Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 18 November 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My dear friend
N. York Novr. 18. 1787.
I returned hither yesterday from Philada. to which place I had proceeded under arrangements for either going on to Virginia, or coming back as I might there decide. Your very affectionate favor of the 23d. Ult: found me in Philada. after travelling to N. York, and I should have answered it before my return, had any matters for communication occurred worth the expence of postage. I did not make any observations on the scheme mentioned in your letter from the Bolling-Green, because it had an object which I thought it unadvisable to pursue; because I conceived that my opinion had been fully made known on the subject, and I wished not unnecessarily to repeat or dwell on points, on which our ideas do not accord; and because I considered that part of your letter merely as a friendly communication, and a pleasing pledge of your confidence, and not as a subject on which my ideas were wished. So much indeed was this the case, that at the time of answering that letter, I had not considered the expedient, with sufficient accuracy, as a means of attaining the end proposed, to justify any opinion or remarks touching its fitness. The difficulty which struck me on a subsequent attention to it, and which seemed insuperable was that several Legislatures would necessarily have provided for a Convention, and even adjourned before amendatory propositions from Virginia could be transmitted.
I have not since my arrival collected any additional information concerning the progress of the federal Constitution. I discovered no evidence on my journey through N. Jersey, that any opposition whatever would be made in that State. The Convention of Pennsylvania is to meet on tuesday next. The members returned I was told by several persons, reduced the adoption of the plan in that State to absolute certainty and by a greater majority than the most sanguine advocates had calculated. One of the Counties which had been set down by all on the list of opposition had elected deputies of known attachment to the Constitution.
I inclose herewith sundry letters which came by the French packet just arrived. The letter for Col. N. Lewis, Mr. Jefferson tells me is of great consequence. You will have frequent opportunities during the Assembly, of giving it a safe conveyance. I have myself no public information by the packet, and have not yet learnt that any of moment has been received at the office of Foreign Affairs. The intelligence passing in conversation is that the Porte has declared war agst. Russia, that notwithstanding the advance of the Prussian troops into Holland, it is not certain that an accomodation may not prevent actual hostilities, and that in general it remains doubtful whether war or peace in the Western parts of Europe is to result from the present crisis of Affairs. A great change has taken place again in the French Ministry. The Count de la Luzerne, brother of the Chevalier, succeeds the Marshal de Castries in the department of Marine. The provincial Assemblies throughout are established, and some of them have already met. The Marquis is a leading member in that of Auvergne. The Parliament is returned to Paris, and it is supposed that the Court will not enforce either the Stamp duty or the territorial impost. The Count de Moutier is appointed Minister to the U. States and may shortly be expected.
I do not find that a single State is represented except Virginia, and it seems very uncertain when a Congress will be made. There are individual members present from several States; and the attendance of this & the neighbouring States, may I suppose be obtained when it will produce a quorum. With the most sincere & invariable affection I remain my dear friend Yrs.
Js Madison Jr


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 18 November 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
New York Novr. 18. 1787.
Your favor of the 5th. instant found me in Philada. whither I had proceeded, under arrangements for proceeding to Virginia or returning to this place, as I might there decide. I did not acknowledge it in Philada. because I had nothing to communicate, which you would not receive more fully and correctly from the Mr. Morris’s who were setting out for Virginia.
All my informations from Richmond concur in representing the enthusiasm in favor of the new Constitution as subsiding, and giving place to a spirit of criticism. I was fearful of such an event from the influence and co-operation of some of the adversaries. I do not learn however that the cause has lost its majority in the Legislature, and still less among the people at large.

I have nothing to add to the information heretofore given concerning the progress of the Constitution in other States. Mr. Gerry has presented his objections to the Legislature in a letter addressed to them, and signified his readiness if desired to give the particular reasons on which they were founded. The Legislature it seems decline the explanation, either from a supposition that they have nothing further to do in the business, having handed it over to the Convention; or from an unwillingness to countenance Mr. Gerry’s conduct; or from both these considerations. It is supposed that the promulgation of this letter will shake the confidence of some, and embolden the opposition of others in that State; but I cannot discover any ground for distrusting the prompt & decided concurrence of a large majority.
I inclose herewith the 7 first numbers of the federalist, a paper addressed to the people of this State. They relate entirely to the importance of the Union. If the whole plan should be executed, it will present to the public a full discussion of the merits of the proposed Constitution in all its relations. From the opinion I have formed of the views of a party in Virginia I am inclined to think that the observations on the first branch of the subject may not be superfluous antidotes in that State, any more than in this. If you concur with me, perhaps the papers may be put into the hand of some of your confidential correspondents at Richmond who would have them reprinted there. I will not conceal from you that I am likely to have such a degree of connection with the publication here, as to afford a restraint of delicacy from interesting myself directly in the republication elsewhere. You will recognize one of the pens concerned in the task. There are three in the whole. A fourth may possibly bear a part.
The intelligence by the packet as far as I have collected it, is contained in the gazette of yesterday.
Virginia is the only State represented as yet. When a Congress will be formed is altogether uncertain. It is not very improbable I think that the interregnum may continue throughout the winter. With every sentiment of respect & attachment I remain dear Sir Yr. Affect. & hble servant
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: From James Madison to Lawrence Taliaferro, ca. 18 November 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Taliaferro, Lawrence

ca. 18 November 1787, New York. Acknowledged in Taliaferro to JM, 16 Dec. 1787. Reports news of Taliaferro’s nephew, John Taliaferro, whom JM saw at Princeton.


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Jones, 22 November 1787
From: Jones, Joseph
To: Madison, James

Dr. Sr.
Richmond 22d. Novr. 1787.
I have your letter of the 26th. of October and have this day obtained from Mr. Thompson the survey of the upper part of James River, and shall Tomorow morning have an answer from Mr. Lambert to whom I was advised as a proper person to copy it whether he will undertake to do it. If he does, the work will perhaps be well executed. Should he decline doing it my endeavours shall not be wanting to engage some other person to undertake the execution of it, and forward it to you as early as I am able. There are no wild crab trees that I can hear of near this place, except at Col. R. Goodes, who I am told has a few Trees standing in one of his inclosures, where probably some Sprouts may be got if not injured by the Cattle. I will send there for the purpose, and if they can be obtained contrive them to you as safely as I can.
The Assembly have not yet passed any act of consequence. British debts—installments and the circuit or district plan of jurisprudence, are under consideration. There is great diversity of Opinion on these subjects. One party presses forward the removing impediments to the fullfillmt. of the Treaty—another for removing the legal impediments by one bill and introducing installmts. by another. A third class think the recommendation of Congress respecting the Treaty had better lye unmoved untill the convention shall have decided on the new constitution of Government. The introducer of the British debt proposition suspending the law if it shall pass untill the other States pass similar laws is the introducer of the plan of installments for these and all other private debts; and from the manner in which the business is managed will probably loose the whole. This day a Com: of the whole are upon allowing Tobacco to be received as a commutable in Taxes. The price at these Warehouses & Manchester &c. 30/ those at the heads of the other Rivers 28/. and so on with all the other Warehouses in the same ratio of increase on the prices of last year as fixed by law, and from the spirit of accommodation which seemed to govern to day from what prevailed a few days past when the subject was first debated I think the measure will succeed.
The New plan of Government is still very much the subject of conversation. I mix little in the croud and am unable as yet to form any estimate whether it gains or looses ground with the Members of the legislature. Wherever I hear the subject agitated I find Gentlemen pretty much divided, each party appear to maintain their opinions with apparent zeal. After a while more temper will prevail and the excellencies or defects of the System be treated with less prejudice and more moderation. I much doubt whether the people in this State whatever may be the situation of mens minds in other States are yet ripe for the great change which the new plan will ultimately effect. There would have been less repugnance to it here had the judiciary been less exceptionable and the Executive and legislative had been separate. The true line could it have been hit was to have yeilded full management of all exterior matters to Congress, leaving interior matters to the States, so far as the power of regulating trade as well between other nations as the States wod. have admitted of—with a Court of Appeals properly constituted for administering justice ultimately to all alike, and with some means of coercion, not violent or military. Some such improvements our State from all I can learn would have not hesitated in yeilding their assent to. The great change proposed will I think meet with strong opposition though it may be adopted. Cou[ld] the constitution of the Senate be varied and the Judiciary be better established than it now stands on the paper I could more willingly give the Constitution my assent. As it stands I shall receive it with reluctance. The 4th. Number of the American Citizen has been printed here in Davis’s paper. The three numbers you sent me were printed and in the same paper. I am Yr. friend
Jos: Jones


Title: Virginia Delegates to Edmund Randolph, 22 November 1787
From: Virginia Delegates
To: Randolph, Edmund

Sir,
New York Nov. 22. 1787
We do ourselves the honor to communicate to your Excellency the European intelligence which we have received to the 22d. of September by the last French packe[t.]
The Affairs of Holland were at that time in a gloomy state as they respected the Patriots, and it is to be apprehended that before this, they must have been brought to a serious issue: it appears hardly possible that the event can be any thing short of a perfect disappointment of the views of that party. The King of Prussia, urged by England, and incensed by the indignity alledged to have been offered to his Sister, has sent 30,000 Troops into these provinces. This formidable Army, Commanded by the Duke of Brunswic, made its invasion on the 15th. of September, and by the 22d. had obtained possession, against little or no opposition, of Utrecht and all the other places which had made an appearance of opposing the Stadtholder, except Amsterdam. This City is saved, for the present, by the inundation of the Country between it and the Enemy. The Patriots have no foreign Aid to expect but from France; she is by no means in a situation to engage two such powers as England & Prussia in their behalf, and a late event still adds to her embarrassments. This is a declaration of War by the Porte against Russia. As the powers now stand arranged, with a view to this War, the Parties are Turkey & France (perhaps Spain also) against Russia, the Emperor of Germany, Prussia & England: the inequality is so striking, that it would seem madness in France to proceed in it. She might plunge herself into Ruin in an attempt to support the Turks, and must still, eventually, leave them to their fate; in this State of things it might not be difficult for her to determine what conduct to observe were she left to decide intirely with a view to her own present circumstances, but it is not unlikely that the great ascendency which, one of the parties in the War, are about to possess, will excite such apprehensions in this Court, that she will not be content with barely withdrawing from it. The balance of powers, so essential to the tranquillity and safety of Europe, will be destroyed, and this she will not suffer to take place if she can by any means prevent it. Her only resort must be to such negotiations as may eventually place her in alliance with some, against others, of the powers at present concerned on the other side; the probability is, that in such event, she will be connected with the two Empires, and, consequently, be placed in the scale opposite to the Porte; in short, it must lead to an entire change of the System of Europe. In any event it appears that an extensive and bloody Continental War is inevitable, which will press hard upon the Turks, and may, eventually, drive them out of Europe.
Should the changes here suggested take place by an early period, the Patriotic Party in holland may possibly derive advantages from them. France will in every situation continue their Freind, and will not fail to exhibit proof of it whenever she can with effect.
It appears that the Emperor will carry into effect his new arrangements in Brabant; He has contrived to amuse his discontented subjects with pretended negotiations until he has established amongst them a sufficient force to compel them to compliance.
France is again in a State of tranquillity. The Parliaments have made such firm opposition against the Stamp-Act and territorial impost, that the King has suspended his efforts to carry them into effect, which is understood as an entire relinquishment. The Parliament of Paris, which was banished to Troyes, is recalled. The Provincial Assemblies are established as recommended by the Notables. Our Freind, the Marquis de la Fayette, is in Auvergne, and a principal Member in the Assembly of that province. This Nobleman is high in the estimation of his Country, and appears to be inspiring all orders of it, with those principles of liberty and equality which, though the growth of his own mind, have been confirmed in the American School. The Revenues of this Kingdom will be greatly increased by a more equal administration of the old systems than was formerly made. The property of the Nobles and Clergy, which were nearly exempted, will now be brought to Contribute to the support of the public burthens. This reform with reductions in the expenditures of the public money, it is hoped, will provide for the relief of our good Ally from the difficulties which now press her. It is much to be regretted that in this hour of her distress the American debt can not be paid.

The French Cabinet has undergone nearly an entire change. The Archbishop of Toulouse being made prime-Minister the Marechals of Castries & Segur, Ministers of the Marine & War departments have resigned. To the first the Count de la Lucerne (Brother of the late Minister in America), and to the latter Monsr. de Brienne have succeeded. The department of Controul has had a very rapid succession of Tenants. From Mr. Calonne it passed to Mr. de Fourqueux, from him to Villedeuil, & from him to Lambert who holds it at present. Great changes have also taken place in the foreign appointments. The Count de Moustier is to come to America, and the Chevalier de la lucerne, it is supposed, will go to London—& Mr. de St. Preist is sent to holland in pl[ace] of Mr. de Verac. We have the honor to be with the highest respect Your Excellencies Most Obedt. Servts.
Js. Madison JrEd. Carrington


Title: The Federalist Number 10, [22 November] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

[22 November 1787]
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both antient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations.
In the first place it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the encreased variety of parties, comprised within the union, encrease this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state.
In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists.
Publius.


Title: Edmund Randolph to Virginia Delegates, 24 November 1787
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Virginia Delegates

24 November 1787. Acknowledged in Virginia Delegates to Randolph, 11 Dec. 1787. Requests delegates to obtain the appointment of a separate superintendent of Indian affairs for Virginia and North Carolina. Recommends Major Dromgoole for this position.


Title: From James Madison to Archibald Stuart, 25 November 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Stuart, Archibald

Dear Sir
N. York. Novr. 25. 87.
I have recd. your favor of the 9th. instant and thank you for its Communications. I am sorry that I have none to make in return, no occurrences of moment having arrived since my last. The Pennsylvania Convention was to meet on Tuesday last, but I have heard nothing from that quarter. The election in Connecticut is over and the Returns it is said by those who the members & their characters, reduce the adoption of the Constitution in that State, to certainty. We have no Congress yet. Col. Carringt[on] tells me he has sent you the papers you request up to the date of his letter. I add those which have since appeared. With much esteem & regd. I remain Yr. Obedt. Servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Adam Stephen, 25 November 1787
From: Stephen, Adam
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Martinburg Berkely County Novr 25h. 1787
It appears that the Wild men of Franklin State have an intention to drive the Cherokees out of their Country.
They are a well behaved people. I carryd on an Expedition against them in —61 made a treaty with them at the long Island in Holston, kept the principals of the Nation with me untill such reputable person among them as I named carryd the Treaty to Charleston & Confirmed it There. This Treaty they faithfully Observed untill our People broke it, by wantonly killing Some their Hunters. Should these ill advisd people force them into a War, we shall have all the Southern Indians against us—and among other Evills they will infect the Navigation of the Mississippi, which would greatly distress our people settled on the Waters of the Ohio. If Mr Sevier has not authority to reclaim these intruders, which by the by he should be Strictly enjoind to do—perhaps it would be Adviseable to Post a hundred Rangers under a discreet Officer of insinuating Manners and Address, at some Convenient place between the Inhabitants and Indians—to see that the people of Franklin behaved According to treaty. When treaties are made and promises given without seeing them fullfilld—It naturally gives the Savages an unfavourable Opinion of us and our Government.
The Cherokee Nation have conceived a good Opinion of Major Drumgoole, and I am confident he will not deceive them, but as there is little or no government in Franklin I question if he can alone withstand the Torrent. The Banditti will probably get him knockd in the head.

The Western Territory belonging to N Carolina is extensive and Valuable, and well disposed of, may help the U States to discharge their debts. It merits attention as well as the Country N W of Ohio—from the head Wate[r] of Holston to their lower Settlements on Cumberland is at least 300 miles; and I do not imagine that there are abo[ve] 3500 Gunmen in that great distance.
The General Convention exceeded my Expectation. I hope the plan will be adopted as it is. When the defecets appear they can be mended. When America is so happy as to have it established, Congress Will have as many Ambassadors, as Augustus Cæsar had, when he first came to the imperial throne—and if we are happy to have men of Abilities and patriotism at the head of Affairs for one twenty years—Few States in Europe will command equall Respect. I have the honour to be sr your most hule. Sr.
Adam Stephen


Title: Additional Memorandums on Ancient and Modern Confederacies, [ante 30 November] 1787
From: Madison, James
To:

Editorial Note
In his advocacy of the Constitution, JM had frequent recourse to his knowledge of history. He used his Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies (PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——)., IX, 4–22) extensively in writing The Federalist and apparently sometime during the winter of 1787–1788 decided to supplement those notes with additional memorandums on the constitutions and governments of a number of countries. The structure of the Memorandums is far more random and less cohesive than the Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies. Rather than making a systematic study and analysis of confederacies as in the earlier document, JM appears to have jotted down for his own reference fragmentary notes on various, and not necessarily related, aspects of the political composition of unions, constitutional monarchies, and republics: “examples shewing defects of mere confederacies”; the seat of power and character of representation in various European countries; “Examples of hostile consequences of rival communities not united by one Government”; dangers of invasions, if disunited; and the nature of representation and sources of authority in Sparta, Carthage, and Rome.
The specific purpose JM had in mind in drawing up the Memorandums is uncertain. He used them in writing The Federalist, Nos. 14 and 63, particularly the latter, in which he explained and defended the proposed Senate (see Bourne, “The Authorship of The Federalist,” in Essays in Historical Criticism [1967 reprint], pp. 142–44). The title he added indicates that JM also used the Memorandums during the ratifying convention in Richmond. The extent to which he referred to them during the debates of that convention cannot be precisely ascertained because the recorder, David Robertson, often noted that he could not hear JM and apparently did not always take down sections of speeches containing specific historical illustrations. But during the first part of the convention both Federalists and Antifederalists ranged the entire field of history in search of examples that would buttress their arguments. JM drew on his vast knowledge of past confederacies and governments to counter the Antifederalists’ attacks on the augmented powers of the new central government and their warnings against the dangers of consolidation (see Bourne, “Madison’s Studies in the History of Federal Government,” in ibid., pp. 168–69). The Memorandums, and especially his Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies, must have informed his arguments and enabled him to assert convincingly the necessity of adopting the Constitution.

[ante 30 November 1787]
Memorandums for the Convention of Virginia in 1788 on the federal Constitution—

[1]Examples shewing defect of mere confederacies
Amphyctionic League. See
Lycian do.
Achæan do.
German do.—note Germany has more than 150 sovereignties
Swiss do.
Belgic do.
United Colonies—see
Albany project—see Albany papers.
Articles of Confederation
Hanseatic do.
Union of Calmar. See p. 4.
Engd. & Scotland—formed in 1706. by 32 Commssrs. appd. for each Kgdom: they sat from April 18th. to middle of July—they were appd. by crwn by acts of two Parlts—restrained from treating of Religion
The Scotch had got the notion of a fœderal Union like Holld. & Switzd—Engd. opposed decidedly amg. other reasons, because if differt. Parlts—eithr. cd. break it when pleased.

Many had despaired of Union as Burnet himself.

In Scotland opposed violently, particularly by those who were for a new revolution, as Union fatal bar to it—carried in Parliamt. by inconsidble. majority—The presbyterians bro’t into opposition by persuasion that religious rights wd. be in danger—this argt. used most by those known to be most adverse to that Religion—especially Dutchess of Hamilton & son, who as next in succession hoped for Crown if separate Kingdom.
Genl. argts. vs Union in Scotd.
1. antiquity & dignity of Kingdom to be given up & sold.
2. departing from Independt. State & to be swallowd by Engd.
3. wd. be outvoted in all questions by Engds: superiority in Parlt.
4. Scotland no more be regded. by foregin [sic] Nations.
5. danger to the Kirk.
Finally, Scotch parlt. prevailed on to annex conditions which advisers tho’t wd. never be agd. to & thus the plan be defeated.

Opposers of Union findg. majority vs them—endeavd. to raise storm out of doors—petitions, addresses & Remonstrances came up from all quarters, instigated by Minority—Even riots excited abt Parlt. House.

In Engld. alarm also for Religion, & act passed to secure it—H. of Commons unan[im]ous—Lords 50 & 20.

[2]Sweeden
2 remarkable circumstances—1. Citizens—elect by votes the multiples of their property—some rich merchts. have several hundred votes. 2. Country gentlemen between nobles & peasants—have no votes in electing the latter order—are not represented nor eligible at all.
Constitn. Prior to 1772. alternately monarchical & aristocratic. Foreign powers had chief agency in producing the Revolution of 1772. King had at the time only 2 Companies of Guards. [Power of King reduced to its lowest ebb at time of Revolution—Sheridan] [the power of peasants predominant originally—hence alternate anarchy & tyranny. Id]—on death of Ch: XII. all prerogatives of Ex. abolished—hence, legisl: soon exercised Ex. & Judicl. power both—any 3 out of 4. houses competent to legislation.
The Revol: of 72. owing to unpopularity of Diet owing to Abuse of power from union of Ex & Judl. with Legisl:—factions venality & foreign influence—The people favored the enterprize of the King.
Denmark.
The change in 1660. produced by the aversion to the Nobility—who as feudal lords had almost all power, the peasants being slaves to them—the two other orders being the Clergy—and Commons or represent[ative]s of Tuns. The Clergy were the great agents in the revolution & the King rather passive—Ld. Molesworth saith, Denmark differed little from an aristocracy when it became an absolute monarchy.
France—
The 3d. estate was composed accordg. to Robertson of Reps. of Cities &c within King’s demesne only—and the tillers of the earth the greatest body in all countries nothing or represented by the Nobles.
Spain—
Peasants never represented in Cortes—quere—
Poland
153 Senators—about 200 Nuncios—

[3]Examples of hostile consequences of rival communities not united by one Government.
All the antient & modern Confederacies.
Saxon Heptarchy (a)—England and Scotland (b) G.B. & Ireland Engd: & Wales—
Antient Republics of Italy—before Roman Empire
do—after dissolution of do.
(a) [anno 827] “Thus were united all the Kingdoms of the Heptarchy in on[e] Great State near four hundd. years after 1st arrival of Saxons in Britain [& 250 after establisht.]; and the fortunate arms &c. of Egbert [King of Wessex] at last effectd. what had been so often attempted in vain by so many princes” Hume Vol. 1. p. 59.
“Kent, Northumberland and Mercia had successively aspired to general dominion” Id. p. 60.
(b) question in 1713 in H. of Lords for dissolving Union as not answering & ruinous to Scotland, carried in negative by 4 voices only. Deb. Peers II. 313—Burg. 3. 360.

Harrington (pol. aphorisms 49. 50. 51—page 517.[)] pronounced the Union destructive to both Engd. & Scotland.

Heptarchy reduced to two, after some ages—Mercia & W. Saxons—& then one (Egbert)
See Kennet. vol. 1. p. 37. for an apt & short quotation as to Heptarchy

England & Wales prior to union under Edwd. 1—& more fully under H. VIII

[4] Union at Calmar in 1397 of Sweeden—Denmark—& Norway—
formed by Margaret Queen of the 2 last & elected Queen also of the former.† She convoked the deputies of the 3. Stas. Genl. at Calmar—40 from each attended & formed the Union or Treaty—main argumt used by Queen—the contentions & wars when disunited.
Union consisted of 3 principal articles:
1. that the 3 Kgdoms which were each elective—sd. have same King to be elected by turns out of each, with an exception however in favor of offspring whom the 3 Ks might elect.
2. The King to divide his residence by turns amg. each, & to spend in each the revenues of each Crown
3. The most important that each sd. keep its particular Senate—Customs—privileges. Govrs. Magistrs—Genls. Bishops & even troops & garrisons to be taken from respective Kigdoms. so that King sd. never be allowed to employ subjects of one in another; being mutually regarded as strangers.
This Union, thus imperfect, increased the mutual enmity & laid foundation for fresh & more bitter animosities & miseries.

[5]
Danger, if disunited,—1 of foreign Invasion by sea—2. of Eastern invasion, on S. Sts.
Examples of invasions of defenseless Coasts†
Such more formidable than by land, because more sudden & easily supported by supplies.

Romans invade England

   See Hume Hist: Vol. 1.

Saxons invade England

Danes—do

Normans do

   do. vol. 1. p 69–70.

Danes do France
Egyptians & Phonicians invade Greece

English—Ireland
Greece do. Italy

Europeans America
Carthaginians do. Italy & Spain

do. East-Indies
Visigoths from Spain—Barbary

do. Africa

—Countries without navy conquerable in proportion to extent of Coast—England more frequently & thoroughly conquered than France or Spain.

[6]Sparta.

2 Kings—
}
the two jointly forming a Council with power of life & death.

28 Senators

Senate—1 for life
2 vacancies filled by popular election, out of Candidates 60 years old
3 had right of convoking & proposing to Assemblies—as had Kings
   Usurped this right—

4 decrees of no force till ratified by people—

Kings—were for life—in other respects like 2 Consuls Generals during war—presided in assemblies & public sacrifices in peace—cd. propose to Assemblies—dissolve them when convoked by Kings—but cd do nothing with consent of nation—the 2 Kings alway’s jealous & on ill terms with each other were watched by field deputies in war.
People
Assemblies general & particular—former of all Citizens—latter of Citizens of Sparta alone had power of peace & war—treaties—great affairs—& election of Magistrates.
Ephori—chosen annually by people, and concurred in their behalf with Kings & Senate over both when they had authority—They had more authority than Tribunes—presided at elections of Magistrates demanded acct. of their administration—could imprison Kings—had the adm[in]istration of Money—superintended Religion—in fine directed every thing.
lands divided in 39,000 shares—

[7]Carthage—
500 years, says Ari[s]totle without any considerable sedition—or tyrant—
3 different authorities—Suffetes—Senate—people
Suffetes—like Consuls—and annual does not appear by whom chosen—assembled Senate presiding—proposing & collecting the votes—presided also in Judgmts. of most important affairs—sometimes commanded armies—at going out were made Pretors

Senate—composed of persons qualified by age—experience—birth—riches—were the Council of State—& the Soul of all public deliberation no. not known—must have been great since the 100 drawn out of it. Senate treated of great affrs—read letters of generals—recd. plaints of provinces—gave auds: to ambassrs—and decided peace and War† When Senate unanimous decided finally—in case of division people decided—Whilst Senate retained its authority says Polybius—wisdom & success marked every thing.
People—at first gave way to Senate—at length intoxicated by wealth & conquests, they assumed all power—then cabals & factions prevailed & were one of the principal causes of the ruin of the State.
Tribunal of 100—composed of 104. persons—were in place of Ephori at Sparta, according to Aristotle—& instituted to balance the Great & the Senate—with this differe[n]ce that here the Council was perpetual—Generals accounted to them.
Tribunal of 5—taken out of 100 above—duration of office unknown—like the Council of 10 at Venice—filled vacancies—even in Senate—had great power—but no salaries—became tyranical.

[8]Rome
power of Senate (exclusive of people). 1. care of Religion. 2. to regulate the provinces. 3.
   Gracchiis transferred their criml. jurisdiction to equestrian order
 over public treasury and expences of Govt. with appt. of stipends to Generals—no. of troops, & provisions & cloathing for armies—4
   ambassors. taken from their own body—Code d Humanitè
 appd with such instructions—& recd. ambassrs—& gave such answrs as they thought fit. 5 decreed thanksgivings—& conferred honor of triumphs 6 inquire into crimes & treasons at Rome & in Italy—& decide disputes among dependent cities 7 interpreting dispensing with, & even abrogating laws—8 arm Consuls with absolute power—darent operam &c—9. prorogue & postpone assemblies of people—pardon & reward—declared any one enemy—Middleton on R. Sen.
power of Senate—to propose to people who cd. not originate laws—this taken away by the Tribunes—& Senate not only obliged to allow assemblies at all times to be called, but to agree before hand to whatever acts of the people—Idem.
power of Senate unlimited almost at first—except legisl: power—choice of Magtres. and peace & war—all power in Senate—& a second Senatus consultum necessary—to ratify, act of people in consequence of proposition from Senate—Cod. d’Hum.

Senate consisted originally of 100—usually abt. 300—finally by Jul. Cæsar 1000—not agreed how appd. (whether by Consuls & Censors—or people &)—on extraordy. occasions by Dictator—censors—on ordinary (Middleton)—by people out of annual magistrates till these became a regular supply of course—Middleton
Censors could expel—but other Censors reinstate—& Senators had an appeal from them to people—Id.
Vertot thinks people had nothing to do in appointg Senators—power being first in Kings—then Consuls—then Censors—& on extra. occasions in Dictator—age required but not ascertained by antiquaries—so estate between £6 & 7000 Stng. Senate assembled by Kings—Consuls—Dicta[t]ors—Tribunes.

[9]
power of Consuls 1. Heads of Repub. 2. command of armies—levy troops in consequence of author[it]y from Commitia—3. authy over Italy & provs—who cd. appeal to their tribunal—and could cite subjects to Rome & punish with death 4. convene Senate propose business—count votes—& draw up decrees—nor cd. any resol. pass if one of the Consuls opposed—5 addressed letters to Kings &c—Gave audience to Ambasrs—introdd: them to Senate—& carried into execution decrees touchg all these matters—6 convoked Commitia—presided therein 7. applied money.—Had all the power of the Kings—Must be 42 years
Tribunes—uncertain whether at first—2—3—or 5. estabd. in 260. increased to 10. in 297. confind to City & one mile. At first had no power but to defend people, their persons being sacred for that purpose—but soon arrogated right to call Senate & assembly of people—& propose to them.
They were—(1). protectors of people—under wch. title they interfered in all affairs—released malefactors—& imprisoned principal magistrates of Repub: as Consuls & after a time exerted their authority over dictators & censors—(2) had the veto, to stop the functions of all other Magistrs. & to negative all laws & decrees of Senate—to dissolve Comitia so that Repub: often in anarchy & once 5 years without other Magistrs: than Tribunes—by this veto particularly as opposed to levies of men by order of Senate, they extorted every thing they wanted. (3). sacredness of persons of wch. they availed themselves much—pretending that it was violated in the persons of their officers—(4) to convoke Senate—& people—at first sat at door of Senate waiting to be informed of result of its deliberations† and had no right to assemble people—but Junius Brutus caught at incautious acknowledgt. of consul—got comit: tribut. estabd. in place of Centuries where votes unequal—& of curiata where as in Centuries, auspices necessary—& in both concurrence of Senate to the calling them & coming to Resolns† to these They soon brought trial of principal Citizens by appeal—& all sorts of affairs—got plebiscite made laws by Coma. trib: which they ma[na]ged & directed as they pleased†—(5) disposed of Govts. & command of armies—finances—& lands of the public—Sylla as dictator humbled the Tribunes but they were restored & Jul: Cæsar caused himself to be perpetual Tribune. The shadow continued down to Constantine the Great.
†
It appears that it was the design of Clodius to extend the suffrage to all the freedmen in the several tribes of the City, that the Tribunes might by corruption the more easily foment seditions. Cicero’s Milo with the note
Above 30,000. voters in some Counties of Engd. 3,000. only in all Scotland—Dalrymple F.P.

Writ of Error liesfrom B.R. in Ireld. to B.R. in Engd—Blackst.

do.
do.
from Wales to B.R. Jenkins’ Cent: & 1 W & M. c. 27.

as to Scotland into Parliament—see 6. Ann. c. 26. sect. 12.

difficulty of drawing line between laws apparent in Act of Union between Engd. & Scotland—1. Art: 18. The laws concerning regulation of trade, Customs &c. see Abridgt. by Cay—Vol. 2. 384. under “Scotland.” For line between Courts—see art: 19.
Roman Empire more than 2000 M. from N-to-S. more than 3000 from W-to-E. Gibbon
population of do. abt. 120 Million including slaves who abt. ½. this more than in Europe. Id.

Spain
700 by 500 Miles
Engd.
 360 by 300

France
600 by 500
Scotd.
 300 by 150

Italy—
600 by 400
Denmark
 240 by 180

Germany
600 by 500
Norway
1000 by 900.

Poland
700 by 680

Sweeden
800 by 500


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 20 [30] November 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
N. York Novr. 20. [30] 1787.

My last inclosed the seven first numbers of the paper of which I gave you some account. I now add the seven following numbers, which close the first branch of the subject, the importance of the Union. The succeeding papers shall be forwarded from time to time as they come out.
The latest authentic information from Europe, places the Dutch in a wretched situation. The patriots will probably depend in the event on external politics for the degree of security and power that may be left them. The Turks & Russians have begun a war in that quarter. And a general one is not improbable.
I have heard nothing of consequence lately concerning the progress of the New Constitution. The Pennsylvania Convention has probably by this time come to a decision; but it is not known here.
Not more than two or three States are yet convened. The prospect of a quorum during the winter continues precarious. With every sentiment of respect & attachment I remain Dear Sir Yr. Affect. humble servt.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 2 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My dear friend
New York Decr. 2d. 1787.
The period since my last has been so unfruitful of occurrences that I have not thought it worth while to trouble you with a letter and I do it now more to prevent too long a chasm, than for the sake of any interesting communication. Our public letter gave you the latest authentic information from Europe. A general war seems not improbable; a war between the Turks & Russians has actually commenced. The enterprising movements of the Prussian troops have disconcerted the patriotic party & their supporters, and it seems as if the Stadtholder would gain a compleat triumph. What effect this may have on the Government of that Country I cannot undertake to foretell. I have never been inclined to think that compleat success to the views of either party would be favorable to the people. If the Stadtholdership were abolished, the Government unless further changes concurred, would be a simple aristocracy. Should the patriots as they call themselves be excluded from the Govt. the Stadtholder would be an absolute Monarch. Whilst both continue they check each other, which is absolutely necessary as the people have no check on either. The consequence of the people arises from the competitions of the two for their favor. In general the lower order have been partizans of the Stadtholder. They are so it is said in the present contest.
A British packet arrived here a few days ago but does not bring later information than the last one from France. She has had a long voyage and called in at Halifax, a circumstance which some connect with the probability of a war.
We have not more than two or three States as yet attending. It is altogether conjectural when the deficiency of a quorum will be made up.
No recent indications of the views of the States as to the Constitution have come to my knowledge. The elections in Connecticut are over and as far as the returns are known, a large majority are friendly to it. Docr. Johnson says, it will be pretty certainly adopted; but there will be opposition. The power of taxing any thing but imports appears to be the most popular topic among the adversaries. The Convention of Pennsylvania is sitting. The result there will not reach you first through my hands. The divisions on preparatory questions, as they are published in the Newspapers, shew that the party in favor of the Constitution have 44 or 45. vs. 22 or 24. or thereabouts.
The inclosed paper contains two numbers of the Federalist. This paper was begun about three weeks ago, and proposes to go through the subject. I have not been able to collect all the numbers, since my return from Philada. or I would have sent them to you. I have been the less anxious as I understand the Printer means to make a pamphlet of them, when I can give them to you in a more convenient form. You will probably discover marks of different pens. I am not at liberty to give you any other key than that I am in myself for a few numbers & that one besides myself was a member of the convention. I wish you all happiness and remain my dear Sir Yr. affecte. friend
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Archibald Stuart, 2 December 1787
From: Stuart, Archibald
To: Madison, James

Dr Sir
Richmond Decr. 2d. 1787
I find by yrs. of the 18th. Novr. that one of my letters prior in date to the One of the 2d. Novr. has miscaried. This Gives me some uneasiness on account of its contents which possibly may transpire. An Absence of ten days prevented my writing last week. The legislature have taken up the subject of British debts and after four days debate on the subject passed a Vote for the payment of them by a Majority of thirty. In this business P H: took a Very Active part. His anxiety was too great to be concealed & had such an effect upon his whole frame as to make him sweat at every pore & appear to a greater disadvantage—in short when the question was decided disappointment was painted in strikeing colours in the Countenances of the Minority. A proposition for installing the Debts similar to the One made in 84 was also rejected by the same Majority.
P: H: Brought forward some time ago resolutions prohibiting the farther importation of All distilled Spirits & Carried the Same by a very large majority. We have passed An Act for the Receipt of Tobo. in the taxes of the present yr. at 30/ P[er] H for the first quality &c notwithstanding there is a loss of £2:700 in what is already sold of the Last years collection.
We counted the money in the Treasury yesterday & found there £30.136:6.5. & Tobo. to the Amount of £9.692:7:4.½. Of this we have appropriated six thousand pounds Cash & the Whole of the Tobo. to the purchase of Government securities to be laid out under the Direction of the Executive. It is true the Bill for this purpose is not actually passed but it is ordered to be read the third time & its friends are as 3 to 1.
It is my Opinion from conversing with the Members that we shall comply with the Requisitions of Congress so far as to pass an Act on the subject but I believe the funds will be doubtfull, it being the General wish to possess ourselves of a large proportion of the Publick securities before an Appreciation takes place under the New Government.
A Resolution was brought forward the day before yesterday for paying the members to Convention in June their Wages & securing to them Certain priviledges &c seconded by P: H: & Mason which after making Provision for the purposes aforesaid goes farther & sais that should the Convention think proper to propose Amendments to the Constitution this state will make provision for carrying the same into effect & that Money shall be advanced for the Support of Deputies to the Neighbouring States &c. This Many of us opposed as improper & proposed that the same provision should be made in General terms which should not discover the sense of the house on the Subject but after a Long Debate the point was carried against us by a Majority of sixteen. In the Course of the Debate P: Hy: Observed that if this Idea was not held forth our southern neighbours might be driven to despair seeing no door open to safety should they disapprove the new Constitution. Mason on the subject was less candid than ever I knew him to be. From the above mentioned Vote there appears to be a Majority vs the Govt. as it now Stands & I fear since they have discovered their Strength they will adopt other Measures tending to its prejudice. From this circumstance I am happy to find Most of the States will have decided on the Question before Virginia for I now have my doubts whether She would afford them as usual a good Example. Installments are yet in Statu quo. The form of the Courts is despaired of except some amendments to the County Court Bill.
Yesterday a Boat with sixteen men was brought down the Canall from West Ham, to its termination which is within one mile & an half of Richmond.
Mathews & Selden are removed from Council & Wm Heth & Jos. Egglestone reign in their stead.
I do not Wish you to forget that yr friends are all anxious that you should come into the Convention.
Colo. T Mathews will Write to you his intentions of having you elected for the Borough of Norfolk should you think it proper. I am Dr Sir yr most obt H Servant
Archd Stuart


Title: To James Madison from James Monroe, 6 December 1787
From: Monroe, James
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Richmond Decr. 6th. 1787.
I have had hopes of being able to give you something from the proceedings of the Assembly of an interesting nature which might also be agreeable. But perhaps yr. wishes in this respect may not even yet be gratified. The resolutions respecting the Constitution you have long since receiv’d. In those you find no provision for the pay or priviledges of the members of the Convention. These especially the former were thought the subject matter for an act & were seperated from them. A few days since resolutions were brought in by Mr. Hopkins & supported by Messrs. Henry & Mason for this purpose & providing funds for defraying the expence of deputies to attend other convention or Conventions of the States, if this Convention shod, think the measure expedient, wh. were adopted by the house by a majority of abt. 15. The bill is not yet brought in. The B. debt business hath also been another subject of curious managment. Resolutions of absolute repeal pass’d the committee first by a great majority. Without any apparent necessity Messrs. Mason & Nicholas who advocated them agreed to a clause of suspension untill the other states shod. pass similar laws of repeal. When the bill was under discussion yesterday Nicholas who had been most active & zealous in the business chang’d his former ground in every instance and acceded to the proposition of Mr. Henry wh. suspended its effect untill G. B. shall have complied. Owning himself convinc’d by the arguments that had been us’d, this Gentn. appears to have abandon’d the prospect of instalments wh. he brought forward early in the session. That of district or circuit courts seems also to be despair’d of by those who are desirous of amending this branch of our system. A bill of Mr. Henry’s for prohibiting the importation of foreign distill’d spirits & other purposes, is among the orders of the day & will most probably be thrown out. It appears difficult to organize the affrs. of this & perhaps of any one State in a tolerable manner & it is doubtful, if it were done whether it cod. be executed or whether the people wod. not have it repeal’d the next Assembly. The ct. of chy. break up tomorrow. The chancelor is yet present but in a low state of health. I doubt whether I shall stay untill the end of the session, Mrs. M. & her sister are with me. What is new with you. I think the cloud wh. hath hung over us for sometime past is not yet dispell’d or likely soon to be. Sincerely I am dr Sir yr. friend & servant
Jas. Monroe
Since the above the house went in committee on a bill for amending the cty ct. law. It terminated in 2. resolutions, 1. that the administration of justice shod. be made more equal & expeditious 2. that under executns. property sold so low as to require some legislative provision for preventing it. Afterwards in the house a proposition for establishing district courts was agreed to; the alternative of extendg the term of the genl. ct. was rejected by a great majority. The plan of instalmt. will be brot. forward, and that of altering the executn. law so as to prevent property being sold but for ¾ its value. The former is the favorite of Mr. N. the latter of Mr. Henry. It is not improbable but that the district bill may fail if incumber’d with either, cod. either get a decided majority in preference to the other, yet it is possible that their division upon this point may lessen the weight of opposition to the district bill & promote its adoption.


Title: To James Madison from Benjamin Hawkins, ca. 6 December 1787
From: Hawkins, Benjamin
To: Madison, James

ca. 6 December 1787, Tarborough. Mentioned in Hawkins to JM, 14 Feb. 1788. Reports the time set for the election and meeting of the North Carolina ratifying convention.


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 7 December 1787
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
New York Decr. 7. 1787
My last inclosed a continuation of the Fœderalist to number 14. inclusive. I now add the numbers which have succeeded.
No authentic information has yet arrived concerning the posture of Europe. Reports, with some less doubtful symtoms, countenance the suspicions of war.
I understand that the Constitution will certainly be adopted in Connecticut; the returns of the deputies being now known, and a very great majority found to be its declared and firm friends. There will be more opposition in Massachussetts, but its friends there continue to be very sanguine of victory. N Hampshire, as far as I can learn, may be set down, on the right list. I remain Dear Sir, with the highest respect and the most unfeigned attachment Your Obedient humble servant
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Henry Lee, 7 December 1787
From: Lee, Henry
To: Madison, James

dear Madison
Stratford Decr. 7t. 87
Having a few moments only to devote, you must be satisfied with a very laconic letr. Such is my distance from the line of posts, that to use it, I must avail myself of accidental conveyances, which are often like the present, sudden. It is with real Grief I inform you that by a late vote of the assembly of Virga. on a collateral question, they have manifested hostility to the new constitution. Henry whose art is equal to his talents for declamation, conducted this business & gained a majority on the vote of sixteen.

We are told by Gentlemen from Richmond, that the whole district south of James river are in the opposition. In this corner the people are warmly attached to the new system, but we are small in size, being only four or five countys.
I saw Genl. Washington on my return, he continues firm as a rock. The Pages are all zealous abettors of the constitution so is R Wormely & F. Lightfoote Lee. Both of these Gentlemen are candidates for the convention. The last is an important acquisition & breaks the influence of the stratford Lees. It becomes you to return in time to secure your election. If possible let me see you. I have offered myself for Westmoreland, but such is the number who contend for this distinction, it is not probable that I may succeed. God bless you—
Henry Lee


Title: To James Madison from George Washington, 7 December 1787
From: Washington, George
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Mount Vernon Decr. 7th. 1787.
Since my last to you, I have been favored with your letters of the 28th. of Octr: & 18th. of Novr. With the last came 7 numbers of the Fœderalist under the signature of Publius. For these I thank you. They are forwarded to a Gentleman in Richmond for re-publication. The doing of which, in this State, will, I am persuaded, have a good effect; as there are certainly characters in it who are no friends to a general government—perhaps I might go further, & add, who would have no great objection to the introduction of anarchy & confusion.
The sollicitude, to know what the several State Legislatures would do with the Constitution, is now transferred to the several Conventions thereof; the decisions of which being more interesting & conclusive, is consequently more anxiously expected than the other. What Pensylvania & Delaware have done, or will do, must soon be known. Other Conventions are treading closely on their heels—but what the three Southern States have done, or in what light the New Constitution is viewed by them, I have not been able to learn. North Carolina it is said (by some Accts. from Richmond) will be governed in a great measure by the conduct of Virga. The pride of South Carolina will not, I conceive, suffer this influence to operate in her Councils; and the disturbances in Georgia will, or at least ought to shew the people of it, the propriety of a strict Union, and the necessity there is for a general government.
If these, with the States Eastward and Northward of us, should accede to the proposed plan, I think the Citizens of this State will have no cause to bless the opponents of it here, if they should carry their point.
A Paragraph in the Baltimore Paper has announced a change in the Sentiments of Mr. Jay on this subject; and adds, that from being an admirer of it, he is become a bitter enemy. This relation, without knowing Mr. Jays opinion, I discredit, from a conviction that he would consider the matter well before he would pass Judgment, and having done so, would not change his opinion, almost in the same breath. I am anxious however to know, on what ground this report originates, especially the indelicacy of the expresn.
It would have given me great pleasure to have complied with your request in behalf of your foreign Acquaintance. At present I am unable to do it. The Survey of the Country between the Eastern and Western Waters is not yet reported by the Commissioners, tho’ promised to be made very shortly—the Survey being compleated. No draught that can convey an adequate idea of the Work, on this river, has been yet taken. Much of the labour, except at the great falls, has been bestowed in the bed of the River; in a removal of Rocks, and deepning the Water. At the great falls, the labour has indeed been great. The Water there (a sufficiency I mean) is taken into a Canal about 200 yards above the Cataract, & conveyed by a level cut (thro’ a solid rock in some places, and much stone every where) more than a mile to the lock seats; five in number; by means of which, when compleated, the craft will be let into the River below the falls (which together amount to 76 feet). At the Seneca falls, Six miles above the great Falls, a channel which has been formed by the River when inundated, is under improvement for the Navigation. The same, in part, at Shanondah. At the lower falls, where nothing has yet been done, a level cut and locks are proposed. These constitute the principal difficulties & will [be] the great expence of this undertaking; The parts of the river between requiring loose stones only to be removed, in order to deepen the Water where it is too shallow in dry seasons. With very great esteem & regard I am, My dear Sir Yr. Most Obedt. & Affece Ser
Go: Washington

PS. Since writing the foregoing, I have received a letter from a member of our Assembly at Richmond, dated the 4th. instt. giving the following information.
“I am sorry to inform you that the Constitution has lost ground so considerably that it is doubtful whether it has any longer a majority in its favor. From a vote which took place the other day this would appear certain, tho’ I cannot think it so decisive as the enemies to it consider it. It marks however the inconsistency of some of its opponants. At the time the Resolutions calling a Convention were entered into Colo. M——n sided with the friends to the Constitution, and opposed any hint being given, expressive of the sentiments of the House as to amendments. But as it was unfortunately omitted at that time to make provision for the subsistence of the Convention, it became necessary to pass some resolutions for that purpose; among these is one providing for any expence which may attend an attempt to make amendments. As M—— had on the former occasion declared that it would be improper to make any discovery of the sentiments of the House on the subject, and that we had no right to suggest any thing to a body paramount to us, his advocating such a resolution was matter of astonishment. It is true he declared it was not declaratory of our opinion; but the contrary must be very obvious. As I have heard many declare themselves friends to the Constitution since the vote, I do not consider it as altogether decisive of the opinion of the House with respect to it.”
“In a debating society here, which meets once a week, this subject has been canvassed at two successive meetings, and is to be finally decided on tomorrow evening. As the whole Assembly almost has attended on these occasions, their opinion will then be pretty well ascertained. And as the opinion on this occasion will have much influence, some of Colo. Innis’s friends have obtained a promise from him to enter the lists.
“I am informed both by Genl. Wilkinson (who is just arrived from New Orleans by way of No. Carolina) and Mr Ross, that North Carolina is almost unanimous for adopting it. The latter received a letter from a member of that Assembly now sitting.”
“The Bill respecting British debts has passed our house, but with such a clause as I think makes it worse than a rejection.”
The letter of which I enclose you a printed Copy, from Colo R H. Lee to the Govr. has been circulated with great industry in manuscript, four weeks before it went to press, and is said to have had a bad influence. The enemies to the Constitution leave no stone unturned to encrease the opposition to it. Yr. &ct
G: W.


Title: The Federalist Number 18, [7 December] 1787
From: Madison, James,Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[7 December 1787]
Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics associated under the Amphyctionic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present confederation of the American states.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece—to declare and carry on war—to decide in the last resort all controversies between the members—to fine the aggressing party—to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient—to admit new members. The Amphyctions were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory and upon paper, this apparatus of powers, seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The Amphyctions had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to use coertion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.
Very different nevertheless was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities, awed and corrupted those of the weaker, and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes, or the hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign war, were filled up by domestic vicissitudes, convulsions and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the Lacedemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians finding that the Lacedemonians would lose fewer partizans by such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union; the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system, to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had become in fact satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbé Milot, been as wise as they were courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals, and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief, than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds and injuries, ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions; so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphyctionic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphyctions, and to avenge the violated god. The latter being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphyctionic council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle, on which this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achæan league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league, retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war—of sending and receiving ambassadors—of entering into treaties and alliances—of appointing a chief magistrate or pretor, as he was called, who commanded their armies; and who with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberation, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two pretors associated in the administration, but on trial, a single one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council, is left in uncertainty. It is said only, that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedemon was brought into the league by Philopœmen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achæans. The Amphyctionic confederacies, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achæan affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The abbé Mably in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achæan republic, because it was there tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not in a certain degree agitate the particular cities; much less, that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.
Whilst the Amphyctionic confederacy remained, that of the Achæans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practised among the Achæans; each city was seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression ere long awakened their love of liberty. A few cities re-united. Their example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissentions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm, and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achæans, threw a fatal damp on the enterprize. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the league to court the alliance of the kings of Egypt and Syria; who, as successors of Alexander were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbours the Achæans; and who as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian princes, to effect a breach of their engagements with the league. The Achæans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contest of the Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbour, of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared: Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achæans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally, is but another name for a master. All that their most abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked, by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achæans, though weakened by internal dissentions, and by the revolt of Messene one of its members, being joined by the Etolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succour of foreign arms. The Romans to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered: Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissentions broke out among its members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders, became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder, the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty
   This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head.
 throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride, the violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts, this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of antient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in compleating the ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achæans were cut to pieces; and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson; and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achæans constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies, rather to anarchy among the members than to tyranny in the head.
Publius.