Title: The Federalist Number 57, [19 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[19 February 1788]
The third charge against the house of representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy, are numerous and various. The most effectual one is such a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people.
Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the house of representatives, that violates the principles of republican government; or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles; and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every state of electing the correspondent branch of the legislature of the state.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow citizens, we are to presume, that in general, they will be somewhat distinguished also, by those qualities which entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honour, of favour, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed, that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires, is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions, and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the people, would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities however would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the house of representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation, can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain, unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
I will add as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the house of representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of interest and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked what is to restrain the house of representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer, the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws, and above all the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the house of representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the cords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of men. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the identical means on which every state government in the union, relies for the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to chuse their own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?
Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode prescribed by the constitution for the choice of representatives, he could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that the mode prescribed by the state constitutions was in some respect or other very grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a supposition would err as to the two first points. Nor would it in fact be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual states the election of a representative is left to about as many hundred. Will it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to the state governments and an abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the objection turns, it deserves to be examined.
Is it supported by reason? This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of chusing a fit representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary assures us, that as in so great a number, a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him, by the intrigues of the ambitious, or the bribes of the rich.
Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their public servants in every instance where the administration of the government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number of citizens?
Is the doctrine warranted by facts? It was shewn in the last paper, that the real representation in the British house of commons very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes, not existing here and which favor in that country, the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as a representative of a county, unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that annual value. To this qualification on the part of the county representatives, is added another on the part of the county electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many.
But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is explicit and decisive. The districts in New-Hampshire in which the senators are chosen immediately by the people, are nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in the congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose. And those of New-York still more so. In the last state the members of assembly, for the cities and counties of New-York and Albany, are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representatives only. It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts and counties, a number of representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. If the same electors, at the same time, are capable of choosing four or five representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her counties which elect her state representatives, are almost as large as her districts will be by which her federal representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives. It forms however but one county, in which every elector votes for each of its representatives in the state legislature. And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually elects a single member for the executive council. This is the case in all the other counties of the state.
Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed against the branch of the federal government under consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts and New-York; or the executive council of Pennsylvania; or the members of the assembly in the two last states, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few; or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in other states, by very small divisions of the people?
But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole state. So is the governor of that state, of Massachusetts, and of this state, and the president of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion that a diffusive mode of chusing representatives of the people tends to elevate traitors, and to undermine the public liberty.
Publius.


Title: From James Madison to George Washington, 20 February 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Washington, George

Dear Sir
New York Feby 20. 1788
I am just favored with yours of the 7th. inst: and will attend to your wishes as to the political essays in the press.
I have given notice to my friends in Orange that the County may command my services in the Convention if it pleases. I can say with great truth however that in this overture I sacrifice every private inclination to considerations not of a selfish nature. I foresee that the undertaking will involve me in very laborious and irksome discussions; that public opposition to several very respectable characters whose esteem and friendship I greatly prize may unintentionally endanger the subsisting connection; and that disagreeable misconstructions, of which samples have been already given, may be the fruit of those exertions which fidelity will impose. But I have made up my determination on the subject; and if I am informed that my presence at the election in the County be indispensable, shall submit to that condition also; though it is my particular wish to decline it, as well to avoid apparent solicitude on the occasion; as a journey of such length at a very unpleasant season.
I had seen the extract of your letter to Col. Carter, and had supposed from the place where it first made its appearance that its publication was the effect of the zeal of a correspondent. I cannot but think on the whole that it may have been of service, notwithstanding the scandalous misinterpretations of it which have been attempted. As it has evidently the air of a paragraph to a familiar friend, the omission of an argumentative support of the opinion given will appear to no candid reader unnatural or improper.
We have no late information from Europe, except through the English papers, which represent the affairs of France as in the most ticklish state. The facts have every appearance of authenticity, and we wait with great impatience for the packet which is daily expected. It can be little doubted that the patriots have been abandoned; whether from impotency in France, misconduct in them, or from what other cause is not altogether clear. The french apologists are visibly embarrassed by the dilemma of submitting to the appearance of either weakness or the want of faith. They seem generally to alledge that their engagements being with the Republic, the Nation could not oppose the regular Authority of the Country by supporting a single province, or perhaps a party in it only. The validity of this excuse will depend much on the real connection between France and the patriots, and the assurances given as an encouragement to the latter. From the British King’s speech it would seem that France had avowed her purpose of supporting her Dutch friends; though it is possible, her menaces to England might be carried farther than her real promises to the patriots. All these circumstances however must have galled the pride of France, and I have little doubt that a war will prove it as soon as her condition will admit of it; perhaps she may be the sooner forced into it on account of her being in a contrary situation.
I hear nothing yet from the Convention of N. Hampshire. I remain yours most: respectfully & Affectly.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: The Federalist Number 58, [20 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[20 February 1788]
The remaining charge against the house of representatives which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population may demand.
It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The following observations will shew that like most other objections against the constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject; or from a jealousy which discolours and disfigures every object which is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the state constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years.
Within every successive term of ten years, a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to re-adjust from time to time the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants; under the single exception that each state shall have one representative at least: Secondly, to augment the number of representatives at the same periods; under the sole limitation, that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several states, we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject; that others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal constitution; and that the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the state constitutions, has at least kept pace with that of the constituents; and it appears that the former have been as ready to concur in such measures, as the latter have been to call for them.
3. There is a peculiarity in the federal constitution which ensures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their representatives, to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens; the other of the states: In the former, consequently the larger states will have most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the smaller states. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred, that the larger states will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so happens that four only of the largest, will have a majority of the whole votes in the house of representatives. Should the representatives or people therefore of the smaller states oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few states will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition, which notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest but justified by equity and the principles of the constitution.
It may be alledged, perhaps, that the senate would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the house composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful states, and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness felt by the same side, of being supported in its demands, by right, by reason, and by the constitution; and the consciousness on the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn considerations.
It is farther to be considered that in the gradation between the smallest and largest states, there are several which, though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all the new states may be gained over to the just views of the house of representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these states will for a great length of time advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent re-apportionments of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large states therefore, who will prevail in the house of representatives, will have nothing to do, but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most growing states will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their states will feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller states, or their predominant influence in the councils of the senate; a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger states, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The house of representatives can not only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They in a word hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which we behold in the history of the British constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people, gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the most compleat and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
But will not the house of representatives be as much interested as the senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the senate? Or if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect, that in all cases the smaller the number and the more permanent and conspicuous the station of men in power, the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger or of a dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British house of commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every department of the state in the general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal senate or president will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the constitution of the house of representatives, I have passed over the circumstance of economy, which in the present state of affairs might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives; and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the constitution as has been furnished by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal service, a large number of such characters as the people will probably elect. One observation however, I must be permitted to add on this subject, as claiming in my judgment a very serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies, the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous any assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendancy of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the antient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as compleat a sway, as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hands. On the same principle the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning; and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniencies in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule; the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in particular emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shewn itself even in states where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us.
Publius.


Title: To James Madison from John Fitch, 25 February 1788
From: Fitch, John
To: Madison, James

Honoured Sir
New York the 25 February 1788
I beg leave to make you acquainted with a late proposition I made to the Committee of Congress, which was founded on the following Certificate, by a Gentleman inhabitant of the Natchies—A Coppy.
The most common custom of Navigating up the River Mississippi from the City of New Orleans to the Illinois are as followeth Viz—
They commonly employ one man to every ton on Board, their wages for the trip about one hundred dollars each, their provisions and a pint of Taffy pr day found them, dureing their passage thether—John Woods.
Propositions &c—I suppose each man with his Baggage and Oar to Weigh 200 lbs., I suppose provisions and liquor for 30 men 100 days at 3 lb. pr man pr. day to be 9,000 lb., in all 15,000. Taffy for 100 days at ½ a dollar pr Gallon is 187½ Dollars, provisions for 100 days at ⅛ of a dollar pr day is 375 Dollars, wages 3,000 dollars in all is 3562½ dollars. Therefore propose that I am restricted to make and navigate a Boat from New Orleans to the Illinois of 60 tons burthen for 3562½ dollars, or in other words I say, I will build a Boat with the Engine and all compleat every trip, and transport the goods at half the price they now cost, or pay for said Lands, and give indisputable security for the performance. (How the Committee will report I do not know, but if they can look upon me to be serious, and these to be facts, I should fain hope they would not Treat it with Contempt.) At the same time I have prayed them to make certain stipulations to a Boat on the Delaware, which with other matters will here be too tedious, and shall be happy if I have not already exceeded the bounds of modesty, and may once more be permitted to subscribe myself your most Devoted and Very Humble Servant
John Fitch


Title: To James Madison from André Limozin, 27 February 1788
From: Limozin, André
To: Madison, James

Most Honored Sir
Havre de Grace 27th february 1788.
I took the Freedom to trouble your Excellency yesterday & begd to procure the Forwarding of Sundry inclosed.
I have the honor to remitt you a Bill of Lading of Captn Rolland of the Kings Packet No 3 for two Cases which Mr Jefferson Ambassor. of the US of America at the Court of Versailles our mutuall worthy Friend hath desired me to forward to your Excellency. I hope they will be deliverd in as good order as I have Shipped them. I have already payd the freight for them. I have the Honor to be with the very highest regard Your Excellency’s Most obedient & very Humble Servant
Andre Limozin


Title: The Federalist Number 62, [27 February] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[27 February 1788]
Having examined the constitution of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered, are—I. the qualifications of senators—II. the appointment of them by the state legislatures—III. the equality of representation in the senate—IV. the number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected—V. the powers vested in the senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age, and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative, must be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust; which requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merit and talents may claim a share in the public confidence; and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the state legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the state governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government; and that among independent and sovereign states bound together by a simple league, the parties however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason, that in a compound republic partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try by the standard of theory, a part of the constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result not of theory, but “of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.” A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller states. The only option then for the former lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small states; since they are not less solicitous to guard by every possible expedient against an improper consolidation of the states into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the senate, is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence first of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the states. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favor of the smaller states would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other states, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger states will always be able by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser states; and as the facility and excess of law making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
IV. The number of senators and the duration of their appointment come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to enquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these it will be necessary to review the inconveniencies which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it, may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies; it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.
Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked is that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought moreover to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well constituted senate?
A good government implies two things; first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: Most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert that in the American governments, too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourth. The mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the states, is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just as well as more important, in national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
In the first place it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbours may pity him; but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage of the indiscretions of each other. Every nation consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbours. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulged, or undergo such incessant changes that no man who knows what the law is today can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising and the moneyed few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue; or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change and can trace its consequences; a harvest reared not by themselves but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the few not for the many.
In another point of view great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking; the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labours and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government any more than an individual will long be respected, without being truly respectable, nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.
Publius.


Title: To James Madison from Joseph Spencer, 28 February 1788
From: Spencer, Joseph
To: Madison, James

D Sir
Orange County Febry. 28th 1788
The Federal Constitution, has it Enimyes in Orange as well as in other parts, Col. Thos. Barber offers as a Candedit for our March Election, he is as grate an Enimy to it as he posabley can be, & if not as grate as any it has, as grate as his abiliteys will alow him to be, which if our County men admired his Politickes no more then I do, the Constitution would have but Little to fear from that Quarter, but his unwared Labours Riding his Carquits & the Instrements he makes use of to Obtain his Election, misrepresents things in such Horred carrecters that the weker clas of the people are much predegessed agains it by which meens he has many which as yet, appears grately in favour of him, amoungs his Friends appears, in a General way the Baptus’s, the Prechers of that Society are much alarm’d fearing Relegious liberty is not Sufficiently secur’d thay pretend to other objections but that I think is the principle objection, could that be Removed by sum one Caperble of the Task I think thay would become friends to it, that body of people has become Very formible in pint of Elections, as I can think of no Gentln. of my Acquaintance so Suitible to the task as your Self I have taken the liberty to Request it of you, Several of your Conections in Orange Joines me in oppinion, thinking it would Answer a Valuable purpus for I am Cartain that pople Relye much on your integerity & Candure, Mr. Leeland & Mr. Bledsoe and Sanders are the most publick men of that Society in Orange, therefore as Mr. Leeland Lyes in your Way home from Fredricksburg to Orange would advise you’l call on him & Spend a few Howers in his Company, in Clos’d youl Receive his Objections which was Sent by me to, Barber, a Coppy I tooke, this copy was first Design’d for Capt Walker, but as I hoped youl be in this state in a few days thought proper to Send it to you, by which means youl be made Acquainted with their objections & have time to Consider them should you think it an Object worth yr. Attention, my fears are that Except you & yr. friends do Exerte yr. Selves Very much youl not obtain yr. Election in Orange Such are the predegeses of the people for in short there is nothing so Vile, but what the Constitution is Charged with, hope to See you in Orange in a few days I am with the Gratest Respect yr. most obedt h Sarve
Joseph Spencer


Title: To James Madison from Edmund Randolph, 29 February 1788
From: Randolph, Edmund
To: Madison, James

My dear friend
Richmond Feby 29. 1788.
The decision of Massts., had it been adverse to the constn, wd. have damned it here. But as it is, it fixes the event, if N. York, N. Hamp. and Maryland should follow the example. This must be understood with this restriction; that altho’ 9 states will force Va. by their assent to come in, there is reason to believe that no intelligence of that sort can reach us before our convention meets; as So. Carolina will sit on the 12th. of may only. I received a letter last night from Mr. P. H——y, mentioning his having resumed the practice of the law, and his determination to oppose the constn. even if only ½ a state should oppose. The baptist interest and the Counties on the So. Side of Jas. river from Isle of Wight, upwards, are highly incensed by H——y’s opinions, and public speeches, whensoever occasion has presented. As to the temper on the North side, I cannot clearly discern it. But upon a review made by Mr. Marshall of their comparative strength, he seems to think, that the question will be very nice. The election of Henrico commences on Monday. The persons proposed are Dr. Foushee, Marshall and myself. Nothing but a small degree of favor, acquired by me, independently of the constitution, could send me; my politicks not being sufficiently strenuous against the constn. Marshall is in danger; but F. is not popular enough on other scores to be elected, altho he is perfectly a Henryite.
But to return to Massts—what a paltry snare? Some of the amts. are inadmissible, others pointed against the Negro states, and others milk & water. The first is among the rocks on which the old confn. has split; the 2d. is aimed against the So. Ss—the 3d. provides vs. no real danger; the first part of the 4th. is as the 3d. and moreover destroys an essential idea of a national govt.; the 5th. tho’ a new and juster theory now prevails, ought to be left to the occasional wisdom of congress; the 6th. sounds an unnecessary alarm; the 7th. strikes not at all the most exceptionable points of the jurisdiction; the 8th. I conceive is not true in supposing even at common law a trial of fact to be best on all occasions by a jury; and the 9th. can have been designed only to make out a number of amts. equal to the no. of states, who may give birth to the govt. In short H——k. proposes them not in the form of objections, but to remove fears, and I do not conceive that Massts. may be yet said to be fairly inlisted; altho’ to me it is satisfactory, since the men of talents and property are in its favor, vs. the Shayites, and the gentlemen of bad fame, with whom we recusants have been classed.
A writer, calling himself Plain dealer, who is bitter in principle vs. the constn. has attacked me in the paper. I suspect the author to be Mr. Spencer Roane, and the importunities of some to me in public and private are designed to throw me unequivocally and without condition into the opposition.
But pray answer me, what is to become of our debit for the old contl. money? Shall we not be obliged to compensate the Indiana company for our legislative violence? Does not the exception as to a religious test imply, that the congress by the general words had power over religion? I expect a coalition between the high and low fœderalists. Nothing less can save the fœderal govt.


Title: The Federalist Number 63, [1 March] 1788
From: Madison, James
To:

[1 March 1788]
A fifth desideratum illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: The one is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy: The second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had in every instance been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiassed part of mankind.
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode-Island, would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that state, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister states; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone, would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now labouring.
I add as a sixth defect, the want in some important cases of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces this responsibility. The remark will perhaps appear not only new but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes; the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country needs no explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements, which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, at any rate, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached and palpable operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well constructed senate, only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought in all governments, and actually will in all free governments ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.
It may be suggested that a people spread over an extensive region, cannot like the crouded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have on the contrary endeavoured in a former paper to shew that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked that the same extended situation which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time, under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect, that history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome and Carthage are in fact the only states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate in the last, is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council drawn out of the senate was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation as they are repugnant to the genius of America, are notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other antient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well antient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the controul of such an institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests: but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.
The difference most relied on between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation, which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the antient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shewn that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint therefore in observing that the position concerning the ignorance of the antient governments on the subject of representation is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing the people in their executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine archons, annually elected by the people at large. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly first of four and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the people; and partially representing them in their legislative capacity, since they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws; but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage also, whatever might be its power or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most if not all the popular governments of antiquity.
Lastly in Sparta, we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the people: and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these and the American governments lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of representatives of the people, from the administration of the former. The distinction however thus qualified must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favour of the United States. But to ensure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed that any form of representative government, could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer the general reply ought to be sufficient; that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter; and that the former rather than the latter is apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the state legislatures, must then corrupt the house of representatives, and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the senate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the house of representatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?
If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The senate of that state is elected, as the federal senate will be, indirectly by the people; and for a term less by one year only, than the federal senate. It is distinguished also by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment; and at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation, as is provided for the federal senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections that do not lie against the latter. If the federal senate therefore really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the senate of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving from the salutary operations of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any state in the union.
But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The senate there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The house of representatives, instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years; and in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here unquestionably ought to be seen in full display, the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny, which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately however for the antifederal argument, the British history informs us, that this hereditary assembly has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the house of representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for life, continually gained on its authority, and finally drew all power into their own hands. The tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. This fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side. To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had at the commencement of the second punic war, lost almost the whole of its original portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the federal senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of representatives with the people on their side will at all times be able to bring back the constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature, the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves.
Publius.


Title: From James Madison to George Lee Turberville, 1 March 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Turberville, George Lee

1 March 1788. Acknowledged in Turberville to JM, 16 Apr. 1788 (NN). Replies to Turberville’s queries concerning the Constitution put forward in his letter to JM of 11 Dec. 1787. Includes in his reply “powerfull reasons that may be urged agt. the adoption of a Bill of Rights.”


Title: To James Madison from Moustier, 2 March 1788
From: Moustier
To: Madison, James

Monsieur
À Newyork le 2. Mars 1788
Rien ne me dedommagera certainement de l’agrement que je vais perdre par votre depart. Quand on s’attache aux personnes il est necessaire de pouvoir communiquer avec Elles. C’est avec peine que je mêle des regrets aux assurances de l’estime et de l’affection que vous m’avez inspirées. Je sens egalement combien je perds du coté de l’utilité que j’aurois pû retirer de vos lumieres et de vos conseils, qui m’auroient été d’autant plus necessaires que j’entrevois ici plus de difficultés que je m’y etois attendu. Je me suis flatté que vous auriez la complaisance de me seconder neanmoins, autant que l’eloignement peut le permettre, dans la recherche des moyens de remplir le but que je me propose de concilier les interets reciproques. La France a toujours temoigné son empressement à faire les avancer. Pour rendre ce Systême durable il faut qu’Elle puisse en recueillir des fruits. C’est servir la patrie de la part d’un Americain que de montrer que les demandes de ses compatriotes peuvent s’accorder avec les interets de la France. C’est dans cette persuasion, Monsieur, que je prends la liberté de vous adresser quelques questions. Si je n’avois craint d’etre indiscret, je les aurois un peu plus etendues. Ce que vous voudriez bien ajouter au delà des objets auxquels je me suis borné, ne ferois qu’augmenter ma reconnoissance. Je vous prie d’en etre bien convaincu ainsi que du très sincere et parfait attachement avec lequel j’ai l’honneur d’etre, Monsieur, Votre très humble et très obeissant Serviteur
Le Cte. de Moustier

[Enclosure]
Questions, dont M. le Cte. de Moustier prie Monsieur Madison de vouloir bien lui addresser la solution, quand ses occupations le lui permettront.
1.
Quelle est l’opinion des habitans les plus instruits dela Virginie sur le Contrat dela Ferme avec M. Rob. Morris et quel est le systeme qu’ils voudroient y substituer?
2.
Ne pourrions nous pas fournir à très bon marché le gros lainage pour l’habillement des negres?
3.
Quels sont en general les objets de Commerce, dont il pourroit être interessant d’encourager l’importation soit en France, soit aux Antilles.

4.
Quelles sont d’un autre coté les marchandises du Royaume ou des Isles, dont les Virginiens paroissent avoir le plus grand besoin?
5.
Est-il vraisemblable que les eaux de vie de France fassent tomber entierement le Rum des Isles?
   A quoi peut se monter la consommation annuelle des Vins de France en Virginie?

6.
Se sert-on beaucoup du sel de France pour les Salaisons et que faut-il faire pour en rendre l’usage plus commun?
7.
La Virginie commence-t-elle à exporter elle même ses denrées et quelle est la proportion de sa navigation avec celle des autres nations pour le transport des tabacs et autres articles.
8.
Comme les Americains desirent beaucoup d’obtenir de nouvelles faveurs dans nos Antilles, que pourroient-ils proposer pour faciliter un arrangement de cette nature sans trop prejudicier aux avantages que la France ne cesse de tirer de ses Colonies?

Condensed Translation
Moustier regrets JM’s departure. He appreciates JM’s support of his investigation of the reciprocal trade interests of France and the United States and requests that JM answer questions concerning the opinion of Virginians on the tobacco contract between the Farmers General and Robert Morris; the products of Virginia and of France and her West Indian colonies that could be traded to mutual advantage; the consumption of French wines and salt in Virginia; the extent to which Virginia products are transported in ships registered in Virginia; and the kind of trade arrangement that JM thinks should exist between the United States and the French West Indies.


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 3 March 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Pendleton, Edmund

Dear Sir
N. York Mar. 3. 88.
The Convention of N. Hampshire have disappointed much the general expectation. Instead of adopting the Constitution they have adjourned without any final decision until June; this expedient being found necessary to prevent a rejection. It seems that a majority of 3 or 4 members would have voted in the negative, but in this majority were a number who had been proselyted by the discussions, but were bound by positive instructions. These concurred with the federalists in the adjournment, and carried it by a majority of 57 agst. 47. It is not much doubted that in the event N. Hampshire will be among the adopting States. But the influence of this check will be very considerable in this State (N. York) and in several others. I have enquired whether June was preferred for the 2d. meeting, from any reference to Virga. or N. York, and am informed that it was merely an accommodation to the intermediate annual elections & Courts.
I am just setting out for Virga. and shall not write again from this place. I wish you every happiness & am Dr Sir Yr Affe friend
Js. Madison Jr


Title: From James Madison to Edmund Randolph, 3 March 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Randolph, Edmund

My dear friend
N. York Mar. 3. 88.
The Convention of N. Hampshire have disappointed the general expectation. They have not rejected the Constitution, but they have adjourned without adopting it. It was found that on a final question there would be a majority of 3 or 4 in the negative but in this number were included some who with instructions from their Towns against the Constitution, had been proselyted by the discussions. These concurring with the fœderalists in the adjournment, carried it by 57 agst. 47. if I am rightly informed as to the numbers. The second meeting is not to be till the last week in June. I have enquired from the Gentlemen from that quarter what particularly recommended so late a day, supposing it might refer to the times fixed by N.Y. & Virga. They tell me it was governed by the intermediate annual elections and Courts. If the opposition in that State be such as they are described it is not probable that they pursue any sort of plan, more than that of Massts. This event whatever causes may have produced it, or whatever consequences it may have in N.H. is no small check to the progress of the business. The opposition here which is unquestionably hostile to every thing beyond the fœderal principle, will take new spirits. The event in Massts. had almost extinguished their hopes. That in Pena. will probably be equally encouraged.
Col. Heth arrived a day or two ago with the proceedings of the Commissrs. They will be laid before Congs. to day. I have been detained from setting out for Virga. by this circumstance having fixed on yesterday for the purpose. I shall probably get away tomorrow, and possibly this afternoon. Yrs. Affey.
Js. Madison Jr


Title: To James Madison from Guillaume-Stanislaus Faure, 7 March 1788
From: Faure, Guillaume-Stanislaus
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Havre, March 7th. 1788.Great-street st. Michael.

I have shipped on board of the King’s Packet, number 3d. Capn. Rolland, Sailed for Newyorck the 27th. last, a large case packed up, marked MFR, and a small packet at your direction, according the bill of lading wich I could not send to you by the same opportunity: I forward it to you together with a letter directed to me for you from Paris by my brother, and you’ll receive them by the first packet for your country, which intends to sail the 25th Instt.
If I may be so happy as to have my Services agreeable to you in this place, you’ll oblige me in disposing of them entirely. I am with the utmost esteem, Sir, Your Very humble and obedient servant,

Triplicata.
Stas: Faure


Title: To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 8 March 1788
From: Jefferson, Thomas
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Mar. 8. 1788.

The bearer of this letter is mr. Francis Adrian Van der Kemp one of the late victims of patriotism in Holland. Having determined to remove himself & his family to America, his friend the Baron de Capellen, another of those expatriated worthies, has asked of me to give letters of introduction to Mr. Van der Kemp, recommending him for his extraordinary zeal in the cause of liberty, his talents, & his sufferings. These motives, together with a respect for the very estimable person who recommends him, induce me to ask for him your civilities and your services. Uninformed of the part of our country in which he may chuse to settle, I am unable to address him to the particular persons into whose society he may wish to enter. But when he shall have decided on the place of his settlement, you will be able to give, or to procure for him, such letters as may be accomodated to his views. In doing this you will add to the many motives of obligation & esteem with which I am, Dear Sir Your affectionate friend & humble servt
Th: Jefferson


Title: To James Madison from James Bryson, 12 March 1788
From: Bryson, James
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Post Office March 12th. 1788.
Supposing that it might not be unacceptable; I have taken the liberty of enclosing you an extract from the Ordinance of Congress, for Regulating the Post Office &ca concerning the powers given the Post Master General, respecting the carriage of News papers by the Posts. Wishing at the same time (when you have leisure) that you would please to mention the circumstance to the other Gentlemen of the Committee, on Post Office business—and that they would Urge the necessity of the Post Master General’s puting the power given him, into execution.
I have to beg leave to mention, that if any new Arangement in the Depa[r]tment should take place during the time of your Attendance in Congress; that I may be honoured with your friendship; as I have the sattisfaction of beleiving (and think that those who know me also beleive) that no man in America understand the Direction of the Post Office Department better than my self—and have always had the labouring Oar—and not the best reward. I only mention this, that in case Mr. H——d may have enemies

   I say Enemies, as I make no doubt but even News paper Assertions may create him enemies.

 enough to displace him—I may not be forgot. Which friendship would ever be remembered, by, Sir, Your Most Obedt. Hle. Servt.
Jas. Bryson


Title: To James Madison from Cyrus Griffin, 17 March 1788
From: Griffin, Cyrus
To: Madison, James

dear Madison
N: Y: march 17th: [1788]
Neither the french or the english packets have yet arrived, which is not a little extraordinary.
Not a syllable of domestic news but what the enclosed papers will exhibit to you.
The Marchioness is a good deal better, and wants exceedingly to be present at the Indian Treaty; I think the Governor General can do nothing less than take so sweet a companion in his Train; but he seems to be averse from the plan.
I think the french Minister confines himself at home too much—I am sorry he does not mix more with the Inhabitants.
My dear friend—I have been very sick for 4 or 5 days past, but I hope to attend Congress on wednesday.
I have sent forward your letter to G. L. Turberville esq.

I thank you for calling upon my little people in Phil. I am dear M. with the highest consideration &c
C: Griffin


Title: From James Madison to Eliza House Trist, 25 March 1788
From: Madison, James
To: Trist, Eliza House

Orange March 25 [1788]. The badness of the roads & some other delays retarded the completion of my journey till the day before yesterday. I called at Col Syms in Alexanda. but had not the pleasure of seeing either him or his lady. He was not at home though in Town and I was so hurried that I could halt a few minutes only; and she was confined to her chamber by indisposition. I had the satisfaction to find all my friends well on my arrival; and the chagrin to find the County filled with the most absurd and groundless prejudices against the fœderal Constitution. I was therefore obliged at the election which succeeded the day of my arrival to mount for the first time in my life, the rostrum before a large body of the people, and to launch into a harangue of some length in the open air and on a very windy day. What the effect might be I cannot say, but either from that experiment or the exertion of the fœderalists or perhaps both, the misconceptions of the Government were so far corrected that two federalists one of them myself were elected by a majority of nearly 4 to one. It is very probable that a very different event would have taken place as to myself if the efforts of my friends had not been seconded by my presence. The elections as yet are not sufficiently known to authorize any judgment on the probable complexion of the Convention. As far as I have heard of them they are not discouraging; but I have heard little from the great district of Country which is said to be most tainted with antifederalism. I am so taken up with company that I cannot at present add more than my sincerest wishes for your happiness. Adieu.
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Alexander Hamilton, 3 April 1788
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Madison, James

April 3d. [1788]
I have been very delinquent My Dear Sir in not thanking you sooner for your letter from Philadelphia. The remarks you make on a certain subject are important and will be attended to. There is truly much embarrassment in the case.
I think however the principles we have talked of, in respect to the legislative authorities, are not only just but will apply to the other departments. Nor will the consequences appear so disagreeable, as they may seem at first sight, when we attend to the true import of the rule established. The states retain all the authorities they were before possessed of not alienated in the three modes pointed out; but this does not include cases which are the creatures of the New Constitution. For instance, the crime of treason against the United States immediately, is a crime known only to the New Constitution. There of course was no power in the state constitutions to pardon that crime. There will therefore be none under the new &c. This or something like it seems to me to afford the best solution of the difficulty.
I send you the Fœderalist from the beginning to the conclusion of the commentary on the Executive branch. If our suspicions of the author be right, he must be too much engaged to make a rapid progress in what remains. The Court of Chancery & a Circuit Court are now sitting.
We are told that your election has succeeded; with which we all felicitate ourselves. I will thank you for an account of the result generally.
In this state our prospects are much as you left them—a moot point which side will prevail. Our friends to the Northward are active. I remain Yr. affectionate & obedt serv
A Hamilton


Title: To James Madison from George Nicholas, 5 April 1788
From: Nicholas, George
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir,
Charlottesville April 5th. 88.
I consider the present moment as so important to America, that I shall take the liberty of communicating to you my sentiments, as to the conduct that her real freinds ought to pursue. The adoption of the new constitution (on which I conceive her salvation to depend) in this state, depends much on the conduct of the other states; from the list of members returned to the convention, I think a majority of them are federal; but that majority if it exists, will be but small, and I apprehend some of them will fear to give the last hand to the business, unless the conduct of the other states will justify it. The adjournment of the New-Hampshire convention puts an end to the hope that nine will adopt before the meeting of our convention, but it will be a great matter to have the sanction of eight states. Maryland and South-Carolina are the only ones which are now to meet, and I flatter myself will both be favorable to the plan; but I apprehend great efforts will be made to induce them to adjourn until after our meeting, and if this can be brought about, depend on it Sir, it will have great influence in this country; if you consider this matter in the same point of view that I do, may I hope that you will impress on your freinds in those states, the importance of their sanction prior to the meeting of this state. I have great expectations from the influence of Mr. Pendleton, and know that effort will be used to induce him to come into the proposition of demanding amendments before the adoption, you can prevent the danger from that quarter. Not having been in the state for some time, perhaps you are a stranger to the real sentiments of some of the leaders of the opposition. You know better than I do what was the conduct of Mr. Mason at the convention, immediately after his return, he declared, that notwithstanding his objections to particular parts of the plan, he would take it as it was rather than lose it altogether; since that I have reason to believe his sentiments are much changed which I attribute to two causes: first the irritation he feels from the hard things that have been said of him, and secondly to a vain opinion he entertains (which has industriously been supported by some particular characters) that he has influence enough to dictate a constitution to Virginia, and through her to the rest of the union. Mr. Henry is now almost avowedly an enemy to the union, and therefore will oppose every plan that would cement it. His real sentiments will be industriously concealed, for so long as he talks only of amendments, such of the freinds to the union, as object to particular parts of the constitution will adhere to him, which they would not do a moment, if they could be convinced of his real design. I hope to be possessed of sufficient information by the meeting of the convention to make that matter clear, and if I am it shall not be with-held. The opposition except from that quarter will be feeble. Our freind E: R. talks of a compromise between the freinds to the union, but I know of but one that can safely take place; and that is on the plan of the Massachussetts convention: it appears to me impossible, that another continental convention assembled to deliberate on the whole subject, should ever agree on any general plan.
Let the decision of our convention be what it may, I think it will be of great consequence that an address to the people at large should go forth from such of the members as are freinds to the constitution: if this had been done in Pennsylvania, it would have counteracted much of the poison contained in the dissent of the minority. I consider the situation of the freinds as very different, and requiring them to pursue a line of conduct, which would not be justifiable in the minority after the adoption of the government. Their only object could be to wish to foment a civil war to destroy a government, which they suppose not perfect; but if this government is rejected, America will be left without one, at least only in possession of one which all parties agree is insufficient; it will therefore be our duty to state to the people the necessity of a change and place in it’s true point of view the one now offered. Nine tenths of the people are strong freinds to the union, and such of them as are opposed to the proffered government, are so, upon suppositions not warranted by the thing itself. No person in the convention can so well prepare this address as yourself, and if it appears as important in your eyes as it does to me, I hope that you will undertake it. The greater part of the members of the convention will go to the meeting without information on the subject, it will be very important to give this as early as may be, and if possible before they go from home. Publius of the fœderalist if it is published in a pamphlet, would do it better than any other work; if it is published can I get the favor of you to procure me thirty or forty copies of it, that I may distribute them; if they were sent to Orange or Richmond I should soon get them.
The only danger I apprehend is from the Kentucky members; and one consideration only has any weight with them: a fear that if the new government should take place, that their navigation would be given up. If Mr. Brown could be satisfied on this subject, and would write to that country, and also have letters here for the members, I am satisfied they would be right. You will pardon this liberty and believe me to be with respect and esteem Dr. Sir, Yr. obdt. servt.
G: Nicholas
I wrote the above on a supposition that you had or would immediately return to New York but being informed yesterday that you did not intend it, one other consideration appears as important as any that I have yet mentioned. If the convention adopts the new government it will depend on the next assembly whether it shall be set in motion; if they reject it, no plan for a substitute can come from any other quarter: so that on either event it will be material to have a majority there federal. We laid the ground work of a reform in our courts of justice last fall, it requires the finishing hand; you know the number that are opposed to all reforms, and how formidable they will be with Henry at their head. If then as I suppose the truth is, that nothing very important can come before the present Congress, will it not be necessary for you to go into the assembly. At any rate none but federal men should be elected.
Has Congress determined on any thing as to the separation of Kentucky? I am much interested in the welfare of that country as I expect to reside in it within twelve months.
G: N.


Title: To James Madison from Cyrus Griffin, 7 April 1788
From: Griffin, Cyrus
To: Madison, James

my dear Sir
N: Y: April 7th [1788]
Colonel Wadsworth has thought proper to leave us—and his state being unrepresented we are again reduced to six only—and probably may continue in that situation a week or two longer. The N. York delegates do not attend—it seems to me the period is fully arrived to close the Confederation.
As no french packet has yet appeared or been heared of the minister is inclined to think that a prohibition was made to their sailing during the winter months—or perhaps some change in that department may have occasioned it.
Rhode Island have in fact rejected the constitution—so that only eight states can have adopted the system before the Session of Virginia. We all much rejoiced to hear of your election, especially as your being present, we are told, was absolutely necessary to counter-act some unwarrantable proceedings.
I do not know whether you are acquainted with a mr Paradise from London who came to Virginia in October last with the strongest recommendations as a man of understanding and a good American—he is now in this City and will embark for Paris in the first french packet—if you have any confidential letters to mr. Jefferson I am sure he will take the best charge of them—he is very intimate with that minister and will go immediately to his house.
At some convenient hour I hope you will give me your opinion upon the prospect of the new-Constitution—the Elections now finished &c.
News papers enclosed. I am, my dear Sir, with the highest respect & friendship your obedient Servant
C Griffin