Title: From Alexander Hamilton to the New York Committee of Correspondence, 28 April 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: New York Committee of Correspondence

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]April 28, 1777
Gentlemen
Extreme hurry of business puts it out of my power to say but very little.
Your information concerning a piece of ordnance lately constructed at Philadelphia is true. There is such a piece at Head Quarters, weighs 227 ld, carries a three pound ball. The iron is wraught hooped and welded together. The General and others esteem it a great acquisi[ti]on. It has been fired twenty times as fast as possible, and is supposed to be thorough proof. For my part I am rather dubious of this matter, and have recommended 50 successive discharges instead of 20. If she would stand that her sufficiency would be ascertained beyond a doubt, and her value would be immense; and as it is a new experiment, we cannot take too much pains ⟨to be sure. If Mr.⟩ Livingston ⟨can con⟩struct ⟨pieces of the same kind⟩ and weight that will stand a similar proof, he will render the most essential service to his Country. We cannot have too respectable an artillery; and he need not doubt they will be wanted.

As to the ships opposite Fort Washington, The General first supposed they might be intended to make a descent on the Jersey side and come by surprise on our left flank; but he now considers it wholly as an amusement, while they were executing their attempt upon the stores at Danbury. Of this affair, you are probably as well advised as we are.
I thank you for your promise of sending me the model of your Government as soon as published. I have sanguine expectations concerning it.
Nothing new at Head Quarters but the attempt against Danbury. If the enemy do not ⟨take the field⟩ in a general way in a fortnight, of ⟨which except⟩ the maturity of the season, ⟨there are no new arguments since I last, entered upon the Subject, I shall begin to think with you, that they probably mean to confine themselves to a partizan war⟩ ’till they get reinforced or receive further orders.
Troops coming on from the southward. We are told there are 2000 Carolinians, far on their way to Philadelphia—a part arrived.
I am with great respect   Gentlemen   Your most Obdt servant
A Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Benjamin Lincoln, [28 April 1777]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Lincoln, Benjamin

[Morristown, New Jersey, April 28, 1777]
It appears by your letter to his Excellency that the detachment of Marylanders under Col Spotswood, have marched to your post, with the other troops. His intention and directions were, that they should remain at Princeton, as he wishes to keep the Corps united, but since the matter has fallen out differently, he desires that detachment may immediately return to Princeton.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Gurdon Saltonstall, 28 April 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Saltonstall, Gurdon

Morristown [New Jersey] April 28, 1777. Refuses to comply with Saltonstall’s request for back pay.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, 29 April 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, William

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]April 29. 1777
Sir,
The inclosed was intended to be sent with the prisoners mentioned in the list; but before this could be done, Mr. Sims, one of the chief Justices of the State came to this town, and informed me, that the Governor and Council were upon the point of adjourning, and that the sending the prisoners to them would only be an embarrassment without answering, at present, any valuable purpose. He considered himself as authorised to take the matter under his direction, and desired a sight of the papers relating to it. After perusing them, he determined, that it was best the prisoners should remain here, until he should receive your further orders on the subject; and informs me, that a letter here-with sent you, contains a representation of their cases, as they appear to him, for the purpose of knowing your sense in what manner they shall be disposed of. He admitted two of them, Woolverton and Silas Howel, to bail.
In addition to the former, I send you a second list of four others that have been lately committed to Jail. These are capital offenders and among the number of those, who, it were to be wished, could have an immediate trial and punishment, Isaac Ogden in particular is one of the most barefaced, impudent fellows, that ever came under my observation. He openly acknowleged himself a subject to the King of Great Britain and flatly refused to give any satisfaction to some questions that were put to him respecting one Moses Nichols, an emissary from the enemy, alleging no other reason for his refusal, than that he had given his word to be silent.
A spirit of disaffection shows itself with so much boldness and violence, in different parts of this state, that it is the ardent wish of his Excellency, no delay might be used in making examples of some of the most atrocious offenders. If something be not speedily done to strike a terror into the disaffected, the consequences must be very fatal. Among other ill effects all security to the friends of the American cause, will be destroyed; and the natural effect of this will be an extinction of their zeal in seconding and promoting it. Their attachment, if it remain, will be a dead, inactive, useless principle. And the tories, emboldened by impunity, will be encouraged to proceed to the most daring and pernicious lengths.
On the other hand it may not be unuseful to acquaint you, that in the course of the examination made by His Excellency’s order, it appeared, that private pique and resentment had had their influence in causing some innocent persons to be apprehended; and that, in many instances, there was so slight a foundation of guilt as made it highly impolitic to meddle with them. It is always injurious to apprehend those, whose cases are such as afterwards oblige us to acquit or discharge them. To the innocent and friendly it is an occasion of disgust; to the wavering and disaffected it serves as an argument for a greater defection, and affords an opportunity for triumph and declamation. Their unmerited persecution is a good topic to excite the sympathy and pity of their neighbours; and there is an easy transition from these feelings to those of abhorrence and indignation against the unjust persecutors. It would be happy could things be put upon such a footing, as that those who ought to be taken notice of, might not escape; and that the innocent, or petty offenders might not be improperly molested, just as the malignity of some and the indiscretion of others may suggest. All this is submitted with due deference to Your Excellency’s judgment.
I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect   Your Excellency’s Most Obedient servant
A HamiltonA D.C.
Governor Livingston


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, 3 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: McDougall, Alexander

Morristown [New Jersey] May 3, 1777. Approves detention of Seward’s company. States that the sailing of British ships from Amboy, New Jersey, necessitates further attention to British movements on North River.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, 6 May 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Duer, William

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]May 6. 1777
Sir,
The bearer of this is Mr. Malmedi a french Gentleman of learning, abilities and experience. I believe he thinks himself intitled to preferment and comes to Congress for that purpose. At the recommendation of General Lee he was made Brigadier General by the State of Rhode Island, and filled the station to the satisfaction of his employers, as appears by a letter from Governor Cook, speaking of him in the highest terms of approbation. This has led him to hope that he should be adopted by the Continent on an equal footing. But in this he will no doubt be mistaken as there are many insuperable objections to such an event. Among others it would tend to raise the expectations of Frenchmen in general, already too high, to a pitch, which it would be impossible to gratify or endure. It might not however be amiss to do whatever propriety would warrant to keep him in good humour, as he is a man of sense and merit. I think policy would justify the advancing him a step higher, than his former Continental rank.
Congress in the beginning went upon a very injudicious plan with respect to Frenchmen. To every adventurer that came, without even the shadow of credentials, they gave the rank of field officers. This circumstance, seconding the aspiring disposition natural to those people, carried the expectations of those who had really any pretensions to the character of officers to a length that exceeded all bounds of moderation. As it was impossible to persue this impolitic plan, the Congress have begun to retrench their excessive liberality; and the consequence has been universal disgust and discontent.
It would perhaps be injurious, as the French are much addicted to national punctilio, to run into the opposite extreme to that first embraced, and by that mean create a general clamor and dissatisfaction. Policy suggests the propriety of discriminating a few of the most deserving, and endeavouring to keep them in temper even by gratifying them beyond what they can reasonably pretend to. This will enable us to shake off the despicable part with safety, and to turn a deaf ear to the exorbitant demands of the many. It will be easily believed in France that their want of merit occasioned their want of success, from the extraordinary marks of favor that have been conferred on others; whereas the united voice of complaint from the whole, might make ill impressions in their own Country, which it is not our interest should exist.
We are already greatly embarrassed with the Frenchmen among us, and from the genius of the people shall continue to be so. It were to be wished that our agents in France, instead of courting them to come out, were instructed to give no encouragement but where they could not help it; that is where applications were made to them by persons, countenanced and supported by great men, whom it would be impolitic to disoblige. Be assured, Sir, we shall never be able to satisfy them; and they can be of no use to us, at least for sometime. Their ignorance of our language, of the disposition of the people, the resources and difficiencies of the country, their own habits and tempers—all these are disqualifications that put it out of their power to be of any real use or service to us. You will consider what I have said intirely as my own sentiments & believe me to be with regard Sir   Your most hum servt
A. Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 7 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

Morristown [New Jersey] May 7, 1777. Encloses letter to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, who is needed at Headquarters.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, 11 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: McDougall, Alexander

Morristown [New Jersey] May 11, 1777. States that Major General Nathanael Greene and Brigadier General Henry Knox will inspect posts under McDougall’s command.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gouverneur Morris, 11 May 1777
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Kingston, New York, May 11, 1777. On May 12, 1777, Hamilton wrote to Morris: “I have received the pleasure of your favour of yesterday’s date.” Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, 12 May 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Gouverneur

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]May 12th 1777
Dear Sir,
I have received the pleasure of your favour of yesterday’s date. The reasons you assign for the interval of silence on your part are admitted as sufficient; though I regret that the principal one exists—the combination of the tories for a general insurrection. But perhaps on the scale of policy I ought rather to congratulate you on the event: That there are too many tories in your state as well as in several others is a fact too well known: That they should confederate themselves for active purposes of revolt and disaffection, when once discovered, is desireable; because it arms the vindictive justice of the state, and will justify, in the eyes of all the world, a radical blow at the faction. Were it not that we have seen so many similar instances, that only prove the temerity and folly of the Tories, I should consider this, as a presumptive argument, that the enemy intend your way.
It seems now fully the opinion of our Generals, that the last year’s project for uniting the two armies by the conquest of your state, will be prosecuted this campaign. To confirm this supposition, all the latter intelligence we have received from the enemy strongly indicates an intention to evacuate the Jerseys; and ’tis thought there will be very great obstacles to an attempt upon Philadelphia, by way of the Delaware; ’tis concluded that the North River must be the object. And, upon this principle, General’s Green and Knox in whom, His Excellency has great confidence, are sent to examine the situation of things with you, and in concert with General McDougall, who is in equal estimation, to adopt every proper expedient for putting you in the best state of defence. They set out this day.
If the enemy do not, in fact, aim at Philadelphia, they have been very artful in throwing out appearances well calculated to deceive; and which, though they have not had so full an effect, as at any time to cause our cautious General to lose sight of the other object which ’tis now imagined they propose to themselves; yet they have so far deceived as to beget pretty universally the opinion they wished to impose. But for my own part, though I am staggered in my conjectures; yet I by no means give up my first supposition. I think it very probable they are only evacuating the Jerseys, to be out of danger of an attack from us, which they have reason to fear from the increasing strength of our army; and mean to incamp on Staten Island ’till reinforced. It would be madness in them weak as they are in numbers to risk all in any capital attempt; and I am confident they will not do it unless they have a desperate game to play and have no expectation of reinforcements. Such a conduct would be contrary to every principle of war or policy. Howe cannot take the field with more than eight thousand men; let him go where he will, the probability of a defeat will be strong; and the consequences of it would be absolutely fatal. How can he hope to penetrate so far with so small a force, and with such a miserable supply of Horses to convey his Artillery and Baggage? It seems to me too, with respect to the supposed design upon your state, if it really existed, they would have taken care to have seized your forts and other important posts, when they must have been apprized you were in no condition to defend them.
We have lately had one or two little skirmishes here. A party from Bound brook, beat up some of the enemies advanced pickets, from Brunswick. An attack was made upon their pickets near Bonum Town. We have no regular account of this matter; but what we have had is to this purport: That a party under Col: Cook attacked one of their pickets and drove it in: That it was reinforced and sallied out again and was beaten in a second time: That it received a second reinforcement and made a second sally; and, That General Maxwell who conducted the affair; perceiving the matter growing too serious by continual succours coming to them from Brunswick and Amboy, thought it best to retire which he did in good order, the enemy keeping at a respectful distance, during the whole time of their retrogradation. Tis said we have lost between 20 & 30, killed, wounded and a few stragglers taken; and ’tis also asserted that some of our officers counted nineteen dead bodies of the enemy on the field. The Royal Highlanders had taken possession of a wood, by way of ambuscade, out of which they were expelled by our troops. Here I believe the principal loss was sustained on both sides.
I am with great regard   Sir   Your Obedient servant
A Hamilton
I thank you for the inclosures of every kind. I believe you have not received a letter I wrote a few days ago, giving my idea of your cons[ti]tution, with which on a second inspection I am better pleased than at first. You will oblige me by forward[ing] the inclosed.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General James Mitchell Varnum, 14 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Varnum, James Mitchell

Morristown [New Jersey] May 14, 1777. Orders Varnum to forward recruits despite the opposition of the Rhode Islanders.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, 19 May 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Gouverneur

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]May 19th. 1777
Dear Sir,
I this moment received the favour of your letter of the 16th instant.

I partly agree and partly disagree with you respecting the deficiencies of your constitution. That there is a want of vigor in the executive, I believe will be found true. To determine the qualifications proper for the chief executive Magistrate requires the deliberate wisdom of a select assembly, and cannot be safely lodged with the people at large. That instability is inherent in the nature of popular governments, I think very disputable; unstable democracy, is an epithet frequently in the mouths of politicians; but I believe that from a strict examination of the matter, from the records of history, it will be found that the fluctuation of governments in which the popular principle has borne a considerable sway, has proceeded from its being compounded with other principles and from its being made to operate in an improper channel. Compound governments, though they may be harmonious in the beginning, will introduce distinct interests; and these interests will clash, throw the state into convulsions & produce a change or dissolution. When the deliberative or judicial powers are vested wholly or partly in the collective body of the people, you must expect error, confusion and instability. But a representative democracy, where the right of election is well secured and regulated & the exercise of the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities, is vested in select persons, chosen really and not nominally by the people, will in my opinion be most likely to be happy, regular and durable. That the complexity of your legislative will occasion delay and dilatoriness is evident and I fear may be attended with much greater, evil; as expedition is not very material in making laws, especially when the government is well digested and matured by time. The evil I mean is, that in time, your senate, from the very name and from the mere circumstance of its being a separate member of the legislature, will be liable to degenerate into a body purely aristocratical. And I think the danger of an abuse of power from a simple legislative would not be very great, in a government where the equality and fulness of popular representation is so wisely provided for as in yours. On the whole, though I think there are the defects intimated, I think your Government far the best that we have yet seen, and capable of giving long and substantial happiness to the people. Objections to it should be suggested with great caution and reserve.
Nothing particular in the military line—The enemy still in the Jersies, though they have been some time sending away their stores baggage &c. and are raising new works of defence. All this may be preparatory to an evacuation at all events, and they may be only intended to pave the way for a retreat, in case of an attack, or any accident. Advices from the West Indies, that have an appearance of authenticity, mention a french vessel bound for the Continent, being taken by the British frigate, Perseus, and carried into Dominique; and a remonstrance being made by the Governor of Martinique, threatening reprisals in case of a detention. Nay, some accounts say he has actually seized all the English vessels in the harbour of Martinique and imprisonned their seamen ’till restitution shall be made. If these accounts be true, they are important, and may be considered as an earnest of more general hostility.
Perhaps your next favour will find me at Bound brook. Head Quarters will soon be moved there. Our family seem desirous of cultivating a closer acquaintance with the enemy than we have had the pleasure of, for some time past.
With real regard, I am Sir,   Your most obedt servant
A Hamilton
Relying on your punctuality in favouring me with any important intelligence your way, I am likely to lose a beaver hat, which was staked against the truth of the report of the stores at St. John’s being destroyed. If you forget me in future, I will certainly excommunicate you.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, 23 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: McDougall, Alexander

Morristown [New Jersey] May 23, 1777. Commends McDougall on his attachment to the cause. Suggests that the needed food can be obtained at Albany. Agrees that uniformity of regulations is necessary and disapproves of officers breaking parole.


Title: General Washington to James Warren, 23 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Warren, James

Morristown [New Jersey] May 23, 1777. Commends Massachusetts’ exertions, but states that still more effort is necessary. Lists reasons why the invasion of Massachusetts is unlikely. Discusses the necessity and advantages of a single, unified army as opposed to individual state forces. Entreats Massachusetts, therefore, not to raise local regiments. States that supernumerary regiments can remain in Massachusetts.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gouverneur Morris, 24 May 1777
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Kingston [New York] May 24, 1777. Has no news of the destruction of stores at St. Johns. Speculates on future course of the war and discusses need for maintaining health of troops.


Title: George Washington to Charles Thomson, 24 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Thomson, Charles

Morristown [New Jersey] May 24, 1777. Encloses copy of plan for establishing a cavalry force.


Title: George Washington to Robert Morris, 28 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Morris, Robert

Morristown [New Jersey] May 28, 1777. Encloses a letter from Major General Charles Lee. States that he (Washington) is on his way to Bound Brook.


Title: George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 29 May 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Sullivan, John

Morristown [New Jersey] May 29, 1777. Orders Sullivan to send intelligence concerning the enemy as rapidly as possible. Repeats orders for rerouting men and wagons. States that John Parke Custis is not to come by the usual road.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Captain Francis Grice, [30 May 1777]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Grice, Francis

[Middlebrook, New Jersey, May 30, 1777. By Washington’s orders Hamilton wrote to Grice, assistant deputy quartermaster general, ordering the removal of all boats in the Delaware from Trenton up to Coryells. Letter not found.]


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Catharine Livingston, May 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Catharine

Head Quarters Morris Town [New Jersey]May 1777
When I was almost out of patience and out of humour at your presumptuous delay, in not showing yourself duly sensible of the honor done you, by me, your epistle opportunely came to hand, and has put all matters tolerably to rights.
As I thought it well enough written, and no discredit to you, I ventured to show it to a Gentleman of our family. He was silly enough to imagine, that I did this through vanity, and a desire to display my own importance, in having so fair and so sensible a correspondent, as he indulgently called you; but I hope you will not be so vain as to entertain a single moment, the most distant imagination of the same kind. It would be paying your self too high a compliment, and give room to suspect you are strongly infected with that extreme self-complacency, commonly attributed to your sex.
But as I have no reason to believe this Gentleman has serious thoughts of becoming my rival; to give, at once, a mortal blow to all his hopes, I will recount what passed on this occasion. After attentively perusing your letter, during which, the liveliest emotions of approbation were pictured in his face, ‘Hamilton!’ cries he, ‘when you write to this divine girl again, it must be in the stile of adoration: none but a goddess, I am sure, could have penned so fine a letter!’ As I know you have ⟨an⟩ invincible aversion to all flattery and extravagance, I ⟨can⟩not be afraid, that a Quixot[e], capable of uttering hims⟨elf⟩ perfectly in the language of knight-errantry, will ev⟨er be⟩ able to supplant me in the good graces of a lady of you⟨r⟩ sober understanding.
I am glad you are sensible of the oblig⟨at⟩ions, you are under to me, for my benevolent and disinteres⟨ted⟩ conduct, in making so currageous an effort, under all the imaginary terrors you intimate, without any tolerable p⟨ros⟩pect of … compensation. I am very willing to continue my kindness, even though it meet with no better a return, than in the past instance; provided you will stipulate on your part, that it shall meet with no worse. But to g⟨ive⟩ a more perfect idea of what you owe me for this condesce⟨nding⟩ generosity, let me inform you, that I exercise it at the ⟨risk⟩ of being anathematized by grave censors for dedicating so much of my time, to so trifling and insignificant a toy as—woman; and, on the other hand, of being run through the body by saucy inamorato’s, who will envy me the prodigious favour, forsooth, of your correspondence. So that between the morose apathy of some and the envious sensibility of others, I shall probably be in a fine way. But ALL FOR LOVE is my motto. You may make what comments you please. Now for politics.
’Tis believed by our military Connoisseurs, that the enemy are preparing to quit the Jerseys, and make some expedition by water. Many suppose up the North River. But my opinion is, that, if they abandon the Jerseys, they will content themselves with enjoying quiet quarters on Staten Island, ’till re-inforced. Perhaps, however, the appearances, which give rise to an opinion of an evacuation of the Jerseys, are only preparatory to an attack upon us. They would admit such an interpretation if an attempt of the kind were not too hazardous to be consistent with prudence. Should they leave this state, your return home would be the more safe and agreeable; but you need not be precipitate.
Your sentiments respecting war are perfec⟨tly⟩ just. I do not wonder at your antipathy to it. Every finer feeling of a delicate mind revolts from the idea of shedding human blood and multiplying the common evils of life by the artificial methods incident to that state. Wer⟨e⟩ it not for the evident necessity and in defence of all that is valuable in society, I could never be reconciled to a milit⟨ary⟩ character; and shall rejoice when the restoration of pe⟨ace⟩ on the basis of freedom and independence shall put it ⟨in⟩ my power to renounce it. That my fugitive friend soon be restored to those peaceful and secure abodes she ⟨longs⟩ for, is not more her own wish, than that of—
Alexr. Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Major General William Health, 1 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Health, William

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 1, 1777. Discusses arrival of Du Coudray. Approves of removal of military stores.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Samuel Holden Parsons, 1 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Parsons, Samuel Holden

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 1, 1777. Orders all troops not needed for the Long Island expedition to Peekskill, New York.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, 2 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jay, John

Middle Brook Camp [New Jersey]June 2d. 1777
Dear Sir,
I received your favour per express, and as the absence of my former respectable correspondents has made a change necessary, I am happy that you have been substituted in their room.
Except a body of Militia at and about Pumpton and a few detachments of observation, our whole army is now collected at two points; the main body here, and a division under General Sullivan at Princeton. Though this alteration of circumstances takes off in a great measure the restraints imposed upon the enemy during the Winter, gives them a more ample field to range in, and exposes the country more to their ravages; yet the measure is abundantly justified by every wise military maxim. The rigor of the season has been heretofore our chief security against those advantages which might have been taken of our dispersed state; and this dispersion was necessary, both for the conveniency of Winter Quarters, and with a view to confine and distress the enemy, which was the most capital object we could then propose to ourselves. It was also necessary by this method to second the check to that torrent of influence which their successes in the Jerseys had given them. Many other justifying reasons might be assigned which I doubt not you will easily conceive, and which it would be indiscreet to commit to paper.
But now that a more active season is arrived, and something of importance must be done on one side or the other, it becomes our business to put ourselves in the best posture both for defence and offence. Common sense dictates that the best way to effect this is to collect our strength. In a collected state we can best repel a general attack; we can best make one, if circumstances warrant it; and we can move with greater expedition to disconcert any sudden push not immediately upon us, which the enemy are likely to make. It is needless to enlarge on a subject which your own judgment will enable you, of itself, to view in a just light.
As to the designs of the enemy, appearances are so intricate, fluctuating, and seemingly inconsistent, that it is difficult to form any certain conclusion from them. Either they do not understand themselves and are very irresolute and fickle, or they very artfully manage matters to deceive us. I am rather inclined to suppose the former. This however I may say, with tolerable certainty, that my ideas of their intending to operate to the Southward, derive just support from such parts of their conduct lately as are most intelligible. We have a variety of concurring intelligence that they have lately drawn more troops into the Jerseys, that they have brought over a large number of waggons and all the boats perpared for bridges, with several other particulars of less importance—all which denote a preparation to operate this way. Persons who have been among them assert confidently that they mean to attack us. But we are divided in sentiment as to the probability of that or of their making a forced march to Philadelphia. If they act wisely they will neither attack us in our present situation, strongly posted as we are, nor will they attempt to cross a river, where they may certainly expect opposition in front, and leaving at the same time a formidable army in the rear. He should endeavour to draw us off from here and fight us upon more equal ground. But after all, if he expects any timely reinforcement, upon what rational principle can he risk his own reputation and all the hopes of his cause, in an attempt, with his present force, so extremely important and hazardous? Perhaps he only means to get every thing in readiness against the arrival of the reinforcements, looked for, that he may immediately commence his operations. Things however will hardly bear this construction.
We are told that in seventeen sail lately arrived from Europe, there were about 2000 raw recruits. This from deserters.
The enemy yesterday perpetrated a most barbarous butchery upon a Lieutenant Martin of ours. He was out with a scouting party, and met some of the British light horse; his men ’tis said quitted him. But however other matters may be ’tis certain his dead body was found most horribly mangled. He had not a single bullet wound, but was hacked to pieces with the sword. He had several cuts in his head, each of which was sufficient to dispatch him, besides a number of more inconsiderable scars about his body and hands. It is evident, that the most wanton and unnecessary cruelty must have been used towards him; for the greater part of his wounds must have been given him when utterly out of a condition to resist. This may be relied on as a fact, for I saw his corps as did also every officer and soldier in camp that chose it. The General sent him down to their lines with a letter to Lord Cornwallis, as an undeniable evidence of their brutality; but the letter was taken from the flag and sent in; the flag and the body not permitted to pass their out posts.
I am   Sir   With real respect & esteem   Your most Obedt servt
A Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Charles, Earl Cornwallis, 2 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Cornwallis, Charles, Earl

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 2, 1777. Remonstrates against murder of William Martin.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 2 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Middlebrook Camp [New Jersey] June 2, 1777. Encloses news from Northern Department. Deplores deficiency of troops. States that Colonel Elias Boudinot is going to Philadelphia to discuss exchange of prisoners.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General John Sullivan, 4 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Sullivan, John

Head Quarters Campat Middle Brook [New Jersey] June 4th. 1777
Sir
His Excellency has received your favour of this Day. In answer to it he commands me to inform you that though he is exceedingly happy to hear such an animation prevails among the inhabitants, yet he can by no means, consent to put arms in their hands. This article is too much wanted for the Continental army to be spared to the militia; and experience has taught us, that there has been infinite abuse and misapplication of the public arms when confided to them. As to ammunition, [The] General has no objection that a small quantity should be given them; provided it be lodged with their officers, who are to be accountable, for its being devoted to the uses intended.
I am   Dr. Sir   Yr Most Obedt serv
A Hamilton ADC


Title: George Washington to James Lovell, 4 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Lovell, James

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 4, 1777. Discusses the qualifications of Lutterloh.


Title: George Washington to Charles, Earl Cornwallis, 6 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Cornwallis, Charles, Earl

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 6, 1777. States that all supplies for prisoners must go through Colonel Elias Boudinot’s hands. Assures Cornwallis that the greatest care will be taken with these supplies. Is surprised at Cornwallis’ reasoning concerning the murder of William Martin.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 7 June 1777
From: Livingston, Robert R.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

7th. June 1777 Kingston [New York]
Dear Sir
With my place at Council I resume the agreeable task of writing to you & answering your Letter directed to Mr. Jay.
I see with you the propriety of collecting our army to a point & have often been under apprehentions least the enemy should take advantage of our former dispersed state & the necessity that drove us into it. But they have wanted the spirit of enterprize or been deceived greatly as to our strength. I can hardly yet persuade myself that they design to go to the Southward since it appears to me an undertaking infinitely above their strength unless they are very considerably reinforced; what their prospects of being so are I have not been able to learn. I do not know how to account for their leaving a part of their troops at Rhode Island when they need their assistance in the Jersies; had they heretofore moved on rational principles I should suppose that they expected to be so far strengthened as to be able to make a divertion there, while their main body carried on its operations to the Southward; but their motions have always been so excentrick that there is no rule by which we can form a judgment of them.
If it should be true that more force has been drawn from New York into the Jerseys, might it not be worth while to alarm New York by sending down two or three thousand men who might possibly strike some bold stroke or at least oblidge the Enemy to retain a considerable part of their force at that place & proportionably weaken their army in the Jerseys? The practicability of this measure must however depend upon a variety of circumstances with which you are better acquainted than I can be. Our act of grace has had a very happy effect & numbers are daily coming in to take the benefit of it. The spirit of disaffection being lower now than it has been in this State since the begining of the controversy owing to the vigilence of the government, the punishment of some capital Offenders, and above all to the weakness & langour of the enimies measures. Some very concientious persons have declared (when they took the oath to the State) that they held themselves absolved from all allegience to a power that was no longer able to protect them. Tho’ I do not think such convertions greatly to be relied on, yet they are of use in stoping the progress of disaffection & giving an appearance of strength & unanimity to our government on which more depends than is generally imagined.
I am Sir   With the utmost regard & esteem   Yours &c.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Samuel Blachley Webb, 7 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Webb, Samuel Blachley

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 7, 1777. Censures Webb for overdrafts of clothing. Orders Webb to march to Peekskill.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Israel Putnam, 9 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Putnam, Israel

Head Quarters Camp atMiddle Brook [New Jersey] June 9th. 1777.
Sir,
His Excellency desires you will not open or distribute the Cloathing stopped at your post, ’till a Deputy Cloathier comes up to take Charge of it, who will be with you without Loss of time.
I am Sir   Your most humb servt.
A Hamilton ADC


Title: George Washington to Colonel Charles Armand, 11 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Armand, Charles

[Middlebrook, New Jersey] June 11, 1777. Orders Armand to assume command of Ottendorf’s corps, to expand this corps to a full regiment, and in the future to take orders from Major General Benjamin Lincoln.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General John Sullivan, [12–25 June 1777]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Sullivan, John

Head Quarters Camp at[Middlebrook, New Jersey, June 12–25, 1777]
Sir,
His Excellency has received your two last favours to day. In the first you hint the want of a reinforcement; but as the intention of your body is chiefly for observation and skirmishing and not to make any serious stand, it is the less necessary it should be powerful in numbers. It will however depend upon circumstances, how far it will be expedient to reinforce you; and as soon as any thing can be determined from them, you shall have whatever addition of strength you may stand in need of.
The information contained in your last of the enemy’s being incamped on the road leading from Brunswick to Princeton about the three Mile run is not well founded. We have had parties and officers reconnoitring as far as the mile run and there is no sign of an incampment. They seem to be taking their old position with their right at Amboy and their left at Brunswick; but how long they will remain so it is hard to tell. His Excellency desires you will engage some trusty persons at South Amboy, on whom you can depend for faithful and early intelligence of the appearance of shipping in the river, or any preparations for a movement by water, that we may be, in time, prepared to counteract them.
I am with regard   Sir   Your most Obed servant
A Hamilton ADC


Title: Discharge of Joshua Austin, 13 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Austin, Joshua

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 13, 1777. “… Joshua Austin, belonging to the independent company of the State of Connecticut, … appears to be incapable of military service. He is hereby discharged from the Continental army.…”


Title: George Washington to Charles Thomson, 13 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Thomson, Charles

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 13, 1777. Encloses copy of a plan for the establishment of a cavalry force.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Thomas Elliott, 21 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Elliott, Thomas

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 21, 1777. Warns Elliott that any further delay in appearing at Headquarters will result in a replacement being appointed to his position in the regiment.


Title: George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 22 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 22, 1777. Orders Putnam to prepare for a probable British attack up the North River. States that enemy has abandoned Brunswick and will probably also leave Amboy. Orders stores to be removed from Fishkill.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Alexander McDougall, 23 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: McDougall, Alexander

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 23, 1777. Approves of McDougall’s return to Peekskill. States that British are leaving New Jersey. Warns McDougall to expect an attack up North River.


Title: George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, 23 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 23, 1777. Regrets inability to supply field pieces. Is pleased with report on quota of troops. Advises Trumbull on exchange of Danbury prisoners. Praises American attack on British evacuating Brunswick.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, [25 June 1777]
From: Livingston, Robert R.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Kingston, New York, June 25, 1777. On June 28, 1777, Hamilton wrote to Robert R. Livingston: “Yours of the 25th came to hand last night.” Letter not found.]


Title: George Washington to Baron d’Arendt, 25 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Arendt, Henry Leonard Philip

Quibbletown [New Jersey] June 25, 1777. Grants permission for Baron d’Arendt to visit Philadelphia and advises D’Arendt to consult Congress on plan for Prussian treaty.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert R. Livingston, 28 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Robert R.

Head Quarters Campat Middle Brook [New Jersey] June 28 1777
Dear Sir.
Yours of the 25th came to hand last night. Since my last addressed to Mr. Morris, the enemy have been trying a second experiment to tempt us to an engagement, on equal terms of ground. Under the supposition of their intending to evacuate the Jerseys immediately, in order to keep up the idea of a persuit, and to be in a posture to take advantage of any critical moment that might present itself to give them a blow, the chief part of our army, after their retreat from Brunswick, was marched down to Quibble town, and parties detached thence further towards the enemy. Finding this disposition take place and expecting that elated by what had passed, we might be willing to venture upon a general engagement, which is Howe’s only hope, he came out with his whole army from Amboy early on thursday morning and made a forced march towards our left, with design, if possible, to cut off some of our detachments, particularly one under Lord Stirling; and propably, if we were not expeditious in regaining the heights, to get there before us, by rapidly entering the passes on our left. Lord Stirlings party was near being surrounded; but after a smart skirmish with the enemy’s main body, made their retreat good to Westfield, and ascended the pass of the mountains back of the Scotch plains. The other parties after skirmishing on their flanks came off to join the main body and take possession of the heights. The enemy continued their march towards our left as far as Westfield, and there halted. In the mean time, it was judged prudent to return with the army to the mountains, lest it should be their intention to get into them and force us to fight them on their own terms. They remained at Westfield ’till the next day, and perceiving their views disappointed have again returned to Amboy, plundering and burning as usual. We had parties hanging about them in their return; but they were so much on their guard no favourable opportunity could be found of giving them any material annoyance. Their loss we cannot ascertain; and our own, in men, is inconsiderable, though we have as yet received no returns of the missing. I have no doubt they have lost more men than we, but unfortunately, I won’t say from what cause, they got three field pieces from us, which will give them room for vapouring, and embellish their excursion, in the eyes of those, who make every trifle a matter of importance. It is not unlikely they will soon be out of the Jersies; but where they will go to next is mere matter of conjecture, for as you observe, their conduct is so eccentric, as to leave no certain grounds on which to form a judgment of their intentions.
I know the comments that some people will make on our Fabian conduct. It will be imputed either to cowardice or to weakness: But the more discerning, I trust, will not find it difficult to conceive that it proceeds from the truest policy, and is an argument neither of the one nor the other. The liberties of America are an infinite stake. We should not play a desperate game for it or put it upon the issue of a single cast of the die. The loss of one general engagement may effectually ruin us, and it would certainly be folly to hazard it, unless our resources for keeping up an army were at an end, and some decisive blow was absolutely necessary; or unless our strength was so great as to give certainty of success. Neither is the case. America can in all probability maintain its army for years, and our numbers though such as would give a reasonable hope of success are not such as should make us intirely sanguine. A third consideration did it exist might make it expedient to risk such an event—the prospect of very great reinforcements to the enemy; but every appearance contradicts this, and affords all reason to believe, they will get very inconsiderable accessions of strength this campaign. All the European maritime powers are interested for the difeat of the British arms in America, and will never assist them. A small part of Germany is disposed to make a market of its troops, and even this seems not over-fond of being drained any further. Many springs may be put in motion even to put a stop to this. The King of Prussia may perhaps without much difficulty be engaged to espouse views unfriendly to the Court of Britain, and a nod of his would be sufficient to prevent all future German succours. He as well as most other powers of Europe feels the necessity of Commerce and a large maritime force to be generally respectable. His situation, ’till lately, has been unfavourable to this; but the reduction of Poland and the acquisition of Dantzig in the Baltic, have put it very much in his power to persue commercial schemes; and may tempt him to be propitious to American independence. Russian assistance is still infinitely more precarious; for besides that it cannot be the true interest of that ambitious empire to put its troops to sale, it is, at present, embroiled with the turks and will want all its men to employ in its own wars. England herself, from the nature of her polity can furnish few soldiers and even these few can ill be spared to come to America in the present hostile appearance of affairs in Europe. On whatever side it is considered, no great reinforcements are to be expected to the British army in America. It is therefore Howe’s business to make the most of his present strength, and as he is not numerous enough to conquer and garrison as he goes, his only hope lies in fighting us and giving a general defeat at one blow.
On our part, we are continually strengthening our political springs in Europe, and may every day look for more effectual aids than we have yet received. Our own army is continually growing stronger in men arms and discipline. We shall soon have an important addition of Artillery, now in its way to join us. We can maintain our present numbers good at least by inlistments, while the enemy must dwindle away; and at the end of the summer the disparity between us will be infinitely great, and facilitate any exertions that may be made to settle the business with them. Their affairs will be growing worse—our’s better;—so that delay will ruin them. It will serve to perplex and fret them, and precipitate them into measures, that we can turn to good account. Our business then is to avoid a General engagement and waste the enemy away by constantly goading their sides, in a desultory teazing way.
In the mean time it is painful to leave a part of the inhabitants a prey to their depredations; and it is wounding to the feelings of a soldier, to see an enemy parading before him and daring him to a fight which he is obliged to decline. But a part must be sacrificed to the whole, and passion must give way to reason. You will be sensible, that it will not be adviseable to publish the sentiments contained in this letter as coming from me, because this will make the enemy more fully acquainted with our views; but it might not be amiss to have them circulated, as those which ought to govern the conduct of the army, in order to prepare the minds of the people for what may happen and take off the disagreeable impressions our caution may make.
I am Dr. Sir   Your most Obed servant
A Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Brigadier General Charles Scott, 30 June 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Scott, Charles

Head Quarters [Middlebrook, New Jersey] June 30th. 1777
Sir,
I wrote you this moment by His Excellency’s order; but he is so anxious you should be acquainted with his apprehensions on the score of the enemy’s leaving Amboy, with some of their stores remaining in it, that fearing a miscarriage of my former letter he desires me to write another to the same effect.
The enemy have had their own leisure to go off and carry whatever they thought proper. What then should induce them to leave any stores behind unless by way of ensnaring some party of ours that should be tempted by them to venture incautiously into the place they have quitted? This is much to be suspected, and you are strongly enjoined to reconnoitre well before you trust any part of your men into the Town. It will be the easiest matter in the world if you are not exceedingly vigilant to throw a party across the river upon your rear and intercept you. You had better not send your whole Brigade in; but only send in a small party to take possession of the stores, and convey as many out as you can to some other place. For this purpose you will collect as many waggons as you can about the neighbourhood. You are, by no means, to remain in Amboy all night; but retire immediately after you have put an end to any endeavours to carry off the remaining stores. Keep parties reconnoitring from Amboy to Elizabeth Town point and take every precaution to avoid a surprise.
I have ordered down provisions to Bonum Town. You can either go that place or send for the provisions from thence.
I am Dr. sir   Your most Obed serv
A Hamilton ADC


Title: George Washington to the Board of War, 30 June 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Board of War

Middlebrook [New Jersey] June 30, 1777. Discusses disposal of artillery imported in the Amphitrite. Emphasizes need for centralized regulations for procuring supplies.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gouverneur Morris, 4 July 1777
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Hamilton, Alexander

Kingston [New York] July 4 1777
Dear Sir
Your Letter gave me the Pleasure of knowing with Certainty what might be depended upon among the numerous Reports circulated Thro the Country with Relation to the Several movements of the Enemy. That Howe wishes to draw you to a General Action is highly Probable because certainly he hath no other Means of conquering the Country, but the time when he wishes to Engage must depend upon a General Estimate in his mind of what Forces he now hath, What Accessions he may receive, our Force and the Probability of its Increase or Decrease. To hazard a Generale Action on our Part is certainly contrary to the true Principles of the defensive War in wich we are engagd, so long as we can keep an Army in the Field. The most splended Victory would not Increase our Resources, nor while the Enemy keeps Amboy Strongly fortifyd in their Rear would it much weaken them. Whether Howe will risque an Attack upon our Strong Hold at a Distance from him is rather doubtfull. Possibly he may with a View to draw our Army out Upon a disorderly Retreat, tho this Idea is Rather too fine Spun for him. All the Difficulty with us will be to avoid an Action, and at the same Time save our Reputation. This Perhaps may require some master strokes in the Art of war. On the whole I am Inclined to think that Howe is loth to leave the Ferries with the Air of Compulsion, & Genl, Washington unwilling to let it be believed that he retires in any other way. That is to say (if we may venture to speake Philosophically upon a Subject of this Kind) they are Both Bidding for the Good Opinion of the Disaffected. Many Brave Fellow may Possibly Loose theare Lives on this Occasion which after all can be of little Importance in the General Scale. If the news from the northward be true in all the Extent wich the Generals seem to apprehend Howe will come up the River, but If as I verily believe The Truth is Carlton only makes a Fient in that Quarter to Prevent an Attack on our Part then Howe must in some way or other force you to fight him or bid Adieu to the Conquest of America.
But tis in vain to Scrutinize future Events. Let us know from Time to time how many Prisoners you make and what Deserters come in that we may Puff a little. Adieu.
your most Obedient & humble Servant
Gouvr Morris


Title: George Washington to Major General Charles Lee, 4 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Lee, Charles

Morristown [New Jersey] July 4, 1777. Discusses Drummond’s breach of parole.


Title: George Washington to John Rutledge, 5 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Rutledge, John

Morristown [New Jersey] July 5, 1777. Approves of Rutledge’s and Brigadier General Robert Howe’s decision not to attack St. Augustine. Discusses British failure to move against Philadelphia. Speculates on whether the center of the next British attack will be the Hudson River or Philadelphia. Describes American plans to counteract either move.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, 6 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Gouverneur

Head Quarters MorrisTown [New Jersey] July 6th. 1777
Dear Sir,
I received your favour of the 4th, by express. If I recollect how far my last went, it did not announce the return of the enemy from Westfield to Amboy, nor their evacuation of that place since. After resting and refreshing themselves a night, they decamped the following day and proceeded to Amboy from which place they went to Staten Island as expeditiously as they could; where they still remain.
The news, from the Northward, wore so serious a face that our generals thought the enemy were about to operate in earnest against our posts in that quarter; and, as supposing this the case, General Howe might certainly be expected to co-operate by way of the North river, it was judged necessary to move the main body of the army from Middle Brook to Morris Town—to advance a division under General Sullivan to Pumpton—and another under General Parsons ⟨as⟩ far ⟨as⟩ Peeks Kill. A Brigade at that post under General N⟨ixon⟩ was ordered, so soon as Parsons’ division arrived near its destination, to proceed immediately as a reinforcement to the Northern army. This disposition is deemed advantageous to prevent the success of a coup de main, on the Highland passes, and not inconsistent with a proper attention to Philadelphia, should the Northern alarm prove nothing more than a diversion and Howe return to the charge that way. I am loth to risk a conjecture about Mr. Howe. He is such an untilligible Gentleman, that no rule of interpretation can possibly be found out, by which to unravel his designs. If he acted like a man of sense, he would wait quietly on Staten Island, and there concenter all his forces. He would draw round all the men that could be spared from Canada, and all that are now at Rhode Island. With these and the reinforcements he may receive from Europe, he would make a point of forcing us by some means or other to an action. In this his only hope lies, if he could defeat our army, and improve the moment of success he would go very near effecting his purpose. But let him go to the Northward or to the Southward, every new post he takes weakens his main body, and makes it the more liable to be ruined by our collective strength. Any object short of our army is a bad one, and that plan is the worst, where by a division of his forces he runs the hazard, in case of an accident either way, of having his whole scheme overturned.
We have different accounts of the present situation of his army. Some tell us that the whole is now incamped on Staten Island, others, that the greater part of the Hessians are on board the Ships. By some sailors who came from them yesterday, we are told that the ships are taking in water and provisions for two months, and that conveniences for transporting horses are fitting up in them. All this is rather vague and may, or may not be true.
Their flourishes in the Jerseys, I believe, cannot have cost them less than 6 or 700 men. We have not lost above a hundred. This is the best way to ruin them, without risking anything.
Our present situation is embarrassing. Their ships give them a vast advantage; and we shall probably be much puzzled when they begin their operations again. We shall however act cautiously and do the best we can. We are anxiously waiting for Northern intelligence.
I am Dr. Sir   With great regard   Yrs. &c.
A. Hamilton
Please to forward the inclosed to General Schuyler ⅌ first Oppy.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Colonel Elias Dayton, 7 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Dayton, Elias

Head Quarters MorrisTown [New Jersey] July 7th. 1777
Sir,
Doctor McWorter has represented to His Excellency the case of a certain negro lately taken by a party of militia belonging to Mr. Caleb Wheeler. This fellow, it seems, some time since, went over to the enemy, and is now detained in confinement on that account. I am ordered to desire you to inquire into the circumstances of the affair, and particularly by whom the negro was taken, for on this depends the Generals power of releasement; and if you find he was taken by any party acting under Continental authority and in Continental pay, and there is no reason for detaining him besides merely the consideration of his having joined the enemy, you are authorized, as far as it comes under His Excellency’s direction to deliver him to his owner. If he was taken by a party acting merely under the authority of the state, The General has nothing to do with him, and of course you must refer his owner to the Governor or other civil magistrate impowered to take cognizance of it. If there are any particular circumstances other than those mentioned that make it improper to release him, and yet leave the matter within the reach of The General’s authority, you will be pleased to explain them to him, and wait his further directions.
I am   Sir   Your most hum serv
A Hamilton ADC


Title: George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, 7 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Trumbull, Jonathan

Morristown [New Jersey] July 7, 1777. Speculates on purpose of attack on Ticonderoga. Warns Trumbull that British may attack eastern states rather than advance up North River. Gives permission for use of arms from Springfield arsenal if Connecticut is attacked.


Title: George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 12 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Pompton Plains [New Jersey] July 12, 1777. Orders Putnam to keep Brigadier General John Glover in readiness to march to Ticonderoga, to send Brigadier General John Nixon’s men on to join their brigade, and to forward field pieces to Major General Philip Schuyler. Warns of possible attack by Sir William Howe on Peekskill.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, 13 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Jay, John

Head Quarters PomptonPlains [New Jersey] July 13th. 1777
D Sir,
I received your favour and one from Mr. Morris last night by express. The stroke at Ticonderoga is heavy, unexpected and unaccountable. If the place was untenable why not discovered to be so before the Continent had been put to such an amazing expence, in furnishing it with the means of defence? If it was tenable, what, in the name of common sense could have induced the evacuation? I would wish to suspend my judgment on the matter; but certainly present appearances speak either the most abandonned cowardice, or treachery. What can be become of Sinclair and the army? Did they venture to retreat without knowing where the enemy were, or what rout[e] to take? Or did they wilfully run into their mouths? All is mystery and dark beyond conjecture. But we must not be discouraged at a misfortune; we must rather exert ourselves the more vigorously to remedy the ill-consequences of it. If the army gets off safe, we shall soon be able to recover the face of affairs. I am in hope that Burgoignes success will precipitate him into measures that will prove his ruin. The entreprizing spirit he has credit for, I suspect, may easily be fanned by his vanity into rashness.
The day before yesterday, Our whole army marched to this place computed to be about eighteen miles from Morris Town; as soon as the weather will permit we shall continue our march to Peeks-Kill. Howe’s army we are told are all embarked. We suppose they will shortly make an excursion up the North River. If we can get there before them all will be well.
The most we have to fear is that a panic will seize the people, and disqualify them for giving their aid. It behoves their leaders to put on a chearful countenance, and combat their fears by a spirited and manly example.
I am Dr Sir   Your most Obed servant
A Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Tronson du Coudray, 13 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Tronson du Coudray

Pompton Plains [New Jersey] July 13, 1777. Discusses disposal of the artillery imported on Amphitrite. Says that Du Coudray is wrong in assuming that Mauduit du Plessis is aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Henry Knox. States that, as Du Coudray does not yet hold an official position, original arrangements for artillery will continue in effect.


Title: George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, 13 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Schuyler, Philip

Pompton Plains [New Jersey] July 13, 1777. Discusses supplies sent to Schuyler. Is astonished that there has been no word from Major General Arthur St. Clair.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Gouverneur Morris, [18 July 1777]
From: Morris, Gouverneur
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[Saratoga, New York, July 18, 1777. On July 22, 1777, Hamilton wrote to Morris: “Your favour of the 18th ⟨from Saratoga reached me⟩ yesterday.” Letter not found.]


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood, 18 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Smallwood, William

Smiths Clove [New York] July 18, 1777. Requests Smallwood to join Army at Headquarters.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, 22 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Morris, Gouverneur

⟨Smiths Clove, New York, July 22, 1777⟩
Dear Sir,
Your favour of the 18th ⟨from Saratoga reached me⟩ yesterday. Your pronouncing Fort Edward among the other forts indefensible surprises me a little, as it is intirely contrary to the representations of several Gentlemen of judgment, who have had an opportunity of seeing and considering its situation, by whom we have been taught to believe, that it would be an excellent post, at least ⟨for⟩ checking and retarding Burgoigne’s progress. I agree with you ⟨that⟩ our principal strength in the quarter you are will be in the ⟨forests and⟩ natural strength of the Country, and in the want of forage, ⟨provisions,⟩ carriages &c. in which the enemy may easily be thrown by ⟨taking⟩ away what there are of those articles; which you observe have ⟨never⟩ been in great abundance.
I am doubtful whether Burgoigne will attempt to penetrate far, and whether he will not content himself with harassing our back settlements by parties assisted by the savages, who, it is to be feared will pretty generally, tempted by the enemy’s late successes, confederate in hostilities against us. This doubt arises from some appearances that indicate a Southern movement of General Howes army, which, if it should really happen, will certainly be a barrier against any further impressions of Burgoigne; for it cannot be supposed he would be rash enough to plunge into the bosom of the Country, without an expectation of being met by General Howe. Things must prove very adverse to us indeed, should he make such an attempt, and not be ruined by it. I confess however that the appearances I allude to do not carry a full evidence in my mind; because they are opposed by others of a contradictory kind; and because I cannot conceive upon what principle of common sense or military propriety Howe can be running away from Burgoigne to the Southward. It is much to be wished he may, even though it should give him ⟨the possession of Phila⟩delphia, which by our remoteness from it may very ⟨well happen. For⟩ in this case, we may not only if we think proper retali⟨ate by aiming a st⟩roke at New York; but we may come upon him with ⟨the greatest part of⟩ our collective force, to act against that part which is ⟨under him. We⟩ shall then be certain that Burgoigne cannot proceed, ⟨and that a small forc⟩e of Continental troops will be sufficient for that ⟨partizan War which⟩ he must carry on the rest of the Campaign. A small force will also be sufficient to garrison the fort in the highlands, and prevent any danger there; so that we shall be able to bring nearly the whole of the Continental army against Mr. Howe. The advantages of this are obvious. Should he be satisfied with the splendor of his acquisition and shut himself up in Philadelphia, we can ruin him by confinement. Should he leave a Garrison there and go forward, we can either fall upon that or his main body diminished as it will be by such a measure with our whole force. There will however be many disagreeable consequences attending such an event; amongst which the foremost ⟨is⟩ the depreciation of our currency; which from the importance in which Philadelphia is held, could not fail to ensue.
I am Dear Sir   Your most Obedient servant
Alex Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 22 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Smiths Clove [New York] July 22, 1777. Asks for accurate report of British movements on Long Island Sound. Requests information on posts around Kings Bridge and Fort Washington.


Title: George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, 22 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Schuyler, Philip

Smiths Clove [New York] July 22, 1777. Is sending Brigadier General John Glover’s brigade to reinforce Schuyler.


Title: George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, 24 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Schuyler, Philip

Ramapo [New Jersey] July 24, 1777. Is disappointed in number of militia sent to Schuyler. Regrets inability to send Schuyler more Continental troops, but believes Schuyler will be aided by eastern states. Discusses strength of enemy. Is sending Major General Benjamin Lincoln to aid Schuyler and to command militia. Approves of stationing men about the New Hampshire Grants. Suggests putting Major General Benedict Arnold in charge of Fort Schuyler.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Elisha Sheldon, 24 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Sheldon, Elisha

Ramapo [New Jersey] July 24, 1777. Orders Sheldon to Headquarters.


Title: To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 25 July 1777
From: Livingston, Robert R.
To: Hamilton, Alexander

[July 25, 1777. On July 29, 1777, Hamilton wrote to Livingston: “I have the pleasure of your favour of the 25th.” Letter not found.]


Title: George Washington to William Franklin, 25 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Franklin, William

Ramapo [New Jersey] July 25, 1777. Expresses sympathy with Franklin’s request to see sick wife. Regrets that commanding general cannot supersede a congressional resolution, but has forwarded Franklin’s letter to Congress.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 25 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Ramapo [New Jersey] July 25, 1777. Introduces Monsieur D’Avout.


Title: George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, 25 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Putnam, Israel

Pompton Plains [New Jersey] July 25, 1777. Reports that Philadelphia is probable destination of enemy fleet. Orders Putnam to replace part of Continental troops at Peekskill with New York and Connecticut militia.


Title: George Washington to Colonel Theodorick Bland, 26 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Bland, Theodorick

Mr. Lott’s [East of Morristown, New Jersey] July 26, 1777. Orders Bland to halt at Bristol, Pennsylvania, or Trenton and then proceed to Philadelphia if enemy is in Delaware Bay.


Title: George Washington to Major General William Heath, 27 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Heath, William

Morristown [New Jersey] July 27, 1777. Disapproves of requisition of arms for proposed St. Johns expedition. Approves of Heath’s methods of dealing with deserters. Requests Heath not to send French volunteers to Headquarters, as their pretensions to office are “embarrassing.” Reports that British fleet’s destination is probably Philadelphia. Orders Continental troops sent to the Northern Department. States that fall of Ticonderoga could not have happened if the eastern states had complied with requests for troops.


Title: George Washington to Robert Erskine, 28 July 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Erskine, Robert

Flemington [New Jersey] July 28, 1777. Offers Erskine position of geographer with the Army.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert R. Livingston, 29 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Robert R.

Head Quarters Coryells ferry [New Jersey]July 29th 1777
Dear Sir,
I have the pleasure of your favour of the 25th. I cannot be induced to think the enemy are so numerous as you apprehend, and would place no dependence on what is said either by deserters or prisoners, further than as it respects their own company, nor even that with regard to prisoners in general who commonly have their cue, as the phrase is, and know very well how to manufacture stories calculated to serve the purposes of the side they belong to. If we may judge at all from the state of the British and foreign regiments in Howes army, or the proportion of recruits they have had this year, we cannot but believe the representations you mention greatly exaggerated. Though the Northern army have not suffered much by action, they have probably suffered more by sickness than the Southern; for many accounts agree that they have been very sickly and particularly that there was a great mortality among them while lying at the Isle of Noix. From the estimate of the first prisoner, they must have been greatly reduced by some means or other, for it appears that before his company had been augmented by the 24 foreigners, it was only 26 strong; and it is very improbable it should have had so large an augmentation, for I am morally certain the regiments under Howe have not had fifty men each as recruits, and I see no reason to suppose Burgoignes could have had so much better luck. Eight companies at 26 men each amount to 208. Suppose each regiment to have received 100 recruits, which by every rule of comparison must be more than the truth. This brings a regiment to about 300 men. Ten regiments at 300 each amount to 3000, the number of British troops in Canada.

Again, if I am not mistaken, 4000 was the allotment of foreign troops for the Northern department. As the sickness spoken of fell chiefly upon them, they in all probability lost more in that way than they have gained in recruits. But even if this were not the case, they cannot exceed the original number, 4000 added to 3000 make 7000. Besides these there are the Grenadiers and light infantry. Of these there cannot be above eighteen companies each—which allowing them to contain every one [1]00 men amount to 1800—and this brings them to about 8.800 men in their whole force of British and foreign troops. Of these at least one sixth must be unfit for duty, by every calculation, which reduces the number of men fit for the field to about seven thousand five hundred. Part of these must be left in Canada, if it were for no other purpose than to guard their magazines, and for other duty of that kind. Nor could they with safety commit the charge of those things to the Canadians, many of whom are notoriously disaffected, and would be very likely to destroy instead of preserve them. From this view which I verily believe is too favorable to them, they cannot bring more than between six and seven thousand British & foreign troops to act out of Canada.
Out of these six or seven thousand, a considerable part must be left to Garrison Ticonderoga and secure their rear in case of accidents; for they could not without madness attempt to advance, and leave the posts behind them in a defenceless state. And they may be obliged to increase their attention to this matter by keeping a body of men somewhere about the grants which has been recommended. When this last deduction is made Burgoigne cannot advance with more than between five and six thousand men, to suppose him to act with his whole collective force; except Canadians and Indians who are not by any accounts numerous.
Let us now take a view of our own force. When Glovers Brigade gets up, and the recruits for the regiments there, now on their march, arrive, General Schuyler will have about five thousand Continental troops. Surely the Eastern states cannot sleep so soundly, when the danger is so imminent, but that they will reinforce him with 8 or 10000 militia. If this happens and He cannot stop General Burgoigne progress it must proceed from other causes than the want of men. With about the same army last year, General Washington kept Howe with 16. or 17000 men at bay.
Perhaps it may be said there will not be time to collect this force as the enemy are advancing with very great rapidity. I am much mistaken if there will not be abundant time. The nature of the ground, the difficulty of transporting the immense quantity of baggage provisions &c. necessary to accompany an army of 5000 men penetrating an enemys country, the want of waggons for the purpose, the impediments thrown in their way by cutting up the roads—all these obstacles will retard their march much more than is at first sight imagined; and will give full time to prepare them a good reception.
On the whole I am clearly of opinion, that unless Howe cooperates with Burgoigne against your state it has very little to fear; and I even doubt, if he goes to the Southward, whether Burgoigne will attempt to penetrate far. At present there is every appearance of a Southern expedition. Seventy Sail of the enemys fleet have been seen passing by little egg harbour making short tacks towards the capes of Philadelphia. Three divisions of the army are arrived here and at Howels ferry 4 miles up. One is coming on by way of Princeton &c. Another coming after us by way of Morris Town. I wish this last to halt there. Two Brigades more have been ordered to cross the North River and wait further orders. We shall not however pass the Delaware ’till we hear of the arrival of the enemy in the capes of Philadelphia. Nor will those two Brigades be ordered on ’till the same event takes place. We shall act the most cautious part possible in our circumstances.
I communicated your letter to the General. He agrees with me, in point of the enemy’s numbers. With respect to animating the Eastern states, he has written the most urgent letters to their several assemblies, which I am in hopes will answer the end you propose from sending persons to each of them.
It were to be wished your forts and ships were well supplied with Cannon; but it is wholly out of the General’s line to strip the ships to the Eastward of their cannon for that purpose. If your Convention were to make application to the Congress or board of war it might succeed; but I should have very little hope of it.
I am with great esteem   Dr Sir   Your most Obedt
Alexr. Hamilton


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Major General Israel Putnam, 30 July 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Putnam, Israel

Head Quarters Coryel[l]s ferry [New Jersey]July 30th. 1777.
Sir,
His Excellency commands me to acknowlege the receipt of yours of the 27th instant.
The circumstance of the fleet appearing off, opposite to Blue Point does not indicate any movement to the Eastward. It was necessary in going out of the Hook, whatever course they might intend to steer, whether to the Southward or Eastward, to stand out in that direction for some time, as they went out with a Westerly wind. If however you hear any thing more of them, you will give His Excellency the earliest notice of it.
General Clinton informs His Excellency, that he is called to attend at Kingston and take the oath of office conformable to his appointment as Governor of the State of New York. It is to be regretted that so useful an officer is obliged to leave the posts under his superintendency at a time like this. The General is at a loss how to supply his place properly, without doing an injury to some other post, where the presence of the person fit to succeed General Clinton would be equally wanted. But as some person must be found to succeed him, He desires me to mention to you General James Clinton, who is, in his present situation, in a manner lost to the service. This Gentleman, having been formerly stationed at those posts, is to be supposed well acquainted with them; and he has the character of being a brave man, but it is to be apprehended he may want activity which will be a very essential quality. To remedy this defect I am to suggest the stationing Col: Malcolm ⟨——————————⟩. The General does not mean to direct absolutely in this matter. He only means to suggest for your consideration and that of the other General officers with you, whom he wishes you to consult, on what is best to be done, and leaves it to your option either to send General James Clinton, or any person who may be deemed fitter for the purpose, and can be spared from where he may now be, to take the command in place of General George Clinton. If Col: Malcolm is ordered from the Clove, it will be requisite to send some other person, with a proportionable number of men to supply his place.
General Clinton also informs that the time of service for which the Militia at the posts under him are engaged expires tomorrow; and that there will then be only Col DuBois regiment and Col: Meig’s detachment remaining. The General wishes you to attend particulary to this matter as it will by no means be prudent to leave those posts in so weak a state.
General Sullivan has been ordered to halt wherever the letter which was sent off last night for the purpose should find him. I imagine this will be at Morris Town or in the neighbourhood of it. He is directed to march off immediately to you on your giving him notice of any number of the enemy’s fleet appearing in the North River. The rest of the troops are all halted on the Jersy side of the Delaware ’till further intelligence.
I am with much respect   Dr Sir   Yr. most Obed servant
AH   ADC


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Hugh Knox, [July 1777]
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Knox, Hugh

[July 1–28, 1777]
… have fallen into the enemy’s hands. This event redounds very little to our credit; for if the post was untenable, or required a larger number of troops to defend it than could be spared for the purpose, it ought long ago to have been foreseen, and given up. Instead of that we have kept a large quantity of cannon in it and have been heaping up very valuable magazines of stores and provisions, that in the critical moment of defence are abandoned and lost. This affair will be attended with several evil consequences, for besides the loss of our stores, which we cannot well afford, it opens a new and easy door by which to penetrate the Northern states; it wi⟨ll⟩ fix the hitherto fluctuating disposition of the indians in that quarter, in their favour and expose the frontiers of the adjacent country to their depredations. But though it is a misfortun⟨e⟩ we have reason to lament, I dare say it will be regarded with you as much more important than it really is, and as materially endangering the success of our cause, which is by no means the case. Our opposition is at this time too well matured and has too great statibility, to be shaken by an accident of that kind. While we have a respectable army in the field and resour⟨ces⟩ to feed, cloath and arm them, we are safe. We have had a force sufficient the foregoing part of this Campaign to maintain such a superiority over the main army of the enemy as effectually to hinder them from effecting any of their purposes. And to the Northward with the reinforcements sent up to succour the retreating Garrison of Ticonderoga, and the militia flocking in from New England, I think there is little doubt, we have by this time a force adequate to the giving Mr. Burgoigne a seasonable check. One good effect will result from the misfortune which is, that it will stimulate the Eastern states to greater exertion than they might otherwise make. By our last advices, the enemy were in possession of all the country between Ticonderoga and Fort George; and our army nearly equal in number to them were about to take post somewhere between Fort Edward and Saratoga.
The consequences of this Northern affair will depend much upon the part that Howe acts. If he were to cooperate with Burgoigne, it would demand our utmost efforts to counteract them. But if he should go towards the Southward all or most of the advantages of Burgoignes success will be lost. He will either be obliged to content himself with the possession of Ticonderoga and the dependent fortresses, and with carrying on a partizan war the rest of the Campaign, or he must precipitate himself into certain ruin, by attempting to advance in the country with a very incompetent force. Appearances lead us to suppose that Howe is fool enough to meditate a southern expedition, for he has now altered his station at Staten Island mentioned above and has fallen down to the Hook. Judging it morally certain, that there would be a cooperation of the two armies, we thought it expedient to march Northerly, and had accordingly reached within fourteen miles distance from New Windsor, the place where we could cross the North River, without danger of interruption. But this new movement of the enemy’s fleet has induced us to return a few miles, and make a disposition for marching Southerly. We shall however be cautious how we proceed in that course, lest nothing more than a feint is intended, to divert us from the real object. If they go to the Southward in earnest, they must have the capture of Philadelphia in view, for there is no other sufficient inducement. We shall endeavour to get there in time to oppose them, and shall have the principal part of the Continental force and a large body of spirited militia, many of them from their services during the last campaign pretty well inured to arms, to make the opposition with. Yet I would not have you to be much suprised if Philadelphia should fall; for the enemy will doubtless go there with a determination to succeed at all hazards, and we shall not be able to prevent them without risking a general action—the expediency of which will depend upon circumstances. If the militia turn out, with that zeal, we have a right to expect from their conduct, when the enemy made their last experiment in the Jerseys and were supposed to be going to Philadelphia we may do it without much inconvenience: But If they fall materially short of it, we shall be obliged to confine ourselves to a skirmishing opposition, which we cannot expect will be effectual. It may be asked, if to avoid a general action, we give up objects of the first importance, what is to hinder the enemy from carrying every important point and ruining us? My answer is that our hopes are not placed in any particular city or spot of ground, but in the preserving a good army furnished with proper necessaries, to take advantage of favourable opportunities and waste and defeat the enemy by piece-meal. Every new post they take requires a new division of their forces, and enables us to strike with our united force against a part of thei⟨rs⟩ and such is their present situation that another Trentown aff⟨air⟩ will amount to a complete victory on our part, for they are at too low an ebb to bear another stroke of the kind. Perhaps before I may have an opportunity of sending this facts will unfold what I am now endeavouring to anticipate by conjecture.
You will expect some animadversions on the temper and views of the French-nation. I presume you are nearly as well acquainted with the assistance they are giving us as, I am; both by their intrigues in foreign courts and by supplies of every kind of war like stores and apparatus. It does not admit of a doubt that they are interested to wish us success, and their conduct plainly shows they are willing to give us every aid essential to our preservation. But it is natural they should desire to do it with as much convenience to themselves as they can; I apprehend they are not overfond of plunging themselves into a war with England, if they can avoid it and still answer the end, they have to persue; and indeed, from the evident reluctance show⟨n⟩ on the part of the latter to do any thing that may bring about such an event, it becomes extremely difficult to dra⟨w⟩ her into it. The conclusion we may make is—that France will not wish to force England into a war, unless she finds our affairs to require it absolutely, and England will not enter into one ’till she is compelled to do it.
My best respects to all friends and, I beg you will believe me to be with unabated regard   Dr Sir   Your most Obed servant
A Hamilton


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Preudhomme de Borre, 3 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Preudhomme de Borre, Philippe-Hubert, chevalier de

Philadelphia, August 3, 1777. Orders De Borre to remain at Bound Brook until enemy arrives at “the Hook” and then to proceed to Peekskill. Condemns De Borre’s execution of a Tory.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Francis Nash, 3 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Nash, Francis

City Tavern [Philadelphia] August 3, 1777. Orders Nash to hold troops and vessels in readiness.


Title: George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 4 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

[Philadelphia] August 4, 1777. Forwards Congress’ appointment of Gates to the command of Northern Department.


Title: George Washington to The New York Council of Safety, 4 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: New York Council of Safety

Philadelphia, August 4, 1777. Warns of danger of popular attitude toward fall of Ticonderoga and the advance of General John Burgoyne. Does not wish to aid Northern Department by weakening main Army. Laments lack of aid that has been given by the eastern states, but is assured that presence of Major General Benjamin Lincoln and Major General Benedict Arnold will induce a change. Advises that no help from the South is possible. Believes that information concerning size of Burgoyne’s troops has been exaggerated. Comments favorably on George Clinton’s election as governor of New York.


Title: George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 6 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

Camp near Germantown [Pennsylvania] August 6, 1777. Notifies Gates that De Malmady has been given permission to serve under Gates in Northern Department.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Robert R. Livingston, 7 August 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Livingston, Robert R.

Head Quarters Camp nearGerman Town [Pennsylvania] 7 Augt 1777
Dear Sir
I last Evening had the pleasure of your favour of the 2d. I am with you exceeding anxious for the Safety of your State, though the Numbers of the Enemy have very little part in producing the anxiety; the panic in the army (I am afraid pretty high up) and the want of zeal in the Eastern States are the only alarming Considerations, for tho Burgoine should be weak in numbers as I suppose him, if the army Tumble at his name, & those who Command it ready to fly from the most defencible Ground at the Terror of small Scouting Parties of Indians, and, if to Crown the Whole the Eastern States go to Sleep & leave New York dismembered & Exhausted, as it is, to play the whole Game against a Skilfull & Enterprising Antagonist; I say if that is to be the Case, we can look for nothing but Misfortune upon Misfortune, & Conquest without a blow. I have been always a very partial Judge of General Schuylers Conduct, and Vindicated it frequently from the Charges brought against it, but I am at last forced to suppose him Inadequate to the Important Command with which he has been Intrusted. There seems to be a want of firmness in all his Actions, and this last Instance in my Opinion is too unequivocal to be doubted. The Reason assigned for his last retreat is the panic among the army, which he seems to say is beyond any thing that ever was known, and Mentions an Instance of 300 Men running away from about 50 Indians. Last Campaign while our Affairs in this department were at the Lowest ebb and the Continet almost in a State of dispair, I never saw any thing like a general panic among the Troops. They appeared in the worst of times as resolute & spirited as in the best. What could be the Reason of this but that their Commanders always set them the example by putting on the face of Fortitude and Resolution amidst all the Causes of Dejection, they experienced; and what can be the Reason that the Contrary is the Case with respect to the Northern Army at this time but that their Commanders observes different Conduct. Soldiers Commonly look up to those that Command them & take their Complection from their Armies. Under the best, Leaders may be seized with a sudden panic that may precipitate them into the most cowardly behaviour for the Moment, but a settled durable panic is generally a Reflection upon the Leader.
What I have here said is of Course of Confidence, but you will have heard before this Reaches you that the Congress have recalled Generals Schuyler & Sinclair, & given the Command to Gates, how far this will be a remedy I will not determine, but I am afraid General Gates is hardly the Man. I wish among other things he had never rendered himself Odious to your State by taking the part tis said he did with the people of the Grants, but his appointment to this Command could not be avoided. It behoves you my Dear Sir & every other Gentleman of Influence in the State to do every thing that can be done to remove the prejudices of the people, and prevent their opperating against their own Safety. In a Conversation I lately had with Mr. Jay he mentioned sending Governor Clinton with all the New York Malitia of the upper part of your State to assist in opposing Mr. Burgoine. I wish you may do this of all things. Genl Clinton is an excellent officer, the people have Confidence in him, will once act with zeal and Serve with Spirit & perseverance under him; his being wanted in the Civil line should be no Objection. It imports you more to take measures for preserving your State than for Governing what you may not long have to Govern. Governor Clinton I am persuaded can render you the most Essential Services in the way purposed. It is now better than a Week since Mr Howe has disappeared from the Capes; there are many Conjectures where he is gone but none Satisfactory; that he did not Steer for the North River seems pretty certain, from his not yet having appeared that Way, & his having had the fairest Winds to Carry him there. That he is not hovering about the Capes, with Intention to Return is pretty Evident because no Reason can be assigned why he should do it so long, Especially as there must be some Risk and Inconvenience in Coasting it with so large a Fleet. There is no object it is thought further to the Southward. And therefore it is concluded they are gone far to the Eastward—some think to Rhode Island, & thence to Boston; others immediately thither & others to portsmouth—for my own part I am weary of Conjecture. We are however bending Eastward; our heavy Baggage Marches to day towards Coryel[l]s. The Army probably Marches to morrow. If Burgoine presses on as fast as some people seems disposed to let him, he will become the first and greatest object to this Army. I cannot conclude without saying some thing about the Enemys numbers. I still think you over rate them. Were we to count How’s force by the same rate you do Burgoines, we should soon make him Irestable on Similar Evidence; he cannot have less than 20,000 Effective Men, but we know he has not many more than half the number; we compare & compound every circumstance, use different kinds of Calculations, & from the whole deduct a pretty acurate & certain Judgment. His prisoners tell us the same tales & concur in them as well, but this has no weight with us because we know that great care is taken by the British Officers to give the Men their Lesson & the Dogs are accute enough to profit by it. The Voluntary Examination you speak of has very little Credit with me. I suspect his desiring to become a Subject of the State is all a pretence to be rid of an Irksome Confinement & get a favourable opportunity to Escape.
You say I am mistaken about the number of Foreigners destined last Campaign for the Northern department which you have been well informed were 6000 instead of 4000; but is it not a fact too well known to be doubted that all the German Troops (except the Brunswickers) came to Genl Howe, and is it not equally certain that there were only 4000 & odd of those people Contracted for. I was never more mistaken in my Life than I am now, if that was not the Case. I agree with you that there is no greater Error than that of undervaluing an Enemy, but with one Exception, which is that of over valueing them. Indeed my Dear Sir I am afraid an Extravagant Idea of their power and numbers in our General officers whose Business it is to oppose them, is of Infinite detriment to our Affairs. But be assured that the Contrary has no ill effect with us, for we plainly see & have long seen that whether the Enemys force be great or Small it too well answers their purpose, & calls for every thing we can do to give it a check, but our means are not equal to our Wishes.
I am Dear Sir with great Esteem and Regard Your most obedient Servant
A Hamilton.


Title: Release of Officer from German Battalion, 7 August 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To:

Camp Near German Town [Pennsylvania] August 7, 1777. Certifies that “Monsieur Bernard Pally De Couseau, Ensign in the German Batalion, is by his own request permitted to leave said batalion.”


Title: George Washington to Major General Horatio Gates, 7 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Gates, Horatio

Camp near Germantown [Pennsylvania] August 7, 1777. Notifies Gates that Du Bouchet has been given permission to serve under Gates in the Northern Department.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 12 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Camp at Cross Roads [Pennsylvania] August 12, 1777. Has instructed Brigadier General Silas Newcomb to maintain New Jersey militia at Woodbury. Asks if Major General Tronson du Coudray may call on Newcomb for aid.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 15 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Camp at Cross Roads [Pennsylvania] August 15, 1777. Suggests plan of defence for Fort Island based on Major General Tronson du Coudray’s maps.


Title: George Washington to Benjamin Franklin, 17 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Franklin, Benjamin

[Camp at Cross Roads, Pennsylvania] August 17, 1777. Acknowledges receipt of Turgot’s recommendation for a French volunteer. Discusses difficulty of placing French officers and advises Franklin to discourage potential candidates in France.


Title: George Washington to Baron de Holtzendorff, 18 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Holtzendorff, Louis-Casimir, baron de

Camp at the Cross Roads [Pennsylvania] August 18, 1777. Acknowledges receipt of the Baron’s “plan of a military work.” Encloses letter to Major General Nathanael Greene stating that the Baron is to be attached as a lieutenant colonel to Greene’s division.


Title: George Washington to Brigadier General Preudhomme de Borre, 19 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Preudhomme de Borre, Philippe-Hubert, chevalier de

Camp at Cross Roads [Pennsylvania] August 19, 1777. Abides by Brigadier General de Borre’s preference of an American as brigade major and recommends Captain Matthew McConnell of Colonel Moses Hazen’s regiment.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 22 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Camp at Cross Roads [Pennsylvania] August 22, 1777. Acknowledges receipt of news that enemy is in Chesapeake Bay. Informs Hancock of orders given to Colonel Thomas Proctor, Brigadier General Francis Nash, Major General John Sullivan, and the Army at Headquarters. Approves of removal of stores from Lancaster and York.


Title: George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 27 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Sullivan, John

Wilmington [Delaware] August 27, 1777. Discusses failure of Staten Island expedition. Advises Sullivan to spare health of men on march to Headquarters.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 28 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Wilmington [Delaware] August 28, 1777. Recommends Count Casimir Pulaski to command cavalry.


Title: George Washington to John Hancock, 29 August 1777
From: Washington, George
To: Hancock, John

Wilmington [Delaware] August 29, 1777. Discusses movements of enemy. Asks Hancock to send commissions for Brigadier Generals John Glover, Enoch Poor, and John Paterson.


Title: From Alexander Hamilton to Colonel Timothy Pickering, 29 August 1777
From: Hamilton, Alexander
To: Pickering, Timothy

Wilmington [Delaware] August 29, 1777. Sends extract from General Orders of June 18, 1777, stating that “Timothy Pickering Esquire is appointed Adjutant General in the Armies of the United States of America.”