Title: To James Madison from Francis Corbin, 22 November 1791
From: Corbin, Francis
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Virginia Richmond Novr: 22d. 1791
The determination of Congress with respect to the Ratio of Representation gives no small degree of satisfaction to a certain description of persons here—and will be, I believe, highly instrumental in promoting the adoption of the remaining Amendments to the Constitution. These Amendments we always intended to consider during the present Session—so that your conjectural Explanation was, in fact, the true One. This Day the federal Court met—and tomorrow, I am told, the great Question concerning the payment of British Debts will be agitated. I fear this Circumstance will tend, in some measure, to inflame the minds of many of the members of the Assembly—so as to cause the Introduction of some rash and intemperate Resolutions.
It was with difficulty that I prevented an attempt of this sort a few weeks ago when the Petition of several Counties, relative to that part of the Treaty of Peace which implies the restoration of—or Compensation for the Negroes Carried away by the British Fleets and armies, was under our Consideration. That Business however fortunately ended in mild and moderate Instructions to our Senators in Congress.
Since my last Letter to you we have heard the Indiana Company at the Bar of the House and have once more rejected their Claim. Yesterday we took up our Revenue matters: and have agreed to continue the Int. of 6 pr. Ct. to the Non-subscribers to the federal Loan. So far then we have acted—to all appearance—consistently with our Remonstrance last year agt. the Assumption. I say to all appearance—for, in truth, the whole is a Deception. For though 6 pr. Ct. is continued—yet it is to be paid in Warrants upon our Aggregate Fund which are not worth more than 14 and 15/ in the pound. So that our 6 pr. Ct. is not better—or very little than the three & two thirds pr. Ct. of Congress. But you are well enough acquainted with the sort of characters who in general compose our Assemblies.
This Day was wholly occupied by Messrs. Henry, Starke and Marshall at the Bar of the House upon the Subject of an application made by one Trumbull for a Divorce. This application is grounded upon a Plea of Incompetency on the part of the Wife to consummate the nuptial Rites.
You may have heard of the case perhaps. If you have not—it will be better related in person than by Letter. It is full of Indecency and is shocking even to think of.
We have understood here that Mr. Hammond has certainly brought over some commercial overtures from G. B. and some propositions, it is said, for a Compromise touching British Debts, Western Posts—and Restoration of Negroes. What foundation there is for these Reports I know not. But I am strongly inclined to believe that such a Compromise might be effected by a man of such talents, manners, & connections as I could describe. It would be well worth our while to make the Attempt—for in the present precarious situation of things the future Consequences are incalculable. A Respectable appointment will, I suppose, be made to the Court of London this Winter, equal to Mr. Hammond’s at least. If so—I hope prejudices of all kinds will be discarded—persons disregarded & the probability of promoting the public Wish alone consulted.
I see by the journals of Congress that the President has made Mr. Mifflin’s Communications to you. This Subject was taken up by our Assembly. Indeed I introduced some Resolutions which purported a Wish that Congress should pass a general Law or Laws for the purpose of carrying into Effect not the 2d. Clause only of the 2d. Sectn. of the 4th. Article of the Constitution but the first—second and third clauses, as all connected with and dependent on each other. These Resolutions however were rejected under an Idea that the State Legislatures alone were competent to make the necessary Laws—and that Congress had no Right to interfere in it. A Bill was accordingly ordered in—but has never yet made it’s appearance, and I suppose never will. But the History of this whole Business will presently be transmitted to you. It will be brought before this Legislature again in the shape of a Letter of Complaint from the Repves. of Ohio, in behalf of their Constituents; which Letter will be acted upon and our proceedings forwarded to the President or to Congress. The Conduct of Pennsylvania has been hasty, partial and unjust in the Extreme. However we are willing to Impute it rather to misinformation than to Intention. A Satisfactory Relation of the circumstances shall be detailed in my next—with an acct. of the Steps we take. In the mean time I remain Dr. Sir with great Respect and Sincere Regard Yr. Mo: Ob. & Mo: Hle: Sert.
Francis Corbin


Title: A Note on the Sources of Madison’s Speeches in the Second Congress, 22 November 1791–1 March 1793 (Editorial Note)
From:
To:

Editorial Note
One result of JM’s reduced role as a congressional leader after 1791 was that he spoke less frequently. While the editors selected over one hundred of his speeches for publication from the First Congress, only twenty-eight from the Second Congress merit full coverage when using the same selection criteria (Madison at the First Session of the First Federal Congress, 8 Apr.–29 Sept. 1789, PJMWilliam T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The
          Papers of James Madison (vols. 1–10, Chicago, 1962–77; vols. 11—, Charlottesville,
        Va., 1977—)., XII, 62–63). The sources for the speeches in the Second Congress are also fewer than those for the first. Eighteen of the twenty-eight speeches printed here were reported in John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States; twelve of those eighteen were reported nearly identically in other Philadelphia newspapers. Fenno’s paper, as it had done during the First Congress, usually reported at greater length and in more detail than its competitors but sometimes published debates as much as three months after they took place. By the second session of the Second Congress, that newspaper alone regularly printed speeches in detail. In fact, other Philadelphia papers often gave more complete coverage to the proceedings of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
Complaints about the reportorial quality of the speeches were frequent. Indeed, John Carey (the stenographer for Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser and the General Advertiser) despaired of keeping up with the full proceedings or of adequately representing both sides of debates. He asked JM to provide him with notes to one of his speeches and resolved to “refrain from attempting to publish the debates, & confine himself to a bare minute of the proceedings.” The rumblings continued, and on 20 April 1792, less than three weeks before the first session recessed, Elbridge Gerry moved that stenographers be appointed as officers of the House. In a speech supporting his motion the Massachusetts congressman cited examples from Dunlap’s which he claimed misrepresented the proceedings. Carey published an apology for the inaccuracies; both papers for which he reported thereafter reduced coverage (Carey to JM, 8 Feb. 1792; Dunlap’s Am. Daily Advertiser, 21 and 23 Apr. 1792; General Advertiser, 23 Apr. 1792).
The publisher of the General Advertiser was already disinclined to report speeches verbatim. On 2 October 1790, in the prospectus to the first issue, Benjamin Franklin Bache had described his method of reporting congressional debates: “The Publisher conceives, that to convey the meaning of the speaker, in clear, intelligible language, and in as concise a manner as the nature of the subject admits, will be sufficient. He has been induced to believe that this method will be found preferable to the insertion of the speech at full length, taken verbatim from the Speaker’s mouth.”

Ten of the twenty-eight speeches printed here were not reported in the Gazette of the United States; four speeches appeared only in the Federal Gazette and Philadelphia Daily Advertiser, published by Andrew Brown, Sr. The latter journal was the first to publish five more speeches by JM which other Philadelphia papers reprinted. According to Hamilton, Brown “was originally a zealous federalist and personally friendly to me. He has been employed by Mr. Jefferson as a Printer to the Government for the publication of the laws; and for some time past ’till lately the complexion of his press was equally bitter and unfriendly to me & to the Government” (Hamilton to Edward Carrington, 26 May 1792, Syrett and Cooke, Papers of HamiltonHarold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (26 vols.; New York, 1961–79)., XI, 431). While essays and editorials in the Philadelphia newspapers became more polemic during the Second Congress, reports of congressional speeches were not overtly politicized, if only because coverage was greatly reduced. The issue of political bias was not a notable feature in the contemporary criticism but rather the inaccuracies in that coverage. Philip Freneau did not have an independent stenographer for congressional speeches; his avowedly anti-administration National Gazette merely reprinted other newspapers’ accounts of the speeches. Thus a fair, systematic, and accurate accounting of the debates remained only as an ideal, and JM lived with this chronic problem through the rest of his congressional career.


Title: From James Madison to George Nicholas, 24 November 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Nicholas, George

Letter not found. 24 November 1791. Acknowledged in Nicholas to JM, 1 Feb. 1792. Apparently concerns pending legislation in Congress, including the excise bill and duties on spirits.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 25 November 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir
George Town Novr. 25th. 1791
I have now only time to acknowledge the receipt of yr. favor 25th. Instant, & to mention an incident which has given me great concern. Mr. D Carrolls of Duddington new house is pulld down or in a great degree so by Majr. L’Enfant’s directions without consulting the Commissioner—he first wrote to Mr Carroll, who went to Annapolis & obtaind an injungtion from Chancery—before his return the business was done. I hope this may not injure our application to the Assembly—we shall do what we can to prevent that opperation. Pray mention to Mr Jefferson that the Commsrs. fear that they will not have time to answer his letter of the 21st. until next Post. Majr. Ellicot desires us to say the same for him. Yrs Dr sr &ca.
Danl Carroll


Title: To James Madison from the Right Reverend James Madison, 25 November 1791
From: Madison, James (Reverend)
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir
Williamsburg Novr 25. 1791
Mr. Otway Bird wishes to obtain your assistance in some Business wh. he has with Congress, & has expressed a Desire that I should introduce him to you. Permit me then to assure you, that he is a Gentleman of real worth. We have few Citizens so distinguished for that disinterested Part, which he took in the late Contest, & none more, for a Conduct truely exemplary & respectable on every Account. Any good offices which you can render him, will be bestowed upon one, worthy of being ranked among the Number of your Friends.
My Wife, who always desires to be affy remembered, & myself, sometimes flatter ourselves, that you will take this Place in your Tour to or from the Northward. Nothing wd give us more Pleasure, for, be assured that no one is more sincerely your Affe. Friend than
J Madison
Be pleased to present my best Respects to Mr Jefferson.


Title: To James Madison from James Madison, Sr., 26 November 1791
From: Madison, James, Sr.
To: Madison, James

Letter not found. 26 November 1791. Acknowledged in JM to his father, 10 Dec. 1791. Concerns family business, including an order for “slitted” iron placed with Robert Dunbar.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 29 November 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
Novr. 29th. 1791
I wrote to you a few lines by yesterdays post. The affair of Mr Carrolls House gives us uneasiness on several accounts—as it must wound the feelings of the President, & may be of some injury.
The Major wrote to Mr Carroll in very polite terms to take down his House, being built on public ground. Mr Carroll for answer informd him that whenever it shoud be deemd an obstruction in consequence of buildings in that part of the City, it shou’d be taken down, & that he had written to the President on the Subject. I have not seen what passd, & say only what I hear.
Docr Stuart & myself were together on business abt 10 days past. It seems at that time Majr. L’Enfant told the Docr. that he had written to Mr Carroll as mentiond. If Mr Carroll did not agree, the Docr. desird of the Major that the Letters between Mr Carroll & him shou’d be layd before the Commsrs. at their next meeting which was to be on the friday following. Mr Stuart remain’d under a confidence that this wou’d be done. Major L’Enfant however in two or 3 days proceeded to demolish the House. Mr Carroll apprehending that he woud not wait had gone to Annapolis for advice in consequence of which he obtaind an injungtion in Chancery to stop proceeding with a Summons or Subpœna, for the Major to appear at Annapolis in Decr.
The Commsrs. on their meeting directed those acting under Majr. L’Enfants orders in his absence to desist untill The Commissioners had sent a Memorial to the Assembly, the Substance of which I show’d Mr Jefferson, & I believe yrself in G Town on yr. way to Virga. We fear this matter may give an unfavorable cast to our wishes. Indeed I have considerable anxiety in my mind for the result of that business. I hope for the best. I can only add now that I am Dr Sr yrs. Affy
Danl Carroll
The House is so far demolishd that I suppose it woud not be rebuilt as it stands, if not on public ground.
I can trust to yr. discretion for not being quoted wrong in any thing I write on this Subject.
Comps. to Mr Lee, I shall write to him by next post.


Title: Notes on the Influence of Extent of Territory on Government, [ca. December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. December 1791]
In estimating the tendency of Governme⟨n⟩ts to the increase or the relaxation of their powers particular causes distinct from their respective structures, but of powerful influence on their operation, seem to have been overlooked or little heeded by the great oracles of political wisdom. In the discussions produced by the establishment of and revisions of the new forms of Govt. in the U. S. and especially of their General Govt. some of these causes have engaged particular attention. (see the Federalist number 10). A Govt. of the same structure, would operate very differently within a very small territory

   as communications are small, difficulty of goverg. impartially great e.g. Corporations. In Rep St. Marino resort to ⟨alien⟩ magistrates.

 and a very extensive one: over a people homogeneous in their opinions & pursuits, and over a people consisting of adverse sects in religion, or attached to adverse theories of Govt: over a Society composed wholly of tenants of the soil aspiring and hoping for an enlargement of their possessions and a Society divided into a rich or independent class, and a more numerous class without property and hopeless of acquiring a permanent interest in maintaining its rights: over a nation secure agst. foreign enemies, and over one in the midst of formidable neighbours.
The influence of the extent of territory seems to have been least understood or attended to; and yet admits of the most satisfactory illustrations. Were the British Govt. limited in its exercise to the City of London and freed from all external dangers, is it not certain that the facility of popular combinations and the force of public opinion & feeling, would give the law to the monarch with all his splendid prerogatives and to the peers with all their titled wealth, and be able at any moment to transform the Govt. into a simple democracy. Reverse the supposition, and let the Island be enlarged to the dimensions of China, and it is equally evident, that the difficulty of concerting popular plans & movements, with ⟨the⟩ facility possessed by veiling its designs from distant eyes, and of turning the prejudices and interests real or imaginary of the parts agst each other, and the necessity of multiplying the prerogatives of the Ex., as a substitute for the minute & diversified legislation called for, would gradually enable the Executive branch of the Govt. to overwhelm the others, and convert the Govt. into an absolute monarchy.


Title: Appropriation for Operating the Federal Government, [2 December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[2 December 1791]

   In Committee of the Whole, Parker of the Virginia delegation requested an examination of the increased expenses, as the proposed appropriation was nearly double that of the previous year. A general debate followed.

Mr. Madison considered the present a good opportunity to determine how far the House could go into an examination of the accounts of public officers. It was true that the Representatives of the people were the guardians of the public money, and consequently it was their duty to satisfy themselves as far as possible of the sources from which money flowed into the treasury—how that money was applied—under what authority, and to enquire at different times what balance actually remained in the treasury. This he conceived could best be done by appointing a committee periodically to examine the books of the Treasurer, see what balance appeared on the face of them, and enquire whether that balance was really in the treasury.
He mentioned the practice of the former Congress to appoint 4 committees to inspect the operations of the four departments under them. These departments, he observed, however, now belonged more to the executive; but still as the representatives were by the constitution made the guardians of the public money, they had a right and it was their duty to inspect the operations of the treasury department. This right could not be conveniently exercised, in his opinion, by the whole body, but should by a detachment from it who would report the necessary information. This mode of proceeding was usual, he instanced the practice of the British House of Commons and of several state legislatures. Even if these enquiries procured no more information than was obtained by means of reports from the different officers of government, yet being made by the immediate representatives of the people they would give more satisfaction. So far as it was usual to ascertain the real balance in the treasury, so far these periodical committees would be of the first utility. A question arose whether the progress of the bill before the committee should be stopped to make those enquiries, or whether it should be suffered to go on, on the supposition that all was right. He wished the proper regulations on this subject settled, as standing regulations, and to be adopted before any idea of their necessity should arise from suspicious circumstances.


Title: From James Madison to James Madison, Sr., 3 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, James, Sr.

Hond Sir
Philada. Decr. 3. 1791
The last letter I recd. from you was of Novr. 12. I had previously informed you that your certificates had been funded by Messr. Ashton & Wister. They are now in my hands, with interest due on them from Jany. last, which cannot be drawn without a power of attorney to me for the purpose. My brother William can procure you blank powers at Richmond. It will be proper in filling up the blank to provide for the receipt of interest at the end of the running quarter, by inserting “due or growing due.” If you wish the certificates to be sold a power must be sent for that purpose also. The articles procured here in Sepr. for you, were shipped Novr. 5. in the Sloop Clara, Capt: Joshua McWilliams. His receipt is in the hands of the Shipper here. I hope that both these & the articles last shipped have before this got safe to hand. Since the last shipment the price of Sugar has fallen a few shillings in consequence of unexpected arrivals. If you should chuse to part with any of the quantity sent you, & trust to a future supply on better terms, you will probably be able to do it. Mr. Leiper has not been able to sell your Tobo. & the price has fallen. He could not now get more than 26/. but I am not without hopes that 28/ or 30/. at least will by some means or other be made out. As soon as I get a statement of the whole from him, I will forward it with the acct. of the articles procured for you & brother A. which I have not time now to make out. I have got the Trinket for Fanny and mean to send it to Richmond to brother William, by a gentleman who will set out in 8 or 10 days. No report has yet been made on Mr. Webbs case, & from the mass of previous references not yet reported on, I consider the time he is to wait for a decision as at a very considerable distance, perhaps beyond the present Session.
The apportionment of Reps. is Still with the Senate, where attempts are made to alter the simple ratio of 1 for 30,000. in favor of some calculations that will throw the loss of fractions differently on the States. What the event will be I can not say. A letter from brother W. affords me the pleasure of hearing that my mother is as well as usual. Yr. Affe. son
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Hardin Burnley, 3 December 1791
From: Burnley, Hardin
To: Madison, James

Dr Sir
Richmond Decr. 3d. 1791.
I have to apologize to you for not answering sooner the enquiries which you requested me to make before you left Virginia. I have deferred my answer ’till this time that I might be able to give satisfactory information on the subject of your enquiries. On application to Col: Harvie which I made immediately after the receipt of your favor I coud obtain no further information than this, that warrants for 15000 Acres of land had issued to Baron Stuben & had been delivered to Genl. Weedon, that no plat or survey on these warrants had been returned to the register’s office, & that it was the uniform practice with the continental surveyor, to keep them in his hands ’till the fees of office were paid. I have referred to the act of assembly which made the grant to the Baron & find that there is no exemption from the payment of the ordinary fees, but that the grant was made to him on the same terms with other public donations of land. This information was so incompleat that I thought it most proper to postpone any communication on the subject ’till the arrival of the members of assembly from Kentucky. By them I was informed that Majr. Craughn from the western country woud soon be in Richmond & probably wd. be able to give satisfactory information. Majr. Craughn has been here & as I am informed by Col: Edwd. Carrington (for I was at that time so unwell as to be unable to apply to him in person) had in his possession several surveys which had been made for the Baron. He left this place a few days ago for Philadelphia & I must beg leave to refer you to him for further particulars.
The federal court is now in session at this place & have had before them for several days the subject of British debts. The pleadings have been so conducted as to bring the infraction of the treaty of peace between G. Britain & America before the court, & will induce the necessity of deciding first whether that subject is within the cognizance of the court & next whether a breach of treaty on one side will release individuals on the other from obligations which the treaty wd. otherwise impose. In the case now before the court it appears that a partial payment has been made into the loan office under the act of 79. and consequently this cause will produce an entire decision on the subject, both as it may respect the efficacy of those payments & also as it may relate to those cases in which no such step has been taken. On the first of these points the general opinion out of doors is much in favor of the Defendt. on the other a great contrariety prevails. I have the honor to be with the highest esteem Dr Sir yr. Most Obt Servt
Hardin Burnley


Title: To James Madison from William Madison, 3 December 1791
From: Madison, William
To: Madison, James

D: Sir
Richmond Decr 3 1791
The arguments on the subjects of the British debts are at length concluded and it is expected the Court will decide tomorrow. Judge Blair docs not set in the Cause. The Bill for reforming the inferior Courts is still before the House it has undergone several alteration & I apprehend will finally be rejected for the regulation will effect a great number of those who are to determine its fate. A Bill has been presented subjecting Lands to the payment of Debts hereafter contracted, the second reading was opposed by Mr Clark and a few others who in debate shewed they had never attended to the Bill, however I beleive the result will be that some few amendments be made & then published for the consideration of the People. I have written to Culpeper for Freneau’s subscr[i]ption paper which shall be forwarded to Philadelphia as soon as it comes to hand. I wish to suggest to you the renewal of a correspondence with Col Henry I am authorised, by a particular and intimate acquaintance of his, to say that such an intercourse will not only be extreemly acceptable but its decline is a subject of regret to Col Henry and his Lady. For my part I do not see any impropriety but on the other hand great advantage probally resulting from the communication as it is in his power to give you more information of the disposition of the different parts of the State than perhaps any other Man in it. I wish to know your sentiments on the subject and if you do not see any greater obstacle than I do I hope you will gratify the old gentleman. I remain yours Affectionately
Wm Madison


Title: For the National Gazette, 3 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

Philadelphia, Dec. 3. [1791]
Consolidation.
Much has been said, and not without reason, against a consolidation of the States into one government. Omitting lesser objections, two consequences would probably flow from such a change in our political system, which justify the cautions used against it. First, it would be impossible to avoid the dilemma, of either relinquishing the present energy and responsibility of a single executive magistrate, for some plural substitute, which by dividing so great a trust might lessen the danger of it; or suffering so great an accumulation of powers in the hands of that officer, as might by degrees transform him into a monarch. The incompetency of one Legislature to regulate all the various objects belonging to the local governments, would evidently force a transfer of many of them to the executive department; whilst the encreasing splendour and number of its prerogatives supplied by this source, might prove excitements to ambition too powerful for a sober execution of the elective plan, and consequently strengthen the pretexts for an hereditary designation of the magistrate. Second, were the state governments abolished, the same space of country that would produce an undue growth of the executive power, would prevent that controul on the Legislative body, which is essential to a faithful discharge of its trust, neither the voice nor the sense of ten or twenty millions of people, spread through so many latitudes as are comprehended within the United States, could ever be combined or called into effect, if deprived of those local organs, through which both can now be conveyed. In such a state of things, the impossibility of acting together, might be succeeded by the inefficacy of partial expressions of the public mind, and this at length, by a universal silence and insensibility, leaving the whole government to that self directed course, which, it must be owned, is the natural propensity of every government.
But if a consolidation of the states into one government be an event so justly to be avoided, it is not less to be desired, on the other hand, that a consolidation should prevail in their interests and affections; and this too, as it fortunately happens, for the very reasons, among others, which lie against a governmental consolidation. For, in the first place, in proportion as uniformity is found to prevail in the interests and sentiments of the several states, will be the practicability of accommodating Legislative regulations to them, and thereby of withholding new and dangerous prerogatives from the executive. Again, the greater the mutual confidence and affection of all parts of the Union, the more likely they will be to concur amicably, or to differ with moderation, in the elective designation of the chief magistrate; and by such examples, to guard and adorn the vital principle of our republican constitution. Lastly, the less the supposed difference of interests, and the greater the concord and confidence throughout the great body of the people, the more readily must they sympathize with each other, the more seasonably can they interpose a common manifestation of their sentiments, the more certainly will they take the alarm at usurpation or oppression, and the more effectually will they consolidate their defence of the public liberty.
Here then is a proper object presented, both to those who are most jealously attached to the separate authority reserved to the states, and to those who may be more inclined to contemplate the people of America in the light of one nation. Let the former continue to watch against every encroachment, which might lead to a gradual consolidation of the states into one government. Let the latter employ their utmost zeal, by eradicating local prejudices and mistaken rivalships, to consolidate the affairs of the states into one harmonious interest; and let it be the patriotic study of all, to maintain the various authorities established by our complicated system, each in its respective constitutional sphere; and to erect over the whole, one paramount Empire of reason, benevolence and brotherly affection.


Title: To James Madison from Alexander Spotswood, 4 December 1791
From: Spotswood, Alexander
To: Madison, James

Gentlemen—
Nottingham Virginia december 4th. 1791
Being Convinced in my own mind, that America, would, one day, or another; have a navy—and being Willing to do all in my power to assist in Maning of it—I did at an early period, enter my Second Son, John Augustine Spotswood, on Board of a Merchant ship—and next april, Compleats his regular Servitude, From a Cabbin boy up to Mate, in which Capacity he is now Acting—he is now in London; and will Return Sometime in March 1792—when he means to push his Fortune to the Indies, in some of the American Indiamen, and to remain in that Service; until he has an opportunity of offering his Service to his Country as a naval officer—Great pains has been Taken, (and it is with pleasure, that I am informed by all the Nautical Gentlemen who know him & say with Success) to perfect him in his Nautical Education, by the several men of abilities, Both here, and in Europe, that he has by my directions, put himself under, so Soon as the ship had discharged her cargo—at this time he is under the direction of that famous Teacher of Mathamaticks & Navigation (Mr John Hambleton Moore of London) and will remain with him until the Ship is ready to Sail—he wishes to get a Cheif Mates Birth—But does not desire it, without being first examined with rigidness—Being a Stranger to the owners, & Captains of ships, who trade in this line—I have to beg of you Gentlemen—to use your Influence in geting him the Birth he wants—& altho he is my son—I will venture to Say, you will never have cause to repent, in the extention of your Freindship towards him—I must here repeat to you, again, that he has not been Brought up a Gentleman-Sailor—but has Served regular—ruffed it as a Common Seaman four years—and has worked As hard as any corn field Negroe—I have heard much of a Capt. Truxton—who I am told goes out this next year, in an Indiaman, called the deleware—with this Gentleman I wish to get my Son—& if a cheif mates Birth cannot be had, he must put up with a 2d or 3d—your influence, & Intrest on this Occasion, will be an obligation ever Acknowledged by Gentlemen yr Mt Obt
Alexr Spotswood
My Son is 21. yrs. of age next June—he is a good Accomptant—an[d] a fine draftsman—


Title: To James Madison from Francis Corbin, 7 December 1791
From: Corbin, Francis
To: Madison, James

My Dear Sir
Richmond—Virga. Decr. 7th. 1791
I embrace the first oppy. to inform you that your Conjectures with respect to the motives of the Virga. assemy. for sending forward to Congress only One of the 12 Amendts. to the Consn. were well founded. So that your object—whether it was to save our federal Credit, or to promote our adoption of those Amendments—has been fully Accomplish’d.
The multiplicity of Local business before the House of Delegates, which you know is always of the most importunate kind, prevented me from bringing them forward sooner than yesterday; when, by a sort of Modest Gasconade, I prevailed upon our lower House to adopt them all, without a single Exception, and (Excepting One Nay) by an unanimous Vote. How they will fare in the Senate—I know not. But I am apprehensive that some impediments will be there thrown in the Way of a Complete Ratification. I am led to entertain some suspicions from the Conversation I had yesterday with Mr. Henry who favored me with his Company at Dinner.
However this Day he left Richmd. & I am in hopes that my fears and doubts upon the Subject will depart with him.
The British Debt business has Ended better than I Expected—with nothing more than a Delay of Legislative Matters for 6 Days! The judges have decided nothing!
Tomorrow we shall proceed to the arrangement of Congressional Districts. I do not wish to interfere at all—but I am afraid I shall be obliged to do it. Party Work runs higher than I ever knew it before upon any Legislative Arrangt. whatever. Much time will be spent in Disputation.
I wish it was over—for I mean to pay you a Visit as soon as the session Ends.
Inclosed you receive a rough hasty and ill worded Statement of facts relative to the Pennsylvanian Demands on Virga. You will be able however to collect the Substance out of the Chaos. I am puzzled in drawing a Report upon the Subject—so as to do justice to Virga. & to avoid disagreeable Imputations.
In order to suit the temper of the present Assembly, and to promote what I think right, I shall be obliged to refine a little in my Construction of the Consn. Whatever is finally agreed upon shall be immedy. commd. by Dear Sir with Sincere Regard Yrs. Mo faithfully
Francis Corbin


Title: Post Office and Post Roads, [7 December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[7 December 1791]

   In Committee of the Whole on 6 December Sedgwick had moved to delete from the post office bill specification of the post roads and instead to grant the president authority to designate them. Debate resumed on 7 December, when White and Livermore spoke against the motion.

Mr. Madison said that the arguments which are offered by the gentlemen who are in favor of the amendment, appear to be drawn rather from theory rather than any line of practice which had hitherto governed the house.
However difficult it may be to determine with precision the exact boundaries of the legislative and executive powers, he was of opinion that those arguments were not well founded, for they admit of such a construction as will lead to blending those powers so as to leave no line of separation whatever.
The greatest obstacle to the due exercise of the powers vested in the legislature by the bill, which has been mentioned, is the difficulty of accommodating the regulations to the various interests of the different parts of the Union—and this is said to be almost impracticable—but it may be remembered, that similar embarrassments appeared when the impost and tonnage bills were under consideration; on those subjects, the members were obliged to be governed, in a great degree, by mutual information and reciprocal confidence, in respect to the establishment and arrangements of the different ports of entry and clearance, and other objects—that was a business of much greater importance and difficulty than this; but it was accomplished.
The constitution has not only given the legislature the power of creating offices, but it expressly restrains the executive from appointing officers, except such as are provided for by law. As has been well observed by the gentleman from Delaware, the President is invested with the power of filling those offices—but does it follow that we are to delegate to him the power to create them?
The reference to the appointments and arrangements made by the executive, pursuant to the powers delegated to the executive by the excise law, cannot be considered as a parallel case; no similar exigency exists to justify a similar delegation. The danger of infringing on the powers of the executive, which has been suggested, and the caution to the house against touching on the appointment of officers, is a species of reasoning on the subject, which may be carried so far as to say that we ought not to make any appointments by law—and yet this has been done as in the instance of the appointment of the commissioners for purchasing in the public debt, all of whom were appointed by the act making provision for the reduction of the public debt.
Where is the necessity of departing from the principles of the constitution in respect to the post-office and post-roads, more than in all other cases? The subject is expressly committed to legislative determination by the constitution. If the second section of the bill requires amendment, it can be rectified when it comes before us; and with respect to future cases, should there be a necessity for additional post-roads, they can be provided for by supplementary laws—and therefore no reason on that account can be urged for delaying the provision proposed by the bill. He concluded by saying that there did not appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the house—and that if this should take place, it would be a violation of the Constitution.


Title: To James Madison from Reuben Lindsay, 9 December 1791
From: Lindsay, Reuben
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Richmond 9th. Decemr. 1791.
Your favor of the 10th. Novemr. I recd. some days ago—on my giving the two Mr. Dickensons notice of the contents, they came here & have disposed of their interest in the certificates to Mr. Robert Pollard of this place—And have granted Powers of Attorney to Mr. John Vaughan of Phila. his agent to Negotiate the business—To whom You will please deliver the Certificates.
The Mr. Dickensons Acknowledge themselves under great Obligations to you for the trouble you have taken in the business. I am respectfully Dear Sir Your Hble servt.
Rn. Lindsay


Title: From James Madison to James Madison, Sr., 10 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, James, Sr.

Hond Sir
Philada. Decr. 10. 1791.
Your favor of the 26 Ult: has just come to hand. I am glad you have put the commission for slitted Iron into the hands of Mr. Dunbar. He will probably be able to get it when to be had on better terms. I find there is some now advertised but there is no more conveyance by water for this season. I am sorry that this circumstance will put it out of my power to forward the article desired by Miss Baynton. Your wine must also be postponed till the Spring. The price of Tobo. has fallen here to 26/. Pa. Curry. I cannot therefore advise the sending yours unless of a quality to be taken by Leiper who I believe will still allow 35/. for what is really of the first quality. He has not yet been able to dispose of your last shipment; & delays till that is done, to make out an acct. of sales for the whole.
Inclosed is an acct. of the articles last sent. Those for Mrs. Mason are paid for at your expence. You are therefore to settle with her as you please. The Shoes being all packed up together I could not distinguish which were on your acct. & which on my brothers; and as his share seemed to be the greatest have charged the whole to him, leaving your share to be repaid him by you. To assist in separating them I inclose the measures with the memorandums endorsed. The trinket for Fanny goes by Mr. Brackenridge of Albemarle the bearer of this, to Richmond, from whence she will get it to Mr. Mason’s.
The Bill for apportioning Reps. has been returned by the Senate with an alteration, striking out 1 for 30,000, & inserting 33,000. It remains to be decided which of these ratios will be carried. The House of Reps. have not yet taken up the amendment from …


Title: Memorandum from George Turner, 10 December 1791 (Abstract)
From: Turner, George
To: Madison, James

Abstract. 10 December 1791. “Distances on the Wabash; with observations on its navigation.” The distances are “computed French Leagues.”


Title: From James Madison to Francis Corbin, ca. 10 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Corbin, Francis

Letter not found. Ca. 10 December 1791. Alluded to in Corbin to JM, 15 Dec. 1791. Informs Corbin that the Senate has amended the apportionment bill, lowering the ratio of representation from 1:30,000 to 1:33,000.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 12 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
George Town Decr. 12th. 1791
I send by this post the act of our Assembly past last Saturday entiteld [sic] an Act Concerning the Territory of Columbia—and the City of Washington. I refer you to it. The very great advantages of this Law will be strikeing. It gives some relief to my mind which has indeed been much oppressd by the disagreable business we have lately had on hand. I am sorry for the Chagrin which it must have given the President, at a time too when the Intelligence from the Westward had just come to hand.
I shall in my next mention some to whom Mr. Frenau is to send the National Gazett—& hope for something worth while soon.
Surely the Senate cannot expect yr. House will recede in the Bill on representation. What about Land Office, Post Roads & Militia. Yrs. affy.
D Carroll
I hope by next post to say more to you.


Title: To James Madison from David Owings and David Woods, 12 December 1791
From: Owings, David,Woods, David
To: Madison, James

Sir,
Albemarle County Decr. 12th 1791
Permit us (th’o Stranger[s]) to beg leave to trouble you, with a matter that there is no one but you Can do for us.
We were Soldierers in the late Continen⟨tal⟩ army—and never have had our Claims Settled and have laid the matter before the Assembly of this State—and they have Judged it reasonable. And sent the papers on to Congress—in order to have them paid but we are inform’d Congress refus’d to take the matter up—and sent them back again to the Assembly. The Assembly have resolv’d to Send them back again to Congress. Therefore we Entreat you when the papers Comes to hand again—to Examine our claims and present them Seperate from the other Claims and take the matter up in our behalf—and write us word what is their fate or if there is any other voughers wanting more than is Contain’d among the papers. And you will much oblige your most obt. And very Humble Sts.
David Owings &David Woods
NB. If you write to us please to direct the letter to mr. Richd. Bruce who manages the matter for us.

D O
D—W


Title: From James Madison to William Madison, 13 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Madison, William

Phila. Dec. 13. 91. “I have recd. yours of the 3d. instant, mentioning the conversation held with you by an intimate acquaintance of Col: Henry. Having never, in the midst of political contests indulged any personal ill-will to that gentleman, & at all times admired his eminent talents, I cannot be supposed insensible to any friendly sentiments he may have expressed towards me, or indisposed to give any proof of it which occasion might prompt. On the other hand having never been in the habit of a correspondence with him, an abrupt commencement of one, is not perhaps so proper a proof as you seem to have conceived. I do not well understand, what is meant by the words in your letter—‘but its decline (that is of intercourse) is a subject of regret to Col. Henry and his lady’—It cannot refer to any pre-existing intercourse for the reason just mentioned. If any letter has been written to which it is supposed an answer was declined (a construction extremely improbable) it is proper to be known, that no such letter has been recd. and for that reason only, not answered.”


Title: From James Madison to Baron von Steuben, 13 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To: Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, Baron von

Dear Baron
Philada. Decr. 13th. 1791.
I have not been neglectful of your commission, though I am so late in making report of my proceedings. Whilst I was in Virginia I laid a train for remitting to Col: Anderson the money lodged with me, and since my arrival here I have learned that it is gone to him by a safe hand. I also wrote to a friend in Richmond, desiring the proper steps to be taken there for obtaining patents. An answer was never obtained till two days ago, when I was informed that no satisfactory information concerning the surveys could there be had; and was referred for it to Majr. Croghan, who had passed through Richmond, during an indisposition of my correspondent, on his way to this place. I this morning had an interview, the first in my power, with Majr. Croghan. He had in his possession, the five surveys, each for one thousand acres, on which the sum remitted to Col: Anderson was due, and delivered them on me, on my giving him a receipt for them, and a memorandum, that the money had been sent to Col: Anderson. By a safe hand, who sets out tomorrow morning for Richmond, I have transmitted the surveys to Governour Lee, with a request that he will take out patents from the Land Office, and forward them to you through my hands, or any other channel that may be more direct. Should he make use of the first mode of conveyance, you shall hear from me as soon as the patents arrive. In the mean time I remain, with the sincerest & most affecte. esteem Yr. Obedt. servt
Js. Madison Jr.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 13 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,
George Town Decr. 13th. 91
I wrote a few lines lately confidentially. The following are under the same circumstances. You have heard I doubt not by our official letter that Major L’Enfant immediately on his return proceeded to finish the demolition of Mr. Carrolls House, our directions to the contrary notwithstanding. On our meeting he sent us a letter of which we have not yet taken any notice, excepting what has passd between him & Docr Stuart in conversation. There is a remark in that letter respecting myself which I must mention to you. After mentioning several matters in justification of his conduct he proceeds to say “that it was himself (Mr. D Carroll of Duddington) then if he thought himself wrongly us’d who ought to have requird the interference of yr. Board, but it was not my business to call yr. attention on that matter, beside I cou’d not have done it with any propriety, since on a former occasion when a foresight of the circumstances in which this House has been finally found to be, induc’d me to intimate my opinion of the propriety of using with it as I have done one of yr. Gentlemen Mr. D Carroll declared that if a question was put respecting this business for the Board to determine on he wou’d not then act as a Commissioner, & that there being at the Moment only two of you Gentlemen who coud have been calld together Mr. D Carroll not being consistently with his declaration to interfere in any manner in the business, one single Member of the Board cou’d not determine.”
I refer you to what I sent you respecting Majr. Ellicot. Soon after Majr L’Enfants return on some conversations takeing place respecting Mr. Carrolls House & hearing the idea mentiond by him, I observd that if that matter became a question I must be an evidence & not a Commissioner on the occasion. I considerd this matter in a very difft. point of view with the Major. I beleivd the public interest might be affected by the manner of conducting it, & doubted, not but that there wou’d be a full Board if brought to a decision before them. I shoud have requested the other Gentn. on that occasion to excuse me from acting from the peculiar circumstances I was under, but certainly shoud have acted if they had desird it. I have mention’d the Conversation Docr Stuart had with him, & the impression he was under in Consequence thereof. The observation made by the Major respecting myself is intended I suppose as a reason for his not applying to the Board. When the Commissioners found he had proceeded to act without authority from them, I shou’d have thought myself justly blamable if I had not joind in giveing a public testimony of disaprobation of the manner of proceeding more especially at that moment from circumstances which have been mentiond. But does not his subsequent Conduct after the act of the Commissioners render it needless to say [any]thing on that point?
Excuse me, my dear friend, for troubling you on this Subject. I will leave off. Yrs. affy
Danl Carroll


Title: To James Madison from Francis Corbin, 15 December 1791
From: Corbin, Francis
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Richmond Virga. Decr. 15th: 1791
I sieze the earliest moment to inform you that all the Amendments to the federal Constitution have at length pass’d the Senate.
The Bill for the arrangement of Districts lies upon our Table to be Engross’d: but your Information this Evening will render it necessary for us to new model the whole System. The Assembly have determined to rise on Saturday—but unless they make an unjustifiable Sacrifice of Duty to Inclination, I think, that determination must be rescinded.
There is nothing worth communicating to you of a Legislative nature, Except indeed it be the unanimous adoption of a Resolution which I proposed to congratulate the National Assembly of France on the Establishment of their New Constitution. I have drawn the Address or Letter and sincerely wish I had consulted with you upon the propriety of it a few Weeks ago. Such as it is however you shall have it by the next Post. I am Dr. Sir with Sincere Regard Yr. Mo: Ob. Set.
Francis Corbin


Title: To James Madison from Charles Carter, 16 December 1791
From: Carter, Charles
To: Madison, James

Dr Sr
Acadamy Decr 16th. 1791
Yours of the 4th I duly recieved, and am much pleased, at the acct of my Dr Boys situation, & that he pleases his master. From my last letter from the Atty, I feard there woud have been, some dificulty as to the time, of his continuance with Mr Hunter, but hope all obstacles are removd. Shoud any thing be yet unsetled, I hope your aid will not be wanting, to accomodate, the business. I have wrote to my Freind Mr R. and my Son fully on the occasion. The reverse of Fortune has compelled me, to turn my Sons, out to learn to get, an honest living, and I flatter myself, if they behave them selves well, they will not loose the esteem of their acquaintance, by being honest Machanicks. For I think a worthy Tradesman, a much more reputable character, then a wild dissipated Son of a Gentleman, without a fortune. With these Virginia swarms. The Defeat of our Army, must be a great shock, to Congress. But hope by their prudence we shall not be so much distressed, as at first sight, might have been expected. I fear if report says true, the Garrison of Fort Jefferson are lost. This will be a great addition to our misfortune. Our Assy it is said will rise on Saturday. But I fancey they will not, before the Kentuckians, take leave of them. Which must be the last of the month. So that I hope the districks will be laid out. Your Freind French Strother has pland, a district, for him self, and to get rid of you, as he intends to offer, for Congress. Culpepper, Spotsylvania, & Stafford, I hope he not succeed in his Election.
I think there are several things to be done, that woud be advantagious. We suffer greatly for want of small change. The very article of postage. We cant pay 6 a Bitt is always demanded, the postmaster pockets 1½ on every letter. Dry measures vary, in every County, our wheat is weighd and measured, if under 60 deducted, if above seldom allowd. Indeed the experienced purchaser can tell at sight, if tis his interest to weigh. All in my opinion shoud be sold by weight. This woud be a fair way of dealing, and stimulate the Farmers to bring clean Wheat to market. A Bankrupt Law is thought much benifit woud arise from. Our merchants and people at large, are much disapointed, that a Limb of the Bank, was not extended to Virginia. They are now endeavouring to establish a Virga Bank. In which tis the received opinion they’l succeed. After returning my sincere thanks for your great politeness, to my Dr Son, give me leave to conclude my self Yr Affe Freind and Much Obliged Hle St
Chs Carter


Title: To James Madison from Hubbard Taylor, 17 December 1791
From: Taylor, Hubbard
To: Madison, James

Dear Sir
Lexington 17th. Decr. 1791
Yours of the 23d. of November came this day to hand; and I thank you for the paper inclosed. The letter you wrote from Orange has not yet come to hand, and fear from the long delay that it will totally miscarry for which I shall be extreamly sorry. Nothing meterial has tra[n]spired here lately excerpt the late unluckey affair of Genl. St Clairs defeat, wherein it is said he lost between 900 & 1000 Men, Killed. The Election for the Members to Convention is now on hand in this place, the people were pleased to nominate me among the rest & its probable I shall succeed the others are more dubtfull. I have inclosed you a list of the members from the Counties where the elections are over and flatter my self I shall be able at a future day to acquaint you of Colo. Nicholas’s election as it is a matter of the utmost importance to this district: For fear the letter above mentiond should not come to hand, if your leisure will [a]dmit—shall be glad to have one simular there to. Great doubt seems to prevail respecting two Houses in the Leguslature & elections of all Kinds wheather they shall not be solely in the hands of the people or partly so. I intend to write you again in a few weaks when I shall be entirely at leisure and then shall be more full. I cannot omit my great full acknowledgements for your very particular attention to my letters, by which you confer a lasting obligation. Our friends in generall here are all as well as usual, and beleave me to be with great regard Dear Sir Yr: Affe. Hbl: sert:
H. Taylor


Title: Notes for the National Gazette Essays, [ca. 19 December 1791–3 March 1792]
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 19 December 1791–3 March 1792]

Influence of the size of a nation on Government
page. 1.
________ of external danger on Government
10
________ of the stage of Society on Government
16
________ of Public opinion on Government
22
________ of Education on Government
30
________ of Religion on Government
35
________ of Domestic slavery on Government
40
________ of Dependent dominions on Government
46

Checks devised in democracies marking self-distrust
49
True reasons for keeping the great departments of power separate
55
Federal Governments
65
Government of United States
75
Best distribution of people in Republic
82
(1)
Influence of the size of a nation on Government
Plato limits the number of Citizens to five thousand and forty. Montesquieu tom. II c. 16, 17
L’experience a fait voir que le nombre des hommes en etat de porter les armes, ne doit être ici (dans une republique sagement reglee) ni fort au dessus, ni fort au dessous de vingt mille. Anach: vol. [II] p: 117 & citation.

See Convention Notes—letter to Mr. Jefferson on a federal negative on State laws Federalists No. X et alia:—Case of popular confiscation in Switzerland, mentioned in Encyclop: Method: Plunder of rich Citizens by democracy of Megara. Anacharsis vol. 3. p. 409 instances of proscriptions of rich in Antient & Italian Republics—Exiles so numerous as to return sometimes and seize the Govt. Aristotle Repub. book 5. cap. 5. Anacharsis vol. 5 page 268

(a) All overgrown empires have betrayed first tyranny—then impotency, as the Assyrian—Persian—Macedonian—Roman—that of Charlemagne—

In order to temper an aristocracy into a mild Govt. the state should like those of Switzerland be so small as to admit a ready combination of the people agst. oppression, as in order to temper a Republic, it ought to be so large, as to impede a combination of the people for the purpose of oppression. See p. 10. See Anacharsis as to oligarchy of Rhodes—vol. 6 p. 240.

For the extent of antient republics & confederacies—see Encyclopae. Ant: Geograp: Anacharsis with the Maps—

The best provision for a stable and free Govt. is not a balance in the powers of the Govt. tho’ that is not to be neglected, but an equilibrium in the interests & passions of the Society itself, which can not be attained in a small Society. Much has been said on the first. The last deserves a thorough investigation. (see p 2. (a))

The larger a community, the more respectable the whole & the less the share of importance felt by each member—the more submissive consequently each individual to the general will.

Whatever facilitates a general intercommunication of sentiments & ideas among the body of the people, as a free press, compact situation, good roads, interior commerce &c. is equivalent to a contraction of the orbit within wch. the Govt. is to act: and may favor liberty in a nation too large for free Govt. or hasten its violent death in one too small & so vice versa. Could the people of G. Britain be contracted into one of its Counties it would be scarcely possible for the monarchical branch to support itself agst. the popular branch. Could they be spread over 10 times the present area, or the communion of sentiments be obstructed by an abolition of the press &c. the reverse would happen. The extent of France & heterogeneousness of its component provinces have been among the principal causes of the monarchical usurpations. See Robertson’s Chs. V. notes.

The Roman Empire was more than 2,000 miles from N. to S. & [more] than 3000 from W to E. Its population about 120,000[,]000 including slaves (who amounted to about one half)—this more than the population of all Europe. See Gibbon

In monarchies, the danger is twofold. 1. that the eyes of a good prince cannot see all that he ought to know—2 that the hands of a bad one cannot be sufficiently tied by the fear of easy combinations against him. Both these considerations prove, contrary to the received opinion, that a very great extent of Country is not suited to that form of Government: In a Representative Republic the eyes of the Government see every thing; and the danger arising cheifly from easy combinations under the impulse of misinformed or corrupt passions—it appears on the other hand, equally agst. the received opinion, that such a form of Govt. may be extended over a great Country, and cannot succeed in a small one.
The influence of this circumstance, is strongly enforced by attending to the extremes of size. Among 3 men in a Wilderness, two would never obey one—nor perhaps the one escape the oppression of the two should any real or fancied interest unite them agst. him. On the other hand, were all Europe formed into one society, the mighty mass, being unable to govern themselves wd be necessaryly governed by a few or one, and being also incapable of uniting agst. oppression, would be sure to be oppressed by their Governors.
(2
(a) see p 1.—(Natural divisions exist in all political societies, which should be made mutual checks on each other. But it does not follow that artificial distinctions, as kings & nobles, should be created, and then formed into checks and balances with each other & with the people. This reasoning in politics, would be as inadmissible as it would be in Ethics, to say that new vices ought be promoted that they may control each other, because this use may be made of existing vices—avarice and vanity—cowardice & malice—&c)

The danger of oppression to the minority from unjust combinations of the majority, and which is the disease of small States is illustrated by various instances.
By the case of Debtors & Creditors in Rome & Athens
By that of the Patricians & Plebeians & the Rich & poor, in the latter, in Florence & the other free Cities of Italy
By the Spartans & Helots
By the case of Black slaves in Modern times
By religious persecutions every where
By the tender & other unjust laws in U. S.
By the law of St: Marino which requires its Judges to be foreigners
By the law de medietate in England
By the law agst. admitting a member of Corporation to be on a jury where the Corporation is party.
The danger is still greater where geographical distinctions enforce the others, as appears

  By the conduct
  of Carthage towards Sicily &c—

  of Athens towards her colonies

  of Genoa towards Corsica

  of Holland towards her colonies

  of Rome towards her provinces

  of G. B towards Ireland

  of do towards America.

(10
Influence of external danger on Government
Fear & hatred of other nations, the greatest cement, always appealed to by rulers when they wish to impose burdens or carry unpopular points. Examples in Engd. & France abound. See Federalist No. VII & XXX. Roman Senate quelled popular commotions by exciting foreign wars—

See (a) under the preceding head page 1. Extensive Governments have fallen to pieces not more from the inadequacy of Govt. to the Extent—than from the security agst. external danger.

Quere; if an insulated people be found on the Globe united under one Govt.? However small the number, they must be divided into hostile nations, that mutual fear may support Govt. in each.

In small states external danger tends to aristocracy (see p. 1.) a concentration of the Public will being necessary, and that degree of concentration being sufficient. The many can not govern on acct. of the emergencies which require the constant vigilance & provisions of a few, but on account of the smallness of the Society the facility of the combinations of the many moderates the power of the few, & the few themselves oppose the usurpation of a single tyrant. In Thessaly, intersected by Mountainous barriers into a number of small cantons, the Governments were for the most part oligarchical—see Thucidides 1. 4. c. 78—see Anachar. v. 3. p. 352.

For the effect of the situation of Crete on its internal divisions—see Id. v. 6. p. 257.

Sicily, tho a part of a moderate Kingdom, always when free divided into separate & hostile communities see Thucidides Livy &c
(16
Influence of Stage of Society on Government.
(22
Influence of public opinion on Government
Public opinion, sets bounds to every Government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.
As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the Government, so there are cases, where, not being fixed, it may be influenced by the Government. This distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the Government to the sentiments of the people.
If the British Government be as excellent as represented, it is less because so in itself, than because so in the public opinion. Its boasted equilibrium is preserved more by this cause, than by the distribution of its powers. If the nation favored absolute monarchy its representatives would at once surrender the public liberty; if republicanism, the monarchical branch could not maintain its independence. If the public opinion was neutral only, the ambition of the House of Commons would easily strip the Prince of his prerogatives. The provision to be made at every accession, for the Civil list, shews at once his dependence on the popular branch, and its dependence on the public opinion. Were the establishment to be from year to year instead of for life, the Monarchy would dwindle into a name. But the nation would in such a case take the side of the King agst. its own representatives. Those who ascribe the character of the British Government to the form alone in which its powers are distributed & counterpoised, forget the changes which its form has undergone. Compare its primitive with its present form; a King at the head of 7 or 8 hundred Barons sitting together in their own right, or (admitting another Hypothesis) some in their own right, others as representatives of a few lesser barons, but still sitting together as one House—& the Judges holding during the pleasure of the King; with a King at the head of a Legislature consisting of two Houses, each jealous of the other, one sitting in their own right, the other representing the body of the people, and the Judges forming a distinct & independent department; in the first case the Judiciary united with the Executive, the legislature not divided into separate branches; in the latter, the Legislative Executive & Judiciary distinct, and the Legislature itself divided into rival parts. What can be more contrasted than these forms? If the one be self-balanced, the other could have no balance at all. Yet the one subsisted as well as the other, and lasted longer than the other has yet been tried. It was supported by the opinion of the times, like many of the intermediate forms thro’ which, the B. Govt. has passed, and as the future forms will probably be supported, thro’ which changes of circumstances and opinions are yet to conduct it.
Not only Theoretical writers as Plato (Republic), but more practical ones as Swift &c. remark that the natural rotation in Government is from the abuses of Monarchy to Aristocracy, from the oppression of aristocracy to democracy, and from the licentiousness of Democracy back to Monarchy. Many examples, as well as the reason of the King, shew this tendency. Yet it appears from Aristotle that under the influence of public opinion, the rotation was very different in some of the States of Greece. See Arist: Repub. b. 5 c. 12.
In proportion as Government is influenced by opinion, must it be so by whatever influences opinion. This decides the question concerning a bill of rights, which acquires efficacy as time sanctifies and incorporates it with the public sentiment.
(30
Influence of Education on Government
(35
Influence of Religion on Government.
For the cave of Jupiter in Crete where Minos, Epimenides & Pythagoras pretended to have recd. a divine sanction to their laws & see Anacharsis v. 6. p. 248
(40
Influence of domestic slavery on Government

See proportion of slaves in Grecian & Roman Republics—

See private life of Romans by ——
do. of Athenians & Lacedemonians in Anacharsis

In Arcadia 300,000 slaves. Anacharsis—vol. 4. p. 298.

In proportion as slavery prevails in a State, the Government, however democratic in name, must be aristocratic in fact. The power lies in a part instead of the whole; in the hands of property, not of numbers. All the antient popular governments, were for this reason aristocracies. The majority were slaves. Of the residue a part were in the Country and did not attend the assemblies, a part were poor and tho in the city, could not spare the time to attend. The power, was exercised for the most part by the rich and easy. Aristotle (de rep: lib. 3. cap. 1 & 4.) defines a Citizen or member of the sovereignty, to be one who is sufficiently free from all private cares, to devote himself exclusively to the service of his Country—See also Anacharsis, vol. 5. p. 280/1. The Southern States of America, are on the same principle aristocracies. In Virginia the aristocratic character is increased by the rule of suffrage, which requiring a freehold in land excludes nearly half the free inhabitants, and must exclude a greater proportion, as the population increases. At present the slaves and non-freeholders amount to nearly ¾ of the State. The power is therefore in about ¼. Were the slaves freed and the right of suffrage extended to all, the operation of the Government might be very different. The slavery of the Southern States, throws the power much more into the hands of property, than in the Northern States. Hence the people of property in the former are much more contented with their establishd. Governments, than the people of property in the latter.
(46
Influence of dependent dominions on Government
Mais c’est principalement aux victoires que les Atheniens remporterent contre les Perses, qu’on doit attribuer la ruine de l’ancienne Constitution. (Arist: de rep: 1. 2. cap. 12.) Apres la bataille de Platée, on ordonna que le citoyens de derniers classes exclus par Solon de principales magistratures, auroient desormais le droit d’y parvenir. Le sage Aristides, qui presenta ce decret (Plut: in aris) donna le plus funeste des examples a ceux qui lui succederent dans le commandement. Il leur fallut d’abord flatter la multitude, et ensuite ramper devant elle. Anarch: vol. 1. p. 147/8

See Hist: of Grecian Colonies—Roman Provinces—dependencies in E. & W. Indies—

The principal part of the Revenues of Athens consisted of tributes from her dependencies Anacharsis Vol. 4. p. 429.

Dependent Colonies are to the superior State, not in the relation of Children and parent according to the common language, but in that of slaves and Master; and have the same effect with slavery on the character of the Superior. They cherish pride, luxury, and vanity. They make the labor of one part tributary to the enjoyment of another.

Dependent territories are of two kinds. 1 those which yield to the superior State at once a monopoly of their useful productions, and a market for its superfluities. These may excite & employ industry and may be a source of riches. The West-Indies are an example. 2. those which, tho yielding in some degree a monopoly and a market, are lucrative by the wealth which they administer to individuals and which is transported to the Superior State. Their wealth resembles that drawn not from industry, but from mines, and may produce like consequences. The East Indies are an example.

The influence of the E. & W. Indies & other dependencies belonging to G. Britain, on the side of the Crown, is an adventitious circumstance, which like the National debt, weighs much.

See “History of the Colonization of the free States of Antiquity applied to the present Contest between G. B. & her American Colonies. With reflections concerning the future settlement of these Colonies.[”] London, printed for T. Cadell on the Strand. M.DCC.LXXVII.
See Remarks on an essay entitled “The History &c &c—and her Amr. Colonies.” By John Symonds. LLD. Professor of Mod. Hist: in the Univy. of Cambridge. London: printed by J. Nichols, successor to W. Bowyer; and sold by T. Payne, Mewsgate; W. Owen[,] Temple. Bar P. Elmsly. Strand; T. Evans Pat: Nost: row; J. Woodyer Cambridg & J. Fletcher Oxford. 1778

The money with which Pericles decorated Athens, was raised by Aristides on the confederates of Athens for common defence, and on pretext of danger at Delos which was the common depository, removed to Athens, where it was soon regarded as the tribute of inferiors instead of the common property of associates, and applied by Pericles accordingly. See Remarks by J. Symonds above, & authors there cited. p. 42.
(49
Checks devised in Democracies marking self-distrust
In Athens all laws were to be agreed to in the Senate before they could be deliberated in the popular assembly.
The first speakers in the assembly were to be 50 years of age at least. Æschines in Timarc. Anachar: Vol. 1. p. 106
No orator was allowed to engage in public affairs, until he had undergone an examination relative to his character, and every Citizen was permitted to prosecute an Orator who had found means to withold the irregularity of his manners from the severity of this examination. Æschin: ibid et Suid in ρὴτορ
The Areopagus for life &c.

With The prayers at the commencement of public deliberations were mingled frightful imprecations agst. the Orator who shd. have recd presents, to deceive the people, or the Senate, or the Tribunal of the Heliastes. See Anacharsis—& the citations II, p. 281. For other cautions agst. the undue influence of Orators—see id: p. 287.

Ostracism, Petalism, Dictatorship, punishment of unsuccessful propositions of new laws.

In Athens death was decreed by the people to the Orator who should propose to apply to the public defence, the money destined to pay for the seats of the poor at the Spectacles. Anacharsis vol. 4. p. 430/1

In the Republic of the Italian Locris, it was ordained by Zaleucus, that whoever proposed a new law, or repeal or alteration of an old one, should do it with a rope about his neck, that if unsuccessful, he might be immediately executed.

   What ignorance & susceptibility of delusion in the people of Locris, is ⟨impl⟩ied by such a precaution! J. M.

 Ubbo Emmius, tom 3. p. 353
The Augurs in Rome—College of Heralds with Negative on war & peace, instituted by Numa. See Moyle on Rom: Govt. p. 46—& Dionysius Halycarnassus.
(55
True reasons for keeping great departments of power separate
(65
Federal Governments
See Federalist Vol. 1. pg—
The Governments of the cantons of Greece were federal—composed of the Govts. of Towns, of which the principal usually gave law to the rest—see Anacharsis. vol. 4. p. 345

For the Beotian Confederacy—see Anacharsis, vol. 3. p. 309.
(a) For the Amphyctionic do. see do. vol. 3. 336 & seq.

For the confederacies of Thessaly see Anacharsis vol. p. 352 & seq.

For Union of Calmar see—

For Saxon Heptarchy see—

For confederation of 4 N. England Colonies—see Hazard collection of papers—

For the Etolian Confederacy see Anacharsis vol. 3 p. 405.

For Acarnanian do. see do. p. 404.

For Achæan do.—see do. p. 463—

For the Confederacy of Elis see do. p. 470. Of Messenia do.

(a) neither Thucidides nor Xenophon’s continuation of him make the least allusion to the Amphyctionic Council, altho’ Athens & Lacedemon were under its Authority. That the Pelopponesian War, so distinguished for its duration its belligerent parties and its consequences, should have been carried on without any interference or mention of that institution is a remarkable proof of its insignificancy.

For the Arcadian Confederacy see Anacharsis vol. 4. page 298

For the Argive do. see Strabo lib. 8—Anacharsis vol. 4. p. 346.

For the three confederacies of the Asiatic Greeks—see Id. vol. 6. p. 203/4—209/10

For the Syncretism of Crete. Id. vol. 6. p. 259.

For the Albany project see Franklin’s works also Pownal’s Colonies

For Hanseatic League, see

For the Germanic Belgic & Achean see Meerman’s prize discourse belongg. to Mr. Jefferson.
(75
Government of United States—
See Federalist, passim—particularly No. 51.

Here is the most characteristic trait in the Govt. of the U. S.—The powers surrendered by the people of America, are divided into two parts, one for the State, the other for the Genl. Govt. & each subdivided into Legislative Ex. & Judiciary. As in a single Govt. the Legislative Ex. & Judicy. ought to be kept separate by defensive armour for each. So ought the two Govts. federal & State. If this should be found practicable, it must be a happy discovery for mankind. As far as the security agst. power lies in a division of it, the security must be increased, by a system which doubles the number of parts. It must be confessed that the difficulty of dividing power between two Govts. is greater than between the several departmts. of the same Govt. as well as the difficulty of maintaining the division. It is more easy to divide from each other the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers, wch. are distinct in their nature, than to divide the legislative powers wch. are of the same nature, from each other—as well as do the same with the Executive & Judiciary powers.
(82
Best distribution of people in Republic
A perfect Theory on this subject would be useful, not because it could be reduced to practice by any plan of legislation; but because it would be a model to which successive spontaneous improvements might approximate the condition of the Society.
That is the best distribution, which would most favor health, virtue, intelligence, and competency of fortune in the Citizens, and best secure the Republic agst. external dangers.
The life of the husbandman is most, that of the seaman least favorable to the comfort & happiness of the individual.
Among manufacturers, those employed on necessaries, are first to be secured. The remaining classes to be decided on by the preceding criteria.
The class of literati is not less necessary than any other. They are the cultivators of the human mind—the manufacturers of useful knowledge—the agents of the commerce of ideas—the censors of public manners—the teachers of the arts of life and the means of happiness.
See with the mark (J. M.) Freneau’s National Gazette


Title: For the National Gazette, [ca. 19 December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[ca. 19 December 1791]

Public Opinion.
Public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.
As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the government; so there are cases, where not being fixed, it may be influenced by the government. This distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the government to the sentiments of the people.
In proportion as government is influenced by opinion, it must be so, by whatever influences opinion. This decides the question concerning a Constitutional Declaration of Rights, which requires an influence on government, by becoming a part of the public opinion.
The larger a country, the less easy for its real opinion to be ascertained, and the less difficult to be counterfeited; when ascertained or presumed, the more respectable it is in the eyes of individuals. This is favorable to the authority of government. For the same reason, the more extensive a country, the more insignificant is each individual in his own eyes. This may be unfavorable to liberty.
Whatever facilitates a general intercourse of sentiments, as good roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and particularly a circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people, and Representatives going from, and returning among every part of them, is equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and is favorable to liberty, where these may be too extensive.


Title: Proportional Representation, [19 December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[19 December 1791]

   On 9 December 1791 the Senate approved the apportionment bill but amended the ratio of representation from 1:30,000 to 1:33,000. When the House considered the Senate amendments on 12 December, “Mr. Madison observed, that the idea of diminishing the fractional parts appears to be the only reason for the alteration proposed by the Senate. The aggregate of these fractions only has been taken into consideration; but, said he, if the fractions of any particular States will be augmented by the amendment, which would be the case, he conceived that the argument amounted to no good reason for agreeing to it; and this, he said, would evidently be the fact” (Gazette of the U.S., 21 Dec. 1791). He voted with the majority when the House on 14 December rejected the amendment, but it was upheld the following day by the casting vote of John Adams as president of the Senate. The amendment not only reduced the ratio of representation but also cut the Virginia delegation from twenty-one to nineteen, thus rekindling old large state-small state and sectional disputes. In debate on 19 December Ames and Dayton defended the amendment, and Venable opposed it.

Mr. Madison, after making a few prefatory observations, said he felt himself impelled to take some notice of the arguments that had been used this day on the subject before the House: he would not, however, attempt any reply to the gentleman from New Jersey, nor pretend to follow him in his flights of imagination respecting the New-Jerusalem or the umpirage of Pennsylvania, but leave it to those to whom such observations might have been addressed to draw their own conclusions. He was sorry that it almost always happened, whenever any question of general policy and advantage to the union was before the House, when gentlemen found themselves at a loss for general arguments, they commonly resorted to local views; and at all times as well as the present, when there was most occasion for members to act with the utmost coolness, when their judgments ought to be the least biassed—it was to be regretted that at those times they suffered their feelings, passions and prejudices to govern their reason. Thus it is that the most important points are embarrassed, the northern and southern interests are held up, every local circumstance comes into view, and every idea of liberality and candor is banished.
The gentleman from New York, (Mr. Lawrance) when he introduced this subject at the commencement of the present session, did it on the most generous plan, and disavowed every principle of calculation so much, that he then declared he had not so much as made a single calculation of the different fractions which have since been introduced into the debate—his only object was to fix a rule on general principles, agreeably to the constitution and to the preservation of the rights of the people; and this idea was approved by two of the gentlemen from New-Jersey, who have since altered their opinions, although they then had no objections but as to the expence; the idea of fractions was not then contended for, but has since become the very essence of the opposition; and we are called on to violate the constitution by adopting a measure that will give representatives for those separate and distinct fractions in the respective states; and afterwards are told it is not to the fractional numbers in the states that they refer, but to the aggregate of the fractions in the United States. If this reasoning is good, why do the gentlemen stop at this boundary of a representation by states? Why not proceed to erect the whole of the United States into one district, without any division, in order to prevent the inequality they conceive to exist in respect to individual states?
He would not encroach upon the time of the House by protracting the debate, which had already swelled to an immoderate extent. Upon the whole, he said that this was a great question, wherein attention should be paid to the people, and a strict eye kept towards the public good, divested of prejudice; but he had heard with pain how much had been said to divert the House by an attention to fractions, from the true object of general welfare—yet he hoped that the government would be equally administered—that none of those predictions or threats thrown out in the course of the debate, that no mutilation of the union, would take place; but on the contrary, that harmony would guide the decision of this question, free from every local consideration.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 20 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,Decr. 20th. 91
I mentiond in my last of the 15th or 16th Instant of which please to acknowledge the receipt, that You woud hear from C. Carroll of Cn. when he reachd Pha some particulars on the passage of the Law “Concerning the Territory of Columbia &ca.[”] Since then I have seen Govr Lee, & it gave me great concern to hear from him that Mr Carroll had doubts of joining Congress this session. I immediately wrote him that public and private considerations demanded his attendance—that if there was no appearance of any thing material to call on him, yet his absence woud lay him open to severe Censure. That private considerations however weigh but a feather compar’d to public. That his absence might occasion attempts to be made, which his presence might check, or be very instrumental in defeating. I have reminded him how deeply the peace & wellfare of the Union is concernd, how much individuals have at Stake, some of whom certainly relied on the Support of those who were active in bringing about this great event, & if any thing disastrous was to happen wou’d be ruind—& to consider what wou’d be his own reflections hereafter. I have desird him not to think these apprehensions entirely chimerical & have mentiond what you write of the intended Motion, & that we have otherways heard that it was to be made by a Member of New York.
I have opend this Subject to you because I hope you correspond with Mr Carroll, & that you will write to him if occasion. You are Sufficiently intimate—I know the weight of Yr. opinion with him.
I have just recd. a letter from Mr Johnson returnd from the federal Court in Virginia; He will be with us after Xmass when I suppose we shall take a view of past transactions, & consider the ensuing—it is not improbable that our Ideas will Coincide with yrs. in the Sales upon a large scale, & under Covenants for improvements.
Acquainted with the World as we are we must expect Cavilling at the best intentiond Conduct—& it is probable the Commsrs will meet with their share. If I satisfye my own mind, & the person from whom I receive the Trust, other reproach will at most give me but short disquiet. Adieu—My dear friend for the present. Yrs Affy
Danl Carroll
PS. Do you think it probable the motion mentiond will be made?
If your house do not adhere on the occasion mentiond they deserve to be———If the Senate on such a Subject is to say what shall be, can you ever refuse any thing they demand from you?


Title: Memorandum from George Turner, 20 December 1791 (Abstract)
From: Turner, George
To: Madison, James

Abstract. 20 December 1791. “Account of Indians inhabiting the North-Eastern parts of the Territory N. W. of the Ohio—Collected from good information.” Lists the locations, nations, tribes, and numbers of families of Indians.


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 21 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

Dear Sr.Decr. 21.91
You may hear something on the Subject of a memorial from some of the proprietors respecting D. Carroll of Duddington’s House, & otherwise in favor of Majr L’Enfant; I feel for the Chagrin this must give the president, particularly at this time. Astonishing that persons under their circumstances wou’d not avoid wounding his feelings.
I must mention a Circumstance to you & leave it to yr. discretion according to circumstances. In the draft of the Bill we sent to the Assembly, the Clerk was to be appointed during the pleasure of the Commissioners, with a Clause makeing the records in the least manner possible expensive on the transfers of property. It was alterd on its passage to be during good behaviour to make it independent & with respect to the mode of transfers more profitable—a very great Struggle was made in both Houses to vest in the Govr. & Council the appointment. Report says with appearance of probability that Col Forrest was to have been a Candidate before the Govr & Council.
I hope I do not trespass on yr. friendship or propriety. Yrs &ca
D Carroll


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 21 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,George Town Decr. 21st. 1791
I wrote to you by last Post from Bladensburgh. A Letter from Mr Lee, & the News papers shew me the shamefull State of the Representation Bill on the 13th Inst. Such a receeding in yr. House and on such a subject is astonishing. I fear disagreable effects—the evill is to continue 10 years; during which time matters will often occur to revive reflections on this event. It appears to me not quite right that the 2 Senators from Vermont shoud decide on the Repn of Kentucky. Mr Carroll has been usefull in our Assembly, but I do not think that a sufft. excuse. Mr. Rd. Hy. Lee has been a considerable time on his way, I have heard. My anxiety about what I wrote you respecting Mr Carroll of Carrollton indued me to write to him again which I hope may have effect. Docr. Stuart presents his comps. & requests Mr. Frenau will send his papers to Messrs Willson & Potts in Alexa. & to Mr Lund Washington near Alexa., & I suppose the papers from the beginning. I must request that my papers from Mr Frenau may be inclosd & seald & not left open at the sides. I do not get one out of 10, of this However I woud not have him take notice yet to our Post-Master. Unless difft. regulations prevail there will be an end to Subscriptions. Dr Sr. yrs. affy
Danl Carroll


Title: Bill for Pennsylvania Land Contract, [21 December] 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

[21 December 1791]
Mr. Madison, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for carrying into effect a contract between the United States and the State of Pennsylvania …


Title: To James Madison from Henry Lee, 22 December 1791
From: Lee, Henry
To: Madison, James

My dear sir.Richmond Decr. 22d 1791.
Mr James Marshall brother to our friend John is about going to London on business very important to himself. Proper introductory letters will be very necessary to him especially to characters political & commercial. For it may happen that the interposition of the first may be necessary to remove some difficultys which he apprehends. You know the merit of the family, the excellence of Mr. John Marshall, & I can assure you that Mr James is personally entitled to every respect & consideration.
Will you be so good then as to ask letters from the British minister in his behalf to such gentlemen in London as he may please to make Mr Marshall known to.
Your attention to this business will singularly oblige Mr. Marsha⟨ll⟩ & his many friends among whom I beg to be ranked. Affy. yours
Henry Lee


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 26 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,Decr. 26th. 1791
My last was, I beleive, on the 21st. Instt since which yrs. of the 20th Came to hand.
I do indeed regret the failure of the Represenn. Bill—& the circumstances attending it. What will be the result? If the residence Act is attackd as you say in a regular manner, or any other after what has taken place, I shall conclude there is a deep scheme for some other wicked purpose—Nil admirari &c. I will yet beleive no more is intended than as a threat.
We hope to see Mr. Johnson next week—& to send a Certified copy of the Act of our Assembly concerning the Territory of Columbia & City of Washington; I transmitted a rough copy to Mr Jefferson sometime past.
I have not heard from Mr C. Carroll in answer to what I wrote him. I hope you will soon see him in Pha. Let me know who are with you at Mrs Houses. Yrs. Dr Sr Most Affy
Danl Carroll


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 30 December 1791
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,Decr 30th. 91
Yr. favors of the 20th. & 25th came to hand.
Mr Carroll writes me that he shall sett of[f] for Pha. abt the 10th of next month, sooner if any thing urgent happens—this has releiv’d me from considerable anxiety. He thinks it impossible that any body will be so hardy as to make the attempt you mention—indeed on considering that Subject so many things strike my mind, that I cannot beleive any attempt will be made, unless with views much more wicked than the times are yet ripe for, especially to Come from Mr B——n of N York.
It gives me much pleasure to find by yrs. of the 25th that the subject on the Representation is likely to be again taken up. I wish it a happy issue to general Satisfaction if possible.
Our family has been for some days past under great alarm & uneasiness on acct of our aged Parent who has been dangerously ill, and tho something better, still, in a very precarious State. Adieu my Dr Friend yrs. &ca.
Danl. Carroll


Title: For the National Gazette, 31 December 1791
From: Madison, James
To:

Dec. 31. [1791]

Government.
In monarchies there is a two fold danger—1st, That the eyes of a good prince cannot see all that he ought to know—2d, That the hands of a bad one will not be tied by the fear of combinations against him. Both these evils increase with the extent of dominion; and prove, contrary to the received opinion, that monarchy is even more unfit for a great state, than for a small one, notwithstanding the greater tendency in the former to that species of government.
Aristocracies, on the other hand, are generally seen in small states: where a concentration of the public will is required by external danger, and that degree of concentration is found sufficient. The many, in such cases, cannot govern on account of emergencies which require the pr⟨omp⟩titude and precautions of a few, whilst the few themselves, resist the usurpations of a single tyrant. In Thessaly, a country intersected by mountainous barriers into a number of small cantons, the governments, according to Thucydides, were in most instances, oligarchical. Switzerland furnishes similar examples. The smaller the state, the less intolerable is this form of government, its rigors being tempered by the facility and the fear of combinations among the people.
A republic involves the idea of popular rights. A representative republic chuses the wisdom, of which hereditary aristocracy has the chance; whilst it excludes the oppression of that form. And a confederated republic attains the force of monarchy, whilst it equally avoids the ignorance of a good prince, and the oppression of a bad one. To secure all the advantages of such a system, every good citizen will be at once a centinel over the rights of the people; over the authorities of the confederal government; and over both the rights and the authorities of the intermediate governments.


Title: From James Madison to Henry Lee, 1 January 1792
From: Madison, James
To: Lee, Henry

My Dear SirPhiladelphia Jany. 1st 1792
I have received your’s of the 22d Dec, and am sincerely sorry that I cannot be as instrumental on the occasion stated in it as My respect for the wishes of the Mr. Marshall’s and particularly for your’s, by which they are seconded, would make me anxious to be. The truth is I am not on any footing of personal acquaintance with Mr. Hammond which would justify me in asking the favor of him in his private character—and I could not of course make such a request from his public character, without enabling him by explanations your letter does not contain, to decide for himself how far the nature and importance of Mr. Marshall’s business could claim a patronage of that sort.
You already know the fate of the apportionment Bill—the subject was revived in the Senate, but I understand has been suspended in order to give an opportunity to the house of Reps. to precede in a second Bill if it pleases. Nothing however has been done in it, and it is difficult to say when or in what form the business will be resumed. The subject most immediately on hand in the House of Reps. is the Post Office Bill, which has consumed much time and is still in an unfinished State. You see in the Newspapers historical sketches of its progress.
The Senate have of late been much occupied by the nominations of the President for foreign Courts—that is, Mr. Thomas Pinkney for London—Govr. Morris, for Paris, & Short for the Hague. A considerable diversity of opinion is said to prevail, and to be the cause of delay in coming to a decision.
The disturbances in Hispaniola continue without abatement, and tis certain that the contagion is reaching Jamaica.
The plan for retreiving our Western affairs is not yet before the Legislature.
I enclose the report of the Secy. of the Treasury on Manufactures. What think you of the commentary (pages 36 & 37) on the terms “general welfare”? The federal Govt. has been hitherto limited to the Specified powers, by the greatest Champions for Latitude in expounding those powers. If not only the means, but the objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at once.
I sent you by Mr. Brackenridge a number of surveys for our freind Baron Steuben, and have acquainted him with a state of the business as far as I could collect it. Whenever you can supply any further information I shall be ready to aid in forwarding it to him. With the sincerest affection Yrs always
Js Madison jr.


Title: From James Madison to Daniel Carroll, 1 January 1792
From: Madison, James
To: Carroll, Daniel

Letter not found. 1 January 1792. Acknowledged in Carroll to JM, 5 and 8 Jan. 1792. Discusses pending action in Congress on the questions of representation and the residence act.


Title: To James Madison from John Hurt, 4 January 1792
From: Hurt, John
To: Madison, James

Dear SirColo. Marshalls near LexingtonJan 4th. 1792
The enclosed papers I intended to have copied & sent to the President—but for want of paper, the being much indisposed & not expecting to have another opportunity by whom I should chuse to trust them; I send them to you in the careless manner you find them.
If on a perusal of them you think they contain any thing worth his seeing please to make the proper apology & lay them before him—but if on the contrary you should not think them of any utility, I must request the favor of you to commit them to the fire without shewing them to any other person on earth. I beg leave to introduce Capt. Trueman to you as a worthy man & a good Soldier. I am Dear Sir with much respect Your Most humble Servant
John Hurt


Title: To James Madison from Daniel Carroll, 5 January 1792
From: Carroll, Daniel
To: Madison, James

My dear Sir,George Town Jany 5th. 1792
Yr. favor of the 1st Instant is come to hand. It will I presume be necessary to come to some con[c]lusion this session about the Representation. I wish it well over—much irritation on so capital a point must be disagreable, may be injurious. If an attempt is made respecting the Residence Law from a respectable quarter, I shall be certain that not that object, but some other damnable design is brewing. I hope for the best—in this and other matters, but cannot help having my apprehensions of the spirit of our Constitution being gratually sap’d by new principles being introducd, which a variety of causes combine to make palatable.
Mr Johnson Docr Stuart & myself are now here, & hope to enter fully into the business of the Commsrs. before we part—& am glad likewise Mr Johnson will be in Pha. himself abt the beginning of next Month.
As I know how much you are oppressd by correspondence &ca. I am the more sensible of yr. kindness & attention to Dr Sr. Yr. very Affte friend & Servt.
Danl Carroll
P. S. I hope my good friends with you will not atribute to indifference my Silence about them. Indeed I can say sincerely that I often think of them with sentiments of great esteem & regard.