Title: The Defence No. XXII, [5–11 November 1795]
From: “Camillus”,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, November 5–11, 1795]

The analogy of the stipulation in the 10th article with stipulations in our other treaties and in the treaties between other Nations is the remaining topic of discussion. After this, attention will be paid to such observations by way of objection to the article as may not have been before expressly or virtually answered.
The 20th. article of our treaty of Amity and Commerce with France is in these words “For the better promoting of commerce on both sides it is agreed, that if a war shall break out between the said two Nations, six months after the proclamation of War shall be allowed to the Merchants in the cities and towns where they live for selling and transporting their goods and merchandizes, and if any thing be taken from them or any injury be done them within that term by either party or the people or subjects of either full satisfaction shall be made for the same.”
The 18th article of our Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Netherlands is in these words “For the better promoting of Commerce on both sides, it is agreed, that if a war should break out between their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands and the United States of America, there shall always be granted to the subjects on each side the term of Nine Months after the date of the rupture, or the proclamation of War, to the end that they may retire with their effects and transport them where they please, which it shall be lawful for them to do, as well as to sell or transport their effects and goods, in all freedom and without any hindrance, and without being able to proceed, during the said term of Nine Months to any arrest of their effects much less of their persons; on the contrary there shall be given them for their vessels and their effects which they would carry away passports and safe conducts for the nearest ports of their respective countries and for the time necessary for the voyage.”
The 22d article of our Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Sweden is in these words “In order to favour Commerce on both sides as much as possible, it is agreed that in case War should break out between the two nations, the term of nine months after the declaration of War shall be allowed to the Merchants and subjects respectively on one side and the other, in order that they may withdraw with their effects and moveables, which they shall be at liberty to carry off or to sell where they please without the least obstacle; nor shall any seize their effects and much less their persons during the said nine months; but on the contrary passports which shall be valid for a time necessary for their return shall be given them for their vessels and the effects which they shall be willing to carry with them. And if any thing is taken from them or any injury is done to them by one of the parties their people & subjects, during the term above prescribed, full and entire satisfaction shall be made to them on that account.”

The 23 article of our Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Prussia contains this provision “If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their Debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance.”
These articles of four and the only commercial Treaties we had with foreign powers, prior to the pending Treaty with Great Britain, though differing in terms agree in substance; except as to time which varies from six to nine months. And they clearly amount to this, that upon the breaking out of a War between the contracting parties in each case, there shall be for a term of six or nine months full protection and security to the persons and property of the subjects of one which are then in the territories of the other; with liberty to collect their debts

   The term “debts” is only expressed in the Prussian Treaty but there are in the other treaties terms which include debts and this is the manifest spirit & intent of all.

 to sell their goods and merchandizes and to remove with their effects to their own country. For this term of six or nine months, there is a complete suspension of the pretended right to confiscate or sequester, giving and being designed to give an opportunity to withdraw the whole property which the subjects or citizens of the one party have in the country of the other.
The differences between these stipulations and that in the article under examination are chiefly these. The latter is confined to debts property in the public funds, and in public & private banks, without any limitation of the duration of the protection. The former comprehend, besides, goods and merchandizes, with a limitation of the protection to a term of six or nine months, but with the intent and supposition that the term allowed may and will be adequate to intire security. The principle therefore of all the stipulations is the same. Each aims at putting the persons and property of the subjects of one enemy, especially Merchants, being within the country of the other enemy at the commencement of a war, out of the reach of confiscation or sequestration.
The persons, whose names are to our other treaties, on the part of the UStates, are Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. The three first are to the Treaty with France. Mr. Adams is singly to that with the United Netherlands, Doctor Franklin singly to that with Sweden, and these two with Mr. Jefferson are jointly to that with Prussia. The treaty with Sweden was concluded in April 1783 that with Prussia in August 1785. These dates repel the idea that considerations of policy relative to the war might have operated in the case.
We have consequently the sanction of all these characters to the principle, which governed the stipulation entered into by Mr. Jay, and not only from the ratification of the former treaties at different periods distant from each other by different descriptions of men in our public councils, but also from there never having been heard in the community, a lisp of murmurs against the stipulations, through a period of seventeen years counting from the date of the Treaty with France there is just ground to infer a coincidence of the public opinion of the Country.
I verily believe that if in the year 1783 a Treaty had been made with England containing an article similar to the 10th in the present Treaty, it would have met with general acquiescence. The spirit of party had not then predisposed mens minds to estimate the propriety of a measure, according to the agent, rather than according to its real fitness and quality. What would then have been applauded as wise liberal equitable and expedient is now in more instances than one, under the pestilential influence of that baleful spirit condemned as improvident impolitic and dangerous.
Our Treaty with Prussia, the 23 article of which has been cited, is indeed a model of liberality, which for the principles it contains does honor to the parties, and has been in this country a subject of deserved and unqualified admiration. It contradicts, as if studiously, those principles of restriction and exclusion, which are the foundations of the mercantile and navigating system of Europe. It grants perfect freedom of conscience and worship to the respective subjects and citizens, with no other restraint than that they shall not insult the religion of others. Adopting the rule that free ships shall make free goods, it extends the protection to the persons as well as the goods of enemies. Enumerating as contraband only “arms amunition and military stores” it even provides that contraband articles shall not be confiscated but may be taken on the condition of paying for them. It provides against embargoes of vessels and effects. It expressly exempts women children scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artizans manufacture[r]s and fishermen unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns villages and places, and in general all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind—their houses fields and goods, from molestation in their persons and employments and from burning wasting and destruction, in time of war; and stipulates payment at a reasonable price for what may be necessarily taken from them for military use. It likewise protects from seizure and confiscation in time of war vessels employed in trade, and inhibits the granting commissions to private armed vessels empowering them to take or destroy such trading vessels or to interrupt their commerce. And it makes a variety of excellent provisions to secure to prisoners of War a humane treatment.
These particulars are stated as evidence of the temper of the day, and of a policy which then prevailed to bottom our system with regard to foreign nations upon those grounds of moderation and equity, by which reason religion and philosophy had tempered the harsh maxims of more early times. It is painful to observe an effort to make the public opinion in the respect retrograde, and to infect our Councils with a spirit contrary to these salutary advances towards improvement in true civilization and humanity.
If we pass from our own Treaties to those between other Nations, we find that the provisions which have been extracted from ours have very nearly become formulas in the Conventions of Europe. As samples of this may be consulted the following articles of Treaties between Great Britain & other powers (to wit) the XVIII article of a Treaty of Peace & Commerce with Portugal in 1642 the XXXVI article of a Treaty of Peace Commerce and Alliance with Spain in 1667 the XIX article of a Treaty of Peace and the II of a Treaty of Commerce with France both in 1713 and the XII article of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Russia in 1766.
The article with Portugal provides that if difficulties and doubts shall arise between the two Nations, which give reason to apprehend the interruption of Commerce public notice shall be given of it to the subjects of both sides, and after that notice, two years shall be allowed to carry away their merchandizes and goods, and in the mean time there shall be no injury or prejudice done to any persons or goods on either side.
The articles with France, in addition to the provisions common in other cases, particularly stipulate that during the term of the protection (six months) “the subjects on each side shall enjoy good and speedy justice, so that during the said space of six months, they may be able to recover their goods and effects, entrusted as well to the public as to private persons.”
The article with Russia, besides stipulating an exemption from confiscation for one year with the privilege to remove and carry away in safety, provides additionally that the subjects of each party “shall be further permitted either at or before their departure to consign the effects, which they shall not as yet have disposed of, as well as the debts that shall be due to them to such persons as they shall think proper, in order to dispose of them according to their desire & for their benefit—which debts, the Debtors shall be obliged to pay in the same manner as if no such rupture had happened.”
All these articles are with those in our treaties analogous in principle, as heretofore particularly explained, to the tenth article of the Treaty under discussion. That of the British Treaty with France designates expressly debts due from the Public as well as those due from private persons—that with Russia goes the full length of our tenth article; empowering the creditors on each side to assign the debts which they are not able to collect within the term of their residence to whomsoever they think fit for their own benefit, and declaring that these debts shall be paid to the Assignees in the same manner as if no rupture had happened.
There is a document extant which may fairly be supposed to express the sense of the Government of France at the period to which [it] relates of the foundation of these stipulations. It is a memorial of Mr. Bussy Minister from the Court of France to that of London for negotiating peace dated in the year 1761 and contains these passages “As it is impracticable for two princes who make war with each other to agree between them which is the aggressor in regard to the other,

   Note *Thus we find it the sentiment of this Minister that it is impossible for two princes who make war with each other, to agree which is the aggressor with regard to the other—and yet Mr. Jay was to extort from Great Britain an acknowlegement, that she was the aggressor with regard to us, and was guilty of pusyllanimity in waving that question.

 Equity and Humanity have dictated these precautions, that where an unforeseen rupture happens suddenly and without any previous declaration, foreign vessels, which navigating under the security of peace and of treaties happen, at the time of the rupture, to be in either of the respective ports shall have time and full liberty to withdraw themselves.”
“This wise provision, so agreeable to the rules of good faith, constitutes a part of the law of Nations; and the article of the Treaty which sanctifies these precautions, ought to be faithfully executed notwithstanding the breach of the other articles of the Treaty, which is the natural consequence of the War.”
“The Courts of France & Great Britain used this salutary precaution in the Treaties of Utrecht and Aix la Chapelle.”

These passages place the security stipulated in the Treaties for the persons and property of the subjects of one party found in the Country of another at the beginning of a War upon the footing of its constituting a part of the law of Nations; which may be considered as a formal diplomatic recognition of the principle for which I contend. As this position was not itself in dispute between the two Governments, but merely a collateral inference from it, applicable to vessels taken at sea prior to a declaration of War, it may be regarded as a respectable testimony of the law of Nations on the principal point.
If the law of Nations confers this exemption from seizure upon vessels, which at the time of the rupture happen to be in the respective ports of the belligerent parties, it is evident that it must equally extend its protection to debts contracted in a course of lawful Trade. Vessels are particularly mentioned because the discussion turned upon vessels seized at sea. But the reference to the Treaties of Utrecht and Aix la Chapelle shews that the Minister in his observation had in view the whole subject matter of the articles of those treaties, which provide for the security of Merchants and their effects in the event of War.
This conformity, in principle, of the article, under examination with the provisions in so many Treaties of our own and of other Nations, taken in connection with the comment of Mr. Bussy, brings a very powerful support to the article. It is additional and full evidence that our Envoy in agreeing to it did not go upon new and untrodden ground, that on the contrary he was in a beaten tract, that in pursuing the dictate of reason and the better opinion of Writers as to the rule of the law of Nations respecting the point, he was at the same time pursuing the examples of all the other Treaties we had ourselves made and of many of those of other Countries.
It is now incumbent upon me to perform my promise of replying to such objections to the Article as may remain unanswered by the preceding remarks. It is with pleasure, I note, that the field is very narrow—that indeed there scarcely remains any thing which is not so frivolous and impotent as almost to forbid a serious replication. It will therefore be my aim to be brief.

It is said there is only an apparent reciprocity in the article, millions being due on our side and little or nothing on the other.
The answer to this is, that no right being relinguished on either side—no privilege granted—the stipulation amounting only to a recognition of a rule of the law of Nations—to a promise to abstain from injustice & breach of faith—there is no room for an argument about reciprocity—further than to require that the promise should be mutual, as is the case. This is the only equivalent which the nature of the subject demands or permits. It would be dishonorable to expect a boon merely for an engagement to fulfil a moral obligation.
But it has been shewn, that the stipulation will be beneficial to us by the confidence which it will give on the other side; obviating and avoiding the obstructions to trade, the injuries to and incumbrances upon Credit naturally incident to the distrust and apprehension, which after the question had been once moved, were to be expected. Here if a compensation were required there is one. Let me add as a truth which perhaps has no exception that in the wise order of Providence Nations in a temporal sense may safely trust the maxim that the observance of Justice carries with it its own and a full reward.
It is also said that having bound ourselves by Treaty we shall hereafter lose the credit of moderation which would attend a forbearance to exercise the right. But it having been demonstrated that no such right exists, we only renounce a claim to the negative merit of not committing injustice, and we acquire the positive praise of being willing to renounce explicitly a pretension which might be the instrument of oppression and fraud. It is always honorable to give proof of upright intention.
It is further said, that under the protection of this stipulation, The King of Great Britain, who has already speculated in our funds

   The Assertors would be puzzled to bring proof of the fact.

 may engross the whole Capital of the Bank of the U States and thereby secure the uncontrouled direction of it—that he may hold the Stock in the name of his ambassador or of some citizen of the U States, perhaps a Senator, who if of the virtuous twenty,

   Those who advised to a Ratification of the Treaty

 might be proud of the honor—that thus our citizens in time of peace might experience the mortification of being beholden to British Directors for the accommodations they might want, that in time of War our operations might be cramped at the pleasure of his Majesty and according as he should see fit or not to accommodate our Government with loans & that both in peace and war we may be reduced to the abject condition of having the whole Capital of our national Bank administered by his Britannick Majesty.
Shall I treat this Rhapsody with seriousness or ridicule?
The Capital of the Bank of the U States is ten millions of dollars; little short at the present Market Price of [three millions of] pounds Sterling; but from the natural operation of such a demand in raising price ’tis not probable that much less than four Millions Stereling would suffice to complete the monopoly. I have never understood that the private purse of his Britannic Majesty, if it be true as asserted that he has already witnessed a disposition to speculate in our funds (a fact however from which it was natural to infer a more pacific disposition towards us) was so very ample as conveniently to spare an item of such size for a speculation across the Atlantic. But perhaps the national purse will be brought to his aid. As this supposes a parliamentary grant, new taxes and new loans it does not seem to be a very manageable thing, without disclosure of the object; and if disclosed so very unexampled an attempt of a foreign Government would present a case completely out of the reach of all ordinary rules, justifying by the manifest danger to us even war and the confiscation of all that had been purchased. For let it be remembered, that the article does not protect the public property of a foreign Government Prince or State; independent of the observation just made that such a case would be out of the reach of all ordinary rules. It may be added that an attempt of this kind from the force of the pecuniary Capital of G Britain would, as a precedent, threaten and alarm all Nations. Would consequences like these be incurred?
But let it be supposed that the inclination shall exist and that all difficulties about funds have been surmounted, still to effect the plan there must be in all the stockholders a willingness to sell to the British King or his Agents as well as the will and means on his part to purchase. Here too some impediment might be experienced. There are persons who might choose to keep their property in the shape of Bank Stock, and live upon the income of it, whom price would not readily tempt to part with it. Besides there is an additional obstacle to complete success. The U States are themselves the proprietors of two Millions of the Bank Stock.
Of two things one—Either the monopoly by his Britannic Majesty would be known (and it would be a pretty arduous task to keep it a secret especially if the Stock was to stand as suggested in the name of his ambassador) or it would be unknown and concealed under unsuspected names. In the former supposition, the observations already made recur—there would be no protection to it from the article—and the extraordinary nature of the case would warrant any thing. Would his Majesty or the Parliament choose to trust so large a property in so perilous a situation?
If to avoid this the plan should be to keep the operation unknown the most effectual method would be to place the Stock in the names of our own citizens. This it seems would be attended with no difficulty; since even our senators would be ambitious of the honor; and if they should have qualms or fears, others could no doubt be found amongst the numerous sec [re]taries or adherents of Great Britain in our Country—probably some of the patriots would not be inexorable if properly solicited, or in the last resort persons might be sent from Great Britain to acquire naturalization for the express purpose.
In this supposition too the article would be at least innocent. For its provisions are intirely foreign to the case of stock standing in the names of our own citizens. It neither enlarges nor abriges the power of the Government in this respect.
Further. How will the article, work the miracle of placing the Bank under the management of British directors? It gives no new rights, no new qualifications.
The constitution of the Bank (Sections the 5th. and 7th of the Act of Incorporation) has provided with solicitude these important guards against foreign or other sinister influence. I  That none but a citizen of the U States shall be eligible as a Director. II  That none but a stockholder actually resident within the U States shall vote in elections by proxy. III  That one fourth of the Directors, who are to be elected annually, must every year go out of the direction. IV That a Director may at any time be removed & replaced by the Stockholders at a general Meeting. V  That a single share shall give one vote for directors, while any number of shares, in the same person copartnership or body politic, will not give more than thirty votes.
Hence it is impossible that the Bank can be in the management of British Directors. A British subject is incapable of being a director. It is also next to impossible that an undue British Influence could operate in the choice of Directors out of the number of our own Citizens. The British King, or British subjects out of the U States, could not even have a vote by Attorney in the choice. Schemes of secret monopoly could not be executed because they would be betrayed unless the secret was confined to a small number. A small number, no one of whom could have more than thirty votes, would be easily overruled by the more numerous proprietors of single or small number of shares with the addition of the votes of the U States.
But here again it is to be remembered that as to combinations with our own citizens, in which they were to be ostensible for any pernicious foreign project, the article under consideration is perfectly nugatory. It can do neither good nor harm, since it merely relates, as to the exemption from confiscation and seizure on our part to the known property of British subjects.
It follows therefore that the dangers pourtrayed to us from the speculating enterprizes of His Britannic Majesty are the vagaries of an overheated imagination or the contrivances of a spirit of Deception, and that so far as they could be supposed to have the least colour, it turns on circumstances upon which the Treaty can have no influence whatever. In taking pains to expose their futility I have been led principally by the desire of making my fellow Citizens sensible in this instance, as in others, of the extravagances of the opposers of the Treaty.
One artifice to render the article unacceptable has been to put cases of extreme misconduct on the other side, of flagrant violations of the laws of nations of war of justice and of humanity and to ask whether under such circumstances the confiscation or sequestration of debts would not be justifiable. To this the answer is, that if circumstances so extraordinary should arise as without the Treaty would warrant so extraordinary an act, they will equally warrant it under the Treaty. For cases of this kind are exceptions to all general rules. They would excuse the violation of an express or positive as well as of a tacit or virtual pledge of the public faith which describes the whole difference between the existence & non existence of the Article in question. They resemble those cases of extreme necessity (through excessive hunger for instance) which in the eye of the law of nature will excuse the taking of the property of another, or those cases of extreme abuse of authority in rulers, which amounting unequivocally to tyranny, are admitted to justify forcible resistance to the established authorities. Constitutions of Government laws, Treaties, all give way to extremities of such a description. The point of obligation is to distinguish them with sincerity and not to indulge our passions and our interests in substituting pretended for real cases.

A writer who disgraces by adopting the name of Cicero makes a curious remark by way of objection. He affirms that the article is nugatory because a Treaty is dissolved by the state of War, in which the provision is designed to operate. If this be true, the article is at least harmless, and the trouble of painting it in such terrific colours might have been spared. But it is not true. Reason, writers, the practice of nations all accord in this position that those stipulations which contemplate the state of War—in other words which are designed to operate in case of War preserve their force and obligation when war takes place. To what end else all the stipulations which have been cited from so many Treaties?

   Note This Writer is as profligate as he is absurd. Besides imputing to Camillus in general terms a number of things of which he never dreamt, he has the effrontery to forge as a literal quotation from him calling it his own language, & designating by inverted commas, a passage respecting the impressing of seamen which certainly not in terms, nor even in substance upon fair construction, are to be found in any thing he has written.

Previous to a conclusion, I shall observe barely with a view to accuracy, that the article leaves unprotected all Vessels goods and merchandize, every species of property indeed, except debts between individuals and the property of individuals in the public funds and in public and private banks. With this exception whatever may have been before liable to confiscation or sequestration, still remains so, notwithstanding anything contained in this article.
To overrate the value or force of our own arguments is a natural foible of self love—to be convinced without convincing others is no uncommon fate of a writer or speaker but I am more than ordinarily mistaken if every mind open to Conviction will not have been satisfied by what has been offered that the tenth article of the Treaty lately negotiated with Great Britain does nothing but confirm by a positive agreement a rule of the law of Nations indicated by reason supported by the better opinion of Writers ratified by modern usage—dictated by justice and good faith recognised by formal acts and declarations of different nations—witnessed by diplomatic testimony—sanctioned by our treaties with other countries and by treaties between other countries—and conformable with sound policy and the true interest of the U States.
The discussion has been drawn out to so great length, because the objections to this article are among those which have been urged with most warmth and emphasis against the Treaty, and its vindication from them if satisfactory must go far towards securing to it the public suffrage. Citizens of America! tis for you to perform your part of the task; tis for you to weigh with candor the arguments which have been submitted to your judgments; to consult without byass the integrity of your hearts; to exile prejudice, and to immolate on the altar of Truth the artifices of Cabal and Falshood.

   In applying the character of dishonesty & turpitude to the principle of confiscation or sequestration, I am far from intending to brand as dishonest men all those whose opinions favor it. I know there are some ardent spirits chargeable with the error of whose integrity I think well.

 There can then be no danger that Patriotism will have to lament, or National Honor to blush at the sentence you shall pronounce.
The articles, which adjust the matters of controversy between the two Countries, all those which are permanent, have now been reviewed. Let me appeal to the consciences of those who have accompanied me in the Review. If these articles were all that composed the Treaty, would it be better that they should exist, or that all the sources of rupture and War with Great Britain should have survived the negotiation to extinguish them and should still subsist in full vigour? If every enlightened and honest man must prefer the former, then let me make another observation & put another question. The remaining articles of the Treaty which constitute its commercial part expire by their own limitation at the end of twelve years. It is in the power of either party consistently with the instrument to terminate them at the expiration of two years after the present war between France & Great Britain. Is it at all probable that they can contain any thing so injurious, considering the short duration which may be assigned to them, as to counterballance the important consideration of preserving peace to this young Country, as to warrant the excessive clamours which have been raised, as to authorise the horrid calumnies which are vented and to justify the systematic efforts which are in operation to convulse our country and to hazard even civil War.

Camillus


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to the Editor of The Argus, [6 November 1795]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Greenleaf, Thomas

[New York, November 6, 1795]

For the Minerva.
The Defence No. 22, if I recollect aright was sent you on Sunday last, accompanied with an intimation that the subsequent numbers would be transmitted with greater frequency, and requesting that their publication might be accelerated. You could be at no loss to conjecture the motive. Since that time, to facilitate dispatch, two other numbers have been sent you.
Instead of acceleration, your paper of the 5th inst. announces that you had resolved to delay the publication of No. 22 ’till Saturday—and to diminish in future by one half the place you had before allowed to these papers in your Gazette; the effect of which would be extremely to retard their progress.
This circumstance obliges me to change the channel of the publication and to recall the papers now in your hands, which you will accordingly deliver to the bearer.
You are at the same time requested to insert in your paper this explanation of the reason for the change. It will remain with the Public to judge, whether considering the general uniform complexion of your paper, and the numerous columns constantly devoted to views opposite to those of Camillus, it would really have been truly an “imposition,” to allow to that writer the full proportion of place which his performance requires and to have continued so far to give to your paper a little diversity of tint. And it will remain with you, by transcribing from other papers or not, to the extent of the six columns you mention to have destined for Camillus, to manifest whether this resolution was designed only to check his progress or to banish him entirely from your paper.

Camillus
November, 6th, 1795.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 10 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir,
Philadelphia 10th. Nov. 1795.

(Private)
Your favor of the 5th. has been duly received, but nothing was said in it of young Fayette. I am willing, as I said in my last, to receive him under any circumstances, or in any manner you may conceive best; & wish to know what that is.
Having, since I wrote to you on the 29th. ult received more agreeable—tho’ not conclusive—accounts from abroad, I pray you to suspend your superstructure until you receive a ground plan from me, which shall be in a few days with better, or at least with more ample materials.
Yours always—and very affectionately

Go: Washington
Colo. Hamilton


Title: Explanation, [11 November 1795]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[New York, November 11, 1795]

A very virulent attack has recently been made upon the President of the U States, the present Secretary of the Treasury, and myself as his predecessor in office, on the ground of extra payments to The President on account of his salary. The charges against all the three are no less heinous than those of intentional violation of the constitution, of the laws, and of their oaths of office. I annex the epithet intentional, because though not expressly used in the terms of the attack, it is implied in every line of it; since an involuntary error of construction, if that could even be made out, would not warrant the imputations “of contemning and despising every principle which the people have established for the security of their rights, of setting at defiance all law and authority, and of servile submission and compliance with the lawless will and pleasure of a President.”
Were considerations personal to myself alone to be consulted the present attempt would be treated with no greater attention than has been shewn to all the anonymous slanders by which I have been so long and so implacably persecuted. But convinced by a course of observation for more than four years that there exists in this country an unprincipled and daring combination, to obstruct by any means, which shall be necessary and can be commanded, not short even of force, the due and efficient administration of the present government, to make our most important national interests subservient to those of a foreign power—and as means to these ends to destroy by calumny and misrepresentation the confidence of the people in the truly virtuous men of our country and to transfer it with the power of the State to ambitious hypochrites, and intriguing demagogues perhaps corrupted partisans perceiving likewise that this infatuated combination in the belief that the well earned esteem and attachment of his fellow Citizens towards the actual chief Magistrate of the UStates is the principal remaining obstacle to the execution of their plan are making the most systematic efforts to extinguish those sentiments in the breasts of the people—I think it a duty to depart from my general rule of Conduct and to submit to the public with my name an explanation of the principles which have governed the Treasury Department on the point in question.
I shall state in the first place, that the rule with regard to expenditures and appropriations, which has uniformly regulated the practice of the Department is this (viz) to issue no money from the Treasury but for an object, for which there was a law previously passed, making an appropriation and designating the fund from which the money was to arise. But there being such a law and an adequate fund to support the expenditure, it was deemed justifiable as well before as after the service was performed or the supply obtained, for which the appropriation was designed, to make disbursements from the Treasury for the object, if it appeared safe and expedient so to do. If made before, it was an advance or anticipation for which the party was charged and held accountable till exonerated by the performance of the service or the furnishing of the supply. If afterwards, it was a payment and went to some general head of Account as such.
Thus, if a sum was appropriated for provisions for the army for a particular year it was common to make advances on account to the contractors long before the supplies were furnished. If the law was passed in one year for the next, there would be no hesitation to make the advance immediately after the passing of the law and before the year to which the appropriation was applicable had commenced. So also sums would be furnished to the Department of War in anticipation of the monthly pay of the officers and soldiers, and advances on account of pay in particular circumstances and for good reasons would be actually made by that Department to the officers and soldiers. And so likewise advances have been made for the use of the President and of the members [of] both houses of Congress in anticipation of their respective compensations.

It will without difficulty be comprehended that the practice of the Treasury has in some cases been essential to the due course of the public service.
Every good judge will be sensible that from the insufficiency of individual capitals to such large advances as the supplies of an army require, it was indispensable to the obtaining of them that anticipations from the Treasury should enable the contractors to do what otherwise they would have been unable to do—and that these anticipations must also have had the effect of procuring the supplies on cheaper terms to the U States.
When it is considered too that the army has operated for several years past at [five or six] hundred miles distance from the seat of Government and a considerable part of the year from the rudeness of the country & obstructions of the Waters, it is impracticable to transmit monies to the scenes of payment—it will be perceived that without advances from the Treasury in anticipation of their pay, not only a compliance with the engagements of the Government would have been impossible—but the troops must have been always left most unreasonably in arrear. In June 1794 Congress passed a law declaring that the army should in future be paid in such manner as that the arrears should not exceed two months. Compliance with this regulation renders anticipations at certain seasons a matter of physical necessity; yet that law gave no special authority for the purpose.
A particular case, by way of example in which, distinct from general rules, advances or anticipations in the war department are necessary respects the recruiting service. The officers who are for a long time distant from their corps require the accommodation of an advance of pay to be able to discharge their duty. Towards the possibility of enlisting men, it is indispensable they should carry with them the bounty money and this upon conjecture of what may be done and with the possibility that from not being able to obtain the men the ultimate expenditure may not take place. This instance will suggest to reflection an infinite number of cases in the course of the public service in which a disbursement from the Treasury must precede the execution of the object and may exceed the sum finally requisite for it.
These cases indicate the expediency, and even necessity of the construction which has regulated the practice of the Treasury. And it might be shewn if necessary that it is analogous to the practice under the former Government of the UStates and under other governments; and this too where the theory of expenditure equally is, as expressed in our Constitution, that no money shall be expended but in consequence of an appropriation by law.
It remains to see whether this rule of conduct so indispensable in the practice of the department be permitted by a fair interpretation of the constitution and the laws.
The general injunction of the Constitution (Article I § IX) is that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.”
That clause appears to me to be exactly equivalent to this other clause—“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but for which there is an appropriation made by law.” In other words before money can legally issue from the Treasury for any purpose, there must be a law authorising an expenditure and designating the object and the fund. This being done the disbursement may be made consistently with the constitution either by way of advance or anticipation or by way of payment. It may precede or follow the service supply or other object of expenditure. Either will equally satisfy the words “in consequence of” which are not words of strict import, but may be taken in several senses—In one sense, that is “in consequence of” a thing, which, being bottomed upon it, follows it in order of time. A disbu[r]sement must be either an advance or anticipation or a payment. Tis not presumeable that the constitution meant to distinguish between these two modes of disbursement. It must have intended to leave this matter wholly to convenience.
The design of the constitution in this provision was as I conceive to secure these important ends—that the purpose the limit and the fund of every expenditure should be ascertained by a previous law. The public security is complete in this particular if no money can be expended but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.
Even in cases which affect only individual interests, if the terms of a law will bear several meanings that is to be preferred which will best accord with convenience. In cases that concern the public this rule is applicable with still greater latitude. Public convenience is to be promoted, public inconvenience to be avoided. The business of administration requires accommodation to so great a variety of circumstances, that a rigid construction would in countless instances arrest the wheels of Government. It has been shewn that the construction which has been adopted at the Treasury is in many cases essential in practice. This inclines the scale in favour of it—the words “in consequence of” admitting of various significations.
The practice of the legislature as to appropriation laws favours this construction.
These laws are generally distinct from those which create the cause of expenditure. Thus the act which declares that the President shall be allowed twenty five thousand dollars ⅌ annum, that which declares that each senator and representative shall be intitled to so much per day, that which determines that each officer and soldier shall have so much per Month &c. neither of these acts is an act of appropriation. The Treasury has not conceived itself authorised to expend a single cent upon the basis of any such act; regarding it merely as constituting a claim upon the Government for a certain compensation, but requiring prior to an actual disbu[r]sement for such claim, that a law be passed authorising the disbursement out of a specified fund. This is what is considered as the law by which the appropriation is made; from which results to the Public a double security.
Hence every year a particular act (sometimes more than one) is passed appropriating certain sums for the various branches of the public service, and indicating the funds from which the monies are to be drawn. The object, the sum and the fund are all that are to be found in these acts. They are commonly, if not universally, silent as to any thing further.
This I regard as constructive of the clause in the constitution. The appropriation laws are in execution of that provision and fulfil all its purposes. And they are silent as to the distinction between anticipation & payment, in other words, as to the manner of disbursement.
Hence I conclude that if there exist a law appropriating a certain sum for the salary of the President, an advance upon that sum in anticipation of the service, is as constitutional as a payment after the service has been performed; in other words, that the advance of a quarters salary at the beginning of a quarter is as much warranted by the constitution as the payment of it at the end of a quarter.
It is in the sense, that the present Secretary of the Treasury has affirmed that “not one Dollar has at any time been advanced for the use of The President for which there was not an existing appropriation.” He did not mean to say, that no money had been advanced in anticipation of the service; for the fact is otherwise, but nothing is more true than that the sums disbursed were within the limits of the sums appropriated. If there was an excess at the end of one year, there had been a previous appropriation for a succeeding year, upon which that excess was an advance.
It is objected to this practice, that the death of the party between the advance to him and the expiration of an equivalent term of service, by superseding the object of the advance, would render it a misexpenditure of so much money and therefore a violation of the constitution.
I answer that the same casualty might have the same effect in other cases, in which it would be against common sense to suppose that an advance might not be made with legality and propriety.
Suppose for example a law was to be passed directing a given quantity of powder to be purchased for public use, and appropriating a definite sum for the purchase, and suppose intelligence brought to the secretary of the Treasury that the quantity required could be procured for prompt payment at Boston. It cannot in such case be doubted that the sum appropriated might legally be advanced to an Agent to proceed to Boston to make the purchase. Yet that Agent might die, and the money never be applied according to its destination, or the desired quantity might be procured for a less sum, and a ballance remain in his hands. In either case, there would be money disbursed which was not actually applied to the object of the law—in the last case there is no final object for the disbursement because the ballance is a surplus. This proves that the possibility of a failure or falling short of the object for which an advance is made is not an objection to its legality. Indeed the consequence is a possible one in every case of an anticipation, whether to contractors or to other public agents, for a determinate or an indeterminate purpose.
The only consequence is that the sum unapplied must be accounted for and refunded. The distinction here again is between an advance and a payment. More cannot certainly be finally paid than is equal to the object of an appropriation, though the sum appropriated exceed the sum necessary. But more may be advanced, to the full extent of the appropriation, than may be ultimately exhausted by the object of the expenditure, on the condition which always attends an advance of accounting for the application & refunding an excess. This is a direct answer to the question whether more can be paid than is necessary to satisfy the object of an appropriation. More cannot be paid, but more may be advanced, on the accountability of the person to whom it is advanced.
But risk of loss to the public may attend this principle? This is true, but it [is] as true in all the cases of advances to Contractors &c. as in those of advances upon salaries and compensations—nor does this point of risk affect the question of legality—it to touches merely that of a prudent exercise of discretion. When large sums are advanced it is usual to obtain security for their due application or for indemnification. This security is greater or less according to the circumstances of the parties to whom the advances are made. When small sums are advanced, especially if for purposes quickly fulfilled, and to persons who are themselves adequate sureties, no collateral security is demanded. The head of the department is responsible to the Government for observing proper measure and taking proper precautions. If he acts so as to incur justly the charge of improvidence or profusion he may be dismissed or punished according to the nature of his misconduct.
But the principle which is set up would, it is said, be productive of confusion distress and bankruptcy at the Treasury, since the appropriation for the support of Government is made payable out of the accruing duties of each year, and an established right in the officers of Government to claim their compensations, which amount to several hundred thousand dollars per annum, either on the first day of the year, or on the first day of a quarter before the services were rendered, would create a demand at a time when there might not and possibly would not be a single shilling in the Treasury arising out of that appropriation to satisfy it.

   These ideas with regard to the administration of the fund appropriated are very crude & incorrect—but it would complicate the subject to go into the developpemts.

It is not pretended, that there is an established right in the Officers to claim their salaries, by anticipation, at the beginning of a year or at the beginning of a quarter—no such right exists. The performance of the service must precede the right to demand payment. But it does not follow that because there is no right in the officer to demand payment, it may not be allowable for the Treasury to advance upon account for good reasons. A discretion of this sort in the head of the department can at least involve no embarrassment to the Treasury, of the formidable evils indicated; for the officer who makes the advance being himself the judge whether there is a competent fund and whether it can be made with convenience to the Treasury he will only make it when he perceives that no evil will ensue.
Let me recur to the example of advances to contractors for supplying the army. Suppose that in the terms of contract certain advances were stipulated and made; but it turned out nevertheless that the contractor disappointed in the funds on which he had relied could not execute his contract without further advances. Here there would be no right on his part to demand such further advances; but there would be a discretion in the Treasury to make them. This is an example of a discretion to do what there is not a right to demand. The existence of this discretion can do no harm, because the head of the Treasury will judge whether the state of it permits the required advances. But It is essential that the discretion should exist, because otherwise there might be a failure of supplies which no plan that could be substituted might be able to avert.
Yet the discretion is in neither case an arbitrary one. It is one which the head of the department is responsible to exercise with a careful eye to the public interest and safety. The abuse of it, in other words, the careless or wanton exercise of it, would be a cause of dismission for incapacity or of punishment for malconduct.
Thus advances on account of salaries or to Contractors for procuring public supplies might be carried so far and so improvidently managed as to be highly culpable and justly punishable; but this is a distinct question from the violation of constitution or law.
In all the cases, it is a complete answer to the objection of embarrassment to the Treasury, that not the will of the parties but the judgment of the head of the department is the rule and measure of the advances which he may make within the bounds of the sums appropriated by law.
I consider the law which has been cited with regard to the pay of the army as a legislative recognition of the rule of practice at the Treasury. The legislature could not have been ignorant that it was impracticable at certain seasons of the year to convey the money to the army to fulfil their injunction, without an advance from the Treasury before the pay became due. They presuppose a right to make this advance and enjoin that the Troops shall not be left more than two months in the year. The origin of this law enforces the observation. It is known that it passed in consequence of representations that the pay of the army was left too long in arrear, and it was intended to quicken the measures of payment. No person in either house of the legislature, I believe, doubted that there was power to precede the service by advances so as to render the payment even more punctual than was enjoined.
Indeed such advances when the army operated at a distance were necessary to fulfil the contract with the army. Its pay became due monthly, and in strictness of contract was to be made at the end of each month; a thing impossible unless advanced from the Treasury before it became due. No special authority was ever given for this purpose to the Treasury, but it appears to have been left to take its course on the principle, that the disbursement might take place as soon as there was an appropriation, though in anticipation of the term of service.
The foregoing observations vindicate, I trust, the construction of the Treasury as to the power of making disbursements in anticipation of services and supplies, if there has been a previous appropriation by law for the object, and if the advances never exceed the amount appropriated; and at the same time evince that this practice involves no violation of the constit[ut]ional provision with respect to appropriations.
I proceed to examine that clause which respects the pay of the President. It is in these words—“The President shall at stated times receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished, during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the UStates or any of them.”
I understand this clause as equivalent to the following—“There shall be established by law for the services of the President a periodical compensation, which shall not be increased nor dim[in]ished during the term for which he shall have been elected, and neither the U States nor any state shall allow him any emolument in addition to his periodical compensation.”
This will I think, at first sight, appear foreign to the question of a provisional advance by the Treasury on account of the compensation periodically established by Law for his services.
The manifest object of the provision is to guard the independence of the President from the legislative controul of the UStates or of any state, by the ability to withold lessen or increase his compensation.
It requires that the law shall assign him a definite compensation for a definite time. It prohibits the legislature from increasing or dim[in]ishing this compensation during any term of his election, and it prohibits every state from granting him an additional emolument. This is all that the clause imports.
It is therefore satisfied, as to the U States, when the legislature has provided that the President shall be allowed a certain sum for a certain term of time and so long as it refrains from making an alteration in the provision. All beyond this is foreign to the subject.

The Legislature having done this, an advance by the Treasury in anticipation of the service cannot be a breach of the provision. Tis in no sense an additional allowance by the UStates. Tis a mere advance or loan upon account of the established periodical compensation. Will legal ideas or common parlance warrant the giving the denomination of additional compensation to the mere anticipation of the term of an established allowance? If they will not, tis plain such an advance is no breach of this part of the constitution.
If the clause is to be understood literally it leads to an absurdity. The terms are “The President shall at stated times receive &c” and again “he shall not receive within that period &c.”
His allowance is at the rate of 25000 Dollars per annum, 6250 Dollars quarter yearly. Suppose at the end of a year, an arrear of 5000 Dollars was due to him, which he omits to receive till some time in the succeeding year, and in the succeeding year actually receives that ballance with his full salary for the last year. Tis plain that he would not have received in the whole more than he was allowed by law, and yet in the stated period of one year he would have received 30,000 Dollars, five thousand more than his salary for the year. In a literal sense then constitutional provision as to actual payment would not have been complied with; for within the first of the stated periods he would not have received the compensation allotted and within the second of them, he would have received more. In a literal sense, it would be necessary to make the payment at the precise day, to the precise amount, neither more nor less; which as a general rule the indispensable forms of the Treasury render impossible. It follows that actual receipt or payment are not the criterion but the absolute definitive allowance by law. An advance beforehand or a payment afterwards are equally consistent with the true spirit & meaning of this part of the constitution.
Let us now see, if the construction of the Treasury violates the law which establishes the Presidents compensation.
The act of the 24th Septr. 1789 allows to the President at the rate of 25000 dollars per annum, to commence from the time of his entering on the duties of his office, and to be paid quarterly out of the Treasury of the U States.”
The question is what is to be understood by these words, to be paid quarterly out of the Treasury of the UStates?
The conception of the Treasury has been that these words, as used in this and in the analogous cases, were meant to define the time, when the right of an individual to the compensation earned became absolute; not as a command to the Treasury to issue the money at the precise day and no other.
As mentioned above, the indispensable forms of the Treasury, in compliance with the law establishing the department and to secure a due accountability, make it impracticable to pay at the day; and if expressions of the kind in question are to be construed literally and as a positive injection to the Treasury to issue the money at the period defined, it will be as much a breach of the law to pay afterwards as to advance beforehand.
The position that an after payment would be a breach of the law will hardly be contended for, and if not—the alternative seems to be the construction adopted by the Treasury. Such expressions denote simply that at certain periods individuals acquire a perfect right to particular sums of money for their services which it becomes a matter of course to pay; but they are not obliged to receive it at the day, nor is the Treasury restrained from paying it afterwards or from anticipating by way of loan, if there are adequate reasons for such anticipation.
It is not true as alleged that the invariable practice of the Treasury, as to compensations for services differs in principle from what was done in the case of the President.
Instances to the contrary have been stated. As to what regards the army, there has been sufficient explanation.
But it will be useful to be more particular as to the course which has been pursued with reference to the two houses of Congress.
The law that regulates their compensation (passed the 22d of Sep. 1789) allows to each member a compensation of six dollars for every day he shall attend the House, to which he belongs, together with six Dollars for every 20 Miles of distance to & from his place of residence, and directs that the compensation which shall be due shall be certified by the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives and shall be passed as public accounts and paid out of the Treasury.
By an arrangement between each house and the Treasury Department the course actually pursued has been as follows.
Certain gross sums usually of   at the commencement of each session & from time to time afterwards have been advanced from the Treasury, at request to the President of the Senate for the members of the Senate, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the members of that house; on account and frequently in anticipation of their accruing compensations. The President of the Senate in the Senate & the Speaker of the House of Representatives in that house disbursed the monies to the individuals, & afterwards upon the close of each session settled an account at the Treasury, accompanied with the certificates required by the law and the receipts of the members which were examined adjusted & passed as other public accounts.
Whether there were any advances actually made to the members, in anticipation of their compensations, was a point never discussed between the Treasury & the presiding officers of the two houses, with whom the money was deposited, but I understand that examples of such advances did exist in relation to the House of Representatives. The fact is however immaterial to the point in issue. That must be tested by the times of the advances from the Treasury, and it is certain that these were usually made in anticipation of compensations to grow due; and it is also certain that the course was well understood by both houses of Congress, & is exhibited by the Accounts of the Treasurer laid before them in each session.

If therefore the advances for the President were unconstitutional and illegal; those for both houses of Congress were equally so; and if the President be chargeable with a violation of the constitution of the laws and of his oath of office on account of extra-advances to his secretaries, whether with or without his privity, the members of both houses of Congress, without exception, have been guilty of the same crimes, in consequence of the extra advances with their privity to the presiding officers of their respective houses.
A distinction may possibly be attempted to be taken in the two cases from this circumstance—that the law which allots the compensation of the members of the two houses does not use the words “to be paid every day out of the Treasury” while that which establishes the Presidents compensation does use the terms “to be paid quarterly out of the Treasury.” But this distinction would be evidently a cavil. When a law fixes the term of a compensation; whether per day ⅌ month per quarter or per annum, if it says nothing more, it is implied that it is payable at each epoch out of the Treasury, in the same sense as if this was expressly said. This observation applies as well to the monthly pay of the Army as to the dayly pay of Congress. The motive to the arrangement which was made for the payment of the members of Congress was two fold. It was to obviate embarrassment to them by facilitating and accelerating the receipt of their compensations and to avoid an inconvenient multiplication of adjustments entries warrants & payments. The theory of the provision admitted of as many Treasury settlements entries warrants & payments each day as there were members in both houses.
Having examined the question as it stands upon the constitution & the laws, I proceed to examine the course of the fact.
But previous to this, I shall take notice of one point, about which there has been doubt and which it is not within my present recollection whether definitively settled or not by the accounting officers of the Department. It respects the time of the commencement of the Presidents compensation. The law establishing it refers to the time of his entering upon the duties of his office, but without defining that time.

When in a constitutional & legal sense did the President enter upon the duties of his Office?
The constitution enjoins that before he enters upon the execution of his office, he shall take a certain oath, which is prescribed. This oath was not taken till the 30th. of April 1789. If we date the entrance upon the duties of his office at the time of taking this oath, it determines the epoch to be the 30th. of April 1789.
But there is room for another construction. The 3 of March 1789 is the day, when the term, for which the President Vice President & the members of Congress were first elected, was deemed to commence. The constitution declares that the President shall hold his office for four years; and it is presumeable that the clause respecting his compensation contemplates its being for the whole term for which he is to hold his office. Its object may otherwise be evaded.
It is also (I believe) certain that the President may execute his office and do valid acts as President without previously taking the oath prescribed; though in so doing if voluntary he would be guilty of a breach of the constitution & would be liable to punishment. The taking of the oath is not therefore necessarily the criterion of entering upon the duties of office.
It is a fact too if I remember right that at New York the place assigned for the first meeting of the Government on the 3d. of March 1789—which might be considered as an entrance upon the duties of his office; though from the delays which attended the meeting of Congress the oath was deferred till the 30th of April following.
On the strength of these facts, it may be argued that by force of the constitution, dating the commencement of the Presidents term of service on the 3d. of March 1789, the law respecting his compensation ought to be considered as referring to that period for a virtual entrance upon the duties of his Office.
In stating this construction, I must not be understood to adopt it. I acknowlege that the other as most agreeable to the more familiar sense of the terms of the law has appeared to me preferable; though I had reason to believe that an important officer of the Government (I do not mean the President) once thought otherwise. The result in point of fact will vary as the one or the other is deemed the true construction.
I return to an examination of the course of the transaction.
Authentic statements which have been published with some supplementary ones received from the Treasury upon the occasion exhibit the following results.
I  Result. The sums advanced for the use of the President from the Treasury have never exceeded the sums previously appropriated by law; though they have sometimes exceeded sometimes fallen short of the sums actually due for services. This is thus explained—

An Act of the 24th of September 1789 Appropriated for paying the compensation of the President Dollars
25000

The sums advanced to the 8th. of April 1790 & charged to this appropriation are
25000

An Act of the 26 of March 1790 appropriates for the same purpose
25000

The sums advanced from May 4th. 1790 to the 28 Feby. 1791 & charged to this appropriation
25000

An Act of the 11th. of Feby. 1791 appropriates for the same purpose
25000

The sums advanced from the 28th. February 1791 to 27 of December in the same year & charged to this appropriation are
22150

Excess of appropriation beyond the Advances Dr.
 2850

An Act the 23 of December 1791 appropriates for the same purpose
25000

The sums advanced from the 3d. of Jany. 1792 to the 15 of January 1793 & charged to this appropriation are
25000

An Act of the 28 of February 1793 appropriates for the same purpose
25000

The sums advanced from the 9th. of March 1793 to the 27 of December in the same year & charged to this appropriation are
25000

An Act of the 14th of March 1794 appropriates for the same purpose Dollars
25000

The sums advanced from the 17 of March 1794 to the first of January 1795 & charged to the same appropriation are
25000

An Act of the 2d. of January 1795 appropriates for the same purpose
25000

The sums advanced from the 12 of January 1795 and prior to the 1st of October in the same year and charged to this appropriation are
12500

Excess of appropriation beyond advances on the first of August 1795
12500

Excess of Appropriation on the Act of the 11 of February 1791
2850

Total Excess of appropriations beyond advances to the 1st of October 1795.Dr.
15350

The residue of the proposition is illustrated by the quarterly statement of salary and advances at foot.

II   Result   The Treasury never has been in advance for the President beyond the sums actually accrued and due to him for services to the amount of one quarter’s salary. The largest advance at any one time is 6154 dollars. A quarter’s salary is 6250 Dollars. Deducting the sums at certain times in arrear from those at other times in advance, the average of the advances for the whole term of his service is about . The particulars of this result appear in the statement at foot. This statement is digested by quarters of the Calendar year which is the established course of the Treasury & a course essential to the order of its affairs; that is to say it is essential there should be certain fixed periods to which the ordinary stated disbursements are referred & in conforming with which the Accounts of the Treasury are kept.
III   Result   On the first of October 1795, there were actually due to the President for his compensation over and above all advances for his use the sum of 846 Dollars. This likewise appears from the statement at foot and intirely refutes the malevolent suggestion which has appeared of an accumulation of advances to twelve or fifteen [thousand] Dollars.
IV   Result   The sums advanced for the President prior to the commencement of the term of his second election the 3d. of March 1793 fall short of the sums appropriated for his compensation 2850 Dollars: thus

The aggregate of the sums appropriated for four years from the 29 of September 1789 to the 23 of December 1791 inclusively is Ds.
100 000

The amount of all the sums advanced prior to the 3d. of March 1793 is
97 150

Excess of appropriations beyond advances. =
 2 850

It is nevertheless true that not only there have been frequent anticipations of the Presidents salary (as appears more particularly in the statement at foot) but counting from the 30th of April 1789 as the commencement of his compensation the sums advanced for his use prior to the 3d. of March 1793 the expiration of his first term of election exceed those actually due to that period by 1108 Dollars & 34 Cents.
If on the contrary, the construction were adopted which dates his compensation on the 4th of March 1789 there would have been a ballance due to him on the 4 of March 1795 of 2850 Dollars.
But proceeding on the first supposition the whole question still turns upon the legality of advances. If it was legal to make him an advance in anticipation of his salary within any period of his election—within one quarter on account of a succeeding quarter, it was equally legal to do it within one year on account [of] a succeeding year and within one term of an election on account of a succeeding term. The only inquiry would be in either case—will the sum advanced be within the bounds of the sums before that time appropriated? It has been seen, that the sums appropriated for the first four years of service exceeded those advanced prior to the commencement of the second period of election by 2850 Dollars. Besides this on the 28 of February 1793 there was a further appropriation of 25000 Dollars so that at the beginning of the second term, the total appropriation exceeded the total disbursements by 27850 Dollars.
Thus has it been shewn, that the advances for the use of the President have been governed by a rule of construction, which has obtained in analogous cases, or more truly which has regulated the general course of disbursements from the Treasury—a rule which I trust has been demonstrated to be consonant with the Constitution and the laws.
It is requisite to inquire a little further whether there has been any improper use or rather abuse of the discretion which is contended for, for here there is likewise an unquestionable responsibility. It is seen that the advances have at no time equalled one quarters salary.
I ask was it unreasonable or unfit, if constitutional and legal, to afford the President of the U States an accommodation of this extent?

I pledge my veracity, that I have always understood and to this moment I have good reason to be satisfied, that the expences of the President, those of his household and others incident to his official situation, have fully equalled if not on some occasions exceeded the allowance made to him by the U States. Under this conviction, especially, how could the head of a department hesitate by so small an accommodation as the advance of less than a quarters salary to enable the President of the U States to meet his expences as they accrued, without being obliged to intrench upon his own private resources, or to resort to the expedient of borrowing to defray expences imposed upon him by public situation? I knew that no possible risk could attend the advance, little considerable as it was. The estate of the President was answerable in case of death or other premature vacancy, and abundant for the indemnification of the Government.
Reasons of a peculiar kind forbade hesitation. The scale of expence was unavoidably such as to render the income even of what is deemed a large landed property in this country a slender auxiliary. Without an advance from the Treasury it was not improbable borrowing might be necessary. Was it just to compel the President to resort to that expedient for a purpose in fact public, at his private expence? Was it for the dignity of the Nation that he should have been exposed to a necessity, an embarrassment of this sort?
My judgment and feelings answered both these questions in the negative. I entertained no doubt of the constitutionality or legality of the advance, and I thought the making of it due to the situation—due to propriety—due to every public consideration connected with the subject. I can never regret it.
How far the President was privy to the course of advances, I cannot say. But it is certain they have been all made to his private secretaries upon a general arrangement and not by special directions from him. And I think it proper to add that very early in the day, and probably before any was made, on an application by Mr. Lear, for a sum which would constitute an advance he qualified it by this observation—“if in your opinion it can be done with legality & perfect propriety.” I answered that I had no doubt of either.
I shall not attempt to assume any greater responsibility in this transaction than belongs to me but I have been accustomed to think that the responsibility for the due and regular disbursement of monies from the Treasury lies exclusively with the Officers of the Department. And that except in a very palpable and glaring case, the charge of blameable participation could not fall on any other person.
As between the officers of the Treasy, I take the responsibility to stand thus. The Secretary and Comptroller in granting warrants upon the Treasurer are both answerable for their legality. In this respect the Comptroller is a check upon the Secretary. With regard to the expediency of an advance, in my opinion the right of judging is exclusively with the head of the Department. The Comptroller has no voice in this matter. So far therefore as concerns legality, in the issues of money, while I was in the Department, the Comptroller must answer with me. So far as a question of expediency, or the due exercise of discretion may be involved, I am solely answerable. And so uniformly was the matter understood between successive Comptrollers & myself—So also it is essential to the due administration of the department, that it should be understood.
I have stated my reasons for considering the advances made for the use of the President as constitutional legal and proper. But I pretend not to infallibi[li]ty. ’Tis possible I may have erred. But to convert error into guilt it must be supposed to have been wilful. To suppose it wilful it is necessary to trace it to some interested or sinister motive. If any appears let it be pointed out. It is not common for men to commit crimes of a deep die without some adequate inducement.
What criminal inducement could have probably influenced the rule of construction as to advances which has been stated to have been adopted & acted upon at the Treasury? What criminal inducement particularly could have led to the application of this rule to the Presidents compensation in so restricted a form as never once to equal one quarter’s salary? Who in his senses will believe that the President would consciously have hazarded the imputation of violating the constitution the laws and his oath of office, by imposing on the officers of the Treasury the necessity of making him so paltry an advance? falsely and ridiculously called a donation? Who will believe that those officers would have consented to expose themselves to the same imputation by a compliance, when they knew that the evidence of their guilt must regularly be communicated in each succeeding session to both houses of Congress and to the public at large? To believe either is to believe all the parties concerned foolish in the extreme, as well as profligate in the extreme, destitute equally of intellect as of principle.
To an observation made by Mr. Wolcott on the communications from the Treasury, it has been answered that there was no merit in the disclosure, because the number of Agents and the forms of the Treasury rendered it unavoidable. The fact is so. But the force of the observation turns upon the egregious folly of intentionally committing the crimes imputed, when it was certain beforehand that the means of detection must be furnished and without delay by the Treasury itself.
It is certain that there never has been the least attempt at mystery or concealment. The documents reported by the Treasury to both houses of Congress carried in their face the prominent evidence of what was done. Frequent and indiscriminate personal suggestions revealed the principle of action. It is evident, that it must have been understood and acquiesced in by all the members of the two houses of congress.
Hard would be the condition of public officers, if even a misconstruction of constitutional & legal provisions, attended with no symptom of criminal motive, carrying the proof of innocence in the openness and publicity of conduct, could justly expose them to the odious charges which on this occasion are preferred. Harder still would be their condition if in the management of the great and complicated business of a Nation the fact of misconstruction which is to constitute their guilt is to be decided by the narrow and rigid rules of a criticism—no less pedantic than malevolent! Preeiminently Hard in such circumstances, was the lot of the man who called to the head of the most arduous department in the public administration, in a new Government, without the guides of antecedent practice & precedent, had to trace out his own path and to adjust for himself the import and bearings of delicate and important provisions in the constitution & in the laws!
Reposing myself on a consciousness which in no possible situation can fail to prove an invulnerable shield to my tranquillity I leave to a candid Public to pronounce the sentence which is due to an attempt, on such a foundation, to erect against The President of the U States, my successor in Office and myself, the heinous charges of violation of the constitution, violation of the laws, exertion of arbitrary will on the one side, abject submission on the other misapplication of the public money and to complete the newspaper groupe—intentional Perjury!

A H

Quarterly statements of the account for compensation of the President of the United States from his taking the oath of office on the 30th April, 1789, to the 30th September, 1795.

1789

Dollars.

Sept. 30
Compensation from 30 April to 30th June, 1789.

4,246

Compensation one quarter ending 30th September, 1789,

6,250

10,496

Warrants drawn 26th sept. 1789
1,000

due to the President 30th sept.

9,496

Dec. 31. Compensation due,

6,250

15 746

Warrants drawn this quarter,
13,500

1790. due the President 31st December,

2,246

 March 31
compensation due

6,250

8,496

Warrants drawn,
8,246 66

Due the President 31st March,

249 34

June 30
compensation due,

6,250

6,499 34

Warrants drawn,
8,253 34

Due the United states 30th June,

1,754

Sept. 30
Warrants drawn,

9,000

10,754

Compensation due,
6,250

Due the United states 30th sept

4,504

Dec. 31
Warrants drawn,

6,000

10,504

Compensation due,
6,250

1791 Due the United states, 31st Dec.

4,254

March 31,
warrants drawn,

8,150

12,404

compensation due,
6,250

Due the United states 31st March,

6,154

June 30,
warrants drawn,

4,500

10,654

compensation due,
6,250

Due the United states 30th June,

4,404

Sept. 30,
warrants drawn,

8,050

12,404

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th sept.

6,154

Dec. 31,
warrants drawn,

5,500

11,654

compensation due,
6,250

1792. due the United states, 31st Dec,

5,404

March 31,
warrants drawn,

6,000

11,404

compensation due
6,250

due United States 31st March,

5,154

June 30,
warrants drawn,

6,000

11,154

compensation due,
6,250

due the U states, June 30,

4,904

Sept. 30,
warrants drawn,

2,500

7,404

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th sept

1,154

Dec. 31,
warrants drawn,

8,000

9,154

compensation due,
6,250

1793 Due the United states 31st Dec.

2,904

March 31,
Warrants drawn,

8,500

11,404

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 31st March,

5,154

June 30,
warrants drawn,

6,000

11,154

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th June,

4,904

Sept. 30,
warrants drawn,

6,000

10,904

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th sept

4,654

Dec. 31
warrants drawn

7,000

11,654

compensation due
6,250

1794. Due the United states 31st Dec.

5,404

March 31,
warrants drawn,

5,000

10,404

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 31st March,

4,154

June 30
warrants drawn,

6,000

10,154

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th June,

3,904

Sept. 30.
warrants drawn

7,000

10,904

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th sept.

4,654

Dec 31 warrants drawn,

6,000

10,654

compensation due,
6,250

1795. Due the United states 31st Dec.

4,404

March 31
warrants drawn,

7,000

11,404

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 31st March,

5,154

June 30.
warrants drawn,

4,000

9,154

compensation due,
6,250

due the United states 30th June,

2,904

Sept. 30.
warrants drawn,

2,500

5,404

compensation due,
6,250

Due the President, 30th Sept. 1795,

846

Proof.

Compensation from April 30, to June 30, 1789, 62 days,
4,246

Compensation from July 1, 1789, to Sept. 30, 1795, 6 years 3 months,
156,250

Total due dollars,
160,496

Advanced till the end of 1791, pr. printed statement,
72,150

Ditto in 1792,
22,500

Ditto in 1793,
27,500

Ditto in 1794,
24,000

Ditto in 1795, to Sept. 30,
13,500

159,650

Balance due the President,
    846

Dols.   160,496

Treasury Department, Register’s Office, Nov. 13, 1795.
Extract from the books of the Treasury.
Joseph Nourse, Register.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, [11 November 1795]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.

Dr. Sir
[New York, November 11, 1795]

At length I am able to send you the explanation I mentioned to you. The papers upon which it is founded are returned that you may compare & if necessary correct. You may by altering the body or by a note rectify any inaccuracy.
You will observe marks in the margin which will require particular attention. A Let the distance if not so now be rightly stated.
B insert the most usual sum or sums. I think twas 10000 to Senate 20000 to House of Representatives.
C If you think it best you may leave out here & afterwards all that concerns the construction referring the commencement of the compensation to the 4th of March 1789. I think in this respect something will depend on question whether the Treasury has finally taken its ground. And even then a note at foot as after closing the letter may be considered instead of striking out. Do as you please on this point.
F examine the calculation that gives this ballance.
I will thank you to have a proof Sheet brought you. You observe the quarterly statement is to be subjoined? Will it not be best that the Register should sign it.
Yrs.

A Hamilton
Novr. 11. 1795
O Wolcott Esq


Title: [The Defence No. XXIII], [14 November 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, November 14, 1795]


Title: [The Defence No. XXIV], [14 November 1795]
From: “Camillus”,King, Rufus
To:

[New York, November 14, 1795]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 14 November 1795
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Philadelphia, November 14, 1795. On November 16, 1795, Wolcott wrote to Hamilton: “I sent you on Saturday an imperfect translation of Fauchet’s letter.” Letter not found.]


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jean Marie de Bordes, 15 November 1795
From: Bordes, Jean Marie de
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Philadelphia, November 15, 1795. “… On the end of 1776 being recommended to you by General Washington, I was received and Served as a volunteer in your company of Artillery.… Few days after, from your company I was promoted to the duty of an aid-de-camp and temporaly acted as a Brigade-major… to the end of this memorable Campain. Called afterwards by peculiar reasons to the South of America, I … made the tedious and fruitless expedition of Florida. About this very time war was declared between france and England.… I repaired to the french west-indies, there got a commission in their Colonial troops, and soon coming over again to this Continent had an active part … in the unsuccessful Siege of Savannah. Thus was constantly addicted my military life and abilities to the Service of these both countries, to the proclamation of the peace, in 1783. Confined from that time to the retired line of a farmer in st. Domingo, I am now one of those recent and wretched victims whose properties are cruelly became the alternative prey of either consuming flames or of Successive ennemies who mutually contended for and snatched them out of their own bloody hands.… But … being now destitute of every way of living, I am under the unfortunate necessity of petitioning to the Congress the military emoluments which from the month of November 1776 to the end of 1778 are owed to me for my Services in America. In this you may and make no doubt but you’ll be particularly Serviceable to me.…”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 16 November 1795
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir,
Philadelphia 16th. Novr. 1795.

(Private & confidential)
The papers herewith enclosed are so full, on the subject of my former request, that nothing more remains than to refer to them for every information I can give, as the ground work of the Superstructure you are to build. When you are done with them be so good as to return the whole to me again, with those sent before; together with the letter respecting young Fayette, and the result, relative to him.
I would beg the favor of you to run your eye over the letter from Madam de Segur & let one of your young men make some enquiry into the truth of her narrative and if found just, to seal & forward my letter to her, safely. The reason why I give you this trouble, is, that applications of ye kind have been, and still are very frequent; and in more instances than one, impositions have been practiced on me. If this lady’s tale be true, her case is pitiable; and I have only to regret that the frequent calls upon my private purse, render it inconvenient for me to do more for her than the pittance I enclose to her.
With sincere, and affectionate esteem and regard I am ever yours

Go: Washington

PS. Be so good as to drop me a single [line] merely to say that this letter & its enclosures have got safely into your hands.

Colo. Hamilton


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 16 November 1795
From: Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My Dear Sir
Philadelphia Novr. 16. 1795.

Private
I sent you on Saturday an imperfect translation of Fauchets Letter I now send you a Copy of the original; you may at your discretion use the Letter, except causing copies to be taken, or suffering it to be printed.
Mr. Randolph has intensively circulated a Letter in which he attributes his disgrace to the artifices of a “British Faction”—his Letter is accompanied with an explanatory Certificate from Fauchet written at New port, which I have not seen. I am told however by persons who have seen it, that it is a weak evasive performance & only makes bad, worse. When the affair was opened to Randolph, he denied having recd. money or having made any proposition relative to money except on one occasion—which was this. He said that in the summer of 1794 Fauchet told him, that there was a meeting of persons in New York consisting among others of Mr. Hammond & Mr. Jaudenes, who were conspiring to destroy him (R) & Govr. Clinton. Being asked what he meant by destroying him & Govr. Clinton, Randolph answered, to destroy his character as Secretary of State, & Governr. Clintons as Govr. of New York. Randolph said, that he then enquired, whether proof could be got of this conspiracy, and that after some conversation he suggested to Mr. Fauchet, that as he (F) had the resources of the French Govt. at command he could obtain the proof. This foolish story could make no impression, & though Mr. Randolph promised to reduce it to writing, he omitted to do so.
There are reports in circulation I find which change the complection of this first declaration of Randolph & represent the conspiracy as one to ruin France. I also suspect that attempts will be made to represent you as concerned in it. But of this I am not certain—at any rate the whole is idle nonsense & Fauchets attempt by a posterior act, to invalidate the evidence of a confidential Letter will not succed. What must have been the footing of these men when they could familiarly talk about the subversion of the Govt. & inviting the French to aid the insurrection with money.
Yrs truly

Oliv. Wolcott Jr

Pray let me [know] if the Letters are recd.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Timothy Pickering, 17 November 1795
From: Pickering, Timothy
To: Hamilton, Alexander

(Private)
Dear Sir,
Philadelphia Nov. 17. 1795.

The interest you take in all public measures of importance, and the peculiar solicitude you must feel at this time of general agitation, when so many are busy apparently to undermine the government which you so effectually laboured to establish, and have so eminently contributed to maintain—induce me, with that sincerity which I trust has ever marked my character, and that frankness which an entire confidence in your judgement & candour inspires, to exhibit to your view the present situation of the great public offices.
Near three months have elapsed since the office of Secretary of State became vacant. At that moment matters of magnitude respecting the treaty with Great Britain demanded attention; & the general business of the office could not be suspended. With the President’s approbation I undertook the conduct of whatever required the uninterrupted agency of that officer: hoping however to have been relieved long ere this time from the burthen. The President, I know, took immediate measures to fill the office. He first tendered it to Judge Patterson, then to Governor Johnson of Maryland, to General Pinckney & to Mr. King, in succession: and by all it has been refused. The three former nominations the President early communicated to me: but the last he did not mention till about six days ago; nor indeed till then had he spoken of the subject since his last return from Mount Vernon. He recited these attempts to fill the office of Secretary of State; and that finally he had, thro’ Colo. Carrington, made a tender of it to Patrick Henry, who also declined it. In the event of this repulse, he proposed to Colo. Carrington’s acceptance the department of war, under the idea of removing me to the department of state. Colo. Carrington chose to remain where he is. The President having given this detail, made me the tender. I declined it, as not possessing the talents so much to be desired in a secretary of state, in the propriety and ability of whose conduct the dignity as well as the interests of the nation were so materially involved. On various grounds the President urged my acceptance: and after the many fruitless endeavours he had used to fill the office, I felt reluctant to give him a denial. I promised to consider of it.
The same day Mr. Wolcott called upon me: I found he had been consulted: I related what had passed: and he pressed me to accept the office: but I remained undecided. We repeatedly conversed about it afterwards: I still wished the office in abler hands. Last friday evening, going to see Mrs. Washington, I found the President & Mr. Wolcott in the antichamber: the President’s countenance manifestly uneasy. As soon as an opportunity offered, I spoke to Mr. Wolcott: the president was anxious for my determination; and again Mr. Wolcott urged me to take the office. I reflected a few minutes: the company retired: and I then made to the president the following declaration.
That I wished to keep him no longer in suspense; & that I would accept the office of secretary of state: but as I had no ambitious views; and fresh embarrassments might arise in his attempts to fill the department of war; I would propose, with submission to his opinion, that things should for the present remain as they were; I would continue my attention to both departments; if that of war could be filled to his satisfaction, I would go to the department of state; if a character well adapted to the latter should present, I would remain where I was: in one word, to free him from all embarrassment, I would serve in one office or the other as the public good should require. The president answered “That is very liberal;” and desired me to call the next morning to consider of a successor in the department of war.
The President had examined his list of offices in the late war; and selected the most prominent characters, whose names you will find in the inclosed list. Of these you will see but few to be recommended for the office, especially to the southward of Pennsylvania, where, of choice, the President would name one. With ample military talents, General Lee is conceived to want others essential to a secretary of war. Embracing some great objects, the department comprehends a multitude of details, and demands economy in its numerous expenditures. This appointment would doubtless be extremely unpopular: it would be disapproved by the enemies of the government, without acquiring the confidence of its friends. These ideas I have already suggested to the President. Expressing his earnest desire to find a gentleman southward of Pennsylvania, the President remarked, that it would be much less difficult to choose one from the other side of this state. But even there the object may perhaps be found not very easy to accomplish.
The state of New-York has not now one officer on the general staff of government. Colonel William North you will see is on the President’s list: I have thought favourably of his character & abilities: but am not sufficiently acquainted to form any decisive opinion: you must know him well. Will you have the goodness to express your mind? Will you consider the whole list? Will you indulge me with your sentiments on all the subjects of this letter? One other idea ought perhaps to be taken into view: the President, beyond all doubt, will, at the close of his present term, retire forever from public life: we do not know who will succeed him. Our internal politics and our exterior relations may be deeply affected by the character and principles of the President and the Secretary of State.
The tenor of this letter shows that it is perfectly confidential. The President has no knowledge of it. He will be impatient to decide to whom the department of war shall be tendered. I shall therefore be anxious to receive your answer. I earnestly hope your health & business will allow you to put it into the mail of friday, that it may reach me on saturday.
With the truest respect,   I am, dear sir,   your obedient servant,

Timothy Pickering.

P.S. Mr. Wolcott informed me of your wish to see Mr. Fauchet’s letter. I furnished him with a French copy of it, and with my translation to be copied and forwarded for your revision and correction. I was sorry to propose this labour for you: but the letter is of no small importance; it must soon be published; and you are implicated in every page: I therefore wish the translation may be exact.
Alexander Hamilton Esq.

Captain Dayton
N Jersey

Genl. Hand
Pennsylvania

Genl. Huntington
Connecticut

Genl. Irvine
Pennsylvania

Colo. Phil. B. Bradley
Connecticut

Colo. David Forman
N. Jersey

Colo. Howard
Baltimore

Colo. Wm. Heth
Virginia

Colo. Nathl. Ramsay
Maryland

Genl. James Wood
Virginia

Colo. John Brooks
Masstts.

Colo. David Cobb
do.

Colo. Henry Lee
Virga.

Colo. Jereh. Olney
Rhode Island

Colo. Wm. Davis
Virginia

Colo. U. Forrest
Maryland

Colo. Wm. Hull
Masstts.

Colo. D. Humphreys
Connecticut

Colo. Wm. North
N. York

Colo. Robt. Troup
do

Wm. Winder
Maryland

Lt. Colo. John Armstrong
N. York

added by T.P. Matthew Clarkson New-York

(Perhaps some suitable character not in the list, may occur. T.P.)