Title: Excise, [6 January] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[6 January 1791]

   The bill levying additional duties on imported spirits and an excise on domestic spirits was presented on 29 December and taken up on 5 January. After Jackson’s unsuccessful attempt to strike out the first section, the Committee of the Whole proceeded through the eleventh section. On 6 January the twelfth section, levying a duty on domestic rum distilled from foreign materials, came under consideration. Parker moved to strike it out, preferring an additional duty on molasses to an excise (Dunlap’s Am. Daily Advertiser, 13 and 14 Jan. 1791).

Mr. Madison acknowledged, that he felt the force of these objections urged against excises, as a mode of taxation to be adopted by the free government of America. He conceived taxes of all kinds to be evils in themselves, and that they were no otherwise admissible, than in order to avoid still greater evils. But of all the various kinds of taxes, he admitted the excise to be the most disagreeable; yet at the same time, he must say, that of the excise, that particular branch which related to ardent spirit was in itself the most proper; most likely to be productive, and least inconsistent with the spirit and disposition of the people of America. Now the question to be considered is, whether it is necessary in order punctually to perform the engagements this government has entered into, that a given sum over and above what is already provided for, be raised or not? The evidence adduced before the house by the Secretary of the Treasury, obliged him to admit that a further sum was necessary. This leads to a second question, in what form, by what fund, can this be best provided. We have in the opinion of many gentlemen, entirely exhausted the means of the impost; additional duties cannot be laid to any considerable degree, without risking the entire loss of that productive branch of the revenue. We are then reduced to the alternative, and must either make our election of direct taxes, or excises. Although there may be other subjects that do not come under these heads, yet they have not been brought before the committee; and if they were to be mentioned, they would not be less disrelished than those proposed in the bill. It may be recollected, that I early intimated, that if my judgment alone was to guide me, I should prefer direct taxation to that of excise. But I am sensible, that it is averse to the general spirit and sentiments of the people of the United States. So far as the same can be collected, as well as contrary to the prevailing idea of the majority of this body, and I am persuaded the attempt to carry such a measure would be a mere waste of time. Under this impression I shall forbear it; and because it may be a question, whether the general government can at this time constitutionally impose a direct tax, or whether they are not bound to wait until the census shall be completed? Though I am not satisfied, that an expedient could not be devised for getting over this embarrassment, yet I believe it would be difficult. If then we are not to attempt additional duties on imposts, if the public voice as well as contingent circumstances, renders an immediate application to direct taxation improper, if not impracticable, I see nothing left us but the plan of the excise: and as no branch of the excise is less exceptionable to the generality of the people, as well as to my own mind, I cannot, while I believe there is an urgent necessity for raising additional revenue, agree to strike out a clause which appeared to be the necessary conveyance of the measure already agreed to. If additional revenue is to be raised on spirits imported, it follows of course, and is dictated by sound policy, that we extend the duty to spirits distilled in the United States from articles of foreign materials. If this should not be done, the consumer of ardent spirit manufactured in the country would evade the duty, and shrink from under the burthen which others bear: beside the revenue itself must fail, because the duty laid on imported spirits, will operate as a bounty upon those manufactured here, which will tend to improve its quality, and increase its rivalry of foreign rum, if, as may be expected, it should be used in place of West India spirit, less of the other will consequently be imported.
An excise system is rendered particularly disagreeable, by the extensive powers given to the officers employed in the collection. On this account it is sometimes dangerous to civil liberty. But great caution has been observed in avoiding that obnoxious part: every check is intended to be placed on the officer, and if after all, he shall act improperly, he shall be liable to punishment. This is not the case in that country from which we separated. And the omission, is one great reason why the system is so much disrelished in that kingdom. As I said before, I would not agree to it here, if any other scheme could be adopted with propriety, for raising the necessary revenue. But the gentleman has deemed that it is necessary: there is not much occasion to differ, on this point it depends on matter of fact, and can be ascertained. I hope before the question is finally decided, that we shall be fully informed on this head. And if it is found, that money must be raised, I presume we shall not part with this part of the bill, until something is offered and considered for a substitute: for although an excise scheme cannot be freed from objections, yet it may be rendered as a necessary evil, to which we shall be compelled to submit, in order to avoid a greater.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 10 January 1791
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Th: J. to J. M.
Jan. 10. 1791.
Will you be so good as to let me know how much I am in your debt for travelling expences & the horse. My monstrous bill of freight rendered the question useless till now. I send you a moment’s amusement at my expence in the Connecticut paper. I suppose it is from some schoolmaster who does not like that the mysteries of his art should become useless.


Title: From James Madison to Edward Carrington, ca. 10 January 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Carrington, Edward

Letter not found. 10 January 1791. Acknowledged in Carrington to JM, 2 Feb. 1791. Encloses Attorney General Randolph’s report on the judiciary.


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 15 January 1791
From: Pendleton, Edmund
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 15 January 1791. Acknowledged in JM to Pendleton, 13 Feb. 1791. The list probably kept by Peter Force (DLC: Madison Miscellany) notes that the letter consisted of three pages and calendars it as follows: “British debts. The Bank system. The Judiciary. Direct taxes. Impost. Disposal of the Public Lands. The public debt. The Militia bill. Meeting ⟨of?⟩ debtors to British subjects.”


Title: From James Madison to James Madison, Sr., 23 January 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, James, Sr.

Hond. Sir
Philada. Jany. 23. 1791.
Since my last to my brother A. I have recd. no letter from Orange, altho yours & his both, preceding left me particularly anxious to know the event of the Influ[e]nza attack on my Mothers health.
The peace between G. B. & Spain has been fully authenticated. The English accts. give a sad picture of affairs in France, but there are more direct accts. which are more favorable.
The H. of Reps. has been long employed on the Excise Bill. It is much opposed within & without doors. I think however it will pass, as less offensive than a direct tax which seems to be the alternative. What reception will it meet with in your quarter? Stills will be taxed, but the owner will have the option of returning & paying for the quantity of spirits actually distilled.
The Kentucky Bill has come down from the Senate & will probably go thro the H. of Reps. without difficulty. The Bank is also come from the Senate, but will not go thro’ if at all, without opposition. The Militia & Western Land Bills, wait for the conclusion of the Excise bill.
Let Mr. W. Webb know that I have recd. his papers from Col. Monroe, & have drawn & presented a petition for him. The fate of it is uncertain & probably will not be known for a considerable time. Yr. affecte. Son
Js. Madison
What is the no. of inhabitants in Orange—& What the State & prospect of the Census in general.


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Howell, 24 January 1791
From: Howell, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Office of late Army Account⟨s⟩ Philada. Jany 24 1791.
Sir

The Certificate alluded to in the letters herewith returned is not to be found in this Office. It either never was lodged by Mr Dunscomb or in the late movement from New York has been misplaced. The Certificate, I conceive, cannot be of material use to Capt Spotswood in his application for Commutation for with or without it must prove fruitless on a[ccoun]t of his receiving a pension from the U. S.
J Howell


Title: To James Madison from Tench Coxe, 25 January 1791
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Jany 25th. [1791]
In pursuance of the intention I had the honor to intimate to you last week I have commenced the collection of the documents necessary to make out the various statements. On Saturday evening I sketched out a plan for the Tonnage which will exhibit all the information, I think, that can be extracted from the returns of the collectors in their present form. It is as follows—A statement of Tonne. in the form enclosed is proposed for each state, and for the district of Maine. These when completed are to be concentred twice in two forms of general return—the first exhibiting the tonnage employed by the Union in the mode in wch. the Tonnage employed by each state will be exhibited in the enclosed form—the other exhibiting the sums of the several national tonnages employed in each State in order that they may be the more easily compared. This last will be in the form of that laid before your house. A third general return may perhaps be useful, exhibiting the following facts—The Tonnage to the ports of Europe within the Baltic Do. within the Mediterranean—Do the rest of Europe—Do. the West Indies—do. Africa—do. the East Indies—Do. South America.
Should you find on examining this plan that it is defective of any exhibition that appears interesting you will do me the favor to note it on a piece of paper to be enclosed with the form when you return it. If you should have a convenient opty within a day or two with the Secy. of State I should be much obliged by his applying a quarter of an hour to inspecting the form. I am anxious that the documents should be rendered as informing as possible, which I trust will apologize for the trouble I may give. I have the honor to be with great respect & esteem your most obedt. hum. Servt.
Tench Coxe
It is proposed to vary the collectors returns in such manner as to shew further in future

What

  Emigrants
  free

  do.
  Slaves

Transient passengers

the number of
seamen

Apprentices

Officers

what Vessels arrive in balast

what with coal
}
& how much

what with Salt—

The three last are intended to aid in forming an Opinion of the ratio of inward freights, the probable benefits of foreign ships in our trade &ca.


Title: To James Madison from Charles Yancey, 27 January 1791
From: Yancey, Charles
To: Madison, James

Sir.
Louisa Jan. 27th. 1791.
You will please to excuse me for Troubling of you on a private Matter—the case is this. I am about to purchase a Tract of Valuable land And to Effect which Must part with a Quantity Of State Securities As also Those of the Domestick debt Or as we Call them final Settlements, And as our Assembly have taken some Steps that may recommend A reconsideration of the funding System of the State’s Debt I request the favour of your advice Relative to the Value at present in Phyledelphia And also your Opinion whether any alteration of the said System will take place that may give a sudden Change in the rise or fall thereof either in the Domestick or State debt. The Opinion of your Constituents As far as my Information reaches Is that the State Debts Are funded on Very Partial Principles with respect to my own situation In that property the Case is different from Most Certificate holders.
Being fixed On the publick Road what property I possessed Was ever exposed to the impressments of the publick which I neve[r] held up from them of Course my Warrants Cost me full 20/ in the Pound And having held them so long on the faith Of Goverments I am Now desirous of Carrying them to the best Market which I am told is the Residence of Congress. Pardon me for troubling of you with so tedious a history of my private Matters And request Your favour by the Stage in which You will Lay me Under Singular Obligations. I am Sir with the great esteem and Respect Your Most Humble Servant
Charles Yancey
PS. please to forward your advice by the first opportunity to Richmond.
C Y


Title: Memorandum for Thomas Jefferson, [ca. 31 January] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 31 January 1791]

At war

At Peace

G. Britain from
May
1689 to Sept.
1697
=
 8y.
4.m.
to May
1702
=
 4y.
8.m.

May
1702 to Aug.
1712
=
10.
3.
to Decr.
1718
=
 6.
4.

Decr.
1718 to June
1721
=
 2.
6
to Mar.
1727
=
 5.
8

Mar.
1727 to May
1727
=
 0.
2
to Octr.
1739
=
12.
4

Octr.
1739 to May
1748
=
 8.
7
to June
1755
=
 7.
0

June
1755 to Novr.
1762
=
 7.
5
to June
1778
=
15.
7

June
1778 to Mar.
1783
=
 4.
9
to May
1789
=
 6.
2

3. lost in broken months

42.
War

58.
peace

Altho’ these estimates are from an Underwriter it may be well to consult Mr. T. C or others, on them.
{

  During war Insurance
  between
  U. S. & G. B. may be rated
  from 12 to 20
  PerCt.

  do.
  U. S. & W. Inds.
  from 12 to 20
  do.

  During peace

  U. S. & G. B
  about 2½
  do.

  U. S. & W. Inds.
   abt. 2½
  do.

  During war increase of freight beyond that of peace from 30 to 50 PerCt.

   Champion p. 140.
The annual
value
of exports from U. S. to G. B. in British Bottoms
=
Dollars

Freight
of do. from do. in do. to Europe
=
do.

do.
of do. from do. in do. to W. Inds
=
do.

Annual value of Imports in Brit: Bottoms (see Champion p. 51)
=
do.

(See Report of Impost & the 10 PerCt. discount in favr. of Amer. Botts.)

From these data result the expence of Insurance & freight taxed by Brit: wars on the trade or rather agriculture of U. S. during their present dependence on British Bottoms
From the same may be inferred the loss which war with Spain wd. have cost the U. S. During the prospect of it insurance in some instances rose to near double the peace rate.
To the wars of the above Period, France was with little exception a party. So was Holland, excluding the war preceding the last. So in fact were the maritime nations in Genl.
Perhaps it may be easiest to make the calculation for all our trade in Foreign Bottoms, than for that in British alone: or expedient to superadd the former to the latter calculation.


Title: Notes on Banks, [ca. 1 February] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 1 February 1791]
On Banks in general & particular ones other than that of England.

The first establd. was that of Venice 1157.

Genoa Florence & other Ital: cities soon followed the example.
The bank of Venice is like that of Amsterdam for transfer only

— it is an engine of State merely
— its agio has been as high as 30 PerCt. now restrained to 20
— Its original Capital was 2,000,000 ducats wch. has been doubled
— Both before & since the capital was increased the State has made free with it, making itself security for replacing it.

The Bank of St. George at Genoa—proposed in 1345—erected 1407
— It was produced by public debt & meant as a provision for them
— The Holders of the debt had the customs assigned to them
— They had a Council consisting of 100—& 8 Govrs. for executing the business.
— They became by good managemt. very rich & granted aids to the State—for which the Cities & territories of Genoa pawned & were sold.
— The Cities pawned were govd. by the bank.
— Machiavel of opinion that by degrees the Bank wd get possession of the whole city & republic.
The first charitable bank (mons pietatis) was erected at Padua by its Bishop, lending to the poor, on pawns, at a low interest, in order to save them from Usurers—this example soon spread.
Bank of Amsterdam established in 1609

— produced by inconveniency of large payments in Silver
— it is purely a bank of deposit—the magistracy of Amsterdam being the cashiers of the inhabitants
— The credits are transferred by sealed tickets, directing the bank to carry the credit of the ower to that of the receiver
— not less than 600 Guilders, at first, nor of 300 since, transferred
— one advantage—the registry being proof of the transactions hin⟨ders?⟩ law suits
— all payments in bills of exchange made in the bank
— the burgomasters only have inspection of the bank
— 1 stiver pd to Bank for every transfer of more than 600 Guilder
— 6 stivers for leave to transfer less than 300 do—&
— 10 Guilders on first opening acct. with Bank &
— these incomes, the expence of managemt. is defrayed—the Surplus goes to the poor of City
— the agio commonly abt. 5 per Ct. owing to greater purity of coin than current money—& the demand on banks.

— in 1672. run on bank—yet it paid all calling for their money.
— Jewels &⟨c deposited as much?⟩ as money
The Bank of Rotterdam, was erected in 1635

— It is not very considerable
— Bills of exchange are paid in large money—and only ten perCt. in shilling pieces.
The Bank of Hamburg, an imitation & nearly of the same standing with that Amsterdam.

— It takes in none but the purest coin & has an agio
— It lends on pledges at moderate interest
— none but Citizens admitted to have acct. in their books.

The Banks of Amsterdam Venice & Hamburg, solely for the Convenience of Merchants—not so Genoa, Naples & Bologna, which having advanced money to the State have a perpetual fund of Interest, and are Banks of loan & deposit, being models of that of Engd. And. 3. p 141.

In 1650the favorers of the Commonwealth led by the convenience of the Italian & Amsterdam Banks—first began to project one for London.
In The Bank of Engd. & E. Inda. Compy. established. They pd. to Govt. 3,200,000 for 8 PerCt. StClair p. 365

The capital of the Bank for—
Quer. ⟨how?⟩ much of the debt of G. B. has been lent by the Bank

The Bank not only nor greatest lender. E. Ind. & S. Sea Compy.
The competition of different lendrs. good—if establish Bank can & sd.
Also—other great rival Money Companies—See rival offers—Sinclair p. 433
— where that rivalship cause of S. Sea Bubble

In time of war, when [illegible] would most—Govt at mercy of Bank—vis vers in peace

Bank. see Sinclair p.403.
E. Ind Compy.402
In deciding on the policy of raising funds beyond par—consider

1. unjust to debtor part of people.

2. interest then of Creditors to prevent sinking fund, & this caused perversion of sinking do. in G. B. Sinclair p. 438


Title: Notes on the Bank of England, [ca. 1 February] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 1 February 1791]
Bank of Engd. estabd. 1694. for abt. 11 years—to 1705. on the models of Genoa, Naples & Bologna. And. 3. 141

The 1,200,000 £ subscribed in 10 days—& ¼ pd. down p. 144

In 1697. Bank Notes depreciated 15 to 20 PerCt. The Bank obliged to pay 10 PerCt once a fortnight—& at length 3 PerCt. ev[er]y 3 months. p. 176,7.
In 1697. the capital of the Bank increased to 6,360,450—& the term extended to 1710—the Bank advancing to Govt. the amt. of the increase or in other words the tallies &c. being subscribed—& as these were pd. off in a few years—the Bank was reduced to its original capital. p. 178,9.—Note those tallies red. at par tho’ bought at 50 or 6 perCt. discount—greatest fortunes made ever known. p. 180 felony to counterfeit the seal or notes of Bank.

1706.The Bank prolonged, on its circulating 1½ Milln. Exch: bills at 4½ PerCt: till redemption of sd. bills—
In 1709.The Stock £2,201,171. doubled—& that sum subscribed at the rate of 115 £. for 100 Stock—between the hours of 9 a m. & 1 p. m. of same day—& 1 Mil. more wd. have been subscribed if room for it—for this & prolongation of Charter to 1732—the Bank advanced £400,000 witht. interest—& to cancel exchequer bills 1,775,027 £ p. 244

Capital now £6,577,370.
1713.
The Bank supplied the Govt. 1,200,000 by circulating exchequer bills to the amt.—The Bank to continue a Corporation till 1742—& repayt. of yearly fund & origl. capital of 1,600,000 £. p 278.
1715.
The fund of Bank enlarged for circulating to Exchequer Bills & the B. to continue till redempn. of origl. fund. p. 285
1722.
Bank purchased of S. Sea—4,000,000, which made the B. capital due from public, 9,379,027 £ p 373
1727.
The Interest of part of the Bank Capital reduced from 5 to 4 PerCt. p. 384.
1727.
Bank aided Govt. to amt. of 1,750,000 £. by accepting annuities at 4 Perct. 500,000 pd. to B. by Govt. being part of 2[,]000,000 added to ⟨that capital?⟩ by 3. Geo. I.—whereby total of capital stock reduced to £4,875,027.
1728.Bank advanced by purchase of annuities 1,250,000, at 4 PerCt. p. 400
1738.
1,000,000 £ of Bank Capital pd. off, which reduced it to 3,875,027 £ p. 487.
1742.
Bank advanced 1,600,000 £ witht. interest, i.e. the 6 perCt of the old capital to that amt. reduced to 3 & 3 pd. on the advance. The consideration was, continuance of the monopoly charter from 1743 to 1764. Counterfeiters & Serts. of Compy. breaking trust made felons witht. clery. p 506.
1744.
Total Bank Capital £10,700,000 due from Govt. & entitled to dividend—Besides which, 2,400,000 of annuities transferrable at Bank witht. any share of the profit—Dividend now & for some years 5½—interest from Govt. 4 PerCt.
1746.
986,000 added to capital Stock due from Govt. making total—11,686,800
1759.
Scarcity of money by German Wars. Bank issues notes as low as 15 & 10 £. ☞ Bs. of Edinbg. 20/ —
1781.
Bank purchased renewal of Charter for 21 years from 1785 by lendg. 2[,]000,000 at 3 perCt—& this opposed as unfavorable to Govt.
1781.
Dividend of 6 PerCt.

Banks of Edinborough on same model with that of Engd. And. 3. 141


Title: To James Madison from Martha Daingerfield Bland, 2 February 1791
From: Bland, Martha Daingerfield
To: Madison, James

Sir
⟨ca⟩wson Feby. 2d. 1791
As a representative from the State of Virginia, I take the liberty to ⟨e⟩nclose you a parcel of papers. The ⟨c⟩laim I have upon the United States is ⟨ce⟩rtainly a Just one and perhaps under ⟨y⟩our patronage may meet with success. ⟨The⟩ president advised me to write to Colonl ⟨Lu⟩tterlow who he informd me resided in ⟨W⟩ilmington (N C)—but looking over ⟨a⟩ philadelphia paper the other day I observd ⟨his⟩ Name in the business of Congress ⟨so⟩ that ’tis probable he is now in phila⟨d⟩elphia. I have the honour to be sr yr Obdt Servt
M Bland


Title: To James Madison from Edward Carrington, 2 February 1791
From: Carrington, Edward
To: Madison, James

My Dr sir,
Powhatan Feb. 2. 1791
I am just favored with yours of the 2d. Ult: also with that covering the report of the Attorney Genl. Accept my thanks for both. The subject of an Excise did sometime ago excite much apprehension here owing to its being contemplated, and industriously represented by some, with all the horrible circumstances said to attend that of England: much conversation has been held upon it through the Country, and it begins to be understood that the Similarity exists in name only—& that it will operate most heavily on the Eastern States. Some resource other than the impost must doubtless be tried: that is perhaps already Strained too high to ensure faithful collections—high imposts produce corruption amongst the Shippers of goods & from them it is too apt to be infused into the Officers of Govt. Witness the British Customs where the price of bribery is little less than openly acknowledged as a perquisite of Office. So far as I rely on my own imperfect judgment, a direct Tax would be the most equal mode of raising Money; yet, as there is so great an aversion to it, it may be well to let the people find their error from experience, and desire the exercise of the measure. As to a Militia I expect that several sessions must pass off before a plan for establishing one will be agreed on. There is great diversity of opinion both in & out of Congress upon that subject, & it is of a Nature to excite much jealousy. I possess but little knowledge of the principles of Banks—I consider it however as an established truth that they are extremely useful to all commercial Countries, and that the accumulation of wealth in the particular spots where they are situated is not so great as to overbalance the accommodations they afford to the distant parts which feel their influence. Nor do I think their benefits can possibly be extensive unless they are situated in large Commercial Cities having many distant connections, for otherwise the Notes cannot circulate far from whome [sic]. This is one consideration why I should not expect to see a Bank flourish in any of our small southern Towns, & why I should rely on greater benefits from a Bank in Phila. or N. York than in Richmond—the paper of the Banks of Phila. & N. York have often been a means of Virga. Planters & Farmers meeting Purchasers for their Crops, by the Bills being more portable than specie, nor yet have these Notes prevented as much specie as we wanted from coming amongst us, because the Bills always travel back in exchange for Cash when they become redundant. These considerations would perhaps incline me, were I for a National Bank to fix it intirely in Phila. It is however questionable whether it is necessary or even politic to have one at all, at least for the present—the private banks now in being give every useful facility to Trade, & in the infancy of Government perhaps both its time & money might be better employed, especially as it may not be clearly foreseen what influence the measure might have on the future residence of the Governmt. To these observations I will add one on the subjects of which the Secretary proposes to compose the Bank—these are, a little money, & a great deal of public paper—the latter to be carried to Market in case of a run on the Bank beyond the reach of the specie: may there not be danger of attempts to break the bank, such as are frequently made on others, & in a case of this sort, may we not be forced to carry into the market, so much paper as to produce the fatal issue, by the fall of price? You requested my ideas on this business—these observations are founded neither in reading nor experience, they may therefore be illy founded, & are certainly very imperfect—you will take them as they may seem to merit your consideration.
As to the Census few returns have yet come in—I have reason to beleive it is going on well & that our Numbers will be great. I am yr Affe. Freind &c.
Ed Carrington


Title: The Bank Bill, [2 February] 1791
From: Senate
To:

[2 February 1791]

   The Senate bill to incorporate subscribers to the Bank of the United States was read in the House on 21 January. It came before the Committee of the Whole on 31 January, was read by paragraphs, and reported to the House without amendment. After a third reading, the House on 1 February proceeded to the question on the passage of the bill. Smith (South Carolina), protesting that the bill had been “taken up rather unexpectedly yesterday,” moved that it be recommitted to the Committee of the Whole for the purpose of making amendments. Laurance and Gerry declared that those who wished to make changes should have brought them forward the previous day. JM replied “that at this moment it was not of importance to determine how it has happened that the objections which several gentlemen now say they have to offer, against the bill—were not made at the proper time—it is sufficient for them if the candor of the house should lead them now to recommit the bill, that in a committee of the whole they may have an opportunity to offer their objections.” Ames remarked that it was “absurd to go into a committee of the whole to determine whether the bill is constitutional or not,” but JM insisted that “there was the greatest propriety in discussing a constitutional question in the committee of the whole.” The motion for recommitment was defeated, 34 to 23, and the main question was resumed on 2 February (Gazette of the U.S., 2 and 19 Feb. 1791; Gen. Advertiser, 5 Feb. 1791).

Mr. Madison began with a general review of the advantages and disadvantages of banks. The former he stated to consist in, first, the aids they afford to merchants who can thereby push their mercantile operations farther with the same capital. 2d. The aids to merchants in paying punctually the customs. 3d. Aids to the government in complying punctually with its engagements, when deficiencies or delays happen in the revenue. 4th. In diminishing usury. 5th. In saving the wear of the gold and silver kept in the vaults, and represented by notes. 6th. In facilitating occasional remittances from different places where notes happen to circulate. The effect of the proposed bank, in raising the value of stock, he thought, had been greatly overrated. It would no doubt raise that of the stock subscribed into the bank; but could have little effect on stock in general, as the interest on it would remain the same, and the quantity taken out of the market would be replaced by bank stock.
The principal disadvantages consisted in, 1st. banishing the precious metals, by substituting another medium to perform their office: This effect was inevitable. It was admitted by the most enlightened patrons of banks, particularly by Smith on the Wealth of Nations. The common answer to the objection was, that the money banished was only an exchange for something equally valuable that would be imported in return. He admitted the weight of this observation in general, but doubted whether, in the present habits of this country, the returns would not be in articles of no permanent use to it. 2d. Exposing the public and individuals to all the evils of a run on the bank, which would be particularly calamitous in so great a country as this, and might happen from various causes, as false rumours, bad management of the institution, an unfavorable balance of trade from short crops, &c.
It was proper to be considered also, that the most important of the advantages would be better obtained by several banks properly distributed, than by a single one. The aids to commerce could only be afforded at or very near the seat of the bank. The same was true of aids to merchants in the payment of customs. Anticipations of the government would also be most convenient at the different places where the interest of the debt was to be paid. The case in America was different from that in England: the interest there was all due at one place, and the genius of the monarchy favored the concentration of wealth and influence at the metropolis.
He thought the plan liable to other objections: It did not make so good a bargain for the public as was due to its interests. The charter to the bank of England had been granted for 11 years only, and was paid for by a loan to the government on terms better than could be elsewhere got. Every renewal of the charter had in like manner been purchased; in some instances, at a very high price. The same had been done by the banks of Genoa, Naples, and other like banks of circulation. The plan was unequal to the public creditors—it gave an undue preference to the holders of a particular denomination of the public debt, and to those at and within reach of the seat of government. If the subscriptions should be rapid, the distant holders of paper would be excluded altogether.
In making these remarks on the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself, he said, the right to deny the authority of Congress to pass it. He had entertained this opinion from the date of the constitution. His impression might perhaps be the stronger, because he well recollected that a power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the general convention and rejected.
Is the power of establishing an incorporated bank among the powers vested by the constitution in the legislature of the United States? This is the question to be examined.
After some general remarks on the limitations of all political power, he took notice of the peculiar manner in which the federal government is limited. It is not a general grant, out of which particular powers are excepted—it is a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in other hands. So it had been understood by its friends and its foes, and so it was to be interpreted.
As preliminaries to a right interpretation, he laid down the following rules:
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the government cannot be just.
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be, are to be admitted—where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences.
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
Cotemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the parties.
In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the probability or improbability of its being left to construction.

Reviewing the constitution with an eye to these positions, it was not possible to discover in it the power to incorporate a Bank. The only clauses under which such a power could be pretended, are either—
1. The power to lay and collect taxes to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare: Or,
2. The power to borrow money on the credit of the United States: Or,
3. The power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution those powers.
The bill did not come within the first power. It laid no tax to pay the debts, or provide for the general welfare. It laid no tax whatever. It was altogether foreign to the subject.
No argument could be drawn from the terms “common defence, and general welfare.” The power as to these general purposes, was limited to acts laying taxes for them; and the general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined. To understand these terms in any sense, that would justify the power in question, would give to Congress an unlimited power; would render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers; would supercede all the powers reserved to the state governments. These terms are copied from the articles of confederation; had it ever been pretended, that they were to be understood otherwise than as here explained?
It had been said that “general welfare” meant cases in which a general power might be exercised by Congress, without interfering with the powers of the States; and that the establishment of a National Bank was of this sort. There were, he said, several answers to this novel doctrine.
1. The proposed Bank would interfere so as indirectly to defeat a State Bank at the same place. 2. It would directly interfere with the rights of the States, to prohibit as well as to establish Banks, and the circulation of Bank Notes. He mentioned a law of Virginia, actually prohibiting the circulation of notes payable to bearer. 3. Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, altho it should interfere with the laws, or even the constitution of the States. 4. If Congress could incorporate a Bank, merely because the act would leave the States free to establish Banks also; any other incorporations might be made by Congress. They could incorporate companies of manufacturers, or companies for cutting canals, or even religious societies, leaving similar incorporations by the States, like State Banks to themselves: Congress might even establish religious teachers in every parish, and pay them out of the Treasury of the United States, leaving other teachers unmolested in their functions. These inadmissible consequences condemned the controverted principle.
The case of the Bank established by the former Congress, had been cited as a precedent. This was known, he said, to have been the child of necessity. It never could be justified by the regular powers of the articles of confederation. Congress betrayed a consciousness of this in recommending to the States to incorporate the Bank also. They did not attempt to protect the Bank Notes by penalties against counterfeiters. These were reserved wholly to the authority of the States.
The second clause to be examined is that, which empowers Congress to borrow money.
Is this a bill to borrow money? It does not borrow a shilling. Is there any fair construction by which the bill can be deemed an exercise of the power to borrow money? The obvious meaning of the power to borrow money, is that of accepting it from, and stipulating payment to those who are able and willing to lend.
To say that the power to borrow involves a power of creating the ability, where there may be the will, to lend, is not only establishing a dangerous principle, as will be immediately shewn, but is as forced a construction, as to say that it involves the power of compelling the will, where there may be the ability, to lend.
The third clause is that which gives the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute the specified powers.
Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress.
Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers.
The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and as it were, technical means of executing those powers. In this sense it had been explained by the friends of the constitution, and ratified by the state conventions.
The essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited and enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental means, any means could be used, which in the language of the preamble to the bill, ‘might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the finances; or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans.’ He urged an attention to the diffuse and ductile terms which had been found requisite to cover the stretch of power contained in the bill. He compared them with the terms necessary and proper, used in the Constitution, and asked whether it was possible to view the two descriptions as synonimous, or the one as a fair and safe commentary on the other.
If, proceeded he, Congress, by virtue of the power to borrow, can create the means of lending, and in pursuance of these means, can incorporate a Bank, they may do any thing whatever creative of like means.
The East-India company has been a lender to the British government, as well as the Bank, and the South-Sea company is a greater creditor than either. Congress then may incorporate similar companies in the United States, and that too not under the idea of regulating trade, but under that of borrowing money.
Private capitals are the chief resources for loans to the British government. Whatever then may be conceived to favor the accumulation of capitals may be done by Congress. They may incorporate manufacturers. They may give monopolies in every branch of domestic industry.
If, again, Congress by virtue of the power to borrow money, can create the ability to lend, they may by virtue of the power to levy money, create the ability to pay it. The ability to pay taxes depends on the general wealth of the society, and this, on the general prosperity of agriculture, manufactures and commerce. Congress then may give bounties and make regulations on all of these objects.
The States have, it is allowed on all hands, a concurrent right to lay and collect taxes. This power is secured to them not by its being expressly reserved, but by its not being ceded by the constitution. The reasons for the bill cannot be admitted, because they would invalidate that right; why may it not be conceived by Congress, that an uniform and exclusive imposition of taxes, would not less than the proposed Banks ‘be conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances, and tend to give facility to the obtaining of revenue, for the use of the government?’
The doctrine of implication is always a tender one. The danger of it has been felt in other governments. The delicacy was felt in the adoption of our own; the danger may also be felt, if we do not keep close to our chartered authorities.
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To borrow money is made the end and the accumulation of capitals, implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is then the end, and a bank implied as the means. The bank is then the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital punishments, &c. implied as the means.
If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of political economy.
The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the constitution itself.
Congress have power “to regulate the value of money”; yet it is expressly added not left to be implied, that counterfeitors may be punished.
They have the power “to declare war,” to which armies are more incident, than incorporated Banks, to borrowing; yet is expressly added, the power “to raise and support armies”; and to this again, the express power “to make rules and regulations for the government of armies”; a like remark is applicable to the powers as to a navy.
The regulation and calling out of the militia are more appurtenant to war, than the proposed bank, to borrowing; yet the former is not left to construction.
The very power to borrow money is a less remote implication from the power of war, than an incorporated monopoly bank, from the power of borrowing—yet the power to borrow is not left to implication.
It is not pretended that every insertion or omission in the constitution is the effect of systematic attention. This is not the character of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men. The examples cited, with others that might be added, sufficiently inculcate nevertheless a rule of interpretation, very different from that on which the bill rests. They condemn the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.
It cannot be denied that the power proposed to be exercised is an important power.
As a charter of incorporation the bill creates an artificial person previously not existing in law. It confers important civil rights and attributes, which could not otherwise be claimed. It is, though not precisely similar, at least equivalent, to the naturalization of an alien, by which certain new civil characters are acquired by him. Would Congress have had the power to naturalize, if it had not been expressly given?
In the power to make bye laws, the bill delegated a sort of legislative power, which is unquestionably an act of a high and important nature. He took notice of the only restraint on the bye laws, that they were not to be contrary to the law and the constitution of the bank; and asked what law was intended; if the law of the United States, the scantiness of their code would give a power, never before given to a corporation—and obnoxious to the States, whose laws would then be superceded not only by the laws of Congress, but by the bye laws of a corporation within their own jurisdiction. If the law intended, was the law of the State, then the State might make laws that would destroy an institution of the United States.
The bill gives a power to purchase and hold lands; Congress themselves could not purchase lands within a State “without the consent of its legislature.” How could they delegate a power to others which they did not possess themselves?
It takes from our successors, who have equal rights with ourselves, and with the aid of experience will be more capable of deciding on the subject, an opportunity of exercising that right, for an immoderate term.
It takes from our constituents the opportunity of deliberating on the untried measure, although their hands are also to be tied by it for the same term.
It involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen.
It leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one of the most solemn acts of sovereign authority.
From this view of the power of incorporation exercised in the bill, it could never be deemed an accessary or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a means of executing another power; it was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the constitution could never have been meant to be included in it, and not being included could never be rightfully exercised.
He here adverted to a distinction, which he said had not been sufficiently kept in view, between a power necessary and proper for the government or union, and a power necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers. In the latter case, the powers included in each of the enumerated powers were not expressed, but to be drawn from the nature of each. In the former, the powers composing the government were expressly enumerated. This constituted the peculiar nature of the government, no power therefore not enumerated, could be inferred from the general nature of government. Had the power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the constitution.
But the proposed bank could not even be called necessary to the government; at most it could be but convenient. Its uses to the government could be supplied by keeping the taxes a little in advance—by loans from individuals—by the other banks, over which the government would have equal command; nay greater, as it may grant or refuse to these the privilege, made a free and irrevocable gift to the proposed bank, of using their notes in the federal revenue.
He proceeded next to the cotemporary expositions given to the constitution.
The defence against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights, presupposed, he said, that the powers not given were retained; and that those given were not to be extended by remote implications. On any other supposition, the power of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press, or the rights of conscience, &c. could not have been disproved.
The explanations in the state conventions all turned on the same fundamental principle, and on the principle that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional powers to those enumerated. (Here he read sundry passages from the debates of the Pennsylvania, Virginia and North-Carolina conventions, shewing the grounds on which the constitution had been vindicated by its principal advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its powers, charged on it by its opponents.) He did not undertake to vouch for the accuracy or authenticity of the publications which he quoted—he thought it probable that the sentiments delivered might in many instances have been mistaken, or imperfectly noted; but the complexion of the whole, with what he himself and many others must recollect, fully justified the use he had made of them.
The explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the ratifications of the several states formed a striking evidence, wearing the same complexion. He referred those who might doubt on the subject, to the several acts of ratification.
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended for. These explanations were the more to be respected, as they had not only been proposed by Congress, but ratified by nearly three-fourths of the states. He read several of the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th. and 12th. the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation—the latter, as excluding every source of power not within the constitution itself.
With all this evidence of the sense in which the constitution was understood and adopted, will it not be said, if the bill should pass, that its adoption was brought about by one set of arguments, and that it is now administered under the influence of another set; and this reproach will have the keener sting, because it is applicable to so many individuals concerned in both the adoption and administration.
In fine, if the power were in the constitution, the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential—if not there, the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a precedent of interpretation, levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of the general government, and protect those of the state governments. If the point be doubtful only, respect for ourselves, who ought to shun the appearance of precipitancy and ambition; respect for our successors, who ought not lightly to be deprived of the opportunity of exercising the rights of legislation; respect for our constituents who have had no opportunity of making known their sentiments, and who are themselves to be bound down to the measure for so long a period; all these considerations require that the irrevocable decision should at least be suspended until another session.
It appeared on the whole, he concluded, that the power exercised by the bill was condemned by the silence of the constitution; was condemned by the rule of interpretation arising out of the constitution; was condemned by its tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the constitution; was condemned by the expositions of the friends of the constitution, whilst depending before the public; was condemned by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified the constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves to the Constitution; and he hoped it would receive its final condemnation, by the vote of this house.


Title: Memorandum from Roger Sherman, [ca. 4 February] 1791
From: Sherman, Roger
To: Madison, James

[ca. 4 February 1791]
You will admit That Congress have power to provide by law, for raising, depositing & applying money for the purposes enumerated in the constitution, & generally of regulating the Finances That they have power so far as no particular rules are pointed out, in the constitution to make such rules & regulations as they may Judge necessary & proper to effect these purposes. The only question that remains is—Is a Bank a proper measure for effecting these purposes?
And is not this a question of expediency rather than of rights?


Title: The Bank Bill, [8 February] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[8 February 1791]

   The House continued to debate the bank bill on 3, 4, 5, and 7 February.

Mr. Madison observed, that the present is a question which ought to be conducted with moderation and candor—and therefore there is no occasion to have recourse to those tragic representations, which have been adduced—warmth and passion should be excluded from the discussion of a subject, which ought to depend on the cool dictates of reason for its decision.
Adverting to the observation of Mr. Smith, (S. C.) “that it would be a deplorable thing for the Senate of the United States to have fallen on a decision which violates the constitution,” he enquired, What does the reasoning of the gentleman tend to shew but this, that from respect to the Senate, this house ought to sanction their decisions? And from hence it will follow, that the President of the United States ought, out of respect to both, to sanction their joint proceedings: but he could, he said, remind the gentleman, of his holding different sentiments on another occasion.
Mr. Madison then enlarged on the exact balance or equipoise contemplated by the constitution, to be observed and maintained between the several branches of government—and shewed, that except this idea was preserved, the advantages of different independent branches would be lost, and their separate deliberations and determinations were intirely useless.
In describing a corporation he observed, that the powers proposed to be given, are such, as do not exist antecedent to the existence of the corporation; these powers are very extensive in their nature, and to which a principle of perpetuity may be annexed.
He waved a reply to Mr. Vining’s observations on the common law, (in which that gentleman had been lengthy and minute, in order to invalidate Mr. Madison’s objection to the power proposed to be given to the Bank, to make rules and regulations, not contrary to law). Mr. Madison said the question would involve a very lengthy discussion—and other objects more intimately connected with the subject, remained to be considered.
The power of granting Charters, he observed, is a great and important power, and ought not to be exercised, without we find ourselves expressly authorised to grant them: Here he dilated on the great and extensive influence that incorporated societies had on public affairs in Europe: They are a powerful machine, which have always been found competent to effect objects on principles, in a great measure independent of the people.
He argued against the influence of the precedent to be established by the bill—for tho it has been said that the charter is to be granted only for a term of years, yet he contended, that granting the powers on any principle, is granting them in perpetuum—and assuming this right on the part of the government involves the assumption of every power whatever.
Noticing the arguments in favor of the bill, he said, it had been observed, that “government necessarily possesses every power.” However true this idea may be in theory, he denied that it applied to the government of the United States.
Here he read the restrictive clause in the Constitution—and then observed that he saw no pass over this limit.
The preamble to the Constitution, said he, has produced a new mine of power; but this is the first instance he had heard of, in which the preamble has been adduced for such a purpose. In his opinion the preamble only states the objects of the confederation, and the subsequent clauses designate the express powers by which those objects are to be obtained—and a mean is proposed thro which to acquire those that may be found still requisite, more fully to effect the purposes of the confederation.
It is said, “there is a field of legislation yet unexplored.” He had often heard this language—but he confessed he did not understand it. Is there, said he, a single blade of grass—Is there any property in existence in the United States, which is not subject to legislation, either of the particular States, or of the United States? He contended that the exercise of this power on the part of the United States, involves, to all intents and purposes, every power which an individual state may exercise. On this principle he denied the right of Congress to make use of a Bank to facilitate the collection of taxes. He did not, however admit the idea, that the institution would conduce to that object: The bank notes are to be equal to gold and silver, and consequently will be as difficult to obtain as the specie. By means of the objects of trade on which gold and silver are employed, there will be an influx of those articles—but paper being substituted, will fill those channels, which would otherwise be occupied by the precious metals—This, experience shews is the uniform effect of such a substitution.
The right of Congress to regulate trade, is adduced as an argument in favor of this of creating a corporation—but what has this bill to do with trade? Would any plain man suppose that this bill had any thing to do with trade?
He noticed the observation respecting the utility of Banks to aid the government with loans—He denied the necessity of the institution to aid the government in this respect—Great Britain, he observed, did not depend on such institutions—she borrows from various sources.
“Banks it is said, are necessary to pay the interest of the public debt,”—then they ought to be established in the places where that interest is paid—but can any man say, that the bank notes will circulate at par in Georgia. From the example of Scotland we know that they cannot be made equal to specie, remote from the place, where they can be immediately converted into coin—they must depreciate in case of a demand for specie—and if there is no moral certainty that the interest can be paid by these bank bills, will the government be justified in depriving itself of the power of establishing banks in different parts of the union?
We reason (said he) and often with advantage from British models, but in the present instance there is a great dissimilarity of circumstances. The bank notes of Great-Britain do not circulate universally; to make the circumstances parallel, it ought to have been assumed as a fact that banks are established in various parts of Great-Britain, at which the interest of the national debt is paid—but the fact is, it is only paid in one place.
The clause of the constitution which has been so often recurred to, and which empowers Congress to dispose of its property, he supposed referred only to the property left at the conclusion of the war, and has no reference to the monied property of the United States.
The clause which empowers Congress to pass all laws necessary, &c. has been brought forward repeatedly by the advocates of the bill; he noticed the several constructions of this clause which had been offered; the conclusion which he drew from the commentary of the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Gerry, was that Congress may do what they please—and recurring to the opinion of that gentleman in 1787; he said the powers of the constitution were then dark, inexplicable and dangerous—but now, perhaps as the result of experience they are clear and luminous!

The constructions of the constitution, he asserted, which have been maintained on this occasion go to the subversion of every power whatever in the several States—but we are told for our comfort that the judges will rectify our mistakes; how are the judges to determine in the case; are they to be guided in their decisions by the rules of expediency?
It has been asked that if those minute powers of the constitution were thought to be necessary, is it supposable that the great and important power on the table was not intended to be given? Mr. Madison interpreted this circumstance in a quite different way, viz. if it was thought necessary to specify in the constitution, those minute powers, it would follow that more important powers would have been explicitly granted had they been contemplated.
The Western Territory business he observed, was a case sui generis, and therefore cannot be cited with propriety: West Point, so often mentioned he said, was purchased by the United States pursuant to law—and the consent of the State of New York is supposed, if it has not been expressly granted; but on any occasion does it follow that one violation of the constitution is to be justified by another?
The permanent residence bill, he conceived was entirely irrelative to the subject; but he conceived it might be justified on truly constitutional principles.
The act vesting in the President of the United States the power of removability has been quoted; he recapitulated in a few words his reasons for being in favor of that bill.
The bank of North-America, he said, he had opposed, as he considered the institution as a violation of the confederation. The State of Massachusetts he recollected voted with him on that occasion. The bank of North-America was however the child of necessity—as soon as the war was over, it ceased to operate as to continental purposes. But, asked he, are precedents in war, to justify violations of private and State rights, in a time of peace? And did the United States pass laws to punish the counterfeiting the notes of that bank? They did not, being convinced of the invalidity of any such law—the bank therefore took shelter under the authority of the State.
The energetic administration of this government is said to be connected with this institution. Mr. Madison here stated the principles on which he conceived this government ought to be administered—and added, other gentlemen may have had other ideas on the subject, and may have consented to the ratification of the constitution on different principles and expectations—but he considered the enlightened opinion and affection of the people, the only solid basis for the support of this government.
Mr. Madison then stated his objections to the several parts of the bill: The first article he objected to, was the duration—A period of twenty years, he observed, was to this country as a period of a century in the history of other countries—there was no calculating for the events which might take place: He urged the ill-policy of granting so long a term, from the experience of the government in respect to some treaties, which tho found inconvenient, could not now be altered.
The different classes of the public creditors, he observed, were not all put on an equal footing by this bill; but in the bill for the disposal of the Western Territory, this had been thought essential: The holders of 6 per cent. securities, will derive undue advantages—Creditors at a distance, and the holders of 3 per cent. securities, ought to be considered—as the public good is most essentially promoted by an equal attention to the interest of all.
I admit, said he, that the government ought to consider itself as the trustee of the public on this occasion, and therefore should avail itself of the best disposition of the public property.
In this view of the subject, he objected to the bill, as the public, he thought, ought to derive greater advantages from the institution than those proposed. In case of a universal circulation of the notes of the proposed bank, the profits will be so great that the government ought to receive a very considerable sum for granting the charter.
There are other defects in the bill, which render it proper and necessary in my opinion, that it should undergo a revision and amendment before it passes into a law: The power vested by the bill in the executive to borrow of the bank, he thought was objectionable—and the right to establish subordinate banks, he said, ought not to be delegated to any set of men under heaven.
The public opinion has been mentioned: If the appeal to the public opinion is suggested with sincerity, we ought to let our constituents have an opportunity to form an opinion on the subject.
He concluded by saying, he should move for the previous question.


Title: To James Madison from John Nelson, 11 February 1791
From: Nelson, John
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Kg: Wm: County Virga: 11th Febry: 1791.
I have been desired by Mr: Saml: Tinsley who served under me as an Officer in the Cavalry of this State, to mention him to you as one extreamly anxious to get a Commission in the Troops of the United-States under the Command of Genl: St. Clair; he will take his Departure immediately for the Western-Country & means to serve as a Volunteer ’till Some thing better offers; he informs me that there are several, in this State, who will not accept their Appointments, particularly a Mr John Heth, who had an Ensigns Commission; should this Vacancy not be filled up, Mr: Tinsley will think himself happy to be appointed to it & I really do not know any young Man more worthy of a Commission, for since I first knew him, he has always conducted himself with great Propriety; I must therefore beg the Favor of you to speak to the President in his Behalf, as I believe all Appointments come from him.
You will be so good as to excuse the Liberty I have taken in giving you this Trouble & be assured that I am, with great Esteem & Respect—Sir, Yr: mo: obedt: hble: Servt:
J: Nelson


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 13 February 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Pendleton, Edmund

Dear Sir
Philada. Feby. 13. 1791
Since the receipt of your favor of the 15 Jany. I have had the further pleasure of seeing your valuable observations on the Bank, more at length, in your communications to Mr. White. The subject has been decided, contrary to your opinion as well as my own, by large majorities in both Houses, and is now before the President. The power of incorporating can not by any process of safe reasoning, be drawn within the meaning of the Constitution as an appurtenance of any express power, and it is not pretended that it is itself an express power. The arguments in favor of the measure, rather increased my dislike to it because they were founded on remote implications, which strike at the very essence of the Govt. as composed of limited & enumerated powers. The Plan is moreover liable to a variety of other objections which you have so judiciously developed.
The Excise is not yet returned by the Senate. It has undergone sundry alterations in that House, but none that affect its principle or will affect its passage. In many respects it is displeasing to me, and a greater evil than a direct tax. But the latter wd. not be listened to in Congs. and wd perhaps be not less offensive to the ears of the people at large, particularly in the Eastern part of the Union. The Bill contains, as you would wish, an optional clause permitting the owners of Country stills to pay the tax on their capacity, or to keep an acct. of the liquors actually distilled, and pay according to that & no more.
The Bill for admitting Kentucky has passed into a law, and another for extending the privilege to Vermont who is knocking at the door for it, has come from the Senate, and will not be opposed in the House of Reps. The Bill for selling the public lands, has made some progress & I hope will go through. The fate of the Militia & several other important Bills is problematical at the present Session which will expire on the 4th: of next month. With the sincerest affection I am Dear Sir Mo: respectfully yours
Js. Madison Jr
The inclosed paper I observe has a sketch of some of the argts. agst. the Bank. They are extremely mutilated, and in some instances perverted, but will give an idea of the turn which the question took.


Title: From James Madison to an Unidentified Correspondent, 15 February 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

Dear Sir
Philada. Feby. 15. 1791.
Since my last I have taken an opportunity of speaking with the Secry. at War pretty fully on the reduction of your pension from 75 £ to 62 £. He says that the State of the Business is such, that a revision of what has been done by the States, would produce much confusion and not be likely on the whole to end in an improvement of the system. I mention this circumstance that you may the better judge how far it will be worth while to take any steps in consequence of what has been suggested in my last. I beg you to understand at the same time that should you be able to make any further use of my services, you will gratify me by commanding them; being with great esteem & respect Dear Sir Your Obedt. hble. servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: Report on the Financial Administration of Robert Morris, [16 February] 1791
From: House of Representatives
To:

[16 February 1791]
That it being evidently impossible for the Committee to examine in detail, the public accounts under the administration, and unnecessary, as the same have been examined and passed in the proper offices, they have thought their duty would be best discharged by obtaining from the Register, the statements of the receipts and expenditures, and other extracts from the public records, herewith submitted, along with a more particular statement of the public Accounts, during the same period, made out in the year 1784, in such a number of printed copies of both, as will furnish to each member of Congress, the best practicable means of appreciating the Services of the Superintendant, and the utility of his administration.
That from these documents, it will be found that

The Receipts of public monies in the Treasury of the
}
8,177,431.72

United States, during the said Administration, amounted to

And the expenditures, settled as above mentioned, to
}
8,155,445—

Leaving, at the close of the administration, in the Treasury of the United States, a balance of
}
21,986.72

The authorities under which the Superintendant acted in the course of his administration, are referred to in the first mentioned document.


Title: To James Madison from Mann Page, 19 February 1791
From: Page, Mann
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
Mann’sfield Feby. 19th. 1791
Colo. Thos. Towles, with whom, I believe, you were formerly acquainted when in the Assembly of Virginia, will have the Honour of delivering this to you. He goes to Philadelphia on Business with Congress, which to him is of Importance. He is a Stranger in the Place, & also to the Mode of conducting his Business. Your Aid & Attention to him will be employed in serving a most worthy Man, & in confering a particular favour on, dear sir, your Freind & hble. sert.
Mann Page


Title: To James Madison from Maxcey Ewell, 21 February 1791
From: Ewell, Maxcey
To: Madison, James

Sir
Virginia Albemarle County 21st Feby. 1791.
In October 1790 I wrote to Mr Jefferson concerning my Publick Accts. Mr. Jefferson after communicating the matter to you wrote me on the Subject that you Suppos’d Philadelphia to be the place where alone my business could be settled. He also wrote me that you directed me to get my papers from Mr. Hopkins who they were log’d with and forward them to [you] at Philadelphia and you would put them in the necessary train for which I humbly thank. I have since made application to Mr. Hopkins for them but agreable to directions of the late Board of Treasury he forwarded them to the treasury of the united States in New York Now Mr Maddison I wish you to be so kind as to inform me in what manner I may come at them for I am reduc’d to so low an ebb by a long Servitude to my Country that its out of my power to get to New York for during the late war I aided in every place I could when ever call’d on with my Muskett on my shoulder and at the raising of Men I chearfully threw in my mite and so on till I was call’d in to the Staff department where I continued three years or nearly so till what little I had was quite exhausted I was then turnd loose with a wife and a Number of small Children without Bread meat or money I Labourd Night and day for their Support very chearfully knowing that from a long teadious war things was not to be settled in a day and knowing things of a greater moment were before the Gentlemen in Congress but Mr Maddison I hope you will do some thing for me, as I hope the Gentlemen will take that matter under their consideration—being with Much Esteem your most Ob’t humb’e Serv’t
Maxcey Ewell


Title: Draft Veto of the Bank Bill, 21 February 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

Feby. 21. 1791. Copy of a paper made out & sent to the President at his request, to be ready in case his judgment should finally decide agst. the Bill for incorporating a National Bank, the Bill being then before him.
Gentlemen of the Senate
Having carefully examined and maturely considered the Bill entitled “An Act  I am compelled by the conviction of my judgment and the duty of my Station to return the Bill to the House in which it originated with the following objections:
(if to the Constitutionality)
I object to the Bill because it is an essential principle of the Government that powers not delegated by the Constitution cannot be rightfully exercised; because the power proposed by the Bill to be exercised is not expressly delegated; and because I cannot satisfy myself that it results from any express power by fair and safe rules of implication.
(if to the merits alone or in addition)
I object to the Bill because it appears to be unequal between the public and the Institution in favor of the institution; imposing no conditions on the latter equivalent to the stipulations assumed by the former. (Quer. if this be within the intimation of the President.) I object to the Bill because it is in all cases the duty of the Government to dispense its benefits to individuals with as impartial a hand as the public interest will permit; and the Bill is in this respect unequal to individuals holding different denominations of public Stock and willing to become subscribers. This objection lies with particular force against the early day appointed for opening subscriptions, which if these should be filled as quickly as may happen, amounts to an exclusion of those remote from the Government, in favor of those near enough to take advantage of the opportunity.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Wash, 22 February 1791
From: Wash, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Louisa County Virginia Frebuary 22d. 1791
Altho’ a Stranger I make bold to Write to you, Soliciting you to do me a favour, Which Ignorance and Inconveniance puts it out of my power to do myself. I Served as Clerk to mr. John Cheesborough A Comy of Isues to the North Carolina Brigade of Continental troops to the Northward Under the Command of General Washington from the 3d. of march 1778 to the 15th June 1779 for Which time my name may be found on the payrool for the Isuing Department, I received my pay regularly 26 Dollars & ⅔ Pr. mo Exclusive of ten Dollars for Subsistance money, I also served as Asistant Comisy. of hides for the State of New york Under Moses Hetfield Comisy. Genl. of hides for the Said State, the time of the Said Service I dont Exactly Recollect when it Commenced, for my Comission Which I received from the Board of War in Philadelphia, I lost at Genl Gates Defeat, But my name may be found on the payrool of the Hide Department in August or Sepr. 1779 and Continued untill Some time in Decr. following. I Recd. my pay Regularly 40 Dollars Pr. month Exclusive of 20 Dr. for Subsistance money, The favour I beg of you is to Settle with the Publick for the Depreciation of my pay for the above service and After paying yourself Sufficiently for all the Trouble you may be at on my Acct., please to Froward the same to Mr. Davis Printer in richmond. I Expect the time has Elapsed which was allowed for the Settlement of those Accoumpts But my plea I suppose to be Tolerable good for it was Entirely through Ignorance that I never applyd Before for a Settlemt not Knowing any Such money Would be allowed me, Before some of the Said Departmt Went last summer to New york and got the Depreciation of there pay allowed them. I have Enclosed a power to Enable you to Settle if it may be Sufficient. But in Case that Should prove Insufficient youl please to Inform me by post What to do. Mr. John Cheesborough is dead or I would Inclose a Certificate of my Serv[i]ce in the Isuing Department, But my name on the payrools will be sufficient I Expect with Colo. Winston Letter to you, to prove that I did the service Colo Winston at that time being a Continental Officer. Any Letters you may write on my Acct. youl please to leave me to pay post on and mine Shall Come postage paid, As soon as Convenient I Shall be glad [to] hear from you. I am sir Your Obt. Hbe servt.
Thomas Wash


Title: To James Madison from John Winston, 23 February 1791
From: Winston, John
To: Madison, James

Sir
Hanover Virginia February 23. 1791
At the request of Mr. Thomas Wash one of your Constituents (who informs me that he has a claim against the united States for services during the late war) I take the liberty of informing you that Mr. Wash is a Man whom I am acquainted with, and know also that he acted in the Commissary’s department in the late war. He is also one whom I am perswaded would not exhibit any account against the public, but what he thought Just. For the particulars of his claim you must be refered to Mr Wash, and believe me to be with every sentiment of respect sir Your Most Obt. Humble St.
Jno. Winston


Title: To James Madison from Edward Carrington, 26 February 1791
From: Carrington, Edward
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
Richmond Feb. 26. 1791
I came to Town late last night and was this morning favored with yours of the 26th. & Ult. and 12th. Inst. Having last week forwarded to the post Office a letter to be put into the Mail for you I hope you have by this time recd. it. In that letter I made some observations upon both the excise and the Bank. I find that each has passed. I never reflected on the latter upon the ground you took for your opposition. I own that in my mind your observations upon that point carry much weight, and it still inclines me the more in addition to my former reasons, to wish the subject had been postponed for more mature consideration. It is a subject too remote in its operations to excite much enquiry amongst the people of the Country and therefore nothing appears to be said or thought about it there even by the most wealthy & intelligent. So far as I have heard the sentiments of the Mercantile characters it seems to be rather approved of amongst them. As to the excise I have been much in the way of hearing the sentiments of the people. The dissatisfaction at first excited on account of this measure is much abated, indeed I can with truth, I beleive, venture to assert that the popular mind is daily more and more disposed to receive well Congressional Acts of any kind, and I verily beleive that very little noise will be heard in the execution of the excise. The returns of the assistants who are executing the Census are coming in, but they make their appearance slowly, for your information I inclose a paper containing extracts from the returns of eleven Counties which average upwards of 8000; I am inclined to think the average of the district will be greater for reasons which are noted on the paper—you are acquainted with the Country and may apply your own observations. I have in a letter propounded a question to the Secretary of the Treasury which he has not thought proper to answer, & which I humbly conceived to be of some consequence in the execution of the Census. The Assistants employed in the business are mostly remote from here or any where else to which they can apply for their small earnings, and these will be scarcely worth seeking if they are to make a second business of coming for them after having rendered their returns—now Sir, I have commun[i]cated this matter to the secretary with a request that he would be good enough to inform me, to whome the Assistants naturally look, whether provision has not been made for paying these claims, & also whether some arrangement could not be made for the Assistants to receive payment at this place, upon my certificates of the sums to which they are respectively entitled. I did suppose this not an improper question, and did also suppose the secretary was the proper Officer for me to propound it to—I may however have been mistaken, and will thank you for some information on the subject. I know that most of the business is compleated in the Country, and cannot account for the slow appearance of the returns, but from the present distant prospect and probable future trouble of obtaining payment. Present me to yr. worthy Colleagues and beleive me to be with great truth your Affe. Freind & HI St.
Ed Carrington

[Enclosure]

  Whites — other Free persons — Slaves — Total

In Spotsylvania County
5157
148
5937
11242

  Frederick
15329
116
4256
19701

  Monongalia
4623
12
154
4789

  Ohio
4907
24
281
5212

  Harrison
2013

67
2080

  Stafford
5465
87
4036
9588

  Rockbridge
5791
41
680
6512

  New Kent
2382
147
3693
6222

  Greenesville
2524
212
3610
6346

  Surry
2762
368
3097
6227

  Sussex
 4771
 391
 5387
10549

55724
1546
31198 = 88468

I suppose the average of the whole district of Virga. will be somewhat greater than that of these eleven Counties, as three of them are beyond the Allegany and very thinly settled—several of those which are in the lower Country, are very small, and none of them are our largest & most populous Counties. I am inclined to beleive, our whites & blacks will be nearly equal the one to the other.
E. C


Title: From James Madison to Edward Carrington, 27 February 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Carrington, Edward

Letter not found. 27 February 1791. Acknowledged in Carrington to JM, 20 Apr. 1791 (DLC). Concerns JM’s views of the legislation chartering the Bank of the United States, and the constitutional questions raised by a charter proposal. JM apparently suggests that the federal government lacks the power to establish banks.


Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 28 February 1791
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Philadelphia Feby 28. 1791.
I have wish’d to partake with you fully in our mohawk purchase, & with that view have endeavor’d to dispose of property elsewhere, but without effect. As so small a portion therefore is no object with me and the possession of the whole, will make it a more important one with you, if it suited shod. be glad you wod. take it yrself. This disposition wod. suit my arrangments in other respects much better than the present one. You will consult how far it suits yours. If you think proper to take it we will accomodate other matters to our mutual convenience. I am sincerely yr. friend & servt.
Jas. Monroe


Title: From James Madison to Ambrose Madison, 2 March 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, Ambrose

Dear brother
Philada March 2d, 1791
Tomorrow will put an end to our existence. Much of the business has been laid over to the next session which is to be held the 4th Monday in Ocr. The most important bill lately past is that for establishing a Bank. You will see in the inclosed gazetteer the ground on which it was attacked & defended. The bill remained with the President to the last moment allowed him, and was then signed by him. Since the passage of that Bill one has passed for taking Alexa into the district for the seat of Gov’t if the Presidt finds it convenient. This is a confirmation of that measure & passed by a very large majority.
I enclose the report of the Secy at War on Col: Taylor’s case which you will hand to him. The grounds on which the claim is objected to are stated. The Report has not been decided on by Congs; and having but very lately been made lies over to another session. I can not yet fix on the time of my setting out for Virga. I shall at least wait till the Roads are safer than at present & am not sure that I may not make a trip into New England before I return. I have often projected this gratification to my curiosity, and do not foresee a more convenient opportunity, especially if I should be able to form a party for the purpose. I shall write you again before I make any definite arrangements. Remember me affectly to all.
I have recd yours of the 20th Feby from Falmouth. The young lady you mention has I find connections of the best sort in this place.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Pleasants, Jr., 4 March 1791
From: Pleasants, Thomas, Jr.
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
Raleigh 4th March 1791.
I have before me your obliging favour of the 13th Ulto. Had I foreseen that procuring an accot of the annual amot of the exports from the U states, would have Caused so much trouble and difficulty at the Treasury department, it would not have been Requested by me.
Mr Thompson, upon his arival at Madeira, was informed that it was highly probable that Mr Pintard would Resign the Consulate; which gave Rise to his application to me, and of my letter of the 6h. Jany to you. But by a letter from him since of the 8h decr, enclosing Copies of the letters that he had adressed to you and Mr Jefferson; I find that his information was premature—and that disappointed in his Views at Madeira, he had turned his thoughts to Lisbon, or Cadiz, both of which places he says are Vacant.
I am uninformed in respect to the advantages that may be expected from the appointment, but without an emolument, or a Well established Merchantile Connexion with these States, I should Concieve it not worth his acceptance—not long after Mr Harison was appointed Consul to Cadiz, I saw his partner Colo Hooe, who told me that without a salary Mr Harison would not accept, and if not worth his acceptance, I Cannot see what Views Mr Thompson Can have. But he seems very anxious to obtain the appointment and he ought to know best. I however am glad that he hath made a direct application to you, as it will make any farther interference of mine unecessary, as I feel a Reluctance at troubling you with Matters of this kind.
I Could have wished that the Exegencies of the General Government, had not been such, as so soon to have made a Recourse to Excises or direct Taxation necessary—and in that View an assumption of the State debts seemed Impolitick. But what may be Called the Monied Interest—the speculators in the publick Securities, or, that set of Men, who in the language of Lord Chatham “live in Riot, and Luxury upon the plunder of the Ignorant—the Innocent—the helpless—upon that part of the Community that stand most in Need of and best deserves the Care and protection of the Legislature”—seem to have obtained too great an Influence in the General Government. And to support their Luxury, Idleness, and extravagance, the bulk of the people of the U states must be loaded and oppressed with Taxes—that will fall Very heavy upon the southern States—as the securities Chiefly Rest with the people in the great Trading Towns to the North.
I wonder that a Stamp-Tax has not been brought forward in preference to an Excise—I suppose it will be said that its name will Render it unpopular—which at this time Certainly Can have but little Weight—as it was the principle, and not the Nature of the Tax that was Combated, and which Made it obnoxious to the people of America. But however unpopular it may be in the Eastern & Northern states, it Cannot be more so than the Excise will be to the people of the southern States.

The National Bank seems to be the offspring of the same Set of Men, and Alike Calculated to promote their Interest at the expence of the people at large. With great Regard, I am yr obliged frd. & Mo. obt. Hble servt.
Thomas Pleasants jr


Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 8 March 1791
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 8 March 1791 Offered for sale by Robert K. Black, Upper Montclair, N.J., 1966, with a catalog notation that the one-page letter concerned “the sale of land.” JM’s reply of 12 Apr. 1791 (DLC) makes it clear that Monroe made an inquiry concerning some books on behalf of “Mr. Brackenridge,” and possibly enclosed a list of the desired volumes.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 13 March 1791
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Th: J. to J. M.
Mar. 13. 1791.
What say you to taking a wade into the country at noon? It will be pleasant above head at least. The party to finish by dining here. Information that Colo. Beckwith is coming to be an inmate with you, & I presume not a desireable one, encourages me to make a proposition, which I did not venture as long as you had your agreeable Congressional society about you, that is, to come & take a bed and plate with me. I have 4. rooms of which any one is at your service. Three of them are up two pr. of stairs, the other on the ground floor, and can be in readiness to recieve you in 24. hours. Let me intreat you, my dear Sir, to do it, if it be not disagreeable to you. To me it will be a relief from a solitude of which I have too much: and it may lessen your repugnance to be assured it will not increase my expences an atom. When I get my library open you will often find a convenience in being close at hand to it. The approaching season will render this situation more agreeable than 5th. street, & even in the winter you will find it not disagreeable. Let me have I beseech you a favorable answer to both propositions.


Title: To James Madison from Tench Coxe, 14 March 1791
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Madison, James

March 14. 1791.
Mr. T. Coxe will be very much obliged to Mr. Madison if he can inform him what is the estimated amount of the debt of the Citizens of Virginia to the British Merchants; and, if he knows it, of those of any other state. He understands the following to be the debt of So. Carolina.

Principal due in 1775

£ 2,000,000.

Interest from 1775 to 1791 (deducting the 7 years from 1776 to 1783) is 9 years at 8 ⅌ Ct. their then intt.
}
  1,440,000

Sterling

£ 3,440,000.

The remittances made since the peace are not supposed to exceed the principal and interest of the debt contracted since 1775.


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 14 March 1791
From: Pendleton, Edmund
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 14 March 1791. According to the list probably kept by Peter Force (DLC: Madison Miscellany), Pendleton wrote a one-page letter to JM this day. The summary reads: “Stock speculations. Should a member of Congress be a Bank Director. The succession to the Presidency.”


Title: Creation of the National Capital, 6 April 1791 (Editorial Note)
From:
To:

Editorial Note
In the 1790 legislative skirmish over the national capital, JM led the fight for the Potomac site, but once that battle was won the executive branch took charge. Thereafter, JM was not officially involved in planning the new federal district. His interest, however, never flagged, and he was frequently consulted from the summer of 1790 onward (Memorandum on the Residence Bill, ca. 29 Aug. 1790, PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville,
        Va., 1977—)., XIII, 294–96). As the documents in this volume indicate, JM was looked upon as one of the architects of the capital plan. He willingly gave counsel to the president and secretary of state while keeping abreast of developments by personal observation and reports from the federal district commissioners. In a letter of 28 August 1791 Jefferson informed these commissioners that conferences had taken place in Philadelphia, that “as mr. Madison & myself, who were present at the conferences, propose to pass through George town on our way to Virginia, the President supposes that our attendance at the meeting of the Commissioners might be of service to them,” and that he and JM would meet with the commissioners on 8 September (DLC: Jefferson Papers). Indeed, Jefferson’s papers reveal JM’s continuing unofficial involvement with the federal district. On 6 November Jefferson told the president, “I have conferred with mr. M. on the idea of the Commissioners of the federal town proceeding to make private sales of the lots & he thinks it adviseable,” and on 1 December forwarded to Washington “a draught of letters to Majr. L’Enfant & the Commissioners, prepared on a conference with mr. Madison.” As L’Enfant’s relations with the commissioners worsened, Washington on 15 February 1792 asked Jefferson to come the following morning to discuss with him the federal district and “the letter you have written to Majr. L’Enfant…. P.S. If Mr. Madison can make it convent. to come with you I should be glad to see him also—In that case, it might be well to Give him a previous perusal of the enclosed papers.” On 26 February (the day before L’Enfant’s dismissal) Washington informed Jefferson, “I have perused the enclosed answer to your letter, to Majr. L’Enfant. Both are returned. A final decision thereupon must be had. I wish it to be taken upon the best ground, and with the best advice. Send it, I pray you, to Mr. Madison who is better acquainted with the whole of this matter than any other.”


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 6 April 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
George Town Apr. 6th. 1791
I have flatterd myself with hopes of receiving a line from you with information of the time you woud be at this place. On enquiry however I find it incertain whether you wou’d not turn yr. face to the East. Shou’d that not be the Case, I claim yr. promise of letting me know when I may expect to see you, & hope you will arrange matters so as not to be in a hurry to proceed when you get to this place. I refer you to the George Town paper for some intelligence respecting the Fœderal City. The Union of the George Town & Carrollsburgh interests, has given a Cast to this business more favourable than was expected even by its friends. It was a union I have most ardently wish’d for & promoted on public & personal considerations.
I inclose the articles of Agreement, sign’d by all the proprietors of Land within the propos’d limits of the City, so far as to compleat this important object with a Condemnation of a Small ps. of land the right of a person insane, & by an accommodation respecting the Lotts in Hamburgh & Carrollsburgh & a Condemnation of some Lotts in each of those places, as the proprietors cannot be come at.
It is propos’d that both these places shall be Subject to be lay’d out again. At the time the principal proprietors of the two interests agreed to a compromise, it was proposd & agreed too that the private property shou’d be subject to the same regulations respecting the buildings &ca as shou’d be thought proper for the public; this was in the hurry omitted to be inserted in the articles signd. We hope however to obtain it in the deeds.
I wish much to see you & am My dear Sr, allways & Sincerely yr. affte. friend & Servt.
Danl Carroll
Present my comps. to Mrs House & Mrs Triste, & assure them of my esteem & regard.
Send the inclosd note to Fenno.


Title: To James Madison from the Right Reverend James Madison, 10 April 1791
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir
Apl. 10h. 1791.
I am greatly obliged for your Favours by Col. Griffin. The Pleasure, wh. I receive from your Communications, is always particularly agreable; I often wish they were more frequent, but I know the Constancy of your Attention to Matters of more Moment; and it is with real Concern, that I hear your Attention to them has been the means of impairing your Health. I hope however, it will be effectually restored during the Summer Recess. I am myself, like a crazy Vessel wh. often wants a new Peice of Timber, or some Repair; However, as I am sure that I am not fitted for a long Voyage, I keep myself as much in Port as I can, always repairing, & always in Want of Repair.
I know not how it has happened; but if your Arguments had carried the same Conviction to the Minds of others, which they have brought to mine, you wd. not have been in the Minority, upon either of the great Questions which have lately been agitated. It appears to me that your Arguments have more Force, out of Doors, than within. Whether it be, that those who are not immediately concerned in the Debate, are more impartial, or what ever may be the Cause, yet I think the Effect is certain, that your Fellow Citizens here coincide entirely in Opinion with you upon those Questions.
The Chemical Publication has certainly Merit, & will be useful—I am much obliged to you for it. But the introductory Lecture, is a new kind of Phænomenon in the Schools. I was however anxious to see it, & therefore am also much obliged. I wish we could return these Favrs. by some litterary Productions—but you know they are not among the indigenous of our State. I intended to have brought with me from London, principally to send it to yourself & our Friend the Atty. a late Publication, wh. the celebrated Horne, now Horne Tooke, informed me had great Merit, Viz. La Mechanisme de la Societé. I do not recollect the Author. But my short Stay prevented me from procuring it.
My Wife desires to be affy. remembered. Be assured, my dear Sir, that I am ever Yr. sincere & Affe Friend
J Madi⟨son⟩
I beg to be remembered by our valuable Friend Mr Jefferson. I have had great Pleasure in the Perusal of his Report upon Wts. & Measures—Subjects wh. he has discussed with his usual Philosophic Acumen.


Title: From James Madison to Daniel Carroll, 10 April 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Carroll, Daniel

Letter not found. 10 April 1791. Acknowledged in Carroll to JM, 23 Apr. 1791. JM apparently sought details of the land acquisitions within the area set aside for the federal district on the Potomac.


Title: From James Madison to Ambrose Madison, 11 April 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, Ambrose

Dear brother
Philada April 11, 1791
I herewith inclose by a conveyance to Fredericksburg three pamphlets as requested by my father, the other by yourself: to which is added a list of the seeds &c sent lately to Mr Maury, according to the information contained in my last. I have not heard from you in answer to my letter on the subject of Tobacco. I have informed Mr Maury of my request to you to forward a few of the Hhds to this place, and have requested him to ship the rest as usual to his broker in Liverpool. I shall set out at a pretty early day from this place, and shall in company with Mr. Jefferson go at least as far northwardly as Lake George, with which route I shall be able to make some private business partly my own, and partly that of a friend coincide. Whether I shall afterwards extend my route Eastwardly I do not yet decide. I have not yet made any purchase of sugar or coffee as desired by my father. Both articles have fallen, the former is however still high, the latter is tolerably cheap. I shall look at some from the Isle of France today or tomorrow, and shall probably before I leave this provide a supply of that article for the family to whom be so good as to remember me affecly.


Title: From James Madison to James Monroe, 12 April 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Monroe, James

Dear Sir
Philada. April 12: 1791.
Your note of the 8th. March left in Philada. was not put into my hands till the 24th. I immediately took the proper steps for complying with the desire of Mr. Brackenridge, and now inclose the information obtained for him. The Books are to be had according to the Editions & prices annexed to his list of Mr. Rice of this City. Should Mr. Brackenridge be satisfied with them, which in most instances it is probable will be the case, and can make any further use of my services they are at his command. I expect to leave this at a pretty early day, and shall in company with Mr. Jefferson make a trip as far as Lake George. Whether I shall go into the Eastern States I do not yet decide. On my return thro’ this place I shall be able to execute any commands that may be sent me. If this shd. find you in Fredg. it will be handed to you by Mr. St. Tris whom I believe you know to possess real worth and to be entitled to the Civilities of those who respect it. I have nothing new to tell you. My best compliments to Mrs. Monroe. Yrs. affecly.
Js. Madison Jr