Title: General Defense of the Constitution, [6 June] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[6 June 1788]

   On 5 June, Patrick Henry leveled a lengthy attack on the Constitution. This evoked a Federalist rebuttal in general terms by Governor Randolph and JM’s point-by-point refutation.

Mr. Madison then arose—(but he spoke so low that his exordium could not be heard distinctly). I shall not attempt to make impressions by any ardent professions of zeal for the public welfare: we know the principles of every man will, and ought to be judged, not by his professions and declarations, but by his conduct; by that criterion I mean in common with every other member to be judged; and should it prove unfavourable to my reputation, yet it is a criterion, from which I will by no means depart. Comparisons have been made between the friends of this constitution, and those who oppose it: although I disapprove of such comparisons, I trust, that in points of truth, honor, candor, and rectitude of motives, the friends of this system, here, and in other states, are not inferior to its opponents. But professions of attachment to the public good, and comparisons of parties, ought not to govern or influence us now. We ought, sir, to examine the constitution on its own merits solely: we are to enquire whether it will promote the public happiness: its aptitude to produce this desirable object, ought to be the exclusive subject of our present researches. In this pursuit, we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to those understandings and judgments which were selected by the people of this country, to decide this great question, by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that gentlemen, in displaying their abilities, on this occasion, instead of giving opinions, and making assertions, will condescend to prove and demonstrate, by a fair and regular discussion. It gives me pain to hear gentlemen continually distorting the natural construction of language; for, it is sufficient if any human production can stand a fair discussion. Before I proceed to make some additions to the reasons which have been adduced by my honorable friend over the way, I must take the liberty to make some observations on what was said by another gentleman, (Mr. Henry). He told us, that this constitution ought to be rejected, because it endangered the public liberty, in his opinion, in many instances. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation—let the dangers which this system is supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed out. If any dangerous and unnecessary powers be given to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without examination. If powers be necessary, apparent danger is not a sufficient reason against conceding them. He has suggested, that licentiousness has seldom produced the loss of liberty; but that the tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations: but on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbulence, violence and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions, which, in republics, have more frequently than any other cause, produced despotism. If we go over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and what are the sources of that diversity of sentiments which pervades its inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear, that the same causes may terminate here, in the same fatal effects, which they produced in those republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. Perhaps in the progress of this discussion it will appear, that the only possible remedy for those evils, and means of preserving and protecting the principles of republicanism, will be found in that very system which is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression. I must confess, I have not been able to find his usual consistency, in the gentleman’s arguments on this occasion: he informs us that the people of this country are at perfect repose; that every man enjoys the fruits of his labor, peaceably and securely, and that every thing is in perfect tranquility and safety. I wish sincerely, sir, this were true. If this be their happy situation, why has every state acknowledged the contrary? Why were deputies from all the states sent to the general convention? Why have complaints of national and individual distresses been echoed and re-echoed throughout the continent? Why has our general government been so shamefully disgraced, and our constitution violated? Wherefore have laws been made to authorise a change, and wherefore are we now assembled here? A federal government is formed for the protection of its individual members. Ours was attacked itself with impunity. Its authority has been disobeyed and despised. I think I perceive a glaring inconsistency in another of his arguments. He complains of this constitution, because it requires the consent of at least three-fourths of the states to introduce amendments which shall be necessary for the happiness of the people. The assent of so many, he urges as too great an obstacle, to the admission of salutary amendments; which he strongly insists, ought to be at the will of a bare majority—we hear this argument, at the very moment we are called upon to assign reasons for proposing a constitution, which puts it in the power of nine states to abolish the present inadequate, unsafe, and pernicious confederation! In the first case he asserts, that a majority ought to have the power of altering the government, when found to be inadequate to the security of public happiness. In the last case, he affirms, that even three-fourths of the community have not a right to alter a government, which experience has proved to be subversive of national felicity! Nay, that the most necessary and urgent alterations, cannot be made without the absolute unanimity of all the states. Does not the thirteenth article of the confederation expressly require, that no alteration shall be made without the unanimous consent of all the states? Could any thing in theory, be more perniciously improvident and injudicious, than this submission of the will of the majority to the most trifling minority? Have not experience and practice actually manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be extremely impolitic? Let me mention one fact, which I conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any one—the smallest state in the union has obstructed every attempt to reform the government—that little member has repeatedly disobeyed and counteracted the general authority; nay, has even supplied the enemies of its country with provisions. Twelve states had agreed to certain improvements which were proposed, being thought absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of the general government; but as these improvements, though really indispensible, could not by the confederation be introduced into it without the consent of every state; the refractory dissent of that little state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concurrence in alterations in the confederation, must be known to every member in this convention; ‘tis therefore needless to remind them of them. Is it not self-evident, that a trifling minority ought not to bind the majority? Would not foreign influence be exerted with facility over a small minority? Would the honorable gentleman agree to continue the most radical defects in the old system, because the petty state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them?
He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district where the seat of the government may be fixed. Would he submit that the representatives of this state should carry on their deliberations under the control of any one member of the union? If any state had the power of legislation over the place where congress should fix the general government; this would impair the dignity, and hazard the safety of congress. If the safety of the union were under the control of any particular state, would not foreign corruption probably prevail in such a state, to induce it to exert its controling influence over the members of the general government? Gentlemen cannot have forgotten the disgraceful insult which congress received some years ago. When we also reflect, that the previous cession of particular states is necessary, before congress can legislate exclusively any where, we must, instead of being alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it.
But the honorable member sees great danger in the provision concerning the militia: this I conceive to be an additional security to our liberty, without diminishing the power of the states, in any considerable degree—it appears to me so highly expedient, that I should imagine it would have found advocates even in the warmest friends of the present system: the authority of training the militia, and appointing the officers, is reserved to the states. Congress ought to have the power of establishing an uniform discipline throughout the states; and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrections and repel invasions: these are the only cases wherein they can interfere with the militia; and the obvious necessity of their having power over them in these cases, must convince any reflecting mind. Without uniformity of discipline, military bodies would be incapable of action: without a general controlling power to call forth the strength of the union, to repel invasions, the country might be over-run, and conquered by foreign enemies. Without such a power to suppress insurrections, our liberties might be destroyed by domestic faction, and domestic tyranny be established.
The honorable member then told us, that there was no instance of power once transferred, being voluntarily renounced. Not to produce European examples, which may probably be done before the rising of this convention; have we not seen already in seven states (and probably in an eighth state) legislatures surrendering some of the most important powers they possessed? But, sir, by this government, powers are not given to any particular set of men—they are in the hands of the people—delegated to their representatives chosen for short terms—to representatives responsible to the people, and whose situation is perfectly similar to their own: as long as this is the case we have no danger to apprehend. When the gentleman called our recollection to the usual effects of the concession of powers, and imputed the loss of liberty generally to open tyranny, I wish he had gone on further. Upon a review of history he would have found, that the loss of liberty very often resulted from factions and divisions; from local considerations, which eternally lead to quarrels—he would have found internal dissentions to have more frequently demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition in rulers to retain any stipulated powers.
(Here Mr. Madison enumerated the various means whereby nations had lost their liberties.)
The power of raising and supporting armies is exclaimed against, as dangerous and unnecessary. I wish there were no necessity of vesting this power in the general government. But suppose a foreign nation to declare war against the United States, must not the general legislature have the power of defending the United States? Ought it to be known to foreign nations, that the general government of the United States of America has no power to raise or support an army, even in the utmost danger, when attacked by external enemies? Would not their knowledge of such a circumstance stimulate them to fall upon us. If, sir, congress be not invested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will be invited, by our weakness, to attack us; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans, would certainly be attended with success, when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar situation of this country; the multiplicity of its excellent inlets and harbours, and the uncommon facility of attacking it, however much he may regret the necessity of such a power, cannot hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may elucidate this argument. In the course of the late war, when the weak parts of the union were exposed, and many states were in the most deplorable situation, by the enemy’s ravages; the assistance of foreign nations was thought so urgently necessary for our protection, that the relinquishment of territorial advantages was not deemed too great a sacrifice for the acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted with great reluctance even by those states who expected most advantages from it. The crisis however at length arrived when it was judged necessary for the salvation of this country, to make certain cessions to Spain; whether wisely, or otherwise, is not for me to say; but the fact was, that instructions were sent to our representative at the court of Spain, to empower him to enter into negociations for that purpose. How it terminated is well known. This fact shews the extremities to which nations will recur in cases of imminent danger, and demonstrates the necessity of making ourselves more respectable. The necessity of making dangerous cessions, and of applying to foreign aid, ought to be excluded.
The honorable member then told us, that there are heart-burnings in the adopting states, and that Virginia may, if she does not come into the measure, continue in amicable confederacy with the adopting states. I wish as seldom as possible to contradict the assertions of gentlemen, but I can venture to affirm, without danger of being in an error, that there is the most satisfactory evidence, that the satisfaction of those states is increasing every day, and that in that state where it was adopted only by a majority of nineteen, there is not one-fifth of the people dissatisfied. There are some reasons which induce us to conclude, that the grounds of proselytism extend every where—its principles begin to be better understood—and the inflammatory violence, wherewith it was opposed by designing, illiberal, and unthinking minds, begins to subside. I will not enumerate the causes from which, in my conception, the heart-burnings of a majority of its opposers have originated. Suffice it to say, that in all they were founded on a misconception of its nature and tendency. Had it been candidly examined and fairly discussed, I believe, sir, that but a very inconsiderable minority of the people of the United States would have opposed it. With respect to the Swiss, which the honorable gentleman has proposed for our example, as far as historical authority may be relied upon, we shall find their government quite unworthy of our imitation. I am sure if the honorable member had adverted to their history and government, he never would have quoted their example here: he would have found that instead of respecting the rights of mankind, their government (at least of several of their cantons) is one of the vilest aristocracies that ever was instituted: the peasants of some of their cantons are more oppressed and degraded, than the subjects of any monarch in Europe: nay, almost as much so, as those of any eastern despot. It is a novelty in politics, that from the worst of systems the happiest consequences should ensue. Their aristocratical rigor, and the peculiarity of their situation, have so long supported their union: without the closest alliance and amity, dismemberment might follow: their powerful and ambitious neighbours would immediately avail themselves of their least jarrings. As we are not circumstanced like them, no conclusive precedent can be drawn from their situation. I trust, the gentleman does not carry his idea so far as to recommend a separation from the adopting states. This government may secure our happiness; this is at least as probable, as that it shall be oppressive. If eight states have, from a persuasion of its policy and utility, adopted it, shall Virginia shrink from it, without a full conviction of its danger and inutility? I hope she will never shrink from any duty: I trust she will not determine without the most serious reflection and deliberation.
I confess to you, sir, were uniformity of religion to be introduced by this system, it would, in my opinion, be ineligible; but I have no reason to conclude, that uniformity of government will produce that of religion. This subject is, for the honor of America, perfectly free and unshackled. The government has no jurisdiction over it—the least reflection will convince us, there is no danger to be feared on this ground.
But we are flattered with the probability of obtaining previous amendments. This calls for the most serious attention of this house. If amendments are to be proposed by one state, other states have the same right, and will also propose alterations. These cannot but be dissimilar, and opposite in their nature. I beg leave to remark, that the governments of the different states are in many respects dissimilar in their structure—their legislative bodies are not similar—their executives are more different. In several of the states the first magistrate is elected by the people at large—in others, by joint ballot of the members of both branches of the legislature—and in others, in other different manners. This dissimilarity has occasioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of government, which will, without many reciprocal concessions, render a concurrence impossible. Although the appointment of an executive magistrate, has not been thought destructive to the principles of democracy in any of the states, yet, in the course of the debate, we find objections made to the federal executive: it is urged that the president will degenerate into a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of the honorable member, to explain the reasons of proposing this constitution, and develop its principles; but I shall postpone my remarks, till we hear the supplement which he has informed us, he intends to add to what he has already said.
Give me leave to say something of the nature of the government, and to shew that it is safe and just to vest it with the power of taxation. There are a number of opinions; but the principal question is, whether it be a federal or consolidated government: in order to judge properly of the question before us, we must consider it minutely in its principal parts. I conceive myself, that it is of a mixed nature: it is in a manner unprecedented: we cannot find one express example in the experience of the world: it stands by itself. In some respects, it is a government of a federal nature; in others it is of a consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the constitution is investigated, ratified, and made the act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what the honorable gentleman has alledged, that this government is not completely consolidated, nor is it entirely federal. Who are parties to it? The people —but not the people as composing one great body—but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties: were it as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining states would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it: were it such a government as it is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this state, without having had the priviledge of deliberating upon it: but, sir, no state is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the states adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen states of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the states; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system a majority of the states cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the states required for that purpose; three-fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national house of representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the senate, its members are elected by the states in their equal and political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere confederacy. If Virginia were separated from all the states, her power and authority would extend to all cases: in like manner were all powers vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government: but the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only operate in certain cases: it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.
But the honorable member has satirized with peculiar acrimony, the powers given to the general government by this constitution. I conceive that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience, or, losing the union. Let us consider the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode of providing for them will be adopted. When therefore direct taxes are not necessary, they will not be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those in power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult the conveniences of the people, will cost them nothing, and in many respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labour? Not the expenses of the governments, but war. If this country should be engaged in war (and I conceive we ought to provide for the possibility of such a case) how would it be carried on? By the usual means provided from year to year? As our imports will be necessary for the expences of government, and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the means of defence? How is it possible a war could be supported without money or credit? And would it be possible for a government to have credit, without having the power of raising money? No, it would be impossible for any government in such a case to defend itself. Then, I say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies, and give this power to the general government—for the utter inutility of previous requisitions on the states is too well known. Would it be possible for those countries whose finances and revenues are carried to the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an uncontrolled power of raising money? Has it not been necessary for Great-Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of procuring money? Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was known that her power to raise money was limitted? Has not France been obliged on great occasions to use unusual means to raise funds? It has been the case in many countries, and no government can exist, unless its powers extend to make provisions for every contingency. If we were actually attacked by a powerful nation, and our general government had not the power of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable: if the revenue of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations. This must be obvious to every member here: I think therefore, that it is necessary for the preservation of the union, that this power should be given to the general government.
But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the power of direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy all subordinate authority; that its increasing influence will speedily enable it to absorb the state governments. I cannot think this will be the case. If the general government were wholly independent of the governments of the particular states, then indeed usurpation might be expected to the fullest extent: but, sir, on whom does this general government depend? It derives its authority from these governments, and from the same sources from which their authority is derived. The members of the federal government are taken from the same men from whom those of the state legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the federal representatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the general will never destroy the individual governments; and this conviction must be strengthened by an attention to the construction of the senate. The representatives will be chosen, probably under the influence of the members of the state legislatures: but there is not the least probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the former. One hundred and sixty members represent this commonwealth in one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to the general legislature. The reasons offered on this subject, by a gentleman on the same side (Mr. Nicholas) were unanswerable, and have been so full, that I shall add but little more on the subject. Those who wish to become federal representatives, must depend on their credit with that class of men who will be the most popular in their counties, who generally represent the people in the state governments: they can, therefore, never succeed in any measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend. It is almost certain, therefore, that the deliberations of the members of the federal house of representatives, will be directed to the interests of the people of America. As to the other branch, the senators will be appointed by the legislatures, and though elected for six years, I do not conceive they will so soon forget the source from whence they derive their political existence. This election of one branch of the federal, by the state legislatures, secures an absolute dependence of the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one-third, will lessen the facility of a combination, and may put a stop to intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will attend to the interests of their constituent states. Have not those gentlemen who have been honored with seats in congress, often signalized themselves by their attachment to their states? I wish this government may answer the expectation of its friends, and foil the apprehensions of its enemies. I hope the patriotism of the people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties. I believe its tendency will be, that the state governments will counteract the general interest, and ultimately prevail. The number of the representatives is yet sufficient for our safety, and will gradually increase—and if we consider their different sources of information, the number will not appear too small.


Title: From James Madison to Edward Carrington, 6 June 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Carrington, Edward

Letter not found. 6 June 1788. Acknowledged in Carrington to JM, 17 June 1788. Reports gains for Federalists at the Virginia convention, but cannot predict the outcome.


Title: Weaknesses of the Confederation, [7 June] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[7 June 1788]

   At Henry’s invitation, Randolph defended the direct taxing powers and the system of representation established by the Constitution. As on 6 June, JM followed the governor, this time to justify the creation of a national revenue system and point out defects in the Articles of Confederation.

Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman—In considering this great subject, I trust we shall find that part which gives the general government, the power of laying and collecting taxes, indispensible and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well organised system of government: if we consult reason, and be ruled by its dictates, we shall find its justification there: if we review the experience we have had, or contemplate the history of nations, here we find ample reasons to prove its expediency. There is little reason to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is fully possessed of the power of withholding them. If a government depends on other governments for its revenues; if it must depend on the voluntary contributions of its members, its existence must be precarious. A government which relies on thirteen independent sovereignties, for the means of its existence, is a solecism in theory, and a mere nullity in practice. Is it consistent with reason, that such a government can promote the happiness of any people? It is subversive of every principle of sound policy, to trust the safety of a community with a government, totally destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members. Can congress, after the repeated unequivocal proofs it has experienced of the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisitions, reasonably expect, that they would be hereafter effectual or productive? Will not the same local interests, and other causes, militate against a compliance? Whoever hopes the contrary must ever be disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause. Let each county in this commonwealth be supposed free and independent: let your revenues depend on requisitions of proportionate quotas from them: let application be made to them repeatedly: is it to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate collection could be made from partial compliances? It is now difficult to collect the taxes from them: how much would that difficulty be enhanced, were you to depend solely on their generosity? I appeal to the reason of every gentleman here, whether he is not persuaded, that the present confederation is as feeble, as the government of Virginia would be in that case: to the same reason I appeal, whether it be compatible with prudence to continue a government of such manifest and palpable debility.
If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind, I undertake to say, that no instance can be produced by the most learned man, of any confederate government, that will justify a continuation of the present system; or that will not demonstrate the necessity of this change; and of substituting to the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system now under consideration, or one equally as energetic. The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies, is, that instead of promoting the public happiness, or securing public tranquillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion; ineffectual for the preservation of harmony, and a prey to their own dissensions and foreign invasions.
The Amphyctionic league resembled our confederation in its nominal powers; it was possessed of rather more power. The component states retained their sovereignty, and enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our present system; yet it had the same radical defect. Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders, and final destruction: it was compelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to inforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to foreign assistance: by complying with such an application, together with his intrigues, Philip of Macedon, acquired sufficient influence to become a member of the league. This artful and insidious prince soon after became master of their liberties.
The Achæan league, though better constructed than the Amphyctionic, in material respects, was continually agitated with domestic dissensions, and driven to the necessity of calling in foreign aid: this also eventuated in the demolition of their confederacy. Had they been more closely united, their people would have been happier; and their united wisdom and strength would not only have rendered unnecessary all foreign interpositions in their affairs, but would have enabled them to repel the attack of any enemy. If we descend to more modern examples, we shall find the same evils resulting from the same sources.
The Germanic system is neither adequate to the external defence, nor internal felicity of the people—the doctrine of quotas and requisitions flourishes here. Without energy—without stability—the empire is a nerveless body. The most furious conflicts, and the most implacable animosities between its members, strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and co-operation are incompatible with such an injudiciously constructed system.
The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced for its stability, but even there, dissensions and wars of a bloody nature, have been frequently seen between the cantons. A peculiar coincidence of circumstances contributes to the continuance of their political connection. Their feeble association owes its existence to their singular situation. There is a schism this moment in their confederacy, which, without the necessity of uniting for their external defence, would immediately produce its dissolution.

The confederate government of Holland, is a further confirmation of the characteristic imbecility of such governments. From the history of this government we might derive lessons of the most important utility.
(Here Mr. Madison quoted sundry passages from De Wit, respecting the people of Holland, and the war which they had so long supported against the Spanish monarch; shewing the impolitic and injudicious structure of their confederacy; that it was entirely destitute of energy, because their revenues depended chiefly on requisitions; that during that long war, the provinces of Guelderland and Overyssel had not paid their respective quotas, but had evaded altogether their payments; in consequence of which, two sevenths of the resources of the community had never been brought into action; nor contributed in the least towards the prosecution of the war: that the fear of pressing danger stimulated Holland and the other provinces to pay all the charges of the war: that those two provinces had continued their delinquencies; that the province of Holland alone paid more than all the rest; still those provinces who paid up their proportional shares, claimed from the failing states the amounts of their arrearages; that the most fatal consequences had nearly resulted from the difficulty of adjusting those claims, and from the extreme aversion of the delinquent states to discharge even their most solemn engagements: that there are existing controversies between the provinces on this account at present; and to add to the evils consequent upon requisitions, that unanimity and the revision and sanction of their constituents, were necessary to give validity to the decisions of the states general.)
Mr. Madison then added, That these radical defects in their confederacy must have dissolved their association long ago, were it not for their peculiar position—circumscribed in a narrow territory; surrounded by the most powerful nations in the world; possessing peculiar advantages from their situation; an extensive navigation and a powerful navy—advantages which it was clearly the interest of those nations to diminish, or deprive them of: and that their late unhappy dissensions were manifestly produced by the vices of their system. (He then continued)—We may derive much benefit from the experience of that unhappy country. Governments destitute of energy, will ever produce anarchy. These facts are worthy the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. Does not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lesson drawn from our own experience? I most earnestly pray that America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instructive information she may derive from a contemplation of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a similar fate by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprung. If the general government is to depend on the voluntary contributions of the states for its support, dismemberment of the United States may be the consequence. In cases of eminent danger, the states more immediately exposed to it, would only exert themselves—those remote from it, would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive. The general government ought therefore to be empowered to defend the whole union.
Must we not suppose, that those parts of America which are most exposed, will first be the scenes of war? Those nations whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power, and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and wealthy, must naturally be inclined to exert every means to prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be impelled to attack the most exposed parts of the union? Will not their knowledge of the weakness of our government stimulate them the more readily to such an attack? Those parts to which relief can be afforded with most difficulty, are the extremities of the country, and will be the first objects of our enemies. The general government having no resources beyond what are adequate to its existing necessities, will not be able to afford any effectual succour to those parts which may be invaded.
America, in such a case, would palpably perceive the danger and folly of withholding from the Union, a power sufficient to protect the whole territory of the United States. Such an attack is far from improbable, and if it be actually made, it is difficult to conceive a possibility of escaping the catastrophe of a dismemberment. On this subject we may receive an estimable and instructive lesson, from an American confederacy; from an example which has happened in our country, and which applies to us with peculiar force, being most analogous to our situation. I mean that species of association or union which subsisted in New-England. The colonies of Massachusetts, Bristol, Connecticut, and New-Hampshire, were confederated together.
The object of that confederacy was primarily to defend themselves against the inroads and depredations of the Indians. They had a common-council, consisting of deputies from each party, with an equality of suffrage in their deliberations. The general expenditures and charges were to be adequately defrayed. Its powers were very similar to those of the confederation. Its history proves clearly, that a government founded on such principles must ever disappoint the hopes of those who expect its operation to be conducive to the public happiness.
There are facts on record to prove, that instead of answering the end of its institution, or the expectation of its framers, it was violated with impunity; and only regarded when it coincided perfectly with the views and immediate interests of the respective parties.
The strongest member of the union availed itself of its circumstances to infringe their confederacy. Massachusetts refused to pay its quotas. In the war between England and Holland, it was found particularly necessary to make more exertions for the protection of that country.
Massachusetts being then more powerful and less exposed than the other colonies, refused its contributions to the general defence. In consequence of this, the common council remonstrated against the council of Massachusetts. This altercation terminated in the dissolution of their union. From this brief account of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a longer adherence to the latter.
(Mr. Madison then recapitulated many instances of the prevalent persuasion of the wisest patriots of the states, that the safety of all America depended on union; and that the government of the United States must be possessed of an adequate degree of energy, or that otherwise their connection could not be justly denominated an union. He likewise enumerated the expedients that had been attempted by the people of America to form an intimate association, from the meeting at New-York in the year 1754, downwards: that their sentiments on this subject had been uniform, both in their colonial and independent conditions: and that a variety of causes had hitherto prevented the adoption of an adequate system.)
He then continued thus—If we take experience for our guide, we shall find still more instructive direction on this subject. The weakness of the existing articles of the union, shewed itself during the war. It has manifested itself since the peace, to such a degree as admits of no doubt to a rational, intelligent, and unbiassed mind, of the necessity of an alteration: nay, this necessity is obvious to all America—it has forced itself on the minds of the people. The committee has been informed, that the confederation was not completed till the year 1781, when a great portion of the war was ended; consequently no part of the merit of the antecedent operations of the war could justly be attributed to that system. Its debility was perceived almost as soon as it was put in operation. A recapitulation of the proofs which have been experienced of its inefficacy, is unnecessary. It is most notorious, that feebleness universally marked its character. Shall we be safe in another war in the same situation? That instrument required the voluntary contributions of the states, and thereby sacrificed some of our best privileges. The most intolerable and unwarrantable oppressions were committed on the people during the late war. The gross enormity of those oppressions might have produced the most serious consequences, were it not for the spirit of liberty, which preponderated against every consideration.
A scene of injustice, partiality and oppression, may bring heavenly vengeance on any people. We are now by our sufferings, expiating the crimes of the otherwise glorious revolution. Is it not known to every member of this committee, that the great principles of a free government, were reversed through the whole progress of that scene? Was not every state harrassed? Was not every individual oppressed and subjected to repeated distresses? Was this right? Was it a proper form of government, that warranted, authorised, or overlooked, the most wanton deprivation of property? Had the government been vested with complete power to procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, those oppressive measures would have been unnecessary. But, sir, can it be supposed that a repetition of such measures would ever be acquiesced in? Can a government that stands in need of such measures secure the liberty, or promote the happiness or glory of any country? If we do not change this system, consequences must ensue that gentlemen do not now apprehend. If other testimony were necessary, I might appeal to that which I am sure is very weighty, but which I mention with reluctance. At the conclusion of the war, that man who had the most extensive acquaintance with the nature of the country; who well understood its interests, and who had given the most unequivocal and most brilliant proofs of his attachment to its welfare—when he laid down his arms, wherewith he had so nobly and successfully defended his country, publicly testified his disapprobation of the present system, and suggested that some alteration was necessary to render it adequate to the security of our happiness. I did not introduce that great name to bias any gentleman here. Much as I admire and revere the man, I consider these members as not to be actuated by the influence of any man; but I introduced him as a respectable witness to prove that the articles of the confederation were inadequate, and that we must resort to something else. His modesty did not point out what ought to be done, but said, that some great change was necessary. But, sir, testimony if wished for, may be found in abundance, and numerous conclusive reasons urged for this change. Experience was daily producing such irresistible proofs of the defects of that system, that this commonwealth was induced to exert her influence to meliorate it: she began that noble work, in which I hope she will persist: she proposed to revise it—her proposition met with that concurrence, which that of a respectable party will always meet. I am sure if demonstration were necessary on the part of this commonwealth, reasons have been abundantly heard in the course of this debate, manifold and cogent enough, not only to operate conviction, but to disgust an attentive hearer. Recollect the resolution of the year 1784. It was then found that the whole burthen of the union was sustained by a few states. This state was likely to be saddled with a very disproportionate share. That expedient was proposed (to obviate this inconvenience) which has been placed in its true light. It has been painted in sufficient horrors by the honorable gentleman who spoke last.
I agree with the honorable gentleman (Mr. Henry) that national splendor and glory are not our objects—but does he distinguish between what will render us secure and happy at home, and what will render us respectable abroad? If we be free and happy at home, we shall be respectable abroad.
The confederation is so notoriously feeble, that foreign nations are unwilling to form any treaties with us—they are apprised that our general government cannot perform any of its engagements; but, that they may be violated at pleasure by any of the states. Our violation of treaties already entered into, proves this truth unequivocally. No nation will therefore make any stipulations with congress, conceding any advantages of importance to us: they will be the more averse to entering into engagements with us, as the imbecility of our government enables them to derive many advantages from our trade, without granting us any return. But were this country united by proper bands, in addition to other great advantages, we could form very beneficial treaties with foreign states. But this can never happen without a change in our system. Were we not laughed at by the minister of that nation, from which we may be able yet to extort some of the most salutary measures for this country? Were we not told that it was necessary to temporise till our government acquired consistency? Will any nation relinquish national advantages to us? You will be greatly disappointed, if you expect any such good effects from this contemptible system. Let us recollect our conduct to that country from which we have received the most friendly aid. How have we dealt with that benevolent ally? Have we complied with our most sacred obligations to that nation? Have we paid the interest punctually from year to year? Is not the interest accumulating, while not a shilling is discharged of the principal? The magnanimity and forbearance of that ally are so great, that she has not called upon us, for her claims, even in her own distress and necessity. This, sir, is an additional motive to increase our exertions. At this moment of time, a very considerable amount is due from us to that country and others. (Here Mr. Madison mentioned the amount of the debts due to different foreign nations.) We have been obliged to borrow money, even to pay the interest of our debts. This is a ruinous and most disgraceful expedient. Is this a situation on which America can rely for security and happiness? How are we to extricate ourselves? The honorable member told us, we might rely on the punctuality and friendship of the states, and that they will discharge their quotas for the future. The contributions of the states have been found inadequate from the beginning, and are diminishing instead of increasing. From the month of June, 1787, till June, 1788, they have paid only 276,641 dollars into the federal treasury for the purposes of supporting the national government, and discharging the interest of the national debts: a sum so very insufficient, that it must greatly alarm the friends of their country. Suggestions and strong assertions dissipate before these facts. I shall no longer fatigue the committee at this time, but will resume the subject as early as I can.


Title: To James Madison from Alexander Hamilton, [8 June] 1788
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

My Dear Sir
[8 June 1788]
In my last I think I informed you that the elections had turned out, beyond expectation, favourable to the Antifœderal party. They have a majority of two thirds in the Convention and according to the best estimate I can form of about four sevenths in the community. The views of the leaders in this City are pretty well ascertained to be turned towards a long adjournment say till next spring or Summer. Their incautious ones observe that this will give an opportunity to the state to see how the government works and to act according to circumstances.
My reasonings on the fact are to this effect. The leaders of the party hostile to the constitution are equally hostile to the Union. They are however afraid to reject the constitution at once because that step would bring matters to a crisis between this state and the states which had adopted the Constitution and between the parties in the state. A separation of the Southern district from the other part of the state it is perceived would become the object of the Fœderalists and of the two neighbour[i]ng states. They therefore resolve upon a long adjournment as the safest and most artful course to effect their final purpose. They suppose that when the Government gets into operation it will be obliged to take some steps in respect to revenue &c. which will furnish topics of declamation to its enemies in the several states and will strengthen the minorities. If any considerable discontent should show itself they will stand ready to head the opposition. If on the contrary the thing should go on smoothly and the sentiments of our own people should change they can then elect to come into the Union. They at all events take the chances of time and the chapter of accidents.
How far their friends in the Country will go with them I am not able to say, but as they have always been found very obsequious we have little reason to calculate upon an uncompliant temper in the present instance.
For my own part the more I can penetrate the views of the Antifœderal party in this state, the more I dread the consequences of the Non adoption of the Constitution by any of the other states, the more I fear an eventual disunion and civil war. God grant that Virginia may accede. The example will have a vast influence on our politics. New Hampshire, all accounts give us to expect, will be an assenting state.
The number of the volumes of the Fœderalist which you desired have been forwarded as well the se[c]ond as first; to the care of Governor Randolph. It was impossible to correct a certain error.
In a former letter I requested you to communicate to me by express the event of any decisive question in favour of the constitution authorising changes of horses &c with an assurance to the person sent that he will be liberally paid for his diligence.


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, 8 June 1788
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Mount Vernon June 8th. 1788.
I am much obliged by the few lines you wrote to me on the 4th. and though it is yet too soon to rejoice one cannot avoid being pleased at the auspicious opening of the business of your Convention. Though an ulterior opinion of the decision of this state on the Constitution would at any time previous to the discussion of it in the Convention have been premature yet I have never dispaired of its adoption here. What I have mostly apprehended is that the insiduous arts of its opposers to alarm the fears and to inflame the passions of the Multitude may have produced instructions to the Delegates that would shut the door against argument and be a bar to the exercise of the judgment. If this is not the case I have no doubt but that the good sense of this Country will prevail against the local views of designing characters and the arragent opinions of chagreened and disappointed Men. The decision of Maryland & South Carolina by such large Majorities and the moral certainty of the adoption by New-Hampshire will make all except desperate Men look before they leap into the dark consequences of rejection.

The Ratification by eight States without a negative—By three of them unanimously—By Six against one in another—By three to one in another—By two for one in two more—and by all the weight of abilities & property in the other is enough one would think to produce a cessation of opposition. I do not mean that Number alone is sufficient to produce conviction in the Mind, but I think it is enough to produce some change in the conduct of any man who entertains a doubt of his infalibility.
Altho’ I have little doubt of your having received a copy of the enclosed pamphlet, yet I send it. It is written with much good sense & moderation. I conjecture, but upon no certain ground, that Mr. Jay is the Author of it. He sent it to me sometime ago, since which I have received two or three more copies. With the sincerest esteem & most Affecte regard I am ever Yours
Go: Washington


Title: From James Madison to Alexander Hamilton, 9 June 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Dr Sir
Richd. June 9. [1788]
The Heat of the weather &c. has laid me up with a bilious attack: I am not able therefore to say more than a few words.
No material indications have taken place since my last. The chance at present seems to be in our favor. But it is possible things may take another turn. Oswald of Phila. came here on saturday; and has closet interviews with the leaders of the Opposition. Yours Affely.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: From James Madison to Rufus King, 9 June 1788
From: Madison, James
To: King, Rufus

Dear Sir
Richd. Monday June 9th. [1788]
I have been for two days & still am laid up with a bilious attack. Writing is scarcely practicable & very injurious to me. I can only say to you therefore appearances have not changed sensibly since my last. I think we have a majority as yet; but the other party are ingenious & indefatigable. I wish you all happiness & am Yrs.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Tench Coxe, 11 June 1788
From: Coxe, Tench
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Philada June 11th. 1788
We have been made very happy by the accots from Richmond by yesterday’s post which were to the 5th. of June. From them we learn that Governor R. has acquiesced in the evident sense of the Majority of the States and of the people & that all Questions were to be defer’d till the whole should be considered in parts—and a letter from the head of the Convention expresses the fullest belief, that the Constitution will be ratified. This latter information is carefully kept from print on accot. of the delicate Situation of the writer. Our opposition has been done for some days. The Adoption by so large & such a Majority in Maryland made a great impression on them. South Carolina completed the matter, & before the accots. from your Convention two very active and very able opponents in the City had openly treated the Business as the future Government of America. Our people seem disposed to be kind & unmindful of all that has past, for which I am happy in giving them a considerable Degree of Credit, as indeed the mode of opposing here was very unbecoming.
The course of things at New York has proved very unfavorable unless the Virtue, Knowlege and Abilities of the friends of the Constitution in that Convention, work such Conversions as were effected in Massachussetts. The accots. from your State will also have a great effect, & have gone forward by this morning’s stage. They will reach New York at furthest in the Morning of the 12th, and New Hampshire on the 19th, by post, or earlier by a short passage by Water, or by a private hand. In the enclosed paper you will find an address to the New York Convention, which being just sent to the press when the accots. from Virginia arrived I had time to add a line in the last paragraph affirming that Virginia would adopt. If you think it may serve any useful purpose in your State or North Carolina you will be pleased to have it introduced into your Newspapers.
The opinion of men of knowlege and judgment in New York, before the complexion of yr. house was known, was that their Convention might be induced to adjourn, & such was the plan proposed by the friends of the Constitution.
I submit to you the propriety of striking out the words “and North Carolina,” and changing the word “three” for two in the 3d. Column of the Pennsylvanian. I fear one of the impediments to Adoption in N. Carolina is paper Money—and that they may fear the honest payment of debts that would be produced by disuse of a paper Medium. There can be no impropriety in your making the Alteration thus authorized.
I remember you were struck with the probable benefits from Cotton to the United States. The acquisition of Machines has encreased its importance. It supports its price in Europe & consequently in the W Indies. A fair experiment has been made here, and I can now assure you after careful examination and a fair calculation that the Cotton Manufacture will be always a profitable branch at 2/6 ⅌ lb (⅓ of a dollar) for Cotton, & the first cost & charges of English or french Goods as the price of ours. The South Carolinians have put in all the seed this year they could procure, and I have no doubt will find a profit in it. The Concourse of people attending the Convention will give you a good opportunity of making Enquiries into the present extent of the Cultivation, the extension of it if any this year, the probable quantity put in, and the comparative Quality of it. I should suppose that near the Salts, where the injuries from frost are rare & inconsiderable the Situation would be favorable. The Inspection office of Cotton in Barbado’s is worth I am told 700 Guineas ⅌ Ann. @ 1½d Barbado’s Curry ⅌ 100 lb. The island is growing very rich with it & 22d. Barbado’s Money or 16½d Sterling is esteemed a great price. Every Barbadian speaks of it with rapture. I hope in one or two Years every Virginian & Southern Citizen of America will do the same. I am dear Sir with sincere Regard & Esteem—your most respectf. Servt.
Tench Coxe


Title: Outline of Speech in Support of Direct Taxation, [11 June] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[11 June 1788]
direct taxation
necessary—practicable—safe—œconomical.
I. necessary.
1. for punctuality—credit—suppose war & most to feared &c—free ships free goods.

2. conditl. taxn. produce failure from

3 distrust of concurrent exertions amg. Sts who will deliberate

4. Some Sts less in danger & less willing to exert.

5. Contests between Congs & Sts.

6 effect of being punishment & St. on side of people. Represents. of particular oppose 1st. in Congs. then elsewhere.

7. case of partial payments within time.

8. prevent whole burden on imposts & S. Sts.

9. imports not eno’—now—& decrease in war—& manufactures.

10. Secure responsibility—when not to fix sum only—but find means—

II. practicable
1. 10 or 15 men eno’ for this State

2. aid of State laws—

3. increase of mutual knowledge

4. land—poll—property

5 uniformity not essential—Engd. & Scotd.—local customs.

6. concurrent collections—as both act for people.

III. Safe
1 to public liberty—Reps. of large distrcts—as London &c.

2. comparative dependence & influence of Genl & St: Govts—

3. No members of St: Govt. elected by Genl. Govt.

4. Presidt. elected under influence of St: Legislre.

5. Senate appd. by St: Legislres— Col: Monroes idea & inconsistency here—

6. H. of Reps—attached to Sts: more than Senate.

7. people of Sts. attachd. to St: Govts.

8. compare no. of appointmts.

9. compare powers—

10. powers of Congs. same only as of Confedn. substantiated.—case of Congs [Issuing?] paper money.

IV. Œconomical
1—as to customs
2. as in place of 1500, or 2000 Members.
3—as less mutable—& less exposed to speculations &c.


Title: Power to Levy Direct Taxes, [11 June] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[11 June 1788]

   Technically, Sections 1 and 2 of Article I of the Constitution were still under discussion. “We have sat eight days, [and] so little has been done,” George Nicholas complained, “that we have hardly begun to discuss the question regularly” (Robertson, Virginia DebatesDavid Robertson, Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia (2d
        ed.; Richmond, 1805)., p. 173).

Mr. Madison. Mr. Chairman—It was my purpose to resume before now, what I had left unfinished, concerning the necessity of a radical change of our system. The intermission which has taken place, has discontinued the progress of the argument, and has given opportunity to others to advance arguments on different parts of the plan. I hope we shall steer our course in a different manner from what we have hitherto done. I presume that vague discourses and mere sports of fancy, not relative to the subject at all, are very improper on this interesting occasion. I hope these will be no longer attempted, but that we shall come to the point. I trust we shall not go out of order, but confine ourselves to the clause under consideration. I beg gentlemen would observe this rule. I shall endeavour not to depart from it myself.
The subject of direct taxation is perhaps one of the most important that can possibly engage our attention, or that can be involved in the discussion of this question. If it be to be judged by the comments made upon it, by the opposers and favorers of the proposed system, it requires a most clear and critical investigation. The objections against the exercise of this power by the general government as far as I am able to comprehend them, are founded upon the supposition of its being unnecessary, impracticable, unsafe and accumulative of expence. I shall therefore consider, 1st, how far it may be necessary; 2dly, how far it may be practicable; 3dly, how far it may be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at large, as to the state legislatures; and 4thly, with respect to œconomy. First then, is it necessary? I must acknowledge that I concur in opinion with those gentlemen who told you that this branch of revenue was essential to the salvation of the union. It appears to me necessary, in order to secure that punctuality which is necessary in revenue matters. Without punctuality individuals will give it no confidence; without which it cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to consider the situation of this country, if unhappily the government were to be deprived of this power. Let us suppose for a moment that one of those powers which may be unfriendly to us, should take advantage of our weakness, which they will be more ready to do when they know the want of this resource in our government. Suppose it should attack us, what forces could we oppose to it? Could we find safety in such forces as we could call out? Could we call forth a sufficient number, either by draughts, or any other way, to repel a powerful enemy? The inability of the government to raise and support regular troops, would compel us to depend on militia. It would be then necessary to give this power to the government, or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief, that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the United States, it would flash conviction on the minds of the citizens of the United States, of the necessity of vesting the government with this power, which alone can enable it to protect the community. I do not wish to frighten the members of this convention into a concession of this power, but to bring to their minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity. If we were secured from the possibility, or the probability of danger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that concourse of dangers which may probably arise at remote periods of futurity, nor all those which we have immediately to apprehend, for this would lead me beyond the bounds which I prescribed myself. But I will mention one single consideration, drawn from fact itself. I hope to have your attention.
By the treaty between the United States and his most Christian majesty, among other things it is stipulated, that the great principle on which the armed neutrality in Europe was founded, should prevail in case of future wars. The principle is this, that free ships shall make free goods, and that vessels and goods shall be both free from condemnation. Great-Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was against her, she held out without acceding to it. It has been considered for some time past, that the flames of war already kindled, would spread, and that France and England were likely to draw those swords which were so recently put up. This is judged probable. We should not be surprised in a short time, to consider ourselves as a neutral nation—France on one side, and Great-Britain on the other. What is the situation of America? She is remote from Europe, and ought not to engage in her politics or wars. The American vessels, if they can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the contending nations. It is a source of wealth which we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, sir, is there not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution we shall be drawn into the war? If American vessels have French property on board, Great-Britain will seize them. By this means we shall be obliged to relinquish the advantage of a neutral nation, or be engaged in a war. A neutral nation ought to be respectable, or else it will be insulted and attacked. America in her present impotent situation would run the risk of being drawn in as a party in the war, and lose the advantage of being neutral. Should it happen that the British fleet should be superior, have we not reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that nation to us and to all the world, that we should be insulted in our own ports, and our vessels seized? But if we be in a respectable situation—if it be known that our government can command the whole resources of the union, we shall be suffered to enjoy the great advantages of carrying on the commerce of the nations at war; for none of them would be willing to add us to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more on this point, there being others which merit your consideration.
The expedient proposed by the gentlemen opposed to this clause, is, that requisitions shall be made, and if not complied with in a certain time, that then taxation shall be recurred to. I am clearly convinced, that whenever requisitions shall be made, they will disappoint those who put their trust in them. One reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of delinquency in others. States will be governed by the motives that actuate individuals.
When a tax law is in operation in a particular state, every citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to enforce payment, and that every other citizen is performing his duty, will chearfully discharge his duty; but were it known that the citizens of one district were not performing their duty, and that it was left to the policy of the government to make them come up with it, the citizens of the other districts would be very supine and careless in making provisions for payment. Our own experience makes the illustration more natural. If requisitions be made on thirteen different states, when one deliberates on the subject, she will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it also. This, sir, has been a principal cause of the inefficacy of requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce the same evil. If the legislatures are to deliberate on this subject, (and the honorable gentleman opposed to this clause, thinks their deliberation necessary) is it not presumable, that they will consider peculiar local circumstances? In the general council, on the contrary, the sense of all America would be drawn to a single point. The collective interest of the union at large, will be known and pursued. No local views will be permitted to operate against the general welfare. But when propositions would come before a particular state, there is every reason to believe, that qualifications of the requisitions would be proposed—compliance might be promised, and some instant remittances might be made. This will cause delays, which in the first instance will produce disappointment. This also will make failures every where else. This I hope will be considered with the attention it deserves. The public creditors will be disappointed, and more pressing. Requisitions will be made for purposes equally pervading all America; but the exertions to make compliances, will probably be not uniform in the states. If requisitions be made for future occasions; for putting the states in a state of military defence, or to repel an invasion, will the exertions be uniform and equal in all the states? Some parts of the United States are more exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert themselves equally? We know that the most exposed will be more immediately interested, and will make less sacrifices in making exertions. I beg gentlemen to consider that this argument will apply with most effect to the states which are most defenceless and exposed. The southern states are most exposed, whether we consider their situation, or the smallness of their population. And there are other circumstances which render them still more vulnerable, which do not apply to the northern states. They are therefore more interested in giving the government a power to command the whole strength of the union in cases of emergency. Do not gentlemen conceive that this mode of obtaining supplies from the states, will keep alive animosities between the general government and particular states? Where the chances of failures are so numerous as thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment in the first place, and consequent animosity must inevitably take place.
Let us consider the alternatives proposed by gentlemen instead of the power of laying direct taxes. After the states shall have refused to comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by congress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamours will be raised among the people against the government; hatred will be excited against it. It will be considered as an ignominious stigma on the state. It will be considered at least in this light by the state where the failure is made, and these sentiments will no doubt be diffused through the other states. Now let us consider the effect, if collectors are sent where the state governments refuse to comply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition of mankind not to stop at one violation of duty. I conceive that every requisition that will be made on any part of America, will kindle a contention between the delinquent member, and the general government. Is there no reason to suppose divisions in the government (for seldom does any thing pass with unanimity) on the subject of requisitions? The parts least exposed will oppose those measures which may be adopted for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to presume, that the representatives from the delinquent state will be more likely to foster disobedience to the requisitions of the government, than study to recommend them to the public?
There is, in my opinion, another point of view in which this alternative will produce great evil. I will suppose, what is very probable, that partial compliances will be made. A difficulty here arises which fully demonstrates its impolicy. If a part be paid, and the rest withheld, how is the general government to proceed? They are to impose a tax, but how shall it be done in this case? Are they to impose it by way of punishment, on those who have paid, as well as those who have not? All these considerations taken in view (for they are not visionary or fanciful speculations) will, perhaps, produce this consequence. The general government to avoid those disappointments which I first described, and to avoid the contentions and embarrassments which I last described, will, in all probability, throw the public burdens on those branches of revenue which will be more in their power. They will be continually necessitated to augment the imposts. If we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side, shall we not discourage commerce, and suffer many political evils? Shall we not increase that disproportion on the southern states, which for some time will operate against us? The southern states, from having fewer manufactures, will import and consume more. They will therefore pay more of the imposts. The more commerce is burdened, the more the disproportion will operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the power of the general government to lessen that inequality. But this inequality will be increased to the utmost extent, if the general government have not this power. There is another point of view in which this subject affords us instruction. The imports will decrease in time of war. The honorable gentleman who spoke yesterday, said, that the imposts would be so productive, that there would be no occasion of laying taxes. I will submit two observations to him and the committee. First: in time of war the imposts will be less; and as I hope we are considering a government for a perpetual duration, we ought to provide for every future contingency. At present our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our sales, and to the number of our inhabitants; but when we have inhabitants enough, our imports will decrease; and as the national demands will increase with our population, our resources will increase as our wants increase. The other consideration which I will submit on this part of the subject is this: I believe that it will be found in practice, that those who fix the public burthens, will feel a greater degree of responsibility when they are to impose them on the citizens immediately, than if they were to say what sum should be paid by the states. If they exceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and clamour will arise. Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from the citizens of America—would they not consider their circumstances? Would they not attentively consider what could be done by the citizens at large? Were they to exceed in their demands, what were reasonable burdens, the people would impute it to the right source, and look on the imposers as odious.
When I consider the nature of the various objections brought against this clause, I should be led to think, that the difficulties were such that gentlemen would not be able to get over them, and that the power, as defined in the plan of the convention, was impracticable. I shall trouble them with a few observations on that point.
It has been said that ten men deputed from this state, and others in proportion from other states, will not be able to adjust direct taxes so as to accommodate the various citizens in thirteen states.
I confess I do not see the force of this observation. Could not ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts from this state, lay direct taxes on a few objects in the most judicious manner? It is to be conceived, that they would be acquainted with the situation of the different citizens of this country. Can any one divide this state into any ten districts so as not to contain men of sufficient information? Could not one man of knowledge be found in a district? When thus selected, will they not be able to carry their knowledge into the general council? I may say with great propriety, that the experience of our own legislature demonstrates the competency of congress to lay taxes wisely. Our assembly consists of considerably more than a hundred, yet from the nature of the business, it devolves on a much smaller number. It is through their sanction, approved of by all the others. It will be found that there are seldom more than ten men who rise to high information on this subject. Our federal representatives, as has been said by the gentleman (Mr. Marshall) who entered into the subject with a great deal of ability, will get information from the state governments. They will be perfectly well informed of the circumstances of the people of the different states, and the mode of taxation that would be most convenient for them, from the laws of the states. In laying taxes, they may even refer to the state systems of taxation. Let it not be forgotten, that there is a probability, that that ignorance which is complained of in some parts of America, will be continually diminishing. Let us compare the degree of knowledge which the people had in time past, to their present information. Does not our own experience teach us, that the people are better informed than they were a few years ago? The citizen of Georgia knows more now of the affairs of New-Hampshire, than he did before the revolution, of those of South-Carolina. When the representatives from the different states are collected together, to consider this subject, they will interchange their knowledge with one another, and will have the laws of each state on the table. Besides this, the intercourse of the states will be continually increasing. It is now much greater than before the revolution. My honorable friend over the way, (Mr. Monroe) yesterday, seemed to conceive, as an insuperable objection, that if land were made the particular object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would exonerate the commercial part of the community—that if it were laid on trade, it would be unjust in discharging the landholders; and that any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair. If the general government were tied down to one object, I confess the objection would have some force in it. But if this be not the case, it can have no weight. If it should have a general power of taxation, they could select the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner, as that they should fall in a due degree on every member of the community. They will be limited to fix the proportion of each state, and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner to the public.
The honorable member considered it as another insuperable objection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen states, and that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression. Perhaps it may not be found, on due enquiry, to be so impracticable as he supposes. But were it so, where is the evil of different laws operating in different states, to raise money for the general government? Where is the evil of such laws? There are instances in other countries, of different laws operating in different parts of the country, without producing any kind of oppression. The revenue-laws are different in England and Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to custom, excises, and trade, are similar; but those respecting direct taxation are dissimilar. There is a land-tax in England, and a land-tax in Scotland, but the laws concerning them are not the same. It is much heavier in proportion in the former than in the latter. The mode of collection is different—yet this is not productive of any national inconvenience. Were we to conclude from the objections against the proposed plan, this dissimilarity, in that point alone, would have involved those kingdoms in difficulties. In England itself, there is a variety of different laws operating differently in different places.
I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that concurrent collections under different authorities, were not reducible to practice. I agree that were they independent of the people, the argument would be good. But they must serve one common master. They must act in concert, or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the people. If the general government be so constructed, that it will not dare to impose such burdens, as will distress the people, where is the evil of its having a power of taxation concurrent with the states? The people would not support it, were it to impose oppressive burdens. Let me make one more comparison of the state governments to this plan. Do not the states impose taxes for local purposes? Does the concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general purposes, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial and county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression? The collection of these taxes is perfectly practicable, and consistent with the views of both parties. The people at large are the common superior of the state governments, and the general government. It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid interferences for two causes—to avoid public oppression, and to render the collections more productive. I conceive they will be more likely to produce disputes, in rendering it convenient for the people, than run into interfering regulations.
In the third place I shall consider, whether the power of taxation to be given the general government be safe: and first, whether it be safe as to the public liberty in general. It would be sufficient to remark, that they are, because, I conceive, the point has been clearly established by more than one gentleman who has spoken on the same side of the question. In the decision of this question, it is of importance to examine, whether elections of representatives by great districts of freeholders be favorable to fidelity in representatives. The greatest degree of treachery in representatives, is to be apprehended where they are chosen by the least number of electors; because there is a greater facility of using undue influence, and because the electors must be less independent. This position is verified in the most unanswerable manner, in that country to which appeals are so often made, and sometimes instructively. Who are the most corrupt members in parliament? Are they not the inhabitants of small towns and districts? The supporters of liberty are from the great counties. Have we not seen that the representatives of the city of London, who are chosen by such thousands of voters, have continually studied and supported the liberties of the people, and opposed the corruption of the crown? We have seen continually that most of the members in the ministerial majority are drawn from small circumscribed districts. We may therefore conclude, that our representatives being chosen by such extensive districts, will be upright and independent. In proportion as we have security against corruption in representatives, we have security against corruption from every other quarter whatsoever.
I shall take a view of certain subjects which will lead to some reflections, to quiet the minds of those gentlemen who think that the individual governments will be swallowed up by the general government. In order to effect this, it is proper to compare the state governments to the general government with respect to reciprocal dependence, and with respect to the means they have of supporting themselves, or of encroaching on one another. At the first comparison we must be struck with these remarkable facts. The general government has not the appointment of a single branch of the individual governments, or of any officers within the states, to execute their laws. Are not the states integral parts of the general government? Is not the president chosen under the influence of the state legislatures? May we not suppose that he will be complaisant to those from whom he has his appointment, and from whom he must have his re-appointment? The senators are appointed altogether by the legislatures.
My honorable friend apprehended a coalition between the president, senate, and house of representatives, against the states. This could be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts.
A coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their nature. The house of representatives is not chosen by the state governments, but under the influence of those who compose the state legislature. Let us suppose ten men appointed to carry the government into effect; there is every degree of certainty, that they would be indebted for their re-election, to the members of the legislatures. If they derive their appointment from them, will they not execute their duty to them? Besides this, will not the people (whose predominant interest will ultimately prevail) feel great attachment to the state legislatures? They have the care of all local interests—those familiar domestic objects, for which men have the strongest predilection. The general government on the contrary, has the preservation of the aggregate interests of the union—objects, which being less familiar, and more remote from men’s notice, have a less powerful influence on their minds. Do we not see great and natural attachments arising from local considerations? This will be the case in a much stronger degree in the state governments, than in the general government. The people will be attached to their state legislatures from a thousand causes; and into whatever scale the people at large will throw themselves, that scale will preponderate. Did we not perceive in the early stages of the war, when congress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the object most dear to America, that they were attached to their states? Afterwards the whole current of their affection was to the states, and would be still the case, were it not for the alarming situation of America.
At one period of the congressional history, they had power to trample on the states. When they had that fund of paper money in their hands, and could carry on all their measures without any dependence on the states, was there any disposition to debase the state governments? All that municipal authority which was necessary to carry on the administration of the government, they still retained unimpaired. There was no attempt to diminish it.
I am led by what fell from my honorable friend yesterday to take this supposed combination in another view. Is it supposed, that the influence of the general government will facilitate a combination between the members? Is it supposed, that it will preponderate against that of the state governments? The means of influence consist in having the disposal of gifts and emoluments, and in the number of persons employed by, and dependent upon a government. Will any gentleman compare the number of persons, which will be employed in the general government, with the number of those which will be in the state governments? The number of dependants upon the state governments will be infinitely greater than those on the general government. I may say with truth, that there never was a more œconomical government in any age or country; nor which will require fewer hands, or give less influence.
Let us compare the members composing the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the general government, with those in the states, and let us take into view the vast number of persons employed in the states; from the chief officers to the lowest, we will find the scale preponderating so much in favor of the states, that while so many persons are attached to them, it will be impossible to turn the balance against them. There will be an irresistible bias towards the state governments. Consider the number of militia officers, the number of justices of the peace, the number of the members of the legislatures, and all the various officers for districts, towns and corporations, all intermixing with, and residing among the people at large. While this part of the community retains their affection to the state governments, I conceive that the fact will be, that the state governments, and not the general government, will preponderate. It cannot be contradicted that they have more extensive means of influence. I have my fears as well as the honorable gentleman—but my fears are on the other side. Experience, I think, will prove (though there be no infallible proof of it here) that the powerful and prevailing influence of the states, will produce such attention to local considerations as will be inconsistent with the advancement of the interests of the union. But I choose rather to indulge my hopes than fears, because I flatter myself, if inconveniences should result from it, that the clause which provides amendments will remedy them. The combination of powers vested in those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of the states.
The powers of the general government relate to external objects, and are but few. But the powers in the states relate to those great objects which immediately concern the prosperity of the people. Let us observe also, that the powers in the general government are those which will be exercised mostly in time of war, while those of the state governments will be exercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of war will be little compared to that of peace. I should not complete the view which ought to be taken of this subject, without making this additional remark, that the powers vested in the proposed government, are not so much an augmentation of powers in the general government, as a change rendered necessary, for the purpose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it before. It cannot escape any gentleman, that this power in theory, exists in the confederation as fully as in this constitution. The only difference is this, that now they tax states, and by this plan they will tax individuals. There is no theoretic difference between the two. But in practice there will be an infinite difference between them. The one is an ineffectual power: the other is adequate to the purpose for which it is given. This change was necessary for the public safety.
Let us suppose for a moment, that the acts of congress requiring money from the states, had been as effectual as the paper on the table—suppose all the laws of congress had had complete compliance, will any gentleman say, that as far as we can judge from past experience, that the state governments would have been debased, and all consolidated and incorporated in one system? My imagination cannot reach it. I conceive, that had those acts that effect which all laws ought to have, the states would have retained their sovereignty.
It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new expences and burdens on the people. I believe it is not necessary here to make a comparison between the expences of the present and of the proposed government. All agree that the general government ought to have power for the regulation of commerce. I will venture to say, that very great improvements, and very œconomical regulations will be made. It will be a principal object to guard against smuggling, and such other attacks on the revenue as other nations are subject to. We are now obliged to defend against those lawless attempts, but from the interfering regulations of different states, with little success. There are regulations in different states which are unfavorable to the inhabitants of other states, and which militate against the revenue. New-York levies money from New-Jersey by her imposts. In New-Jersey, instead of co-operating with New-York, the legislature favors violations on her regulations. This will not be the case when uniform regulations will be made.
Requisitions though ineffectual are unfriendly to œconomy. When requisitions are submitted to the states, there are near 2500 or 2000 persons deliberating on the mode of payment. All these, during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great proportion of every session, in every state, is employed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode. Let us suppose 1500 persons are deliberating on this subject. Let any one make a calculation—it will be found that a very few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public money, than one year of that of the general legislature. This is not all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers will be vested in the general government, there will be less of that mutability which is seen in the legislation of the states. The consequence will be a great saving of expence and time. There is another great advantage which I will but barely mention. The greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject, is a vicissitude of laws, and continual shifting and changing from one object to another, which must expose the people to various inconveniences. This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men always have, and always will make an advantage. From whom is advantage made? From the industrious farmers and tradesmen, who are ignorant of the means of making such advantages. The people will not be exposed to these inconveniences under an uniform and steady course of legislation. But they have been so heretofore. The history of taxation of this country is so fully and well known to every member of this committee, that I shall say no more of it.
We have hitherto discussed the subject very irregularly. I dare not dictate to any gentleman, but I hope we shall pursue that mode of going through the business, which the house resolved. With respect to a great variety of arguments made use of, I mean to take notice of them when we come to those parts of the constitution to which they apply. If we exchange this mode, for the regular way of proceeding, we can finish it better in one week than in one month.