Title: Robert Yates’s Version, [18 June 1787]
From: Yates, Robert
To:

Mr. Hamilton. To deliver my sentiments on so important a subject, when the first characters in the union have gone before me, inspires me with the greatest diffidence, especially when my own ideas are so materially dissimilar to the plans now before the committee. My situation is disagreeable, but it would be criminal not to come forward on a question of such magnitude. I have well considered the subject, and am convinced that no amendment of the confederation can answer the purpose of a good government, so long as state sovereignties do, in any shape, exist; and I have great doubts whether a national government on the Virginia plan can be made effectual. What is federal? An association of several independent states into one. How or in what manner this association is formed, is not so clearly distinguishable. We find the diet of Germany has in some instances the power of legislation on individuals. We find the United States of America have it in an extensive degree in the cases of piracies.
Let us now review the powers with which we are invested. We are appointed for the sole and express purpose of revising the confederation, and to alter or amend it, so as to render it effectual for the purposes of a good government. Those who suppose it must be federal, lay great stress on the terms sole and express, as if these words intended a confinement to a federal government; when the manifest import is no more than that the institution of a good government must be the sole and express object of your deliberations. Nor can we suppose an annihilation of our powers by forming a national government, as many of the states have made in their constitutions no provision for any alteration; and thus much I can say for the state I have the honor to represent, that when our credentials were under consideration in the senate, some members were for inserting a restriction in the powers, to prevent an encroachment on the constitution: it was answered by others, and thereupon the resolve carried on the credentials, that it might abridge some of the constitutional powers of the state, and that possibly in the formation of a new union it would be found necessary. This appears reasonable, and therefore leaves us at liberty to form such a national government as we think best adapted for the good of the whole. I have therefore no difficulty as to the extent of our powers, nor do I feel myself restrained in the exercise of my judgment under them. We can only propose and recommend—the power of ratifying or rejecting is still in the states. But on this great question I am still greatly embarrassed. I have before observed my apprehension of the inefficacy of either plan, and I have great doubts whether a more energetic government can pervade this wide and extensive country. I shall now show, that both plans are materially defective.
1. A good government ought to be constant, and ought to contain an active principle.
2. Utility and necessity.
3. An habitual sense of obligation.
4. Force.
5. Influence.

I hold it, that different societies have all different views and interests to pursue, and always prefer local to general concerns. For example: New-York legislature made an external compliance lately to a requisition of congress; but do they not at the same time counteract their compliance by gratifying the local objects of the state so as to defeat their concession? And this will ever be the case. Men always love power, and states will prefer their particular concerns to the general welfare; and as the states become large and important, will they not be less attentive to the general government? What, in process of time will Virginia be? She contains now half a million inhabitants—in twenty-five years she will double the number. Feeling her own weight and importance, must she not become indifferent to the concerns of the union? And where, in such a situation, will be found national attachment to the general government?
By force, I mean the coercion of law and the coercion of arms. Will this remark apply to the power intended to be vested in the government to be instituted by theire plan? A delinquent must be compelled to obedience by force of arms. How is this to be done? If you are unsuccessful, a dissolution of your government must be the consequence; and in that case the individual legislatures will reassume their powers; nay, will not the interest of the states be thrown into the state governments?
By influence, I mean the regular weight and support it will receive from those who will find it their interest to support a government intended to preserve the peace and happiness of the community of the whole. The state governments, by either plan, will exert the means to counteract it. They have their state judges and militia all combined to support their state interests; and these will be influenced to oppose a national government. Either plan is therefore precarious. The national government cannot long exist when opposed by such a weighty rival. The experience of ancient and modern confederacies evince this point, and throw considerable light on the subject. The amphyctionic council of Greece had a right to require of its members troops, money and the force of the country. Were they obeyed in the exercise of those powers? Could they preserve the peace of the greater states and republics? or where were they obeyed? History shows that their decrees were disregarded, and that the stronger states, regardless of their power, gave law to the lesser.
Let us examine the federal institution of Germany. It was instituted upon the laudable principle of securing the independency of the several states of which it was composed, and to protect them against foreign invasion. Has it answered these good intentions? Do we not see that their councils are weak and distracted, and that it cannot prevent the wars and confusions which the respective electors carry on against each other? The Swiss cantons, or the Helvetic union, are equally inefficient.
Such are the lessons which the experience of others affords us, and from whence results the evident conclusion that all federal governments are weak and distracted. To avoid the evils deducible from these observations, we must establish a general and national government, completely sovereign, and annihilate the state distinctions and state operations; and unless we do this, no good purpose can be answered. What does the Jersey plan propose? It surely has not this for its object. By this we grant the regulation of trade and a more effectual collection of the revenue, and some partial duties. These, at five or ten per cent, would only perhaps amount to a fund to discharge the debt of the corporation.
Let us take a review of the variety of important objects, which must necessarily engage the attention of a national government. You have to protect your rights against Canada on the north, Spain on the south, and your western frontier against the savages. You have to adopt necessary plans for the settlement of your frontiers, and to institute the mode in which settlements and good government are to be made.
How is the expense of supporting and regulating these important matters to be defrayed? By requisition on the states, according to the Jersey plan? Will this do it? We have already found it ineffectual. Let one state prove delinquent, and it will encourage others to follow the example; and thus the whole will fail. And what is the standard to quota among the states their respective proportions? Can lands be the standard? How would that apply between Russia and Holland? Compare Pennsylvania with North-Carolina, or Connecticut with New-York. Does not commerce or industry in the one or other make a great disparity between these different countries, and may not the comparative value of the states from these circumstances, make an unequal disproportion when the data is numbers? I therefore conclude that either system would ultimately destroy the confederation, or any other government which is established on such fallacious principles. Perhaps imposts, taxes on specific articles, would produce a more equal system of drawing a revenue.
Another objection against the Jersey plan is, the unequal representation. Can the great States consent to this? If they did it would eventually work its own destruction. How are forces to be raised by the Jersey plan? By quotas? Will the states comply with the requisition? As much as they will with the taxes.
Examine the present confederation, and it is evident they can raise no troops nor equip vessels before war is actually declared. They cannot therefore take any preparatory measure before an enemy is at your door. How unwise and inadequate their powers! and this must ever be the case when you attempt to define powers. Something will always be wanting. Congress, by being annually elected, and subject to recall, will ever come with the prejudices of their states rather than the good of the union. Add therefore additional powers to a body thus organized, and you establish a sovereignty of the worst kind, consisting of a single body. Where are the checks? None. They must either prevail over the state governments, or the prevalence of the state governments must end in their dissolution. This is a conclusive objection to the Jersey plan.
Such are the insuperable objections to both plans: and what is to be done on this occasion? I confess I am at a loss. I foresee the difficulty on a consolidated plan of drawing a representation from so extensive a continent to one place. What can be the inducements for gentlemen to come 600 miles to a national legislature? The expense would at least amount to £100,000. This however can be no conclusive objection if it eventuates in an extinction of state governments. The burthen of the latter would be saved, and the expense then would not be great. State distinctions would be found unnecessary, and yet I confess, to carry government to the extremities, the state governments reduced to corporations, and with very limited powers, might be necessary, and the expense of the national government become less burthensome.
Yet, I confess, I see great difficulty of drawing forth a good representation. What, for example, will be the inducements for gentlemen of fortune and abilities to leave their houses and business to attend annually and long? It cannot be the wages; for these, I presume, must be small. Will not the power, therefore, be thrown into the hands of the demagogue or middling politician, who, for the sake of a small stipend and the hopes of advancement, will offer himself as a candidate, and the real men of weight and influence, by remaining at home, add strength to the state governments? I am at a loss to know what must be done; I despair that a republican form of government can remove the difficulties. Whatever may be my opinion, I would hold it however unwise to change that form of government. I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced, and such has been its progress in the minds of the many, that this truth gradually gains ground. This government has for its object public strength and individual security. It is said with us to be unattainable. If it was once formed it would maintain itself. All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrouling disposition requires checks. The senate of New-York, although chosen for four years, we have found to be inefficient. Will, on the Virginia plan, a continuance of seven years do it? It is admitted, that you cannot have a good executive upon a democratic plan. See the excellency of the British executive. He is placed above temptation. He can have no distinct interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. The weak side of a republican government is the danger of foreign influence. This is unavoidable, unless it is so constructed as to bring forward its first characters in its support. I am therefore for a general government, yet would wish to go the full length of republican principles.

Let one body of the legislature be constituted during good behaviour or life.
Let one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers.
It may be asked is this a republican system? It is strictly so, as long as they remain elective.
And let me observe, that an executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for seven years.
It may be said, this constitutes an elective monarchy? Pray, what is a monarchy? May not the governors of the respective states be considered in that light? But by making the executive subject to impeachment, the term monarchy cannot apply. These elective monarchs have produced tumults in Rome, and are equally dangerous to peace in Poland; but this cannot apply to the mode in which I would propose the election. Let electors be appointed in each of the states to elect the executive—(Here Mr. H. produced his plan, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed,) to consist of two branches—and I would give them the unlimited power of passing all laws without exception. The assembly to be elected for three years by the people in districts—the senate to be elected by the electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life. The executive to have the power of negativing all laws—to make war or peace, with the advice of the senate—to make treaties with their advice, but to have the sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors and appoint all military officers, and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by advice of the senate. On his death or removal, the president of the senate to officiate, with the same powers, until another is elected. Supreme judicial officers to be appointed by the executive and the senate. The legislature to appoint courts in each state, so as to make the state governments unnecessary to it.
All state laws to be absolutely void which contravene the general laws. An officer to be appointed in each state to have a negative on all state laws. All the militia and the appointment of officers to be under the national government.
I confess that this plan and that from Virginia are very remote from the idea of the people. Perhaps the Jersey plan is nearest their expectation. But the people are gradually ripening in their opinions of government—they begin to be tired of an excess of democracy—and what even is the Virginia plan, but pork still, with a little change of the sauce.


Title: John Lansing’s Version, [18 June 1787]
From: Lansing, John
To:

Hamilton—The Situation of the State he represents and the Diffidence he has of his own Judgment induced him to Silence tho his Ideas are dissimilar from both Plans.
No Amendment of Confederation can answer the Exigencies of the States. State Sovereignties ought not to exist. Supposes we have Powers sufficient. Foederal an Association of States differently modified. Diet of Germany has Power to legislate for Individuals. In United States Confederacy legislate for States and in some Instances on Individuals—Instances Piracies. The Term sole he supposes was to impress an Idea only that we were not to govern ourselves, but to revise Government.
Another Difficulty that the Legislature cannot be supposed to have delegated a Power they did not possess themselves—So far as Respects the State of New York one of the Branches of the Legislature considered it—It was said they might have Recourse to the People—this had its Influence and it was carried by one Vote. We ought not to sacrafice the public Good to narrow Scruples. All America, all Europe, the World would condemn us. The only Enquiry ought to be what can we do to save our Country. Five Essentials indispensible in foederal Government.
1. A constant and active Interest.
2. Utility and Necessity.
3. A habitual Sense of Obligation.
4. Force.
5. Influence.
Every Set of men who associate acquire an Esprit de Corps. This will apply forcibly to States—they will have distinct Views—their own Obligations thwart general Good.
Do we not find a Jealousy subsisting? In the State of New York we had an Instance. The last Requisition was partially paid—the principal Part of their Funds applied to discharge State Obligations—the Individual States hostile to general Interest.
Virginia will in 25 Years contain a Million of Inhabitants—It may then be disposed to give up an Union only burthensome. The Distribution of Justice presents itself to every Eye—this has a powerful Influence and must particular attach Individuals to the State Governments.
Two modes of Coercion—of Laws—of Military.
Individuals are easily controuled—not so Society—You must carry the Force to Individuals—If only State delinquent it would cause a war—If more they would associate and make a common Cause of it.
We must resort to Influence—Dispensations of Honors and Emoluments of Office necessary—these are all in the Hands of the State Governments. If they exist in State Governments their Influence too great. our Situation is peculiar. It leaves us Room to dream as we think proper. Groecian Confederacy lost for Want of adequate Powers—German the same. Swiss Cantons—general Diet has lost its Powers. Cannot combine States but by absorbing the Ambition and Avarice of all.
Jersey Propositions—Regulating Trade—Revenue not adequate to meet our Debt—where are we to find it? Requisitions—the several States will deliberate on them. Requisitions founded on Quotas must always fail. There is no general Standard for Wealth in Communities—Pennsylvania and North Carolina—Connecticut and New York compared. New York derives great Wealth from Commerce—Connecticut none. Indirect Taxation must be multiplied.
Equality of Suffrage ruinous to the Union.
Doubts have been entertained whether the United States have a Right to build a Ship or raise a Reg(imen)t in Time of Peace—this Doubt might involve almost our Ruin.
The Organization of Congress exceptionable—They are annually appointed and subject to recal.—They will of Consequence represent the Prejudices of the States not general Interests. No Power will be executed if the States think proper to obstruct it. If general Government preserves itself it must extinguish State Governments.
If Congress remains Legislature the Sovereignty must ultimately vest in them.

The Expence of national Government is a Consideration with him—it will probably amount to £100,000 per ann.—this however surmountable. It will not do to propose formal Extinction of State Governments. It would shock public Opinion too much. Some subordinate Jurisdictions—something like limitted Corporations. If general Government properly modified it may extinguish State Governments gradually. Representation is another difficulty. British Government the best. Dispairs of ever uniting the great Objects of Government which have been so successfully attained by the British, public Strength and individual Safety, in any Republican System. He thinks here it would support itself—the Citizens of America may be distinguished into the wealthy well born and well educated—and the many. If Government in the hands of the latter they sacrafice the few—are as often in the wrong as right.
You can only protect the few by giving them exclusive Rights—they have Nothing to hope from Change. Monarchy is essential to them. One Branch of Legislature ought to be independent to check popular Frenzy—or Democraties will prevail. Seven Years is no Check—It is no Object for Men of first Importance. Little Daemagogues will fill Assembly. Undertakers your Senate.
In Republics trifling Characters obtrude—they are easily corrupted—the most Important Individuals ought to [be] drawn forth for Government—this can only be effected by establishing upper House for good Behaviour. Congress are Objects of foreign Corruption.
Executive ought to be during good Behaviour. He will part with his Power with Reluctance. You ought to interest him in the Government.
This may be objected to as establishing an elective Monarchy—but he will be liable to Impeachment for mal-conduct. The Election it supposed would cause Tumults. To avoid this the People in each District should chuse Electors—those should elect a few in that State who should meet with Electors from the other States and elect the Governor.
Roman Emperor—elective—by Army.
German Emperor—by great Electors.
Polish King—great Barons who have numerous Dependents.
These were tumultous from their Institutions. We may guard against it.

The principal Citizens of every State are tired of Democracy—he then read his Plan and expatiated on it—See


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Necessity for a National Government, [19 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 19, 1787]

Col. Hamilton, assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature. He was not yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met now on an equal footing but could see no inference from that against concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this occasion of observing for the purpose of appeasing the fears of the small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a National Govt. in which they might lose the equality of rank they now held: one was the local situation of the 3 largest States Virga. Masts. & Pa. They were separated from each other by distance of place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish the interests of one State from those of another. No combination therefore could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States from Va. the largest down to Delaware the smallest, it would always happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might & wd. be counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest. No combination has been seen among large Counties merely as such, agst. lesser Counties. The more close the Union of the States, and the more compleat the authority of the whole: the less opportunity will be allowed the stronger States to injure the weaker.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Organization of the House of Representatives, [21 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 21, 1787]

Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence which could not be too watchfully guarded agst. All too must admit the possibility, in case the Genl. Govt. shd. maintain itself, that the State Govts. might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore shd. not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks in Support of a Three-Year Term for Members of the House of Representatives, [21 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 21, 1787]

Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years. There ought to be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other branches of Governt. would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of ye. Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virga. it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance & voting of the people by severe regulations.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on Wages to Be Paid Members of the National Legislature, [22 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 22, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconveniency from fixing the wages. He was strenuous agst. making the National Council dependent on the Legislative rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters of those who are paid. Payment by the States would be unequal as the distant States would have to pay for the same term of attendance and more days in travelling to & from the seat of the Govt. He expatiated emphatically on the difference between the feelings & views of the people—& the Governments of the States arising from the personal interest & official inducements which must render the latter unfriendly to the Genl. Govt.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks in Opposition to the Payment of Members of the National Legislature by the States, [22 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 22, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the distinction between State Govts. & the people. The former wd. be the rivals of the Genl. Govt. The State legislatures ought not therefore to be the paymasters of the latter.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Ineligibility of Members of the House of Representatives for Other Offices, [22 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 22, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become the subjects of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess there is danger where men are capable of holding two offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious—their passions may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it was necessary to support a good government. We have taken up many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume’s opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark, that there is always a body of firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of those passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good—for these ever induce us to action. Perhaps a few men in a state, may, from patriotic motives, or to display their talents, or to reap the advantage of public applause, step forward; but if we adopt the clause we destroy the motive. I am therefore against all exclusions and refinements, except only in this case; that when a member takes his seat, he should vacate every other office. It is difficult to put any exclusive regulation into effect. We must in some degree, submit to the inconvenience.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Term of Office for Members of the Second Branch of the Legislature, [26 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 26, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He concurred with Mr. Madison in thinking we were now to decide for ever the fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind for ever. He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible. He concurred also in the general observations of (Mr. Madison) on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true: that nothing like an equality of property existed: that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the patricians & plebians, what followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark that (Mr. Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Govt. was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to Govt. particularly all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the hands of the Govt. there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governt. had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. S. whether the State at this time, dare impose & collect a tax on ye. people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the effect, as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on Equality of Representation of the States in the Congress, [29 June 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, June 29, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton observed the individuals forming political Societies modify their rights differently, with regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualifications of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been sd. that if the smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will lose power, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pa. having 400,000: but will the people of Del: be less free, if each citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pa. He admitted that common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence in public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions be in a great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying States, which divide instead of uniting the largest States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State of N. York into different districts of different sizes.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominions are & must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on it. It had been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was domestic tranquility & happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No Governmt. could give us tranquility & happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak & sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction of them.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from George Washington, 10 July 1787
From: Washington, George
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Dear Sir,
Philadelphia 10th. July 87.

I thank you for your communication of the 3d. When I refer you to the State of the Councils which prevailed at the period you left this City—and add, that they are now, if possible, in a worse train than ever; you willfind that little ground on which the hope of a good establishment can be formed. In a word, I almost dispair of seeing a favourable issue to the proceedings of the Convention, and do therefore repent having had any agency in the business.
The Men who oppose a strong & energetic government are, in my opinion, narrow minded politicians, or are under the influence of local views. The apprehension expressed by them that the people will not accede to the form proposed is the ostensible, not the real cause of the opposition—but admitting that the present sentiment is as they prognosticate, the question ought nevertheless to be, is it or is it not, the best form? If the former, recommend it, and it will assuredly obtain mauger opposition.
I am sorry you went away. I wish you were back. The crisis is equally important and alarming, and no opposition under such circumstances should discourage exertions till the signature is fixed. I will not, at this time trouble you with more than my best wishes and sincere regards.
I am Dear Sir   Yr Obedt Servt
Go: Washington
Alexr. Hamilton Esqr


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to The Daily Advertiser, [21 July 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Daily Advertiser

[New York, July 21, 1787]

It is currently reported and believed, that his Excellency Governor CLINTON has, in public company, without reserve, reprobated the appointment of the Convention, and predicted a mischievous issue of that measure. His observations are said to be to this effect:—That the present confederation is, in itself, equal to the purposes of the union: That the appointment of a Convention is calculated to impress the people with an idea of evils which do not exist: That if either nothing should be proposed by the Convention, or if what they should propose should not be agreed to, the one or the other would tend to beget despair in the public mind; and that, in all probability, the result of their deliberations, whatever it might be, would only serve to throw the community into confusion.
Upon this conduct of his Excellency, if he is not misrepresented, the following reflections will naturally occur to every considerate and impartial man:
First. That from the almost universal concurrence of the states in the measure of appointing a Convention, and from the powers given to their Deputies, “to devise and propose such alterations in the Federal Constitution as are necessary to render it adequate to the purposes of government, and to the exigencies of the union,” it appears clearly to be the general sense of America, that the present confederation is not “equal to the purposes of the union,” but requires material alterations.
Secondly. That the concurrence of the legislatures of twelve out of the thirteen states, which compose the union (actuated as they are by a diversity of prejudices and supposed interests) in a measure of so extraordinary a complexion, the direct object of which is the abridgement of their own power, in favor of a general government, is of itself a strong presumptive proof that there exist real evils; and that these evils are of so extensive and cogent a nature, as to have been capable of giving an impulse from one extremity of the United States to the other.
Thirdly. That some of these evils are so obvious, that they do not seem to admit of doubt or equivocation; of this description are,
1. The defective and disproportionate contributions of the several states to the common treasury, and, in consequence of this, the total want of means in the United States to pay their debts, foreign or domestic, or to support those establishments which are necessary to the public tranquillity.
2. The general stagnation of commerce, occasioned no doubt, in a great degree, by the exclusions, and restraints with which foreign nations fetter our trade with them; while they enjoy in our ports unlimited freedom, and while our government is incapable of making those defensive regulations, which would be likely to produce a greater reciprocity of privileges.
3d. The degradation of our national character and consequence, to such an extreme of insignificance, that foreign powers in plain terms, refuse to treat with us, alledging, and alledging truly, that we have no government to ensure the performance of the stipulations on our part.
Fourthly. That these and many other facts and circumstances, prove to a demonstration, that the general government is fundamentally defective; that the very existence of the union is in imminent danger, and that there is great reason to dread, that without some speedy and radical alterations, these states may shortly become thirteen distinct and unconnected communities, exposed, without a common head, to all the hazard of foreign invasion, and intrigue, of hostility with each other, and of internal faction and insurrection.
Fifthly. That at this very instant the union is so far nominal, that it is not only destitute of the necessary powers to administer the common concerns of the nation, but is scarcely able to keep up the appearances of existence; sunk to so low an ebb that it can with difficulty engage the attendance of a sufficient number of members in Congress, even to deliberate upon any matter of importance.
Sixthly. That this state of our affairs called for the collective wisdom of the union to provide an effectual remedy; that there were only two ways of uniting its councils to that end, one through the medium of Congress, and the other through the medium of a body specially appointed for the purpose; that several reasons conspired to render the latter mode preferable. Congress, occupied in the ordinary administration of the government could not give so steady and undivided an attention to the national reform as the crisis demanded: The parties, which will always grow up in an established body, would render them less likely to agree in a proper plan. Any plan they should agree upon, would have greater prejudices to encounter in its progress through the states; for the mind is naturally prone to suspect the aims of men who propose the encrease of a power, of which they themselves have the present possession; and, in several of the states, industrious and wicked pains have been taken by the parties unfriendly to the measures of the union, to discredit and debase the authority and influence of Congress. In addition to these considerations, the states would have it in their power, in a special Convention, to avail themselves of the weight and abilities of men, who could not have been induced to accept an appointment to Congress; and whose aid, in a work of such magnitude, was on many accounts desirable. The late illustrious Commander in Chief stands foremost in this number.
Seventhly. That though it is too justly to be apprehended that local views, state prejudices, and personal interests, will frustrate the hope of any effectual plan from any body of men whatever, appointed by so many separate states, yet the object was worthy of an experiment, and that experiment could not be made with so much advantage in any way, as in that which has been fallen upon for the purpose.
Eighthly. That however justifiable it might be in the governor to oppose the appointment of a convention, if the measure were still under deliberation; and if he sincerely believed it to be a pernicious one, yet the general voice of America having decided in its favor, it is unwarrantable and culpable in any man, in so serious a posture of our national affairs, to endeavour to prepossess the public mind against the hitherto undetermined and unknown measures of a body to whose councils America has, in a great measure, entrusted its future fate, and to whom the people in general look up, under the blessing of heaven, for their political salvation.

Ninthly. That such conduct in a man high in office, argues greater attachment to his own power than to the public good, and furnishes strong reason to suspect a dangerous predetermination to oppose whatever may tend to diminish the former, however it may promote the latter.
If there be any man among us, who acts so unworthy a part, it becomes a free and enlightened people to observe him with a jealous eye, and when he sounds the alarm of danger from another quarter, to examine whether they have not more to apprehend from himself.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Mullett, 23 July 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Mullett, Thomas

[New York] July 23, 1787. “The want of Some original papers which Mr. Brailsford was to have Sent me, puts it out of my power to proceed to a trial of his Cause with Wooldridge.… Mr. Wooldridge is willing, if I will let him out on Common bail, to give me a Bond in any Sum … that he will not go out of this State … and that he will not give any impedment or delay to the attachments now pending. I have no doubt that it is Mr. Brailsford’s interest to accept of this Arrangement; but … I have thought proper to Communicate the Matter to you to take your instructions as Attorney in fact to him.”


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Thomas Mullett, 23 July 1787
From: Mullett, Thomas
To: Hamilton, Alexander

New York, July 23, 1787. Advises Hamilton to accept the settlement which has been arranged in a cause pending between Samuel Brailsford and Thomas Wooldrige.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John Auldjo, [26 July 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Auldjo, John

Sir,
[New York, July 26, 1787]

I have delivered the paper you committed to me as it stood altered to Major Peirce from whose conduct I am to conclude the affair between you is at an end. He informs me that he is shortly to set out on a jaunt up the North River.
As you intimate a wish to have my sentiments in writing on the transaction I shall with pleasure declare that the steps you have taken in consequence of Mr. Pearces challenge have been altogether in conformity to my opinion of what would be prudent proper and honorable on your part. They seem to have satisfied Mr. Pearces scruples arising from what he apprehended, in some particulars, to have been your conduct to him and I presume we are to hear nothing farther of the matter.
I remain with great esteem   Sir Your obedient & humble servant
Alex Hamilton
New York July 26 1787


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to ———, 6 August 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

New York, August 6, 1787. Introduces “a son of Mr. Israel, who is going to Philadelphia to endeavour to effect the settlement of his fathers demand upon the Administrator of Barnard Levi.”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Motion on Citizenship Requirement for Membership in the House of Representatives, [13 August 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, August 13, 1787]

Col. Hamilton was in general agst. embarrassing the Govt. with minute restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that had been suggested On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here where they will be on a level with the first Citizens. He moved that the section be so altered as to require merely citizenship & inhabitancy. The right of determining the rule of naturalization will then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will answer every purpose.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, [20 August 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: King, Rufus

Dr Sir
[New York, August 20, 1787]

Since my arrival here, I have written to my colleagues, informing them, that if either of them would come down I would accompany him to Philadelphia. So much for the sake of propriety and public opinion.
In the mean time if any material alteration should happen to be made in the plan now before the Convention, I will be obliged to you for a communication of it. I will also be obliged to you to let me know when your conclusion is at hand; for I would choose to be present at that time.
I remain with sincere regard   Yr. Obed Servt
A Hamilton
Aug. 20. 87


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Wadsworth, [20 August 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Wadsworth, Jeremiah

My Dear Sir
[New York, August 20, 1787]

The inclosed is said to be the Copy of a letter circulating in your state. The history of its appearance among us is that it was sent by one Whitmore of Stratford, formerly in the Pay Master Generals Office to a James Reynold of this City.
I am at a loss clearly to understand its object—and have some suspicion that it has been fabricated to excite jealousy against the Convention with a view to an opposition to their recommendations. At all events I wish if possible to trace its source and send it to you for that purpose. Whitmore must of course say where he got it and by pursuing the information we may at last come at the author. Let me know the political connections of this man and the complexion of the people most active in the circulation of the letter. Be so good as to attend to this inquiry somewhat particularly, as I have different reasons of some moment ⟨for⟩ setting it on foot.
I remain &c
A H
Augt. 20–87


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Jeremiah Wadsworth, 26 August 1787
From: Wadsworth, Jeremiah
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My Dear Sir
Hartford August 26 1787

I recd your favor this day with the inclosed Copy of a letter said to be circulating in this State. Some time since a Paragraph in the New Haven Paper hinted at such a letter, & appeared to be written to scare the antifederal Party or alarm them—and I believed it was well intended as it seemed to be meant to prepare them to comply with the doings of the convention, least worse befell them—but the close of this letter appears to be calculated for other purposes. Wetmore has always associated with Men who wished well to America & a good Government. He is half Brother to the Spirited federal Writer in our papers who Signs him self Cato, and if he has really written or circulated the letter in question I am quite at a loss to know his intentions. I have communicated this matter to Col Humphry in confidence who is on his way to New Haven (where Wetmore lives tho formerly of Stratford) he will enquire carefully into ye matter & write you. He has lived in the same house with Wetmore & can easily fathom him—Wetmore is naturally sanguine has some tallents & I believe is enterprizing—but ⟨fickle⟩. Who the Active people in this business are I have Yet to learn as it certainly has not circulated hereabout. But from Humphry you may expect to know all that is true in Wetmores neighborhood. I have always been Humphrys friend—but a nearer acquaintance with him Convince me he is a Man of great integrity and several talents as would wear well in any employment of consequence. If he comes to New York I wish you to be more Acquainted with him.
I am dear Sir   Your very Hum set
Jere Wadsworth


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, [28 August 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: King, Rufus

Dear Sir,
[New York, August 28, 1787]

I wrote to you some days since, that to request you to inform me when there was a prospect of your finishing as I intended to be with you, for certain reasons, before the conclusion. It is whispered here that some late changes in your scheme have taken place which give it a higher tone. Is this the case?
I leave town today, to attend a circuit in a neighbouring County, from which I shall return the last of the week, and shall be glad to find a line from you explanatory of the period of the probable termination of your business.
New York Aug 28.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Baron von Steuben, [August–September 1787]
From: Steuben, Baron von
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[New York, August–September 1787]

Mon Cher Ami. L’amour pour la justice, autant que L’Amitié dont Vous m’avez honoré depuis dix ans Vous a induit d’acquiescer à ma Sollicitation & de Vous charger de ma demande Envers les E: U: Vous Ayant Exposé les titres sur lesquelles ma pretention est fondé, Votre Opinion joint a Ceux de Mr: Douane, Chancellier Livingston et Mr: jay, etoit Unanime, que la stipulation fait entre les E:U: et moi, avant mon Entré dans le service, Attesté et Certifier par les Memes personnes que le Congres avoit chargé de traiter avec moi, Avoit toute la Validité d’un Contract Entre un Souverain et un individu. Vous etiez d’Accord que ce contract etoit remplie de mon côté, dans toute son Etendue, et qu’il ne L’etoit qu’en partie du côté des E:U:
Vous Avez pris la peine Monsieur d’Exposer la justice de mes demandes dans un jour, que mes plus Ardens Antagoniste seront obligé de Ceder à la Verité. Ainsi tout mes desirs, tout mes Esperences, se bornent a la reconnoissance de ce Contract. Si le Congres ne peut ou ne Veut pas remplir ses Engagemens, il n’y Vat que de ma fortune, & dans le Catalogues des personnes rendue Malheureux, par un Gouvernement plus Malheureux Encore, je ne ferai qu’un individue de plus. Mais si le Congrès denie le Contract, allors il y Vat de mon honneur, et si J’ai le Courage de braver la pauvrete a laquelle L’injustice ma reduit, je n’aurez jamais la lacheté, de me Voir Accusé d’Escrocquerie & de fauseté. Dans ce Cas je suis determiner de publie, tout les transactions & la Mauvaise fois avec laquelle, le Congres a rencontre mes proposition Generuse & comme il a recompenser mes services.
Je doit a mon honneur la poursuite de cette Affaire, je le doit encore pour ma justification, envers les honnettes Gens, quil m’ont Avancé la somme neccessaire pour Venir de L’Europe servir les E. U. et dont il etoit hors de mon pouvoir de payer ni Capital ni interet. Les payement chetives & periodique que J’ai touché depuis la paix, ne servoit qu’a me faire Vivotter, dans une dependence, aussi humiliante, que le plus Cruëll tirant, ne feroit Essuyer a son Esclave. Cet a ce payement periodique que J’attribue le Comble de mes Malheur, parcequ’il ma barrer toutes les Moyens pour faire un Etablissement sollide soit en Europe ou meme dans ce païs cy. Mais pourquoi Vous Ennuyerai je d’un recit de mes Malheur, dont Vous Connoissez trop bien tout les detailles. Il S’agit de portez L’Afaire a une decision definitive, il S’agit de mettre ma derniere application devant le Congrès. L’Esperence que nos Affaires publique prendrons une tournure plus Avantageuse nous a fait suspendre, cette demarche finale depuis dix huit mois. Ce retard m’a approche a ma derniere resource, et tout changement pour le Mieux dans les Affaires Publique, S’emble S’eloigner a mesure que je m’approche de ma derniere Ruine.
Comme il ne S’agit point d’un payement, Mais d’une Reconnoissence de la justice de mes pretentions je Vous demande S’il Vaut la peine de suspendre plus longtems la presentation du Memoire en question Cependant je me repose entierement sur Vos lumieres: faites ceque Vous juges apropos, Mais Epargnez moi L’a demarche humiliante, de sollicité; même d’exposer mon Affaire, personnellement a cette Classe des Gens, que je croie insensible aux sentimens de L’honneur & de delicatesse.
je Viendroi Vous Voir pour Vous Epargnez la peine de m’ecrire. bon soir
steuben


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from David Humphreys, 1 September 1787
From: Humphreys, David
To: Hamilton, Alexander

My dear Sir
New Haven [Connecticut] Septr. 1st. 1787

Our friend Col Wadsworth has communicated to me a letter in which you made enquiries respecting a political letter that has lately circulated in this State. I arrived in this Town yesterday & have since conversed with several intelligent persons on the subject. It appears to have been printed in a Fairfield Paper as long ago as the 25th of July. I have not been able to trace it to its source. Mr Wetmore informs me that when he first saw this letter it was in the hands of one Jared Mansfield, who, I believe, has formerly been reputed a Loyalist. Indeed it seems to have been recieved & circulated with avidity by that Class of People, whether it was fabricated by them or not. I think, however, there is little doubt that it was manufactured in this State. I demanded of Mr Wetmore what he thought were the wishes & objects of the writer of that letter; he said he believed it might be written principally for the amusement of the author & perhaps with some view to learn whether the People were not absolutely indifferent to all government & dead to all political sentiment.
Before I saw the letter in question, a Paragraph had been published by Mr. Meigs, giving an account of it & attempting to excite the apprehension of the Antifederalists, with an idea, that the most disastrous consequences are to be expected, unless we shall accept the Proceedings of the Convention. Some think this was the real design of that fictitious performance; but others, with more reason, that it was intended to feel the public pulse & to discover whether the public mind would be startled with propositions of Royalty. The quondam Tories have undoubtedly conceived hopes of a future union with G. Britain, from the inefficacy of our Government & the tumults which prevailed in Massachusetts during the last winter. I saw a letter written, at that period, by a Clergyman of considerable reputation in Nova Scotia to a Person of eminence in this State; stating the impossibility of our being happy under our present Constitution & proposing (now we could think & argue calmly on all the consequences) that the efforts of the moderate, the virtuous & the brave should be exerted to effect a reunion with the parent State. He mentioned among other things, how instrumental the Cincinnati might be & how much it would redound to their emolument. It seems by a conversation I have had here, that the ultimate practicability of introducing the Bishop of Osnaburgh is not a novel idea among those who were formerly termed Loyalists. Ever since the peace it has been occasionally talked of & wished for. Yesterday, where I dined, half jest, half earnest, he was given as the first Toast.
I leave you now, my dear friend, to reflect how ripe we are for the most mad & ruinous projects that can be suggested, especially when, in addition to this view, we take into consideration how thoroughly the patriotic part of the Community, the friends of an efficient Government are discouraged with the present System & irritated at the popular Demagogues who are determined to keep themselves in office at the risque of every thing. Thence apprehensions are formed, that tho’ the measures proposed by the Convention, may not be equal to the wishes of the most enlightened & virtuous; yet that they will be too high-toned to be adopted by our popular Assemblies. Should that happen our political Ship will be left afloat on a Sea of Chance, without a Rudder as well as without a Pilot.
I am happy to see you have (some of you) had the honest boldness to attack in a public Paper, the Antifederal Dogmas of a great Personage in your State. Go on & prosper. Were the men of talents & honesty, throughout the Continent, properly combined into one Phalanx, I am confident they would be competent to hew their way thro’ all opposition. Were there no little jealousies, bickerings, & unworthy sinister views to divert them from their object, they might by perseverance establish a Government calculated to promote the happiness of Mankind & to make the Revolution a blessing instead of a curse.
I think it probable that I shall soon go to the Southward, in the mean time, I beg you to be persuaded that I am, with sentiments of sincerest friendship & esteem, My dear Hamilton,
Your most obedient & Most humble Servant
D. Humphreys
Col. Hamilton.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Election of the President, [6 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 6, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton said that he had been restrained from entering into the discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Govt. in General; but as he meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing, he wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He liked the new modification, on the whole, better than that in the printed Report. In this the President was a Monster elected for seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great powers, in appointments to office, & continually tempted by this constitutional disqualification to abuse them in order to subvert the Government. Although he should be made re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legislature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be continued in office. It seemed peculiarly desireable therefore that some other mode of election should be devised. Considering the different views of different States, & the different districts Northern Middle & Southern, he concurred with those who thought that the votes would not be concentered, and that the appointment would consequently in the present mode devolve on the Senate. The nomination to offices will give great weight to the President. Here then is a mutual connection & influence, that will perpetuate the President, and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be the remedy? He saw none better than to let the highest number of ballots, whether a majority or not, appoint the President. What was the objection to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as the plan stands, the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest number of votes, and make him President.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Second to James Madison’s Motion on Amending the Constitution, 10 September 1787
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Philadelphia, September 10, 1787. On this date, Hamilton seconded the following motion made by James Madison: “The Legislature of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U S.”


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Manner of Ratifying the Constitution, [10 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 10, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indecorum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He considered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by art XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the existing one. He wd. propose as a better modification of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legislature declaring that if the Convention of the State should think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying States, the same shd. take effect accordingly.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Ratification of the Constitution, [10 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 10, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton. No Convention convinced of the necessity of the plan will refuse to give it effect on the adoption by nine States. He thought this mode less exceptionable than the one proposed in the article, and would attain the same end.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Withdrawal of a Motion, [10 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 10, 1787]

Col: Hamilton withdrew the remainder of the motion to postpone art XXII, observing that his purpose was defeated by the vote just given.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to The Daily Advertiser, [15 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Daily Advertiser

[New York, September 15, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton, in his absence from New York on public duty (with how much propriety and temper his fellow citizens must decide) has been attacked by name, as the Writer of a publication printed in Mr. Childs’ paper of the 21st of July last. In fixing that publication upon him, there is certainly no mistake; nor did he ever mean to be concealed. He left his name with the Printer, to be disclosed to any person who should apply for it on the part of the Governor; with instructions to make that circumstance known, which was accordingly done. The fairness of this conduct speaks for itself. The Citizens of the state have too much good sense to be deceived into an opinion, that it could have been dictated by a wanton disposition to calumniate a meritorious character. They must and will consider it as an honorable and open attempt to unmask, what appeared to the Writer, the pernicious intrigues of a man high in office, to preserve power and emolument to himself, at the expence of the Union, the Peace and the Happiness of America.
To say, that it would have been derogatory to the first Magistrate of the state to enter the lists in a news paper with an “anonymous scribbler” is a miserable subterfuge. Though Mr. Hamilton, to avoid the appearance of ostentation, did not put his name to the piece; yet, having left it with the Printers to be communicated to the party concerned, there is no pretence to consider it in the light of an anonymous publication. If the matter alleged had been false, the Governor had his choice of two modes of vindicating himself from the aspersion; one, by giving a simple and direct denial to it in the public prints; the other, by having a personal explanation on the subject with the Writer. Neither of these modes could have wounded his dignity. The first is practiced in most governments where public opinion is respected. A short paragraph to the following effect would have answered the purpose—“The Printer of this Paper is authorised to assure the public, that His Excellency the Governor never made use of the expressions attributed to him, in a publication contained in Mr. Childs paper of the 21st July, nor of any others of similar import.” This would have thrown it upon Mr. Hamilton to bring forward to public view the sources of his information and the proofs of his charge. And this he has too much regard for his reputation not to have been prepared to do. This he is still ready to do, whenever such a denial shall appear.
The Governor, if he had had any objection to this mode of proceeding, might have had recourse to the other,—that of a personal explanation with the Writer. Mr. Hamilton would have conceived himself bound, by the principles of candour and honor, to declare on what grounds he had proceeded, and, if he could have been satisfied they were erroneous, to retract the imputations founded upon them. Would it have impaired the dignity of the first Magistrate of a republic to have had such an explanation with any reputable Citizen? Would it have impaired his dignity to have had such an explanation with a Citizen, who is at this moment acting in an important and delicate trust, by the appointment of the legislature of the State?
Mr. Hamilton freely submits to the judgment of his fellow citizens, whether there was any thing in the manner of his animadversions, that preclude⟨d⟩ such an explanation. They were strong and pointed; but he flatters himself they were free from indecorum. He states the charge as matter of Report, and mak⟨es⟩ his observations hypothetically, even seeming to admi⟨t⟩ a possibility of misrepresentation. As he was not himself present at the conversation; but spoke from the information of those who were, he could not with propriety have expressed himself in more positive terms. As he was speaking of an officer of the first rank in the state, he was disposed to use as much moderation in the manner of exhibiting his misconduct, as was consistent with that explicitness and energy, which were necessary to place it in its proper light.

These remarks, while they explain Mr. Hamilton’s motives, will serve to refute the ca⟨vil –⟩ respecting his doubt of the truth of the fact alleged by him. He now declares, that from the nature of his information he had no doubt of the kind and that since the publication he has understood from different partisans of the Governor, that he did not deny the expressions attributed to him to be in substan⟨ce⟩ true, with some minute and unessential distinctions.
It is insinuated, that the circulation of the fact is calculated to produce the evil pretended to be guarde⟨d⟩ against, by diffusing throu⟨gh⟩ the community a knowlege of the Governors sentiments. This remark admits of an obvious answer. If his Excellency was predetermined to oppose the measures of the Convention, as his conduct indicates, he would take care himself to propagate his sentiments, in the manner in which it could be done with the most effect. This appears to have been his practice. It was therefore proper that the antidote should go along with the poison; and that the community should be apprised, that he was capable of forming such a predetermination, before, it can be presumed, he had any knowlege of the measures themselves, on which to found his judgment.
A cry is attempted to be raised against the publication of Mr. Hamilton, as if it were an invasion of the right of the first Magistrate of the State to deliver his sentiments on a matter of public concern. The fallacy of this artifice will easily be detected. The Governor has an undoubted right to give his sentiments freely on every public measure. Under proper circumstances, it will be always his duty to do it. But every right may be abused by a wrong exercise of it. Even the constitutional powers vested in him may be so employed, as to subject him justly not only to censure, but to impeachment. The only question then is, whether he has in the present instance used his right properly, or improperly—whether it became him, by anticipation, to endeavour to prejudice the community against the “unknown and undetermined” measures of a body, to which the general voice of the union had delegated the important trust of concerting and proposing a plan for reforming the national constitution? Let every man answer this question to himself.
The apologists for the Governor, in the intemperate ardor of their zeal for his character, seem to forget another right, very precious to the citizens of a free country, that of examining the conduct of their rulers. These have an undoubted right, within the limits of the constitution, to speak and to act their sentiments; but the citizen has an equal right to discuss the propriety of those sentiments, or of the manner of advancing, or supporting them. To attempt to abrige this last right, by rendering the exercise of it odious, is to attempt to abrige a privilege, the most essential of any to the security of the people. The laws, which afford sufficient protection to the Magistrate, will punish the excess of this privilege; within the bounds ⟨they allow, it is the bulwark of public liberty.
But, observations of either kind might mutually have been spared. There is no danger that the rights of a man, at the head of the Government (possessing all the influence to be derived from long continuance in office, the disposition of lucrative places, and consummate talents for popularity) can be injured by the voice of a private individual. There is as little danger, that the spirit of the people of this State will ever tolerate attempts to seduce, to awe, or to clamor them out of the privilege of bringing the conduct of men in power to the bar of public examination.
To all the declamation and invective, with which the Republican winds up his performance, and labors to mislead the public attention from its true object, a short answer will be given. It is the stale trick of the party to traduce every⟩ independent man, opposed to their views, the better to preserve to themselves that power and consequence, to which they have no other title than their arts of deceiving the people.
Mr. Hamilton can however defy all their malevolent ingenuity to produce a single instance of his conduct public, or private, inconsistent with the strictest rules of integrity and honor—a single instance, that may even denominate him selfish, or interested—a single instance in which he has either “forfieted” the confidence of the people or failed in obtaining any proof of their favour for which he has been a candidate. It would be ingratitude in him not to acknowlege that the marks of their confidence have greatly exceeded his deserts.


Title: Constitutional Convention. Remarks on Signing the Constitution, [17 September 1787]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

[Philadelphia, September 17, 1787]

Mr. Hamilton expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent sparks which lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may soon subside. No man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other.