Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 23 May 1787
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Fredricksburg May 23. 1787.
My leasure furnishes me with the opportunity, but the country around does not with materials to form a letter worthy your attention. The scale of my observations is a narrow one & confin’d entirely within my room: & the subjects of my researches in which I am but seeking to make some proficiency, as I shod. only detail to you the sentiments of others, give me nothing to supply the deficiency. We all look with great anxiety to the result of the Convention at Phila. Indeed it seems to be the sole point on which all future movments will turn. If it succeeds wisely & of course happily, the wishes of all good men will be gratified. The arrangments must be wise, and every way well concerted, for them to force their way thro the States. The experience of the federal govt. hath taught Congress, or rather those who have compos’d it, the sentiments of the several States upon the subject of the powers it shod. possess. Yet it may, by some be thought doubtful, whether it hath not taught them that it will be almost impossible to adopt any plan that will have the concurrence of all the states; or if it hath, that will be of any duration afterwards. It is however the business of every passenger to do what he thinks right & to hope that others will act on the same principle. I have to acknowledge yr. kind attention to my affrs. in N. York & particularly for the dispatch of my furniture & the advance I find you have been under the necessity of making for me. I am sorry to find it probable that my share of Mordicai’s effects (when obtain’d) will not even reemburse this sum. At what time I shall be able to make up the deficiency as well as remit the amt. due for the completion of our contract with Taylor I cannot precisely say. I have hopes of effecting it soon, but can give no assurance with certainty. I have not heard of the furniture since it sail’d but suspect it is at Norfolk, from whence I have taken measures for its removal. I am Dear Sir yr. friend & servt.
Jas. Monroe


Title: To James Madison from William Grayson, 24 May 1787
From: Grayson, William
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
24th. May 1787.
I am much obliged by your kind favor and am sorry I have little to communicate from this quarter worth your acceptance; We have been a caput mortuum for some time past except the little flurry that was kicked up about Philada. Carrington I presume has giv’n you full information on that point; during the contest, the Enemy wanted to raise a mutiny in our camp by proposing to go to Georgetown at a certain time: They were answered they had served us so once before. Since the matter has blow’n over, some particular gentlemen have offered to join us in getting Georgetown fixed as the capital of the foederal Empire: they say they will vote money for the buildings, & in every respect make the compact as irrevocable as the nature of the case will admit of provided we will agree to stay here a reasonable time untill every thing is made proper for their reception. I am not certain when all the Eastern States come forward, but some good may come out of this, provided we act with delicacy & caution: Most of the foreigners who come among us, say the sessions of Congress should be fixed by national compact; I think they are right in their reasoning with respect to all such governments as ours. The arguments are too obvious to be mentioned to you. We have a right to it at Georgetown: & ought in justice to get it.
Entre nouz. I believe the Eastern people have taken ground they will not depart from respecting the Convention. One legislature composed of a lower-house biennially elected and an Executive & Senate for a good number of years. I shall see Gerry & Johnson, as they pass & may perhaps give you a hint.

Since your departure Maryld. has openly declared agt. the Missisippi. It is therefore of the utmost importance that So. Carolina should think right on the subject. Parker who comes in in Nov. next is firm. Mr. Kean from his bad State of health will not in all probability attend.
We have lately had a new farce wrote by Poet Tyler, called May day. It has plott & incident and is as good as several of the English farces; It has however not succeeded well, owing I believe to the Author’s making his principal character a scold; Some of the New York ladies were alarmed for fear strangers should look upon Mrs. Sanders as the model of the gentlewomen of this place.
Inclosed is a letter from France which was handed to me by a Mr. Walton who came over in the packett. All my family present their complimts. to yourself & the worthy family where you live: Alfred laments your absence in very pathetic though I believe very interested strains. Please make my respectful complimts. to Genl. Washington, & conclude yr. Affect. frd. & Obed sert
Willm. Grayson


Title: Appendix: Meteorological Journal for Orange County, Virginia, 1 April–26 June 1786, and 18 January 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

1 April–26 June 1786, 18 January 1787

1786

Thermr sunrise
Wind sunrise
Weather Sun-rise
Thermr 4 OC. PM
Wind 4 OC. P.M.
Weather 4 OC. P.M.
Shooting &c. of Plants & c.
Appearance & c. of birds & c.
Miscellanea

April
1
43
NE
mixture of snow & hail driving with considerable force
43
NE
still snow & hail driving from NE. Thermr. 26. in air

Forward cherries & a few peaches killed.

2
36
NW
windy, clouds broken, snow 5½ inches deep & very firm
45
NW
fair

Daffodil & Jonquil blossoms bit, & some killed

3
40
W
fair, snow frozen so hard as to bear a man.
52
SSW
fair, snow nearly gone

4
49
S
cloudy, snow gone, 9 O C. beginning to rain
51
E
raining fast, as it has done since 9 O C. A.M.

5
48
NE
still raining
46
NE
still raining

6
44
SW
fair, surface of ground thinly frozen, tops of blue ridge covered with snow
58
W
fair

7
52
SW
fair
58
N
fair

8
51
SE
cloudy
54
SE
somewhat cloudy

9
50
NE
somewhat cloudy
58
E
somewhat cloudy

10
47
NE
somewhat cloudy

NE
Sky muddy

11

fair
52
E
somewhat cloudy

12
46
NE by E
somewhat cloudy
54
NE by E
somewhat cloudy, windy

13
46
NE
somewhat cloudy & moist
55
NE
somewhat cloudy

14
48 & 32 [illegible]
N
fair
64
NE
fair

15
54
NE
smokey
66
E
fair

16
54
SW
somewhat cloudy
68
SW
smokey

17
60
NE
smokey NW
60
W
somewhat cloudy & windy

18
54
W
somewhat cloudy

fair

19
56

smokey NW
65
SE
somewhat cloudy

Whip poor Will first heard

20
56
E
cloudy & damp
55
E
cloudy & damp

21
48
NE
raining
52
NE
still raining

22
54
S
cloudy & foggy after much rain
60
SE
broken clouds

23
58
NE
foggy & cloudy
59
E
cloudy & damp

24
57
NE
raining
62
NE
almost fair

(24) Asparagus first at dinner

25
58
SW
somewhat cloudy
66
N
somewhat cloudy & windy

(25) Humming bird appears

26
60
N by E
fair
70
N
fair

27
58
SW
fair
74
N by E
fair

28
62
SW
fair
73
W
somewhat cloudy
tulips blowing

29
67
SW
somewhat cloudy
70
N
fair, windy

(29) 9 oC. P.M scattered & transient streams of Aurora Bor. from NNW to NNE

30
55
N
fair
62½
N
fair

May
1
57
SW
fair
72
NE
sky muddy NW

2
62
NE
fair, somewhat smokey
72
NE
fair

3
62
E
air thick
70
SE
fair

4
60
SE
sky somewhat muddy
70
NE
air thick
primrose begins to blow

(4) forward peas beginning to blossom

5
60
E
air thick
68
NE
sky muddy

6
57
NE
somewhat cloudy
66
NE
sky muddy
pionies blowing

7
60
NE
air thick
6

fair
Wood bine in blossom
Humming birds frequent

8
62
W
sky muddy, air thick

fair.

9
62
NE
somewhat cloudy air thick
70
E
smokey

10
63
NE
cloudy NW
72
E
fair

11
61
SW
cloudy & foggy (12 oC. raining)
62
SW
cloudy

12
63
S
foggy

fair

13
62
NE
cloudy & moist
66
W
fair

Cherry birds observed

14
62
W
fair
76
SW
fair

15
66
SW
fair
72
NE
showers of rain with thunder

16
66
NE
cloudy & foggy
68
SW
cloudy
Strawberries beginning to rendden [sic]

17
63
SW by W
fair
65
N
fair & windy
Cherries beginning to redden

18
60
SW
fair
66
SW by W
flying & watery clouds, 6 oC. shower of rain

19
58
N
fair
66
N
fair

20
59
E
somewhat cloudy
63
E
cloudy

21
62
E
somewhat cloudy
72
W
moderate shower with good deal of thunder

22
66
NE by E
cloudy & foggy
67
E
cloudy & foggy

23
65
ENE
cloudy, after rain during night

NE
cloudy

(23) strawberries first at table

24
60
NE
raining
62
E
cloudy

(24) garden peas first at dinner

25
60
E
rainy, clouds low & very thick
62
E
raining clouds, still low & very thick

26
57
NE
rainy & very thick
62
NE
very thick & misty

27
62
S
cloudy & misty
70
E
flying clouds

28

NE
raining fast & clouds very low & thick
70
W
fair, after heavy rain during forenoon

29
67
S
somewhat cloudy
71
SE
very showery, from 5 to 6 OC. a most powerful rain

30
68
E
cloudy & foggy
74
E
fair, 6 OC. moderate shower

31
68
E
raining
71
ENE
cloudy & showery

June
1
67
ENE
raining, clouds very low & thick
70
ENE
moderate rain, clouds low & thick

2
68
ENE
light rain, clouds low & thick
72
E
cloudy & showery

3
69
E
very thick & rainy
76
NNE
fair

(3) Cherry birds disappear

4
70
NNE
fair
78
E
fair

5
72
E
fair
81
NE
fair

6
73
SE
foggy
80
NNE
fair

7
74
NNE
foggy
81
WSW
fair

8
74
W
fair
76
SE
somewhat cloudy after thunder shower SW

9
69
NNE
somewhat cloudy
80
ENE
fair

10
70
SE
cloudy
79

fair

11
71
SW
foggy & cloudy
81
W
fair

12
69
SW
fair
75
W
fair

13
67
W
fair
77½
SW
fair

14
69
N
fair
82
E
fair

15
74
SW
fair
85
SSW
fair

16
77
SSW
fair
86
S
fair

17
78
SSW
somewhat cloudy
82
SW
fair

18
77
SW
very little cloudy

small thunder shower passing from NW towds. NE

19
76
NNE
somewhat cloudy
82
E
fair

20
73
SW
fair
83
SE
fair

21
68
NE
cloudy & likely for rain, after moderate shower in night
76
NE
cloudy

22
62
N
somewhat foggy
77
N
fair

(22) strawberries last at table

23
66
N
fair
78
SW
fair

24
70
SW
somewhat cloudy
77
SW
thundercloud SE

25
74
SSW
fair

fair

26
74
NE
fair

Cloudy

[1787 January]

18
42
SW
Fair
50
W
fair & very windy


Title: Virginia Delegates to George Washington, 8 January 1782
From: Virginia Delegates
To: Washington, George

Dear sir
Philadelphia Jany. 8. 1782.
Your excellency will, I hope, readily believe, that I most cheerfully obey the commands of my brethren in the delegation, to transmit to you the vote of the Virginia assembly, expressing their sentiments of your conduct and exertions at York. We cannot pass by this favorable opportunity of declaring to your excellency, the thorough coincidence of our feelings with theirs.
Shall we beg the favor of you to forward the inclosure to the Marquis. Its contents are honorary in a great degree; but I fear, there is something very unusual in presenting a gentleman with a bust of himself. I have the honor to be Dear sir with the sincerest respect and esteem yr. exclly’s obliged and obt. serv:
Edm: Randolph.


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Randolph, 22 March 1781 [1782]
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
Bushtown March 22. 1781 [1782]
The roads have been hitherto so bad, that we have been able to accomplish no more of our journey, than about 80 miles. Tomorrow we shall see Baltimore; and unless my arrangements miscarry, I shall revisit Richmond on Sunday se’ennight.
For a few minutes this afternoon I thumbed the body of Maryland laws. In the preface to Bacon’s edition of them, I found a recital of an act of the Lords commissioners &c. on the 4th. of April 1638, asserting the principles of preemption. The cause of this act was, that a Mr. Clayborne had attempted to settle under the title of the Indians within the precincts of Lord Baltimore: and the board absolutely protested against the usurpation.
Consult too the many laws respecting the Nanticoke and Choptank Indians. Not one of them can be supported but upon the grounds of preemption.
Betsy begs to be particularly remembered to Mrs. House, Mrs. Trist, Mrs. Jones, Mr. Jones & yourself, and offers her respects to the rest of your family. As for myself, I profess particular regard to the ladies, and wish most sincerely the welfare of the gentlemen. To you, my dear Sir, I subscribe as your friend
E. R.


Title: Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison, 17 April 1782
From: Virginia Delegates
To: Harrison, Benjamin

Sir
Philadelphia April 17th. 1782
The enclosd relation was directed by Congress to be transmitted to the Executives of Virginia & Pensylvania, that they might make enquiry into the facts, & take such measures in it as they deemed proper. Your Excellency’s Letter, touching the capture in north Carolina, remains yet unreported on.
We thought it necessary to have a decision from Congress, relative to the cession of our western territory, for the information of the ensuing Assembly; & therefore movd for the appointment of a day, to take up the consideration of the report on that subject. Monday last was the day assigned; but a call for an adjournment, put it by for that day. A Vessel just arrived here from the Cape, reports, that 17 Spanish Sail of the Line & 12 thousand troops were then in that port.
We had the honor of your last Letter, & will comply with what your Excellency desires relative to the one for forty Emission by the next post. With the highest respect we have the honor to be, Your Excellency’s most Obedt. & most Humb. Servts.
Jos: Jones.Theok: Bland.J. Madison JrArthur Lee


Title: Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison, 15 April 1783
From: Virginia Delegates
To: Harrison, Benjamin

Sr.
Philada. April 15th 1783
Nothing new has happend Since our last by Mr. St. Greaves—the last Post Brought us no letter from yr. Excelly we have the honor to enclose to days Paper & are with Perfect respect Yr. Excellys. most obdt. Sets
Theok Bland JrJ. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 26 April 1789 [1783]
From: Pendleton, Edmund
To: Madison, James

26 April 1789 [1783], Richmond. Misdated by a cataloguer. The correct date is assigned by internal evidence. “News of the Peace. Objections to the impost. Virginia elections.” Noted in the list probably kept by Peter Force (DLC: Madison Miscellany).


Title: To James Madison from Lafayette, 22 October 1784
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir
Boston October the 22d 1784
In spite of Calculations and Engagements, I Cannot absolutely leave Boston, at least for some time, and the Remainder of my tour, must, of Course, be much differed. The Reception I Have met with exceeds description. My feelings are still more Unrepressible. It was not in my power to go so soon as I expected and am under a Necessity to visit Rhode island and New Hampshire. Thus Circumstanced, my dear sir, I have delayed my departure to the first or second day of Next month when in the Nimph frigat I will sail for Virginia. With Common weather, I may expect to be at York by the eight or tenth (probably sooner), and thre[e] days after that I will have the pleasure to take you by the Hand at Richmond. Least Genl Washington should wait for me, I send one of my servants by land, and Have ordered Him to Have this letter forwarded to you, as I would be much disappointed to Miss you on my passage. In Case However You was not with the Assembly, let me know where you Could then be found. I will inquire for my letters at the Williamsburg Post Office. Chev. de Caraman presents his best Compliments to you—and Hoping to find you in good Health and Spirits Have the Honor to be with great Regard and affection My dear sir Your sincere friend
Lafayette


Title: From James Madison to Richard Henry Lee, 14 November 1784
From: Madison, James
To: Lee, Richard Henry

Dear Sir
Richmond 14. Novr. 1784
I did not get to this place till the fourteenth day after that fixed for the meeting of the Assembly, but was two days only after a H. of D was actually made. You will infer therefore that little business of moment has yet been done. Excepting a few Resolutions for the Delegation urging a Treaty with the Southern Indians, and negociations with the Spaniards touching the Mississippi, our time has been cheifly taken up with the scheme of a Genl. Assessment. The one proposed & supported, comprehends Christians alone and obliges other sects to contribute to its maintenance. It was opposed not only on the general principle that no Religious Estabts. was within the purview of Civil authority, but on th[e …] ground on which it was placed; and the infraction […] the last article of the Decl: of Rights. On the question 47 w[er]e f[or the] proposition, 32 against it. The majority was produced by a Coalition between the Episcopal & Presbyterian Sects. A Memorial presented since the vote by the Clergy of the latter shews that a Schism will take place. They do not deny but rather betray a desire that an Assessment may be estabt. but protest agst. any which does not embrace all Religions, and will not coincide with the Decl: of Rights. It is probable that the foundation of the scheme will finally be enlarged, & that an experiment at least of its practicability will be made. The other objects immediately in view are a digest of our Militia laws—an amendment of our Revenue acts—of the land law—provision for restraining licentious Citizens from trespasses on the people of other Nations, & particularly those of the Spaniards on the other side of the Mississip[pi—] the surveying our Rivers from their falls to their Sources which has been already resolved on in the House of Delegates, and some other matters which will be mentioned as they arise. The breach made by the last Session on the definitive Treaty still rankles in the breasts of some, & some remonstrances which have appeared agst. it present an occasion which will be embraced, to renew the subject in the Assembly. No step has been taken yet for appointing a Successor to Mr. Harrison. Mr. H. I understand does not refuse & it certainly depends on his option. With sentiments of the greatest respect & esteem I am Dr Sir Yr. Obedt Sv[t …]


Title: Madison at the Federal Convention, 27 May–17 September 1787 (Editorial Note)
From:
To:

Editorial Note
JM had already committed himself to work for a new constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation when he arrived in Philadelphia on 5 May 1787, nearly three weeks before the Federal Convention had a quorum. The government he hoped to see established would be “republican,” deriving its authority from the great body of the people and administered by persons appointed directly or indirectly by the people. Beyond the republican principle, which enjoyed nearly universal acceptance among Americans and would not become a matter of serious debate at the convention, JM envisioned three fundamental reforms. First, he proposed to replace the existing “federal” government that acted through sovereign states with a “national” one that acted directly on individuals, exercising an authority superior to that of the state governments. Second, he hoped to substitute proportional representation in the national legislature for equal representation of the states. JM confidently predicted that the convention would accept this new mode of representation with little difficulty. “A majority of the States,” he wrote Washington, “and those of greatest influence, will regard it as favorable to them. To the Northern States it will be recommended by their present populousness; to the Southern by their expected advantage in this respect. The lesser States must in every event yield to the predominant will. But the consideration which particularly urges a change in the representation is that it will obviate the principal objections of the larger States to the necessary concessions of power” (16 Apr. 1787, PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., IX, 383). Third, he favored vesting the general government with a negative, or veto, “in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States” (ibid.). He regarded the negative as the indispensable anchor of the new system; it would both establish the supremacy of the national government and serve to protect individual and minority rights (PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., IX, 347–48). These were the principal changes JM hoped the convention would adopt. He also expected as a matter of course that the new government would have additional positive powers—taxation and the regulation of trade, for example—and be organized into separate legislative, executive, and judiciary departments.
JM’s reform proposals were largely embodied in the fifteen resolutions of the Virginia Plan, which Governor Edmund Randolph presented to the convention on 29 May. The Virginia resolutions became the basis of debate on 30 May, when the convention formed a Committee of the Whole. Reaping the benefits of initial strategy and organization, the Virginia delegation, supported by those of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, secured the committee’s acceptance of the plan within two weeks. Although the committee approved proportional representation for both branches of the legislature, the close vote to extend the principle to the second branch hinted at future difficulty. On 13 June the Committee of the Whole submitted its report, an expanded and revised version of the Virginia Plan. This report represented the high point of JM’s influence at the Philadelphia convention, but even then he had not gained all he sought. He was dissatisfied with the decision to give the national legislature only a qualified veto power over state laws. On 8 June he had supported Charles Pinckney’s unsuccessful motion to authorize the national legislature to disallow any state law that it judged improper. JM’s advocacy of an unlimited negative, which he called “the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States” (first speech of 8 June), revealed a doctrinaire cast to his mind that became even more apparent when he defended proportional representation. Any departure from that “doctrine,” he warned, was “inadmissible, being evidently unjust” (first speech of 7 June). JM thus served notice that on certain matters of principle he would resist compromise. He proved notably unyielding on the subject of proportional representation, convinced that his views were grounded in right and justice.
During the first two weeks of the convention the Virginians and their large-state allies had perhaps been too successful, their proposals too easily and too quickly adopted. That the representatives of the small states, caught unprepared at the beginning, would eventually offer stiffer resistance was predictable. On 15 June their leader, William Paterson of New Jersey, presented an alternative plan, “one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 240). JM regarded the New Jersey Plan, which was modeled on the existing Confederation, as a direct challenge to his own reform program. He accordingly devoted his longest speech at Philadelphia to a searching critique of this plan. Immediately following this speech (19 June) the committee again voted to report the expanded Virginia Plan in preference to that of New Jersey.
Despite rejection of the New Jersey Plan, the reported Virginia Plan still had to pass formal consideration by the convention. Opponents of the plan used this opportunity to reopen fundamental questions. The principle of bicameralism, for instance, which the Committee of the Whole had accepted without debate on 31 May, underwent a lengthy discussion on 20 and 21 June before the convention officially endorsed it. The “great difficulty,” however, as JM noted on 19 June, was the matter of representation—if this problem could be solved, “all others would be surmountable.” Debate on this thorniest of issues resumed on 27 June and reached a climax on 2 July, when the convention, having earlier approved proportional representation for the first branch of the legislature, deadlocked on a motion to establish equal representation of the states in the second branch. On that same day the delegates referred the entire question to a grand committee, and from that point on sentiment in favor of compromise grew steadily. On 16 June the convention adopted the “Great Compromise,” providing for proportional representation in the first branch and equal representation in the second branch.
Throughout this debate JM tenaciously adhered to his position that the principle of proportional representation should apply to both branches of the legislature. Time and again he entreated the delegates from the small states to see the justice and expediency of his views. To their fears of a combination of the larger states against the smaller, he replied that the real political division was between the northern and southern states (first speech of 30 June; 9 July). When the grand committee on 5 July reported the compromise that the convention later adopted, JM only intensified his efforts to retain proportional representation in both branches. He even tried to intimidate his opponents by warning that the large states would not be deterred from founding a government on “just principles”; the small states, unable to stand alone, would have no choice but to join it (5 July). “The people of the large States,” he added, “would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers” (14 July). These threats, however, had the opposite effect JM intended and only confirmed the worst fears of the small-state delegates. Indeed, as the debate wore on, JM’s influence within his own faction diminished. The morning following the compromise vote of 16 July, he tried to persuade the members of this group, “comprising the principal States, and a majority of the people of America,” to draw up their own separate plan to propose to the states (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., II, 19–20). This meeting ended without any agreement, and the members from the large states accordingly accepted the compromise.
After one major defeat on 16 July, JM suffered another the following day when the convention rejected the negative on state laws. At this point he might well have given up hope of obtaining a fundamental reform. Yet, rather than quit the meeting in disgust, JM reluctantly sacrificed “theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations” (The Federalist No. 37). Within the limits imposed by the convention, he continued to participate fully in the work of building a national government on a broad republican foundation. Some reform was better than none, he must have concluded, and the present moment offered possibly the only chance to bring about even a modest change. If the compromise on representation and the rejection of the negative on state laws meant that the states would have too great an influence in the proposed government, especially in one branch of the legislature, JM hoped to curtail such influence by promoting a more equal distribution of power among the three departments of government. To ensure a proper balance he believed it was most important to check the legislative power, for the experience of the states “had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex” (first speech of 21 July). Now that the states were to have equal representation in the Senate and the state legislatures were to elect senators, JM was even more inclined to restrict the power of the national legislature and enlarge that of the other two departments, particularly the executive.
During the latter half of the convention JM consistently sought to promote the power and independence of the executive as the best means of preserving the national principle. Soon after the 16 July compromise, for example, he changed his mind on the appointment of judges. Earlier he had opposed vesting this power in the executive and was “inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch” (first speech of 5 June); he now moved that the executive should nominate judges and that this nomination should become an appointment unless disagreed to by two-thirds of the Senate. He justified this change by referring to the altered constitution of the Senate. The “principle of compromise,” he said on 21 July (third speech), required “a concurrence of two authorities, in one of which the people, in the other the States, should be represented. The Executive Magistrate wd. be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally sympathising with every part of the U. States.” In order to transform the executive into a truly “national officer,” JM now believed that the election of the executive should be by the people at large rather than by both branches of the legislature, as provided in the Virginia Plan. He also advocated a veto over acts of the national legislature, originally preferring to associate the judiciary with the executive in this “revisionary” power. Although opposed to an absolute veto, he later supported an amendment to require a three-fourths, rather than two-thirds, majority in each house of the legislature to overrule the executive.
On 26 July the convention adjourned for ten days while the Committee of Detail prepared a draft constitution. After receiving the committee’s report on 6 August, the delegates took the rest of that month to consider the twenty-two draft articles. They then referred all postponed matters to a grand committee, which included JM as the representative of Virginia. On the recommendation of this committee, the convention adopted several substantial amendments to the 6 August draft. In place of election by the legislature, it substituted the electoral college system of choosing the president, as the executive was now styled. It vested the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court, which in the 6 August draft belonged exclusively to the Senate, in the president and Senate jointly. On the other hand, the power of appointment to offices not provided for in the Constitution, formerly in the hands of the president alone, became conditional on the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate also gained the power to try impeachments. JM opposed this last change, arguing that the trial of impeachments properly belonged to the Supreme Court. He apparently accepted the other changes as improvements over the report of 6 August. Although the president had gained power as a result of these amendments late in the convention, JM believed that the impeachment power left the president still “too dependent” on the legislature (14 Sept.).
Several times during August and September JM attempted unsuccessfully to revive the negative on state laws. Although the draft constitution contained specific prohibitions on the states, in his opinion these were insufficient. Nor did he place much confidence in the Supreme Court as the source of redress for wrongs committed by the states. JM clearly regarded the loss of the negative as a serious, perhaps fatal, omission from the Constitution. Writing to Jefferson on 6 September, he predicted that the proposed plan would “neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts agst the state governments” (partly in code).
JM was thus disappointed with the outcome of the lengthy proceedings at Philadelphia. No other delegate had so thoroughly diagnosed the ills of the American Confederation. The majority of his colleagues, while agreeing with his diagnosis, nevertheless rejected his most important proposals to remedy these defects. To replace the discredited Confederation government, the convention devised not a national government, but one “partly federal, and partly national,” a mixed form that JM later celebrated in The Federalist No. 39. This change, mild as it was in his eyes, excited such intense opposition that the Constitution only narrowly escaped defeat. It seems clear that a plan embodying JM’s favorite ideas would have stood little chance of success in the state ratifying conventions.
Although the Constitution fell short of his high hopes, JM accomplished more at the Federal Convention than he fully understood at the time. He was most effective in demonstrating the impotence of the Articles of Confederation, thereby convincing the delegates that a mere patching up of the existing system would be wholly inadequate. His emphasis on the need to protect private and minority rights, which the state governments so often violated, provided a persuasive rationale for strengthening the national government. Finally, JM contributed a novel, yet encouraging, vision of republican government capable of realizing its full potential when it operated over an extensive territory.

The Notes on Debates
Had JM not uttered a word at the Philadelphia convention, his name would still be inseparably linked with that epochal meeting because of the priceless manuscript he left to posterity, his Notes on Debates in the Federal Convention. Although Secretary William Jackson kept an official Journal, and other delegates left behind notes and memorandums, these materials are merely supplementary to JM’s remarkably full and complete Debates, which constitute the heart of the surviving records of the convention. Less than a stenographic transcript of the speeches, which JM as an active participant could not have been expected to render, this work remains the closest thing we have to a daily account of the convention’s deliberations.
In an unfinished memorandum prepared late in life and evidently intended as a preface to the first published edition of the Debates, JM recalled that he undertook the arduous labor of reporting the debates in order to satisfy the historical curiosity of future generations. Aware of the deficiency of the historical materials relating to confederacies, he resolved to preserve as far as he could “an exact account of what might pass in the Convention” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., III, 550). JM had gained valuable experience for this assignment by keeping notes on the proceedings in the Continental Congress, most recently in the winter and spring of 1787, but his convention notes far exceeded in magnitude these earlier notes. For nearly four uninterrupted months he conscientiously carried out his self-imposed task, an ordeal that “almost killed him,” he later told Edward Coles (Grigsby, Virginia Convention of 1788, I, 95 n. 107). In the same memorandum JM described his method of note-taking: “In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of the presiding member with the other members, on my right & left hand. In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms legible & in abreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes during the session or within a few finishing days after its close in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., III, 550). The manuscript of the Debates is thus actually a transcript made from rough notes that JM presumably destroyed as he wrote out the speeches in full after the day’s session adjourned. He kept this manuscript among his papers for the rest of his life, working on it from time to time in preparation for eventual publication. Although he expected the Debates to be published, JM resisted pressure to publish the manuscript during his lifetime (Jefferson to JM, 16 Jan. 1799, P. L. Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VII, 318; JM to Jefferson, 8 Feb. 1799, to Thomas Ritchie, 15 Sept. 1821, to J. G. Jackson, 27 Dec. 1821, to S. H. Smith, 2 Feb. 1827, to James Robertson, 27 Mar. 1831, Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., III, 381, 447–48, 448, 475, 497). Until JM’s death in 1836 the only persons besides family members and secretaries known to have looked at the Debates were Thomas Jefferson and John Wayles Eppes, Jefferson’s nephew and son-in-law. Jefferson first saw the Debates in the early 1790s, when he and JM were together in Philadelphia. Eppes studied under Jefferson’s tutelage in Philadelphia between 1791 and 1793, and one of his handwriting assignments, probably carried out in the summer of 1791, was to copy the Debates (Boyd, Papers of JeffersonJulian P. Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of
          Thomas Jefferson (19 vols. to date; Princeton, 1950——)., XIX, 544–51). Late in 1795, after Jefferson returned to Virginia, JM permitted his manuscript to be delivered to Monticello for Jefferson’s inspection (JM to Jefferson, 8 Nov. 1795 and 4 Apr. 1796, Madison, Letters [Cong. ed.][William C. Rives and Philip R. Fendall, eds.], Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (published by order
        of Congress; 4 vols.; Philadelphia, 1865)., II, 61, 90; Jefferson to JM, 17 Apr. 1796, P. L. Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VII, 70).
The manuscript as JM left it at his death in 1836 contains numerous deletions, interlineations, and insertions. These corrections are in JM’s hand except for a few by John C. Payne made under JM’s direction (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., II, 649). Many of the alterations are doubtless contemporary corrections of mistakes—for example, copying the wrong word or skipping a line—that occurred as JM wrote out the speeches and proceedings from his rough notes. Other changes are clearly of a later date, as indicated by differences in the fading of the ink (ibid., I, xviii). When Farrand first published his Records in 1911, he assumed that JM did not begin the extensive revision of his manuscript until after retiring from public life, an assumption suggested by the fact that the official Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention … (Boston, 1819) was apparently not accessible to JM until it was published. We now know that in the fall of 1789 JM made his own copy of the Journal from the original that Secretary Jackson turned over to George Washington after the convention adjourned. That copy came to the Yale University Library in 1926 and was the subject of an article by Charles R. Keller and George W. Pierson published in 1930 (“A New Madison Manuscript Relating to the Federal Convention of 1787,” AHRAmerican Historical Review., XXXVI [1930–31], 17–30). Keller and Pierson offered convincing evidence that JM used his copy of the Journal to make a substantial number of additions and corrections to his manuscript of the Debates within a few years after the Federal Convention adjourned. They concluded, for example, that as many as twenty of the twenty-two slips of paper containing revisions that JM pasted into the manuscript were done before he obtained a copy of the printed Journal. Unaware of its location, Keller and Pierson predicted that if the Eppes copy of the Debates ever came to light, “it should be found to include many of these slips and corrections in its running text” (ibid., XXXVI, 29).
It is now possible to confirm this prediction, for large parts of the Eppes copy, both the original and a letterpress copy, survive. Eppes did not copy that section of the Debates from 21 June through 18 July, as JM himself noted (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 354 n.). In 1836 John C. Payne used the Eppes copy, correcting it and filling in the omissions, to make a complete transcript of the Debates for translation into foreign languages (John C. Payne to Albert Gallatin, 30 Sept. 1836 [NHi: Albert Gallatin Papers]). This transcript, incorporating much of the original Eppes copy, is in the Edward Everett Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston. The surviving fragment of the letterpress copy is at the New York Public Library.
Together the Eppes copy and JM’s copy of the Journal prove that JM did indeed make numerous corrections and additions to his manuscript of the Debates before Eppes copied it (Boyd, Papers of JeffersonJulian P. Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of
          Thomas Jefferson (19 vols. to date; Princeton, 1950——)., XIX, 548–49). He was evidently in the midst of these revisions early in 1791, some months before Eppes arrived in Philadelphia, for he told Jefferson that he was busy “compleating the little task” he had allotted for himself (13 Mar. 1791, ibid., XIX, 552). Part of this task, as Keller and Pierson predicted, consisted of copying material from the Journal on separate slips of paper and pasting them into the manuscript. The Eppes copy incorporates fourteen of these pasted slips into its text. Of the remaining eight, one is obviously copied from the 1819 Journal, while seven fall into sections not copied by Eppes or on dates for which his copy is no longer extant. JM added not only the pasted slips, but a large number of other revisions from the Journal at this early date rather than after 1819 as Farrand believed (Records, I, xvi–xviii; IV, 12–13). He also used the 1819 Journal, for in the margin he occasionally referred to “the printed Journal.” Whenever he inserted material containing a vote tally, JM most likely obtained his information from the 1819 Journal, for he had omitted the table of votes in transcribing the Journal in 1789 (Keller and Pierson, “A New Madison Manuscript,” AHRAmerican Historical Review., XXXVI [1930–31], 18, 28–29).

Most of the revisions JM made in his manuscript after 1787 resulted from collating the Journal, both his own copy and the 1819 printed edition, with the Debates in order to obtain the exact wording of motions, the record of votes, or the names of those who introduced and seconded motions. He made comparatively few changes in the reports of speeches. Among these were some fifty brief insertions from Robert Yates’s Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled, in the year 1787 … (Albany, 1821). This work is an important supplement to JM’s Debates through 5 July, when the New York delegate stopped taking notes. Unsympathetic with the aims of the convention, Yates soon thereafter left Philadelphia. JM borrowed from the Secret Proceedings to fill in his account of some of his own speeches even though he regarded Yates as a prejudiced and inaccurate reporter (see first speech of 29 June, n. 2). Besides the additions from Yates, the reports of speeches also contain a number of deletions and interlineations, most of them stylistic alterations rather than substantive changes in meaning or emphasis. A close study of JM’s own speeches, comparing the Debates text with the Eppes text, once again shows that many of these corrections, if not contemporary, occurred at an early date.
After taking all these revisions into account, the editors are compelled to state their conviction that the manuscript of the Federal Convention Debates remains essentially as JM wrote it in 1787 and that the changes he made after that date were motivated by an earnest desire for completeness and accuracy.
The editors believe that it is beyond the scope of the present chronological series to reproduce the whole manuscript of JM’s Federal Convention Debates. This volume therefore includes only selected reports of JM’s speeches, extracted from his own voluminous notes and those of Robert Yates, John Lansing, Rufus King, James McHenry, William Pierce, William Paterson, and Alexander Hamilton. A new edition of the entire Debates will no doubt be published at some future day, either as a separate set of volumes within The Papers of James Madison or as part of another editorial enterprise comprehending all the records of the convention. Of the many published editions of the Debates the most accurate are Documentary History of the Constitution, III; Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37).; and The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott (New York, 1920). The Hunt and Scott text has been reprinted in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, ed. Charles C. Tansill (Washington, 1927), and in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison (Athens, Ohio, 1966). Most scholars will probably prefer Farrand because it incorporates JM’s Debates with the other delegates’ notes and memorandums, except those kept by Lansing.
Because JM spoke more than two hundred different times at the convention, the editors have perforce exercised their discretion in omitting a number of shorter speeches, incidental remarks, and motions. Their selection of more than eighty speeches and briefer remarks illustrates the full range of ideas he expressed at the Philadelphia convention. The selected speeches include most of those JM made in June and July, when the convention debated broad general principles.
The editors have used the original manuscript of the Debates as the text for JM’s speeches, except in those few instances JM did not record his own speech. In such instances they have chosen the fullest account of one of the other seven delegates who took notes. Where there is more than one version of a speech, the most complete (almost always JM’s) becomes the text and the others are placed in a footnote in descending order of fullness. In printing the other versions of JM’s speeches the editors have employed the following sources: Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., for those of Yates, King, McHenry, and Pierce; Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., for those of Lansing; Syrett and Cooke, Papers of HamiltonHarold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (21 vols. to date; New York, 1961——)., IV, for those of Hamilton; and Papers of William Paterson (DLC), for those of Paterson. Preceding the speeches are headings supplied by the editors and, where deemed necessary, brief context notes. The heading is not repeated if JM made two or more consecutive speeches on the same subject. The purpose of the context notes is to give only enough information to make JM’s speeches understandable, not to provide a running account of the convention.
In rendering the text of JM’s reports of his speeches the editors have used his expansion of “Mr. M.” to “Mr. Madison.” The first word of a speech is capitalized if it begins a sentence. A comma following “Mr. Madison” has been omitted if “Mr. Madison” is part of the first sentence (example: “Mr. Madison, observed …” becomes “Mr. Madison” observed …”). JM’s brackets have been rendered as parentheses by the editors, who have resorted to textual notes sparingly, ignoring deletions and interlineations resulting from minor stylistic changes. When alterations have been noted, the editors where possible have indicated whether JM made the change before or after Eppes copied the Debates. For a printed text that attempts an exact reproduction of the Debates, showing all deletions and interlineations, see Documentary History of the Constitution, III.


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 27 May 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Pendleton, Edmund

Dear Sir
Philada. May 27. 1787.
I have put off from day to day writing to my friends from this place in hopes of being able to say something of the Convention. Contrary to every previous calculation the bare quorum of seven States was not made up till the day before yesterday. The States composing it are N York, N. Jersey, Pena. Delaware, Virga. N. Carolina & S. Carolina. Individual members are here from Massts. Maryland & Georgia; and our intelligence promises a compleat addition of the first and last, as also of Connecticut by tomorrow. General Washington was called to the chair by a unanimous voice, and has accepted it. The Secretary is a Major Jackson. This is all that has yet been done except the appointment of a Committee for preparing the rules by which the Convention is to be governed in their proceedings. A few days will now furnish some data for calculating the probable result of the meeting. In general the members seem to accord in viewing our situation as peculiarly critical and in being averse to temporising expedients. I wish they may as readily agree when particulars are brought forward. Congress are reduced to five or six States, and are not likely to do any thing during the term of the Convention. A packet has lately arrived from France but brings no news.
I learnt with great pleasure by the Governour that you continued to enjoy a comfortable degree of health, and heartily wish this may find it still further confirmed, being with sincere affection & the highest esteem Your obedt. friend & servant
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: The Virginia Plan, 29 May 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

Editorial Note
The Federal Convention plunged into its momentous assignment without great delay chiefly because a prepared outline for a new government was ready for the delegates’ consideration—the so-called Virginia Plan. JM never claimed to be the author of this plan, but his guiding influence in the Virginia caucus, which drafted the resolutions, is beyond dispute. Some weeks before the delegates assembled at Philadelphia, JM had sketched the main features of the plan in letters to Jefferson, Randolph, and Washington (PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., IX, 318–19, 369–71, 383–85). JM later recalled that the task of introducing the resolutions to the convention fell to Edmund Randolph, “being then the Governor of the State, of distinguished talents, and in the habit of public speaking. Genl. Washington, tho’ at the head of the list was, for obvious reasons disinclined to take the lead. It was also foreseen that he would be immediately called to the presiding station” (JM to John Tyler, [March?] 1833, Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., III, 525). Although Randolph submitted the fifteen resolutions “in writing,” the original draft has not been found and may have been among “all the loose scraps of paper” Secretary William Jackson burned (ibid., I, 16 and n. 3; Jackson to Washington, 17 Sept. 1787, ibid., III, 82).
The text below is from the copy in JM’s Notes on Debates, which the editors believe to be an accurate transcription of the original resolutions despite the doubts raised more than seventy years ago by J. Franklin Jameson. Jameson argued that none of the copies then existing was “the exact text of the original” and concluded that “the exact form of those resolutions can be recovered only by inference, and in one or two particulars remains uncertain” (“Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of 1787,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902 [2 vols.; Washington, 1903], I, 103–11). This conclusion was supported by Homer C. Hockett (The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing [New York, 1955], pp. 35–39) and disputed by Max Farrand, who maintained that JM’s was “an accurate copy of the original” (Records, III, 593–94). In comparing manuscript copies of the Virginia Plan, Farrand noted that they were alike in all significant details. But he failed to give complete information concerning the number and location of the extant copies, and he did not distinguish between the working copies (actually used by the delegates in the convention) and fair copies possibly made at a later time. Jameson and Hockett, on the other hand, relied almost entirely on printed texts, and thus failed to avoid the pitfalls that occur when pertinent manuscript evidence is overlooked.
Of the fifteen resolutions in the Virginia Plan, Jameson cast doubt on the wording of only two clauses of the ninth resolution. JM’s copy reads: “Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature.… That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the high seas.…” According to Jameson, certain phrases of these clauses were not in the original resolution, but were added by the Committee of the Whole on 4 and 12 June. On 4 June, as recorded in the Journal, the committee agreed to a motion “to add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely ‘to consist of One supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals[’]” (ibid., I, 95). Although he noted that this wording is slightly different from the clause in JM’s text (e.g., the transposition of “one or more”), Jameson assumed that JM’s was a garbled version of the motion agreed to on 4 June. He thus denied that the original resolution included a distinction between supreme and inferior courts. That such a distinction existed in the original resolution, however, is indicated by William Paterson’s notes for 29 May, a source evidently unknown to Jameson at the time (ibid., I, 28). Thus the motion of 4 June might well have been intended merely to change the wording of the original clause to make it consistent with the remainder of the resolution. As it reads in JM’s text the ninth resolution is carelessly worded, referring to “one or more supreme tribunals” in the first clause, but to one supreme tribunal in the last.
Jameson also called attention to the motion of 12 June “to alter the resolution submitted by Mr Randolph, so as to read as follows namely. ‘That the jurisdiction of the supreme Tribunal shall be to hear and determine in the dernier resort all piracies, felonies &ca.’” (ibid., I, 211). He cited this motion as proof that the first mention of the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal did not occur until 12 June. He assumed that the motion of that day was the result of the action of 4 June, when, so he argued, the Committee of the Whole first divided the judiciary into supreme and inferior courts. Yet Jameson did not explain how the reference to the jurisdiction of the inferior courts had crept into JM’s text. It obviously did not come from the motion of 12 June. A simpler explanation is that the intent of the latter motion was to delete that part of the original resolution defining the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This action was necessary, for on 5 June the committee had eliminated the constitutional provision for inferior tribunals (ibid., I, 118).
Jameson’s argument rests on what Farrand called “the somewhat doubtful authority of the Journal.” Even if the Journal is correct, however, Jameson’s is not the only plausible explanation of the motions of 4 and 12 June. Paterson’s notes contain evidence supporting the accuracy of JM’s version of the ninth resolution. More important evidence is to be found in the surviving manuscript copies of the Virginia Plan, each of which incorporates into the text the disputed phrases of the ninth resolution. The existence of several of these copies was doubtless unknown to Jameson at the time he wrote his article, but there is at least one he could have consulted. Instead he used two printed versions that led him astray.
The extant manuscript copies of the Virginia Plan may be divided into two groups: fair copies and working copies. We can assume that the fair copies were made at a later time (although some of them could well have been made at the time the resolutions were first submitted). The working copies, containing deletions, interlineations, and marginalia, were prepared and used by the delegates as the resolutions progressed through the Committee of the Whole. These copies have the greater authority because they are closer to the original. The copy in JM’s Notes on Debates of course belongs to the first group, but from our knowledge of the Virginian’s conscientious effort to preserve a full record of the convention, it is difficult to believe that he did not have an accurate text from which to make this copy. The other fair copies are those of George Washington (DLC: Washington Papers), James McHenry (DLC: McHenry Papers), Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (DLC: Pinckney Family Papers), and William Paterson (DLC: Paterson Papers, photostat). The working copies are those of William Paterson (DLC: William Samuel Johnson Papers), David Brearley (DNA: RG 360, Records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, microfilm M866), and John Lansing (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., pp. 113–18). The copy of Jacob Broom, with a few interlineations in the hand of John Dickinson, does not clearly fall into either group (PPL: John Dickinson Papers).
By examining the working copies it is possible to distinguish the original text from the later alterations. In each of them there is no doubt that the disputed parts of the ninth resolution belong to the original text and are not later insertions. The Brearley and Lansing texts do embody a few phrases that were not added until after 29 May. The marginal insertions on the former, however, indicate that Brearley made his copy no later than 1 June. Lansing did not arrive until 2 June and presumably made his copy that day (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 14). Their versions of the ninth resolution, which first came under discussion on 4 June, should therefore still be considered accurate texts of the original. Paterson’s working copy needs no such qualification.
The only manuscript Jameson examined was Paterson’s fair copy, which the New Jersey delegate included in a notebook containing copies of other documents of the convention. Because this text incorporates later changes, Jameson correctly rejected it as a copy representing the original. Evidently he was unaware of the existence of Paterson’s earlier working copy. What is more difficult to explain is why he failed to look at the Brearley manuscript, which has been in the public archives since 1818. This manuscript was the source of two printed texts discussed by Jameson, one printed in the official Journal of 1819, pp. 67–70, the other in Documentary History of the Constitution, I, 329–32. In the former the text of the first clause of the ninth resolution omits not only what Brearley deleted, but also some of what remained. The result is confusing: the first clause does not mention supreme and inferior courts, but the last clause defines the jurisdiction of these hitherto unmentioned tribunals. Jameson noted this inconsistency and concluded not that something was missing from the first clause, but that the last clause contained too much. The latter text follows the Brearley manuscript as corrected by him, incorporating his later insertions and deletions. The important fact is that both printed versions seriously distort the original manuscript. Jameson correctly stated that Brearley’s text of the Virginia Plan, as printed in Documentary History of the Constitution, “represents the original, plus most of the modifications made up to about June 11 or 12.” If he had inspected the manuscript, Jameson could have easily distinguished the original from the later modifications. Thus he overlooked a valuable aid to the restoration of the original text of the Virginia Plan.

Resolutions proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787
1. Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, “common defence, security of liberty and general welfare.”
2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.
3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the national Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every  for the term of ; to be of the age of  years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those beculiarly [sic] belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of  after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space of  after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall.
5. Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of  years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and for the space of  after the expiration thereof.
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts; that the national Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.
7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of  years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
8. Resd. that the Executive and a Convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by  of the members of each branch.
9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
10. Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the whole.
11. Resd. that a Republican Government & the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State.
12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.
13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider & decide thereon.


Title: Establishment of a National Government, [30 May] 1787
From: McHenry, James
To:

[30 May 1787]

   The delegates were considering in place of the first resolution of the Virginia Plan a substitute offered by Randolph: “that a national Government ⟨ought to be established⟩ consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 33).

Mr. Madison—The motion does go to bring out the sense of the house—whether the States shall be governed by one power. If agreed to it will decide nothing. The meaning of the States that the confed. is defect. and ought to be amended. In agreeing to the …


Title: Popular Election of the First Branch of the Legislature, [31 May] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[31 May 1787]
Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first—the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.


Title: Election of the Senate, [31 May] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[31 May 1787]

   Wilson had suggested that the Senate should be chosen from special political units created by a fusion of several districts formed for selecting members of the first branch.

Mr. Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho’ better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga. where large & small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.


Title: Powers of the National Legislature, [31 May] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[31 May 1787]

   The clause of the sixth resolution of the Virginia Plan giving the national legislature power “to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent” was under debate.

Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enemeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the Community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.

   Ms (DLC).

   Pierce’s version:

   “Mr. Maddison said he had brought with him a strong prepossession for the defining of the limits and powers of the federal Legislature, but he brought with him some doubts about the practicability of doing it:—at present he was convinced it could not be done” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 60).

   According to Pierce, during this debate JM had also commented prior to this speech: “it was necessary to adopt some general principles on which we should act,—that we were wandering from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in any one principle” (ibid., I, 60).

[31 May 1787]
The coercive-power clause of the sixth resolution, authorizing the use of force against a state “failing to fulfill its duty” to the Union, was under debate.
Mr. Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually. A Union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed.

   Ms (DLC).

   After “postponed,” JM deleted “till the contrary should be found on trial to be the case,” a change he made before Eppes copied the Debates. Many years later JM explained that the coercive-power clause was “suggested by the inefficiency of the Confederate system, from the want of such a sanction; none such being expressed in its Articles” (to John Tyler, [March?] 1833, Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., III, 528). JM himself in 1781 had drafted a proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation authorizing the use of force to compel the states “to fulfill their federal engagements” (PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., III, 17–19). As long as the U.S. remained a confederation of sovereign states, JM believed that the federal government needed this coercive power, although he admitted “the difficulty & awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State” (JM to Washington, 16 Apr. 1787, PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., IX, 385). Such a provision would be unnecessary, however, if the convention devised a national government operating directly over individuals. See JM to Jefferson, 24 Oct. 1787.


Title: Term of the Executive, [1 June?] 1787
From: Pierce, William
To:

[1 June 1787?]

   Bedford favored a triennial election and ineligibility after nine years because the executive could be ousted for “misfeasance only, not incapacity” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 69).

Mr. Maddison observed that to prevent a Man from holding an Office longer than he ought, he may for malpractice be impeached and removed;—he is not for any ineligibility.


Title: Removal of the Executive, [2 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[2 June 1787]

   Dickinson had moved that the executive be subject to removal by the national legislature when such an action was requested by a majority of the state legislatures.

Mr Madison & Mr. Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent the removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his administration tho’ just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans, he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.


Title: Power of the Executive to Veto Laws, [4 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[4 June 1787]

   Wilson and Hamilton moved to give the executive an absolute veto on laws.

Mr. Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be would have firmness eno’ to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G.B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand the unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.


Title: Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [4 June] 1787
From: King, Rufus
To:

[4 June 1787]

   This speech preceded Wilson’s motion, seconded by JM, to combine the judiciary with the executive in vetoing legislative acts.

Mad. The Judicial ought to be introduced in the business of Legislation—they will protect their Department, and uniting wh. the Executive render their Check or negative more respectable—there is weight in the objections agt. this measure—but a Check is necessary experience proves it, and teaches us that what we once thought the Calumny of the Enemies of Republican Govts. is undoubtedly true—There is diversity of Interest in every Country the Rich & poor, the Dr. & Cr. the followers of different Demagogues, the diversity of religious Sects—The Effects of these parties are obvious in the ant’. Govts.—the same causes will operate with us—
We must introduce the Checks, which will destroy the measures of an interested majority—in this view a negative in the Ex: is not only necessary for its own safety, but for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an unjust and interested majority—The independent condition of the Ex. who has the Eyes of all Nations on him will render him a just Judge—add the Judiciary and you increase the respectability—


Title: Method of Choosing the Judiciary, [5 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[5 June 1787]

   The clause of the ninth resolution of the Virginia Plan proposing that the judiciary be chosen by the national legislature was under consideration.

Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body. Besides the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. On the other hand he was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous eno’ to be confided in—as not so numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be struck out, & a blank left to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection.


Title: Method of Ratifying the Constitution, [5 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[5 June 1787]

   The Virginia Plan resolution (fifteen) providing for popularly elected ratifying conventions was under debate.

Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confedn. themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States, and of Congs. especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State Tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.


Title: Establishment of Inferior Courts, [5 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[5 June 1787]

   Rutledge moved to strike out the clause of the ninth resolution providing for inferior national courts. He argued that the state courts “ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance” and that the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal was sufficient to secure the national rights (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 124).

Mr. Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho’ ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.


Title: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 6 June 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Dear Sir
Philada. June 6th. 1787.
The day fixed for the meeting of the Convention was the 14th. ult. On the 25th. and not before seven States were assembled. General Washington was placed unâ voce in the chair. The Secretaryship was given to Major Jackson. The members present are from Massachussetts Mr. Gherry, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. King, Mr. Strong. From Connecticut Mr. Sherman Docr. S. Johnson, Mr. Elseworth. From N. York Judge Yates, Mr. Lansing, Col. Hamilton. N. Jersey, Governour Livingston, Judge Brearly, Mr. Patterson, Attorney Genl. [Mr. Houston & Mr. Clarke are absent members.] From Pennsylvania Doctr. Franklyn, Mr. Morris, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Fitzimmons, Mr. G. Clymer, Genl. Mifflin, Mr. Governeur Morris, Mr. Ingersoll. From Delaware Mr. Jno. Dickenson, Mr. Reed, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Broom, Mr. Bassett. From Maryland Majr. Jenifer only. Mr. McHenry, Mr. Danl. Carrol, Mr. Jno. Mercer, Mr. Luther Martin are absent members. The three last have supplied the resignations of Mr. Stone, Mr. Carrol of Carolton, and Mr. T. Johnson as I have understood the case. From Virginia Genl. Washington, Governor Randolph, Mr. Blair, Col. Mason, Docr. McClurg, J Madison. Mr. Wythe left us yesterday, being called home by the serious declension of his lady’s health. From N. Carolina, Col. Martin late Governor, Docr. Williamson, Mr. Spaight, Col. Davy. Col. Blount is another member but is detained by indisposition at N. York. From S. Carolina Mr. John Rutlidge, General Pinkney, Mr. Charles Pinkney, Majr. Pierce Butler, Mr. Laurens is in the Commission from that State, but will be kept away by the want of health. From Georgia Col. Few, Majr. Pierce, formerly of Williamsbg. & aid to Genl. Greene, Mr. Houston. Mr. Baldwin will be added to them in a few days. Walton and Pendleton are also in the deputation. N. Hamshire has appointed Deputies but they are not expected; the State treasury being empty it is said, and a substitution of private resources being inconvenient or impracticable. I mention this circumstance to take off the appearance of backwardness, which that State is not in the least chargeable with, if we are rightly informed of her disposition. Rhode Island has not yet acceded to the measure. As their Legislature meet very frequently, and can at any time be got together in a week, it is possible that caprice if no other motive may yet produce a unanimity of the States in this experiment.
In furnishing you with this list of names, I have exhausted all the means which I can make use of for gratifying your curiosity. It was thought expedient in order to secure unbiassed discussion within doors, and to prevent misconceptions & misconstructions without, to establish some rules of caution which will for no short time restrain even a confidential communication of our proceedings. The names of the members will satisfy you that the States have been serious in this business. The attendance of Genl. Washington is a proof of the light in which he regards it. The whole Community is big with expectation. And there can be no doubt but that the result will in some way or other have a powerful effect on our destiny.
Mr. Adams’ Book which has been in your hands of course, has excited a good deal of attention. An edition has come out here and another is in the press at N. York. It will probably be much read, particularly in the Eastern States, and contribute with other circumstances to revive the predilections of this Country for the British Constitution. Men of learning find nothing new in it. Men of taste many things to criticize. And men without either not a few things, which they will not understand. It will nevertheless be read, and praised, and become a powerful engine in forming the public opinion. The name & character of the Author, with the critical situation of our affairs, naturally account for such an effect. The book also has merit, and I wish many of the remarks in it, which are unfriendly to republicanism, may not receive fresh weight from the operations of our Governments.
I learn from Virga. that the appetite for paper money grows stronger every day. Mr. H—n—y is an avowed patron of the scheme, and will not fail I think to carry it through unless the County [Prince Edward] which he is to represent shall bind him hand and foot by instructions. I am told that this is in contemplation. He is also said to be unfriendly to an acceleration of Justice. There is good reason to beleive too that ⟨he is⟩ hostile to the object of the convention and that he wishes either a partition or total dissolution of the confederacy.
I sent you a few days ago by a Vessel going to France a box with peccan Nuts planted in it. Mr Jno. Vaughn was so good as to make the arrangements with the Capt: both for their preservation during the voyage & the conveyance of them afterwards. I had before sent you via Eangland a few nuts sealed up in a letter.
Mr. Wythe gave me favorable accounts of your Nephew in Williamsburg. And from the Presidt. of Hampden Sidney who was here a few days ago I recd. information equally pleasing as to the genius, progress, and character of your younger Nephew.
I must beg you to communicate my affecte. respects to our friend Mazzei, and to let him know that I have taken every step for securing his claim on Dorhman, which I judged most likely to succeed. There is little doubt that Congress will allow him more, than he owes Mr. Mazzei, and I have got from him such a draught on the Treasury board as I think will ensure him the chance of that fund. Dorman is at present in Virga. where he has also some claims & expectations, but they are not in a transferrable situation. I intended to have written to Mazzei and must beg his pardon for not doing it. It is really out of my power at this time. Adieu Yrs Affy


Title: From James Madison to William Short, 6 June 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Short, William

Dear Sir
Philada. June 6th. 1787.
I have been sensibly obliged by your favor of the 23. of March which arrived by the last Packet. I had previously received from Mr. Jefferson information concerning the dislocation of his wrist, and the remedial journey which he had projected. His friends are particularly interested and none more than myself in his recovering the entire use of a member, without which they must lose the pleasure of many of his valuable communications and reflections. I should not go too far in saying that it will be a loss to the world, if the use of his pen should be frustrated or even abridged, by the permanent effect of the accident. I write to him by this conveyance on the supposition that it will find him returned to Paris.
The Convention has been formed about 12 days. It contains in several instances the most respectable characters in the U.S. and in general may be said to be the best contribution of talents the States could make for the occasion. What the result of the experiment may be is among the arcana of futurity. Our affairs are considered on all hands as at a most serious crisis. No hope is entertained from the existing Confederacy. And the eyes and hopes of all are turned towards this new Assembly. The result therefore whatever it may be must have a material influence on our destiny, and on that of the cause of republican liberty. The personal characters of the members promise much. The spirit which they bring with them seems in general equally promising. But the labor is great indeed; whether we consider the real or imaginary difficulties, within doors or without doors.

I learn with much pleasure that the Marquis de la fayette is so actively engaged in the reforms aimed at in the Convention at Paris. I sincerely wish his influence may be as great as it deserves to be. I beg you to make my most affectionate respects to him, and to let him know that I shall write to him as soon as I can make a letter interesting. I should not wait indeed for such materials, if the present opportunity did not happen to find me too much occupied, to trouble him with one of a contrary character. With the sincere esteem & regard I am dear Sir Yr. Affecte. hble. servt.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: Popular Election of the First Branch of the Legislature, [6 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[6 June 1787]

   Charles Pinckney moved that the first branch of the legislature be elected by the state legislatures, not by the people.

Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Govt. and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. He differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sharman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity, of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practiced in some of the States. The gentleman (Mr. Sharman) had admitted that in a very small State, faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho’ less than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Govt. would admit. This was the only defence agst. the inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt. All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed the manufacturing the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large numbers little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression. These observations are verified by the Histories of every Country antient & modern. In Greece & Rome the rich & poor, the creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians & plebians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent Cities of Rome, Athens & Carthage, & their respective provinces: the former possessing the power, & the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it? Why was America so justly apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expence. We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a common sentiment and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure. In a Republican Govt. the Majority if united have always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d place, that in case they shd have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils wch. have been experienced.


Title: Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [6 June] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[6 June 1787]

   Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the judiciary from a share in vetoing legislative acts.

Mr. Madison 2ded. the motion. He observed that the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the nature of Republican Govt. which could not give to an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that personal interest agst. betraying the national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a Republic personal merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation, but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The Executive Magistrate would be envied & assailed by disappointed competitors: His firmness therefore wd. need support. He would not possess those great emoluments from his station, nor that permanent stake in the public interest which wd. place him out of the reach of foreign corruption: He would stand in need therefore of being controuled as well as supported. An association of the Judges in his revisionary function wd both double the advantage and diminish the danger. It wd. also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend itself agst. Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made 1st. that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them. 2dly. that the Judiciary Departmt. ought to be separate & distinct from the other great Departments. The 1st. objection had some weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting that a small proportion of the laws coming in question before a Judge wd. be such wherein he had been consulted; that a small part of this proportion wd. be so ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases wd. probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous passages. How much good on the other hand wd. proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character wch. the Code of laws wd. receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2d. objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the Executive & to the Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was founded required a separation of the Executive as well as of the Judiciary from the Legislature & from each other. There wd. in truth however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal of Justice (the House of Lords) formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In short, whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable.