Title: From Alexander Hamilton to ———, [December–March 1779–1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Morristown, New Jersey, December, 1779—March, 1780]
Sir,

The present conjuncture is by all allowed to be peculiarly critical. Every man of reflexion employs his thoughts about the remedies proper to be applied to the national disorders; and every one from a partiality to his own ideas wishes to convey them to those who are charged with the management of affairs. The channel of the public papers commonly made use of for the purpose appears to me exceptionable on several accounts. It not only restrains a freedom of discussion from the extreme delicacy of the subject, but the discussion itself increases the evil by exposing our weak sides to the popular eye and adding false terrors to those well founded apprehensions which our situation authorises.
Instead of persuing this method, I prefer addressing myself to a member of that body in whose power alone it is by well digested system to extricate us from our embarrassments. I have pitched upon you from a personal knowledge of your abilities and zeal. If I offer any thing new and useful, I am persuaded you will endeavour to turn it to advantage; if the contrary is the case, I am at least certain of doing no harm. I shall only have had the trouble of writing, and you of reading a few useless pages.
The object of principal concern is the state of our currency. In my opinion ⟨a⟩ll our speculations on this head have been founded in error. Most people think that the depreciation might have been avoided by provident arrangements in the beginning without ⟨any aid⟩ from abroad, and a great many of our ⟨sanguine⟩ politicians ’till very lately imagined the ⟨money⟩ might still be restored by expedients ⟨within our⟩selves. Hence the delay in attempting ⟨to procure⟩ a foreign loan.
This idea proceeded from ⟨an igno⟩rance of the real extent of our resources⟨. The⟩ war, particularly in the first periods⟨, required⟩ exertions beyond our strength; to which ⟨neither⟩ our population nor riches were equ⟨al. We⟩ have the fullest proof of this in the co⟨nstant thin⟩ness of our armies, the impossibility⟨, at this time,⟩ of recruiting them otherwise than by ⟨compulsion,⟩ the scarcity of hands in husbandry ⟨and other oc⟩cupations, the decrease of our staple ⟨commodi⟩ties and the difficulty of every species ⟨of supply.⟩ I am aware that the badness of the ⟨money⟩ has its influence; but it ⟨was ori⟩ginally an effect not a cause⟨, though it⟩ now partakes of the nature of both. A part of those ⟨evils⟩ would ap⟨pear were⟩ our finances in a more flourishing con⟨dition.⟩ We experien[ce]d them before the ⟨money⟩ was materially depreciated, and they ⟨contri⟩buted to its depreciation. The want ⟨of men⟩ soon obliged the public to pay extra⟨vagant⟩ wages for them in every department⟨. Agri⟩culture languished from a def⟨ect of hands⟩. The mechanic arts did the same. ⟨The price⟩ of every kind of labor increased ⟨and the⟩ articles of foreign commerce from the ⟨interrup⟩tion it received more than kept pace ⟨with⟩ other things.
The relative value of m⟨oney⟩ being determined by the greater or less ⟨portion⟩ of labor and commodities which it ⟨will pur⟩chase, whatever these gained in price⟨, that of⟩ course lost in value.
The public expenditures from the dearness of everything necessarily became immense, great⟨er⟩ in proportion than in other countries and much beyond any revenues which the best concerted scheme of finance could have extracted from the natural funds of the state. No taxes which the people were capable of bearing on that quantity of money, which is deemed a proper medium for this country (had it been gold instead of paper) would have been sufficient for the current exigencies of government.
The most opulent states of Europe in a war of any duration are commonly obliged to have recourse to foreign loans or subsidies.

   France owes a debt of near £200.000.000 Sterling of which about £28.000.000 is due to Governments and individuals in the United Provinces. England owes a debt not much short, of which about 30.000.000 is likewise due in The United Provinces.

   The United Provinces themselves owe a debt of the Generality of 50.000.000 Stg. besides the particular debts of each province. Russia, Prussia Denmark, Sweden all owe money to the United Provinces, notwithstanding the assistance of their mines. These Governments too are patterns of œconomy. Sweden receives a constant subsidy from France. The House of Austria is also to be included in the catalogue. Spain is almost the only considerable European power to be excepted, but this is to be attributed [to] that inexhaustible fund of treasure which she possesses in the mines of South America.

   The King of Prussia is one of those Potentates the least in debt; notwithstanding he has a long time made a figure in Europe much above what the comparitive strength and resources of his Kingdom intitled him to expect. This his superior genius has effected. By a wise administration he maintains an army of 150.000 men, nearly equal to that of France with one third of its people and less than a third of its riches. This he does by judicious arrangements, by a rigid œconomy and by a species of commerce which is carried on, on account of the State. There are several public manufactories from which the army is supplied and by the help of which the money paid out with one hand is taken in by the other.

 How then could we expect to do with out them and not augment the quantity of our artificial wealth beyond those bounds, which were proper to preserve its credit? The idea was chimerical.
The quantity of money formerly in circulation among us is estimated at about thirty millions of dollars. This was barely sufficient for our interior commerce. Our exterior commerce was chiefly carried on by barter. We sent our commodities abroad and brought back others in return. The ballance of the principal branch was against us; and the little specie derived from others was transferred directly to the payment of that ballance without passing into home circulation. It would have been impracticable by loans and taxes to bring such a portion of the forementioned sum into the public coffers as would have answered the purpose of the war; nor could it have spared so considerable a part without obstructing the operations of domestic commerce. Taxes are limited not only by the quantity of wealth in a state; but by the temper, habits and genius of the people, all which in this country conspired to render them moderate; and as to loans, men will not be prevailed upon to lend money to the public when there is a scarcity and they can find a more profitable way of employing it otherwise, as was our case.
The ordinary revenues of The United Provinces amount to about 25.000.000 of Guilders or 2.250.000 £ Sterling per annum. This is in proportion to its territory and numbers the richest country in the world, and the country where the people sustain the heaviest load of taxes. Its population is about equal to ours, 2000000 of souls. The burthens on the subject are so great that it is by some held almost impracticable even on extraordinary emergencies to enlarge the revenues by new impositions. It is maintained their dependence in these cases must be on the extraordinary contributions of wealthy individuals; with the aid of which in some of their wars they have raised 4000.000 Stg. a year. In a country possessed of so vast a stock of wealth, where taxes are carried to such a height and where the means of paying them so infinitely exceed those in our power, if the national revenues only amount to the sum I have stated, how inadequate must have been the product of any taxes we could have levied to the demands of the service? Loans for the reason before hinted would have been out of the question; at least they would have been so trifling as to be an object of little importance.
Suppose we should have been able to raise a million Sterling annually a sum that probably would have exceeded our ability; how unequal would this have been to our wants?

   This will appear by recurring to our expences in the commencement of the war before the money was depreciated. In 75, which was only three fourths of a year the emissions amounted to 7.000.000 of dollars, in 76 to 14.000.000. The war did not begin in earnest ’till 76.

 No œconomy could have made it bear any proportion, especially if we recur to the causes already enumerated by which the currency depreciated in its first stages.
From these reasonings it results that it was not in the power of Congress when their emissions had arrived at the 30,000,000 of dollars to put a stop to them.

   This is meant, without employing the assistance of a foreign loan and of other expedients besides borrowing and taxing.

 They were obliged, in order to keep up the supplies to go on creating artificial revenues by new emissions; and as these multiplied their value declined. The progress of the depreciation might have been retarded but it could not have been prevented. It was in a great degree necessary.
There was but one remedy, a foreign loan. All other expedients should rather have been considered as auxiliary. Could a loan have been obtained and judiciously applied, assisted by a vigorous system of taxation, we might have avoided that excess of emissions which has ruined the paper. The credit of such a fund would have procured loans from the monied and trading men within ourselves; because it might have been so directed as to have been beneficial to them in their commercial transactions abroad.

   This will appear from the plan which will be proposed.

The necessity of a foreign loan is now greater than ever. Nothing else will retrieve our affairs. The wheels of government without it cannot much longer be kept in motion. Including loan-office certificates and state emissions, we have about 400.000.000 of dollars in circulation. The real value of these is less than 7.000.000, which is the true circulating medium of these states; for though the price of specie is  and the rate of Exchange for Sterling-bills  the nominal value of every commodity is at least 60 to 1 on an average. All the reasoning against the possibility of raising the current expences on the foundation of 30.000.000 apply to our present situation in the ratio of 30 to 7; that is, it is as 30 to 7 less practicable now, than when our emissions amounted to only thirty millions. Could every dollar in circulation be brought annually into the Treasury, which never was effected in any country and is politically impossible, the revenue would not be equal to the yearly expence.
The hope of appreciating the money by taxes and domestic loans is at an end. As fast as it could be received it must be issued in the dayly expenditures. The momentary interval between its being drawn out of circulation and returning into it, would prevent its receiving the least advantage.
These reasonings may appear useless; as the necessity of a foreign loan is now acknowleged, and measures are taking to procure it. But they are intended to establish good principles, the want of which has brought us to the desperate crisis, we are arrived at and may still betray us into fatal mistakes.
How this loan is to be employed is now the question; and its difficulty equal to its importance. Two plans have been proposed: one to purchase up at once in specie or Sterling bills all the superfluous paper and to endeavour by taxes, loans and œconomy to hinder its returning into circulation. The remainder it is supposed would then recover its value. This it is said will reduce our public debt to the Sterling cost of the paper.
Suppose 200.000.000 were to be purchased and the rest called in by taxes. At  this would require bills to the amount of  of dollars. But I doubt whether four times this sum would be sufficient. The moment it was known such purchases were to be made the avarice of speculators would begin to operate. The demand would immediately occasion an artificial appreciation; each successive million would cost more than the preceding. But this appreciation would be more relative to the purchasing medium than to the prices of commodities. The raising the value of the paper relative to the former would depend on the combinations of a few artful individuals, and would be easily accomplished. The diminution of prices must be slow, as it implies a change in the sentiments of the body of the people with respect to the money. A sudden revolution in the general rates of all the necessaries of life is not to be expected. The prices of these as they have reached their present summit by degrees must by degrees revert to their former station. The minds of the peoples will not readily admit impressions in favour of the currency. All their past experience has given a habit of diffidence; and the epidemical spirit of extortion will maintain a violent struggle with whatever has a tendency to produce a fall of prices. A permanent reduction of the quantity of circulating cash will alone gradually effect it. But this will not happen on the present plan.
The necessity of continuing the supplies at nearly the same rates now given, (which would be the case if my reasonings are true) would have nearly the same effect mentioned with respect to taxes and domestic loans. The money would return into circulation almost as fast as it was drawn out; and at the end of the year we should find our treasury empty, our foreign loan dissipated and the state of our finances as deplorable as ever. At a moderate calculation we should have spent ten or twelve millions of real dollars for the sole purpose of carrying on the war another year. It would be much better instead of purchasing up the paper currency, to purchase the supplies out of our specie or Bills. In the first instance the public would suffer a direct loss of the artificial appreciation relative to the purchasing medium; in the last it would buy at the value of the commodities in specie or bills.

A great source of error in disquisitions of this nature is the judging of events by abstract calculations, which though geometrically true are false as they relate to the concerns of beings governed more by passion and prejudice than by an enlightened sense of their interests. A degree of illusion mixes itself in all the affairs of society. The opinion of objects has more influence than their real nature. The quantity of money in circulation is certainly a chief cause of its decline; but we find it is depreciated more than five times as much as it ought to be by this rule. The excess is derived from opinion, a want of confidence. In like manner we deceive ourselves when we suppose the value will increase in proportion as the quantity is lessened. Opinion will operate here also; and a thousand circumstances may promote or counteract the principle.
The other plan proposed is to convert the loan into merchandize and import it on public account. This plan is incomparably better than the former. Instead of losing on the sale of its specie or bills, the public would gain a considerable profit on the commodities imported. The loan would go much further this way towards supplying the expences of the war, and a large stock of valuable commodities useful to the army and to the country would be introduced. This would affect the prices of things in general and assist the currency. But the arts of monopolize[r]s would prevent its having so extensive and durable an influence as it ought to have.
A great impediment to the success of this as well as the former scheme will be the vast sums requisite for the current expences. The arguments adduced in the former case are applicable here also, though not with equal force. The necessity the public will be under of parting with its stock to defray the dayly demands will give designing men an opportunity by combinations not to purchase, to oblige it to sell at a rate below the real value of the money. This they may the more easily effect as the demand for foreign commodities is much less than formerly, on account of the general spirit of parisimony which has obtained from necessity and the manufactures carried on in private families for their own use. The greatest part of the country people now almost intirely cloath themselves.
The public must either sell very cheap to collect rapidly the superfluous paper in hopes of raising the value of the remainder, or it must sell very slow to preserve the due proportion between the articles it has for sale and those it wants to buy. By persuing the first method, it will soon exhaust its stock at a very considerate loss and only give temporary relief to the currency. According to my principle, ⟨though⟩ it sells cheap it must still buy dear; and consequently the money collected cannot remain in the Treasury long enough to preserve the rise in its appreciated state. If it persues the second method the expenditures will be equal to the income, and though the public will make the natural profits on its goods, as it will lay up nothing, it will do nothing towards the appreciation.

   To form an idea of the effect of this plan, let it be supposed that the goods imported amount to £2.000.000 Stg & that these sell at £150 in paper for each pound Sterling. The whole proceeds will be 800.000.000 of dollars; to these add 200.000.000 raised in taxes. There will then be in the hands of the public 1.000.000.000 of dollars which at sixty to one gives 16.666.666⅔ of real dollars. Take the year 76 for a standard, and suppose 14.000.000 of dollars to be the proper annual expence of the war, which is only 2.666.666⅔ less than the whole amount of the goods and taxes. At this rate, the plan would do little more than defray the expences of the war for one year. But this calculation is not exactly true, because the money would certainly appreciate in some degree by the reduction of its quantity, yet as this reduction would not last, at least in the same extent, to preserve the appreciation and as in proportion to the appreciation the price of goods must fall and bring less money in, it is difficult to say whether it would not ultimately come to the same thing.

The Farmers have the game in their own hands and will make it very difficult to lower the prices of their commodities. For want of labourers there is no great superfluity of the most essential articles raised. These are things of absolute necessity and must be purchased as well by the other classes of the society as by the public. The farmers on the contrary, if they do not like the price are not obliged to sell because they have almost every necessary within themselves, salt and one or two more excepted, which bear a small proportion to what is wanted from them and which they can obtain by barter for other articles equally indispensible. Heavy taxes, it may be said will oblige them to sell but they can pay with a small part of what they have any taxes our legislatures will venture to impose or would be able to inforce.
One measure alone can counter-ballance these advantages of the Farmers and oblige them to contribute their proper quota to the support of government; a tax in kind. This ought instantly to begin throughout the states. The present quantity of cash though nominally enormous would in reality be found incompetent to domestic circulation were it not that a great part of our internal commerce is carried on by barter. For this reason it is impossible by pecuniary taxes to raise a sum proportioned to the wants of the state. The money is no longer a general representative, and when it ceases to be so, the state ought to call for a portion of the thing represented; or in other words to tax in kind. This will greatly facilitate whatever plan of finance is adopted, because it will lessen the expenditures in cash and make it the easier to retain what is drawn in.
I said the demand for foreign goods is less than it formerly was. I mean there is not a demand for so large a quantity, which the reasons already assigned clearly demonstrate; nor are the exorbitant rates now given any objection to this doctrine. There is an absolute scarcity even in comparison of the present consumption; and of course a demand for what there is. But should an importation of two millions sterling take place the market would be glutted and there would be no way of keeping up the price but by making very slow sales. A less quantity would stand no chance of calling in the money and keeping it in long enough to effect any thing in favour of its credit.
I say nothing about the risk of importation. I do not believe we could obtain a convoy sufficient to justify our hazarding it without the precaution of insurance. But with this expedient we are safe and must be satisfied with smaller profits for the sake of security.
This is a plan not altogether to be rejected. With prudent management it might enable us to carry on the war two or three years (which perhaps is as long as it may last) but if we should expect more from it, the restoration of the currency, we should be disappointed.
The only plan that can preserve the currency is one that will make it the immediate interest of the monied men to cooperate with government in its support. This country is in the same predicament in which France was previous to the famous Mississippi scheme projected by Mr. Law. Its paper money like ours had dwindled to nothing, and no efforts of the government could revive it, because the people had lost all confidence in its ability. Mr. Law who had much more penetration than integrity readily perceived that no plan could succeed which did not unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with those of the state; and upon this he framed the idea of his project, which so far agreed in principle with the bank of England. The foundation was good but the superstructure too vast. The proprietors aimed at unlimited wealth and the government itself expected too much; which was the cause of the ultimate miscarriage of the scheme and of all the mischiefs that befel the Kingdom in consequence.
It will be our wisdom to select what is good in this plan and in any others that have gone before us, avoiding their defects and excesses. Something on a similar principle in America will alone accomplish the restoration of paper credit, and establish a permanent fund for the future exigencies of government.
Article 1st The plan I would propose is that of an American bank, instituted by authority of Congress for ten years under the denomination of The Bank of The United States.
2d A foreign loan makes a necessary part of the plan; but this I am persuaded we can obtain if we persue the proper measures. I shall suppose it to amount to 2000000 £ Sterling. This loan to be thrown into the Bank as a part of its stock.
3 A subscription to be opened for 200.000.000 of dollars and the subscribers erected into a company called the company of the Bank of the United States.
4th. The Government to guarantee this subscription money to the proprietors at the rate of one for twenty; that is to engage at the dissolution of the Bank to make good to them the sum of ten millions of dollars in lieu of the 200.000.000 subscribed, payable in spanish milled dollars or a currency bona fide equivalent to them.
5th. The taxes raised in money annually to be thrown into stock.

   The taxes are made to increase every year for the three years, because the money in circulation increases and consequently the people can afford to pay more.

6th. All the remaining paper to be called in (at the option of the possessor) and bank-notes issued in lieu of them for so much Sterling payable to the bearer in three months from the date at 2 per Cent ⅌ an[num] interest. A pound Sterling to be estimated at 266⅔ of the present dollars.

   This is 60 paper dollars to one dollar of 4/6 Sterling, which is the real value of the money; but if it is apprehended that this may meet with opposition, let the evaluation of the bank notes be the same as the price of European Bills of Exchange. Other operations must be regulated accordingly.

 The interest to be punctually paid in specie at the end of the three months; when it shall be at the choice of the possessor to have the bank notes renewed or to receive the sum deposited, in the old paper.
7 All the money issued from the bank to be of the same denomination and on the same terms.

   The reason of this is to preserve the idea of a stock and make it seem that the old paper is still in existence; but there is danger notwithstanding the reasons to the contrary that there may be a run upon the bank from particular causes which may embarrass it. It is not probable the old paper will be intirely though nearly called out of circulation; what remains will appreciate; this may tempt those who have bank notes to demand payment on the terms of the original deposit, without considering that by bringing too great a quantity again into circulation it will again depreciate. The bank may be pushed to a very disagreeable extremity by this mean. I do not know whether it may not be adviseable to confine the privilege of repayment to the lenders to the bank and make the Bills bear interest payable every three months without making the principal demandable. Much may be said for and against. It is well worth consideration.

8 The Bank to furnish Congress with an annual loan of two millions sterling if they have occasion for it at 4 ⅌Cent interest.
9 The whole, or such part of the stock as is judged necessary, to be employed in commerce, in the manner and on the terms which shall be agreed upon from time to time between the Company and a Board of Trade to be appointed by Congress.
10. The Bank to issue occasionally by permission of Congress such sums as may be thought safe and expedient in private loans on good securities at six per Cent interest.
11 The government to share one half of the whole stock and profits of the Bank.
12. The Bank to be managed by the trustees of the company under the inspection of the Board of Trade,

   This Board ought immediately to be established at all events. The Royal Council of Commerce in France and the subordinate chambers in each province form an excellent institution and may in many respects serve as a model. Congress have too long neglected to organize a good scheme of administration and throw public business into proper executive departments. For commerce I prefer a Board, but for most other things single men. We want a Minister of War, a Minister for foreign Affairs, a minister of Finance and a Minister of marine. There is always more decision, more dispatch, more secrecy, more responsibility where single men, than when bodies are concerned. By a plan of this kind, we should blend the advantages of a Monarchy and of a republic in a happy and beneficial Union. Men will only devote their lives and attentions to the mastering a profession on which they can build reputation and consequence which they do not share with others.

   If this plan should be approved Congress ought immediately to appoint a Minister of Finance under whatsoever title they think proper and charge him with its execution. He ought to be a man of ability to comprehend it in all its consequences and of eloquence to make others comprehend and relish it. He ought besides to have some general knowledge of the science. This man ought immediately to address himself to some of the most sensible monied men and endeavour to convince them of the utility of the project. These must engage others and so on till a sufficient number is engaged. Then Congress must establish the Bank and set it a going. I know of no man that has better pretensions than yourself and shall be very happy to hear that Congress have said, “Thou art the man.”

   I had like to have omitted one remark which is that the subscription money may be guaranteed if necessary at ten to one as a greater inducement. This will only be 20 millions of dollars or £5000000 Sterling a cheap bargain to get rid of the perplexities we labour under and convert the torrent of ideal money into a moderate but sufficient stream to supply the real wants of the State. Congress no doubt would be able to borrow enough abroad to pay this debt if it should not find better means within itself. But I shall be much mistaken if the proprietors will desire to be repaid and not prefer continuing the loan to government on reasonable terms.

 who may have recourse to the company books whenever they think proper, to examine the state of its affairs. The same is done in England and in other countries where banks are established, and is a priviledge which the Government has a right to demand for its own security. It is the more necessary in this case from the commercial nature of the bank.
To give an idea of the advantages
[part of manuscript missing]
which having all [the] operation of money, and of a more advantageous kind than that which the lenders have parted with will have all the efficacy of a payment. It is for this reason they are made to bear interest; and there can be no doubt that every man will prefer a species of money which answers all the purposes of a currency and even when lying idle brings in a profit to the possessor. The same consideration will prevent the lenders recalling the old paper at the quarterly payments; because they hold a more valuable property instead of it. The interest is to be paid in specie as a further temptation, for which a small sum will suffice. The denomination of the money is altered because it will produce an useful illusion. Mankind are much led by sounds and appearances; and the currency having changed its name will seem to have changed its nature.

The Bank will advance Bills to the amount of £2.000.000 Sterling to Congress, and in addition to its stock will now have a debt due it of this sum, which is to be considered as so much gained.
[part of manuscript missing]

Brought over

7.075.000

To be deducted . . .

Drawn out of circulation by the sale of goods imported
4.000.000

By governmental taxes supposed to be
1.000.000
5.000.000

Remaining in circulation the fourth year
£2.075.000

This will be less than the preceding which is occasioned by the million supposed to be drawn in by taxes.
The national debt on this plan will stand thus at the end of three years.

Foreign loan
2.000.000

Domestic loan at 2 Millions per annum
6.000.000

Interest at 4 per Cent
 320.000

8.320.000

Half the value of the Bank
7.900.000

Ballance against the United States
£ 420.000

We may therefore by means of this establishment carry on the war three years and only incur a debt of 420.000 £; over and above the Guarantee of the subscription money which however is not to be paid ’till the end of ten years.
I have said in one place that abstract calculations in questions of finance are not to be relied on, and as the complex operations of trade are involved in the present plan, I am myself diffident of those flattering results which it presents at every step. I am aware how apt the imagination is to be heated in projects of this nature and to overlook the fallacies which often lurk in first principles. But when I consider on the other hand, that this scheme stands on the firm footing of public and private faith, that it links the interests of the state in an intimate connexion with those of the rich individuals belonging to it, that it turns the wealth and influence of both into a commercial channel for mutual benefit, which must afford advantages not to be estimated, that there is a defect of circullating medium which this plan supplies by a sort of creative po⟨wer⟩ converting what is so produced into a real and efficacious instrument of Trade; I say, when I consider these things and many more that might be added, I cannot forbear feeling a degree of confidence in the plan, and at least hoping that it is capable of being improved into something that will give relief to our finances.
I do not believe that the advantages will be so great in fact as they seem to be in speculation. They will be limited by the means of commerce, which the states produce and these may not be so extensive in the beginning as the plan supposes. Besides this, the profits of the commerce will not be so large in proportion after the first or second year as during those years; neither will it be possible to increase the paper credit in the same degree. But the bank of England is a striking example how far this may be carried, when supported by public authority and private influence. On the other hand a variety of secondary expedients may be invented to enlarge the advantages of the bank. The whole system of annuities, as practiced in England may be ingrafted upon it with such differences as are proper to accommodate it to our circumstances. The European loan may also be converted into an European bank, the interests of which being interwoven with the American bank may engage rich individuals there in promoting and extending the plan.
Very beneficial contracts may be made between Government and the company for supplying the army; by which money may be saved to the public, the army better furnished and the profits of the Bank extended.
I have confined the bank to the space of ten years; because this will be long enough to judge of its advantages and disadvantages, and the latter may be rectified by giving it a new form. I do not suppose it will ever be discontinued, because it seems to be founded on principles that must always operate well and make it the interest both of Government and the company to uphold it. But I suppose the plan capable of improvement which experience will suggest.
I give one half the whole property of the bank to The United States; because it is not only just but desireable to both parties. The United States contribute a great part of the stock; their authority is essential to the existence of the Bank; their credit is pledged for its support. The plan would ultimately fail if the terms were too favourable to the company and too hard upon Government. It might be incumbered with a debt which it could never pay and be obliged to take refuge in a bankruptcy. The share which the state has in the profits will induce it to grant more ample privileges, without which the trade of the company might often be under restrictions injurious to its success.
It is not perhaps absolutely necessary that the sum subscribed should be so considerable as I have stated it, though the larger the better: It is only necessary it should be considerable enough to engage a sufficient number of the principal monied men in the scheme. But Congress must take care to proportion the advantages they give and receive.
It may be objected that this plan will be prejudicial to trade by making the Government a party with a trading company, which may be a temptation to arrogate exclusive privileges, and thereby fetter that spirit of enterprise and competition on which the prosperity of commerce depends. But Congress may satisfy the jealousies on this head by a solemn resolution not to grant exclusive privileges, which alone can make the objection valid. Large trading companies must be beneficial to the commerce of a nation, when they are not invested with these; because they furnish a capital with which the most extensive enterprises may be undertaken. There is no doubt the establishment proposed would be very serviceable at this juncture merely in a commercial view; for private adventurers are not a match for the numerous obstacles resulting from the present posture of affairs.
The present plan is the product of some reading on the subjects of commerce and finance and of occasional reflexions on our particular situation, but a want of leisure has prevented its being examined in so many lights, and digested so maturely as its importance requires. If the outlines are thought worthy of attention and any difficulties occur, which demand explanation or if the plan be approved, and the further thoughts of the writer are desired, a letter directed to James Montague Esqr. lodged in the Post Office at Morris Town will be a safe channel of any communications you may think proper to make and an immediate answer will be given. Though the Writer has reasons which make him unwilling to be known, if a personal conference with him should be thought material, he will endeavour to comply.
You will consider this as a hasty production and excuse the incorrectnesses with which it abounds.
I am Sir very respectfully   Your most Obedt &   humble serv


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Brigadier General Louis Le Bèque Du Portail, [1779]
From: Du Portail, Louis Le Bèque
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[1779] States his willingness to go to South Carolina, but does not wish to ask for such a mission. Asks Hamilton to suggest to Washington that he be sent south.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 2 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

Morristown [New Jersey] January 2, 1780. Asks intentions of Congress concerning continuance of Brigadier General Louis Le Bèque Du Portail and Colonels Laumoy and Gouvion in service. Commends their service and recommends that they be retained.


Title: George Washington to William A. Livingston, 2 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Livingston, William A.

Morristown [New Jersey] January 2, 1780. Discusses Livingston’s parole and the possibility of his becoming a “subject” of the United States. Thanks him for his offer of service.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Nathanael Greene, [4 January 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Greene, Nathanael

[Morristown, New Jersey, January 4, 1780]
Dr Sir

The General requests you will let him know your opinion of the number of expresses necessary to be kept in constant pay, considering the late regulation of the post office. You know the necessity of œconomy and he is persuaded will rate the number as low as possible. You will have in view the occasional employment of trusty serjeants. He is writing to Congress.
Dr Sir   Your most Obedt & very humb sev

A Hamilton   Aide De Camp
Hd. Qrs.   Jany 4th 1779


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Major General Nathanael Greene, 4 January 1780
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Morristown. [New Jersey] 4th January 1780.
Dear Sir.

It is impossible for me to tell the number of Expresses that may be necessary to do the public business, that depending so much upon contingencies, and the manner of conducting it. We have heretofore kept about Thirty in pay with the Army; and the duty has been so hard, and the encouragement so small, that the greater part have given me warning, to provide others in their place. If the Resolution of Congress is meant to strike off all the Expresses employed at particular posts, and in certain Districts, I can give no answer to that; only the number that has been employed, which from the critical state of the public affairs, I believe cannot be lessened, without hazarding worse consequences. If the Orderly Serjeants can be employed as Expresses, we can strike off the whole of our Expresses at Camp; but I am persuaded it will be found, there will be no great saving, after furnishing them with horses, and paying their expences, and giving them the additional allowance, necessary to engage them in this service. There will [be] one advantage result from the measure. The Serjeants in general, are better men than we can get for Expresses. I should suppose (if the posts are well regulated) fifteen Expresses may serve for emergencies and Camp duty.
I am, Sir, Your humble Servt.
Nath Greene   QMG
Col. Hambleton


Title: George Washington to Colonel Daniel Brodhead, 4 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Brodhead, Daniel

Morristown [New Jersey] January 4, 1780. Regrets postponement of attack on Detroit. Doubts that Brodhead will have sufficient men for expedition against Natchez, but does not discourage plan if Brodhead believes it feasible. Cautions secrecy.


Title: George Washington to Baron de Kalb, 6 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: De Kalb, Baron

Morristown [New Jersey] January 6, 1780. Asks De Kalb to deliver enclosed orders.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, 8 January [1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Laurens, John

[Morristown, New Jersey] Jany 8t. [1780]

I had written the enclosed and was called off. Some ruffian hand has treated it in the manner you see. I have no time to copy it. I shall take up the story where I left it.
Another reason for believing the destination is your way, is that Governor Martin and divers others refugees of Georgia South and North Carolina are said to have gone in the fleet. You will have a busy time; acquit yourselves well. We hope however that some late violent winds will drown them all on their way. There is no other military news.
Believe me my Dr Laurens I am not insensible of the first mark of your affection in recommending me to your friends for a certain commission. However your partiality may have led you to overrate my qualifications that very partiality must endear you to me; and all the world will allow that your struggles and scruples upon the occasion deserve the envy of men of vertue. I am happy you placed the matter upon the footing you did, because I hope it will ultimately engage you to accept the appointment. Had it fallen to my lot, I should have been flattered by such a distinction but I should have felt all your embarrassments.

Of this however I need have no apprehension. Not one of the four in nomination but would stand a better chance than myself; and yet my vanity tells me they do not all merit a preference. But I am a stranger in this country. I have no property here, no connexions. If I have talents and integrity, (as you say I have) these are justly deemed very spurious titles in these enlightened days, when unsupported by others more solid; and were it not for your example, I should be inclined in considering the composition of a certain body, to suppose that three fourths of them are mortal enemies to the first and three fourths of the other fourth have a laudable contempt for the last.
Adieu God preserve and prosper you
A Hamilton

I have strongly sollicited leave to go to the Southward. It could not be refused; but arguments have been used to dissuade me from it, which however little weight they may have had in my judgment gave law to my feelings. I am chagrined and unhappy but I submit. In short Laurens I am disgusted with every thing in this world but yourself and very few more honest fellows and I have no other wish than as soon as possible to make a brilliant exit. ’Tis a weakness; but I feel I am not fit for this terrestreal Country.
All the Lads embrace you. The General sends his love. Write to him as often as you can.


Title: George Washington to the Officers to Collect Provisions, 8 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Offices to Collect Provisions

Morristown [New Jersey] January 8, 1780. Orders collection of two hundred head of cattle and eight hundred bushels of grain in Bergen County, New Jersey. States how owners are to be paid. If there is a refusal to cooperate, officers are to impress needed goods. Urges officers to respect individual rights.


Title: George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, 8 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan

Morristown [New Jersey] January 8, 1780. Asks Trumbull’s cooperation in obtaining food for Army.


Title: George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Tench Tilghman, 11 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Tilghman, Tench

Morristown [New Jersey] January 11, 1780. Defers march of detachment until following day. Sends instructions and asks for further information.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [14 January 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

[Cranes Mills, New Jersey, January 14, 1780]
Dr. Sir,

On our present plan, It appears to me the quantity of ammunition proposed by General Knox for the Artillery is insufficient. A larger consumption may be necessary. The Stone house, in which the enemy may attempt to defend themselves may be obstinate and we should have it in our power by the severity and duration of our fire to bring them to reason. I take the liberty to suggest these matters, and to add that if more is to be sent it cannot come with too much dispatch.
I am requested by his Lordship to acknowlege the receipt of your letter of this evening 7 oClock to the contents of which he will pay particular attention. Our intelligence of the state of the ice at Bergen point makes it impassable; but the point is not absolutely ascertained. We find great difficulty in getting down the piece of cannon mentioned by his Lordship, but it might be effected tomorrow. However as there is no ammunition for it, it would be of no use.
I have the honor to be   Yr. Excellency’s   respectful & obed servt
Alex Hamilton
Jany. 14   One oClock P.M.

The troops are beginning to get in motion.


Title: Major General William Alexander, Lord Stirling, to George Washington, 16 January 1780
From: Stirling, Lord (née William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

Elizabethtown [New Jersey] January 16, 1780. Reports details of invasion of Staten Island and retreat. Tells of plundering by troops and what has been done to rectify wrongs inflicted.


Title: George Washington to Sir Henry Clinton, 19 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, Henry

Morristown [New Jersey] January 19, 1780. Explains reasons for delay of return of certain prisoners on parole.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Nathanael Greene, [21 January 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Greene, Nathanael

[Morristown, New Jersey, January 21, 1780]
Sir,

It is found necessary to send surgeons with the detachments on the lines, and they must have horses to convey their Chirurgical apparatus. Will it be most convenient to get them from you by special application or to obtain them from the Brigades? This question the General orders me to make.
Yr. very humble serv
Alex Hamilton   Aide DeCamp
Jany. 21. 1780.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Moses Hazen, 21 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Hazen, Moses

Morristown [New Jersey] January 21, 1780. Discusses value of a second attempt on Staten Island. Cautions that if it is undertaken it must prove successful.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 26 January 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

Morristown [New Jersey] January 26, 1780. Recommends appointment of Captain Daniel Nevins to Corps of Engineers. Inquires about commissions for officers of Sappers and Miners who will be very much needed in the next campaign.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major Ichabod Burnet, [28 January 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Burnet, Ichabod

[Morristown, New Jersey, January 28, 1780]
Dr Sir,

The General considers the applicat⟨ion⟩ as unusual and does not think proper to authorise a compliance with it.
Yrs.
Alex. Hamilton   A D C
Hd. Qrs. Jany. 28. 80


Title: Statement of Money Owed Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton for his Services as Aide-de-Camp, [January 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[January, 1780]

Pay due to Lt Col Hamilton, Aide De Camp to The Commander in Chief from the last of June to the last of December 1779
Six Months, at 60 dolls ⅌ M: 360


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Catharine Livingston and Elizabeth Schuyler, [January–February 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Catharine,Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Morristown, New Jersey, January–February, 1780]

Col Hamiltons compliments to Miss Livingston and Miss Schuyler. He is sorry to inform them that his zeal for their service make him forget that he is so bad a Charioteer as hardly to dare to trust himself with so precious a charge; though if he were only to consult his own wishes like Phaeton he would assemble the chariot of the sun, if he were sure of experiencing the same fate. Col Tilghman offers himself a volunteer. Col Hamilton is unwilling to lose the pleasure of the party; but one or the other will have the honor to attend the ladies.


Title: George Washington to Silas Condict, 1 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Condict, Silas

Morristown [New Jersey] February 1, 1780. Thanks Condict for his warning of a possible attack on Washington.


Title: George Washington to the Magistrates of New Jersey, 2 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Magistrates of New Jersey

Morristown [New Jersey] February 2, 1780. Commends magistrates for their cooperation in recent crisis.


Title: George Washington to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, 4 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: La Luzerne, Chevalier de

Morristown [New Jersey] February 4, 1780. Discusses British failure to obtain troops from Germany, exchange of prisoners, and Spanish-British negotiations. Thanks La Luzerne for news of France’s intention to send more arms and ammunition.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Charles Armand, 6 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Armand, Charles

Morristown [New Jersey] February 6, 1780. Certification of Armand’s service and conduct.


Title: George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 6 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Huntington, Samuel

Morristown [New Jersey] February 6, 1780. Informs Huntington that Colonel Armand is not going to France.


Title: George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 8 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

Morristown [New Jersey] February 8, 1780. Sends instructions for paying for transportation of the Army.


Title: George Washington to Baron von Steuben, 8 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Steuben, Baron von

Morristown [New Jersey] February 8, 1780. Asks whether a defensive or offensive campaign should be planned. States that money and foreign aid are needed for a decisive offensive campaign. Believes that a defensive campaign therefore is necessary. Approves of von Steuben’s estimates of men and cavalry needed. Questions value of incorporating regiments for the sake of economy.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, 12 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, James

Morristown [New Jersey] February 12, 1780. Asks Clinton to investigate reported defects in his brigade and to correct them.


Title: George Washington to Chevalier de la Luzerne, 15 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: La Luzerne, Chevalier de

Morristown [New Jersey] February 15, 1780. Regrets that the shortage of men makes it impossible to send detachment to guard William Duer’s tree-cutting expedition. Believes that a guard will not be necessary, but suggests applying to the local militia, if one is desired.


Title: George Washington to John Cleves Symmes, 22 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Symmes, John Cleves

Morristown [New Jersey] February 22, 1780. Explains why a state should not interfere in enlistment complaints.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Nathanael Greene, [23 February 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Greene, Nathanael

[Morristown, New Jersey, February 23, 1780]
Dr. Sir

Have you received any directions from The General concerning some espontoons to be brought from Fish Kill for the use of the Officers here? If you have not be pleased to receive them now and give directions accordingly.
Yr. obedient humble serv
A Hamilton   Aide De Camp
Hd. Qrs. Feby. 23d. 1780.


Title: George Washington to the Board of War, 23 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

Morristown [New Jersey] February 23, 1780. Asks that noncommissioned officers be supplied with swords as stated in regulations. States need for “drums fifes and standards.”


Title: George Washington to the Board of War, 26 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

Morristown [New Jersey] February 26, 1780. Disapproves of court-martial authorized by the Board of War. Sends authorization for new hearing. Suggests that the judge advocate be more “explicit and particular in designating the circumstances of the crime and of the evidence.”


Title: George Washington to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, 27 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Lincoln, Benjamin

Morristown [New Jersey] February 27, 1780. Is pleased with Lincoln’s present situation. Hopes that the Spanish success in Florida will turn the British attempts in that direction. Instructs Lincoln to cooperate with Juan de Miralles. Reports that Virginia troops are being sent to the South.


Title: George Washington to Juan de Miralles, 27 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Miralles, Juan de

Morristown [New Jersey] February 27, 1780. Congratulates De Miralles on Spanish successes. Believes that the Carolinas are destination of the British fleet.


Title: George Washington to Major General William Phillips, 29 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Phillips, William

[Morristown, New Jersey] February 29, 1780. Agrees that Phillips be a member of the commission for the exchange of prisoners which is to meet at Amboy. Meeting day is changed from March 6 to March 9.


Title: George Washington to Lewis Pintard, 29 February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Pintard, Lewis

[Morristown, New Jersey] February 29, 1780. Orders Pintard to Amboy for a meeting of commissioners on subject of prisoners.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Margarita Schuyler, [February 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Margarita

[Morristown, New Jersey, February, 1780]

In obedience to Miss Schuylers commands I do myself the pleasure to inclose you a letter, which she has been so obliging as to commit to my care, and I beg your permission to assure you that many motives conspire to render this commission peculiarly agreeable. Besides the general one of being in the service of the ladies which alone would be sufficient, even to a man of less zeal than myself, I have others of a more particular nature. I venture to tell you in confidence, that by some odd contrivance or other, your sister has found out the secret of interesting me in every thing that concerns her; and though I have not the happiness of a personal acquaintance with you, I have had the good fortune to see several very pretty pictures of your person and mind which have inspired me with a more than common partiality for both. Among others your sister carries a beautiful copy constantly about her elegantly drawn by herself, of which she has two or three times favoured me with a sight. You will no doubt admit it as a full proof of my frankness and good opinion of you, that I with so little ceremony introduce myself to your acquaintance and at the first step make you my confident. But I hope I run no risk of its being thought an impeachment of my discretion. Phlegmatists may say I take too great a license at first setting out, and witlings may sneer and wonder how a man the least acquainted with the world should show so great facility in his confidences—to a lady. But the idea I have formed of your character places it in my estimation above the insipid maxims of the former or the ill-natured jibes of the latter.

I have already confessed the influence your sister has gained over me; yet notwithstanding this, I have some things of a very serious and heinous nature to lay to her charge. She is most unmercifully handsome and so perverse that she has none of those pretty affectations which are the prerogatives of beauty. Her good sense is destitute of that happy mixture of vanity and ostentation which would make it conspicuous to the whole tribe of fools and foplings as well as to men of understanding so that as the matter now stands it is ⟨very⟩ little known beyond the circle of these. She has good nature affability and vivacity unembellished with that charming frivolousiness which is justly deemed one of the principal accomplishments of a belle. In short she is so strange a creature that she possesses all the beauties virtues and graces of her sex without any of those amiable defects, which from their general prevalence are esteemed by connoisseurs necessary shades in the character of a fine woman. The most determined adversaries of Hymen can find in her no pretext for their hostility, and there are several of my friends, philosophers who railed at love as a weakness, men of the world who laughed at it as a phantasie, whom she has presumptuously and daringly compelled to acknowlege its power and surrender at discretion. I can the better assert the truth of this, as I am myself of the number. She has had the address to overset all the wise resolutions I had been framing for more than four years past, and from a rational sort of being and a professed contemner of Cupid has in a trice metamorphosed me into the veriest inamorato you perhaps ever saw.
These are a few specimens of the mischiefs, and enormities she has committed the little time she has made her appearance among us. I should never have done, were I to attempt to give you a catalogue of the whole, of all the hearts she has vanquished, of all the heads she has turned, of all the philosophers she has unmade, or of all the inconstants she has fixed to the great prejudice of the general service of the female world. It is essential to the safety of the state and to the tranquillity of the army that one of two things take place; either that she be immediately removed from our neighbourhood, or that some other nymph qualified to maintain an equal sway come into it. By dividing her empire it will be weakened and she will be much less dangerous when she has a rival equal in charms to dispute the prize with her. I solicit your aid to


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General John Stark or Officer Commanding his Brigade, February 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Stark, John

[Morristown, New Jersey] February, 1780. Asks Stark to inspect and correct certain defects in Stark’s brigade.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Colonel Azariah Dunham, 3 March 1780
From: Dunham, Azariah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Morristown [New Jersey] March 3, 1780. Reports that an investigation of “the state of stores and resourses of Provisions” reveals a shortage of flour and grain.


Title: George Washington to Major General William Alexander, Lord Stirling, 5 March 1780
From: Washington, George
To: Stirling, Lord (née William Alexander)

Morristown [New Jersey] March 5, 1780. States that discipline and military effectiveness can best be achieved by a good example and close inspection rather than by numerous orders.


Title: George Washington to Major General Arthur St. Clair and Lieutenant Colonels Edward Carrington and Alexander Hamilton, [7 March 1780]
From: Washington, George
To: St. Clair, Arthur,Carrington, Edward,Hamilton, Alexander

[Morristown, New Jersey, March 7, 1780]

By His Excellency George Washington Esquire General and Commander in Chief of the Forces of the United States of America.

To Major General Arthur St: Clair and Lieutenant Colonels Edward Carrington and Alexander Hamilton—
Whereas a proposition hath been made and acceded to for a meeting of Commissioners at Amboy on Thursday the 9th: instant for the purpose of settling a General Cartel—
In order to carry the said proposition into effect and to make the most liberal permanent and extensive provision for the exchange and accomodation of prisoners of War
You Major General St: Clair and Lieutenant Colonels Carrington and Hamilton in virtue of full powers to me given by the Honorable the Congress of the United States are hereby appointed and authorised to meet such Commissioners of suitable Rank as shall come duly authorised on the part of His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton or His Excellency Lieutenant General Knyphausen in virtue of powers from His Britannic Majesty at the time and place above mentioned and at any time and place afterwards to which it may be thought proper to adjourn—with them to treat, confer, determine and conclude upon a General Cartel for the exchange and accommodation of prisoners of War including the Troops of the Convention of Saratoga and all matters whatsoever which may be properly contained therein on principles of justice humanity and mutual advantage and agreeable to the custom and practice of War among civilized Nations:
For all which this shall be your Warrant and your engagements being interchanged shall be ratified and confirmed by me
Given under my Hand and Seal atmy Head Quarters at Morris Townthis 7th: day of March 1780
Go: Washington
By His Excellency’s CommandRob: H: Harrison: Secy


Title: Minutes of the Proceedings at Amboy, 10-14 March 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Amboy [New Jersey] March 10th. 1780.

Minutes of the proceedings of the Commissioners, on the part of His Excellency General Washington and of His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton.
The Commissioners being met agree to the following preliminaries.
That copies of the powers should be interchanged, and they were interchanged accordingly.
That the limits of the neutral ground should extend three miles round Amboy, that Town being accounted the Center.
That two British Dragoons be stationed at the ferry opposite on Staten Island for the purpose of forwarding expresses and that no molestation be given by either party to any express, that may be sent from the Commissioners to either respective Head Quarters.
It is agreed upon that if any controversial points should arise, they might be debated upon, and the opinion on them given on the following day.
The hours of meeting to be at Eleven oClock in the morning, and to adjourn at Three oClock.
Agreed to adjourn till tomorrow Saturday March 11th.

Amboy March 11th. 1780.
The conference was resumed.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton, having entered upon the business of the Negotiation, proceeded to examine the powers vested by General Washington in his Commissioners, and find them to be fully adequate for the purposes for which the Commission is met, and are therefore, willing and desirous to enter on the business of a General Cartel and General exchange.
The Commissioners from General Washington then delivered the minute subjoined.
The Commissioners on the part of His Excellency General Washington having examined the powers produced by the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton, are sorry to find them essentially defective, professing the settlement of a General Cartel and General Exchange, on no other foundation than the private faith of the present Commander in Cheif, whereas they think an agreement of such importance and intended to have a permanent operation can have no sufficient basis without the sanction of national authority and national faith. They therefore and as their powers expressly require them to treat on these terms, are obliged to decline all negotiation unless the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton can be vested with more ample powers in which case they would be happy to give their concurrence in a Cartel of the most equitable liberal and generous nature.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton delivered the following paper in answer to the foregoing objections to their powers.
The Commissioners from His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton are under the greatest concern at the unexpected objections made to the powers under which they act by the Commissioners from General Washington; they decline entering upon any political discussion on the matter but declare themselves of the opinion that their powers seem to them to go fully to a negotiation for a General Cartel and General Exchange.
Impressed with the strongest feelings of humanity for the suffering Prisoners on both sides, they have declared and do declare themselves ready to enter upon a negotiation for a General Exchange, wishing to persue that local operation, provided the more extensive plan of a General Cartel cannot be effected, and to do so under every description of humanity, liberality and justice.
If the Commissioners from General Washington are not vested with powers for entering upon a General Exchange it is to be extremely lamented, but the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton must be excused for not admitting it possible that any mistake should arise in the object of the proposals sent in to General Washington, signed by Major General Phillips, and Colonels Magaw and Mathews, Lieutenant Colonels Ely and Ramsay, and approved of by Sir Henry Clinton. It must be allowed those proposals go pointedly and directly to a General Exchange to be settled upon the faith of the Commanders in Chief of the British and American Armies, not meaning however to exclude the intention of a General Cartel, supposing it possible to effect so good a purpose.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton beg leave to assure those from General Washington, how unhappy they are to find that they conceive their instructions given them by General Washington to be of such a nature as to debar them from entering upon the business for which purpose the meeting has been held at Amboy.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton conceiving the powers vested in them by His Excellency to be fully adequate to answer the end of adjusting either a General Exchange of Prisoners or of settling a General Cartel, have now only to lament that their wishes and endeavours prompted by humanity alone to releive persons who have so long suffered in captivity, should have failed of success.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton desire to express their great satisfaction at having met Gentlemen of liberal principles and who have seemed to be equally disposed with themselves to promote the humane purpose of giving relief to captivity, did they presume that their powers were adequate to their wishes.
Adjourned till tomorrow Sunday March 12th.

Amboy March 12th. 1780.
The Conference was resumed, and the Commissioners from General Washington produced the following paper.
The Commissioners on the part of His Excellency General Washington sincerely unite with those of His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, in lamenting that the purpose of the present meeting acknowledged to be infinitely interesting to humanity, is unhappily defeated like all the former by a fundamental defect in the powers of the British Commissioners. They cannot however imagine how the objections now made could have been unexpected, as they are obvious and conclusive in themselves and have been uniformly insisted upon on every similar occasion, with no new motive to depart from them, but with many additional ones to adhere to them. They omit a repetition of the reasonings which they have urged in conversation in their support, as the British Commissioners decline “political discussion.” They agree in opinion with these Gentlemen, that their powers seem to go fully to a General Cartel and General Exchange, but it is on this very account they object to them, because they have an ostensible object without the essential characters to make that object practicable. The object of the powers on both sides being a General Cartel, and this being impossible for the reasons assigned, the Commissioners from General Washington conceive that neither they nor the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton have any authority to enter into a partial or particular agreement, and that therefore as well as for other still more important considerations, they cannot with propriety treat of a General Exchange distinct from a General Cartel. Any such transaction must be independent of the Commission, consequently merely of a private nature and without validity. They beg leave to observe that General Sir Henry Clinton’s powers connect the General Cartel and General Exchange together, and do not make them alternatives, of course do not warrant the seperation now proposed.
The Commissioners from General Washington believe that the design of the proposals mentioned by Sir Henry Clinton’s Commissioners has not been misunderstood. But these proposals only made a part of the transactions which produced the present meeting. The letter from General Washington to Colonels Mathews, Ely and Ramsay, while it acknowledges that as far as the proposals go, they are generally upon just and liberal principles, clearly intimates that they do not comprehend every thing necessary, and only considers them as capable of being improved into an agreement of mutual and permanent advantage. His letter of the 29th. of February to His Excellency Lieutenant General Knyphausen expressly designates the purpose of the meeting to be “to negotiate a General Cartel.” General Knyphausen’s letter in reply literally consents to that purpose. The powers of the British Commissioners profess the same. It was expected that aware of the difficulties which had before existed, and which were evidently not to be surmounted on our part, the British Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton would come with powers not liable to the same substantial objections, which had prevented the efficacy of all former attempts.
Flattered by the favourable opinion, which the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton are polite enough to express of their principles and dispositions, the Commissioners from General Washington take pleasure in declaring, that they on their part have the highest sense of the liberality and humanity of the Gentlemen with whom they have the honour to confer. They are firmly persuaded, that the insufficiency of their powers is the sole impediment to the success of the negotiation, and that had there not been this impediment the endeavours would have been mutually sincere towards giving the desired relief. The Commissioners from General Washington feel the deepest regret at being obliged to return without having accomplished the end of their mission—the more so as this effort failing seems to leave little prospect that any future can succeed. So far however from being sensible of any imperfection in their own powers by which they are rendered inadequate to their wishes, they are happy in feeling themselves fully authorised to enter into a treaty that can alone afford compleat relief to captivity. Experience has proved that nothing short of a General Cartel can remove the numerous inconveniences and distresses to which the prisoners in this War have been exposed; and it cannot be too much deplored, that partial and temporary expedients should be preferred to a measure which offers so decisive and durable a remedy. It is not a particular or momentary interest that ought to influence transactions of this nature, but principles of general humanity, aiming at no other end than the mere relief of the unfortunate Prisoner.
But while the Commissioners from General Washington are unhappily precluded from executing their Commission or consulting their own wishes, they cannot forbear expressing a hope that notwithstanding the obstructions in the way of a General Cartel, the business of exchanges may return into its old channel and be again carried on without interruption on the equitable terms which have heretofore from time to time obtained. The not being able to give so full relief as might be wished is certainly no argument for withholding all relief whatsoever.
Adjourned ’till tomorrow Monday March 13.

Amboy March 13th. 1780.
The Conference was resumed and the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton produced the following paper.
The Commissioners from His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton unwilling to prolong a meeting which they are sorry to find must terminate so contrary to the sanguine hopes and benevolent intentions with which they entered on the present Commission, find it however necessary to reply to the assertions contained in the minutes delivered to them by the Commissioners from General Washington, wherein they intend to invalidate the powers granted by Sir Henry Clinton by advancing a fact which they endeavour to establish as a maxim to evince the clearness and obvious intentions of the purport of the negotiation, but which conclusion the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton can by no means admit to be deduced or inferred from it. They must assert that the proposals concerted between Major General Phillips and Colonels Magaw, Mathews and Lieut. Colonels Ely and Ramsay and approved by Sir Henry Clinton were expressly designed to serve as a Basis whereon to treat for a General Exchange of Prisoners upon the mutual faith of the Commanders in Chief of the British and American Armies, with a hope also, that the proposals might be improved into an agreement of permanent advantage to both parties.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton must be of the opinion that the powers they are vested with comprehend an alternative, for a General Cartel involving in its consequences a General Exchange, the latter need not have been expressed had it not been intended to imply a General Exchange might still be adopted, provided the more desirable purpose of a General Cartel could not be effected.
The American Commissioners having stated a new fact, drawn from the correspondence between General Washington and Lieutenant General Knyphausen, it becomes proper to observe upon it, that General Sir Henry Clinton having left instructions with Lieutenant General Knyphausen for carrying the intentions into force for a meeting of Commissioners, it will appear by a reference to the Lieutenant General’s letter of the 19th. of February 1780 to General Washington that the spirit and tenor of the aforementioned proposals were precisely adhered to as in that letter, it is expressly declared that the Commissioners were to meet for the purpose of settling a “General Exchange,” and although in the Lieutenant General’s letter, as quoted by the American Commissioners, there is a customary and civil recapitulation of part of General Washington’s letter of the 29th. of February 1780, expressive of his wishes that a General Cartel might be settled, it by no means debarred, nor did it in any manner preclude, the avowed intention of a General Exchange, the desireable purpose which Lieutenant General Knyphausen had already expressed in His Excellency’s first letter to General Washington.
Under this description of the matter which the Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton apprehend will appear, on an impartial review of the correspondence and transactions previous to this meeting, to be justly founded, they are well warranted to declare that it seems to them not possible for the American Commissioners, who they now have the honour to meet, to infer that General Washington should have supposed a delegated authority from Great Britain essential to the purpose of the present meeting, and they therefore, must beg to be excused when they testify their surprize at the objections made to their powers, which certainly by no prior declaration, expression, or implication they could foresee would have happened.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton take leave to observe that they conceive the American Congress have never intended a General Cartel or a General Exchange unless upon national ground which must ever frustrate the humane purposes the British Commissioners so ardently wished to have effected.
Adjourned ’till tomorrow Tuesday March 14th.

Amboy March 14th. 1780.
The Conference was resumed and the Commissioners from General Washington produced the following paper.

The Commissioners from His Excellency General Washington reluctantly prosecute a discussion which promises no advantage to the purpose of the meeting, in which alone they are interested; but find themselves obliged to it, by the Commissioners from His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton having involved a proposition foreign to the simple and natural import of their own powers, and endeavouring as they conceive by a forced construction to justify that proposal. The Commissioners from General Washington have too entire a confidence in the candour of the British Commissioners to suppose they have any such intention, but in the present case, if their interpretation of the powers be right, the operation of the offer respecting a General Exchange is to give the negotiation on the side of the British Commissioners a degree of credit to which it is not entitled, by manifesting an apparent willingness to do an act desireable in itself, but which in reality they are not empowered to do.
The Commissioners from General Washington deny not, that the object of the proposals between Major General Phillips, and Colonels Magaw, Matthews Lieutenant Colonels Ely and Ramsay was such as described by the British Commissioners. They have already admitted it. But they still maintain that the ground of the present meeting has been changed, by subsequent and more authentic acts, and extended from a temporary to a permanent agreement, from a particular exchange to a general cartel. The letter the British Commissioners are pleased to cite from His Excellency Lieutenant General Knyphausen of the 19th. of February rather confirms than invalidates this position; for that also admits the idea of improving the proposals into an agreement for permanent advantage. It is conceived that the ideas of a permanent agreement and of one depending on the mere authority of a Commander in Chief, of course liable at any time to be violated by his successor are contradictory and irreconcileable. But if it be a good rule as it has always been held to be, to interpret antecedent by posterior acts there can remain no room for doubt—General Washington’s letter of the 29th. of february and Lt. General Knyphausen’s of the 4th Instant, both which were before referred to make a General Cartel the express and sole purpose of the meeting. It is apprehended it would be dangerous to admit that mode of explanation by which the plainest stipulations of official writings may be done away by resolving them into the mere forms of a customary civility. Nor can it but appear somewhat strange, that there should be a difference in opinion about the purpose of the meeting when Sir Henry Clinton’s powers themselves furnish so clear a comment; the avowed object of them being a General Cartel. The Commissioners from General Washington urge that a General Cartel can have no other foundation than national authority and national faith, without which it must be nominal and illusory. They therefore repeat their assertion, that after what had passed upon the subject in former interviews, it was to be expected, that either this purpose would not have been professed at all or Commissioners would have come with national powers to carry it into execution. The sense and practice of mankind must decide whether the principles on which the concurrence of the respective Governments is required be well founded or not, and to these the Commissioners from General Washington venture to appeal with confidence.
The Commissioners from General Washington flatter themselves that the British Commissioners will cease to think it impossible for them to have drawn the inference, “that General Washington supposed a delegated authority from the Court of London essential to the purpose of the present meeting”—when they possitively declare, as they before intimated, that this was absolutely the case—and when they add, that he considers a General Cartel on any other Basis, as inadmissible, delusive and impracticable.
The Commissioners from General Washington find no reason to alter their opinion, that the powers from Sir Henry Clinton, do not authorise the proposition for a General Exchange, distinct from a General Cartel, and for the reason already given that they stand connected with each other and not as alternatives. The observation of the British Commissioners, deduced from a general exchange, being the consequence of a general cartel, only serves to show that there was rather a superfluous expression; but without an application entirely new of the common signs of language, it never can be construed into an alternative. Had this been intended, a mode of expression, admitting no ambiguity, would doubtless have been preferred. Instead of that, which has been made use of, nothing could have been more easy or natural than to have said, a General Cartel or General Exchange.
The construction given by the Commissioners from General Washington appears the more evident, by a comparison of one part of the powers with the other. The preamble, which delineates the purpose of the meeting confines it to a General Cartel; the authorising clause speaks of a General Cartel and General Exchange. It must be supposed that the last was nothing more than an excess of terms, and could not mean to go beyond the acknowledged purpose of the meeting.
The Commissioners from General Washington entirely concur with the British Commissioners in opinion, that the Honourable the Congress never intended a General Cartel but on national ground, because this determination has been frequently announced and because they conceive there cannot possibly be any other proper ground; and they are persuaded that Congress will never depart from the principles, which have governed Nations at war in every similar treaty. But so far as relates to actual exchanges, to as great extent as the proportion of Prisoners on both sides will permit the Commissioners from General Washington, declare in the most explicit manner that they may at any time be carried into effect if the British Government or British General be so disposed on the terms which have prevailed in the course of the War, or on any others consistent with mutual justice and mutual advantage.
The Commissioners from Sir Henry Clinton closed the correspondence by giving the following as their final answer.
The Commissioners from His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton conceive they have uniformly declined entering into any discussion on the subject of the objections to their powers, made by the Commissioners from General Washington farther than by such assertions as might go to prove facts and explain, in the real sense, any parts of the previous leading matters which were thought necessary for producing this meeting. They take a liberty, of imagining that, however ingenious the reasonings of the American Commissioners may be, they will not convince nor have they confuted.

The British Commissioners assert that a General Exchange has been an object desired on their part and that they conceive themselves vested with powers from His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton to give so humane a purpose a full operation, supposing it could not be agreed to enter on a Negotiation for a General Cartel.
This closed the conference on the Commission.

Amboy March 14th 1780
Ar. St. Clair,   Ed. Carrington   Alex Hamilton
Compared the above with the original draft of the minutes and found it to be a true Copy.
W Phillips   Cosmo Gordon   Ch: Norton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, 15 March 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Amboy, New Jersey, March 15, 1780. On March 17, Hamilton wrote to Elizabeth Schuyler: “I wrote you a hasty letter two days ago.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Schuyler, [17 March 1780]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Schuyler, Elizabeth

[Amboy. New Jersey] Thursday Forenoon [March 17, 1780]
My dearest girl

I wrote you a hasty letter two days ago; since which I have had the happiness of hearing you were well by Col Webb and did not forget me when he was coming away. Every moment of my stay here becomes more and more irksome; but I hope two or three days will put an end to it. Col Webb tells me you have sent for a carriage to go to Philadelphia. If you should set out before I return have the goodness to leave a line informing me how long you expect to be there. I beg too you will not suffer any considerations respecting me to prevent your going; for though it will be a tax upon my love to part with you so long, I wish you to see that city before you return. It will afford you pleasure and whatever does that will always be most agreeable to me. Only let me entreat you to endeavour not to stay there longer than the amusements of the place interest you, in complaisance to friends; for you must always remember your best friend is where I am. If possible and you give me your consent I should try to make a short visit to the city while you are there; but it is very uncertain whether I shall be able to do it.
If I were not afraid of making you vain, I would tell you that Mrs. Carter, Peggy, and yourself are the dayly toasts of our table; and for this honor you are chiefly indebted to the British Gentlemen; though as I am always thinking of you, this naturally brings Peggy to my mind who is generally my toast. Capt Beebe is here and talks of her sometimes; but I won’t give my consent to his being her favourite. I don’t think him clever enough for her; he sings well and that’s all. Your little velancey is not of the party. I am told he is a pretty fellow. I have learnt a secret by coming down here.
Our interview is attended with a great deal of sociability and good humour; but I begin notwithstanding to be tired of our British friends. They do their best to be agreeable and are particularly civil to me; but after all they are a compound of grimace and jargon; and out of a certain fashionable routine are as dull and empty as any Gentlemen need to be. One of their principal excellencies consists in swallowing a large quantity of wine every day, and in this I am so unfortunate that I shall make no sort of figure with them. You must not think me prejudiced for the picture is a true one.
I had written so far when the express arrived with your dear billet under cover of one from your guardian. I cannot tell you what extacy I felt in casting my eye over the sweet effusions of tenderness it contains. My Betseys soul speaks in every line and bids me be the happiest of mortals. I am so and will be so. You give me too many proofs of your love to allow me to doubt it and in the conviction that I possess that, I possess every thing the world can give. The good Meade had the kindness to tell me that you received my letter with apparent marks of joy and that you retired with eagerness to read it. Tis from circumstances like these we best discover the true sentiments of the heart. Yours upon every occasion testifies that it is intirely mine. But notwithstanding all I have to thank you and to love you for, I have a little quarrel with you. I will not permit you to say you do not deserve the preference I give you, you deserve all I think of you and more and let me tell you your diffidence with so many charms is an unpardonable amiableness. I am pleased with it however on one account which is that it will induce you to call your good qualities into full activity, and there is nothing I shall always delight in more than to assist you in unfolding them in their highest perfection. I have spun out this letter much longer than I intended. It is now half an hour past our time of meeting. I must bid you adieu. Adieu my charmer; take care of your self and love your Hamilton as well as he does you. God bless you
AH


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 17 March 1780
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Amboy [New Jersey] 17th. March 1780
Dear Sir

I duly received your letter of the 14th. and shall not fail in conjunction with General St Clair to attend to the military object of it.

I am much obliged to your Excellency for the communication of your Southern advices. The enemy are still in the dark about their fleet and army gone that way as we gather from the Commissioners. They pretend to have little European news, though a vessel arrived two or three days since from England after ten weeks passage. We send you some late New York papers.
The Commission has been several days at an end. The enemy as was supposed had no idea of treating on national ground. We are now in private conversation and so far not without hopes that the liberation of our prisoners will be effected on admissible terms. Two or three days more will probably put an end to the interview. General St Clair and Col Carrington beg their respects may be presented to Your Excellency.
I have the honor to be   Very respectfully and affectionately   Yr Excellency’s   Most Obed serv
Alex Hamilton


Title: A Proposition, [18 March 1780]
From: Phillips, William,Gordon, Cosmo,Norton, Chapel
To: St. Clair, Arthur,Carrington, Edward,Hamilton, Alexander

[Amboy, New Jersey, March 18, 1780]

That the Exchange of the first Division of the Troops of Convention according to the proposed Plan given in shall have immediate Operation with the Exchanges of Officers for Officers Prisoners of War, and that the Exchange of the second Division of the Troops of Convention according to the proposed Plan given in shall, also, have immediate Operation so far as the Estimate of American Officers, Prisoners of War, according to the Tarif settled shall apply; and those American Officers Prisoners of War in South Carolina and Georgia who may be now in Possession of the British Army and were actually Prisoners on the 31st. Day of December 1779 are to be comprehended in the Estimate already mentioned.
That, however, the said American Officers Prisoners of War in South Carolina and Georgia be applyed in the first Instance to the immediate Exchange of Lieutt. Governor Hamilton according to a Rank which may be settled for him, and, also, of the Major and other Officers of the Army or Militia who may be with him in Virginia, and who were made Prisoners of War by a Capitulation with the American Colonel Clarke.
That the Discussion may be entered upon hereafter and determined when possible concerning a certain Person of the Name of Aligood said by the American Commissary General of Prisoners to be a Colonel or Lieutt.-Colonel in the British Service, made a Prisoner of War, and supposed to be somewhere upon Parole; as, also, of such other Persons mentioned by the American Commissary to be Officers in the British Service, but whose real Situation and Rank with that of the Person named Aligood must be considered as doubtful and uncertain, but should it be proved such Persons, so named and designated, shall have held Rank in the British Service at the time they were taken in Arms, they will undoubtedly be considered in a future Exchange and received in the mean time into the Lists of Prisoners of War by the British and American Commissaries General of Prisoners.
There being a considerable Number of American Prisoners with exprest Ranks given in a Return by Mr. Loring, the British Commissary General of Prisoners, but to whom Objections have been made to their being accounted as Prisoners of War they may remain under the same Description as that specified respecting Aligood and others.
That Officers made Prisoners of War belonging to the Military Staff of the British and American Armies who have no Regimental Rank may be exchanged by Composition to be now settled and to serve on future Occasions; but any American Military Staff Officers, who may be now Prisoners of War, to be considered in the Rank they held previous to a Resolution of the American Congress annulling Rank to such Establishments.
That Canadians and others belonging to the Government of Canada, being entirely dependant upon General Haldimand the Commander in Chief in Canada all Matters relating to them must be discussed between the American Commissaries and those of the British in Canada, and whenever any Matters relating to Prisoners of War with their Ranks appear properly certified from Canada they will in course from Motives of Conveniency and Humanity to both Parties be considered in Exchanges, as has been the Case in a Variety of Instances by the British Commander in Chief of the Southern Army.


Title: Major General Arthur St. Clair and Lieutenant Colonels Edward Carrington and Alexander Hamilton to Major General William Phillips and Lieutenant Colonels Cosmo Gordon and Chapel Norton, 19 March 1780
From: St. Clair, Arthur,Carrington, Edward,Hamilton, Alexander
To: Phillips, William,Gordon, Cosmo,Norton, Chapel

[Amboy, New Jersey] Sunday March the 19th. 1780

Major General St Clair Lt Col Carrington and Lt. Col Hamilton give it as their opinion as the result of the conversation held upon the subject that the most likely plan for effecting the exchange in contemplation is to confine it to the unexceptionable characters on both sides first exchanging all the prisoners of war and then the troops of convention for the balance, according to the distribution which has been made of them into divisions. In this is meant to be included Lt. Governer Hamilton, a Major and some other officers made prisoners of war by a capitulation with Colonel Clarke.
They think it may be an impediment to the business to involve the prisoners in South Carolina and Georgia at any rate from the great uncertainty in which both parties are of their number and description; but if this be made a point they are willing to propose it under the following form only—that it shall extend solely to the officers in captivity in that quarter on the 31st of December last, who shall remain unexchanged—that all officers prisoners of war to the United States, whose specific ranks and circumstances are not now ascertained and who are not therefore comprehended in the above description of unexceptionable characters, shall stand against whatever balance there may be of the aforesaid Southern prisoners in favour of the British according to such ranks and by such compositions as may hereafter be agreed upon after a more full inquiry into the nature of their respective appointments in the British service & the situations in which they were taken. It is of course understood that this settlement is to be made on liberal and equitable terms and to respect only such as were in captivity at the forementioned period of the 31st of Decr. last—That if there be still a balance of officers in favour of the British, it shall be applied as far as it will go towards an exchange of the remainder of the 2d division of the troops of Convention. It is intended to comprehend in this arrangement those Canadian officers who have been sent in on their parole and are not yet accounted for. The circumstance of their belonging to the Northern department can be no objection to this; as frequent exchanges have been made here from time to time of prisoners sent from Canada and in a recent instance during the present interview, credit has been given by the American Commissary for a list of such prisoners said to be delivered by a flag vessel from Halifax.
They admit that Lts. Baron D. Utretch Blake Kukox Wilcox Porter & Netherland—as they are stiled & Stated as prisoners of war to the British shall be subject to a like inquiry and settlement with the above described persons and shall come into this arrangement respecting Southern Prisoners. With regard to those persons borne on the British Commissary list of prisoners objected to as not being taken in arms, they not only decline all present discussion; but are persuaded there never will be a future one.
They think the fairest mode with respect to staff officers who have no Regimental rank is that they be exchanged for each other according to the rank they actually held in the army at the time of capture, and for such as held no rank according to a composition to be now settled.