Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Francis Childs’s Version), [27 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 27, 1788]
The hon. Mr. Hamilton. This is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise, and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its first impressions create a prejudice, before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils, than the advantages of a measure; and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger, than to see the necessity, of giving powers to our rulers. Hence I may justly expect, that those who hear me, will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in those which favour, their prepossessions.
After all our doubts, our suspicions and speculations, on the subject of government, we must return at last to this important truth—that when we have formed a constitution upon free principles, when we have given a proper balance to the different branches of administration, and fixed representation upon pure and equal principles, we may with safety furnish it with all the powers, necessary to answer, in the most ample manner, the purposes of government. The great desiderata are a free representation, and mutual checks: When these are obtained, all our apprehension of the extent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What then is the structure of this constitution? One branch of the legislature is to be elected by the people—by the same people, who choose your state representatives: Its members are to hold their office two years, and then return to their constituents. Here, sir, the people govern: Here they act by their immediate representatives. You have also a senate, constituted by your state legislatures—by men, in whom you place the highest confidence; and forming another representative branch. Then again you have an executive magistrate, created by a form of election, which merits universal admiration. In the form of this government, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the best writers have ever conceived. What more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one branch, in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches properly balanced: The executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their office during good behaviour. This organization is so complex, so skillfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the great scrutiny with success. Now what do gentlemen mean by coming forward and declaiming against this government? Why do they say we ought to limit its powers, to disable it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing the people? Has philosophy suggested—has experience taught, that such a government ought not to be trusted with every thing necessary for the good of society? Sir, when you have divided and nicely balanced the departments of government; When you have strongly connected the virtue of your rulers with their interest; when, in short, you have rendered your system as perfect as human forms can be; you must place confidence; you must give power.
We have heard a great deal of the sword and the purse: It is said, our liberties are in danger, if both are possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used, and so little understood. It is, that you shall not place these powers in either the legislative or executive singly: Neither one nor the other shall have both; Because this would destroy that division of powers, on which political liberty is founded; and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny. But where the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another, there can be no danger. All governments have possessed these powers. They would be monsters without them, and incapable of exertion. What is your state government? Does not your legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches. Sir, when we reason about the great interests of a great people, it is high time that we dismiss our prejudices and banish declamation.
In order to induce us to consider the powers given by this constitution as dangerous; In order to render plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit of the most important power in government; the gentleman complains that we shall not have a true and safe representation. I have asked him, what a safe representation is; and he has given no satisfactory answer. The assembly of NewYork has been mentioned as a proper standard: But if we apply this standard to the general government, our Congress will become a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse, and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system afford security? Can you have confidence in such a body? The idea of taking the ratio of representation, in a small society, for the ratio of a great one, is a fallacy which ought to be exposed. It is impossible to ascertain to what point our representation will increase: It may vary from one, to two, three or four hundred. It depends upon the progress of population. Suppose it to rest at two hundred. Is not this number sufficient to secure it against corruption? Human nature must be a much more weak and despicable thing, than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred of our fellow citizens can be corrupted in two years. But suppose they are corrupted; can they in two years accomplish their designs? Can they form a combination, and even lay a foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period? It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of things as they are; and hold up opinions in the light in which they ought to appear: and I maintain, that all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle or fact—That it is mere verbage, and idle declamation. The true principle of government is this—Make the system compleat in its structure; give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts; and the powers you give it will never affect your security. The question then, of the division of powers between the general and state governments, is a question of convenience: It becomes a prudential enquiry, what powers are proper to be reversed to the latter; and this immediately involves another enquiry into the proper objects of the two governments. This is the criterion, by which we shall determine the just distribution of powers.
The great leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace, and provide for the common defence. In these are comprehended the regulation of commerce; that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse; the support of armies and navies, and of the civil administration. It is useless to go into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general government are numerous, extensive and important. Every one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all respects and in every degree, equal to these objects. This principle assented to, let us enquire what are the objects of the state governments. Have they to provide against foreign invasion? Have they to maintain fleets and armies? Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the procuring alliances, or forming treaties of peace? No: Their objects are merely civil and domestic; to support the legislative establishment, and to provide for the administration of the laws. Let any one compare the expence of supporting the civil list in a state, with the expence of providing for the defence of the union. The difference is almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great-Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that kingdom, the ordinary expences of peace to those of war, are as one to fourteen: But there they have a monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous civil establishment, with which we have nothing in this country to compare. If, in Great-Britain, the expences of war and peace are so disproportioned; how wide will be their disparity in the United States; How infinitely wider between the general government and each individual state! Now, Sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every rational man will give an immediate answer. To what extent shall these resources be possessed? Reason says as far as possible exigencies can require; that is, without limitation. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation’s wants; it ought not therefore to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected invasions—long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the country: Shall not your government have power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations: They cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination. Will you limit the means of your defence, when you cannot ascertain the force or extent of the invasion? Even in ordinary wars, a government is frequently obliged to call for supplies, to the temporary oppression of the people.
Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we shall be obliged to fix some distinguishing line, which neither government shall overpass. The inconveniencies of this measure must appear evident, on the slightest examination. The resources appropriated to one, may diminish or fail; while those of the other may increase, beyond the wants of government: One may be destitute of revenues, while the other shall possess an unnecessary abundance: and the constitution will be an eternal barrier to a mutual intercourse and relief. In this case, will the individual states stand on so good a ground, as if the objects of taxation were left free and open to the embrace of both the governments? Possibly, in the advancement of commerce, the imposts may increase to such a degree, as to render direct taxes unnecessary; These resources then, as the constitution stands, may be occasionally relinquished to the states: But on the gentleman’s idea of prescribing exclusive limits, and precluding all reciprocal communication, this would be entirely improper. The laws of the states must not touch the appropriated resources of the United States, whatever may be their wants. Would it not be of more advantage to the states, to have a concurrent jurisdiction extending to all the sources of revenue, than to be confined to such a small resource, as, on calculation of the objects of the two governments, should appear to be their due proportion? Certainly you cannot hesitate on this question. The gentleman’s plan would have a further ill effect; It would tend to dissolve the connexion and correspondence of the two governments, to estrange them from each other, and to destroy that mutual dependence, which forms the essence of union.
Sir, a number of arguments have been advanced by an honorable member from New-York, which to every unclouded mind must carry conviction. He has stated, that in sudden emergencies, it may be necessary to borrow; and that it is impossible to borrow, unless you have funds to pledge for the payment of your debts. Limiting the powers of government to certain resources, is rendering the fund precarious; and obliging the government to ask, instead of empowering them to command, is to destroy all confidence and credit. If the power of taxing is restricted, the consequence is, that on the breaking out of a war, you must divert the funds, appropriated to the payment of debts, to answer immediate exigencies. Thus you violate your engagements, at the very time you increase the burthen of them. Besides, sound policy condemns the practice of accumulating debts. A government, to act with energy, should have the possession of all its revenues to answer present purposes. The principle, for which I contend, is recognized in all its extent by our old constitution. Congress is authorized to raise troops, to call for supplies without limitation, and to borrow money to any amount. It is true, they must use the form of recommendations and requisitions: but the states are bound by the solemn ties of honor, of justice, of religion, to comply without reserve.
Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a principle, that no government but a despotism can exist in a very extensive country.  This is a melancholy consideration indeed. If it were founded on truth, we ought to dismiss the idea of a republican government, even for the state of New-York. This idea has been taken from a celebrated writer, who, by being misunderstood, has been the occasion of frequent fallacies in our reasoning on political subjects. But the position has been misapprehended; and its application is entirely false and unwarrantable: It relates only to democracies, where the whole body of the people meet to transact business; and where representation is unknown. Such were a number of antient, and some modern independent cities. Men who read without attention, have taken these maxims respecting the extent of country; and, contrary to their proper meaning, have applied them to republics in general. This application is wrong, in respect to all representative governments; but especially in relation to a confederacy of states, in which the supreme legislature has only general powers, and the civil and domestic concerns of the people are regulated by the laws of the several states. This distinction being kept in view, all the difficulty will vanish, and we may easily conceive, that the people of a large country may be represented as truly, as those of a small one. An assembly constituted for general purposes, may be fully competent to every federal regulation, without being too numerous for deliberate conduct. If the state governments were to be abolished, the question would wear a different face: but this idea is inadmissible. They are absolutely necessary to the system. Their existence must form a leading principle in the most perfect constitution we could form. I insist, that it never can be the interest or desire of the national legislature, to destroy the state governments. It can derive no advantage from such an event; But, on the contrary, would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid in executing the laws, and conveying the influence of government to the doors of the people. The union is dependent on the will of the state governments for its chief magistrate, and for its senate. The blow aimed at the members, must give a fatal wound to the head; and the destruction of the states must be at once a political suicide. Can the national government be guilty of this madness? what inducements, what temptations can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station; will they increase the national strength; will they multiply the national resources; will they make themselves more respectable, in the view of foreign nations, or of their fellow citizens, by robbing the states of their constitutional privileges? But imagine, for a moment, that a political frenzy should seize the government. Suppose they should make the attempt. Certainly, Sir, it would be forever impracticable. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by reason and experience. It has been proved, that the members of republics have been, and ever will be, stronger than the head. Let us attend to one general historical example. In the antient feudal governments of Europe, there were, in the first place a monarch; subordinate to him, a body of nobles; and subject to these, the vassals or the whole body of the people. The authority of the kings was limited, and that of the barons considerably independent. A great part of the early wars in Europe were contests between the king and his nobility. In these contests, the latter possessed many advantages derived from their influence, and the immediate command they had over the people; and they generally prevailed. The history of the feudal wars exhibits little more than a series of successful encroachments on the prerogatives of monarchy. Here, Sir, is one great proof of the superiority, which the members in limited governments possess over their head. As long as the barons enjoyed the confidence and attachment of the people, they had the strength of the country on their side, and were irresistable. I may be told, that in some instances the barons were overcome: But how did this happen? Sir, they took advantage of the depression of the royal authority, and the establishment of their own power, to oppress and tyrannise over their vassals. As commerce enlarged, and as wealth and civilization encreased, the people began to feel their own weight and consequence: They grew tired of their oppressions; united their strength with that of the prince; and threw off the yoke of artistocracy. These very instances prove what I contend for: They prove, that in whatever direction the popular weight leans, the current of power will flow: Wherever the popular attachments lie, there will rest the political superiority. Sir, can it be supposed that the state governments will become the oppressors of the people? Will they forfeit their affections? Will they combine to destroy the liberties and happiness of their fellow citizens, for the sole purpose of involving themselves in ruin? God forbid! The idea, Sir, is shocking! It outrages every feeling of humanity, and every dictate of common sense!
There are certain social principles in human nature, from which we may draw the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of individuals, and of communities. We love our families, more than our neighbours: We love our neighbours, more than our countrymen in general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity, as they depart from the center; and become languid, in proportion to the expansion of the circle, on which they act. On these principles, the attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the states governments: They will be a mutual protection and support. Another source of influence, which has already been pointed out, is the various official connections in the states. Gentlemen endeavour to evade the force of this, by saying that these offices will be insignificant. This is by no means true. The state officers will ever be important, because they are necessary and useful. Their powers are such, as are extremely interesting to the people; such as affect their property, their liberty and life. What is more important, than the administration of justice, and the execution of the civil and criminal laws? Can the state governments become insignificant, while they have the power of raising money independently and without controul? If they are really useful; If they are calculated to promote the essential interests of the people; they must have their confidence and support. The states can never lose their powers, till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties. These must go together, they must support each other, or meet one common fate. On the gentleman’s principle, we may safely trust the state governments, tho’ we have no means of resisting them: but we cannot confide in the national government, tho’ we have an effectual, constitutional guard against every encroachment. This is the essence of their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond conception.
With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I shall certainly admit that the constitution ought to be so formed, as not to prevent the states from providing for their own existence; and I maintain that it is so formed; and that their power of providing for themselves is sufficiently established. This is conceded by one gentleman, and in the next breath, the concession is retracted. He says, Congress have but one exclusive right in taxation; that of duties on imports: Certainly then, their other powers are only concurrent. But to take off the force of this obvious conclusion, he immediately says that the laws of the United States are supreme; and that where there is one supreme, there cannot be a concurrent authority: and further, that where the laws of the union are supreme, those of the states must be subordinate; because, there cannot be two supremes. This is curious sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together, is false. They are inconsistent only when they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme, as to all their proper, constitutional objects: The laws of the states are supreme in the same way. These supreme laws may act on different objects, without clashing; or they may operate on different parts of the same common object, with perfect harmony. Suppose both governments should lay a tax of a penny on a certain article: Has not each an independent and uncontrolable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim—that there can not be two supremes—is simply this:—Two powers cannot be supreme over each other. This meaning is entirely perverted by the gentlemen. But, it is said, disputes between collectors are to be referred to the federal courts. This is again wandering in the field of conjecture. But suppose the fact certain: Is it not to be presumed, that they will express the true meaning of the constitution and the laws? Will they not be bound to consider the concurrent jurisdiction; to declare that both the taxes shall have equal operation; that both the powers, in that respect, are sovereign and co-extensive? If they transgress their duty, we are to hope that they will be punished. Sir, we can reason from probabilities alone. When we leave common sense, and give ourselves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty, no security in our reasonings.
I imagine I have stated to the committee abundant reasons to prove the entire safety of the state governments and of the people. I would go into a more minute consideration of the nature of the concurrent jurisdiction, and the operation of the laws, in relation to revenue; but at present I feel too much indisposed to proceed. I shall, with the leave of the committee, improve another opportunity of expressing to them more fully my ideas on this point. I wish the committee to remember, that the constitution under examination is framed upon truly republican principles; and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for the common protection and the general welfare of the United States, it must be utterly repugnant to this constitution, to subvert the state governments, or oppress the people.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 28 (Francis Childs’s Version), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
The hon. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, in the course of these debates, it has been suggested, that the state of New-York has sustained peculiar misfortunes, from the mode of raising revenues by requisitions. I believe we shall now be able to prove, that this state, in the course of the late revolution, suffered the extremes of distress on account of this delusive system. To establish these facts, I shall beg leave to introduce a series of official papers, and resolutions of this state, as evidence of the sentiments of the people, during the most melancholy periods of the war. I shall request the secretary to read these papers, in the order in which I point them out.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of June 28 (John McKesson’s Version), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—Requests several Resolutions & reports from the Journal of the Senate be read—
7 Septr. 1780—part of the Governors message—
9 Septr. part of the Answer of the Senate
10 Octr. Resolution of assembly page 33
5th Feby 1781—and a Letter from Rivingtons Paper
19 March
29 March 1781
21 Novr 1781
20 July 1782 Resolutions


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of June 28, [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton. We shall make the same reservation. By the indisputable construction of these resolutions, we shall prove that this state was once on the verge of destruction, for want of an energetic government. To this point we shall confine ourselves.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of June 28 (Francis Childs’s Version), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Childs, Francis
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton. The honorable gentleman from Ulster has given a turn to the introduction of those papers, which was never in our contemplation. He seems to insinuate that they were brought forward, with a view of shewing an inconsistency in the conduct of some gentlemen—perhaps of himself. Sir, the exhibition of them had a very different object. It was to prove that this state once experienced hardships and distresses to an astonishing degree, for want of the assistance of the other states. It was to shew the evils we suffered since, as well as before the establishment of the confederation, from being compelled to support the burthen of the war; That requisitions have been unable to call forth the resources of the country; That requisitions have been the cause of a principal part of our calamities; that the system is defective and rotten, and ought forever to be banished from our government. It was necessary, with deference to the honorable gentleman, to bring forward these important proofs of our argument, without consulting the feelings of any man.

That the human passions should flow from one extreme to another, I allow is natural. Hence the mad project of creating a dictator. But it is equally true, that this project was never ripened into a deliberate and extensive design. When I heard of it, it met my instant disapprobation. The honorable gentleman’s opposition too is known and applauded. But why bring these things into remembrance? Why affect to compare this temporary effusion with the serious sentiments our fellow citizens entertained of the national weaknesses? The gentleman has made a declaration of his wishes for a strong federal government. I hope this is the wish of all. But why has he not given us his ideas of the nature of this government, which is the object of his wishes? Why does he not describe it? We have proposed a system, which we supposed would answer the purposes of strength and safety. The gentleman objects to it, without pointing out the grounds, on which his objections are founded, or shewing us a better form. These general surmises, never lead to the discovery of truth. It is to be desired, that the gentleman would explain particularly the errors in this system, and furnish us with their proper remedies. The committee remember that a grant of an impost to the United States, for twenty-five years, was requested by Congress. Though this was a very small addition of power to the federal government, it was opposed in this state, without any reasons being offered. The dissent of New-York and Rhode-Island frustrated a most important measure. The gentleman says, he was for granting the impost; yet he acknowleges, he could not agree to the mode recommended. But it was well known, that Congress had declared, that they could not receive the accession of the states, upon any other plan than that proposed. In such case, propositions for altering the plan amounted to a positive rejection. At this time, Sir, we were told it was dangerous to grant powers to Congress. Did this general argument indicate a disposition to grant the impost in any shape? I should myself have been averse to the granting of very extensive powers: But the impost was justly considered as the only means of supporting the union. We did not then contemplate a fundamental change in government. From my sense of the gentlemen’s integrity, I am bound to believe, that they are attached to a strong united government; and yet I find it difficult to draw this conclusion from their conduct or their reasonings.
Sir, with respect to the subject of revenue, which was debated yesterday, it was asserted that in all matters of taxation, except in the article of imposts, the united and individual states had a concurrent jurisdiction; that the state governments had an independent authority, to draw revenues from every source but one. The truth of these positions will appear on a slight investigation. I maintain, that the word supreme imports no more than this; that the constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, cannot be controuled or defeated by any other law. The acts of the United States therefore will be absolutely obligatory, as to all the proper objects and powers of the general government. The states as well as individuals are bound by these laws. But the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain sphere, and when they depart from this sphere, they are no longer supreme or binding. In the same manner the states have certain independent powers, in which their laws are supreme: For example, in making and executing laws concerning the punishment of certain crimes, such as murder, theft, &c. the states cannot be controuled. With respect to certain other objects, the powers of the two governments are concurrent, and yet supreme. I instanced, yesterday, a tax on any specific article. Both might lay the tax; both might collect it without clashing or interference. If the individual should be unable to pay both, the first seizure would hold the property. Here the laws are not in the way of each other; they are independent and supreme. The case is like that of two creditors: Each has a distinct demand; the debtor is held equally for the payment of both. Their suits are independent; and if the debtor cannot pay both, he who takes the first step, secures his debt. The individual is precisely in the same situation, whether he pays such a sum to one, or to two. No more will be required of him to supply the public wants, than he has ability to afford. That the states have an undoubted right to lay taxes in all cases in which they are not prohibited, is a position founded on the obvious and important principle in confederated governments, that whatever is not expressly given to the federal head, is reserved to the members. The truth of this principle must strike every intelligent mind. In the first formation of government by the association of individuals, every power of the community is delegated, because the government is to extend to every possible object; Nothing is reserved, but the unalienable rights of mankind: But when a number of these societies unite for certain purposes, the rule is different, and from the plainest reason: They have already delegated their sovereignty, and their powers to their several governments; and these cannot be recalled, and given to another, without an express act. I submit to the committee whether this reasoning is not conclusive. Unless therefore we find that the powers of taxation are exclusively granted, we must conclude, that there remains a concurrent authority. Let us then enquire if the constitution gives such exclusive powers to the general government. Sir, there is not a syllable in it, that favours this idea: Not a word importing an exclusive grant, except in the article of imposts. I am supported in my general position, by this very exception. If the states are prohibited from laying duties on imports, the implication is clear. Now, what proportion will the duties on imports bear to the other ordinary resources of the country? We may now say, one third; but this will not be the case long. As our manufactures increase, foreign importations must lessen. Here are two thirds at least of the resources of our country open to the state governments. Can it be imagined then, that the states will lose their existence or their importance for want of revenues? The propriety of Congress possessing an exclusive power over the impost appears from the necessity of their having a considerable portion of our resources, to pledge as a fund for the reduction of the debts of the United States. When you have given a power of taxation to the general government, none of the states individually will be holden for the discharge of the federal obligations: The burthen will be on the union.
The gentleman says, that the operation of the taxes will exclude the states, on this ground, that the demands of the community are always equal to its resources; that Congress will find a use for all the money the people can pay. This observation, if designed as a general rule, is in every view unjust. Does he suppose the general government will want all the money the people can furnish; and also that the state governments will want all the money the people can furnish? What contradiction is this? But if this maxim be true, how does the wealth of a country ever increase? How are the people enabled to accumulate fortunes? Do the burthens regularly augment, as its inhabitants grow prosperous and happy. But if indeed all the resources are required for the protection of the people, it follows that the protecting power should have access to them. The only difficulty lies in the want of resources: If they are adequate, the operation will be easy: If they are not, taxation must be restrained: Will this be the fate of the state taxes alone? Certainly not. The people will say no. What will be the conduct of the national rulers? The consideration will not be, that our imposing the tax will destroy the states, for this cannot be effected; but that it will distress the people, whom we represent, and whose protectors we are. It is unjust to suppose that they will be altogether destitute of virtue and prudence: it is unfair to presume that the representatives of the people will be disposed to tyrannize, in one government more than in another. If we are convinced that the national legislature will pursue a system of measures unfavorable to the interests of the people, we ought to have no general government at all. But if we unite, it will be for the accomplishment of great purposes: These demand great resources, and great powers. There are certain extensive and uniform objects of revenue, which the United States will improve, and to which, if possible they will confine themselves. Those objects which are more limited, and in respect to which, the circumstances of the states differ, will be reserved for their use: A great variety of articles will be in this last class of objects, to which only the state laws will properly apply. To ascertain this division of objects is the proper business of legislation: It would be absurd to fix it in the constitution, both because it would be too extensive and intricate, and because alteration of circumstances must render a change of the division indispensible. Constitutions should consist only of general provisions: The reason is, that they must necessarily be permanent, and that they cannot calculate for the possible changes of things. I know that the states must have their resources; but I contend that it would be improper to point them out particularly in the constitution.
Sir, it has been said that a poll-tax is a tyrannical tax: But the legislature of this state can lay it, whenever they please. Does then our constitution authorize tyranny? I am as much opposed to a capitation as any man: Yet who can deny, that there may exist certain circumstances, which will render this tax necessary. In the course of a war, it may be necessary to lay hold of every resource: and, for a certain period, the people may submit to it. But on removal of the danger, or the return of peace, the general sense of the community would abolish it. The United Netherlands were obliged, on a emergency, to give up one half of their property to the government. It has been said, that it will be impossible to exercise this power of taxation: If it cannot be exercised, why be alarmed at it? But the gentlemen say that the difficulty of executing it with moderation will necessarily drive the government into despotic measures. Here again they are in the old track of jealousy and conjecture. Whenever the people feel the hand of despotism, they will not regard forms and parchments. But the gentlemen’s premises are as false as their conclusion. No one reason can be offered, why the exercise of the power should be impracticable: No one difficulty can be pointed out, which will not apply to our state governments. Congress will have every means of knowledge, that any legislature can have. From general observation, and from the revenue systems of the several states, they will derive information as to the most eligible modes of taxation. If a land tax is the object, cannot Congress procure as perfect a valuation as any other assembly? Can they not have all the necessary officers for assessment and collection? Where is the difficulty? Where is the evil? They never can oppress a particular state, by an unequal imposition; because the constitution has provided a fixed ratio, a uniform rule, by which this must be regulated. The system will be founded upon the most easy and equal principles—to draw as much as possible from direct taxation; to lay the principal burthens on the wealthy, &c. Even ambitious and unprincipled men will form their system so, as to draw forth the resources of the country in the most favorable and gentle methods; because such will be ever the most productive. They never can hope for success, by adopting those arbitrary modes, which have been used in some of the states.
A gentleman yesterday passed many enconiums on the character and operations of the state governments. The question has not been, whether their laws have produced happy or unhappy effects: The character of our confederation is the subject of our controversy. But the gentleman concludes too hastily. In many of the states, government has not had a salutary operation. Not only Rhode-Island, but several others have been guilty of indiscretions and misconduct—of acts, which have produced misfortune and dishonor. I grant that the government of New-York has operated well; and I ascribe it to the influence of those excellent principles, in which the proposed constitution and our own are so congenial. We are sensible that private credit is much lower in some states, than it is in ours. What is the cause of this? Why is it at the present period, so low even in this state? Why is the value of our land depreciated? It is said there is a scarcity of money in the community: I do not believe this scarcity to be so great, as is represented. It may not appear; It may be retained by its holders; but nothing more than stability and confidence in the government is requisite to draw it into circulation. It is acknowledged that the general government has not answered its purposes. Why? We attribute it to the defects of the revenue system. But the gentlemen say, the requisitions have not been obeyed, because the states were impoverished. This is a kind of reasoning that astonishes me. The records of this state—the records of Congress prove that, during the war, New-York had the best reason to complain of the non-compliance of the other states. I appeal to the gentlemen. Have the states, who have suffered least, contributed most? No sir—the fact is directly the reverse. This consideration is sufficient entirely to refute the gentlemen’s reasoning. Requisitions will ever be attended with the same effects. This depends on principles of human nature, that are as infallible as any mathematical calculations. States will contribute or not, according to their circumstances and interests: They will all be inclined to throw off the burthens of government upon their neighbours. These positions have been so fully illustrated and proved in former stages of this debate, that nothing need be added. Unanswerable experience—stubborn facts have supported and fixed them. Sir, to what situation is our Congress now reduced! It is notorious, that with the utmost difficulty they maintain their ordinary officers, and support the mere form of a federal government. How do we stand with respect to foreign nations? It is a fact, that should strike us with surprize and with shame, that we are obliged to borrow money, in order to pay the interests of our debts. It is a fact, that these debts are every day accumulating by compound interest. This, sir, will one day endanger the peace of our country, and expose us to vicisitudes the most alarming. Such is the character of requisitions; Such the melancholy, dangerous condition, to which they have reduced us. Now, sir, after this full and fair experiment, with what countenance do gentlemen come forward, to recommend the ruinous principle, and make it the basis of a new government? Why do they affect to cherish this political demon, and present it once more to our embraces? The gentleman observes, that we cannot, even in a single state, collect the whole of a tax; Some counties will necessarily be deficient: In the same way, says he, some states will be delinquent. If this reasoning were just, I should expect to see the states pay, like the counties, in proportion to their ability; which is not the fact.
I shall proceed now more particularly to the proposition before the committee. This clearly admits, that the unlimited power of taxation, which I have been contending for, is proper. It declares that after the states have refused to comply with the requisitions, the general government may enforce its demands. While the gentlemen’s proposal admits my principle, in its fullest latitude, the whole course of their argument is against it. The mode they point out would involve all the inconveniences, against which they would wish to guard. Suppose the gentlemen’s scheme should be adopted; Would not all the resources of the country be equally in the power of Congress? The states cannot have but one opportunity of refusal. After having passed through the empty ceremony of a requisition, the general government can enforce all its demands, without limitation or resistance. The states will either comply, or they will not. If they comply, they are bound to collect the whole of the tax from the citizens. The people must pay it. What then will be the disadvantage of its being levied and collected by Congress, in the first instance? It has been proved, as far as probabilities can go, that the federal government will, in general, take the laws of the several states as its rule, and pursue those measures, to which the people are most accustomed. But if the states do not comply, what is the consequence? If the power of compulsion be a misfortune to the states, they must now suffer it, without opposition or complaint. I shall shew too, that they must feel it in an aggravated degree. It may frequently happen, that, though the states formally comply with the requisitions, the avails will not be fully realized by Congress: The states may be dilatory in the collection and payment, and may form excuses for not paying the whole: There may be also partial compliances, which will subject the Union to inconveniences. Congress therefore in laying the tax will calculate for these losses and inconveniences: They will make allowances for the delays and delinquencies of the states, and apportion their burthens accordingly: They will be induced to demand more than their actual wants. In these circumstances the requisitions will be made upon calculations in some measure arbitrary. Upon the constitutional plan, the only enquiry will be—how much is actually wanted; and how much can the object bear, or the people pay? On the gentlemen’s scheme, it will be—what will be the probable deficiencies of the states? for we must increase our demands in proportion, whatever the public wants may be, or whatever may be the abilities of the people. Now suppose the requisition is totally rejected, it must be levied upon the citizens, without reserve. This will be like inflicting a penalty upon the states: It will place them in the light of criminals. Will they suffer this? Will Congress presume so far? If the states solemnly declare they will not comply, does not this imply a determination not to permit the exercise of the coercive power? The gentlemen cannot escape the dilemma, into which their own reasoning leads them. If the states comply, the people must be taxed; If they do not comply, the people must equally be taxed: The burthen, in either case, will be the same; the difficulty of collecting the same. Sir, if these operations are merely harmless and indifferent, why play the ridiculous farce? If they are inconvenient, why subject us to their evils? It is infinitely more eligible, to lay a tax originally, which will have uniform effects throughout the Union; which will operate equally and silently. The United States will then be able to ascertain their resources, and to act with vigor and decision: All hostility between the governments will be prevented: The people will contribute regularly and gradually, for the support of government; and all odious, retrospective enquiries will be precluded.
But, the ill effects of the gentlemen’s plan do not terminate here. Our own state will suffer peculiar disadvantages from the measure. One provision in the amendment is, that no direct taxes shall be laid till after the impost and excise shall be found insufficient for the public exigencies; and that no excise shall be laid on articles of the growth or manufacture of the United States. Sir, the favorable maritime situation of this state, and our large and valuable tracts of unsettled land, will ever lead us to commerce and agriculture as our proper objects. Unconfined, and tempted by the prospect of easy subsistance and independence, our citizens, as the country populates, will retreat back, and cultivate the western parts of our state. Our population, though extensive, will never be crowded, and consequently we shall remain an importing and agricultural state. Now, what will be the operation of the proposed plan? The general government, restrained by the constitution from a free application to other resources, will push imposts to an extreme. Will excessive impositions on our commerce be favorable to the policy of this state? Will they not directly oppose our interests. Similar will be the operation of the other clause of the amendment, relative to excise. Our neighbours not possessed of our advantages for commerce and agriculture, will become manufacturers: Their property will, in a great measure, be vested in the commodities of their own production: But a small proportion will be in trade, or in lands. Thus, on the gentlemen’s scheme, they will be almost free from burthens, while we shall be loaded with them. Does not the partiality of this strike every one? Can gentlemen, who are laboring for the interest of their state, seriously bring forward such propositions? It is the interest of New-York, that those articles should be taxed, in the production of which, the other states exceed us. If we are not a manufacturing people, excises on manufactures will ever be for our advantage. This position is indisputable. Sir, I agree, that it is not good policy to lay excises to any considerable amount, while our manufactures are in their infancy—but are they always to be so? In some of the states, they already begin to make considerable progress. In Connecticut such encouragement is given, as will soon distinguish that state. Even at the present period, there is one article, from which, a revenue may very properly be drawn: I speak of ardent spirits. New-England manufactures more than a hundred gallons to our one. Consequently, an excise on spirits at the still-head would make those states contribute in a vastly greater proportion than ourselves. In every view, excises on domestic manufactures would benefit New-York. But the gentlemen would defeat the advantages of our situation, by drawing upon us all the burthens of government. The nature of our union requires, that we should give up our state impost: The amendment would forfeit every other advantage. This part of the constitution should not be touched. The excises were designed as a recompence to the importing states, for relinquishing their imposts. Why then should we reject the benefits conferred upon us? Why should we run blindly against our own interest?
Sir, I shall no further enlarge on this argument. My exertions have already exhausted me. I have persevered, from an anxious desire to give the committee the most complete conception of this subject. I fear however, that I have not been so successful, as to bestow upon it that full and clear light, of which it is susceptible. I shall conclude with a few remarks, by way of apology. I am apprehensive, Sir, that in the warmth of my feelings, I may have uttered expressions, which were too vehement. If such has been my language, it was from the habit of using strong phrases to express my ideas; and, above all, from the interesting nature of the subject. I have ever condemned those cold, unfeeling hearts, which no object can animate. I condemn those indifferent mortals, who either never form opinions, or never make them known. I confess, Sir, that on no subject, has my breast been filled with stronger emotions, or more anxious concern. If any thing has escaped me, which may be construed into a personal reflection, I beg the gentlemen, once for all, to be assured, that I have no design to wound the feelings of any one who is opposed to me. While I am making these observations, I cannot but take notice of some expressions, which have fallen, in the course of the debate. It has been said, that ingenious men may say ingenious things, and that those, who are interested in raising the few upon the ruins of the many, may give to every cause an appearance of justice. I know not whether these insinuations allude to the characters of any, who are present, or to any of the reasonings in this house. I presume that the gentlemen would not ungenerously impute such motives to those, who differ from themselves. I declare, I know not any set of men who are to derive peculiar advantages from this constitution. Were any permanent honors or emoluments to be secured to the families of those who have been active in this cause, there might be some ground for suspicion. But what reasonable man, for the precarious enjoyment of rank and power, would establish a system, which would reduce his nearest friends and his posterity to slavery and ruin? If the gentlemen reckon me among the obnoxious few; If they imagine, that I contemplate, with an ambitious eye, the immediate honors of the government; yet, let them consider, that I have my friends—my family—my children, to whom the ties of nature and of habit have attached me. If, to day, I am among the favoured few; my children, tomorrow, may be among the oppressed many: These dearest pledges of my patriotism may, at a future day, be suffering the severe distresses, to which my ambition has reduced them. The changes in the human conditions are uncertain and frequent. Many, on whom fortune has bestowed her favours, may trace their family to a more unprosperous station; and many who are now in obscurity, may look back upon the affluence and exalted rank of their ancestors. But I will no longer trespass on your indulgence. I have troubled the committee with these observations, to shew that it cannot be the wish of any reasonable man, to establish a government unfriendly to the liberties of the people. Gentlemen ought not then to presume, that the advocates of this constitution are influenced by ambitious views. The suspicion, Sir, is unjust; the charge is uncharitable.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of June 28 (John McKesson’s Version), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
These Resolutions were introduced to shew that it was the settled opinion of the Legislature as well before as after the Confederation that the Powers of Congress were inadequate—
Mentioning the Subject of a Dictator was not necessary—
The Gent. says he is for an energetic fœderal Govt—what is it
If what we Contend for by this System
A Measure of Impost was once passed in this State—but afterwards frustrated by this State and Rhode Island—
This failed in the State because not granted as Congress required—
It was objected that it was not proper to grant any Very Extensive Power to Congress—
Since the New System is proposed the Ground is changed now it tho’t best to encrease and Improve the old System
These things do not in my Mind Comport
Yesterday—
1 That it is a republican System and the powers so divided that if
2d. The Genl. Govt. never could have an Intention to destroy
That the States had sufficient Power to resist
That there was a concurrent Jurisdiction (except Imposts
That the word Supreme does not
Supreme can only mean that those Laws cannot be changed by Superior Power—The Laws of the Individual States as to taxes will also be Supreme
Must be so adjudged in every Court—
No Necessity that the one should controul the other
Exgr. A Man indebted to two Creditors—he must pay both—the Creditor who takes the first Steps

Every Power not delegated to the United States, rests with the respective States—
When you give Genl. Legislative Powers to Govt. all Powers not reserved are given (except the unalienable Rights of Mankind—
This must remain with the State Govt. unless such are given away to the Genl Govt—Nothing can be taken away but what is granted to the Genl Govt—
Is the Power of Taxation taken away—No
Is an exclusive Grant of Taxation given (except on Imports) no—
There might be another method—as that of Naturalization
That by Construction would give an Exclusive Right—
Neither of these three modes are taken—
This is a concurrent Jurisdiction and the Genl. Govt. & State Govt. may tax the Same thing (except Imports) otherwise why are imports excepted.
Therefore the States have every power of Taxation (except on Imports)
Suppose Imports one third—The States have two thirds open to them but not Exclusively so—
The Duties on Imports were necessarily given to the united State[s] for uniformity—
The States should yield to them a great part of the Resources of the Community to discharge a large Debt—
When the United State[s] Debts are discharged the Expenditure of each State will be Small—
It is wise to leave open to the Genl. Govt the general Resources as they must be the General Paymaster—
If there are not resources for all what will be the Conduct of the Genl Govermt.
They will be destitute of prudence or they will defeat themselves—
They must provide for the most urgent Necessity—they must Satisfy their
in part but not Totally—
If they render themselves Odious to the People they defeat themselves but not the State Governmts
The State Govts. can lay their Taxes with equal Authority
In practice it will be this—

They lay Taxes on Such Objects as will be equally taxable in all the States, and will apply thro all the States equally—
There will be an infinite variety of Objects in the respective State Govts.
As to Houses and Lands Generally if taxed by the Genl Govt. it will be according to the Quantity—It may also bear a State Tax One object only fix for State Taxes vizt. Personal Estate
Then why not Separate these things and leave them to the State Govts.
Answer—because in Times of War these things may be necessarily Taxed by the Genl. Govt.
If men sent to the Genl Govt. are to be Harpies and Vultures but if to [be] considered as men of prudence attached
A Poll Tax has been objected to—This State has that Power—is it therefore a Tyrannical Govt—May not Cases happen in War or Otherwise as to make A poll Tax necessary—Exigencies may arise in which it will [be] indispensibly necessary
Holland
It is said it will be impracticable to Execute it—
Then why is unsafe to give if it cannot be exercised
No reason given why it cannot be exercised—
A Man in a National Govt. can compute what Taxes on Consumption Articles will bear—They can assess Lands—Can they not employ our own Supervisors for that purpose—
If the Money is wanted and can be raised is [it] not better to give the Power and raise them to accumulate Debts—
They cannot oppress One State more than Another because there is a Rule—
It will operate Salutarily and with Caution and lay their Taxes on Luxuries—And draw what they can from indirect Taxation—
It is their Interest to do this because they will not render themselves Odious—This is Com Sense—and necessary to a Support of their Power—
The State Govts. can go further in Experimts. in Taxation This Power is practicable and will operate in a Salutary Manner The Gent Yesterday entered into a Eulogium on our State Govts—
This is not to the point if true—

But the whole States Govt. have not operated well—Rhode Island has not operated well—
In our State Govt. has operated tollerably—
but why so little Credit—Why Lands depreciated—why no money lent
But if the State Govts. operate well what is that to the operat of the Genl Govt. which it is admitted do not
It is to shew that in Time when the Embarrasmts are removed they will comply with requisitions—
The Facts are otherwise—the Resolutions read contradict it—
The States who suffered most by the war have paid most and best complied—
The States having the Power of Deliberation wish to save themselves
A State pressed with war will exert themselves and Comply—
New Hampshire So. Carolina & Georgia have paid almost nothing—
This State and Pensylvania paid almost all that is paid—
Congress can scarcely pay their officers & keep up a Shaddow of Govt.
They are now negociating a Loan to pay Interest—is this right in time of Peace—
This is the History of Requisitions—They have not contributed any thing in proportion to each other even where they have contributed Now Proposition before the House
Insert it
The Proposition admits in its full force that an unlimitted Power of Taxation is necessary in the Genl. Govt.
If the State Govts. are not able to supply the Genl Govt. and Support the State Govts. it comes to the same thing—for by the Amendmt. the Genl Govt. is finally to tax & Collect—
More likely to be less Burthensome in the Genl Govt. than in the State Govts—
If the Genl. Govt. regulate by requisition they only demand in sums all they want

If they Tax—they will consider what Tax any Article can bear—If the Article canot bear it—They will tax Less—
When Several States have not complyed will congress fix a Stigma And Collect by force. No—
The others who are willing will distress themselves—
Some of the States are so much in Debt that they cannot pay—A compromise must be made—
Georgia Offers Lands for her specie Requisition and a further Sum—She is a Bankrupt—The Lands must be accepted and her Debt cancelled—
If a War happens the like will happen again—We have paid but what we have paid too much we must loose—
It is better to loose the Debt than enforce payment by war and blood—
This State will be one of the Contributing and loosing States and Therefore
Another Argumt.—No Excise on the Growth or manufacture of any State—We are a navigating State—We have a Western Territory—
Our Surpluss population will improve that—We shall be carriers and proceed in agriculture
When the merchant pays the Tax the loss is a loss to the State—
New England full of people—are manufacturers—that object will encrease with them
It is our Interest to have excises laid on manufactures—
A Duty may be laid at the Still Head on Ardent Spirits—
New England manufactures much more than our State
Pensylvania manufactures many things more than us—
Connecticut is improving manufactures—
Therefore we should Consent to Excise as it will relieve us—Virginia as an Importing State tho’t that Excise would operate on them Injuriously—
It would be an impolictic Restriction—we should suffer by it—
The Power may be safely Trusted to the Genl Govt—they exercise it prudently—If not trusted to them this State will Suffer and be unequally taxed—
Conclude
An Appology for myself I have used Strong Expressions—I am much Interested in this Constitution It is owing to my Earnestness and used to Strong Expressions—I mean not to hurt the feelings of any Gentlemen—
A Gent said (Mr. Williams) something about artful Cunning or ambitious Men.
If this was a constitution that would establish a Nobility an Ambitious Man would have temptations—
But what can any man hope from a Govt. depending on the Suffrages of the People
Men must not only be considered as designing and Ambitious but also with affection or attention to his posterity—
It cannot be the wish of a rational Man who considers the Vicisitudes of Human Life to establish a Tyranny—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Fourth Speech of June 28 (Newspaper Account), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,New York Daily Advertiser
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
A letter of the 1st inst. says, “That on Saturday the 28th ult. the Convention were still discussing the 1st clause of the 8th section of the 1st article, respecting the powers of Congress. Objections were at large stated, and amendments proposed by Mr. Williams, Mr. Smith and Mr. Lansing, who were answered by Mr. Hamilton in a most animated and powerful defence of the clause. Mr. Lansing in reply, let fall some expressions which tended to shew an inconsistency in Col. Hamilton’s conduct. He asserted that in the Federal Convention that gentleman had agreed strongly that the State governments ought to be subverted or reduced to mere corporations. He compared these sentiments to those he had avowed in the present Convention, viz. That the State governments were necessary for the preservation of liberty. This called up Mr. Hamilton, who entered into a statement of facts; denied what the gentleman had asserted; declared that in the General Convention his ideas had been uniformly the same as on the present occasion: that tho’ he at that time declared, as he had constantly and publicly done since, his apprehension that the State governments would finally subvert the general system, unless the arm of the Union was more strengthened than it was even by this Constitution; yet he had through the whole of the business advocated the preservation of the State governments, and affirmed them to be useful and necessary. He accused Mr. Lansing’s insinuation as improper, unbecoming and uncandid. Mr. Lansing rose, and with much spirit resented the imputation. He made an appeal to Judge Yates, who had taken notes in the Federal Convention for a proof of Mr. Hamilton’s expressions. This produced some disorder in the Committee, and the Chairman was obliged to call to order. A motion for adjournment put an end to the altercation.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Fourth Speech of June 28 (John McKesson’s Version), [28 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 28, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—There would be a rivalship of Power—That the danger was that the State Govts. would Subvert the National Government
It was not the prevailing opinion that the State Govts would be subverted.
—He says that I tho’t the Subversion of the State Govt necessary—
I wished to have an Extensive State Govt. but advanced as a reason
Reason that the State Governmts. should carry Govts. Home
The System fell Short of my Ideas in the Convention—
Mr Lansing—The Honoble. Member will recollect he said between the Individual States and the united States there would be hostility—
The member wanted to place them in the Quality of Corporations—
None of their Laws to take Effect without an Officer of the united States present—

Mr Hamilton I Supposed a Rivalship of Power—I was for giving additional Cautions in favor of the National Govt—
I held up the State Govts. as necessary to the Support of Government
I think it highly improper and uncandid for a Gent. to mention in this Committee Argumts. by me used in that Convention—
Mr. Lansing—I am charged with being uncandid & improper Behavior—
I did not at first express the matter as full as it came out afterwards—
I was compelled to it—The Matters of that Convention were no longer Secrete when their proceedings were published—
The Convention have a right to call on us—
Mr Hamilton—A disingenuty is imputed to me—That Honorable Member ought to retract it—It is improper to be here introduced—because if my Sentiments were improper—the Convention tho’t differently—To bring forth Individial Sentiments to operate agt. the Acts of Convention—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Newspaper Account), [30 June 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,New York Daily Advertiser
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, June 30, 1788]
On Monday Mr. Yates was again called upon by Mr. Lansing for his evidence; to which Mr. Hamilton freely submitted. Mr. Yates made an apology for the possible mistakes of his minutes, and said that in the General Convention, Mr. Hamilton had urged strongly for giving the most compleat sovereignty to Congress, and that in order to prevent the encroachments which he feared the State governments would make on the Union, they should be reduced to a smaller scale and be invested with only corporate powers. Mr. Hamilton observed, that corporate was an ambiguous term, and asked Mr. Yates if he understood that he (Mr. Hamilton) used it as descriptive of powers, similar to those of the city of New-York? To which Mr. Yates answered in the negative; adding that he understood the gentleman not to wish such a privation of powers as would reduce the States to mere corporations in the popular acceptation of that term; but only such as would prevent the Members from retarding in any degree, the operations of the united government. Col. Hamilton then asked him if he did not, after the above mentioned debate in the Federal Convention, hear him (Col. Hamilton) say, that his opinion was that the State governments ought to be supported, and that they would be useful and necessary: and further asked him if he did not remember that he (Col. Hamilton) had recommended (as an additional security to the States governments) a Court of Impeachments, to be composed by the Chief Judges of the several States, together with the Chief Justice of the United States. To all which Mr Yates gave an affirmative answer. On Mr. Jay’s proposing to Mr. Yates some questions with a view to set the matter in the most explicit point of light, Mr. Yates answered as before, that Col. Hamilton’s design did not appear to him to point at a total extinguishment of the State governments, but only to deprive them of the means of impeding the operation of the Union. Some explanations were attempted by Mr. Lansing, but as Mr. Jay was already on his legs, the gentleman was called to order. Mr. Lansing afterwards expressed a wish that Mr. Yates’s notes might be read; but it was not permitted on the suggestion that it ought to be brought forward by a formal motion, according to the rule of the House. Mr. Lansing not seeing fit to comply with this, the affair was terminated by a motion to adjourn.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of July 2 (John McKesson’s Version), [2 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 2, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton
Loans in Time of Peace peculiar to our Govt. because made thro Necessity—
The Inconvenience of being in Debt is a sufficient restriction—
If I was reason I would
The Only Method of preventing Loans to an improper Degree [is to] give them all the Resources of the Country that they may be able by their Own Efforts to avoid the Necessity of Loans—
Neither should their Power be restrained—
When the Resourses of the Country are insufficient they ought to have the Unrestricted Power of making Loans—
This is restraining the Arm of Power which is necessary for its defence—
Gent. seem to dread Corruption
Foreign Corruption is the most dangerous and to be dreaded—
If a foreign Power can corrupt a Small minority of your Counsel in Senate, only five, and they will prevent a Loan, which may be necessary for Your Common Defence—
Corruption has had its Effects in the Commonwealths of Holland and Sweden and other Republic’s—
We ought not to facilitate the like in our Govt—
We ought not to do any thing to impede a Loan when necessary—

As to the Gent from Ulster—
It was a part of the policy between the Northn. & So. Navigatg & non Navigatg States that Treaties should not be made whereby many States might be Injured—
As to Impeachmts—They are the accusations of the Representatives of the People and therefore popular—
to guard Innocence it is necessary that ⅔ds. Should find the party guilty
Tho’ this may in some Cases be a proper Guard it cannot be necessary [in] other Cases—especially where the Genl defence is concerned—
Navigat Acts were contended to be made by ⅔ds. but at last a Majority prevailed—
In this Case it would Embarrass your defence—
The Power of the President to send an Act back with his objections does not weigh—Because tho he may do that it cannot be necessary to establish it so as always to have two thirds—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of July 2 (John McKesson’s Version), [2 July 1788]
From: McKesson, John,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 2, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—
The Gent says if they are disinclined to a War they will clogg it agreed—but his Amendment is to encrease their Power
If the President interposes Objections from Local Views it is an evill which can only be remedied by ⅔ds—

The Gent would have 2/3ds in all Cases—This encreases the Evil—
The fisheries are claimed by France England & the Eastern States
The Navigation of the Mississippi
Our Western Posts—perhaps we could persuade a Majority to assist us to obtain them—but perhaps one third part might not concur—
It should be in our power to enforce a defence and assert the Rights of the Nation—And the Major will should be left open to make the defence and assert the Rights—
When you cannot raise more Money by Taxes and more is necessary you must have recourse to Loans—And must not fetter the Govermt—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Third Speech of July 2 (John McKesson’s Version), [2 July 1788]
From: McKesson, John,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 2, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—I add to enforce the Ideas of the member who spoke last
The Gent from Dutchess says it is less dangerous to grant power to restrain an Act than a power to do
Here the Power to restrain is as dangerous as to do an Act—The Power to restrain here is to restrain you from your defence—
The Gentleman contends that there may be corruption in a Majority or the whole—
We contend that there may be corruption in a Small Body only five
If evils are to be submitted to which to be prefered—to trust a majority of your whole Govt. and president to enter into a War of Ambition—or to put it into the power of a minority to prevent your own defence agt. an Ambitious War—
What Interest in a Republic to have a War of Ambition—Some Individuals may obtain a part of the Common Frame—but no men can acquire Territory—


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. First Speech of July 3, [3 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 3, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton explained—
I suppose It intends that a Vessel bound from one State to another—
If she puts into any port in another State [to] which She is bound She shall not there be Obliged [to] enter clear or pay Duties


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of July 3, [3 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,McKesson, John
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 3, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton—The word Impair an english word and means to weaken or Injure. This gives no Light, how far shall this weakening extend—Is it practicable so to State it as to prevent Litigation hereafter.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, [8 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

[New York, July 8, 1788]
My Dear Sir
I felicitate you sincerely on the event in Virginia; but my satisfaction will be allayed, if I discover too much facility in the business of amendment-making. I fear the system will be wounded in some of its vital parts by too general a concurrence in some very injudicious recommendations. I allude more particularly to the power of taxation. The more I consider requisition in any shape the more I am out of humour with it.
We yesterday passed through the constitution. To day some definitive proposition is to be brought forward; but what we are at a loss to judge. We have good reason to believe that our opponents are not agreed, and this affords some ground of hope. Different things are thought of—Conditions precedent, or previous amendments; Conditions subsequent, or the proposition of amendments upon condition, that if they are not adopted within a limited time, the state shall be at liberty to withdraw from the Union, and lastly recommendatory amendments. In either case constructive declarations will be carried as far as possible. We will go as far as we can in the latter without invalidating the act, and will concur in rational recommendations. The rest for our opponents.

We are informed, There has been a disturbance in the City of Albany on the 4th of July which has occasioned bloodshed. The antifœderalists were the aggressors & the Fœderalists the Victors. Thus stand our accounts at present. We trust however the matter has passed over & tranquillity been restored.
Yrs   Affecty

A Hamilton
New York July 8. 88


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Sullivan, [10 July 1788]
From: Sullivan, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Durham [New Hampshire] July 10th 1788.
Dear Sir
Capt Roche who was employed by me in consequence of your directions to forward the news of New Hampshires having adopted the new Constitution, called on me this Day with the Inclosed Account, the Ballance of which I paid him in Cash and have taken the Liberty of drawing on you for the same with the addition of seven shillings more which is the Loss by Discount & postage at 3 1/2 per Cent. His Laiming a horse was unfortunate but could not be avoided. I shewd him your Letter to me and in every respect complied with your directions and I have no Doubt of his having used every Exertion to fulfill your commands aside as I have advanced the Cash I doubt not my Bill will be duly honoured

I am very respectfult Sir your most obedy and very humble servt

Jno. Sullivan
Honble: Colo Hamilton


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Notes for Speech of July 12, [12 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 12, 1788]

A. I. A republic a word used in various senses.
Has been applied to aristocracies and monarchies.

1. To Rome under the Kings.
2. To Sparta though a Senate for life.
3. To Carthage though the same.
4. To United Netherlands, though Stadholder, Hereditary nobles:
5. To Poland though aristocracy and monarchy
6. To Great Britain though Monarchy &c

II.
Again great confusion about the words. Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchy

I.
Democracy defined by some Rousseau &c

A government exercised by the collective body of the People
2 Delegation of their power has been made the criterion of Aristocracy

II.
Aristocracy has been used to designate governments.
1. Where an independent few possessed sovereignty.
2. Where the representatives of the people possessed it.

III.
Monarchy, where sovereignty in the hands of a single man

☞
General idea—Independent in his situation. in any other sense would apply to State of New York

III.
Democracy in my sense, where the whole power of the government in the people

I. Whether exercised by themselves, or

2. By their representatives chosen by them either mediately or immediately and legally accountable to them.

IV.
Aristocracy where whole sovereignty is permanently in the hands of a few for life or hereditary

V. Monarchy where the whole sovereignty is in the hands of one man for life or hereditary.

VI. Mixed government when these three principles unite.

B.

I.
Consequence, the proposed government a representative democracy.

1. House of representatives directly chosen by the people for two years.
2. Senate indirectly chosen by them for six years
3. President indirectly chosen by them for four years.
☞ Thus legislative and executive representatives of the people.
4. Judicial power, representatives of the people indirectly chosen during good behaviour.
5. All officers indirect choice of the people.
☞ Constitution revocable and alterable by the people.

C.
I.
This representative democracy as far as is consistent with its genius has all the features of good government. These features.

1. An immediate and operative representation of the people which is found in the house of representatives.
2. Stability and Wisdom which is found in the Senate.
3. A vigorous executive which is found in the president.
4. An independent judicial, which is found in the Supreme Court &c.

b. A seperation of the essential powers of government. Ascertain the sense of the Maxim.
I. One department must not wholly possess the powers of another.
= Montesquieu.
= British Government.
II. Departments of power must be seperated, yet so as to check each other.
1. Legislative
2. Legislative executive.
3. Judicial legislative.
4. Legislative judicial.
☞ All this done in the proposed Constitution.

1. Legislative in the Congress, yet checked by negative of the Executive.
2. Executive in the President, yet checked by impeachment of Congress.

3. Judicial check upon legislative, or Interpretation of Laws.
4. And checked by Legislative through Impeachment.

D.
1
Can such a Government apply to so extensive a Territory? Exaggerated ideas of extent.

N
45°
42°

S
 31
 31

 14
 11

434

973.
764½
mean
868¾
by

750

Great Britain
2
De[s]potic Government for a large country to be examined.

Review

Security against Corruption respecting offices—

I First house of representatives chosen every second year &c
II
Senate for 6 years by LegislaturesRotation every two years probable increase—
III
Executive manner of appointment compensation—Negotiation of treatiesNomination of officers—
IV
Judicial power constitution of judgesExtent of powersinferior CourtsTrial by juryCriminal cases—

Powers

I To provide revenue for the common defence
II to regulate commerce
III to declare war
IV to raise & support armies

V admission of new States
V Disposal of property
Miscellaneous advantages
I to prohibit importation of slaves prior to 1808
II account to be rendered of expenditure of monies
III No state shall emit bills of Credit tender ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant title of nobility
V Definition of treason
V Guarantee of republican Governments

Discussion

I Concurrent jurisdiction
objections to system proposed recapitulation with additional idea respecting necessity of standing army—

General observation
1 on restraint of revenue necessitating a standing army
2 on restraint upon power respecting Militia tending to the same point
3 on restraint upon reeligibil⟨it⟩y of the executive after 8 years
 with a Council of influence—

Desireable amendments
Structure of Government
1 in relation to house of representatives
2 in relation to Court of impeachments
3 in relation to standing armies

4 in relation to trial by jury
This being the character of the constitution we are to adopt it is evident that it would be unwise upon speculative defects to reject it or even to do what might by possibility amount to a rejection—
Let us now examine the nature of the propo[sition] before us—

I
First inquiry have we power—
1   Trace it Convention direct that it be submitted to Conventions for assent and ratification—
2   Congress send it to legislatures to be submitted in conformity to that resolution
3   Joint resolutions submit it for that purpose—

☞

Consequence we are to assent or reject and have no power to bind the people by amendments of any kind—

{
Amendments make a new constitution & in this case the people would be bound upon a contingency of 9 States calling a Convention

II
Could Congress receive it

1 People Creators
2 Congress and all its attributes The Creature
☞ Consequence no attribute or character or power but these—What is or is not a ratification is to be sought for them
3 Is it or is not an assent to that Constitution? It is not
☞ Congress therefore cannot consider it as such

☞

The best is this—It is professedly a condition which requires a subsequent assent—
2 Congress must be organised to assent
3 It is not therefore a valid original ratification
3 Nor according to the instrument by which Congress are created—

☞

Can Congress assent—
1. If they can their power must result in theory from the nature of delegated power—or
2. From some express provision in the Constitution—
3 There is no such express provision—New States—Mode of alteration
4 Contrary to theory
5 The Depositation of delegated power can neither increase nor diminish. Leg. pow[er]
6 Examine argument about forbearing exercise
7 Maxim legislature cannot bind itself nor alienate itself

Therefore
8 Congress cannot constitutionally accept if they were to attempt it, their act would be nugatory

What number shall be sufficient to assent to Cond[i]t[io]ns

Is it probable it will be accepted?

I Difficulty will begin with present Congress about place
II Precedent
III Obstacle from prejudgment of present Congress many of whom will probably be members of that
IV Perhaps from the desire of some states to dismember us—
V From pride for after all ten receivin[g] the lawWant of confidence &c
VI From unwillingness to submit the matter to discretion of a minority
Disadvantages
I If we are out of the Union we cannot have a voice in amendments—

I Cui bono? Is it a ground on which we can stand?


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Newspaper Account), [12 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,New York Daily Advertiser
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 12, 1788]
On Saturday morning, Mr. Jay opened the business by representing the unfairness of the proceedings in the informal Committee. He complained that when met for mutual discussion, they had been insulted by a complete set of propositions presented in a dictatorial manner for their passive acquiescence. He was soon followed by Mr. Hamilton, who in a most argumentative and impassioned address, demonstrated that the propositions before the Committee, would be a total rejection of the Constitution. He opened with a beautiful exordium, in which he described in a delicate but most affecting manner the various ungenerous attempts to prejudice the minds of the Convention against him. He had been represented as “an ambitious man, a man unattached to the interests and insensible to the feelings of the people; and even his supposed talents had been wrested to his dishonor, and produced as a charge against his integrity and virtue. He called on the world to point out an instance in which he had ever deviated from the line of public or private duty. The pathetic appeal fixed the silent sympathetic gaze of the spectators, and made them all his own.
He then proceeded to refute the fallacious reasonings of opposition—and to describe the nature and tendency of a provisional adoption. He proved, in the first place, from the series of papers on which the authority of the present Convention was founded, that it had no possible decisive power, but to adopt or reject absolutely: that it had indeed a power to recommend, because this was a natural right of every freeman; but it had none to dictate to or embarrass the union by any restrictions or conditions whatever: that the Committee was not a body commissioned to tender stipulations or form a compact, but to dissent from or agree to a plan of government, which could be altered either in its form or exercise only by an authority equal in all respects, to the one which gave it existence. Having made this point clear, he went on to shew that the future Congress would have no authority to receive us into the union on such terms: that this conditional adoption included evidently a disagreement to and rejection of a part of the Constitution: that Congress, which would hold all the powers it possessed under the Constitution as a simple plan, must consider such a partial rejection in the light of a total one.
That a declaration by any legislature that such and such constitutional powers should not be exercised was in its own nature a nugatory one: that these provisions, making no part of the Constitution, and when accepted by Congress, having, even if consistent with the Constitution, no other than a legal force, would be subject to immediate repeal; that it was indispensibly necessary to good government that the discretion of the legislature should be uncontrolable, except by the Constitution: But by the proposed measure, the discretion of Congress would be limited and controled by a provision not only foreign from, but totally inconsistent with the Constitution; a provision coming from a part of the union without the consent of the other parts; a provision most preposterously calculated to give law to all the sister states. He adduced other arguments to prove that restraining the exercise of a power, or exercising it in a mode different from that pointed out in the form of government, was utterly anti-constitutional, especially when the restraint was only to respect a part of the community.
Mr. Hamilton then urged many forcible reasons to prove that even if it were consistent with the Constitution to accept us on these terms, it was entirely improbable that the other states would submit to it. Their interests and their pride would be opposed to it. Their pride, because the very proposal is an insult; and the animosity of some states, embittered as it is by what they deemed a kind of commercial tyranny, and a system of selfish, partial politics, would receive most pungent gratification from a diminution of our fortune and our power. Their interests would be opposed, because the misfortunes of one powerful state commonly contribute to the prosperity of its neighbors.
Mr. Hamilton, after recapitulating his arguments in a concise and cogent manner, entreated the Convention in a pathetic strain to make a solemn pause, and weigh well what they were about to do, before they decided on a subject so infinitely important. The orator then closed his address, and received from every unprejudiced spectator the murmur of admiration and applause.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Nathaniel Chipman, 14 July 1788
From: Chipman, Nathaniel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Tinmouth [Vermont] July 14. 1788
Sir
Your character as a federalist, has induced me, altho’ personally unknown to you, to address you on a subject of very great importance to the State of Vermont, of which I am a citizen, and from which, I think, may be derived a considerable advantage to the fœderal Cause. Ten States have now adopted the new fœderal plan of government. That it will now succeed is beyond doubt; what disputes the other states may occasion, I know not. The people of this State, could certain obstacles be removed, I believe, might be induced almost unanimously to throw themselves into the fœderal Scale. You are not unacquainted with the Situation of a considerable part of our landed property. Many grants were formerly made, by the government of New York, of lands within this territory, while under that jurisdiction. On the assumption of government by the people of this State, the same lands, partly it is said, for want of ⟨in⟩formation respecting the true Situation of those grants, and partly from ⟨the⟩ opinion prevailing with our then Leaders, that the New York grants within this territory were of no validity, have been granted to others under the authority of this state. It is now generally believed that should we be receivd into the union the New York grants would in the federal Court be prefered to those of Vermont. The Legislature of this State have in some instances made a compensation to the grantees under New York; and I am persuaded, were it in their power, would gladly do the same for others, but they are possessed of no more land for that purpose. For these reasons, I presume, no others, the Governor and some few gentlemen deeply interested in those lands under Vermont have expressed themselves some what bitterly against the new federal plan of government. Indeed were we to be admitted unconditionally it would introduce much confusion. Now, Sir, permit me to ask, whether you do not think it probable, that the fœderal Legislature, when formed, might, on our accession, be induced on some terms to make a compensation to the New York grantees out of their western land? and whether those grantees might not be induced to accept of such compensation? Let me farther Suggest whether it might be favorable for Vermont to make some of those amendments, which have been proposed by Several States, and which I think are generally within the power of the fœderal Legislature the basis of her admission? Could the difficulties, I have mentioned, be removed all interest in opposition would here be reconciled; the Idea of procuring Justice to be done those, whom we had, perhaps, injured by our too precipitate measures, and of being connected with a government which promises to be efficient, permanent and honorable, would I am persuaded produce the greatest unanimity on the Subject. If you think these matters worthy the attention of the friend of the confederacy, be good enough to write me by my brother, who will be the bearer of this.
Our Legislature will meet in October, when these matters will be taken up Seriously. Several gentlemen of my acquaintance who are men of influence, and will be members of the Legislature have requested me to procure all the information in my power on this Subject. Any thing you may communicate to me in confidence will be Sacredly attended to, of which Mr. Kelly who writes by the same opportunity will give you the fullest assurance.
I am Sir with Sentiments of esteem your most obedient Servant
Nathl Chipman
Alexdr Hamilton Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Kelly, 14 July 1788
From: Kelly, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Tinmouth, Vermont, July 14, 1788. On this date Nathaniel Chipman wrote Hamilton that Kelly “writes by the same opportunity.” Letter not found.]


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Gilbert Livingston’s Version), [14 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Livingston, Gilbert
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 14, 1788]
Ham[ilton]  wishes the questin may not be put as it will now be a decision of the comparitive view betwn the two propositions. True it has been largely discussed; on saturday said he supposed it would amount to a rejection, yet would suggest same Ideas. Recappitulates the argts of saturday; is willing to agree that the constitution was Advisory; it has now become obligatory by the will of the people, especially by the States which have adopted. What is advised by the instrument? Could the people in the difft. states, which have agreed, admit of conditions? A condition on the one part requires a power on the other part to consent. Suppose 9 had not agreed to adopt, no power could assent, therefore the Legislature could not mean we should make condn. If all the states had made condns, they never could have been organized. Reflect on this & see wheather it is not conclusive. No questn. could ever have been taken on it. In the concurrent resolutions of this state, it is referred to have the papers submitted. If it is stated as the gent wishes, it must refer to adopt or reject. These acts are an evidence of the thing intended, & nothing else can determine. The people did vary, & believed the Northern countys did wish amendts, but can we be bound by this? In N.Y. they knew a Consn. was to be submitted, but not to be altered, for this we are not met, only to consider from the Acts. We have no binding power beyond these: we may recommend. New terms do not amount to our adoption. Congs. cannot abridge their powers nor extend a Legislative authority; cannot put it out of their power to alniate their power or suspend their Judgt.
Gent[lemen] have taken latitude, in stating cases. The Legislative power must be exercised uniformly tho particular cases may happen, as to particular cases, few exemptions.
The Legislature to produce the public good may pledge funds to borrow money, and thus lay aside genl. powers in this instance. Gent[lemen] state the questn. wrong, that congs only lay aside the power for a time, but to do this congs. must lay aside their powers and conclude to submit this right of Judging. It is not tenable to admit this right. Congs. have no authority to propose a Convention, but must wait for nine states to make the proposition to them.
This will lead every man who wishes an adoption into a snare, tho’ they do not intend it—congs cannot adopt it.
If these arguments are not sufficient to convince, must abandon the maxim, “that there is force in truth.”
Wishes gent[lemen] would not call for the questn, but retire & consider.
No pride of Opinion ought to weigh, genl good ought to influence. Would not for the world loose this glorious opportunity of establishing a free government; would not wish to put it to the risk of Arms. Must be cautious to listen to Jealousy. Liberty is put to the hazard.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Remarks (Melancton Smith’s Version), [14 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Smith, Melancton
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 14, 1788]
Mr. Hamilton.   1st. our powers—agreed yt. the Constitution, was advisory—suppose the Constitution advice, we must refer to the instrument—it is impossible that the Convenn. or the people shd. have had in view, such alterations because until they had assented, there was no body to submit amendments to—there being no common body to determine.
Therefore it must of necessity been their view that we shd. alter, as the Legisl. could not known 9 States.
How to know, whether the Counties would chuse, if we had not expected to agree to reject.
1—It does not follow because a legisl. may forbear to exercise a power, therefore that they may abdicate.
Laws ought to be general, and not to extend to a part.
May except against a power, in cases of distress—but does not apply—a Governmt.
The Legislature may to promote the publick good, pledge funds, grant immunities.
Congress may submit them to the assent of 2/3. This takes away the right of judging—cannot do this.
Or else must wait for 9 States—this a contingency.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Amendments to the Constitution, [15 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 15, 1788]
Amendments to the Constitution to be recommended

I That there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand according to the enumeration or census mentioned in the constitution until the whole number of representatives amounts to two hundred; after which that number shall be continued or increased, but not diminished, as Congress shall direct, and according to such ratio as Congress shall fix, in conformity to the rule prescribed for the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes.

Agreed to
II   That the Court for the trial of impeachments shall consist of the Senate, the Judges of the Supreme court of the United States and the first or senior judge for the time being of the highest court of general and ordinary common law jurisdiction in each state. That Congress shall by standing laws designate the Courts in the respective states answering this description; and in states having no courts exactly answering this description shall designate some other court, preferring such if any there be, whose judge or judges may hold their places during good behaviour; provided that not more than one judge shall come from one state. That Congress be authorised to pass laws for compensating the said judges and for compelling their attendance; and that a majority at least of the said judges shall be requisite to constituting the said Court. That no person impeached shall sit as a member thereof. That each member shall previous to the entering upon any trial take an oath or affirmation honestly and impartially to hear and determine the cause: and that  of the members present shall be necessary to a conviction.

Agreed to
III   That the authority given to the Executives of the states to fill the vacancies of senators be abolished, and that such vacancies be filled by the respective legislatures.

Agreed to
IV   That the compensation for the senators and representatives be ascertained by standing laws; and that no alteration of the existing rate of compensation shall operate for the benefit of the representatives until after a subsequent election shall have been had.
V   That no appropriation of money in time of peace for the support of an army, shall be by less than two thirds of the representatives and senators present.
VI   That the Executive shall not take the actual command in the field of an army, without the previous desire of Congress.
VII   That each state shall have power to provide for organising arming and disciplining its militia, when no provision for that purpose shall have been made by Congress and until such provision shall have been made; and that the militia shall never be subjected to martial law but in time of war rebellion or insurrection.

Agreed to
VIII   That the journals of Congress shall be published at least once a year with the exception of such parts relating to treaties or military operations as in the judgment of either house shall require secrecy.

Agreed to
IX   That the Judicial power of the United States shall extend to no controversy respecting land unless it relate to claims of territory or jurisdiction between states or to claims of land, between individuals or between states and individuals, under the grants of different states.
X   That no judge of the Supreme Court shall hold any other office under the United States or any of them.
XI   That when the number of persons in the district of territory to be laid out for the seat of the government of the United States, shall according to the rule for the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes amount to  such district shall cease to be parcel of the state granting the same and provision shall be made by Congress for their having a distinct representation in that body.
XII   That the representatives Senators, President, Vice President and judges of the United States shall each take an oath or affirmation not to infringe or violate the Constitutions of the respective states.

Agreed to unanimous
XIII   That no capitation tax shall ever be laid by Congress.


Title: New York Ratifying Convention. Second Speech of July 15, [15 July 1788]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Livingston, Gilbert
To:

[Poughkeepsie, New York, July 15, 1788]
Ham[ilton]—hopes the quest[io]n will not be pressed—as the Amend[ment]s expressly contemplate a condition—hopes time will be taken to consider of the New propositions—and not pass the revision by hastily taking this quest[io]n—which must be binding finally—