined as to be of little consequence; in the new constitution a regular system is provided; the legislative power was made effective for its objects; the executive was co-extensive with the legislative, and it was equally proper that this should be the case with the judiciary. If the latter be concurrent with the state jurisdictions, it does not follow that it will for that reason be impracticable. It is admitted that a concurrence exists in some cases between the legislative authorities of the federal and state governments; and it may be safely affirmed that there is more, both of novelty and difficulty in that arrangement than there will be in the other.
To make the state courts federal courts, is liable to insuperable objections. Not to repeat that the moment that is done, they will from the highest down to the county courts, hold their tenures during good behavior, by virtue of the constitution. It may be remarked that in another point of view, it would violate the constitution by usurping a prerogative of the supreme executive of the United States. It would be making appointments which are expressly vested in that department, not indeed by nomination, but by description, which would amount to the same thing. But laying these difficulties aside, a review of the constitution of the courts in many states will satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of the federal laws. In some of the states it is true they might, and would be safe and proper organs of such a jurisdiction; but in others they are so dependent on the state legislatures, that to make the federal laws dependent on them, would throw us back into all the embarrassments which characterized our former situation. In Connecticut the judges are appointed annually by the legislature, and the legislature is itself the last resort in civil cases. In Rhode-Island, which we hope soon to see united with the other states, the case is at least as bad. In Georgia, even under their former constitution, the judges are triennially appointed, and in a manner by no means unexceptionable. In Pennsylvania they hold their places for seven years only. Their tenures leave a dependence, particularly for the last year or two of the term, which forbid a reliance on judges who feel it. With respect to their salaries, there are few states, if any, in which the judges stand on independent ground. On the whole, he said, he did not see how it could be made compatible with the constitution, or safe to the federal interests to make a transfer of the federal jurisdiction to the state courts, as contended for by the gentlemen who oppose the clause in question.


Title: Location of the Capital, [3 September] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[3 September 1789]

   The Committee of the Whole took up Scott’s motion of 27 August: “That a permanent residence ought to be fixed for the general government of the United States, at some convenient place, as near the centre of wealth, population, and extent of territory as may be consistent with convenience to the navigation of the Atlantic ocean, and having due regard to the particular situation of the western country.”

Mr. Madison. I move to strike out the word wealth, because I do not conceive this to be a consideration that ought to have much weight in determining the place where the seat of government ought to be. The two other principles I admit, are such as ought to have their influence; but why wealth should, is not so clear. Government is intended for the accommodation of the citizens at large; an equal facility to communicate with government is due to all ranks; whether to transmit their grievances or requests, or to receive those blessings which the government is intended to dispense. The rich are certainly not less able than those who are indigent, to resort to the seat of government, or to establish the means necessary for receiving those advantages to which, as citizens, they are entitled.
I should rather suppose, if any distinctions are to be made, or superior advantages to be enjoyed from the presence of the government, that the government ought rather to move toward those, who are the least able to move toward it, and who stand most in need of its protection.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 340–41 (also reported fully in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 4 Sept. 1789, and Gazette of the U.S., 9 Sept. 1789). JM’s motion lost and Scott’s was adopted.

[3 September 1789]

   Goodhue proposed the east bank of the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania as the permanent seat of the government, with New York City as the temporary capital.

Mr. Madison. The gentleman who brought forward this motion, [was] candid enough to tell us, that measures have been preconcerted out of doors, and that the point was determined; that more than half the territory of the United States, and near half its inhabitants have been disposed of, not only without their consent, but without their knowledge. After this, I hope the gentleman will extend his candor so much farther, as to shew that the general principles, now to be established, are applicable to their determination, in order that we may reconcile this fate to our own minds, and submit to it with some degree of complaisancy.
Though it was deemed improper to assign the general principles, submitted by my colleague, in a preamble, yet I trust they will be unfolded, and explained in the course of argument, and their superiority over those just agreed to, demonstrated. But waving this enquiry for the present, I call upon gentlemen to shew, how the principles agreed to apply to the subsequent resolution.
I hope, if the seat of government is to be at, or near the centre of wealth, population, and extent of territory, that gentlemen will shew that the permanent seat there proposed, is near the permanent centre of wealth, population, and extent of territory, and the temporary seat, near the temporary centre. I think we may, with good reason, call upon gentlemen for an explanation on these points, in order that we may know the ground on which the great question is decided; and be able to assign to our constituents satisfactory reasons, for what some of them may consider a sacrifice of their interest, and be instrumental in reconciling them, as far as possible, to their destiny.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 342–43 (also reported fully in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 5 Sept. 1789, and Gazette of the U.S., 12 Sept. 1789).

[3 September 1789]
Mr. Madison Meant to pay due attention to every argument that could be urged on this important question. Facts had been asserted, the impressions of which he wished to be erased, if they were not well founded. It has been said, that the communication with the Western Territory, by the Susquehanna, is more convenient than by the Potowmack. I apprehend this is not the case; and the propriety of our decision will depend, in a great measure, on the superior advantages of one of these two streams. It is agreed, on all hands, that we ought to have some regard to the convenience of the Atlantic navigation. Now, to embrace this object, a position must be taken on some navigable river; to favor the communication with the Western Territory, its arms ought likewise to extend themselves towards that region. I did not suppose it would have been necessary to bring forward charts and maps, as has been done by others, to shew the committee the comparative situation of those rivers. I flattered myself it was sufficiently understood, to enable us to decide the question of superiority; but I am now inclined to believe, that gentlemen have embraced an error, and I hope they are not determined to vote under improper impressions. I venture to pledge myself for the demonstration, that the communication with the Western Territory, by the Potowmack is more certain and convenient than the other. And, if the question is as important as it is admitted to be, gentlemen will not shut their ears to information; they will not precipitate the decision; or if they regard the satisfaction of our constituents, they will allow them to be informed of all the facts and arguments that lead to the decision of a question, in which the general, and particular interests of all parts of the union are involved.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 351–52.

[3 September 1789]

   Laurance replied to charges that the northern members had combined to support “their partial interests.” He recalled that “in the debate upon the tonnage bill, a gentleman from Virginia observed, that could the moderate and equal policy of that day’s proceeding, have been foreseen in the convention of Virginia, many objections that were there produced against the constitution, would have been thereby obviated.”

Mr. Madison. I acknowledge, that on a former day, I made the observation alluded to, with singular complacency. I said, I had found a moderation and liberality prevailing here, which I sincerely believed, if foreseen in the convention of Virginia, would have obviated a very powerful objection to the adoption of the federal constitution. But, give me leave now to say, that if a prophet had risen in that body, and brought the declarations and proceedings of this day into their view, that I as firmly believe, Virginia might not have been a part of the union at this moment.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 360 (also reported in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 7 Sept. 1789, and Gazette of the U.S., 12 Sept. 1789). The Daily Advertiser gave a misleading report of the exchange between Laurance and JM. Editor Francis Childs later issued a clarification (Coxe to JM, 9 Sept. 1789 and n. 1).

[3 September 1789]

   Sedgwick took exception to JM’s preceding remarks.

Mr. Madison. When I alluded to the proceedings of this day, I contemplated the manner in which the business was conducted; and though I acknowledge that a majority ought to govern, yet they have no authority to deprive the minority of a constitutional right; they have no authority to debar us the right of free debate. An important and interesting question being under consideration, we ought to have time allowed for its discussion. Facts have been stated on one side, and members ought to be indulged on the other with an opportunity of collecting and ascertaining other facts. We have a right to bring forward all the arguments which we think can, and ought to have an influence on the decision. It is unusual, on a partial discussion, even of questions of inferior magnitude, to decide in the course of a single day. How then can gentlemen reconcile their conduct of this day, to the liberality they have heretofore shewn? This manner of proceeding would mark a genius in this body, which will contradict the expectations of its warmest friends. I hope nothing will be fixed by a hasty determination. I said before, and repeat it again, that I wish to make some observations on what has been advanced, for which at present there is not time. But, if there was, I do not wish to address a determined and silent majority. No, sir, if this be the temper of to-day, let me appeal to a more favorable temper to-morrow. If gentlemen refuse this appeal, I must submit; but I will, to the last moment, assert my right, and remonstrate against a precipitate decision.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 361 (also reported in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 7 Sept. 1789). After further contentious wrangling between northerners, who wished to bring Goodhue’s motion to a vote, and southerners, who sought a postponement, the committee agreed to rise.


Title: Location of the Capital, [4 September] 1789
From: Madison, James
To:

[4 September 1789]

   Debate continued on Goodhue’s motion to fix the permanent location of the capital on the east bank of the Susquehanna in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Madison Said, if this delay should not have produced any alteration in the sentiments of the gentlemen, it will at least soften that hard decision which seems to threaten the friends of the Potowmack. He hoped that all would concur in the great principle on which they ought to conduct, and decide this business: an equal attention to the rights of the community. No government, he said, not even the most despotic, could, beyond a certain point, violate that idea of justice, and equal right, which prevailed in the mind of the community. In republican governments, justice and equality form the basis of the system; and perhaps the structure can rest on no other that the wisdom of man can devise. In a federal republic, give me leave to say, it is even more necessary and proper, that a sacred regard should be paid to these considerations. For beyond the sense of the community at large, which has its full agency in such a system, no such government can act with safety. The federal ingredient involves local distinctions, which not only produce local jealousies, but, give at the same time, a greater local capacity to support, and insist upon equitable demands. In a confederacy of states, in which the people operate, in one respect as citizens, and in another as forming political communities, the local governments will ever possess a keener sense and capacity, to take advantages of those powers, on which the protection of local rights depend. If these great rights be the basis of republics, and if there be a double necessity of attending to them in a federal republic, it is further to be considered, that there is no one right, of which the people can judge with more ease and certainty, and of which they will judge with more jealousy, than of the establishment of the permanent seat of government; and I am persuaded, that however often this subject may be discussed in the representative body, or however the attention of the committee may be drawn to it, the observations I have made will be more and more verified. We see the operation of this sentiment fully exemplified in what has taken place in the several states. In every instance where, the seat of government has been placed in an eccentric position; we have seen the people struggling to place it where it ought to be. In some instances they have not yet succeeded, but I believe they will succeed in all. In many they have actually gained their point.
One of the first measures in the state of Virginia, after the commencement of the revolution, was the removal of the seat of government, from an eccentric position, to one which corresponds more with the sense of the state, and an equal regard to the general conveniency. In North-Carolina, we have seen the same principle operating, though in a different mode. In South-Carolina the same. In the state of Pennsylvania, powerful as the inducements are in favor of its capital, we have seen serious, and almost successful efforts already to translate it to a proper place. In the state of Delaware, where the government was as little removed from the centre, as it could be in any other state, we have seen the same spirit displaying itself. In the state of New-York, the same thing has happened with some fluctuations, arising from occasional motives of convenience. In Massachusetts, the same efforts have been made, and in all probability, when some temporary considerations cease, we shall find the same principle taking effect there also. It is not surprising, when we consider the nature of mankind, that this should be the case.
With respect, however, to the federal government, there is one consideration that shews, in a peculiar manner, the necessity and policy of paying a strict attention to this principle. One of the greatest objections, which have been made by the opponents of the system; which has been allowed most weight by its friends, is the extent of the United States. It has been asserted by some, and almost feared by others, that within so great a space, no free government can exist. I hope and trust, that the opinion is erroneous; but at the same time, I acknowledge it to have such a certain degree of force, that it is incumbent on those who wish well to the union, to diminish this inconvenience as much as possible. The way to diminish it, is to place the government in that spot which will be least removed from every part of the empire. Carry it to an eccentric position, and it will be equivalent to an extension of our limits. And if our limits are already extended so far as warrants, in any degree, the apprehension before mentioned, we ought to take care not to extend them farther.
The truth is, in every point of view in which we can contemplate this subject, we shall perceive its high importance. It is important, that every part of the community should have the power of sending, with equal facility, to the seat of government such representatives to take care of their interests, as they are disposed to confide in. If you place the government in an eccentric situation, the attendance of the members, and of all others who are to transact the public business, cannot be equally convenient. The members of the union, must be on an unequal footing. Thus you violate the principle of equality, where it ought most carefully to be ascertained, and wound the feelings of the component parts of the community, which can be least injured with impunity. If we consider the expence, that is an inconvenience not without its weight. In the compensations that have been lately voted, the eccentricity of our position has had a manifest influence. The more remote the government is, the greater will be the necessity of making liberal compensations, and holding out powerful inducements, in order to obtain the services of fit characters, from every part of the union; and as you can make no distinction, you must give to those who make the fewest sacrifices, the same as to those who make the most.
The seat of government is of great importance; if you consider the diffusion of wealth, that proceeds from this source. I presume that the expenditures which will take place, where the government will be established, by them who are immediately concerned in its administration, and by others who may resort to it, will not be less than a half a million of dollars a year. It is to be regretted, that those who may be most convenient to the centre, should enjoy this advantage in a higher degree than others; but the inequality is an evil imposed by necessity; we diminish it as we place the source from which those emanations of wealth are to proceed, as near the centre as possible.
If we consider, sir, the effects of legislative power on the aggregate community, we must feel equal inducements to look for the centre, in order to find the proper seat of government. Those who are most adjacent to the seat of legislation, will always possess advantages over others. An earlier knowledge of the laws; a greater influence in enacting them; better opportunities for anticipating them, and a thousand other circumstances, will give a superiority to those who are thus situated. If it were possible to promulge our laws, by some instantaneous operation, it would be of less consequence in that point of view where the government might be placed; but if, on the contrary, time is necessary for this purpose, we ought, as far as possible, to put every part of the community on a level.
If we consider the influence of the government in its executive department, there is no less reason to conclude, that it ought to be placed in the centre of the union. It ought to be in a situation to command information relative to every part of the union, to watch every conjuncture, to seize every circumstance that can be improved. The executive eye ought to be placed where it can best see the dangers which may threaten, and the executive arm, whence it may be extended most effectually to the protection of every part. Perhaps it is peculiarly necessary, that in looking for this position, we should keep our eye as much as possible towards our western borders; for a long time dangers will be most apt to assail that quarter of the union.
In the judiciary department, if it is not equally necessary, it is highly important that the government should be equally accessible to all.
Why should the citizens of one quarter of the union be subject to greater difficulties than others? Why should they be obliged to travel farther, to carry their witnesses at a greater expence, and be more subject to all the inconveniencies attending the administration of justice at a remote distance? In short, whether we consider the subject with regard to the executive, the legislative, or the judicial departments, we see the soundest reasons for fixing the government in that place, which may be the most permanent centre of territory and population.
With respect to the Western Territory, we are not to expect it, for it would be an affront to the understanding of our fellow citizens on the western waters, that they will be united with their Atlantic brethren, on any other principle than that of equality and justice. He would venture to say, that it was essentially necessary, therefore, that we should deal out the blessings of government with an impartial hand; and that, in placing the government from which these blessings are to flow, we should retire from the Atlantic as far as is consistent, and approach towards that point which will best accommodate the western country; in doing this, we shall still stop short of that geographical centre, whose circle would most commodiously embrace our ultramontane fellow-citizens. In his opinion, he said, the desire manifested by them, on this subject, was as reasonable as possible; they do not expect that we should lose sight of a proper and easy communication with the Atlantic, and will acquiesce, with cheerfulness, in a position necessary for that purpose, though it would still leave them subject to peculiar inconveniences. From the Atlantic to the Mississippi, according to the best computation, the distance is not less than 750 miles: If we go to that part of the Potowmack which is proposed, we carry the government 250 miles only west, it will still be 500 miles from the Mississippi.
He was sure, that if justice required us to take any one position in preference to another, we had every inducement, both of interest and of prudence, to fix on the Potowmack, as most satisfactory to our western brethren. It is impossible to reflect a moment on the possible severance of that branch of the union, without seeing the mischiefs which such an event must create. The area of the United States, divided into two equal parts, will leave, perhaps, one half on the west side of the Allegany mountains: From the fertility of soil, the fineness of climate, and every thing that can favor a growing population, we may suppose the settlement will go on with every degree of rapidity which our imagination can conceive. If the calculation be just, that we double in twenty-five years, we shall speedily behold an astonishing mass of people on the western waters. Whether this great mass shall form a permanent part of the confederacy, or whether it shall be separated into an alien, a jealous and a hostile people, may depend on the system of measures that is shortly to be taken. The difference, he observed, between considering them in the light of fellow-citizens, bound to us by a common affection, obeying common laws, pursuing a common good, and considering them in the other light, presents one of the most interesting questions that can occupy an American mind: Instead of peace and friendship, we shall have rivalship and enmity; instead of being a great people, invulnerable on all sides, and without the necessity of those military establishments which other nations require, we shall be driven into the same expensive and dangerous means of defence: We shall be obliged to lay burthens on the people, to support establishments which, sooner or later, may prove fatal to their liberties. It is incumbent on us, he said, if we wished to act the part of magnanimous legislators, or patriotic citizens, to consider well, when we are about to take a step of such vast importance, that it be directed by the views he had described; we must consider what is just, what is equal, and what is satisfactory.
It may be asked, why it was necessary to urge these principles, since they would not be denied? He apprehended, that in general, there would be a disagreement as to the principles which ought to govern: But, at the same time, principles were so connected with facts, in the present case, that it was not more necessary to collect all the light, than to fortify all the impressions that might be favorable to a just decision.
On a candid view of the two rivers, he flattered himself, that the seat, which would most correspond with the public interest, would be found on the banks of the Potowmack. It was proper that we should have some regard to the centre of territory; if that was to have weight, he begged leave to say, that there was no comparison between the two rivers. He defied any gentleman to cast his eye, in the most cursory manner, over a map, and say, that the Potowmack is not much nearer this centre than any part of the Susquehanna. If we measure from the banks of the Potowmack to the most eastern parts of the United States, it is less distant than to the most southern. If we measure this great area diagonally, the Potowmack will still have the advantage: If you draw a line perpendicular, to the direction of the Atlantic coast, we shall find that it will run more equally through the Potowmack than through any other part of the union; or, if there be any difference between one side and the other, there will be a greater space on the southwest than on the north-east: All the maps of the United States shew the truth of this. From the Atlantic coast to that line which separates the British possessions from the United States, the average distance is not more than 150 miles: If you take the average breadth of the other great division of the United States, it will be found to be six, seven, and eight hundred miles.
From this view of the subject, which is not easy to describe by words, but which will strike every eye that looks on a map, I am sure, that if the Potowmack is not the geographical centre, it is because the Susquehanna is less so.
He acknowledged that regard was also to be paid to the centre of population. But where shall we find this centre? He knew of no rule by which to be governed, except the proportion among the representatives of the different states; and he believed, if that criterion was taken, the present centre of population would be found somewhere in Pennsylvania, and not far from the Susquehanna. He granted that the present centre of population is nearer the Susquehanna than the Potowmack. But are we chusing a seat of government for the present moment only? He presumed not, we must look forward to those probable changes that may soon take place. He appealed to the judgment of every gentleman, if they had not reason to suppose, that these future changes, in the population of this country, would be particularly favorable to that part which lies south of the Potowmack. On what do the measures and extent of population depend? They depend on the climate, on the soil, and the vacancy to be filled. We find that population, like money, seeks those places where it least abounds, and has always the same tendency to equalize itself. We see the people moving from the more crouded to the less crouded parts. The swarms do not come from the southern, but from the northern and eastern hives. This will continue to be the case, until every part of America receives its due share of population. If there be any event, on which we may calculate with certainty, I take it that the centre of population will continually advance in a south-western direction. It must then travel from the Susquehanna; if it is now found there, it may even extend beyond the Potowmack. But the time would be long first, and as the Potowmack is the great highway of communication between the Atlantic and the western country, attempts to remove the seat farther south must be improbable. I have said that the communication with the Western Territory is more commodious through the Potowmack than through the Susquehanna; I wish all the facts connected with this subject could have been more fully ascertained, and more fully stated; but if we consider the facts that have been offered, by gentlemen who have spoken on the subject, we must conclude, that the communication through the Potowmack would be more facile and effectual than through any other channel. If we consider what was related by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Scott) whose judgment is the more to be relied on, as it is founded on his personal knowledge of that country. He tells you, that the communication by water, either to or from the western country, is next to impracticable by the Susquehanna.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 365–72 (also reported fully in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 7–8 Sept. 1789, and Gazette of the U.S., 16 Sept. 1789 [taken from Daily Advertiser]).

   Here and elsewhere on 4 Sept., JM spoke of a “proposed” site on the Potomac, but his recorded remarks suggest only the approximate location he had in mind. He noted, for example, that the Potomac spot “is almost as much farther to the west, as it is distant from the proposed spot on the Susquehanna.” The place mentioned on the Susquehanna was Wright’s Ferry (Columbia, Pennsylvania), ten miles west of Lancaster. The contemplated Potomac site was thus nearly at the same latitude as Wright’s Ferry, and no more than “a degree and five or six minutes” south of the latitude of New York City (4 Sept. 1789, second speech). A Potomac location that met these conditions obviously lay far to the northwest of Georgetown, the ultimate location of the federal capital. JM may have been thinking of the spot where Conococheague Creek empties into the Potomac at Williamsport, Maryland, which represented the western limit of the district defined in the Residence Act of 1790; or perhaps he looked even farther west, to the vicinity of Hancock, Maryland, where the boundaries of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania met (Boyd, Papers of JeffersonJulian P. Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of
          Thomas Jefferson (19 vols. to date; Princeton, 1950—)., XIX, 3–20).

   For a different opinion, see Coxe to JM, 20 Sept. 1789.

[4 September 1789]

   Clymer interjected that the Juniata River, a tributary of the Susquehanna, offered a practicable means of linking the Susquehanna with the western territory.

Mr. Madison Proceeded, and said he wished every fact to be ascertained that could throw any light upon the subject. Taking the Susquehanna, as it was, practicable for navigation, it would be found, that through that route of communication, Fort-Pitt would be four or five hundred miles from the proposed seat on its banks, and that the distance by land, was not less than 250 miles; whereas, through the Potowmack, the distance from the proposed spot on its banks to Fort-Pitt, was not calculated at more than 250 miles, and he believed the distance, by land, would be found not to exceed 160 or 170 miles.
Whether we measure the distance by land or water, then, the result is in favor of the Potowmack. If we consider the progress already made in opening this great channel, its title becomes still stronger. Let me add, that it has been found, on accurate research, that the waters communicating with the Ohio are not more than two or three miles distant from the sources of the Potowmack. This is a fact of peculiar importance.
It has been said, that if congress should make choice of the Potowmack, greater discontents would arise than if they should prefer the Susquehanna: I know not the data from which this opinion is drawn. Who will have the greatest right to complain? Will it be those who might be gratified if the government should be fixed on the Susquehannah? I believe not. The truth is, that if the place which is now short of the geographical centre, be short also of the centre of population, as it will be in a reasonable time, we have reason to conclude, that the southern inhabitants will feel themselves most aggrieved. I do not hesitate to declare, that if the seat of government should be fixed on the Susquehanna, every part south of that river, and every part of the United States south of the Ohio, will conceive that the great principles of equal justice have been disregarded. If we are to consider the subject, in that point of view, I am certain it is most expedient that we should give the preference to the Potowmack. This is not all; if you establish the government on the Potowmack, those who think themselves not equally dealt by, will find the cause of their discontent continually subsiding, because the centre of population will be continually approaching to the geographical centre. If, on the other hand, you fix the seat in a place which is perpetually eccentric with respect to territory, the centre of population will continually recede, and cause of discontent continually increase.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, yesterday, raised great objections against the Potowmack, because it was, as he supposed, subject to periodical maladies, from which the other river was free. I am not authorised, from personal experience, or very particular information, to draw a comparison between them; but there are some general facts that may serve to shew, that if there is any difference, it is more likely to be in favor of the Potowmack than of the Susquehanna. The position contemplated on the banks of the former, is considerably farther from tide-water than the place proposed on the latter. On this account, therefore, we have little reason to suppose that the Potowmack is more unhealthy. If we regard their comparative situation, westwardly, the spot on the Potowmack is almost as much farther to the west, as it is distant from the proposed spot on the Susquehanna; and he well knew that, generally speaking, as we retire towards the western and upper country, we are generally removed from the causes of those diseases to which southern situations are exposed. As the two places are moreover in the same latitude, the objection advanced, with respect to that point, cannot apply to one more than the other. It is only their western or eastern position, their remoteness from, or their proximity to the lower country, and to fresh or stagnated waters, that can possibly affect the question. It is not because we advance so much to the south that we advance to the centre, it is because we go more to the west. I do not know that there is a difference of more than a degree and five or six minutes between the latitude of New-York and the place proposed on the Potowmack.
I will not at present go farther into this argument. I flatter myself, that the considerations already stated, will have their proper weight; and if they should be controverted, that we shall be able further to support and inculcate them.

   Cong. RegisterThomas Lloyd, comp., The Congressional
          Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates of the First House of
          Representatives … (2 vols.; New York, 1789; Evans 22203–4)., II, 373–75 (also reported fully in N.Y. Daily Advertiser, 8 Sept. 1789, and Gazette of the U.S., 16 Sept. 1789 [taken from Daily Advertiser]). The Daily Advertiser combined JM’s second speech with the first. A motion to substitute “Potomac” for “Susquehanna” was defeated. JM’s motion to add “or Potomac” after “Susquehanna” was also unsuccessful. Goodhue’s motion then passed. After a series of roll call votes on 7 Sept., the House ordered a bill to be drawn up providing for the permanent location of the capital on the banks of the Susquehanna, with the temporary location at New York City.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 6 September 1789
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris September 6. 1789.
I sit down to write to you without knowing by what occasion I shall send my letter. I do it because a subject comes into my head which I would wish to develope a little more than is practicable in the hurry of the moment of making up general dispatches.
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of every government. The course of reflection in which we are immersed here on the elementary principles of society has presented this question to my mind; & that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof. I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’: that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, & reverts to the society. If the society has formed no rules for the appropriation of it’s lands in severalty, it will be taken by the first occupants. These will generally be the wife & children of the decedent. If they have formed rules of appropriation, those rules may give it to the wife and children, or to some one of them, or to the legatee of the deceased. So they may give it to his creditor. But the child, the legatee, or creditor takes it, not by any natural right, but by a law of the society of which they are members, & to which they are subject. Then no man can, by natural right, oblige the lands he occupied, or the persons who succeed him in that occupation, to the paiment of debts contracted by him. For if he could, he might, during his own life, eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, & then the lands would belong to the dead, & not to the living, which would be the reverse of our principle.
What is true of every member of the society individually, is true of them all collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of the individuals. To keep our ideas clear when applying them to a multitude, let us suppose a whole generation of men to be born on the same day, to attain mature age on the same day, & to die on the same day, leaving a succeeding generation in the moment of attaining their mature age all together. Let the ripe age be supposed of 21. years, & their period of life 34. years more, that being the average term given by the bills of mortality to persons who have already attained 21. years of age. Each successive generation would, in this way, come on, and go off the stage at a fixed moment, as individuals do now. Then I say the earth belongs to each of these generations, during it’s course, fully, and in their own right. The 2d. generation receives it clear of the debts & incumbrances of the 1st. the 3d of the 2d. & so on. For if the 1st. could charge it with a debt, then the earth would belong to the dead & not the living generation. Then no generation can contract debts greater than may be paid during the course of it’s own existence. At 21. years of age they may bind themselves & their lands for 34. years to come: at 22. for 33: at 23. for 32. and at 54. for one year only; because these are the terms of life which remain to them at those respective epochs. But a material difference must be noted between the succession of an individual, & that of a whole generation. Individuals are parts only of a society, subject to the laws of the whole. These laws may appropriate the portion of land occupied by a decedent to his creditor rather than to any other, or to his child on condition he satisfies the creditor. But when a whole generation, that is, the whole society dies, as in the case we have supposed, and another generation or society succeeds, this forms a whole, and there is no superior who can give their territory to a third society, who may have lent money to their predecessors beyond their faculties of paying.
What is true of a generation all arriving to self-government on the same day, & dying all on the same day, is true of those in a constant course of decay & renewal, with this only difference. A generation coming in & going out entire, as in the first case, would have a right in the 1st. year of their self-dominion to contract a debt for 33. years, in the 10th. for 24. in the 20th. for 14. in the 30th. for 4. whereas generations, changing daily by daily deaths & births, have one constant term, beginning at the date of their contract, and ending when a majority of those of full age at that date shall be dead. The length of that term may be estimated from the tables of mortality, corrected by the circumstances of climate, occupation &c. peculiar to the country of the contractors. Take, for instance, the table of M. de Buffon wherein he states 23,994 deaths, & the ages at which they happened. Suppose a society in which 23,994 persons are born every year, & live to the ages stated in this table. The conditions of that society will be as follows. 1st. It will consist constantly of 617,703. persons of all ages. 2ly. Of those living at any one instant of time, one half will be dead in 24. years 8. months. 3dly. 10,675 will arrive every year at the age of 21. years complete. 4ly. It will constantly have 348,417 persons of all ages above 21. years. 5ly. And the half of those of 21. years & upwards living at any one instant of time will be dead in 18. years 8. months, or say 19. years as the nearest integral number. Then 19. years is the term beyond which neither the representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can validly extend a debt.
To render this conclusion palpaple by example, suppose that Louis XIV. and XV. had contracted debts in the name of the French nation to the amount of 10,000 milliards of livres, & that the whole had been contracted in Genoa. The interest of this sum would be 500. milliards, which is said to be the whole rent roll or nett proceeds of the territory of France. Must the present generation of men have retired from the territory in which nature produced them, & ceded it to the Genoese creditors? No. They have the same rights over the soil on which they were produced, as the preceding generations had. They derive these rights not from their predecessors, but from nature. They then and their soil are by nature clear of the debts of their predecessors.
Again suppose Louis XV. & his cotemporary generation had said to the money-lenders of Genoa, give us money that we may eat, drink, & be merry in our day; and on condition you will demand no interest till the end of 19. years you shall then for ever after receive an annual interest of

   100 £, at a compound interest of 5. per cent, makes, at the end of 19. years, an aggregate of principal & interest of £252–14, the interest of which is 12 £–12s–7d. which is nearly 12⅝ per cent on the first capital of 100. £.

12⅝ per cent. The money is lent on these conditions, is divided among the living, eaten, drank, & squandered. Would the present generation be obliged to apply the produce of the earth & of their labour to replace their dissipations? Not at all.
I suppose that the recieved opinion, that the public debts of one generation devolve on the next, has been suggested by our seeing habitually in private life that he who succeeds to lands is required to pay the debts of his ancestor or testator: without considering that this requisition is municipal only, not moral; flowing from the will of the society, which has found it convenient to appropriate lands, become vacant by the death of their occupant, on the condition of a paiment of his debts: but that between society & society, or generation & generation, there is no municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature. We seem not to have percieved that, by the law of nature, one generation is to another as one independant nation to another.
The interest of the national debt of France being in fact but a two thousandth part of it’s rent roll, the paiment of it is practicable enough: & so becomes a question merely of honor, or of expediency. But with respect to future debts, would it not be wise & just for that nation to declare, in the constitution they are forming, that neither the legislature, nor the nation itself, can validly contract more debt than they may pay within their own age, or within the term of 19. years? and that all future contracts will be deemed void as to what shall remain unpaid at the end of 19. years from their date? This would put the lenders, & the borrowers also, on their guard. By reducing too the faculty of borrowing within it’s natural limits, it would bridle the spirit of war, to which too free a course has been procured by the inattention of money-lenders to this law of nature, that succeeding generations are not responsible for the preceding.
On similar ground it may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, & what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their own persons, & consequently may govern them as they please. But persons & property make the sum of the objects of government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course, with those who gave them being. This could preserve that being till it ceased to be itself, & no longer. Every constitution then, & every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, & not of right. It may be said that the succeeding generation exercising in fact the power of repeal, this leaves them as free as if the constitution or law had been expressly limited to 19 years only. In the first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing an equivalent. But the power of repeal is not an equivalent. It might be indeed if every form of government were so perfectly contrived that the will of the majority could always be obtained fairly & without impediment. But this is true of no form. The people cannot assemble themselves. Their representation is unequal & vicious. Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them astray from the general interests of their constituents: and other impediments arise so as to prove to every practical man that a law of limited duration is much more manageable than one which needs a repeal.
This principle that the earth belongs to the living, & not to the dead, is of very extensive application & consequences, in every country, and most especially in France. It enters into the resolution of the questions Whether the nation may change the descent of lands holden in tail? Whether they may change the appropriation of lands given antiently to the church, to hospitals, colleges, orders of chivalry, & otherwise in perpetuity? Whether they may abolish the charges & privileges attached on lands, including the whole catalogue ecclesiastical & feudal? It goes to hereditary offices, authorities & jurisdictions; to hereditary orders, distinctions & appellations; to perpetual monopolies in commerce, the arts & sciences; with a long train of et ceteras: and it renders the question of reimbursement a question of generosity & not of right. In all these cases, the legislature of the day could authorize such appropriations & establishments for their own time, but no longer; & the present holders, even where they, or their ancestors, have purchased, are in the case of bonâ fide purchasers of what the seller had no right to convey.
Turn this subject in your mind, my dear Sir, & particularly as to the power of contracting debts; & develope it with that perspicuity & cogent logic so peculiarly yours. Your station in the councils of our country gives you an opportunity of producing it to public consideration, of forcing it into discussion. At first blush it may be rallied, as a theoretical speculation: but examination will prove it to be solid & salutary. It would furnish matter for a fine preamble to our first law for appropriating the public revenue; & it will exclude at the threshold of our government the contagious & ruinous errors of this quarter of the globe, which have armed despots with means, not sanctioned by nature, for binding in chains their fellow men. We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay. I should be pleased to see this second obstacle held out by us also in the first instance. No nation can make a declaration against the validity of long-contracted debts so disinterestedly as we, since we do not owe a shilling which may not be paid with ease, principal & interest, within the time of our own lives. Establish the principle also in the new law to be passed for protecting copyrights & new inventions, by securing the exclusive right for 19. instead of 14. years. Besides familiarising us to this term, it will be an instance the more of our taking reason for our guide, instead of English precedent, the habit of which fetters us with all the political heresies of a nation equally remarkeable for it’s early excitement from some errors, and long slumbering under others.
I write you no news, because, when an occasion occurs, I shall write a separate letter for that. I am always with great & sincere esteem, dear Sir Your affectionate friend & servt
Th: Jefferson


Title: To James Madison from Henry Lee, 8 September 1789
From: Lee, Henry
To: Madison, James

My dear sir.
Berkeley. 8h. Sepr. 89
The last ler. I got from you shewed the little leisure you possessed, & together with other considerations induced me to decline for a time writing to you.
Indeed occupied with matters of a private nature only, I am out of the habit of communication as well as conversation with political affairs. In my tour in the upper country for Mrs Lee[’]s health, I have as much as in my power attended to the progress of the potomac company in the important object which associated them. To their credit it must be acknowledged that the undertaking is among the most useful which could have occupied the human mind, and it is to be lamented that their strength of purse is not correspondent to the enterprize. Yet such has been the wise and persevering exertions of the President & directors, that the navigation of the river from fort cumberland to the great falls will be generally used in the transportation of the present crop to market. In Shepherds town I saw the other day four boats just completed the property of one merchant, which will in one trip convey three hundred barrels of flower. Every where above boats are building, the owners of some of which contemplate employment not only in the carriage of our produce to market but also in the transportation of European manufactures to the western settlements.
Strange it is with what rapidity the idea of connecting the atlantic country with the west by means of this navigation has seized the minds of all orders. Nor is it to be wondered at, when the subject is fully enquired into.
The views of thousands are pointed to establishments over the mountains for the support of numerous familys. The great objection to characters of reflexion & weight, to the execution of these views has been hitherto, the apprehension, that the country of their choice was by nature severed from the country of their birth. The discovery recently & universally received that the east & the west may & ought to continue members of the same govt. has done away this bar to emigration, & men respectable in character family & fortune begin to leave us in every quarter—they go now with the persuasion that we shall continue long to be one people & that the potomack river will strengthen our connexion by the easy exchange it affords of those things mutually wanted.
But I beleive their reasoning on this subject presumes that the national policy will lend its aid to the accomplishment of this happy event. They consider the fixture of the imperial city on the northern banks of the potomac indubitable. Suggestions to the contrary fill every mind with passions indicative of disagreeable consequence to our peace unity & harmony. What the event might do I cannot say, perhaps the moderation peculiar to american character would soon get the better of early disgust. But in the present unsettled state of the fœderal govt. danger is to be apprehended from a decision of the question concerning the permanent seat. Better would it be in my mind to wait a little longer, let the influence & good of the new constitution be felt among the people & let the edge of opposition be blunted. No injury can result from delay, & much mischeif may be done by precipitation. Indeed the public mind ought to be gradually prepared for the event & if possible should go hand in hand with the measure, otherwise discontent & great discontent will ensue, decide as you may.
It is not conceivable to you at a distance, how the inhabitants of the So. potomac country feel on this subject.
I am told their brethren on the north side are if possible more impressed with hopes & fears. Together they form a most respectable body & I really beleive are the most wealthy set of husbandmen in proportion to the extent of country within these States. They inhabit a region as delightful & as fertile as bounteous heaven ever gave to man. They enjoy the highest health and are hardy in war & industr[i]ous in peace. My thoughts have taken this turn on hearing yesterday that Mr. White was summond to Congress from a presumption the seat of govt. would be fixed. If precip[i]tation or evident trick should be connected with the decision, clamor & mischeif will proportionately encrease. Carlisle is the most suitable spot in Pensylvania for the interest of potomac, if hard necessity should force you to fix in that state.
How happens it that your house should determine to rise on the 22—much important business, essential indeed, not done & yet this question so full of thorns, so inopportunely introduced—Many gentlemen from the south too absent, & the union not completed. What will No. Carolina say, the very moment she is about to unite, a matter of the highest consequence is unseasonably determined, for if you rise agreable to your vote, the decision must be not only unseasonable but hasty & puerile. Already has the hopes of some of the best friends to govt. abated, pray be careful how you add to the causes of disgust. Farewel. Yours truely & affy
Henry Lee
I send this ler. to Frederic town, when to [sic] may reach you I dont know—have you heard from Mr. Jefferson.


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, [ca. 8 September] 1789
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

[ca. 8 September 1789]
Confidential
The points which at present occur to me, and on which I wish your aid, are brought to view in the enclosed statement—I give you the trouble of receiving this evening that you may (if other matter do not interfere) suffer them to run through your Mind between this and tomorrow afternoon when I shall expect to see you at the appointed time.
Besides the enclosed
Would it do now that Mr Barton has declined the Judges Seat (western Territory) to nominate Col Carrington for that Office? If not, can you think of any other that would suit him, of new creation—by this I mean, which has not an actual occupant or one who from similarity of Office may have better pretensions to it.
Can you bring to mind any fit character for the vacancy just mentioned (west of New Jersey). As Virga. has given & may furnish characters for important Offices probably it would be better to exclude her also on this occasion.
What sort of a character in point of respectability and fitness for this Office has Majr. Turner late of So. Carolina now of Philadelphia.
Have you any knowledge of the character of Mr. Laurence?—a practising Attorney and Son in law to General St. Clair.
What can I do with A—— L—— he has applied to be nominated one of the Associate Judges—but I cannot bring my mind to adopt the request. The opinion entertained of him by those with whom I am most conversant is unpropitious and yet few men have received more marks of public favor & confidence than he has. These contradictions are embarrassing.
Should the sense of the Senate be taken on the propriety of sending public characters abroad—say, to England, Holland & Portugal—and of a day for thanksgiving.
Would it be well to advise with them before the adjournment, on the expediency and justice of demanding a surrender of our Posts?
Being clearly of opinion that there ought to be a difference in the wages of the members of the two branches of the Legislature would it be politic or prudent in the President when the Bill comes to him to send it back with his reasons for non-concurring. Yrs. sincer[e]ly
G Washington