Title: From George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 2 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Dr sir
Head Quarters White Marsh [Pa.] Decr 2d 1777.

The importance of the North River in the present contest and the necessity of defending it, are subjects which have been so frequently and so fully discussed and are so well understood, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon them. These facts at once appear, when it is considered that it runs thro’ a whole State—That it is the only passage by which the Enemy from New York or any part of our coast can ever hope to co operate with an Army that may come from Canada; that the possession

of it is indispensibly essential to preserve the communication between the Eastern—Middle and Southern States; and further, that upon it’s security in a great measure depend our chief supplies of Flour for the subsistence of such Forces as we may have occasion for, in the course of the War, either in the Eastern or Northern Departments, or in the country lying high up on the West side of it. These facts are familiar to all, they are familiar to you. I therefore request you in the most urgent terms, to turn your most serious and active attention, to this very and infinitely important object. Seize the present opportunity, and employ your whole force and all the means in your power for erecting and compleating, as far as shall be possible, such works and obstructions as may be necessary to defend and secure the river against any future attempts of the Enemy. You will consult Govr Clinton—Genl Parsons and the French Engineer, Colo. Radiere, upon the occasion. By gaining the passage, you know the Enemy have already laid waste and destroyed all the Houses—Mills and Towns accessible to them. Unless proper measures are taken, to prevent them, they will renew their Ravages in the Spring, or as soon as the Season will admit, and perhaps Albany the only Town in the State of any importance remaining in our Hands, may undergoe a like fate, and a general Havoc and devastation take place. To prevent these Evils therefore, I shall expect that you will exert every Nerve and employ your whole force in future, while and whenever it is practicable, in constructing and forwarding the proper works and means of defence. They must not be kept out on command and acting in detachments to cover the Country below, which is a consideration infinitely less important and interesting. I am &c.

Go. Washington


Title: To George Washington from Captain Robert Smith, 2 December 1777
From: Smith, Robert
To: Washington, George

Sir
Germantown, 2d Decr [1777] 7 OClock

Hardly any thing has come out to Day. No Passes have been granted from Town. Some Ladies who got out by special Favor say as far as the Accots from the british Officers are to be attended to a Movement will take Place early tomorrow Morning. Some of them say to this Town, others that they do not know the Route. At such a Time I think it my Duty to send your Exy the most minute Circumstances. What makes against their Moving. the Troops some of them have got new Cloathing. others are promis’d in a Day or two. they are also promis’d their Pay to morrow or next Day. they have a very considerable number of

flat bottom’d Boats on Carriages. very few Goods are yet Landed, I mention’d the Rumour given out to your Exy yesterday. I am yr most hbl. Servt

Robt Smith


Title: General Orders, 3 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Decr 3rd 1777.
Parole Portugal.C. Signs Falmouth. Derby.

At a General Court martial whereof Col. Grayson was president, held the 26th, 27th 28th and 29th of Novr last, Major Howard appeared before the court, charged with “1st Wounding Capt: Lieut. Duffey with his sword—2nd Abetting a riot in camp, and 3rd In the front of his men (at his request assembled) attempting the life of Capt: Duffey with a loaded firelock, and fixed bayonet, being utterly subversive to good order and military discipline”—The Court having considered the charges and the evidence are of opinion that Major Howard did not intentionally wound Capt: Duffy, and therefore acquit him of the first charge Upon the second charge; they are of opinion, that however justifiable the motives were, by which Major Howard was at first actuated his conduct in the end was such as tended rather to promote than suppress a riot—They therefore sentence him to be reprimanded in General Orders—With respect to the 3rd charge the Court are of opinion that it is not supported by evidence, and therefore do acquit him of the said charge.
Capt: Duffey appeared before the court, charged with “1st Aiding and abetting a riot—2nd Assaulting and abusing Major Howard in the execution of his office”—The Court having considered the first charge and the evidence, are of opinion that Capt: Duffey behaved with a warmth, which tended to produce a riot, and do sentence him to be reprimanded in General Orders—Upon the second charge they are of opinion that Major Howard, when Capt: Duffey struck him, had deviated from the line of his duty, and consequently was not in the execution of his office—They do therefore acquit Capt: Duffey of the second charge.
The foregoing opinions are approved by the Commander in Chief, and the sentences of reprimand appear to be pronounced with great justness, on an impropriety of conduct unbecoming the character of officers, whose duty it is to suppress all riot and tumult, and to set examples of moderation, decency and order.

The officers and men of the company raised by the late Capt. Calderwood, are to be annexed to Capt: Niven’s Company, in Col. Malcom’s regiment.


Title: Circular to the General Officers of the Continental Army, 3 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: General Officers of the Continental Army

Sir
[Whitemarsh, Pa.] Decr 3d 1777

I wish to recall your attention to the important matter recommended to your Consideration sometime ago—namely—the Advisieability of a Winters Campaign, & practicability of an attempt upon Philada with the Aid of a considerable body of Militia to be assembled at an appointed time & place. Particular reasons urge me to request your sentiments on this matter by the Morning, & I shall expect to receive them accordingly in writing by that time. I am Sir your mo. Obedt Servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General John Cadwalader, 3 December 1777
From: Cadwalader, John
To: Washington, George

Dear sir
Head Quarters [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 3d Decr 1777

whether the army under your Excellency’s command should continue in the field this winter; and whether it is expedient to call to your assistance a great body of militia to make an attack on the City, are very important Questions—the determination of which may decide the fate of America—They therefore require our most serious consideration.
It is certainly usual with all nations, in every cold climate, to retire with their armies into winter quarters—The men want cloathing & want rest; and the army is generally much reduced by action, sickness & a variety of casualties. To repair these losses, to nurse & recruit the Soldiers & to make the necessary arrangements for another campaign are certainly great objects; but, Sir, if the practice of other nations, & the rules laid down in books by military authors, are implicitly, to regulate the armies of these States I cannot help thinking our ruin is inevitable—precedents may justify us to military pedants, but not the sensible Citizen.
The situation of the american states is very different from that of a nation whose independance is acknowledged & established. It requires great management to keep up the spirits of the well-affected & to subdue those who have taken a part against us—Imprisonment, confiscation & death are the punishments for those who engage in the support of a revolution—these are terrors not so much dreaded in common wars—To remove these fears, and to secure the inhabitants from danger, appears to me to be measures of the utmost importance. The people of this State had the greatest expectations that the army under your Excellency’s command would have prevented General How from penetrating thro’ the country & taking possession of the capital of this State—They were disapointed! and it is very evident what conclusions they must have drawn—The superiority of the enemy was easily discovered, and it naturally affected their spirits. Our Successes to the northard have enabled you to draw great reinforcements from thence—our whole force, now collected, gives them new hopes; and tho they may not expect a successful attack will be made on the city this winter, they expect to be protected. The withdrawing your army to a great distance will not only magnify the enemy’s strength (in the opinion of the Inhabitants) but will be construed into an acknowledgment of our own weakness—The enemy may then detach a body of Troops to take post at Bordenton or Mount Holly; another to Newtown on this Side, and a third to Wilmington—with these (having possession of the Capital) they have perfect command of an immense country; from which they

can draw provision, forage & men. The State of delaware must be totally subjected—the eastern shore of maryland & virginia left open to be ravaged at will; in short the inhabitants, within this great Circle, must come in for protection, must swear allegiance to the King, & deliver up their arms—Those men who are to compose a very considerable part of your army the next Campaign will be engaged against you; the inhabitants of other States, who are eventually concerned in these misfortunes, will feel very sensibly their dreadful effects—the power of Legislatures will be weakened & the States may find it impossible to enlist, draft, or, by any other means, to furnish their quota’s for the ensuing Campaign—All the manufactures that might be drawn from the Country you desert, will be lost to us—The depreciation of our money will encrease; and, in a short time, the Credit of the States will be totally ruined—Your Army too, cantooned in a scattered manner, at so great a distance from the Enemy, will be dispersed thro’ the States, by Leave-of-absence, Furlows, & Desertion—and instead of your Troops coming into the Field better disciplined (as some Gentlemen expect) they will become licentious, ungovernable & total Strangers to military Discipline.
Last winter, after repeated ill-successes, you was obliged to retire from post to post, as the enemy advanced and in addition to your misfortunes, your army was every day reduced, by whole Brigades, leaving you, in sight of the Enemy—when you crossed the Delaware tho reinforced with the Philada Militia, you had but a handful of men, & these in a wretched ragged condition—what then would have been the consequence if you had retired to the back-country to nurse & recruit the miserable remnant of your army; and to enlist men for the next Campaign? the Consequences are so evident they need no explanation. By having the river as a Barrier you kept the field till an opportunity offered; and by a well times, well executed blow, you gave hopes again to all the States—in consequence of this, the Princetown affair happened, which drew the enemy to one point; and, at once, recovered N. Jersey & set America again on her Legs.
The King of Prussia (in the last war) overpowered by numbers, had almost lost all his Dominions during the Summer; but by a noble exertion, with those very troops that had been harrassed & almost torn to pieces by repeated actions and constant Marches, he recovered his Losses by a winter Campaign.
Your men, I know, Sir, are in great want of cloathing, but I conceive they will be sooner equipped by remaining in the field than in winter Quarters—because by being in the field, the necessity will appear more evident, will enduce those employed to provide cloathing to exert

themselves, and will justify measures that otherwise would disgust & exasperate those from whom they are taken—Let the robust, & those best cloathed, do the duty of Guards; let the Invalids be sent to the most comfortable Quarters; & let premiums be given to those who shall make the best Hutts.
If you are out of the reach of a surprize, the Duty will be easy; and you may as effectually annoy the enemy as if you was nearer.
I am far from thinking that a winter Campaign will not be attended with great distress to the poor Soldiers, & do not mean to insinuate that good winter Quarters may not be more comfortable; but I am obliged from the necessity of the case to declare, that I think, if your army was reduced by action & sickness, to one half its present number, the consequences would not be so fatal, as if we were to take winter Quarters.
I have confined myself, merely, to the Question, “whether a winter Campaign is advisable” but beg leave to make a few remarks on the two Positions that have been proposed.
To cover our stores, to afford the most protection to the country, to procure the best Shelter (& out of the reach of a Surprize) where there is plenty of water forage & provisions—These appear to me to be the considerations that should determine the choice of the position for winter quarters—Lancaster & the line from thence to Easton, has been mentioned as a proper place for winter Quarters—others have mentioned Wilmington & its neighbourhood—Let us compare them! Lancaster &c., tis said, from the best information, are so crouded with families from the City & its Invirons, that a traveller can with difficulty get a night’s lodging. I cannot conceive that any person can seriously propose to turn out those inhabitants, while their Husbands, Fathers & Brothers are now, perhaps in the Field—Hutts then must be substituted in the place of houses—You have plenty of water, forage & perhaps provisions, and you leave a vast country exposed as has been mentioned above—You are to live on that country from whence you must draw your chief supplies—the next Campaign, & every article brought a great distance in waggons.
Wilmington has not its usual number of Inhabitants; & several other Towns in the neighbourhood are under the like circumstances; there are 9 or 10 miles at Brandywine; all these will afford shelter for a great body of Troops—This situation is out of the reach of surprize, & near enough to annoy the Enemy, cover your stores & a great part of the country, which in the other case is left exposed—wood water & forage in great plenty and provisions, as the Com: General informs, may be had in large quantities from Maryland & Virginia by water, to the Head

of Elk—Hutts may be built, in such places as will best answer the purposes of defence, for that part of the army that cannot give Shelter in Houses.
I am so perfectly convinced, that nothing but Success, can keep up the Spirits of our Friends, confirm the doubtful Characters, convert our Enemies & establish our Credit, (on which the bringing another army into the Field very much depends), that every Effort ought to be made to procure it. I have no doubt but a successful attack could be made upon the City this winter by calling a considerable Boby of Militia to your assistance if the Enemy remain in their present position—But I am apprehensive: that by declaring your Intention (which will be necessary to induce the militia to turn out) it would immediatly alarm the Enemy—they would find it necessary to surround the City with works, on the west side, and by drawing their force within a narrow compass, might defeat your Scheme as they could only be carried by Storm, at this Season of the Year.
It would probably take two months to collect the Militia from the distant States, which would bring us to the first of February, at which time the Ice is often gone, or at least so weak as not to answer our purpose—I am therefore inclined to think it will not be proper to give the militia so fatiguing a march at this severe Season, or put the States to so great an Expence without a greater prospect of Success. I am Dr sir, with great respect & esteem your Excellency’s most ob. very hble Servt

John Cadwalader


Title: To George Washington from Major John Clark, Jr., 3 December 1777
From: Clark, John Jr.
To: Washington, George

sir
Mr Trumbals 3rd Decr 1777, 1 oClock P.M.

Col: Laurens Letter came to hand this morning.
I am sorry a Guard of Militia under the Command of Colonel Warner took up one of my Friends going into Philada which has prevented my getting some very material intelligence as I had formed a channel

through which every thing in that way wou’d have come with secrecy & for that purpose had sent a little provision to my Correspondent in Philada from whom I herewith send you an extract of a Letter just from the City & you will observe what necessity there was for so doing—“We are pretty well of as yet, have a barrell of good Flower & some Potatoes—Money is very ill to be got—numbers of People in Town will take no paper Money of any Currency—Brigadier General Pattison,✻ has taken your new Shop Yard & Stable for his Cattle & live Stock, there’s a Centry placed over them & no fire or Candle allowed some of his principal Officers is quarter’d in Falconers ‡ new Houses & I have a Young Scotch Officer quartered on me.”
The Enemy are in motion have a number of flat bottom’d Boats on Carriages & Scantling—& are busy pressing Horses & Waggons—no persons permitted to come out except those on whom they can depend—they were busy this morning—I have ordered the person to be discharged & hope you will approve of the plan I had adopted—the impropriety of communicating it to you by Letter will plead my excuse—and I am under every circumstance Your Excellency’s faithful

Jno. Clark Junr

                  ✻ Second Street
                  }
                  on the Hill

                  ‡ Shippen Street


Title: To George Washington from Major John Clark, Jr., 3 December 1777
From: Clark, John Jr.
To: Washington, George

sir
Mr Lewis’s 3rd Decr 1777 6 oClock P.M.

One of my Spies this moment arrived from the City, which place he left this Day at 12, oClock—he confirms the account transmitted you this Day at one oClock with respect to the Enemy pressing Horses & Carriages—but seen no Boats &c. on Carriages—he went thro the greatest part of the City assures me Troops are quarter’d in almost every

House—they are pulling down a great many frame Buildings for the use of Fuel—this morning a Serjeant a Countryman of my Spies, assured him the Troops had received Orders to hold themselves in readiness when call’d for, and to draw two Days provision—Biscuit was served out to them when he came away—and ’twas the current language in the City among the Troops, & Citizens that they were going to make a move—the paper Currency is entirely printed up, not one in a hundred will take a Farthing of it, this has created great confusion & dissention among the Citizens Salt sells for £4 Coffee & Sugar at 6/ hard Cash—no Goods of any account permitted to land as yet—a great number of Carts to the amount of 300 was paraded & the Horses geared, at 11 oClock a number of Cannon was fired & some say small Arms towards Jersey or else Signals in the River—Shou’d the enemy move ’twill be sudden, & rapid I am sorry the Militia behaved so imprudent in taking up my Spy Yesterday, had this not happened, I shou’d have had early this Day a compleat account of the Enemy’s situation & design—I must beg your Excellency will please to Order Col. Warner of General Potters Brigade to make immediate restitution of the Provisions taken from the person I employed, as ’twill enable me to get some intelligence of the utmost importance both at present & in future—I cannot help saying they are a rude ungovernable set of Gentry—If a Proclamation was issued by you ’twou’d deter any Inhabitant in this Neighbourhood from going in or supplying the Enemy with provisions & wou’d have the happyest effect.
On the 16th of Septr last Baron Arndt, took a Mare from my Landlord valued at £100, & promised to Return her next Day, but has never done it, Mr Lewis begs he may be ordered to do it, as the Enemy have taken the remainder of his Creatures & he has done me many services for the United States I have given his complaint a place in this Letter & beg leave to recommend him as a person worthy compassion. I am in haste Your Excellency’s Faithful & Obedt Hble servt

Jno: Clark Junr

P.S. I herewith send you a paper of the 29th Novr.


Title: From George Washington to George Clinton, 3 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Clinton, George

D. Sir
Head Qrs White Marsh [Pa.] Decemb. 3d 1777.

The importance of the North River in the present contest and the necessity of defending It, are Subjects so well understood and so familiar to you, that it is needless for me to enlarge upon them. I therefore only mean to mention, that no exertions can be too great to render it secure against any future attempts of the Enemy, and that the present opportunity should be improved to effect it, as far as it may be practicable. There cannot remain a doubt, but that the Enemy, as soon as the Spring opens, or the condition of the River after the Winter’s frost will permit, will attempt to gain possession of it, to prosecute their favourite plans of ruin & of devastation. Under these Ideas, I must beg, my Dr Sir, that you will turn your attention to this infinitely important Object, and, by your advice and assistance, promote and forward as much as possible such Works & Obstructions, as shall be essential to render it perfectly secure. I wish to be favoured with your sentiments upon the subject, and that you will give them with freedom & without reserve as to the present management, or of any difficulties that may have occurred to prevent you from interfering. Genl Gates was directed by Congress, to turn his views to this matter, but from some proceedings that have just come to hand, he may be employed in the Board of War, if it shall be his choice. Should this be the case, nothing would be more pleasing to me, and I am convinced more advancive of the Interest of the States, than for you to take the cheif direction and superintendance of this business; and I shall be happy, if the Affairs of Government will permit you: If they will, you may rest assured no aid in my

power to afford you shall be witheld, and there are no Impediments on the score of delicacy or superior command, that shall not be removed. I am Dr Sir with great regard Yr Most Obedt servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Duportail, 3 December 1777
From: Duportail, Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle
To: Washington, George

Sir
3d December 1777.

I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable, the Project of attacking the English and it still appears to me too dangerous—the great Body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for this purpose does not give me any additional hope of succeeding—it is not the number of Troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the quality, or rather their nature and manner of fighting—The Troops wanted are such as are capable of attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest firmness—Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable Loss in the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy—for this must be the case in an Attack of Intrenchments—although when the Works are carried the Chance turns and the Loss is on the side of the intrenched—now, are the Militia or even our Continentals capable of undergoing this Trial, in which the best Troops in the world cannot always support themselves—I am very sorry in giving

the motives for my opinion to be obliged to speak so unfavorably of our Army—but the Battle of German Town ought to be a Lesson to us—if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that occasion, would not the English have been completely defeated—The Disposition was excellent—Your Excellency in that instance really conquer’d General How, but his Troops conquered yours—if then notwithstanding the advantages of a complete Surprise, notwithstanding the advantages of ground—we were repulsed—what would happen before a Line of Redouts well disposed in all appearance, and the Intervals of which are closed with Abbatis.
There is however a case in which I think we might attack the Enemy with Success—I mean if the Schuylkil should be sufficiently frozen below their left to admit of our throwing our greatest Force on their Rear at the same time that we should make an attack in front—Gentlemen acquainted with the Country must decide this point—if indeed the Schuylkil is sufficiently frozen every year to afford a passage for Columns of Troops with Artillery—my opinion is fixed—I think the Army ought to be marched to the other side of Schuylkil, to be reinforced with all the militia that can be collected, while we wait for the favorable moment.
I would go more minutely into the Subject, if Your Excellency did not order me to send my Answer this morning—I did not receive Your Excellencys Letter ’till half after twelve, and it is now half after one. I am With great Respect Sir Yours &c.

Sign’d Le Chevr Du Portail


Title: To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 3 December 1777
From: Greene, Nathanael
To: Washington, George

Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] December 3d 1777

The Subject under Consideration before the board is whether a plan to draw together a large Body of militia in aid of the continental Troops in the dead of winter to attack General Howe in his winter quarters is eligible or not. However desireable the destruction of General Howe’s army may be & however impatient the public may be for this desireable event; I cannot recommend the measure. I have taken the most serious View of the subject in every point in which I am able to examine it, & cannot help thinking the probability of a disappointment is infinitely greater than of Success. We must not be governed in our measures by our Wishes—the love of glory natural to men often prompts them to exceed the bounds of human nature in their enterprizes.

I am sensible in many instances that things pronounced impracticable have been crowned with success in the Attempt. I know it is justifiable in war to leave something to chance, yet prudence forbids that being made a principle which necessity alone can justify; I am by no means inclined from an excess of caution in a council of war to rob my Country of the happy consequences that may result from a due exertion of the spirit and bravery of the Soldiery—but at the same time let us not flatter ourselves from the heat of our Zeal that men can do more than they can. To judge properly upon the subject we must first consider what human nature is capable of when aided by all the powers of art, and what is to be expected when unsupported by those necessary Assistants. In the second place we have to consider how reluctantly people will leave the pleasures of domestic life and engage in a hard and dangerous enterprize at such a rugged season of the year, especially after being out [a] great part of the summer.
In the third and last place let us consider what a combination of circumstances are necessary to give success to the enterprize; weigh this in the Scales of probability and see how far we can promise ourselves a happy issue to the design.
In the first place supposeing our soldiery the best of veterans, capable of the boldest attacks, are they cloathed, are they appointed, with every thing necessary for such a severe and difficult attempt? Let any body examine the Condition of the troops, one half without breeches, Shoes, or stockings and some thousands without Blankets and judge how far men in this situation are capable of enduring the severity of a winter’s Campaign. The continental troops must be out in the field during all the time the militia are drawing together, and in the natural order of things there must be a great diminution of their Force; the troops must be subject to this evil or else go into winter quarters untill the militia are collected, in which case the officers will be dispersed, which will render it very difficult if not impracticable to draw the troops out of quarters in a condition to undertake the attack. I would not wish to spare either blood or treasure necessary to work the destruction of General Howe’s Army; the object is so important that it demands every sacrifice that human nature or national policy can justify, but to make a great sacrifice of men and money without accomplishing the design will be disgraceful to the Army and discouraging to the Country.
The militia perhaps may come together something better cloathed than the continental troops, but the different manner of their living in camp to what they have been accustomed to, together with the extraordinary hardships they must be necessarily subject to in the undertaking cannot fail of producing a great mortality, or at least some thousands

may be expected to fall sick and be rendered incapable of duty. This will not only produce a great diminution of Strength but a numerous Sick must be very distressing to those that are well.
In Europe where they are much older in war than we can pretend to be and where there are as hardy a race of men as are on the Globe, where the severity of the season little exceeds that of ours and where necessity, ambition and military Glory all conspire to produce winter campaigns yet they are never undertaken without the soldiers being well cloathed and each furnished with a good watch coat and Blanket. Experience is the best of schools and the safest guide in human affairs—yet I am no advocate for blindly following all the maxims of European policy, but where reason corresponds with what custom has long sanctified, we may safely copy their Example. It must be confessed and the fatal effects of last winter’s campaign will confirm it, that unless men are well cloathed they must fall a sacrifice to the severity of the weather when exposed to the hardships of a winter’s campaign—The successes of last winter were brilliant and attended with the most happy consequences in changing the complexion of the times, but if the bills of mortality were to be consulted, I fancy it would be found we were no great gainers by those operations.
There is not only the difficulty of cloathing, but that of covering also. Tents cannot be procured, houses in the country are too scattering to quarter the troops in either for attack or defence. If the troops lye out in the weather they must soon, very soon, be rendered unfit for duty. Such a numerous body of men, hastily drawn together, all unconnected cannot be speedily so arranged as to cooperate in one great and general design. To these difficulties may be added, that of subsisting such a numerous body of troops without having large magazines previously established for that purpose, when such a cold and rigid season and the variableness of the weather will render transportation by land and water very difficult and uncertain.
Hospitals proper to receive such a number of sick as we may reasonably expect there will be will increase the distresses of the army and add to the complaints of the country—especially if the event should be unfortunate.
The second objection I have to the measure is the difficulty of drawing out such a body of militia from the different States as will be necessary to ensure Success to the Enterprize. Those States which are remote from dangers, whose militia have been harassed in the Course of the Campaign will be unwilling to call them out without the most pressing necessity, and supposing the Legislators to feel all the military enthusiasm we could wish we cannot flatter ourselves that that Spirit will

pervade all orders of men which will be necessary to draw out such bodies as will be requisite for the Design.
Every one that has attended to the difficulties of calling out large bodies of militia, the uncertain success of the most spirited exertions, the impatience they discover to be gone, and the trouble of manageing them when here, may form a good judgement what success we can promise ourselves when we have all those difficulties to encounter in the different stages.
It is highly probable that a requisition from the Congress to the neighbouring states may produce a resolution in each to furnish their quota, but out of the number demanded perhaps not two thirds would actually march and out of the Number that did march, ten to one whether more than three fifths ever arrive at camp.
The time of the troops being drawn together and forwarded on to camp depends on the coercive power of Government; some being stronger and some weaker, those that arrive first will get out of patience before the arrival of the others—Desertion and disgust will be the consequence, and if either the one or the other should prevail to any considerable degree, the whole plan would be defeated. I would ask any one if these observations are not founded in truth and human nature, & whether it is not the true history of the militia? If it is, what can we promise ourselves from the attempt; when if the whole force was to arrive safe at camp—still there is a great combination of circumstances necessary to compleat the work; the failure of either may render abortive the whole scheme.
The best way of judgeing of men and measures at a future period is to recur to their past conduct under similar circumstances—How difficult have we found it to draw the militia of one State to the aid of that of another even where it was necessary to give a check to the enemy from entering the State to which they belong.
This measure must go recommended to Congress—From the Congress after a week or ten day’s consultation a resolve will take place, recommending it to the different States—The Assemblies of each are to be called together their Deliberations and judgement to be had upon the propriety of the measure and then an order after ten or twelve Days, issues to assemble the militia, if the officers are slow and tardy as usual, to collect and march them to camp will be the business of a month—The continental troops must be out in the field near two months on the most moderate calculation before the Scheme will be ripe for execution—We shall all this time be wasting the very vitals of the army, and risquing a certain evil for an uncertain good, dependent upon too many contingencies for us to be very sanguine of success.

The different States will be put to no small difficulty to provide arms for a numerous Militia, which must protract the time for collecting it—Consider likewise what delays great and heavy Storms will produce. How distressing they must prove to those that are comeing to camp as well as those waiting their Arrival there.
The third and last objection I have to the measure is the great combination of circumstances necessary to crown it with success, and the improbability of such a multitude of circumstances ever harmonizing together that are independant of each other and originate from such different springs.
There is in the first place a sufficient force so appointed as to be able to execute the plan of attack, it is highly improbable that such force can be put in motion and still more improbable that they will be properly equipt—Supposeing the necessary force to meet properly appointed, they will be a very unweildy Machine, and it must take up a very considerable time to organize the whole in such a manner as to move in concert—Such a numerous militia cannot be drawn together very near the Enemy, where their force is collected and always ready to take advantage of circumstances, without being very liable to Surprize and defeat. Therefore if they must be drawn together at a considerable distance from the enemy’s Lines, and first organized, and then move to the attack the variableness of the weather may interfere—Heavy storms of either rain or Snow will put a total Bar to the operations for a time, and more especially the former—but suppose neither of these difficulties interferes, still the operations will be dependant upon the temper of the weather which must be neither too severe or too moderate to enable us to prepare and execute the Manoeuvre—If the weather is very severe the men cannot live out in the Field long enough to prepare and execute the attack—If the weather is not so severe as to freeze the rivers hard enough for men & artillery to pass over there can no attack be made only in front of the Enemy’s lines—and how far such an attack can be expected to succeed I leave every one to judge—I am told the weather is very variable here and that Storms are frequent—both of which must ruin the platform of our operations; our whole success depending upon the Rivers being sufficiently frozen to enable us to pass over on the ice—But suppose all these circumstances should happen to combine to give success to the design—which by the bye is scarcely within the limits of possibility & far out of the bounds of probability can we promise ourselves a victory? Does history afford us an instance as a foundation for such a hope? It is agreed on all hands that there is a very formidable force in Philadelphia and every house is a fortification—can it be expected that young troops unaccustomed to such enterprizes will have steadiness enough to push the Enemy from

place to place untill they are totally routed from the City? to make the attack and not totally defeat them will fall far short of the importance of the design or the expectations of the public.
What aid can be expected from the militia? Will they come up to storm the houses? Let us recur to past experience of the militia & such a militia too as we cannot expect for the present attack and see how far we can hope for success with such troops opposed by such as we have to attack—I must confess I think it right to trust every thing to the spirit & bravery of troops that is warranted by human nature, History or our own observation. Has the present Scheme these Sanctions? Are we not rather drawn into the attempt by the brilliancy of the object than by the probability of it’s Success founded in either nature or Reason.
The King of Prussia the greatest General of the age strongly protests against attacking troops by storm in villages much more, in large regular brick cities—He observes, it often proves the ruin of the best part of an army—this was verified in several attacks he made upon towns and villages last war—Philadelphia is a great object but I wish our reason may not be seduced from it’s importance to take measures to repossess it that are not warranted by history or our own observation—An Attack of this nature will not depend upon the multitude that attacks, but upon their bravery—for the greater the multitude the worse the confusion when once they are thrown into disorder, and we have no reason to expect any thing else from our or others experience—Men who are brought from home with all their family feelings about them commanded by officers who in general have little or no ambition for military glory are not fortified for such scenes of carnage as are generally exhibited in attacks made upon towns defended by a large body of veteran troops.
I am not against a winters campaign if the temper of the officers and the conditions of the troops would admit of it, neither have I the least objection to making an attack upon Philadelphia if there was a probability of succeeding founded in human nature or the experience of mankind.
Let us consider the consequences that will result from a disappointment in a measure of this nature—In the first place, it will be attended with a vast expence and the loss of many lives to no valuable purpose—it will prove a great obstruction to the recruiting service and a defeat will give a general alarm and spread universal discontent throughout the continent—It will expose the weakness of our militia to the enemy and not only them but to all europe who now consider them much more formidable than they really are.
A winters campaign in the present discontented state of the officers and an attack upon the city of Philadelphia appear to me like forming

a crisis for american liberty which if unsuccessful I fear will prove her grave—If the army goes through a winters Campaign and the recruiting service is as much injured as I expect from calling out the militia it will be in a miserable plight to open the campaign with in the spring; and we may reasonably expect that great britain will rake all the kennels of Europe for troops to repair their affairs in America.
I have wrote my mind so fully upon the subject of winter quarters and with respect to a winter campaign that it is unnecessary to add any thing further here—I would beg leave to recommend the measure suggested in that paper for recruiting the army—and filling up the continental Battalions—if the measure is adopted the army can be recruited nearly or quite as soon as the militia can be got together—the attack can be made with much more hopes of success & if we are defeated we shall still have a force to carry on a regular Seige as soon as the military apparatus can be prepared and the season will permit us to open batteries against the enemy’s lines.
These are my sentiments Sir upon the subject which with all due deference are submitted to your Excellency’s consideration, but if your Excellency thinks a winters campaign a necessary measure or an attack upon Philadelphia an eligible plan I will lend every possible aid in my power to carry it into execution; notwithstanding that this is the third year since I have paid the least attention to my own private affairs.

Nath. Greene M.G.


Title: To George Washington from Major General Johann Kalb, 3 December 1777
From: Kalb, Johann
To: Washington, George

Sir,
[3 December 1777]

When your Excellency recommended sometime ago the Consideration of the practicabity of an attack on the Ennemy, I was already of opinion for Such an attack if it was possible to make an attempt on the City behind the lines, either by Sending troops in Boats down Delawar River to land on, or below the wharf, or by crossing Schuylkill river below middleferry either by throwing over Bridges or upon the ice in

great frosts, to fall into the Ennemies rear at the Same time the army was to attack the lines in front with Several Colums.
Sending down Troops Delawar river, Seems at least very dangerous if not entirely impracticable.
The Passage over Schuylkill appears more eligible if attempted by a considerable body of Militia or other Troops (I Say Militia, because I think the regulars would be all necessary for the chief attack in front) Posted along the right bank of Said river, on the best and most advantageous Spots, from whence the artillerie & even Small arms could annoy the Ennemy and protect the workmen for erecting Bridges, and in Some places Seemingly working. for the better drawing the Ennemy on that Side, there ought to be made Such Seeming or reall attempts in Several places at the Same time. as this is the weak Side, there is no doubt they would considerably divide their forces, and give room to break in upon them either in front or on this Side, perhaps on both at once.
If the necessary Boats and Materials for Such bridges could not be provided, or carried to the proper places to be employed or if there was an impossibility of erecting Bridges, or preventing the Ennemies of cutting a Channel through the ice, in fine if a Passage over Schuylkill Should be impracticable, it appears to me, that the attack ought rather to be dropped, than to attack the Ennemies in their Stronghold, in front only, this would be running the risk of a repulse, or of a total defeat and the bad consequences thereof.
If on the contrary the river may be crossed especially upon the Ice, the principal attack could be made on this Side with the best troops, and the Militia be drawn up in Battle or in Colums before the lines to make a Show and keep up the attention of the Ennemy. for that purpose a Large body of Militia from all States Should be drawn together, and Such measures taken for their march as to arrive all on the Same day or very near, that on one hand, the expedition may take place immediately after their arrival, the Ennemies may be surprised or at least not have sufficient time to Collect more forces or to add to their Works, and on the other hand that the army may not be distressd for Provisions, nor the Militia kept a long time in the field for fear of Sickness, or disgust, which is by all means to be avoided.
Upon the whole this attack is Subject to many inconveniencies, and the greatest of all, will be the necessity of a Winters campaign, this will ruin the army by Sickness and discontent perhaps too by desertion, and how will another almost new one be raised, except Congress take such measures as to oblige the Militia to serve constantly at least for two years, and to be put into the regulars to compleat the regiments, in

fixing a certain number for every State and to be all levied at a Limited time, and there is none to be lost. if your Excellency resolve for a Winter Campaign, The Troops ought to be immediately Supplied with Cloathing at any rate. if not Winter quarters to take place without loss of time. But in this case where and how to take them is a matter of the highest consideration. if real Winter quarters and rest are intended they must be taken at a distance (as between Lancaster & Reading or Reading & Easttown) from the Ennemy, But this would give up to the Ennemy the Jeseys, the whole State of Delawar, the eastern part of maryland, chester, Philadelphia & Bucks Counties in this State of Pensilvania; the Ennemy would draw out of these lands, forrage, Provisions, live-Stock, and what would be Still worse, numbers of able men to bear arms against their country, either by consent, delusion, or by force, besides the bad Effect it would have or produce in Political matters. This may partly be prevented by taking up Winterquarters at Wilmington and Environs with the addition of hutts, but then there will be little or no rest, and no possibility of Sending home many officers & soldiers for recruiting their regiments, and at the least movement of the Ennemy on Schuylkill, we must come up with them in order not to be Surprised, in some of our quarters or cut off from the neighbouring States and from our Stores; the greatest alertness will be required from all Commanders in those quarters, and the fatigues the army would lie under, and the Sicknesses they would be Subject to, call aloud on Congress for recruits and Cloathing.

Baron de Kalb Major General


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Henry Knox, 3 December 1777
From: Knox, Henry
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp White Marsh [Pa.] 3d Decembr 1777

I receiv’d your Excellencys orders to give my sentiments “upon the advisability of making a Winters Campaign, and Practicability of an attack upon Philadelphia, with the aid of a considerable body of militia to be assembl’d at an appointed time & place”—Were it probable that Sir Wm Howes destruction would be the consequence of a Winters Campaign I would most chearfully give my voice and opinion for one—I think a Winters Campaign, under the present circumstances, will be the inevitable destruction, if not of the Liberties of the Country,

yet of the present Army; my opinion is founded on the following Reasons.
Our entire want of Cloathing to keep the men from Perishing by the cold winters season.
The improbability & impracticability of surprizing 10.000 veteran troops in a well fortified city.
The impossibility of our keeping the field to besiege their works and city regularly, and being almost totally deficient of any warlike apparatus for so ardous an enterprize.
The uncertainty of obtaining such a sufficient number of Militia as to make the enterprize warranted by reason, or common Military knowledge.
My Opinion is for putting the Army in good Winter Quarters—to repair the damages done: to recruit & reform the Army: to provide the Magazines &c. In the spring we may be enabl’d to strike the enemy a decisive blow, which by making a Winters Campaign I think improbable and impossible. I am sir with the greatest respect Yr Excellency’s Most Obt Hble Servant

H. Knox B.G. Artillery


Title: To George Washington from Major General Lafayette, 3 December 1777
From: Lafayette, Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de
To: Washington, George

[3 December 1777]

the project of calling a large body of militia for such a day, in order to attack the ennemy in philadelphia, seems to me attended with so many difficulties, inconveniences and bad chances, that if it is not looked upon as a necessary and almost desesperate enterprize, tho’ it is a very shining and highly pleasing idea, however I cannot think it is a prudent and reasonable one. the reasons for my rejecting it are as follows.
1st  I do not believe that any body could advise your excellency to attack only the redoubts in front, whatever could be our force; such an attack vould be attended with a greater loss but not a greater succès than if we had only continental troops.
2º  We must therefore expect the moment when the ice upon the Schullchill will oppen to us all the left side of the ennemy’s lines and encampements. but or the climate makes a great difference betwen this country and the european ones, or one single fine day may frustrate all our hopes and preparations in pulling a way all the ice. then we schould expect one other moment before dismissing the troops, and in my actual supposition they are to be kept a very schort time.

3º  in europe ice is brocken every night when it can facilitate the projects of the ennemy; if All is not cleaned, at least a ditch can be formed in the river. I know that we schould annoy theyr work men, I know that such an operation would be very hard an troublesome for them. but in the first case I’l answer that every where Military works are performed with the same inconveniences, in the second the people of philadelphia can be employed there. when I say that we could trouble theyr operation, I suppose that our winter quarters are not in the back country.
4º  We ca’nt expect any secrecy in our collecting those forces, we ca’nt deceive the ennemy for theyr destination. therefore (unless we could have a respectable body in the jersay) he can go of[f] before fighting and then we Must not entertain the hope of oppressing and destroying all that army, but only of recovering philadelphia.
5º  Supposing that we could go upon the ice we have one only way of attaking. for if we put the militia in first line, they will fall back upon the continental troops, and we can not depend enough upon our men to believe that we could maintain order and resolution amongs them if the militia is in rear, and the regulars were repulsed certainly they will not advance where continentals troops do’nt succeed. if amongs us, I do’nt believe it would do better therefore our only way should be to make false attacks of militia, and true ones of continental troops, to have a curtain what we call in french un rideau of troops in the whole lenght of the Schulchill and on this side, of the redoubts, in order to cover the heads of our columns, and our points of attack, and to put the disorder amongs the ennemy by an easy fire. I wishoud too a body should be in the jersay in case it would be possible for the ennemy to retreat by the delaware. and does your excellency think that such a quantity of troops could be raised?
6º  when I consider all the difficulties of turning out some militia in interesting occasions I c’ant flatterer myself that all that people could be sent to your army for such a day, without the utmost difficulties. each state will have an excuse for not sending as many men as they’l be desired. the Cold, the rivers, the want of cloathes of every thing will seem sufficient reasons, if not to stay at home at least to arrive after the time of the rendez vous. every one will trust upon the another and if we do not succeed all will be against us.
7º  have we in the continent all the cloathes, arms, ammunition & &c. which would be necessary for so many soldiers. would it be possible to find subsistances enough in cattle, forage &c. all things which I ca’nt know, but however I think worthy of being mentionned and that principally because the want of exactitude, the necessity of giving to them

a light idea of what they are to do will engage us to keep them longer than we think.
8  I know that all those inconveniences can not be together; because if we keep them some time, then we schall find an opportunity of going over the Schulchill in case that we can prevent theyr braking the ice; on the other hand if we have them only for few days, difficulties of subsistence will be much lesser; and if it is impossible for the ennemy to pass the delaware, certainly a body in jersay is quite useless. I can add that in case we could not go over the ice, it is possible to throw bridges upon the river. but, Sir, I have mentionned all the difficulties which strike me, because my opinion is not to begin such an enterprize unless we shall be certain of succeeding. a great schame for our arms, a great michief for our cause would attend our being repulsed when we schould attack a part of the british forces with all the united forces of america. europe has a great idea of our being able to raise when we please an immense army of militia, and it is looked upon as our last but certain ressource. if we fall this phantom will fall also and you know that the american interest has alwaïs been since the begining of this war to let the world believe that we are stronger than we can ever expect to be. if we destroy the english army, our generous effort will be admired every where, if we are repulsed it will be called a rash and laughable expedition. therefore we must not let a shining appearance and the pleasing charms of a bold fine enterprize, deceive us upon the inconveniences and dangers of a Gigantesque and in the same time decisive expedition.
however perhaps the interest of america, the wish of all the states, the instructions of congress, the necessity of finishing soon the war, all those circonstances which are unknown to me, make it necessary for your excellency to hazard some thing in this occasion. perhaps the difficulties in the phisick and moral ressources of this country are not so great as I am affraïd to find them. perhaps it is possible to raise, to arm, to cloath, to subsist, to keep together and give some instructions to that so considerable army which according to my opinion is necessary; perhaps the weather is not so changeable in this country as it is in europe, or some other means than going upon the ice could seem eligible to Your excellency. but if the difficulties which I fear are indeed true (what you can judje, and I can not know myself) then I am not for that expedition in considering it as only a militar one.
if however I was deceived, or if politic circumstances schould make it necessary to try such an enterprize, the following precautions seem me to be taken.
1º  I do not ascertain the number of militia to be raised because of it must be as large as we can arm, cloath, and subsist.

2º  all possible exertions are to be taken for having them at the appointed time which time must be now as soon as it is possible.
3º  Some instructions should take place before the operation, only for some days, because if they were marched to the ennemy without the less idea of marching together such a disorder would prevent the succès of the less difficult enterprize.
4º  the continental troops schould be sent in theyr winter quarters as soon as possible, to take a good rest, to recomfort themselves, to be reinforced by theyr men now skattered every where, by some recruits, and the whole to be managed and exerced by theyr genl officers. under that point of vüe, and principally cloathes should be delivered to them, and theyr arms put in a good order. (it seems to me that this prospect could engage us to be nearer from the ennemy than lancaster is.[)]
5º  the soldiers and pricipally the officers of our army schould not be permitted to go home till it would be over.
6º  proper means for recruiting the army schould be taken as soon as possible. one of the best according to my opinion would be (after having suppressed the substitutes) to annex a part of the militia of each state to theyr continentals divisions in order to serve there for twelve months. I think that such a regulation is eligible in all cases. for a strong continental army well managed and disciplined, and ready to begin an early campaign, and to make use of all the unforeseen and soudain occasions, would do much greater service than all the militia in the world. and their militia should be made use of only in a less great number or in particular circomstances.

The Marquis de lafayette M.G.


Title: To George Washington from Captain Henry Lee, Jr., 3 December 1777
From: Lee, Henry Jr.
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Haddonfield [N.J.] Decbr 3d 77.

Genl Green directed me on his departure, to tarry on this side the river, & assist in protecting the inhabitants from the depredations of the enemy. We have been active in executing the Generals directions, & have visited the shore from this town, down to Sweedsborough, daily. The enemy still possess Billingsport, they have a garrison of four hundred men in that fort, & two nine pounders. Good troops with a little address, might with facility surprize & capture the whole party.
Different accounts from Ph⟨ila.⟩ mention, that Lord Cornwall⟨is⟩ has never made his appearance in the city since his expedition with

the Jersey. It is certain, his Lordship was with the party engaged by Col. Butlers rifflemen near the town of Gloucester. We flatter ourselves, that in that skirmish, some lucky ball has rea[c]hed the gentleman On the 1st inst. eleven ma[r]ines were taken by a party of my dragoons near Billingsport. They are in care of the militia, & will be sent on to Head quarters. I mean to stay here, a day or two longer, unless your Excellency should require my immediate return. I am with the most perfect respect your Excellys Obt H. servt

Heny Lee jr


Title: To George Washington from Major General Stirling, 3 December 1777
From: Stirling, Lord (né William Alexander)
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Decemr 3d 1777

Your Excellency’s letter of this date requesting my Sentiments on “the Adviseability of a Winters Campaign; and the practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia with the Aid of a Considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled at an appointed Time and Place.” I have duely Considered, and in Answer to the first Question am of Opinion—that in order to Undertake a Winters Campaign the Troops should be fresh, in good Order and well Cloathed with at least two Warm Vests two pair Milled Woolen Stockings & Mittens, good Shoes, Woolen Overhalls, a Good blanket Coat besides a blanket to Lodge in. Our Troops are not in this Condition, nor are they like to be provided in this Manner, they are already worn out by a long fatigueing Campaign, a Considerable part of them in the Hospitals above one half of those in Camp are almost Naked, and are walking bare footed on the Ice or frozen Ground; In short if a Winters Campaign should be attempted with them, our hopes will be deceived, the Army will be totally ruined, and we shall find ourselves without one in the Spring. The Consequences of which in the Affairs of the American States are too Evident to need an enumeration, and therefore must Conclude that a Winters Campaign—extreemly Unadviseable.
As to the Second Question—I have already declared my Opinion (after your Excellency’s own Veiw of the Enemy’s lines) that it is impracticable on this side Schuylkill with the Troops now under your Command, and were you Aided by all the Militia the States on this Continent Can furnish by the first of february they would only Serve to make the Carnage, or the Route, the greater: the only Chance we have of Attacking Philadelphia to advantage, is, over the Schuylkill when it

is Sufficiently frozen to bear a Column of Troops to pass it; this happens to be the Case in most Winters, sometimes in one Month, sometimes in another, last Winter it was so, in the begining of January, it broke up by the Middle of that Month, and did not get firm again in the remainder of the Winter. this Uncertainty would render the Attempt Very precarious, after an Immense expence in Collecting a Great body of Militia we might have no opportunity of passing the Schylkill; the Men would be disgusted with the Service at that Severe Season, without any thing to Cover them, they would return dispirited, the disapointment in the Expedition would bear the Caracter of a defeat & would have all the bad Effects of one, it would increase our Sick, hurt the Recruiting Service and prove Ruinous to the Army. but should the Schuylkill prove passable at a proper Season, I should have but little hope of our Carrying philadelphia, to Storm the Streets thro’ the fire from Redoubts houses & Columns of Men, is too much to expect from any Troops, to Set down before it at that Season, and to drive them out of it by Battering, is to us impracticable, and any Attempt of the kind highly inadviseable. I am your Excellency’s Most Obedient Humble Servant

Stirling,


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Armstrong, 4 December 1777
From: Armstrong, John
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp at Whitemarsh [Pa.] 4th Decr 1777

In regard to the Advisability of a Winters Campaign, I answer—In keeping the Field, the hardships on both officers and privates are manifestly great, nor is there an alternative presenting your Excy with less inconvenience, at best you have but a choice of difficulties of which Hutting in the field is in my Opinion the least of the two, and most in Character for the Army.
The only Semblance of Quarters known to us being so remote from the Enemies Post as to leave a great part of Pennsylvania for Several months fully in their power—an acquisition this, too great to be yielded to these cruel & haughty intruders, unless under a greater degree of necessity than has yet reached your Army—To the advantages of the Enemy we must here subjoine the piteous sufferings of the well minded populace, too many to ennumerate, too tender to express—I wish Sir to be divested of every Local prejudice in the present enquiry where the publick weal is not clearly involved, but most certainly if in

present or equal Circumstances the whole of the Army shall retire to distant villiages already crowded with her own refugees, Pennsylvania is that moment a publick Sacrifice, her Spirits, her hopes & future exertions Civil & Military, are blasted at once! unhappy State! & well if her diseases do not contaminate some of her neighbours—a mutillated victim cursed of the other twelve—and by Britain too, who for her manyfold Services to Congress & to this Army, hath now made her the Capital Seat of War. To considerations of this sort may naturally be added a train of things relative to the great design uses & reputation of the Army, all pointing against the ineligible quarters, but at present shall Omit these.
Discipline & œconomy will be better maintain’d in the field than in the villiages, where Quarters are so far detatched—Health & vigour better maintain’d than in bad Quarters, and liable to debauchery. Hutting in the field in a dry Cold winter, is by no means incompatible with health—this hath been experienced. If our Army is remote the lower Counties & some part of Maryland will probably be Subject to the like incursions of the Enemy with the uncovered parts of Pennsylvania—In the field, favourable Openings for annoying the Enemy may happen & be improved—Great quantities of Provisions and Forage now convenient to the Enemy may be Saved—If in the field the Enemy will be cautious, if in quarters they will triumph, and their Small partys dispersed abroad will serve their purposes & do us much damage—On the whole I am fully of Opinion however arduous that the present Situation of our affairs calls aloud for a winter Campaign, that it is advisable, practicable, honourable and will be found to be Salutary—But as far as possible to reconcile jarring difficulties, Suppose One half of the Continental Troops with Some Militia alwais in the field and the other in quarters alternately, by which means Some publick good may Still be done, whilst all that ease that the nature of things can possibly admit will be granted to the Troops generally?
With respect to the practicability of an attack on Philada with the aid of a Considerable body of Militia to be assembled at a certain time and place—’tis a pleasing idea at first view, and ready to elate the anxious mind, in it there is something noble & consonant to the great points in view, and did they assemble in convenient time, the attack might doubtless be made with probable Success—Or their very numbers occasion the Enemy to abscond, or a desertion in their Army—Coopers Ferry wou’d best annoy the Enemy with Carcasses—but the Engineers Shou’d be knowing provided with materials & might throw light on the best means of attack on whatever Side of the Town it might be made. Notwithstanding these wishful things, so many are the contingencies attending the convention of a distant Militia, and the ice Serving in

proper time, together with the great prejudice of disappointment, that a measure the efficacy of which must depend on such an exact coincidence of things can scarcely be advised but must be given up as rather to be wished than expected. Such an attempt with the advantage of Boats, might perhaps be matter of consideration for the Spring. I am with perfect Submission Yr Excellencys Most Obedt Servt

John Armstrong


Title: To George Washington from William Dewees, Jr., 4 December 1777
From: Dewees, William Jr.
To: Washington, George

Hond Sir
frankford [Pa.] Decbr the 4th 1777

I Have Just Recd Information which I Beleive to be the Best Can be Obtaind that the British Army had Last Night Packd up all their Baggage & each Man four Days Provision Coock’d; their Horses hitchd to their Artillery & every Appearance of marching out Immediately But something happening which is Not accounted for the orders were Countermanded; the Reason Assignd to me is they Expect our army to move their Camp very soon as they Have Recievd such Information and think they will Do Better to attack when your army moves as they have heard you are advantagiously Posted; But it is Expected they are Determind to Attack you where you Now Are; on Saturday morning Next I Expect I shall be Able to Inform you Exactly when they will Attack for Beyound all Doubt they are Determind to Attack at all Events; I Have the Hounour to be Sir Your Most Obedt Humble Servt

⟨Wm Dewees, Jun.⟩


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General James Irvine, 4 December 1777
From: Irvine, James
To: Washington, George

Sir
Whitemarsh [Pa.] Decemr 4th 1777

If posting the army in a position similar to that I advised in my last letter, be to form a winters campaign, the measure in my opinion is not only adviseable, but absolutely necessary, as the more I think on the subject the more I am convinced that retiring into winter quarters and leaving the country uncovered will be followed with the ruin of our friends, give ease and plenty to our enemies, and do an irreparable injury to the cause we are ingaged to defend; the aids to be drawn from this state in future will be triffling indeed, the inhabitants of new jersey will be intimidated, the delaware state lost and an opportunity given to the tories on the eastern shore of maryland once more to appear in arms against us. When I proposed hutting the army it was not so much with a view of annoying the enemy in their present possessions as to prevent them from ravaging the country, and to give our officers a better opportunity of attending to the discipline of the troops than they could possibly have were they dispersed in extensive cantonments; how far the former may be effected by drawing together a large body of militia, is a question not easily determined. The idea I confess is a noble one, and could it be reduced to practice might be attended with the most happy consequences, but the great variety of circumstances that must concur to insure those consequences is a strong argument against making the experiment. I take it for granted that not less than eighteen or twenty thousand militia would be called, it is uncertain whether so large a body could be collected on the short notice they will receive, it is equally uncertain whether the different states could arm their quota’s, and their assembling at the place of rendezvous at or near the time to be fixed, still more so, as it may depend upon circumstances not in their power to foresee or prevent: allowing they came in time and properly armed, the ice or weather may be against our striking a capitol stroke for some time, and the difficulty of keeping such a body of militia in the field at that season of the year (when they expected to be discharged in a day or two) is easier to foresee than get over. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that tho’ it is necessary for this army to remain somewhere between twenty and thirty miles of philadelphia this winter, it is not adviseable to attempt collecting a large body of militia together with a view of attacking that place. I am with the greatest respect Sir Your most obedient & humb. servt

James Irvine


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General William Maxwell, 4 December 1777
From: Maxwell, William
To: Washington, George

Sir
White Marsh [Pa.] 4th Decemr 1777

Your Excellencys Favour of yesterday I received concerning the Adviseability of a winter Campaign, and the practicability of an attack upon Philada with the Aid of a considerable body of Militia asembled at an apointed time and place. I do ashure Your Excellency I think the object a verry desireable one could it be put properly into execution and without tacking a winter Campaign to it, which in our present circumstances would be sufficient to ruin us of it self.
It appears to me verry plain that General How does not think himself strong enough now to meet us in the field therefore will give us no opertunity of attacking him but to our great disadvantage. Our expectations have never been verry sanguine that we could prevent our Enemys from taking possession of some of our Sea ports but if they cannot meet us in the field they will make verry slow work in conquering the Country. It appears verry plain we must have another Campaign next summer, and the sooner we begin to prepair for it the better by taking every method in our power to preserve our present Armey, and Increas it.
The attack proposed on Philada Appears to me to be liable to so many Accidents that the success of it would be verry doubtfull and should it fail our Armey would be ruined waiting for it.
I am therefore against the Attack and the Winter Campaign and am Your Excellencys Most Obedient Humble Servant

Wm Maxwell


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, 4 December 1777
From: Muhlenberg, Peter
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] Decembr 4th 1777.

Your Excellency was pleasd to desire the Opinion of your General Officers on “The Adviseability of a Winters Campaign, & practicability of an Attack upon Philadelphia, with the Aid of a considerable Body of Militia to be Assembled at an appointed Time & place”—I must Confess that to me this Question seems so much interwoven, with the Question

Your Excellency was pleasd to put a few days ago, that I can hardly Seperate them: The main point, I conceive, is still, whether A Winters Campaign is practicable, if not, the last Question Falls of Course, unless the Time is the Spring. A Winters Campaign to me, seems not only unadviseable, on account of our Situation, but impracticable, at least if I am to Judge of other Brigades by my own; One single Regt of mine have turnd out Ninety Men unfit for duty, on Account of Shoes & other Necessarys. The Sick become Numerous, & the Men, notwithstanding the utmost Care of their Officers, will be Frostbitten, & Subject to many other disorders, if they are to keep the Field, untill the Militia can be Collected, which if we are to Judge From the past, cannot be done in less than two Months—in the meantime it cannot be expected that the Enemy will remain Idle, Their Works will be Continued, Their Vessells who are now before the Town, will not only furnish them with Cannon, but with Marines, Sailors &c. so that in all probability, before the Militia can be Collected an Attack will be though impracticable, upon the same Grounds & perhaps with more reason than at present—At the Time when this Hint was first thrown out in Council, I was pleasd with it, there seemd a probability of Success: but I had no Idea, that a Winters Campaign was so closely Connected with the plan, which in my Opinion would prove more fatal to the Army under Your Excellencys Command than an unfortunate Attack on the Town—but I am far from thinking the plan ought to be droppd entirely, If the Army was to go into Winter Quarters where the Men could be refreshd & Clothd, & remain there, until the latter end of March; the Militia could be Collected in the mean time. Then a Vigorous Attack could be made with a probability of Success.
Thus I have given Your Excellency my Sentiments on the Question proposd, as Clear as the shortness of the time I had for Consideration would permit me, which was only a few Minutes this Morning; The utility of hearing a Question debated is great, at least to a young Soldier—should the Question be decided otherwise Your Excellency may be Assurd that any part entrusted to me shall be executed with the greatest Chearfullness. Your Excellencys Most Obedt & very humble Servt

P: Muhlenberg


Title: To George Washington from Richard Peters, 4 December 1777 [letter not found]
From: Peters, Richard
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from Richard Peters, 4 Dec. 1777. GW wrote to Peters on 14 Dec. that “Your several favs. of the 28th Novem. and 4th and 5th instants came duly to hand.”


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Enoch Poor, 4 December 1777
From: Poor, Enoch
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 4th Decer 1777

In answer to the question Recevd by note from your Excellency yesterday—a winters Campain I am Sure it will be attended with the Graet loss of our numbers as to the Militia troops their is but little Dependence upon them in Case you make an Asolt upon Philidha besides if the Rivers Should be froze over the Enemy Doubless will Contract lines & make their Situation nearly as Strong as it is now.
I think that if your Army Should be Emediatly Sent into winter Quarters—the Absentees Colected that Early next Spring you’d be able to take the field with Dubble the numbers that youl have if a winters Campain is kept up.

as your men are much fortigued & numbers falling Sick every day for want of Clothing and Coumfertable habitations.
I am Clear of Opinion that its Best to put your Army into winter quarters without Loss of Time—however am Ready to Complie with any Disposition that Shal⟨l be⟩ Concluded upon. I am Sir your Excellencys Most obedent Hue Servt

Enoch Poor B. Gl


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General James Potter, 4 December 1777
From: Potter, James
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Pa.] Decr 4th 1777

your excelancey by your letter of yesterday Requested my sentements on two points.
first the advisabelity of a winter Campaign secondly the Practicability of an Attact upon Philadelphia—Ass to the first of these points my Sentiments is that a winter campaign is Practable—I confess the verey thought of a winter Campaign in our Sercumstances appeers dredfull But it is liek meny other Evels, that befaul us in this life, before we under go them we are Redey to conclud the are unseportable, but when the are over we dont find them so dredfull as we appurhended. I can from experance say so of a winter Campaign—I have not found it, to have so many Evels Attending it as I have hard warmly Represented—But on suposition that those evels were Reale, how Shall they be remeded the answer—will be by going into winter Quarters.
I Assart winter Quarters is not to be found In the State of pennsylvania my Reasons for this Assarteon is, the Capatale is in persesion of the Enemy, and there is such large Numbers fled from it, and the Neighbourhood, adjasant, and the Towns and Veledges along the River Dalawer, that all the Towns and Velidges Back in the Countey are full of Refugees all Redey.
What will be dun with those people Turn them out of Dores to make Room for the solders, god for Bid it—that would be cruilly unaxamplyfied by General How himself.
then it Remains that we must Buld Huts, for our soldeers go where we will, in this State—and I take it for granted we will not leave the state Entirly to the marcey of the enemy.
I would Recommend the Taking persision of Wilmington and Newport and what other Houses we could find in a Conveneant place in

Chester County, and Rais huts for the Remainder of our Troops, so as to prevent, the enemys furidging in that County by this Station being Ocquipied By us, we will get the furredge and provisions that our enemys would otherwise get, and the Back parts of the Cuntrey will be Resarved for the ensuing campaign, and in Case the Should be Able to force there way into our Cuntrey in the spring, the furridge and provisions being Acosted will retard there march, and will be mucth in our favour, that our stors are safe in our Reer—another advantige will follow by Quartring in the afore said maner it will be In your power to Keep a number of men in Bucks and Philadelphia Countys to prevent the enemys coming out in small partys to force the Inhabitance to Take the Oath of Elegance to the King, Nor will the have it in there power to gat that Suckuer from the disaficted part of the community, if they are closely shut up in the City—I am Convinced a winter Campaign will Give Sperits and Veger to all the Inhabitance of these United States and will do Honour to the Army and Good to our cause In genral.
Ass to the Provibility of an Attact on the City of Philadelphia with the Aid of a Bodey of Militia it is unsartain when or at what time it would be posible to cross the Revers to Attact them, for that is the way that appeers most provable to me at present.
If your Enjineers are Confidant that they can set the City on fier from the other side of the Dalawer or Schuylkill in case the Ise did not answer I would be for cauling the Militia to Aid the Army, if they could not set it on fier, I think we woud be verey liable to disapointment. I am your excelanceys Most Obedant Humble servant

Ja’s Potter


Title: To George Washington from Major General John Sullivan, 4 December 1777
From: Sullivan, John
To: Washington, George

Dear General
Camp Whitemarsh [Pa.] Decemr 4th 1777

Agreable to your Excellenceys Directions I have Considered upon the Advisability of making a winters Campaign and the practicability of making an Attack upon Philadelphia with the aid of a Body of Militia to be Called in for that purpose.
Though The Attacking & carrying Philadelphia is an object much to be wished yet as the attempt carries with it an Idea of a winters Campaign I must give my opinion against it. When this motion was first made I was in favor of it but I was then taught to believe by those who pretended to have viewd the Enemys Lines that their Redoubts were not Inclosed in Rear but my own observation has Since Convinced me of the Contrary, my own opinion as well as that of a Great majority of the General officers has been that an Attack upon the Enemies Redoubts in Front & upon the City afterward would be Hazardous & must End in Ruin to the Army; & as we find their Redoubts are Equally Strong in Rear The Attempt will be Equally Dangerous—but if not altogether So it must at Least be attended with great Hazard–and in order to make the attempt your naked Army must be kept in the field the greater part if not the whole of the winter This in my opinion Should never be Done but where the object is of great importance and where there is a moral Certainty of obtaining the End in view. Even when an Army is properly Cloathed against the Inclemencey of the Season: but of your Army one third of them at Least are now Confined to their Cold Tents & unwholsome Hutts for want of Shoes Stockings & other Cloathing a very Large number of them unable Longer to Endure the Severity of their Situation have retired (Sick) to the Hospitals or to Country Houses The numbers which Daily fall Sick in Camp is Surprizing They have neither Cloaths to keep them warm by Day or Blankets by night Most of the officers are in the Same Situation. This it is which Induces So many of them to Resign many officers who have behaved with Credit have petitioned me for Leave to Retire for a Season or to Resign their Commissions & assigned as a Reason for not waiting on me that they were So naked they were ashamed to be seen That Cloathing was not to be had & Even if it was Their wages would not Enable them to purchase. I have taken pains to Inquire from the most Sensible officers & have Conversed with Several General officers upon the alarming Spirit of Resignation which takes place in the Army & find they in General Say this: “that they and their men have been marching and Countermarching all the year; that they have fought two General Actions beside Skirmishes that the Cloathes & Shoes which they wore out has amounted to their wages which Leave their Families

to Suffer at home That the Baggage they Sent to Bethlehem has been mostly plundered & they have no possable way of replacing it: That the price of Articles bears no proportion to their wages—they further Say that their Rank has not been Settled that they have been told from time to time that This Should be Done when they Retired to winter Quarters of which they See not the Least prospect & that while they have Contentedly born all this they Daily See Congress placing men over their heads without any Regard to their Rank or Services[.”] Dear General I feel for you when I tell you that this is not the Language of a few officers of Inferiour Rank but of high & Low Such a Disaffection I never could have conceived had not my inquiries Convinced me I know I must give you pain as it is not in your power to Redress those grievances but Duty oblidges me to give the information I am fully Convinced and fear the Event will prove that more than half your officers will Leave you in a month unless Some Remedy is found out to Quiet their minds and relieve their Distresses—Under These circumstances a winters Campaign will in my opinion Dissolve the Army: I know it has been urged that the above Sad State of our affairs Should induce us to Risque an Action as Soon as possible and I am myself fully of that opinion but can we Compell the Enemy to it if they Decline it if Mr Howe does not come to Attack us when we Lay So near him it is Evident he does not mean to fight us unless we attack his Lines—whoever would advise to this Measure puts the fate of America upon the Toss of a Single Die without Reflecting upon the Dismal Situation our affairs must be in if unsuccessful in an attempt where there are at Least twenty Chances to one against us—to remedy those Evils as much as possible I most Sincerely Recommend that the Army be removed immediately to Winter Quarters That Congress fall upon Some method of affording a proper Support to Officers & Soldiers and that the Rank throughout the Army be Settled & made known That in Instances of Rank which give universal Dissatisfaction the Honor of a few individuals Should be Sacrificed to the good of the whole & Every method taken to Recruit the Army Collect the Scattered, Recover the Feeble & Discipline the whole in order to take the field with vigor Early in the Spring which may be by March or April & in the mean while an Apparatus Should be collecting to Set down before Philadelphia in form So Early in the Spring as will enable us by Regular approaches to carry the Town before a Reinforcement can arrive. A Body of Militia may (if thot necessary) be Seasonably notified to Join us on the Day your Excellencey may fix for opening the Campaign—I know it may be objected to this plan that During the winter we Leave a vast Tract of Country Exposed to the Enemy but this may be Said in all cases of taking winter Quarters Every Army that Retires to Winter Quarters must Leave some Country Exposed and I think it much better to give them all Pensyvania for the

Winter than to Ruin That Army which must Save America, if Saved at all. If a winters Campaign is Carried on barely for the purpose of preventing the Enemy from Drawing provisions and Forage we Shall in my opinion be the greatest Sufferers the Army cannot in a Little time Act but in the partizan way Some of Colo. Stewards Regt will Soon Leave you nine virginia Regiments must Soon go Home The Drafts from Connecticut Leave you the first of January this with what will be taken off by fatigue &c. will Render Mr Howe Superiour to you in the field through the winter & if our attention is taken up in carrying on a partizan winters Campaign you will have in the Spring the miserable remains of an Army worn out with Fatigue & totally unfit for any opperations The King of prussia Speaking of winter Campaigns Says that no man having his Eyes open will carry on a winters Campaign unless he has Infinite objects in view this he Says of winter Campaigns Generally but I believe if his opinion was taken upon an Armys Carrying one on under our Disadvantages he would adopt a Language Still more forceable; he Says good winter Quarters are to give Tranquility to the minds of the Soldiers to Recruit your Army restore Constitutions reduced by Fatigue mend Carriages fill up your Regiments manouvre your Troops refresh your Horses make your Arrangements & Lay your Plans for the Ensuing Campaign all This is Essentially necessary for us at present to be About. I am therefore Clearly of opinion that no time Should be Lost in taking the Troops to winter Quarters & that we Should immediately fall upon Some method of giving Ease to our Soldiers & Satisfaction to our officers: unless this is Done & unless all other Considerations give way to it I fear the Event of the next Campaign will prove That in Striving to do too much we have Ruined all I am Confident that if the plan I propose is adopted we Shall be able in the Spring to take the field with an Army vastly Superiour to the Enemy Even if our New Recruits Should not be Numerous we have a vast number of Sick many have Deserted to their own homes there are upward of a hundred Deserters from the Delaware Regiment only who are Secreted by the Tories many other Regiments have almost an Equal proportion these might all be collected in the winter and with the Sick which may recover & Recruits which may be added our army will be able to take the field with great advantage in the Spring. The above is with all Due Submission offered by Dear General Your Excellenceys Most Obedt Servt

Jno. Sullivan

P.S. The best mode I could Devise for Covering the country I pointed out in my Last Therefore forbear to repeat it in this.

J.S.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, 4 December 1777
From: Wayne, Anthony
To: Washington, George

Sir
Camp [Whitemarsh, Pa.] 4th Decr 1777

I am not for a Winters Campaign in the Open field—the Distressed and naked State of your Troops will not admit of it.
But if taking post at Willmington & the Villages in it’s Vicinity—or Hutting at the Distance of about Twenty Miles West of Phila. (which will not only support the Honor & Reputation of Your Army in the eyes of the Enemy—and the States of Europe—but will give Confidence to America and cover this Country against the Horrid rapine and Devestation of a Wanton Enemy)—be Deemed making a Winters Campaign—I am then for it, upon every principal of Honor—policy and Justice.
The probability of a Successful Attack upon Phila. during the Winter—depends so much on time Season and a variety of Other Circumstances, that calling out the Militia in General, may not be Strictly Warrantable.
Notwithstanding I wish to see a proper Number of them always hanging on the Skirts of the Enemy—to prevent any small parties from Committing Depredations—to save the Continental Troops from that fatigue and should the Enemy move out in force, to give timely notice of their Approach and to Assist in their Repulse. I am your Excellencies Most Obt and very Humbe Sert

Anty Wayne B.G.


Title: To George Washington from Brigadier General George Weedon, 4 December 1777
From: Weedon, George
To: Washington, George

Dr Sir,
Camp white Marsh [Pa.] Decr 4th 1777

I have from the first moment it was Suggested to your Excellency, “that an attack on Philadelphia this winter with the aid of Militia was practicable and promised success,” kept in mind the desirable Object; have compaired and viewed it in every light, and on every ground I could place it, and after Mature consideration on the matter cannot promise a single Advantage that would justifie the measure, nor can I see the least prospect of anything honorable or advantagious by adopting it. On the other hand I foresee Numberless Obstacles to retard, and perplex that with sober reasoning stares any man in the face who views it with an impartial eye, places it on a military scale, and reflects on what human Nature is. It has been found, I believe, by most of your Officers who you have advised with on the matter, that your Continental Force is far, very far, Inadequate to an attack on the enemies lines, in their present strength and situation, Operations like those proposed, are of too extensive a nature to carry into sudden execution. Reasons Sufficiently cogent, must diminish your force every day you keep the field at this season of the year, and to resolve on the measure, ensures, a winters Campaign to this Army, which in their Circumstances also ensures certain destruction to great part of them, without the Aid of an enemy—your principle dependence must then be on the Militia, to carry this important matter into execution, Glory and our Countries good is no doubt what every upright Soldier would wish to obtain, but we may be too keen in pursuit of it, And like the Dogs in the fable, Suffer the Substance to escape while we Grasp at the Shadow. I would only mention to yr excellency some Difficulties that occur in drawing a sufficient force of Militia together for this purpose, and providing for them; particularly at a season of the year when our Fields, and Rivers are Ice & Snow. Covering we have not for them when they arrive, Hospitals stores we could not furnish for the numbers that would fall sick by being exposed to the severity of the winter, Nor do I know that even provisions and forrage, could be procured with any degree of certainty, which surely should be rendered beyond a doubt in such cases; take the matter still on a more extensive scale. Every one that reflects on human nature and considers mankind at large must know how reluctively they relinquish the ease and more calmer pleasures

of domistick & social life to share the hardships and Fatigue of a Camp, even in more plesent weather than what winter generally affords us. Men that are not taught and compell’d to obay, will never render Service, And Obideance and perseverance is not to be expected from a permiscuous body of men drawn together from all Quarters of the Globe, ware they to assemble, but you would find one half would desart on thir way to Camp, others proberly might arive, a day or two before thir time of Service expired, No object on Earth would keep them afterwards, nor could an Angle influance them after their time was out. What would follow must be distressing to an exaulted mind, you would find your regular Troops by this time much diminished, They must bare the burthen of all necessary duties, in such cases, while this body of men are Collecting, expensive preperations are daily Accumelating, The Eyes of the Continent, are turned towards you. Much Speculation on the practicability of the expedition terminating with success, which you at last find yourself Obliged to relinquish, leaving the unthinking world (who want nothing more to blast reputation than a miscarriage, without enquiring into it’s causes) at liberty to Sencure boath you & Army. Your Excellency is perfectly acquainted with my Sentiments respecting this Army, it is Sir the Bullwark of America and should be nursed and Cherished as the salvator of her Liberties. The Troops that compose it are not more than Mortal, and cannot worke maricles. The bravest spirits may be exausted by uncommon, and constant fatigue, And Sir, there is not in my opinion an Object on the Continent that justifies Subjecting them, at this particular time, to a winters Campaign, unless there was a moral certainty of obtaining that Object, and with it, a perminant and honorable end to any further Hostilities, I give it therefore as my clear Opinion, that keeping this Army in the Field for the purpose of attacking Philadelphia, under the uncertainty of sufficient Aid and support of Militia, is by no means Advisable. and Am Sir, with high esteem, Yr Excellencies Most Obt Sert

G. Weedon B. Genl


Title: To George Washington from Colonel John Gibson, 5 December 1777
From: Gibson, John
To: Washington, George

May it please your Excellency
Fort Pitt [Pa.] Decr 5th 1777.

By the inclosed Return Your Excellency will be made Acquainted with the strength of the Garrison at this place. Genl Hand ordered me to send the Deserters from the Different Corps at Camp down by Capt. Saml Miller of the 8th Pensl. Regt, which I Accordingly have done, Excepting those of the 13th Virga Regt and some who were sick. I shoud have sent the whole of them But at the time of Capt. Millers March, from the number of men who were on Commands, at the Small pox Hospital, & Employed as Artificers, we cou’d hardly mount a Serjts Guard. I make no doubt Genl Hand has already Acquainted your Excellency of the Situation of Affairs in this Country and of his having gone down to Regulate the Garrisons on the Ohio. since he left this place nothing Material has happened. Simon Girty a Messenger dispatched by General Hand to the Seneca towns on the Heads of the Allegeney, Returned here a few days a goe, he in forms us Guashota a Chief of them had Returned from War, that he had killed four people near Legonier, that another party Returned and Brought in a white Woman and three Scalps whilst he was in the towns, that they told him all the Nations Excepting White Eyes and a few Delawares woud strike us in the Spring. that they told him he must goe with them to Niagara, that he made his Escape; By going to hunt for his horse. he says the News of Burgoynes Surrender had not Reached there.
Lt Cane was ordered down the Country to Bring up the Cloathing for the Remainder of the 13th Virga Regt now here, But as the Cloathing is not Yet Arrived, and the men Being in the most distressed Condition, I have now sent Capt. Sullivan for that purpose, and hope your Excellency will Give such directions as will Enable him to Return as soon as possible. I am with the Utmost Respect your Excellency’s most Obedient humble Servt

Jno. Gibson


Title: To George Washington from Richard Peters, 5 December 1777 [letter not found]
From: Peters, Richard
To: Washington, George

Letter not found: from Richard Peters, 5 Dec. 1777. GW wrote to Peters on 14 Dec. that “Your several favs. of the 28th Novem. and 4th and 5th instants came duly to hand.”


Title: General Orders, 6 December 1777
From: Washington, George
To:

Head-Quarters, White Marsh [Pa.] Decr 6th 1777.
Parole Bennington.C. Signs Bedford. Bethlehem.

The Commissary General says he has put six day’s provisions into the hands of the division and brigade Commissaries; if therefore the troops want provisions, it must be the fault of the latter; and this want will be attended with such pernicious consequences, that no excuse will be admitted in behalf of any Commissary who fails supplying his division or brigade, but a severe example will be made of him.
The troops are to ground their arms at their alarm posts; and as soon as possible, draw and cook their provisions for to day and to morrow, and immediately set about making the best provision they can of wood and huts for to night.
The officers commanding brigades, and corps, are again called upon, to bring back from the baggage, sent off yesterday, every man who has cloathing and shoes sufficient to enable him to do duty—And to prevent the strolling and loss of men, the commanding Officer of every corps is to see, that the rolls are called every two hours, and to know where every man is.
The Q. M. Genl has stores to supply such brigades as want them—The Brigade Qr Masters, and all to whom any are issued, are to be accountable, respectively, to those of whom they receive them.