Title: Enclosure: Francisco de Miranda to John B. Prevost, 2 April 1797
From: Miranda, Francisco de
To: Prevost, John B.

Réponse.
A Paris ce 2 avril 1797.
Le général Miranda S’empresse d’envoyer à monsieur Prevost la résponse à la lettre de M. Monroe, que M. Prevost lui a adressée—en le priant de vouloir bien la lui faire parvenir.


Title: Enclosure: Francisco de Miranda to James Monroe, 2 April 1797
From: Miranda, Francisco de
To: Monroe, James

a Paris Ce 2 avril 1797.
Monsieur,
Ce n’est que dans le moment que je reçois Votre lettre du 17 mars. Mr. Prévost qui me l’envoie m’explique ainsi l’objet de Votre sollicitude: “the papers alluded to in the within note (votre lettre) are those which respect a negotiation with Mr. Pitt; confided to Mr. Miranda Some time Since by Messieurs hamilton and Knox, the object of which was to adopt Some effectual measure to liberate South America.” Je puis Vous assurer, monsieur, qu’il n’y a pas un mot de vrai dans tout ce rapport. Mr. Paine, duquel Vous dites le tenir, S’est assurément trompé en prenant pour des négociations quelques notes peut-ètre qu’il a vues à ma Compagne de minilmontant, faites dans le tems de mes Voyages dans les Etats Unis, et qui m’ont été données par ces deux respectables amis quand ils n’etaient que de Simples Citoyens, bien antérieurement à leur ministére. C’est la seule fois que M Paine ait été chez moi, et que nous aions parlé (autant que je puis m’en Souvenir) de la situation politique de l’amérique du Sud, ma patrie. Et certes, Vous conceves d’abord que si j’eusse eu le Desir, depuis deux ans, de remetre des papiers entre Vos mains, ou de les faire passer en Amérique, je n’aurais pas manqué de Vous en prévenir, dans les deux seules occasions que j’ai eu l’honneur de Vous voir, en nous rendant des Visites d’honnèteté, à ma Sortie des prisons de la tyrannie.
Je Vous Souhaite un tres heureux Voyage, et voulant profiter de Votre offre généreuse, je Vous prie de Vouloir bien Vous charger de présenter mes Complimens respectueux, aux général Washington—le C. A. hamilton, et le général knox. Je suis avec parfaite Consideration,
Monsieur   Votre très humble et très obeissant Serviteur
f. Miranda.
James Monroe Esqe.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, [1 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

[New York, April 1, 1797]
My Dear Sir
I have received your letter of the 30th. with the statement inclosed. I do not believe that its publication would have any influence upon the question of a rupture with France; but yet, as it seems that those who surround the President are not agreed in the matter—as an opinion is industriously circulated that too much fuel has been added by the publications of the Government—as it is important to disarm a certain party of the weapons of calumny—as it is in general best to avoid inofficial publications of Official matter—as it may be even useful for the sake of impression to reserve the disclosure till the Meeting of Congress, when the accumulation of insult may be the instrument of giving a strong impulse—I rather advise the with-holding of the statement. When Congress meet it will be very useful to have a statement of this kind ready as the abstract of the communications to present to the people a summary view.
Such, My Dear Sir, is the infatuation of a great part of our Community that it will be policy in our Government to do a great deal too much to make the idea palpable that Rupture was inevitable.
Adieu Yrs. truly
A Hamilton
April 1. 1797
If the statement is published, I would close with the words “January last” in the last Paragrap[h]. The residue will make a good separate news Paper Paragraph. Pray who is the Emigrant alluded to?

T Pickering Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Uriah Tracy, 1 April 1797
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Tracy, Uriah

[New York, April 1, 1797. On April 6, 1797, Tracy wrote to Hamilton: “I thank you for your Letter of the 1st. inst.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 2 April 1797
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London Ap. 2. 1797
Dear Sir,
As Mr. Church is the bearer, I refer you to him for what it would take many Pages to relate, and will only say that notwithstanding the injuries we continue to receive from France I still hope, the same policy that has hitherto kept us out of the war, will continue to influence and decide our Government.
How the new President will conduct himself in a situation thorny and embarrassing remains to be seen; the first Step is very important, and therefore shd. be deeply and extensively considered.
Every thing looks like an active, and to a certain degree, a vigourous campaign: yet with all these appearances of the continuance of the war, Peace may be near: But what will be the consequence of such a Peace as alone can be had at this Time? A late Arret of the Directory gives notice to all french Citizens, that the Treaty of Feb. 1778 between France and the UStates of Amer. has been (of full right,) in virtue of the 2d. article thereof, modified so as to conform to the stipulations contained in the treaty of 1794 between the UStates & G Britain—the arret then proceeds to specify the modification:

1. all Enemy Goods, and all merchandize “non suffisament constatée neutre,” on board Amer. Vessels shall be lawful Prize; but the vessel shall be released &c.
2. to the articles of Contraband specified in the treaty of Feby. 1778 shall be added “les bois de construction” &c enumerating the additional articles of Contraband contained in the treaty between the US. & G. Br.

3. “D’apres l’article 21 du traité de Londres de 19. Nov. 1794, tout individu reconnu Américain, porteur d’une commission donnée par les Ennemis de la france, ainsi que tout marin de cette nation faisant partie des Equipages des Navires ou Vaisseaux ennemis, sera ce seul fait, declaré pirate, et traité comme tel, sans qu’il puisse aucun cas, alleguer qu’il y a été forcé par violence, menace ou autrement.”
4. According to the Law of 14. feb. 1793, the Regulations of that of ye 21. Octr. 1744, and of that of 26 July 1778, concerning the Trial of neutral Ships & Cargos, shall be observed; and in Consequence thereof, every american Ship shall be a good Prize, on board whereof there shall not be found, un Rôle d’equipage en bonne forme such as is required by the Form annexed to the Treaty of the 6. feb. 1778, the execution of which is hereby required.
5. respects certain causes of Forfeiture by reason of misconduct in destroying papers, possessing double Papers &c &c.

6. repeals certain former Regulations.
7. directs the insertion of the arret in the Bulletin of the Laws &c The third article is a false construction, for obvious purposes, of the analogous article in our Treaty with Engd—the fourth will render all our Ships liable to Capture and if acted upon to condemnation, since no American Vessel has on board her the Document required. In our printed Laws, are also the treaties; and among them those we formed with France—to the coml. Treaty, though the 25. & 27 articles refer to it, there is no model or Form of a Passport. Mr. Jefferson has certified that Treaty to be correct, and a perfect copy, as you will see by his printed certificate in the Law Book.
I have a copy of the coml. Treaty with France printed in London in 1783, wh. has the Form of a Passport, Role d’Equipage &c annexed. A copy of it I have given to Mr. Church who will shew it to you; by wh. you will see that none of our Vessels are exempt from Capture if this Copy is that referred to in the late Arret—indeed it seems too absurd in some things to be genuine, yet I suspect it is the model or Form referred to & required by the 4th Art. of the arret.
farewel yrs &c
Rufus King


Title: Deed from Peter Goelet, Robert Morris, and William Popham, [4 April 1797]
From: Goelet, Peter,Morris, Robert,Popham, William
To:

[New York, April 4, 1797]
Peter GoeletRobert Morris &William Popham Trustees for all theCreditors of Peter Hassenclever andothers under an Attachment &c  ToAlexander Hamilton
}
Deed dated the fourth day of April An: Dom 1797. in Consideration of two thousand four hundred and twenty two pounds thirteen shillings and ten pence for a Tract of Land situate lying and being in the Manor
of Cosby, on the North side of the Mohawk river, containing Lots from No. 22 to 50 inclusive, contai[n]ing Six thousand seven hundred and fifty five Acres as described in a Map of that part of the Manor of Cosby which lies on the North side of the Mohawk river.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 5 April 1797
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia April 5. 1797
Dear Sir,
I received your letter of the  and accord with your opinion that the proposed publication of the intelligence from Genl. Pinckney should be omitted. The “emigrant” we conclude to be Perigord, formerly bishop of Autun. Sometime since, I was informed that he left this country with signs of enmity towards it; and the Directory would naturally place great confidence in his opinion: and yet it is so extravagant we may wonder that it should gain any credit. But, as Barras said to Monroe, “They will not stoop to calculate the consequences of our condescension to our ancient tyrants;” nor, it would seem, of their own atrocities. They are giddy with their successes, and stick at no means which promise to promote their views of domination & plunder.
I have omitted to answer your letter of Feby. 10. To-day, I have examined Chancellor Livingston’s letter books. On the 25th of March 1783, he wrote to the American Commrs Adams, Franklin, Jay & Laurens, acknowledging the rect. of their letter with the “preliminary articles.” He tells them that “the steadiness manifested in not treating without an express acknowledgement of our independence, previous to a treaty, is approved, and it is not doubted but it accelerated that declaration.” Yet you will recollect (as I have stated in my printed letter to Genl. Pinckney) that Count de Vergennes urged Mr. Jay’s negociating with Mr. Oswald without insisting on that previous acknowledgement; and this concurring with other facts inspired Mr. Jay with the suspicions which the Chancellor censures. The grounds of those suspicions were detailed in Mr. Jay’s letter of Septr. 18. of Which the Chancellor acknowledged the receipt on the 30th of December 1782.
In the same letter of March 25th 1783, to the Comrs, after informing them that the preliminary articles had been laid before Congress—“that they had met with their warmest approbation, & been generally seen by the people in the most favourable point of view; and made some comments on the subject; and noticed the British debts which, says he, “no honest man could wish to withhold”—he adds—“But, gentlemen, tho’ the issue of your treaty has been successful, tho’ I am satisfied that we are much indebted to your firmness & perseverance, to your accurate knowledge of our situation & of our wants for this success, yet I feel no little pain at the distrust manifested in the management of it, particularly in signing the treaty without communicating it to the court of Versailles, till after the signature, and in concealing the separate article from it even when signed. I have examined with the most minute attention all the reasons assigned in your several letters to justify these suspicions. I confess they do not appear to strike me so forcibly as they have done you; and it gives me pain that the character for candor & fidelity to its engagements which should always characterize a great people should have been impeached thereby. The concealment was in my opinion absolutely unnecessary. For had the court of France disapproved the terms you had made after they had been agreed upon, they could not have acted so absurdly as to counteract you at that late day, & thereby put themselves in the power of an enemy who would certainly betray them, & perhaps justify you in making terms for yourselves. The secret article is no otherwise important than as it carries in it the seeds of enmity to the court of Spain, and shews a marked preference for an open enemy.” The Chancellor continues his remarks on the secret article, and expresses his opinion that the same boundary for West Florida should have been stipulated, into whose hands soever it might fall at the conclusion of the war. “I feel (says he) for the embarrassment explanations on this subject must subject you to, when this secret is known to your allies.” He incloses to them his report (or letter) to congress on the manner in which the negociation had been conducted, in regard to the concealment from the Court of Versailles, and the secret article, and the motions to which the communication gave rise in Congress. But while under consideration, letters arrived from Count D’Estaing & the Marquis de la Fayette, containing accounts that preliminaries (I suppose of a general peace) were signed; and the whole affair went over without any decision.
In his report to Congress, he reminds them of their reiterated expressions of Confidence in France, and quotes their public resolution of the 4th of Octr. 1782, “That Congress will not enter into the discussion of any overtures for pacification but in confidence and in concert with his most Christian Majesty.” “Yet (says he) it has unfortunately so happened that the ministers of these states have imagined they had sufficient grounds to suspect the sincerity & the court of France, & have not only thought it prudent to agree upon & sign preliminaries with Great Britain, without communicating them till after the signature to the ministers of his most Christian Majesty, but have permitted a separate article to be inserted in their treaty which they still conceal from the court of France.” This he considers as reducing Congress to a most embarrassing situation, either of contradicting all their former professions of confidence in their ally, or of exposing their ministers at the court of France, and too when those ministers have obtained such terms from the court of London as does great honor to them, & at least equals our highest expectations.” The preamble to the provisional articles he supposes to have been framed in England; and all his observations manifest this suspicions of insidious designs in that power. Finally he submits the following resolutions.
“That the secretary for foreign affairs be directed to communicate the separate article in the provisional preliminary treaty with Great Britain, to the minister of his most Christian Majesty, in such manner as will best tend to remove any unfavourable impression it may make on the court of France of the sincerity of those states or their ministers.”
“That the ministers for negociating peace be informed of this communication, and of the reasons which influenced Congress to make it. That they be instructed to agree that in whatsoever hands West Florida may remain at the conclusion of the war, the United States will be satisfied that the line of north boundary be as described in the said separate article.”
“That it is the sense of the U. States in Congress, that the articles agreed upon between the ministers of these states and those of his Britannic Majesty, are not to take place until a peace shall have been actually signed between their most Christian & Britannic Majesties.”
Actually signed—If you turn to the preamble of the provisional articles, you will see that it was declared that the treaty of peace, which the articles were to constitute, was not to be concluded “until terms of a peace shall be agreed upon between G.B. & France; and his B.M. shall be ready to conclude such treaty accordingly.” Now, says the Chancellor, “this preamble is so expressed as to render it very doubtful whether our treaty does not take place the moment France & England have agreed on the terms of their treaty, tho’ France should refuse to sign till her allies were satisfied.”
As you have not mentioned the object of your enquiry on this subject, this detail may perhaps be deficient or redundant. In either case you will advise me; and particularly I must request you to acknowledge the receipt of this letter, that I may be sure of its having reached your hands.
I am dear sir   very truly yours
T. Pickering


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Loughton Smith, 5 April 1797
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Smith, William Loughton

New York, April 5th 97
I have received My Dear Sir Your letter of the  with your little work accompanying it, which I shall read with the interest I take in the author, the first leisure hour. I have cast my eye over it and like very much the plan.
Our affairs are indeed very critical. But I am sorry to find that I do not agree with several of my friends. I am clearly of opinion for an extraordinary mission and as clearly that it should embrace Madison. I do not think we ought to construe the declaration of the Directory against receiving a Minister Plenipotentiary as extending to an extraordinary mission pro hac vice. And if it does, it would be no reason with me against it. I would accumulate the proofs of French Violence & demonstrate to all our Citizens that nothing possible has been omitted. That a certain party desires it is with me a strong reason for it—since I would disarm them of all plea that we have not made every possible effort for peace. The idea is a plausible one that as we sent an Envoy Extraordinary to Britain so ought we to send one to France. And plausible ideas are always enough for the multitude.
These and other reasons (and principally to avoid Rupture with a political monster which seems destined soon to have no Competitor but England) make me even anxious for an extraordinary mission.
And to produce the desired effect, it seems to me essential that it shall embrace a distinguished character agreeable to France & having the confidence of the adverse party. Hence I think of Madison—but I think of him only as one, because I would not trust him alone. I would unite with him Pinckney & some strong Man from the North, say Cabot, and two of the three should rule.
We should then be safe. I need not tell you that I am disposed to make no sacrifices to France. I had rather perish myself and Family than see the Country disgraced. But I would try hard to avoid Rupture & if that cannot be to unite the opinions of all good Citizens of whatever political denomination. This is with me a mighty object.
I will give you hereafter my ideas of what ought to be done when Congress meet. My plan ever is to combine energy with moderation.
Yrs. Affectly
A Hamilton
Wm. Smith Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [5 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[New York, April 5, 1797]
Dear Sir
I have received your letter of March 31. I hope nothing in my last was misunderstood. Could it be necessary I would assure you that no one has a stronger convinction than myself of the purity of the motives which direct your public Conduct or of the good sense and judgment by which it is guided. If I have a fear (you will excuse my frankness), it is lest the strength of your feelings, the companions of energy of character, should prevent that pliancy to circumstances which is sometimes indispensable. I beg you only to watch yourself on this score & the public will always find in you an able as well as faithful servant.
The situation of our Country My Dear Sir, is singularly Critical. The map of Europe is every way discouraging. There is too much reason to apprehend that the Emperor of Germany in danger from Russia & Prussia, perhaps the Porte, as well as France may be compelled to yield to the views of the latter. England standing alone may be driven to a similar issue. It is certain that great consternation in Court and Country attended the intelligence of Buonapartes last victories. Either to be in rupture with France united with England alone or singly as is possible would be a most unwelcome situation. Divided as we are who can say what would be hazarded by it?
In such a situation it appears to me we should rather err on the side of condescention than on the opposite side. We ought to do every thing to avoid rupture, without unworthy sacrifices, and to keep in view as a primary object union at home.
No measure can tend more to this than an extraordinary Mission. And it is certain to fulfil the ends proposed it ought to embrace a character in whom France and the Opposition have full Credit. What risk can attend sending Madison if combined as I propose with Pinckney & Cabot or such a man (two deciding). Depend on it Pinckney is a man of honor & loves his Country. Cabot we both know. Besides there ought to be certain leading instructions from which they may not deviate.
I agree with you that we have nothing to retract—that we ought to risk every thing before we submit to any dishonorable terms. But we may remould our Treaties. We may agree to put France on the same footing as Great Britain by our Treaty with her. We may also liquidate with a view to future wars the import of the mutual gurantee in the Treaty of alliance substituting specific succours & defining the casus fœderis. But this last may or may not be done, though with me it is a favourite object.
Ingersol will not fulfil the object but I had rather have him than do nothing.
I am clearly of Opinion with You that the President shall come forward to Congress in a manly tone & that Congress shall adopt vigourous defensive measures. Those you propose are proper & some others on which I may write hereafter.
If Madison is well couplied I do not think his intrigues can operate as you imagine. Should he advocate dishonorable concessions to France the public opinion will not support. His colleages by address & shewing a disposition to do enough may easily defeat his policy & maintain the public Confidence. Besides that it is possible too much may be taken for granted with regard to Mr. Madison.
Yrs. very truly
A H
April 5. 1797

After reading Return me the inclosed.

Oliver Wolcott Jun Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Uriah Tracy, 6 April 1797
From: Tracy, Uriah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philada. 6th. April ’97
Sir
I thank you for your Letter of the 1st inst.—but as Johnson of Salisbury teazes to purchase for him the Land, which lies in that Town, in your care, I will thank you to write me or him, whether you mean he should have it.
Your plan you say respecting our public affairs is to move together till common danger rouse to common Action. I am perfectly in sentiment with you—provided we can rouse before all is lost—And to exhaust attempts at negociation. In this, I agree, if it has not been done already; I have no objection to clothing with full powers, to Treat with France, either of our foreign Ministers, or even keeping Mr Pinckney at Amsterdam, or any other convenient place, for the purpose, as he has all the ordinary & extraordinary powers of the plenipotentiary & Envoy—& let France & the world know we are ready to negociate on any terms of accomodations—the moment the French Governmt are willing to treat us with civility & propriety, but Sir, I am not willing to send an Envoy Extraordinary to France, nor to retract a syllable of our Governmental Acts, nor a single step of the administration; sending an Envoy now would do all this, and more, it would commit the whole of our national dignity, to be trampled upon by that haughty & accursed Nation, & rivet their infamous disorganizing chains on us, beyond even our present disgraceful situation.
Every nerve ought to be exerted to induce a preparation for War; This preparation is not only proper, but necessary to our existence as an independent Nation—& if such a Vote cannot be obtained in the House of Representatives, (the Senators there seem to be yet a doubt of) what will be the condition of our Country? We shall be much worse than Colonies to France, we shall be like the little Sister Republics in Europe—oppressed with spoliations & then taxed for the very fraternal piracy. If the Country can be roused to a proper sense of their wrongs, & their National dignity, if we are not so far benumbed with French principles as to have lost a sense of all propriety we shall undoubtedly arm in self defence, & let the French Nation & the World know, we have the discernment & spirit to discover & resent injuries of the most flagrant nature.
But if the House of Reps as I much fear they will not only vote to do nothing, but add to this their opinion by a public Vote, that the Governmt has injured France, & we deserve all this, as many of them now talk—Then it is, & in that case only, that I urge a separation.
The Southern part of the Union is increasing by frequent importations of foreign scoundrels as well as by those of home manufacture, their country is large & capable of such increase both in population & number of States—that in both houses of Congress, the Northern States will soon be swallowed up, & the name & real character of an American soon be known only as a thing of tradition; add to this the explosion which must sooner or later derive itself from their Slaves, & which must be hastened by such a step of the Government, drawing closer the bands of Amity with the French; all these, & many more painful facts induce me to believe a separation absolutely necessary to preserve an independence in a part, which could not be done united. We are really so different in manners in opinion and in activity & exertion, that the Northern States have been a number of years carrying the Southern on their backs—as the living subjects of Mezentius were doomed each to carry a corpse. In this view of the subject, I cannot be brought to regret a separation; if we must altogether become Colonies or worse to France or Separate, I am for a Separation—if we are, in the Northern States, to be Colonies to France or England, I choose the latter; but I really see no danger of any connection, beyond that of Commerce & Navigation, such as we now have with G Britain, with some additions of a similar kind. An influence of a political kind, cannot be established by the British Nation, and as to the French with the South combating the North in Connection with Britain; allow the worst it is only subjugation to one power, or another, and is that any worse than the situation we shall be in, if my fears are verified, as to the conduct of the House of Reps? French influence must not be increased, it must be diminished. I cannot hesitate a moment between the increase of French influence, & a division of the Union. I can conceive of no possible situation so terrible to this Country, as to admit the French to impose such friendship upon us as they are determined to, unless timely resistance is given. I cannot fear British influence, but had rather risk it, than not to knock off the chains of French fraternity; which are literally the primal curse of Heaven. Pardon me, my Dear Sir, I will not be obstinate, but I must be convinced of my Error, & I will retract. I know the sensible part of our Southern Brethren fear a separation, & I really think a measure, would tend to hinder it. I am Sir, Yrs sincerely,
Uriah T⟨racy⟩
Col⟨o⟩ Hamilt⟨on⟩


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, [8 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: King, Rufus

[New York, April 8, 1797]
I thank you, My Dear Sir, for your letter of the 6th. of February. The intelligence that the Directory have ordered away our Minister is every way unpleasant. It portends too much a formal Rupture as the only alternative to an ignominious submission. Much public feeling has been excited. But the Government, I trust and believe, will continue prudent and do every thing that honor permits towards accommodation. Tis however to be feared that France successful will be too violent and imperious to meet on any admissible ground.
Congress are called to gether. I can give you no conjecture as to what will be done. Opinions are afloat. My idea is another attempt to pacify by negotiation, vigorous preparation for war, and defensive measures with regard to our Trade. But there never was a period of our affairs in which I could less foresee the course of things.
I believe there is no danger of want of firmness in the Executive. If he is not ill-advised he will not want prudence. I mean that I believe that he is himself disposed to a prudently firm course.

You know the map of our Senate. That of our house of Representatives is not ascertained. A small majority on the right side is counted upon. In Virginia it is understood that Morgan comes in place of Rutherford & Evans in place of Page. The whole result of the Virginia election is not known.
The conduct of France has been a very powerful medicine for the political disease of this Country. I think the Community improves in soundness.
Adieu God bless you
A Hamilton
April 8. 1797
R King Esq


Title: Enclosure: [Notes on Conduct with Great Britain], [10 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Smith, William Loughton

It must be acknowleged by all who can comprehend the subject that the present situation of the UStates is in an extreme degree critical, demanding in our public councils a union of the greatest prudence with the greatest firmness. To appreciate rightly the course which ought to be pursued it is an essential preliminary to take an accurate view of the situation.
That the preservation of peace is a leading article in the policy of this country has been peculiarly the tenet of the friends of the Government. It is a tenet supported by conclusive reasons. In addition to the general motives to peace which are common to other nations—it is of the utmost consequence to us that our progress to that degree of maturity which puts humanly speaking our fortunes absolutely in our hands shall not be retarded by a premature war.
But the state of affairs externally and internally suggests the strongest imaginable auxiliary motives to avoid, if possible, at this time a rupture with France. Externally we behold France most formidably successful—extending too her connections and influence, while the affairs of her remaining enemies decline. The late events in Italy have for the present put that Country intirely in the power of France with all its resources. It was evident that the Emperor had made a violent exertion for the relief of Mantua. The issue has been to him a terrible one. He will probably be able to bring forward new and powerful forces but it is likely to be attended with great difficulty and embarrassment—and there is too much reason to suspect that these new forces will be under the disadvantage, of raw-troops contending with Veterans led by a General who seems to have chained Victory to his cha[i]r. It would seem too that France has awed or seduced Naples into her alliance. And who can say what she may not do as to Venice? Does not every thing seem to promise her the intire command of Italy and its cooperation against the Emperor?
What is the situation of Great Britain? Triumphant at sea but deeply, if not mortally wounded in her vital part, in that which is the vital energy of the Opposition to France—I mean in her pecuniary system. The late measures with regard to the Bank, however vieled, amount to nothing less than a stoppage of payment and an act of bankruptcy in that Institution. The magic which surrounded it, and gave it its principal force exists no longer. Opinion must be injured and with it credit. The consequences are incalculable. An incapacity to afford further subsidies or loans to the Emperor may be inferred with almost moral certainty. Though the great national resources of England and the universal interest in public Credit may arrest and abrige the extent of the evil yet it is scarcely possible that it shall not very much enervate the future efforts against France & it may be expected to fortify extremely the desire of peace in the Nation.
The conduct of the present Emperor of Russia is at best equivocal. Having departed from the engagements of his predecessor towards the Emperor it is in the course of calculation that he may be thrown into the opposite scale. What is the King of Prussia about? Nothing friendly to the Emperor of Germany, if we may reason from his conduct for sometime past—though if we were to reason from his solid interest we ought to conclude that he would not be willing to have France for a contiguous neighbour commanding Holland, and the Emperor of Germany so weakened as to be a counterpoise neither to France nor Russia. Yet a crooked policy pursuing some immediate interest seems most likely to be his governing motive.
According to appearances then there is great danger that the Emperor and England may be compelled to subscribe to the conditions of France, or to continue the contest on unequal and ruinous terms. It is true in the shifting scenes of Europe the political hemisphere may quickly wear a totally different aspect, but such as it is, it exhibits every evil omen to the enemies of France.
To be involved in a contest with France at this time and under such circumstances would be in the highest degree inauspicious. If the war continues between her and her present enemies the contest can still promise nothing but evil to us without a possibility of Gain. If a sudden peace in Europe takes place and we are left to contend alone the prospect is a most uncomfortable one. France will have large bodies of troops that she will be glad to get rid of and it cannot be doubted that she will be governed by a spirit of domination and Revenge.
Internally, though our situation in this respect, mends, it is certain that there is a very large party infatuated by a blind devotion to France. Who will guarantee that in a contest so dangerous these men on considerations of ambition fear interest and predilection would not absolutely join France? There is at least enough of danger of this to furnish a strong reason for avoiding if possible rupture.
In the South we have a vast body of blacks. We know how successful the French have been in innoculating this description of men and we ought to consider them as the probable auxiliaries of France. Let us add that we may have to contend on the South & West with Spain & all the Savage tribes they can influence.
The aggregate of these considerations is little less than awful.
In such a state of things large and dispassionate views are indispensible. Neither the suggestion of pride nor timidity ought to guide. There ought to be much cool calculation united with much calm fortitude. The Government ought to be all intellect while the people ought to be all feeling.
The result is in my mind that there ought to be 1 a further attempt to negotiate & 2 vigorous preparation for war with an intermediate embargo.
As to a further attempt to negotiate—let a Commission extraordinary consisting of three persons be sent to France, and let Jefferson or Madison be at the head of this Commission, perhaps as the Ostensible Minister, but obliged to cooperate with his Colleagues & to conform to the Major opinion. Let General Pinckney be one of the Commission, and let Mr. King or Mr. Cabot or some other able man of the Northern Region be the third. If thought expedient the Com~. May go to Amsterdam & announce their mission by a Courier asking for passports &c.
Let two leading principles of action be prescribed to these Commissioners. They must not directly or indirectly acknowlege any fault or culpability in the U States—they must not stipulate any succour to France of any kind or in any shape in the present War—they must stipulate nothing inconsistent with any existing treaty with another Power.
What may they do? They may now modify our Treaties with France so as to assimilate the Commercial one with that with Great Britain and so as mutually to do away, or liquidate with an eye to future defensive wars the guarantee contained in the Treaty of alliance, substituting specific succours in defined cases to the general guarantee.
This measure will keep open the door of accommodation and give us the chance of favorable events. It will furnish a bridge to the pride of France to retreat. It will give her the motive of endeavouring to strengthen her party by appearing to yield peace to a leader of that party. It will convince the people completely that the Government is at least as solicitous to avoid War with France as it was to avoid it with Great Britain. It will take from the partisans of France the argument that as much has not been done in her case as in that of Great Britain & thus it will contribute, if the measure fails, to the all important end of uniting Opinion at home.
Let us see the objections to this measure and the answers they admit.
Objection 1. The conduct of France has been so violent & insulting towards us that we cannot without disgrace make a further Overture for negotiation.
Answer. This was the opinion of many with regard to Great Britain when Mr. Jay was sent & in all appearance her conduct was very outrageous. Yet our moderation on that occasion not only averted war but raised the character of the Country abroad. It is true France has gone much further than Great Britain ever did. But on the other hand the state of things, and of opinion, requires greater circumspection in the case of France, than was necessary in that of Great Britain. If we couple this measure with others which will evince that we are in earnest about defending ourselves and repelling aggression, our honor will be saved and our moderation only will be displayed. When also it shall be known that our ministers were prohibited from unworthy concessions, it will be demonstrated that we did nothing more than wave punctilio in favour of peace. It is often too wise by some early condescension to avoid the danger of future humiliation. Our Country is not a military one. Our people are divided. France may present herself to their imaginations as the terrible and invincible conqueror of Europe. Who will answer for their fortitude and exertion under such circumstances? Will it not be prudent to avoid if we can the Experiment by a little condescention now?
But this is not all. The measure will tend to unite and fortify & this may ensure that very fortitude which in a different state of things might be wanting. It may beget the noble resolution to die in the last ditch.
2 Object: The sending of a man unfriendly to the course of our Government & devoted to France may give an opportunity to play into the hands of France & leave greater odium upon the Government for not acceding to inadmissible terms of accommodation. He may be a medium of Cabal between France and the party rather than the Negotiator of accommodation.
Answer. There is perhaps more weight in this than in any other Objection which can be made. But it seems to admit of a satisfactory answer. First. It goes further in ascribing Turpitude to the character in question than perhaps is warrantable. It is far from certain that he would be disposed to make an absolute sacrifice of his country and it is to be remembered that in accepting the appointment with known restrictions he agrees to their reasonableness & engages his reputation upon the issue of success. Considerable securities result from these considerations. But admit the disposition to do what is feared, If he is coupled with men of address a counter game may be played & such a complexion may be given to the thing as may put both him and France intirely in the wrong. All will depend on the characters combined. Pinckney, it may be depended on, is a man of honor & loves his Country. Unite with him a man of skill and an effectual counteraction is provided. Such a man can certainly be found in a case where the Government may command any of its citizens.
3 Objection. If the measure succeeds under such a man it will strengthen his hands and through him increase the influence of France from which it is of the utmost importance to emancipate the Country.
Answer. There will be some evil of this sort. But this must be weighed against the good obtained. That will be the preservation of peace in the most dangerous crisis that can well be imagined. Besides the credit of the measure will at least be divided between the Authors & the Agent. The President and the Government will have a large share. And the poison will carry with it its antidote. Moreover it is morally certain that the course of things in France will furnish every day some new cure to a moral and orderly people like the people of this Country. But this objection such as it is lies against the person not the measure.
4th Objection. The conduct of France has been such as to free us from the shakles of Treaties which present only nominal advantages to us or such as in future will be real to her (alluding chiefly to the mutual guarantee).
Answer. This may be true, but the consequence can only take place in a final Rupture. And this would be to stake perhaps our political existence against a partial incumbrance. Surely it could not be wise to attempt to disengage ourselves from our connection with France by a War with her at such a juncture. It might happen that in the end we might be obliged to consent to be fettered in a much greater degree, and increase rather than diminish the evil for which the rupture was hazarded. Expediency is so clearly against it that it is unnecessary to examine the morality of such a policy.
Objection 5 The conduct of France leaves no hope that such a measure will be useful or even that the mission will be heared. There will then be pure disgrace without any advantage.
Answer. The course of things in France does not authorise us to expect any very steady plan there. Events within and without will govern—and there may exist when the Minister arrives a good disposition to receive and hear him. The refusal to receive a minister Plenipotentiary may mean only an ordinary one to reside & may not extend to an extraordinary one pro hac vice. But suppose the worst, it will tend to the most precious of all things Union at home. The repetition of effort to avoid war and of Insult from France will have the most happy influence upon the Temper of our Country.
Object 6. The policy of remodifying our Treaty of Alliance is very questionable. It converts a vague into a specific contract, and substitutes precise obligations to such as each party may interpret according to its convenience.
Answer. This is not an essential part of the plan & may be rejected if thought inexpedient.

But considering the Treaty of alliance as the price, no less than the instrument of the assistance from France, morality, which is most consistent with good policy, requires it should be paid. The genuine meaning of that alliance, as to the obligation of the U States, seems to be that when France is really & truly engaged in a defensive war & her West India possessions are attacked the U States ought to assist in their defence with their whole force. In future the U States will not have the excuse of inability. They are becoming dayly a powerful nation. They must then either evade their obligation, or as often as France is engaged in a defensive war with a maritime power, take part with her with their whole force. Hence they may be exposed to frequent wars. The denial of their duty besides the guilt & disgrace of broken faith may not avoid that consequence, for as it would be a just so it might be the actual cause of War with the ally.
The vagueness of the Obligation as a source of reciprocal Controversy is in itself an evil which it would be important to get rid of.
Specific succours by either party to the other would not necessarily have the effect of involving the Giver in War. It is settled that such succours in consequence of a Treaty antecedent to the War are not a cause of War.
It would therefore seem to be a great point to the UStates to convert its obligation into that of a specific succour to be defined & thus lessen the danger of a quarrel either with France or its enemies and likewise the evils of a general War.
It is bad to be under obligations which it will be a violation of good faith not to perform & which it will certainly compromit the peace of the Country to perform.
In addition to the reasons already given for pacificatory measures are these cogent ones. The plan of the Government and of the Fœderal party has been to avoid becoming a party in the present War. If any measure it has taken is either the cause or pretext of a War with France, the end will be lost. The credit of preserving peace will not exist. The wisdom of the plan pursued will be questionned. The confidence in the Government will be shaken. The adverse party will acquire the Reputation & the influence of superior foresight. The evil avoided will be forgotten. The evil incurred will be felt. The doubt entertained by many of the justifiableness of the Treaty with G B in respect to France may increase with suffering and danger—& the management of Affairs may be thrown into the hands of the opposite party by the Voice of the people & the Government & the Country sacrificed to France.
Hence it is all important to avoid War if we can—if we cannot to strengthen as much as possible the Opinion that it proceeds from the Unreasonableness of France.
As to preparation for War they ought in my opinion to consist of these particulars.
I   Revenue, which ought to go as far as not to be really oppressive. A large sum may be raised within this limit. The objects may be hereafter designated.
II   A loan of five Millions of Dollars on the basis of that Revenue. This may be put on a footing which will ensure its gradual, yet timely success.
III   The completion of the three frigates with all possible speed & the purchase of Twenty ships the most fit to be armed and equipped as Cutters & Sloops of War. These will serve to guard our Trade against the Pickeroons of France in the West Indies which are chiefly dangerous. They are to be used in the first instance merely as convoys with instructions purely defensive—prohibitted from cruising for prizes or from attacking, or from capturing except when attacked.
IV   Instructions to our Minister in Great Britain, if the Negotiation fails, to endeavour to purchase from Great Britain or obtain on a loan Two ships of the line & three frigates. It will be her interest to do this as she has more ships than she can well man & our men employed in them will increase the force to be employed against the common enemy. This may be the most expeditious mode to augment our navy.
V   To grant Commissions to such of our Merchantmen as choose to take them authorising them to arm and defend themselves but not to cruise and not to capture unless attacked.
VI   To lay a general Embargo with authority to The President to grant licenses to sail, if the Vessels go themselves armed or with Convoys either of our own or of any foreign Nation. This will serve our Vessels and our seamen without arresting our Trade. In a short time, it will go on as usual under protection.
VI   To raise upon the Establishment some additional Artillery and Two thousand additional Cavalry. These will be useful guards against the Insurrection of the Southern Negroes—and they will be a most precious arm in case of Invasion. Cavalry will be of infinite importance as auxiliary to new against veteran Troops.
VII   The establishment of a provisional army of Twenty thousand infantry. They may be engaged to serve if a War breaks out with any foreign power, and may receive certain emoluments in the mean time—cloaths, full wages when they assemble to exercise, a dollar ⅌ Month at other times. This corps must be regularly organised & officered by the United States. The Officers to take rank with those of the establishment. Its advantage will be to have a body of men at a small expence ready for emergencies. The chance of not being employed will facilitate the obtaining of the men on moderate terms.
There may be a disposition to rely wholly on the Militia on three grounds—the supposed improbability of an Invasion—the belief that Militia are sufficient—the Expence in the first instance.
Those who may think an Invasion improbable ought to remember that it is not long since there was a general Opinion the U States was in no danger of War. They see how difficult it has been and is to avoid one. They ought to suspect that the present opinion that there is no danger of invasion may be as chimerical as that other which experience proves to be false.
If France can transport her troops here what is to hinder an invasion? Will she not be very likely to imagine that numerous partisans will join her standard so as to enable her to effect a Revolution & place us more completely under her influence? What if the corps destined to this service be lost? Will it not be to get rid of an incumbrance rather than to sustain a loss? While the War with Great Britain continues it will be difficult though not impossible to throw any considerable Corps into our Country. But if the War with G Britain should end there is no longer any thing to hinder. It is then an event so much in the compass of possibility that it ought to enter seriously into our calculations by anticipation. The situation of Europe is so extraordinary that the most improbable enterprizes in ordinary times become now probable.
Should an invasion take place, though the Militia & after raised troops may finally rescue us, yet there will be no comparison in the expence and evils with or without such a corps prepared beforehand as the trunk of our Military force.
VIII   Fortification of our Principal Ports. This ought seriously to be attended to but it is a source of expence not requited beyond the utility to embrace more than the principal port in each state.

In addition to these measures it may be proper by some religious solemnity to impress seriously the minds of the People. A philosopher may regard the present course of things in Europe as some great providential dispensation. A Christian can hardly view it in any other light. Both these descriptions of persons must approve a national appeal to Heaven for protection. The politician will consider this as an important mean of influencing Opinion, and will think it a valuable resource in a contest with France to set the Religious Ideas of his Countrymen in active Competition with the Atheistical tenets of their enemies. This is an advantage which we shall be very unskilful, if we do not improve to the utmost. And the impulse cannot be too early given. I am persuaded a day of humiliation and prayer besides being very proper would be extremely useful.
Perhaps attempts to engage the good offices, not the mediation, of some other foreign powers may be useful. In this light Spain Holland & Prussia present themselves. This however is a very delicate point.
But we have a further object in the Mission—to obtain compensation and redress for the Spoliations on our Trade. This is an object which our Government ought not to lose sight of. Here however it may be expedient to facilitate the matter by allowing as an offset to France some of her gratuities during the late War. It is useful to get rid of obligations as fast and as fully as we can; for we see the compensation hitherto claimed is nothing less than the sacrifice of our Independence.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [12 April 1797]
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Phila. Apl. 12. 1797.
Dear Sir
I thank you for your Letter of April 5th. & enclose Mr. Kings Letter. I presume that the British Comrs. under the 6th. Article (for Debts) will contend for a similar construction respecting cases determined in our Courts. Is there any ground on which the principle can be opposed?
Are we to consider the British Credit as at an end, if so what effects, will it probably produce here?
Your further opinions respecting the course to be pursued by France, will be very acceptable.
Sincerely yours
Oliv Wolcott Jr
A Hamilton Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [13 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[New York, April 13, 1797]
My Dear Sir
The post of today brought me a letter from you. I am just informed that an order is come to the Custom House not to clear out any Vessel if armed, unless destined for the East Indies. Under the present circumstances I very much doubt the expediency of this measure. The excesses of France justify passiveness in the Government and its inability to protect the Merchants required that it should leave them to protect themselves. Nor do I fear that it would tend to Rupture with France, if such be not her determination otherwise.
The legality of the prohibition cannot be defended. It must stand on its necessity. It would I think have been enough to require security that the vessel is not to be employed to cruise against any of the belligerent powers. Perhaps even now where vessels have been armed previous to the receipt of the prohibition, it is just and adviseable to except them on the condition of such security. Think of this promptly. The general measure may be further considered at leisure. Nor am I prepared to say that having been taken it ought to be revoked.
I will send you shortly some remarks in reply to Questions you propose. Adieu. Yrs
A HApril 13. 1797
Ol Wolcott Jun Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Girard, 17 April 1797
From: Girard, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, April 17, 1797. “As I wish to have the Suit against Armstrong & Barnwall Brought to an end, I wrote to Capn Briggs at New London to be ready for this next court. I received: Last saturday his answer was that tho’, he was just from Sea, that he was forced to Sett off immediately for Jeremie.… Pray what and how Shall I do? It is indispensable for you to take the properest means So as to get said Capn or his new deposition for the Court in Jully, I cannot Loss such a Sum my ciricumstances dont allow me to make an abandon of it, But my generosity will make the greatest acknowlegement for your Troubles; and if a commission of 10 ⅌ Ct. is not Adequate with or to your time, I Shall add great deal more. The capital is 48 or 4900 Drs. but the damages & interests Brings that sum to above 8000 Drs.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 19 April 1797
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia] 19 April 1797.
My dear H.
I enclose you a further request on the subject of the paper communicated to you in my last, that you may have the whole before you and that you may aid me with your talents and experience.

It strikes me that, it will be proper for the Pres. to state to Congress the species of defensive force necessary for the occasion, and consider it an essential attribute of negociations I had given him in writing the kind & the quantity & expence of the force I conceived indispensably requisite and am very happy to find that I have met in every thing but quantity your ideas.
Would it be disadvantagious to the U.S. to propose to France a new commercial treaty considering the exist, com. treaty as null which should comprise in it every article of the B. treaty that can be made applicable to the Trade of the two countries. Would not this serve to silence Amer. clamours whether adopted or refused.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Elisha Boudinot, 20 April 1797
From: Boudinot, Elisha
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New Ark [New Jersey] April 20, 1797. “I wrote you a few days ago relative to my business with F. … and as I have not heard any thing from you on the subject, I take it for granted they have shuffled as usual, if so, please to order the writ to be issued at once—and in order to give you no further trouble of negociating with persons so little disposed to the common rules of equity—I have authorized Timothy Green Esqr as my agent in fact—to accomodate the suit if they should be disposed to settle it previous to the trial, but they must not expect the lenient offers that have been made thru’ you.”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [22 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

[Albany, April 22, 1797]
The consideration for the candidates in the better part of the community stands nearly thus. Clarkeson, ver Plank, Fish = Walker, Burrall, Giles, Watson.
I have thought it better to give you the map of the characters for the information of the President than to draw myself any definitive conclusion. It is not easy to err much in a choice among them.
I should have mentioned Col Smith among the most prominent but for the late unfortunate circumstances which attend him and which would render his appointment ineligible to such an Office at this time.
Yrs. truly
A HamiltonApril 22. 1797
Ol Wolcott Jun Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, [23 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

[Albany, April 23, 1797]
Lest my Dear Eliza any circumstance should have prevented your departure before this reaches you, I conclude to drop you a line to tell you your Father is considerably better at the same time considering the delicate state of his health generally I am very desirous you should come up as he is.
Yrs. Most Affec
AHApril 23. 1797
Mrs. Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Louis Le Guen, [24 April 1797]
From: Le Guen, Louis
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Albany, April 24, 1797]
Monsieur
Les Evênements inatandue qui ont Empeschés Mr. Burr de se réndre issy à temps de Vous Seconder dans mon Affaire, ont Parue Vous désobliger, sa présance est peu m’estre favorable. Néamoints, Monsieur, Vos talens, Votre Zélle, et L’integrités de Ceux qui doivent Estre mes Juges, ne me Laisse pas le Moindre doute que Vos Efforts ne me feront Obtenir un Jugement favorable. Enconcequ’ence Sy Vous n’avés aucu’unes objections, Veuillés bien demain pléder Ma Cause. Je my trouveraie Sy Vous le Jugés Convenable, et En tout disposés á mè diriger d’après Vos Sages Conseils
J’ay L’honneur d’Estre avec un Entier Devoûment   Votre trés humble et trés obéissant serviteur
L. Le Guen
Albany 24 avril 1797.
Colonel hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Brockholst Livingston, 28 April [1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Brockholst

[Albany] April 28 [1797]. “The situation of General Schuyler & other family circumstances do not permit me to attend Court this day. Will you do me the favour to argue the motion for setting aside the Non suit & granting a new trial on the inclosed case? …”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 29 April 1797
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London Ap. 29. 1797
Dear Sir
Unless greater attention is given to the procuring of the requisite evidence in the Cases of Capture than has yet been done, we shall ultimately meet with serious Losses, and give occasion to much Complaint.
The Sufferers depend on the Government, and the Government on the Sufferers, and thus that wh. shd. be done is omitted. I inclose to you a copy of notes wh. Mr. Gore & I made this morning upon this subject—he has sent a Copy to the Secy. of State—perhaps some Public Notice shd. be given on this subject.
Yrs. &c
Rufus King
Col. Hamilton
P.S. We are anxious to hear from Vienna—the last post brings intelligence to the 12. The armistice expired on the next day—if no treaty was concluded, a serious & decisive Battle must have been fought before this Date. Some people Suppose Buona Pane’s situation was critical, and very dangerous. The Check recd. by the French in the Tyrol has enabled a corps of Austrian to gain the Rear of Buona Parte’s Army.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, 29 April 1797
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: McHenry, James

[Albany] April 29. 1797
Dr Sir
I now send you a cursory answer to certain questions. They are imperfect & probably will come too late. But court avocations and distress in the family have prevented any thing better. General Schuyler has been critically ill though now as I hope out of danger. My Brother in law Mr. Rensselaer has just lost a favourite Daughter one & the Eldest of two Children without a prospect of more. The whole has thrown a gloom upon the family & my health is not the stoutest.
I shall answer your last by the next post.
Adieu
A H


Title: Enclosure: Answer to Questions Proposed by the President of the U States, [29 April 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: McHenry, James

To The first.   It is difficult to fix the precise point at which indignity or affront from one state to another ceases to be negotiable without absolute humiliation and disgrace. It is for the most part a relative question—relative to the comparitive strength of the parties—the motives for peace or war—the antecedent relations—the circumstances of the moment as well with regard to other nations as to those between whom the question arises. The conduct of France exclusive of the refusal of Mr. Pinckney is no doubt very violent insulting and injurious. The treatment of Mr. Pinckney if it does not pass certainly touches upon the utmost limit of what is tolerable. Yet it is conceived that under all the singular and very extraordinary circumstances of the case further negotiation may be admitted without the absolute humiliation and disgrace which ought perhaps never to be incurred—to avoid which it is probably always wise to put even the political existence of a Nation upon the hazard of the die.

The triumphs of France have been such as to confound and astonish mankind. Several of the principal powers of Europe even England herself have found it necessary or expedient in greater or less degrees to submit to some humiliation from France. At the present juncture the course of her affairs & the situation of her enemies more than ever admonishes those who are in danger of becoming so and who are not able to oppose barriers to her progress to temporise. The mind of mankind tired with the suffering, or spectacle, of a war, fatal beyond example, is prepared to see more than usual forbearance in powers not yet parties to it who may be in danger of being involved. It is prepared to view as only prudent what in other circumstances would be deemed dishonorable submission.
The U States have the strongest motives to avoid war. They may lose a great deal; they can gain nothing. They may be annoyed much and can annoy comparatively little. Tis even a possible event that they may be left alone to contend with the Conquerors of Europe. When interests so great invite and dangers so great menace, delicacy is called upon to yield a great deal to prudence. And a considerable degree of humiliation may, without ignominy, be encountered to avoid the possibility of much greater and a train of incalculable evils.
The former relations of the U States to France—the agency of that power in promoting our revolution—are reasons in the nature of things for not lightly running into a quarrel with—even for bearing and forbearing to a considerable extent. There is perhaps in such a case peculiar dignity in moderation.
France in declining to receive Mr Pinckney has not gone to the ne plus ultra. She has declined to receive a minister till grievances, of which she complains, are redressed. She has not absolutely ordered away a minister as the preliminary to war. She has mingled some qualifications. It is not even clear that she means to say she will not receive an extraordinary minister. This leaves some vacant ground between her act and rupture. The U States may occupy it by a further attempt at negotiation. This further attempt seems to be that which must carry us to the point beyond which we cannot go.
Besides the object of explanation to satisfy France, we have the most serious grievances to complain of and of which to seek redress. This last will be a principal object of an extraordinary mission. It will not be to make submissions but to explain and to demand reparation. This double object contains a great salvo for the national honor.
We have just seen in the case of Sweden the negotiation in some way or other of a similar insult. Though the refusal of our minister, as being more pretextless is more offensive, yet the forbearance of Sweden is a precedent of some force for us.
As to our own Country—There is a general and strong desire of peace—and with a considerable party still a particular repugnance to war with France. The state of public opinion is not likely to consider a farther attempt at negotiation as too humiliating. It may be safely taken for granted that it will approve such an attempt as prudent—& that at home it will have no other effect than to lay the foundation for great Union and Constancy, in case of failure.
But to preserve character abroad—and esteem for the Government at home, it is essential that the idea of further negotiation be accompanied by measures that shall demonstrate a spirit of resistance in case of failure—that shall yield present protection—and promise future security.
With this adjunct, it is believed that the Government in pursuing the plan for further negotiation will raise rather than depress the character of the Nation abroad & will preserve the dignity of the American mind & the esteem of the American people.
The enunciation of one measure by the Executive ought therefore to be accompanied with a decisive recommendation of the other course. In doing this however it will be wise to avoid all expressions that may look like menacing France with what we intend to do. The attempt to negotiate must be put upon the foot of an appeal to her justice and friendship. The recommendation of preparatory & defensive precautions must be put on the foot of present necessity in reference to the actual & ruinous depredations on our Trade and the possibility of future dangers which it may not be in our power to avert.
To the second—It will be expedient to declare to France that if there be any thing in the Treaty with G Britain which France is desirous of incorporating in the Treaty with her—The U States are ready to do so—having no wish to give to any other power privileges which France may not equally enjoy on the same terms. This general offer seems the most unexceptionable & will stop as well the mouth of France as of her partisans among ourselves. The duration of privileges should also be in both cases the same.
To the third.   It does not occur that it will be expedient to propose the abolition of any of the articles of our Treaties with France further than may be implied in the above general offer. To propose the abolition of things inconvenient to us would confirm the suspicion that we were disposed to narrow the privileges of France and would do harm there and here. The defining of some of the stipulations according to our practice upon them would be desireable if obtainable, but it is better to leave them as they are than define the other way. And the probability is that the definition would end in the last way which might compromit us with other powers. The only thing that can be done with advantage is to propose to liquidate the meaning and effect of the mutual Guarantee in the Treaty of Alliance. That Guarantee is now general. The obligation it imposes on France towards us is essentially nominal in future, because our sovereignty and independence can hardly again come in question. That which it lays upon us would expose us to general war with the enemy of France as often as in a purely defensive war her West India posessions should be attacked. This is a great evil. The alternative in such a case is to chicane our engagements and risk war with France for not performing them—or to perform them, if called upon, and encounter war with her enemies. It would be a great point gained to reduce this general guarantee to a treaty of mutual specific definite succour,

   A definite succour is not a cause of War, if previously stipulated.

 excluding the present war and definining the casus fœderis to be that case in which the first act of actual hostility by sea or land is committed against the ally—without reference to antecedent motives and causes which are ever vague & complicated.
To the Fourth—If an amicable course of negotiation should take place modifications in this Convention may be proposed. Not having it by me the desireable alterations do not occur further than the restraining the mutual right of jurisdiction in questions between the citizens of either power to cases between the Officers & Crews of Vessels. Beyond this it works ill—establishes an imperium in imperio, extends foreign influence & indirectly injures our own Citizens & preventing efficacious justice between French Citizens who are often their debtors &c. Particularly it is ill to insert foreign jurisdiction in our country.
To the fifth—It does not appear expedient to propose or agree to such new articles. In general it is wisest neither to give nor take peculiar privileges—but equalize our commercial system with all nations. Indeed it will be very difficult to adjust such new articles without interference with other Treaties. The only method of favouring France is to stipulate that certain articles if her production or manufacture not common to Great Britain which enter largely into our supplies should be admitted without duty or on light duties to be specified. This applies principally to her brandies and wines; but even then they must lie on the same footing if coming through G Britain as if coming directly from France. Yet the essential & ultimate benefit would accrue to France as favouring the vent and consumption in our country of her peculiar commodities. But all this is far better avoided. The diminution of our Revenue and jealousies in other powers will be certain evils for which France will & can give no real equivalent.
To the 6th.   What was done in the case of Great Britain will be a good precedent for this case.
To the seventh.   The terms of the remonstrances against spoliations should be mild and calm without offensive epithects, but serious and depicting strongly the extent of the evil. They should suppose the West India constructions to be abuses of the Orders of the directory; but they should notice that these were so vague and indefinite in themselves as to be naturally liable to abuse. They should urge a revocation of these orders and compensation for the injuries they have produced as due from the good faith Justice and Friendship of France to the violated rights of the U States and their Citizens—and to restoration of cordial harmony between the two nations, which must otherwise suffer a deep and perhaps incurable wound.
To the 8th.   This is answered in the answer to the seventh.
To the 9th.   This claim of our Citizens ought to be noticed and urged as a great and serious one having from the motives of the individuals in the greatest number of cases a title to peculiar attention. Yet the whole ought to be managed as not to compromit the Government for the ultimate vindication of this claim. It is very questionable whether it be not such a one (as far as credit was voluntary) as that those who gave it ought finally to be left to the honor of the Government to which they trusted.
To the 10th.   This is answered in the Affirmative in the answer to the seventh Question. There is no solid distinction between captures and seizures by private vessels or public Vessels. The Government which gave the Commission to cruise is liable in both cases. This observation has reference to those depredations which result from vague orders of the Government or the abusive constructions of its Agents intrusted with local jurisdictions as Governors Commissioners &c.
To the 11th.   A Commission like that with England ought to be agreed to as a very happy issue out of the embarrassment.
To the 12th.   This is answered in the answer to the second question. The equivalent privileges in the French East India Trade will be the analogous compensation though not of equal extent. But situated as we are with France, it seems proper to be content with less. If privileges in her West India Trade could be obtained it would be desireable. But this ought not to be a sine qua non. A limitation of the duration of a new Treaty if made is a great desideratum.
To the 13th.   It scarcely seems adviseable to offer the project of such a new Treaty. It opens at once all the cards. It is better to deal in generals. This will leave less in the power of France or her partisans.
To the 14.   It is conceived most adviseable to follow former precedent in this respect, which may avoid much delay and embarrassment. In the exercise of this branch of Executive Power, it will be found the best course to reduce the Cooperation of the Senate to the appointment of the Negotiator and the ultimate fiat or Negative. Much has been done to this end & it will not be expedient to relinquish the ground which has been gained.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 29 April 1797
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia April 29. 1797.
Dear Sir,
In contemplating the idea suggested by you, of arming the merchant vessels of the United States for Defence only, a difficulty at once presented. This measure is incompatible with the right of a belligerent power to visit and examine neutral vessels, to ascertain whether they have on board contraband goods—&, where a treaty does not alter the law of nations, whether they are laden with enemies’ goods—to see, indeed, whether under neutral colours, they are such, or enemies. The answer suggested to myself is this—That the power at war who has discarded treaties & the laws of nations, avowedly & practically, is not entitled to corresponding rights—rights relating to the same subject, under such treaties and laws; and consequently that American vessels, if allowed to be defensively armed, are not to submit to any such visits. Vessels of a neutral nation under convoy of the armed ships of such nation, I take it are not subject to such visits: and our armed merchant vessels would be their own convoy. I do not know where this question is treated of in books; you probably can inform me. The arming our merchant vessels, tho’ only for defence, will be zealously opposed in the House of Representatives, on the above ground, that, as well by treaty as the law of nations, the French have a right to visit our vessels; and because of the danger of its leading to open war.
On the subject of a Commission Extraordinary to the French Republic, much difficulty occurs. To give a better prospect of success to this measure, you observe that a man agreeable to them should go; and you name two persons, either of whom you would advise to be joined with Mr. Pinckney & another on whose attachment to the system of our government, as established & administered, perfect reliance may be placed. But in the first place, would either of the two you name consent to go? You certainly reckon on Genl. Pinckney’s inviolable integrity and federal attachments. Will not the man whom you name as agreeable to the French see that his hands will be tied? If you place any confidence in either of the two, that if commissioned he will faithfully consult and firmly persist in measures which the rights and neutral condition of our country demand without suffering his choice, his passions or his prejudices in favour of France and from hatred to G.B. to sacrifice any of our rights or interest to the former, why name a third Commissioner, of principles directly opposed, to check and effectually controul him? I should be inclined to think that neither of the two would under such a view of the case, accept the appointment; and one of them perhaps would from his present station deem it improper.
Would not the Directory also see such a commission constituted as you propose, in the same point of view? And would they not say that ostensibly there was an intention to manifest a particular respect and attention to them, while in reality we meant no such thing? Or do you consider Genl. Pinckney as a neutral character, in the politics of our country? And by appointing two associates of opposite characters, enable him to hold the balance? This is the most favourable light in which I can view the proposition. But when we consider the asperity of the parties here, and that the two characters named have been considered among the leaders—that probably neither has a confidence in the other—that your friend in particular will perhaps fear to disclose his sentiments on the most interesting questions lest they should be betrayed to the French; is there a well grounded hope that the mission would be successful?
On the organization of a provisional army, to receive certain compensations but not full pay, I shoud be glad to receive your ideas a little in detail. The propriety of increasing our artillery establishment is clear, & I should imagine not difficult to obtain. I have my doubts of the cavalry. The militia corps of horse are already composed, generally speaking, of the best man and best horses in the country. But they need discipline. I much doubt, unless the danger of a war should appear more certain than at present, whether even a provisional army will be granted: if not, perhaps a much larger army of select militia might be agreed to; the corps to be composed of volunteers or draughts of young men, from the general militia, and completely organized. The militia system to be improved.
On these several subjects and any others relating to our French connections, I shall be happy to receive your communications, as early as your leisure will admit.
I am most sincerely & respectfully yours.
T. Pickering
P.S. What if General Pinckney were to be appointed Envoy Extraordinary, or even Ambassador, with fresh instructions relative to the subjects of complaint? The Directory have said they will not receive another Minister Plenipotentiary, until &c. They refused to receive the Chargé d’Affaires of Sweden, sent to announce the young King’s ascending the throne, because at other courts the same thing had been done by accredited ministers. And they have made it a subject of serious complaint (as J.Q. Adams was well informed at the Hague) against Denmark, because that court omitted to announce to the Directory the death of the old Queen Dowager! He remarks that they are seeking for pretences of quarrel with all the neutral commercial nations: their great object being to insist on measures to be adopted by neutrals, to injure or destroy the commerce of Britain. If a commission extraordinary should be appointed, what should you think of Mr. Barlow for a member? He has managed the negociations with Algiers with great ability, address, and zeal for the interest of his country. Having been formerly elected a member of the French Convention, he may be deemed of sufficient respectability. He is even admitted, I take it, to French citizenship. His talents are unquestionable. I should sooner confide in him than in Mr. M. The other person named by you, I consider as out of the question, because of his station. Mr. Barlow has no personal antipathies & resentments to gratify, resentments engendered in the collision of parties at home.
Alexander Hamilton Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from William Loughton Smith, 1 May 1797
From: Smith, William Loughton
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philad. May 1. 97.
Dear sir
I shod. sooner have acknowledged the receipt of your interesting communication, had I not been informed of your Journey to Albany.
I coincide perfectly in opinion with you as to the expediency of measures of defence, & an extraordy. mission. But I see very considerable difficulty in the measure of a Commission, & still greater in its’ including Jefferson & Madison. From the former plan I foresee embarassment & encreased expence, without any benefit. If the majority of the Commrs. be anti-gallicans, the party will not be gratified; we shall place an enemy in the Commission, without acquiring their support. If the majority be gallicans, we give up the Game. There are serious constitutional objections against Jefferson, as Commisr.—& Madison has done so much to prostrate this Country at the feet of France, that I fear his appointmt. would appear humiliating & give disgust to our Friends. I doubt also whether either of them would go on this business, unless as Sole Envoy; certainly not, unless as Senior Commissr. & this would be harsh to Pinckney, who has conducted himself well. From these considerations I have been induced to think the most dignified & safe mode of doing this business would be to Send Pinckney a new Commission either as Envoy or Ambassador Extraordy.: he is near at hand, he is unexcept[iona]ble. to all parties, the French have no personal objections to him, the Jacobins of most of the Southern states have great confidence in him, & he has made great sacrifices to go on a mission which has hitherto been attended with nothing but mortification. He is waiting at Amsterdam the orders of the Executive, probably expecting the Commission of Envoy Extraordy.—it is not improbable too that any thing like Slight to him may alienate more friends than would be acquired by adding to the mission one of the other party. I have lately met with a Report of the Comrs. of public safety in April 95, which was adopted by the Convention, on the subject of the different grades of Ministers, wherein it is Stated “that the Sending of an Ambassador is peculiarly agreable to Republics & a particular mark of respect.” This report preceded the reception of De Stael as Ambassador Extraordy. from Sweden: I have shewn the Secy. of state the Report, & the Commission of De Stael: Perhaps it may be thought expedient to send a Com. of Am. Extra. to Gl. Pinckney, & to give weight & importance to the Mission to add, in the Character of Secretary to the Embassy, some character, above the common class of private Secretaries; this last point is however only a suggestion of my own; this practise is generally followd. in Europe.
I have shewn your letter to Tracy & to Wolcott & McHenry, all of whom applied for the perusal of it & were much pleased with every part, except the Commission: this idea does not seem to coincide with the opinions of any of our friends here.
I leave town tomorrow for a Jaunt of a few days to Lancaster York &ca on my return I hope to hear from you & remain
Dear Sir   Very sincerely Yours
Wm Smith


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Hamilton, 2 May 1797
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, William

Duplicate
Albany State of New YorkMay the 2d. 1797
My Dear Sir
Some days since I received with great pleasure your letter of the 10th. of March. The mark, it affords, of your kind attention, and the particular account it gives me of so many relations in Scotland are extremely gratifying to me. You no doubt have understood that my fathers affairs at a very early day went to wreck; so as to have rendered his situation during the greatest part of his life far from eligible. This state of things occasionned a separation between him and me, when I was very young, and threw me upon the bounty of my mothers relations, some of whom were then wealthy, though by vicissitudes to which human affairs are so liable, they have been since much reduced and broken up. Myself at about sixteen came to this Country. Having always had a strong propensity to literary pursuits, by a course of steady and laborious exertion, I was able, by the age of Ninteen to qualify myself for the degree of Batchelor of Arts in the College of New York, and to lay a foundation, by preparatory study, for the future profession of the law.
The American Revolution supervened. My principles led me to take part in it. At nineteen I entered into the American army as Captain of Artillery. Shortly after, I became by his invitation Aide De Camp to General Washington, in which station, I served till the commencement of that Campaign which ended with the seige of York, in Virginia, and the Capture of Cornwallis’s Army. This Campaign I made at the head of a corps of light infantry, with which I was present at the seige of York and engaged in some interesting operations.
At the period of the peace with Great Britain, I found myself a member of Congress by appointment of the legislature of this state.
After the peace, I settled in the City of New York in the practice of the law; and was in a very lucrative course of practice, when the derangement of our public affairs, by the feebleness of the general confederation, drew me again reluctantly into public life. I became a member of the Convention which framed the present Constitution of the U States; and having taken part in this measure, I conceived myself to be under an obligation to lend my aid towards putting the machine in some regular motion. Hence I did not hesitate to accept the offer of President Washington to undertake the office of Secretary of the Treasury.
In that office, I met with many intrinsic difficulties, and many artificial ones proceeding from passions, not very worthy, common to human nature, and which act with peculiar force in republics. The object, however, was effected, of establishing public credit and introducing order into the finances.
Public Office in this Country has few attractions. The pecuniary emolument is so inconsiderable as too amount to a sacrifice to any man who can employ his time with advantage in any liberal profession. The opportunity of doing good, from the jealousy of power and the spirit of faction, is too small in any station to warrant a long continuance of private sacrifices. The enterprises of party had so far succeeded as materially to weaken the necessary influence and energy of the Executive Authority, and so far diminish the power of doing good in that department as greatly to take the motives which a virtuous man might have for making sacrifices. The prospect was even bad for gratifying in future the love of Fame, if that passion was to be the spring of action.
The Union of these motives, with the reflections of prudence in relation to a growing family, determined me as soon as my plan had attained a certain maturity to withdraw from Office. This I did by a resignation about two years since; when I resumed the profession of the law in the City of New York under every advantage I could desire.
It is a pleasing reflection to me that since the commencement of my connection with General Washington to the present time, I have possessed a flattering share of his confidence and friendship.
Having given you a brief sketch of my political career, I proceed to some further family details.
In the year 1780 I married the second daughter of General Schuyler, a Gentleman of one of the best families of this Country; of large fortune and no less personal and public consequence. It is impossible to be happier than I am in a wife and I have five Children, four sons and a daughter, the eldest a son somewhat passed fifteen, who all promise well, as far as their years permit and yield me much satisfaction. Though I have been too much in public life to be wealthy, my situation is extremely comfortable and leaves me nothing to wish but a continuance of health. With this blessing, the profits of my profession and other prospects authorise an expectation of such addition to my resources as will render the eve of life, easy and agreeable; so far as may depend on this consideration.
It is now several months since I have heared from my father who continued at the Island of St Vincents. My anxiety at this silence would be greater than it is, were it not for the considerable interruption and precariousness of intercourse, which is produced by the War.
I have strongly pressed the old Gentleman to come to reside with me, which would afford him every enjoyment of which his advanced age is capable. But he has declined it on the ground that the advice of his Physicians leads him to fear that the change of Climate would be fatal to him. The next thing for me is, in proportion to my means to endeavour to increase his comforts where he is.
It will give me the greatest pleasure to receive your son Robert at my house in New York and still more to be of use to him; to which end my recommendation and interest will not be wanting, and, I hope, not unavailing. It is my intention to embrace the Opening which your letter affords me to extend intercourse with my relations in your Country, which will be a new source of satisfaction to me.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Mann and Isaac Parker, 6 May 1797
From: Mann, Oliver,Parker, Isaac
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Boston, May 6, 1797. On June 28, 1797, Hamilton wrote to Mann and Parker: “Your letter of the 6th of May last by making a circuit to Albany did not reach me in due time.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, [11 May 1797]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

[New York, May 11, 1797]
My Dear Sir
On my return here I found your letter of the 29th . The sitting of a Court of Chancery and important business there have unavoidably delayed a reply. Now, it must be much more cursory than I could wish.
As to the mission, in some shape or other, the more I have reflected upon it, the more has it appeared to me indispensable. To accomplish, with certainty, a principal object of it—the silencing of Jacobin criticism and promoting union among ourselves—it is very material to engage in it a person who will have the Jacobin confidence. Else, if France should still refuse to receive, or if receiving, the mission should prove unsuccessful—it will be said that this was because a suitable Agent was not employed. Hence my mind was led to Jefferson or Madison. But as it would be unsafe to trust either alone, the idea of associates occurs as an essential part of the plan. This likewise is an expedient for saving Mr. Pinckneys feelings.
But will either of them go on this footing? If offered and they refuse, they will put themselves in the wrong. For on so great an emergency they cannot justifiably decline the service without a good reason & it would not be a good reason for refusal that there was to be a commission. The refusal too if it happened would furnish a reply to Jacobin clamour. It was offered to your leaders and they would not act.

I confide in Pinckneys integrity & foederal attachments. Why then name a third? Because 1 two may disagree and there may be inaction 2 Though I have the confidence I mention—I think Pinckney has had too much French leaning to consider him in conjunction with Jefferson or Madison as perfectly safe. A third on whom perfect reliance could be placed would secure Pinckney’s cooperation. I do consider him as in some sort a middle character.
As to the two Gentlemen named (Jefferson & Madison) it may be fairly observed to either of them that the combination of characters is essential to combine the confidence of the Country & to render the result whatever it may be acceptable. It may also be observed that delicacy to Mr. Pinckney dictates this course—not to exclude him after what has happened. To Mr. Pinckney the state of parties here may also be pleaded.
The French Directory may also be made to understand indirectly that the association has proceeded from a desire in the Executive to unit Confidence in the mission and secure its success at home.
I should not despair that in such a crisis men of opposite politics might agree. I verily believe that Jefferson Pinckney & King would agree. There might be a joint commission for action, and a separate Commission to Jefferson as Envoy or Ambassador extraordinary for representation. I miscalculate if Jefferson will not be anxious for peace. I only fear that alone he would give too much for it.
If this plan is thought liable to too strong objections, the next best thing is to send the Commission of Ambassador Extraordinary to Pinckney & send him also some clever fellow as secretary of embassy.
But I repeat it with extreme solicitude—another mission is absolutely indispensable.
On the subject of permitting our vessels to arm there is some difficulty. You are right in the idea that Merchant vessels under the convoy of Ships of War are exempt from search. But I know no book where it is to be found. Yet I have so constantly understood it to be the usage that I venture to rely upon it. But I believe the privilege is confined to Public ships of war & could not according to usage be transferred to private armed Vessels. The measure must therefore be justified by the extremity.
Moreover—I understand no other consequence as resulting from the being armed than that it exposes the vessel to confiscation for resisting a search. It is no breach of neutrality to permit the being armed.
But I would avoid the formation of a Commission and would substitute some Permit, perhaps to be signed by the head of a department. This should be united with great precautions to prevent abuse by cruising by d[r]iving contraband trade by transfer to foreigners.
At all events our Trade must have protection. For our whole mercantile Capital will else be destroyed our seamen lost & our country involved in extreme distress.
As to a provisional army—I reason thus. No plan of a militia, which is not the equivalent, in other words which is not under a positive engagement to constitute a permanent army in case of invasion will be worth any thing. For we want a stable force created beforehand to oppose to the first torrent, which with mere militia, would involve incalculable dangers and calamities. Hence as a substitute for a standing army I offer a provisional one. It would be composed thus. The Officers to be appointed by the United States & rank with those of the establishment—to receive some pay till called into actual service say half a third or a fourth. Those employed to recruit to be fully paid.
The men to be regularly inlisted upon condition not to be called into actual service except in case of Invasion & then to serve during the war. To receive a uniform coat, & a dollar perhaps two dollars per Month when not in the field—to be obliged to assemble for exercise so may days in the year & then to have full pay and rations. When called into actual service to have the same compensations &c with the establishment, in short to become part of it. To be armed by the U States To be liable from the beginning to the articles of War.
I think such a corps from the certainty of advantage & the uncertainty of service might be engaged sooner than a standing force & with precautions in the enlistment would be a solid resource in case of need.
I am much attached to the idea of a large corps of efficient Cavalry; & I cannot allow this character to Militia. It is all important to an undisciplined against a disciplined army. It is a species of force not easy to be brought by an invader—by which his supplies may be cut off & his activity extremely checked. Were I to command an undisciplined army, I should prefer half the force with a good corps of cavalry to twice the force without one.
Yrs. truly
A HMay 11.
T Pickering Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jeremiah Wadsworth, 13 May 1797
From: Wadsworth, Jeremiah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Hartford, May 13, 1797. “A Mr Johnston who holds Mr Churches Land shewed me a letter from Mr Tracy dated last April in which he says. ‘Col Hamilton says Col Wadsworth has the sole disposal of the Land in Salisbury:’ Mr Johnston came to me to finish the business.… I believe Johnston would take a quit claim & risk the Title & secure the payment according to the inclosed appraisement.”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 14 May 1797
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia 14th May 1797.
My dear H.
I received your letters and papers. I added to them, but changed nothing, for the train of ideas in both ran in the same channel and embraced the same objects.
The speech extenuates nought—recommends proper measures—promises a fresh attempt at negotiation—and declares the principles by which administration mean to be governed, in other words that the President will follow the principles of the late administration.
It is not perhaps precisely such a speech as you would have written—a little too plain. It may however be better fitted on that account for the occasion.
Your affectionate
James McHenry


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 15 May 1797
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philad. 15 May 1797
My dear H.
I wrote you a line yesterday acknowleging the receipt of your late letters from Albany.
I expect that there will be a quorum of both branches to-day.

It appears that the news of the Emp. of Germ. having signified his intention to make peace was unfounded. Had it even been so, it ought to have augmented our endeavours to meet hostility.
It is probable that a new character will be given Pinckney and a Secry to the Mission.
Yours
J McH


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Scott, 16 May 1797
From: Scott, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

St. Mildred’s Court, Mansion House [London], May 16, 1797. “… I beg leave to trouble you with Power of Atty from Mr. Hodgson to you accompanied with a Letter by Invoice of Goods to enable you to recover £247.15 of Mr. Bn. Bakewell of your Town who I understand is a very honest man.… I am trustee of Hodgson the Constituent who has also failed.…”


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, 22 May 1797
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Robert

[New York, May 22, 1797. On May 23, 1797, Morris wrote to Hamilton: “Your letter of yesterday is arrived.” Letter not found.]


Title: Théophile Cazenove to Egbert Benson and Alexander Hamilton, 29 May 1797
From: Cazenove, Théophile
To: Benson, Egbert,Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, May 29, 1797. “The enclosed extract of a Letter lately received from General Schuyler will create much uneasiness amongst the Dutch proprietors who have obtained the faculty to hold their Lands in the state of New York ’till the 11th. April 1803. A Law passed in the last Session extends that faculty ’till 1816. provided the Dutch Proprietors shall interest themselves as stockholders or money lenders in the Western Canal Company for an amount of 250,000, Dollars. I send herewith also a copy of the letter from the managers of the Western Canal Company to Mr. Busti. It would be needless to observe how hard & disadvantageous to my friends the conditions offered to them, are. If as Moneylenders at the low rate of 3 ⅌ ct. the mortgage offered is of a nature which will make an execution, most impossible & certainly fruitless—If as Stockholders, they will be only so to appearance—in short the meaning of the proposals translated in plain words is, ‘You shall loose the 250/m Dollars if the undertaking of the Company does not Succeed. And if they Succeed, You shall have 3 ⅌ ct. of Your money.’ … I hope the Indian title for the Genesee Lands will be obtained this Year, but for more than a part cannot be expected. In the actual state of things both here & in Europe it is not only possible but it is probable that neither exertions nor moderate prices will procure the Sale of all the Lands in the possession of our Dutch friends, at least not at a price equal to the risks, cares & casualties to which the proprietors are Submitted nor proportioned to the long credit the Sale of such a quantity of acres of Land will require.…”