Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act Acknowledging the Independence of Vermont, [28 March 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, March 28, 1787]
Mr. Chairman,
The counsel for the petitioners has entered into a large field of argument against the present bill. He has endeavoured to shew that it is contrary to the constitution, to the maxims of sound policy and to the rights of property. His observations have not been destitute of weight. They appear to have the more force, as they are to a certain degree founded in truth. But it is the province of the committee to distinguish the just limits of the principles he has advanced; how far they extend, and where they terminate. To aid the committee in this enquiry shall be my endeavour, and following the counsel for the petitioners; through the different heads of his argument, I hope to be able to shew, that neither of the objections he has urged, stands in the way of the measure proposed, and that the constitution permits, policy demands it and justice acquiesces in its adoption.
The first objection is drawn from that great principle of the social compact—that the chief object of government is to protect the rights of individuals by the united strength of the community. The justness of this principle is not to be disputed; but its extent remains to be ascertained. It must be taken with this limitation: The united strength of the community ought to be exerted for the protection of individuals so far as there is a rational prospect of success; so far as is consistent with the safety and well being of the whole. The duty of a nation is always limited by these considerations. It is bound to make efforts and encounter hazards for the protection of its members proportioned to its abilities, warranted by a reasonable expectation of a favorable issue, and compatible with its eventual security. But it is not bound to enter in or prosecute enterprises of a manifest rashness and folly; or which, in the event of success, would be productive of more mischief than good.
This qualification of the principle, can no more be denied than the principle itself. The counsel for the petitioners indeed admits it in substance when he admits that a case of extreme necessity is an exception to the rule; but he adds that this necessity must be apparent and unequivocal.
What constitutes a case of extreme necessity, admits of no precise definition. It is allways a question of fact, to be determined by a consideration of the condition of the parties, and the particular circumstances of the case itself. A case of necessity then exists, when every discerning, unprejudiced man, well acquainted with facts, must be convinced that a measure cannot be undertaken or pursued with a probability of success. To determine this an experiment is not always necessary: Circumstances may exist so decisive and palpable in their nature, as to render it the extreme of temerity to begin as well as to continue an experiment. The propriety of doing the one or the other, must equally be decided by a judicious estimater of the national situation.
The tendency of the principle contended for, and the application of it in argument, has been to prove, that the state ought to employ the common strength of the society to protect the rights of its citizens, interested in the district of territory in question, by reducing the revolted inhabitants of that district to an obedience to its laws. The enquiry therefore is—can this be done? Is it in a rational sense practicable? Is the state in a situation to undertake it? Is there a probability that the object will be more attainable at a future day? Is there not rather a probability that it will be every day more out of our reach, and that leaving things in their present state, will be attended with serious dangers and incoveniencies? Is it even desireable, if practicable, to reduce the people in question under subjection to this state?
In pursuing this enquiry we ought to bear in mind, that a nation is never to regulate its conduct by remote possibilities or mere contingencies, but by such probability as may reasonably be inferred from the existing state of things, and the usual course of human affairs.
With this caution, no well informed mind can be at a loss in what manner to answer the questions I have proposed. A concise review of the past, and a dispassionate consideration of the present, will enable us to judge with accuracy of the obligations and interests of the state.
The pretensions to independence of the district of territory in question, began shortly after the commencement of the late revolution. We were then engaged in a war for our existence as a people, which required the utmost exertion of our resources to give us a chance of success. To have diverted any part of them from this object to that of subduing the inhabitants of Vermont—to have involved a domestic quarrel which would have compelled that hardy and numerous body of men to throw themselves into the arms of the power, with which we were then contending, instead of joining their efforts to ours in the common cause of American liberty, as they for a long time did, with great advantage to it, would have been a species of phrenzy, for which there could have been no apology, and would have endangered the fate of the revolution more than any one step we could have taken.
This idea is too obvious to need being enlarged upon. The most prejudiced will acquit the state from blame for not trying the effect of force against that people during the continuance of the war. Every moderate measure, every thing short of hostility, or a total sacrifice of those rights, which were the original cause of the revolt, and which are the occasion of the opposition to the present bill, were tried. Conciliating laws were passed, overtures made, negotiations carried on in Congress, but all to no purpose.

The peace found the Vermonteers in a state of actual independence, which they had enjoyed for several years—organized under a regular form of government, and increased in strength by a considerable accession of numbers. It found this state the principal seat of the war, exhausted by peculiar exertions and overwhelmed in debt. The embarrassments arising from this situation press us daily. The utmost exertion of wisdom in our public councils, would not be more than equal to extricating us from them. As matters stand, the public debts are unprovided for, and the public credit prostrate.
Are we now then, in a situation to undertake the reduction of Vermont? Or are we likely speedily to be in such a situation? Where are our resources, where our public credit to enable us to carry on an offensive war?
We ought to recollect, that in war, to defend or attack, are very different things—to the first, the mountains, the wildernesses, the militia, sometimes even the poverty of a country will suffice; the latter requires an army and a treasury.
The population of Vermont will not be rated too high, if stated at nearly one half of that of New-York. Can any reasonable man suppose that New-York, with the load of debt the revolution has left upon it and under a popular government, would be able to carry on with advantage an offensive war against a people half as numerous as itself, in their own territory; a territory defended as much by its natural situation, as by the numbers and hardihood of its inhabitants? Can it be imagined that it would be able finally to reduce such a people to its obedience? The supposition would be chimerical and the attempt madness.
Can we hope a more favorable posture of affairs hereafter? Will not the population and strength of Vermont increase in ratio to our own? There is perhaps no essential difference between their government an[d] ours—the necessity of making provision in one way, or another, for the exigencies of the union, and for the discharge of the debts of the state, must continue to subject our citizens to heavier burthens than are borne by the inhabitants of that country; who have no call for revenue beyond the support of their domestic administration. A country possessing a fertile soil exempt from taxes, cannot fail of having a rapid growth.
The enterprise will of course become more difficult by delay, and procrastination can only serve to render the claims of the state and its citizens, in the opinion of mankind, obsolete, and to give the cement of time to the connection which the people of Vermont have in all appearance already formed with the British government. This last point I shall discuss more fully in another place.
I have confined myself in my reasoning to an examination of what is practicable on the part of this state alone—No assistance is to be expected from our neighbours: Their opinion of the origin of the controversy between this state and the people of Vermont, whether well or ill founded, is not generally in our favor; and it is notorious that the eastern states have uniformly countenanced the independence of that country. This might suggest to us reflections that would confirm the belief of the impracticability of destroying, and the danger of attempting to destroy that independence.
The scheme of coertion would ill suit even the disposition of our own citizens; the habits of thinking, to which the revolution has given birth, are not adapted to the idea of a contest for dominion over a people disinclined to live under our government.
And in reality it is not the interest of the state ever to regain its dominion over them by force. We shall do well to advert to the nature of our government and the extent of the state, according to its acknowledged limits. Are we sure we shall be able to govern what we already possess, or would it be wise to wish to try the strength of our government over a numerous body of people disaffected to it, and compelled to submit to its authority by force? For my part I should regard the re-union of Vermont to this state as one of the greatest evils that could befall it, as a source of continual embarrassment and disquietude.
It is hinted by the counsel for the petitioners that many of the inhabitants of Vermont are desirous of living under our government; and sanguine tempers have long ago predicted that they would shortly grow weary of their independence, throw it off and become reunited with us and New-Hampshire of their own accord. There are clear principles of human nature to which we may resort to falsify this prediction. In popular governments the sentiments of the people generally take their tone from their leaders. The leaders of Vermont cannot desire a reunion with New-York, because this would amount to an abdication of their own power and consequence. The people of Vermont will not desire it; because no people ever desired to pass from a situation in which they were exempted from taxes, and in which they suffered no particular oppression, to one in which they would be subject to burthens comparatively heavy.
I pass now to an examination of the constitutionality of the measure proposed by the bill. It is observed that by the constitution, the counties of Charlotte, Cumberland and Gloucester are constituent parts of the state—that one article of it declares that no power shall be exercised over the people, but such as is derived from, and granted by them, that no express power is given to the legislature to dismember any part of the state; and that this silence of the constitution is a tacit reservation of that power to the people.
To all this I answer, that the sovereignty of the people by our consitution is vested in their representatives in senate and assembly, with the intervention of the council of revision and, that the power of dismembering the state under certain circumstances is a necessary appendage of the sovereignty. The practice of nations and the authority of writers conspire to establish this principle; and the safety of society requires it. There are certain situations of Kingdoms and states in which the sacrifice of a part is essential to the preservation or welfare of the rest.
History furnishes abundant examples of such sacrafices. Nations in making peace frequently cede parts of their territories to each other. Civil commotions have many times produced similar dismemberments. The monarchy of Spain after a destructive and fruitless contest to preserve it was obliged at last to surrender its dominion over the Netherlands. The Crown of Austria was in like manner compelled to abandon its jurisdiction over the Swiss Cantons. And the United-States are a recent and still more signal instance of the exercise of the same right. Neither of these instances has been censured or condemned nor the power of the sovereign to accede to the separation called in question.
The celebrated author quoted by the council for the petitioners is explicit on this article and decides with clearness that the prince or body entrusted with the sovereign authority may in certain emergencies dismember the empire and lop off a limb for the good of the body. This inferrence from the silence of a constitution, is the reverse of that drawn by the council for the petitioners. Doubts have been raised by particular theorists upon this subject; but their theories were too abstract for practice, and are now exploded by the ablest writers on the laws of nations. Indeed those doubts were chiefly applied to the case of a cession or relinquishment of a part of the empire, still in possession of the sovereign; it has been long considered as a clear point, that where a part of an empire is actually severed by conquest, or a revolution, the prince or body, vested with the administration of the government, has a right to assent to, and to ratify that separation. This is an obvious and important distinction; from which other inferrences of moment will be drawn in another place. It will be found in Vattel. Book IV Chap 2d §.
Vermont is in fact severed from New-York, and has been so for years. There is no reasonable prospect of recovering it, and the attempt would be attended with certain and serious calamities. The legislature have therefore an undoubted right to relinquish it, and policy dictates that it should be done.
It is of no force to say that this principle would authorise the dismemberment of Long Island, or of any other part of the state; there is no doubt, the same circumstances concurring, the same consequences would result, but not sooner; and it will be the duty of the state to endeavour to prevent a similar extremity.
The next thing, in the order observed by the counsel for the petitioners that presents itself to our discussion, is the policy of the measure.
Against this it is objected that the precedent would be dangerous; that the facility with which the Vermonteers will have accomplished their object, might invite other parts of this state, and the United States to follow the example.
To this I answer, that examples have little to do with the revolutions of empire: wherever such a state of things exist as to make it the interest or the inclination of a large body of people to separate from the society with which they have been connected, and at the same time to afford a prospect of success, they will generally yield to the impulse, without much inquiry or solicitude about what has been done by others, or upon other occasions; and when this is not the case, precedents will never create the disposition. Events of this kind are not produced or controled by the ordinary operations of human policy, care or contrivance.
But whatever may be the effect of the example, it is too late to prevent or redress the evil. It sprang up under circumstances which forbade the application of an effectual remedy, and it has now acquired a maturity which would mock all our efforts to counteract it. Vermont is lost to New-York, beyond the possibility of a recovery; and a passive acquiescence in its independence, cannot make it more formidable, as an example, than a direct recognition of it. Success and impunity are the ingredients that are to constitute the force of the example, and these will exist in either case.
On the other hand the policy of the measure results from two important considerations; the one, that by the union of Vermont to the confederacy, it must of course bear a proportion of the public burdens; the other, that it would be detached from the completion of a connection, already in all appearance begun with a foreign power. The incorporation of Vermont into the confederacy is by the bill, made an express condition of the acknowledgement of their independence.
The first advantage was too obvious to be denied; though observations have been made to diminish its importance. Its inland situation has been noted as a circumstance that precluded the expectation of any considerable revenue from it. But the same thing might be said of the interior parts of this and of the other states; and yet we should make a much worse figure than we do, if our resources were to be drawn wholly from our Atlantic settlements. The country of Vermont is fertile and will soon be populous; and the resources which it may be capable of affording at a day not far remote, though not of great magnitude, will by no means be contemptible.
But the principal advantage to be expected from the measure, is the one mentioned last. Here it is asked, where is the evidence of the fact, where the proof of the connection? Would Great Britain, which has so recently, in a solemn treaty, acknowledged the territory in question, to be comprehended within the limits of the United States, derogate from that treaty, and for so insignificant an object as a connection with a small corner of one of the states, hazard a rupture with the whole confederacy?
Not expecting a formal call for the evidence of the fact, my memory is not prepared to enter into all the details requisite to its full elucidation. I well remember, that during the latter periods of the war, a variety of circumstances produced a connection of its existence every where; in the army, in the legislature, and in Congress. Among other transactions, that came to my knowlege, I shall mention one as nearly as my recollection will serve me. Some time in the year 1781, Fay, and Ira Allen, two of the most influential individuals in that country, went into Canada, and we were well informed, had repeated interviews with General Haldimand. Not long after, a party of the British under St. Leger, penetrated as far Ticonderoga.
A detachment from that body, fell in by accident with a small party of Vermonteers, fired upon them, killed one of their number and took the rest prisoners. Discovering their mistake, they interred the dead body with the honors of war, and sent the prisoners home loaded with kindnesses and caresses. From that period a free intercourse subsisted between Canada and Vermont. This is one proof, and a pretty decisive one to shew that a connection was formed during the war. I doubt not there are others equally strong, within the recollection of other members of the committee. Since the peace, this intercourse has been cultivated with reciprocal zeal, and there are circumstances related (which I shall not repeat as they do not come to me with sufficient authenticity) that look strongly to a continuance of the connection.

If this connection ever existed, what reason have we to believe that it has been since dissolved? To me, I confess, there appears none. On the contrary, the situation of the parties in my opinion forbid the supposition of its dissolution.
I flatter myself, those who know my manner of thinking, will acquit me from a disposition to sow groundless jealousies of any nation. I consider a conduct of this kind, as undignified and indelicate, in a public character; and if I were not persuaded the suspicions I entertain are well founded, no motive would have induced me to bring them forward.
It is asked, in substance, what object Great Britain can have in cultivating such a connection; this admits of several answers.
Great Britain cannot but perceive that our governments are feeble and distracted; that the union wants energy; the nation concert. That our public debts are unprovided for; our federal treasury empty; our trade languishing. She may flatter herself that this state of things will be productive of discontents among the people; and that these discontents may lead to a voluntary return to her dominion. She may hope to see in this country a counterpart of the restoration of Charles the second. However mistaken they may be, it is not impossible, that speculations of this kind may enter into the head of a British minister.
The government lately established in Canada—the splendid title of viceroy—seem to look beyond the dreary regions of Canada and Nova Scotia.
In this view she would naturally lay hold of Vermont as a link in the chain of events. It would be a positive acquisition of so much, and nothing could better answer the purpose of accelerating the progress of discontent than the example of a country, part of ourselves, comparativly speaking, free from taxes. Nothing could have a more powerful influence than such an example, upon the inhabitants of the settlements bordering upon that Country. How far and how rapidly it might extend itself is a matter not easy to be calculated.
But laying aside every supposition of this nature, there are motives of immoderate interest which would dispose the British government to cultivate Vermont. A connection with Vermont will hereafter conduce to the security of Canada and to the preservation of the western posts. That Great-Britain means to retain these posts may be inferred from the interest she has in doing it. The ostensible reason for not having delivered them up heretofore is the infractions of the treaty on our part; but though these infractions in some instances cannot be denied, it may fairly be presumed that they are nothing more than the pretext for witholding the posts while the true motive is the prodigious advantage which the monoply of the furr trade affords to the commerce of the English nation.
If Great-Britain has formed the design of finally retaining those posts she must look forward sooner or later to a rupture with this country; for degraded as we are by our mismanagement she can hardly entertain so mean an opinion of us as to expect we shall eventually submit to such a violation of our rights and interests without a struggle. And in such a case Vermont would be no despicable auxiliary.
But would Great Britain hazard a war with the United-States for so inconsiderable an object?
In the first place the object is not inconsiderable; in the next, our situation is not such as to render our resentment formidable. This situation is perhaps better understood by every body else than ourselves; and no nation would forego a present advantage to our detriment, while it knew that a change of government must precede any inconveniencies from our displeasure.
I do not suppose that the British government would in the present state of things commit itself to any avowed engagements with the people of Vermont. It will no doubt take care to be in such a situation as to leave itself at liberty to act according to circumstances; but it will, and I have no doubt does, by the intermediation of its officers, keep up a secret intercourse with the leaders of that people, to endeavour gradually to mould them to its interest, and to be ready to convert them to its own purposes upon any favourable conjuncture, or future emergency. This policy is so obvious and safe, that it would be presumeable, without any evidence of its existence.
On the part of Vermont, while their fate in the American scale remains suspended, considerations of safety would direct them to such a connection with the British government. They would not choose to lie at our mercy, or to depend on their strength if they could find refuge and support else where.
There is a circumstance too mentioned, with a different view, by the counsel for the petitioners, which would contribute to this connection. I mean the relative situation of Canada and Vermont. It is asked “may not this situation induce Vermont to regret the offer of independence and prompt the people of that country for the sake of commerce, to form still closer connections with a foreign power?” I ask does not this situation, which it is supposed might have so powerful an influence, afford a strong presumption of the existence of such a connection. And is it not our true policy to take away every additional temptation?
I shall readily admit that it is very doubtful whether Vermont will accept the proffered acknowledgment of its independence, upon the condition annexed. I firmly believe, that she does not desire it, and that she would be perplexed by the dilemma to which she would be reduced. But whether she accepts it or not, the offer may be expected to have a good effect. It would at least serve to ascertain facts. Her refusal would be a conclusive evidence of a determined predilection to a foreign connection; and it would shew the United States the absolute necessity of combining their efforts to subvert an independence, so hostile to their safety. If they should find themselves unequal to the undertaking, it must operate as a new inducement to the several states to strengthen the union.
In every light therefore the measure on national ground appears adviseable; but it still remains to inquire what will be our duty in respect to the citizens of this state, who are owners of land in Vermont. How far shall we violate their rights, and how far are we bound to make them compensation?
The claim to a compensation is the thing which has been with most propriety urged, by the counsel for the petitioners. Let us however, examine its nature and foundation.
But before I enter into this examination, I shall repeat an observation which I made upon a former occasion—whatever obligations there may be on the part of the state, cannot be encreased by acceding to the measure proposed. If Vermont is not irretrievably lost to this state, the duty of protection which it owes to individuals obliges it to employ the common strength to reinstate them in their rights; if it is irretrievably lost, no rights capable of being rendered effective will be sacrificed; of course no obligation to making a recompence will exist.
But the truth is, the present bill, so far from surrendering the rights of individuals, puts things in the only train in which they will ever have an opportunity of giving validity. The third clause of the ninth article of the confederation expressly declares that all controversies about the private right of soil between the citizens of different states shall be decided by a Federal Court. The counsel for the Petitioners tells us that his Clients doubt the operation of this clause, but as he gives us no reason for the doubt, I shall only say that the terms of it appear to me clear and explicit.
I have no doubt that the petitioners would be entitled to a federal court; and though that court would not decide in such a question like the tribunals of New-York, but upon general principles of natural and political right, I should confidently expect that all equitable claims of our citizens would have their full effect.
It is however further observed on this head, that the expence of such court would exceed the abilities of individuals, and could only be compassed by the resources of sovereign states.
If this suggestion should be admitted to be true (though I think the expence is greatly over rated) yet surely it would be more reasonable to ask the state for its assistance, in procuring a federal court to obtain justice to the petitioners, than to ask it to undertake a ruinous war for that purpose. The difference in expence would not bear a comparison. Indeed the first would be a trifling object to the state, while the last would exceed its abilities, and perhaps end in its disgrace.
But if the bill even contained no provision for obtaining justice to the petitioners, I should hold that the state would not be under a strict obligation to recompence them for their losses. The distinction I would lay down upon the subject is this; If a government voluntarily bargains away the rights or disposes of the property of its citizens, in their enjoyments, possession, or power, it is bound to make compensation for the thing of which it hath deprived them; but if they are actually dispossessed of those rights or that property by the casualties of war, or a revolution, the state, if the public good requires it, may abandon them to the loss, without being obliged to make reparation. The author quoted by the counsel for the petitioners, has in view the case of a voluntary disposition of the property of citizens in the power of the state; and his doctrine is unquestionably just—but it does not apply to the case of an actual dispossession by any of those events in which nations have no choice. In wars between states, the sovereign is never supposed to be bound to make good the losses which the subject sustains by the captures or ravages of the enemy, tho’ they should amount to the destruction of his whole property; and yet nothing can be more agreeable to natural equity, than that those who happen to be the unlucky victims of the war should be indemnified by the community. But in practice such a principle would be found attended with endless difficulties and inconveniences; and therefore the reverse of it has been adopted as a general rule. The individual sufferer, however, might with great colour of justice, say to the government, why did you make peace without stipulating a reparation for the damage done to your citizens? If it was necessary for the public good to sacrifice my interests, I have a right to a public compensation for my losses.
Though this case may upon a superficial view appear dissimilar to the one under consideration; yet the principle upon examination will be found as applicable to the one as to the other. The true reason is that the resources of nations are not adequate to the reparation of such extensive losses as those which are commonly occasioned by wars and revolutions; and it would therefore be contrary to the general good of society to establish it as a rule that there is a strict obligation to repay such losses. It is better that there should be individual sufferings, than to admit a rule which would fetter the operations of government and distress the affairs of the community.
Generousity and policy may in particular instances dictate such compensations, sometimes they have been made by nations, but much oftener omitted. The propriety of doing the one or the other must depend on circumstances in which the ability of the public will always be a primary consideration.
I think, sir, I have by this time gone through all the arguments that have been brought against the bill and I hope satisfactorily refuted them.
I shall say a little in answer to the observations drawn from the examples of Roman magnanimity. Neither the manners nor the genius of Rome are suited to the republic or age we live in. All her maxims and habits were military, her government was constituted for war. Ours is unfit for it, and our situation still less than our constitution, invites us to emulate the conduct of Rome, or to attempt a display of unprofitable heroism.
One more observation will conclude what I have to say—the present situation [of] our national affairs appears to me peculiarly critical. I know not what may be the result of the disordered state of our government. I am therefore the more solicitous to guard against danger from abroad. Gentlemen who view our public affairs in the same light in which they present themselves to my mind, will, I trust, vote with me upon the present occasion. Those on the contrary, who think all is well—who suppose our government is full of energy—our credit high—and trade and finances flourishing—will probably see no room for any anxiety about the matter, and may be disposed to leave Vermont in its present state. If the bill should fail, I hope they will never have occasion to regret the opportunity they have lost.

As to the petitioners, I shall only say that I have no reason to doubt the purity of the motives with which they are actuated. With many of them I am too well acquainted to permit me to entertain any unfavourable impression of their conduct; but however, their opinion of their own rights or interests may have misled them in estimating the merits of the question before the committee, I trust we shall be cautious how we suffer our judgment of a national question to be biassed or misguided by the speciousness of the arguments, or appearances on which their opposition is supported.


Title: New York Assembly. Report on the Petition of Margaret Livingston, 31 March 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

New York, March 31, 1787. On this date Hamilton, as chairman of a committee on the petition of Margaret Livingston, brought in a bill entitled “An act for dividing the township of New Stamford in Ulster county.”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Daniel Coxe, 4 April 1787
From: Coxe, Daniel
To: Hamilton, Alexander

London, April 4, 1787. “… Interested as I am in a large landed Property in the State of New Yorke; under former Grants of the Crown, and which not having been confiscated, is considered to be secure to me in virtue of the Treaty, I am anxious to be informed, from a Gentleman of your high Professional merit, whether or not, and how far, the Principle of Alienism, is adopted seriously by your State, or Law Courts, or intended to be put in Execution on any Event occuring on the Death of any Landholder, being a British Subject.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Marquis de Lafayette, 12 April 1787
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Paris April the 12th 1787
My dear Hamilton
It is an Age since I Heard from you. Of you I Hear By some of our friends, and in the News Papers. But altho I Have a Right to Complain, I want to let you know the proceedings of our Assembly, which as it is Unusual in France, May Raise Your Curiosity.
Our Constitution is pretty much what it was in England Before it Had Been fairly writen down, and Minutely preserved; so that we Have great claims to freedom, to a National Representation, to the Denial of Taxes, &c., &c. But despotism on one hand, and levity on the other Have Maneuvred us out of allmost Every privilege & they will subsist However more or less in some provinces, and particularly those of Bretagne.
Now that the follies of Courts Had obliged Governemens to saddle us with new taxes and the opposition of our Magistrates did present itself as an obstacle to the Ministers, they Have thought proper to Call an Assembly of Notables, chosen By the King, But taken among the first people in Each order, and to Begin with granting them what is more wished for By the Nation, an Assembly in each province.
The last Assembly of Notables in 1626 Had Been obedient to the Ministers. This one Came at a more enlightened period. It Happened Under a minister, M. de Calonne, who altho He Has parts, is not equal to some of the Members, Men of the first Abilities. We are Backed By the Nation, and altho not Her Representatives, Have Behaved as Her interpreters, and we Have formed a great Majority in favour of popular Measures.
The speeches from the throne, those of M. de Calonne all Have Been printed—the last one Contains Many false Hoods. The first Measure we took was for the Clergy to declare they were Ready to pay in the same proportion with other people, for the ⟨Noblesse⟩ to Make the same declaration and Reject a pecuniary privilege that was offered in lieu of the other that is taken off.
We Have Gratefully Accepted the provincial Elective assemblies, But Have united on such Alterations as will Envigorate them: M. de Calonne Had made a Mixture of democracy and despotism which did Anhiliate those Checks and graduations that are Necessary Evils where Ever there is a King. But I think the provincial Assemblies as they are proposed By us, May lay a foundation for a good Building.
Several plans for the removal of Internal Custom offices, for the free Exportation of Corn, for the change in the salt tax, for the Anihilation of some duties, and Now for the disposal of the King’s domanial possessions all Have Been Examined and Underwent several Alterations. To some we Have only left the titles of the Chapters, But changed them in my opinion much for the Better.
The idea of a General tax in kind was proposed By the Governement, But we said it was not practicable. As to any new imposition, we Have Answered it is impossible to form an opinion Before we know the Returns of the Exportes of the two last years, and the plans of (Economy that are intended. We Have not, it is true, Any powers from the Nation—But our Opinion is asked, and in a Measure Has Become Necessary—and a Majority of us do not think theyr opinion Can Be given, Untill those preliminaries are fulfilled.
There is a very interesting Contrast Between the King’s power at Versailles, and the Opposition of the Assembly which is Held there—and Divided in seven Committees of 20, or 22 each—presided By a prince of the Blood. Hitherto we Have not voted in a General Assembly altho’ we Had some to Hear the Minutes. But the opinions of the Committees only are not taken—and in the end, each vote will Be prono[u]need in the Whole House, Beginning from the last up to the first in Rank. You know that we Have the Clergy, Noblesse, Magistracy, and Tiers etat.
At the last meeting we Had Before the Recess of these Holy ⟨Days⟩ I Had a personal Battle to ⟨–⟩ of some importance—the King’s domanial property Has Been a pretence to lavish Monney on princes of the Blood, favourites and Powerfull people of the Country. I Had the day Before Moved for an examination of those Bargains, wherein more than fifty millions Have Been thrown a way. The great people Being afraid of Being found out, and particularly M. de Calonne who is guilty of the most Indecent depredation, thought they must intimidate me and the Bishop of Langres (M de La Luzerne’s Brother) who Had seconded My Motion. They in consequence of it persuaded the king to Have us told By His Brother our president, that Such Motions ought to Be signed—upon which I signed the inclosed paper—and the Bishop said that after the Recess He would Bring in some Accounts Signed by Him of the Bargain of sinecure made by M. de Calonne.
The King was very Angry with me. M. de Calonne, who Had His Confidence, intended signal Revenge. I was preparing to support what I Had said, when we suddenly Heard that M. de Calonne Had Been dismissed. The Keeper of the seals Has also Been sent off. I am glad we got Rid of M. de Calonne and wish His successor, who unfortunately is an old Broken man, may improve the opportunity of this Assembly and let us make useful arrangements.
Adieu, my dear Hamilton, My Best Respects wait on Mrs. Hamilton. Remember me to Gnl Knox, Wadsworth—all our friends, and particularly the good doctor. Most affectionately   Yours
Lafayette
Don’t tell the french chargé d’affaires that you Have this paper from me, except that there is nothing in it, for Copies have spread every where.


Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on an Amendment to an Act Relative to Debts Due Persons Within the Enemy’s Lines, [12 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 12, 1787]
Went into a committee on the bill to repeal the citation acts.…
Mr. Hamilton advocated the bill with great ability and candor; he mentioned the bad effects of the present laws; the difficulties that the courts of justice threw in the way of them—and the impossibility ever to amend them is such a manner as to have them acted upon. He urged the influence the opinion of our courts ought to have on the legislature. The courts were not interested, and then decision were perfectly impartial. He asked if the southern district of the state, instead of having fared tolerably well, had been ruined, would the legislature have compelled their debtors who were without the lines to have paid additional sums. This he did not believe. And why then, said he, compell the creditors to take a less sum. He mentioned that in several instances, the severity of the law fell on gentlemen who were attached to the American cause, and who had acted meritoriously in the revolution. It was certainly not right to view all the creditors as enemies. Remarking on the ill effects of the legislature interfering in private contracts, and the violation of public faith which it occasioned, he observed, that it would destroy all credit; and be the means of injuring many whom the legislature had intended to benefit.


Title: New York Assembly. Report on the Petition of Henry Ludenton, 14 April 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

New York, April 14, 1787. In his petition, Ludenton asserted that “certain depreciation certificates” had been stolen from him and, after passing through several hands, used for the purchase of a forfeited estate. Ludenton then asked that these certificates be returned. Hamilton, as chairman of a committee, recommended “as an act of generosity in the State,” that the treasurer be instructed to return the certificates.


Title: New York Assembly. Motion for Leave to Bring in a Bill on Places at Which the Legislature Shall Meet, [16 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1787]
Mr. Hamilton moved for leave to bring in a bill to establish the places at which the ordinary sessions of the Legislature shall be holden.
Ordered, That leave be given accordingly.
Mr. Hamilton, according to leave, brought in the said bill, entitled An act to establish the places at which the ordinary sessions of the Legislature shall be holden, which was read the first time, and ordered a second reading.


Title: New York Assembly. Motion that Five Delegates be Appointed to the Constitutional Convention, [16 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1787]
Mr. Hamilton made a motion that the House would agree to a resolution in the words following, viz.
Resolved, (if the Honorable the Senate concur herein) That two Delegates be appointed, in addition to those already appointed to represent this State at the Convention proposed to be holden at Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May next; and that any three of the persons heretofore appointed and of those now to be appointed, shall be sufficient to represent this State at the said Convention; and that this House will be ready on Wednesday next to proceed to the appointment of the said two Delegates, in the manner in which Delegates are appointed to Congress.
The question being put, whether the House would agree to the said resolution, it was carried in the affirmative.


Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on a Motion that Five Delegates be Appointed to the Constitutional Convention, [16 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1787]
I think it proper to apprise the house of the gentlemen on some of whom I wish their choice to fall, and with a view to which I bring forward the present motion. Their abilities and experience in the general affairs of the country cannot but be useful upon such an occasion. I mean Mr. Chancellor [Robert R.] Livingston, Mr. [James] Duane, Mr. [Egbert] Benson, and Mr. [John] Jay. The particular situation of the latter may require an observation or two. His being a servant of Congress might seem an objection to his appointment, but surely this objection if it had any weight would have applied with equal force to the appointment of a member of that body. In the case of Mr. Lansing the two houses appear to have thought there was no force in it; and I am persuaded there can be no reason to apply a different rule to Mr. Jay. His acknowledged abilities, tried integrity and abundant experience in the affairs of this country, foreign and domestic will not permit us to allow any weight to any objection which would imply a want of confidence in a character that has every title to the fullest confidence.


Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on the Petition of Robert Henry, Robert McClellan, and Robert Henry, Junior, [16 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1787]
Mr. Hamilton expressed great regret that he was obliged to oppose this bill; he knew the gentlemen; he knew their peculiarly unfortunate situation, and felt as much for their distresses as any member of the committee. But his objection to the bill, arose from his aversion to any discriminations; there were others, and he was sorry for it, in equally unfortunate circumstances. But he would oppose the bill from another consideration, it held out a provision entirely ideal; the bill stated that the interest should be paid out of any unappropriated monies in the treasury, but would this ever be the case; he doubted that there ever would be any money in the treasury unappropriated.


Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on the Claim of New York City to Fort George, [16 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 16, 1787]
Mr. Hamilton proposed a resolution, which would set aside the order of the day, and answer the purposes much better, in his opinion; it was to direct the attorney general to enquire into the claim of the corporation to the Fort St. James, and its dependencies, now called fort George; and that the commissioners of the land office have a survey made of the property of the state therein; and that a report be made to the legislature at their next meeting, of the said claim of the corporation, and the best manner of disposing of the same.


Title: New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act Repealing Laws Inconsistent With the Treaty of Peace, [17 April 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, April 17, 1787]
Mr. Hamilton in a very animated and powerful speech, expressed great uneasiness that any opposition should be made to this bill, particularly as this state was individually interested therein. He felt greater regret from a conviction in his own mind, on this occasion, that the bill should be objected to, as there was not a single law in existence in this state, in direct contravention of the treaty of peace. He urged the committee to consent to the passing of the bill, from the consideration, that the state of New-York was the only state to gain any thing by a strict adherence to the treaty. There was no other state in the union that had so much to expect from it. The restoration of the western posts, was an object of more than £100,000 per annum. Great Britain, he said, held those posts on the plea that the United States have not fulfilled the treaty. And which we have strong assurances, she will relinquish, on the fulfillment of our engagements with her. But how far Great Britain might be sincere in her declaration, was unknown. Indeed, he doubted it himself. But while he doubted the sincerity of Great Britain, he could not but be of opinion that it was the duty of this state to enact a law for the repeal of all laws which may be against the said treaty, as by doing away all exceptions, she would be reduced to a crisis. She would be obliged to shew to the world, whether she was in earnest or not; and whether she will sacrifice her honor and reputation to her interest. With respect to the bill as it was drafted in conformity to the recommendation of Congress; he viewed it as a wise, and a salutary measure; one calculated to meet the approbation of the different states, and most likely to answer the end proposed. Were it possible to examine an intricate maze of laws, and to determine which of them, or what parts of laws were opposed to the treaty, it still might not have the intended effect, as different parties would have the judging of this matter. What one should say was a law not inconsistent with the peace, another might say was so, and there would be no end, no decision of the business. Even some of the states might view laws in a different manner. The only way to comply with the treaty, was to make a general and unexceptionable repeal. Congress with an eye to this, had proposed a general law, from which the one before them was a copy. He thought it must be obvious to every member of the committee, that as there was no law in direct opposition to the treaty, no difficulty could arise from passing the bill.
Some gentlemen, he observed, were apprehensive that this bill would restore the confiscated estates, &c. This he did not admit. However, if they were so disposed they might add a proviso to prevent it. He had wrote one, which any of the gentlemen might move for if they thought it necessary; in his opinion it was not.
The treaty only provided that no future confiscations should take place; and that Congress should earnestly recommend a restoration of property. But there was nothing obligatory in this.
If this state should not come into the measure, would it not be a very good plea for the other states to favor their own citizens, and say why should we do this, when New-York, the most interested of any of the states, refuses to adopt it; and shall we suffer this imputation when, in fact, we have no laws in existence that militate against the treaty. He stated the great disadvantages that our merchants experienced from the western posts being in the hands of the British, and asked if it was good policy to let them remain so.
It had been said that the judges would have too much power; this was misapprehended. He stated the powers of the judges with great clearness and precision. He insisted that their powers would be the same, whether this law was passed or not. For, that as all treaties were known by the constitution as the laws of the land, so must the judges act on the same, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Cicero, the great Roman Orator and lawyer, lays it down as a rule, that when two laws clash, that which relates to the most important matters ought to be preferred. If this rule prevails, who can doubt what would be the conduct of the judges, should any laws exist inconsistent with the treaty of peace: But it would be impolitic to leave them to the dilemma, either of infringing the treaty to enforce the particular laws of the state, or to explain away the laws of the state to give effect to the treaty.
He declared that the full operation of the bill, would be no more than merely to declare the treaty the law of the land. And that the judges viewing it as such, shall do away all laws that may appear in direct contravention of it. Treaties were known constitutionally, to be the law of the land, and why be afraid to leave the interpretation of those laws, to the judges; the constitution knows them as the interpreters of the law. He asked if there was any member of the committee that would be willing to see the first treaty of peace ever made by this country violated. This he did not believe, he could not think that any member on that floor harboured such sentiments.
He was in hopes the committee would agree with him in sentiment, and give a proof of their attachment to our national engagements by passing the bill, which would do away every exception of the British Court.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Mary Bryant, 23 April 1787
From: Bryant, Mary
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, April 23, 1787. Asks Hamilton’s assistance in securing a disputed legacy left to her by her husband.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Augustus Van Cortlandt, 29 April 1787
From: Van Cortlandt, Augustus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Yonkers, New York, April 29, 1787. Requests that Hamilton take legal steps to secure the payment of money owed Van Cortlandt.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Samuel Breese, William Malcom, and Aaron Burr, April 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Breeze, Samuel,Malcom, William,Burr, Aaron

[New York, April, 1787] “Mrs. Bayard Widow of Mr Samuel Bayard deceased has applied to me to arrange with you some provision for her in persuance of the Will of her husband representing her situation as distressed in the extreme, and assuring me that she is willing to do whatever I shall advise towards a fair adjustment of matters between you and her.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Jay, 2 May 1787
From: Jay, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[New York, May 2, 1787. On May 3, 1787, Hamilton wrote to Jay: “I this morning received your letter of yesterday.” Letter not found.]


Title: Statement of Expenses Incurred by Alexander Hamilton and Egbert Benson in Attending the Annapolis Convention, [8 May 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, May 8, 1787]
The People of the State of New York
To Egbert and Alexander Hamilton Drs.

For our expences in attending the Convention at Annapolis in September last £113 . . 1.4
including the journey thither and back

New York to Wit. Egbert Benson and Alexander Hamilton severally make oath and first the said Egbert Benson saith that of the above mentioned sum he did disburse Thirty six pounds three shillings and four pence and the said Alexander Hamilton saith that he did disburse seventy six pounds and Eighteen shillings being the residue thereof.

Egbt: Benson
Alexander Hamilton
Sworn this 8th day of May 1787 before meRichd. Varick Recorder


Title: Constitutional Convention. Nomination of William Jackson as Secretary of the Constitutional Convention, 25 May 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jackson, William

Philadelphia, May 25, 1787. On this date Hamilton nominated Major William Jackson as secretary of the Constitutional Convention.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jacob Sarly, 26 May 1787
From: Sarly, Jacob
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Delaware Mills near Trenton, May 26, 1787. “On my arrival at Newyork your Letter was handed me.… I will endeavour to fulfill the proposition I made of paying the Remainder due on the Bond I gave, previous to my leaving Newyork for England which will be in the Course of the next Month; for the Ballance which will satisfy one half of the Debt, I will put such Security in your hands as I trust you will approve of.…”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Motion that Representation in the National Legislature Ought to be Proportioned to the Number of Free Inhabitants, 30 May 1787
From: Randolph, Edmund
To:

Philadelphia, May 30, 1787. The Convention having before it a proposition by Edmund Randolph that “the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases,” Hamilton “moved to alter the resolution so as to read ‘that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.’”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Notes Taken in the Federal Convention, [1–26 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 1–26, 1787]

[Notes for June 1, 1787]

[Madison]
1—
The way to prevent a majority from having an interest to oppress the minority is to enlarge the sphere.

Madison
2—
Elective Monarchies turbulent and unhappy— Men unwilling to admit so decided a superiority of merit in an individual as to accede to his appointment to so preeminent a station.

If several are admitted as there will be many competitors of equal merit they may be all included—contention prevented—& the republican genius consulted.

Randolph
I
Situation of this Country peculiar.

II—
Taught the people an aversion to Monarchy.

III
All their constitutions opposed to it.

IV—
Fixed character of the people opposed to it.

V—
If proposed it will prevent a fair discussion of the plan.

      Voice ofAmerica
      }
      —

VI—
Why cannot three execute.—Great exertions only requisite on particular occasions.

      Safety to libertythe great object
      }

                    {
                    ————

Legislature may appoint a dictator when necessary.

Seeds of destruction—Slaves might be easily enlisted.

May appoint men devoted to them—& even bribe the legislature by offices.

Chief Magistrate must be free from impeachment.

Wilson

extent—manners—Confederated republic unites advantages & banishes disadvantages of other kinds of governments.

☞
—
rendering the executive ineligible an infringement of the right of election—

Bedford
—
peculiar talents requisite for executive, therefore ought to be opportunity of ascertaining his talents—therefore frequent change.

Princ
1
The further men are from the ultimate point of importance the readier they will be [to] concur in a change.

2
Civilization approximates the different species of governments.

3
Vigour is the result of several principles—Activity wisdom—confidence.

4
Extent of limits will occasion the non attendance of remote members & tend to throw the government into the hands of the Country near the seat of government—a reason for strengthening the upper branch & multiplying the Inducements to attendance. Sent

A free government to be preferred to an absolute monarchy not because of the occasional violations of liberty or property but because of the tendency of the Free Government to interest the passions of the community in its favour beget public spirit and public confidence.

Re:

When public mind is prepared to adopt the present plan they will outgo our proposition. They will never part with Sovereignty of the state till they are tired of the state governments.

[Notes for June 6, 1787]

  Mr. Pinkney.
  If Legislatures do not partake in the appointment of [the first branch of the national legislature] they will be more jealous.

  Pinckney—
  Elections by the state legislatures will be better than those by the people.

  Principle—
  Danger that the Executive by too frequent communication with the judicial may corrupt it. They may learn to enter into his passions.

  Note—
  At the period which terminates the duration of the Executive there will be always an awful crisis—in the National situation.

  Note—
  The arguments to prove that a negative would not be used would go so far as to prove that the revisionary power would not be exercised.

  Mr. Mason—
  The purse & sword will be in the hands of the legislature.

Principles

I—
Human mind fond of Compromise—Maddisons Theory—

Two principles upon which republics ought to be constructed—

I that they have such extent as to render combinations on the ground of Interest difficult—

II By a process of election calculated to refine the representation of the People—

Answer—There is truth in both these principles but they do not conclude so strongly as he supposes.

The Assembly when chosen will meet in one room if they are drawn from half the globe—& will be liable to all the passions of popular assemblies.

If more minute links are wanting others will supply them. Distinctions of Eastern middle and Southern states will come into view; between commercial and non commercial states. Imaginary lines will influence &c. Human mind prone to limit its view by near & local objects. Paper money is capable of giving a general impulse. It is easy to conceive a popular sentiment pervading the E states.

Observ:
{
large districts less liable to be influenced by factions demagogues than small.

Note—
This is in some degree true but not so generally as may be supposed. Frequently small portions of the large districts carry elections. An influential demagogue will give an impulse to the whole. Demagogues are not always inconsiderable persons. Patricians were frequently demagogues. Characters are less known & a less active interest taken in them.

I
One great defect of our Governments are that they do not present objects sufficiently interesting to the human mind.

I—
A reason for leaving little or nothing to the state legislatures will be that as their objects are diminished they will be worse composed. Proper men will be less inclined to participate in them.

[Notes for June 7, 1787]

Dickinson
II—
He would have the state legislatures elect senators, because he would bring into the general government the sense of the state Governments &

II—
because the more respectable choices would be made.

Note—
Separate states may give stronger organs to their governments & engage more the good will of Ind: while Genl Gov

☞
Consider the Principle of Rivalship by excluding the state Legislatures.

Mason
{
General government could not know how to make laws for every part—such as respect agriculture &c.

particular governments would have no defensive power unless let into the constitution as a Constituent part.

[Notes for June 8, 1787]

Pinckey
—
For general Negative—

Gerry
—
Is for a negative on paper emissions— New states will arise which cannot be controuled—& may outweigh & controul.

Wilson
—
Foreign influence may infect certain corners of confederacy which ought to be restrained.

Union basis of our oppos & Ind

Bedford—
{
Arithmetical calculation of proportional influence in General Government—

{
Pensyl. & Delaware may have rivalship in commerce—& influence of Pens—sacrifice delaware.

If there be a negative in GG—yet if a law can pass through all the forms of SC it will require force to abrogate it.

Butler—

Will a man throw afloat his property & confide it to a government a thousand miles distant?

[Notes for June 16, 1787]

Mr. Lansing—
NS—proposes to draw representation from the whole body of people, without regard to S Sovereignties.

Subs: proposes to preserve the state Sovereignties.

  Powers—
  {
  Different Legislatures had a different object.

  Revise the Confederation.

  Ind. States cannot be supposed to be willing to annihilate the States.

  State of New York would not have agreed to send members on this ground.

In vain to devise systems however good which will not be adopted.

If convulsions happen nothing we can do will give them a direction.

Legislatures cannot be expected to make such a sacrifice.

The wisest men in forming a system from theory apt to be mistaken.

The present national government has no precedent or experience to support it.

General opinion that certain additional powers ought to be given to Congress.

Mr. Patterson—
1—
plan accords with powers

2—
accords with sentiments of the People.

If Confederation radically defective we ought to return to our states and tell them so. Comes not here to sport sentiments of his own but to speak the sense of his Constituents.

States treat as equal.

Present Compact gives one Vote to each state.

alterations are to be made by Congress and all the Legislatures.

All parties to a Contract must assent to its dissolution.

States collectively have advantages in which the smaller states do not participate—therefore individual rules do not apply.

Force of government will not depend on proportion of representation—but on

Quantity of power—

Check not necessary in a geral government of communities—butin an individual state spirit of faction is to be checked—

How have Congress hitherto conducted themselves?

The People approve of Congress but think they have not powers enough.

Body constituted like Congress from the fewness of their numbers more wisdom and energy—

than the complicated system of Virginia

Expence enormous—

  180
  —commons

   90
  —Senators

  270
  —

Wilson— Points of Di[s]agreement—

V[irginia]

NJ

1
2 or three branches
{
One branch

2
Derives authority from People
from states—

3
Proportion of suffrage
Equality—

4
Single Executive
Plural—

5
Majority to govern
Minority to govern—

6
Legislates in all matters of general Concern
partial objects—

7
Negative
None—

8
Removeable by impeachment
on application of majority of Executive

9
Qualified Negative by Executive

None

10
Inf. tribunals

None—

11
Orig: Jurisdiction in all cases of Nat: Rev
None—

12

National Government to be ratified by People
}

to be ratifiedby Legislatures—

Empowered to propose every thing

to conclude nothing.

Does not think state governments the idols of the people.

Thinks a competent national government will be a favourite of the people.

Complaints from every part of United States that the purposes of government cannot be answered.

In constituting a government not merely necessary to give proper powers—but to give them to proper hands.

Two reasons against giving additional powers to Congress.

First it does not stand on the authority of the people.

Second—It is a single branch.

Inequality—the poison of all governments—

Lord Chesterfield speaks of a Commission to be obtained for a member of a small province.

Pinkney—

Mr. Elseworth—

Mr. Randolp—
Spirit of the People in favour of the Virginian scheme.

We have powers; but if we had not we ought not to scruple.

[Notes for June 19, 1787]

Maddison
Breach of compact in one article releases the whole.

Treaties may still be violated by the states under the Jersey plan.

Appellate jurisdiction not sufficient because second trial cannot be had under it.

Attempt made by one of the greatest monarchs of Europe to equalize the local peculiarities of their separate provinces—in which the Agent fell a victim.

Mr. Pinckney
is of opinion that the first branch ought to be appointed in such manner as the legislatures shall direct.

Impracticable for general legislature to decide contested elections.

[Notes for June 20, 1787]

Mr. Lansing—
Resolved that the powers of legislation ought to be vested in the United States in Congress.

If our plan be not adopted it will produce those mischiefs which we are sent to obviate.

Principles of system—

—Equality of Representation—Dependence of members of Congress on States—

So long as state distinctions exist states prejudices will operate whether election be by states or people—

If no interest to oppress no need of apportionment—

Virginia 16—Delaware 1—

Will General Government have leisure to examine state laws?

Will G Government have the necessary information?

Will states agree to surrender?

Let us meet public opinion & hope the progress of sentiment will make future arrangements.

Would like my system if it could be established.

System without example.

Mr. Mason—
Objection to granting power to Congress arose from their constitution.

Sword and purse in one body—

Two principles in which America are unanimous

1 attachment to Republican government.

2 — to two branches of legislature.

Military force & liberty incompatible.

Will people maintain a standing army?

Will endeavour to preserve state governments & draw lines—trusting to posterity to amend.

Mr. Martin—
General Government originally formed for the preservation of state governments.

Objection to giving power to Congress has originated with the legislatures.

10 of the states interested in an equal voice.

Real motive was an opinion that there ought to be distinct governments & not a general government.

If we should form a general government would break to pieces.

For common safety instituted a General government.

Jealousy of power the motive.

People have delegated all their authority to state governments.

Coertion necessary to both systems.

Requisitions necessary upon one system as upon another.

In their system made requisitions necessary in the first instance but left Congress in the second instance—to assess themselves.

Judicial tribunals in the different states would become odious.

If we always to make a change shall be always in a state of infancy.

☞
States will not be disposed hereafter to strengthen the general government.

Mr. Sherman—
Confederacy carried us through the war.

Non compliances of States owing to various embarrassment.

Why should state legislatures be unfriendly?

State governments will always have the confidence & government of the people: if they cannot be conciliated no efficacious government can be established.

Sense of all states that one branch is sufficient.

If consolidated all treaties will be void.

State governments more fit for local legislation customs habits &c.

    [Notes, Probably for June 26, 1787]

    I
    Every government ought to have the means of self preservation

    II
    Combinations of a few large states might subvert

    II
    Could not be abused without a revolt

    II
    Different genius of the states & different composition of the body Note. Senate could not desire to promote such a class

    III
    Uniformity in the time of elections.

    Objects of a Senate

    To afford a double security against Faction in the house of representation

    Duration of the Senate necessary to itsFirmnessInformationsense of national characterResponsibility


Title: Constitutional Convention. Second of Benjamin Franklin’s Motion that Proposed Executive Serve Without Pay, 2 June 1787
From: Franklin, Benjamin
To:

Philadelphia, June 2, 1787. On this date Benjamin Franklin moved that the expenses of the proposed Executive should be paid but that he should receive “no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever” for his service. “The motion was seconded by Col. HAMILTON with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight.”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Second of a Motion by James Wilson and Remarks Thereon, 4 June 1787
From: Wilson, James,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Philadelphia, June 4, 1787. James Wilson on this date made a motion, which Hamilton seconded, that a motion by Elbridge Gerry stating “that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by  parts of each branch of the national Legislature” be replaced by a provision “so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: HAMILTON that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Objection of Order, 4 June 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Philadelphia, June 4, 1787. To a motion by James Wilson, seconded by James Madison, that “a convenient number of the National Judiciary” act with the executive in vetoing acts of the national legislature, Hamilton made “an objection of order … to the introduction of the last amendment at this time.”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, [15 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 15, 1787]
Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either plan— supposes both might again be considered as federal plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee, and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of the two.


Title: Introductory Note: Constitutional Convention Speech on a Plan of Government, [18 June 1787]
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There are five versions of Hamilton’s speech of June 18 to the Constitutional Convention. In the first place, there are Hamilton’s own notes which he presumably used while he was delivering the speech. In the second place James Madison, Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., and Rufus King all made notes on the speech while Hamilton was delivering it. Because the several accounts of the speech are different and because this speech is perhaps the most important address ever made by Hamilton—if its importance can be measured either by its use in subsequent evaluations of Hamilton’s political philosophy or by the controversy about it during his lifetime—both Hamilton’s notes and the other four versions of the speech have been printed.
The footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the five documents that appear below. Whenever an explanation is required for any material which, although phrased differently, appears in more than one version of Hamilton’s speech, the note has been given for the material in the first version in which that material appears.


Title: James Madison’s Version, [18 June 1787]
From: Madison, James
To:

Mr. Hamilton, had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could by no means accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted. As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A federal Govt. he conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet—& among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va. (Mr. R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigences of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the States can not ratify a plan not within the purview of the article of Confederation providing for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned agst. it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans—prove that there were essential defects in both—and point out such changes as might render a national one, efficacious. The great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts—their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Genl. Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl. Govt. as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Govt. attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virga. will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance & self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear Govt. to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; tho’ he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Masss. is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. influence. he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the Genl. Govt. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Genl. Govt. and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force agst. delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their Councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho’ aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any Union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another. How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general Governmt. as will turn all the strong principles & passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Congs. but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves can not be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia: France or Engd. with other countries of Europe. Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on situation. Cont. N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn? from Commerce? even from exports which notwithstanding the common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These tho’ not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much the ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Congs. at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. Ps. plan provides no remedy. If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Congs. is such that they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Congs. being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is agst. all the principles of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate in a bad Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt. was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Govts. as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great œconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Govt. He did not mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals: corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the center of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1st. branch would only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Govt. This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican Govt. could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise & good, that the British Govt. was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that the power of Congs. was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt. in the world “which unites public strength with individual security.” In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself agst. the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier agst. every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have the firmness eno’ to answer the purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it. Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Govt. is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the remark. As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question: for can there be a good Govt. without a good Executive. The English model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad—and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermedling Neibours. Sweeden was a striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former. What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his ambition wd. be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Govt. He wd. reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd. be a monarch for life—the other propd. by the Report from the Comtte of the whole, wd. be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies wd. be the best if they could be guarded agst. the tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In Poland the election is made by great rival princes with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the community agst. these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he shd. prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved—he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies—he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd. place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following: towit.…”
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.