Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan and Brigadier Generals William Maxwell and Anthony Wayne, 23 November 1777
From: Sullivan, John,Maxwell, William,Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

Camp at White Marsh [Pa.] Novr 23d 1777

May it please your Excellency, We the Subscribers, General Officers in the American Army, beg leave to represent, That we have severally been accus’d of unsoldierly Conduct, dangerous Neglect, and other Crimes, which, had they been prov’d, must have blacken’d our Characters as Officers, and sunk us beneath the Reproaches of our Country. In Consequence of these malicious Accusations, Courts were appointed to examine into our Conduct. We patiently waited the respective Tryals, and each of us was honourably acquitted of the Charges brought against us. Since which, we have observ’d our malignant Accusers remaining in Office, without Reprimand, or Censure, triumphing at the trouble they have unjustly occasion’d us, with impunity to themselves. Were we in the Character of private Gentlemen, we shou’d be at no loss what Steps to pursue, to obtain Redress. But when we consider ourselves as

Officers of Rank in the Army, bound to yield Obedience to every Article of War, & to punish dissobedience in others, that Remedy which our own Feelings wou’d naturally suggest, becomes not only derogatory to our Rank, and injurious to the Service, but, wd inevitably involve us in that ruin, which, our malicious Accusers have hitherto fail’d to accomplish; for however Individuals may applaud, and the inconsiderate Populace admire, an act of false Bravery; a Court sworn to regulate their Sentence by the Articles of War, must condemn, every Breach of them, or give the World Liberty to accuse them, of Perjury if therefore any Steps are taken by us to obtain personal Satisfaction, we see our ruin connected wth the first; We well know that in other Armies, a false Accuser is not only liable to be tried, and cashier’d, but such is the spirit of Resentment against him, that no Officer will suffer him to keep Company, or serve with him. But with great Concern we see, that in this Army, the Encouragement given to Inferior Officers, to arraign the Conduct of their Superiors, has already gone but too far, in destroying the small distinction, which those Gentlemen have been pleasd to make, in their own minds, between themselves, and Officers of the first Rank in the Service. We cannot help observing, that as we recieve our Orders from your Excellency, and are accountable to you, for the Execution, we apprehend, that any unsoldierly Behaviour, or general Breach of those Orders, ought in the first instance, to be known to, and reprehended by you. Inferior Officers may indeed discover Cowardice in their Commanding Officer, in time of Action, and other particular faults, but it is impossible for them to judge, whether his Conduct is in general unmilitary, unless, they are made acquainted with the Orders he acts under; We are exceeding sorry to say, that inferior Officers, who neither know the Plan, or the Orders, we are to pursue, will undertake to give their opinion condemning those measures, we are bound by our Orders, to pursue, and by tacking to the charge Crimes which never existed but in their own imagination, they will bring to tryal, any Officer they please, & after he is honorably acquitted, they triumph in their injustice, and glory in the Perplexity, they have given him. They know, if they are fortunate, their Purpose will be fully answer’d, if not, they have nothing to fear; we are fully convinc’d, that unless some Remedy is found for this evil, it will become necessary, for every General Officer, to lay his Plans, and Orders, before all his commissiond Officers, & perhaps, even before the noncommissiond Officers, and ask their Approbation of the Measures he is about to pursue, or those who condemn the Plan, will bring him to tryal for his Conduct, & in addition, compel him, to answer for every matter he has been concern’d in, during the Service. We are by no means against General Officers being made answerable in a proper way, but we insist,

that when the Accusers not only fail, but appear to have made a false and malicious Attack, some Punishment should be pointed out against them. The wisdom of common & civil Law has found this absolutely necessary, perhaps in the Army, it may be found still more so, especially, when it is considerd that Inferiors in the Army, have some temptation, to remove their Superiors, to clear the Stage for their own advancement. Though our peculiar Situation compels us, to apply to your Excellency to point out some mode of redress, we flatter ourselves, that no Arguments can persuade you, that the want of Personal Bravery induces us to make this request. Respect for the Regulations of Congress, and regard for the Service of our Country, are our only motives; We wou’d not wish while we remain Officers in the Army, to violate any of those Articles, by which, we and every Member of it, ought to be govern’d, nor do we wish to put ourselves in a Situation to demand satisfaction, as Private Gentlemen, till we find the Regulations of our Army insufficient, to afford us redress. Shou’d that unfortunately be the Case, we trust that when we make known to the Publick, what Steps we have taken, the impartial Part of Mankind will justify us, in reducing ourselves to that Situation, which will enable us (without violating the Articles of War) to demand, & take that Satisfaction as Private Gentlemen, which as Officers we are unable to obtain. We have the honor to be with much esteem, Your Excellency’s most obedient servants,

Jno. Sullivan M. Genl
Wm Maxwell B.G.
Anty Wayne B.G.


Title: General Orders, 24 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Novr 24th 1777.
Parole Newbern.C. Signs Norfolk. Oxford.

Information having been given that divers of the late sutlers, and some of the inhabitants have opened tippling houses within and adjacent to the encampment of the army, by which the design of banishing the Sutlers from the army is in a great measure frustrated. The Deputy Quarter Master General is required forthwith, to make diligent inquiry, and examination, for discovering such houses, and suppressing them,

and to assure all who are driving this pernicious trade, that if continued any longer, their liquors shall be seized, and they expelled from the neighbourhood of the army, on pain of the severest punishment if they return.
The Legislature of the State of New-Jersey, having made provision for supplying their troops with cloaths & blankets; all officers sent thither for the purpose of collecting those articles, are by their commanding officers to be immediately recalled.


Title: Brigadier General John Cadwalader’s Plan for Attacking Philadelphia, 24 November 1777
From: Cadwalader, John
To:

[c.24 November 1777]

As the Enemy have made very considerable Detachments from their main Body to New Jersey under the Command of Lord Cornwallis; and a considerable number of men being necessary to defend the several Posts on the Islands which are at least 7 miles from the Lines it may be very proper to consider whether a successfull attack cannot be made on the City.
The following plan of an attack is offered for Consideration, including the Troops now in Camp—If two thousand men could be drawn from the Detachments under Gen: Green to make the Attack by water the main attack upon the Lines might be much strengthened & the plan rendered more compleat.
Tis proposed to make the attack on Thursday Morning next a little before day-break in the manner following.
General Sullivan’s Division & Woodford’s Brigade consisting of 1811 men rank & file to march to the Right of Wissahickon Road & attack the Enemy’s Left near the Banks of Schuylkill, a little before day break.
Lord Sterling’s & Wayne’s Divisions & Scotts Brige consisting of 2940 men to form the main attack & possess themselves of the Posts at Meredith’s & Francis’s—and then by inclining to the Right penetrate into the Common on the Right of Wissahickon Road.
Gen: Kalb’s Division & Patterson’s Brigade consisting of 2400 men, to march on Wednesday to Howells, a little above Frankfort Creek, & embark in the night, time enough to Land precisely at the Hour appointed

—The Gallies to move down & amuse the Frigate or drive her from her Station—These Troops to Land between Arch & Race Streets; on private wharves march through the Streets in Columns as wide as the Streets will admit—& attack the Enemy in Rear.
The Pennsylvania Militia to amuse the Enemy on their Right by a brisk Cannonade & to penetrate when an Opportunity offers—These Feints to be made between 2d & third, & third & fourth Streets.
Carolina Brigade; Lee’s, Jacksons & Henley’s Battalions of 1020 men to compose the Reserve & form in four Columns—upon the Right of the Rear of the main Attack.
Maryland Militia about 900 to compose a Body of Reserve on the Left of the main Attack to occupy Posts left in the Rear or other purposes.
Gen: Potter to occupy the Hill at  House a little above Bush’s Ferry, & Mr Beveridge’s Hill: as from these Posts the Enemy may be much annoyed by Cannon—Small Detachments will be sufficient for these Posts—The main-body of this Brigade should drive in the Guard at the middle Ferry (after the attack is begun on this Side) & by a brisk Cannonade endeavour to keep the Enemy from crossing; & in case their Batteries should be abandoned to pass the Bridge & assist in the Attack.
N.B. The Qr Mr General says there are forty Boats; sixteen of which are fitted for Waggons—are these Boats sufficient to carry the number of men proposed?
It is highly necessary that every method should be taken to procure Intelligence relating to the Situation of the Enemy & their Works—The General Officers will have time to re[c]onnoitre the Grounds where their several attacks upon the Lines are to be made.
From the best information, the Enemy have detached about 3,000 men to N. Jersey & there cannot be less than a thousand or fifteen hundred left on the Islands; therefore they cannot have more than 5 or 6000 men to oppose us—our Strength in Contl Troops is upwards of 8000 men, exclusive of the Detachments in New Jersey, & exclusive of Col: Webb’s Regt which is now on the Road & will be here before the Attack—Add to these the Pennsylvania & Maryland Militia which may be computed at least at three Thousand—and the whole make a very formidable Body of Troops.
If the Enemy should discover the preparation for conveying the Troops to Philadelphia, it is apprehended they will imagine we intend to reinforce our Troops in N. Jersey—which may enduce them to reinforce theirs. If any of the Enemy’s Troops should be recalled before the Attack; or, if any armed Vessels should be brought up for the Defence of the City, we can have timely notice, & the plan may be altered, or laid aside—The advantage is evidently in favor of those who make

the Attack especially if you effect a Surprize: the Enemy too, always magnify our Numbers & will in this Instance have more reason to be confirmed in this Opinion, as it is the first Instance where you have been superior in numbers.


Title: To George Washington from Robert Erskine, 24 November 1777
From: Erskine, Robert
To: Washington, George

May it please your Excy
Ringwood [N.J.] November 24th 1777

The twenty Ovens ordered last Summer, concerning which I have your favour of the 14th Inst., were delivered as follows; four to Coll Mifflin, as the army passed Pompton; fourteen were sent after it to Morristown, by seven Waggons impressed for that purpose; & two large and ten small ones remained here, when I was at Wilmington, which I mentioned to Coll Mifflin; who ordered me to send four, (Viz. two large & two small) to the Care of Major Taylor at New Windsor, which was done; and to keep the rest here till further orders.
From the time I had the honour of speaking with you at the Cross Roads, I fully resolved to enter upon the proposed Office next spring, should it then be vacant; & God willing, I shall devote my whole time to it, if your Exy thinks proper, by the beginning of next April: mean while, I have the satisfaction of giving some part of my time now, to the public service; Govr Clinton having accepted of my assistance at New Windsor; where I have been taking Surveys and Levels of the ground near the Chevaux de Frise, for a Fort; which is erecting under the direction of the French Engineer Your Excellency sent to Fort Montgomery. I am happy to assist a Gentleman of skill in his profession, from whom much of the art of practical Engineering may be learnt, & shall return to the North River again in a few days, to finish some surveys at New Windsor, Forts Constitution, Montgomery, &c.: Copies of which shall immediately be transmitted your Excellency by May it please Your Excellency Your most Obliged & most Obedt humble servant

Robt Erskine


Title: From George Washington to Col. David Forman, 24 November 1777 [letter not found]
From: Washington, George
To: Forman, David

Letter not found: to Col. David Forman, c.24 Nov. 1777. In his letter to William Livingston of 24 Nov., GW writes: “I have given orders to have all the Officers ... except Colo. Forman, for whom you have a letter.”


Title: From George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 24 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

Dr Sir
Head Qrs [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 24th 1777

If you have not moved from Mount Holley when this comes to hand, I wish you to wait there till you see Colo. Meade, who will set off immediately charged with some important matters which I thought it improper to commit to paper. This However you are to understand under this restriction—That I do not mean to prevent you a moment from prosecuting any Object you have immediately in view that promises success. I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt sert

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 24 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir,
Mount Holly [N.J.] Novr 24. 1777

I have nothing new to communicate to your Excellency with Respect to the Motions of the Enemy—they remain or did last night at Woodbury, with a Guard at Timber Creek, consisting of about six hundred men. The Boats that went up, mentioned in my former Letter, I conjecture had on Board the Baggage of the Army; the Soldiers seen on board, were the regimental Guards to the Baggage.
The Militia of this State is dwindling to nothing—Gen: Varnum says, there was upwards of 1400 a few days since; they are reduced now to between seven & eight. Colo. Shreeve is gone out to see what Impression he can make upon the People, and to endeavour to draw together as large a Number as possible; but I cannot flatter myself with any

considerable reinforcement. I will endeavour to inclose your Excellency a Return of our Strength in Continental & Militia, this Afternoon if possible.
We are all ready to advance; but the General Officers think it adviseable, to wait the Return of the first Express, sent to Glover’s Brigade; to learn the strength & time the Junction may be formed, with that Brigade. I have heard nothing where it is, notwithstanding I have sent three Expresses. Capt. Lee is not arrived, neither have I heard any thing of him—I could wish if possible, some Horse might be sent, as every Army is an unweildy Body without them; & in this Country, they are more immediately necessary, to prevent the Enemy from sending out theirs to collect Stock.
Colo: Cox who is with me at this Place, says, if the Enemy can open a Communication with the three lower Counties, they will be able, independant of all the surrounding Country, to draw Supplies of every kind, necessary for the Subsistance of the Army, & Inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia.
Your Excellency observes, in your last, you must leave the Propriety of attacking the Enemy to me. Would you advise me to fight them with very unequal Numbers. Most People, indeed all, agree they are near or quite 5000 strong—Our Force is upwards of three, exclusive of the Militia, which may be from seven to eight hundred at most. The Situation the Enemy are in, the Ease with which they can receive Reinforcements, & the Difficulty of our knowing it, will render it absolutely necessary, whenever we advance from this Place, to make the Attack as soon as possible. I had much rather engage with three thousand against five, than attack the Enemy’s Lines, & there is a much greater prospect of succeeding, but still I cannot promise myself Victory, nor even a Prospect of it, with Inferior Numbers—I have seen of late, the difficulty your Excellency seemed to labour under, to satisfy the Expectations of an ignorant Populace, with great Concern. It is our Misfortune to have an Extent of Country to cover, that demands four times our Numbers—the Enemy so situated as to be very difficult to approach, and from pretty good Authority, superior to us in Numbers. Under these Disadvantages—Your Excellency has the choice of but two things, to fight the Enemy without the least Prospect of Success, upon the common Principles of War, or remain inactive, & be subject to the Censure of an ignorant & impatient populace. In doing one you may make a bad matter worse and take a Measure, that, if it proves unfortunate, you may stand condemned for, by all military Gentlemen of Experience; in pursuing the other you have the Approbation of your own mind, you give your Country an opportunity to exert itself to supply the present Deficiency, & also act upon such military Principles

as will justify you to the best Judges in the present day, & to all future Generations. For my own Part, I feel Censure with as great a Degree of Sensibility as is possible, and I feel ambitious of doing every thing that common Sense can justify; but I am fully persuaded, in attempting more you may make a temporary, a lasting Evil. The Cause is too important to be trifled with to shew our Courage, & your Character too deeply interested, to sport away upon unmilitary Principles.
For your Sake for my own Sake & for my Country’s Sake I wish to attempt every thing which will meet with your Excellency’s Approbation—I will run any Risque or engage under any Disadvantages if I can only have your Countenance if unfortunate. With the Publick I know Success sanctifies every thing and that only. I cannot help thinking from the most dispassionate Survey of the Operations of the Campaign that you stand approved by Reason & justified by every military Principle. With Respect to my own Conduct, I have ever given my Opinion with Candour & to my utmost executed with Fidelity whatever was committed to my Charge. In some Instances we have been unfortunate—In one I thought I felt the Lowr of your Excellency’s Countenance when I am sure I had no Reason to expect it. It is out of my Power to command success but I trust I have ever endeavoured to deserve it. It is mortifying enough to be a common Sharer in Misfortunes but to be punished as the Author, without deserving it, is truly afflicting.
Your Excellency’s Letter of the 22d, but I suppose it was of yesterday, this moment came to hand. as I have wrote so fully upon the Subject I have nothing to add, only, that to advance from this place before Glover’s Brigade joins us unless we attack the Enemy without them will rather injure than facilitate our Designs. But if your Excellency wishes the Attack to be made immediately—give me only your Countenance & notwithstanding it is contrary to the Opinion of the General officers here I will take the Consequences upon myself.
Inclosed is a copy of a Letter from Colo: Ellis at Haddonfield.
The Hospitals in the Jerseys are greatly complained of—they prove a Grave for many of the poor Soldiery—principally oweing to the Negligence of the Surgeons who have the Care of the Hospitals. How far these Complaints are well grounded I can not pretend to say—but I would beg leave to recommend the sending of good trusty Officers to inspect the Management of the Hospitals & to remain there untill regularly released. I am with great Respect Your Excellency’s most Obdt Servt

Nath. Greene

Major Burnet has just returned from Glover’s Brigade they will be at the black Horse to Night. Eight miles from this place.
half past three oClock.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 24 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir
Mount Holly [N.J.] 9 oClock Nov. 24 1777

I receivd your favor by Col. Mead who has communicated to me the design of an attack upo[n] Philadelphia, the consequences if successful are so desireable that I wish it appeard to me more practicable—In war there must be always some thing left to chance and I would always recommend to trust some consequences to the Spirit and bravery of the troops—An excess of caution which councils of War are generally productive of—often deprives a country, of the advantages of a due exertion of the spirit & bravery of the troops—but I have viewed this

subject in and out of council, I have weighed the good and bad consequences—I have surveyd it in a Historical point of light, I have examined it from my own observations in the course of the war and I cannot thin[k] there is that degree of probability of the attempts succeeding that will warrant the undertakeing. I have not time without detaining Col. Mead too long to give my reasons against the attack in full detail, but I think it a hassardous attempt and will terminate to the injury of the Continent and disgrace of the Army—I am sensible that many things pronounced impracticable before they were attempted have been crowned with success in the undertakeing—But prudence forbids that being made a principle which necessity alone can justify. I wish that it was in our power to give that Army some capital wound—the reputation of the Army and the happiness of the country loudly call for it—but in consulting our wishes rather than our reason, we may be hurried by an impatience to attempt something splendid into inextricable difficulties.
The depreciation of Money the corruption of the people and the dislike to service that prevails throughout the Army will justify measures at this day that might wear the complexion of rashness under different circumstances—How far these considerations may authorise the attempt I cannot pretend to say—One thing I would beg leave to recommend that is if your Excellency thinks of attacking the City this Winter—improve the present moment for sure I am whatever reinforcements of Militia may be drawn in to aid the Army they can not render it so formidable and equal to the attempt as it is at this hour—I am very willing to lay aside my own private Judgment and second the attempt—you may depend upon it Sir that I will as freely embark in the attempt if your Excellency thinks it warrantable as if I was of the same sentiment, and whatever may be the event my Opinion never shall be known.
The troops here are under marching Orders—Glovers Brigade will join us in the morning—I intended to advance in the morning at Nine, but Col. Meads coming and recommending the postponing the march until I hear further from your Excellency, and as the troops coming in will want one days rest I thought it best to countermand the orders for marching until I hear from your Excell. And I am further inducd to the measure because I don’t apprehend the difficulties of attacking Lord Cornwallis will be increasd from one or two days delay—the Enemy give out they are 10,000 Strong and that they intend to march to Burlington. I wish your Excellency to weigh the subject coolly and take your measures accordingly—I shall be perfectly satisfied be the result what it may. I am with the sincerest regard ⟨your mo⟩st Obedient ⟨Servt⟩

N. Greene


Title: From George Washington to William Livingston, 24 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Livingston, William

Sir
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 24th Novemr 1777

I am honored with yours of the 22d. It gives me great pleasure to find that your Legislature have undertaken to procure a Quantity of Blankets and other Cloathing, by Civil Authority, which mode ought ever to be adopted instead of the Military. I have given orders to have all the Officers, who were vested with powers to collect these Articles, immediately recalled, except Colo. Forman, for whom you have a letter to that purpose.
I highly approve of the Measures you are taking to put a stop to the illicit Correspondence that is carrying on between the Inhabitants upon the Sound and New York. I am with great Respect Yr Excellency’s most obt

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Brig. Gen. James Potter, 24 November 1777 [letter not found]
From: Washington, George
To: Potter, James

Letter not found: to Brig. Gen. James Potter, 24 Nov. 1777. GW writes in a letter of this date to Potter: “I wrote you . . . this morning & . . . fear my Letter should have miscarried.”


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General James Potter, 24 November 1777
From: Potter, James
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp at the [Newtown] Squair [Pa.] Novr 24th 1777

I was at Chester yesterday the most of the shiping is gon up the River as far as the Bend below Billingsport, the enclosed lines I Receved from a good honast whig that would not assart a falce hood Knowing it to be such he lives in the City. I am your Excelanceys Most Obedant Humble sert.


Title: From George Washington to Brigadier General James Potter, 24 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Potter, James

Dr Sir
[Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 24: 1777.

I thank you for your Favor of this date & for the intelligence it contained. You will continue your endeavours to obtain further information, and will transmit as soon as you can whatever you may think material and necessary to be known.
I intend to send a Reconnoitring party over Schuylkill to Morrow Morning and request that you will detach Two Hundred Men to cover them. you will direct them to take post & to patrole between the Bridge over Schuylkill & the Ferry next above it. I wrote you on this subject this morning & have mentioned it again for fear my Letter should have miscarried.
I shall be glad if you will find out, Whether the Bridge over Schuylkill is made to draw—or is what we commonly call a Drawbridge. I wish to be ascertained of this, as soon as you can procure satisfactory information respecting it & Whether it is drawn at Night. I am Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt servt

Go: Washington


Title: General Orders, 25 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Novr 25th 1777.
Parole Rutland.C. Signs Stafford. Troy.

For the information of the troops lately arrived, the General Order issued some time since is repeated; That Tatoo is not [to] be beaten in camp.


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Armstrong, 25 November 1777
From: Armstrong, John
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp at Whitemarsh [Pa.] 25th Novr 1777

Without such an acquaintance of the Enemies lines as wou’d discover to you where they are more or less accessible I can not well approve of an attack upon them, nor can I conceive the opposite numbers at Philada under Six thousand or upward—And question whether an attack can be Succesful if the lines are not penetrated in so Short a Space of time (perhaps some Seven or at most ten minutes) as will render it impossible for the party thrown into the City shou’d the first attempt on the lines fail, to contribute any effectual influence—The principle upon which that part of the dispossition is formed is perfectly just, but the numbers too few, and the contingencies various.

In the present view of things I rather approve carrying the Army Over Scuilkill & making tryal of any advantages that yet may be derived from a possession of the Islands &c. &c. by which means either the Enemy may be drawn out or the Scuilkill pass’d to advantage on the Ice. At the Same time I am totally Summissive to yr Excellencys commands, beging leave only to add that whether the attack is made or not, but especially if it is, the far greater part of yr force in the Jersey may Suddenly be recalled and join the Army—And that I am with the greatest respect Yr Excellencys most Obdt Servt

John Armstrong


Title: To George Washington from Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, 25 November 1777
From: Burgoyne, John
To: Washington, George

Sir
Cambridge [Mass.] Novber 25 1777

Your Excellency will have observed by the dispatch from Sir Willm Howe to me which passed thorough your hands, that it was matter of great doubt whether the transports destined to carry the troops to England according to the Convention would be able to make the Port of Boston in this advanced season of the year; & therefore that it might be advisable to send them to Rhode Island, upon the supposition that a mere change of place, which made no alteration in the intent & meaning of the convention, would be readily agreed to.
That no time may be lost in an embarkation which I conceive will be equally desireable to the troops & to this Country in point of convenience, I take the earliest occasion to apply to your Excellency, or through your means if you judge necessary, to the Continental congress, for consent to march the troops to Providence, or such other place as may be commodious to pass them by small craft to Newport. This march to take place whenever advice shall be received of the arrival of the transports. Should any objection be against Rhode Island any convenient port in the Sound would equally answer the purpose.
Should any considerations arise which I do not foresee to make the whole proposal objectionable to yourself or the Congress, & the troops should be obliged thereby to wait the passage of the transports round Cape Cod, I in that case request passports for myself & my suite to Rhode Island in order to embark on board a separate frigate; not only matters of great private concern in business, but also my state of health requiring my speedy return to England.

I have no scruple, Sir, in asking this favour, at your hands, nor shall I have any in acknowledging it; confident that no duty is impaired by an intercourse of personal civilities in matters where the publick Cause cannot possibly be committed or affected.
The packet directed to Sir Willm Howe enclosed herewith contains recommendations in which the preferment of many meritorious individuals is deeply interested. I am persuaded Sir that description will be a full apology for troubling you to pass it by a trumpet. I have the honour to be Sir Your Most Obedient & Most Humble Servant

J: Burgoyne Lt Genl


Title: To George Washington from Richard Caswell, 25 November 1777
From: Caswell, Richard
To: Washington, George

sir
North Carolina 25th November 1777.

I have the Honor to Inclose you a Resolve of the General Assembly of this State, respecting the Resignation of the Officers of the Troops raised here; And am to request you will be pleased, in case any of the Officers who come within the meaning of the said Resolve, do resign, to Certify the same to me so soon as you find the same practicable. I am sir, Your Excellency’s Most Obedient Humble Servant

Rd Caswell


Title: From George Washington to Major John Clark, Jr., 25 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Clark, John Jr.

Sir
Head Qrs [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 25: 1777.

Your two favors of the 22d & that of the 24th Instant have been duly received. I thank you for your exertions to procure intelligence and hope they will be continued. I have inclosed you a List of Questions to which I wish the most satisfactory Answers that can be obtained. You will direct your Emissaries & Spies particularly on these Head, and will request their pointed attention to them.
I fear there is no foundation for the report of Lord Cornwallis’s captivity. If the Fact was so, I should have received authentic intelligence of it before now. No persons employed by you, have been with me. I shall be glad to know who John Fox is, whose permit you inclosed. Is he the Person who carried on the Cutlery business in Philadelphia? I am Sir Yr Most Obedt servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 25 November 1777
From: Duportail, Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle
To: Washington, George

[25 November 1777]

To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult and dangerous Project, it has especially this very considerable Inconvenience, the exposing our Army in case it does not succeed to a total Defeat. This is easily demonstrated—One of the principal means proposed is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy—if we do not succeed these are so many men absolutely lost—as to the main body of the Army which is to attack in front, it must pass through the Intervals left between the Abattis and Redouts, which they say form very narrow Passages—if after penetrating we should be repulsed can Troops in disorder return easily by the Passages through which they were introduced—will it not be very easy for the English to cut off their Retreat—Our whole Army then may be destroy’d or made prisoners—Now does it become this Army which is the principal one, to run such Risques—does it become it to stake the Fate of America on a single Action? I think not—for my part I never would place this Army in a Situation where its Rear was not perfectly free—much less where it will be inclosed on all sides without means of Retreat—to justify such an Enterprise the Success must be almost certain—to judge of this we have only to take a view of the Dispositions which must be made for this attack—this View will render the Difficulties evident—first two thousand men are to be introduced by a River of which the Enemy are wholly Masters—if we embark them near the Enemy the noise may alarm them—if at a distance, the cold which they will undergo, will render the use of their Arms exceedingly difficult in the morning—besides can we flatter ourselves that the River Side is unguarded—let us reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this project miscarry and cause us the Loss of two thousand men.
As to the Attack in front—these are nearly the Dispositions which would be followed—We should march upon as many Columns as there are Roads leading to the Enemy—upon our arrival in their presance, each Commanding Officer of a Column, according to the Size of the works before him, and the number of men which he judges are contained in them, divides his Troops into two parts, one of which surrounds the works and attacks them vigorously while the other marches boldly through the Intervals and falls upon the Troops in the Rear—but every one sees how much harmony is required in all these dispositions—how much presance of mind in the Superior Officers—how much firmness in the Troops who have to execute all their manœuvres under the fire of an Enemy who are in a great measure cover’d.

If the Enemys Works are not inclosed, the Enterprise would be much less dangerous—if they are, the Enterprise is too hardy.
His Excellency I think desired us to say a word respecting the operations in Jersey. in general it seems to me that we can do nothing better than to endeavour to attack the Enemys Force there with superior numbers—but there is a very important Observation to be made, which is, that we should not weaken ourselves too much here, for we are to consider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one night and attack us by day-break with their whole force.

The Chevalier du Portail

If However an attack be determined upon, the Enemys Works should be more particularly reconnoitred.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 25 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir
Mount Holly [N.J.] Nov. 25th [1777] 4 oClock

This moment receivd intelligence the enemy are embarking from Glouster and [c]rossing over to Philadelphia Col. Comstock sends this intelligence and sais it may be depended upon—I have orderd General Varnums & General Huntingtons brigade to advance immediately to fall upon the enemies rear and prevent their geting off their stock—I wait your Excellencies Orders to march where you may think advisable—Colo. Sheppard got into camp about noon. the whole body of the troops will be ready to move at a moments warning—The Riffle Corps & about 600 Militia are upon the enemies flanks.
A detachment from Cap. Lees Horse took Nine prisoners yesterday—the first account I ever had of their being in this quarter. I am with great esteem Your Excelly Obed. Servt

N. Greene


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 25 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir
Mount Holly [N.J.] Nov. 25th [1777] 12 oClock

I wrote your Excellency this afternoon that the enemy were crossing from the Jerseys to Philadelphia and that the intelligen[c]es came from Col. Comstock—he is stationd at Haddenfield to collect intelligence—I have receivd two letters from the Col. to day the first dated at 12 oClock the last at three both of which I have inclosd—It appears to me the enemy are crossing their Cattle but I much doubt whether any part of the troops have crost the river perhaps they may begin in the morning—I am divided in my mind how to act—If your Excellen⟨cy⟩ intends an attack on Philadelphia our moveing down to Haddenfield will prevent our coopperating with you but if the enemy are crossing, the attack upon the city would not be warrantable now if before without our whole collective force at least and as part is below and part here I wish to move forward for the support of the troops below and attack the enemy if ⟨practicable.⟩
I expected before this to have receivd your Excellencies further orders but as I have not and from the intelligence there appears a prospect of attempting something here I have ventured to put the troops in motion if I should receive orders to the contrary I can speedily return.
If the enemy cross to the city they may be attackt at any time hereafter as well as now—if they have not crost and are in a situation to be attackt we shall have an opportunity to attempt something—I am anxious to do every thing in my power and more especially as the people

seems to be dissatisfied at the evacuation of red bank fort. I am with sentiments of regard your Excellencys most Obedient Servt

N. Greene


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General James Irvine, 25 November 1777
From: Irvine, James
To: Washington, George

Sir
Whitemarsh [Pa.] novr 25th 1777.

I have seriously revolved in my mind the subject that was debated in council last night, and notwithstanding the present disagreable situation of our affairs, cannot think that we are yet reduced to the necessity

of hazarding the total destruction of the army by a general attack, on the very ground that general Howe would wish to fight us on; to attack redoubts &ca with any prospect of success, we should be much superior in numbers to the enemy and at least equal to them in discipline, were we possessed of those advantages, & had boats sufficient to throw about 3000 men into their rear I should chearfully vote for the proposed attack as in my opinion the defeat of genl Howe would then be as certain, as I am afraid ours would be were we to attack him with our present strength.
I could therefore wish that the army was placed in such a position (either on this or the other side of Schuykill) as to invite or oblidge general Howe to leave his strong holds & seek us in the field, as the probability of success in a general action then, would be more in our favour with equal numbers, than in an attempt upon his lines with our present triffling superiority.
I have had but little experience in war, & therefore give my opinion on this important question with diffidence, should your excellency or the major part of the council determine on the attack, I shall chearfully sustain the part assigned to me, & exert my utmost abilities to procure success. I have the honor to be with the greatest respect Sir Your most obedient & humb. servt

James Irvine


Title: To George Washington from Major General Johann Kalb, 25 November 1777
From: Kalb, Johann
To: Washington, George

at Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 25 9ber 1777

According to His Excellency General Washington’s orders, and desire of having every Gentleman’s opinion on the Subjects laid before the Council last evening.
Mine is to attempt an attack on the lines & City, as Soon as the Plan thereof can be properly laid, all necessary dispositions and calculations made, as to the mode & time. In respect to the Plan much must depend on intelligences of the Ennemy’s Position—& Collected or separated forces, and the whole Entreprise on Jurcey and Expedition.
Two Essential points would be necessary to be known.
1º whether a passage for a Column will be practicable on the Bridge or middle ferry on Schuylkill river, to make there a Strong attack, or whether the Ennemies take down the Bridge in night time. in this case a Small body of troops and some artillery would be sufficient on

the right bank of that river to disquiet & annoy them in their Lines, and the whole army to be Employed to attack in front with different Columns.
2º Whether the key & City Shore of Delawar be not strongly defended, either by Pikets, intrenchments, row Gallies, floating and other Batteries, and whether the Noise of the Boats to be employed there, will not prevent or defeat the Execution of a landing, for if th’ attempt Should fail by Such obstructions, the boats could hardly be brought off and these troops would be in great danger of being either Sunk or taken. if on the contrary no such obstacles were to be feared, a suprise on that side and a well timed attack in the rear of the lines woud undoubtedly insure a compleat Victory.
Many more things could be said on this Subject.
As for myself and Division we will do our best in what ever part of the Entreprise and attack His Excellency will find proper to Employ me.

Baron de Kalb


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Maxwell, 25 November 1777
From: Maxwell, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
White Marsh [Pa.] 25th Novbr 1777

Agreeable to Your Excellencys request of last night that I should give my opinion this morning in writing concerning the making an attact on Philidelphia immediately.
I am not for attacting it at present and will proceed to give some reasons why I would not Viz. It is but a few days ago; before Generals Green & Huntington crossed the Dellaware that we determined in a full council that an attact on the Enemy in their Fortifycations &C. was by no means eligible, and I think we was as strong then as we are now on this side. It is urged that if we do not make an attact on the Town we must be put to the greatest difficultys to raise another Armey, keep up our credit &Ca. I am of opinion if we throw the Armey away we have, without some good appearance of success we are much more likely not to get another one nor support the Credit of our money. I am for attacting and Harrassing them by every means in our power; by any other Method than that of attacting them in their works. And am Sir Your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble

Wm Maxwell B.G.

N.B. have heard that the Enemy has got up 2 or 3 small armed Vessels to Philadelphia by people that came out ye[s]terday.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General John Paterson, 25 November 1777
From: Paterson, John
To: Washington, George

Sir
[Whitemarsh, Pa.] Nov. 25th 1777

The proposed attack on Philidelphia in my Opinion will be so hazardous that we cannot be Justified in Prosecuting of it, as a Failure will most certainly be attended with the loss of great Numbers of our Troops which I am fearfull would be attended with Fatal Consequences. my perfect Ignorance of the Country renders me intirely incapable of recommending any other Plan, but shall with Chearfulness do my utmost to put in Execution this or any other your Excellency shall think adviseable. I am your Excellencies most Obt humble Servant

Jno. Paterson


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Enoch Poor, 25 November 1777
From: Poor, Enoch
To: Washington, George

Sir
[Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 25th 1777

I am Sencuble that the Situation of our Country loudly Calls for the Exertions of this Army.
But fear an atact upon the lines Round the City of Philidelphia will be unsucesful therefore dont advize to it.
as I have Jest arived to Camp & not acquainted in the Country beg to be Excused from proposing a new Desposition of the Army. I am your Excellencys Most obediant Hue Servt

Enoch Poor B. Gl


Title: To George Washington from George Read, 25 November 1777
From: Read, George
To: Washington, George

Sir.
Newark New Castle County [Del.] 25 Novr 1777.

I was honoured with yours of the 8th Instant delivered to me the 15th by Col: Pope, by whom I immediately wrote to persons in Authority in the Counties of Kent & Sussex to give him every Assistance in procuring Cloathing & Blankets for the Use of our Battalion with you. I know not what may be the success but have hopes that sufficient for their immediate wants will be obtained. The State had made some Provision in this way at the time of raising the Battalion in the beginning of the Year, A part of which was then only expended, but upon the March of Genl Howe’s Army through this County the greater part of what remained was sent by the person in whose Custody it was, with his own Effects, in A Vessel into Manto Creek near to Red-bank Fort, whether safe at this time I know not. It Consisted of 350 yds of Cloth of different kinds in remnants, the Gleanings of very many Shops, I have ordered an inquiry to be made respecting them—I luckily laid my hands upon 150 Yds of Linnen of the publick Stock saved from the Enemy’s searches in Wilmington which is made into Shirts ready for Col: Pope on his return.
The County of New Castle has heretofore been so stript of Blanketing that we have not got A sufficiency for the few Militia we have now in Service guarding the Shore of the Delaware, The Manufacture of this State ever was inconsiderable in proportion to its number of Inhabitants, depending principally on foreign Goods purchased at Philadelphia: That part of the State which did most in this way was severely pillaged by Genl Howe’s Army both as to the Cloathing of the People and their Sheep, so that their distress is great at this Season; to give you some Idea of the amazing price Necessaries have arose to, A person next door to me has just purchased A little American made linnen at 58/ ⅌ Yard such as but 3 Years since might have been had for 4/—I have A Tanners Bill for Leather for my own Use now before me in which Soal leather is charged at 10/ ⅌ lb. 2 Calf Skins at 70/ each and A 3d at 90/. the three not weighing all together 6 lb.—Shoes sell from Six to Eight dollars ⅌ pair—how to remedy these things I know not, they make unfavourable impressions.
I have the Satisfaction to inform Your Excellency that we have checked and put almost an entire Stop to that intercourse which was

had with the Enemy’s Ships in our River, this employs all the Militia we can draw out along A Shore of more than One hundred and twenty Miles, and too many of our people are disposed to supply themselves with Salt, Sugar, Coffee &c. at lower Rates than they can be had for within the State, for such has been the produce of most of the traffick yet discovered—Our State has been peculiarly unlucky in the Captivity of Mr President McKinly, of the publick papers, Monies and records, it damped the Spirits of our people, and they are not over the Effects of it. while on this Subject I must entreat your Excellency’s Attention to the Obtaining his Release by Exchange as soon as it may be in Your power. his Usefulness was such that his loss is severely felt through the State, and particularly by myself, upon whom that duty devolves as Speaker of the Legislative Council, I am truly inadequate to either Station, but especially that of Vice-President and such is the Provision in the Constitution of our State, that it cannot be well altered without doing A worthy Man (our President) injustice—Be Assured that in procuring his Speedy return here you will do A signal favour to the State, as well as to your Excellency’s most Obedient Humble Servt

Geo: Read


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Charles Scott, 25 November 1777
From: Scott, Charles
To: Washington, George

Sir
White Marsh [Pa.] 25th Novr 1777.

I am for making an attack, So soon as things Can be put in readiness. as to the plan I can Think of none better than that proposd by Genl Cadwalader, with this alteration, that the partie proposd to land in the City be detached from Genl Green and not taken from this armey. I Have two reasons for this, the one is that those Men with him are the Flower of the armey and That it will requier, the best men we can pick to effect the landing if opposd. my other Is that we cant well Spare them from this armey. I have the Honour to be Your Excellencys Obt Servant

Chs Scott


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Smallwood, 25 November 1777
From: Smallwood, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novemr 25th 1777

I have revolved in my Mind the Subject of your Requisition last Night, and placed it in every Point of View, and must confess I am much embarrassed, I see the Propriety and Necessity of an Attack, I view with Pain the pressing Expectations of the Public, the Reputation of the Army at Stake, the depression of our Money, the difficulty & hazard of the proposed Attact, and the Misfortunes & I may add the almost inevitable destruction which must ensue upon a Defeat; and upon due Reflection let it suffice to say I am against an Attact on the Enemys Lines, from an Impression that our Troops are not equal to it, unless there was a moral certainty of throwing in the Parties proposed, down the Delaware & across the Schuylkil, to Alarm and make a Diversion on the Flanks & in their Rear, but I think this Event wou’d be doubtful & uncertain, as well as extremely hazardous for the Delaware Party, & might in general subject the Army to too great a Sacrifice upon such a Contingency.
I shou’d therefore think it more eligible to manœuvre, and endeavor to draw Genl Howe out of his Lines to an Engagement, wch I shou’d judge is both Practicable, and probable. I have the Honor to be with sincere Regard, Your Exellencys Most Obedt Hble Sert

W: Smallwood


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 25 November 1777
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 25th 1777

In Compliance with your Excellency’s request that each of the General Officers met in Council Yesterday Evening, should give you their Sentiments in Writeing on what Measure’s had best be pursued in the

present Exegency of our Affairs; I must now beg leave to give it as my opinion That as all the reinforcements we had any reason to expect, have now Joined the Main Army, and as a Considerable body of the Enemy’s Army is detached in to New Jersey under the Command of Lord Cornwallis, a favorable opertunity is presented for an immediate Attack of the Enemy. That other Circumstances render this Measure absolutely necessary. that from all that I have heard said, or that has Occured to me on the Subject; I think the following plan of Attack most feaseable, 1st That the Enemy’s lines on this side Philadelphia be attacked at Day light by three Columns properly flanked and Supported. 2d that two thousand Men be drawn from General Green and Embarked in Boats at Dunks’s ferry to proceed to philadelphia, land at or near Spruce Street, push thro’ to the Common, endeavour with part to Secure the Bridge over Schuylkill and with the remainder to Attack the Enemy in the Rear of their Lines. 3d that five hundred Continental Troops with the Millitia under General Potter possess such of the hills on the other Side of Schuylkill as Command an Infilade of the Enemy’s Lines, and while part of them Carry on a Brisk Canonade in that place, the rest of them proceed to the Bridge over Schuylkill and wait an oppertunity of Attacking the Works there in front, when the party from Spruce Street make an Attack in the Rear. the Landing of the party at Spruce Street should be Effected if possible Just before day light, as it would greatly facilitate their passage thro’ the Town and bring the Alarm to the Rear of the Enemy’s lines in time to Cooperate with the Main Attack in front. These are outlines of the plan I would propose, and Submit it to Your Excellency & am with great Regard & Respect your Excellency’s Most Humble Servant

Stirling,


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 25 November 1777
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

sir
Camp at White Ma[r]sh [Pa.] 25th Novr 1777

After the most Dispationate & Deliberate Consideration of the Question your Excellency was pleased to propose to the Council of General Officers last Evening; I am Solemnly and Clearly of Opinion; that the Credit of the Army under your Command, the Safety of the Country—the Honor of the American Arms—the Approach of Winter which in a few days will force you from the field—and above all the Depreciation of the Currency of these States, Points out the Immediate necessity of giving the enemy Battle—could they possibly be drawn from their Lines—it’s a Measure Devoutly to be wished.
But if that can not be Effected—It is my Opinion that your Excellency should March tomorrow morning and take part with this Army at the Upper or North end of Germantown—and from thence Immediately Detatch a Working party to throw up or effect to throw up some Redoubts under the direction of Your Engineers—this Intelligence will reach the Enemy—they will Conclude that you Intend to make good your Quarters there, and however desirous they may be to Dislodge you—yet it will take up some time to withdraw their force from the Jersey.
by this manoeuvre you will be within Striking Distance, the Enemy will be Deceived by your Works, your Troops will be fresh and ready to move the same Night so as to Arrive at the Enemies Lines before day light on thirsday morning Agreeable to the proposed plan of Attack—with great part of which I am in fellowship—the out lines are good—they may be Improved to Advantage and Crowned with Success.
It has been Observed by some Gentlemen that the Attack is Hazardous—that if we prevail it will be Attended with great loss.
I agree with the Gentlemen in their position, but however hazardous the Attempt and Altho’ some loss is Certain—yet it is my Opinion—that you will not be in a worse Situation—nor your Arms in less Credit—if you should even meet with a misfortune—than if you were to Remain Inactive.
The eyes of all America are fixed on you, the junction of the Northern Army—which—Obliged Genl Burgoyne to lay down his Arms—gives the Country & Congress some expectation—that a vigorous Effort will be made to Dislodge the Enemy.
It’s not in our power to Command success but it is in our Power to produce a Conviction to the World that we Deserve it. Interim I am your Excellencies Most Obt & very Hume Sert

Anty Wayne B.G.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Woodford, 25 November 1777
From: Woodford, William
To: Washington, George

Dear Genl
[Whitemarsh, Pa.] Novr 25th 1777.

I cannot help viewing the purposed Attack upon the Enemys Lines as attended with many Hazards & Dificuties.
But these are over ballanced by the following considerations Vizt first the necessity that something should be attempted by this Army before it retires into Winter Quarters, both for its own Cr. & the support of our paper currency.
Secondly, that from my knowledge of the State of the Soldiery, we are not likely to be in a better condition, if so good a one, at any Future time.
Thirdly, that all the Force we expected is arrived—and lastly that the present Detach’d situation of the two Armys promises a fairer prospect of Success, than is likely to p[r]esent itself again whilst we are able to continue in the Field.
I am therefore for makeing the Attack so soon as your Excellency & some of the Genl Officers have had sufficient time to Digest a proper plan. I have the Honour to be Your Excellencys Most Obedt humble Servt

Wm Woodford


Title: General Orders, 26 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Novr 26th 1777.
Parole Carlisle.C. Signs Derby. Dover.

If any Gentlemen of the army can give information to the General, of shoes, stockings or leather breeches, in quantities, he will be exceedingly obliged to them—He will likewise be obliged to any of the General officers, for recommending proper persons to be employed in collecting these articles.
General Smallwood, and the Colonels of the Maryland regiments are

to meet to morrow morning, at nine o’clock, at General Smallwood’s quarters, to state, as far as they can, the ranks of all other officers in those regiments, and the dates which their commissions ought to bear—Where there are competitions for rank among the Colonels, they are to state their claims.
The money for the payment of the army for september is expected every moment—The regimental pay Masters are immediately to make out their Abstracts for the month of October, and deliver them to the pay Master General for examination—As an alteration in the payment of rations is now under consideration of Congress, it is recommended to the commanding officers of regiments not to add their ration accounts, to the pay-rolls, until their determination is known, which will be signified in General Orders—The Pay Master General has complained of the slovenly, careless manner in which some of the captains make out their pay rolls—The regimental pay Masters are not to receive any but such as are made out fair, and agreeable to the form some time since given out, by the Pay Master General, which the regimental Pay Masters are to furnish such captains with, as have not already received the same.
No regimental Pay Master is to leave the service, without first applying to the Commander in Chief, nor any new pay master appointed without first obtaining his approbation.


Title: To George Washington from Major John Clark, Jr., 26 November 1777
From: Clark, John Jr.
To: Washington, George

sir
Mr Lewis’s 26th Novr 1777. 9 oClock P.M.

Yours of the 25th I received, and will strictly adhere to the contents thereof—this moment my Friend from Philadelphia came to me and informs me he left the City this Evening—previous to his departure he viewed the Wharfs & Streets none of which have any Cannon on, this Day upwards of thirty Sail of Transports came up the River, above one

hundred now ly opposite the City—several of which have Troops on board, but had not landed—a considerable number of Horse were also on board—among the number were a 20, & an 18 Gun Frigate they ly a little below Market Street Wharf—the Delaware & a Galley called “the Lady Washington” ly opposite Kensington; at which place there is two Batteries commanding the River—& one below the City near the old Fort—The Enemy busy unloading Transports at the Wharfs—Lord Cornwallis was expected to dine in the City to Day—’twas said Troops were landing at Gloucester Point but did not see them—The Bridge at Middle Ferry has hinges, nigher this side than the other but dont know whether any t’other side—or whether they draw it at Night—believes not—A considerable number of the Enemy came over & were pursuing General Potters Scouts, who had annoyed their Picket & wounded some of them, whether they mean to come up this way or not I cannot say but have given the General notice—he don’t know that they took any Vessells of ours seen some burning—Mr J.F. lives in this Neighbourhood a man of considerable Estate & never lived in Philada—whether the Troops on board are those that went to Jersey or not is not certain off but believes they are—several of The Transports mount from three, to six pieces of Cannon on back, don’t know of any Gun Boats—no Troops have crossed to Jersey—since those under Lord Cornwallis—The Troops still remain camp’d along the line of Redoubts from the upper Ferry to Kensington—none of the Streets are barricaded my Friend has permission to go & come unmolested—If you have any further directions I am ready to obey them—I must not omit informing you my Horses are almost ruined the only one I had left is foundered—If I cou’d get a good one from the Quarter Master for a few Days mine will recover, I hope, or permission to impress what I may have occasion for while here—my riding is very severe & I have ruined two or three of my own. I am with the greatest respect Your Excellencys Most Obedt

Jno: Clark Junr

P.S. You may rely on this intelligence as my Friend is a man of Sense, & very communicative, in this I am justified by my acquaintance & his Attachment to me.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Nathanael Greene, 26 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Greene, Nathanael

Dear ⟨Sir⟩
⟨White Marsh [Pa.] No⟩vr 26⟨th 1777⟩

My Letter ⟨of⟩ yester night (wro⟨te af⟩ter I returnd from a view of ⟨the Ene⟩my’s Lines from the other side Schuylkill) I must refer to. Our Situation, as you justly obs⟨erve, is⟩ distressing, from a variety ⟨of irreme⟩diable causes; but more espe⟨ci⟩ally from the impracticabillity of ⟨an⟩swering the expectations of the world without running hazards w⟨hich no⟩ military principles can j⟨ustify; a⟩nd which, in case of failure, ⟨might pr⟩ove the ruin of our cause; patience, and a steady perseveran⟨ce⟩ in such measures as appear war⟨ranted⟩ by sound reason and policy ⟨must⟩ support us under the censure ⟨of the⟩ one, and dictate a proper line of conduct for the attainment of ⟨the oth⟩er, that is the great object in view. this, as ⟨it e⟩ver has, will I think, ever re⟨main⟩ the first wish of my heart, ho⟨wev⟩er I may mistake the means of a⟨cc⟩omplishment. that your vi⟨ews⟩ are the same⟨,⟩ & that your endeavours have pointed to the same end, ⟨I am⟩ perfectly sat⟨isfi⟩ed of, altho⟨’⟩ you ⟨seem⟩ to have imb⟨ibd⟩ a suspicion ⟨which⟩ I never en⟨tertai⟩nd.
I can fo⟨rsee Inc⟩onvenienc⟨es, I can⟩ fo⟨rsee losses a⟩nd I ⟨daresay⟩ I may ⟨add tha⟩t I ca⟨n forsee m⟩uch dissa⟨tisfactio⟩n that w⟨ill ari⟩se from the ⟨withdra⟩wing the Con⟨tine⟩ntal Troops f⟨rom the⟩ Jerseys. ⟨But⟩ how is it to be ⟨avoide⟩d? we cannot be divided ⟨when⟩ the Enemy ar⟨e⟩ collected—the evils ⟨wh⟩ich I apprehended from th⟨rowing⟩ Troops in⟨to⟩ the Jersey’s n⟨ow stare⟩ me more forcibly in the fa⟨ce⟩ a⟨nd a⟩ day or two, if you cannot j⟨oin us⟩ in that time, m⟨ay⟩ realize them⟨. Fo⟩r my mind scar⟨ce⟩ entertains a doubt but that Genl Howe is collec⟨ting his⟩ whole force with a view of ⟨pushing⟩ at this army. this, e⟨speciall⟩y under the information you have rec⟨eive⟩d of Lord Cornwallis’s recrossing the Delaware, induces me ⟨to pre⟩ss dispatch upon you, that our ⟨junc⟩tion may be formed as spee⟨di⟩ly as possible and the consequen⟨ce⟩s of a division avoided.
The Cur⟨rent⟩ Sentiment as far as I can col⟨lect⟩ it, without making it a matte⟨r o⟩f question, is ⟨in⟩ favour of our taking Post ⟨on⟩ the other side Delaware in this c⟨ase⟩ near the Jerseys will ⟨be le⟩ft totally unco⟨ver⟩ed—consequ⟨ently a⟩ll the Craft ⟨in the⟩ River—with ⟨their⟩ Rigging, Gu⟨ns &c.,⟩ the Hospit⟨als on⟩ that side of ⟨the Riv⟩er—the ⟨Magazines⟩ of P⟨rovisions which the Commisaries are⟩ ab⟨’t establishing in the upper⟩ part of Je⟨rsey &c.⟩—think ⟨there⟩fore I bese⟨ech⟩

you of all these things & prepare ⟨yoursel⟩f by re⟨flec⟩tion, and obs⟨ervatio⟩n (being ⟨on⟩ the spot) to give me your advice on these sevl m⟨atte⟩rs. The Boats (those belonging ⟨to the⟩ Public, & built for the purpos⟨e of tra⟩nsporting Troops &ca acr⟨o⟩ss the Rivers) ought in my jud⟨gment⟩ to be removd, so soon as ⟨they ha⟩ve served your prest ca⟨lls, up⟩ to Coryells Ferry at least if ⟨not high⟩er. I am almost Incline to think (if we should cross the Schuylkill) ⟨th⟩at they ought to be carted ove⟨r a⟩lso.
I shall only add that ⟨your⟩ Letters of 12 O’clock and 4 yesterday have both come to hand & s⟨inc⟩e I began this—and that I ⟨am⟩ with sincere regard and ⟨affec⟩te Dr Sir Yr Most Obedt

Go: Washington

It has been p⟨ropo⟩sed ⟨t⟩hat some of the ⟨Ga⟩lleys should fall d⟨own⟩ to, or near the Mou⟨th⟩ of Frankfort Creek, in ⟨order⟩ to prevent Troops ⟨coming⟩ up by Water ⟨and⟩ falling in the Rear ⟨of our Picke⟩ts near the ⟨E⟩nemys Lines⟨. W⟩ill you ⟨discuss⟩ with the C⟨ommodo⟩re on this ⟨su⟩bject? ⟨Will you⟩ also ask ⟨what is beco⟩me ⟨of the⟩ han⟨ds that were⟩ on bo⟨ard the⟩ Vessels ⟨wch were burnt?⟩


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 26 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir
Haddonfield [N.J.] Novr 26th 4 O’Clock P.M. 1777.

Your Excellency’s letter of the 25th reached me at this place—I halted the troops on the reciept of it those that had not got into the town—Genl Varnums & Huntington’s Brigades got to this place before the letter came to hand—I am sorry our march will prove a fruitless one—the enemy have drawn themselves down upon the Peninsula of Gloucester—the Ships are drawn up to cover the Troops—there is but one road that leads down to the point, on each side the ground is swampy, & full of thick under brush, that it makes the approaches impracticable almost—these difficulties might have been surmounted, but we could reap no advantage from it—the Shipping being so posted as to cover the Troops and this country is so intersected with creeks, that approaches are rendered extremely difficult, and retreats very dangerous. I should not have halted the troops, but all the Genl Officers were against making an attack the enemy being so securely situated—and so effectually covered by their Shipping.

We have a fine body of troops & in fine spirits & every one appears to wish to come to action: I proposed to the Gentlemen drawing up in front of the enemy & to attack their Picquet and endeavour to draw them out but they were all against it, from the improbability of the enemies coming out. The Marquis with about 400 Militia & the rifle Corps, attacked the enemies Picquet last evening, kill’d about 20 & wounded many more & took about 20 prisoners—the Marquis is charmed with the spirited behaviour of the Militia & Rifle Corps—they drove the enemy above half a mile & kept this ground untill dark—the enemy’s picquet consisted of about 300 & were reinforced during the skirmish—The Marquis is determined to be in the way of danger.
From the best observations I am able to make & from the best intelligence I can obtain it is uncertain whether any of the enemy have crossed the river, the boats are constantly going but I believe they are transporting stock—there is as many men in the returning boats, as there goes over. by tomorrow it will be reduced to a certainty—I believe the enemy have removed the great Chiveaux de frize—there went up 60 Sail of Vessels this morning. If the obstructions are removed in the river it accounts for the enemies evacuating Carpenters & Province Islands as they are no longer necessary—the prisoners say the enemy are going into Winter quarters as soon as they get up the river.
Inclosed was our order for battle, with a plate agreeing to the order.
I purpose to leave General Varnums brigade & the rifle corps at this place for a few days, especially the rifle men who cover the country very much—Genl Varnum’s brigade will return to Mount Holly tomorrow or next day. I will make further inquiry respecting the hospitals, & give such directions as appear necessary.
My division, Huntington’s & Glover’s Brigades, will proceed with all dispat⟨ch⟩ to join your Excellency. I could wish the enemy might leave the Jersies before us. I am your Excellency’s most Obedient Servant

Nath. Greene


Title: To George Washington from General William Howe, 26 November 1777
From: Howe, William
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Philadelphia [26] Novemr 1777.

I am averse to Altercation, and therefore wish to be explicit, and understood in my Answer to your Letter of the 14th Instant, and to your very importunate Requisition of the 23rd.
I shall never agree to a partial Exchange of Prisoners, until you have on your Part fulfilled the Cartel agreed upon; but as that Matter has already been sufficiently investigated in the Course of our Correspondence, & by Deputies respectively appointed, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon the Subject. As liquidating the Account by the Delivery of an equal Number of Prisoners for those received by your Agents and Commissaries is the only Preliminary which can be admitted for a further Arrangement—Of course it rests with you, whether an Exchange is to take Place or not, and therefore you stand responsible, for the Inconvenience, which the Officers and Men of our respective Armies, must unavoidably be put to in their present State of Captivity.
In Order to alleviate their Distress, and remove the Evil as far as depends upon me, I shall permit Officers for Officers of equal Rank to go home upon their Paroles—that Rule, if you chuse to adopt the Measure, shall be observed for such Officers as you send upon their Paroles, to this Place, New York, or Rhode Island.

I could wish there were no Grievances on either Side real or imaginary to be complained of—As every Man, in my Opinion, who comes fairly under the Description of a Prisoner of War, without any aggravating Circumstance on his Part, is undoubtedly entitled to good Treatment, and every Indulgence which can in Prudence be granted; but that Indulgence can only be regulated by the Situation of the Place, in which Prisoners happen to reside.
If ever any Officer or Commissary under my Command has deviated from the Civility, Care, and Attention, due to Prisoners of War, under the above Description, it is not consistent with my Knowledge, and is contrary to my Directions and Intention.
The Provision issued to the Prisoners, which are or have been in my Hands, has been uniformly the same, and is agreeable to a Regulation, which has long been established for victualling British Troops, when they are on board Men of War or Transports; they surely must receive that Allowance, as a Field Officer, visits them every Morning, who has Orders to hear their Complaints, and to report to me—You cannot suppose there could be an Intention of deviating from this Rule, in the Case of Joseph Cloyd and William Dewes.
I have no Objection to your sending a Commissary, with a Supply of Clothing, Money, and other Necessaries for the Prisoners at Philadelphia, who shall be permitted to visit the Places where they are confined.
In Return I expect you will send Passports for Persons, who shall not be above the Rank of Quarter Masters, or Commissaries, to carry Supplies for the Prisoners in your Hands at Hartford and other Places, where they are confined. You can stipulate the Places where it is necessary the Quarter Masters and Commissaries should go to; I cannot with any Precision ascertain them, and therefore leave it at large for your Determination.
I cannot enter into the Merits of Mr Boudinot’s Report to you, as he refers to a Correspondence with Commissary Loring who is at New York.
You wish me to particularize the Cases I allude to of Prisoners of War being injuriously and unjustifiably loaded with Irons. Major Stockdon and other Officers of the New Jersey Volunteers were put in Irons at Prince Town—the Major and a Captain of that Regiment were marched out of that Place under a Guard, and handcuffed together. I am with due Respect, Sir, your most obedient Servant

W. Howe


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Henry Knox, 26 November 1777
From: Knox, Henry
To: Washington, George

sir
Park of Artillery Camp Whitemarsh [Pa.] 26th Novr 1777

I exceedingly lament my want of experience and ability to fill properly the important Station in which I am, and I am more particularly distress’d when such important Questions are refer’d to my decission as those which your Excellency gave us in charge the last evening. The happiness or misery of the people of America may be the consequence of a right or erroneous judgement.
Much lately has be urg’d concerning the reputation of our arms, as if we had long been a warlike nation whose existence like the antient Romans depended on their military Fame—I confess I view the matter differently and cannot bring myself to beleive (how much soever I may wish it) that we are upon a par in military knowledge and skill with our enemies indeed it is not posible and the sensible part of mankind well know it.
We set out in the contest with notions and sentiments very different from these, we then consider’d we were contesting for our All, for every thing dear to humanity: But it now seems otherwise with many persons, whose anxiety for military Fame seems to absorb every other consideration.
I have also heard it urg’d that your Excellencys reputation would suffer. I freely confess an Idea of this kind pains me exceedingly and were I fully to beleive it I should be impell’d to give my opinion for measures as desperate as I conceive the attempt to storm the enemies works and Philadelphia—I am no⟨t⟩ of opinion that your Excellencys

character suffer⟨s⟩ in the least with the well affected part of the people of America. I know to the contrary, the people of America look up to you as their Father and into your hands they intrust their all full⟨y,⟩ confident of every exertion on your part for their security and happiness—and I do not bele⟨ive⟩ there is any man on Earth for whose welfare ther⟨e⟩ are more sollicitations at the Court of heaven than for yours.
I beleive perfectly that there are some people who speak disrespectfully of your Excellency, but I as perfectly beleive that these are people who have never given any unequivocal evidence of their attachment to our rights; or whose boundless Ambition has been check’d by your well try’d patriotism.
The state of the depreciation of our Currency has also been urg’d as a principal inducement to some desperate attack. That its value diminishes every day. It is but too true that the large emisions and some other causes have effected a diminution of the value of our paper currency. had the same enormous emisions taken place in a time of profound peace and flourishing Commerce as have taken place during the War, without sinking any part of them by taxes—I do asert that the Currency would be equally depreciated as at present.
The circumstances of the respective states would not permit them ’till lately to endever to sink their proportions of the paper currency. but now almost every state on the Continent are making large strides towards it. The Currency in the eastern states, from their large taxes will increase in its value every day. I cannot therefore perceive the force of the argument urg’d deriv’d from the consideration of the failure of the currency.
The Gentlemen who urge the desperate measure of attacking the enemies Line, Redoubts and city of Philadelphia Seem to Forget the many principles laid down by people experienc’d in the art of war against our engaging in General actions upon equal terms—against our risquing our all on the event of single Battles—In the beginning of the Contest our friends in England urg’d the impropriety of such conduct giving instances of Numbers of States who lost their liberties by means of them—It is an invariable principle in War that it cannot be the interest at the same time of both parties to engage—It is also another fix’d principle that the invaders of a Country ought to bring the defenders of it to action as soon as possible. But I beleive there is not a single maxim in War that will justify a number of undisciplin’d troops attacking an equal number of disciplind troops strongly posted in redoubts and having a strong city in their rear such as Philadelphia.
It is propos’d to attack the enemies redoubts without being perfectly acquainted with their number, strength, or situation, with troops, of

whom we have had the experience in two capital actions, that it was impossible to rally after they were broken. by the mode of attack propos’d we are to stake the Libert⟨ies⟩ of america on a Single attempt in which the probability of Success is against us and if defeated of sacrificing the happiness of posterity to what is call’d the reputation of our arms.
It has been agreed that the enemies Force consists of 10,000 rank and file fit for duty. it is said Lord Cornwallis has taken with him ⟨from⟩ 1500 to 3000. suppose the number 2000, which is 500 more than I beleive he has—there remains 7500 rank and file fit for duty. our returns are 8000. (I say 8000 because I hold the militia in case of an Attack of this kind useless entirely, for we Know they will not stand within the range of a Cannon ball)—we are to attack 7500 strongly posted redoubts having batteries and a strong City in their rear. In this instance the Idea that is necessary among disciplind troops of having three to one to storm works is laid aside not because our troops are better disciplind than the enemies, but because from a concurrence of circumstances our affairs are in a desperate situation and we must retreive them or perish.
Marshall Saxe says redoubts are the strongest and most excellent kind of field Fortification and infinitely preferable to extended lines—because each redoubt requires a separate attack one of which succeeding does not facilitate the reduction of the others. Charles the 12th with the best troops in the World was totally ruin’d in the attack of some redoubts at Pultowa altho he succeeded in taking three of them.
The Character of the British troops in Europe is far above mediocrity—and the experience we have had of their discipline and valor by no means proves them contemptible. In the commencement of the War they storm’d an unfinish’d work on Bunker Hill, but the experience gain’d there has entirely prevented them from making any similar attempts. indeed the Germans lately made an attempt on red Bank the event of which will hardly give them a favorable opinion of the attack of redoubts by storm.
The situation of the American army on long Island after the Battle of the 27th Augt was exceedingly ineligible and the enemy must have known it, but they did not attempt to carry our redoubts by storm altho’ had they succeeded in one instance and made a sufficient opening for the introduction of a large Column of troops, the greater part of our army then on the Island must have fallen a sacrifice or have been taken prisoners.
From the experience deriv’d from reading and some little service and the knowledge of the strength of the enemies works, my opinion is clearly, pointedly, and positively against an attack on the enemies

redoubts, because I am ⟨fully co⟩nvinc’d a defeat certain and inevitable.
My opinion is to draw our whole strength together, take post at and Fortify Germantown, considering it as our Winter Quarters—When the Works there are in a tolerable state of defence, I should propose taking our whole force (except one brigade to guard the redoubts) and proceed near the enemies Lines, offering them Battle; which if they declin’d would in the opinion of every rational man fully evince our Superiority in point of Strength—if they should come out fight and defeat us, we have a secure retreat and Winter Quarters.
I have thus offer’d my sentiments to Your Excellency with freedom, but if a contrary disposition should take place and an attack be resolv’d upon, I shall endevor to execute the part that may be assign’d me to the utmost of my ability. I am with the most profound Respect Your Excellencys most Obdt Hble Sert

H. Knox B.G. Artilly


Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 26 November 1777
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

Dear General
haddonfield [N.J.] the 26 november 1777

I went down to this place since the day before yesterday in order to be acquainted of all the roads and grounds arround the ennemy—I heard at my arrival that theyr Main body was betwen great and little timber creek since the same evening—Yesterday morning in recconnoitring about I have been told that they were very busy in crossing the delaware—I saw them myself in theyr boats and sent that intelligence to general greene as soon as possible as every other thing I heard of—

but I want to acquaint your excellency of a little event of last evening which tho not very considerable in itself will certainly please you on account of the bravery and Alacrity a small party of ours showed in that occasion—After having spent the most part of the day to make myself vell acquainted with the certainty of theyr motions I came pretty late into the glocester road betwen the two creeks—I had ten light horse with mr lindsey, almost hundred an fifty riflemen under colonel buttler, and two piquets of the militia commanded by colonel hite, and ellis. My whole body was not three hundred—colonel armand, colonel laumoy, the chevaliers du plessis and gimat were the frenchmen who went with me—a scout of my men with whom was Mr du plessis to see how near were the first piquets from glocester found at two miles and a half of it a strong post of three hundred and fifty hessians with field pieces (what number I did know by the unanimous deposition of theyr prisoners) and engaged immediately—as my little recconnoitring party was all in fine spirits I supported them—we pushed the hessians more than an half mile from the place were was theyr main body, and we made them run very fast—british reinforcements came twice to them but very far from recovering theyr ground they Went alwaïs back—the darkness of the night prevented us then to push that advantage, and after standing upon the ground we had got I ordered them to return very slow to haddonfield—the ennemy knowing perhaps by our drums that we were not so near came again to fire at us—but the brave major moriss with a part of his riflemen sent them back and pushed them very fast—I understand that they have had betwen twenty five and thirty wounded, at least that number killed amonghs whom I am certain is an officer some say more, and the prisoners told me that the have lost the commandant of that body—We got yet this day fourteen prisoners—I send you the most moderate account I had from themselves—We left one single man Killed a lieutenant of militia and only five of ours were wounded—Colonel armand’s, chevalier du plessis’s and major brice’s horses have been wounded—Such is the account of our little entertainement, which is indeed much too long for the matter, but I take the greatest pleasure to let you know that the conduct of our soldiers is above all praises—I never saw men so merry, so spirited, so desirous to go on to the ennemy what ever forces they could have as that little party was in this little fight. I found the riflemen above even theyr reputation and the militia above all expectations I could have—I returned to them my very sincere thanks this morning—I wish that this little succès of ours may please you—tho’ a very trifling one I find it very interesting on account of the behaviour of our soldiers.
Some time after I came back Gral varnum arrived here—general greene is too in this place since this morning—he engaged me to give

you myself the account of that little advantage of that small part of the troops under his command—I have nothing more to Say to your excellency about our business on this Side because he is wraïting himself—I should have been very glad if circumstances had permitted me to be useful to him upon a greater scale—as he is obliged to march slow in order to attend his troops, and as I am here only a volonteer, I’l have the honor to wait on your excellency as soon as possible, and I’l set out to day—it will be a great pleasure for me to find myself again with you. With the most tender affection and highest respect I have the honor to be dear general Your excellency’s the most obedient humble servant

lafayette

I must tell too that the riflemen had been the whole day running before my horse without eating or taking any rest.
I have just now a certain assurance that two british officers besides those I spocke you of have died this morning of theyr wounds in an house—this and Some other circumstances let me believe that theyr loss may be greater than I told to your excellency.


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 26 November 1777
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
York [Pa.] 26. Novemr 77

I beg leave to refer Your Excellency to my last trouble unacknowledged of the 22d by Jones.
Your favor of the 23d containing the Six papers refered to I had the honour of receiving in the minute I was Sitting down to pay my present respects, the whole Shall be duly presented to Congress to morrow.
I am ordered to convey to your Excellency the undermentioned Resolves which will be found covered with this.
Of the 25th Inst. that Congress will Speedily take under Consideration the merits of Such officers as have distinguished themselves &ca.
the Same date—for removing John Simpers at his own expence from Confinement in this State to the State of Maryland.
this date—on means for reinlisting Men in the Nine Virginia Regiments whose times are nearly expired.
& for acknowledging the merit of Monsr Fleury. In consequence of the last mentioned Resolution I shall by this opportunity transmit Lt Colonel Fleury a Brevet Certifying his Rank.
this will go by the hand of a Brother of Simpers who was well Spoken of in Congress by Mr Rumsey from Maryland the poor Man so deeply Interested himself in his Brothers Case as leaves no room to doubt his waiting upon Your Excellency with more than the dispatch of our ordinary Messengerss. I am with very great regard &ca.


Title: From George Washington to John Augustine Washington, 26 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Washington, John Augustine

Dear Brother,
Camp at White Marsh [Pa.] 12 Miles from Phila. Novr 26th 1777.

Your Letters of the 26th of Octr and 7th Instt have come safe to hand—by the last, it would appear that a Letter which I wrote you about the 18th of Octr had not reached you which I am exceeding sorry for as, to the best of my recollection, I wrote you very fully on the posture of our affairs and should be exceedingly concernd if it should have fallen into the hands of the Enemy or some disaffected Rascal who would make an improper use of it. In that Letter (which upon Second thoughts I put under cover to Colo. Lewis open, as I had not time to write two, that he might also be apprizd of our Situation) I inclosed one to my Sister thanking her for the nice and elegant Stockings she was obliging enough to send me accompanied by an Affectionate Letter written I think in June but which with the Stockings never got to my hands till about the 15th of last Month. If those Letters of mine to you, & her, have miscarried which I shall be exceeding sorry for I shall be obliged to you now to thank my Sister for the present and assure her that I shall set great store by them, & will wear them for her sake.
Red Bank, or Fort Mercer, being little more than an aid to Fort Mifflin was evacuated about 4 days ago upon a large body of Troops being

thrown over the River for the purpose of reducing it—so soon as I got information of the design I also detached pretty largely in hopes of saving the Fort but the Enemy having a small distance to go and great convenience of crossing, whilst we were deficient in the latter and had a circuitous rout to March by, it was found impracticable; and now I have only to lament my having made the detachment, as, by Intelligence, the Enemy are recrossing to Phila. and may in our divided state fall upon us with their whole force which would not gibe well with our present circumstances—I have however ordered them back with all possible expedition, and shall look for them in a couple of days. when they arrive with the assistance of some of the Northern Troops which have joind us within these few days from Genl Gates we shall be in a more respectable footing than we have been the whole Campaign but, unfortunately, before this Junction happened the Enemy had fortified themselves so strongly that it is now impossible to attack them with the least hopes of success. they have also, by removing the obstructions in the river, got up their shipping to the City and of consequence their provisions Stores &ca—had the reinforcement from the Northward arrived but Ten days sooner it would, I think, have put it in my power to have saved Fort Mifflin (which defended the Cheveaux de frieze) and consequently have rendered Phila. a very ineligable Situation for them this Winter. they have also received a reinforcemt from New York. but not quite so large I believe as ours. with truth I beleive I may add, that, till within these few days, I have never (notwithstanding the numbers given me by the World & which it was not my Interest to contradict) had as many Men in the field under my immediate command as Genl Howe has had under his altho we have fought him twice, and prevented him hitherto from obtaining other advantages than that of possessing himself of the City which but for the eclat it is attended with brings no solid advantage to their Arms. The Militia which have been called upon in aid of our Troops (Continentals I mean) have come out in such a manner that before you could get a second class of them the first were always gone, by which means altho the sound of them was great you never could Increase your real numbers & strength.
The attack upon red bank al[ia]s Fort Mercer sometime ago, followed by the loss of at least 400 Hessians killed & wounded, with their leader Count Donop as also the burning of the Augusta Man of War of 64 Guns & the Merlin Sloop of 18 is true. Indeed the number of Men lost at the attack of Fort Mercer is said to be much more than 400—that many we are sure of. at different times during the Siege of Fort Mifflin they lost many Men. the above ships however were not destroyed by either Fire rafts or our Galleys—the first took fire by accident and blew up—the other getting a ground and apprehending danger

from the explosion of the Augusta, was set fire to by the Crew & Abandoned. both these things though happened during the attack on the Fort.
My love attends my Sister, the young Married couple, and the rest of your family—My Complimts to all friends—and with sincere regard I am Dr Sir Yr Most Affecte Brother

Go: Washington

P.S. I expect part of the troops which I sent to Jerseys back to Night & the residue in a day or two.


Title: General Orders, 27 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head Quarters, White-Marsh [Pa.] Novr 27th 1777.
Parole. Glocester.C. Signs Bedford. Berwick.

A detachment of 300 men are to parade to morrow morning on the Grand-parade, precisely at half past three o’clock in the morning—Col. David Hall, Lt Col. Craig and Major Tyler are appointed Field Officers for the detachment.
Twelve light dragoons are to go on the same command, and to repair this evening to Col. Biddle’s quarters.
After Orders. A detachment of 100 men to be under the command of Capt. McLane, are to parade to morrow morning at sun-rise, on the

grand parade, with one or two days provisions & boxes full of ammunition—They will be absent from camp one week, near the enemy’s lines, and are to go prepared accordingly.


Title: From George Washington to Major John Clark, Jr., 27 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Clark, John Jr.

Sir
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 27th Novemr 1777

I have yours of Yesterday and am obliged for the particular information which you give to the points I gave you in charge.
As I have now got the necessary information as to the Enemy’s Works, position &ca what your Friends will particularly attend to, will be, the Return of Lord Cornwallis and his Troops, and what appear after that, to be their intentions. Whether to sit down in quarters for the Winter, or to seek this Army. Some late accounts look as if a War in Europe was not far distant. Persons yesterday from the City mentioned that they heard it talked of among the Officers. desire your Friends to enquire particularly into this Matter. Desire Genl Potters Quarter Master to furnish you with a horse till your own is fit for Service. I am Sir Yr most obt Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 27 November 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir
Mount Holly [N.J.] Nov. 27. 1777

Your favor of yesterday I receivd last Night about 12 OClock—The greater part of the troops returnd to this place last Night and marched early this morning to cross the Delaware—I staid at Haddenfield my self with General McDougals division to give the necessary Orders to the Militia—I have left the riffle Corps at Haddenfield and Capt. Lees

troop of light Horse to encourage the Militia and awe the enemy, to prevent their coming out in small parties—Col. Olney had orders to make an attack upon their Piquet this morning but they drew them in so close to their main body and there being but one road he could not effect it—their Piquet consisted of about 300 men. I am much afraid the withdrawing the troops will greatly alarm the Country—Any position below this with any considerable force would be very dangerous. the country is so exceedingly intersected with creeks, and lies so contiguous to Philadelphia—I think any body of troops may be surprisd from the city at haddenfield in five hours and at almost any place in its neighbourhood.
The Hospitals will be in some danger at Burlington, Brudenton & Princetown if all the troops are withdrawn from this state, but if the sick were orderd to be immediately removd it would still increase the alarm in the country, for which reason I would risque what are there at present and order the Director General not to send any more there.
I shall set out immediately for Burlington—I have given Lt Col. Abell orders to procure Waggons and send off all the spare ammunition to Huntindon the heavy cannon to Bordenton—At my arrival at Burlington I will enquire of the Comodore respecting the matters by you directed.
General McDougals division will quarter here to Night and march at five in the morning for Burlington—I think there are as many troops gone forward as will be able to get over today.
I shall push on the troops as fast as possible without injuring their healths—I sent forward one of my Aids to Burlington early this morning to supertend the embarkation of the troops & baggage. I am with sincere regard & due respect your Excellencies most Obedient Sert

N. G⟨re⟩ene


Title: From George Washington to Richard Peters, 27 November 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Peters, Richard

Sir,
Head Quarters Whitemarsh [Pa.] 27th Novr 1777

I was duly favd with yours of the 11th inst. The inattention of the Officers to the dress of their Men has been I beleive one principal cause of their present bareness and want of Cloathing. I have repeatedly given positive orders that such a list of Necessaries as you call a Rag Roll, should be kept and the Articles weekly inspected, but that, like too many other wholesome Regulations has general passed unnoticed and untill the Officers are taught by a course of regular discipline to pay strict obedience to General Orders, many things must and will remain undone that ought to be done for it is impossible for me to see them carried into execution personally. That I am endeavouring to reform the Army will appear by the great number of severe sentences of Courts Martial that have lately pass’d. But I very much fear that many valuable Officers will leave the Service at the end of the Campaign, some because the excessive high price of every article of life renders it impossible to live upon their pay alone, and others, on account of that

lavish distribution of high military Rank to persons upon the Staff of the Army, which sets them above their duty and makes a man of spirit look upon any Commission under the degree of a Feild Officer, with contempt.
Altho’ as I have before said, great fault is to be laid upon the Carelessness of the Officers, yet allowance is to be made for the ordinary quality of a great deal of the Cloathing. I assure you many of the Regiments have fairly worn out their Uniforms, and that is the Reason why Suits are again called for, for those, who have been supplied before.
We shall never proceed regularly in the Cloathing of our Men until we have a sufficient Stock to deliver out their yearly allowance at one time. They will then perhaps take more care of what they get, as they will know that any thing further will certainly be deducted from their pay. But at present, it is difficult to determine whether many of them have or have not had the quantity allowed by Congress.
I can only hope that time and experience which brings all things to perfection will at length have the desired effect upon the Manners of our Army. I can only say that no exertions of Mine have or shall be wanting to forward the work. I am &ca.


Title: To George Washington from the Continental Navy Board, 28 November 1777
From: Continental Navy Board
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Continental Navy Board Borden Town [N.J.] 28th Novr 1777

We are under a Necessity of drawing your Excellency’s Attention, once more, to the Frigates at this Place. Notwithstanding our Endeavours, we have not been able to raise the Effingham—she still lyes on her Beam Ends in a very disagreeable Situation. After the Destruction of our Fleet at Red Bank, the Officers & Crews of the several Vessels came up to this Place, to the Amount of between three & four Hundred. We are much at a Loss for Accommadations for these Men; but if we had our Frigates afloat, this Difficulty would be obviated. As we have now so many Hands at Command, we are of Opinion, we can with Certainty get these Ships ready for their Reception; & at the same Time have the Plugs so fix’d that they might be drawn at a Minute’s Warning & the Vessels sunk should the Enemy make an Attempt upon them. Nevertheless, however safe or convenient this Plan may appear to us, we do not think proper to put it in Execution without your Approbation. As the Winter is now approaching fast & must soon put an End to all our Water Schemes, we request your Excellency’s Answer by the Return of the Bearer (Capt. Pomeroy) Whatever your Advice may be in this Matter, you may depend on our strict Compliance with it.
Several Captains of the Vessels lately destroyed have saved some of their Sails, Stores &ca. We wish to know whither you are of Opinion, they may be kept here with Safety or not.
A Report is circulated & again contradicted respecting a French War, we shoul⟨d⟩ thank your Excellency for Information whether it is so or not. We have the Honour to be with great Respect Your Excellency’s most obedient humble servts

Fras Hopkinson
John Wharton

P:S: We are sorry to trouble you with Letters to Congress; but hope it will be attended with no great Inconvenience, apprehending that you have frequent Occasions to send to York Town & that our packets may go with your Dispatches.