Title: The Stand No. IV, [12 April 1798]
From: “Titus Manlius”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 12, 1798]

In the pursuit of her plan of universal empire, the two objects which now seem chiefly to occupy the attention of France, are a new organization of Germany favorable to her influence, and the demolition of Great Britain. The subversion and plunder, first of Portugal, next of Spain, will be merely collateral incidents in the great drama of iniquity.
In the new distribution of the territories, population and political power of the Germanic body, which has been announced as in contemplation of the Directory, three characters are conspicuous—a disposition to build up rivals to the Imperial chief, strong enough to feel the sentiment of competition, but too weak to hazard it alone, who will therefore stand in need of the patronage of France, and as a consequence will facilitate her influence in the affairs of the Empire—a generosity in making compensation, at the expense of others, for the spoils with which she has aggrandized herself—a facility in transferring communities, like herds of cattle, from one master to another, without the privilege of an option. In a project like this, it is impossible to overlook the plain indications of a restless, overbearing ambition, combined with a total disregard of the rights and wishes of nations. The People are counted for nothing, their Masters for everything.
The conduct of France towards Great Britain is the copy of that of Rome towards Carthage. Its manifest aim is to destroy the principal obstacle to a domination over Europe. History proves, that Great Britain has repeatedly upheld the balance of power there, in opposition to the grasping ambition of France. She has no doubt occasionally employed the pretence of danger as the instrument of her own ambition; but it is not the less true, that she has been more than once an essential and an effectual shield against real danger. This was remarkably the case in the reign of Louis the XlVth, when the security of Europe was seriously threatened by the successful enterprizes of that very ambitious monarch.
The course of the last negociation between France and Britain leaves no doubt, that the former was resolved against peace on any practicable terms. This of itself indicates, that the destruction of the latter is the direct object in view. But this object is not left to inference. It has been fastidiously proclaimed to the world—and the necessity of crushing the Tyrant of the Sea has been trumpeted as a motive to other powers to acquiesce in the execution of a plan, by which France endeavors to become the Tyrant both of Sea and Land. The understanding of mankind has, at the same time, been mocked, with the proposition that the Peace of Europe would be secured by the aggrandizement of France on the ruins of her rivals; because then, it is said, having nothing to fear, she would have no motive to attack; as if moderation was to be expected from a government or people having the power to impose its own will without control. The peace of Europe would in such case be the peace of vassalage.
Towards the execution of the plan of destroying Great Britain, the rights of other nations are openly and daringly invaded. The confiscation is decreed of all vessels with their cargoes, if composed in any part of articles of British fabric; and all nations are to be compelled to shut their ports against the meditated victim Hamburgh is stated to have already reluctantly yielded to this humiliating compulsion.

While the demolition of Great Britain is eagerly pursued as a primary object, that of Portugal seems designed to form an Episode in the Tragedy. Her fears had induced her to buy a peace. The money which she had paid was the immediate instrument of the revolution of September last—Yet no sooner had the news of pacification with the Emperor reached Paris, than pretences were sought to elude the ratification of the purchased treaty. A larger tribute was demanded, more, probably, than it was expected Portugal would be able to pay, to serve as an excuse for marching an army to revolutionize and plunder.

   Such is the account of this transaction received thro authentic channels.

 The blow may perhaps be suspended by further sacrifices, but it is not likely to be finally averted.
Spain, too, was in a fair way of enjoying the fruits of her weakness in putting on the yoke of France, and of furnishing another proof of the general scheme of aggrandizement and oppression. The demand of the cession of Louisiana, long pressed upon her, had at length become categoric. The alternative was to comply or offend. The probability is that before this time the cession has been made; and Spain has learnt, to her cost, that the chief privilege of an ally of France is to be plundered at discretion. With the acquisition of Louisiana, the foundation will be laid for stripping her of South America and her mines; and perhaps for dismembering the United States. The magnitude of this mighty mischief is not easy to be calculated.
Such vast projects and pretensions pursued by such unexampled means are full evidence of a plan to acquire an absolute ascendant among nations. The difficulties in the final execution of a plan of this kind are, with many, decisive reasons against its existence. But in the case of ancient Rome, did it not in fact exist, and was it not substantially realized? Does the experience of the present day warrant the opinion that men are not as capable of mad and wicked projects as they were at any former period? Does not the conduct of the French government display a vastness and sublimation of views, and enormity of ambition, and a destitution of principle, which render the supposition of such a design probable? Has not a more rapid progress been made towards its execution, than was ever made by Rome in an equal period? In their intercourse with foreign nations, do not the directory affect an ostentatious imitation of Roman pride and superiority? Is it not natural to conclude that the same spirit points to the same ends?
The project is possible. The evidence of its existence is strong, and it will be the wisdom of every other state to act upon the supposition of its reality.
Let it be understood, that the supposition does not imply the intention to reduce all other nations formally to the condition of provinces. This was not done by Rome in the zenith of her greatness. She had her provinces and she had her allies. But her allies were in fact her vassals. They obeyed her nod. Their Princes were deposed and created at her pleasure.
Such is the proud pre-eminence to which the ambition of France aspires! After securing as much territory as she thinks it expedient immediately to govern, after wresting from Great-Britain and attaching to herself the command of the sea, after despoiling Spain of the riches of Mexico and Peru, after attaining by all these means to a degree of strength sufficient to defy and awe competition, she may be content, under the modest denomination of allies, to rule the rest of the world by her frown or her smile.
The character of the actual Directory of France justifies the imputation to them of any project the most extravagant and criminal. Viewed internally, as well as externally, their conduct is alike detestable. They have overturned the constitution, which they were appointed to administer with circumstances of barefaced guilt that disgrace a revolution, before so tarnished as seemed scarcely to admit of greater degradation; and have erected in its stead a military despotism, cloathed, but not disguised with the mere garb of the constitution which they have abolished. In the accomplishment of this usurpation, they have assassinated one of their colleagues,

   Carnot—as was reported at the time, and as is confirmed by nothing having been since heard of him. He had been too deeply in the horid secrets of the violent party. It was necessary to silence him.

 and seized and banished another, together with all those members of the two councils, who were disposed and able to combat their pernicious aims. They have done more; not content with rendering themselves masters of the two councils, and converting them into the mere pageants of national representation, they have thot it proper to secure their own power by exiling or imprisoning such private citizens as they feared might promote the future election of men hostile to their views, on the futile pretence of a counterrevolutionary plot to be effected by royalizing the elections. Thus have they not only monopolized all the power for the present, but they have made provisions for its perpetuation; so long at least as the Prætorian bands will permit.
No impartial man can doubt that the Plot charged upon the exiled members is a forgery. The characters of several of the accused bely it. Barthelemy and Pichegru are virtuous men. The former has long merited and possessed this character. The latter has given numerous proofs of a good title to it—his only fault seems to have been that of enthusiasm in the worst of causes. Neither of them, like Dumourier, had been from his entrance on Public life marked out as the votary of an irregular ambition. The alledged object of the plot, as to such men, from the circumstances of the conjuncture, was wholly improbable; nothing like satisfactory proof has come to light. But the decisive argument of their innocence is, that the usurpers did not dare to confront them with a fair legal accusation and trial. It was so clearly their interest and policy to have justified themselves by establishing the guilt of the accused, if in their power, that the omission to attempt it is the demonstration of its impossibility. Having all authority in their own hands, and the army at their devotion, they had nothing to fear from the pursuit; and they must have foreseen that the banishment, without trial, would finally marshal public opinion against them. There can be little doubt that the people of France at this moment regard, with compassion and regret, the banished Directors and Deputies, and with horror and detestation the authors of their disgrace. But the people of France internally are annihilated. To their liberty and happiness this last usurpation gave a more fatal blow than any or all of the former. It has more of system in it; and being less sanguinary is less likely to provoke resistence from despair.
The inference from the transaction is evident. The real crime of the banished was the desire of arresting the mad career of the directory and of restoring peace to France, in the hope that peace might tend to settle the government on the foundations of order, security and tranquility. The majority of the directory foresaw that Peace would not prove an element congenial with the duration of their power; or perhaps under the guidance of Sieyes, the conjuror of the scene, they judged it expedient to continue in motion the revolutionary wheel, till matters were better prepared for creating a new Dynasty and a new Aristocracy,

   There is good evidence that this is at bottom the real plan of the Abbe Sieyes; and some of the most influential in the Executive Department are his creatures.

 to regenerate the exploded monarchy of France with due regard to their own interest.
Thus we perceive, that the interior conduct of the directory has the same characters with their exterior—the same irregular ambition, the same contempt of principle, the same boldness of design, the same temerity of execution. From such men, what is not to be expected? The development of their recent conduct towards the United States will no doubt confirm all the inferences to be drawn from other parts of the portrait; and will contribute to prove that there is nothing too abandoned or too monstrous for them to meditate or attempt.
Who that loves his country or respects the dignity of his nature, would not rather perish than subscribe to the prostration of both before such men and such a system? What sacrifice, what danger is too great to be incurred in opposition to both? What security in any compromise with such unprincipled tyranny? What safety but in union, in vigor, in preparation for every extremity, in a decisive and corageous stand for the rights and honor of our injured and insulted Country?

Titus Manlius.


Title: The Stand No. V, [16 April 1798]
From: “Titus Manlius”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1798]

To estimate properly the conduct of revolutionary France towards the United States the circumstances which have reciprocally taken place must be viewed together. It is a Whole not a Part which is to be contemplated. A rapid Summary, nevertheless, of the most material is all that can be presented.
Not only the unanimous good wishes of the citizens of this country spontaneously attached themselves to the Revolution of France in its first stages But no sooner was the change from monarchy to a Republic officially announced than our Government, consulting the principles of our own revolution and the wishes of our citizens, hastened to acknowlege the new order of things. This was done to the last Minister sent by Louis the XVI, before the arrival of the first envoy from the republic. Genet afterwards came—his reception by the Government was cordial, by the people enthusiastic.
The Government did not merely receive the Minister of the Republic, in fact, and defer the obligation of Treaties till the contest concerning its establishment had been terminated by success: But giving the utmost latitude to the maxim that real treaties bind nations notwithstanding revolutions of Government, ours did not hesitate to admit the immediate operations of the antecedent treaties between the two countries; though the revolution could not be regarded as yet fully accomplished; though a warrant for a contrary policy might have been found in the example of France herself and though the treaties contained several stipulations which gave to her important preferences relative to war & which were likely to give umbrage to the powers coalesced against her.
In acknowleging the republic, the U States preceded every other nation. It was not till a long time after that any of the neutral powers followed the example. Had prudence been exclusively consulted, our Government might not have done all that it did at this juncture, when the case was very nearly Europe in arms against France.
But good faith and a regard to consistency of principle prevailed over the sense of danger. It was resolved to encounter it; qualifying the step by the manifestation of a disposition to observe a sincere neutrality as far as should consist with the stipulations of Treaty. Hence the proclamation of neutrality.
It ought to have no small merit in the eyes of France that at so critical a period of her affairs we were willing to run risks so imminent. The fact is, that it had nearly implicated us in the war on her side at a juncture when all calculations were against her, and when it was certain she could have afforded us no protection or assistance.
What was the return? Genet came with neutrality on his lips but war in his heart. The instructions published by himself and his practice upon them demonstrate that it was the premeditated plan to involve us in the contest not by a candid appeal to the judgment friendship or interest of our country but by alluring the avarice of bad citizens into acts of predatory hostility by instituting within our territory military expeditions against nations with whom we were at peace. And when it was found that our Executive would not connive at this insidious plan, bold attempts were made to create a scism between the people and the government and consequently to sow the seeds of civil discord insurrection and revolution. Thus began the Republic.
It is true that the Girondist Faction having been subverted by that of Robespierre, our complaint of the Agent of the former was attended with success. The spirit of vengeance came in aid of the justice of our demand. The offending Minister was recalled with disgrace. But Robespierre did not fail in a public speech to give a gentle hint of delinquency in the United States, sufficiently indicating that the authors and the manner were more in fault in his opinion than the thing. It was not then expedient to quarrel with us. There was still a hope that a course of things, or more dextrous management might embark us in the war as an auxiliary to France.
The Treaties were made by us the criterion of our duty; but as they did not require us to go to war, as France did never even pretend this to be the case, listening to the suggestions not only of interest but of safety, we resolved to endeavour to preserve peace. But we were equally resolved to fulfil our real obligations in every respect. We saw without murmur our property seized in belligerent vessels; we allowed to French Ships of War and privateers all the peculiar exclusive privileges in our ports to which, they were entitled by our treaties upon fair construction, upon a construction fully concurred in by the political leader

   Mr. Jefferson.

 of the adherents to France—we went further, and gratuitously suffered her to sell her prizes in our country, in contravention perhaps of the true principles of neutrality—we paid to her new government the debt contracted by us with the old not only as fast as it became due but by an anticipation which did not give pleasure to her enemies. While our government was faithful; our citizens were zealous. Not content with good wishes they adventured their property and credit in the furnishing of supplies to an extent that showed in many cases the cooperation of zeal with interest. Our country, our Merchants and our ships in the gloomy periods of her Revolution have been the organs of succours to France to a degree which give us an undoubted title to the character of very useful friends.
Reverse the medal. France from the beginning has violated essential points in the Treaties between the two countries. The first formal unequivocal act by either of the belligerent parties interfering with the rule that “free ships make free goods” was a decree of the French Convention. This violation has been persisted in and successive violations added till they amount to a general war on our commerce.
First the plea of necessity repelled our feeble and modest complaints of infractions. Next the plea of delinquencies on our part was called in aid of the depredations which it was found convenient to practice upon our trade. Our refusal to record privileges not granted by our Treaties but claimed by misconstructions destitute even of plausibility, privileges which would have put us at once in a state of war with the enemies of France the reciprocal application to them of principles originally established against their remonstrances in favour of France

   * Note. This was the case as to the horses procured by the British in Virginia. France had before freely procured military supplies in our Country. The British Minister had remonstrated. The reply, adhered to, was that belligerent powers had a right to procure supplies in a neutral country.

 occasioned embarrassments to her privateers, arising from the established forms of our courts and the necessity of vigilance to frustrate her efforts to entangle us against our will in the war—delays in giving relief in a few instances rendered unavoidable by the nature of our government and the great extent of our territory—these were so many topics of bitter accusation against our government and of insult as rude as was unmerited. Our citizens in judging whether the accusation was captious or well founded ought to bear in mind that most of the transactions on which it was predicated happened under the administrations of Jefferson and Randolph; and, as is well ascertained with their full assent & cooperation. They will not readily suppose that these very cunning men were the dupes of colleagues actuated by ill will towards France; but they will discover in this union opinon among men of very opposite principles, a strong probability that our government acted with propriety and that the dissatisfaction of France, if more than a colour, was unreasonable.
Hitherto the progress, no less than the origin of our controversy with France, exhibits plain marks of a disposition on her part to disregard those provisions in the treaties which it was our interest should be observed by her, to exact from us a scrupulous performance of our engagements and even the extension of them beyond their true import—to embroil us with her enemies contrary to our inclination and interest and without even the allegation of a claim upon our faith—to make unreasonable demands upon us the grounds of complaints against us and excuses to violate our property and rights, to divide our nation and to disturb our government.

Many of the most determined advocates of France among us appear latterly to admit that previous to the Treaty with Great Britain, the complaints of France against the U States were frivolous, those of the United States against France real and serious. But the Treaty with G Britain, it is affirmed, has changed the ground. This, it is said, has given just cause of discontent to France—this has brought us to the verge of war with our first ally and best friend—to this fatal instrument are we indebted for the evils we feel and the still greater which impend over our heads.
These suggestions are without the shadow of foundation; They prove the infatuated devotion to a foreign power of those who invented them and the easy credulity of those with whom they have obtained currency. The evidence of a previous disposition in France to complain without cause and to injure without provocation is a sufficient comment upon the resentment she professes against the Treaty. The partiality or indulgence with which the ill treatment received from her prior to that event was viewed by her decided partisans is a proof of the facility with which they credit her pretences and palliate her aggressions.
The most significant of the charges against the Treaty, as it respects France, is that it abandonned the rule of free ships making free goods—that it extended unduely the list of contraband articles and gave colour to the claim of a right to subject provisions to seizure—that a Treaty of amity with the enemy of France in the midst of a war was a mark of preference to that enemy and of ill will to her. The replies which have been given to these charges are conclusive.

As to the first point—The stipulation of two powers to observe between themselves a particular rule in their respective wars a rule too innovating upon the general law of nations can on no known or reasonable principle of interpretation be construed to intend that they will insist upon that rule with all other nations, and will make no treaty with any however beneficial in other respects which does not comprehend it. To tie up the will of a nation and its power of providing for its own interests to so immense an extent required a stipulation in positive terms. In vain shall we seek in the Treaty for such a stipulation or its equivalent. There is not even a single expression to imply it. The idea is consequently no less ridiculous than it is novel. The cotemporary proceedings legislative and judiciary of our government shew that it was not so understood in this country. Congress even declined to become a formal party to the armed neutrality, of which it was the basis; unwilling to be pledged for the coercive maintenance of a principle which they were only disposed to promote by particular pacts. It is equally futile to seek to derive the obligation of the U States to adhere to this rule from the supposition of a change in the law of nations by the force of that league. Neither theory nor practice warrants the attributing so important an effect to a military association springing up in the war and ending with it; not having had the universal consent of nations nor a course of long practice to give it a sanction.
Were it necessary to resort to an auxiliary argument, it might be said with conclusive force, that France having before our Treaty with Great Britain violated in practice the rule in question absolved us from all obligation to observe it, if any did previously exist.
As to the second point—it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the enumeration of contraband in the treaty with Great Britain is agreeable to the general law of nations. But this is a matter from its nature liable to vary according to relative situation, and to be variously modified not only between different nations but between one nation and different nations. Thus in our Treaty with Great Britain some articles are enumerated which are omitted in that with France; in that with France some articles are inserted which are omitted in that with Britain. But it is perhaps the first time that a diversity of this sort has been deemed a ground of umbrage to a third party.
With regard to provisions, the treaty only decides that where by the law of nations they are subject to seizure they are to be paid for. It does not define or admit any new case. As to its giving colour to abuse in this respect, thus if true would amount to nothing. For till some abuse has actually happened and been tolerated to the prejudice of France there was no cause of complaint. The possibility of abuse from a doubtful construction of a Treaty between two powers is no subject of offence to a third. It is the fact which must govern. According to this indisputable criterion, France has had no cause to complain on this account; for since the ratification of the Treaty no instance of the seizure of provisions has occurred & it is known that our government protested against such a construction.
Further, the Treaty has made no change whatever in the actual antecedent state of things to the disadvantage of France.
Great Britain had before the Treaty with the sanction of our Government acted upon the principles, as to free ships making free goods and generally as to the affair of contraband which the treaty recognizes. Nor was That sanction merely tacit but explicit and direct. It was even diplomatically communicated to the Agents of France. If there was any thing wrong therefore in this matter, it was chargeable, not upon the Treaty, but upon the prior measures of the Government, which had left these points mere points of form in the Treaty.
The remaining charge against that instrument involves a species of political metaphysics. Neither the theory of Writers nor the history of nations will bear out the position, that a treaty of amity, between a neutral state and one belligerent party not granting either succours or new privileges relative to war not derogating from any obligation of the neutral state to the other belligerent party is a cause of umbrage to the latter. There can be no reason why a neutral power should not settle differences or adjust a plan of intercourse beneficial to itself with another power because this last happens to be at war with a third. All this must be a mere question of curtesy; and might be uncurtious or otherwise according to circumstances, but never a ground of quarrel. If there even might have been want of curtesy in the U States to have entered into a Treaty of this sort with the enemy of France, had they volunteered it without cogent motives—there could be none in the particular situation. They were led to the Treaty by preexisting differences which had nearly ripened to a rupture, and the amicable settlement of which affected very important interests. No favourable conjunction for this settlement was to be lost. The settlement, by the usual formulas in such cases, would amount to a Treaty of Amity.
Thus is it evident, that the Treaty, like all the rest, has been a mere pretence for ill treatment. But admitting that this was not the case, that it really afforded some cause of displeasure, was this of a nature to admit of no atonement, or of none short of the humiliation of our country?
If the contrary must be conceded, it is certain that our Government has done all that was possible towards reconciliation, and enough to have satisfied any reasonable or just government.
France after the treaty proceeded to inflict still deeper wounds upon our commerce. She has endeavoured to intercept and destroy it with all the ports of her enemies. Nor was this the worst. The spoliation has frequently extended to our trade with her own dominions attended with unparall[el]ed circumstances of rapacity and violence.
The diplomatic representative of the French Government to the U States was ordered to deliver to our government a most insulting manifesto and then to withdraw.
Yet our government, notwithstanding this accumulation of wrongs, after knowing that it had been repeatedly outraged in the person of one Minister, condescended to send another specially charged to endeavour to conciliate. This Minister was known to unite fidelity to his country with principles friendly to France and her revolution. It was hoped that the latter would make him acceptable and that he would be able by amicable explanations and overtures to obviate misunderstanding and restore harmony. He was not received.
Though it was very problematical whether the honor of the U States after this permitted a further advance; yet, the Government anxious if possible to preserve peace concluded to make another and more solemn experiment. A new mission, confided to three extraordinary ministers took place. They were all three in different degrees men well affected to France and her revolution. They were all men of high respectability and among the purest characters of our country. Their powers and instructions were so ample as to have extorted from the most determined opposers of the government, in the two houses of Congress, a reluctant approbation in this instance of the Presidents conduct.
In contempt of established usage and of the respect due to us as an independent people, with the deliberate design of humbling and mortifying our government, these special and extraordinary ministers have been refused to be received. Admitting all the charges brought against us by France to be well founded, still ministers of that description ought on every principle to have been accredited and conferred with, ’till it was ascertained that they were not ready to do as much as was expected. Not to pursue this course was to deny us the rank of an independent nation; it was to treat us as Great Britain did, while we were yet contending with her for this character.
Instead of this, informal Agents probably panders and mistresses, are appointed to intrigue with our envoys. These attending only to the earnest wish of their constituents for peace, stoop to the conference. What is the mishapen result?

Money, money is the burthen of the discordant song of these foul birds of prey. Great indignation is at first professed against expressions in the Presidents speech of May last. The reparation of a disavowal is absolutely due to the honor of the Directory and of the republic; but it turns out that there is a practicable substitute more valuable. The honor of both being a marketable commodity—is ready to be committed for gold.
A douceur of 50000 pounds Sterling for the special benefit of the Directory was to pave the way. Instead of reparation for the spoliations of our commerce exceeding twenty Millions of Dollars, a loan equal to the amount of them is to be made by us to the French Government. Then perhaps a mode might be settled for the liquidation of the claims of our Merchants to be compensated at some future period. The depredations nevertheless were to continue till the Treaty should be concluded, which from the distance between the two countries must at all events take a great length of time, and might be procrastinated indefinitely at the pleasure of the Directory.
In addition to all this we must purchase of the Directory at par Dutch Inscriptions to the amount of thirty two millions of florins and look to the ability of the Batavian Republic to redeem them. Already are these Assignats depreciated to half their nominal value and in all probability will come to nothing; serving merely as a flimsy viel to the extortion of a further & immense contribution.
“Money a great deal of money”

   Il faut de’largent—il faut beaucoup d’argent”

 is the cry from the first to last; and our commissioners are assured that without this they may stay in Paris six months without advancing a step. To enforce the argument they are reminded of the fate of Venice.
At so hideous a compound of corruption and extortion, at demands so exorbitant and degrading, there is not a spark of virtuous indignation in an American breast which will not kindle into a flame. And yet there are men—could it have been believed? There are men to whom this country gave birth—vile and degenerate enough to run about the Streets to contradict to palliate to justify to preach the expediency of Compliance. Such men merit all the detestation of all their fellow citizens; and there is no doubt that with time and opportunity they will merit much more from the offended justice of the laws.

T M


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Jay, 19 April 1798
From: Jay, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Albany 19 April 1798
Dear Sir

I have this Instant recd. a Letter dated the 14th. Instant from Judge Hobart, resigning his Seat in the Senate of the united States, and as our Legislature is not now in Session, it hath become my Duty to appoint a Senator to succeed him and take his place, untill the next Meeting of the Legislature.
The present delicate State of our public affairs, and the evident Expediency of filling this Vacancy without Delay, induce me without requesting your Permission and waiting for your answer, to determine to send you a Commission to fill that place, by the next Post. I can say nothing that will not occur to You.
adieu   yours sincerely

John Jay
Alexander Hamilton Esqr.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Jay, 19 April 1798
From: Jay, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Albany 19 Ap. 1798
Dr. Sir

I wrote you a few Lines this Morning informing you that Judge Hobart had resigned his Seat in the Senate, and that by the next post I should send you a Commission to fill his place.
On further Reflection I doubt the propriety of appointing you without your previous permission, and therefore shall postpone it untill I receive your answer. If after well considering the Subject you should decline an appointmt. be so good as to consult with some of our most judicious Friends and advise me as to the Persons most proper to appoint and at the same time likely to accept.
yours sincerly

John Jay
Col. A. Hamilton


Title: The Stand No. VI, [19 April 1798]
From: “Titus Manlius”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 19, 1798]

The inevitable conclusion from the facts which have been presented is, that Revolutionary France has been and continues to be governed by a spirit of proselytism, conquest, domination and rapine. The detail well justifies the position, that we may have to contend at our very doors for our independence and liberty.
When the wonders atchieved by the arms of France are duely considered the possibility of the overthrow of Great Britain seems not to be chimerical. If by any of those extraordinary coincidences of circumstances, which occasionally decide the fate of empires, the meditated expedition against England shall succeed, or if by the immense expence to which that Country is driven and the derangement of her commerce by the powerful means employed to that end her affairs shall be thrown into such disorder as may enable France to dictate to her the terms of peace; in either of these unfortunate events the probability is, that the UStates will have to choose between the surrender of their sovereignty, the new modelling of their government according to the fancy of the Directory, the emptying of their wealth by contributions into the coffers of the greedy and insatiable monster—and resistance to invasion in order to compel submission to those ruinous conditions.
In opposition to this, it is suggested that the interest of France concurring with the difficulty of execution is a safeguard against the enterprize. It is asked what incentives sufficiently potent can stimulate to so unpromising an attempt?
The answer is—the strongest passions of bad hearts—inordinate ambition, the love of domination, that prime characteristick of the despots of France—the spirit of vengeance for the presumption of having thought and acted for ourselves, a spirit which has marked every step of the revolutionary leaders—the fanatical egotism of obliging the rest of the world to adapt their political system to the French standard of perfection—the desire of securing the future controul of our affairs by humbling and ruining the independent supporters of their country and of elevating the partisans and tools of France—the desire of entangling our commerce with preferences and restrictions which would give to her the monopoly—these passions the most imperious, these motives the most enticing to a crooked policy, are sufficient persuasives to undertake the subjugation of this country.
Added to these primary inducements, the desire of finding an outlet for a part of the vast armies which on the termination of the European war are likely to perplex and endanger the men in power would be an auxiliary motive of Great Force. The total loss of the troops sent would be no loss to France. Their cupidity would be readily excited to the undertaking by the prospect of dividing among themselves the fertile lands of this Country. Great Britain once silenced, there would be no insuperable obstacle to the transportation. The divisions among us, which have been urged to our commission[er]s as one motive to a compliance with the unreasonable demands of the Directory would be equally an encouragement to invasion. It would be believed that a sufficient number would flock to the standard of France to render it easy to quell the resistance of the rest. Drunk with success nothing would be thought too arduous to be accomplished.
It is too much a part of our temper to indulge an overweening security. At the close of our revolution war the phantom of perpetual peace danced before the eyes of every body. We see at this early period with how much difficulty war has been parried and that with all our efforts to preserve peace we are now in a state of partial hostility. Untaught by this experience, we now seem inclined to regard the idea of invasion as incredible and to regulate our conduct by the belief of its improbability. Who would have thought eighteen months ago that Great Britain would have been at this time in serious danger of invasion from France? Is it not now more probable that such a danger may overtake us than it was then that it would so soon assail G B?
There are currents in human affairs, when events at other times less than miraculous are to be considered as natural and simple. Such were the æras of Macedonian, of Roman of Gothic of Saracen inundation. Such is the present æra of French fanaticism. Wise men, when they discover the symptoms of a similar æra, look for prodigies and prepare for them with foresight and energy.
Admit, that in our case invasion is upon the whole improbable; yet if there are any circumstances which pronounce that the apprehension of it is not absolutely chimerical, it is the part of wisdom to act as if [it] was likely to happen. What are the inconveniences of preparation compared with the infinite magnitude of the evil if it shall surprise us unprepared? They are lighter than air weighed against the smallest probability of so disastrous a result.
But what is to be done? It is not wiser to compound on any terms than to provoke the consequences of resistance?
To do this is dishonor—it is ruin—it is death. Waving other considerations there can be no reliance on its efficacy. The example of Portugal teaches us that it is to purchase disgrace, not safety. The cravings of despotic rapacity may be appeased but they [are] not to be satisfied. They will quickly renew their fires and call for new sacrifices in proportion to the facility with which the first were made. The situation of France is likely to make plunder for a considerable time to come an indispensable expedient of government. Excluding the great considerations of public right and public policy, and bringing the matter to the simple test of pecuniary calculation, resistance is to be preferred to submission. The surrender of our whole wealth would only procure respite, not safety. The disbursements for war will chiefly be at home. They will not necessarily carry away our riches, and they will preserve our honor and give us security.
But in the event supposed can we oppose with success? There is no event in which we may not look with confidence to a successful resistance. Though G Britain should be impolitic or wicked enough (which is hoped to be impossible) to compromise her differences with France by an agreement to divide the U States, according to the insulting threat of the Agents of France, still it is in our power to maintain our independence and baffle every enemy. The people of the UStates from their number situation and resources are invincible if they are provident and faithful to themselves.
The Question returns—what is to be done? Shall we declare war? No—there are still chances for avoiding a general rupture which ought to be taken. Want of future success may bring the present despots to reason. Every day may produce a revolution which may substitute better men in their place and lead to honorable accommodation.
Our true policy is, in the attitude of calm defiance, to meet the aggressions upon us by proportionate resistance, and to prepare vigorously for further resistance. To this end, the chief measures requisite are to invigorate our treasury by calling into activity the principal untouched resources of revenue—to fortify in earnest our chief sea ports—to establish founderies and increase our arsenals—to create a respectable naval force and to raise with the utmost diligence a considerable army. Our Merchant vessels ought to be permitted not only to arm themselves but to sink or capture their assailants. Our vessels of war ought to cruise on our coast and serve as convoys to our trade. In doing this, they also ought to be authorised not only to sink or capture assailants, but likewise to capture & bring in privateers found hovering within twenty leagues of our coast. For this last measure, precedent if requisite is to be found in the conduct of neutral powers on other occasions.
This course, it will be objected implies a state of war. Let it be so. But it will be a limited and mitigated state of war, to grow into general war or not at the election of France. What may be that election will probably depend on future and incalculable events. The continuation of success on the part of France would insure war. The want of it might facilitate accommodation. There are examples in which states have been for a long time in a state of partial hostility without proceeding to general rupture. The duration of this course of conduct on our part may be restricted to the continuance of the two last decrees of France, that by which the trade of neutrals with the ports of her enemies has been intercepted, and that by which vessels and their cargoes, if composed in whole or in part of British fabrics are liable to seizure and condemnation.
The declared suspension of our treaties with France is a measure of evident justice and necessity. It is the natural consequence of a total violation on one side. It would be preposterous to be fettered by treaties which are wholly disregarded by the other party. It is essentially our interest to get rid of the guarantee in the treaty of alliance, which on the part of France is likely to be henceforth nugatory, on the part of the U States it is a substantial and dangerous stipulation; obliging them in good faith to take part with France in any future defensive war, in which her West India colonies may be attacked. The consular convention is likewise a mischievous instrument devised by France in the spirit of extending her influence into other countries, and producing to a certain extent imperium in imperio.
It may be happy for the U States that an occasion has been furnished by France, in which with good faith they may break through these trammels; readjusting when reconciliation shall take place a basis of connection or intercourse more convenient and more eligible.
The resolution to raise an army, it is to be feared, is that one of the measures suggested, which will meet with greatest obstacle; and yet it is the one which ought most to unite opinion. Being merely a precaution for internal security, it can in no sense tend to provoke war, and looking to eventual security, in a case, which if it should happen would threaten our very existence as a nation, it is the most important.
The history of our revolution-war is a serious admonition to it. The American cause had nearly been lost for want of creating in the first instance a solid force commensurate in duration with the war. Immense additional expence and waste and a variety of other evils were incurred which might have been avoided.
Suppose an invasion, & that we are left to depend on Militia alone. Can it be doubted that a rapid and formidable progress would in the first instance be made by the invader? Who can answer what dismay this might inspire—how far it might go to create general panic—to rally under the banners of the enemy the false and the timid? The imagination cannot without alarm anticipate the consequences. Prudence commands that they shall be guarded against. To have a good army on foot will be best of all precautions to prevent as well as to repel invasion.
The propriety of the measure is so palpable, that it will argue treachery or incapacity in our councils, if it be not adopted. The friends of the government owe it to their own characters to press it; its opposers can give no better proof that they are not abandonned to a foreign power than to concur in it. The public safety will be more indebted to its advocates than to the advocates of any other measure, in proportion as our Independence & liberty are of more consequence than our Trade.
It is the fervent wish of patriotism that our councils and nation may be united and resolute. The dearest interests call for it. A great public danger commands it. Every good man will rejoice to embrace the adversary of his former opinions if he will now by candour and energy evince his attachment to his country. Whoever does not do this consigns himself to irrevocable dishonor. But tis not the triumph over a political rival, which the true lover of his country desires—’tis the safety, ’tis the welfare of that Country—and he will gladly share with his bitterest opponent the glory of defending and preserving her. Americans! rouse! be unanimous be virtuous be firm, exert your courage, trust in heaven and nobly defy the enemies both of god and man!

T M


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Abraham Van Vechten, 20 April 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Van Vechten, Abraham

New York, April 20, 1798. “I wrote to you from N Haven on the subject of two suits Low Adsm Graham & Gracie Adsm Brot. I continue in the wish that the argument for a new trial may be postponed till July.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Henry A. Williams, 26 April 1798
From: Williams, Henry A.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, April 26, 1798. “I am much supprized by being informed by my Wife that you cannot find either my papers or any way of Coming at the property so long withheld from me.… Exert yourself & not lett me Linger Longer in this Bastile while my family are Sufferring at home.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Robert G. Harper, 27 April [1798]
From: Harper, Robert G.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia April 27th. [1798]
My dear sir

Could any thing prevail on you to undertake the war-department? Reflect on the importance of the station at this moment. Consider how much more important a war minister is than a general, & how much more difficult to be found.
We shall have an army of 20,000 men, with the power to revive voluntary inlistments ad libitum in addition to it the volunteers to be armed & cloathed at their own expence. This, under proper direction, will give us the flower of the country; and put arms into the hands of all our friends. But every thing will depend on the name of the general, & the talents of the minister.
I write this without any authority: but I have good reason to believe, from late conversations with the President, that if he were to understand your willingness to come forward, the arrangement would immediately take place. In that case Mr. Mc.Henry would give way: and there is no difference in opinion among the federal party on the absolute necessity of his doing so.
Genl. Pinckney & Carrington of Virginia have been thought of among our friends, if you cannot be got: but the first is absent, & the 2d. however able, wants the weight of Character requisite at this time. Besides he may be more fit for the marine, where also will be wanted a man of athorty & detail.
Yours truly

Rob: G. Harper.
Col. Hamilton


Title: A French Faction, [April 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[April, 1798]
There is a set of men, whose mouths are always full of the phrazes British Faction, British Agents British Influence. Feeling that they themselves are enlisted in a foreign faction, they imagine, that it must be so with every one else—and that whoever will not join with them in sacrificing the interests of their country to another Country must be engaged in an opposite foreign faction. Frenchmen in all their feelings and wishes they can see in their opponents nothing but Engglishmen. Every true American, every really independent man becomes in their eyes a British Agent a British Emissary.
The truth is, that there is in this Country a decided French Faction but no other foreign faction. I speak as to those who have a share in the public councils or in the political influence of the country. Those who adhered to Great Britain during the Revolution may be presumed generally to have still a partiality for her. But the number of those who have at this time any agency in public affairs is very insignificant. They are neither numerous nor weighty enough to form in the public councils a distinct faction. Nor is it to this description of men that the phraze is applied.
The satellites of France have the audacity to bestow it upon men who have risked more in opposition to Great Britain than but few of them ever did—to men who have given every possible proof of their exclusive Devotion to the interests of their own country.
Let facts speak. The leaders of the French Faction during the War managed to place the Ministers of this Country abroad in a servile dependence on the Ministry of France—and but for the virtuous independence of those men, which led them to break their instructions, it is very problematical whether we should have had as early or as good a peace as that we obtained. The same men, during the same period, effected the revocation of a Commission which had been given for making a commercial Treaty with Great Britain, and again, on the approach of peace, defeated an attempt to produce a renewal of that Commission; and thus lost an opportunity known to have been favourable for establishing a beneficial Treaty of Commerce with that Country—though they have since made the obtaining of such a Treaty the pretext for reiterated attempts to renew hostilities with her. The same men have been constantly labouring from the first institution of the present Government to render it subservient, not to the advancement of our own manufactures, but to the advancement of the Navigation & Manufactures of France.
Is a plan proposed which aims at fostering our own Navigation and elevating our own manufactures by giving them advantages over those of all foreign Nations? A thousand obstacles occur. A thousand alarms are sounded. Usurpation of ungranted powers—Designs to promote the interests of particular parts of the Union at the expence of other parts of it—and innumerable other spectres are conjured up to terrify us from the pursuit. Is the project to confer particular favours upon the navigation and manufactures of France even at the expence of the UStates? Then all difficulties vanish. This is the true and only object of the constitution. For this it was framed—by this alone it can live and have a being. To this precious end, we are assured, the states who may particularly suffer, will be willing to sacrifice. In this holy cause, we are to risk every thing. Our Trade our Navigation our manufactures our agriculture, our revenues our peace. Not to consent is to want spirit to want honor to want patriotism.
Thus does Gallicism assume the honorable garb of Patriotism!


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 12 May 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London May 12. 1798
Dear Sir
It will not surprise you to hear that an open Scism, accompanied by mutual reproaches took place between our Envoys before they separated. Mr. Gerry remains at Paris; and there is a strong opinion that great pains will be taken to persuade him to consent to a public reception, in order to deceive and mock his Country with overtures of an insidious negociation. Marshall & Pinckney left Paris about the middle of April; the former I hope is on his passage to Philadelphia; the latter will embark early in June.
You will be at no loss to understand this state of things. Nothing but vigour and energy will save our Country. Unanimity cannot be expected. Moderation and forbearance with all the virtues that meekly follow in their train, have been faithfully employed, and without success. It is now time, and the wretched Picture exhibited by the Countries where France has introduced her detestable Principles should admonish us, to give up halfway measures with halfway men: they do not belong to the Times in which we live. The people of America will support their Government, if that Government acts with decision, if it appeals to the Pride, the Patriotism, and the Honor of the Nation! But if it temporises, if it wastes itself in words, if it stops short of the only course that remains for its adoption, consistently with the public safety; the next Election will convulse the Country and may, as the Directory intend and expect it shall, give the Government to those who will deliver us up to the same ruin that continues to dessolate Europe.
There is a slight appearance that things are mending upon the Continent; but little interests, little jealousies and little men, whose united influence is opposed to the only effectual Remedy for the mischief, forbid us to expect it until the Evil has spread still wider: for so wretched are the Governments on the Continent, not yet subverted, that the best hope is from the People who are cured when the Fire has passed over them.

I received a short Letter from you a few days since without date, which gave me great satisfaction, as it authorized the hope that the public opinion was sounder than that of its Representatives. War will encrease the public Taxes; these are unpleasant subjects for meditation; the Passions must be attended to; they must have an object; there is a great one. I can’t explain myself. I have had no occasion for reserve with the Secretary of State, because I write to him in Cipher.
Yours &c
R.K.
Col. Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 12 May 1798
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philad. 12 May 1798.
My dear Hamilton.
I shall in a short time be able to get to sea, one or two of our frigates, and perhaps, in less than six or seven days, Cap Dale, in the Ganges, a lately purchased vessel. Can you spare an hour or two to help me to the instructions that it will be proper to give to their captains. Our ships of war, it is probable, will meet with French privateers, who may be in possession of our merchantmen, or with our merchant vessels having French prize masters on board; or with French privateers cruising upon our coast to capture american vessels. They may also when acting as convoys be obliged to employ force to protect their convoy, and may even be obliged to board a French ship of war to terminate a contest and insure its safety. What instructions ought to be given to meet such cases, or enable them to afford competent protection to our merchantmen and preserve the Executive from any future accusation, of having by its orders involved the country in war. I foresee these instructions will fall to my lot, there being no chance that we shall have a Secretary of the Navy in time to frame them or relieve me from the responsibility. Neither the President has mentioned the subject yet to me nor any other gentleman. You will easily conceive how necessary it is I should be assisted with your ideas and a sketch of such instructions as in your opinion will comport with the existing state of things, and the profound reserve of Congress.
Yours sincerely & Affectionately
James McHenry


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Burrall, [17 May 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Burrall, Jonathan

[New York, May 17, 1798]
Dr Sir
Of the sum deposited in the Office of the B of the U States in my name in trust for Louis LeGuen you will please to cause to be paid upon his orders or Checks as they may be presented The excess beyond thirty thousand Dollars, which 30000 Dollars are to remain in deposit until a further communication from me.
With esteem   Yr Obd Svt.
A HamiltonNew York May 17. 1798
Jonathan Burrall EsqrCashier


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, [17 May 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: McHenry, James

[New York, May 17, 1798]
My Dear Sir
I have received your letter of the  instant. Not having seen the law which provides the Naval Armament, I cannot tell whether it gives any new power to the President that is any power whatever with regard to the employment of the Ships. If not, and he is left on the foot of the Constitution, as I understand to be the case, I am not ready to say that he has any other power than merely to employ the Ships as Convoys with authority to repel force by force, (but not to capture), and to repress hostilities within our waters including a marine league from our coasts.
Any thing beyond this must fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that Department which is to declare or make war.
In so delicate a case, in one which involves so important a consequence as that of War—my opinion is that no doubtful authority ought to be exercised by the President—but that as different opinions about his power have been expressed in the house of Representatives, and no special power has been given by the law, it will be expedient for him, and his duty, and the true policy of the Conjuncture to come forward by a Message to the two houses of Congress declaring that “so far and no farther” he feels himself confident of his authority to go in the employment of the naval force; that as in his opinion the depredations on our trade demand a more extensive protection he has thought it his duty to bring the subject under the review of Congress by a communication of his opinion of his own powers—having no desire to exceed the constitutional limits.
This course will remove all clouds as to what The President will do—will gain him credit for frankness and an unwillingness to chicane the Constitution—and will return upon Congress the Question in a shape which cannot be eluded.
I presume you will have heared before this reaches you that a French Privateer has made captures at the mouth of our harbour. This is too much humiliation after all that has passed. Our Merchants are very indignant. Our Government very prostrate in the view of every man of energy.
Yrs. truly
A HamiltonMay 17. 1798
James McHenry Esq.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Uriah Tracy, 17 May 1798
From: Tracy, Uriah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philada. 17th. May 1798.
Sir
Our Envoys continuing so long in Paris, is not only a mortifying circumstance, but will probably prevent any energy of Govt. even in the Senate. A Committee of Senate to take into consideration the Subject, was together this morning consisting of 5 members. I laid before them, the followg Bill (viz)—
“A bill declaring the Treaties between the U. S. and the Republic of France, to be void, and more effectually to protect the Commerce & Coasts of the U. States.”
Whereas the Govt of the French Republic has repeatedly violated the Treaties subsisting between the U S and the French Nation, and whereas under authority of the sd Govt. armed Vessels, belonging to the French Republic and Citizens thereof, have repeatedly captured the Ships and property of the Citizens of the U.S. on the coasts thereof, while engaged in commerce authorized by sd Treaties, and the law of Nations. Therefore Be it enacted &c.
That the Treaties of “Alliance” and of “Amity and Commerce” now subsisting between the U.S. and the French Nation, which were agreed upon and signed at Paris on the 6th day of Feby 1778, by the authority of the U. S. & the then King of France, and the stipulations contained therein, be and they are hereby declared to be void, and of no effect. And the U. S. and every Citizen thereof, are hereby declared to be released & discharged from all and singular the Obligations & stipulations contained in sd. Treaties or either of them.”
“And be it further enacted. That the President of the U. S. be and he hereby is authorized to instruct the Commanders of all armed Vessels of the U. States, to take and bring into Port all armed Vessels belonging to the Republic of France, or any citizen thereof, which may be found within 40 leagues of any part of the Coast of the U. States—and further to instruct sd. Commanders, who are employed to convoy any Merchant Vessel or Vessels of the U. States, not to permit search to be made on board of such Vessel or Vessels, by Officers or Crew of a French cruizer or armed Vessel on any pretence whatever.”
This bill you will see is a rought draught, but the ideas were too strong for our Committee. We may possibly, with immense, labor, drive thro’ the Senate a bill authorizing, instructions to capture a cruizer that has unjustifiably taken one of our Vessels on our Coast—but the Treaty must remain intangible until our Envoys are out of Paris. I never permit myself to despair of the Common Wealth, but I am sometimes exhausted & discouraged & think the U. S. must succumb under the intrigues of the “great Nation.” Our best men are so timid, and our worst so active and profligate—that nothing is done, but with excessive fatigue & industry—confidence in one another is lost—and among ourselves, I mean federalists, there is a look out, to secure against possible events, and protections from the French who may invade us, are now thought of, and qualifications, for friendship from French clemency, are now in calculation.
Pardon me, Sir, for troubling you so long. I wish for your assistance, and that of all good men to excite our friends, our Enemies I fear not, if our friends will be faithful to themselves.
Yours respectfully
Uriah Tracy
Mr. Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 18 May 1798
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Phila. May 18. 1798
Dr. Sir (Private)
You may render great service by corresponding occasionally with your acquaintances in Congress, prompting them to vigorous measures, & dispelling whims & hysterics. Mr. Lawrence & Mr. Bingham have frequently created much embarrassment—The former is now firm—the latter troublesome—both want stimulants occasionally. No person here can say anything to them with advantage.
Congress appears to be but little better than before the publication of the dispatches. All their measures are feeble and qualified with some proviso, or limitation, which shows that they are not in earnest.
Mr. Cabot will not accept the naval Department & I almost despair of obtaining a tolerably fit character. The purchase, building & providing of the Ships falls upon me, & you know that my other duties are enough to employ a mind more active & vigorous than I possess. To diminish the care as much as possible I must employ efficient agents to whom much must be confided. John Blagge does not appear to answer this description. Colo. Stevens wishes to be employed—but he certainly has not all the requisite qualifications. Will you be so good as to turn the thing in your mind, & mention a number of the most suitable characters.
We hear nothing from the Envoys, I fear that their delay will ruin our Affairs. Their continuance in France furnishes the only plausible argument for inaction.
I am Dr. Sir yours
Oliv Wolcott.
Alexander Hamilton Esq.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 19 May 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

New York May 19. 1798
My Dear Sir
At the present dangerous crisis of public affairs, I make no apology for troubling you with a political letter. Your impressions of our situation, I am persuaded, are not different from mine. There is certainly great probability that we may have to enter into a very serious struggle with France; and it is more and more evident that the powerful faction which has for years opposed the Government is determined to go every length with France. I am sincere in declaring my full conviction, as the result of a long course of observation, that they are ready to new model our constitution under the influence or coertion of France—to form with her a perpetual alliance offensive and defensive—and to give her a monopoly of our Trade by peculiar and exclusive privileges. This would be in substance, whatever it might be in name to make this Country a province of France. Neither do I doubt, that her standard displayed in this country would be directly or indirectly seconded by them in pursuance of the project I have mentioned.
It is painful and alarming to remark that the Opposition-Faction assumes so much a Geographical complexion. As yet from the South of Maryland nothing has been heared but accents of disapprobation of our Government and approbation of or apology for France. This is a most portentous symptom & demands every human effort to change it.
In such a state of public affairs it is impossible not to look up to you; and to wish that your influence could in some proper mode be brought into direct action. Among the ideas which have passed through my mind for this purpose—I have asked myself whether it might not be expedient for you to make a circuit through Virginia and North Carolina under some pretence of health &c. This would call forth addresses public dinners &c. which would give you an opportunity of expressing sentiments in Answers Toasts &c. which would throw the weight of your character into the scale of the Government and revive an enthusiasm for your person that may be turned into the right channel.
I am aware that the step is delicate & ought to be well considered before it is taken. I have even not settled my own opinion as to its propriety—but I have concluded to bring the general idea under your view, confident that your judgment will make a right choice and that you will take no step which is not well calculated. The conjuncture however is extraordinary & now or very soon will demand extraordinary measures.

You ought also to be aware, My Dear Sir, that in the event of an open rupture with France, the public voice will again call you to command the armies of your Country; and though all who are attached to you will from attachment, as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a right—yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labour may demand to give it efficacy this further, this very great sacrifice.
Adieu My Dear Sir   Respectfully & Affecly Yr very obed servt
A Hamilton
General Washington


Title: For The Time Piece, [22 May 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, May 22, 1798]
A most unprovoked & wanton attack upon me appeared in the Time pi[e]ce of yesterday under the signature of William Keteltas. Were this man as well known elsewhere as in his own state his attack would [be] treated with silent contempt. As it is, a very slight notice only can be taken of it. It is barely necessary to state that where he is known, the doubt is whether he is most madman or knave, that he is so contemptible as to have been the missionary of a party to go three hundred miles into the Western parts of this state, with saddle bags full of addresses to be distributed for an electioneering purpose, and that his present publication is replete with gross falshoods. By the allusion to Caesar and Brutus he plainly hints at assassination. Though his fears may be the only, it is not doubted that they will be a full security that he will not attempt to be the assassin. But while he is conscious that the worthlessness of his character renders it impossible to descend to his level he may be assured he will not find me unprepared to repel attack and that he is despised and defied.
AH


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 26 May 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[London, May 26, 1798. King’s notation for this letter reads: “Hamilton. Politicks.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 27 May 1798
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Mount Vernon 27th of May 1798.
My dear Sir,
Yesterday, brought me your Letter of the 19th. instant.
You may be assured, that my Mind is deeply impressed with the present situation of our public affairs, and not a little agitated by the outrageous conduct of France towards the United States; and at the enemical conduct of its partisans among ourselves, who aid & abet their measures: You may believe further from assurances equally sincere, that if there was any thing in my power, which could be done with consistency to avert, or lessen the danger of the Crisis, it should be rendered with hand and heart.
The expedient however, which has been suggested by you, would not, in my opinion, answer the end which is proposed. The object of such a tour could not be veiled by the ostensible cover to be given to it; because it would not apply to the state of my health, which never was better; and as the measure would be susceptible of two interpretations, the enemies to it—always more active & industrious than friends—would endeavour, as much as in them lay, to turn it to their own advantage, by malicious insinuations; unless they should discover that the current against themselves was setting too strong, & of too serious a nature for them to stem; in which case the journey would be unnecessary, and in either case, the reception might not be such as you have supposed.
But, my dear Sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as it is to be prepared at all points, for the worst that can happen; (and no one is more disposed to this measure than I am)—I cannot make up my mind, yet, for the expectation of open War; or, in other words, for a formidable Invasion, by France. I cannot believe, although I think them capable of any thing bad, that they will attempt to do more than they have done; that when they perceive the spirit, & policy of this country rising into resistance; and that they have falsely calculated upon support from a large part of the People thereof, to promote their views & influence in it, that they will desist, even from those practices; unless unexpected events in Europe, or their possession of Louisiana & the Floridas, should induce them to continue the measure. And I believe further, that although the leaders of their party, in this country, will not change their sentiments, that they will be obliged nevertheless to change their plan, or the mode of carrying it on; from the effervescence which is appearing in all quarters, and the desertion of their followers, which must frown them into silence—at least for a while.
If I did not view things in this light, my mind would be infinitely more disquieted than it is; for if a crisis should arrive when a sense of duty, or a call from my Country, should become so imperious as to leave me no choice, I should prepare for the relinquishment, and go with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should do to the tombs of my Ancesters.
To say at this time, determinately, what I should do under such circumstances, might be improper, having once before departed from a similar resolution; but I may declare to you, that as there is no conviction in my breast that I could serve my country with more efficiency in the command of the Armies, it might Levy, than many others, an expression of its wish that I should do so, must, some how or other, be unequivocally known, to satisfy my mind that, notwithstanding the respect in which I may be held on account of former services, that a preference might not be given to a man more in his prime. And it may well be supposed too, that I should like, previously, to know who would be my coadjutors, and whether you would be disposed to take an active part, if Arms are to be resorted to.
Before this letter can get to your hands, you will have seen the Resolutions & proposed Address from the Citizens of Charleston, in South Carolina. Their proceedings will, I am persuaded, give the ton to other parts of that State. Two or three very good Addresses have already appeared from No. Carolina; one with the Signature of a late Governor thereof, Spaight. All the upper, most populous, and hardy yeomanry of this State, have come, & are coming forward, with strong Addresses to the Executive, and assurances of Support. The Address from Norfolk (I do not mean the impertinent one from Magnien’s Grenadier Company) is a good one. The middle counties of this State, with two or three exceptions, have hitherto been silent; they want leaders; but I shall be much mistaken if a large majority of them do not forsake, if they have heretofore been with, those who have pretended to speak their Sentiments. As to the Resolutions which were entered into at Fredericksburgh, it is only necessary to point to the Manager of them; & add, that the meeting was partial. From Georgia, no developement of the public sentiment has yet made its appearance; but I have learnt from a very intelligent Gentleman just returned from thence, where he has been sometime for the benefit of his health; travelling, going & returning, slowly, and making considerable halts, that the people of that State, as also those of South & North Carolina, seem to be actuated by one spirit, and that, a very friendly one to the General Government. I have likewise heard, that the present Governor of the first (Georgia) professes to be strongly attached to it. These disclosures, with what may yet be expected, will, I conceive, give a different impression of the sentiments of our people to the Directory of France, than what they have been taught to believe; while it must serve to abash the partizans of it for their wicked, & presumptive information.
Your free communication on these political topics, is so far from needing an apology, that I shall be much gratified, & thankful to you, for the continuation of them; & I would wish you to believe that with great truth and sincerity, I am always
Your Affectionate friend, & Obedt Sert.
Go: Washington
Alexr. Hamilton Esqr.


Title: Introductory Note: To James McHenry, [1 June 1798]
From:
To:

This letter contains the first of many references to the plans for the fortification of New York City during the Quasi-War with France. What on the surface should have been a relatively simple operation became extraordinarily complex because of the division of responsibility among the United States Government, the Military Committee of New York City, the state government, and the city government.
The fortification of ports and harbors in the United States was first undertaken in 1794 when war with Great Britain seemed imminent. On March 20, 1794, Congress enacted “An Act to provide for the Defence of certain Ports and Harbors in the United States.” This statute was implemented by “An Act making appropriations for the support of the Military establishment of the United States, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four,” which appropriated “For fortifying certain ports and harbors of the United States, and purchasing the lands necessary for the erection of the same, seventy-six thousand dollars. …” As a result of this legislation, the fortification of New York City was begun in 1794, but the work was not completed.
In his eighth annual message to Congress on December 7, 1796, George Washington inquired “… whether our Harbours are yet sufficiently secured,” and on December 16, 1796, the House of Representatives “Resolved, That inquiry ought to be made into the actual state of the fortifications of the ports and harbors of the United States, and whether any, and what, further provision is necessary on that subject.” On June 23, 1797, “An Act to provide for the further Defence of the Ports and Harbors of the United States” appropriated not more than one hundred and fifteen thousand dollars “for fortifying certain ports and harbors of the United States.” More money was appropriated for fortifications on May 3, 1798, by “An Act supplementary to the act providing for the further defence of the ports and harbors of the United States.” This act provided “That a sum not exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, in addition to the sums heretofore appropriated, remaining unexpended, shall be, and is hereby appropriated, and shall and may be paid out of any monies not before appropriated, to make and complete, at the discretion of the President of the United States, the fortifications heretofore directed for certain ports and harbors, and to erect fortifications in any other place or places as the public safety shall require, in the opinion of the President of the United States; and which other fortifications he is hereby authorized to cause to be erected, under his direction from time to time as he shall judge necessary.”
Following the enactment of the 1794 statutes, Henry Knox, Secretary of War, appointed Ebenezer Stevens agent of the War Department for the fortification of New York City. In this capacity, Stevens was responsible for the funds allocated for the defense of New York. In the late spring of 1798, Secretary of War James McHenry reappointed Stevens as War Department agent.
The city government first became interested in measures for the defense of New York Harbor on April 30, 1798, when, in response to a petition from the Chamber of Commerce, the Common Council requested that “sixteen long eighteen Pounders of those now at West Point mounted upon travelling Carriages or as many of them as can be spared” be transferred to New York City and “Ordered that Mr Mayor [Richard Varick] issue his Warrant on the Treasr to pay Colo Ebenr Stevens $1000, on Acct towards providing Timber for Carriages & other Apparatus.…” On May 28, 1798, the Common Council ordered that Aldermen John B. Coles, Gabriel Furman, and John Bogert “be a Committee in conjunction with Colo Stevens to attend to the Measures … for the Defence of the City & Harbor of New York.…” Subsequently the Council “Resolved that this Board will provide a Sum not exceeding fifty thousand Dollars to be applied towards the Defence of this Port & City And that an Application shall be made to Congress and, if necessary, to our State Legislature for the Reimbursement thereof.” Instead of appropriating the money in question, the Council authorized Furman to borrow it from the Bank of New York, which he did. On October 14, 1799, the state reimbursed the city with “the Sum of Sixty thousand Dollars … borrowed last Year … and also a further Sum … for Interest thereof.…”
The Military Committee of New York City originated as a citizens’ organization with neither official standing nor authority. At a meeting at City Hall on June 11, 1798, representatives of the “Officers of the late army and navy of the United States,” various city wards, and the Chamber of Commerce discussed measures for the defense of the city and appointed a Military Committee consisting of Aaron Burr, Hamilton, and Stevens. Although the power and responsibilities of the Military Committee were never clearly defined, its members—particularly Hamilton and Stevens—took an active part in formulating the plans for the city’s defenses, and more often than not they were responsible for the supervision of the projects initiated by the Federal, state, and city governments.
The New York legislature first acted on the city’s defenses on March 26, 1794, when it passed “An Act authorising the erecting of Fortifications, within this State.” This act stated: “Whereas the monies that may be appropriated by the Congress, for the purpose of repairing or erecting fortifications at or near the city and port of New-York, may not be sufficient to put the said city and port in a proper state of defence,
“… That a sum or sums of money not exceeding in the whole the sum of thirty thousand pounds, shall be appropriated.…”
Ebenezer Stevens was one of seven commissioners appointed by this act.
On August 27, 1798, the legislature passed “An Act for the further defence of this State and for other purposes.” In a letter to President Adams on September 26, 1798, Governor John Jay described the contents of this act and wrote: “I … take the liberty of submitting to your Consideration whether as Majr. Genl. Hamilton is a national Officer in whom great confidence may be reposed, it would not be expedient to authorize him to concert with me the plan of laying out this money to the best advantage and to appoint him to superintend the execution of it.…” Adams accepted this proposal. The upshot of this arrangement was that Hamilton was the principal officer of both the state and Federal governments for the fortification of the city and port of New York and that Ebenezer Stevens was his immediate subordinate in this undertaking.
That this system—or lack of system—of overlapping authority worked as well as it did can be attributed to the fact that Hamilton and Stevens were the leading figures in each of the participating agencies. The Military Committee (or Hamilton and Stevens, for Burr took little part in the committee’s activities) worked closely with—and were often the designated agents of—the Federal, state, and city governments. More important, Stevens was agent for the War Department in New York City, and both men were the principal state and Federal officials responsible for the city’s fortification. In any given instance, Hamilton and Stevens may not have known under what authority they were acting, but they seldom, if ever, had to doubt that such authority existed.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, [1 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: McHenry, James

[New York, June 1, 1798]
My Dear Sir
Our citizens are extremely anxious that some further measures for their defence should take place. Do me the favour to inform me confidentially what means are actually in the disposition of your department for this purpose when & how they will be applied.
Yrs truly
A HamiltonJune 1. 1798

A Capt Hacker formerly of our Navy is desirous of being employed. One or two good men have recommended him to me. It seems however that he has been heretofore rather Democratic. I barely wish that his pretensions may be fairly but carefully considered & that he may have such chance as he merits.
The sooner I hear from you the better.

J McHenry Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 2 June 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

New York June 2d1798
My Dear Sir
I have before me your favour of the 27. of May.
The suggestion in my last was an indigested thought begotten by my anxiety. I have no doubt that your view of it is accurate & well founded.
It is a great satisfaction to me to ascertain what I had anticipated in hope, that you are not determined in an adequate emergency against affording once more your Military services. There is no one but yourself that could unite the public confidence in such an emergency, independent of other considerations—and it is of the last importance that this confidence should be full and complete. As to the wish of the Country it is certain that it will be ardent and universal. You intimate a desire to be informed what would be my part in such an event as to entering into military service. I have no scruple about opening myself to you on this point. If I am invited to a station in which the service I may render may be proportioned to the sacrifice I am to make—I shall be willing to go into the army. If you command, the place in which I should hope to be most useful is that of Inspector General with a command in the line. This I would accept. The public must judge for itself as to whom it will employ; but every individual must judge for himself as to the terms on which he will serve and consequently must estimate himself his own pretensions. I have no knowlege of any arrangement contemplated but I take it for granted the services of all the former officers worth having may be commanded & that your choice would regulate the Executive. With decision & care in selection an excellent army may be formed.
The view you give of the prospects in the South is very consoling. The public temper seems every where to be travelling fast to a right point. This promises security to the Country in every Event.

I have the honor to remain very truly My Dr. Sir   Yr. faithful & Affectionate servant
A Hamilton
General Washington


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, 3 June 1798
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

[New York] June 3d. 1798
I have been extremely uneasy, My beloved Eliza, at the state of health and state of mind in which you left me. I earnestly hope that there has been a change of both for the better. Let me entreat you as you value my happiness to tranquillize yourself and to take care of yourself. You are infinitely dear to me. You are of the utmost consequence to our precious Children. You have every motive to study your own health and repose.
I will not hurry you to return because you must do as duty and affection to your father demand and because I know you will be glad to come back to my arms as soon as possible. These when you arrive will welcome you with increased affection. I always feel how necessary you are to me. But when you are absent I become still more sensible of it, and look around in vain for that satisfaction which you alone can bestow.
I dined with Angelica today—Margaret was with her. My spirits were not very good—though every body tried to make my time pass pleasantly. Give my love to your father & mother. Kiss the dear Children with you for me and receive the assurance of my fond & unalterable tenderness.
A H


Title: Call for a Meeting, [4 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Army and Navy Officers

[New York, June 4, 1798]
Card.
The officers of the late army and navy of the United States are requested to meet at Gautier’s, on Tuesday evening, 7 o’clock, to consult on the subject of measures for the immediate security of our port and city.
A. Hamilton,
M. Clarkson,
E. Stevens.
June 4.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James McHenry, 4 June 1798
From: McHenry, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philada. 4 June 1798
My dear Hamilton
I have just recd. yours of the 1st.
I have calculated to be able to leave this on Wednesday, to examine the harbour of New York, and to with the aid of the best advice I can procure, determine what further works can be constructed out of the means that can be spared.
Be kind enough to Tell Col. Stevens to have a pilot boat engaged and the proper apparatus ready to take depths and ascertain the quality of the ground on bottom.
Yours
Col. Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, [5 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

[New York, June 5, 1798]
I wrote to you, My beloved Eliza, by the Monday’s Post. You will be glad to hear that your dear boys & myself continue in good health & that they thus far behave well. I hope they will continue to do so—for in our mutual love & in them consist all our happiness.
I trust you are by this time arrived & shall impatiently look out for a letter from you. Our public affairs continue to march in a good train; & when you shall return to me my private affairs cannot fail to be in as good a train as I desire them.
Yrs. most faithfully & affec
A HJune 5th 1798
Mrs. Hamilton


Title: Enclosure: Further Measures Adviseable to Be Taken without Delay, [5 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

Further measures adviseable to be taken without delay

  I
  To authorise the President to proceed forthwith to raise the 10000 men already ordered.

  II
  To establish an academy for naval & military instruction. This is a very important measure and ought to be permanent.

  III
  To provide for the immediate raising of a corps of Non Commissioned officers (viz) serjeants & Corporals sufficient with the present establishment for an army of 50000 men. The having these men prepared & disciplined will accelerate extremely the disciplining of an additional force.

  IV
  To provide before Congress rise, that in case it shall appear that an invasion of this country by a large army is actually on foot—there shall be a draft from the Militia, to be classed, of a number sufficient to complete the army to 50000 men. Provision for volunteers in lieu of drafts. A bounty to be given.

  V
  To authorise the President to provide a further naval force of six ships of the line & 12 frigates with 20 small vessels not exceeding sixteen Guns. It is possible the Ships of the line & frigates may be purchased from G Britain to be paid for in Stock. We ought to be ready to cut up all the small privateers & gun boats in the West Indies so as at the same time to distress the French Islands as much as possible & protect our own Trade.

  VI
  Is not the Independence of the French Colonies under the Guarantee of the UStates to be aimed at? If it is there cannot be too much promptness in opening negotiations for the purpose. Victor Hughes is probably an excellent subject. This idea however deserves mature consideration.

  VII
  It is essential the Executive should have half a million of secret service money. If the measure cannot be carried without it, The expediture may be with the approbation of three members of each house of Congress. But Twere better without this incumbrance.

  Probable produce 500.000

  VIII
  Revenue in addition to the 2000000 of land tax say

  In lieu of tax on slaves which is liable to much objection
  {
  a Stamp duty on hats as well manufactured at home as imported distributed into three Classes 10. 15. 25 Cents

  100.000
  {
  Saddle horses 1 Dollar each excluding those engaged in agriculture &Salt add so as to raise the present Duty to 25 Cents ⅌ Bushel.

  500.000
  {
  Male Servants of those capacities by whatever name Maitre D’hotel house steward valet de chambre Butler Underbutler Confectioner Cook house Porter Waiter footman Coachman Groom Postilion Stable boy

  For one such servant   1 Dollar

  for 2 such servants & not more   2 Dollars each

  For three & not more   3 Dollars each

  Above three   4 Dollars each

  One Dollar additional by Batchelors

  100.000
  {
  New Modification with greater diversity of licenses for sale of Wines &

  100.000
  1 ⅌ Cent on all succession by descent or devise

  IX
  A loan of 10,000 000 of Dollars. The interest to be such as will insure the loan at par. Tis better to give high interest redeemable at pleasure than low interest with accumulation of Capital as in England.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 6 June 1798
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London June 6. 1798
My Dear Sir
We have certain intelligence that the Toulon expedition has sailed. The number of Troops, of Transports, and of men of war are variously stated, but it is known that Buona parte commands and that the fleet is a very great one—its Destination is the subject of inquietude and of conjecture. A few Days will bring us more perfect accounts, and from the Force and Position of the Br. fleet under Ld. St. Vincents the public are in daily, not to say hourly expectation of hearing that he has discovered and destroyed this boasted Armada.
If Ireland is the object, the Insurrection has been ill judged and premature—in almost every instance the insurgents have been dispersed and killed, and the quarter round Dublin is now nearly restored to the Kings Peace. Still however if a moderate french force with a supply of Arms could now be thrown into Ireland, the issue wd. be dubious, so deep and general is the Defection. Great Britain is unquestionably in a better and more secure, as well as more united state than she has been since the commencement of the war. With her the question with france is at issue; and so far as regards Europe upon her alone must it essentially depend, for upon the continent french principles & french Influence seem still to extend themselves in every Direction. Tho it is more than a fortnight since the Publication of the Instructions & Dispatches of our Envoys must have been received at Paris neither their Papers, nor Letters from France take any notice of them. Gerry is still there, but about to return home, and if I mistake not will be the bearer of a soothing and treacherous Message from the Directory. Be upon your Guard; france will not declare war agt us; no her policy will be to pursue with us the same course she already has done, and which has served her purpose in Italy and among the honest but devoted and ruined Swiss.
I will say if after all that ⟨has occured⟩ among ourselves, and in other Countries, we are content ⟨to⟩ be duped, and cajoled, and betrayed, we shall deserve the fate which they are preparing for us.
Yours affectionately.
R K


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, [7 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

[New York, June 7, 1798]
My Dear Sir
As McHenry will probably have left Philadelphia, before this reaches that place, I take the liberty to address the subject of it to you.
I have received a letter from Capt Van Rensselaer, in which he informs me that he is a candidate for a Commission on board of our navy, and requests my recommendation of it. As a connexion of our family—I cannot refuse it as far as truth & propriety will warrant. When he first began his carreer the young man did things which were not pretty; but he has since that retrieved his character by a conduct which has rapidly raised him to the command of a Ship which he has had of several. I have particularly inquired concerning him; & my inquiries have been satisfactorily answered—so that I really conclude he is a deserving man. But of this you can be better ascertained from persons in Philadelphia in whose employ I believe he has sailed.
My only intention is to request attention to his pretensions as far as they may appear to be good & in the proportion which they bear to those of other candidates. I owe this to him as a family connection and I may add that he is of a brave blood.
What do the British mean? What are these stories of the Thetis &c? In my opinion our Country is now to act in every direction with spirit. Will it not be well to order one of our frigates to Charlestown to protect effectually our Commerce in that quarter & if necessary controul the Thetis? This Conduct will unite & animate.
Yrs. truly
A HamiltonJune 7. 1798

PS If an alien Bill passes I should like to know what policy in execution is likely to govern the Executive My opinion is that while the mass ought to be obliged to leave the Country—the provisions in our Treaties in favour of Merchants ought to be observed & there ought to be guarded exceptions of characters whose situations would expose them too much if sent away & whose demeanour among us has been unexceptionable. There are a few such. Let us not be cruel or violent.

A H
T Pickering Esq


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Elizabeth Hamilton, [8 June 1798]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hamilton, Elizabeth

[New York, June 8, 1798]
This is the third time I have written to my love since her departure. I continue to enjoy good health and my spirits are as good as they can be in her absence. But I find as I grow older her presence becomes more necessary to me. In proportion as I discover the worthlessness of other pursuits, the value of my Eliza and of domestic happiness rises in my estimation.
Angelica & her family are all well except that Mr. Church’s gout is not intirely gone. Peggy has been as well as usual. Yesterday however she complained of a little gout in her hand. Cornelia is well.
Tell your father that our affairs continue to mend & that there is every prospect that we shall not put on the French Yoke. Adieu My very dear wife.
Yrs. most affecty
A HJune 8. 1798
Mrs. H