Title: Enclosure: Answers to Questions proposed by the President of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury., 15 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

New York September 15. 1790

Question the first
“What should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?”
Answer
In order to a right judgment of what ought to be done in such case, it may be of use previously to consider the following points.

First. Whether there be a right to refuse or consent, as shall be thought most for the interest of the United States.
Secondly. The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent.
Thirdly. The motives to the one or to the other.
As to the first point, if it were to be determined upon principle only, without regard to precedents, or opinions, there would seem to be no room for hesitation about the right to refuse. The exc[l]usive jurisdiction which every independent Nation has over its own territory appears to involve in it the right of prohibiting to all others the use of that territory in any way disagreeable to itself, and more especially for any purpose of war, which always implies a degree of danger and inconvenience: with the exception only of cases of necessity.
And if the United States were in a condition to do it without material hazard, there would be strong inducements to their adopting it as a general rule never to grant a passage for a voluntary expedition of one power against another, unless obliged to it by treaty.
But the present situation of the United States is too little favourable to encountering hazards, to authorise attempts to establish rules, however eligible in themselves, which are repugnant to the received maxims or usages of Nations.
It is therefore necessary to inquire what those maxims or usages enjoin in the case suggested.
With regard to usage it has been far from uniform. There are various instances in ancient and modern times of similar permissions being demanded; many in which they have been granted; others in which they have been refused and the refusal acquiesced in; but perhaps more in which, when refused, a passage has been forced—and the doing it has often been deemed justifiable.
Opinions are not more harmonious. Among those who may be considered as authorities on such subjects, Puffendorf and Barbeyrac confine within narrow limits the right of passage through neutral territories; while Grotius and Vatel, particularly the former, allow to it greater latitude. Puffendorf treats it not as a natural right but as derived from compact or concession; especially when the enemy of a neighbouring state desires leave to march troops through a neutral Country against its neighbour. For it seems (says he) to be a part of the duty which

we owe to our neighbours, especially such as have been kind and friendly, not to suffer any hostile power to march through our Country to their prejudice; provided we can hinder the design with no great inconvenience to ourselves. And as it may have a tendency to make our own Country the theatre of the war (since the power intended to be attacked may justifiably march within our limits to meet the approaching enemy) he concludes that it is the safest way of acting in such case, if we can do it, without any considerable prejudice to our own affairs to deny the enemy passage, and actually to oppose him, if he endeavour to force it without our consent. But if we are either too weak to hinder his progress or must on this score engage in a dangerous war, he admits, that the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbour.
Examples, he adds, have little force in the decision of this question. For, generally, as people have been stronger or weaker, they have required passage with modesty or with confidence, and have in like manner granted or refused it to others.
Barbeyrac in his commentary on Grotius is still stronger against the right of passage. He affirms that even though we have nothing to apprehend from those who desire a passage, we are not therefore obliged in rigour to grant it. It necessarily follows (says he) from the right of property, that the proprietor may refuse another the use of his goods. Humanity indeed requires that he should grant that use to those who stand in need of it, when it can be done without any considerable inconvenience to himself; but if he even then refuses it, though he transgresses his duty, he does them no wrong, properly so called; except they are in extreme necessity, which is superior to all ordinary rules. Thus far and no further extends the reserve with which it is supposed the establishment of property is accompanied.
Grotius on the other hand, expresses himself thus—A free passage ought to be granted to persons where just occasion shall require, over any lands or rivers, or such parts of the sea as belong to any nation; and after enumerating several examples in support of his position, he concludes that the middle opinion is best, to wit, that the liberty of passing ought first to be demanded, and if denied may be claimed by force. Neither (says he) can it be reasonably objected that there may be suspicion of danger from the passing of a multitude; for one man’s right is not diminished by another man’s fear. Nor is the fear of provoking

that prince against whom he that desires to pass is engaged in a just war, a sufficient reason for refusing him passage. Nor is it any more an excuse that he may pass another way; for this is what every body may equally allege, and so this right of passing would be entirely destroyed. But ’tis enough that the passage be requested without any fraud or ill design, by the nearest and most convenient way. If indeed, he who desires to pass undertakes an unjust war, or if he brings people who are my enemies along with him, I may deny him a passage; for in this case I have a right to meet and oppose him, even in his own land, and to intercept his march. Thus it would seem to be the opinion of Grotius that a party engaged in a just war has a right, of course, to a passage through a neutral territory, which can scarcely, if at all, be denied him, even on the score of danger or inconvenience to the party required to grant it.
But Vatel, perhaps the most accurate and approved of the writers on the laws of Nations, preserves a mean between these different opinions. This is the sum of what he advances—
  “That an innocent passage is due to all nations, with whom a state is at peace, for troops equally with individuals; and to annoy as well as to avoid an enemy. That the party asking and the party asked are both, in different degrees, judges of the question when innocent? That where the party asked has good reasons for refusing, he is not under any obligation to grant, and in doubtful cases his judgment ought to be definitive; but in evident ones, or those in which the harmlessness of the passage is manifest, the party asking may, in the last resort, judge for himself, and after demand and refusal may force his way. That, nevertheless, as it is very difficult for the passage of a powerful army to be absolutely innocent, and still more difficult for its innocence to be apparent, a refusal ought to be submitted to, except in those very rare cases, when it can be shewn in the most palpable manner, that the passage required is absolutely without danger or inconvenience. And lastly that this right of passage is only due in a war not manifestly unjust.[”]
Perhaps the only inference to be drawn from all this is, that there exists in the practice of nations and the dogmas of political writers a certain vague pretension to a right of passage in particular cases, and according to circumstances, which is sufficient to afford to the strong a pretext for claiming and exercising it,

when it suits their interests, and to render it always dangerous to the weak to refuse, and, sometimes not less so, to grant it.
It is, nevertheless, a proper inquiry, whether a refusal could be placed on such ground as would give no reasonable cause of umbrage to the party refused, and as in the eye of the world would justify it.
Against the propriety of a refusal are the following circumstances; that there is no connection between us and Spain, which obliges us to it: That the passage asked will be down rivers, and for the most part through an uninhabited wilderness; whence no injury to our citizens or settlements will be to be apprehended: And that the number of troops to be marched, especially considering the route, will probably not be such as on their own account, to be a serious cause of alarm. These circumstances may give our refusal the complexion of partiality to Spain and of indisposition towards Britain, which may be represented as a deviation from the spirit of exact neutrality.
In support of the propriety of a refusal, the following is the only assignable reason: That it is safer for us to have two powerful, but rival nations, bordering upon our two extremities; than to have one powerful nation pressing us on both sides and in capacity, hereafter, by posts and settlements, to invelop our whole interior frontier.
The good offices of Spain in the late war; the danger of the seduction of our Western inhabitants; the probable consequences to the trade of the Atlantic States; are considerations rather to be contemplated, as motives, than alleged, as reasons.
The first reason, however, is of a nature to satisfy the mind of the justice of a refusal; admitting the authority of more moderate opinions, which have been cited. And the danger, too, upon the supposition of which it is founded, appears to be obvious enough, to vindicate it in the opinion of the disinterested part of Mankind; little likely as it may be to engage the acquiescence of the party whose wishes would be thwarted by the refusal. It deserves notwithstanding to be noticed on this point, that the ground of dissent would not result from the thing itself, that is the mere passage, but from the nature of the acquisition, to which it would give facility—This circumstance may somewhat obscure the clearness of the conclusion that there is a perfect right to refuse.

But upon the whole there does not appear to be room enough for a scruple about the right, to deter from refusal, if upon examination it shall be found expedient.
Does the right of consenting to the passage stand upon ground equally unexceptionable?
This question Vatel answers in the following manner—“When I have no reason to refuse the passage, the party against whom it is granted has no room for complaint, much less for making it a pretence for war; since I did no more than what the law of nations enjoins. Neither has he any right to require, that I should deny the passage, because he is not to hinder me from doing what I think is agreeable to my duty, and even on occasion when I might with justice deny the passage, it is allowable in me not to make use of my right; especially when I should be obliged to support my refusal by my sword. Who will take upon him to complain of my having permitted the war to be carried into his own country rather than draw it on myself? It cannot be expected, that I should take up arms in his favour, unless obliged to it by a Treaty.” And Puffendorff admits, as has been before noted, that if we are either too weak to hinder his progress or must on that score engage in a dangerous war, the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbour.
Nothing need be added to reasoning so perspicuous and convincing. It does not admit of a moment’s doubt as a general rule that a neutral state, unfettered by any stipulation, is not bound to expose itself to a war, merely to shelter a neighbour from the approaches of its enemy. It remains to examine if there are any circumstances, in our particular case, capable of forming an exception to that rule.
It is not to be forgotten that we received from France, in our late revolution, essential succour, and from Spain valuable countenance, and some direct aid. It is also to be remembered that France is the intimate ally of Spain, and that there subsists a connection by treaty between the former power and the United States.
It might thence be alleged that obligations of Gratitude towards those powers require that we should run some risk, rather than concur in a thing prejudicial to either of them, and particularly in favour of that very nation against which they assisted us. And the natural impulse of every good heart will second the

proposition, ’till reason has taught it, that refinements of this kind are to be indulged with caution, in the affairs of Nations.
Gratitude is a word the very sound of which imposes something like respect. Where there is even an appearance upon which the claim to it can be founded, it can seldom be a pleasing task to dispute that claim. But where a word may become the basis of a political system, affecting the essential interests of the state, it is incumbent upon those who have any concern in the public administration, to appreciate its true import and application.
It is necessary then to reflect, however painful the reflection, that gratitude is a duty or sentiment which between nations can rarely have any solid foundation. Gratitude is only due to a kindness or service, the predominant object of which is the interest or benefit of the party to whom it is performed. Where the interest or benefit of the party performing is the predominant cause of it, however there may result a debt, in cases in which there is not an immediate adequate and reciprocal advantage, there can be no room for the sentiment of gratitude. Where there is such an advantage there is then not even a debt. If the motive to the act, instead of being the benefit of the party to whom it is done, should be a compound of the interest of the party doing it and of detriment to some other, of whom he is the enemy or the rival, there is still less room for so noble and refined a sentiment. This analysis will serve as a test of our true situation, in regard both to France and Spain.
It is not to be doubted that the part which the Courts of France and Spain took in our quarrel with Great Britain is to be attributed, not to an attachment to our independence or liberty, but to a desire of diminishing the power of Great Britain by severing the British empire. This they considered as an interest of very great magnitude to them. In this their calculations and their passions conspired. For this, they united their arms with ours and encountered the expences and perils of war. This has been accomplished; the advantages of it are mutual; and so far the account is ballanced.
In the progress of the war they lent us money, as necessary to its success, and during our inability to pay they have foreborn to press us for it. The money we ought to exert ourselves to repay with interest, and as well for the loan of it, as for the forbearance

to urge the repayment of the sums, which have become due, we ought always to be ready to make proportionate acknowlegements and, when opportunities shall offer returns answerable to the nature of the service.
Let it be added to this, that the conduct of France in the manner of affording her aid bore the marks of a liberal policy. She did not endeavour to extort from us, as the price of it, any disadvantageous or humiliating concessions. In this respect, however, she may have been influenced by an enlightened view of her own interest, she intitled herself to our esteem and good will. These dispositions towards her ought to be cherished and cultivated but they are very distinct from a spirit of romantic gratitude calling for sacrifices of our substantial interests; preferences inconsistent with sound policy; or complaisances incompatible with our safety.
The conduct of Spain towards us presents a picture far less favourable. The direct aid we received from her during the war was inconsiderable in itself, and still more inconsiderable compared with her faculty of aiding us. She refrained from acknowleging our independence—has never acceded to the Treaty of Commerce made with France, though a right of doing it was reserved to her, nor made any other Treaty with us. She perseveringly obstructs our sharing in the navigation of the Mississippi; though it is a privilege essential to us, and to which we consider ourselves as having an indisputable title. And perhaps it might be added upon good
Spain therefore must be regarded upon the whole as having slender claims to peculiar good will from us. There is certainly nothing that authorises her to expect we should expose ourselves to any extraordinary jeopardy for her sake. And to conceive that any considerations relative to France ought to be extended to her would be to set up a doctrine altogether new in politics. The ally of our ally has no claim, as such, to our friendship. We may have substantial grounds of dissatisfaction against him, and act in consequence of them, even to open hostility, without derogating in any degree from what we owe to our ally.
This is so true, that if a war should really ensue between Great Britain and Spain, and if the latter should persist in excluding us from the Mississippi (taking it for granted our claim to share

in its navigation is well founded) there can be no reasonable ground of doubt that we should be at liberty, if we thought it our interest, consistently with our present engagements with France, to join Britain against Spain.
How far it might be expedient to place ourselves in a situation which in case France should eventually become a party in the war, might entangle us in opposite duties on the score of the stipulated guarantee of her West India possessions, or might have a tendency to embroil us with her, would be a mere question of prudential and liberal calculation, which would have nothing to do with the right of taking side against Spain.
These are truths necessary to be contemplated with freedom, because it is impossible to foresee what events may spring up, or whither our interests may point; and it is very important to distinguish with accuracy, how far we are bound, and where we are free.
However vague the obligations of gratitude may be between Nations, those of good faith are precise and determinate. Within their true limits, they can hardly be held too sacred. But by exagerating them, or giving them a fanciful extension, they would be in danger of losing their just force. This would be converting them into fetters, which a nation would ere long become impatient to break, as consistent neither with its prosperity, nor its safety. Hence while it is desireable to maintain with fidelity our engagements to France, it is adviseable on all occasions to be aware, that they oblige us to nothing towards Spain.
From this view of the subject there does not appear any circumstance in our case capable of forming an exception to the general rule; and as it is certain that there can hardly be a situation less adapted to war than that in which we now find ourselves, we can with the greatest sincerity offer the most satisfactory excuse to Spain for not witholding our consent if our own interests do not decide us to a contrary course.
The consequences to be expected from refusal or consent present themselves next to consideration. Those of consent shall be first examined.
An increase of the means of annoying us, in the same hands is a certain ill consequence of the acquisition of the Floridas and Louisiana by the British. This will result not only from contiguity to a greater part of our territory but from the increased facility

of acquiring an undivided influence over all the Indian tribes inhabiting within the borders of the United States.
Additional danger of the dismemberment of the Western Country is another ill consequence to be apprehended from that acquisition. This will arise as well from the greater power of annoying us, as from the different policy, which it is likely would be pursued by that nation, if in possession of the key to the only outlet for the productions of that Country. Instead of shutting, they would probably open the door to its inhabitants, and by conciliating their good will on the one hand, and making them sensible on the other of their dependence on them for the continuance of so essential an advantage they might hold out to them the most powerful temptation to a desertion of their connection with the rest of the United States. The avarice and ambition of individuals may be made to cooperate in favour of these views.
A third ill consequence of that acquisition would be material injury in time to come to the Commerce of the Atlantic States. By rendering New Orleans the emporium of products of the Western Country, Britain would at a period, not very distant have little occasion for supplies of provisions for their Islands from the Atlantic States; and for their European Market they would derive from the same source copious supplies of Tobacco and other articles now furnished by the Southern States: Whence a great diminution of the motives to establish liberal terms of Commercial Intercourse with the United States collectively.
These consequences are all expressed or implied in the form of the Question stated by the President. And as far as our consent can be supposed likely to have influence upon the event they constitute powerful objections to giving it.
If even it should be taken for granted that our consent or refusal would have no influence either way, it would not even then cease to be disagreeable to concur in a thing apparently so inauspicious to our interests. And it deserves attention, that our concurrence might expose us to the imputation either of want of foresight to discover a danger or of vigour to withstand it.
But there is almost always in such cases a comparison of evils; and the point of prudence is to make choice of that course which threatens the fewest or the least, or sometimes the least certain.

The consequences of refusal are therefore to be weighed against those of consent.
It seems to be a matter taken for granted by the writers upon the subject, that a refusal ought to be accompanied with a resolution to support it if necessary by the sword—or in other words, to oppose the passage, if attempted to be forced, or to resent the injury, if circumstances should not permit an effectual opposition. This indeed is implied in the nature of the thing; for to what purpose refuse, unless it be intended to make good the refusal? or how avoid disgrace, if our territories are suffered to be violated with impunity, after a formal and deliberate prohibition of passage?
There are cases in which a nation may without ignominy wink at infractions of its rights; but this does not appear to be one of them. After having been asked its permission and having refused it, the presumption will be that it has estimated the consequences, calculated its means, and is prepared to assert and uphold its rights. If the contrary of this should turn out to be its conduct, it must bring itself into contempt for inviting insult which it was unable to repel, and manifesting ill will towards a power whom it durst not resist. As on the one hand, there cannot be conceived to be a greater outrage than to pass through our country, in defiance of our declared disapprobation, so on the other there cannot be a greater humiliation than to submit to it.
The consequence therefore of refusal if not effectual must be absolute disgrace or immediate war. This appears at least to be the alternative.
Whether a refusal would have the desired effect is at best problematical. The presumption, perhaps, is, that Great Britain will have adverted to the possibility of it; and if under the uncertainty of what would be our conduct she should still have resolved on prosecuting the enterprise through our territory, that she will at the same time have resolved, either to ask no questions or to disregard our dissent. It is not unlikely, that the reasoning of the British Cabinet will have been to this effect—If the United States have no predilection for Spain, or if their views of their own interest are not opposed to the acquisition we meditate, they will not withold their consent; if either the one, or the other be the case, it ought to be determined before hand,

whether their enmity be a greater evil, than the projected acquisition, a good, and if we do not choose to renounce the one, we must be prepared to meet the other.
A further ill consequence of the refusal, if ineffectual, not wholly destituted of weight, is this, that Great Britain would then think herself under less obligation to keep measures with us and would feel herself more at liberty to employ every engine in her power to make her acquisition as prejudicial to us as possible; whereas, if no impediment should be thrown in the way by us, more good humour may beget greater moderation, and in the progress of things, concessions securing us may be made as the price of our future neutrality. An explicit recognition of our right to navigate the Mississippi to and from the Ocean with the possession of New Orleans, would greatly mitigate the causes of apprehension from the conquest of the Floridas by the British.
The consequences of refusal or consent constitute leading motives to the one or to the other; which now claim a more particular discussion.
It has been seen that the ill effects to be apprehended from the conquest of the Spanish territories in our neighbourhood, are an increase of the means, whereby we may be hereafter annoyed, and of the danger of the separation of the Western Country from the rest of the Union—and a future interference with the trade of the Atlantic States, in a manner too not conducive to the general weal.
As far as there is a prospect that a refusal would be an impediment to the enterprize, the considerations which have been mentioned afford the strongest inducements to it. But if that effect of it be doubtful, the force of these inducements is proportionably diminished; if improbable, it nearly ceases. The prospect in this case, would be that a refusal would aggravate instead of preventing the evil it was intended to obviate. And it must be acknowleged that the success of it is at least very doubtful.
The consideration that our assent may be construed into want of foresight or want of vigour, though not to be disregarded, would not be sufficient to justify our risking a war in our present situation. The cogent reasons we have to avoid a war are too obvious and intelligible; not to furnish an explanation of and an apology for our conduct in this respect.
Whatever may be the calculations with regard to the probable

effect of a refusal, it ought to be predicated upon the supposition, that it may not be regarded, and accompanied with a determination to act as a proper attention to national dignity would in such an event dictate. This would be to make war.
For it is a sound maxim, that a state had better hazard any calamities than submit tamely to absolute disgrace.
Now it is manifest, that a Government scarcely ever had stronger motives to avoid war, than that of the United States, at the present juncture. They have much to dread from war; much to expect from peace; something to hope from negotiation, in case of a rupture between Britain and Spain.
We are but just recovering from the effects of a long arduous and exhausting war. The people but just begin to realise the sweets of repose. We are vulnerable both by water and land without either fleet or army. We have a considerable debt in proportion to the resources which the state of things permits the government to command. Measures have been recently entered upon for the restoration of credit, which a war could hardly fail to disconcert, and which if disturbed would be fatal to the means of prosecuting it. Our national government is in its infancy. The habits and dispositions of our people are ill suited to those liberal contributions to the treasury, which a war would necessarily exact. There are causes which render war in this country more expensive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on than in any other. There is a general disinclination to it in all classes. The theories of the speculative and the feelings of all are opposed to it. The support of public opinion (perhaps more essential to our government than to any other) could only be looked for in a war evidently resulting from necessity.
These are general reasons against going into war. There are others of a more particular kind. To the people at large the quarrel would be apt to have the appearance of having originated in a desire of shielding Spain from the arms of Britain. There are several classes of men to whom this idea would not be agreeable, especially if the Dutch were understood to be in conjunction with the British. All those who were not friendly to our late revolution would certainly dislike it. Most of the descendants of the Dutch would be unfriendly to it. And let it not be overlooked, that there is still a considerable proportion of those who were firm friends to the Revolution who retain prepossessions in favour of Englishmen, and prejudices against Spaniards.

In a popular government especially, however prejudices like these may be regretted, they are not to be excluded from political calculations.
It ought also to be taken into the account, that by placing ourselves at this time in a situation to go to war against Great Britain we embark with the weakest party—with a total uncertainty what accession of strength may be gained—and without making any terms, with regard either to succour, indemnity or compensation.
France is the only weight which can be thrown into the scale capable of producing an equilibrium. But her accession however probable ought not to be deemed absolutely certain. The predominant party there may choose to avoid war as dangerous to their own power. And if even obstacles should not arise from that quarter, it cannot be foreseen to what extent France will be in condition to make efforts. The great body of malcontents comprehending a large proportion of the most wealthy and formerly the most influential class; the prodigious innovations which have been made—the general and excessive fermentation which has been excited in the minds of the people, the character of the Prince, or the nature of the government likely to be instituted, as far as can be judged prior to an experiment, does not prognosticate much order or vigour in the affairs of that country for a considerable period to come.
It is possible indeed, that the enthusiasm which the transition from Slavery to Liberty may inspire, may be a substitute for the energy of a good administration, and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions of enthusiasm must ever be a precarious reliance. And it is quite as possible that the greatness, and perhaps immaturity, of that transition may prolong licentiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may happen in France must be unusually fallible; not merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change, which has been wrought in the situation of the people.
These considerations are additional admonitions to avoid as far as possible any step that may embroil us with Great Britain. It seems evidently our true policy to cultivate neutrality. This at least is the ground on which we ought to stand, until we can see more of the scene, and can have secured the means of changing it with advantage.

We have objects which in such a conjuncture are not to be neglected. The Western posts, on one side, and the navigation of the Mississippi, on the other, call for a vigilant attention to what is going on. They are both of importance. The securing of the latter may be regarded in its consequences as essential to the unity of the Empire.
But it is not impossible if war takes place, that by a judicious attention to favourable moments we may accomplish both, by negotiation. The moment however we became committed on either side the advantages of our position for negotiation would be gone. They would even be gone in respect to the party, with whom we were in cooperation; for being once in the war we could not make terms as the condition of entering into it.
Though it may be uncertain how long we shall be permitted to preserve our neutrality; that is not a sufficient reason for departing from it voluntarily. It is possible we may be permitted to persist in it throughout. And if we must renounce it, it is better it should be from necessity than choice; at least ’till we see a prospect of renouncing, with safety and profit. If the government is forced into a war, the chearful support of the people may be counted upon. If it brings it upon itself, it will have to struggle with their displeasure and reluctance. This difference alone is immense!
The desire of manifesting amity to Spain, from the supposition, that our permanent interest is concerned in cementing an intimate connection with France and Spain ought to have no influence in the case. Admitting the existence of such an interest, it ought not to hurry us into premature hazards. If it should finally induce us to become a party, it will be time enough, when France has become such and after we shall have adjusted the conditions, upon which we are to engage.
But the reality of such an interest is a thing about which the best and the ablest men of this country are far from being agreed. There are of this number, who, if the United States were at perfect liberty, would prefer an intimate connection between them and Great Britain as most conducive to their security and advantage; and who are of opinion, that it will be wise to cultivate friendship between that country and this, to the utmost extent which is reconcileable with the faith of existing engagements: While the most general opinion is, that it is our true

policy, to steer as clear as possible of all foreign connection other than commercial and in this respect to cultivate intercourse with all the world on the broadest basis of reciprocal privilege.
An attentive consideration of the vicissitudes which have attended the friendships of nations, except in a very few instances, from very peculiar circumstances, gives little countenance to systems which proceed on the supposition of a permanent interest to prefer a particular connection. The position of the United States, detached as they are from Europe admonishes them to unusual circumspection on that point. The same position, as far as it has relation to the possessions of European powers in their Vicinity, strengthens the admonition.
Let it be supposed that Spain retains her possessions on our right, and persists in the policy she has hitherto pursued without the slightest symptom of relaxation of barring the Mississippi against us, where must this end, and at a period not very distant? Infallibly in a War with Spain, or separation of the Western Country. This Country must have an outlet for its commodities. This is essential to its prosperity, and if not procured to it by the United States must be had at the expence of the Connection with them. A war with Spain, when our affairs will have acquired greater consistency and order, will certainly be to be preferred to such an alternative. In an event of this sort we should naturally seek aid from Great Britain. This would probably involve France on the opposite side, and effect a revolution in the state of our foreign politics.
In regard to the possessions of Great Britain on our left, it is at least problematical, whether the acquisition of them will ever be desireable to the United States. It is certain that they are in no shape essential to our prosperity. Except therefore the detention of our Western posts (an object too of far less consequence than the navigation of the Mississippi) there appears no necessary source of future collission with that power.
This view of the subject manifests, that we may have a more urgent interest to differ with Spain, than with Britain. And that conclusion will become the stronger, if it be admitted, that when we are able to make good our pretensions, we ought not to leave in the possession of any foreign power, the territories at the mouth of the Mississippi, which are to be regarded as the key to it.

While considerations of this nature ought not to weaken the sense, which our Government ought to have of any obligations which good faith shall fairly impose, they ought to inspire caution in adopting a system, which may approximate us too nearly to certain powers, and place us at too great a distance from others. Indeed every system of this kind is liable to the objection, that it has a tendency to give a wrong biass to the Councils of a Nation, and sometimes to make its own interest subservient to that of another.
If the immediate cause of the impending war between Britain and Spain be considered, there cannot be drawn from thence any inducements for our favouring Spain. It is difficult to admit the reasonableness or justice of the pretensions on her part, which occasioned the transaction complained of by Great Britain, and certainly the monopoly, at which those pretensions aim, is intitled to no partiality from any maritime or trading people. Hence considerations, neither of justice nor policy, as they respect the immediate cause of the quarrel, incline us towards Spain.
Putting therefore all considerations of peculiar good will to Spain or of predilection to any particular connection out of the Question, the argument respecting refusal or consent, in the case supposed, seems to stand thus.
The acquisition of the Spanish territories, bordering upon the U. States, by Britain would be dangerous to us. And if there were a good prospect, that our refusal would prevent it, without exposing us to a greater evil, we ought to refuse. But if there be a considerable probability that our refusal would be ineffectual; and if being so, it would involve us in war or disgrace, and if positive disgrace is worse than war, and war, in our present situation, worse, than the chances of the evils, which may befall us, from that acquisition, then the conclusion would be that we ought not to refuse. And this appears to be the true conclusion to be drawn from a comprehensive and accurate view of the subject; though first impressions are on the other side.
These reflections also may be allowed to come in aid of it. Good or evil is seldom as great, in the reality, as in the prospect. The mischiefs we apprehend may not take place. The enterprise, not withstanding our consent, may fail. The acquisition, if made, may in the progress of things be wrested from its possessors.

These if pressed hereafter (and we are willing to accept it) may deem it expedient to purchase our neutrality by a cession to us of that part of the territory in question, which borders on the Mississippi accompanied with a guarantee of the navigation of that river. If nothing of this sort should happen, still the war will necessarily have added millions to the debt of Britain, while we shall be recruiting and increasing our resources and our strength. In such a situation, she will have motives of no inconsiderable force for not provoking our resentment. And a reasonable confidence ought to be reposed in the fidelity of the inhabitants of the Western Country; in their attachment to the Union; in their real interest to remain a part of it, and in their sense of danger from the attempt to separate, which at every hazard ought to be resisted by the United States.
It is also to be kept in view, that the same danger, if not to the same extent, will exist, should the territories in question remain in the hands of Spain.
Besides all this, if a war should even be deemed a less evil than the neighbourhood of the British in the quarter meditated, good policy would still seem to require as before intimated, that we should avoid putting ourselves in a situation to enter into it, till we had stipulated adequate indemnities and considerations for doing so; that we should see a little further into the unravellment of the plot, and be able to estimate what prospect these would be by our interference of obviating the evil. It deserves a reflection, that if those territories have been once wrested from Spain, she will be more tractable to our wishes, and more disposed to make the concessions, which our interests require, than if they never passed into other hands.
A question occurs here whether there be not a middle course between refusal and consent; to wit, the waving an answer by referring the matter to further consideration. But to this there appear to be decisive objections. An evasive conduct in similar cases is never dignified, seldom politic. It would be likely to give satisfaction to neither party—to effect no good—to prevent no ill. By Great Britain, it would probably be considered as equivalent to a refusal—as amounting to connivance by Spain—as an indication of timidity by all the world.
It happens that we have a post on the Wabash, down which River the expedition, it is presumeable, must go. If the Commanding

Officer at that post has no orders to the contrary, it will be his duty to interrupt the passage of the British troops; if he does, it would seem necessary for them in order to the safe passage of their boats, with their artillery stores, provisions, and baggage, to take that post. Here then would be a passage through our territory, not only without our permission, but with the capture of a post of ours; which would be in effect making war upon us. And thus silence, with less dignity, would produce the same ill consequence, as refusal.
If to avoid this, private orders were to be sent to the commanding officer of that post not to interrupt the passage, his not being punished for his delinquency would betray the fact and afford proof of connivance.
The true alternative seems to be to refuse or consent: And if the first be preferred to accompany it with an intimation, in terms as free from offence as possible, that dispositions will be made to oppose the passage if attempted to be forced; and, accordingly, as far as practicable to make and execute such dispositions.
If on the contrary consent should be given it may deserve consideration whether it would not be expedient to accompany it with a candid intimation that the expedition is not agreeable to us, but that thinking it expedient to avoid an occasion of controversy, it has been concluded not to withold assent. There are however objections to this mode. In case of consent an early and frank explanation should be given to Spain.
Question the Second
What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?
If leave should be asked and refused and the enterprise should be prosecuted without it, the manner of treating it has been anticipated, that is the passage if practicable should be opposed, and if not practicable, the outrage should be resented by recourse to arms.
But if the enterprise should be undertaken without asking leave, which is presumed to be the import of the question, then the proper conduct to be observed will depend on the circumstances.

As the passage contemplated would be by water, and almost wholly through an uninhabited part of the Country, over which we have no actual jurisdiction, if it were unaccompanied with any violence to our citizens or posts, it would seem sufficient to be content with remonstrating against it, but in a tone that would not commit us to the necessity of going to war: the objections to which apply with full force here.
But, if as is to be feared will necessarily be the case, our post on the Wabash should be forced, to make good their passage, there seems to be no alternative but to go to war with them; unwelcome as it may be. It seems to be this, or absolute and unqualified humiliation: Which as has been already noticed, is in almost every situation a greater evil than war.
In such an event, it would appear adviseable immediately to convene the Legislature; to take the most vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand of satisfaction; to commence negotiations for alliances; and if satisfaction should be refused to endeavor to punish the aggression by the sword.

Alexander HamiltonSecretary of the Treasury


Title: To George Washington from Betty Washington Lewis, 16 September 1790
From: Lewis, Betty Washington
To: Washington, George

My dear Brother,
Sept. 16th 1790

I congratulate you on your Safe arrival at Mount Vernon, which I understand happen’d on Saturday Evening last—your Voyage to Rhode-Island I hope has been beneficial to your health—as Robert informed me the pain in your breast had not entirely left you—I have only a few days past returned from Frederick which has been of great service to my health as it was materially injured by the influenza which in this place proved

fatal in several instances, if my helth and the weather will admit I propose paying you a visit before you return to Philadelphia, If you and my Sister Washington Can make it Conveniant to Pay me a Visit it will make me extreamly happy.
There are several articles in my possession, that was left to you by my Mother which has never been sent for, thay Can be of little or no service to you, and of very great to me, I will thank you for them, if you think them worth sending for I have not a wish to Detain them.
I shall endeaver to have all the Ac[coun]ts of the Estate settled as soon as possible, and will bring them with me to Mount Vernon.
The family join me in love and good wishes for you Sister Washington, and the Majors family. I am Dear Brother your very Affectionate

Sister Betty Lewis


Title: From George Washington to David & Francis Clark, 17 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Clark, David & Francis

Sir,
Mt Vernon Sep: 17th 1790

From the best judgment I can form of the repairs and alterations to be made in my old Coach (under the statement & opinions given in your letter of the 13th instt) I feel most inclined to give you the following directions for your procedure that no delay or disappointment may happen.
The colour is to be as at present; but to be neatly painted and highly varnished.
The Seasons (which are now on the Carriage) is to be continued on the Doors, front & back—and my crest without any cypher is to be on the 4 quarter pannels; all to be enclosed by the original ovals—If it is thought best that the crests should be painted (as Silver does not show on a light ground) they may be painted.
The Seasons (if they should require it, and a masterly hand can be employed) must be repaired, or at least freshned in their appearance to make them corrispond with the fresh painting of the Coach, & as festoons were on the Coach before ought they not [to be there again if the seasons &c. are retained.]
I approve of the pattern sent as lining for the Coach & desire you may use it.
Plated handles to the doors—plated Brace buckles—and plated mouldings around the roof should be added to make one part correspond with the other.
A Glass in front must unquestionable be provided. In all other respects you are to observe the directions which was given when I saw you in Phi.


Title: From George Washington to Tobias Lear, 17 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Lear, Tobias

Dear Sir,
Mount Vernon Septr 17th 1790

Having received no letter from you since the one dated the 3d instant, I have nothing to reply to. The motive for writing to you at this time, is, that upon unpacking the china ornaments which accompanied the Mirrors for the Tables; it was found

(notwithstanding they were in Bran) that many of the delicate & tender parts were broken; occasioned I believe by the Bran not being put in & settled down by little at a time. To press the Bran around the images (you have to remove with the Plateaux) will not answer; still, it must be so compact as to prevent friction, in moving; and this can only be done by putting each image or figure in a seperate box, with Bran by little & little, shaking & settling it by degrees, as it is added.
By a letter which Major Jackson has received from General Steward, he had compleated his removal, & Mr Morris had began to take the things out of the House I am to have to make room for my furniture; but as Mr Morris was desired, so I am persuaded he will, inform you when it will be safe, & proper for you to remove. The sooner I think it can be done, the better; as you will be able to make such arrangements, & provide such conveniences as you will know we shall want; and which (I suppose) through the channel they are now making, may be accomplished.
We have resolved to take one of my Cooks with us—and if upon examining into the matter, it shall be found convenient, I may also take on a boy: at any rate there will be no occasion for Mrs Lewis or her daughter; for a Scullion may always be had in Philadelphia.
In one of my former letters I suggested to you the Propriety of knowing, decidedly, what Mr Hydes views are before he is removed from New York at my expence; and I now repeat it: first, because it is necessary for me to be placed upon a certainty; and secondly, because if he has any difficulties, or doubts—or has in contemplation to talk in a short time (which is but too common a case) of increased wages, it would be best to seperate at once; as well for these reasons as the one I communicated in a former letter, and because I fear his Table is a much more expensive one than it ought to be. But as this is conjecture only, I will not charge him with it—tho’ I think the short duration of the first Pipe of Pintards Wine, is a pretty evident proof that that article was expended more expeditiously than it ever was in Francis’s time. How it has been with other things, if you have been able to compare the Accounts of the one with the other, you must be the best judge.
We arrived safe at this place on Saturday last, but not without

one upset of the Chariot, and Waggon—fortunately nothing was hurt. We all unite in best wishes for you & Mrs Lear. and I am your sincere friend, and Affecte Servant

Go: Washington

Take measures either by yourself or through Colo. Biddle to engage Wood in Season. and whilst it is to be obtained on good terms.


Title: To George Washington from Tobias Lear, 17 September 1790
From: Lear, Tobias
To: Washington, George

Sir
New York September 17th 1790

I have been honored with your letter of the 9 Inst. from Baltimore; and in consequence of your suggestion I have written to Mr Morris, requesting him to inform me at what time the house would be ready to receive the furniture. By the Post of last evening I received a letter from Colo. Biddle in which he says one of the Committee had informed him that the house would not be ready before the 10th of October; but he thinks himself it will be sooner; as Mr Morris was then removing, and such rooms as required no alteration would be painted and dry before that time, in which the furniture could be deposited ’till the other rooms are in readiness for its proper distribution. In my last I

mentioned the arrangement I had made with respect to Mrs Lewis & her daughter, which I am happy to find accords with your wishes.
Your directions respecting the Looking Glasses and Lamps for Mr Morris, shall be particularly attended to.
I had requested Colo. Biddle to make inquiry and let me know upon what terms one or more Packets could be had from this place to Philada when we should want them, as the owners lived in Philadelphia. He informs me that at first they demanded one hundred dollars for each Packet; but at length they offered to take at the rate of one dollar per ton for the measurement of the Vessels; which will bring the whole freight per Vessel to from 60 to 80 dollars as their Packets are about that number of Tons. This he thinks is a reasonable price. And I find it is below what I have been informed of here. It is possible that other vessels, besides the Packets, may offer to go for less than the beforementioned sum, when it is found they can have a full freight. But unless there should be more difference than I at present apprehend, I would prefer the Packets on account of the superior Knowledge which their Captains must have of the coast & Bay, and the great convenience which those vessels afford for stowing such things as we have to carry.
Mr Macomb informed me yesterday that he would, if agreeable to you, go into the house after we had left it; and allow one hundred pounds for the Rent of it to the first of May: He will likewise allow as much for the wash house and Stable as may be offered for them to take them away; which any other person but himself must do. This is reasonable. But I imagine any offer for them must be very small, as they would only be worth the materials (which are not in demand) and these materials incumbered with the expense of taking down and removing. I have likewise offered him the Franklin Stoves and other fixtures which you bought of the French Minister; but he does not seem inclined to take them at any rate. The Lustre which you bought of him he wished to have at the price you gave for it, (£76.13s. NYk Curry) but I could not accede to that without your consent; it is packed up in such a way as to be in no danger of being injured.
The enclosed papers will give everything of a public nature that has transpired here lately; I have therefore nothing further to offer at this time but the best respects of Mrs Lear to which I join mine for Mrs Washington, with our love to the children,

and my best wishes to all my friends in Virginia. I have the honor to be with the highest respect & most sincere attachment Sir Yr most obliged Humble Servt

Tobias Lear


Title: To George Washington from Gouverneur Morris, 18 September 1790
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Washington, George

public
SirLondon 18 September 1790
I had the Honor to address you on the 16th of August, and stated as nearly as I could the Situation of Russia and Sweden. This Situation has produced a very natural Effect. Sweden being unsupported by her allies, and Russia having Nothing to gain by farther Fighting but a Part of the finland Deserts not worth fighting for, they have struck a Bargain of Peace immediately, without the Interference of any one else. This leaves the Russian and Turk to pursue their Game single-handed. The Ministers of Britain are by no Means well pleased that they were not consulted by the Swede, and I think it probable that if Russia makes Peace with the Turks, it will be without the Mediation of Prussia or England. For as Things are situated it seems impossible for those Powers to do the Empress any Mischief before next Spring.
The national Assembly of France have also adopted as a national Compact the old family Compact with Spain, and they are arming as fast as their disjointed Condition will admit. At the same Time the general Opinion of this Country seemed to be that the Ministry would obtain very honorable Terms from Spain whereas the Ministers themselves were as I beleive much embarrassed as to the Line of Conduct which they should pursue. To support the high Tone in which they first opened would probably bring on a bloody War for an empty Sound. To recede

would expose them to severe animadversion at Home and a Loss of Reputation abroad. These Circumstances appearing to me favorable I wrote the Letter of which No. one is a copy. It is calculated first to operate upon an administration which I beleived to be divided in Regard to America, and a Sovereign who hates the very name, while he prides himself upon his Piety and moral fame. Secondly it was intended as a Ground of future Justification for any Measures which Congress might think proper to adopt. And thirdly it had I own a special View to the Nature of this Government and People; for if they do eventually get engaged in War, and feel a little from our Coldness, and if in Addition thereto the commercial Men find any Ground of Complaint, it will make them so eager to rectify their Mistake as to give us considerable advantages.
In answer to this Letter I received that of which Number two is a Copy. This was written in his own Hand Writing, and as it is said therein to be not ministerial but confidential we must so consider it. Consequently it is not a public Paper. The Inference to be drawn from it is that the Council could not agree as yet upon the Answer to be given. Hence I concluded that those who pursuing the true Interests of Great Britain wish to be on the best Terms with America are outnumbered by those whose sour Prejudices and hot Resentment render them averse to every Intercourse except that which may immediately subserve a selfish Policy. These then do not yet know America. Perhaps America does not yet know herself. They beleive that british Credit is essential to our Commerce. Useful it certainly is at present, but let our public Credit be well established and supported, and in a very few years our commercial Resources will astonish the World. We are yet but in the seeding Time of national Prosperity, and it will be well not to mortgage the Crop before it is gathered. Excuse I pray Sir this Digression. The Matter of it is not wholly inapplicable.
A Copy of my answer to the Duke and of his Reply are in the Papers No. 3 & 4. In Consequence of the latter I waited upon him the fifteenth Instant, and I saw at once by his Countenance that he felt himself obliged to act an aukward Part. I waited therefore for him to begin the Conversation which he did by saying he understood I was going to America. I told him he had mistaken my Letter for that by the Continent I meant the

Continent of Europe. After some pause he said that he hoped soon to fix upon a Minister to America. That they had a Person in Contemplation who was not however absolutely agreed on. I did not ask who it was. After a farther pause he said that in order to save Time and obviate Difficulties the Intention was to send over a Gentleman with a common Letter of Recommendation but having Letters of Credence in his Pocket. I exprest my perfect approbation of this Expedient. He told me that he was earnestly desirous of a real bona fide Connection not meerly by the words of a Treaty but in Reality. I met these by similar Professions but took Care to confine them to a commercial Intercourse for mutual Benefit on liberal Terms. He told me that as to the two Points of the Treaty there were still Difficulties. He wished they could be got out of the Way. He then hesitated a little and dropt the Conversation. Having waited some time for him to resume it and being convinced by his Silence that it was intended to hold a Conference and say Nothing I determined to try for Information in a different way. I began therefore by expressing with an Air of serious Concern my conviction that their Detention of the western Posts would form an insurmountable Barier against a Treaty with us. Knowing so well as he did the nature of popular Governments he would not be surprized that some in America should oppose a Treaty with Britain from serious Doubt as to the Policy of the Measure and others from private Reasons, and he must see that holding those Posts, would form an Argument for one and a Pretext for the other. Finding that he felt this, I added that their Conduct in this Respect gave serious Alarm to reasonable well meaning Men. Some beleived their Design was to deprive us of our Share in the Fur Trade which they considered as a serious Injury, but others were convinced that holding those Posts was attended with great and useless Expence to Britain which the Benefits of the Fur Trade by no Means compensated, and even that she would derive those Benefits whether that Trade were carried on thro the Medium of Canada or of the United States. Hence they inferred some other, and consequently some hostile Views. So that every Murder committed by the Indians was attributed to british Intrigues; and altho some Men of liberal Minds might judge differently their Arguments could have little Weight with the many who felt themselves aggreived. He owned that there was Force in these

Reflections. I told him farther that I did not presume to judge of the great Circle of european Politics, but according to my limited Comprehension was led to suppose that they could not act with the same decisive Energy towards their Neighbours while they doubted of our Conduct. He said I was perfectly right, and he said so in a Manner which shewed that this had been urged and felt during the late Negotiations. I porceeded therefore a little farther, premising that this Conversation was meerly from one Gentleman to another, and prayed him to consider that in a War between Britain and the House of Bourbon (a thing which must happen at some Time or other) we can give the West India Islands to whom we please without engaging in the War ourselves, and our Conduct must be governed by our Interest. He acknowledged that this was naturally to be expected, and it seemed from his Manner that the same Thing had been represented before but not in such strong Colors. I observed that those Preferences which we had a Right to give in our own Ports, and those Restrictions which we had a Right to impose, would have a most extensive Operation. Assured him of my sincere Beleif that their exclusive System as far as it related to the Commerce of their Islands had a Tendency to injure that Navigation which it was their Object to encrease, because if we met them on equal Ground of Restriction they would loose more in one Way than they gained in another. That they had many large Ships employed in carrying the single Article of Tobacco; and if we should pass a Navigation Act to meet theirs they could not bring us a Yard of Cloth which contained Spanish Wool and so of other Things. I thought I could perceive that Considerations like these had already given them some Alarm. I therefore said that I supposed his People had transmitted Information of the Attempts made in Congress to adopt such Regulations. He said they had. I observed that not having yet received the Laws passed by Congress I could not say exactly what had been done. That I hoped Things were yet open for Treaty. That doubtless there were many Persons in this Country who to gratify the Resentment occasioned by Losses or Disappointments in the american war would be glad to urge on a State of commercial Hostilities, but this would prove perhaps a loosing Game to both. He really thought it would. Having gone as far in that Line as was useful, I took a short Turn in my Subject and said I had waited with great Patience

during the Negotiations they were carrying on, because I supposed they would naturally square their Conduct towards us by their Position in Respect to other nations. I made this Observation in a careless Manner as a Thing of Course but immediately fixing my Eye upon him he shewed that it was exactly the Circumstance they had wished to conceal. I added that finding the northern Courts were at Peace, and supposing they had come to their final Decisions with Respect to the House of Bourbon, I thought it probable that they were prepared to speak definitively to us also. Here I waited for his Answer which indeed I did not expect to receive. He was pretty sufficiently embarrassed, and from his Look and Manner I collected quite as much as he was willing to communicate—After some little Sayings of no Consequence he asked me what the united States would think of the undefined Claim of Spain to America. Having no Objection to take that Information from his questions which could not be drawn forth in his Answers I told him that it would make no Impression on our Minds. That the Spaniards being in Fact apprehensive of Danger from us were disposed to make Sacrifices for our Friendship. That the Navigation of the Mississippi, hitherto the Bone of Contention, was I beleived given up by them already, or soon would be so, and as for their Claims they never could affect us and therefore we did not care any Thing about them. That the Reason for withholding that Navigation, hitherto, was the Fear of contraband Trade, and for the same Reason they must in my opinion sacrifice the last Man and last Shilling upon the question about Nootka Sound. He said he had always thought the Danger of contraband ought to be considered in dealing on this Subject, for that Nations like Individuals ought to treat with Candor and Honesty. We had a good Deal of Conversation on that and other Topics in which America was not directly concerned, and then I told him that if they came to any Determination in Regard to us speedily I should wish to be apprized of it. He assured me that I should, and offered to make his Communications to you thro me, and for that Purpose to address his Letters to me in Paris, but for Reasons communicated in a former Letter I thought it best to decline this Offer, and therefore observed that his own Packets would give him a speedier and more certain Means of Conveyance. I then took my Leave.
I have troubled you Sir with the leading Features of this Conversation,

that you might the better judge of the Conclusions I draw from it. I think the Cabinet is divided on the question of War or Peace. If France appeared strong enough to excuse a retrograde Manœuvre I beleive they would discover all at once that Spain has better Reasons to urge than they had been before apprized of, and therefore on Principles of Justice and having received the strongest Assurances of brotherly Love from the catholic King the Defender of the Faith would disarm. His ministers will not treat with us at present, unless they could see their Way to an offensive and defensive Alliance, which we shall be in no Hurry to contract. Should War break out, the anti-american Party will I beleive agree to any Terms, for it is more the Taste of the Medicine which they nauseate, than the Size of the Dose. Mr Pitt I beleive wishes a Continuance of Peace—Observe that he is rather the Queens man than the King’s, & that since his Majesty’s illness she has been of great Consequence. This depends in Part on a medical Reason. To prevent the Relapse of Persons who have been mad, they must be kept in constant Awe of Somebody; and it is said that the Phisician of the King gave the Matter in Charge to his royal Consort who performs that, like every other Part of her conjugal Duty, with singular zeal and Perseverance. He and all those who are in Possession of his entire Confidence, wish it is said for war; which gives you know great Patronage, and by the Encrease of Taxes and Offices, encreases the Influence and Power of the Crown. The King and his friends are also violently indisposed to America.
Things being so situated, and having Business on the Continent, I shall leave this City in a few Days and shall perhaps write a farther Letter of Lamentations to the Duke of Leeds before I go. I intend to write such a Letter to you on the whole Business, as may in Case of Need be laid before the Legislature, and consequently before the Public.
I long since expressed my Opinion to you Sir that the Appearances of Prosperity here were fallacious. In Nothing are they more so than in the Affairs of the India Company, which are deplorably bad, and they are now engaged in a War with Tippoo Saib which, terminate how it may, must make them worse.
It is Time to close this lengthy Epistle. Let me therefore entreat you to receive the Assurances of that sincere Respect & Esteem with which I have the Honor to be &ca.

Gouvr Morris


Title: From George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 20 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Sir
Mount Vernon Septemr 20th 1790.

In answer to your letter of the 10th instt relative to the establishment of the boats or Cutters for the protection of the revenue, I have to observe, That, if there appears to exist a necessity for equipping the whole number therein mentioned, the arrangement for building and stationing them, seems judicious, and is to me perfectly satisfactory.

It is my wish that your Enquiries, respecting proper characters to command these Vessels, may be extended to the States south of Virginia—Mr Lear can furnish you with the List of Applications already made. Two persons, with nearly equal recommendations, have offered themselves from Philadelphia—Captains Montgomery & Roach. There are several respectable names subscribed in favor of each of these persons; some of them, I believe, in favor of both: such is the facility, with which, on certain occasions, recommendations are granted—It would seem, however, that they are both qualified; but, in favor of the former, it is stated that he now fills a subordinate station in the revenue, which he accepted with a view of being brought into notice when such an appointment, as that which he now solicits, should be made.
Captain Barney was not at Baltimore whem I passed through, nor cou’d I learn with certainty whether he wished to receive the appointment or not. But I was informed that he had written in answer to an intimation made to him, by you or one of his friends, on the subject, whence I suppose his wish may be collected.
There is a Mr Richard Taylor of this State, an applicant for one of the appointments, who from my knowledge of him, appears to be a proper person both as to character, and experience in the profession.
Remarking to you that the advantage, which might accrue from their superintendance, seems to suggest the propriety of nominating the Commanders before the Vessels are put on the stocks—you have my permission to carry the arrangement for building the Boats or Cutters, stated in your letter into immediate effect, in such extent as to your judgment shall seem necessary for the public service. I am, sir, Your most Obedient servant

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from James Iredell, 20 September 1790
From: Iredell, James
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Alexandria [Va.] Sept. 20th 1790.

It mortifies me extremely that I should be so near your seat without having it in my power to pay my respects to you and Mrs Washington there, which otherwise I should have had the greatest pleasure in doing—But unfortunately a continued sickness in my Family detained me in New York solong that I have now not a moment to spare, considering that I have some business of consequence to transact in North Carolina if I possibly can before I proceed to Georgia. I beg leave to return my most grateful thanks for the civilities and attention which Mrs Iredell and myself had the honour to receive from you and Mrs Washington in New York. None can more ardently wish for your and her happiness than we at all times shall do. I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Sir, Your most obedient and most faithful Servant

Ja. Iredell


Title: From George Washington to Charles Lee, 20 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Lee, Charles

Dear Sir,
Mount Vernon Septr 20th 1790

I have duly received your letter of the 12th. About Six hundred dollars may supply my wants between this and my arrival in Philadelphia. At present I have no immediate call.
Mrs Washington and myself, during our stay at this place, will at all times be glad to see Mrs Lee & yourself, and other friends & acquaintances without ceremony. I am Dear Sir Your Most Obedt Hble Servt

Go: Washington


Title: To George Washington from John Dandridge, 21 September 1790
From: Dandridge, John
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Pamocra [New Kent County, Va.] Septr 21st 1790

I have for a long time intended to forward to you the present inclosed Deed for the Gloucester land, & must beg pardon for my neglect in omitting it. I have, for a year past, monthly expected to be able to make you some payments on account of Doctr D. Stuart, & have still been disappointed. The most positive promises have been made that I shall receive some considerable sums at the meeting of our next Genl Assembly; I[n]

which case I shall immediately make an opportunity of remitting to you.
I must request you to make my most dutiful & affectionate compliments to my Aunt, & permit me to join yourself with her in my congratulations on your return to Mount Vernon. Her Friends here are generally well; & I dare say, still remember her with affectionate respect. I am, Sir, with great regard & sincere Esteem, Yr Obt Servt

Jn Dandridge


Title: To George Washington from Alexander Hamilton, 21 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Sir
New York Septemr 21st 1790.

Doctor Craigie has communicated to me, a letter from Mr Daniel Parker to him, dated, London the 12th of July, which mentions that he had just seen Mr De Miranda, who had recently conversed with the Marquis Del Campo, from whom he had learnt that the Court of Spain had acceded to our right of navigating the Mississippi.
Col: Smith has also read to me a passage out of another letter of the 6th of July, which mentions, that orders had been sent to the Vice Roy of Mexico and the Governor of New Orleans, not to interrupt the passage of Vessels of the United States through that river.
It is probable that other communications will have ascertained

to you, whether there be any and what foundation for this intelligence; but I have thought it adviseable notwithstanding to impart it to you.
The reports from Europe favour more and more the idea of peace. They are however not conclusive, and not entirely correspondent.
Captain Watson of the ship New York, who left London the 28th of July and Torbay the 16th or 17th of August, informs that the evening preceding her departure from Torbay, he was informed by different Officers of the fleet, that peace between Britain and Spain had taken place and had been notified by Mr Pitt, in a letter to the Lord Mayor of London, of which an account had arrived that Evening. He had however seen no papers containing the account. And the press of Seamen had continued down to the same evening.
On the other hand, Capt. Hunter of the ship George, who left St Andero the 8th of August, affirms that vigorous preparations for War were still going on at that port. I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect and truest attachment Sir Yr most obt hume servt

Alexander Hamilton


Title: To George Washington from Gouverneur Morris, 21 September 1790
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Washington, George

public
Sir,London 21 September 1790
Your Letter of the thirteenth of October last was delivered to me in Paris on the twenty first of January and the Receipt was immediately acknowleged from thence. I left that City shortly after and passing thro Flanders and Holland arrived in London the 27th of March. Next Morning I waited on his Grace the Duke of Leeds and (he not being at Home) wrote a Note requesting the Honor of an Interview. He appointed the next Day, when I waited on him at Whitehall and presented your

Letter. He appeared much pleased and expressed the Wish to cultivate a Good Understanding with the United States. I proceeded to the specific Points of your Letter but found that his Grace was not prepared to go farther than general Professions. I therefore observed that he might perhaps wish to consider the Matter a little and read again the Treaty. He told me that he should and desired I would leave your Letter which should be copied and returned. This Request was in Course complied with and at the same Time I expressed the Wish to be favored with a speedy Answer which he promised.
This Answer was expected ’till the 19th of April, but in vain. I then wrote the Note of which No. 1 is a Copy and which also remained unanswered on the 29th. I wrote the Letter of which No. 2 is a Copy. Late in the Evening of that Day I received the Letters of which No. 3 & 4 are Copies, & replied the next Morning by the Letter of which No. 5 is a Copy. To this I received no Reply.
In the Beginning of May Orders were issued from the Admiralty for impressing of Seamen in Consequence of which many Americans were taken. The improper Treatment of our Countrymen was mentioned to me in such Manner that I felt myself bound to represent it, and therefore on the eighteenth of May again requested an Interview with the Duke of Leeds. This took Place on the twentieth and he opened the Conversation by an Apology for not answering my Letter. I also apologized for troubling him with an Affair which I was not authorized to speak upon and then mentioned the Situation of the Americans who had been impressed. In the Course of this Conversation he made again many Professions of Good Will and said I had misunderstood one Part of his Letter for that he meant to express a Willingness to enter into a Treaty of Commerce. I told him that I supposed he would at his Leizure reply to mine and therefore we would waive the discussion for the present. At coming away he desired me to call the next Day.
On the twenty first I found Mr Pitt with him a long Conversation took Place, in the Course of which they both repeatedly made Professions of a friendly Disposition towards America and they assured me that I had mistaken that Part of his Graces Letter which related to a commercial Intercourse. I desired that if so the Matter might be put right by a written Reply because

meer Conversation might be misunderstood and disagreable questions afterwards arise, whereas written Things remain and speak for themselves.
It appeared to be the Wish of Mr Pitt to take up Matters as they now stand in a general Way and make a new Treaty rather than execute the old one. This would imply an Acknowlegement that they rightfully withhold their Compliance, and of Course that we had violated our Faith pledged in that Treaty, an Idea by no Means admissible. At the Close of this Conversation Mr Pitt told me that the Duke and he would confer together and transmit me the Result.
I waited for this Communication till the tenth Instant, but finding that Matters of every Sort remained still in the same undecided Situation I addressed to his Grace a Letter of which No. 6 is a Copy The Duke’s Answer of the same Date contained the polite Acknowlegement of its Reception, as a private Gentleman, but declared itself to be not ministerial. It contained also a Desire to see me before my Departure. The fifteenth I waited on him by Appointment and received again the same general Professions and Assurances which had been repeatedly made before. I do not trouble you, Sir, with the Particulars because (evidently) if the Government of this Country meant to treat on fair and honorable Ground the Opening given to them was amply sufficient; and if they have no such Intention the private Sentiments of individual Ministers however respectable in themselves cannot influence our Conduct. I beleive that some of them do sincerely wish an intimate Connection with the United States, but the more entire is our Faith in the Profession of their friendly Sentiments, the stronger must be our Conviction that Sentiments far different are entertaind by others: and Facts speaking more distinctly than Words will leave us at no Loss to determine on which Side the Majority lies.
It is now almost six Months since I have waited in this City for a decisive Answer upon the Points of your Letter, and find that from some Cause or other it cannot be obtained. I am obliged therefore to leave the Business unfinished and shall depart on Friday the 24th. If any Thing occurs in the Interim it will of Course be communicated. Accept I pray you Sir the Assurances of that Respect with which I have the Honor to be &ca.


Title: To George Washington from John Blair, 22 September 1790
From: Blair, John
To: Washington, George

Sir,
Philadelphia. Septr 22d 1790.

Capt. Francis Bright, being a candidate for the command of one of the cutters which are designed to cruize for prevention of smuggling, has asked me to mention to you what I could say in his favour, & also to forward, together with this, the accompanying testimonials—From them You will perceive the station he has already occupied, & the propriety of his conduct therein. After having given so much satisfaction to those whose duty it was to super-intend him, & to whom he was officially accountable, it would be unnecessary for me to say any thing, especially as it could only amount to this, that I have always understood that Capt. Bright was a very good officer—The letter to Warner Lewis Esqr. & that from Mr Page to Capt. Bright, are only designed to shew how the letter to Mr Jefferson came to be opened.

We have a report from Baltimore, that your carriage was overset between that place & Spurrear’s, & that you, & only you, suffered much by it—But as the public papers announce your arrival & doing business, at George-town, without taking notice of such an accident, I trust the report is groundless. I have the honour to be, with every sentiment of respect, esteem, & gratitude, Worthy Sir, Your affectionate friend and humble servant,

John Blair


Title: To George Washington from Tobias Lear, 22 September 1790
From: Lear, Tobias
To: Washington, George

Sir,
New York September 22nd 1790

I have the honor to inform you that a Ship arrived here last evening from London after a passage of 36 days from Torbay.

By her intelligence is received of the dispute between G. Britain and Spain being finally accommodated. Another Vessel arrived here at the same time from Lisbon in 35 days, and brings the same accounts.
I have nothing to add since my letter of the 20th Inst: but the best respects and affectionate remembrance of Mrs Lear and myself to all our friends. With the highest respect and most sincere attachment I have the honor to be Sir, Your obliged & very humble Servant

Tobias Lear

P.S. Johns wife has requested me to forward the enclosed letter to him, which I take the liberty to do at this time.


Title: To George Washington from William McRea, 24 September 1790
From: McRea, William
To: Washington, George

Alexandria, Va., 24 Sept. 1790. Being informed that vessels will be appointed to cruise Chesapeake Bay to prevent illicit trade, applies for an appointment to one and can obtain appropriate recommendations if necessary.


Title: To George Washington from Tobias Lear, 26 September 1790
From: Lear, Tobias
To: Washington, George

Sir,
New York September 26th 1790.

I have been duly honored with Your letters of the 17th & 20th of the present month. To such parts of which as have not been anticipated by my letter of the 17th, I shall now reply.
The Table Images had been packed up some days before your letter of the 17th came to hand; but precisely in the mode which you there recommended—viz. each Image in a separate box made amply large, with bran put in and shook down (not pressed) by degrees. The small Images wer put into two boxes, six in each (as they came) with bran as the others. If anything will preserve them I think it must be this mode of packing, and particular attention paid to their removal.
I have entered into a very full discussion with Mr Hyde upon the subject of his and his wife’s continuance in the family; and have stated to him as particularly and minutely as I am able, everything which is expected from and dependent upon them. I have told him very candidly the idea that was formed of the expensiveness of the Table at which he presides, founded upon the high rate of his bills and the consumption of liquors. After laying these things plainly before him, I submitted it to his decision whether he and his wife would continue or not; informing him, at the same time, that no relaxation of duties hitherto performed, nor no increase of wages must be expected on their parts; unless, if you should bring one of your Cooks into the family, which you had suggested was probable, there might possibly be some assistance given by him or Vicar to Mrs Hyde in preparing the desert on entertaining days which she said was the heaviest duty she found to do; but even here she must not consider that she had a right to assistance; but if it could be given conveniently, she would undoubtedly receive it. After some consultation they agreed to continue in the family; and I shall draw up Articles accordingly for one year. Upon the subject of consumption of liquors, Mr Hyde appeared to be much affected when I told him it had far exceeded expectation & calculation, the latter founded in its fullest latitude upon the account of a week’s consumption which he had himself given in. He observed that tho’ he had been accurate in noting the quantity used in the week for which his account was made out; yet it oftener hapened

that more was used per week than less; for the season of his keeping that account was when the weather was cold, and that the same company will drink more of the same liquor in warm than in cold weather—that there had been some instances—viz. the 4th of July and when the Indians were here, where a considerable quantity was consumed which did not come into the calculation—that wine was more frequently called for when company came in in the morning in summer than winter—and that the loss occasioned by drawing it daily out of the pipe is considerable and could not be brought into his account for the week. It is unnecessary for me to make a comment on these observations. You, Sir, will be able to judge of their weight. This stands calculation. On the 13th of March the first pipe of Mr Pintard’s wine was brouched; (Two pipes containing 219 Gallons, were then in the house.)—And a few days after you left this place, I had the remains of the second pipe drawn off into a smaller cask: there was 45 Galls. of it. This brings the whole consumption of Mad[eir]a to 174 Galls. since the 13th of March. Mr Hyde states the consumption of the table at 2 quarts per day for 6 days in the week, and 12 quarts on the entertaining day; which makes 6 Galls, per week. 24½ weeks from the 13th of march to the 31st of August at 6 Galls. per week will make 147 Galls.—45 Galls. remaining give 192 Galls. accounted for—27 Galls. therefore stand to the account of extra consumption, loss by drawing &ca. That there has been an extra consumption there is no doubt. But what the loss on a pipe in drawing daily may be I know not. Where excise is collected 20 per Cent is allowed for the loss on Liquors drawn off & retailed; but if one half of that quantity is allowed in this case, whole will be pretty well accounted for. A pipe of Tenerieff wine was bought on the 12th of March containing 101 Galls. @ 4/.—This has been used on Friday evenings—for cooking—and at Mr Hyde’s table. 30 Galls. of it now remains; but as I am not able to judge of the quantity necessary for cooking, it is not in my power to say whether the consumption of this has been improper or not. Mr Hyde says it is his wish to have the wine all drawn off into bottles, and a certain number delivered to him every week, for which he will make himself accountable at the end of each week; for it can easily be brought within the recollection of any one at your table how the wine has been consumed for one week, when it

would not be particularly remembered what had been the consumption for months. He says he shall either totally relinquish the use of wine at the second table, or render in a weekly acct of what is used there. As to the consumption of other articles in the family, he says he should only decieve you and himself was he to pretend that he could do with less than he has, provided you continue the same numbers and style of living. It can always be known whether he decieves in the prices or not by inquiry at the market.
I have gone through a comparative examination of his accounts & I find nothing in them that can impeach his honesty. The difference between his & Frauncess I stated in a former letter.
In my letter of the 17th, I mentioned the proposal of Mr Macombe, which so far as relates to the house is better than expectation; for a tenant could hardly be found for this house on any terms; and should the exchange be made with Mr Macombe, it is not probable that £100 could be obtained for the one which he occupies till the first of may, as the rent of houses in this street has fallen at least one half. I do not think I shall be able to obtain £30 for the buildings. Indeed I see no prospects of any offer for them. I have not advertised them for sale; but I have mentioned their being so to all who appeared to me most likely to want them, and they say they would hardly accept them to take them away, so small is the demand for any thing of this kind. I have been fortunate enough to let my house in King Street for £25 to the first of may.
Dingwell has not called upon me since your departure, and it seems not worth while to send for him. If he makes his appearance again, I will give him the sum which you mentioned.
I informed you in my letter of the 17th that Colo. Biddle had written to me that the largest Packet could be obtained for eighty dollars to take a freight from this place to Philadelphia; and on the 20th I mentioned my having requested him to engage her for me. On friday I received a letter from Colo. Biddle informing me that he had made a considerable mistake in his former letter; and that 160 dollars would be the price of the vessel instead of 80 as he had first told me. I enclose his two letters to me on the subject, that you may see the grounds on which I gave you the information in my letter of the 17th. Before I received

Colo. Biddle’s last letter I had made inquiries here respecting the terms on which a vessel could be engaged, and was uniformly informed that if I could get one of that size and in every respect well fitted for the business for 150 dollars it would not be an extravagant price; for the lowest terms upon which they carried goods on freight in ever so large quantities, unless one person took the whole vessel was 6d. New Yk Curry per foot, and at 40 feet per ton, the rate of measurement, a vessel of 79½ tons would amount to much more than 160 dollars. I therefore flattered myself that I had made an extraordinary good bargain. But when I received Colo. Biddle’s letter of the 22d I was not so well pleased with the prospect, and entered upon fresh inquiries, which terminated rather worse than the first; for those employed in the trade knowing that there would be a demand for vessels in the course of a few weeks, had determined to hold up their’s at a higher rate than they at first demanded; and I could not have obtained a Packet here of 60 tons for 160 dollars. Those who are not employed in this trade will go for less; but taking the season of the year, and every circumstance into consideration, it did not appear so safe to engage one who is not so well acquainted with the coast, and especially as her cargo will be very valuable. The difference of Insurance on goods shipped in the Packets & those shipped in other vessels is one half per Cent—it being done for one per Cent in the former & 1½ in the latter. I therefore wrote to Colo. Biddle to engage Captn Albertson’s Packet at 160 dollars for the trip, provided she arrives here and is ready to receive her cargo by monday the 4th of October. Should she not be here by that time I shall get the most suitable vessel I can then find. I have desired Colo. Biddle to make a written agreement with the owner upon this condition. I fixed upon the 4th of Octr for beginning to load the vessel as that will, in all probability get the Furniture to Philadelphia by the 10th or 12th of the month, which is as soon as I imagine the house will be ready, according to a letter I received from Mr Morris of the 19th. We shall be able to load the vessel in two days, and as soon as she sails I shall set out for Philadelphia with Mrs Lear.
A French Packet arrived a few days ago by which there are certain accounts of the safety of the vessel in which your wines were shipped from Bordeaux; but she was very much injured

by bad weather and it is feared that the wines are almost destroyed, as her cargo has been found to be much damaged. Neither the Captain of this Packet nor the merchant here can give any particular account of the wines, which to me appears strange, and I shall make further inquiry into the matter. Mr Fenwick, who was apprized of the circumstances of the shipment &ca, when he was here, will undoubtedly take the necessary steps in the business in France.
Nothing further occurs at this time, I have therefore only to add the best respects of Mrs Lear & myself and to assure you that I am, with the highest respect and most sincere attachment, Sir, Your obliged & very humble Servt

Tobias Lear


Title: To George Washington from Edmund Randolph, 26 September 1790 [letter not found]
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Washington, George

  Letter not found: from Edmund Randolph, 26 Sept. 1790. In his 3 Oct. 1790 letter to Randolph, GW referred to the attorney general’s “letter of the 26 ultimo.”


Title: To George Washington from Nathaniel Gilman, 27 September 1790 [letter not found]
From: Gilman, Nathaniel
To: Washington, George

	Letter not found: from Nathaniel Gilman, c.27 Sept. 1790. On 6 Oct. 1790 Alexander Hamilton wrote to the president that he received a 27 Sept. 1790 letter from Nathaniel Gilman “informing me, that he has transmitted his commission to you, with a resignation of his Office” of New Hampshire loans commissioner, to which GW had appointed him on 6 Aug. 1790.


Title: From George Washington to Tobias Lear, 27 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Lear, Tobias

Dear Sir
Mount Vernon Septr 27th 1790

Since my last to you (the date I do not recollect, keeping no copies of my letters to you) I have received yours of the 17th and 20th instant, & shall answer such parts of them as require it.
I am glad to find that the House, according to Mr Morris’s notification to you, will be ready about the time you had made arrangements for the removal of my furniture—the mode of doing which, is, I am persuaded, the cheapest & best. How have

you disposed (for safety) of the Pagoda? It is a delicate piece of stuff, & will require to be tenderly handled.
I expected that Mr Macomb, if he found no other person was disposed to take the House off my hands, would endeavour to impose his own terms: and allowing me only £100 for Seven Months use of it, when the rent (independent of the houses I put on the lots) is £400, is a pretty strong evidence of it. and if you do not take some measures to see what can be had for the Wash house & Stable he will impose his own terms there also. But after all, we are in his power and he must do as he pleases with us.
As the Lustre is paid for & securely packed up—and may suit the largest drawing room at Mr Morris’s, I do not incline to part with it—The Franklin Stoves & other fixtures if they cannot be disposed of without loss must be brot round with the other furniture—we may find use for them. Such things as are freighted in the common way (if the Vessel you desired Colo. Biddle to procure is unable to carry the whole) had better be of the kinds which require least care. The Sale of the old Chariot was proper; for although the price is small it will be so much saved for the public. If much worn, or lumbering articles, could be disposed of to any tolerable account, might it not be better to sell them at New York & buy (if necessary) New ones at Philadelphia than to pay freight for them round?
Mrs Morris has a Mangle (I think they are called) for Ironing of Clothes, which, as it is fixed in the place where it is commonly used, she proposed to leave, & take mine. To this I have no objection, provided mine is equally good & convenient; but if I should obtain any advantage besides that of its being up, & ready for use I am not inclined to receive it.
Mrs Washington and all of this family unite in best wishes for you and Mrs Lear and I am Your sincere friend and Affectionate Servant

Go: Washington


Title: From George Washington to James Innes, 28 September 1790
From: Washington, George
To: Innes, James

Dear Sir,
Mount Vernon September 28. 1790.

Your letter dated the 17 of August did not come to my hands until Sunday last, or it should have received an earlier acknowledgement. For an answer to it I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Warner Lewis (of Gloucester) who, having taken much trouble to ascertain the properties and value of the land, (you wish to know the price of) and asking on what terms it would be disposed of, was sometime ago fully acquainted with my sentiments thereon. Not having the copy of my letter to him, by me at this place to refer to for these terms, nor the circumstances much in recollection—and being unwilling to propose others to you, which may differ from them, is the reason why I put you to the trouble of making this further enquiry. I am dear Sir, Your most obedient and very humble servant

G. Washington


Title: To George Washington from Alexander Hamilton, 29 September 1790
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Washington, George

Sir
Treasury Department New York Septr 29th 1790.

I have been duly honor’d with your two letters of the 18th and 20th of Septemr.
My opinion on a certain subject has been forwarded, and I hope will, ere this, have come to hand.
Inclosed you will be pleased to receive a list of such characters, as from the documents furnished by Mr Lear, from my inquiries, and from the intimations contained in your letter of the 20th, appear to stand, upon the whole, fairest for the command of the revenue boats; except for the stations of North Carolina and Georgia, concerning which, there is no satisfactory information.
Capt. Montgomery is said to have on some accounts greater pretensions to respectability than Capt. Roach (tho’ both are represented to be men of merit) and something like claim to preference from situation.
Mr Gross is submitted on the recommendation of Capt. Barney, who mentions favourably both him and a Mr Daniel Porter, naming Gross first, but without expressing a preference of either.
The Vice President put into my hands a day or two ago, the enclosed letters concerning Captain Lyde, but as Williams, who is recommended by Governor Hancock, is also warmly recommended by Genl Lincoln, the evidence in his favor may be deemed to be preponderate.
The manifest expediency of the previous nomination or appointment

of the persons, who are to command the boats, to oversee the building and equipping of them, will suspend the further execution of the business till your pleasure, as to the persons, shall be signified. The subaltern Officers, can be appointed at greater leisure, for which purpose I am collecting information, as I am also doing in respect to Commanders for the two boats destined for North Carolina & Georgia; but I presume the others need not be delayed on this account. I have the honor to be with the most perfect respect and truest attachment sir Yr mo: Obt & hble servt

A. Hamilton

P.s: The British packet is just arrived. The rumour is, that the declarations in the enclosed paper were regarded as the prelude of peace; but that the matter was not consider’d as finished and accordingly the press of seamen had continued with as much vavacity as before. In the letter from the Minister to the Lord Mayor those declarations seem to be regarded in the abovementioned light. The letter says, the negotiators were about to proceed to the discussion of the other matters in dispute, with a view to a definitive arrangement.