Title: The Defence No. XXV, [18 November 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, November 18, 1795]

It will be useful, as it will simplify the Examination of the commercial articles of the Treaty, to bear in mind and preserve the Division that we find established by the 12. 13. & the 14. & 15. articles. Each respects a particular Branch or portion of the trade between the two Countries, the regulations whereof, differ from, and are severally independent of each other. Thus one is relative to the west Indies, another to the east Indies, and the third distinct from both the former respects our Trade with the british Dominions in Europe.
That Great Britain will consent to place our Trade with her west India Colonies, upon an equally advantageous footing with her own, is improbable. This would be doing what none of the great colonizing Nations has done, or is likely to do. It would be to relinquish the principal ends of the Establishment, and Defence, of her Colonies—it would be equivalent to making her Islands in the west Indies, the common Property of Great Britain & america for all commercial, & profitable, purposes; and exclusively her own, in the Burthen of Support & Defence.
The Senate have however, & I think wisely, considered the Terms and Conditions on which it is agreed by the XII article that we should participate in the Trade to the British west Indies as less liberal than we may with reason expect. The exclusion of all vessels above the Burthen of Seventy Tons, would diminish the Benifits, and value, of this Trade; and tho we cannot calculate upon obtaining, by future negotiation, a total removal of a Limitation on this Subject, it is altogether improbable that a Tonnage something larger may be procured.
Those who are conversant with our present intercourse with the west Indies can best determine, whether many Vessels under Seventy Tons Burthen are not at this Time profitably employed in that Trade: It is believed to be true, that previous to our Independence, Vessels of this Burthen were much engaged in this Employ, as well in the southern, as in the eastern, States.
This Limitation tho’ disadvantageous, is not the strongest Objection to the XII Article; the Restraining, or regulating of a Portion of our Trade, which does not proceed from, and is independent of the Treaty, forms a more decisive Reason against the article, than any thing else that it contains.
The cause of this Restraint is found in that commercial Jealousy, and Spirit of monopoly, which have so long reigned over the Trade of the Colonies. Under [our Treaty with France &] the french colonial Laws, it has been shewn, that we could not procure from the french Islands, Sugar, Coffee, Cocoa, Cotton, or any of their other Productions, Melasses and Rum excepted—Great Britain has seen it, to be compatible with her Interests, to admit us to share more extensively in the Productions of her Islands; but she has desired to place limitations on this Intercourse—to have left it entirely open & free, would have been [to have enabled us not only to supply ourselves by means of our own navigation, but to have made it an instrument of the supply of other Nations with her West Indian productions.]
When we reflect upon the established maxims of the colony System, and moreover when we consider that an entire Freedom of Trade with the British west Indies, might at Times materially raise the Price of west India productions on the British consumers, the supply of whom is essentially a monopoly in the Hands of the British Planters; we shall be the less inclined to believe, that Great Britain will yield an unrestrained commerce with her West India possessions to any nation whatever.
But if this was the Object of the Restraint, it may be asked why it was not confined to such enumerated articles as were of the Growth or Production of her own Islands; instead of being so extended, as to comprehend, all molasses, Sugar, Coffee, Cocoa, & Cotton, including even the Cotton of the growth of our own Country. It is very possible that the Circumstance of our native Cotton’s becoming an article of Export to foreign Markets might not have occured to our negotiator. This would be the less extraordinary, as heretofore it has not been cultivated except in a [very] limited degree, and as an article of export rather, in the manner of Experiment than otherwise, and as moreover, from the Expence and Difficulty of separating the Seeds from the Cotton, we have been [hardly] able hitherto, to class Cotton among our Exports. It’s cultivation is said latterly to have become an object of attention in Georgia, & South Carolina—still however it cannot yet be considered as a staple commodity. But from the recent Invention of an ingenious, & simple, Machine, for ginning Cotton, It is hoped that the cultivation may be extended, so that not only our own Domestic manufactures may be relieved from a Dependence on foreign Supply, but the catalogue of our valuable Exports inriched by the addition of this inestimable production.
In answer to the Question that has been stated, it may be further observed, that these enumerated articles, though the production of different Territories [being] so much alike, as not easily to be distinguished, It is probable that the Difficulty in discriminating the productions of the British Islands, from those of a different Growth, was supposed to be so great, that an apprehension was entertained that the prohibition to reexport the former would be easily evaded, and illusory, while the latter remained free.
This apprehension however, it is believed, [was carried too far,] as on a minute examination of the subject it will be found, that our Laws relative to Drawbacks [with a few analogous provisions in addition] can be made sufficiently to discriminate, and identify [on reexportation,] all such articles of the Growth of the British Islands as may be within our Country, and that they will afford the same security, for a faithful, and exact, execution of the prohibition to reexport such articles, as that on which our own Government relies against Frauds upon the Revenue. [The application of these laws with the requisite additions and sanctions may be secured by a precise stipulation for that purpose in the Treaty in such manner as would afford an adequate guard against material evasions.]
But though the conduct of the Senate in with-holding their assent to this article, is conceived to have been upon the whole well judged and wise, yet there were not wanting reasons of real weight to induce our negotiator to agree to it as it stands.
The inviolability of the principles of the navigation act had become a kind of axiom incorporated in the habits of thinking of the British government and nation. Precedent, it is known, has great influence as well upon the councils as upon the popular opinions of nations!—and there is perhaps no country in which it has greater force than that of Great Britain. The precedent of a serious and unequivocal innovation upon the system of the navigation act dissolved as it were the spell, by which the Public prejudices had been chained to it. It took away a mighty argument derived from the past inflexibility of the system, and laid the foundation for greater inroads upon opinion for further and greater innovations in practice. It served to strip the question of every thing that was artificial and to bring it to the simple test of real national interest, to be decided by that best of all arbiters, experience.
It may upon this ground be strongly argued that the precedent of the privilege gained was of more importance than its immediate extent—an argument certainly of real weight and which is sufficient to incline candid men to view the motives that governed our negotiator in this particular, with favor, and the opinion to which he yielded with respect. It is perhaps not unimportant, by way of precedent that the article, tho’ not established, is found in the treaty.
Though the XII. article so far as respects the Terms and conditions of the Trade to the British Islands forms no part of the Treaty, having been excepted, and made the Subject of further negotiation, it may nevertheless be useful to take notice of some of the many ill founded Objections that have been made against it. Of this character is that which asserts that the Catalogue of articles permitted to be carried by us to the British Islands, may be abridged, at the pleasure of Great Britain, and so the trade may be annihilated.
The article stipulates that we may carry to any of his majesty’s Islands and Ports in the west Indies from the United States in american vessels not exceeding Seventy Tons, any Goods or merchandizes, “being of the Growth manufacture or Production of the said States, which it is, Or may be, lawful to carry to the said Islands from the said States in british Vessels”—not all such articles as it is, & May be, lawful to carry; but in the disjunctive, all such as it is, or may be lawful to carry; in other words, all such articles as it is now lawful to carry, together with such others, as hereafter it may be lawful to carry: the Catalogue may be enlarged, but cannot be diminished. [It may also be remarked incidentally that this objection sounds ill in the mouths of those who maintain the essentiality of the supplies of this Country under all possible circumstances to the British West Indies; for if this position be true there never can be reasonable ground of apprehension of too little latitude in the exportation in British vessels, which is to be the standard for the exportation in ours.]
The article has been further criticised, on account of the adjustment of the impost and tonnage Duties payable in this Trade, and it has been attempted to be shewn that the Footing, on which we were to share in the same, would on this account be disadvantageous and the competition unequal. What is this adjustment? The Article proposed that British vessels employed in this Trade shall pay on entering our Ports the alien Tonnage Duty payable by all foreign Vessels, which is now Fifty Cents per Ton; further, the Cargoes imported in british Bottoms from the british west Indies shall pay in our Ports the same impost, or Duties, that shall be payable on the like articles imported in american Bottoms; and on the other Side, that Cargoes imported into the British Islands in american Bottoms shall pay the same impost or Duties that shall be payable on the like articles imported in British Bottoms—that is to say the Cargoes of Each, shall pay in the Ports of the other, only native Duties, it being understood that those imposed in the british west Indies on our Productions are small and unimportant, while those imposed in our Ports on the productions of the west Indies are high, and important to our Revenue. The vessels of each shall pay in the ports of the other, an equal alien Tonnage Duty and our Standard is adopted as the common Rule.
Is not this equal? Can we expect, or ask, that british vessels should pay an alien Tonnage Duty in our ports, and that american vessels should enter their ports freely, or on payment only of native Tonnage Duties? can we in equity require them to pay on the importation of their Cargoes in British Vessels, an addition of ten per Cent on the Duties payable on the importation of the like articles in american Vessels, and at the same Time, demand to pay no higher or other Duties on the Cargoes carried in our Vessels to the British Islands, than those payable by them on the like articles imported in British Vessels? The very stating of the Question suggests to a candid mind, an answer that demonstrates the injustice of the Objection. [To expect more were to expect that in a Trade in which the opinions and practices of Europe contemplate every privilege granted to a foreign nation as a favour—we were by Treaty to secure a greater advantage to ourselves, than would be enjoyed by the Nation which granted the privilege.] But it is added that our Laws impose a Tonnage Duty of six Cents per Ton on the entry of american vessels engaged in foreign Trade, and it is not known that british Vessels pay any Tonnage Duty on their Entry in their Ports in the West-Indies, and so uniting the two entries, that is the entry in the west Indies and the entry on a return to our Ports, an american vessel will pay Fifty Six Cents per Ton, when the British vessel will pay only Fifty Cents per Ton. If the British Government impose no tonnage Duty on their own Vessels, and we do impose a Tonnage Duty on ours, this certainly cannot form an Objection against them. They are as free to abstain from the imposition of a Tonnage Duty on their own Ships, as we are to impose one on ours. If their policy is wiser than ours in this respect, we are at liberty to adopt it by repealing the Tonnage Duty levied on american navigation [which if we please may be confined to the particular case;] the effect of such a measure [as far as it should extend] tho the Duty is small, would be to add a proportional advantage to our Shipping in foreign competition. But the object of the Article in this particular, is to equalize not the Duties that each may choose to impose on their own Vessels, but those that they shall impose on the Vessels of each other; and in this Respect the Article is perfectly equal. [It is perhaps the first time that the question of inequality was founded on a circumstance depending on the laws of the party affected by it and removeable at his own option.]
This view of the Subject authorises a Belief that in the revision of the article, a modification of it may be agreed [to], that will prove satisfactory. Indeed from the short duration of the article taken in connexion with the Expressions made use of towards the close of it, relative to the renewal of the Negotiation for the purpose of such further Arrangements as shall conduce to the mutual advantage, and Extension, of this Branch of commerce, we may infer that Great Britain contemplates a more enlarged, and equal adjustment on this Point.
The Relaxations which now exist in the colonial Systems, in consequence of the necessities of the War, and which will change to our Disadvantage, with the return of Peace, have been considered by some as the permanent State of things. And this Error has had its influence in misleading the public in respect to the Terms & Conditions in which we may reasonably expect to participate in the Trade to the British west Indies. But let it be remembered that the Restoration of Peace will bring with it a Restoration of the Laws of limitation, & Exclusion, which constitute the colonial System. Our Efforts therefore should be directed to such an adjustment with Great Britain on this Point, as will secure to us, a Right, after the return of Peace, to the greatest attainable Portion of the Trade to her Islands in the west Indies.
It has been alledged should the expected modification of this article retain its present stipulation on the subject of Impost & Tonnage Duty, that as France by Treaty may claim to enjoy the Rights & privileges of the most favoured nation, she would demand an exemption from the ten per Cent on the Duties [upon] the productions of the west Indies imported in foreign Bottoms, and would moreover be free to impose an alien Tonnage on our Vessels entering their Ports in the West Indies, equal to that imposed on her Vessels in our Ports. This is true, but in order to make this Demand, France must agree by Treaty to open all her Ports in the west Indies, to give us a Right to import into them Flour, Bread, Tobacco, and such other articles as Great Britain shall permit, and which France prohibits; she must also concede to us a Right to purchase in her Islands, and bring away Sugar, Coffee, & Pimento, which by her permanent System she prohibits. [She must do all this because by our Treaty with her she can only intitle herself to a special privilege granted to another Nation by granting on her part to us, the equivalent of what was the consideration of our Grant.] Should France be inclined, so to arrange the Trade between us and her Islands, we certainly shall not object; because, [besides the right,] such an arrangement would be more advantageous to us, than that, which now regulates our intercourse with her west Indies.
So much of the twelfth article as respects its duration, and the renewal of the negotiation, previous to the expiration of two years after the conclusion of the war, in order to agree in a new arrangement on the subject of the west Indies Trade, as well as for the Purpose of endeavouring to agree whether in any, and in what Cases, neutral Vessels shall protect Enemy Property, and in what cases Provisions and other articles not generally contraband may become such, form a part of the Treaty as ratified by the President. These Clauses sufficiently explain themselves, and require no comment in this Place. They however prove one point, which is, that after every Effort on the Part of our Negotiator the Parties were not able to agree in the Doctrine that free Bottoms should make free Goods, nor in the Cases in which alone Provisions and other Articles not generally contraband should be deemed such—leaving therefore both these Points, precisely as they found them (except in respect to provisions, the payment for which, when by the law of Nations liable to capture & used as contraband is secured) to be regulated by the existing Law of Nations, it is stipulated to renew the Negotiation on these Points, at the Epoch assigned for the future adjustment of the west India Trade, in order then to endeavour to agree in a conventional Rule, which, instead of the Law of Nations, should thereafter regulate the conduct of the Parties in these Respects.
[The 11th Article has been passed over in silence as being merely introductory & formal.

Camillus]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 18 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir,
Philadelphia 18th. Novr. 1795

Having no doubt that the petition contained in the enclosed Gazette, will make its appearance in the Virginia Assembly; and nearly as little of its favourable reception in that body, I resolved to give you the perusal of it, at this moment.

But my principal view in writing to you now, is, to request that you would desire young Fayette and his Tutor to proceed to this place without delay; having resolved, unless some powerful reasons can be suggested to the contrary, to take them at once into my family.
The young gentleman must have experienced some unpleasant feelings already from being kept at a distance from me, and I feel as unpleasantly as he can do, from the same cause.
Very sincerely & affectionately   I am Yours

Go: Washington
Colo. Hamilton.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, 20 November 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

My Dear Sir
New York November 20. 1795

I duly received your letter of the 17th. which needed no apology as it will always give me pleasure to comply with any wish of yours connected with the public service, or your personal satisfaction.
Good men, in the idea of your appointment to the office of Secretary of State, will find many consolations for your removal from one in which your usefulness was well understood.
I wish it was easy to replace you in the department you will leave. But this is a most difficult point.
I consider it as absolutely necessary that the person shall come from some State South of Pensylvania. All the great offices in the hands of men from Pensylvania Northward would do the lord knows what mischief. I speak as to public opinion. Hence I forbear any remarks on Characters from that quarter.
Of those South, notwithstanding there are real and weighty objections, I incline on the whole to Lee.
Of the others whom you present (and none others have occured to me) whose qualifications are known to me, I believe I should prefer Howard.
Yet I speak with hesitation, for I am afraid he is not enough a man of sense or business. But he is of perfect worth is respectable in the community and has reputation as a soldier.
There are others who would stand better as to Talents, but temper or fairness of character is wanting. I do not known enough of Winder.
Since writing the above Judge Pendleton of Georgia has occurred to me. He was a military man—Aide to General Greene & esteemed by him. He is certainly a man of handsome abilities. I have however within a few days heared that he had some agency in the purchase of the Georgia lands. If he has had any interested concern in this transaction it would be an immense objection. Otherwise, if he would accept, all things considered I should prefer him. He is tinctured with Jeffersonian Politics but I should be mistaken, if among good men & better informed, he did not go right.
I have received the French copy of a certain paper & thank you for it. The translation you mention has not yet come to hand. I will with pleasure revise & if requisite correct it. I even wish for the opportunity; for as you say, it much concerns me, & it is also very important to the public & there are many nice turns of expression, which to be rendered perfectly demand a very critical knowledge of the language.
Yrs. with true esteem & regard

A Hamilton
Timothy Pickering Esq


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 23 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir,
Philadelphia 23d Novr 1795.

Enclosed are letters for Mr. de la Fayette, and his Tutor. I leave them open for your perusal; and notwithstanding the request in my letter of the 18th. I shall cheerfully acquiesce in any measures respecting them which you (and others with whom you may be disposed to consult) may deem most eligible.
As there can be no doubt, that the feelings of both are alive to every thing which may have the semblance of neglect or slight, and indeed, expectant as they must have been (without adverting perhaps to the impediments) of an invitation to fly to me without delay—and distressing & forlorn as the situation of one of them is—It is necessary that every assurance & consolation should be administered to them. For these reasons I pray you to send my letters to them by Express, the expence of which I will repay with thankfulness.
The doubt which you have expressed of the propriety of an open and avowed conduct in me towards the son of Mr. de la Fayette, and the subject it might afford to malignancy to misinterpret the cause, has so much weight that I am distrustful of my own judgment in deciding on this business lest my feelings should carry me further [than] prudence (while I am a public character) will warrant. It has, however, like many other things in which I have been involved—two edges, neither of which can be avoided without falling on the other. On one side, I may be charged with countenancing those who have been denounced the enemies of France; on the other with not countenancing the Son of a man who is dear to America.
When I wrote to you last I had resolved to take both the Pupil & Tutor into my own family, supposing it would be most agreeable to the young gentleman, & congenial with friendship—at the sametime that it would have given me more command over him—been more convenient & less expensive to myself than to board them out. But now, as I have intimated before, I confide the matter entirely to your decision, after seeing, & conversing with them.

Mr. Adet has been indirectly sounded on the coming over of the family of Fayette generally, but not as to the exact point—his answer was, that as France did not make war upon women & children he did not suppose that their emigration could excite any notice. The case however, might be different, if one of them (with his Tutor, whose character, conduct & principles may, for ought I know to the contrary, be very obnoxious) was brought into my family, & of course, into the company that visited it. But as all these things will be taken into consideration by you I shall not dwell upon them, and only add that
With esteem, regard & sincere Affn.   I am ever yours

Go: Washington

PS. I have no doubt but that young Fayette and his Tutor might be boarded at German Town or in the vicinity of this City, and would be at hand to receive assistance & advice as occasion might require although he might not be a resident under my roof.

Colo. Hamilton.


Title: [The Defence No. XXVI], [25 November 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, November 25, 1795]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 26 November 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Sir
New York November 261795

Since my last, La Fayette & his tutor have been here. I conversed with them concerning a future destination, as by way of consultation, without proposing any thing, and in a way best calculated to sooth. But I found that the idea of not being permitted to see you is very painful to them—though they both profess submission to whatever may be your decision & behave modestly. The declaration, however, was not unaccompanied by remarks that witnessed the chagrin produced.
Yesterday they were to dine with me at a Friends house. They came in, while I was out, & left word that they had just received some interesting letters, among them one for a friend in the Country, which they must carry him and would be absent till early in the ensuing week. I was sorry for this, but I presume it means nothing more than is declared.
Seeing the impression made on them, I took occasion to converse with General Knox, now here, on the subject, who is very firm in a similar opinion with the other Gentlemen I mentioned to you. This coincidence of so many judicious opinions cannot but increase a distrust of contrary impressions. And yet there are possible consequences of a very unpleasant sort on the other side.
The wish of the two Young Men appears to go only to one interview with you & then to any destination you may prescribe—but even this is thought by other Gentlemen consulted inexpedient.
They both seem averse to any connection with a public seminary. In this idea I see no place where they would be more comfortable or better than Hartford under the good offices & attentions of Wadsworth.
Very respectfully & Affecty I have the honor to be Sir   Your obed serv

A Hamilton
The President of The U States


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 28 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir,
Philadelphia 28th. Nov. 1795

If indisposition, or business of a pressing nature, should have prevented your looking into, and making a digest of the papers I sent you on the 16th. Inst I pray you to return them to me by the first Post after this letter is received.
The meeting of Congress is near at hand and there is good reason to expect a punctual attendance of the members. I should be extremely unwilling therefore to be unprepared for this event; and shall endeavor to work the materials (no copy of which I have by me) into the best form I am able so soon as I get them, if it is yet to do.
You omitted in your last, to enclose the letters of Mr. Fayette, his tutor and Mr. Cabot, to me, and the copy of mine to the latter. I beg they may accompany the other papers.
I am always & Affectionately   Yours

Go: Washington
Colo. Hamilton

PS. I had written the foregoing letter, to go by young Mr. Jay, this morning, but he having postponed his journey, I now add, that your letter of the 26th. came to me by the Mail of to day, without the papers, or any mention thereof; which (as I requested, if you could possibly make it convenient, to let me have them by the 24th.) has given me a good deal of alarm, lest they should have been entrusted to a private hand who may be dilatory or may have met with some other mischance on the way.
Did my letter to young Fayette (under cover to you) get to hand in time to be presented to him, at the interview you had with him? My desire of seeing, and assuring him from my own mouth, of my fixed determination to be his friend & supporter, is such, that I hardly know how to reconcile to my feeling, the denial of permitting him to come hither for a few moments to receive it. But supposing that whatsoever you decide on will be for the best, I shall acquiesce therein.
Yrs.
G:W


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 28 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, November 28, 1795. Second letter of November 28 not found.]


Title: Draft of George Washington’s Seventh Annual Address to Congress, [28 November–7 December 1795]
From: Hamilton, Alexander,Washington, George
To:

[New York, November 28–December 7, 1795]

I trust, I do not deceive myself, while I indulge the persuasion, that I have never met you at any period, when more than at the present, the situa⟨tion⟩ of our public affairs has afforded just cause for mutual congratulation and for inviting you to join with me in profound gratitude to the Author of all Good for the numerous and signal blessings we enjoy.
The Termination of the long expensive and distressing war, in which we have been engaged with certain Indians N W of the Ohio is placed in the option of the U States by a Treaty which the Com of our army has provisionally conclu⟨ded⟩ with twelve of the most powerful of the hostile tribes in that Region. In the adjustment of t⟨he⟩ terms, the satisfaction of the Indians was deemed an object worthy no less of the policy than of the liberality of the U States, as the necessary basis of permanent tranquillity. This object it is believed has been fully attained. The articles agreed upon will be immediately laid before the Senate for their advice and consent.
The Creek & Cherokee Indians who alone of the Southern Tribes had annoyed our frontier have lately confirmed their preexisting Treaties with us, and were giving unequivocal evidence of a sincere disposition to carry them into effect; by the surrender of the prisoners and property they had taken. But we have to lament that the fair prospect in this quarter has been momentarily clouded by wanton murders which some citizens of Georgia have perpetrated on hunting parties of the Creeks, which have again involved that frontier in disquietude and danger which ⟨w⟩ill be productive of ⟨f⟩urther expence & is ⟨l⟩ikely to occasion ⟨so⟩me ⟨ef⟩fusion of blood. ⟨M⟩easures are in ⟨tr⟩ain to obviate or ⟨m⟩itigate the conse⟨qu⟩ences, and with ⟨th⟩e reliance of being ⟨ab⟩le at least to ⟨pr⟩event general hostility.
A letter from The Emperor of Morrocco announces to me the renewal of our Treaty and consequently the restoration of peace with that Power. But the instrument for this purpose, which was to pass through the hands of our Minister Resident at Lisbon, who was temporarily absent on business of importance, is not yet received. It is with peculiar satisfaction I can add to this intelligence that an Agent deputed on our part to Algiers communicating that the preliminaries of a Treaty with the Regency of that Country had been settled, and that he had no doubt of completing the business of his mission; comprehending the Redemption of our unfortunate fellow Citizens from a grievous captivity.
The last advices from Our Envoy to the Court of Madrid give moreover the pleasing information, that he had received positive assurances of a speedy and satisfactory conclusion of his negotiation. While the Event, depending on unadjusted particulars, cannot be regarded as ascertained, it is agreeable to cherish the expectation of an issue, which securing amicably very important interests of the U States, will at the same time establish the foundation of durable harmony with a power whose friendship we have so uniformly and so sincerely endeavoured to cultivate.
Though not before officially disclosed to the House of Representatives, You are all apprised, that a Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation has been negotiated with Great Britain, and that the Senate by the voice of two thirds have advised and consented to its ratification, upon a condition which excepts part of one Article. Agreeably to this advice and consent and to the best judgment I was able to form of the public interest, after full and mature deliberation—I have added my sanction. The result on the part of His Britannic Majesty is unknown. When received, the subject will without delay be placed before Congress.
This interesting summary of affairs with regard to the foreign Powers between whom & the U S controversies have subsisted and with regard also to those of our Indian Neighbours with whom we have been in a state of enmity or misunderstanding opens a wide field for consoling and gratifying reflections. If by prudence and moderation on every side, the extinguishment of all the causes of external discord which have heretofore menaced our tranquillity, on terms consistent with our national rights and honor, Shall be the happy result—how firm and how precious a foundation will have been laid for establishing accelerating and maturing the prosperity of our Country!
Contemplating the situation of the UStates in their internal as well as external relations, we find equal cause for contentment and satisfaction. While the greater part of the nations of Europe with their American dependencies have been and several of them continue to be involved in a contest unusually bloody exhausting and calamitous—in which the ordinary evils of foreign war are aggravated by domestic convulsion riot and insurrection—in which many of the arts most useful to society are exposed to decay or exile, and in which scarcity of subsistence embitters other suffering while even the anticipations of the blessings of peace and repose are alloyed by the sense of heavy and accumulating burthens which press upon all the departments of Industry and threaten to clog the future springs of Governt—Our favoured country happy in a striking contrast enjoys universal peace a peace the more satisfactory because preserved at the expence of no duty. Fait[h]ful to ourselves, we have not been unmindful ⟨of⟩ any obligation to others. Our agriculture our commerce and our manufactures prosper beyond former example (the occasional depredations upon our Trade however detrimental to individuals being greatly overballanced by the aggregate benefits derived to it from a neutral position). Our population advances with a celerity which exceeds the most sanguine calculations augmenting fast our strength and resources and guaranteeing more and more our national security. Every part of the Union display indications of rapid and various Improvement. With burthens so light as scarcely to be perceived with resources more than adequate to our present exigencies—with a mild constitution and wholesome laws—is it too much to say that our Country affords a spectacle of national happiness never surpassed if ever before equalled in the annals of human affairs?
Placed by a Providence in a situation so auspicious motives the most sacred & commanding admonish us with sincere gratitude to heaven and pure love of our country to unite our efforts to preserve prolong and improve the immense advantages of our condition. To cooperate with you in this most interesting work as may depend on me, is the dearest wish of my heart.
Fellow Citizens—Amongst the objects which will claim your attention in the course of the session a review of our military establishment will not be the least important. It is called for by the events which have changed and are likely still further to change the relative situation of our Interior frontier. In this review you will no doubt allow due weight to the consideration that the questions between us and certain foreign powers are not yet finally adjusted—that the War in Europe is not yet terminated and that the evacuation of our Western posts when it shall happen will demand a provision for garrisoning and securing them. You will consider the subject with a comprehensiveness equal to the extent & variety of its relations. The Secretary at War will be directed to lay before Congress The present state of the ⟨m⟩ilitary force, ⟨inc⟩luding the terms of service, to⟨ge⟩ther with that ⟨of⟩ the fortification ⟨of⟩ our harbours.
With the review of our army is naturally connected that of our Militia establishment. It will merit inquiry what imperfections in the existing plan experience may have unfolded, what improvements will comport with the progress of public opinion. The subject is of so much magnitude in my estimation as to beg a constant solicitude that the consideration of it may be renewed till the greatest attainable degree of perfection is accomplished. Time, while it may furnish others is wearing away some advantages for forwarding the object. None better deserves the presevering attention of our public councils.
In contemplating the actual condition of our Western borders, the pleasure, which it is calculated to afford ought not to cause us to lose sight of a truth to the confirmation of which every days experience contributes (viz)—that the provisions heretofore made are inadequate to protect the Indians from the violences of the irregular and lawless part of the frontier inhabitants—and that without some more effectual plan, for restraining the murthers of those people by bringing the murderers to condign punishment, all the exertions of the government to prevent or repress the outrages of the Indians and to preserve peace with them must prove fruitless—all our present agreeable prospects fugitive and illusory. The frequent distruction of innocent women and children, chiefly the victims of retaliation, must continue to shock humanity; while an expence truly enormous will drain the treasure of the Union.

To enforce the observance of Justice upon the Indians, tis indispensable there should be competent means of rendering justice to them. If to these means could be added a provision to facilitate the supply of the articles they want on reasonable terms (a measure the mention of which I the more readily repeat as in all the conferences with them they urge it with solicitude) I should not hesitate to entertain a strong hope of permanent good understanding with them. It is agreeable to add that even the probability of their civilization by perseverance in a proper plan has not been diminished by the experiments thus far made. G of the H of Representatives:
The state of the Revenue in its several relations with the sums which [have] been borrowed and reimbursed pursuant to different acts of Congress will be submitted by the proper Officer: together with an estimate of the appropriations necessary to be made for the current service of the ensuing year. Reports from the late & present Director of the Mint (which I shall also cause to be laid before you) will shew the situation & progress of that institution and the necessity of some further legislative provisions for carrying the business of it more completely into execution and for checking abuses which appear to be arising in particular quarters.
Whether measures may not be adviseable to reinforce the provision for the Redemption of the public Debt will not fail, I am sure, to engage your attention. In this examination the question will naturally occur whether the present be not a favourable juncture for the disposal of the vacant lands of the UStates N W of the Ohio. Congress have demonstrated their sense to be and it were superfluous to repeat mine—that whatever will tend to accelerate the honorable extinguishment of our public Debt will accord as much with the true interest of our country as with the general sense of our Constituents.
Gentlemen &c
The progress in providing materials for the frigates, & in building them; the state of the fortification of our harbours—the measures which have been pursued for obtaining proper sites for Arsenals and for furnishing our Magazines with military stores—and the steps which have been taken in execution of the law for opening a Trade with the Indians will also be presented for the information of Congress.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from James Butler, 1 December 1795
From: Butler, James
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Sir,
Alexandria [Virginia] 1st. Xbr. 1795

(Tho’ I have not the honour of your acquaintance) I shall take the liberty of addressing you, to inform you of the real pleasure & satisfaction it gives me to read your Explanation in favour of the Ilustrious President. And to inform you of Some of his Charitable donations—I mean What came Within my knowledge, which I am Sure are but trifling if compar’d With the imense Charities he bestows, that none besides himself, & the many Objects that receive them, know’s.
He pays £ 50⅌ annum for the Tuition of twenty Orphans at the Accademy in Alexandria, if any of his Overseers die he will give the Widows A house & garden & grass for their Cows &c—if any of his Domestics or Slaves get Sick he Will Visit ’em, & Send for a doter if requisite; his house is always open for travellers & strangers & Will give them money to support them to their journey’s End. I livd with him as Overseer for two years; three months of which I was confin’d to my bed, & room, With a Violent feavr Not able to render him the Smallest Service. (Notwithstanding) he paid my Salary in full; & paid for my board for three months, & ’till I was able to teach in the Accademy. (In Short Sir) there is not A better mind’d or more humane Man on Earth. (thank god) his Charactr. is too Well known To be hurt by any Spurious, envenom’d Reptile that Wrote again him; their malice now falls in their own dirt.
Pardon this liberty I take With you, which flows, from the real regard, & good Wishes I have for him, Of My Esteem for you, on Acct. of your just & candid explanation Which I duly read With real joy & Satisfaction. I have the honor Sir of being your most obt hble. Servt.

Jams. Butler


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 1 December 1795
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Dr. Sir
Phila. Decr. 1. 1795

I have not been able to ascertain all the points upon which you requested me to write to you.
In February 1780 a Comtee. reported a conference with the Minister of France, the substance of which was—That the King of Spain wished for an alliance with the United States, but that it was necessary that the United States should explain their claims precisely.
That the Cabinet of Madrid, construed the western rights of the U.S. to extend no further westward, than the line of settlement permitted by the British proclamation of 1763.
That the United States had no Right to navigate the Missippi.
That the King of Spain would conquer Florida for himself.
And that the lands westward of the line of 1763, were proper subjects of conquest by Spain, from G. Britain.
The French Minister said, that his most Christian Majesty, was united by ties of blood to the King of Spain, & to the United States by Treaty & Freindship & that he would endeavour to conciliate the differences of opinion with liberality &c. There are many intimations in the French conferences, exhorting the United States to moderation in their claims—it was stated that France might not be able to obtain an explicit acknowledgement of independence, in which case the U.S. ought to consider whether a tacit acknowledgement ought not to be accepted.
There are intimations at several times that Mr. Adams required positive instructions to prevent him from acting too inflexibly &c &c (this is the idea—not the expression).
June 17th. 1781 Mr. Adams was instructed, thus—“to make the most candid & confidential communications upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the King of France, to undertake nothing in the negociations for peace or truce without the knowledge & concurrence & ultimately to govern your self by their advice & opinion endeavouring in your whole conduct to make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majestys influence for effectual support in every thing that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the US of America.”
It is worthy of remark that the draft of instruction was communicated to the French Minister, & the words scored with a line underneath, inserted afterwards by way of amendment.
I send Chancellor Livingstons draft of a Treaty with England. It furnishes good matter for testing the opinions of Cato, by a rule of authority for himself.
You will judge of the manner of using these hints—but perhaps under present circumstances, they ought only to be considered as information, from which to state facts & reason.
You will hear from me on other points when I can get time.
Yrs truly

Oliv. Wolcott Jr.

I lately requested a corrected translation of a document which I sent to you. I hope it reached you.


Title: [The Defence No. XXVIII], [2 December 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, December 2, 1795]


Title: [The Defence No. XXIX], [5 December 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, December 5, 1795]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from John Habersham, 7 December 1795
From: Habersham, John
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, December 7, 1795. Encloses a letter from “Monsr. De Bordes, a French Gentleman, who was formerly an Officer in the Georgia Line.” Describes De Bordes’s service during the American Revolution.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to James Hardie, 7 December 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Hardie, James

New York, December 7, 1795. “I have received your Letter of the 2d. instant. As I do not practice in the Mayor’s Court I cannot act for you as Attorney in the Cause you mention. But if you think my assistance at the Trial necessary—I shall be ready to give—if on knowing the Circumstances there appears a ground of Defence.”


Title: [The Defence No. XXX], [9 December 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, December 9, 1795]


Title: The Defence No. XXXI, [12 December 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, December 12, 1795]

I resume the subject of the two last papers for the sake of a few supplementary observations.
The objections to the Treaty for not adhering to the rule “that free ships make free goods and enemy ships enemy goods” as being the relinquishment of an advantage which the modern law of Nations gives to Neutrals have been fully examined and I flatter myself completely refuted.
I shall however add one or two reflections by way of further illustration. A preestablished rule of the law of Nations can only be changed by their Common Consent. This consent may either be express, by treaties declarations &c. adopting and promising the observance of a different rule or it may be implied by a course of practice or usage. The consent in either case must embrace the great community of civilized nations. If to be inferred from Treaties, it must be shewn that they are uniform and universall. It can at least never be inferred, while the treaties of different nations follow different rules, or the treaties between the same nation and others vary from each other. So also as to usage; it must be uniform and universal, & let it be added it must be continued. A usage adopted by some nations and resisted by others or adopted by all temporarily and then discontinued is insufficient to abolish an old or substitute a new rule of the law of Nations. It has been demonstrated, that no consent of either description has been given to the rule which is contended for in opposition to the Treaty.
The armed neutrality so much quoted is intirely deficient in the requisite characters. Its name imports that it was an armed combination of particular powers. It grew up in the midst of a War and is understood to have been particularly levelled against one of the belligerent parties. It was resisted by that power. There were other powers which did not accede to it. It is a recent transaction and has never acquired the confirmation of continued usage. What is more it has been virtually abandonned by some of the parties to it, and among these by the principal promoter of it, the politic and enterprising Catharine. Tis therefore a perversion of all just ideas to ascribe to such a combination the effect of altering a rule of the law of the Nations.
In most important questions it is remarkable that the opposers of the Truth are as much at variance with each other as they are with the Truth they oppose. This was strikingly exemplified when the present constitution of the UStates was under deliberation. The opposition to it was composed of the most incongruous materials. The same thing is observable in relation to the Treaty. And one instance of the contrariety applies to the rule cited above.
While some of the adversaries of the Treaty complain of the admission of a contrary principle by that instrument as the abandonment of a rule of the present law of Nations; others, conceding that there is no such rule yet established, censure that admission as a check to its complete and formal establishment, and as a retrograde step from this desireable point.
The objection in this form is more plausible than in the other but it is not less destitute of substance. If there has been any retrograde step, it was taken by the Government prior to the Treaty. Authentic documents which have been communicated by the Executive to Congress contain the evidence of this fact.

Early in the year 1793 some British cruisers having stopped vessels of the U States and taken out of them articles which were the property of French Citizens, Mr. Genet, the then Minister of France in a letter of the 9 of July of that year made a lively representation upon the subject to our Governt; insisting in a subsequent letter of the 25 of that month in which he recurs to the same point that the principles of neutrality establish that friendly vessels make friendly goods, and, in effect, that the violation of this rule by GBritain was a violation of our neutral rights which we were bound to resent.
The reply of our Government is seen in a letter from our Secretary of State to that Minister of the 24 of July. It is in these terms. “I believe (says Mr. Jefferson) it cannot be doubted, but that by the general law of Nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are free and the goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are lawful prize. Upon this principle, I presume, the British armed vessels have taken the property of French Citizens found in our vessels in the cases abovementioned, and, I confess, I should be at a loss on what principle to reclaim them. It is true that sundry nations desirous of avoiding the inconveniences of having their vessels stopped at sea, ransacked, carried into port and detained, under pretence of having enemy goods on board have in many instances introduced, by their special treaties, another principle between them, that enemy bottoms shall make enemy goods and friendly bottoms friendly goods; a principle much less embarrassing to Congress and equal to all parties in point of gain and loss; but this is altogether the effect of particular Treaty, controuling in special cases the general principles of the law of Nations and therefore taking effect between such nations only as have so agreed to controul it.”
Nothing can be a more explicit or unequivocal abandonment of the rule that free ships make free goods and vice versa than is contained in this communication. But this is not all. In the letter from Mr. Jefferson to our Minister in France of the 26 of Augt. 1793 instructing him to urge the recall of Mr. Genet, the subject is resumed—the position asserted in answer to Mr Genet insisted upon anew and enforced by additional considerations. Among other suggestions, we find these. “We suppose it to have been long an established principle of the law of Nations, that the goods of a friend are free in an enemy’s vessel and an enemy’s goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend. The inconvenience of this principle has induced several nations latterly to stipulate against it by Treaty and to substitute another in its stead, that free bottoms shall make free goods and enemy bottoms enemy goods. We have introduced it into our Treaties with France Holland and Prussia and French goods found by the two latter nations in American bottoms are not made prize of. It is our wish to establish it with other nations. But this requires their consent also, is a work of time, and in the mean while they have a right to act on the general principle without giving to us or to France cause of complaint. Nor do I see that France can lose by it on the whole. For though she loses her goods, when found in our vessels, by the nations with whom we have no treaties, yet she gains our goods, when found in the vessels of the same and all other nations; and we believe the latter mass to be greater than the former.”
Thus then stood the business antecedent to the Treaty. Great Britain adhering to the principle of the general and long established law of Nations captures French property in our vessels and leaves free our property in French vessels. We acquiesce in the practice without even a remonstrance or murmur. The French Minister complains of it as contrary to the principles of neutrality. We reply that in our opinion it is not contrary to those principles, that it is fully warranted by the general law of nations, that treaties which establish a different rule are merely exceptions to that law binding only on the contracting parties, that having no Treaty of the sort with Great Britain we should be at a loss on what ground to dispute the legitimacy of her practice. We do not simply forbear to oppose it. We do not offer to France as an excuse for our forbearance that it is inconvenient to us at the moment to assert a questionable right at the hazard of War. But we tell her peremptorily that in our opinion no such right exists & that the conduct of Great Britain in the particular case is justified by the law of Nations. Neither do we wrap the motive of our forbearance in silence nor content ourselves with revealing it confidentially to France alone. But we publish it without reserve to the world, and thus in the presence of Great Britain and of every other Nation make a formal renunciation of the pretension that “free ships shall make free goods and enemy ships enemy goods.” No counter declaration is heared from either house of Congress.
It was impossible to give a more full sanction to the opposite principle than was given by this conduct and these public and positive declarations of our Government. It was impossible more completely to abandon the favourite ground. It is puerile to attempt to discriminate between the force of this species of renumeration and that of an admission of its propriety by Treaty. The conduct of a Government avowed and explained as to motives by authentic public declarations may assert or renounce a pretension as effectually as its compacts. Every nation with whom we had no contrary stipulation could say to us as well before as since the Treaty with G B—“Your Government has explicitly admitted that free ships do not make free goods and you have no right to complain of our not observing that rule towards you.” Candour therefore would oblige us to say that the Treaty has left this point where it found it, that it has only not obtained from Great Britain a concession in favour of an innovation upon the law of nations which it is desireable to establish but which cannot be claimed as matter of right. Though therefore it may not have the merit of strengthening, it has not the demerit of weakening the ground.
The difference in our position in this respect before & since the Treaty amounts to this that before the Treaty the Government had abandonned the ground, through one organ, Mr. Jefferson; by the Treaty it continued the abandonment, through another organ, Mr. Jay. If we consider the organ as the voluntary cause in each case, (the presumption of which is equally fair in both cases), and if there be any blame it falls more heavily on Mr. Jefferson than on Mr. Jay; for the former sounded and made the retreat and the latter only did not advance from the disadvantageous post to which he had retreated. In other words Mr. Jay did only not recover the ground which Mr. Jefferson had lost. And we know that in general ’tis a far more difficult task to regain than to keep.
But in truth no blame can justly be imputed in either case. The law of Nations was against the rule which it is desired to introduce. The U States could not have insisted upon it as matter of right—and in point of policy it would have been in them madness to go to war to support an innovation upon the preestablished law. It was not honorable to claim a right and suffer it to be infracted without resistance. It is not for young and weak nations to attempt to enforce novelties or pretensions of equivocal validity. It is still less proper for them to contend at the hazard of their peace against the clear right of others. The object was truly not of moment enough to risk much upon it. To use a French proverb—“The play was not worth the candle.” In every view therefore it was wise to desert the pretension.
So also, in the midst of a War, like that in which Great Britain was engaged, it were preposterous to have expected that she would have acceded to a new rule, which under the circumstances of her great maritime superiority would have operated so much more conveniently to her enemy than to herself. And it would have been no less absurd to have made her accession to that rule the sine qua non of an arrangement, otherwise expedient. Here again the play would not have been worth the candle.
The importance of the rule has artfully been very much magnified to depreciate proportionably the treaty for not establishing it. It is to be remembered that if something is gained by it something is also given up. It depends on incalculable circumstances whether in a particular war most will be lost or gained. Yet the rule is upon the whole a convenient one to neutral powers. But it cannot reasonably be pretended that it is of so great value as that the U States ought to adopt it as a maxim never to make a Treaty of Commerce in which it was not recognised. They might by this maxim forego the advantages of regulating their commercial intercourse in time of peace with several foreign Powers with whom they have extensive relations of Trade by fixed and useful conventional rules and still remain subject in time of war to the inconveniences of not having established with those powers the principle to which they make that sacrifice.
Though therefore it be a merit to a certain extent in a Treaty to contain this principle it is not a positive fault or blemish that it does not contain it. The want of it is not a good cause of objection to a Treaty otherwise eligible.
Let me add too in the spirit of Mr. Jefferson’s letter—that however it may be our wish to establish the rule with other nations than those with whom we have already done it—this requires their consent also, of course their conviction that it is their interest to consent and that considering the obstacles which lie in the way the attainment of the object must be “a work of time.” It presupposes in some of the principal maritime powers a great change of Ideas, which are not to be looked for very suddenly. It was not therefore to have been expected of our Envoy, that he was to have accomplished the point at so premature and so unfavourable a conjuncture.
The assertion, that he has abandonned it, is made in too unqualified a manner. For while he admits the operation for the present of the general rule of the law of Nations, he has by the 12th article engaged G Britain in a stipulation that the parties will at the expiration of two years after the existing war “renew their discussions and endeavour to agree whether in any & what cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy’s property.” It is true it will be in the option of Great Britain then to agree or not, but it is no less true that the principle is retained with consent of G B in a negotiable state. So far perhaps some ground has been retrieved.
I confess, however, that I entertain much doubt as to the probability of a speedy general establishment of the rule that friendly ships shall make friendly goods & enemy ships enemy goods. It is a rule against which it is to be feared the preponderant maritime power, to whatever nation this character may belong, will be apt to struggle with perseverance and effect; since it would tend to contract materially the means of that power to annoy and distress her enemies, whose inferiority on the sea would naturally cause their commerce during war to be carried on in neutral bottoms. This consideration will account for the resistance of Great Britain to the principle and for the endeavours of some other powers to promote it. And it deserves notice that her last Treaty with France was severely assailed by some of the Chiefs of the opposition for containing a stipulation in favour of that principle. The motive for consenting to it in this instance probably was that the stipulation was likely to be rendered in a great degree nugatory by the relative situation of the two nations which in almost any war in which one of the two was engaged on one side would probably render the other a party on the opposite side.
If these conjectures be right it is a reflection which lessens much the value of stipulations in favour of the rule, that so long as one or more of the principal maritime powers disavow it, there will be a strong temptation to depart from a scrupulous observance of such stipulations; as we, on the part of France, have experienced in the present War.
In the course of the arguments against the 17th article for virtually admitting the right of search in time of War—the objectors have had the temerity to cite the opinion of Vatel as in opposition to that right, and a mutilated quotation has given an appearance of truth to the assertion. It has been heretofore shewn by passages extracted from his work that his opinion so far from denying explicitly supports the right to search. But it may be useful to examine the part of it, which has been tortured into a contrary inference.
After affirming the right to search (B 3 C 7 § 114) he proceeds thus, “But to avoid inconveniences violence and every other irregularity, the manner of the search is settled in the Treaties of Navigation and Commerce. According to the present Custom credit is to be given to certificates and bills of lading produced by the Master of the Ship.” Hence it is alleged the right to search is turned into the right of inspecting the Ships papers which being intitled to credit are to preclude further scrutiny.
But what immediately follows destroys this conclusion; the words “unless any fraud appear in them or there be very good reason for suspecting their validity” are subjoined to the clause just quoted. This admits clearly that the Ships papers are not to be conclusive, but that upon just cause of suspicion the papers may be disregarded and the right of search may be exercised.
Who is to be the Judge of the credit due to the paper & of the just cause of suspicion? Manifestly The Officer of the belligerent party who visits the neutral vessel. Then what does the whole amount to? Merely this—That Ships papers are intitled to a certain degree of respect and credit, how much is left to the discretion of the officer of the belligerent party, who if he be not satisfied of the fairness and validity of the papers may proceed to their verification by a more strict and particular search, and then if he still sees or supposes he sees just cause of suspicion he may carry the vessel into a port of his own Country for judicial investigation. In doing this he acts at his peril and for an abuse of his discretion exposes himself to damages and other punishment.
This is the true and evident sense of Vatel and it agrees with the doctrine which advocated in these papers, and I will add with the Treaty under examination.
The 17 article admits that the vessels of each party for just cause of suspicion of having on board enemy’s property or of carrying to the enemy contraband articles may be captured or detained and carried to the nearest or most convenient port of the belligerent party to the end that enemy’s property and contraband articles on board may become lawful prize. But so far from countenancing any proceeding without just cause of suspicion or from exonerating the Officer of the belligerent party from a responsibility for such proceeding it leaves the law of nations, in this particular in full force and contemplating that such Officer shall be liable for damages when he proceeds without just cause of suspicion, provides that all proper measures shall be taken to prevent delay in deciding the cases of Ships or cargoes brought in for adjudication, or in the payment or recovery of any indemnification adjudged or agreed to be paid to the Masters or Owners of such Ships. Besides which, the 19th article stipulates “in order that more abundant care may be taken for the security of the respective subjects and citizens of the contracting parties and to prevent their suffering injuries by the men of War and privateers of either party that the Commanders of Ships of War and Privateers shall forbear doing any damage to those of the other party or committing any outrage against them, and that if they act to the contrary they shall be punished and shall also be bound in their persons and estates to make satisfaction and reparation for all damages and the interest thereof of whatever nature the said damages may be.” And further, after establishing that the Commanders of privateers shall before they are commissioned give security to satisfy all damages and injuries, it adds that in all cases of aggressions their commissions shall be revoked and annulled.
These provisions not only conform to, & corroborate the injunctions of the laws of Nations, but they refute the assertion that the Treaty is altogether deficient in precaution for guarding neutral rights—since those above mentioned are among the most efficacious. It is not presumeable that any stipulations have been or can be made which will take away all discretion from the marine Officers of the belligerent parties for this would be a total surrender of the rights of belligerent to neutral nations; and so long as any discretion is left its right or wrong exercise will depend on the personal character of each officer, and abuses can only be restrained by the penalties that await them. Those stipulations of treaties then which reinforce the laws of nations as to the infliction of penalties are the most effectual of the precautions which treaties can adopt for the security of neutral rights; and in this particular the Treaty with Great Britain is to the full as provident as our other Treaties. In one particular it is, I believe, more so; for it expressly stipulates a revocation of the commissions of Commanders of privateers for the aggressions they may commit.
Is not the passage last cited from Vatel a true commentary on those stipulations for regulating and mitigating the right of search which are found in our own and other Treaties? Do they not all intend to reserve to the belligerent party the right of judging of the validity & fidelity of the papers to be exhibited and of extending the search or not according to the circumstances of just suspicion which do or do not appear? And if this be their true construction, as it certainly is their construction in practice, which our own experience testifies—to what after all do they amount—more than without them the laws of nations, as universally recognized, of themselves pronounce? What real security do they afford more than the Treaty with Great Britain affords?

It is much to be suspected that there will always be found advantages essentially criminal operating or not according to the strength or weakness of the neutral party, which if strong will find abundant foundation in the acknowleged laws of Nations on which to rest the protection of its rights.
It is said to be just matter of surprise that these precautions should have no place in a Treaty with Great Britain, whose conduct on the seas so particularly suggested & enforced every guard to our rights that could be reasonably insisted on. Observations of this kind assume constantly the supposition that we had it in our power to fashion every provision of the Treaty exactly to our own palate and that the ideas of the other contracting party were to have no influence even upon the minor features of the contract. But this supposition is absurd; and a Treaty may still be intitled to our approbation which adjusts acceptably the great points of interest though in some of its details it fall[s] short of our desires. Nor can any informed man sincerely deny that it was to have been expected that an adjustment of the particulars in question would fall short of our ideas. It may be answered that we were then at liberty not to make the Treaty; so we were—but does it follow that it would have been wise to split on such points? On a just estimate, their intrinsic value is very moderate.

Camillus


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, 14 December 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: King, Rufus

My Dear Sir
[New York] Decr. 14. 1795

An extraordinary press of occupation has delayed an answer to your letter on the subject of Mr R. Though it may come too late, I comply with your request as soon as I can.
The subject is truly a perplexing one; my mind has several times fluctuated. If there was nothing in the case but his imprudent sally upon a certain occasion I should think the reasons for letting him pass would outweigh those for opposing his passage. But if it be really true—that he is sottish or that his mind is otherwise deranged, or that he has exposed himself by improper conduct in pecuniary transactions, the byass of my judgment would be to negative. And as to the fact I would satisfy myself by careful inquiry of persons of character who may have had an opportunity of knowing.
It is now, and in certain probable events will still more be, of infinite consequence that our Judiciary should be well composed. Reflection upon this in its various aspects weighs heavily in my mind against Mr R, upon the accounts I have received of him, and balances very weighty consideration the other way.
Yrs

A Hamilton

From what a Mr. Wadsworth lately in Philadelphia tells me of a conversation between Burr Baldwin & Gallatin it would seem that the two last Gentlemen have made up their minds to consider the Treaty, if ratified by G Britain, as conclusive upon the H of Representatives. I thought it well this should be known to you, if not before understood from any other quarter.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, 14 December 1795
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Robert

[New York, December 14, 1795. On December 18, 1795, Morris wrote to Hamilton and referred to “Your friendly letter of the 14th.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 14 December 1795
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Dear Sir,
Philadelphia Decr. 14. 95.

The printer of Mr. Randolph’s vindication advertises that it will be published next Friday. The translation of Fauchet’s letter will be in it. This translation was made by Mr. Taylor at Randolph’s request; but Mr. Taylor, who desired the use of mine, told me that he had made but few variations. Now if I have mistaken the sense in any material passages, it is highly probable that they will be transferred to Mr. Taylor’s translation: or Mr. Taylor may mistake the meaning of some passages; to which he will always be liable from the want of a comprehensive view of his subject. I have met with such instances in his other translations, altho’ he is more familiar with the French than I am.
Now it seems to me important that the first translation of Fauchet’s letter that shall be published, should convey its true meaning: and therefore I wish earnestly that yours, or the one you are correcting, may be returned by to-morrow’s post (if not already on its way) that it may be printed in Fenno’s paper before the vindication appears.
I am very sincerely & respectfully yours

T. Pickering
Colo. Hamilton


Title: The Defence No. XXXII, [16 December 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, December 16, 1795]

The 18th Article of the Treaty, which regulates the subject of contraband, has been grievously misrepresented. The objections urged against it with most acrimony are disingenuous and unfounded; yet while I make this assertion which I flatter myself I shall be able to prove, I shall not pretend to maintain that it is an article completely satisfactory. I even admit that it has one unpleasant ingredient in it. And I am convinced that our envoy must have consented to it with reluctance.
But while Candour demands this concession it equally admonishes us that under the circumstances of the moment the points in this respect to be adjusted were peculiarly unmanageable—that the position of the other party rendered an arrangement intirely agreeable to us impracticable—that without compromise nothing could have been regulated—that the article made no change for the worse in our prior situation but in some particulars made our ground better, and that estimating truly the relative circumstances of the parties there is no probability that any thing more acceptable could have been established.
I will add that the degree of imperfection which may fairly be attributed to this article is far from being of such importance as on solid calculations ought to defeat the Treaty. No clear right is abandonned—no material interest of the nation injured. It is one thing whether every part of a Treaty be satisfactory—another and a very different thing whether in the aggregate it be eligible or not and ought to be accepted or rejected. Nations could never make contract with one another if each were to require that every part of it should be adjusted by its own standard of right and expediency. The true question always is upon the collective merits of the instrument; whether upon the whole it reasonably accommodates the opinions and interests of both parties. Tried by this test, the Treaty negotiated with Great Britain fully justifies the acceptance of it by the constituted authorities of our country, and claims the acquiescence of every good Citizen.
The most laboured and at the same time the most false of the charges against the 18th article is that it allows provisions to be contraband in cases not heretofore warranted by the laws of Nations and refers to the discretion of the belligerent party the decision of what those cases are. This is the general form of the charge. The draft of a Petition to the Legislature of Virginia reduces it to this shape. The Treaty “expressly admits that provisions are to be held contraband in cases other than when bound to an invested place, and impliedly admits that such cases exist at present.” The first is a palpable untruth which may be detected by a bare perusal of the article. The last is an untrue inference impregnated with the malignant insinuation that there was a design to sanction the unwarrantable pretension of a right to inflect Famine on a whole Nation.
Before we proceed to an analysis of the article let us review the prior situation of the parties.
Great Britain it is known had taken and acted upon the ground that she had a right to stop and detain, on payment for them, provisions belonging to neutrals going to the dominions of France. For this violent and impolitic measure, which the final opinion of mankind will certainly condemn, she found colour in the saying, of some Writers of Reputation on public Law. A Passage of this kind from Vatel has been more than once quoted in these terms “Commodities particularly used in war and the importation of which to an enemy is prohibitted are called contraband goods. Such are arms military and naval stores, timber horses, and even provisions in certain junctures when there are hopes of reducing the enemy by famine.” [Heineceius

   Law of Nature & Nations B 2 C 9 S 201 Navibus ob vect.]

 countenances the same opinion and even Groties seems to lean towards it.

   [Book III Chpt I & V 3 Cap I & X]]

The U States with reason disputed this construction of the law of nations; restraining the general propositions which seemed to favour it to those cases in which the chance of reducing by famine was manifest and palpable, such as the cases of particular places bona fide besieged blockaded or invested. The Government accordingly remonstrated against the proceeding of Great Britain and made every effort against it which prudence in the then posture of affairs would permit. The order for seizing provisions was after a time revoked.
In this state our Envoy found the business. Pending the very war in which Great Britain had exercised the pretension, with the same administration which had done it, was it to have been expected that she would in a Treaty with us even virtually or impliedly have acknowleged the injustice or impropriety of the conduct? Here was no escape as in the instance of the order of [the 6th of Nov. 1793] in the misconceptions of her officers—the question was to condemn a deliberate and unambiguous act of the administration itself. The pride the reputation the interest of that administration forbade it.
On our side to admit the pretension of Great Britain was still more impossible. We had every inducement of character right and interest against it.
What was the natural and only issue out of this embarrassment? Plainly to leave the point unsettled—to get rid of it—to let it remain substantially where it was before the Treaty.
This I have good ground to believe was the real understanding of the two negotiators; and the article has fulfilled their view.
After enumerating specifically what articles shall be deemed contraband it proceeds thus—“And whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone provisions and other articles not generally contraband may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise: It is further agreed that whenever any such articles, so becoming contraband according to the existing laws of Nations, shall for that reason be seized, the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified; and the Captors or in their default the Government under whose authority they act shall pay to the Masters or Owners of such vessels the full value of all articles with a reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight and also the demurrage incident to such detention.”
The difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases in which articles not generally contraband become so from particular circumstances is expressly assigned as the motive to the Stipulation which follows. This excludes the supposition that any cases whatever were intended to be admitted or agreed. But this difficulty renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise. A provision with this view is therefore made, which is that of liberal compensation for the articles taken. The evident intent of this provision is that in doubtful cases the inconvenience to the neutral party being obviated or lessened by compensation, there may be the less cause for or temptation to controversy and rupture—the affair may be the more susceptible of negotiation and accommodation.
More than this cannot be pretended because it is further “agreed that whenever any such articles so becoming contraband according to the existing laws of nations shall for that reason be seized, the same shall not be confiscated but the owners thereof shall be speedily and completely indemnified &c.”
Thus the Criterion of the cases in which articles not generally contraband may from particular circumstances become so is expressly the existing laws of nations, in other words the laws of nations at the time the transaction happens. When these laws pronounce them contraband they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise they may not be seized. Each party is as free as the other to decide whether the laws of nations do in the given case pronounce them contraband or not, and neither is obliged to be governed by the opinion of the other. If one party on a false pretext of being authorised by the laws of nations makes a seizure, the other is at full liberty to contest it—to appeal to those laws and if it thinks fit, to oppose even to reprisals and war. This is the express tenor of the provision—there is nothing to the contrary—nothing that narrows the ground—nothing that warrants either party in making a seizure, which the laws of nations independent of the Treaty do not permit—nothing which obliges either to submit to one, where it is of opinion the law of nations has been violated by it.
But as liberal compensation is to be made in every case of seizure where a difference of opinion happens, it will become a question of prudence and expediency whether to be satisfied with the compensation or to seek further redress. The provision will in doubtful cases render an accommodation of differences of opinion the more easy, and as a circumstance conducing to the preservation of peace is a valuable ingredient in the Treaty.

A cavil has arisen on the term “existing” as if it had the effect of enabling one of the parties to make a law of nations for the occasion. But this is a mere cavil. No one nation can make a law of nations; no positive regulation of one state or of a partial combination of states can pretend to this character. A law of nations is a law which nature agreement or usage has established between nations. As this may vary from one period to another by agreement or usage the article very properly uses the term “existing” to denote that law which at the time the transaction may happen shall be the then law of Nations. This is a plain and obvious use of the term, when nothing but a spirit of misrepresentation could have perverted to a different meaning.
The argument against the foregoing construction is in substance this (viz) It is now a settled doctrine of the law of nations that provisions and other articles not generally contraband can only become so when going to a place beseiged blockaded or invested—Cases of this kind are fully provided for in a subsequent part of the article. The implication therefore is that something more was intended to be embraced in the antecedent part.
Let us first examine the fact whether all the cases of that kind are comprehended in the subsequent part of the article. I say they are not. The remaining clause of the article divides itself into two parts. The first describes the case of a vessel sailing for a port or place belonging to an enemy without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded or invested, and provides that in such case the vessel may be turned away but not detained nor her cargo, if not contraband, confiscated unless after notice she shall again attempt to enter: The second describes the case of a vessel or goods which had entered into such port or place before it was besieged blockaded or invested and declares that the one or the other shall not be liable to confiscation but shall be restored to the Owners thereof. These are the only cases described or provided for. A third which occurs on the sligh [t] est reflection is not mentioned—the case of a vessel going to a port or place which is beseiged blockaded  or invested, with notice of its being in that state when she commences her voyage or previous to her receiving notice from the beseiging blockading or investing party. This is left to the operation of the general law of Nations except so far as it may be affected by the antecedent clause. Thus the fact which is the foundation of the argument fails and with it of course the argument itself.
But had this been otherwise the conclusion would still have been erroneous. The two clauses are intirely independent of each other, and though they might both contemplate the same cases in whole or in part they do it with an eye to very different purposes.
The object of the first is to lessen the danger of misunderstanding, by establishing this general rule that where ever articles not commonly contraband become so from particular circumstances, according to the laws of nations, they shall still not be confiscated but when seized the Owners of them shall be indemnified.
The object of the last is to regulate some special consequences with regard to vessels and goods going to or which had previously gone to places besieged blockaded or invested; and in respect to which the dispositions of the laws of nations may have been deemed doubtful or too rigorous. Thus it is held that the laws of nations permit the confiscation of ships & goods going to places besieged blockaded or invested; but this clause decides that if going without notice, so far from being confiscated, they shall not even be detained but shall be permitted to go whithersoever they please. If they persist after notice then the contumacy shall be punished with confiscation. In both instances the consequence is intirely different from every thing in the antecedent clause. There, there is seizure with compensation. Here in one instance seizure is forbidden and permission to go elsewhere is enjoined—in the other instance the offending things are confiscated which excludes the idea of compensation. Again the last part of the last clause stipulates in the case which it supposes the restoration of the property to its Owners, and so excludes both seizure and compensation. Hence it is apparent the objects of the two clauses are intirely foreign to each other, and that no argument nor inference whatever can be drawn from the one to the other.

If it be asked what other cases there can be, except those of places besieged blockaded or invested, and if none other what difficulty in defining them—why leave the point so vague and indeterminate? One answer, which indeed has already been given in substance, is that the situation of one of the parties prevented an agreement at the time—that not being able to agree they could not define and that the alternative was to avoid definition. The want of definition only argues want of agreement. It is strange logic to assert that this or that is admitted because nothing is defined.
Another answer is that even if the parties had been agreed that there were no other cases than those of besieged blockaded or invested places—still there would have remained much room for dispute about the precise cases, owing to the impracticability of defining what is a besieged blockaded or invested place. About this, there has been frequent controversy; and the fact is so complicated a one, puts on such a variety of shapes that no definition can well be devised which will suit all. Hence nations in their compacts with each other have not attempted one. At least, I recollect no instance of the attempt.
Moreover is it impossible to conceive other cases in which provisions and other articles not generally contraband might on rational grounds be deemed so? What if they were going expressly and with notice to a besieging army, whereby it might obtain a supply essential to the success of its operations? Is there no doubt that it would be justifiable in such case to seize them? Can the liberty of trade be said to apply to any instance of direct & immediate aid to a military expedition? It would be at least a singular effect of the rule, if provisions could be carried without interruption for the supply [of] a Spanish Army besieging Gibraltar when, if destined for the supply of the garrison in that place, the[y] might of right be seized by a Spanish fleet?
The Calu[m]niators of the article have not had the candour to notice that it is not confined to provisions but speaks of provisions and other articles. Even this is an ingredient which combats the supposition that countenance was intended to be given to the pretension of Great Britain with regard to provisions, which depending on a reason peculiar to itself cannot be deemed to be supported by a clause including other articles, to which that reason is intirely inapplicable.
There is one more observation against this part of the article which may deserve a moment’s attention. It is this, that though the true meaning of the clause be such as I contend for still the existence of it affords to Great Britain a pretext for abuse which she may improve to our disadvantage. I answer, it is difficult to guard against all the perversions of a contract which ill faith may suggest. But we have the same securities against abuses of this sort which we have against those of other kinds namely the right of judging for ourselves and the power of causing our rights to be respected. We have this plain and decisive reply to make to any uncandid construction which Great Britain may at any Time endeavour to raise. “The article pointedly and explicitly makes the existing law of Nations the standard of the cases in which you may rightfully seize provisions and other articles not generally contraband. This law does not authorise the seizure in the instance in question. You have consequently no warrant under the Treaty for what you do.”
The same disingenuous spirit which tinctures all the conduct of the adversaries of the Treaty has been hardy enough to impute to it the last order of Great Britain to seize provisions going to the dominions of France. Strange that an order issued before the Treaty had even been considered in this Country and embracing the other neutral powers besides the UStates should be represented as the fruit of that instrument!
The appearances are that a motive no less imperious than that of impending scarcity had great share in dictating the measure, and Time, I am persuaded will prove, that it will not even be pretended to justify it by any thing in the Treaty.

Camillus


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Rufus King, 16 December 1795
From: King, Rufus
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia] Wednesday 16 Decr. [1795]

I send you Dunlap of this Morning, in it you have the foreign intelligence. Fenno Dunlap & others have erroneously stated that Mr Warder brought the Ratification of Great Britain—no official Dispatch has been received. Rutledge was negatived yesterday by the Senate. From present appearances the address to the President by the House will pass without a Debate. The Draft has been by agreement in the Committee who reported it, shaped so as to reserve all points intended to be discussed relative to the Treaty; the words underscored in the inclosed Draft, were offered in the Committee by Mr. Madison, who agreed to concur in the paragraph if they were added—you perceive the object.
Adieu I am &c

R King
A. Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Robert Morris, 18 December 1795
From: Morris, Robert
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Alexander Hamilton Esqre New York
Dear Sir
Philada December 18. 1795

Your friendly letter of the 14th came to hand on the 16th. It should have been answered yesterday, but my engagements did not permit. I wrote to you on the 16th of Novemr last mentioning a Negotiation opened with Boston in consequence of which I expected to redeem $140,000 Deferred Debt which I have pledged there. This Negotiation was opened under the auspices of Mr Swan, but I begin to think now that like many other things which look promising in the Outsett, it will go off in Air. I shall therefore gladly acquiesce with the proposition contained in your letter of the 14 Inst. My Estate called Morrisville formerly the Delaware Works, is worth upwards of Three hundred thousand Dollars. A person proposing to buy it two years ago proposed two hundred and fifty thousand as the price, and I have since then added Several Improvements and valuable buildings and shall continue doing so, because I persevere in my desire of having a Manufactoring Town there. I have already borrowed upon the Security of this Estate the Amot of about One hundred thousand Dollars for which it is mortgaged. I propose to give to you or to Mr Church as you please a Mortgage upon the same Estate for the Amot of his Claim with my Bond payable as you mention with Interest annually—if the Deferred Debt is changed into Money, or for the stock say one hundred thousand Dollars deferred Debt if that is to remain the Claim. If it is to be changed to a Money Debt the price must be fixed I suppose according to the price of the day, & then the Bond will carry Interest from the date. I am ready to fix it either way and agreeably to what you shall think right. The Security now proposed I consider as ample, even for a much larger sum than will be charged upon it after Mr Churchs is added to the other. Besides that it is ample it is also a Saleable property. There are not less than 17 Farms and the Land (about 3000 acres) has lately risen from £ 10 & £ 12. to above £ 15 p Acre through that neighborhood. I have in all about sixty Houses Three ferries, two Fisheries, Grist Mill, Brewery, Bake House, slitting & Rolling Mill, Fulling Mill, snuff Mill saw Mill, Quarry &ca. It is one of those lively Estates that brings in a Regular annual Income which is constantly increasing. My son Robert lives there and I think it the first Estate and the best for a Gentlemans Residence of any in America. In short I expect to double its present value in the Course of a few years. I observe you seem to think it may be necessary for me to justify my Conduct if I give you Security. I have no such Idea, I want time and nothing but time to pay every farthing that I owe in the World, and I have Property that will do that and leave to myself and family enough to Satisfy Ambition, if they should be ambitious, or Avarice should they be avaricious. I did not know that you had become uneasy on this Subject but I suppose the Stories that are propagated have made you so, and I am not surprized at it. I want Ready Money sadly, but it is not want of property—property however will not command Ready Money at this time without great sacrifices. I do not like to sacrifice if I can help it, because I have worked hard to get what I have, and I will fight a good Battle to keep it. Another year will probably produce the Change in my situation which I wish & altho’ you give me five Years to pay Mr Church I will do it sooner if sooner it shall be convenient.
I am Dr Sir   Yours &ca

RM

P.S. If you agree I will have a Mortgage drafted & send it for your Inspection.
RM