Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 25 April 1778
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

Sir
Valley forge Camp 25th april 1778

The present questions are the most difficult to resolve upon that have been proposed since I have been in this army—there must be as much civil policy as Generalship in the operations of the next campaign—on the other hand our forces, stores, magazines, ressources of every kind (I mean those which we schall get in the camp) are far from being ascertained—we do’nt know how many men we may depend upon, and had we as many as we could wish, I question if we could easely clothe and Aliment them (at least as things seem now to stand).
Your excellency wants my opinion upon these three points—attaking new york—attaking philadelphia—or staying in a fortified Camp, till the ennemy will go out and laying a plan of conduct for this case.
1st  An expedition against New york I am very improper to speack upon as I do not know that part of America—but I have been told those difficulties were not insuperable—you have seen in some of my letters that I was inclined to think of an undertaking upon that part I schould before know what is king’s bridge, and other fortifications behind that point—if fort Washington can be left aside, or easely reduced—if a surprise can be effectuated—if false attacks may have all theyr effect—if we can get a sufficient quantity of boats pontons &c. &c. how far the schipping may help theyr land forces—all those things I Made myself acquainted with only by way of conversation and it is not sufficient to fix upon an operation—however I understand that with the necessary preparations (and I question if they will be schortly made), twenty thousand men, could succeed in the operation and take the town for a time.
in that case fifteen thousand men, eight of ’em continental troops schould be left in our present camp strongly fortified under an officer who schould have orders to intercept as much as possible the communication of the ennemy with the country—that force schould be absolutely

necessary to the security of our stores—but let them be on the other side of the susquehana which is very far, an army is yet indispensable for covering two disaffected states, and we must remember that the intention of the english ministry is to treat not only with Congress but with each state separately.
As we cannot hold Newyork the principal aim would be to destroy such stores as the ennemy schould not have yet on board of theyr vessels—it seems also very important to ruin as much as possible the islands belonging to the ennemy—would not it be possible to fortify king’s bridge on our side? however if there was any propability of taking philadelphia as there is no compareison between the two conquests, even in the case of an offensive war from us, those parts seem to be considered in the secondary point of wiew—then some continental troops with such militia as could not conveniently come down may try to surprise posts by a coup de main, or make expeditions in the islands agreable to circumstances.
the expedition of rhode island I have nothing to say upon as I am stranger to our actual situation and projects in those quarters—but I believe jealousy must be given to the ennemy every where, but in our very points of attak.
2d  I confess the taking of philadelphia is the most agreable idea I can form—we send the ennemy out of two very disaffected states—we begin the campaign in the most schining way—we make the best possible effect both in europe and in America—but that enterprise is a very dangerous one—we must have at least twenty thousand good continental troops and about the same number of militia volonteers &c. we must be very depending upon our troops, for in every case, or we must storm strong fortifications or we must separate our forces two very dangerous steps.
the taking of those redoubts and pallissades by regular approches do not seem to me eligible, then or we must storm the place or we must shut the communications of the ennemy.
for the latter enterprize I understand there is one single place where large vessels can be prevented from coming up—billinsport—then the fort schould be taken, batterys erected into it, and ten thousand good troops left in the jerseys to support those batterys—some thing could be sunk in the chanal as chevaux de frize.
but we prevent only the men of war from reaching philadelphia transports may be sent by the other side of long island unless batterys be erected on tynicum island which is not an easy work and a large body left there to support them—one other army schould be betwen the schuillchyll and the delaware which would keep in echec the present forces of the Ennemy—how far that project may prouve useful I am

very far from ascertaining in my own mind, and speack only of it as the only way I know to embarass the communications of the ennemy but let us speack of storms.
Storming such redoubts is the most hazardous enterprize the best and oldest troops can form—my wound had prevented me from assisting to the recconnoissance which has been made of ’em—they are I understand ve⟨ry⟩ strong—but one commands all the others and there certainly we schou⟨ld⟩ direct the true attak—this intelligence of one commanding all the other I have heard from many officers among whom the baron de Steuben. perhaps we can carry them—after that hard work schall be done philadelphia is not ours—if the english fight well what certainly they will, the houses and the streets wo’nt be easely given up—I wish’d the best retreat could be left to them and known by theyr soldiers before the action, then they would not fight with the same obstinacy.
certainly every soldierlike principle will forbidd to attak with new troops a chain of strong redoubts defended by old and disciplined men, with all the difficulties we schould meet after those redoubts be carried—but we have two reasons for risking some steps; the expectation of theyr reinforcements, and three dreadful commissioners whom I fear more than ten thousand men. your excellency knows better than me what effect those propositions of peace may have, you know better than me what your soldiers fired with the hope of ending the war, of plundering the city &c. &c. may undertake of superior to the common military rules—the only thing I can say is that had we the certainty of storming the city, and cutting the british army to pieces what certainly would be the case, then reducing philadelphia in ashes, and loosing the third part of the army would be a good bargain for America if it was attended with so happy consequences.
I beg leave to say what I think is to be done in the third case.
3d  the idea of attaking, storming, with large well provided armies, in considering our past and present situation seems a very Romantic one—if by want of forces, of provisions &c. &c. and by the danger of the enterprizes, we are reduced to the old defensive plan this very plan who has been the salvation of America then my opinion is as follows.
besides the troops of fishkill, providence &c. who are to keep in echec the forces of the ennemy, prevent his excursions, and undertake something themselves our grand army must alwaïs be the double of this of the ennemy—as the cause of America is not a trifling one we must not play an uncertain Game—I wish’d the third of the army would alwaïs be in motion upon the flanks of the ennemy, to intercept his convoys, give frequent alerts to him, prevent him from taking any rest, and take

all the opportunities ofered to them—the other two thirds would be alwaïs compact, alwaïs upon the defensive—I mean a defensive of marches and planed operations—for with the double of the forces of the ennemy we schould be able to attak him were proper opportunities offered to us.
I think it would be useful to throw the war in some other provinces, but can not foresee how it could be done in the best manner—I wish the fighting spirit of Sir henry clinton may engage him to accept the fields of battle offered by detachements of our army in the jersays where you have also the advantage of being supported by a good militia.
I must confess that tho’ a little concerned by the idea that we schall not have such a numerous army as we want, my greatest fears are directed towards the Need of provisions and supplyes.
Such are, sir, some of the ideas I take the liberty of offering to your excellency—I beg you would excuse theyr bad order as I write in a Great hurry because I have past the time appointed by you and you know that I was prevented from writing those two past days.
Could I know our present and future means of succeeding in those three different projects, it would not become a young stranger to point out a decisive one in an occasion where the knowledge of the civil and military interests of the nation, of the tempers of the people and soldiers of the internal and external ressources of America is absolutely necessary—all what I can say is 1st that newyork is more stranger to me than any other part of america but has this inconvenience that we can not hold it, (so at least I understand), 2nd that the propriety of laying still in a fortified camp depends much on the reinforcements expected from england, and the effect those propositions of peace may have upon the people.
3d for philadelphia it is by far the best scheme if it can be carried with succes—I do’nt believe we may be enabled to take that town by storm—but if it was the case I think we are not to consider either burning houses, expending treasures, loosing men, in comparaison of the immense advantages we schould certainly get on every respect.
if we were to take an offensive party—then notime is to be lost for getting men, and the most profound secrecy must be kept.
I am however convinced that not so much on account of the novelty of our soldiers who are not fit for storms, than by want of provisions, or arms, or men, we w’ont be enabled to obtain in proper time a so happy succes—then if there were not other reasons necessity will compell us to take the third party proposed by your excellency—I heartily wish I may be mistaken. with the greatest respect I have the honor to be Your excellency’s the Most obedient servant

the Marquis de lafayette


Title: From George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 25 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Morris, Gouverneur

Dr Sir
Valley Forge April 25: 1778

I received your obliging favor of the 18th Inst., only Yesterday evening. I thank you much for the explanatory hints it contains and could have wished it had come to hand a little sooner. I have many things to say to you, but as the Express, who will deliver you this, is going with dispatches that will not admit delay, I shall content myself with taking notice of one matter, that appears to me to require immediate remedy.
The Resolution of Congress directs the Council to be formed of Major Generals & the Chief Engineer, who, you say, is to be a Member officially. By this, the Commanding Officer of Artillery is negatively excluded, who by the practice of Armies, & from the very nature of his appointment, is more officially a Member than the other. According to my ideas both or neither ought to be there; or if an official preference is due to one more than the other, it is to the Commander in the Artillery line. I do not know what motives induced the discrimination in this instance, but I should suppose, it will, at least, be felt; and I will further add, tho prejudices may be entertained by some against Genl Knox, there is no department in the Army, that has been conducted with greater propriety, or to more advantage than the one, in which he presides—and owing principally, if not wholly to his management. Surely whatever plans may be come into—the Artillery will have no small share in the execution. You say all will yet be well—I wish it heartily—but am much mistaken if there are not some secret & retrograde

springs in motion to disprove it. I wish you could announce the provision for Officers concluded. It seems to me the basis, of all our operations. Resignation after resignation is taking place—not here only but of Officers acting East of Hudson’s river &ca. I am Dr Sir with great esteem & regard Yr Most Obedt Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Jeremiah Dummer Powell, 25 April 1778
From: Powell, Jeremiah Dummer
To: Washington, George

State of Massachusetts BayCouncil Chamber April 25 1778
Sir

I have the Honor to enclose you the Resolutions of the General Court of this State, Respecting the filling up the fifteen Battalions belonging to the Massachusetts State; and for Reinforceing that part of the American Army on North River, agreeable to the recommendation of the Honorable Congress &c.
We could wish it had been in our power to have sent a much larger reinforcement to your Army, than the number mentioned in the above Resolves, Yet we can’t but hope that, that number together with the recruits procured by the Recruiting Officers, will make such an addition to your Army, as to Enable you to Execute your plan against the Enemy. That you may have the Divine Smiles & Protection, is the Ardent wish and Sincere Prayer of your real Friend and Humble Servant

President of the Council


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Israel Shreve, 25 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Shreve, Israel

Sir.
Head Quarters [Valley Forge] 25th April 1778.

I have received your favor of the 16th inclosing a return of the prisoners taken by the enemy near Coopers Ferry—The Disposition which you have made of the men under your command I have no doubt is founded on a knowledge of the Country, and calculated to answer the ends in view.
Your Quarter master is furnished with an order to procure the number of arms required, at Trenton or Easton—I congratulate those Gentlemen of whose conduct you speak so favorably, upon their prospect of recovering from their wounds and am Sir Your most obedt Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Steuben, 25 April 1778
From: Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, baron von
To: Washington, George

[Valley Forge, 25 April 1778]

With regard to the first question—We are to examine whether the Enemy may expect formidable Succours—if that be the case we ought to reinforce the army with the greatest dispatch, and strike a daring blow before those Succours arrive—The enemys force is estimated at 10000 men—if ours is under 20000 rank and file, the enterprise would be hazardous, and by exposing ourselves to a general action of uncertain success, especially at the opening of a Campaign, the consequences to the Country might be very dreadful.
The second proposition, is to transfer if possible the Theatre of War

to the northward by an enterprise against N. York—where the enemy may have between 4 and 5000 men—To make a diversion in that quarter—without taking into consideration the carrying New York by a coup de main—the northern army should be proportionably reinforced—ten thousand men I mean rank and file, will not be too many for this enterprise—but this reinforcement should not be made at the expence of the Southern army—for at the same time that this Army maintains its position at Valley forge, in order to keep the Enemys Army at Philadelphia in respect, cover our Magazines and the whole Country—it ought to be active, and engage offensively, without however exposing itself to a general action, unless on the most urgent necessity.
The third proposition is to keep ourselves in secure positions, and to regulate our operations by those of the Enemy—this conduct is in appearance the safest, but in reality the most dangerous—A Campaign altogether on the defensive is subject to two considerable inconveniences—the first is that the attacking Army is always in better spirits, than that which acts on the defensive—especially in the case of new Troops—the second not less important is that the attacking General makes his dispositions at leisure, whereas the defending General is obliged always to make his instantly, and is frequently exposed to be deceived by a feint of the Enemy or false intelligence.
In the present Situation of American Affairs, I could never determine myself to vote for general actions, upon which the fate of the nation might depend—my advice is always to act with caution, but to strike vigorously whenever a favorable opportunity offers.
To take Philadelphia by a coup de main, would be to attack the enemy in his Intrenchments—this I must confess appears to me a perilous enterprise—the attack must be supported by the whole Army—the attack might fail—and we might be under the necessity of engaging in a general Action—the ill success of which might have fatal consequences.
A Siege or Blockade, in the first place requires a number far superior to that of the enemy—and in order to pronounce upon it, I must previously reconnoitre the ground and the Enemys fortifications.
To keep the enemy in respect within his intrenchments, or oblige him to abandon the city, without risking a general action, is then what I would wish to effect. the means of attaining this end—would be to keep our Army at the distance of a days march from Philadelphia—in a Camp fortified by nature and art—such is our new position, the advantages of which are—
1st  The Position is strong by nature—its flanks are well supported—its front is strengthened by works—its extent is proportioned to the Force of our Army—and may be covered with Troops and Artillery so as to make a vigorous defence.

2dly  The Situation is advantageous relatively to the distance from Philadelphia, a days march will carry us there—The Enemy exposes himself to a check, if he penetrates the Country with a too feeble party, and leaves the main body in his intrenchments. and he equally exposes himself to a check if he marches into the country in force, and leaves his Intrenchments weakly guarded.
3dly  The Enemy cannot conceal his march—if he enters Jersey, he risks the loss of Philadelphia—if he directs his course towards Wilmington or Lancaster he runs the same hazard—if he pushes forward and menaces our Magazines—we have it in our power to oppose the enterprise, by crossing the Schuylkil—Will he attack us in our Camp, we shall receive him in an advantageous post—will he turn us, he will hazard being turned himself and having his Retreat intercepted.
4thly  Our Situation is advantageous relatively to our Magazines—for the reasons just mentioned.
5thly  It is advantageous, for collecting our reinforcements, and every necessary.
Therefore it is by no means advisable, to abandon this Position, especially before our Strength permits our attempting greater enterprises—or before the Enemy takes any Step which might induce such a Resolution on our part. but the question is now—how we are to close in upon the enemy, and keep them within the limits of their intrenchments and behind the Schuylkil.
The too inconsiderable number of our light troops, will not admit of our practicing what is called little War—which would be our game—We should harrass every detachment that appears out of their intrenchments—take off their escorts—interrupt their Patroles—surprise their advanced posts—disquiet them day and night, even in their works—the method of supplying the deficiency of light Troops, is to make considerable Detachments from the Line—they ought never to be less than two thousand foot and a proportionate number of horse—commanded by a General Officer—this Corps regarded as a flying Corps ought never to be in a permanent post, on the contrary it ought to change its position as often as possible—sometimes on a mountain, sometimes in a wood, but never in houses—and always under arms at night—this Detachment ought to be relieved every eight days—it ought to have 4. Field pieces and an Artillery Officer—the General who commands will take precautions to avoid surprise—and still more to avoid an ambuscade—he should attack the enemy wherever he meets them in equal numbers, and in case of his falling in with too great a Force, he is to fall back on the Army with which he should always keep up a communication—Each Soldier to carry three days provisions and Rum with him—A Commissary to attend the Detachment

who is to take care that provisions for five days more be collected if possible on the Farms between us and the enemy—every eight days the Detachment to be relieved by an equal or even greater number if circumstances should require—if such a Detachment should unfortunately experience a considerable check—let it be withdrawn, and replaced by another, without suffering the plan of our operations to be affected by such an accident.
While we should keep the enemy in play by these means—the Northern Army, sufficiently reinforced and provided would make more serious advances with a superior force towards New York—which would probably oblige the enemy to reinforce their Garrison there, and to weaken themselves at Philadelphia, in which case we should have it in our power to strike a daring blow in that quarter.
And it is thus that the Theatre of the War might be transfered to the North—but to direct our principal force towards New York—exposes us to the loss of Pennsilvania, & all our Magazines, even the Residence of the Congress would be laid open to the Ravages of the Enemy—the disaffected would declare themselves, and we should leave the enemy—at liberty to penetrate into the country, and pillage, and what is more to be dreaded, to excite dangerous seditions—they would soon be masters of this State—and interrupt the communication between the Northern and Southern States.
I add that the sooner we are in condition to make attempts upon the enemy—the better—it will give spirits to our Soldiers—reassure the inhabitants—restrain the disaffected—and intimidate the Enemy.
There are occasions in which a Nation is obliged to put her all at Stake, but I cannot think this to be our case, unless we have certain intelligence that the enemy will be considerably reinforced at the opening of the Campaign.

Steuben


Title: From George Washington to Thomas Turner, 25 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Turner, Thomas

Sir,
[Valley Forge] April 25th 1778.

Altho^ I am not much accustomed to accept presents, I cannot refuse one offered in such polite terms as accompanied the Pistols & furniture you were so obliging as to send me by Captn Fauntleroy. They are very elegant, & deserve my best thanks, which are offered with

much sincerity. The favourable Sentiments you are pleased to entertain of me, & the obliging and flattering manner in which they are expressed add to the obligation & I am Sir Yr Most Obedt & Most H: Ser.

G. W——n


Title: General Orders, 26 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters V. Forge Sabbath April 26th 1778.
Rariton—Rumney—Raymond.

The Commander in Chief has been informed that it is a common Practice for soldiers to go about the Country and make use of his name to extort from the Inhabitants by way of sale (or gift) any necessaries they want for themselves or others he strictly enjoins it upon officers to take the most effectual measures to put a stop to a practice so daring and infamous and assures all concerned that if any Persons shall be detected in the Commission of it they will be punished with every Circumstance of disgrace and Severity.
Elihu Marshall Adjutant of the 2nd New-York Regiment is appointed to do the duty of Brigade Major in General Poor’s Brigade ’till further orders and is to be respected accordingly.
The Commanding Officers of Regiments are desired to wait on the Commander in Chief at Head-Quarters precisely at ten ôClock tomorrow morning.
Wanted immediately for public service the following Workmen (viz.) Two good Smelters, two ditto Miners, four Ax men, One dresser to tend the Stamp-Mill to work and burn ore and a good Smith for which a handsome Salary will be given—Any Person out of the Army that can be well recommended for the above Purpose by applying to Major John Clark at the Auditors Office will meet with Encouragement.


Title: Washington’s Thoughts upon a Plan of Operation for Campaign 1778, 26–29 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

[Valley Forge, c.26–29 April 1778]

In our present situation, and under our present prospects, there appears to be but one of three things that we either can do, or ought to attempt—First, by a collected force, to aim at the destruction of the Enemy in Philadelphia. Secondly, by dividing it, to attempt something against New York whilst Troops are left to cover this Country—& thirdly, by doing neither, lay quiet in a secure Camp and endeavour by every possible means to train and discipline our Army; thereby making our numbers (thô small) as formidable as possible. The first is, undoubtedly, the most desirable object, if within the reach of possibility—the Second, is also an important one, if practicable upon rational grounds. the third, we certainly have in our power to accomplish, if it is advisable.
Each of them deserves mature consideration, & should be placed in every point of light, that human wisdom can view them. The two first requires the aid of Militia—will be attended with considerable expence—great waste of Military Stores, and Arms—and will call for great supplies of Provisions; which, probably, are not within our reach. The third would be giving the Enemy time to receive their reinforcements, spread their baneful influence more extensively—and be a means of disgusting our own People by our apparent inactivity—but to judge accurately of points of this magnitude, let each case be considered seperately, and the advantages, & disadvantages, with the number of Men necessary for their execution, be fairly stated and canvassed, without having much regard to popular opinions.
By the first of June we may, I should suppose, count upon 17,000 Continental Troops fit for duty in this State, Including those upon the

North River, and at Albany; & I think we shall not over rate the Enemy in Philadelphia if we place them at 10,000 exclusive of Marines & Seamen. How many Men then, and what measures, are necessary, to attempt any thing with a prospect of success against this number of Troops in that City? are questions that naturally lead me into a consideration of the
First Plan.
Out of the aforesaid Number of 17000 Continental Troops, not less than two thousand, I should suppose, even with the aid of Militia, can maintain our Posts and Forts on the North River, and secure the important communication with the Eastern States; from whence, most of our Supplies must come—this reduces the Number to 15,000; and two methods of attack presenting themselves for consideration, to wit, by regular approaches, and Blockade, I will make a few observations on each.
The attack by regular approaches simply, & unconnected with a Blockade, would require the least number of Men, because they would be more compact, and their operations more confined; but even here, not less I shd think than 20,000 Men (which will be a call upon the Militia for 5000) would be sufficient to afford Detachments, carry on the Works, and resist a Sortee of the Enemy’s whole force. In case of good behaviour in the Troops on both sides (& we have little room to doubt it on theirs) what time will it probably take to carry the Lines? what expence of Ammunition? what will our probable loss be? and what shall we gain by it. there retreat being open, easy, and secure by water and their Stores removed. A Quantity of Goods might be found there, belonging to Individuals, whose property would deserve confiscation, and that would be all; except the honor of driving them from the City.
To attempt to reduce the City, or rather Troops in it, by a Blockade, it is indispensably necessary to possess Billingsport, with Troops sufficient to hold it against any number not much short of the Enemy’s whole force; for which reason, I should think much less than 5000 Men at the Fort, and in the Jerseys, wd not answer the purpose of holding the place, and cutting off their communication with that shore—Another strong body should be in the Neighbourhood of Derby; as nearly opposite to Billingsport as possible, and strongly Fortified—2500. or three thousand may be sufficient for this Post after it is fortified because it could be supported from the Main body. These two Posts should, at all events stop the Passage of Ships; or the end of taking them would not, by any means, be answered. 18,000 Men might then lay in Front of the Enemy’s Lines, between the two Rivers, and secure themselves in Lines, or by Redoubts, and act as circumstances may dictate—A Bridge of Communication to be thrown over the Schuylkill,

at the most convenient place to this positon—and the Galleys to take post as low in the Delaware, and as much upon the left Flank of this position, as Possible. a Number of Boats in their Rear for the purpose of a speedy transportation of Troops across that River if need be—Posts thus taken, & held, would, in time, starve the Town; or open a door to some other mode of attack, which might prove successful, and more expeditious. This plan at the lowest computation, requires (in aid of the 15,000 Continental Troops) Ten, or 11,000 Militia.
Second Plan.
To carry this into execution, there must be a seperation of our Force, and an aid of Militia—not less than five or Six thousand Troops should go from this Army to join those on the North River; & act in concert with the Militia—As the success of this enterprize would depend in a great measure upon the well timing of matters, and celerity in the execution—hints & false appearances should favor the idea of an Attack upon Philadelphia; in order, if possible, to draw the attention from & Weaken New York and its dependencies—A body of 1000 Jersey Militia, including those now at Elizabeth Town, should assemble without fail, at that place, on the 10th day of June—A Number of Boats should also be collected there, & two or three field Piece (of Iron Cannon) with a view of detaining the Troops upon Staten Island; or making a descent thereon, if they should be removed; or very considerably weakened. these Men to be draughted to serve at least two Months after they arrive at the place of Rendezvous, the day abovementioned.
A like number of Connecticut Militia to assemble (unincumbered with Baggage) at Norwalk; on the same day; and to be provided, if possible, with whale Boats sufficient for the Transportation of at least 800 Men—these Men, and Boats, to move down towards East Chester as the Enemys lines at Kings bridge are approached by the Main body from the highlands; or to act from thence against Long Island or York Island as circumstances may require.
Previous to any movements of this Kind; a correspondance to be settled with Staten Island, & Long Island, to discover what effect these operations, when they take place, will have upon the Troops upon those Islands.
The Militia from the States of New York and Connecticut, now at the Posts in the High-lands to be increased to two thousand; whereof, five hundred only may be drawn from Connecticut (as they are called upon for a thousand to Rendezvous at Norwalk & are also to furnish Rhode Island with Men)—these Troops are also to assemble at Fishkill on the 10th of June with as little Baggage as possible. all the Militia are to serve two months from the date of their arrival, & to bring Arms &ca with them.

The Quarter Master Genl, & Commissaries of Provisions, & Military Stores, are to make ample provision in their respective departments under the best colourable pretences to deceive. The heavy Brass field pieces, & largest Howitzers should be drawn to that Quarter in the same manner, and under like false appearances. Ponton’s should be provided for throwing a Bridge across Harlem River, if need be. a Number of Boats should also be provided at the Post in the Highlands—Numbered, and the Number of Men which each will carry precisely ascertaind; and the whole under skilful officers, to favor an Imbarkation with regularity and dispatch, if occasion should require it. Sheepskin & Nails to be provided for Mufling the oars. A Redoubt to be thrown up at Kings Ferry to secure the passage of Boats from the Enemys Armed Vessells. and good Horses for Transportation of the Artillery—A Number of Teams should also be provided for the purpose of Transporting Provisions—Forage—& Stores with the Army to Kings Bridge—and this to be done under pretence of transporting Provisions &ca to the Army in this State. The Commissary of Provns should also, under the Idea of providing for the Troops, on their March from the North River to this Camp, lay in a stock at Morristown, & sufferans; and a small qty at Bound brook.
These several Orders being given, and the alarm communicated to Philadelphia, creating proper jealousies there—and matters upon the No. River, &c. being in a proper Train, the Troops from here, for that Service, may be put in motion in three divisions—the first may be crossed at Bordenton by the Boats & Galleys giving oblique hints that they are bound to Billingsport after being joined by the Troops which cross above, but nevertheless are to halt there, till the effect of the discovery in Phila., of the real movement, is known; and then advance on, or (in case the Enemy should attempt to throw a body of Men across to So. Amboy by Land) oppose them in conjunction with the Militia, to the utmost. and, that as great a body of Militia may be drawn forth, in case of such an event, as possible, without having them out upon uncertainty & expence let a Beacon be fixed at the noted Tree near Princeton, to be answered by others on the adjacent heights, and fired by order from the Commanding Officer at Bordenton; upon which the Militia who are to be first previously notified of the intention, are immediately to Assemble at Cranbury under cover of the Continental Troops with four days Provins & by Arms, and obstructions in the roads, give every possible opposition to the March of the Enemy.
The Second division which is also to Mar[ch] at the same time, may take the Rout by Trenton (under pretence of not interfering with the first division at Bordenton thence) by Somerset Court House, Springfield, great falls, Peramous, Kakeate, &ca to Kings Ferry.

The third division also Marching at the same time & throwing out the same Ideas may advance by the way of Coryells, Morristown, Pompton, Sufferans &ca to Kings Ferry where Boats are to meet & Transport them. These movements may be countenanced, & covered, by the whole Army advancing to the white Marsh or edge hill. The Rout of each of the two last divisions to be precisely pointed out, & their Marches & halting days assignd that it may be known to an hour when they will arrive at the North River; the day before which the Troops at New Windsor &ca are to take Post at some proper Incampment on the other side, to be marked out by proper hands. from whence, after a little refreshment, & arrangement, the whole are to advance, and take post near the Enemy’s Lines, and Works at Kings bridge. This, undoubtedly, will draw the Enemy’s whole force to that place, or nearly so, leaving the City of New York, Staten, & long Island, bare of Troops—to remedy this, the Shipping will, unquestionably, be disposed of to the best advantage; but whether they can afford effectual cover to those places, or not, is a matter of doubt. If they can, no disadvantage to them will follow their withdrawing the Troops from those Posts—If they cannot, their force becomes divided—their attention distracted, by a care for different objects; and easy descents may be made on the two Islands whilst the City itself through conscious security may be liable to surprize by a rapid move of the Boats from Peekskill to Philips or that Neighbourhood, for Troops to imbark, and run down under cover of a dark Night, upon the ebb tide with mufled oars.
If nothing can be effected by surprize, or a coup de main, it remains to be considered how far the Works are to be carried by regular approaches; and what may be the consequences of spending so much time as must be involved in the operation. To advance by regular approaches to Fort Independance will, I conceive, be tedious & laborious, on acct of the roughness of the ground—and must also be expensive in the article of Ammunition. A Bridge should be in readiness to throw over Harlem River; but unless the City, or Fort Washington could be previously possessed; or there should be force of Men and Artillery sufficient to besiege Forts Independance and Washington at the sametime, Troops on the Island might be endangered without answering any valuable purpose, as the Enemy could draw their supplies by Water under cover of Night, maugre any post we could take there.
If upon the whole then our operations are to be confined to regular approaches—first to Fort Independance—then to Fort Washington—& lastly to the City, it is incumbent on us to consider, what time it will take to effect these, and what will be the probable loss on our side in the operation’s—The first depends upon the nature of the Ground, and the skill with which the works are conducted. & the second, from

the time, & manner of them. But, a matter of no small moment, is, to judge with some degree of accuracy, of the effect that these operations of ours will have upon the Enemy in Philada. To suppose that General Howe will lay quiet there till his reinforcements arrive, if he thinks New York in danger is to suppose what I have not the smallest conception of; and therefore I rather believe that he will pursue one or the other of these two measures; either to reinforce it strongly, leaving a bare Garrison in Philadelphia—or weakly, with some of his most indifferent Regimts (fit enough however for Garrison duty); and with the Flower of his Troops, aim a stroke at this army, & our Stores; and endeavour, by vigorous exertions, to spread Terror & dismay through the State. if he should adopt the first measure, what chance shall we have of success at New York? and what good will result from the Manœuvre? unless, fortunately, it should be a means of transferring the War to New York—thereby disconcerting General Howe’s plans—and placing things in a more eligable situation by removing him from a Country of supplies, & ourselves to a Country of support. on the other hand, if he should pursue the secd Plan, prove successful, and the enterprize on New York unfortunate, will not the world condemn the undertaking as ill judged, and impolitic, it being a well known fact, that little is to be expected from the spirit of the People of this state, in case of such a Manouvre of the British Troops, and much to be apprehended from their disaffection.
The third Plan—
Has advantages and disadvantages attending it—on the one hand, no advantage is attempted to be taken of the Enemy, in their weakest State—but they suffered to remain in peace, boasting their powers & expectation, & spreading their baneful influence far & wide, till their reinforcements enable them to take the field with some degree of eclat—&, if considerable, to form new expeditions—to which may be added the disgust, and dissatisfaction of the Public and their concomitant evils—On the other hand, we are also getting strength in the Continental line, by recruits Draughts, &ca—and shall have time to train and discipline our Officers & men; making the number even if it should prove small, formidable—we shall have leizure to appoint our Officers—arrange the Army—& recover from the disordered State we are now in for want of these and knowing upon what establishment the Army will be placed—We should, moreover, be able to form our Magazines—examine into the State of our Provisions, and know how far it would be in our power to feed, and supply a promiscuous number before they were assembled, avoiding a considerable expence and infinite waste, which must be incurred with Militia in order to attempt that which must be precarious in the Issue; and ruinous if it failed—We could also

make this a strong and formidable Post—too formidable to attack, and too dangerous for the Enemy to leave in their Rear, if they should incline to advance into the Country.
More reasons might be urged for, & against, the three Plan’s here proposed—much also might be said on the state of our currency—badness of our credit—the temper of our People—their expectations—and their fear of seeing one capital place after another fall into the hands of the Enemy, without an attempt to rescue them—The blockade of our Ports—high prices of Comodities &ca are also worthy of great attention but, as these are matters which must have occurr’d to every one, before whom these considerations are proper to be laid, these need, no particular discussion of them in this place although, in the ultimate determination, they are worthy of the closest attention; for altho reason and sound policy (founded on a due regard to circumstances) must be the basis of our opinions, yet popular expectations should always be complied with where injury in the execution is not too apparent; especially in such a contest as the one we are engaged in—where the Spirit, and willingness of the People must, in a great measure, take place of coercion.
General Sullivan might (to use Gen. Howe’s phraze) make demonstration of a descent upon Rhode Island, which would prevent any succour from that Quarter to New York, or expose the Garrison there exceedingly.


Title: To George Washington from the German Battalion Officers, 26 April 1778 [letter not found]
From: German Battalion Officers
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from the German Battalion Officers, c.26 April 1778. On 26 April, Alexander Hamilton wrote to James Mease: “By command of His Excellency, I inclose you a letter to him from the officers of the German batalion. There appears, by the representation, to be something particular in the circumstances of that batalion, with respect to cloathing, which deserves attention. You will do whatever can be done with propriety, to put them upon an equal footing with other regiments” (DLC:GW).


Title: To George Washington from Major General William Heath, 26 April 1778
From: Heath, William
To: Washington, George

Dear General
Head Quarters Boston April 26th 1778

I have been Honored with yours of the 8th Instant.
I do myself the Honor to enclose the resolves of the General assembly of this State for Drafting a number of men to Compleat their Battalions, and to Serve on Hudsons River which They appear to be Determined to accomplish without Delay.
On the 13th Instant I Published an order in the publick Papers for all Soldiers in this Quarter belonging to Regiments in the Service of the United States of america who were absent from their respective Corps to Joyn them Immediately on pain of being treated as Deserters—Several Detachments are on the way to the army.
enclosed is a request of Lieut. Clark of Colo. Lees Regt, for Leave to resign his Commission in the army being in a declining State of Health.
Six or Seven victuallers are now at anchor in this Harbour having on Board 3034 bbs. of Flour 830 bbs. Beef 1235 bbs. Pork, between

Twenty & Thirty Tons of Bread a Quantity of Rice Peas &c. to replace the Provisions that have been Supplied the Troops of the Convention the first four months of their being Here, a further Quantity of Beef is to be Sent from New York, which is to be Delivered here within Forty Days from the 7th of this Instant, which is also Due for the Supplies within the before mentioned months for the fulfilment of this I have a Pledge of Gold in my Hands, which is to remain as a Discharge of the accot if the whole of the Provisions are not replaced within the forty Days. If it is replaced, I am to Deliver the Pledge to Genl Phillips.
Major Genl Pigot has Undertaken to Supply the Troops of the Convention with provisions in future which I think will be a Happy Circumstance in our favor as it will tend greatly to Lower the price of Provisions, and enable us to turn our whole attention to provide for our Own Troops. I have the Honor to be with great respect your Excellencys most Obd. Servt

W. Heath

P.S. I shall the next week forward to the Treasury at York Town about 10,0000 Dollars in solid Coin, which I have received of Genl Burgoyne for fuel.


Title: From George Washington to William Livingston, 26 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Livingston, William

Sir
Valley Forge April 26th 1778

I received yesterday your favor of the 15th Inst., with the papers alluded to.

Your reasoning, upon the subject of Deserters attending Flags, is certainly right & not to be disputed. Their appearing in that character is an additional crime, and it is the practice of War in such instances, founded in principles of common reason & the delicacy of Truces, to execute them immediately. This is the custom in general cases. How far the circumstances, which attended the enlistment of Job Hetfield require a discrimination in his favor, is a point perhaps of some difficulty. I find by inquiry of General Maxwell, that he was inlisted & sworn; but yet, that there was a sort of coercion, which might distinguish it, from an act perfectly free and voluntary. Upon the whole I think his detention & confinement justifiable, which I would prefer to Capital punishment. At the same time, you will permit me to observe, that from the expediency of Flags and the necessity of such an intercourse between warring powers, it is the constant usage for the party detaining, executing &c. to inform the other side of the reasons.
I am sorry, I do not recollect the mode suggested by the Committee, for paying for the Horses. None of the Gentlemen are now here; and therefore, I shall take the earliest occasion to transmit an extract of your Letter to Congress and to forward you their Answer. It is certain without money, things go on heavily, if they go on at all.
As the season for action is fast advancing and it is necessary for me, in forming plans, either offensive or defensive, to know with some degree of certainty, what succours might be obtained from the Country, in any emergency, I request, that you will inform me, as soon as you can, what number of well armed militia (I say well armed, because the Continent cannot supply them) Jersey could afford, if called upon, How long they might be retained in service—& How soon drawn into the field after requisition. I would wish the Estimate to be as accurate, as you can well make it, and if imperfect in any instance, that it should rather fall short of the number that may be obtained, than exceed. I do not mean by this, to relinquish my hopes of your filling your Batallions, and I trust the Legislature will no longer defer measures necessary for effecting so important and interesting a work. It is our misfortune never to have our forces in the Field, till the Enemy have received their reinforcements.
I have taken the freedom to commit to your care a Letter for Major Genl Tryon, which you will be pleased to send by a Flag to Staten Island, or to such other post, as you may deem most proper. I transmit you a copy of our correspondence, which on his part, is pretty similar, it is probable, to His addresses to your Officers. Determined, that I should get some of his obliging Letters, he made out a first—a second and a Third, all of the same tenor & date. I am persuaded, you will be under some difficulty, which to admire most, his impertinence

—or his folly. I am Dr Sir with great esteem & regard Yr Most Obedt servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Major General Philip Schuyler, 26 April 1778
From: Schuyler, Philip
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
Saratoga [N.Y.] April 26th 1778

Yesterday I received a Letter from Lt Colonel Willett commanding officer at Fort Schuyler inclosing a Speech of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras in Answer to a Message I sent them in March, Copy of the Speech I do myself the Honor to inclose—Your Excellency will percieve that some of these Nations intend to join you as soon as the Fort promised to be built in their Country shall be finished—The Marquis De La Fayette before he left Albany gave Orders for having it done and sent up two French Gentlemen to direct the Work, but I am informed that the Troops ordered for that Service did not march and I cannot learn that any others are employed about it.
I momently expect to learn the Result of the Conference held at Onondaga

—I have Reason to believe it will prove favorable as a late Letter from Fort Schuyler advises that three of our friendly Indians lately sent to Niagara for Intelligence are returned and inform “that Butler declared in a public Speech that his Hand was too short to do any Thing this Summer, and that he should set out the Day after the Speech to Detroit to spend the Summer there.”
Your Excellency may rest assured that I shall make use of every Exertion in Conjunction with the other Commissioners to procure the greatest Number of Indians possible to join you.
Five or seven of the Enemy’s largest Vessels on Champlain are arrived at Tyonderoga and, it is said, have debarked a Body of Troops at that place, another Body of about five hundred landed opposite Crown point and in their March towards Mount Independence fell in with Captain Allen, who commanded a Scouting party of one hundred Militia—The latter have been obliged to Retreat with some Loss.
I do not apprehend that any considerable Body of the Enemy will attempt to penetrate into the Country, at least not until they are reinforced from Europe, but Scalping parties will probably commit Depredations, and such is the Dread of the Inhabitants on that Account that they are already leaving their plantations, not a single Soldier being left for their protection.
The Legislature of this State having appointed me an additional Delegate in Congress, I am very anxious that my Trial should be brought on and doubt not but that as soon as your Excellency shall receive the Directions of Congress for that purpose I shall be honored with your Orders to attend at Head Quarters—permit me to entreat your Excellency that with the Order for my Attendance Copy of the Charges may be sent and an Order for such Officers as I may want to give in their Evidence to repair to Head Quarters. I have the Honor to be &c.

Ph: Schuyler


Title: From George Washington to William Tryon, 26 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Tryon, William

Sir,
Head Quarters Valley Forge April 26th 1778

Your letter of the 17th and a triplicate of the same were duly received. I had had the pleasure of seeing the Draughts of the two Bills, before those which were sent by you, came to hand; and I can assure you, they were suffered to have a free currency among the officers and men under my command, in whose fidelity to the United States I have the most perfect confidence The inclosed Gazette published the 24th at York Town will show you, that it is the wish of Congress, they should have an unrestrained circulation.
I take the liberty to transmit you a few printed copies of a resolution of Congress of the 23d instant, and to request, you will be instrumental, in communicating its contents, so far as it may be in your power, to the persons who are the objects of its operation. The benevolent purpose, it is intended to answer, will, I persuade myself, sufficiently recommend it to your candor. I am, Sir, Your most Obedt servant

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Thomas Wharton, Jr., 26 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Wharton, Thomas Jr.

Sir.
Head Quarters [Valley Forge] 26th April 1778.

The season for action is advancing very fast, and it is highly necessary for me, in forming plans either offensive or defensive, to know with certainty what succours, I may look for from the country in any emergency. With this view I am to request you will be pleased to let me know as speedily as possible, what number of well armed Militia, your State could afford if called upon, and what time of service they might be engaged for—I am particular as to their being armed, because they cannot be supplied with arms from the continental Stores.
It is of very great importance that your estimate should be well considered, that the experiment may not disappoint any expectations or projects, which may be formed in consequence. I have the honor to be with great respect. Sir Your most obedt Servt

Go: Washington

Be so good also, to let me know in how short a time, after requisitn is made, they could be drawn into the field.


Title: General Orders, 27 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters V. Forge Monday April 27th 1778.
Simsbury—Solon. Scott.

Lieutt Coll Fleury is to act as Sub-Inspector and will attend the Baron Stuben ’till Circumstances shall admit of assigning him a Division of the Army—Each Sub-Inspector is to be attended daily by an Orderly-Serjeant

drawn by turns from the Brigades of his own Inspection that the necessary orders may be communicated without delay.
A few Continental Lottery Tickets to be sold at the Orderly-Office—The drawing of the Lottery will commence the first of next month.


Title: From George Washington to Samuel Chase, 27 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Chase, Samuel

Dear Sir,
[Valley Forge, 27 April 1778]

Your favour of the 20th instant, I have received—The practice of seizing & confining the friends to America in the civil line, however barbarous it may be is a favourite engine of policy with the enemy;

from which, I believe it will not be easy to make them depart. Their object is to deter men from taking an active and leading part in our governments; the firm establishment of which they foresee will be fatal to their views. Whether the measure, of seizing their friends with us, to redeem ours in their power would put a stop to the practice is extremely doubtful—There are few persons among us, whom they esteem of sufficient consequence—to desist on their account, from any thing which they look upon, as advancive of their interest.
With respect to Mr Bedford, if the exchange you mention was under my direction I should chearfully consent to its taking place. But Mr Cook is not, that I know of, a military prisoner; consequently not subject to my disposal. I apprehend he must be a prisoner to this state—and therefore it lies with them to determine whether he shall be exchanged for Mr Bedford. I am with real esteem and regard Dr Sir Your most Obedt servt.


Title: From George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 27 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

Sir
Head Quarters Valley Forge 27th April 1778

I have lately been informed by a Gentleman, actuated solely by a regard to the public good, and by an apprehension that we might fall short in the indispensible article of musket Cartridges particularly, that there are not, in his opinion, a sufficient number of Workmen kept employed, in the Elaboratories of Carlisle and Lebanon, to answer the exigencies of the Campaign. As the hint was thrown out to me, probably supposing that the public Works were under my direction, I thought it my duty instantly to communicate it to you, that due enquiry might be made, and the Commissary General of Military Stores ordered to enlarge his plan, if it should be found insufficient. While an enquiry of this nature is on foot, perhaps it would be well to extend it to the Elaboratories to the Eastward, and see what progress they are making. I shall not add upon the importance of this subject, or apologize for giving

you this trouble as you are so well acquainted with the real as well as accidental expenditure of ammunition in the Course of a Campaign, and the fatal Consequences attending a scarcity of it. I have the honor to be Sir Yr most obt Servt.


Title: To George Washington from Major General William Heath, 27 April 1778
From: Heath, William
To: Washington, George

27 April 1778. Recommends Col. Henry Jackson to GW’s notice as “an Honest man a worthy Citizen and Good Officer.” States that he has “taken the Liberty to enclose under Cover addressed to your Excellency” a letter to the president of Congress and asks that it be “forwarded by the first Conveyance.”


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 27 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

Sir
Valley Forge April 27th 1778

I had the Honor, yesterday afternoon, to receive your Letter of the 24th continued to the 25th, with it’s important inclosures.
Congress will be pleased to accept my sincere thanks for the fresh instance of confidence, manifested in their Resolution of the 23d and other proceedings, and they may rest assured, that whatever powers are intrusted to me, shall be invariably directed to promote the interest of these States. If in any case there should be a misapplication or a failure in the execution, it will be the effect of mistake, and not of design.

I shall take measures for distributing the report of the Committee on Lord North’s Bills & the Resolution of the 23d, inviting delinquents to return to their allegiance, and to the protection of these States. This proceeding appears to me, founded in great, good policy, & I should hope, that it will be attended with many valuable consequences; But this can only be proved by the event.
Though I wish most heartily for the aid of General Lee in Council, and upon every other occasion, Yet as the time of his return is uncertain, or at least will be several days before it takes place; and as it seems to me, that there is not a moment to lose in forming some general system for our Operations, I should think it inexpedient for General Gates to delay coming to Camp, till his arrival. After a plan is digested, there will be a great deal of time expended before things will be in a proper train for execution. The season is fast advancing, and the period which may be most favourable for any designs we may form, will presently arrive.
I take the liberty to transmit an Extract of a Letter from Genl Heath, which will shew Congress, that he is pressed on all sides for money. Governor Livingston too is apprehensive, he will be under embarrasments on account of the purchase of Horses, in consequence of the recommendation of the Committee. Their Letter to him, by some means, has been mislaid in the Assembly, and he does not know exactly, the mode prescribed for the payment. I cannot inform him myself, or do what perhaps is more necessary, furnish him with money, and therefore hope that Congress or the Committee will.
I have written Major Genl Tryon a few lines, in answer to his Letter, A copy of which is inclosed. I have the Honor to be with great esteem & regard Sir Your Most Obedt servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 27 April 1778
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
York Town [Pa.] 27th April 1778

I had the honour of writing to Your Excellency the 24th Inst. by Mcklosky.
Yesterday about ½ p. 5 oClock P.M. Your Excellency’s favor of the 25th was brought to me in Congress & was immediately presented, the person who had been the bearer of it was anxious to obtain a receipt for the Letter to express the time of delivery & he complained of unnecessary detention half the day at Susquehanna  Ferry—this intimation will answer his purpose.
I am directed by Congress to request Your Excellency will immediately require all Officers Civil as well as Military in the Army, who are at present delinquent, to comply with the terms of an Act of Congress of the 3d ffebruary last by taking the Oath of Allegiance & Abjuration & that Your Excellency will be pleased to cause the necessary Certificates as speedily as possible to be returned & if occasion shall be given which is supposed to be scarcely possible the Name or Names of such persons as shall refuse.
The Bearer hereof will deliver three Packets containing about 600. Blanks which will hasten the business of Admistring Oaths. more shall be sent by the next Messenger.
In considering the article of provision to be made for Officers who shall continue in the Army to the end of the War Congress had proceeded so far last Night as Resolving that one half the present pay be continued during Life without exceptions of Country, to all such Officers as shall also take the Oath of Allegiance & actually reside within the United States. this Resolution & the whole plan for Military Establishment is subject to further discussion respecting the propriety of transmitting it to the several States for concurrence. I have the honour to be With the highest Respect & Esteem Sir Your Excellency’s Most obedient & Most humble servant.

Henry Laurens, President of Congress.


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 27 April 1778
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
York Town [Pa.] 27th April 1778.

The News papers which I received from Your Excellency in company with the honour of Your Excellency’s Letter of the 18th afford me sometimes amusement in intervals from the necessary duties of my present station. I am particularly indebted to Your Excellency for the notice which is included in the kindness of this favor.
Your Excellency is too well acquainted with the Integrity of your own heart & too well assured of the good opinion of your Country Men to admit any anxious impressions from the forgeries of an Enemy—I am disposed to vote for every exertion in our power in order to defeat their designs against us, except following such of their examples as will when related in history greatly abate from that Character for Generosity which England & upon good grounds once boasted.
The late attempt by publishing forged Resolves of Congress within a Garrison’d Town immediately under the Eye of a Commander in Chief appears to me to be mean & scandalous, & must be considered in the same light by every good Englishman Military, or in public or private Life.
We are now verging towards a most important Crisis when all the Wisdom of these States will be required—permit me Sir, to lay before you my private sentiments; If the time shall come for appointing a Deputation for treating with British Commissioners on terms for establishing peace I hold it necessary that able Men be called forth for that purpose from any place within the Union without confining our election within any one State or Body. I intreat Your Excellency’s pardon for this freedom & that you will beleive me to be with the most sincere Esteem & attachment Sir Your obliged & Most obedient servant

Henry Laurens.


Title: To George Washington from William Livingston, 27 April 1778
From: Livingston, William
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir,
Chatham [N.J.], 27th April, 1778.

 I had the honour yesterday of your Excellency’s favours of the 15th and 22d April.***
 I am obliged to your Excellency for the enclosures in your favour of the 22d of April. I entertain exactly the same sentiments with you concerning the design and tendency of the bill and instructions—but I hope in this they will be (as in every thing else they have been) disappointed by that Providence which appears evidently to confound all their devices. I should have been very happy to have received Lord North’s speech only two days sooner, to have contributed my mite towards some observations upon it, to be inserted in the West New-Jersey Gazette; but it coming too late for that purpose, I must defer it to the succeeding week; though I could wish it was undertaken by an abler hand, and one of greater leisure. To provide, however, some antidote to prevent meanwhile the operation of his lordship’s poison, I have sent Collins a number of letters, as if by different hands, not even excluding the tribe of petticoats, all calculated to caution America against the insidious arts of enemies. This mode of rendering a measure unpopular, I have frequently experienced in my political days to be of surprising efficacy, as the common people collect from it that everybody is against it, and for that reason those who are really for it grow discouraged, from magnifying in their own imagination the strength of their adversaries beyond its true amount. ***
I have the honour to be, With the highest esteem, Dear sir, &c.

Wil. Livingston.


Title: To George Washington from Maj. Gen. Alexander McDougall, 27 April 1778 [letter not found]
From: McDougall, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from Maj. Gen. Alexander McDougall, 27 April 1778. On 1 May, GW wrote McDougall, “I return you my thanks for your favor of the 27th Ulto.” McDougall wrote in his journal for 27 April, “Mr Deane left this in

the morning wrote Genl Washington the advice He brought” (NHi: Alexander McDougall Papers).


Title: From George Washington to Robert Morris, 27 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Morris, Robert

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Valley Forge 27th April 1778

I have your favr of the 22d instant. I take the hint in the freindly light in which it was meant, and thank you for your attention to a matter of the utmost importance. I shall write to the Board of War, and, without mentioning names, let them know that there is not that activity and exertion in the Conductors of our Elaboratories, that the advanced season demands. Some allowance must be made, when you consider that our Works were removed the last Winter from Allen Town and Easton to Lebanon and Carlisle, and that it took some time to have them properly fitted for Business; but as that has been compleated, there can be no excuse for not going on briskly now.
The management and direction, of the Elaboratories out of Camp, belongs intirely to the Board of War, and I cannot therefore with propriety send an Officer to superintend them, but I have no doubt that the Board will immediately look into the matter, and give necessary orders upon my representation. I am Dear Sir sincerely Yours.

Go: Washington

Quare have you ever received a Letter from me, in answer to yours by Colo. Armand?


Title: To George Washington from Brig. Gen. William Smallwood, 27 April 1778 [letter not found]
From: Smallwood, William
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from Brig. Gen. William Smallwood, 27 April 1778. On 30 April, GW wrote Smallwood, “I have been favord with yours of the 27th Inst.”


Title: General Orders, 28 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters V. Forge Tuesday April 28th 1778.
Tripoli—Toulon. Tunis.

The Medicine Chests from Scotts and Woodford’s Brigades to be sent to the Yellow-Springs tomorrow where they will be refilled by the Apothecary General Mr Cutting.
The sentences against David Rush & Thomas Fitzgerald mentioned in orders of the 18th instant are commuted to one month’s constant fatigue each.
The Commanding Officers of Regiments are desired to prevent their

men from stragling that they may be ready to turn out on the shortest notice.
It is expected that the several Brigades will be completed as soon as possible with forty rounds pr man: The Brigade Quarter Masters will make out returns immediately for that purpose; They must be signed by the Commanding Officers of Brigades.


Title: To George Washington from Major William Courtis, 28 April 1778
From: Courtis, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
Boston Aprill 28 1778

having Served my Country three years I hope with your Exelenceys Approbation and my frends, not tired with Serving it Longer, but am Constrained through Nessesity to Ask a Dismission, not having a fortune Sufficent to Suppote me, I was at the begin[nin]g of this war in Tolurable good Curcumstanaces but my Pay being not Sufficent to Supporte me, my family Living on what Little I had when this war begun has Reduced me so Low as not to be able to Supporte my Character as an officer any Longer, when I Cannot do that your Exelency would not wish to Se me in the feild, if I Should be oblidged to Come to Camp it will Distress myself and family very much, after Stateing dificutyes which are facts, I flatter myself your Exelency will Except my Resignation without sensure, I flatter myself my Character Stands fair, if in Some futer day your Exelency Should have ocation for my Services I Stand readey to obey your Exelencys Command, but at Present must beg Leave to Resign, I have the honor to subsribe myself your Exelencys obedent humble Servant

Willm Courtis Major in Colo. Henleys Regt


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 28 April 1778
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir.
York Town [Pa.] 28th April 1778

I writ to Your Excellency yesterday by Wilkinson, this Evening Your Excellency’s favour of the same date containing Copy of a Letter to M. General Tryon & Extracts from Govr Livingston & Genl Heath came to hand—these shall be presented to Congress to morrow.
Within the present Cover Your Excellency will receive, an Act of Congress of 27th for enabling the General commanding the Artillery to be of the intended Council if your Excellency shall judge it proper.
The bearer hereof is charged with a packet containing 500 Copies of the Oath of Allegiance & Abjuration—& he is directed to call on Mr Bailey printer at Lancaster for 200 Copies of the Act for granting pardons printed in the German tongue.
This Morning I reported to Congress a Letter from Major General Conway requesting leave to resign his Commission, which the House immediately Resolved to accept; I shall transmit to General Conway the proper notification by the next Express Messenger to Albany. I have the honour to be With the highest Esteem & Regard Sir Your Excellency’s Obedient & humble servant

Henry Laurens, President of Congress.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Charles Lee, 28 April 1778
From: Lee, Charles
To: Washington, George

My Dr General
Prato Verde [Va.] April the 28th 1778

You may better imagine than I can express the happiness which your letter gave me, tho at the time I receiv’d it, which was the night before last, there was some little drawback on my happiness—viz. a small attack of the gout, with indications of it’s being a severe fit, but by three doses of what Lord Chatham calls the great American Panacea, I find myself so much better and the indications so much weaker that I hope to set out tomorrow or the next day at furthest—but you may be assur’d that I will not defer my departure a single moment.
I have read the Papers, and all I shall say on the Subject—is that nothing can equal the impudence of North and his Colleagues but the patience or rather stupid forbearance of the People in not tearing the Scoundrels to pieces. adieu, My Dr General—till I have the pleasure of seeing you—

Charles Lee


Title: To George Washington from Col. William Russell, 28 April 1778 [letter not found]
From: Russell, William Sr.
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from Col. William Russell, Sr., 28 April 1778. On 19 May, GW wrote Russell, “I recd yours of the 28th ulto inclosing a Return of that part of your Regiment that is at Fort Pitt.”


Title: General Orders, 29 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters V. Forge Wednesday April 29th 1778
Ulysses—Ulster Ulm.

Major Ledyard is removed from the 4th to the 1st New York Regiment.
Each Officer who mounts guard will in future bring his Name Regiment & Brigade wrote on a Piece of Paper, which he will deliver to the Brigade Major of the day when he is appointing the Officers to the several guards. Strict compliance with this order is expected, as it will shorten the duty of the Parade.
Those Regiments that are in need of Shoes may be supplied by applying to the Cloathier Genls Store.

In order to prevent any disputes which may hereafter arise among the Officers of the Virginia line relative to the distribution of the draughts from that State, the following mode is henceforward to be observed. The Draughts are upon their Arrival in Camp to be brought to that Brigade to which the Officer who conducts them from Virginia belongs—They are to continue with that Brigade for the space of twenty four hours that they may have time to inform themselves of the situation of the different Regiments in the Line & where their Relations, Friends and Acquaintance are; After the Expiration of the twenty four hours they shall be respectively brought before the Officer commanding the Brigade and make their free Election of Corps which shall be binding and obligatory provided the Regiments they choose shall not be fully completed; in that case they are to have another Choice—While the draughts continue in the Brigade at which they first arrive they shall draw provisions by order of the Commanding Officer and if they have not had the Small-Pox, they shall be innoculated by the Surgeons of the Brigade; These orders are constantly to be made known to the Draughts upon their arrival, and if any Officer is convicted of making use of any undue means to induce the draughts to join his Regiment or Company he may depend upon being called to a severe Account.
Complaint having been made by Mr Dewees Proprietor of the Valley Forge that the soldiers pull down the houses and break the fire bays at what is called the new Forge at the Valley Creek—The Commander in Chief strictly forbids all Persons from further damaging the said buildings and Works which he hopes will be punctually attended to especially when they consider the great loss which Mr Dewees has already suffered by the Enemy and by the great waste which our Army has been under the Necessity of commiting upon his Woods & other Improvements.
As some Inconveniencies have attended the general order of the 17th instant by confining the purchase of Milk and other Necessaries for the use of the sick to the Regimental Quarter Masters; instead of that mode a discreet Serjeant and a few men according to the number of sick in each Regiment are to be sent out daily to purchace those Articles with Passes from the Officers Commanding Brigades respectively.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Horatio Gates, 29 April 1778
From: Gates, Horatio
To: Washington, George

Sir
War Office York Town [Pa.] 29th April 1778

The Board have been favoured with your Excellency’s Letter of the 27th instant relative to the Laboratory at Lebanon. It has been with no small Concern that we have percieved the Affairs in the Commissary General’s Department exceedingly deranged. We cannot find any Neglect in the Gentleman at the Head of it as we believe him to be an active & good Officer. But the same Discontents & Misfortunes which have pervaded almost every other Corps have prevailed in the Regiment of Artificers. The Board have used every Endeavor to remedy the Disorders & hope Things are getting up in that Department. Unfortunately Col: Flower has been for a long time indisposed & most of the Officers have taken little Pains to reinlist the Men. A Mr Sweers who the Board found possessed of Orders from General Knox as the next in the Department is found to be inadequate to the Task ’tho’ he will be useful in a more confined Branch of the Business. He was appointed Deputy Commissary General but must be prevailed on to resign or be removed. As to the making Musket Cartridges the enclosed Papers will give your Excellency the latest Accounts we have on that Subject. The Men are hired by the Day & are of Course under little Command. But it is imagined they are sufficient to make up as soon as it can be wanted all the Lead we have. By the Returns formerly sent you it will be seen that our Stock of this Article is distressingly low & very small Additions have been made since. The Board have written repeatedly & pressingly to every State in the Confederacy desiring Loans or Purchases to be

made, but have reaped but a small Harvest from all their Endeavours. There were at Springfield about twenty five Tons of Lead, but the Board hear General Knox ordered fifteen Tons of it to Lebanon at which Place there are cast into Ball about fifteen Tons. There are at the Head of Elk & at this Place about ten Tons which is all we know of within our Reach at present. One hundred Waggons are gone to the Southward for Military Stores & Cloathing & we have Expectations of some Lead by their Return. We have given every Encouragement to the Opening & working a valuable Mine on the Juniata in this State which from present Appearances is sufficient to supply all America—But there are some Disputes about the Property which we fear will embarrass Matters much.
The Reparation of Arms has gone on but very slow. Complaints are made that they cannot get Workmen & they wish for Drafts from the Army of the Propriety of which your Excellency is the best Judge. Mr Butler the former Superintendant is removed & the Board have appointed William Henry Esq. of Lancaster Superintendant of Arms & Acoutrements. This Gentleman in the Course of the Winter with very little Assistance from us has repaired more Arms & procured more Acoutrements on the best Construction than the whole of those employed in the Commissy Genl or Armourers Departments put together. Our Hopes are strongly built on this Gentleman tho’ his Appointment is rather late. But the Defects in this Branch among others were long ago represented to Congress who were tardy in acting upon the Bussiness. We shall be greatly disstressed too for Want of Acoutrements. We have given repeated Spurs to the People employed in this Branch who have by no Means done what they might. A Pattern of a Cartridge Cannister made of thin rolled Iron is obtained & sent & the Board propose contracting for a large Number of them to supply the Want of Cartouch Boxes of which however as many as possible will be made. We could wish the Board of Ordinance at Camp had undertaken the Duty assigned them as they are on the Spot & will render great Assistance to this Board who will cordially cooperate with them for the Good of the Service. We have given Orders & sent a Pattern of a Cartouch Box to a Person in Connecticut for the making up a large Number of Acoutrements, besides which we have applied to the Governments of every State to establish Factories for Shoes & Acoutrements equal to the Demand from the Troops of their respective Quotas. The Board have stated to your Excellency the real Situation of Matters that you may be acquainted with every Expectation we have & favour us with any of your Thoughts on the Subject as we shall be happy to do everything to put our Affairs in the best Train possible. I have the Honour to be with great Respect your very obed. Humble Servant

Horatio Gates president

P.S. It appears by the Returns that (including those at Camp) there are one Million of Musket Cartridges already made & filled.


Title: From George Washington to Major General William Heath, 29 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Heath, William

Dear Sir,
Valley Forge 29th April 1778

Your two favors of the 6th & 13th Inst., have been duly received.
I am glad to hear that General Burgoyne is gone, & wish his departure

had been much earlier. At the time of his Capture he certainly must have entertained very favourable impressions of our force, & perhaps in point of good policy he should have been allowed to depart, before they were in the smallest degree done away, & before he could have obtained any accurate Ideas of our affairs. He must yet, in vindication of his conduct, speak largely of our Powers.
I received a quantity of Wax from Reading, which I presume, was what you sent.
The resignation of so many good Officers is a painful circumstance whether it proceeds from choice, or necessity. You must indulge Captain Sewal, taking care that his recruiting & regimental accounts are previously setled.
It is astonishing that Officers will, in direct violation of the resolution of Congress—my recruiting instructions and the most evident principles of policy, founded in experience, persevere in inlisting Deserters from the British Army. Supposing it might be done in any case, yet there is every possible objection to the measure in the instance of Deserters from General Burgoynes Army. These Troops did not originally come into our hands thr’o choice—they were conquered—brought to our possession by compulsion. Those apprehensions of punishment in case of return, which may operate on the minds of Deserters, they feel nothing of. So far from the most distant chance of punishment they will be applauded by the Commanders of the British Army, for their fidelity & attachment to their Prince, and their inlisting with us, will be considered as a high stroke of policy and the only probable mode they could adopt to effect their escape. We are counting on Men, who cannot be confided in, & who will embrace the earliest opportunity to leave us & strengthen the Enemy, at the expence of Arms—Cloaths & bounty on our part. But very few, if any of those who Deserted from General Burgoyne and who came on with the two detachments under Lieutenant Colo. Smith, now remain with him—they are gone. In like manner, a detachment from Colo. Henley, which Marched from Boston 60 strong arrived here two or three days ago with 13 Men only, & had it not been for a detachment of New Hampshire Troops, it is highly probable One of ’em would not have been seen. Thirty of the 60 are now in Easton Jail, having formed a plan at that place to go off in a body—the rest except 13 had escaped before. If we would wish to reinforce the Enemy with the whole of Mr Burgoynes Army, we cannot pursue a mode that will be more effectual or more certain, than to inlist it in our service; but it may be done with less injury by sending them the men—unarmed—without Cloaths & without paying ’em an exorbitant bounty.
If nothing else will restrain Officers from pursuing such a pernicious

—ruinous practice, they must be made to pay for all expences and losses occasioned by it. Indeed there is nothing that can compensate for the injury.
Colo. Heister, who was intended to be the object of the flag to Halifax, so far as the Board of War directed, is returned. He arrived at Philadelphia a few days ago, and was discharged.
You seem to be pressed hard for money. The price of articles has got to such a pitch, That it will be difficult to furnish the necessary supplies. I have transmitted an extract of your Letter to Congress upon this subject.
I would wish you to communicate to the General assembly, that part of this Letter which relates to the inlisting of Deserters. It is more than probable, Men under that description may be made up in the Quotas furnished by some of their Towns. I am Dr Sir With great regard your most Obet Servt

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Colonel Stephen Moylan, 29 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Moylan, Stephen

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Valley Forge 29th April 1778

I recd yours of the 21st instant. I am as much at a loss as you can possibly be how to procure Arms for the Cavalry; there are 107 Carbines in Camp, but no Swords or pistols of any consequence. Genl Knox informs me, that the 1100 Carbines, which came in to the Eastward, and were said to be fit for Horsemen, were only a lighter kind of Musket. I beleive Colo. Baylor and Bland have procured Swords from Hunters manufactory in Virginia, but I do not think it will be possible to get a sufficient number of pistols, except they are imported on purpose: I long ago urged to Congress the necessity of importing a large quantity of Horse accoutrements from France, but whether the order was ever given, or whether they have miscarried in the passage I do not know.

I suppose the Horses purchased by Governor Livingston’s order in Jersey will be immediately delivered to the different Regiments. Colo. Baylor and Bland will send on those purchased in Virginia without loss of time, and I am informed that a number are purchased and purchasing in this State. Necessity will oblige us to bring them into the feild very raw, as I look upon it too late to think of engaging the Connecticut Militia Horse, neither do I think the number you mention could be procured.
If the Enemy wait for Reinforcements, it will probably be a considerable time before the Campaign grows active and fatiguing, and if the Officers are attentive, great progress may be made in training while the duty is easy. I am Dear Sir Yr most obt Servt for his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

Tench Tilghman


Title: From George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 29 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Dear Sir
Head Quarters Valley ⟨Fo⟩rge 29th Apl 1778

I recd yours of the 18th instant, and am pleased to hear that your prospect of procuring Recruits and Draughts for the Army bore a more

favourable appearance than when you wrote before. I must beg you to forward on all those for the Regiments at this Camp as fast as possible.
I expect in a few days a general plan of operations for the Campaign will be settled; if one similar to that which you mention should be fixed upon, your assistance will still be wanting in Connecticut to arrange and forward the militia which we shall have occasion to draw from that state, and therefore wish you to continue there till you hear from me. I am Dear Sir Yrs &c.


Title: To George Washington from the Virginia Delegates, 29 April 1778
From: Virginia Delegates
To: Washington, George

Sir
York [Pa.] 29th april. 1778

In compliance with your letter in answer to ours respecting the Paymt of the Bounty to the re inlisted virginia Soldiers, we now send you thirty Thousand Dollars, by particular direction of the executive of our State, ordered into your Hands; it should however have been negotiated, in a less troublesome way to you, but the warrant was thro mistake made out in our Names. Eighty Dollars are sent by Mr Banister, for the use of a Soldier one Abner Howell, from his County, whom he has written to Col. Meade to find out. I am for myself & Colleagues with the highest Respect & Esteem yr Excellency’s mo. obedt & mo. hble Servant

J. Banister


Title: General Orders, 30 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters V. Forge Thursday April 30th 1778.
Watertown—Wenham. Winchester.


Title: From George Washington to George Clinton, 30 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, George

Dr Sir.
Valley Forge April 30th 1778

On monday I received your favor of the 22d Inst.
I should be extremely sorry if the incursions you apprehend, should

take place. From the defeats and disappointments the Indians met with the last campaign, when pushed on and supported by a formidable regular Army, we had reason to hope, that they would remain peaceable, at least for some time. However there is no reasoning with precision from the past to the future conduct of these people. Their own disposition to ravage, with the artifices of the Enemy, may possibly induce them to commit some outrages in order to alarm and divert a part of our force, from the points at which it will be materially wanted. I have not seen the Resolution which you mention, but I imagine Genl Gates, who is to command immediately the whole northern department, will dispose of the Troops acting there, in such way, as the exigency of affairs may seem most to require. Securing the north river is an object of the first magnitude & appears to be a principal one in the opinion of Congress, yet his instructions extend to the protection of the northern & Western frontiers of the State against any ravages that may be attempted. I expect him here in a Day or two, when I shall communicate to him your apprehensions. This proceeding may be placed to the account of our generosity but it certainly cannot to that of policy or our true interest. It appears to me, that no period in this contest had demanded our exertions equal to the present one. Upon every rational principle we should have, if possible, more than a respectable Army on foot. Britain is setting every engine to work against us. She means to try us by force & by fraud, and in proportion to our abilities in the field will be our success in resisting both. I am Dr Sir With great regard & esteem Your most Obet Servt

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 30 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

Dear Sir,
Valley-forge April 30th 1778

I thank you much for your obliging favor of the 27th.
I think with you, that a most important crisis is now at hand; & that there cannot be too much wisdom in all our Councils for conducting our affairs to a safe and happy issue. There should in my opinion be a full representation of the States in Congress, which I have often regretted

has not been the case for a long time past. I also concur with you in sentiment, that Gentlemen any where, whose abilities might be of essential service in case of treaty with the British Commissioners, ought to be called forth for the purpose. It will be a work of infinite importance & the result may lead to happiness or to misery. to freedom, or to slavery.
The enemy are determined to try us by force, & by fraud; and while they are exerting their utmost powers in the first instance, I do not doubt but they will employ men in the second, versed in the arts of dissimulation—of temporising, negotiating, genius’s.
It appears to me, that nothing short of Independance can possibly do—The injuries we have received from Britain can never be forgotten and a peace upon other terms would be the sourse of perpetual feuds and animosities. Besides, should Britain from her love of tyranny, and lawless domination attempt again to bend our necks to the yoke of slavery, and there is no doubt but she would, for her pride and ambition are unconquerable, no Nation would credit our professions, nor grant us aid at any rate. their favors would be obtained upon the most disadvantageous, & dishonorable terms.
I sincerely wish the provision for Officers so long the subject of discussion, was established. It is certainly equitable, & in my opinion essential. Day after day, and hour after hour produces resignations; if they were confined to bad officers ⟨o⟩r to those of little or no character, they would be of little or no consequence. But it is painful to see men who are of a different cast—who have rendered great Services to their Country, & who are still, and may be most materially wanted, leaving the Army on acct of the distresses of their family, and to repair their circumstances which have been much injured by their zeal in the part they have taken in the defence of common Rights; the provision if adopted, would not produce present relief—nor a present expence—yet it would be a compensation in future for their misfortunes and their toils. and be some support to their injured constitutions. I will be done, after observing if the measure is to be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States for their concurrance, that the delay, supposing it should be assented to, will, I fear, be attended with effects that will be only regretted when too late—But the chance in such case will be rather against the adoption; for there are but few of the Legislatures who are impressed, or who can without difficulty be fully informed of the real state of things; and while this matter is held in suspence everything is at a stand, and the most fa⟨tal⟩ consequences may result from ⟨it⟩ I do not to this hour kno⟨w whether⟩ (putting half pay out of ⟨the questi⟩on) the old or new establi⟨shments of⟩ the Regiments is to take place—how to dispose of the Officers in consequence. whether the instituting of the several other Corps, as agreed to by the Comee, & referred

by them to Congress, is adopted or not—in a word, I have no ground to form ⟨a⟩ single arrangement upon; nor do I know whether the augmentation of the Cavalry is to take place, or was rejected, in order that I may govern myself thereby; equally unable am I to answer the incessant applications of the Officers of the Pensylvania, & additional Battalions, who knowing the intended reduction of some of those Corps, are held in suspence, unable what part to act—In short, our present situation (now the first of May) is beyond description irksome and dangerous—But, I will trouble you no further than to assure you that, I am Dr Sir with great regard Yr Obedt & Obligd Hbe Se⟨rvt⟩

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 30 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Laurens, Henry

Sir
Head Quarters [Valley Forge] 30th April 1778.

The extensive ill consequences arising from a want of uniformity in discipline and manœuvres throughout the Army—have long occasioned me to wish for the establishment of a well organised inspectorship, and the concurrence of Congress in the same views has induced me to set on foot a temporary institution, which from the success that has hitherto attended it, gives me the most flattering expectations, and will I hope obtain their approbation.
Baron de Steubens length of service in the first military School in Europe, and his former rank pointed him out as a person peculiarly qualified to be at the head of this department; this appeared the least exceptionable way of introducing him into the army and one that would give him the most ready opportunity of displaying his talents—I therefore proposed to him to undertake the office of Inspector General

which he agreed to with the greatest chearfulness, and has performed the duties of it with a zeal and intelligence equal to our wishes—he has two ranks of Inspectors under him, the lowest are officers charged with the inspection of brigades, with the title of brigade-inspectors—the others superintend several of these—they have written instructions relative to their several functions—and the manœuvres which they are to practice are illustrated by a company which the Baron has taken the pains to train himself.
The Brigade-Inspectors were chosen by the Brigadier and commanding Officers of Regiments in each brigade—The Inspectors are Lt Colonels Barber of Jersey, Brooks of Massachusets—Davis of Virginia and Mr Ternant a french gentleman—the reason for employing him apart his intrinsic merit and abilities, was his possessing the french and english languages equally, which made him a necessary assistant to the Baron de Steuben—he is content to serve without rank, until after an experiment of his abilities, Congress shall determine what he is entitled to.
Upon the arrival of Lt Colonel Fleury in camp, as he was unemployed, and had exercised the office of Aid-Major in France, the Baron proposed to have him employed as an Inspector in which I readily acquiesced, as Congress had given him the rank and pay of Lieut. Colonel—there may be other foreign Officers in continental pay, idle for want of being attached to some corps, of whose services we might avail ourselves in this way—which is the only method of disposing of them, unless they could be formed into a distinct corps.
From the extraordinary fatigue and close attention required of the Officers employed in the inspectorship—I did not think it amiss to let them entertain hopes that Congress would allow some addition to the pay which they derive from their rank; and I take the liberty of recommending the measure—I would propose twenty dollars per month for the brigade-inspectors, and thirty for the inspectors, in addition to their pay in the line.
I should do injustice if I were to be longer silent with regard to the merits of the baron de Steuben, his knowledge of his profession added to the zeal which he has discovered since he began upon the functions of his office, lead me to consider him as an acquisition to the service and to recommend him to the attention of Congress—his expectations with regard to rank extend to that of Major General—his finances he ingenuously confesses will not admit of his serving without the incident emoluments—and Congress I presume from his Character and their own knowledge of him, will without difficulty gratify him in these particulars.
The Baron is sensible that our situation requires a few variations in

the duties of his office, from the general practice in Europe, and particularly that they must necessarily be more comprehensive—in which as well as in his instructions he has skilfully yielded to circumstances.
The Success which has hitherto attended the plan, enables me to request with confidence the ratification of Congress, and is I think a pledge of the establishment of a well combined general System, which insurmountable obstacles have hitherto opposed. I have the honor to be with great respect Sir Your most obedt Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 30 April 1778
From: Laurens, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
York Town 30th April 1778

I had the honor of writing to Your Excellency the day before yesterday by Sharp.
This bearer is dispatched by special order of Congress to return with the bundle of Papers, sent to Head Quarters some time ago by the Committee appointed to collect Evidence &ca on the loss of Tyconderoga & Mount Independence which Your Excellency will be pleased to deliver to him. I have the honor to be With the highest Respect & Esteem Sir Your Excellency’s Obedient & most humble servant

Henry Laurens, President of Congress.


Title: From George Washington to Pierre Penet, 30 April 1778
From: Washington, George
To: Penet, Pierre

Sir,
Valley Forge, in Pensylvania April 30th 1778

I received, not long since, your polite & obliging favor of the 12th of November last, accompanied by your agreeable presents to Mrs Washington and myself, for which we beg you will accept our acknowledgements. It will I am perswaded enhance the pleasure you feel on the occasion to be informed, that the extra shoulder and sword knots are destined for Generals Arnold and Lincoln; Gentlemen, who were wounded, while rendering very distinguished services, in the last actions, between the Northern army and General Burgoyne’s troops.
With my sincere thanks for your polite expressions of regard to me, and wishes for the speedy and prosperous termination of the war in which we are engaged—and with assurances of real esteem—I have the honor to be Sir Your most Obedt Servt.