Title: Questions About French Grounds for Dissatisfaction, 5 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To:

Private5 April 1797

Questions concerning the possible grounds of dissatisfaction on the part of France against the United States.—
I
May not the French conceive that by the 13th article of the British treaty, we made an arrangement with one of the belligerant parties for buying and carrying to market her East India produce and manufactures to the great support and aid of the British East India dominions in the war altho’ we  could not lawfully do so before the war—and that the East India company were by these means enabled to circulate their manufactures throughout the world through our neutral ports and in our neutral vessels.  It is certain that the British courts of Admiralty in Europe and the West Indies have decreed the confiscation of all neutral vessels, which have been taken in similar trades to the Colonies of France, Holland &ca. affirming the measure to be justifiable upon the principles herein contemplated.
II.
May not the French also observe, that the same arangement operates to give the British East Indies in neutral American bottoms, many supplies, not only from neutral; but even their enemies countries, which tho’ not contraband of war, do actually serve as provisions and refreshments for the British army and navy, materials for the equipment, and arming of vessels, troops and fortifications consequently for defence and offence, and even afford greater facility to, or the actual means of offensive operations against the East India colonies of France. May not these things appear the more serious and delicate, because an existing treaty between the United States and France contains a guaranty of the dominions of the United States undertaken with a particular eye to the very power Great Britain with whom the article was formed and which first broached and now decidedly and strenuously maintains the doctrine, that such alterations in war, of the state of things immediately before existing in peace, are just causes for the confiscation of neutral Ships. If this doctrine be held in cases wherein the change is made by the separate act of the belligerant party in the form of a statute or proclamation, is there not a probability, that they may deem it even offensive and injurious when effected by the joint act of an enemy and an ally in the form of a treaty, voluntarily begun and concluded pending a war.
It would have made this arangement unexceptionable, if a provision in the treaty had declared, that this article should begin its operation only from and after the conclusion of the war in which Great Britain France &ca. are engaged. In the mean time England could have done as she pleased, by statute or proclamation, without involving the joint act of our Government.  The French courts of Admiralty must then have been satisfied to capture and confiscate our and other neutral vessels employed in such trade.
III—
May not France observe, that if our real native citizens, are actually taken out of our own Ships and put to the guns of their Enemy’s navy, without a remedy upon the transgressing British Captains having ever been pursued to issue in any one case, it is the conversion of a neutral object, into an hostile engine, and that too without a demand and procurement of reparation and punishment even in acknowledged and ascertained cases, and may not France conceive, that there is not a perfect correspondence between these circumstances, as they affect her and the 21st article of the British treaty as that affects her Enemy.
IV
May not France reasonably except to the arrangement, in regard to provisions destined to ports not blockaded, seeing that we have promulgated an official declaration (considered and settled by the President, Secretary of State and Attorney General &ca.) that such an arrangement could be contrary to a faithful Neutrality [see correspondence between the Secretary of Sate and the Minister of the United States to England, A.D. 1793]
V
May not France, without unreasonableness entertain some dissatisfaction, that this Government has not restrained, by law, the trade of its Citizens with those parts of her dominions (the conquered Islands and districts in the West Indies) which we have guarantied to her by treaty, especially as they have been conquered by that very power against whom she stipulates a guaranty of the territories of the United States and particularly, because the progress of those conquests would have been every where impeded, perhaps in many places arrested by such a law on our part. May she not reflect that the Island of St. Lucia is a mere place of arms for the maintenance and the extension of the power of her enemy, without agricultural or commercial capacities.
VI.
May not France have entertained reflections and feelings concerning the 12th or West India Article of the treaty, similar to those noticed under the 1st & 2d heads in regard to the 13th. East India Article.  If she might think herself injured by what has been stated in regard to the East Indies, she might have some feeling as to the application of similar Ideas in the West India case; because the West India article was agreed to by our Negociator; will be presumed to have been approved by the President, was not known to be opposed by the then nor present Secretary of State, nor does it appear to have been objected to by the Senate upon such principles as are cotemplated under the East India head in the 1st and 2d divisions of this paper.  In the West India case the feelings of France may be the more quickened, because of our guaranty of the West Indies, and perhaps because she may conceive herself to have favored our situation 1793, in waving the performance of that guaranty. The particular duration of the West India article, may have impressed France disagreeably, for tho’ it may be a cautious experiment on the part of England, yet it is, at least at the same time, true that it is to last only through the War, and the short time of restoring the West Indies to repair and vigor after it; that is till the end of two years after the existing War with France. There is one provision in this 12th or West India article, which would have been deeply injurious to the French West India colonies: that is to say, the prohibition to export West India produce from the United States to any other Country. America had proved some support to the French Colonial agriculture in its own revolutionary war; but now that it is at peace, and with a great fleet of private Ships, it is plain, that it would prove a grand support to the french Islands. That article of the treaty would have cut off two thirds of this advantage from France, and would indeed have been a most important alteration of the state of things pending a war.  It is not a complete answer to these reflections upon the present feelings and reasonings of France to observe that the article is rejected, for that only applies to some of these or to other points in the original form of the article. It is only suspended for amendment. It may appear to France to be the intention and desire of the United States to modify it in parts and then to sanction the arrangement.—
VII
The rigidness or laxness observed by belligerant nations in regard to several important articles included by the British treaty in the list of contraband of War, greatly depends upon their own power and necessities, upon the power, resources, and situation of a neutral nation, and upon the circumstances of the moment. Is it not therefore probable that France may feel irritated because the benefits to her of all these chances is cut off in the middle of a war, by the treaty of Great Britain, which explicitly fixes the most unfavorable rule of contraband, that is possible or which has ever been devised by the refinements of the most powerful and grasping nations.  May she not feel an unalterable conviction that the new method of agreeing to be paid for an article at least doubtful, is a device of profit at the hazard of her ruin.  May she not believe that the desire of gain has rendered the United States inattentive to the duties of neutrality and consistancy, in not resisting the doctrines concerning provisions, in the manner which the strong and explicit declarations of our Government, before referred to had led her confidently to expect. France may deem it in us a sufferance of an acknowledged violation of our neutrality for money, and may look with the more zealous upon this article because it is proved to be (on the part of the British Government) the execution of a plan secretly entered into between Russia and England in March 1793 and unreservedly avowed to be a design common to those two powers and to Spain, calculated to be extended to Portugal, Holland &ca. [See Lord Grenvilles declaration to Mr Pinkney on the 5th of July 1794]
Before the British treaty (no law forbidding, the French could sell in our ports all prizes taken from what ever power. The buyer only had to take care abroad. May they not feel some irritation because a treaty made with an enemy, in the time of a war, is the instrument to deprive them of that advantage and that same enemy is left by that treaty and our laws, to enjoy the advantage of having its navy and privateers greatly supported by the right to sell all its prizes (other than French) in our ports. Is not such a state of things calculated to operate upon neutral powers to fear more to join England than France. May not the articles of the treaty in question (No 14 & 15) be considered as working an alteration in these respects, in the state of things, in the time of war.—


Title: To John Adams from Tench Coxe, 5 April 1797
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Adams, John

Sir
April 5th. 1797.

In doing myself the honor to submit to your consideration the ideas contained in the inclosed paper, I feel myself obliged to assure you beg you to believe, that an anxiety for the public peace is my only motive. You will perceive, that if they are reasonable and just, they are of a nature, if true, too arouse afford to partizans both foreign and domestic, with the appearance of observation they may be perverted both at home and abroad to purposes of criticism and censure upon the measures of Government. If erroneous and mistaken unjust, they may contribute to encrease passions already too much excited in America and in Europe.  I have not therefore even consultations,  with a view to correction or melioration, thought it prudent to expose them to any person upon  the whatever, except the Clerk, who copied them.  He is incapable unable to conceive comprehend their nature and is entirely ignorant of or tendency, & will ever lie unacquainted with the use purpose to which I intended to apply them.—
As I now understand the information from Mr. Pinckney, (which however I have not read) a determination not to receive any missionary from the U.S. has been expressed by the french Government.  Permit me to say, Sir, that no man is more dissatisfied displeased than I am with the substance of such a of their communication, nor with what I understand to have been the manner.  But it Yet, I trust, that it I trust will not, appear inconsistent with the proper feelings to remark that before we enter upon a war with a very numerous, strong, very highly excited very irregular and, perhaps by this day, a neighbouring nation—before we give up a relinquish a state of peace, profitable beyond all example peculiarly important to us, and before we enter into a war the most disordoning & destroying dreadful and inveterate, that has ever occur’d, every favor all the just means, nay and every honest political device should, as I respectfully conceive, Sir, be carefully attempted.
If then, Sir, it should appear from that kind of a thorough and dispassionate examination,  either I have attempted  that the self love of France has so much plausible ground of alarm as to extenuate her Conduct, or if it shall appear, that by the experience unintended result operations of the law of nations, of our laws, and of the two treaties and of existing circumstances have been some unfavorable alterations of the state of things have been unobservedly produced in war or if it should appear that a conduct  injurious in principle to France, has been unperceivedly or unavoidably suffered from England her Enemies by us upon a small or a great scale, it will be equally honorable to the President of and advantageous to the United States and       to the people, not committed to  that exalted station, & otherwise, if the such unavoidable and unperceived aberrations of the times past can be  discovered & corrected: by him or if any means should be adopted, which might convince the French that the errors lie entirely, principally or equally on their side.
I am thoroughly sensible Sir that their sudden suspension of their own minister the particular season & manner in which it was done & and as I stand informed their indecorous rejection of our Minister refusal of Mr. Pinckney or any other regular minister who might be sent from us throw great, but I trust not insuperable difficulties, in the way. An informal agent of the President of the United states, of ability, temper, & address, and accurately & fully instructed & prepared, To maintain peace is their inestimable object might produce a change in their Views and conduct—Such an Agent was all that G. Britain would ever employ in the U.S. for eight years after the war altho we sent her a regular & dignified Minister Pleny. & such an agent to England after such indecorous conduct of that Govt. was Mr. G. Morris in the year 1790.  If such an agent were to be sent by the President a public exposure of the dignity of this Country would be avoided, and a renewal of intercourse might be happily effected.  Mr. Adet’s application to the Government of this country, after his functions were suspended, would lessen tend to remove the appearance of undue condescention in the President of the United States. The inestimable object of preserving peace would justify the measure, if successful. If unsuccessful it would unite all parties in repelling insult & injury at every hazard.
I beg leave, Sir, most particularly to apologize to you for this freedom, which even the anxiety I feel to avoid War would probably not have induced me to risque, had not you been pleased to express a disposition to receive what I might at any time take the liberty to offer concerning the public interests—
I have the honor to be / with perfect respect, / Sir, your most obedt. & most humble servant

Tench Coxe


Title: From John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, 6 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Gerry, Elbridge

(copy)
Dear Sir
Philadelphia April 6th 1797—

your favor of the 27th Ult. gave me great pleasure. The proposal of appointing the V.P. to go as Envoy Extraordinary to Paris, has arrived from so many quarters that I presume the thought is a natural one. I will tell you a secret But I wish you to keep it a Secret in your own Breast—I was so impressed with the idea, myself that on the 3d of March, I had a conversation with mr. Jefferson in which I proposed it to him, and frankly declared to him that if he would accept it, I would nominate him the next day, as soon as I should be qualified to do it. He as frankly refused as I expected he would. Indeed I made a great stretch in proposing it, to accommodate to the Feelings, Views and Prejudices of a Party. I would not do it again, because upon more mature reflection I am decidedly convinced of the Impropriety of it. The reasons you give are unanswerable. But there are others. It would be a degradation of our Government in the eyes of our own people as well as of all Europe. The V.P. in our Constitution is too high a personage, to be sent on Diplomatick Errands even in the Character of an Ambassador. We cannot work miracles. We cannot make Nations respect ours or its government, if we place before their Eyes, the Persons answering to the first Princes of the government, in the low and Subordinate character of a foreign Minister. It must be a pitiful Country indeed in which the Second Man in the Nation will accept of a place upon a footing with the Corps Diplomatic, especially Envoy such a one Ambassador such a one, or Plenipo. such a one. The nation must hold itself Very Cheap that can Choose a man one day to hold its Second office, and the next send him to Europe, to dance attendance at Levers and Drawing rooms among the Common Mayor Generals, Simple Bishops, Earls and Barons but especially among the common trash of Ambassadors Envoys and Minist. Plenipo.
The Nation has chosen Jefferson and Commanded him to a Certain Station, The President therefore has no right to Command him to another or to take him off from that. A nation to be consistent must highly resent it. It appeared to me in this Light when the Mission to England was talked of, two or three persons proposed to me to go but I positively refused to have anything said about it and gave the reasons above among many others, indeed I thought it wrong to Send the Chief Justice, he was too high to go even as Ambassador, but to send him as Envoy was unpardonable it must mark us with Contempt in all Europe. But we Studiously regrade our Government by Every ingenious invention and then wonder that our Nation and Government are despised—
The Satisfaction you Express with my Lettle harrangue before taking the oath gives me great pleasure, I had been so abused, belied and misrepresented for Seven years together, without uttering one Syllable in my own Vindication, and almost without one Word in my favor from anybody Else, that I was determined to give the Lie direct to whole Volumes at once, be the Consequence what it would.
I am my dear sir with great respect

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Joseph Ward, 6 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Ward, Joseph

Dear Sir
Philadelphia, April 6th 1797

I received yesterday your favor of the 27th of March for which I thank you.
The strain of Joy at a late event, and of Panegyrick on the subject of it, serve, among some other Instances to Convince me, that old friendships, when they are well preserved become very strong.  The friends of my youth are generally gone The friends of my early political life are chiefly departed—Of the few that remain, some have been found on a late occasion weak, envious, jealous, and spiteful, humiliated and mortified and duped enough by French Finesse, and Jacobinical rascality to show it to me and to the world.  Others have been found faithful and true, generous and Manly.  From these I have received Letters and Tokens of approbation and Friendship in a style of ardour, Zeal, and exultation similar to yours.
Your Postscript is a Morsel of exquisite Beauty and utility. My life will undoubtedly depend in a great Measure on my observance of it—
The Labour of my office is very constant and very severe, and before this time you will have seen enough to convince, that my Prospects as well as yours are grave; I should be much obliged to you for your sentiments and those of the people in general about you concerning what ought to be done.—
I am Sir with sincere esteem your / Friend and Servant,
John Adams—


Title: To John Adams from James McHenry, 8 April 1797
From: McHenry, James
To: Adams, John

8th April 1797.

The quantum and kind of defensive force necessary at this juncture, and which it appears to the Sery of War, Congress ought to make immediate provision for, may be calculated, 1st with reference simply to France; and 2dly with reference to France and Spain united.
This force, calculated with reference to France only, will have for  objects; the protection of our commerce; the securing our Cities from requisitions, by predatory invasions, and the more southern parts of the Union from domestic insurrections.
There will be required for these purposes, in addition to our existing land and naval military establishments, the following actual and contingent force.
Of actual force, which ought to be raised as soon as possible, vz. One Regiment or corps of Artillerists and Engineers; One Regt of Infantry; two companies of Dragoons; three Frigates of 32 guns and six sloops of war of 16 guns. Of contingent force vz. 10,000 regulars to be raised only  as wanted at the discretion of the President.
The Secry. has presumed in forming this breif estimate, that the crippled situation of the marine of France joined to our  distance from Europe, will prevent any formidable invasion by our sea-board; that Spain will evacuate the posts which she now occupies within our territory, and remain neutral & friendly along the Mississippi; and, that a tranquil state of the Western fronteir, as it respects both settlers and Indians, may possibly admit of our drawing thence to our maritime ports a part of the army employed in that quarter. It is proper however to observe, and to be fully understood, that little, or rather no dependence can be placed upon such a resource.
The defensive force, calculated with reference to France and Spain united must be greater than in the preceding estimate, as the points to be protected will be found to be more multiplied. Besides the objects that have been enumerated, these two powers will no doubt apply both force and machinations against the Western Country; and as neither policy, nor the interests and safety of the parts of the union contiguous thereto, would justify our abandoning that quarter to its own means of defence, and thereby delivering it up to intriguers and Independence; it ought therefore to be well guarded and defended, and provision made accordingly.
There will be required for this situation of things, in addition to existing military establishments, and the three frigates and six sloops of war, the following force. For immediate service. Vz. Two Regiments or corps of Artillerists and Engineers; two Regiments of Infantry and six companies of Dragoons. For contingent service, vz. An army of 15,000 regulars to be raised as aforesaid.
Expence of the defensive force upon this first calculation exclusive of the contingent army.Dolls
Maritime fortifications 50,000
3 frigates of 32 guns, men &c—12 months. 481,806
6 Sloops of war 16 guns Do—Do. 445,020
1 Regt. or corps of Art. & Eng. Pay &c 12 mo.  216,061
1 Do Infantry Do—Do. 101,000
2 Companies Dragoons Do. Do. 58,354
Quarter masters dept. &c &c——200,000
1,552,221
Expence of the defensive force upon the second calculation, exclusive of the contingent army.
Maritime fortifications  50,000
3 Frigates & six Sloops of war  926,820
2 Regts. Art. & Engineers——422,032
2 Do. Infantry  202,000
6 Companies Dragoons  175,062
Quarter masters depart. &c  300,000
2,075,914


Title: To John Adams from William Heath, 10 April 1797
From: Heath, William
To: Adams, John

Sir
Roxbury April 10th 1797—

After public Bodies and more elivated Citizens be pleased to accept the Congratulations of an old Republican on your advancement to the Presidental chair of the United States of America.
In a Letter which you did me the honor to write me, Dated at Philadelphia April 15th 1776.—You were pleased to observe, “Altho I never had the pleasure and the honour of so intimate an Acquaintance with you as I wished, yet I have a long time been sufficiently acquainted with your Character, to have the utmost Confidence in your Patriotism, and your Judgement of the true Interest of our Country.”—Whatever grounds sir you had for such an opinion of me with equal sincerity, and better grounds, I express myself to you in the same sentiments, and do most heartily congratulate you and my Country on your advancement to be her first Majestrate.
You are called Sir, to guide the affairs of the States, at a time critical, and difficult, but by no means desperate, and for One, I rest fully satisfied that your knowledge of mankind,—Love for your native Country and discernment of what is for her true interest, will enable you to lead your Fellow Citizens in that path under the Guidance of Heaven, which will be honorary to yourself, and acceptable to the multitude of your brethren.
To be at Peace if it be possible with all the world to obtain right by fair negotiation, rather than by the Sword, to heal all with Justice, and Civility, to give those the first seats—who prove themselves our best friends, but to avoid being under the influence, or Controul of any, to Honour ourselves by loving our Own Country, to be United in this love and in an invariable support of the Constitutions and the Laws, and in the practise of all the Public and private virtues,—will not fail to render the United States, that great and flourishing People, which Providence seems to have designed them to be. that you sir will be an instrument of contributeing largely to this I am fully confident and you may rest assured that you will have the mite, of an old man in private life added to the able exertions of United America in support of your endeavours to serve your Country.
With every wish for your health and an Administration Prosperous to yourself, and your Fellow Citizens.
I have the honor to be / most respectfully / Sir / your most humble Servant

W Heath


Title: To John Adams from Samuel B. Malcom, 10 April 1797
From: Malcom, Samuel B.
To: Adams, John

Sir
Newyork apl. 10th 1797

Every information I can get with respect to a Certain affair I Shall take the Liberty as Early as possible to Communicate; the unfortunate business of the Collector is now becoming generally known, and is the principal Topic of the day.  I have learn’d from a gentleman Some information that you were desirous to know before I left you. I mean whether any intimacy subsisted between Coll. Burr Mr: Willett, and Lamb. This in a great degree has been the Case, their speculations and opinions are all in Common— The Collectors apology I Suppose transpires to day, as the naval officer is to make Known his retirement from the office
Coll Burr is to be a Candidate for Member of assembly This doubtless has within it some View to influence his Election for governor.  Owing as I am told, to a division in the federal Interest at a late Election for a Congressman in the Western part of this State Viz of Mr. Cochran. Mr. Jays interest will be greatly prejudiced and injured, but notwithstanding, this the general Satisfaction he has given during this Administration will secure him the Chair particularly when opposed by a Certain gentleman
No Annuals from Europe or any domestic intelligence of any importance, Mrs. Adams has not yet arrived.
I am Sir with respect / your Obt & humble servant

Samuel B Malcom


Title: From Joseph Anthony to William Allibone, 11 April 1797
From: Anthony, Joseph
To: Allibone, William

Philada. April 11th 1797

We do agree to supply William Allibone Esqr for the use of the Delaware Light House with Fifteen Hundred Gallons of the best winter Straind Sperm Oil for which he is to pay us Eight Shillings per Gallon on delivery, which is to be in the Course of one Month from this date

Joseph Anthony & Co


Title: To John Adams from Oliver Wolcott, Jr., 12 April 1797
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Adams, John

Apl. 12. 1797

The Secy of the Treasury respectfully  reports to the President of the United States.
That in the month of September 1796, it was discovered by the Secretary, that some  important errors existed in the accounts of John Lamb Collector of the Customs for the District of New York, in consequence of which, the Letter dated Sept. 14th. was written from this Department, of which a Copy is herewith transmitted.
A reasonable time having elapsed & no without any answer having been recd the subject was recalled to the Collectors attention by a Letter dated Oct. 26th. to which the reply dated Oct. 31st. was recd. transmitted.
The pressure of public business during the Session of Congress & the assurances contained in the Collectors letter of Oct. 31st. postponed any further enquirings on the part of the Sect. untill Feby 17th when the private Letter of that date was written.
The Letters herewith communicated from the Collector dated February 20th. & 23d. March 25th. & 31st. & April 11th. 1797;—from Benjamin Walker Esq dated March 24th. 1797.— & from William Seton Esq dated March 24th. April 1st. 3d. & 20th. 1797;— & from the Secretary dated Sept 14th March 21st. & 28th & April 5th. 1797—Now the important  of the enquiry to be a probably deficienty of about one hundred thousand Dollars shew the further progress & result of this very unpleasant enquiry.
As there remains but little reason to doubt that the enormous amount of nearly One hundred thousand Dollars has been misapplied by the Collector, the Secy feels it to be his duty to state circumstances, which he presumes will vindicate the Treasury, from answers for one any supposed want of vigilance.
1st. By the detailed accounts of the Collector rendered to & settled by the Auditor of the & Comptroller of the Treasury, it appears that the following balances of Cash remained in the Collectors hands at the close of each year. viz...
at the close of the year 1791$ 16,444.08at the close of the year 179214,744.12at the close of the year 179321,883.06at the close of the year 179447,514.41at the close of the year 179591,273.55
Except the last sum the balances of Cash on hand, were not more than even to be expected, & not more than the frequent amount of attention, or requiring a Report to the Secy.
The accounts for the last quarter of the year 1795, were not settled at the Treasury untill late in the year 1796, although they appear to have been frequently required.—the death of the Deputy Collector, Mr. Fillinghart, & the want of experienced Clerks, suggested plausible apparently solid apologies for the delay on the part of the Collector.—to which it may be added it is possible however, that the unsettled state of the Comptrollers Office,  untill within a few months, may have been the cause of some  apparent relaxation of  on the part of the Treasury.— The Secretary feels however a perfect satisfaction with the conduct of the accounting officers.
2nd With respect myself, of how to to the Secty. himself, he takes the liberty to observe that the Collector has punctually transmitted every week a Statement of his rects. & that it will appear that the balances of those Statements, have been weekly deposit deposited in the Bank to the Credit of the Treasurer—instead therefore of any Course of exciting suspicion the conduct of the Collector has been such as to inspire perfect confidence in his integrity.—A copy of the last weekly return dated March 31s. 1797 is transmitted, as a specimen of what has been the constant course of business.
But it now appears evident that the weekly returns have been mere fabrications adapted to cover fraud—the sums for which the Collector is indebted, have been suppressed; a document intended to convey accurate information has been made the instrument of deception;—the punctuality with which it has been rendered, has tended & may possibly have been designed, to inspire a false confidence.
The Secty on the ground of facts herein stated, fulfills a painful, but as he conceives an important duty, in stating reporting, that in his opinion John Lamb Collector for the District of New York, ought to be immediately removed from Office.
All which is / respectfully submitted


Title: From John Adams to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., 14 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

Philadelphia April 14. 1797

The President of the United States, requests the Secretary of the Treasury to take into his consideration the following Questions, and make report of his opinion in writing. Viz.
1st. Whether the refusal to receive Mr Pinckney and the rude orders to quit Paris, and the Territory of the Republic with Such circumstances of Indignity, Insult, and Hostility as we have been informed of are Bars to all further measures of Negotiation? Or in other words will a fresh Mission to Paris be too great an Humiliation of the American People in their own Sense, and that of the world?
2d. If another Mission be admissible, can any part and what parts or articles of the Treaty of amity & Commerce with Great Britain be offered to France or ultimately conceded to that Power in Case of necessity if demanded by her?
3d. What Articles of the Treaty of Alliance and of the Treaty of Commerce with France should be proposed to be abolished?
4th. Whether it will be prudent to say any thing Concerning the Consular Convention with that Power—and if it will what Alterations in it Should be proposed—
5th. whether any new articles such as are not Contained in Either of our Treaties with France or England Shall be proposed or Can be agreed to if proposed to the French Government?
6th. what Documents Shall be prepared to send to France as Evidence of Insults, and Injuries committed against the Commerce of the United States by French Ships of War, or privateers or by French Commissioners, Agents, Officers or Citizens?—
7th. In what Terms shall remonstrances against spoliations of property Capture of Vessels, Imprisonment of Masters and Mariners, Cruelties, Insults and Abuses of Every Kind to our Citizens, be Made.
8th. In what Terms Shall restitution, Reparation, Compensation and Satisfaction be demanded for such Insults, and Injuries
9. Shall demand be Made of payment to our Citizens for property, purchased by the French Government in Europe, or in the East or West Indies
10th.  Shall demand be Made of the French Government of payment for Vessels and Cargoes Captured and Seized whether by Ships of War or private Ships.
11th. Shall any Commissions of Inquiry and Examination like that with England be agreed to?—
12. What Articles in the British Treaty can be offered to France, without Compensation, and what with Compensation, and what Compensation Shall be demanded?
13. Shall a Project of a New Treaty abolishing the Old Treaties and Consular Convention be proposed to France?
14. Shall Such a Project with a Project of Instructions to the Minister be proposed and laid before the Senate for their Advice and Consent before they be sent to Europe.

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Timothy Pickering, 15 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Pickering, Timothy

Philadelphia April 15. 1797.

The President of the United States requests the Secretary of State, to commit to writing in detail, and report to the President as early as may be convenient, such particulars as the Secretary may think necessary or expedient to be inserted in the Presidents speech at the opening of the ensuing Congress, under the heads
1. of such Things as ought to be communicated to Congress, concerning the state of the Union.
2. of such Measures as ought to be recommended to Congress for their Adoption.
And the Presidents desire is that the Secretary would not confine himself to matters merely within the Department of State, but give himself a liberal Latitude, both in relation to the other departments, and to the Illustrations and Reasonings in support of his Opinions.
The President also requests the Secretary to report to him, his opinion, of the Articles which ought to be inserted in the Instructions of an Ambassador, Envoy Ordinary or Extraordinary, or Minister Plenipotentiary, to be sent to France upon supposition, it should be deemed consistent with the Dignity, Honour and Interest of the United States to send another Mission to that Power.

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., 15 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

Philadelphia April 15. 1797

The President of the United States requests the Secretary of the Treasury, to commit to writing in detail, and report to the President as early as may be convenient, such Particulars as the Secretary may think necessary  or Kreliant to be inserted in the Presidents Speech at the opening of the ensuing Congress, under the heads
1. of Such Things as ought to be communicated to Congress concerning the state of the Union
2. of Such Measures as ought to be recommended to Congress for their Adoption.
And the Presidents desire is that the Secretary would not confine himself to matters merely within the Treasury department, but give himself a liberal Latitude, but both in Relation to the other Departments and to the illustrations and Reasonings in support of his opinions.
The President also requests the Secretary to report to him his opinion, of the Articles which ought to be inserted in the Instructions, of an Ambassador Envoy ordinary or Extraordinary or Minister Plenipotentiary to be sent to France, upon Supposition it should be deemed consistent with the Dignity Honour and Interest of the United States to Send another Mission to that Power

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Commissioners of Washington City, 17 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Washington City, Commissioners of

Gentlemen
Philadelphia April 17. 1797

I am honoured by your Letter of the eleventh.
Sensible of the difficulty of obtaining Loans of Money in Europe at this time, and equally with my Predecessor aware of the evil of Stopping the public Buildings, I shall have no hesitation to approve of your Plan of employing Agents to Sell Lotts, for the best Prices they can obtain, provided they be not lower, than the Standard that you Shall prescribe: Provided also that you Shall judge this measure to be necessary.
The whole of this Business is so new to me, and I have so many pressing Arrestions that I must repose myself very much on your Wisdom and Experience.
With great / Regard I have the Honour to be / Gentlemen your mot humble servant

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to Commissioners of Washington City, 17 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Washington City, Commissioners of

Gentlemen
Philadelphia April 17. 1797

I have received and in due time, your favour of the third of this month.
I have looked into the Acts of Congress and the Deed of Trust, and although I find no literal Authority given to the President to convey Lotts by Deed of Gift, yet the terms and Conditions of the Sales are subjected to his Discretion.
The general Policy of the measure under Consideration, that of offering sites to the foreign Ministers being so obvious, I should have no doubt of the Authority of the President, to convey such Lotts, for very small pecuniary Considerations: but then, I should suppose that the Conveyances ought to be upon Conditions; for example, of erecting Buildings, within a certain reasonable term.
The pledging of the Lotts for the Payment of the Loan, appears not to diminish the Authority of the President to convey them, for such Considerations, and on such Covenants and Conditions as he shall judge most beneficial.
With great Esteem, I have the Honour / to be, Gentlemen, your most / obedient servant

John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Samuel Adams, Sr., 17 April 1797
From: Adams, Samuel, Sr.
To: Adams, John

Sir
Boston April 17th: 1797

I am loth to trespass one moment upon your time, which at present must be very precious.—But I am induced even to offer Mr:  Wyllys this recommendatory Letter to you. He is a native of our Commonwealth, and lately a traveller in Europe. Thô his travels have been merely on Mercantile Business, he appears to be very intelligent, observing, and impartial. He has seen Italy; and conversed among others with Genl. Buonoparte and the Pope. He has visited a number of the Italian States, also Algiers and France.—I flatter myself you will be pleased with his conversation and hope you will find it usefull to you. This is the only motive for my addressing a Letter to you at this Time.—
I congratulate you as the first Citizen of the United States—I may add of the World. I am my dear sir, notwithstanding I have  been otherwise represented in party papers;
Your Old and unvaried Friend—
Samuel Adams


Title: From John Adams to James Drake, 18 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Drake, James

Sir
Philadelphia April 18 1797

I sent 600 dollars this morning to the Bank to purchase a Postnote and they sent me the inclosed. I hope it will answer your purpose: But it is not exactly as I wished and intended. You will please acknowlege the rest of it by return of Post
I am Sir your obliged servant

John Adams


Title: From John Adams to William Heath, 19 April 1797
From: Adams, John
To: Heath, William

Sir
Philadelphia April 19. 1797

I have recd the Letter, you did me the honour to write me on the tenth of this month.
The Date of this Letter reminds me that it is two and twenty years Since our final Separation from Britain, and my Letter which you quote recalls old Times and scenes to remembrance.
I thank you, Sir, for your kind Congratulations on my Advancement.
The Times appear not to me, so critical and difficult, as they did on the 19. Ap. 1775, but they are not without their dangers.  Although Peace be very desireable, and Should be cultivated with Zeal, there is Such a Thing as a just and necessary War, Sometimes, let the Quakers Say what they will. If We have a War it will be forced upon Us, much against our Inclinations, but I know not that We need tremble before any Nation at a thousand Leagues distance, in a just Cause.
With great Esteem I have the honour / to be, Sir, your most obedient and / humble Servant

John Adams


Title: To John Adams from Carlos Martinez de Yrujo, 21 April 1797
From: Yrujo, Carlos Martinez de
To: Adams, John

(Translation)
Sir,Phila. 21. April 1797

I have recent grounds to believe that it is intended to carry into effect the expedition on the part of the English against upper Louisiana, by violating the territory of the US. according to what I informed you in my letter of the 2d March last; I must add that I know to a certainty that the English have made propositions to General Clarke in Georgia, in order to obtain his powerful influence in that state in conjunction with some persons who might make a diversion or serious attack against  Florida; and as by your letter of the 11th of last month you assured me that the US would take the necessary measures to cause their neutrality to be respected, I doubt not that in consequence of this my advice the Executive Government will  take suitable steps for effectually preventing the rights of neutrality being infringed by Georgia to the prejudice of the possessions of the King my Master.
I embrace this oppy. to renew to you my desires to serve you and pray God to preserve your life many years.

Carlos M. de Yriujo


Title: To John Adams from Oliver Wolcott, Jr., 21 April 1797
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Adams, John

April 21st. 1797

The Secretary of the Treasury in obedience to the command of the President of the United States, respectfully reports his opinion on the following questions.
1st. Whether the refusal to receive Mr. Pinckney, and the rude orders to quit Paris and the Territory of the Republic with such circumstances of indignity, insult & hostility as we have been informed of, are bars to all further measures of Negociation? or in other words, will a fresh Mission to Paris, be too great an humiliation of the American People in their own sense and that of the World?
A consideration of this question leads to a review of various proceedings of the American and French Governments.
It has been long known to the President and has been lately demonstrated to the Public, that since the year 1778, France has never relinquished the design then formed, of maintaining an improper influence in the Councils of America. Her system for accomplishing this purpose has been governed by two leading principles—1st. To impair and weaken the energy of the Federal Government, and 2nd. to excite & promote discontents, contests or actual war with Great Britain. The opinions & writings of influential characters in France, and the measures of the Ministers, Consuls & secret Agents of the Government of that Country here, have accordingly been uniformly directed to these ends. It is unnecessary to prove these positions in any other manner than by referring to the known opposition of French Agents to the adoption of the present Constitution of the United States; to the uniform connection between French politics & Antifederealism, and to the notorious popularity in France, of the opposers of every leading measure of our Administration.  This line of conduct is not to be reconciled with French ideas of Government; for while Antifederalism is here supported & encouraged the maxims & principles of the American Federalists who are the only advocates for any form of National Government in the United States, are held to be criminal when applied to France and to other Countries, where her views & Interests have led to a different policy. To prevent this inconsistency from becoming too apparent, and to lessen the influence & popularity of the friends of our National independence, every pretext has been seized to represent their measures & views as incompatible with friendship to France and the stipulations of our Treaties in her favor.
The progress of a measure so contrary to the views of France as an adjustment of disputes with Great Britain, could not be viewed by her with other emotions than of extreme solicitude. Accordingly every attempt was made to prevent overtures for negotiation;—After a Mission was determined on by the President the character of the Minister was attacked & stigmatised;—the public passions were stimulated by every possible artifice, improper suggestions were made to the American Minister at Paris, and by him countenanced and disseminated in this Country: nevertheless the negociation terminated in a Treaty with Great Britain.
From the nature of the publications which appeared before and immediately after the Treaty was divulged, it is almost certain that the French Government or at least their party here had in consequence of information irregularly obtained systematically concerted and arranged their objections; the more unexceptionable the Treaty was found to be, the more was France interested in defeating its effects.
The prejudices & discontents which had been artfully excited in the public mind, were no otherwise opposed by the Friends of Government, who were then unacquainted with the stipulations of the Treaty than by encouraging unreasonable expectations of important concessions by Great Britain, and of positive advantages to be derived from the negociation. When it was afterwards discovered that we had obtained nothing more than was our right, and on condition of performing some duties which had been neglected;—that our Commerce was to remain essentially on the old footing, and which though on the whole advantageous, was susceptible of great meliorations; and moreover when it was known that Great Britain would not relax from certain maxims of the law of Nations, which had been supposed to be unfavorable to pacific & commercial states, there was evidently a momentary declension of the public confidence, and a general sense of disappointment in the community.
It was intended that the first impression should be made upon the Senate; and it is now known that until the vote was actually taken a rejection by that body was confidently expected.
The next attack was made upon the President by means of popular addresses, which were aided by the artifice & chicanery of Mr. Randolph; a fortunate discovery of his perfidy however, accelerated a decision which would in any event have been shortly made, by the eminently impartial virtuous and enlightened mind of the Executive.
A reliance was then placed on the opposition of the House of Representatives; and it is known that this opposition was in defiance of the Constitution conducted with a concert & pertinacity, of which there are few examples.
The last resource has been an attempt to influence the election of a President of the United States, by means of the terror of War, and by measures of actual hostility against the Commerce of this Country.
On the ground of facts thus briefly detailed, it is assumed as a principle, that one of the objects of France is to regain a political influence in the United States, which has been lately in some measure impaired, and that her complaints against the Treaty with Great Britain & the measures adopted for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States, are pretexts to cover her design.
But though this is believed to be the truth, yet it is admitted to be the duty of the United States, to weigh dispassionately & to reply with temper, even to unfounded complaints of a foreign nation;—a cause founded in reason & Justice can never suffer by discussion.
It appears necessary to examine how far this has already been done.
The complaints of France respecting our constructions of the Commercial Treaty & Consular Convention, and the extent of her rights as a belligerent nation in relation to our Country, have been seasonably & fully discussed, and the constructions of the Executive, have in every instance been confirmed by both Houses of Congress, by the Judiciary Department, & by public opinion, as expressed by the Legislatures of most of the States—Decisions so made, and especially by a nation in a state of peace, and for the purpose of preserving that peace, cannot be rescinded, without national humiliation and dishonor.
With respect to the Treaty with Great Britain, which furnishes the principal subject of contention, it may be observed, that prior to the ratification by the President, a Copy was delivered to the French Minister, and that the objections stated by him, were fairly & fully refuted.
As the Measures pursued by the opposers of the Treaty in this Country justified apprehensions that discontents would be manifested by the French Government, Mr. Monroe was at an early period furnished with arguments to enable him to vindicate his Country. It is true they were not improved for this purpose, as soon as was expected, and yet if his declarations are to be credited, no specific objections were ever stated, until a short time before he entered upon the discussion in March 1796.—A reference to the correspondence prior to that time, will it is believed justify an opinion, that the French Government relied upon the efficacy of the opposition here, and were willing to preserve if possible the advantages arising from vague & indefinite expressions of discontent & resentment, rather than incur the hazard of counteracting the policy of their friends, and expose themselves to refutation by a specification of objections.
As soon as the President was informed that the French Government meditated an unfriendly course of conduct towards this Country he determined to send a new Minister to make explanations and selected Mr. Pinckney for this purpose. In the message to Congress dated January 19th. 1797, the President declared “That the immediate object of his (Mr. Pinckneys) Mission, was to make to the French Government such explanations of the principles and conduct of our own as by manifesting our good faith might remove all jealousy & discontent, and maintain that harmony & good understanding which it had been his constant solicitude to preserve”.
The character with which Mr. Pinckney was invested, was that of Minister Plenipotentiary, and his letter of credence of which a copy is in the possession of the Directory, announced that the mission originated in a disposition “Sincerely desirous to maintain that good understanding which from the commencement of their Alliance had subsisted between the two nations, and to efface unfavorable impressions, banish suspicions, and restore that cordiality, which was at once the evidence & pledge of a friendly union”. This circumstance is mentioned as it is thereby demonstrated that the special object of the Mission, must be known to the French Government.
Instead of receiving the explanations respectfully tendered by the Government of the Government of the United States, the Directory has declared to Mr. Monroe, though his powers had then terminated that they will not receive nor acknowledge another Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States, until the greivances of which France has complained have been redressed. The personal treatment which Mr. Pinckney received in Paris was moreover offensive, and a violation of the law of Nations;—it is now understood that he has received orders to quit the Territories of the French Republic.
But it may be asked;—have not the Directory some plausible pretext for rejecting Mr. Pinckney—and is it necessary to infer from their conduct that rupture is unavoidable?
As this question is of great magnitude & delicacy, particular attention is due to every suggestion which has appeared.
A communication in Bache’s paper of March 30th. contains the most skilful apology of which the case is susceptible, and is believed to indicate the wishes of the party which has hitherto been in opposition to the Government.
The communication states, that the refusal to recognise Mr. Pinckney is no more than was expected and indeed no more than was prognosticated by many of our Citizens;—that the Directory having suspended their ordinary Minister here, could not receive an ordinary Minister from the United States; that on the score of national etiquette it was out of the question and on the score of aggression it was less to be expected.
It was then proposed, with reference to what was done in the case of Great Britain, that an Envoy extraordinary should be appointed to suit the “solemnity of the occasion” and to carry with him the “temper & sensibilities of the Country”—Each of the above suggestions, as well as the proposed measure deserve a particular remark.
That the refusal of Mr. Pinckney was expected and was foretold by the Writers in Bache’s paper is certain, and it adds to other proofs that a party in this Country act in conjunction with and are devoted to the views of the Government of France; but that the refusal was proper or consistent with the professed friendship of France, the acknowledged rights of nations, or was required by the honor of the French Government, cannot it is presumed be shewn.
Is the refusal grounded on the suspension of the French Minister here? This pretext cannot be admitted for Mr. Monroe was suffered to remain in Paris and was recognised as Minister, long after the suspension of Mr. Adet was announced to him by the French Government—By their own Act the Directory have therefore allowed, that the suspension of their Minister here, did not impose on them the necessity of refusing to recognise our Minister in Paris—Besides it is remarkable that when Mr. Monroe parted with the Directory, he carried with him their “regrets”.
Is the refusal to be justified on the score of National Etiquette? It will be admitted that every Nation ought to consult its glory, to preserve its rank, and defend its independence; but it is at the same time equally true, that these duties are reciprocal among nations, and are demandable of the United States as well as of France.—Upon what does etiquette depend? Is it not a creature of Society, depending altogether upon conventional rules? If so, what are the rules and ideas of European nations on the point in question? It is answered—they agree in pronouncing that a minister Plenipotentiary and an Envoy Extraordinary are precisely of the same grade.—Minute distinctions exist indeed at some Courts,—in France no distinction has ever been recognised.—It is by Ministers Plenipotentiary, that Treaties are most commonly formed, and national disputes adjusted. For the purpose of adjusting our disputes with France, Mr. Pinckney was appointed, this object was moreover indicated in his letters of credence.
The objection respecting the grade of the Minister being entirely unfounded, what circumstance required the appointment of an Envoy Extraordinary? It is to be understood that the Directory are offended that Mr. Monroe has been recalled? This presupposes France to be capable of urging the inadmissible pretension, that the American Minister in Paris, must be a Character, disposed to favor the views of France in America, and not a Character disposed to promote the views of the American Government in France.
But it may be asked, is there not some just objection of a personal nature against Mr. Pinckney, which may palliate if not excuse the conduct of the Directory? It may be boldly answered, that there is none. In point of Character, connexions, education & public services he is truly one of our most distinguished Citizens—A sincere republican, a rational friend of the ostensive & avowed principles of the French Revolution, at the same time an honest man, and supporter of the honor & independence of his Country.
The result of these reflections is, that in refusing to recognise Mr. Pinckney, the Directory have knowingly rejected with circumstances of indignity & insult, a fair & honorable proposal for the discussion and adjustment of all disputes.
The foregoing observations are made principally with the view of vindicating the Executive from the imputation of having omitted anything in respect to France which was required by propriety; it is not intended to infer that rupture is unavoidable, or even on that supposition, that further measures of negociation ought not to be immediately instituted. It is for the interest of the United States to remain at peace, and War can never be terminated without negociation. Neither honor nor policy require, that the United States should ever hesitate about making advances for promoting peace & friendship with any Nation;—all that is requisite is, that the mode of making pacific overtures be such, as not to indicate servility of disposition, or unnecessarily to concede that Errors have been committed by the Government.
But it is not to be denied that the management of negociations with France in a manner compatible with National honor is a task of great delicacy requiring all the prudence, viligance & firmness of the Government.—To judge of the difficulties, the situation views & Interests of France, and of the United States must be surveyed.
On the Continent of Europe, France is every where successful,—Spain, Italy & Holland being completely within her power, at least for the present.—The Emperor of Russia is said to have refused to comply with the engagements of his Mother, and will probably remain neutral during the remainder of the War. The King of Prussia, though really interested in repressing the views of France, appears to be more strongly impressed with a desire to reduce the Emperor of Germany than alarmed for the security of his own dominions. England is triumphant on the Ocean, but deeply wounded in her vital part, in her credit & finances.
This being the state of things, it is most probable, that hereafter the energies of France, will be principally directed against England.—To effect the humiliation of this power, France is stimulated by the powerful motives of ambition, interest & revenge. In respect to one or both of these nations, the present war can hardly fail to produce an extreme & violent issue.
The means by which England is to be attacked are already developed. The nation is to be disturbed by real & pretended invasions; every Country which France can influence is to be required to restrict British Commerce;—Neutral Commerce of every kind is to be assailed. The consequences intended (if this be practicable) to be produced, are conquest, but at any rate, insupportable expences and destruction of Credit & Resources.
It is certain that the Commerce of the United States, is of vast importance to Great Britain; its security and extension are therefore incompatible with the views of her Enemy.
The opinion of France as expected in the notes published by Mr. Adet; in the address to Mr. Monroe, and in various publications,—evidently proceeds on a belief, that their system of commercial depredation is not irreconcileable with the design of maintaining a political influence in our public Councils.—It is probably imagined that for a time the people may be induced to vindicate France, at the expence of their own government; it may also be imagined, that the loss of Revenue & public credit, will render the administration of our present system impracticable and occasion its dissolution, thereby opening a door for influence, by means of civil dissentions.—and it is not impossible that there may be an ulterior motive confined to the breasts of ambitious men in power, inclining them to discredit of our inviting example of a mild form of Government, now known to be unattainable in France.
Though the internal affairs of the United States are in some respects mending, yet there are circumstances not a little embarrassing—There is still a large party blindly devoted to French attachments; in the Southern States the Slaves are numerous, and this description of men universally consider the French as friends & deliverers;—the influence & popularity of the General Government is inconsiderable in the Western States,—if not inclined to favor France, it may at least be believed, that many of their influential men are disposed to embrace any favorable opportunity for promoting the aggrandisement of the Western Country;—if intrusive settlements upon the new lands were to be favored, it is not unlikely that emigrations would take place in such a degree as would considerably weaken the Country. It will be remembered that the efforts of Virginia, were during the last war rendered nugatory by the settlement of Kentucky; the same thing may happen again upon a larger scale.
The Revenue of the United States at present depends principally on a flourishing state of Commerce, to substitute internal Revenues equal to any considerable deficiency, and sufficient to defray extraordinary expence, will be a work of great intrinsic difficulty;—in the discussions on this subject, party prejudices & foreign influence may operate under the disguise of Patriotism.
The credit of the Country has been injured by extravagant speculations, the evils of which will be rendered more perceptible as money becomes scarce.
The effects of any serious embarrassments in British credit, are at this time incalculable;—if they should produce distrust with respect to the solidity of all public funds, our credit will decline with that of Great Britain:—the last accounts however, encourage a hope, that public opinion will establish a discrimination favorable to this Country.
The present Government of the United States having never been tried in a state of war, leaves it a matter of speculative doubt, whether the organisation & distribution of the Executive power between the general & state Governments will be found in practice favorable to that order, vigour and concert, which in military operations is indispensible.
Of these disadvantages it is probable the French have formed exagerated calculations; indeed the insolence of some of their pretensions proves, that they entertain a proud confidence in their own power & contempt for our supposed imbecillity.
But in proportion to the magnitude & reality of the evil, it behoves the Government to be prompt & decisive. If a want of tone & energy has produced the danger, vigorous & energetic measures are the proper & natural remedy.
To save the honor of the Country, it is deemed important, that no Minister should enter France without a passport previously obtained, and without the formal consent of that Government to the commencement of Negociations.
It is also essential, that no imputation should rest upon the Government in respect to Mr. Pinckneys mission, and therefore that he should be a prominent Agent in the proposed Negociation.
But as the issuing of a new Commission to Mr. Pinckney, would be a measure liable to various constructions, as it might draw in question the sincerity of the professed desire for peace; or the propriety of the former Commission; and as on the principles herein assumed, no superior diplomatic grade is known, except that of Ambassador, which is not contemplated in any Act of Congress, and for which no compensation or one very inadequate is established, it appears to be expedient, that some one or more persons should be joined with General Pinckney in a new Commission.
But to impress France with a conviction, that the Government will not be swayed by their influence to intimate in an unexceptionable manner our opinion that the first overtures ought to have been accepted, and to preserve the confidence of the true friends of American Independence, a careful selection of Characters, appears to be indispensible.
If a person known to be attached to the views of France, or so reputed in the public opinion, were to be intrusted with this mission, the following unfavorable consequences may be apprehended.
1st. . The measure would carry an appearance in the view of France, of inability in the Government to resist her influence, or at best a compromise which would encourage future enterprises.
2nd. The reverse effect would be produced at home, the friends of Government, would be in some measure cooled & discouraged, while the spirits & activity of the opposite party would be excited.
3d. If the Commission consisted of two persons of opposite political sentiments, there would be danger of dissentions, which would disgrace & injure the Government.
4th. If in a Commission of three persons, two persons were appointed, who were reputed partizans of France, there would be extreme danger that something would be done, which would strengthen an influence already dangerous to the Independence of this Country and perhaps embroil us with another Nation.
5th. If in a Commission of three persons only one reputed partizan of France was named, he if a man of real principle & honor would not accept the appointment; and considering the utter incongruity of the opinions which prevail in respect to French policy & the conduct of our Government, such an arrangement would bear too much the aspect of a political Artifice, which could not deceive France, or conciliate parties in this Country.
6th. A Commission including one reputed partizan of France, and two persons of a different description might afford an opportunity to play into the hands of France, and might furnish a medium of Cabal with their party in this Country, rather than of negociation. If France is indisposed to accomodation as is not improbable, she might be enabled to propose terms to which the Commissioners might not be authorised to accede, and thus throw the odium of failure on the Government; or if the Commission should be invested with unlimited powers, an unfavorable Treaty might be made, or a failure occasioned by the disagreement of the Commissioners on a point apparently of little importance.—In short the responsibility for a bad measure would either be divided with the friends of Government, or they would be exposed to censure for what would appear to be unreasonable pertinacity.
7th. It is an undeniable fact, that there exists in the United States a dangerous French influence; and so bold has the faction become in some places,—that an avowed partiality for France in opposition to the Measures of our Government is no injury to the popularity of a public Character.—To keep themselves in countenance, this faction asserts the existence of a British influence in the public Councils. It is constantly affirmed that Mr. Jay & other estimable Characters are of a British Party—It is now required that a French partizan be sent to France on the ground of reciprocity. It is believed that a concession on this point would produce a dangerous association of ideas in the public mind; that it would give to a calumny the force of an argument; that it would encourage irregular enterprises of ambition, and weaken those patriotic attachments which are the only security of elective Governments.
8th. The sending of three Ministers to France from this Country would be attended with an expence which would excite unpleasant reflections in the minds of many, especially if it should be thought also adviseable to send one or more Ministers, to the Northern neutral Courts of Europe.
For the reasons which have been stated, the expediency of uniting two of the Ministers now in Europe with Mr. Pinckney is respectfully suggested.—If the idea be admissible, it is believed that Mr. King & Mr. Adams are the most proper Characters.
But Candor requires, that it should be stated to the President, that there are sincere and intelligent friends of the Government, who maintain the opinion, that one person of the Commission ought to possess credit & influence with France, and the party here in opposition to the Government. Their arguments are 1st. That the measure will furnish a bridge to the pride of France to retreat; 2d.—That it will give France the motive of endeavouring to strengthen her party, by appearing to yield peace to a leader of that party;—3d. That it will convince the people completely that the Government is at least as solicitous to avoid war with France, as it was to avoid it with Great Britain—4th. That it will take from the partizans of France the Argument, that as much has not been done in her case as in that of Great Britain—5th. That in case of failure, it will contribute to the important end of uniting opinion at home.—6th. That considering the power of France and the unprepared situation of this Country, it is wise by some early condesension to avoid the danger of future humiliation.
It is observable that some of the ideas advanced in favor of the measure under consideration have been suggested as leading to a different conclusion; it will of course remain with the President to decide, whether they shall be deemed arguments or objections after considering the following summary replies.
1st. Though the pride of France ought not to be offended, yet it ought not to be flattered at the expence of the pride of the United States—2nd. Though France may be soothed & immediate rupture avoided by encouraging an expectation of increasing her influence, yet the remedy is worse than the disease. War may be compared to an acute but not mortal disorder, while foreign influence is to popular Governments sometimes a slow, but always a corrosive and fatal poison——3d. It is self evident that the Government cannot desire a war with France, as it must be a war purely defensive, without a possibility of securing advantages;—4th. Besides measures equivalent to those adopted in respect to Great Britain have been already taken in respect to France, and her conduct has been & continues to be more violent, unjust & unreasonable than was experienced from Great Britain—5th. There is no reason to doubt that the real unsophisticated opinion—of America can be united in defensive measures combined with a tender of negociation such as is proposed, while all experience has shewn it to be impracticable to conciliate faction—the truces which are obtained by compromises with faction, ever resemble in their nature, the calms which precede Earthquakes.—6th. The power of France whatever its degree may be, is at present directed by a Government ambitious, unprincipled, neither desiring nor capable of enjoying peace—Whatever is attainable by fraud or violence, it will attain; to be safe from the enterprises of this power, it is necessary that the power of the United States should be organised, and put in a state capable of the greatest degree of activity; it is in this way alone that the Government can save the Country from humiliation.
Question 2nd. If another Mission be admissible, can any part and what parts or Articles of the Treaty of Amity & Commerce with Great Britain be offered to France or ultimately conceded to that power in case of necessity if demanded by her.
Answer—The provisions of the Commercial Treaty between the United States and France are for the most part unexceptionable, or at least as favorable as can be expected to be obtainable in a Treaty to be negociated at this time;—it will therefore be sufficient for the United States to manifest a willingness to enter cordially & sincerely into the discussion of any alterations which may be proposed by France.—If in other respects the existing disputes can be adjusted, and the rights of the United States secured, it may be adviseable to renounce the principle, that free ships shall make free goods, and to leave commerce in contraband Articles on the footing of the Laws of Nations;—this may be effected by assimulating the French Treaty in these respects to the Treaty with Great Britain.
But a construction of the law of nations was attempted to be established by the British in respect to Provisions, which the United States are bound to resist as well on the ground of Interest as consistency. It was asserted by Great Britain, that Provisions & other Articles not generally contraband, and not destined to places actually invested or blockaded, may become so under special circumstances.—The law of European nations is for the most part founded in reason; though in some respects it is certainly arbitrary & conventional.—Famine is universally considered an authorised and usual means of coercion in respect to besieged places;—but in respect to great Districts & particularly to such a nation as France, the doctrine was never applied, as its use never appeared to be practicable prior to the extraordinary state of things in France in 1793 & 1794. It appears to be unreasonable to make provision in public Treaties for rare & unusual events; the design of Treaties being merely to regulate the general conduct of nations.—Extreme cases when they occur, ought to be deemed exceptions to ordinary rules; the destruction of Prisoners of war and the exterpation of Nations in supposable cases, are vindicated by the most humane writers; but to specify these cases in a Treaty of Commerce, would be a violation of public decorum, and what has never been done.
As the sensibility of France has been excited by the second clause of the 18th. Article of the Treaty with England, it will be adviseable to use special endeavours to vindicate the conduct of the American Government in this respect.—The proper defence is, that Great Britain would not relax from her construction of the Law of Nations, and that Mr. Jay would not consent to abandon ours—that therefore the point remains unadjusted—that it cannot be denied, that in some cases, provisions may reasonably be deemed contraband, when not destined to places actually invested or blockaded;—the case of an Army or Fleet destined for invasion is of this kind: when New–York was possessed by the British, although we did not command the Sea, and could not blockade the British Army yet we did not hesitate to prevent by all means in our power, neutral nations from furnishing supplies of every kind;—the existence of such cases is a vindication of the Article agreed to by Mr. Jay, and the want of a specification of them, though much to be regretted, is to be attributed solely to the pertinacity of the British Government.
It has been constantly the object of the American Government, to restrict the list of contraband of War, to as few articles as possible, and this policy ought to be pursued.—Where the Law of nations is indefinite as in the case of provisions, attempts ought to be made by specifications, to restrain the exercise of arbitrary discretion. The result of these reflections is, that it ought to be an ultimatum to concede no commercial rights secured to neutral nations, by the European Law of Nations.
Question 3d. What Articles of the Treaty of Alliance and of the Treaty of Commerce with France, should be proposed to be abolished?
Answer. If a review of the existing Treaties shall be proposed by France, it will be proper to propose an abolition of the guaranty in the eleventh Article of the Treaty of Alliance. This stipulation must hereafter perpetually operate against the United States;—France is becoming more military even than formerly, and the general state of things in Europe leads to a belief, that wars will for a long time be frequent;—a guaranty of the Liberty, Sovereignity, Independence & Territorial Possessions of the United States by France, will give us no additional security;—on the contrary our guaranty of the possessions of France in America, perpetually exposes us to the risque & expence of war, or the dishonor of violating our faith.
But in proportion as we are interested in being discharged from this engagement, France will feel the influence of an opposite Interest, accordingly we see that a “reciprocal guaranty” of possessions was proposed in Mr. Genets instructions to be “an essential clause in the new Treaty” on the ground “That it nearly concerned the peace & prosperity of the French nation that a people whose resources increase beyond all calculation, and whom nature had placed so near their rich Colonies, should become interested by their own engagements in the preservation of these Islands”.
There being but little ground to expect that France will agree to the abolition of this stipulation, it remains to be considered whether it be susceptible of beneficial modifications.
The existing engagement is of that kind which is called a general guaranty by the Writers on the Law of Nations; of course the casus federis can never occur, except in a defensive War.
The nature of this obligation is understood to be that when a war exists really & truly defensive, the engaging nation is bound to furnish an effectual and adequate defence, in co-operation with the power attacked—:It follows, that the nation may be required in some circumstances to bring forward its whole force.
The nature, degree & quantity of succour not being ascertained, engagements of this kind are dangerous, on account of their uncertainty—There is always hazard of doing too much or too little, and of course of being involved in involuntary Rupture.
Specific Succours, have the advantage of being certain, and less liable to occasion War, but they allow no latitude for the exercise of Judgment & discretion as is the case with a general guaranty.
The great extent of the British power in the West Indies, and their probable future views in that quarter; the nature of our Government which will always make it extremely difficult to engage a military force to serve out of the Country, render obligations of this kind highly inconvenient—If the general guaranty cannot be shaken off, it may be expedient to stipulate for a moderate sum of money or a quantity of provisions to be delivered in some of our Ports in future defensive Wars, but unless the new terms which may be obtainable are clearly such as to lessen the existing obligation it appears adviseable to suffer it to remain as at present.
In other respects the Treaty of Alliance will have no future operation unless it may be deemed to bear a construction, that France has thereby renounced the right of conquering in future Wars, Canada or Louisiana for herself.
France has repeatedly contended, that the imposition of Fifty Cents per Ton on French Vessels arriving in the United States is contrary to the fifth article of the Treaty of Commerce. The Arguments in support of this pretension are unknown, but it is presumed to be unfounded—The reciprocal right of laying duties equal to those imposed on the most favored Nations, and without any other restriction, sums to be settled by the third & fourth Articles. The fifth Article appears to have been intended merely to define or qualify the rights of American Vessels in France. It is however desireable that the question be understood & properly settled, but the introduction of a principle of discrimination between the duties on Vessels of different foreign nations, and in derogation of the power of Congress to raise revenue by uniform duties on any objects—whatever, ought not to be lightly hazarded.
Question 4th. Whether it will be prudent to say anything concerning the Consular Convention with that power, and if it will, what alterations in it should be proposed?
Answer. The same opinion is entertained of the policy of proceeding in this case as with respect to the Treaties. France has complained that the Convention has not been executed on our part, and the United States ought to manifest a willingness to enter into explanations and to make any reasonable alterations.—But it does not appear safe or proper on any account to do anything which may favor the claims of the French Consuls to exercise any species of Judicial authority not merely voluntary—on the contrary exertions ought to be made to expunge every clause in the existing Convention which has been contrued to support pretensions of this nature;—the Convention originated in a design to establish undue influence, and in a want of confidence in our Laws and Tribunals under the Confederation—Whatever may have been the case formerly; under the present Government, justice is rendered promptly and with strict impartiality to foreigners—As there can be no just reason existing at this time for investing Consuls with powers interfering in any degree with the authority of our Tribunals, the claim ought to be resisted as derogatory from the honor of the Country, and as a precedent fraught with incalculable evils.
Question 5th. Whether any new Articles such as are not contained in either of our Treaties with France or England shall be proposed, or can be agreed to if proposed by the French Government?
Answer. The present state of things is so unsettled both in respect to France & other Countries, that it is difficult to say what would be the final tendency of any artificial regulations with respect to Commerce. The object at which the United States ought to aim—should be, the enjoyment in the greatest attainable degree of free Commerce with every nation in the World, reserving to our Government the right of imposing uniform duties on all nations at discretion—all proposals for the naturalization of Vessels or making a common Interest with any nation relative to any branch of business, ought to be rejected. With these principles in view, it will be hardly possible for a negociator to mistake.
Question 6th. What documents shall be prepared to send to France as evidence of Insults & Injuries committed against the Commerce of the United States by French Ships of War or Privateers, or by French Commissioners, Agents, Officers or Citizens?
Answer—It is conceived that the forms which were adopted in the case of Great Britain ought to be pursued in this case; with such alterations as the different modes of proceeding in the French Courts shall be found to require: In all cases the evidence ought to be the best which the nature of the case will admit.—Proof in particular cases of each description of Insults & Injury, for which the Government means to seek redress, ought to be selected and to be well authenticated—These cases, if a specification should be required by France, may be made to serve as a basis for general measures calculated to procure reparation.—When Mr. Jay preferred complaints, he was called upon to produce proofs; a few were produced, and the result was, an agreement to appoint Commissioners, or provision by some Article in the Treaty.
Question—7th.—In what terms shall remonstrances against spoliations of property, Capture of Vessels, imprisonment of Masters & Mariners, Cruelties, Insults & Abuses, of every kind to our Citizens be made?
Answer—It does not appear to be practicable to furnish the negociator with any very precise instructions on this head, as much will depend on circumstances which cannot be foreseen. The object of the Government is to produce a successful result; accordingly that stile & manner of proceeding will be best, which shall most directly tend to this end. It is not impossible, that there may be such a change of & and measures in France, as will render it politic to speak of the treatment we have received with severity—On the other hand the French Government may be determined to frustrate the negociation, and throw the odium on this Country, in which case, anything like warmth or harshness would be made the pretext. If things remain in their present situation, the style of remonstrance ought to unite as much as possible, calm dignity with simplicity; force of sentiment with mildness of expression; and be calculated to impress an idea of inflexible perseverance, rather than of distrust or confidence.—A negociator of Talents, with general intimations of what was desired, would not fail to execute the intentions of the President.
Question 8th. In what terms shall restitution, reparation, compensation & satisfaction be demanded for such Insults & Injuries?
Answer—Some of the ideas suggested in the last reply, appear to be applicable to this branch of the subject.—In any Official note it will be sufficient to express an expectation of redress, but without specifying the mode,—this being a matter of detail proper to be embraced in some Article of a Treaty.
Question 9th. Shall demand be made of payment to our Citizens for property purchased by the French Government in Europe, or in the East & West Indies?
Question 10th. Shall demand be made of the French Government of payment for Vessels & Cargoes captured & seized, whether by ships of war, or private ships?
Answer—It is believed that payment ought to be demanded in both these cases, and that it ought to appear to be a leading object of the mission to seek for satisfaction on these points—Mr. Pinckneys mission was to make explanations to the French Government, but as the overtures through him were rejected, the making of explanations ought not to be a primary but collateral motive to new advances. Indeed so important is the demand for reparation, that no Treaty ought to be concluded, which does not satisfactorily provide for this object.—Actual payment may be postponed by consent for a reasonable time, on account of the disordered state of the French Finances.—but the obtaining a promise of payment ought to be made an ultimatum.
Prior to the Treaty of 1778, France granted pecuniary aids to the United States, amounting to three millions of Livres, and in 1781, six millions more—Military supplies were also furnished at the beginning of the War, but for these Mr. Beaumarchais has received payment.—The United States ought to shew a willingness to allow these aids by way of discount against the sums due to Citizens of the United States, who would in this case become responsible to the said Citizens. This will be a mode of reducing the amount of those claims for gratitude, which are found to be so dangerous to the Independence, and offensive to the pride of the United States. The proposal will be popular here but may require some delicacy of management with France.—If the offer be not accepted, it will silence future demands.
Question 11th.—Shall any Commission of enquiry and examination like that with England be agreed to?
Answer—This mode of adjusting disputes, or at least of applying general principles to particular cases, has been long practised in Europe, and appears to be liable to no past exceptions. It cannot be expected that France will concede to us the priviledge of determining on the acts of her Government, and of her Officers & Citizens done out of our Jurisdiction;—and it is certainly better to institute a Tribunal in which the United States will have a voice & equal influence, than to trust wholly to French Tribunals.
Question 12th.—What Articles in the British Treaty can be offered to France without compensation, and what with compensation, and what compensation shall be demanded?
Answer—It is proposed that the Treaty with France be assimulated to that with England, by renouncing the principle that free ships shall make free goods, and by leaving the definition of contraband Articles on the footing of the law of Nations, upon condition that France shall agree to make reparation for injuries done to the United States, in the manner proposed, and upon condition, that the Treaties of Alliance & Commerce, and the Consular Convention shall be limited in their duration to a period not exceeding fifteen years, except such Articles as may be declaratory of a state of peace, or as are intended to regulate the conduct of the two nations, at the commencement of or during a state of War.
The tenth Article of the Treaty with Great Britain, though much complained of, appears to be liable to no just objection, and one proper to be adopted in a Treaty with France.
As the United States are rapidly rising in power & resources, it appears to be proper to avoid entering into indefinite obligations, other than such as are founded merely in Morality & Justice, and in their own nature of perpetual obligation—The time cannot be distant, when the United States, will be able to negociate with Europe on more advantageous terms than at present.
Question 13th.—Shall a project of a new Treaty abolishing the old Treaties & Consular Convention be proposed to France?
Answer—It is not seen that any advantage would result from proposing such a project, it being the present policy of the United States, not to be forward in promoting negociations, which cannot be otherwise favorable than as they may terminate the depredations which our Commerce is suffering, and procure satisfaction for those which have been already committed. If minute & accurate instructions are prepared shewing what the United States will concede if necessary to obtain these objects, their negociator can be at no loss how to conduct.
Question 14th.—Shall such a project with a project of instructions to the Minister, be proposed & laid before the Senate for their advice & consent before they be sent to Europe?
Answer—It does not appear to be in general safe or adviseable to consult the Senate in respect to the origination of Treaties—This was indeed done at New York in respect to a Treaty proposed with the Creek Indians, and perhaps the same thing has happened in other cases; but as the general practice has been otherwise, the question may be considered unembarrassed by precedents.
1st.—The instructions must expose the views & wishes of the United States, and the concessions which they will on any account make—If exposed to the Senate they will certainly be known to France; this would leave that power master of the negociation by enabling them to bring the United States immediately to concede every point, which under any circumstances might be proposed to be yielded.
2d.—There would be danger, that the Senate might be divided in opinion, and the want of that full information which is possessed by the Executive, might occasion influential & able men to mistake the interests & policy of the Country.—Erroneous opinions thus formed would have an unfavorable effect, upon all collateral measures of the Government.
3d.—It is doubtful whether the participation of the Senate in matters relating to foreign Affairs, except in the appointment of Ministers, and in consenting to Treaties conditionally negotiated by direction of the President be consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. The reasoning on which the doubt arises is as follows. The President has by the Constitution power to make Treaties by & with the advice & consent of the Senate provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. The making of a Treaty & the consent of the Senate are distinct Acts though both are necessary to fix the obligations of a Treaty. It is proper that this important power which is exclusively vested in the President & Senate, should be exercised in such a manner as will best promote the public Interests, and preserve the check arising from a distinct & independent responsibility. It is beleived that this will be most effectually done by considering, that in the distribution of the general power between the President & Senate; the right of instituting negociations, of instructing ministers, and of making or receiving propositions, which are to form the basis of Treaties, rests exclusively with the President,—and that the right of approving or rejecting in whole or in part all propositions in Treaties negociated by the President rests exclusively with the Senate. There are evidently good reasons for this distribution—Secrecy & personal confidence are frequently essential in the formation of Treaties, and these advantages would be lost by the participation of the Senate in negociations; it is sufficient that this body is allowed an absolute negative, which they certainly have upon the inchoate Treaties negociated by direction of the Executive.
The following leading principles ought to be prescribed to govern the negociation.
1st.—That no blame or censure be directly or directly imputed to the United States—
2nd.—That no aid be stipulated in favor of France during the present War.—
3d.—That no engagement be made, inconsistent with the obligations of any prior Treaty.
All which is most respectfully / submitted by

Oliv: WolcottSecy. of the Treasy.