Title: Rule of Representation in the Senate, [29 June], [30 June] 1787
From: Yates, Robert,Madison, James
To:

[29 June 1787]

   Ellsworth, arguing the advantages of making “the general government partly federal and partly national,” moved that each state have an equal vote in the Senate (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 474).

Mr. Madison. I would always exclude inconsistent principles in framing a system of government. The difficulty of getting its defects amended are great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia state government was the first which was made, and though its defects are evident to every person, we cannot get it amended. The Dutch have made four several attempts to amend their system without success. The few alterations made in it were by tumult and faction, and for the worse. If there was real danger, I would give the smaller states the defensive weapons—But there is none from that quarter. The great danger to our general government is the great southern and northern interests of the continent, being opposed to each other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided by the geography of the country, not according to the size of the states.
Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second branch, from state views, counteract the first? In congress, the single state of Delaware prevented an embargo, at the time that all the other states thought it absolutely necessary for the support of the army. Other powers, and those very essential, besides the legislative, will be given to the second branch—such as the negativing all state laws. I would compromise on this question, if I could do it on correct principles, but otherwise not—if the old fabric of the confederation must be the ground-work of the new, we must fail.

   Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 475–76 (Yates).

   King’s version:

   “Madison—The Gentleman from Connecticut has proposed doing as much at this Time as is prudent, and leavg. future amendments to posterity—this a dangerous Doctrine—the Defects of the Amphictionick League were acknowledged, but they never cd. be reformed, the U Netherlands have attempted four several Times to amend their Confederation, but have failed in each Attempt—The fear of Innovation, and the Hue & Cry in favor of the Liberty of the people will prevent the necessary Reforms—If the States have equal, influence, and votes in the Senate, we are in the utmost Danger—Delaware during the War opposed and defeated an Embargo agreed to by 12. States; and continued to supply the Enemy with provisions during the war” (ibid., I, 478).

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison—Examine Journals of Congress—see whether States have been influenced by Magnitude. Small States have embarrassed us—Embargo agreed to by twelve States during the War—Deleware declined it.…

   “Madison—If there was any Difference of Interests would agree to equal Representation.

   “Let Gentleman recollect the Experiments that have been made to amend Confederation—they always miscarried. The Dutch Republics made four several Experiments all ineffectual” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., pp. 94–95).

   Lansing divided JM’s second speech in two (see ibid., pp. 94–95 nn. 135, 141).

[30 June 1787]

   Ellsworth spoke in favor of equal representation of the states in the Senate.

Mr. Madison did justice to the able & close reasoning of Mr. E. but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them agst. the more numerous Commons. Mr. E. had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. E. of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government. Had the fact been as stated by Mr. E. it would have been of little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments agst. him; The History & fate of the several Confederacies modern as well as Antient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively refused to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions of Congs. and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congs. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the 2d. branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1st. branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the Majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority. 2. they could extort measures repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3. they could impose measures adverse thereto; as the 2d. branch will probly. exercise some great powers, in which the 1st. will not participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large & small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern. And if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants only, and in the other according to the whole no. counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations; one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself—the other was the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which wd. destroy the equilibrium of interests.

   Ms (DLC).

   JM interlined “did justice … itself” at a later time. He originally wrote “observed that the reasoning of Mr. E. at different times did not well [illegible].” The first part of the insertion is a paraphrase of Yates.

   JM later crossed through the concluding clause: “as a security agst. the encroachments of each other.”

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison. Notwithstanding the admirable and close reasoning of the gentleman who spoke last, I am not yet convinced that my former remarks are not well founded. I apprehend he is mistaken as to the fact on which he builds one of his arguments. He supposes that equality of votes is the principle on which all confederacies are formed—that of Lycia, so justly applauded by the celebrated Montesquieu, was different. He also appeals to our good faith for the observance of the confederacy. We know we have found one inadequate to the purposes for which it was made—Why then adhere to a system which is proved to be so remarkably defective? I have impeached a number of states for the infraction of the confederation, and I have not even spared my own state, nor can I justly spare his. Did not Connecticut refuse her compliance to a federal requisition? Has she paid, for the two last years, any money into the continental treasury? And does this look like government, or the observance of a solemn compact? Experience shows that the confederation is radically defective, and we must in a new national government, guard against those defects. Although the large states in the first branch have a weight proportionate to their population, yet as the smaller states have an equal vote in the second branch, they will be able to controul and leave the larger without any essential benefit. As peculiar powers are intended to be granted to the second branch, such as the negativing state laws, &c. unless the larger states have a proportionate weight in the representation, they cannot be more secure” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 496–97).

   Paterson’s version:

“Mr. Maddison.
The Confedn. inadequate to its Purposes. Resoln. of Cont. refusing
“Lycia.
to comply with a federal Reqn.
Germanick
“Repeated Violations in every State. The Rule of Confdn. obtained
Body.”
by the Necessity of the Times.

“The large States will not be secure by the lower Branch.

“2d. Branch may possess a Negative over the Laws of the State-Lgs.”

   (Ms [DLC: Paterson Papers]).

   Paterson recapitulated part of JM’s speech in notes made for a speech apparently never delivered. See Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 506.

   Lansing’s version:

   “Madison—Equality of Representation was dictated by the Necessity of the Times. The larger States cannot be safe unless they have a greater Share in Government. Connecticut has shewn a Disregard to her fœderal Compact—She has declined complying with Requisition” (Strayer, Delegate from N.Y.Joseph R. Strayer, ed., The Delegate from
          New York or Proceedings of the Federal Convention … from the Notes of John Lansing,
          Jr. (Princeton, 1939)., p. 97).

[30 June 1787]

   Wilson proposed that there be a senator for every 100,000 people, and that states having less than that population be allowed one senator.

Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The Senate therefore is only another edition of Congs. He knew the faults of that Body & had used a bold language agst. it. Still he wd. preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.

   Ms (DLC).

   JM deleted the concluding phrase of this sentence: “with very few amendments.”

   JM interlined the two preceding sentences, paraphrasing Yates, and heavily crossed through his original concluding sentence.

   Yates’s version:

   “Mr. Madison. I will not answer for supporting chimerical objects—but has experience evinced any good in the old confederation? I know it never can answer, and I have therefore made use of bold language against it. I do assert, that a national senate, elected and paid by the people, will have no more efficiency than congress; for the states will usurp the general government. I mean, however to preserve the state rights with the same care, as I would trials by jury; and I am willing to go as far as my honorable colleague” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., I, 499–500).

   Paterson’s version:

“Mr. Maddison.
The Amt. is Congress in a new Form; servile to the States.

“No Disposn. in [Cy.?] Rep. or Corporations to swallow up the Rest”

   (Ms [DLC: Paterson Papers]).


Title: Rule of Representation in the Legislature, [5 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[5 July 1787]

   A grand committee (one delegate from each state) was appointed on 2 July to resolve the differences concerning representation in the two branches of the legislature and to submit a compromise plan. Its 5 July report proposed proportional representation in the first branch, which would have exclusive control over money bills, and equal representation of the states in the Senate.

Mr. Madison could not regard the exclusive privilege of originating money bills as any concession on the side of the small States. Experience proved that it had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members in the other house. Bills could be negatived that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the 1st. branch the use of that body as a check would be lost. If the 1st. branch should yield to that of the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn both in G.B. and the States having a similar regulation that it was a source of frequent & obstinate altercations. These considerations had produced a rejection of a like motion on a former occasion when judged by its own merits. It could not therefore be deemed any concession on the present, and left in force all the objections which had prevailed agst. allowing each State an equal voice. He conceived that the Convention was reduced to the alternative of either departing from justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of the people of the U.S. or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the larger States and the majority of the people. He could not himself hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Convention with justice & the majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice and the minority on their side they had every thing to fear. It was in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord among their Constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, & which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be considered that altho’ at first many may judge of the system recommended, by their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention by the System. The merits of the System alone can finally & effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people of the small States would obstinately refuse to accede to a Govt. founded on just principles, and promising them substantial protection. He could not suspect that Delaware would brave the consequences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other States, rather than submit to such a Govt.: much less could he suspect that she would pursue the rash policy of courting foreign support, which the warmth of one of her representatives (Mr. Bedford) had suggested, or if she shd. that any foreign nation wd. be so rash as to hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect that the people of N. Jersey notwithstanding the decided tone of the gentlemen from that State, would choose rather to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the justice of which they could not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem them from the exactions levied on them by the Commerce of the neighbouring States. A review of other States would prove that there was as little reason to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention was no doubt much to be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first instance still more so. But if the principal States comprehending a majority of the people of the U.S. should concur in a just & judicious Plan, he had the firmest hopes, that all the other States would by degrees accede to it.


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 6 July 1787
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 6th. July 1787
I have your letter of the 26th. ult. The Post preceding the arrival of yours brought a letter from the Governor, inclosing Mr. Wythes resignation, when the filling the vacancy made by that Gentlemans departure from Convention was considered, and determined by the Executive to be unnecessary. The length of time the Convention had been seting, and the representation of the State then attending, being within one of the number at first appointed, and these Gentlemen of established Character and approved abilities—were considerations that I believe had weight and governed the determination. Had the supplying Mr. Wythes place been thought necessary, I have no doubt Mr. Corbins well known abilities, and his being on the Spot, wod. have pointed him out to the Executive as a proper person. It is supposed by some Doctr. M.Clurg will soon retire. Should that be the case and the other Gentlemen remain I am inclined to think from what formerly passed at the Board, they will be deemed a representation competent to the great objects for which they were appointed.
If the Mass: Assembly should pursue such measures as from the specimens you mention there is reason to fear they will, the example may probably prove contagious and spread into New Hampshire, whereby the eastern politics will become formidable, and from the principles which appear to govern them and the number of adherents, pernicious consequences are to be apprehended.
Tobacco still rises. The price now current will nearly bring us what the State allowed and it is probable by next Thursday the day we have fixed for the Sale we shall find purchasers giving a price for all the upland Tobacco at least equal to if not higher than the State price. Although the Treasury board refused to take the Tobacco at the State price, we have been applied to this day by Hopkins to postpone the Sale untill he can apply to and be directed by them what to do, or allow him to bid for the Tobacco to the amount of the Bills on him wch. he says is about 25000 dols. All circumstances considered we have agreed he may purchase to the amount of 4000 £. to be considered as Specie, and to be accompanied with the proper proportion of indents under the requisition of 85. Yr. friend
J Jones


Title: To James Madison from James Madison, Sr., 9 July 1787
From: Madison, James, Sr.
To: Madison, James

9 July 1787. Mentioned in JM to James Madison, Sr., 28 July 1787. Concerned activities of slaves, weather conditions, and poor crops.


Title: Apportionment of Representatives in the First Branch of the Legislature, [10 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[10 July 1787]

   A grand committee proposed that the first branch should initially consist of sixty-five members.

Mr. Madison moved that the number allowed to each State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of 65 members, was too small a number to represent the whole inhabitants of the U. States; They would not possess enough of the confidence of the people, and wd. be too sparsely taken from the people, to bring with them all the local information which would be frequently wanted. Double the number will not be too great, even with the future additions from New States. The additional expence was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so important a case. And as far as the augmentation might be unpopular on that score, the objection was overbalanced by its effect on the hopes of a greater number of the popular Candidates.


Title: Apportionment of Representatives in the Legislature, [11 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[11 July 1787]

   Williamson proposed that apportionment of representatives be based on a periodic census. Gouverneur Morris preferred to entrust the legislature with adjusting its representation.

Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this implicit confidence urged by a member who on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly, the political depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one vice and interest by opposing to them another vice & interest. If the Representatives of the people would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what need was there of a Senate? What of a Revisionary power? But his reasoning was not only inconsistent with his former reasoning, but with itself. At the same time that he recommended this implicit confidence to the Southern States in the Northern Majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of the Western Majority. To reconcile the gentln. with himself, it must be imagined that he determined the human character by the points of the compass. The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree. The case of Pena. had been mentioned where it was admitted that those who were possessed of the power in the original settlement, never admitted the new settlemts. to a due share of it. England was a still more striking example. The power there had long been in the hands of the boroughs, of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every reform which had been attempted. Virga. was in a lesser degree another example. With regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion, that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or policy. He thought also that the hope of contributions to the Treasy from them had been much underrated. Future contributions it seemed to be understood on all hands would be principally levied on imports & exports. The extent and fertility of the Western Soil would for a long time give to agriculture a preference over manufactures. Trials would be repeated till some articles could be raised from it that would bear a transportation to places where they could be exchanged for imported manufactures. Whenever the Mississpi. should be opened to them, which would of necessity be the case, as soon as their population would subject them to any considerable share of the Public burdin, imposts on their trade could be collected with less expence & greater certainty, than on that of the Atlantic States. In the mean time, as their supplies must pass thro’ the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States. He could not agree that any substantial objection lay agst. fixing numbers for the perpetual standard of Representation. It was said that Representation & taxation were to go together; that taxation and wealth ought to go together, that population & wealth were not measures of each other. He admitted that in different climates, under different forms of Govt. and in different stages of civilization the inference was perfectly just. He would admit that in no situation, numbers of inhabitants were an accurate measure of wealth. He contended however that in the U. States it was sufficiently so for the object in contemplation. Altho’ their climate varied considerably, yet as the Govts. the laws, and the manners of all were nearly the same, and the intercourse between different parts perfectly free, population, industry, arts, and the value of labour, would constantly tend to equalize themselves. The value of labour, might be considered as the principal criterion of wealth and ability to support taxes; and this would find its level in different places where the intercourse should be easy & free, with as much certainty as the value of money or any other thing. Wherever labour would yield most, people would resort, till the competition should destroy the inequality. Hence it is that the people are constantly swarming from the more to the less populous places—from Europe to Ama. from the Northn. & Middle parts of the U.S. to the Southern & Western. They go where land is cheaper, because there labour is dearer. If it be true that the same quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less value, than on the Delaware, it is also true that the same labor will raise twice or thrice, the quantity in the former, that it will raise in the latter situation.


Title: To James Madison from John Dawson, 14 July 1787
From: Dawson, John
To: Madison, James

Dear sir
July 14. 1787.
It is now some time since I was honourd with a letter from you. Either your engagements in public business, or the want of something new, I presume has been the cause of it.
Nothing has taken place in this state worth communicating. The people in general appear much discontented. To make property receivable in payment of debts appears to be the most favour’d plan at present. The people of this and several of the neighbouring counties are now signing petitions to that purpose.
Early tomorrow morning I set out for the springs. The remote situation of that place, and the difficulty of procuring any information from Pha. or New York, will render any communications from you doubly acceptable. If you will enclose and direct to Majr. Charles Magill, at Winchester I shall receive your letters in a direct line. I am with much respect & esteem Your sin: Friend & Very hm: Sert
J Dawson


Title: Rule of Representation in the Senate, [14 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[14 July 1787]
Mr Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of Governmt. was destroyed, by substituting an equal in place of a proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised. If the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as well as on themselves he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences of laying the existing confederation on improper principles. All the principal parties to its compilation, joined immediately in mutilating & fettering the Governmt. in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed on it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by (Mr. Patterson) that Representation was an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents if convened, would respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as to the other? But it had been said that the Governt. would in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that altho’ in the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in proportion to the people: yet in the former it ought to be according to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Genl. Governmt. is to act on the people, let the people be represented and the votes be proportional. In all cases where the Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like manner as Congs. now act on them, let the States be represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. He called for a single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not to operate on the people individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional representation in the Govt. they would probably accede to no Govt. which did not in great measure depend for its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation, in which case they would indirectly secure their object. The existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of the Genl. Govt. were to be executed by the particular Govts. the latter had a weight in proportion to their importance. No one would say that either in Congs. or out of Congs. Delaware had equal weight with Pensylva. If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal. But Holland, which supplies about half the money, governs the whole republic. He enumerated the objections agst. an equality of votes in the 2d. branch, notwithstanding the proportional representation in the first. 1 the minority could negative the will of the majority of the people. 2. they could extort measures by making them a condition of their assent to other necessary measures. 3. they could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northn. agst. the Southn. Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not between the large & small but between the N. & Southn. States. The institution of slavery & its consequences formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the South, 8 on the Northn. side of this line. Should a proportl. representation take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber the other: but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an equilibrium.


Title: Power of the Legislature to Negative State Laws, [17 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[17 July 1787]
Mr. Madison considered the negative on the laws of the States as essential to the efficacy & Security of the Genl. Govt. The necessity of a general Govt. proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effectually controuled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will controul it. They can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be repealed by the Genl. Legislre. or be set aside by the National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests. In all the States these are more or less dependt. on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by the Legislature. In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be willing instruments of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the improper laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of preserving the harmony of the System. Its utility is sufficiently displayed in the British System. Nothing could maintain the harmony & subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is sometimes misapplied thro’ ignorance or a partiality to one particular part of the empire: but we have not the same reason to fear such misapplications in our System. As to the sending all laws up to the Natl. Legisl: that might be rendered unnecessary by some emanation of the power into the States, so far at least, as to give a temporary effect to laws of immediate necessity.


Title: Term of the Executive, [17 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[17 July 1787]

   McClurg moved to strike out seven years and insert “‘during good behavior’” (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., II, 33). He believed that since the executive had been made reeligible he would be dependent on the legislature and that the independence of the executive was essential.

Mr. Madison. If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislure., if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why was it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an analogy between the Executive & Judiciary departments in several respects. The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in others. The former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others. The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two circumstances—1. the collective interests & security were much more in the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2. in the administration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in the administration of the latter. But if the 2d. consideration proves that it will be more difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for trying the Execut: than the Judges, & forms an objection to the same tenure of office, both considerations prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer a Union between the Executive & Legisl: powers, than between the Judiciary & Legislative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely necessary to a well constituted Republic that the two first shd. be kept distinct & independent of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the motion was a proper one was another question, as it depended on the practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachmts. as certain & as adequate in the one case as in the other. On the other hand, respect for the mover entitled his proposition to a fair hearing & discussion, until a less objectionable expedient should be applied for guarding agst. a dangerous union of the Legislative & Executive departments.

   Ms (DLC).

   JM later wrote a note to McClurg’s motion: “The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of the Executive Magistrate, by holding out a tenure during good behaviour as the alternative for keeping him independent of the Legislature” (ibid.). JM also later noted that “the view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Dr. McClurg, for whom J. M. had a particular regard, [and whose appointment to the Convention he had actively promoted (crossed out by JM)]. The Docr, though possessing talents of the highest order, was modest & unaccustomed to exert them in public debate” (ibid.).

[17 July 1787]

   Mason spoke against executive tenure during good behavior, insisting that it would be the first step towards monarchy.

Mr. Madison was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican Govt. therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but required evidently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine principles of that form should be kept in view.

   Ms (DLC).


Title: From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 18 July 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Jefferson, Thomas

Dear Sir
Philada. July 18. 1787.
I lately received & forwarded to Mr. Jno. Banister Jr. a packet which came from you under cover to me. I had an opportunity which avoided the charge of postage.
The Convention continue to sit, and have been closely employed since the Commence[me]nt of the Session. I am still under the mortification of being restrained from disclosing any part of their proceedings. As soon as I am at liberty I will endeavor to make amends for my silence, and if I ever have the pleasure of seeing you shall be able to give you pretty full gratification. I have taken lengthy notes of every thing that has yet passed, and mean to go on with the drudgery, if no indisposition obliges me to discontinue it. It is not possible to form any judgment of the future duration of the Session. I am led by sundry circumstances to guess that the residue of the work will not be very quickly dispatched. The public mind is very impatient for the event, and various reports are circulating which tend to inflame curiosity. I do not learn however that any discontent is expressed at the concealment; and have little doubt that the people will be as ready to receive as we shall be able to propose, a Government that will secure their liberties & happiness.
I am not able to give you any account of what is doing at N. York. Your correspondents there will no doubt supply the omission. The paper money here ceased to circulate very suddenly a few days ago. It had been for some time vibrating between a depreciation of 12. & of 20 PerCt. Its entire stagnation is said to have proceeded from a combination of a few people with whom the Country people deal on market days, agst. receiving it. The consequence was that it was refused in the market, and great distress brought on the poorer Citizens. Some of the latter began in turn to form Combinations of a more serious nature in order to take revenge on the supposed authors of the stagnation. The timely interposition of some influencial characters prevented a riot, and prevailed on the persons who were opposed to the paper, to publish their willingness to receive it. This has stifled the popular rage, and got the paper into circulation again. It is however still considerably below par, and must have recd. a wound which will not easily be healed. Nothing but evil springs from this imaginary money wherever it is tried, and yet the appetite for it where it has not been tried, continues to be felt. There is great reason to fear that the bitterness of the evil must be tasted in Virga. before the appetite there will be at an end.
The Wheat harvest throughout the Continent has been uncommonly fine both in point of quantity & quality. The crops of Corn & Tobo. on the ground in Virginia are very different in different places. I rather fear that in general they are both bad; particularly the former. I have just recd. a letter from Orange which complains much of appearances in that neighbourhood; but says nothing of them in the parts adjacent. Present my best respects to Mr. Short & Mr. Mazzei. Nothing has been done since my last to the latter with regard to his affair with Dorhman. Wishing you all happiness. I am Dr Sir Yr. Affee. friend & servt.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: From James Madison to Edward Carrington, ca. 18 July 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Carrington, Edward

ca. 18 July 1787. Acknowledged in Edward Carrington to JM, 25 July 1787. Requests Carrington to forward by John Paul Jones JM’s letter of 18 July to Jefferson. Has settled Carrington’s account with Major Turner.


Title: Method of Appointing the Executive, [19 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[19 July 1787]
Mr. Madison If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be if he was to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance even with an ineligibility afterwards would not establish an improper connection between the two departments. Certain it was that the appointment would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large was in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people generally could only know & vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention & esteem. There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.


Title: Impeachment of the Executive, [20 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[20 July 1787]
Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service, was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Legislature or of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.


Title: Method of Choosing the Judiciary, [21 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[21 July 1787]

   JM had moved on 18 July that the national judiciary should be nominated by the executive and “such nomination should become an appointment if not disagreed to … by ⅔ of the 2d. branch” (Ms [DLC]). After being postponed, debate on this motion was now resumed.

Mr. Madison stated as his reasons for the motion. 1 that it secured the responsibility of the Executive who would in general be more capable & likely to select fit characters than the Legislature, or even the 2d. b. of it, who might hide their selfish motives under the number concerned in the appointment. 2 that in case of any flagrant partiality or error, in the nomination it might be fairly presumed that ⅔ of the 2d. branch would join in putting a negative on it. 3. that as the 2d. b. was very differently constituted when the appointment of the Judges was formerly referred to it, and was now to be composed of equal votes from all the States, the principle of compromise which had prevailed in other instances required in this that there shd. be a concurrence of two authorities, in one of which the people, in the other the States, should be represented. The Executive Magistrate wd. be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally sympathising with every part of the U. States. If the 2d. branch alone should have this power, the Judges might be appointed by a minority of the people, tho’ by a majority of the States, which could not be justified on any principle as their proceedings were to relate to the people, rather than to the States; and as it would moreover throw the appointments entirely into the hands of the Northern States, a perpetual ground of jealousy & discontent would be furnished to the Southern States.


Title: Method of Ratifying the Constitution, [23 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[23 July 1787]

   The delegates had previously voted to send the Constitution to state conventions for ratification, but Ellsworth now moved that final approval should come from the state legislatures.

Mr. Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union, which had given a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recommended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures for examining and adopting it.


Title: To James Madison from Edward Carrington, 25 July 1787
From: Carrington, Edward
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
New York July 25. 1787
I was favoured with yours inclosing a letter for Mr. Jefferson, which I delivered, agreably to your request, to Chevalier Jones—his business with Congress is not finished, and therefore he has not gone with the packet, which sailed this morning. No passenger was going whose personal delivery of the letter could be relied upon, and it seems the Capt. could not take it, otherwise than in the Mail. Not knowing it to be matter of indifference with you, whether it should be exposed to inspection or not, it has been determined, in a conference between the Chevalier & myself, that he should keep it until his own departure, which he expects will be in a short time.
I recd. by Colo. R H Lee Ninety dollars which, with the sum you was good enough to pay Major Turner for me, sets us even. Your acknowledgement for the 100 dollars is inclosed.
We are trying to do something with our Western Territory to make it useful to the purposes for which the United States were vested with it. You have seen in the papers the scheme for the temporary as well as perpetual Government of it. A practicable measure for the sale of it, or rather, by means of it to redeem the domestic debt, remains still to be agreed upon, and I fear the difficulties which have always stood in the way of this great object, are not yet to be surmounted. Colo Lee joins Grayson & myself with great zeal, but what will be the issue of our efforts I know not.
Indian affairs wear an hostile aspect, and money must, in all probability, be expended in Treaties with them. A general confederacy is formed of all the Nations & Tribes from the Six Nations inclusive, to the Mississippi under the immediate influence of Brandt. A general Council has been held in form, near detroit, as long ago as last december, in which have been considered as greivances, our Surveying over the Ohio, the Cessions being made by only parts of the Tribes having rights in the ceded Tracts. Of these injuries or greivances they have sent an United representation to Congress requesting that a general Treaty may be held—perhaps this business may be directed by an authority higher than that of Brandt, and should our titles to the Land be compleat it will still be better to spend a little money in Treating, rather than expend a great deal in War, which from the generality of the confederacy is seriously to be apprehended. This subject is now under consideration.
As to the hostilities upon Kentucky the superintendant of Indian affairs, or in case of his inability to go, Colo. Josiah Harmar, is ordered to proceed immediately to some convenient place for holding a Treaty with the hostile tribes, and by that means restore peace between them and our people if practicable. In the mean time Colo. Harmar is so to post the Federal Troops as to provide the best defence for the Country, and to call for such aids of Militia as he shall find necessary. Should the Treaty not succeed report is to be made to Congress for their further orders as to offensive operations. The state of the general confederacy requires some care in the direction of this business. The desperate state of things in the United Netherlands you see in the papers. Be good enough to present me respectfully to your Collegues and beleive me to be with great regard Your Affe. Hl serv
Ed Carrington


Title: Method of Appointing the Executive, [25 July] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[25 July 1787]

   Ellsworth moved that the executive be chosen by the national legislature, except when an incumbent had served a “‘whole term … in which case the choice shall be by Electors’” chosen by the state legislatures (Farrand, RecordsMax Farrand, ed., The Records of the
          Federal Convention of 1787 (4 vols.; New Haven, 1911–37)., II, 108–9).

Mr. Madison. There are objections agst. every mode that has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions—or by some special authority derived from the people—or by the people themselves. The two Existing authorities under the Natl. Constitution wd. be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointmt. favorable to their wishes. Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, altho’ the elective Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most eager interference of for[e]ign princes, and has in fact at length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the Natl. Executive by the first, was objectionable in many points of view, some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Natl. Legislre. was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the Natl. Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt of the Natl. Executive to the State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointmt. of a man who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have the same object, or different objects of the same kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered subservient to them. An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciarys had not & he presumed wd. not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people—and an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst. it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a further precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Govt. and even that no person within a certain distance of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This Mode however had been rejected, so recently & by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified part of them, at large. With all its imperfections he liked this best. He would not repeat either the general argumts. for or the objections agst. this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst. every other mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase of their population. 2. That local considerations must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States he was willing to make the sacrifice.


Title: From James Madison to James Madison, Sr., 28 July 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, James, Sr.

Hond. Sir
Philada. July 28. 1787.
Since my letter to my brother Ambrose, I have received yours of the 9th. instant. The enquiries which I have at different times made of Billey concerning Anthony satisfy me that he either knows, or will tell nothing of the matter. It does not appear to me probable that all the circumstances mentioned by Anthony with regard to his rambles can be true. Besides other objections which occur, there seems to have been scarcely time for all the trips which he pretends to have made. I have not communicated to John the suspicions entertained of him. Whilst he remains in my service it will be well for him to suppose that he has my confidence, and that he has a character staked on his good behaviour. He has been very attentive & faithful to me as yet, particularly since I left Virginia. His misbehaviour in Fredericksbg. was followed by some serious reprehensions, & threats from me, which have never lost their effect.
I am sorry that I cannot gratify your wish to be informed of the proceedings of the Convention. An order of secresy leaves me at liberty merely to tell you that nothing definitive is yet done, that the Session will probably continue for some time yet, that an Adjournment took place on thursday last until Monday week, and that a Committee is to be at work in the mean time. Late information from Europe presents a sad picture of things in Holland. Civil blood has been already spilt, and various circumstances threaten a torrent of it. Many it is said are flying with their property to England. How much is it [to] be lamented that America does not present a more inviting Asylum!
Congress have been occupied for some time past on Western affairs. They have provided for the Governmt. of the Country by an ordinance of which a copy is herewith inclosed. They have on the anvil at present, some projects for the most advantageous sale of the lands. Col. Carrington informs me that Indian Affairs wear a very hostile appearance; that money must in all probability be expended in further Treaties; that a General Confederacy has been formed of all the Nations & tribes from the six nations inclusive to the Mississippi under the auspices of Brandt; that a Genl. Council was held in Decr. last in form, near detroit, in which was considered as a greivance, the Surveying of lands on the N.W. side of the Ohio, the pretext being, as usual that the Treaties which preceded that measure were made by parts only of the Nations whose consent was necessary; and that a united representation of this grievance has been recd. by Congress. That as to the hostilities on Kentucky the Superintendant of Indian Affairs, or in case of his inability to go, Col. Harmar, is ordered to proceed immediately to some convenient place for holding a Treaty with the Hostile tribes, and by that means restore if possible peace in that quarter. In the mean time Col. Harmar is so to post the federal troops as to provide the best defence for the Country, and to call for such aids of Militia as he shall find necessary.
The Crops of wheat in this & the neighbouring States, and indeed throughout the Continent as far as I can learn have been remarkably fine. I am sorry to hear that your crops of Corn are likely to be so much shortened by the dry weather. The weather has been dry in spots in this quarter. At present it is extremely seasonable just here, and I do not know that is otherwise, elsewhere. I hope Virginia partakes of the blessing.
A letter from my brother gave me the first notice of your indisposition. It is my most fervent wish that this may find your health thoroughly re-established, and that of my mother & the rest of the family, unimpaired: Being with entire affection Yr. dutifully Son.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: From James Madison to James McClurg, ca. 28 July 1787
From: Madison, James
To: McClurg, James

ca. 28 July 1787. Acknowledged in McClurg to JM, 5 Aug. 1787. Reports proceedings of the Federal Convention since McClurg’s departure and requests his return to Philadelphia.


Title: From James Madison to Jacquelin Ambler, 30 July 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Ambler, Jacquelin

Sir
Philada. July 30. 1787.
Please to pay ⟨to Messrs. Francis and John West of Philadelphia or order⟩ five hundred and fifty two dollars for value received, as an advance for one quarters attendance on ⟨Congress⟩, to  Yr. Obedt. & hble servt.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from the Reverend James Madison, 1 August 1787
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

Dear Col.
Aug. 1. 1787. Williamsb.
We are here, & I beleive every where, all Impatience to know Something of your conventional Deliberations. If you cannot tell us what you are doing, you might at least give us some Information of what you are not doing. This wd. afford a Clue for political Conjecture, and perhaps be sufficient to satisfy present Impatience. I hope you have already discoverd the Means of preserving the American Empire united—& that the Scheme of a Disunion has been found pregnant with the greatest Evils. But we are not at this Distance able to judge with any Accuracy upon subjects so truely important & interesting as those wch. must engage you at present. We can only hope, that you will all resemble Cæsar, at least in one particular, “nil actum reputans si quid superesset agendum”; & that your Exertions will be commensurate to the great Expectations wch. have been formed. It is probable my Observations upon Mr. A’s Book must have appeared to you to be hasty & undigested. I wish to know what you think of it. Congress, I find, by a late Ordinance establishing temporary Govts. in the new States, have adopted the Adamic Idea. Would not the other States be wise to wait for the Issue of the Experiment wch. will there be made. We shall then have two important Expts. going on at the same Time—The Results of wch. may be the best Guide.
If you be not better or too much engaged I beg you wh. is the principal Object of this Letter to favour me with a few Lines & to beleive me to be most sincerely Dr Col. Yr. Friend
J Madison
Pray remember me to Mr Blair The Govr. & M’Clurg.


Title: To James Madison from William Short, 1 August 1787
From: Short, William
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris Aug. 1. 1787
Since I had last the honor of writing to you I have recieved your two favors of May 16. & June 6. The first brought me a letter from my friend Mr. Nelson, & at the same time recommended to my care an affair which a letter from one of the parties (Mr. Hollingsworth) explained. I beg you to be persuaded Sir, of the pleasure it will at all times give me to render every service in my power to my countrymen who may have business on this side of the Atlantic. In this instance particularly it can give no trouble, as a mercantile gentleman is joined with me in the commission, who will dictate the proper measures, when the powers to act shall arrive.
Mr. Jefferson has returned from his journey, & recieved the letter you wrote him by the last packet. I leave to him therefore Sir, to give you an account of the effects of the waters on a wrist which you appreciate so properly. I mentioned to the Marquis de la fayette what you desired in your letter of the 6th. He expects to hear from you as soon as your time will permit you to write to your friends here, & regrets much your late silence. He sets out in a few days to the Province of Auvergne where he is a member of the assembly under the new regulations that are taking place in this kingdom. His friends had once expected that he would have been made the president of that assembly: but the crime of having only thirty years of age though with more experience than others have at sixty, has prevented his nomination to that place. In this instance the presidents are chosen by the court; in future they will be chosen by the assembly themselves, & then I think the Marquis’s popular talents, without counting his merit, will insure him the preference.
From the public papers, & from Mr. Jefferson you will recieve a much better idea of the present critical situation of affairs in Europe than I can give you. Yet I may add that every circumstance seems to threaten war, except the impossibility in which the two principal champions are to raise money sufficient for the purpose. The treaty of commerce they have lately made, & the advantages which both nations may expect to derive from it would not be sufficient to restrain the two sovereigns if they were free of pecuniary embarassments. You may form some idea of the situation of the finances of this country when you are told that the deficit, after four years peace, is found to be 140. millions annually—that in order to cover this deficit, supposing a peace to continue, it is necessary first to make a loan of 50. millions—secondly, that the King should submit to an oeconomy of 40. millions—& thirdly that new taxes should be imposed to the amount of 50. millions. The loan has been effected—the oeconomies have been promised by the crown—& the new taxes have been absolutely & repeatedly refused by the Parliament of Paris notwithstanding positive orders to enregister the edict creating them. The Princes & Peers have been assembled with the Parliament. This from long desuetude is regarded as a phaenomenon; as yet however they have been able to get nothing from the Parliament but remonstrances. They were assembled yesterday, after a committee of the Parliament had been summoned to Versailles. The event of yesterday’s session is not known with precision. The freedom & the firmness with which these remonstrances have been expressed do great honor to the authors of them, & still more to the influence of philosophy which begins to teach subjects the proper bounds of the authority of sovereigns.
We are happy Sir, in being of a country where the rights of man are considered the gift of heaven and not the grant of [a crow]ned head—but we should be still more happy if our countrymen knew how to estimate such a situation. The result of the deliberations of the convention, & the spirit with which they may be recieved in the different states, will show whether we know how to make small sacrifices where necessary to secure general happiness. I confess to you Sir, that past experience makes me fear to look forward to the event of the trial now making. A want of certainty of its doing good, & a certainty of its doing much harm if it does not, makes me regard with anxiety the dubious event. The representation however is such an one as must effect whatever can be effected by such a convention. You may be sure Sir, I am happy to see that Virginia has furnished her full quota of virtue & talents on this occasion. I am sorry that the Socrates of our State should have been obliged to withdraw his aid on account of the indisposition of a part of his family.
Mr. Nelson’s letter informed me that the plan of paper money had been rejected in Maryland, & that the ardor for it in Virginia was disappearing. If so the symptom may be considered as favorable, but I fear that Mr. Nelson could speak of only a small part of the State, & that not in a quarter most to be feared. I hope, & intreat you Sir, to return to the next Assembly in Virginia. I know nobody but yourself who can oppose with success the dangerous influence of Mr. Henry. Accept, my dear Sir the sincerest wishes for your success in all your enterprizes & particularly in this, from Your friend & servant
W Short


Title: From James Madison to John Pendleton, 2 August 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Pendleton, John

Sir
Philada. Augst. 2. 1787.
Inclosed is the account on which my claim is founded for another quarters advance; for which I have drawn a bill on the Treasurer in favor of Messrs. Wests Merchts. of this City. I was so unlucky as to make out & dispose of the bill before I adverted to the surplus of £14. advanced for the last quarter by mistake of your Clerk. I could not therefore correct the error at this time. In my next account, it shall certainly be attended to. I am Sir with great respect Yr. Obdt. & hble servt.
Js. Madison Jr.

[Enclosure]

1787.
The Commonwealth of Virginia to James Madison	Jr.
Dr.

To Attendance as a member of Congress from July 20. to Octr. 20. being 92 days at 6 dollars per day.
£165 .. 12-

    6

552

    3

  165.12

E. E. Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 2 August 1787
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Paris Aug. 2. 1787.
My last was of June 20. Your’s received since that date are May 15. and June 6. In mine I acknoleged the receipt of the Paccan nuts which came sealed up. I have reason to believe those in the box are arrived at Lorient. By the Mary capt Howland lately sailed from Havre to N. York I shipped three boxes of books one marked I.M. for yourself, one marked B.F. for Doctr. Franklin, & one marked W.H. for William Hay in Richmond. I have taken the liberty of addressing them all to you as you will see by the inclosed bill of lading, in hopes you would be so good as to forward the other two. You will have opportunities of calling on the gentlemen for the freight &c. In yours you will find the books noted in the account inclosed herewith. You have now Mably’s works complete except that on Poland, which I have never been able to get, but shall not cease to search for. Some other volumes to compleat your collection of Chronologies. The 4th. vol. of D’Albon was lost by the bookbinder, & I have not yet been able to get one to replace it. I shall continue to try. The Memoires sur les droits et impositions en Europe (cited by Smith) was a scarce & excessively dear book. They are now reprinting it. I think it will be in three or four quartos of from 9. to 12 a volume. When it is finished I shall take a copy for you. Amelot’s travels into China I can learn nothing of. I put among the books sent you, two somewhat voluminous, & the object of which will need explanation; these are the Tableau de Paris & L’espion Anglois. The former is truly a picture of private manners in Paris, but presented on the dark side & a little darkened moreover. But there is so much truth in it’s ground work that it will be well worth your reading. You will then know Paris (& probably the other large cities of Europe) as well as if you had been here years. L’Espion Anglois is no Caricature. It will give you a just idea of the wheels by which the machine of government is worked here. There are in it also many interesting details of the last war, which in general may be relied on. It may be considered as the small history of great events. I am in hopes when you shall have read them you will not think I have mis-spent your money for them. My method for making out this assortment was to revise the list of my own purchases since the invoice of 1785. and to select such as I had found worth your having. Besides this I have casually met with & purchased some few curious & cheap things. I have made out the Dr. side of the account, taking for my ground work yours of March 18. 1786. correcting two errors of computation in that which were to your prejudice. The account of the Mr. Fitzhughs stood thus. 1785. Sep. 1. cash 600 lt. Nov. 10. pd. their bill of exchange in favor of Limozin 480 lt. making 1080 lt. The money they paid you was worth 1050 lt. according to our mode of settling at 18 lt. for 20/ Virginia money. The difference of 30 lt. will never be worth notice unless you were to meet with them by chance, & hardly then. I must trouble you on behalf of a Mr. Thos. Burke at Loughburke near Loughrea in Ireland, whose brother James Burke is supposed to have died in 1785. on his passage from Jamaica, or St. Eustatius to New York. His property on board the vessel is understood to have come to the hands of Alderman Groom at New York. The inclosed copy of a letter to him will more fully explain it. A particular friend of mine here applies to me for information, which I must ask the favor of you to procure and forward to me.

Writing news to others, much pressed in time, & making this letter one of private business, I did not intend to have said any thing to you on political subjects. But I must press one subject. Mr. Adams informs me he has borrowed money in Holland, which if confirmed by Congress will enable them to pay not only the interest due here to the foreign officers but the principal. Let me beseech you to reflect on the expediency of transferring this debt to Holland. All our other debts in Europe do not injure our reputation so much as this. These gentlemen have connections both in & out of office, & these again their connections, so that our default on this article is further known, more blamed, & excites worse dispositions against us than you can conceive. If you think as I do, pray try to procure an order for paying off their capital. Mr. Adams adds that if any certain tax is provided for the paiment of interest, Congress may borrow enough in Holland to pay off their whole debts in France both public & private, to the crown, to the farmers & to Beaumarchais. Surely it will be better to transfer these debts to Holland. So critical is the state of that country that I imagine the monied men of it would be glad to place their money in foreign countries, & that mr. Adams could borrow there for us without a certain tax for the interest, & saving our faith too by previous explanations on that subject. This country is really supposed on the eve of a bankruptcy. Such a spirit has risen within a few weeks as could not have been believed. They see the great deficit in their revenues, & the hopes of oeconomy lessen daily. The parliament refuse to register any act for a new tax, & require an assembly of the states. The object of this assembly is evidently to give law to the king, to fix a constitution, to limit expences. These views are said to gain upon the nation. The kings passion for drink is divesting him of all respect. The queen is detested and an explosion of some sort is not impossible. The ministry is alarmed, & the surest reliance at this moment for the public peace is on their two hundred thousand men. I cannot write these things in a public dispatch because they would get into a newspaper and come back here. A final decision of some sort should be made in Beaumarchais’ affairs. I am with sentiments of the most perfect esteem Dear Sir Your friend & servt
Th: Jefferson
P.S. The watch & pedometer not done. In the box of books are some for the colleges of Philadelphia & Williamsburg & two vols. of the Encyclopedie for Congress, presented by the author of that part.

[Enclosure]
pa. 1.
State of account between James Madison esq. & Th: Jefferson copied from J. M’s letter of Mar. 18. 1786.

J: M. to Th: J.Dr. lt
1785. Sep. 1.To amount of books1164- 3
Cr.
By balance stated by Th: J. 77 ⅔ lt
Dollars.407-15
By advance to Le Maire 10. Guineas234-
By 6. copies of revisal @ 2½ dollars. 81-
By 25 £ Virga. currcy. remitted to mrs. Carr441- 81164- 3
pa.2.
James Madison esq. to Th: Jefferson Dr.
To 58 £ -6s-8 Virga. currency received lt
from the Fitzhughs1050- 0- 0
1785. Nov. 4.To repaid mr. Short for a Spy-glass bought in England  50-
Nov. 21.To Limozin at Havre transportation of 2. trunks of books Sep. 1785.  34- 8- 9
1786. Aug. 2.To paid for an Umbrella cane  30-
a copying press & apparatus, paper & ink 144-
Oct. 13.a chemical box  69-
1787. July 4.To paid Cabaret for binding books  46- 14
To paid for books, to wit.

 lt s d
Guerre de 1775–83. 4to10- 0- 0
Voyage en Suisse par Mayer. 2. v. 8vo. 7- 4
Ordonnance de marine 8vo. 4- 4
Voiage aux Alpes par Saussure. 4. v. 8vo.18-

Experiences d’Ingenhousz. 8vo. 4- 10
Chymie de Fourcroy. 4. v. 8vo.24- 0
Peines infamantes par La Cretelle. 8vo. 3-12
Savary sur l’Egypte 3. v. 8vo.15- 0
Voiages de Volney. 2. v. 8vo.10- 4
la France et les etats Unis par Warville. 8vo. 4-10
Loix criminelles par Warville 2. v. 8vo. 7- 4
Vie de Turgot par Condorcet. 8vo. 4-10
L’Espion Anglois. 10. v. 12mo.25- 0
Annales Romaines par Macquer. 12mo. 5-
142-18   1424- 2- 9
pa. 3.
 lt s lt   s d
Brought forward142-181424- 2- 9
Troubles de l’Amerique par Soulés. 4. v. 8vo. 16- 0-
Bibliotheque physico-oeconomique (1786) 2. v. 12mo.  5- 4
Mably. Principes de legislation. 12mo.  3-
 de la Grece. 12mo.  2-
De Juvigny sur la decadence des lettres. 8vo.  6-
Abregé chronologique d’Angleterre de Salmon. 2. v. 8vo. 12-
Abregé chronol. de l’histoire ecclesiastique 18-
Abregé chronol. de l’Allemagne par Pfeffel. 2. v. 12mo. 12-

Histoire ancienne de Milot. 4. v. 12mo. 12-
Moderne 5. v. 12mo. 15
de France 3. v. 12mo.  7-10
De Thou. 11. v. 4to 55-
Bibliotheque Physicooeconomique. (1787.) 2. v. 12mo.  5- 4
Pieces interessantes. 4. v. 12mo. 12-
Tableau de Paris 4. v. 12mo. 13-
(given)Demarcation entre l’Espagne et le Portugal en Amerique.
Histoire de Kentuckey. 8vo.  4- 5
Smith’s history of New York. 8vo.  6-
Voiages de Chastellux. 2. v. 8vo. 11-
Memoires de Brandenburgh. 8vo.  6-
Examen de Chastellux par Warville. 8vo.  2- 8
Hennepin. 12mo.  2-
Vie de Voltaire par l’Abbé Duvernet. 8vo.  7- 5
375-14   1424- 2- 9
pa. 4.
 lt  s lt   s d
Brought forward375-141424- 2- 9
Histoire de la Nouvelle France par Lescarbot 8vo.  2-10
Gibson’s Saxon chronicle. 4to. 6/ sterl.  7- 4
Avantages et desavantages de la decouverte de l’Amerique  1- 4
Encyclopedie. 16th. 18th. 19th. 20th. 22d. livraisons @ 24 lt. each.120
15th. 23 lt-10—17th. & 21st. 36 lt-10 each 96-10216-10

* 5th. Oiseaux to. 1. part 2.  7- 0 610- 2
1787. Aug. 4.To paid Limozin carriage of books to Havre (exclus. of Dr. F’s & Hay’s)  27-14- 9
2061-19- 6
Graecorum respublicae Ubbonis Emmii (qu. if sent?)  9 lt.
* when your duplicate vol. shall be returned they will give you credit for it. Cr.

Cr.
By error in computing the value of 10
Guineas in former account
 s  lt  s lt s  lt
(20: 18:: 28: 25-4)  18
£  lt
By do. 25=441-8 remitted to mrs. Carr
£  lt
(25=450)

NB.Having been very desirous of collecting the original Spanish writers on American history, I commissioned mr. Carmichael to purchase some for me. They came very dear, & moreover he was obliged to take duplicates in two instances. I have packed one copy of these in mr. Madison’s box, & will beg the favor of him to sell them for me if he can. I state below the exact prices they cost me in Spain, adding nothing for transportation to France, which was high.

La Florida de Garcilasso de la Vega. fol.
}
200. reals = 10. Dollars

Historia General de la Florida por De Cadenasz Caro. fol.

Herrera Historia General 4. v. fol.

500. reals = 25. Dollars.

Th: Jefferson

Aug. 3. 1787

1784.
Cr.

livres sous den.

Doll.  lt s

By balance brought forward 77⅔ @ 5-5
407-15-0

By advance to le Maire 10
  Guineas
234-

By do. for 6 Revisals at 2½ drs.
 81-

722-15-

By £25 Va. Currency remitted to Mrs. Carr for use of Peter & Dabney equal to the   Balance
441- 8

1164- 3


Title: To James Madison from John Dawson, 5 August 1787
From: Dawson, John
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Bath Augt. 5. 1787.
Two days before I left Frdksburg I did myself the pleasure of addressing a letter to you, and have not receivd one since my arrival at this place. By directing to the care of Majr. Magill, Winchester, there would be a certainty of my receiving any communications you will honour me with.
Yesterday I visited “a flowing spring” abt. thirteen miles from this place, in the state of Pennsylvania and in my estimation it is the greatest curiosety I have ever seen. About twenty years ago a Farmer, who is now the proprietor; as he went out in the morning to his labour, observing a very bold stream, in the woods, stopt, and drank some of the water. As he found it exceedingly cold, on his return he determin’d to repeat his draught; but was much astonish’d when he came to the place to find no water. He informd me that since that period he has observd that it flows generally every six hours, altho sometimes he has known it five time in the day—that it always rises to the same height, whether in winter or summer; in wet or dry weather—that after heavy rains, when the water from the other springs is unfit for use, this is clear—That he has not discoverd any quality in it, which is not possessd by the other springs in his farm, except its coldness.
I arrived at it about eleven oCk at which time it did not contain more than two gallons of water, settled at the bottom. On being informd by the old Farmer that it woud not run untill about two, I immediately had the bed much enlarg’d; and after digging about two feet down discoverd a firm rock.
We then waited untill about half past one with much anxiety, and realy I began to doubt the information receivd from the Farmer. About this time I discoverd some water boiling up from the bottom of the bed, through the rock. It continud untill the hole was nearly full. It then fell—then rose again—and this it repeated six different times, but never rose high enough to discharge any water from the hole. However—about 2 oCk, it rushd up in a dozen places through the rock, and in three minutes the discharge of water was sufficient to have turnd a mill. This continu’d near half an hour, when it began to fall, and in five minutes entirely ceas’d to flow.
I then left it, much astonishd—and unable even to hazard a conjecture of the cause. To you, Who I know are fond of these things, I leave the investigation, and shoud you wish for information on any points I will with pleasure procure it.
The spring is situated at the bottom of a small hill, about five miles from the Patowmac and from tide-water about one hundred. The country is montainous. There are several other springs within thirty years all of which continue to flow constantly. The water is remarkably cold, and strongly empregnated with the lime stone, as are all the neighbouring springs.
About the last of the month I shall leave this place, and intend to take Phia. in my way to Frdksburg. I flatter myself with the pleasure of seeing you. With much respect I am Yr. Friend & hm: Sert
J Dawson


Title: To James Madison from Lafayette, 5 August 1787
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Madison, James

My dear friend
Paris August the 5th 1787
Your Correspondents in france, Besides me, are So Well informed that You Have only to Be affraid of tedious Repetitions. They Will tell You that the dutch are divided into Several Parties, Which are Ranged in two opposite Armies. Three provinces and a Half, among Whom is that of Holland, and the Volunteer Corps are on the Side of freedom. The Remainder of the provinces, the Regulars, and a part of the Mobs Want to Make the State Holder a Kind of King—for the Rage for Kings, altho’ it is Wearing off, is Still Subsisting in the old World. France Has Her interest Connected With the Republican Party—England and Prussia With the other. Preparations are Making for War But Will End, I think, into a Mediation.
The People in the Austrian flanders Have Made a Clever Stand Against Arbitrary Authority—and altho’ the Cause of the Revolt is Stained With Superstition—We are to Admire the Execution of it. It is Still Uncertain Wether the Emperor Will Make Up the difference With the deputies Sent to Him, or Undertake the Long and Expensive March of an Army to that Remote Part of His dominions. The first division of the opinions of the Notables Has Been Sent to You. I Will forward the other When it is Ready. You Will find in the Begining Some principles Which are in themselves, and to a Republican Ear ought to Appear Very foolish. But all Cannot Be done at once, and Great deal it is to Have in Each province A full Representation, Half of Which Commoners, and the Whole Choosen By the people at large. You Will see By the New Constitutions that We Could not get it fixed in that Manner for the present. But it Will Begin With the fourth Year. Those Assemblies are good Seeds of a proper Government.
Now the Parliaments, Warmed By the debates of the Notables, ask for the States generals of the Kingdom. It Will not Be granted for the present, But the political Notions Widen a Great deal. Our Present Administration is Excellent—and there is No abler and Honester Man in the World than the Arch Bishop of toulouse.
I am Very Anxious to Hear of the Convention. The fame of the United States Requires that Some thing Be immediately done. It is Still More Important to their Happiness. Our Notions on that Subject are So Much alike that I Have only to tell you that Such immediate Measures are Necessary to the Consequence of America in Europe. I Know We Have Every thing to Expect from the Liberality, Wisdom, and Patriotism of our fellow Citizens. Should they Be deficient in that Glory and Happiness Which I Expect for them, I feel that the tranquillity of My Life Will Be poisoned. But I See a More pleasant prospect Before me and I do Assure You, My dear friend, that My Best Wishes Have Attended Your Exertions. I don’t write to Clel. Hamilton, not Because He is Lazy, But Because I Will Let Him Hear from me after the Meeting of our first Assembly in a fortnight. Pray Communicate to Him those intelligences as Well as to Gnl. Knox and Clel Lee to Whom I will write also in a few days.
M. de Beaumarchais Waited on me With His Complaints against Congress and the State of Virginia, and Said Congress Had Not Answered His Letters. I told Him that His Wish to obtain an Answer Appeared to me Very proper—that I Would go that Length in My Recommendations—and that the Answer Being obtained He Might See What He Had to do. At the Same time I Advised Him to Wait on Mr. Jefferson, and promised I would give a Letter for You to His Envoy M. chevalier. I observed to M. Beaumarchais that His affairs Could Be Settled either By a Resolve of Congress or instructions to their Ambassadors, or in Case it Was doubted Wether the Envoices Were on account of the Court or M. de Beau Marchais, By an Application to this Governement to Know the truth.   Adieu, My dear Sir, Most affectionately Yours
Lafayette


Title: To James Madison from James McClurg, 5 August 1787
From: McClurg, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
Richmond Augt. 5. 87.
I am much obliged to you for your communication of the proceedings of the Convention, since I left them; for I feel that anxiety about the result, which it’s Importance must give to every honest citizen. If I thought that my return could contribute in the smallest degree to it’s Improvement, nothing should keep me away. But as I know that the talents, knowledge, & well-establish’d character, of our present delegates, have justly inspired this country with the most entire confidence in their determinations; & that my vote could only operate to produce a division, & so destroy the vote of the State, I think that my attendance now would certainly be useless, perhaps injurious.
I am credibly inform’d that Mr. Henry has openly express’d his disapprobation of the circular letter of Congress, respecting the payment of British debts; & that he has declared his opinion that the Interests of this state cannot safely be trusted with that body. The doctrine of three Confederacies, or great Republics, has it’s advocates here. I have heard Hervie support it, along with the extinction of State Legislatures within each great department. The necessity of some independent power to controul the Assembly by a negative, seems now to be admitted by the most Zealous Republicans—they only differ about the mode of constituting such a power. B. Randolph seems to think that a Magistrate annually elected by the people might exercise such a controul as independently as the King of G.B. I hope that our representative, Marshall, will be a powerful aid to Mason in the next Assembly. He has observ’d the continual depravation of Mens manners, under the corrupting Influence of our Legislature; & is convinc’d that nothing but the adoption of some efficient plan from the Convention can prevent Anarchy first, & civil Convulsions afterwards. Mr. H——y has certainly converted a Majority of Prince Edward, formerly the most averse to paper-money, to the patronage of it. The opposers of this Scheme are generally favourers of Installments, together with a total prohibition of foreign Luxuries; that people having no temptation to spend their money, may devote it to Justice. The Importance of the next Assembly, with respect to so many objects of great public Interest, makes me wish most sincerely that Congress was deprived of you, at least for this Session.
Mr. Jones has left town, on a pilgrimage to the Temple of health, somewhere about the Mountains. He had been very sick, but seem’d well enough recover’d before he left us.
You will please to present my Compts. to your Colleagues, & my Acquaintance in your house, & believe me, with perfect esteem & regard, Dear Sir, Your friend, & humble Servt.
James McClurg


Title: To James Madison from Philip Mazzei, 6 August 1787
From: Mazzei, Philip
To: Madison, James

Carmo: Amico,
Parigi 6 Agosto 1787.
Siccome non ò tempo da prender copia delle mie lettere, non so se nella precedente di circa 6. 7 mane. sono vi notificai d’aver ricevuto la gratissima vostra dei 24. Aprile. Mi prevalsi dell’occasione di due francesi, ⅌ i quali Mr. Jefferson mandò i suoi dispaccj, per mandarvi colla da. mia precedente, la prima parte del mio libro e i primi 4. foglj della seconda. Pochi giorni sono consegnai al Dr. Gibbons di Filadelfia il resto della seconda e i primi 4. foglj della terza. Ora gli mando a Havre con questa i due foglj seguenti. Con altra occasione vi manderò il resto della terza, e forse la quarta, cioè il tutto. Parmi d’avervi già scritto che questi che vi mando son foglj di prove. Non credo che potrò mandarvi gli esemplari bene stampati e legati prima della fin d’8bre. o del principio di 9bre. Spero che avrò prima d’allora ricevuto la vostra risposta alla mia precedente, nella quale mi direte la vostra opinione riguardo al numero che dovrei mandarne in America. Il figlio di Mr. Rutlidge è di parere che potrassene vendere 70, o 80. in Charlestoun, dove dice che la lingua francese è molto in voga.
Riguardo all’affare di Dohrman, vi reitero le mie premure per la sbrigazione, giacchè per mia buona sorte avete avuto la bontà d’incaricarvene. Riposo intieramente sulla vostra amicizia. Il tutto si riduce a fargli cedere in pagamento di quel che mi dovrà una porzione del suo credito col Congresso, bastante a saldarmi al prezzo che i detti fondi si venderanno sulla piazza nel tempo della cessione. Voltato poi il mio credito col Congresso in testa dei Fratelli Van-Staphorst, essi non solo mi accorderanno tempo, ma di più mi assisteranno per sollevarmi almeno in parte dalle mie angustie. Di grazia, procuratene la sbrigazione, e soprattutto è necessario di badare che Dohrman non ci faccia qualche brutto scherzo. Non vi sarebbe modo di prender passi tali che impedissero a lui di fare alcun’uso del suo credito col Congresso prima d’avermi sodisfatto? Di avere in somma una preferenza assicurata? Amico, io temo, e non senza ragione. Il mio timore dipende dalla mia trista situazione, dall’esperienza che ò degli uomini in generale, e di Mr. Dohrman in particolare. Ei mi scrisse, in data dei 15. Agosto 1786., che aveva convenuto con Monroe, di accordarmi l’interesse col cambio e ricambio principiando dal primo Gennaio 1786. Io gli sborsai il denaro nel Marzo precedente, la cambiale è dell’istessa data, onde non vedo una sola ragione per cui debba io perdere il cambio di 10. mesi contro l’uso e contro le leggi. Mi pare che i gravi danni già sofferti e da soffrirsi a motivo del disappunto, per il che Dohrman non è certamente scusabile, non richiedano da me nè in giustizia, nè in equità, ulteriori sacrifizj. Giacchè avete la bontà d’assistermi, vi prego di provveder che non mi sia fatto maggior torto, e di avvertirmi se in ciò che mi scrisse Dohrman vi è sbaglio, o almeno farmi sapere il motivo che indusse Monroe ad accordare una tal cosa.
Il Marchese de la F. vi egli comunicato ciò che noi pensiamo riguardo al Mediterraneo? Vi par’egli che io potessi esser’utile. Non posso scrivere di più: amico, addio. Tutto vostro,
Filippo Mazzei.
Sigillate le lettere di Edmond e del Bellini, dopo lette, se ne avete il tempo e la pazienza.

18. 7bre.
Dall’inclusa, diretta a Edmond R; o piuttosto da quella che scrivo a de Rieux inclusa ad E; vedrete la causa del ritardo di questa, delle due dette e di quella del Bellini, coi due foglj E, F.
Spero che il Dr. Gibbons vi avrà recapitato il compimento della seconda parte del mio libro e i primi 4. foglj della terza. Ora vi aggiungo il compimento della terza, e una lettera per il vostro cugino non sigillata. Ve ne includo una per Mr. Oster il quale non so se ora stia a Norfolk o in Williamsburgo. La lettera diretta al Minghini mi è fortemente raccomandata dall’Agente di Toscana. Se poteste farla recapitar sicuramente e farmi pervenir la risposta, mi fareste favore.
Riguardo ai miei affari non potrei che ripetervi quanto contiene la precedente. Aspetto con grande ansietà la vostra risposta, con una consolante notizia del resultato nelle Convenzione di Filadelfia. Addio.

Condensed Translation
Mazzei is uncertain whether he wrote that he had received JM’s letter of 24 April. Mazzei has sent JM the first portion of his book and the first four sheets of the second section. He has since consigned the rest of the second part and the first four sheets of the third to Dr. Gibbons of Philadelphia. Mazzei is anxious for JM’s opinion on how many copies of the book could be sold in America. Mr. Rutledge’s son thinks seventy or eighty might be sold in Charleston, where the French language is much in vogue. Mazzei is depending entirely on JM to square his account with Dohrman, for Mazzei’s finances are in an embarrassing state, and the Van Staphorst brothers would assist him if Dohrman’s account with Congress allowed a remittance to Mazzei. He cautions JM to be vigilant lest Dohrman resort to some vulgar trick. Dohrman wrote Mazzei in August 1785 that he had agreed with Monroe to grant Mazzei the interest from the first day of 1786, but the money was paid to him in March 1785, so why should Mazzei lose the interest for those ten months? Mazzei cannot understand why Monroe agreed to such an arrangement. Has JM heard from Lafayette regarding their thoughts on the Mediterranean? Letters to Edmund Randolph and Bellini are enclosed for JM to forward—JM is free to read them if he has the time and patience. In the postscript Mazzei explains that he is sending the rest of the third part of his book, along with a letter to Mr. Oster, who is either in Norfolk or Williamsburg. Another enclosed letter, addressed to Minghini, was entrusted to Mazzei by the Tuscan agent. Mazzei hopes JM can have it delivered, and also see that the reply is sent to Mazzei. He is anxious for news of the convention being held in Philadelphia.


Title: Suffrage Qualifications for Electing the House of Representatives, [7 August] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[7 August 1787]

   The Committee of Detail report provided that the qualifications for voting in the election of the House of Representatives should be the same as for the largest branch of a state legislature.

Mr. Madison. The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will either combine under the influence of their common situation: in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England had been misconceived (by Col Mason). A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U.S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted.